Philosophical, Anthropological & Film Studies (School of)
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/30
2024-03-28T20:33:59ZAristotle on the limits of final causes. The case of extended teleology
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29487
In this thesis, I discuss the concept of Aristotelian extended teleology (i.e., non-theistic teleological causation in which more than one substance is involved). I argue that some passages of Aristotle’s corpus and Theophrastus’ Metaphysics can be read as arguments of extended teleology. To interpret those passages, I introduce the concept of “axiarchism”, according to which X is actual because X is good. The thesis is composed of five chapters. In chapter 1, I introduce both the doctrine of Aristotle’s four causes and the discussion of the reach of final causes according to the second book of the Physics. In chapter 2, I discuss the teleological arguments that can be found in the first book of Aristotle’s Politics. I argue that some of these arguments can be read as arguments for extended teleology. In chapter 3, I argue that it is reasonable to suppose that, for Aristotle, the sublunary is not a random result of the superlunary and that, therefore, there is some form of order in all the parts of the universe. In this chapter, I focus particularly on Physics VIII, Generation and Corruption II 10. In the fourth chapter, I discuss Metaphysics XII. I defend the view that the tenth chapter of book Lambda can be read as an explicit question about the order and unity of all the parts of the world. In chapter 5, I discuss Theophrastus’ Metaphysics. I argue that Theophrastus is pointing towards the need for an account of extended teleology. He claims that not everything can be the result of a final cause, because some natural phenomena (e.g., the rotation of the sun that causes the yearly seasons) cannot be explained in teleological terms. In questioning the possibility of explaining these phenomena in teleological terms, however, Theophrastus is already thinking in terms of extended teleology.
2021-12-01T00:00:00ZHernández Villarreal, AndrésIn this thesis, I discuss the concept of Aristotelian extended teleology (i.e., non-theistic teleological causation in which more than one substance is involved). I argue that some passages of Aristotle’s corpus and Theophrastus’ Metaphysics can be read as arguments of extended teleology. To interpret those passages, I introduce the concept of “axiarchism”, according to which X is actual because X is good. The thesis is composed of five chapters. In chapter 1, I introduce both the doctrine of Aristotle’s four causes and the discussion of the reach of final causes according to the second book of the Physics. In chapter 2, I discuss the teleological arguments that can be found in the first book of Aristotle’s Politics. I argue that some of these arguments can be read as arguments for extended teleology. In chapter 3, I argue that it is reasonable to suppose that, for Aristotle, the sublunary is not a random result of the superlunary and that, therefore, there is some form of order in all the parts of the universe. In this chapter, I focus particularly on Physics VIII, Generation and Corruption II 10. In the fourth chapter, I discuss Metaphysics XII. I defend the view that the tenth chapter of book Lambda can be read as an explicit question about the order and unity of all the parts of the world. In chapter 5, I discuss Theophrastus’ Metaphysics. I argue that Theophrastus is pointing towards the need for an account of extended teleology. He claims that not everything can be the result of a final cause, because some natural phenomena (e.g., the rotation of the sun that causes the yearly seasons) cannot be explained in teleological terms. In questioning the possibility of explaining these phenomena in teleological terms, however, Theophrastus is already thinking in terms of extended teleology.Trust, audit, and public engagement
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29478
Public auditors such as Audit Scotland aim to provide independent assurance to the public that money is spent effectively, efficiently and that it, and the activities of public organisations, provide public value. This project has two objectives. Firstly, to develop conceptual models of public audit that support public organisations' trustworthiness as organisations that provide public value. Secondly, to develop conceptual models of public engagement that auditors (and public organisations generally) can use to build public trust in their organisations.
The project has three parts. Part 1 provides the project's philosophical foundations, defining the core concepts of trust, trustworthiness, distrust, and untrustworthiness that I employ in the thesis. Then I apply those concepts to trust relations between the public and public organisations. In part 2, I examine the relationship between audit and the trustworthiness of government. I will defend audit against audit sceptics, who argue that audit undermines public organisations' trustworthiness and public trust in those organisations. I will do this by arguing that whether audit faces these objections is dependent on the model of audit practice that we adopt, and I propose models of audit that avoid the audit sceptics’ objections. In part 3, I develop conceptual models of trust- conducive public engagement, and I examine the role that auditors can play in enhancing public trust in public organisations. Firstly, I determine whether the obligation to build trust in public organisations is compatible with audit function. Secondly, I determine what public organisations' communicative obligations are; for instance, do they require public organisations always to be open, honest, and transparent? Finally, I argue that public engagement models that empower the voices of those engaged with are more likely to induce trust between the organisation which empowers and those empowered through such public engagement.
2021-12-01T00:00:00ZKelsall, Joshua James ClarkePublic auditors such as Audit Scotland aim to provide independent assurance to the public that money is spent effectively, efficiently and that it, and the activities of public organisations, provide public value. This project has two objectives. Firstly, to develop conceptual models of public audit that support public organisations' trustworthiness as organisations that provide public value. Secondly, to develop conceptual models of public engagement that auditors (and public organisations generally) can use to build public trust in their organisations.
The project has three parts. Part 1 provides the project's philosophical foundations, defining the core concepts of trust, trustworthiness, distrust, and untrustworthiness that I employ in the thesis. Then I apply those concepts to trust relations between the public and public organisations. In part 2, I examine the relationship between audit and the trustworthiness of government. I will defend audit against audit sceptics, who argue that audit undermines public organisations' trustworthiness and public trust in those organisations. I will do this by arguing that whether audit faces these objections is dependent on the model of audit practice that we adopt, and I propose models of audit that avoid the audit sceptics’ objections. In part 3, I develop conceptual models of trust- conducive public engagement, and I examine the role that auditors can play in enhancing public trust in public organisations. Firstly, I determine whether the obligation to build trust in public organisations is compatible with audit function. Secondly, I determine what public organisations' communicative obligations are; for instance, do they require public organisations always to be open, honest, and transparent? Finally, I argue that public engagement models that empower the voices of those engaged with are more likely to induce trust between the organisation which empowers and those empowered through such public engagement.Moral inquiry : we're all in this together
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29446
Moral inquiry is often thought of as an individualistic enterprise. This is in large part because morality not only seems to require doing the right thing, but being in touch with moral reality in the right way: to act well, it is necessary to ground our actions on an insight into moral reasons—reasons we can only understand when we inquire for ourselves. In this dissertation, I defend a picture
of moral inquiry according to which such inquiry is fundamentally social: we are not alone when it comes to making moral decisions. In particular, I argue that the conception of moral inquiry as an individualistic enterprise wrongly delegitimises a central resource of moral inquiry, moral testimony. To this end, I first argue that moral agreement is of crucial justificatory value in moral inquiry. I then go on to address some worries connected to moral testimony, arguing that reliance on moral testimony is not intrinsically wrong and indeed oftentimes permissible if not required of us. I complement this with a discussion of moral
expertise, arguing that the search for moral experts has often been too focused on theoretical knowledge. However, practical experience is a much more reliable way of identifying those we can rely on with respect to a particular moral issue.
Lastly, I discuss one consequence this more social picture of moral inquiry has, namely that blame can not only be allocated to a wrongdoing agent, but also to those who guided the agent to that act. This concludes my contribution to
the defence of a more social picture of moral inquiry. Overall, however, my aim is not to do away with the importance of being rightly connected to moral reality—it is just that the best connection to moral reality available is often not
through ourselves, but through others.
2024-06-10T00:00:00ZKüspert, NickMoral inquiry is often thought of as an individualistic enterprise. This is in large part because morality not only seems to require doing the right thing, but being in touch with moral reality in the right way: to act well, it is necessary to ground our actions on an insight into moral reasons—reasons we can only understand when we inquire for ourselves. In this dissertation, I defend a picture
of moral inquiry according to which such inquiry is fundamentally social: we are not alone when it comes to making moral decisions. In particular, I argue that the conception of moral inquiry as an individualistic enterprise wrongly delegitimises a central resource of moral inquiry, moral testimony. To this end, I first argue that moral agreement is of crucial justificatory value in moral inquiry. I then go on to address some worries connected to moral testimony, arguing that reliance on moral testimony is not intrinsically wrong and indeed oftentimes permissible if not required of us. I complement this with a discussion of moral
expertise, arguing that the search for moral experts has often been too focused on theoretical knowledge. However, practical experience is a much more reliable way of identifying those we can rely on with respect to a particular moral issue.
Lastly, I discuss one consequence this more social picture of moral inquiry has, namely that blame can not only be allocated to a wrongdoing agent, but also to those who guided the agent to that act. This concludes my contribution to
the defence of a more social picture of moral inquiry. Overall, however, my aim is not to do away with the importance of being rightly connected to moral reality—it is just that the best connection to moral reality available is often not
through ourselves, but through others.Christianity, stigma, and mass conversion among Spanish Gitanos
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29427
My doctoral thesis examines the emergence of religiously based worldviews, values, and collective imaginaries among Roma/Gitanos in Spain. Juxtaposing long-term ethnographical observation, interviews with religious leaders, and critical text-analysis, I analyse the large-scale religious conversion of Gitanos from Catholicism to Evangelical Pentecostal Christianity in the city of Madrid. My thesis contributes to several fields of social scientific inquiry, including the Sociology of Religion, Anthropology of Christianity, and Romani Studies. By examining how Gitanos engage with Evangelicalism, I also provide a lens through which to comprehend how religion and ethnicity intertwine in contemporary southern Europe and enhance our understanding of the influence of non-Catholic forms of Christianity among social minorities in Mediterranean contexts. Focusing on the role of pastors from the leading Gitano Evangelical Church in Spain, known as the Iglesia Evangélica de Filadelfia (IEF), I argue that through conversion Spanish Gitano believers negotiate vital gendered aspects of their cultural identity and reframe their sense of otherness vis-à-vis non-Gitanos. Challenging social and academic assumptions about the victimhood and lack of agency among Roma people, I show how Gitanos engage with Christianity to re-construct their subjectivity and consciousness, face the consequences of discrimination, and refashion their sense of worth in the Spanish society. In so doing, I place agency at the core of sociological and anthropological thinking. Moreover, I engage with social, media, and political debates about the persistence of Roma/Gitano exclusion and marginality in contemporary capitalist societies and discuss Christianity's role in shaping Gitano notions of identity, gender, belonging, and citizenship. Additionally, my thesis opens new questions and further academic knowledge regarding the ethnographic study of Gitano groups by revealing the intricacies of ethnographic encounters shaped by unequal power relations, negotiations, and conflicting interests. By offering ethnographically grounded insights about the religious conversion of Gitanos, my work contributes to comparative studies of other Evangelical stigmatised minorities in various societies in the world.
