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dc.contributor.authorDeVore, Marc
dc.date.accessioned2021-12-05T00:44:56Z
dc.date.available2021-12-05T00:44:56Z
dc.date.issued2020-06-05
dc.identifier.citationDeVore , M 2020 , ' Reluctant innovators? inter-organizational conflict and the U.S.A.’s route to becoming a drone power ' , Small Wars and Insurgencies , vol. 31 , no. 4 , pp. 701-729 . https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2020.1743482en
dc.identifier.issn0959-2318
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 266884815
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 85da307c-0bd3-4705-839a-5f25b5f161ed
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000544476100002
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85087064780
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/24478
dc.description.abstractFew innovations have marked the late-20th and early-21st centuries more than unmanned aerial vehicles, also known as drones. Drones’ current preeminence leads many to assume that their development was teleologically determined by technological advances. The empirical record, however, belies such assumptions and is filled with vicissitudes. The Air Force’s and Naval aviation’s pilot-dominated hierarchies never prioritized drones over manned aircraft of their own accord. Politicians, meanwhile, lacked the expertise to judge what technologies could achieve and therefore could not compel the military to embrace drones. It was, thus, competition from other organizations – the CIA, the Navy’s surface warfare community and the Army –that obliged reluctant aviators to embrace drones. My study’s key original finding is that inter-agency competition impels militaries to embrace technologies that they would otherwise reject. Warfare’s evolution means that non-military bodies – intelligence agencies, interior ministries and paramilitary forces – develop capabilities that rival those of traditional military services in specific domains and these organizations can prove more agile at adopting certain new technologies because of their flatter organizational structures.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofSmall Wars and Insurgenciesen
dc.rightsCopyright © 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This work has been made available online in accordance with publisher policies or with permission. Permission for further reuse of this content should be sought from the publisher or the rights holder. This is the author created accepted manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2020.1743482en
dc.subjectDronesen
dc.subjectMilitary innovationen
dc.subjectUnmanned aerial vehiclesen
dc.subjectUnmanned combat air vehicleen
dc.subjectCentral intelligence agencyen
dc.subjectInter-service competitionen
dc.subjectInter-organizational competitonen
dc.subjectPredatoren
dc.subjectJZ International relationsen
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subject.lccJZen
dc.titleReluctant innovators? : inter-organizational conflict and the U.S.A.’s route to becoming a drone poweren
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.School of International Relationsen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2020.1743482
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.date.embargoedUntil2021-12-05


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