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Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
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dc.contributor.author | Savva, Foivos | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-01-25T16:30:07Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-01-25T16:30:07Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2018-10 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Savva , F 2018 , ' Strong implementation with partially honest individuals ' , Journal of Mathematical Economics , vol. 78 , pp. 27-34 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.07.002 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 0304-4068 | |
dc.identifier.other | PURE: 272210492 | |
dc.identifier.other | PURE UUID: 6699c3ff-ad1a-4484-bd38-7af9119cb86e | |
dc.identifier.other | Scopus: 85050649735 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10023/21322 | |
dc.description | This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council [ES/J500136/1]. | en |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for a social choice rule to be implementable in strong Nash equilibrium in the presence of partially honest agents, that is, agents who break ties in favourof a truthful message when they face indifference between outcomes. In this way, we achieve a relaxation in the condition of Korpela (2013), namely the Axiom of Sufficient Reason. Our new condition, Weak Pareto Dominance, is shown to be sufficient along with Weak Pareto Optimality and Universally Worst Alternative. We finally provide applications of our result in pure matching and bargaining environments. | |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Mathematical Economics | en |
dc.rights | Copyright © 2018 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). | en |
dc.subject | Strong implementation | en |
dc.subject | Partial honesty | en |
dc.subject | Tie-breaking rule | en |
dc.subject | HB Economic Theory | en |
dc.subject | T-NDAS | en |
dc.subject.lcc | HB | en |
dc.title | Strong implementation with partially honest individuals | en |
dc.type | Journal article | en |
dc.description.version | Publisher PDF | en |
dc.contributor.institution | University of St Andrews. School of Economics and Finance | en |
dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.07.002 | |
dc.description.status | Peer reviewed | en |
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