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dc.contributor.authorBall, Derek Nelson
dc.date.accessioned2017-02-28T17:30:11Z
dc.date.available2017-02-28T17:30:11Z
dc.date.issued2016-11-17
dc.identifier.citationBall , D N 2016 , ' No help on the hard problem ' , Animal Sentience , vol. 2016 , no. 11 , pp. 1-3 .en
dc.identifier.issn2377-7478
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 247730357
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: d21ca13c-4a5d-4d2e-b213-efc8a91b618e
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 84952946227
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0002-7229-3282/work/66398260
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/10380
dc.description.abstractThe hard problem of consciousness is to explain why certain physical states are conscious: why do they feel the way they do, rather than some other way or no way at all? Arthur Reber (2016) claims to solve the hard problem. But he does not: even if we grant that amoebae are conscious, we can ask why such organisms feel the way they do, and Reber’s theory provides no answer. Still, Reber’s theory may be methodologically useful: we do not yet have a satisfactory theory of consciousness, but perhaps the study of simple minds is a way to go about finding one.
dc.format.extent3
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofAnimal Sentienceen
dc.rightsCopyright 2017 the author/publisher. This is an open access article published under a CC BY-NC licence.en
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subjectBJ Ethicsen
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.subject.lccBJen
dc.titleNo help on the hard problemen
dc.typeJournal itemen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.Philosophyen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemologyen
dc.description.statusNon peer revieweden
dc.identifier.urlhttp://animalstudiesrepository.org/animsent/vol1/iss11/8/en


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