Our research strengths are in dynamic macroeconomics, choice theory, bounded rationality, game theory, expectations and learning, competition and innovation and climate change. We support two research centres - the Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis (CDMA) and the Centre for Research in Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm (CRIEFF), and we are also actively involved in the Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).

For more information please visit the School of Economics & Finance home page.

Recent Submissions

  • Monetary policy and financial stability in the long run : a simple game-theoretic approach 

    Cao, Jin; Chollete, Lorán (2017-02) - Journal article
    Many theoretical central bank models use short horizons and focus on a single tradeoff. However, in reality, central banks play complex, long-horizon games and face more than one tradeoff. We account for these strategic ...
  • Regulatory decision errors, legal uncertainty and welfare : a general treatment 

    Katsoualcos, Yannis; Ulph, David Tregear (2017-07) - Journal article
    We provide a general treatment of the implications for welfare of various sources of legal uncertainty facing agents about the decisions made by a regulatory authority. We distinguish the legal uncertainty from the decision ...
  • (Hemi)Continuity of additive preference preorders 

    Gerasimou, Georgios (2015-05) - Journal article
    It is shown that the two common notions of topological continuity for preference preorders, which require closed contour sets and a closed graph respectively, are equivalent even when completeness is not assumed, provided ...
  • Robust sequential search 

    Schlag, Karl; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy (University of St Andrews, 2017-12-04) - Working or discussion paper
    A searcher explores alternatives sequentially and is unaware of the distribution of values of unexplored alternatives. We are interested in decision rules that perform close to Bayesian optimal ones under any prior, at ...
  • Persuasion meets delegation 

    Kolotilin, Anton; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy (University of St Andrews, 2018-04-07) - Working or discussion paper
    There are two common ways for a principal to influence the decision making of an agent. One is to manipulate the agent's information (persuasion problem). Another is to limit the agent's decisions (delegation problem). We ...

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