Now showing items 1-10 of 50
Philosophical expertise under the microscope
(2018-03-16) - Journal article
Recent experimental studies indicate that epistemically irrelevant factors can skew our intuitions, and that some degree of scepticism about appealing to intuition in philosophy is warranted. In response, some have claimed ...
Paradoxes of signification
(2016-11-24) - Journal article
Ian Rumfitt has recently drawn our attention to a couple of paradoxes of signification, claiming that although Thomas Bradwardine's "multiple-meanings'' account of truth and signification can solve the first of them, it ...
Contrastivism about reasons and ought
(2015-06-04) - Journal article
Contrastivism about some concept says that the concept is relativized to sets of alternatives. Relative to some alternatives, the concept may apply, but relative to others, it may not. This article explores contrastivism ...
Time is double the trouble: Zeno's moving rows
(2015-03) - Journal article
Kant über Mitleidenschaft
(2016-12-21) - Journal article
In his discussion of sympathetic participation in § 34 of the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant twice uses an unusual word that does not reappear anywhere in his writings: Mitleidenschaft. So far, the significance of this has gone ...
Direct moral grounding and the legal model of moral normativity
(2015-04) - Journal article
Whereas most moral philosophers believe that the facts as to what we’re morally required to do are grounded by the facts about our moral reasons, which in turn are grounded by non-normative facts, I propose that moral ...
Counting the Particles : Entity and Identity in the Philosophy of Physics
(2017-04-01) - Journal article
I would like to attack a certain view: The view that the concept of identity can fail to apply to some things although, for some positive integer n, we have n of them. The idea of entities without self-identity is seriously ...
The Grotian concept of a right
(Brill, 2016-06) - Book item
Memory, belief and time
(2016-01-08) - Journal article
I argue that what evidence an agent has does not supervene on how she currently is. Agents do not always have to infer what the past was like from how things currently seem; sometimes the facts about the past are retained ...
Schellenberg on the epistemic force of experience
(2016-04) - Journal article
According to Schellenberg, our perceptual experiences have the epistemic force they do because they are exercises of certain sorts of capacity, namely capacities to discriminate particulars—objects, property-instances and ...