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dc.contributor.advisorWilson, Tim
dc.contributor.authorBassuener, Kurt
dc.coverage.spatial291en_US
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T09:32:03Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T09:32:03Z
dc.date.issued2021-06-29
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/30221
dc.description.abstractInternational actors seeking to end violent conflicts often broker consociational power- sharing agreements to bring peace and manage conflict. The Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995) and the Ohrid Framework Agreement in North Macedonia (2001) offer two such examples. While these post-Yugoslav divided societies and the deals which ended their armed conflicts differ, both suffer from protracted malgovernance, characterized by low perceived political accountability and largely static political elites. The inducements of EU and NATO membership have done little to nothing to affect their internal political and social dynamics. This dissertation, a comparative study of the trajectories of these two countries under their respective power-sharing deals, demonstrates why this is so – and how these dynamics might be favorably altered. I begin by explaining my empirical methodology, relying on deep on-the-ground engagement in both countries. I then review the relevant literature on consociational power-sharing, as well as on the two states. I proceed with the case studies of Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia, demonstrating the political and social dynamics at play. The following chapter compares them, noting the differences in the societies and mechanics of the power-sharing deals (including the external brokers’ postures), but concluding that they have developed a similar political dynamic which has persisted due to the power- sharing deal’s incentive structure. The political elites in both countries constitute peace cartels - assemblies of political, administrative, economic, criminal, and media power which pursue for-profit politics and avoid democratic or legal accountability. The conclusion details peace cartels’ reliance on fear and patronage to maintain popular acquiescence, as well as their leveraging fear to extract patronage from the external actors who midwifed them – for fear of a renewed conflict which is always implied. It finishes with mapping paths out of the peace cartel’s stasis toward popular accountable democratic governance.en_US
dc.description.sponsorship"Pursuing this PhD would not have been possible without the financial support provided by the US-UK Fulbright Commission's St. Andrews Award."--Acknowledgementsen
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.subject.lccDR1318.B2
dc.subject.lcshPeace-building--Former Yugoslav republicsen
dc.subject.lcshFormer Yugoslav republics--Politics and governmenten
dc.subject.lcshBosnia and Herzegovina--Politics and government--1992-en
dc.subject.lcshNorth Macedonia--Politics and government--1992-en
dc.titlePeace cartels : internationally brokered power-sharing and perpetual oligarchy in Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedoniaen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.sponsorUS-UK Fulbright Commissionen_US
dc.type.qualificationlevelDoctoralen_US
dc.type.qualificationnamePhD Doctor of Philosophyen_US
dc.publisher.institutionThe University of St Andrewsen_US
dc.rights.embargodate2026-01-14
dc.rights.embargoreasonThesis restricted in accordance with University regulations. Restricted until 14 January 2026en
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.17630/sta/1019


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