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dc.contributor.authorSavva, Foivos
dc.date.accessioned2021-01-25T16:30:07Z
dc.date.available2021-01-25T16:30:07Z
dc.date.issued2018-10
dc.identifier.citationSavva , F 2018 , ' Strong implementation with partially honest individuals ' , Journal of Mathematical Economics , vol. 78 , pp. 27-34 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.07.002en
dc.identifier.issn0304-4068
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 272210492
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 6699c3ff-ad1a-4484-bd38-7af9119cb86e
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85050649735
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/21322
dc.descriptionThis work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council [ES/J500136/1].en
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we provide sufficient conditions for a social choice rule to be implementable in strong Nash equilibrium in the presence of partially honest agents, that is, agents who break ties in favourof a truthful message when they face indifference between outcomes. In this way, we achieve a relaxation in the condition of Korpela (2013), namely the Axiom of Sufficient Reason. Our new condition, Weak Pareto Dominance, is shown to be sufficient along with Weak Pareto Optimality and Universally Worst Alternative. We finally provide applications of our result in pure matching and bargaining environments.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Mathematical Economicsen
dc.rightsCopyright © 2018 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).en
dc.subjectStrong implementationen
dc.subjectPartial honestyen
dc.subjectTie-breaking ruleen
dc.subjectHB Economic Theoryen
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subject.lccHBen
dc.titleStrong implementation with partially honest individualsen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.School of Economics and Financeen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.07.002
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden


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