2021-06-28T00:00:00ZMontañés Jiménez, AntonioMy doctoral thesis examines the emergence of religiously based worldviews, values, and collective imaginaries among Roma/Gitanos in Spain. Juxtaposing long-term ethnographical observation, interviews with religious leaders, and critical text-analysis, I analyse the large-scale religious conversion of Gitanos from Catholicism to Evangelical Pentecostal Christianity in the city of Madrid. My thesis contributes to several fields of social scientific inquiry, including the Sociology of Religion, Anthropology of Christianity, and Romani Studies. By examining how Gitanos engage with Evangelicalism, I also provide a lens through which to comprehend how religion and ethnicity intertwine in contemporary southern Europe and enhance our understanding of the influence of non-Catholic forms of Christianity among social minorities in Mediterranean contexts. Focusing on the role of pastors from the leading Gitano Evangelical Church in Spain, known as the Iglesia Evangélica de Filadelfia (IEF), I argue that through conversion Spanish Gitano believers negotiate vital gendered aspects of their cultural identity and reframe their sense of otherness vis-à-vis non-Gitanos. Challenging social and academic assumptions about the victimhood and lack of agency among Roma people, I show how Gitanos engage with Christianity to re-construct their subjectivity and consciousness, face the consequences of discrimination, and refashion their sense of worth in the Spanish society. In so doing, I place agency at the core of sociological and anthropological thinking. Moreover, I engage with social, media, and political debates about the persistence of Roma/Gitano exclusion and marginality in contemporary capitalist societies and discuss Christianity's role in shaping Gitano notions of identity, gender, belonging, and citizenship. Additionally, my thesis opens new questions and further academic knowledge regarding the ethnographic study of Gitano groups by revealing the intricacies of ethnographic encounters shaped by unequal power relations, negotiations, and conflicting interests. By offering ethnographically grounded insights about the religious conversion of Gitanos, my work contributes to comparative studies of other Evangelical stigmatised minorities in various societies in the world.The epistemology of inquiry : individuals, groups & institutions
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29356
Inquiring—roughly, the attempt to answer a question—is one of the most common intellectual undertakings. This thesis is comprised of a set of four essays that investigate the epistemology of inquiry. The first essay looks at one key epistemic state with which we end inquiry, viz understanding; the second essay examines collective inquiry; the third essay considers the normative role of curiosity in motivating inquiry; and the fourth essay discusses inquiry in the legal system. These essays will advance our understanding of what motivates inquiry, the mental states involved in inquiring, the sorts of norms that govern inquiry, and what continuities and discontinuities there are between how individuals and various types of collective inquire into different types of question.
2020-12-02T00:00:00ZRoss, Lewis DylanInquiring—roughly, the attempt to answer a question—is one of the most common intellectual undertakings. This thesis is comprised of a set of four essays that investigate the epistemology of inquiry. The first essay looks at one key epistemic state with which we end inquiry, viz understanding; the second essay examines collective inquiry; the third essay considers the normative role of curiosity in motivating inquiry; and the fourth essay discusses inquiry in the legal system. These essays will advance our understanding of what motivates inquiry, the mental states involved in inquiring, the sorts of norms that govern inquiry, and what continuities and discontinuities there are between how individuals and various types of collective inquire into different types of question.John Stuart Mill as existentialist : does Mill see the role of government as propagating a Sartrean, existentially authentic moral character?
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29309
The purpose of this thesis is to explore whether or not the goal of John Stuart Mill’s political philosophy could be described as existentialist. To do this, I will demonstrate that Mill’s philosophy was centred around the cultivation of an ideal individual moral character in the populace, and then I shall show that this moral character is a form of existential authenticity. It will first draw upon the interpretation by Jones of Mill’s philosophy that states that his political project was centred around an ideal of the individual’s life consisting in Victorian moral norms and the perfection of individual rationality. I will devote the first half of this essay to presenting, developing and defending Jones’ interpretation according to this moral character thesis. The second half of the paper will then examine whether or not this moral character could be described as an existentially authentic one. I will use Sartre’s account of authenticity as a framework against which to compare Mill’s moral character. I will then show that this account of authenticity is near identical to Mill’s moral character, despite the two authors working from different ontological frameworks of human action. I will demonstrate this not only by pointing out how the characteristics of each author’s ideal characters are the same, but also by noting that they respond to the same societal problems of alienation and custom and resolving them through the cultivation of free-thinking individuals who respect the freedom of others. Finally, I shall conclude that while Mill does have as the basis for his political project a distinctly existentialist notion of authentic existence, one could not describe him as an existentialist philosopher in the same manner as writers such as Sartre due to the presence in Mill’s philosophy of an abstract, objective normative ethics that existentialism inherently rejects.
2022-06-13T00:00:00ZRountree, George HughThe purpose of this thesis is to explore whether or not the goal of John Stuart Mill’s political philosophy could be described as existentialist. To do this, I will demonstrate that Mill’s philosophy was centred around the cultivation of an ideal individual moral character in the populace, and then I shall show that this moral character is a form of existential authenticity. It will first draw upon the interpretation by Jones of Mill’s philosophy that states that his political project was centred around an ideal of the individual’s life consisting in Victorian moral norms and the perfection of individual rationality. I will devote the first half of this essay to presenting, developing and defending Jones’ interpretation according to this moral character thesis. The second half of the paper will then examine whether or not this moral character could be described as an existentially authentic one. I will use Sartre’s account of authenticity as a framework against which to compare Mill’s moral character. I will then show that this account of authenticity is near identical to Mill’s moral character, despite the two authors working from different ontological frameworks of human action. I will demonstrate this not only by pointing out how the characteristics of each author’s ideal characters are the same, but also by noting that they respond to the same societal problems of alienation and custom and resolving them through the cultivation of free-thinking individuals who respect the freedom of others. Finally, I shall conclude that while Mill does have as the basis for his political project a distinctly existentialist notion of authentic existence, one could not describe him as an existentialist philosopher in the same manner as writers such as Sartre due to the presence in Mill’s philosophy of an abstract, objective normative ethics that existentialism inherently rejects.Making sense of Melayu : an ethnographic study of primary school children in Brunei Darussalam
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29266
This study examines how social relations in a school, and at home, shape primary school children’s understanding of Melayu (Malay) in Brunei Darussalam. Social relations, specifically the child-child, teacher-pupil, and parent-child relationships, are significant because they inform children’s notions of being Malay as well as uncover ideas that are taken for granted by adults. Concurrently, these relationships highlight the fundamental condition of intersubjectivity, as a form of human sociality.
The ethnographic fieldwork for the study took place at a state school between January 2016 until March 2017. While pupils are the main focus of the study, teachers, parents and guardians are also interviewed because of its usefulness in investigating their experiences when they were primary school children themselves in order to document the transformation of ideas due to changing historical circumstances. The methods used are mainly participant observation and interviews as well as casual conversations with both children and adults.
From the data gathered, the major themes that form the research – and is tied together in the Bruneian context – is personhood, Malay, morality, and respect. Children come to understand the concept of Malay, and what it means to be a Brunei Malay Muslim person, through the different ideas and understandings of respect, which is inextricably linked with moral values and hierarchical relations, against a backdrop of state ideology and the Islamic religion. Consequently, what is significant is that children do not see themselves being born as a Malay person but that they eventually become Malay through their relationships with others. Therefore, I argue that the basis of all social interaction centres on respect since it figures powerfully in the maintenance and negotiation of social relationships. Overall, this study contributes to the current discourse on personhood and to the anthropological inquiry on the concept of respect.
2021-06-28T00:00:00ZShahrin, Shariza WahyunaThis study examines how social relations in a school, and at home, shape primary school children’s understanding of Melayu (Malay) in Brunei Darussalam. Social relations, specifically the child-child, teacher-pupil, and parent-child relationships, are significant because they inform children’s notions of being Malay as well as uncover ideas that are taken for granted by adults. Concurrently, these relationships highlight the fundamental condition of intersubjectivity, as a form of human sociality.
The ethnographic fieldwork for the study took place at a state school between January 2016 until March 2017. While pupils are the main focus of the study, teachers, parents and guardians are also interviewed because of its usefulness in investigating their experiences when they were primary school children themselves in order to document the transformation of ideas due to changing historical circumstances. The methods used are mainly participant observation and interviews as well as casual conversations with both children and adults.
From the data gathered, the major themes that form the research – and is tied together in the Bruneian context – is personhood, Malay, morality, and respect. Children come to understand the concept of Malay, and what it means to be a Brunei Malay Muslim person, through the different ideas and understandings of respect, which is inextricably linked with moral values and hierarchical relations, against a backdrop of state ideology and the Islamic religion. Consequently, what is significant is that children do not see themselves being born as a Malay person but that they eventually become Malay through their relationships with others. Therefore, I argue that the basis of all social interaction centres on respect since it figures powerfully in the maintenance and negotiation of social relationships. Overall, this study contributes to the current discourse on personhood and to the anthropological inquiry on the concept of respect.Perception as a way of knowing
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29263
The aim of this thesis is to construct and defend a theory of perceptual justification derived from a knowledge-first account of epistemic justification on which the rational force of experience is grounded its knowledge-producing power. In the constructive part of the project, Chapter 1, I develop a theory of perceptual justification on the basis of the epistemological framework defended in Williamson (2000). In slogan form, this view holds that “perception is a way of knowing,” and can be stated as the following thesis:
PERCEPTION IS A WAY OF KNOWING (PK) S’s belief that p is perceptually justified if and only if S knows that p via a perceptually- individuated method.
In the remainder of the thesis, I defend PK and the normative framework on which it depends. In Chapter 2 I defend a crucial consequence of PK—viz., the Entailment Thesis, according to which seeing that p entail knowing that p—from recent objections due to Turri (2010). In Chapter 3 I distinguish strong vs weak epistemological disjunctivism (of which PK counts as an instance) and argue that the former, as defended by Pritchard (2012), suffers from a devastating objection. In Chapter 4 I defend the normative framework within which PK is constructed—in particular the account of dispositional rationality developed in Williamson’s work on the knowledge norm of belief—from recent objections due to Brown (2018). In Chapter 5 I argue against the claim that externalist accounts like PK support veridicalist responses to skepticism, viz., the view according to which subjects can know ordinary empirical propositions in global skeptical scenarios. And finally, in Chapter 6, I argue that PK is compatible with recent work in vision science which requires, inter alia, defending the principle of epistemic safety from a recent objection.
2021-06-28T00:00:00ZSkolits, WesThe aim of this thesis is to construct and defend a theory of perceptual justification derived from a knowledge-first account of epistemic justification on which the rational force of experience is grounded its knowledge-producing power. In the constructive part of the project, Chapter 1, I develop a theory of perceptual justification on the basis of the epistemological framework defended in Williamson (2000). In slogan form, this view holds that “perception is a way of knowing,” and can be stated as the following thesis:
PERCEPTION IS A WAY OF KNOWING (PK) S’s belief that p is perceptually justified if and only if S knows that p via a perceptually- individuated method.
In the remainder of the thesis, I defend PK and the normative framework on which it depends. In Chapter 2 I defend a crucial consequence of PK—viz., the Entailment Thesis, according to which seeing that p entail knowing that p—from recent objections due to Turri (2010). In Chapter 3 I distinguish strong vs weak epistemological disjunctivism (of which PK counts as an instance) and argue that the former, as defended by Pritchard (2012), suffers from a devastating objection. In Chapter 4 I defend the normative framework within which PK is constructed—in particular the account of dispositional rationality developed in Williamson’s work on the knowledge norm of belief—from recent objections due to Brown (2018). In Chapter 5 I argue against the claim that externalist accounts like PK support veridicalist responses to skepticism, viz., the view according to which subjects can know ordinary empirical propositions in global skeptical scenarios. And finally, in Chapter 6, I argue that PK is compatible with recent work in vision science which requires, inter alia, defending the principle of epistemic safety from a recent objection.Film festivalisation : the rise of the film festival in the UK's postindustrial cities
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29256
This study presents an examination of three diverse film festivals that are based in postindustrial cities in the UK. It takes the view that all film festivals are intrinsically bound to and affected by their host location. The research is particularly concerned with how film festivals help to create eventful cities, an all important objective within the postindustrial era. By examining Glasgow Film Festival (GFF), Flatpack Festival (Flatpack) in Birmingham and Sheffield International Documentary Film Festival (Doc/Fest) the study presents a perspective on each festival that links their programming strategies and modus operandi to the specificities of their respective city’s postindustrial milieu.
The thesis poses the following question: What are the prevalent characteristics that define film festivals located in postindustrial cities and conversely how does the postindustrial environment contribute to the realisation of each festival? It considers these questions by examining interlinking strategies that relate to programming, place-making and spatial materialisation. The research contributes to the growing field of film festival studies by being the first of its kind to present an in-depth comparative analysis of film festivals established in UK cities. As such the study offers an insight into the broader development of the film-festivalscape in the context of the UK during the most recent phase of its development.
