Dominance solvable games with multiple payoff criteria
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Two logically distinct and permissive extensions of iterative weak dominance are introduced for games with possibly vector-valued payoffs. The first, iterative partial dominance, builds on an easy-to-check condition but may lead to solutions that do not include any (generalized) Nash equilibria. However, the second and intuitively more demanding extension, iterative essential dominance, is shown to be an equilibrium refinement. The latter result includes Moulin's (1979) classic theorem as a special case when all players' payoffs are real-valued. Therefore, essential dominance solvability can be a useful solution concept for making sharper predictions in multicriteria games that feature a plethora of equilibria.
Gerasimou , G 2014 ' Dominance solvable games with multiple payoff criteria ' School of Economics & Finance Discussion Paper , no. 1406 , University of St Andrews , St. Andrews , pp. 1-8 .
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(c) The author 2014
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