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dc.contributor.advisorWilliams, Andrew J.
dc.contributor.authorTodd, Maurice L.
dc.coverage.spatialxiii, 274 p.en_US
dc.description.abstractThis study explores the foundations of US counterinsurgency policy and doctrine in order to better understand the main historical influences on that policy and doctrine and how those influences have informed the current US approach to counterinsurgency. The results of this study indicate the US experience in counterinsurgency during the Greek Civil War and the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines had a significant influence on the development of US counterinsurgency policy and doctrine following World War II through the Kennedy presidency. In addition, despite a major diversion from the lessons of Greece and the Philippines during the Vietnam War, the lessons were re-institutionalized in US counterinsurgency policy and doctrine following the war and continue to have significant influence today, though in a highly sanitized and, therefore, misleading form. As a result, a major disconnect has developed between the “rhetoric and reality” of US counterinsurgency policy. This disconnect has resulted from the fact that many references that provide a more complete and accurate picture of the actual policies and actions taken to successfully defeat the insurgencies have remained out of the reach of non-government researchers and the general public. Accordingly, many subsequent studies of counterinsurgency overlook, or only provide a cursory treatment of, aspects that may have had a critical impact on the success of past US counterinsurgency operations. One such aspect is the role of US direct intervention in the internal affairs of a supported country. Another is the role of covert action operations in support of counterinsurgency operations. As a result, the counterinsurgency policies and doctrines that have been developed over the years are largely based on false assumptions, a flawed understanding of the facts, and a misunderstanding of the contexts concerning the cases because of misleading, or at least seriously incomplete, portrayals of the counterinsurgency operations.en_US
dc.publisherUniversity of St Andrews
dc.subjectGreek Civil Waren_US
dc.subjectHuk Rebellionen_US
dc.subjectTruman Doctrineen_US
dc.subjectCold Waren_US
dc.subjectUS foreign policyen_US
dc.subjectMilitary assistanceen_US
dc.subjectNation buildingen_US
dc.subjectMarshall Planen_US
dc.subjectCovert actionen_US
dc.subjectCentral Intelligence Agencyen_US
dc.subjectOffice of Policy Coordinationen_US
dc.subjectEdward Lansdaleen_US
dc.subjectRamon Magsaysayen_US
dc.subjectOffice of Strategic Servicesen_US
dc.subjectCivic actionen_US
dc.subjectPsychological warfareen_US
dc.subjectUS Armyen_US
dc.subjectCase studyen_US
dc.subjectProcess tracingen_US
dc.subjectStrategic influence operationsen_US
dc.subjectNational securityen_US
dc.subjectUS counterinsurgency policyen_US
dc.subjectUS counterinsurgency doctrineen_US
dc.subject.lcshCounterinsurgency--Government policy--United Statesen_US
dc.subject.lcshCounterinsurgency--Case studiesen_US
dc.subject.lcshUnited States--Military policyen_US
dc.subject.lcshGreece--History--Civil War, 1944-1949en_US
dc.titleRhetoric or reality : US counterinsurgency policy reconsidereden_US
dc.type.qualificationnamePhD Doctor of Philosophyen_US
dc.publisher.institutionThe University of St Andrewsen_US
dc.rights.embargoreasonThesis restricted in accordance with University regulations. Electronic copy restricted until 1st April 2025en_US

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