Empirical evidence of each festival’s strategic approach is provided through case study methodology including participant observation, semi-structured interviews and archival research that examines how each festival came into being, formulated its identity and achieved sustainability. The study maintains that these particular film festivals provide an apt articulation of the experience economy through a marked turn towards non-theatrical programming practices and alternative use of spatial materialisation that has elevated the context of viewing to being a defining differentiator of the festivals in postindustrial cities.
2020-12-02T00:00:00ZSmyth, Sarah ElizabethThis study presents an examination of three diverse film festivals that are based in postindustrial cities in the UK. It takes the view that all film festivals are intrinsically bound to and affected by their host location. The research is particularly concerned with how film festivals help to create eventful cities, an all important objective within the postindustrial era. By examining Glasgow Film Festival (GFF), Flatpack Festival (Flatpack) in Birmingham and Sheffield International Documentary Film Festival (Doc/Fest) the study presents a perspective on each festival that links their programming strategies and modus operandi to the specificities of their respective city’s postindustrial milieu.
The thesis poses the following question: What are the prevalent characteristics that define film festivals located in postindustrial cities and conversely how does the postindustrial environment contribute to the realisation of each festival? It considers these questions by examining interlinking strategies that relate to programming, place-making and spatial materialisation. The research contributes to the growing field of film festival studies by being the first of its kind to present an in-depth comparative analysis of film festivals established in UK cities. As such the study offers an insight into the broader development of the film-festivalscape in the context of the UK during the most recent phase of its development.
Empirical evidence of each festival’s strategic approach is provided through case study methodology including participant observation, semi-structured interviews and archival research that examines how each festival came into being, formulated its identity and achieved sustainability. The study maintains that these particular film festivals provide an apt articulation of the experience economy through a marked turn towards non-theatrical programming practices and alternative use of spatial materialisation that has elevated the context of viewing to being a defining differentiator of the festivals in postindustrial cities.Logical disagreement : an epistemological study
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29243
While the epistemic significance of disagreement has been a popular topic in epistemology for at least a decade, little attention has been paid to logical disagreement. This monograph is meant as a remedy. The text starts with an extensive literature review of the epistemology of (peer) disagreement and sets the stage for an epistemological study of logical disagreement. The guiding thread for the rest of the work is then three distinct readings of the ambiguous term ‘logical disagreement’. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the Ad Hoc Reading according to which logical disagreements occur when two subjects take incompatible doxastic attitudes toward a specific proposition in or about logic. Chapter 2 presents a new counterexample to the widely discussed Uniqueness Thesis. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the Theory Choice Reading of ‘logical disagreement’. According to this interpretation, logical disagreements occur at the level of entire logical theories rather than individual entailment-claims. Chapter 4 concerns a key question from the philosophy of logic, viz., how we have epistemic justification for claims about logical consequence. In Chapters 5 and 6 we turn to the Akrasia Reading. On this reading, logical disagreements occur when there is a mismatch between the deductive strength of one’s background logic and the logical theory one prefers (officially). Chapter 6 introduces logical akrasia by analogy to epistemic akrasia and presents a novel dilemma. Chapter 7 revisits the epistemology of peer disagreement and argues that the epistemic significance of central principles from the literature are at best deflated in the context of logical disagreement. The chapter also develops a simple formal model of deep disagreement in Default Logic, relating this to our general discussion of logical disagreement. The monograph ends in an epilogue with some reflections on the potential epistemic significance of convergence in logical theorizing.
2024-06-10T00:00:00ZAndersen, Frederik J.While the epistemic significance of disagreement has been a popular topic in epistemology for at least a decade, little attention has been paid to logical disagreement. This monograph is meant as a remedy. The text starts with an extensive literature review of the epistemology of (peer) disagreement and sets the stage for an epistemological study of logical disagreement. The guiding thread for the rest of the work is then three distinct readings of the ambiguous term ‘logical disagreement’. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the Ad Hoc Reading according to which logical disagreements occur when two subjects take incompatible doxastic attitudes toward a specific proposition in or about logic. Chapter 2 presents a new counterexample to the widely discussed Uniqueness Thesis. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the Theory Choice Reading of ‘logical disagreement’. According to this interpretation, logical disagreements occur at the level of entire logical theories rather than individual entailment-claims. Chapter 4 concerns a key question from the philosophy of logic, viz., how we have epistemic justification for claims about logical consequence. In Chapters 5 and 6 we turn to the Akrasia Reading. On this reading, logical disagreements occur when there is a mismatch between the deductive strength of one’s background logic and the logical theory one prefers (officially). Chapter 6 introduces logical akrasia by analogy to epistemic akrasia and presents a novel dilemma. Chapter 7 revisits the epistemology of peer disagreement and argues that the epistemic significance of central principles from the literature are at best deflated in the context of logical disagreement. The chapter also develops a simple formal model of deep disagreement in Default Logic, relating this to our general discussion of logical disagreement. The monograph ends in an epilogue with some reflections on the potential epistemic significance of convergence in logical theorizing.Breaking the trust : the case for regulating anonymous shell companies
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29233
Anonymous shell companies (ASCs) are corporate entities whose sole purpose is to cloak the identity of their beneficial owner. Due to their strong anonymity provisions, ASCs allow individuals to perform a variety of illicit activities with little chance of being caught. Thus, they have been used in almost every form of economic crime. Though there is universal agreement in the policy sphere that ASCs facilitate a number of negative externalities, policymakers are divided over how they should be regulated. Specifically, policymakers are stuck in an intractable disagreement over the implementation of a public ownership register – a database containing ownership information of every company registered in a particular country. Opponents of this register argue that the public disclosure of ownership information violates a presumptive right individuals have to privacy. Proponents of this register however, deny the existence of this presumptive right. They point instead to the role of transparency in fostering accountability.
The goal of my thesis is to offer a theoretical justification for the creation of a public ownership register. In short, I argue that we can break this impasse by using the value of public trust to justify creating a public ownership register with specific provisions so as to ensure privacy rights are not infringed upon. My argument proceeds in three parts: First, I establish that trust is at least instrumentally valuable. Thus we have a pro tanto reason to implement regulations to stop trust being undermined. Second, I offer a novel account of public trust predicated on the assumption of a shared intrinsic commitment to a practice rule. Third, armed with this account of public trust, I identify two distinct mechanisms by which ASCs undermine trust. I conclude by showing how drawing on public trust provides a pro tanto reason to implement a public ownership register.
2020-07-27T00:00:00ZSorger, Andreas-JohannAnonymous shell companies (ASCs) are corporate entities whose sole purpose is to cloak the identity of their beneficial owner. Due to their strong anonymity provisions, ASCs allow individuals to perform a variety of illicit activities with little chance of being caught. Thus, they have been used in almost every form of economic crime. Though there is universal agreement in the policy sphere that ASCs facilitate a number of negative externalities, policymakers are divided over how they should be regulated. Specifically, policymakers are stuck in an intractable disagreement over the implementation of a public ownership register – a database containing ownership information of every company registered in a particular country. Opponents of this register argue that the public disclosure of ownership information violates a presumptive right individuals have to privacy. Proponents of this register however, deny the existence of this presumptive right. They point instead to the role of transparency in fostering accountability.
The goal of my thesis is to offer a theoretical justification for the creation of a public ownership register. In short, I argue that we can break this impasse by using the value of public trust to justify creating a public ownership register with specific provisions so as to ensure privacy rights are not infringed upon. My argument proceeds in three parts: First, I establish that trust is at least instrumentally valuable. Thus we have a pro tanto reason to implement regulations to stop trust being undermined. Second, I offer a novel account of public trust predicated on the assumption of a shared intrinsic commitment to a practice rule. Third, armed with this account of public trust, I identify two distinct mechanisms by which ASCs undermine trust. I conclude by showing how drawing on public trust provides a pro tanto reason to implement a public ownership register.Making meaning of Laurence Olivier : reading queer sensibilities in his Hollywood performances, 1939-1960
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29228
Between 1939 and 1940, British actor Laurence Olivier broke new ground as a film actor and star in a sequence of landmark performances in classical Hollywood cinema: as a tortured Heathcliff in ‘Wuthering Heights’ (William Wyler, 1939), a brooding Maxim de Winter in ‘Rebecca’ (Alfred Hitchcock, 1940), and a charming Darcy in ‘Pride and Prejudice’ (Robert Z. Leonard, 1940). This thesis argues that Olivier’s performances in these and subsequent Hollywood films depended on not only his much-vaunted abilities as an actor, but, more fundamentally, on an erotically mysterious and ultimately queer masculinity singular among male stars in the classical Hollywood era. It identifies this queerness as crucial to the Hollywood oeuvre Olivier established by these initial, star-making roles, particularly his performances as George Hurstwood in ‘Carrie’ (William Wyler, 1952), the Prince in ‘The Prince and the Showgirl’ (Laurence Olivier, 1957), Gen. Burgoyne in ‘The Devil’s Disciple’ (Guy Hamilton, 1959) and Crassus in ‘Spartacus’ (Stanley Kubrick, 1960). Existing scholarship on Olivier offers a myopic understanding of the actor, as it neglects his other Hollywood projects in favour of his Shakespearean works on stage or screen. Against such neglect, the thesis is comprised of seven case studies, which, taken together, reveal a continuous, if varied, trajectory of a subversive sexual presence central to his Hollywood career. This thesis deploys Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s foundational concept of the closet to identify and decode a closetedness in each of Olivier’s performances, to argue for their queer sensibilities. Each case study textually analyses Olivier’s performance by bringing various accounts of gender and desire in dialogue with central concepts in queer theory as well as biographical material and archival resources. In exploring the queerness underlying Olivier’s Hollywood performances, this thesis offers a fundamental reassessment of the cultural, social, and aesthetic impact of a figure central to modern conceptions of acting.
2021-12-01T00:00:00ZSapountzi, Ana MariaBetween 1939 and 1940, British actor Laurence Olivier broke new ground as a film actor and star in a sequence of landmark performances in classical Hollywood cinema: as a tortured Heathcliff in ‘Wuthering Heights’ (William Wyler, 1939), a brooding Maxim de Winter in ‘Rebecca’ (Alfred Hitchcock, 1940), and a charming Darcy in ‘Pride and Prejudice’ (Robert Z. Leonard, 1940). This thesis argues that Olivier’s performances in these and subsequent Hollywood films depended on not only his much-vaunted abilities as an actor, but, more fundamentally, on an erotically mysterious and ultimately queer masculinity singular among male stars in the classical Hollywood era. It identifies this queerness as crucial to the Hollywood oeuvre Olivier established by these initial, star-making roles, particularly his performances as George Hurstwood in ‘Carrie’ (William Wyler, 1952), the Prince in ‘The Prince and the Showgirl’ (Laurence Olivier, 1957), Gen. Burgoyne in ‘The Devil’s Disciple’ (Guy Hamilton, 1959) and Crassus in ‘Spartacus’ (Stanley Kubrick, 1960). Existing scholarship on Olivier offers a myopic understanding of the actor, as it neglects his other Hollywood projects in favour of his Shakespearean works on stage or screen. Against such neglect, the thesis is comprised of seven case studies, which, taken together, reveal a continuous, if varied, trajectory of a subversive sexual presence central to his Hollywood career. This thesis deploys Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s foundational concept of the closet to identify and decode a closetedness in each of Olivier’s performances, to argue for their queer sensibilities. Each case study textually analyses Olivier’s performance by bringing various accounts of gender and desire in dialogue with central concepts in queer theory as well as biographical material and archival resources. In exploring the queerness underlying Olivier’s Hollywood performances, this thesis offers a fundamental reassessment of the cultural, social, and aesthetic impact of a figure central to modern conceptions of acting.The struggle, in utero : choice, control and trust in infertility treatment and abortion rights campaigning in Ireland
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29226
In May 2018, the citizens of Ireland voted to repeal the 8th amendment of the Constitution, thus overturning the ban on abortion that had been in place for over a century. The vote paved the way for a more general debate on the relationship between women, reproductive healthcare and the state, and thereby exposed deeply entrenched struggles over the equation of womanhood with motherhood in the Irish Constitution. These were particularly pressing issues because the government was in the process of writing the first legislation on infertility treatment. This thesis provides insights into an extraordinary moment of transition in the Irish social and legal landscape, ripe with uncertainty, ambiguities and possibilities. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork conducted with staff in infertility clinics and pro-choice campaigners in Dublin between 2017 and 2018, I follow my research participants as they navigated these highly contested ‘reproductive borderlands’, a term I coin to describe the grey areas where boundaries around reproduction were drawn and redrawn. These processes centred around the question of who was recognised as a patient, something that was articulated through discourses on ‘control’ in the clinics and ‘choice’ in the campaign. My research participants presented these terms as clear-cut and unambiguous. The everyday practices in the clinics, however, revealed a more nuanced picture in which choice and control emerged as powerful rhetorical devices that were multifaceted and continuously under strain. In the face of this disjuncture, discourses on trust were a key repository for speaking about infertility and abortion, issues that were shrouded by interrelated layers of silence and stigma. Through an examination of the interface between trust and evidence in the clinics and trust and storytelling in the campaign, I develop the concept of ‘intimate violence’ to reflect on the difficult process of long-established silence being unsettled.
