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dc.contributor.authorSchaab, Janis David
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-09T10:30:16Z
dc.date.available2017-01-09T10:30:16Z
dc.date.issued2018-01
dc.identifier.citationSchaab , J D 2018 , ' Why it is disrespectful to violate rights : contractualism and the Kind-Desire Theory ' Philosophical Studies , vol. 175 , no. 1 , pp. 97-116 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0857-xen
dc.identifier.issn0031-8116
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 248713274
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: a16853da-20b8-4f0a-87a9-38732e9a3e65
dc.identifier.othercrossref: 10.1007/s11098-017-0857-x
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85008465470
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/10068
dc.descriptionThis work was developed with the financial support of the German Academic Exchange Service and the St Andrews/Stirling Philosophy Graduate Programme.en
dc.description.abstractThe most prominent theories of rights, the Will Theory and the Interest Theory, notoriously fail to accommodate all and only rights-attributions that make sense to ordinary speakers. The Kind-Desire Theory, Leif Wenar’s recent contribution to the field, appears to fare better in this respect than any of its predecessors. The theory states that we attribute a right to an individual if she has a kind-based desire that a certain enforceable duty be fulfilled. A kind-based desire is a reason to want something which one has simply in virtue of being a member of a certain kind. Rowan Cruft objects that this theory creates a puzzle about the relation between rights and respect. In particular, if rights are not grounded in aspects of the particular individuals whose rights they are (e.g., their well-being), how can we sustain the intuitive notion that to violate a right is to disrespect the right-holder? I present a contractualist account of respect which reconciles the Kind-Desire Theory with the intuition that rights-violations are disrespectful. On this account, respect for a person is a matter of acknowledging her legitimate authority to make demands on the will and conduct of others. And I argue that kind-based desires authorize a person to make demands even if they do not correspond to that person’s well-being or other non-relational features.en
dc.format.extent20en
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophical Studiesen
dc.rightsCopyright The Author 2017. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.en
dc.subjectContractualismen
dc.subjectRightsen
dc.subjectKind-Desire Theoryen
dc.subjectRespecten
dc.subjectDignityen
dc.subjectSecond-person standpointen
dc.subjectBC Logicen
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subject.lccBCen
dc.titleWhy it is disrespectful to violate rights : contractualism and the Kind-Desire Theoryen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0857-x
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden


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