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dc.contributor.authorMcGrath, Matthew
dc.date.accessioned2019-02-17T00:34:32Z
dc.date.available2019-02-17T00:34:32Z
dc.date.issued2018-02-17
dc.identifier.citationMcGrath , M 2018 , ' Sosa on epistemic value : a Kantian obstacle ' , Synthese , vol. First Online . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1717-8en
dc.identifier.issn0039-7857
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 252219534
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: b96b92d1-eb25-42fe-974b-6c3d10546836
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85042128147
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000595368200012
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/17082
dc.description.abstractIn recent work, Sosa proposes a comprehensive account of epistemic value based on an axiology for attempts. According to this axiology, an attempt is better if it succeeds, better still if it is apt (i.e., succeeds through competence), and best if it is fully apt, (i.e., guided to aptness by apt beliefs that it would be apt). Beliefs are understood as attempts aiming at the truth. Thus, a belief is better if true, better still if apt, and best if fully apt. I raise a Kantian obstacle for Sosa's account, arguing that the quality or worth of an attempt is independent of whether it succeeds. In particular, an attempt can be fully worthy despite being a failure. I then consider whether Sosa's competence-theoretic framework provides the resources for an axiology of attempts that does not place so much weight on success. I discuss the most promising candidate, an axiology grounded in the competence of attempts, or what Sosa calls adroitness. An adroit attempt may fail. I raise doubts about whether an adroitness-based axiology can provide a plausible explanation of the worthiness of subjects' beliefs in epistemically unfortunate situations, such as the beliefs of the brain in a vat. I conclude by speculating that the notion of a belief's fit with what the subject has to go on, a notion missing from Sosa's competence-theoretic framework, is crucial to explaining epistemic worth.
dc.format.extent14
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofSyntheseen
dc.rights© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018. This work has been made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created accepted version manuscript following peer review and as such may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1717-8en
dc.subjectEpistemic normsen
dc.subjectKnowledgeen
dc.subjectEpistemologyen
dc.subjectValueen
dc.subjectEpistemic valueen
dc.subjectKanten
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.titleSosa on epistemic value : a Kantian obstacleen
dc.typeJournal itemen
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.School of Philosophical, Anthropological and Film Studiesen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1717-8
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.date.embargoedUntil2019-02-17


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