2021-12-01T00:00:00ZSzabunia, JudithIn May 2018, the citizens of Ireland voted to repeal the 8th amendment of the Constitution, thus overturning the ban on abortion that had been in place for over a century. The vote paved the way for a more general debate on the relationship between women, reproductive healthcare and the state, and thereby exposed deeply entrenched struggles over the equation of womanhood with motherhood in the Irish Constitution. These were particularly pressing issues because the government was in the process of writing the first legislation on infertility treatment. This thesis provides insights into an extraordinary moment of transition in the Irish social and legal landscape, ripe with uncertainty, ambiguities and possibilities. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork conducted with staff in infertility clinics and pro-choice campaigners in Dublin between 2017 and 2018, I follow my research participants as they navigated these highly contested ‘reproductive borderlands’, a term I coin to describe the grey areas where boundaries around reproduction were drawn and redrawn. These processes centred around the question of who was recognised as a patient, something that was articulated through discourses on ‘control’ in the clinics and ‘choice’ in the campaign. My research participants presented these terms as clear-cut and unambiguous. The everyday practices in the clinics, however, revealed a more nuanced picture in which choice and control emerged as powerful rhetorical devices that were multifaceted and continuously under strain. In the face of this disjuncture, discourses on trust were a key repository for speaking about infertility and abortion, issues that were shrouded by interrelated layers of silence and stigma. Through an examination of the interface between trust and evidence in the clinics and trust and storytelling in the campaign, I develop the concept of ‘intimate violence’ to reflect on the difficult process of long-established silence being unsettled.Timescapes of independence : temporality, utopia and living the future in Scotland
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29208
Based on fifteen months of ethnographic fieldwork amongst Edinburgh Scottish National Party (SNP) activists, this thesis argues that the future forms a key element of political life and plays a greater role than the past in moving political activists into action. It shows how traditional political anthropological studies reliant on socio-historical analysis provide insufficient insight into emerging political movements. Instead, it proposes a temporal analytical framework that centralises future-oriented temporalities in political anthropological studies. This uncovers the ways in which people are ‘pulled’ rather than ‘pushed’ into action, and in doing so highlights new relationships, affects, and time-maps that would otherwise remain hidden in political action. Drawing from contemporary work of the anthropology of the future (Bryant and Knight 2019a) this thesis analyses the imaginations of the future that drive SNP activists to action, giving shape to Scotland’s potential independent future. It is these imaginations of utopian/dystopian futures that incites SNP activists to believe in, and campaign for, Scottish independence. The future is revealed as a site of intense political contestation that affects and is affected by the present, concrete yet continuously transformed through the everyday affective experiences of activists. In this way, I argue that Scottish independence is best understood as a timescape comprised of both present and future as well as the complex temporal interactions between the two.
2022-06-13T00:00:00ZManley, GabrielaBased on fifteen months of ethnographic fieldwork amongst Edinburgh Scottish National Party (SNP) activists, this thesis argues that the future forms a key element of political life and plays a greater role than the past in moving political activists into action. It shows how traditional political anthropological studies reliant on socio-historical analysis provide insufficient insight into emerging political movements. Instead, it proposes a temporal analytical framework that centralises future-oriented temporalities in political anthropological studies. This uncovers the ways in which people are ‘pulled’ rather than ‘pushed’ into action, and in doing so highlights new relationships, affects, and time-maps that would otherwise remain hidden in political action. Drawing from contemporary work of the anthropology of the future (Bryant and Knight 2019a) this thesis analyses the imaginations of the future that drive SNP activists to action, giving shape to Scotland’s potential independent future. It is these imaginations of utopian/dystopian futures that incites SNP activists to believe in, and campaign for, Scottish independence. The future is revealed as a site of intense political contestation that affects and is affected by the present, concrete yet continuously transformed through the everyday affective experiences of activists. In this way, I argue that Scottish independence is best understood as a timescape comprised of both present and future as well as the complex temporal interactions between the two.A defence of the truth norm of belief
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29152
For belief, the standard of correctness is truth. Truth is said to be the norm of belief. This thesis aims to address some recent challenges relating to various aspects of the truth norm of belief on a reason-based normative framework. On a reason-based normative framework, normativity is a matter of (normative) reasons. Reasons are facts that count in favour of a response, grounded in value-based, desire-based, constitutive, or practice-based facts. Reasons are the sort of things that we can respond to and they have weights in making a claim on us when we stand in a relation to them. Three anti-normativist challenges arise in recent discussion. First, the grounding challenge concerns whether the reason to believe truly (correctly) and to refrain from believing falsely (incorrectly) can be properly grounded. Second, the guidance challenge concerns whether the reason to believe truly and to refrain from believing falsely is something we can respond to in our belief-formation. Third, the weighting challenge concerns whether the reason to believe truly and to refrain from believing falsely has any weight in making a claim on us regarding what we ought to/may believe. In this thesis, I offer novel responses to all three challenges. I develop and defend a practice-based, variantist account of the truth norm, according to which, the truth norm of belief is grounded in a justified social practice, guides our belief-formation on a reason- responsive model of epistemic guidance, and makes varying claims on us regarding what we
ought to/may believe depending on the circumstances.
2022-06-13T00:00:00ZWei, XintongFor belief, the standard of correctness is truth. Truth is said to be the norm of belief. This thesis aims to address some recent challenges relating to various aspects of the truth norm of belief on a reason-based normative framework. On a reason-based normative framework, normativity is a matter of (normative) reasons. Reasons are facts that count in favour of a response, grounded in value-based, desire-based, constitutive, or practice-based facts. Reasons are the sort of things that we can respond to and they have weights in making a claim on us when we stand in a relation to them. Three anti-normativist challenges arise in recent discussion. First, the grounding challenge concerns whether the reason to believe truly (correctly) and to refrain from believing falsely (incorrectly) can be properly grounded. Second, the guidance challenge concerns whether the reason to believe truly and to refrain from believing falsely is something we can respond to in our belief-formation. Third, the weighting challenge concerns whether the reason to believe truly and to refrain from believing falsely has any weight in making a claim on us regarding what we ought to/may believe. In this thesis, I offer novel responses to all three challenges. I develop and defend a practice-based, variantist account of the truth norm, according to which, the truth norm of belief is grounded in a justified social practice, guides our belief-formation on a reason- responsive model of epistemic guidance, and makes varying claims on us regarding what we
ought to/may believe depending on the circumstances.Reality Engineering and social kinds
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29133
Conceptual Engineering is a new and interesting trend in Philosophy. However, it is not free from problems. The most relevant issue is that, at least following a Cappelen-like account, we are forced to commit to the controversial metaphysical view that the world has a linguistic structure. Under such view, a modification in the semantics of a term implies a modification in nature of the thing which is referred by that word. I propose to explore the implications of the reversal of such principle, thereby committing to the idea that a modification in the nature of things implies a modification of the semantics of the terms that refer to them, and not the other way around. Following this new principle, I am interested in developing an alternative account to Conceptual Engineering, which I call (following Greenough) Reality Engineering.
In this dissertation, I will focus on the analysis of two major points about Reality Engineering, trying to define what it is about and how to perform it. I will argue that Reality Engineering has kinds as its scope and I will restrict the focus of the present enquiry to social kinds only. I will proceed by providing a taxonomy of the most popular views about the metaphysics of social kinds, since in order to modify something properly, first we have to be clear on what that something is. Out of this taxonomy, I will generate two general theories on social kinds. The first one is what we can call a Top-down view, and it says that a social kind is generated via the acceptance of constitutive rules by some group of authorities and the successful application of those rules in ordinary practice. The second one is what we can call a Bottom-up view, according to which social kinds are nothing but the reification of social external norms, where social external norms are to be intended as the set of attitudes/behaviours/treatments/practices that people who are not members of the kind have towards the members of such kind (trivially, if the kind in question, like money, does not include people as its members, then everyone is external to such kind). After presenting these two views, I will explore the possibility of engineering kinds within them, focusing on some case studies and examples. I will highlight various ways in which social kinds can be defective and propose solutions for all kinds of defectiveness.
In conclusion, I will briefly discuss how typical worries concerning Conceptual Engineering projects translate to my framework, focusing on the problems of Feasibility and Control.
2022-06-13T00:00:00ZCalosi, DuccioConceptual Engineering is a new and interesting trend in Philosophy. However, it is not free from problems. The most relevant issue is that, at least following a Cappelen-like account, we are forced to commit to the controversial metaphysical view that the world has a linguistic structure. Under such view, a modification in the semantics of a term implies a modification in nature of the thing which is referred by that word. I propose to explore the implications of the reversal of such principle, thereby committing to the idea that a modification in the nature of things implies a modification of the semantics of the terms that refer to them, and not the other way around. Following this new principle, I am interested in developing an alternative account to Conceptual Engineering, which I call (following Greenough) Reality Engineering.
In this dissertation, I will focus on the analysis of two major points about Reality Engineering, trying to define what it is about and how to perform it. I will argue that Reality Engineering has kinds as its scope and I will restrict the focus of the present enquiry to social kinds only. I will proceed by providing a taxonomy of the most popular views about the metaphysics of social kinds, since in order to modify something properly, first we have to be clear on what that something is. Out of this taxonomy, I will generate two general theories on social kinds. The first one is what we can call a Top-down view, and it says that a social kind is generated via the acceptance of constitutive rules by some group of authorities and the successful application of those rules in ordinary practice. The second one is what we can call a Bottom-up view, according to which social kinds are nothing but the reification of social external norms, where social external norms are to be intended as the set of attitudes/behaviours/treatments/practices that people who are not members of the kind have towards the members of such kind (trivially, if the kind in question, like money, does not include people as its members, then everyone is external to such kind). After presenting these two views, I will explore the possibility of engineering kinds within them, focusing on some case studies and examples. I will highlight various ways in which social kinds can be defective and propose solutions for all kinds of defectiveness.
In conclusion, I will briefly discuss how typical worries concerning Conceptual Engineering projects translate to my framework, focusing on the problems of Feasibility and Control.I'm a believer : Evans' transparency remark and self-knowledge
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29132
The central goal of this thesis is to understand self-knowledge through understanding a particularly difficult and promising remark of Gareth Evans’, from his The Varieties of Reference (Evans, 1982), a remark which has formed the basis of so called ‘Transparency’ accounts of self-knowledge. Evans’ Transparency Remark is sometimes read as deflationary of self-knowledge in some respect, and I hope to show that although Evans’ account is indeed deflationary of our ordinary idea of self-knowledge, it retains what we might consider central features of an account of self-knowledge.
