Show simple item record

Files in this item

Thumbnail

Item metadata

dc.contributor.advisorClark, Peter
dc.contributor.advisorRead, Stephen
dc.contributor.advisorShapiro, Stewart
dc.contributor.authorFriend, Michèle Indira
dc.coverage.spatialMichèle Indiraen_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-06-29T13:14:00Z
dc.date.available2018-06-29T13:14:00Z
dc.date.issued1997-06
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/14753
dc.description.abstract"Second-order logic" is the name given to a formal system. Some claim that the formal system is a logical system. Others claim that it is a mathematical system. In the thesis, I examine these claims in the light of some philosophical criteria which first motivated Frege in his logicist project. The criteria are that a logic should be universal, it should reflect our intuitive notion of logical validity, and it should be analytic. The analysis is interesting in two respects. One is conceptual: it gives us a purchase on where and how to draw a distinction between logic and other sciences. The other interest is historical: showing that second-order logic is a logical system according to the philosophical criteria mentioned above goes some way towards vindicating Frege's logicist project in a contemporary context.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of St Andrews
dc.subject.lccBC128.F8en
dc.subject.lcshLogic, Symbolic and mathematicalen
dc.titleSecond-order logic is logicen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.type.qualificationlevelDoctoralen_US
dc.type.qualificationnamePhD Doctor of Philosophyen_US
dc.publisher.institutionThe University of St Andrewsen_US


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record