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dc.contributor.authorRutledge, Jonathan
dc.identifier.citationRutledge , J 2017 , ' Commonsense, skeptical theism, and different sorts of closure of inquiry defeat ' , Faith and Philosophy , vol. 34 , no. 1 , pp. 17-32 .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 248986146
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 4c1966c6-8d0c-4642-ab9b-2b5d4684a2c7
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85014452163
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0002-9521-8031/work/54516638
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000401420000002
dc.description.abstractTrent Dougherty argues (contra Jonathan Matheson) that when taking into consideration the probabilities involving skeptical theism (ST) and gratuitous evils, an agent may reasonably affirm both ST and that gratuitous evils exist. In other words, Dougherty thinks that assigning a greater than .5 probability to ST is insufficient to defeat the commonsense problem of evil. I argue that Dougherty’s response assumes, incorrectly, that ST functions solely as an evidential defeater, and that, when understood as a closure of inquiry defeater, ST may still defeat reasonable belief in gratuitous evils, even in the face of strong evidence that gratuitous evils exist.
dc.relation.ispartofFaith and Philosophyen
dc.rightsCopyright © 2016, Publisher / the Author. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.titleCommonsense, skeptical theism, and different sorts of closure of inquiry defeaten
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. School of Divinityen
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden

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