I do this by giving an overview of the literature surrounding Evans’ remark and making a distinction between Rationalist and Inferentialist accounts of Transparency. I also suggest that the goal of an account of self-knowledge is to explain, or explain away, the phenomenon of Privileged Access. Having done this we return to Evans’ development of his remark, and from that I develop a novel Rationalist account of self-knowledge of belief which hews closely to Evans’ own development but differs in one significant way, which leads to an answer to one of the central objections to Transparency accounts of self-knowledge, the Puzzle of Transparency. Having developed this Simple Account of Transparency and defended it against what I take to be the major objections to Transparency accounts, I turn to the best developed Inferentialist account, Byrne’s Transparency and Self-Knowledge (Byrne, 2018), and suggest why we might find his account wanting. Finally, I suggest ways in which the Simple Account of Transparency might be extended into a general account of self-knowledge, and suggest there is one important unanswered question remaining.
2022-06-14T00:00:00ZConlan, Paul JohnThe central goal of this thesis is to understand self-knowledge through understanding a particularly difficult and promising remark of Gareth Evans’, from his The Varieties of Reference (Evans, 1982), a remark which has formed the basis of so called ‘Transparency’ accounts of self-knowledge. Evans’ Transparency Remark is sometimes read as deflationary of self-knowledge in some respect, and I hope to show that although Evans’ account is indeed deflationary of our ordinary idea of self-knowledge, it retains what we might consider central features of an account of self-knowledge.
I do this by giving an overview of the literature surrounding Evans’ remark and making a distinction between Rationalist and Inferentialist accounts of Transparency. I also suggest that the goal of an account of self-knowledge is to explain, or explain away, the phenomenon of Privileged Access. Having done this we return to Evans’ development of his remark, and from that I develop a novel Rationalist account of self-knowledge of belief which hews closely to Evans’ own development but differs in one significant way, which leads to an answer to one of the central objections to Transparency accounts of self-knowledge, the Puzzle of Transparency. Having developed this Simple Account of Transparency and defended it against what I take to be the major objections to Transparency accounts, I turn to the best developed Inferentialist account, Byrne’s Transparency and Self-Knowledge (Byrne, 2018), and suggest why we might find his account wanting. Finally, I suggest ways in which the Simple Account of Transparency might be extended into a general account of self-knowledge, and suggest there is one important unanswered question remaining.The verbal dispute about verbal disputes
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29131
Whether a dispute is verbal is important to figure out because it appears to make a huge difference for how the dispute should be resolved. To figure out whether individual disputes are verbal and to figure out how to resolve them, it is crucial to answer what it is for a dispute to be verbal. I defend a pluralistic answer to the question of what verbal disputes are: There are at least two phenomena that equally deserve to be called “verbal dispute”. The first phenomenon is the phenomenon of “talking past each other”, which I analyse in pragmatic terms. The second phenomenon is the phenomenon of “not really disagreeing”, which I analyse in doxastic terms. Both notions of “verbalness” respect certain features, but not others of how the expression “verbal dispute” is used. Furthermore, both notions are important to use since both make a difference for how best to proceed if a dispute is “verbal” in the sense in question.
In section 1, I outline why it is important to develop a good analysis of what verbal disputes are. In short, it is important because whether a dispute is verbal appears to make a difference for how to best resolve them. And resolving disputes in philosophy and academic disciplines more broadly is important to make progress. In section 2, I outline the method I use to establish my analyses of verbalness and argue for adopting this method for arguing for (and against) analyses of verbalness. In section 3, I consider a range of phrases typically used to describe what is distinctive about verbal disputes and boil them down to two central markers of verbal disputes: “talking past each other” and “not really disagreeing”. In section 4, I argue that both markers come apart and one may be present without the other, so these two markers of verbalness do in effect express two independent phenomena. In section 5, I consider existing approaches to the question of what verbal disputes are, consider which of the two phenomena these existing analyses are meant to capture and how well they do indeed capture the phenomenon in question. Building on how these existing approaches can be improved, I argue in section 6 for my analyses of pragmatic verbalness (“talking past each other”) and doxastic verbalness (“not really disagreeing”). In section 7, I argue that the dispute about verbal disputes is itself pragmatically and doxastically verbal. In section 8, I reply to a range of potential objections to my account of verbal disputes.
2022-06-13T00:00:00ZBecker, NiklasWhether a dispute is verbal is important to figure out because it appears to make a huge difference for how the dispute should be resolved. To figure out whether individual disputes are verbal and to figure out how to resolve them, it is crucial to answer what it is for a dispute to be verbal. I defend a pluralistic answer to the question of what verbal disputes are: There are at least two phenomena that equally deserve to be called “verbal dispute”. The first phenomenon is the phenomenon of “talking past each other”, which I analyse in pragmatic terms. The second phenomenon is the phenomenon of “not really disagreeing”, which I analyse in doxastic terms. Both notions of “verbalness” respect certain features, but not others of how the expression “verbal dispute” is used. Furthermore, both notions are important to use since both make a difference for how best to proceed if a dispute is “verbal” in the sense in question.
In section 1, I outline why it is important to develop a good analysis of what verbal disputes are. In short, it is important because whether a dispute is verbal appears to make a difference for how to best resolve them. And resolving disputes in philosophy and academic disciplines more broadly is important to make progress. In section 2, I outline the method I use to establish my analyses of verbalness and argue for adopting this method for arguing for (and against) analyses of verbalness. In section 3, I consider a range of phrases typically used to describe what is distinctive about verbal disputes and boil them down to two central markers of verbal disputes: “talking past each other” and “not really disagreeing”. In section 4, I argue that both markers come apart and one may be present without the other, so these two markers of verbalness do in effect express two independent phenomena. In section 5, I consider existing approaches to the question of what verbal disputes are, consider which of the two phenomena these existing analyses are meant to capture and how well they do indeed capture the phenomenon in question. Building on how these existing approaches can be improved, I argue in section 6 for my analyses of pragmatic verbalness (“talking past each other”) and doxastic verbalness (“not really disagreeing”). In section 7, I argue that the dispute about verbal disputes is itself pragmatically and doxastically verbal. In section 8, I reply to a range of potential objections to my account of verbal disputes.Navigating to the Island of Hope - a Pacific response to globalisation, environmental degradation and climate change
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29083
Navigating to the Island of Hope - A Pacific Response to Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Economic Globalisation in Oceania explores and seeks to understand indigenous responses to the powerful forces of globalisation and climate change through ethnographic research and cultural analysis spanning more than eight years in totality, and the Pacific renaissance concept of the Island of Hope. The Island of Hope serves as a lens, and is of interest both from a scholarly perspective and a praxis perspective, as the Island of Hope is a complex amalgamation and synthesis of Pacific ethics elements, economic justice, communal interconnectedness, cosmology and the Christian idea of heaven on Earth. This dissertation, just as the Island of Hope itself does, aims to critique and offer a unique perspective on a motivating and unifying principle in Oceania, which extends from the personal to international in scope, and explores the political and economic, the religious and spiritual, the local and global, as well as nature conservation and climate change activism. Global connections dictate global obligations.
2020-07-27T00:00:00ZGard, Rowan A.Navigating to the Island of Hope - A Pacific Response to Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Economic Globalisation in Oceania explores and seeks to understand indigenous responses to the powerful forces of globalisation and climate change through ethnographic research and cultural analysis spanning more than eight years in totality, and the Pacific renaissance concept of the Island of Hope. The Island of Hope serves as a lens, and is of interest both from a scholarly perspective and a praxis perspective, as the Island of Hope is a complex amalgamation and synthesis of Pacific ethics elements, economic justice, communal interconnectedness, cosmology and the Christian idea of heaven on Earth. This dissertation, just as the Island of Hope itself does, aims to critique and offer a unique perspective on a motivating and unifying principle in Oceania, which extends from the personal to international in scope, and explores the political and economic, the religious and spiritual, the local and global, as well as nature conservation and climate change activism. Global connections dictate global obligations.Articulating life-itself : growth, place and movement on Mugaba (Rennell) in the Solomon Islands
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29082
Mugaba (Rennell) and Mugiki (Bellona) in the Solomon Islands, is the site of multiple stories, to which different values are given through different registers of 'life-itself'. Research expeditions that renamed Mugaba's life forms would later provide the compelling qualities to merit East Rennell as a UNESCO World Heritage Site (and later as World Heritage in Danger). Earlier ethnographic accounts that endeavoured to capture the last glimpses of a pre-Christian culture, represented both Euro-American genetic legacies, and Rennellese and Bellonese descriptions of people 'coming out of place'. Fieldwork on East Rennell spanned over two years, exploring how Rennellese people have folded these converging stories into their analyses of historical becoming, creating novel articulations of life and its processes. Under the research theme 'Life Itself in the Pacific' at the Centre for Pacific Studies, this work takes Rennellese descriptions of life (human and non-human others) and its contingencies as its starting point. It explores Rennellese articulations of Life-Itself, how people's growth is also enabled by different kinds of movements and flows - those that have elsewhere been qualified as 'history', 'kinship', 'gender', and even 'ecology' - to examine what is at risk in an 'endangered' World Heritage Site.
2020-12-02T00:00:00ZBrowne, Mia KimberlyMugaba (Rennell) and Mugiki (Bellona) in the Solomon Islands, is the site of multiple stories, to which different values are given through different registers of 'life-itself'. Research expeditions that renamed Mugaba's life forms would later provide the compelling qualities to merit East Rennell as a UNESCO World Heritage Site (and later as World Heritage in Danger). Earlier ethnographic accounts that endeavoured to capture the last glimpses of a pre-Christian culture, represented both Euro-American genetic legacies, and Rennellese and Bellonese descriptions of people 'coming out of place'. Fieldwork on East Rennell spanned over two years, exploring how Rennellese people have folded these converging stories into their analyses of historical becoming, creating novel articulations of life and its processes. Under the research theme 'Life Itself in the Pacific' at the Centre for Pacific Studies, this work takes Rennellese descriptions of life (human and non-human others) and its contingencies as its starting point. It explores Rennellese articulations of Life-Itself, how people's growth is also enabled by different kinds of movements and flows - those that have elsewhere been qualified as 'history', 'kinship', 'gender', and even 'ecology' - to examine what is at risk in an 'endangered' World Heritage Site.Infrastructure in Melanesia : imaginaries, experiences and practices of road making in Buka Island
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29081
This thesis explores Melanesian concepts of roads based on multilocal ethnographic research on different kinds of roads in Buka Island, the northern island of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville, Papua New Guinea. It explores how different modes of socialities, politics, and future imaginaries have to be negotiated in the context of infrastructural transformation and varying degrees of infrastructural fragility. Taking the idioms for roads like maroro in Haku dialect and rot in Tok Pisin as an analytical vantage point, my thesis analyses how people in Buka conceptualize, build, maintain, and move along different types of roads, including garden roads (beaten footpaths), coral roads, and sealed sections of a highway. It compares the different socialities, politics, and imaginaries these roads generate and the ways in which they intersect and mutually inform each other. Inspired by the anthropology of roads and infrastructure, I argue that Melanesian socialities and politics and their continuously changing articulations can be addressed particularly well by looking at infrastructural transformations, specifically of roads. In addition, this thesis contributes a Melanesian perspective to the anthroplogy of roads and infrastructure by experimenting with the question of what practices and imaginaries create roads and what makes them infrastructural in Buka. It demonstrates the importance of taking other concepts of roads and types of roads into account when seeking to understand the changes large-scale public infrastructure projects like highway construction bring about for people.
