Show simple item record

Files in this item

Thumbnail

Item metadata

dc.contributor.authorCobham, David
dc.contributor.authorPapadopoulos, Athanasios
dc.contributor.authorZis, George
dc.contributor.editorUniversity of St Andrews. School of Economics and Finance
dc.coverage.spatial28 p.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-04-14T09:15:20Z
dc.date.available2009-04-14T09:15:20Z
dc.date.issued2001
dc.identifier.citationSchool of Economics and Finance discussion paper series ; 0114en
dc.identifier.issn0962-4031en
dc.identifier.urihttp://ideas.repec.org/p/san/wpecon/0114.htmlen
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/657
dc.descriptionPreviously in the University eprints HAIRST pilot service at http://eprints.st-andrews.ac.uk/archive/00000055/en
dc.descriptionRevised November 2001en
dc.description.abstractData from a unique monetary ‘experiment’ conducted in the UK during the period 1994-97 are used to investigate the cost of political intervention in monetary policy. The paper finds that the difference between government bond yields in Germany (but not the US) and the UK was systematically related to an index of the credibility of monetary policy constructed on the basis of the frequency of agreements/ disagreements between the Minister of Finance who took the decisions on interest rates and the Bank of England, whose recommendations were published with a lag, with disagreements causing an increase in the yield differential.en
dc.format.extent154831 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherSchool of Economics and Finance, University of St Andrews.en
dc.subjectmonetary policyen
dc.subjecttime-inconsistencyen
dc.subjectcredibilityen
dc.subject.lccHen
dc.subject.lccHJen
dc.titleThe cost of political intervention in monetary policyen
dc.typeWorking or discussion paperen
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.publicationstatusNot publisheden
dc.statusNon peer revieweden


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record