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dc.contributor.authorBennett, Simon
dc.date.accessioned2014-10-29T16:38:12Z
dc.date.available2014-10-29T16:38:12Z
dc.date.issued2014-09-01
dc.identifier.citationBennett, S. (2014). The Central Intelligence Agency’s armed Remotely Piloted Vehicle-supported counter-insurgency campaign in Pakistan – a mission undermined by unintended consequences? Journal of Terrorism Research, 5(3), pp. 14-30.en_US
dc.identifier.issn2049-7040en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://ojs.st-andrews.ac.uk/index.php/jtr/article/view/943en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/5614
dc.description.abstractThis paper views America's 'drones-first' counter-insurgency effort in Pakistan through the lens of Merton's theory of the unintended consequences of purposive action. It also references Beck’s Risk Society thesis, America’s Revolution in Military Affairs doctrine, Toft’s theory of isomorphic learning, Langer’s theory of mindfulness, Highly Reliable Organisations theory and the social construction of technology (SCOT) argument. With reference to Merton’s theory, the CIA-directed armed Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) campaign has manifest functions, latent functions and latent dysfunctions. Measured against numbers of suspected insurgents killed, the campaign can be judged a success. Measured against the level of collateral damage or the state of US-Pakistan relations, the campaign can be judged a failure. Values determine the choice of metrics. Because RPV operations eliminate risk to American service personnel, and because this is popular with both US citizens and politicians, collateral damage (the killing of civilians) is not considered a policy-changing dysfunction. However, the latent dysfunctions of America's drones-first policy may be so great as to undermine that policy's intended manifest function – to make a net contribution to the War on Terror. In Vietnam the latent dysfunctions of Westmoreland’s attritional war undermined America’s policy of containment. Vietnam holds a lesson for the Obama administration.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherCentre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St Andrewsen_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Terrorism Researchen_US
dc.rightsThis is an open access article published in Journal of Terrorism Research. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/)en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
dc.subjectRPVen_US
dc.subjectWar on Terroren_US
dc.subjectCIAen_US
dc.subjectPakistanen_US
dc.subjectMertonen_US
dc.subjectDysfunctionsen_US
dc.subject.lccHV6431en_US
dc.subject.lcshTerrorismen_US
dc.titleThe Central Intelligence Agency’s armed Remotely Piloted Vehicle-supported counter-insurgency campaign in Pakistan – a mission undermined by unintended consequences?en_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen_US
dc.publicationstatusPublisheden_US
dc.statusPeer revieweden_US
dc.identifier.doihttp://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.943en


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This is an open access article published in Journal of Terrorism Research. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/)
Except where otherwise noted within the work, this item's license for re-use is described as This is an open access article published in Journal of Terrorism Research. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/)