2021-06-28T00:00:00ZRosolowsky, Marlit FelizitasThis thesis explores Melanesian concepts of roads based on multilocal ethnographic research on different kinds of roads in Buka Island, the northern island of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville, Papua New Guinea. It explores how different modes of socialities, politics, and future imaginaries have to be negotiated in the context of infrastructural transformation and varying degrees of infrastructural fragility. Taking the idioms for roads like maroro in Haku dialect and rot in Tok Pisin as an analytical vantage point, my thesis analyses how people in Buka conceptualize, build, maintain, and move along different types of roads, including garden roads (beaten footpaths), coral roads, and sealed sections of a highway. It compares the different socialities, politics, and imaginaries these roads generate and the ways in which they intersect and mutually inform each other. Inspired by the anthropology of roads and infrastructure, I argue that Melanesian socialities and politics and their continuously changing articulations can be addressed particularly well by looking at infrastructural transformations, specifically of roads. In addition, this thesis contributes a Melanesian perspective to the anthroplogy of roads and infrastructure by experimenting with the question of what practices and imaginaries create roads and what makes them infrastructural in Buka. It demonstrates the importance of taking other concepts of roads and types of roads into account when seeking to understand the changes large-scale public infrastructure projects like highway construction bring about for people.The time we experience : understanding the phenomenologies of temporal passage and presentness
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29033
This dissertation explores what is involved in the alleged phenomenologies of the passage of time and the present, two phenomenological data that are normally cited to support the A-theory of time. It argues that the phenomenology corresponding to the purported passage phenomenology is that of dynamic changes in things’ states, and the phenomenology corresponding to the purported presentness phenomenology is that of (only) some things and events occurring simpliciter. It claims that these illusory phenomenologies are products of the feature of our perceptual experience of having a confined temporal horizon, which includes three aspects – limited access, involuntariness, and directionality. It also argues that the illusory phenomenologies of dynamic change and things and events occurring simpliciter, despite being at odds with the B-ontology, do not lend support to the A-theory of time. Furthermore, it provides insight into why our perceptual experience has a confined temporal horizon and how the intuitive beliefs that we experience temporal passage and presentness arise from the illusory phenomenologies.
2024-06-10T00:00:00ZChen, KeyuThis dissertation explores what is involved in the alleged phenomenologies of the passage of time and the present, two phenomenological data that are normally cited to support the A-theory of time. It argues that the phenomenology corresponding to the purported passage phenomenology is that of dynamic changes in things’ states, and the phenomenology corresponding to the purported presentness phenomenology is that of (only) some things and events occurring simpliciter. It claims that these illusory phenomenologies are products of the feature of our perceptual experience of having a confined temporal horizon, which includes three aspects – limited access, involuntariness, and directionality. It also argues that the illusory phenomenologies of dynamic change and things and events occurring simpliciter, despite being at odds with the B-ontology, do not lend support to the A-theory of time. Furthermore, it provides insight into why our perceptual experience has a confined temporal horizon and how the intuitive beliefs that we experience temporal passage and presentness arise from the illusory phenomenologies.Watch and learn : film and the British educational life 1895-1910
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29011
This thesis examines the relationship between film and education in Britain before 1910 and comprehends the impact of moral, religious, and disciplinary instructional cultures on the British film industry. Equally, the thesis traces how the moving image capabilities of the cinematic medium shaped the visual instruction methods of educational institutions such as schools, universities, churches, and disciplinary societies. This thesis argues that the process of institutionalisation of educational film began from the earliest days of the medium, and that forms of institutionalisation existed from these earliest days, rather than in the 1910s as film
historical literature has previously stated. Further, that the history of film’s usefulness to educational institutions is not a singular media history. Here, I situate film within a wider media archaeological framework, and reflect on how developments in moving image technology, and production and exhibition practices, were informed by the socio-cultural roles fulfilled by other
media, such as popular print and magic lantern projection.
Specifically, I examine how late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century legislations that regulated public entertainment shaped the use of film within places of public education in Britain; I discuss how film producers sought to advertise their educational usefulness via the publication of written content; I trace the overlapping history of cinema and geographical education, to show that film was crucial to popularising the discipline’s modes of thinking; and finally, I show how even in its absence within religious institutions, cinema was seminal in shaping the religious instruction strategies within these organisations.
My methodology has been to make use of materials that are recognised for their value to legal, municipal, disciplinary, and religious histories, and foreground their relevance to the history of moving image media. Here the thesis’ discussions are based not only on film-specific archival research – catalogues, trade-journals etc. – but also on the study of municipal records, church committee minutes, proceedings of literary and scientific societies, religious and scientific journals, and other documents that often had very little direct mention of film. In doing so, I connect the development in film technologies, and production and exhibition practices, to the wider developments in turn-of-the-century Britain. Thus, taking an interdisciplinary approach that positions the discourse around film and education within a broader legal, political, and sociological context of British society, the thesis shows that the
history of educational film is central to the history of early filmmaking practice and its subsequent cultural impact.
2024-06-10T00:00:00ZRamakrishnan Agrwaal, AnushrutThis thesis examines the relationship between film and education in Britain before 1910 and comprehends the impact of moral, religious, and disciplinary instructional cultures on the British film industry. Equally, the thesis traces how the moving image capabilities of the cinematic medium shaped the visual instruction methods of educational institutions such as schools, universities, churches, and disciplinary societies. This thesis argues that the process of institutionalisation of educational film began from the earliest days of the medium, and that forms of institutionalisation existed from these earliest days, rather than in the 1910s as film
historical literature has previously stated. Further, that the history of film’s usefulness to educational institutions is not a singular media history. Here, I situate film within a wider media archaeological framework, and reflect on how developments in moving image technology, and production and exhibition practices, were informed by the socio-cultural roles fulfilled by other
media, such as popular print and magic lantern projection.
Specifically, I examine how late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century legislations that regulated public entertainment shaped the use of film within places of public education in Britain; I discuss how film producers sought to advertise their educational usefulness via the publication of written content; I trace the overlapping history of cinema and geographical education, to show that film was crucial to popularising the discipline’s modes of thinking; and finally, I show how even in its absence within religious institutions, cinema was seminal in shaping the religious instruction strategies within these organisations.
My methodology has been to make use of materials that are recognised for their value to legal, municipal, disciplinary, and religious histories, and foreground their relevance to the history of moving image media. Here the thesis’ discussions are based not only on film-specific archival research – catalogues, trade-journals etc. – but also on the study of municipal records, church committee minutes, proceedings of literary and scientific societies, religious and scientific journals, and other documents that often had very little direct mention of film. In doing so, I connect the development in film technologies, and production and exhibition practices, to the wider developments in turn-of-the-century Britain. Thus, taking an interdisciplinary approach that positions the discourse around film and education within a broader legal, political, and sociological context of British society, the thesis shows that the
history of educational film is central to the history of early filmmaking practice and its subsequent cultural impact.Indeterminacy and the law of the excluded middle
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/28934
This thesis is an investigation into indeterminacy in the foundations of mathematics and its possible consequences for the applicability of the law of the excluded middle (LEM). It characterises different ways in which the natural numbers as well as the sets may be understood to be indeterminate, and asks in what sense this would cease to support applicability of LEM to reasoning with them. The first part of the thesis reviews the indeterminacy phenomena on which the argument is based and argues for a distinction between two notions of indeterminacy: a) indeterminacy as applied to domains and b) indefiniteness as applied to concepts. It then addresses possible attempts to secure determinacy in both cases. The second part of the thesis discusses the advantages that an argument from indeterminacy has over traditional intuitionistic arguments against LEM, and it provides the framework in which conditions for the applicability of LEM can be explicated in the setting of indeterminacy. The final part of the thesis then applies these findings to concrete cases of indeterminacy. With respect to indeterminacy of domains, I note some problems for establishing a rejection of LEM based on the indeterminacy of the height of the set theoretic hierarchy. I show that a coherent argument can be made for the rejection of LEM based on the indeterminacy of its width, and assess its philosophical commitments. A final chapter addresses the notion of indefiniteness of our concepts of set and number and asks how this might affect the applicability of LEM.
2024-06-10T00:00:00ZEngler, Jann PaulThis thesis is an investigation into indeterminacy in the foundations of mathematics and its possible consequences for the applicability of the law of the excluded middle (LEM). It characterises different ways in which the natural numbers as well as the sets may be understood to be indeterminate, and asks in what sense this would cease to support applicability of LEM to reasoning with them. The first part of the thesis reviews the indeterminacy phenomena on which the argument is based and argues for a distinction between two notions of indeterminacy: a) indeterminacy as applied to domains and b) indefiniteness as applied to concepts. It then addresses possible attempts to secure determinacy in both cases. The second part of the thesis discusses the advantages that an argument from indeterminacy has over traditional intuitionistic arguments against LEM, and it provides the framework in which conditions for the applicability of LEM can be explicated in the setting of indeterminacy. The final part of the thesis then applies these findings to concrete cases of indeterminacy. With respect to indeterminacy of domains, I note some problems for establishing a rejection of LEM based on the indeterminacy of the height of the set theoretic hierarchy. I show that a coherent argument can be made for the rejection of LEM based on the indeterminacy of its width, and assess its philosophical commitments. A final chapter addresses the notion of indefiniteness of our concepts of set and number and asks how this might affect the applicability of LEM.The mark of the cognitive
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/28831
Several philosophical debates in the philosophy of mind and of the cognitive sciences seem to require the elaboration of a mark of the cognitive (MOC). Some proposals for individually necessary and/or jointly sufficient conditions for cognition are already available, but each of them is not entirely satisfactory for different reasons.
I start by drawing on some of the extant proposals, and I advance a possible candidate necessary condition for cognition. I motivate the claim that cognition requires the existence of a first-person perspective (1PP) associated with it. However, while reasonable, I argue that we should not ultimately accept this claim. Moreover, some of the reasons that I provide for not accepting it also apply to the broader methodological family of approaches to cognition that has been labelled by Lyon (2006) the “anthropogenic” family. As a result, it is not just the 1PP condition that needs to be dismissed, it is the entire anthropogenic approach to cognition that should not be pursued in attempting to elaborate a MOC.
Luckily, the other broad methodological family, the one of the “biogenic” approaches to cognition, is not vulnerable to the same issues that arise in the case of anthropogenic approaches. We should therefore adopt a biogenic approach to the issue of finding a mark of the cognitive. Nevertheless, elaborating a MOC within a biogenic framework may not prove as beneficial as one may hope. In fact, what appears to be the most promising and positively received product of a biogenic approach, namely the Free-Energy Principle and the accounts of cognition based on it, needs to be understood in instrumentalist terms. Consequently, while we may still be able to achieve an understanding of what cognition is, some of the debates meant to be settled by the elaboration of a MOC may remain unsettled.
2024-06-10T00:00:00ZPisano, Niccolò AimoneSeveral philosophical debates in the philosophy of mind and of the cognitive sciences seem to require the elaboration of a mark of the cognitive (MOC). Some proposals for individually necessary and/or jointly sufficient conditions for cognition are already available, but each of them is not entirely satisfactory for different reasons.
I start by drawing on some of the extant proposals, and I advance a possible candidate necessary condition for cognition. I motivate the claim that cognition requires the existence of a first-person perspective (1PP) associated with it. However, while reasonable, I argue that we should not ultimately accept this claim. Moreover, some of the reasons that I provide for not accepting it also apply to the broader methodological family of approaches to cognition that has been labelled by Lyon (2006) the “anthropogenic” family. As a result, it is not just the 1PP condition that needs to be dismissed, it is the entire anthropogenic approach to cognition that should not be pursued in attempting to elaborate a MOC.
Luckily, the other broad methodological family, the one of the “biogenic” approaches to cognition, is not vulnerable to the same issues that arise in the case of anthropogenic approaches. We should therefore adopt a biogenic approach to the issue of finding a mark of the cognitive. Nevertheless, elaborating a MOC within a biogenic framework may not prove as beneficial as one may hope. In fact, what appears to be the most promising and positively received product of a biogenic approach, namely the Free-Energy Principle and the accounts of cognition based on it, needs to be understood in instrumentalist terms. Consequently, while we may still be able to achieve an understanding of what cognition is, some of the debates meant to be settled by the elaboration of a MOC may remain unsettled.The promise of Andean khipu transcriptions : a multi-scale investigation
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/28761
Among the most distinctive documents from the early-colonial Andes are Spanish-language transcriptions of information rendered, in various settings, from khipus—undeciphered knotted string devices that served the function of writing in the Inka Empire (c. 1400–1532 CE). The surviving khipu transcriptions, sometimes also referred to as “paper khipus,” have informed decades of historical research and decipherment projects, which in large part have foregrounded the close study of individual transcriptions. However, how might the conclusions reached from these documents evolve when they are instead studied from a variety of distances and interpretive vantage points—close and far; qualitative and quantitative? Informed by currents in performance theory, semiotics, and the digital humanities, this thesis presents close reading and quantitative aggregation as mutually reinforcing strategies for the study of early colonial khipu transcriptions, employing what Ted Underwood has called a “juxtaposition of scales.” It is argued, by way of three practical case studies, that a multi-scale approach to studying paper khipus enables as much the revelation of new ethnohistoric insights as it does the assessment of previous hypotheses derived from close reading.
Following a historical introduction to khipus and their colonial-era transcriptions, the first case study finds that scribal corrections in a handful of paper khipus may preserve traces of the original “readings” of knotted strings by Andean cord keepers. The second case study zooms out to analyse action verb usage across 10,000 lines of digitized khipu transcriptions, adding new contours to previous narratives of early-colonial economic transformation first proposed by scholars including John Murra and others. Finally, the third case study presents a blueprint for the ambitious task of searching for matches between the surviving transcriptions and individual khipus in existing collections, focusing on a khipu studied by the author in the Museum der Kulturen (Museum of Cultures), Basel, Switzerland. The multi-scale approach is discussed throughout as a tool for ethnohistorians investigating other records of cross-cultural encounter.
2022-06-13T00:00:00ZMedrano, Manuel AntonioAmong the most distinctive documents from the early-colonial Andes are Spanish-language transcriptions of information rendered, in various settings, from khipus—undeciphered knotted string devices that served the function of writing in the Inka Empire (c. 1400–1532 CE). The surviving khipu transcriptions, sometimes also referred to as “paper khipus,” have informed decades of historical research and decipherment projects, which in large part have foregrounded the close study of individual transcriptions. However, how might the conclusions reached from these documents evolve when they are instead studied from a variety of distances and interpretive vantage points—close and far; qualitative and quantitative? Informed by currents in performance theory, semiotics, and the digital humanities, this thesis presents close reading and quantitative aggregation as mutually reinforcing strategies for the study of early colonial khipu transcriptions, employing what Ted Underwood has called a “juxtaposition of scales.” It is argued, by way of three practical case studies, that a multi-scale approach to studying paper khipus enables as much the revelation of new ethnohistoric insights as it does the assessment of previous hypotheses derived from close reading.
Following a historical introduction to khipus and their colonial-era transcriptions, the first case study finds that scribal corrections in a handful of paper khipus may preserve traces of the original “readings” of knotted strings by Andean cord keepers. The second case study zooms out to analyse action verb usage across 10,000 lines of digitized khipu transcriptions, adding new contours to previous narratives of early-colonial economic transformation first proposed by scholars including John Murra and others. Finally, the third case study presents a blueprint for the ambitious task of searching for matches between the surviving transcriptions and individual khipus in existing collections, focusing on a khipu studied by the author in the Museum der Kulturen (Museum of Cultures), Basel, Switzerland. The multi-scale approach is discussed throughout as a tool for ethnohistorians investigating other records of cross-cultural encounter.In defence of a hyperintensional conception of properties
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/28678
In contrast to an intensional conception of properties, which says that sameness of intension among properties implies property identity, a hyperintensional conception of properties says that sameness of intension among properties does not imply property identity, and hence distinct properties may have the very same intension. This PhD thesis is about the metaphysical standing of a hyperintensional conception of properties. While this conception of properties might have an important place in discussions concerning the different ways we represent properties in our language and thought, skepticism looms large among proponents of an intensional conception of properties when a metaphysician takes a hyperintensional conception of properties to extend beyond how we represent properties and into discussions concerning how properties themselves are. The central project of this thesis is to articulate the considerations that underlie this skepticism and defend a hyperintensional conception of properties against them.
In chapter one, I set the scene by addressing a number of preliminary matters that shape my defence of a hyperintensional conception of properties. In chapter two, I consider and respond to objections that this conception of properties relies on distinct properties that do not have the same intension. In chapter three, I consider and respond to objections that this conception of properties is based upon some linguistic and/or epistemic illusion. In chapter four, I present and examine a modal objection, which calls into question hyperintensional distinctions among properties. In chapter five, I consider and respond to objections that this conception of properties is problematic on theoretical and methodological grounds. In chapter six, I round out my defence by proposing a hyperintensional theory of property identity, in order to resolve two problems that lie at the heart of any metaphysically adequate hyperintensional conception of properties.
2023-11-29T00:00:00ZSnodgrass, J. J.In contrast to an intensional conception of properties, which says that sameness of intension among properties implies property identity, a hyperintensional conception of properties says that sameness of intension among properties does not imply property identity, and hence distinct properties may have the very same intension. This PhD thesis is about the metaphysical standing of a hyperintensional conception of properties. While this conception of properties might have an important place in discussions concerning the different ways we represent properties in our language and thought, skepticism looms large among proponents of an intensional conception of properties when a metaphysician takes a hyperintensional conception of properties to extend beyond how we represent properties and into discussions concerning how properties themselves are. The central project of this thesis is to articulate the considerations that underlie this skepticism and defend a hyperintensional conception of properties against them.
In chapter one, I set the scene by addressing a number of preliminary matters that shape my defence of a hyperintensional conception of properties. In chapter two, I consider and respond to objections that this conception of properties relies on distinct properties that do not have the same intension. In chapter three, I consider and respond to objections that this conception of properties is based upon some linguistic and/or epistemic illusion. In chapter four, I present and examine a modal objection, which calls into question hyperintensional distinctions among properties. In chapter five, I consider and respond to objections that this conception of properties is problematic on theoretical and methodological grounds. In chapter six, I round out my defence by proposing a hyperintensional theory of property identity, in order to resolve two problems that lie at the heart of any metaphysically adequate hyperintensional conception of properties.The unity of virtues in Plato and Aristotle
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/28676
“Unity of virtues” is the idea that virtues should be understood in holistic terms.
Part I focuses on Plato’s Protagoras. It argues that, according to Plato’s Socrates, “unity of virtues” is true in the sense that all the apparently different virtues are in fact the same state of soul, namely the state of knowledge. Knowledge shapes how one perceives, deliberates, chooses, acts, and feels. Socrates’ ideal agent is transparent in the sense that what he knows of himself is the same as the truth about what ought to be the case. Further, the idea that “virtue is one” has important pedagogical significance: in reminding us that virtue cannot be compartmentalised, it demands us to stay vigilant: there is always an opportunity to be virtuous, just as there is always an opportunity to be vicious.
Part II concentrates mainly on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics VI and its relation to II-V. It argues that, according to Aristotle, “unity of virtues” is true because attaining practical truth implies the mutual entailment of the ethical virtues. The different ethical virtues can be seen as different ways to attain practical truth, and these different ways of attaining practical truth are themselves manifestations of our nature as practical rational beings. Aristotle’s ideal agent is transparent in an even deeper sense: the excellent condition of his soul reveals the truth about what it is to live well as a practical rational being. Further, in emphasising the importance of “choice”, Aristotle’s account captures how, contra Plato’s Socrates, the well-functioning of the practical intellect is hostage to the well-functioning of the non-rational soul. Aristotle’s theory is just intellectualised enough: the wise practical intellect has its proper role to play, but the ethical virtues are not thereby reduced to wisdom.
2023-11-29T00:00:00ZChong, I Xuan“Unity of virtues” is the idea that virtues should be understood in holistic terms.
Part I focuses on Plato’s Protagoras. It argues that, according to Plato’s Socrates, “unity of virtues” is true in the sense that all the apparently different virtues are in fact the same state of soul, namely the state of knowledge. Knowledge shapes how one perceives, deliberates, chooses, acts, and feels. Socrates’ ideal agent is transparent in the sense that what he knows of himself is the same as the truth about what ought to be the case. Further, the idea that “virtue is one” has important pedagogical significance: in reminding us that virtue cannot be compartmentalised, it demands us to stay vigilant: there is always an opportunity to be virtuous, just as there is always an opportunity to be vicious.
Part II concentrates mainly on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics VI and its relation to II-V. It argues that, according to Aristotle, “unity of virtues” is true because attaining practical truth implies the mutual entailment of the ethical virtues. The different ethical virtues can be seen as different ways to attain practical truth, and these different ways of attaining practical truth are themselves manifestations of our nature as practical rational beings. Aristotle’s ideal agent is transparent in an even deeper sense: the excellent condition of his soul reveals the truth about what it is to live well as a practical rational being. Further, in emphasising the importance of “choice”, Aristotle’s account captures how, contra Plato’s Socrates, the well-functioning of the practical intellect is hostage to the well-functioning of the non-rational soul. Aristotle’s theory is just intellectualised enough: the wise practical intellect has its proper role to play, but the ethical virtues are not thereby reduced to wisdom.Involuted self : the making of elite students in an honored college in Northwest China
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/28594
Abstract redacted
2023-11-29T00:00:00ZZhang, XiaoyangAbstract redactedEcuadorian cinema for the 21st century : negotiating neoliberalism? Policy, industry, and memory during the Ley de Cine years
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/28344
This thesis examines Ecuadorian cinema after the 2006 National Film Promotion Law or Ley de Cine, and its relationship to the encompassing political ideology of Socialism for the 21st century. It contends that the local cinema developed during this period, the so-called “mini-boom” of Ecuadorian cinema, carries the same ambiguities, ruptures, and even reversals as its governing ideology,
constituting what I label “Ecuadorian cinema for the 21st century”. In particular, this thesis identifies underlying neoliberal tendencies that are maintained, and at times encouraged by the mentioned policy and its operational arm, the National Film Council or CNCine, despite the anti-hegemonic rhetoric that informed this political period. To support this argument, this thesis initially argues for Ecuadorian cinema as a national industry, associating the local know-how with broader theories on national and transnational cinemas. With film activities dating back to the early 1900s, Ecuadorian cinema has constructed a particular definition of success that involves participation in film festivals, theatrical exhibition, and box office performance. Yet, Ecuadorian cinema also seems preoccupied by themes of social justice, environmental concerns, migration and coloniality, with cinema representing a continual
space for negotiation and reorientation. As such, this thesis examines the production practices, aesthetic choices, and narrative themes of films that achieved theatrical exhibition between 2007 and 2015, resulting in four identifiable tendencies: narrative features supported by CNCine and constituting a preferred indie subfield, vernacular film expressions that operate outside state support, community cinema practices that prioritise the needs and rights of the community, and memory articulations in documentary form. For each case, the ambiguities of Ecuadorian cinema for the 21st century are made evident, further emphasised by the dismantling of cultural policies in recent years.
