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dc.contributor.advisorReid, Gavin C.
dc.contributor.authorSearle, Nicola C.
dc.coverage.spatial327en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-13T11:31:04Z
dc.date.available2010-12-13T11:31:04Z
dc.date.issued2010-11
dc.identifieruk.bl.ethos.552501 
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/1632
dc.description.abstractThis thesis reports on the economic analysis of trade secrets via data collected from prosecutions under the U.S. Economic Espionage Act (EEA.) Ratified in 1996, the EEA increases protection for trade secrets by criminalizing the theft of trade secrets. The empirical basis of the thesis is a unique database constructed using EEA prosecutions from 1996 to 2008. A critical and empirical analysis of these cases provides insight into the use of trade secrets. The increase in the criminal culpability of trade secret theft has important impacts on the use of trade secrets and the incentives for would-be thieves. A statistical analysis of the EEA data suggest that trade secrets are used primarily in manufacturing and construction. A cluster analysis suggests three broad categories of EEA cases based on the type of trade secret and the sector of the owner. A series of illustrative case studies demonstrates these clusters. A critical analysis of the damages valuations methods in trade secrets cases demonstrates the highly variable estimates of trade secrets. Given the criminal context of EEA cases, these valuation methods play an important role in sentencing and affect the incentives of the owners of trade secrets. The analysis of the lognormal distribution of the observed values is furthered by a statistical analysis of the EEA valuations, which suggests that the methods can result in very different estimates for the same trade secret. A regression analysis examines the determinants of trade secret intensity at the firm level. This econometric analysis suggests that trade secret intensity is negatively related to firm size. Collectively, this thesis presents an empirical analysis of trade secrets.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of St Andrews
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
dc.subjectEconomic Espionage Acten_US
dc.subjectEEAen_US
dc.subjectTrade secretsen_US
dc.subjectIntellectual propertyen_US
dc.subjectTrade secrecyen_US
dc.subjectCriminal lawen_US
dc.subjectTheften_US
dc.subjectDamagesen_US
dc.subject.lccHD38.7S4
dc.subject.lcshTrade secrets--United Statesen_US
dc.subject.lcshTrade secrets--Statisticsen_US
dc.subject.lcshIntellectual property--United Statesen_US
dc.subject.lcshUnited States. Economic Espionage Act of 1996en_US
dc.titleThe economics of trade secrets : evidence from the Economic Espionage Acten_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.sponsorCentre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm (CRIEFF)en_US
dc.contributor.sponsorHorowitz Foundation for Social Policyen_US
dc.contributor.sponsorRussell Trusten_US
dc.type.qualificationlevelDoctoralen_US
dc.type.qualificationnamePhD Doctor of Philosophyen_US
dc.publisher.institutionThe University of St Andrewsen_US


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Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported
Except where otherwise noted within the work, this item's license for re-use is described as Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported