Show simple item record

Files in this item

Thumbnail

Item metadata

dc.contributor.advisorEwald, Christian-Oliver
dc.contributor.authorWang, Wen-Kai
dc.coverage.spatial163en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-03T11:47:11Z
dc.date.available2010-06-03T11:47:11Z
dc.date.issued2009-12-23
dc.identifieruk.bl.ethos.552363
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/893
dc.description.abstractThis thesis presents several problems based on papers written jointly by the author and Dr. Christian-Oliver Ewald. Firstly, the author extends the model presented by Fershtman and Nitzan (1991), which studies a deterministic differential public good game. Two types of volatility are considered. In the first case the volatility of the diffusion term is dependent on the current level of public good, while in the second case the volatility is dependent on the current rate of public good provision by the agents. The result in the latter case is qualitatively different from the first one. These results are discussed in detail, along with numerical examples. Secondly, two existing lines of research in game theoretic studies of fisheries are combined and extended. The first line of research is the inclusion of the aspect of predation and the consideration of multi-species fisheries within classical game theoretic fishery models. The second line of research includes continuous time and uncertainty. This thesis considers a two species fishery game and compares the results of this with several cases. Thirdly, a model of a fishery is developed in which the dynamic of the unharvested fish population is given by the stochastic logistic growth equation and it is assumed that the fishery harvests the fish population following a constant effort strategy. Explicit formulas for optimal fishing effort are derived in problems considered and the effects of uncertainty, risk aversion and mean reversion speed on fishing efforts are investigated. Fourthly, a Dixit and Pindyck type irreversible investment problem in continuous time is solved, using the assumption that the project value follows a Cox-Ingersoll- Ross process. This solution differs from the two classical cases of geometric Brownian motion and geometric mean reversion and these differences are examined. The aim is to find the optimal stopping time, which can be applied to the problem of extracting resources.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of St Andrews
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
dc.subjectDifferential gamesen_US
dc.subjectReal optionsen_US
dc.subjectStochastic optimal controlen_US
dc.subjectPublic goodsen_US
dc.subjectFisheriesen_US
dc.subjectMaximum sustainable yieldsen_US
dc.subjectCox-Ross-Ingersoll processen_US
dc.subjectEnvironmental economicsen_US
dc.subject.lccHD75.5W26
dc.subject.lcshEnvironmental economics--Mathematical modelen_US
dc.subject.lcshReal options (Finance)--Mathematical modelsen_US
dc.subject.lcshDifferential gamesen_US
dc.subject.lcshStochastic processesen_US
dc.subject.lcshFisheries--Economic aspects--Mathematical modelsen_US
dc.titleApplication of stochastic differential games and real option theory in environmental economicsen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.type.qualificationlevelDoctoralen_US
dc.type.qualificationnamePhD Doctor of Philosophyen_US
dc.publisher.institutionThe University of St Andrewsen_US
dc.publisher.departmentSchool of Economics and Financeen_US


The following licence files are associated with this item:

  • Creative Commons

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported
Except where otherwise noted within the work, this item's licence for re-use is described as Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported