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dc.contributor.authorSchaab, Janis David
dc.identifier.citationSchaab , J D 2018 , ' Why it is disrespectful to violate rights : contractualism and the Kind-Desire Theory ' Philosophical Studies , vol. 175 , no. 1 , pp. 97-116 .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 248713274
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: a16853da-20b8-4f0a-87a9-38732e9a3e65
dc.identifier.othercrossref: 10.1007/s11098-017-0857-x
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85008465470
dc.descriptionThis work was developed with the financial support of the German Academic Exchange Service and the St Andrews/Stirling Philosophy Graduate Programme.en
dc.description.abstractThe most prominent theories of rights, the Will Theory and the Interest Theory, notoriously fail to accommodate all and only rights-attributions that make sense to ordinary speakers. The Kind-Desire Theory, Leif Wenar’s recent contribution to the field, appears to fare better in this respect than any of its predecessors. The theory states that we attribute a right to an individual if she has a kind-based desire that a certain enforceable duty be fulfilled. A kind-based desire is a reason to want something which one has simply in virtue of being a member of a certain kind. Rowan Cruft objects that this theory creates a puzzle about the relation between rights and respect. In particular, if rights are not grounded in aspects of the particular individuals whose rights they are (e.g., their well-being), how can we sustain the intuitive notion that to violate a right is to disrespect the right-holder? I present a contractualist account of respect which reconciles the Kind-Desire Theory with the intuition that rights-violations are disrespectful. On this account, respect for a person is a matter of acknowledging her legitimate authority to make demands on the will and conduct of others. And I argue that kind-based desires authorize a person to make demands even if they do not correspond to that person’s well-being or other non-relational features.en
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophical Studiesen
dc.rightsCopyright The Author 2017. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.en
dc.subjectKind-Desire Theoryen
dc.subjectSecond-person standpointen
dc.subjectBC Logicen
dc.titleWhy it is disrespectful to violate rights : contractualism and the Kind-Desire Theoryen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden

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