2022-06-13T00:00:00ZMiño Puga, Maria FernandaThis thesis examines Ecuadorian cinema after the 2006 National Film Promotion Law or Ley de Cine, and its relationship to the encompassing political ideology of Socialism for the 21st century. It contends that the local cinema developed during this period, the so-called “mini-boom” of Ecuadorian cinema, carries the same ambiguities, ruptures, and even reversals as its governing ideology,
constituting what I label “Ecuadorian cinema for the 21st century”. In particular, this thesis identifies underlying neoliberal tendencies that are maintained, and at times encouraged by the mentioned policy and its operational arm, the National Film Council or CNCine, despite the anti-hegemonic rhetoric that informed this political period. To support this argument, this thesis initially argues for Ecuadorian cinema as a national industry, associating the local know-how with broader theories on national and transnational cinemas. With film activities dating back to the early 1900s, Ecuadorian cinema has constructed a particular definition of success that involves participation in film festivals, theatrical exhibition, and box office performance. Yet, Ecuadorian cinema also seems preoccupied by themes of social justice, environmental concerns, migration and coloniality, with cinema representing a continual
space for negotiation and reorientation. As such, this thesis examines the production practices, aesthetic choices, and narrative themes of films that achieved theatrical exhibition between 2007 and 2015, resulting in four identifiable tendencies: narrative features supported by CNCine and constituting a preferred indie subfield, vernacular film expressions that operate outside state support, community cinema practices that prioritise the needs and rights of the community, and memory articulations in documentary form. For each case, the ambiguities of Ecuadorian cinema for the 21st century are made evident, further emphasised by the dismantling of cultural policies in recent years.Deciphering the multilevel Khipu structures : a mixed-methods triangulation modelled on the communal Khipu Boards of Mangas and Casta
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/28260
Since the Middle Horizon the Khipu, or cord writing, of Peru has employed standardised signs. The Inka empire further extended the Khipu for the recording of various aspects of mundane and ritual life. Later, hybrid Khipu combining alphabetic with Indigenous Khipu script, such as the Khipu Boards of Mangas and Casta, were used in the central Andes from the sixteenth century until the middle of the twentieth century. Using a multidisciplinary approach, I triangulated archaeometry (statistical analysis) of the first digital record of the alphabetic Khipu from the community of Mangas in Ancash, with ethnoarchaeology and ethnomethodology at the community of San Pedro de Casta in Huarochirí of Lima. I compare the Mangas Khipu Board with Middle-Horizon Khipu and I look at the use of Khipu Boards through material and ethnographic analysis. Prioritising Indigenous perspectives, I explore the multidimensionality of work tribute registered on the hybrid Khipu of Mangas and Casta to detect sign redundancy and offer an interpretation of their meaning (semantic decipherment). I demonstrate how non-hierarchical structures have been overlooked with the assumption that Khipu structures are hierarchically nested. I develop complex ethnomodels, applicable to other Khipu exhibiting multilevel structures beyond those of the ethnographic context, for the purpose of aiding Khipu methodology and towards a ‘multilevel turn’ in mixed-methods anthropology.
2023-11-29T00:00:00ZKoulouri, MariaSince the Middle Horizon the Khipu, or cord writing, of Peru has employed standardised signs. The Inka empire further extended the Khipu for the recording of various aspects of mundane and ritual life. Later, hybrid Khipu combining alphabetic with Indigenous Khipu script, such as the Khipu Boards of Mangas and Casta, were used in the central Andes from the sixteenth century until the middle of the twentieth century. Using a multidisciplinary approach, I triangulated archaeometry (statistical analysis) of the first digital record of the alphabetic Khipu from the community of Mangas in Ancash, with ethnoarchaeology and ethnomethodology at the community of San Pedro de Casta in Huarochirí of Lima. I compare the Mangas Khipu Board with Middle-Horizon Khipu and I look at the use of Khipu Boards through material and ethnographic analysis. Prioritising Indigenous perspectives, I explore the multidimensionality of work tribute registered on the hybrid Khipu of Mangas and Casta to detect sign redundancy and offer an interpretation of their meaning (semantic decipherment). I demonstrate how non-hierarchical structures have been overlooked with the assumption that Khipu structures are hierarchically nested. I develop complex ethnomodels, applicable to other Khipu exhibiting multilevel structures beyond those of the ethnographic context, for the purpose of aiding Khipu methodology and towards a ‘multilevel turn’ in mixed-methods anthropology.Title redacted
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/28022
Abstract redacted
2023-11-29T00:00:00ZKawasmi, ManarAbstract redactedBeing a viviente : confusion, personhood and autochthony in Tweo Coldita (Quellón, Chiloé, Chile)
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/28021
This thesis addresses notions of personhood in Tweo Coldita, an indigenous community located on Coldita island (Chiloé). It addresses relationality, selfhood and autochthony by means of the Colditan notion of “viviente”, “a person who is living” in spaces between forest and tide. These spaces or “campos”, which Colditans strive to keep open, constitute a “lived world of confusion” from where the viviente emerges. Confusion describes how moving “borders” (environmental, social, temporal and of selfhood) tend to overlap, threatening to drive the viviente and its environment towards a lack of differentiation. To be a proper viviente is a constant struggle in a mythicized world. I argue that the latter’s confusing nature, along that of the vivientes themselves, can be elicited from a “mythical schema” stemming from a Chilote version of the Treng-Treng and Kay-Kay Vilú myth. In this narration, a catastrophe makes the sea and the lands clash, and a lonely, mad man is left in a submerged world. This resembles Tweo Colditans’ notions on confusion: colliding environmental elements growing over the campos and loneliness as a limit for the viviente, a person that is constantly menaced with being turned inwards and that must strive to relate to others and reproduce a world. Because of this mythification, a doubt lingers about the viviente’s origin. This doubt is reflected in the relationship with dwelling places, the campos, in the form of a confusion within that emerges as a feeling of “uncanniness”. I propose that the haunting of the uncanny in Tweo Coldita has to do with the problem of autochthony, the impossibility to fully belong, making the constitution of vivientes an impossible task. The viviente is constantly diluting into confusing selfhood through the very mythicized structuring of the world enacted from the campos. These Colditans notions allow to discuss relationality, personhood and the self, and recent descriptions of Chiloé as defined by the tradition/modernity dyad.
2023-11-29T00:00:00ZSaavedra Gómez, José JoaquínThis thesis addresses notions of personhood in Tweo Coldita, an indigenous community located on Coldita island (Chiloé). It addresses relationality, selfhood and autochthony by means of the Colditan notion of “viviente”, “a person who is living” in spaces between forest and tide. These spaces or “campos”, which Colditans strive to keep open, constitute a “lived world of confusion” from where the viviente emerges. Confusion describes how moving “borders” (environmental, social, temporal and of selfhood) tend to overlap, threatening to drive the viviente and its environment towards a lack of differentiation. To be a proper viviente is a constant struggle in a mythicized world. I argue that the latter’s confusing nature, along that of the vivientes themselves, can be elicited from a “mythical schema” stemming from a Chilote version of the Treng-Treng and Kay-Kay Vilú myth. In this narration, a catastrophe makes the sea and the lands clash, and a lonely, mad man is left in a submerged world. This resembles Tweo Colditans’ notions on confusion: colliding environmental elements growing over the campos and loneliness as a limit for the viviente, a person that is constantly menaced with being turned inwards and that must strive to relate to others and reproduce a world. Because of this mythification, a doubt lingers about the viviente’s origin. This doubt is reflected in the relationship with dwelling places, the campos, in the form of a confusion within that emerges as a feeling of “uncanniness”. I propose that the haunting of the uncanny in Tweo Coldita has to do with the problem of autochthony, the impossibility to fully belong, making the constitution of vivientes an impossible task. The viviente is constantly diluting into confusing selfhood through the very mythicized structuring of the world enacted from the campos. These Colditans notions allow to discuss relationality, personhood and the self, and recent descriptions of Chiloé as defined by the tradition/modernity dyad.A human right to cultural heritage
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27848
In recent years, global institutions like the UN and UNESCO have increasingly treated obligations to preserve cultural heritage as obligations to uphold human rights. Owing to the relative novelty of this approach, little work has been done to see what exactly such rights would be and how this treatment of cultural heritage could be justified. Not only is it unclear what the foundations of a human right to cultural heritage are or what precisely such a right ought to entail, but it is equally uncertain what is meant by cultural heritage in the first place. Considering this, the aims of the thesis are the following: (i) provide a philosophically robust definition of cultural heritage and its social value that could serve as a foundation of the human rights approach to cultural heritage; (ii) building on this understanding of cultural heritage, provide a systematic conceptual analysis of obligations to preserve cultural heritage understood in the language of human rights. The thesis defends a constructionist-inspired account of cultural heritage, according to which cultural heritage is not primarily about historical objects and practices, but rather about how we employ such objects and practices to make sense of our internal and external worlds, both as individuals and as communities. Equipped with this understanding of cultural heritage the thesis provides a justification of a human right to cultural heritage by appealing to the centrality of cultural heritage to our individual normative agency. This is followed by a discussion of the limits of a human right to cultural heritage, where such limits are determined by its harmful uses. Lastly, the thesis provides a discussion of legal duties that a human right to cultural heritage will generate and briefly considers whose responsibility such duties are.
2022-11-30T00:00:00ZDavidaviciute, RasaIn recent years, global institutions like the UN and UNESCO have increasingly treated obligations to preserve cultural heritage as obligations to uphold human rights. Owing to the relative novelty of this approach, little work has been done to see what exactly such rights would be and how this treatment of cultural heritage could be justified. Not only is it unclear what the foundations of a human right to cultural heritage are or what precisely such a right ought to entail, but it is equally uncertain what is meant by cultural heritage in the first place. Considering this, the aims of the thesis are the following: (i) provide a philosophically robust definition of cultural heritage and its social value that could serve as a foundation of the human rights approach to cultural heritage; (ii) building on this understanding of cultural heritage, provide a systematic conceptual analysis of obligations to preserve cultural heritage understood in the language of human rights. The thesis defends a constructionist-inspired account of cultural heritage, according to which cultural heritage is not primarily about historical objects and practices, but rather about how we employ such objects and practices to make sense of our internal and external worlds, both as individuals and as communities. Equipped with this understanding of cultural heritage the thesis provides a justification of a human right to cultural heritage by appealing to the centrality of cultural heritage to our individual normative agency. This is followed by a discussion of the limits of a human right to cultural heritage, where such limits are determined by its harmful uses. Lastly, the thesis provides a discussion of legal duties that a human right to cultural heritage will generate and briefly considers whose responsibility such duties are.When the place speaks : an analysis of the use of venues and locations in the international film festival circuit
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27840
This thesis examines how film festival venues participate in shaping broader film cultures. It proposes an approach to studying film festivals that is founded on looking at their physical spaces instead of merely focusing on the social space of film festivals. The physical sites, as essential and tangible elements and practices of film festivals (and ones entangled with questions of capital and power), play an essential role in representing films, presenting places, and navigating audiences. As such, they open up a productive route for understanding how festivals shape film cultures. Two major case studies – the International Film Festival Rotterdam (IFFR) and the Shanghai International Film Festival (SIFF) – are analysed in this thesis, along with a case study of SIFF and IFFR during the COVID-19 pandemic. The festival venue is approached in terms of three key considerations in three layers: the geographical locations of film festivals, urban space and film festivals, and event sites of film festivals. This research contributes to the field of film festival studies and engages with the broader field of film cultures by highlighting the role of festival venues in presenting film cultures and drawing attention to the material basis of the global film festival circuit. Given the tremendous impact of film festivals' locations and venues – as material and physical features of festivals – on local and global film cultures, I argue that film festivals' venues should be examined in relation to the festivals' intangible formations. It can help us further understand how film festivals have been shaped by the political economy relating to location and how they occupy urban space and engage with the diversity of exhibition practices and space.
2023-11-30T00:00:00ZLi, PeizeThis thesis examines how film festival venues participate in shaping broader film cultures. It proposes an approach to studying film festivals that is founded on looking at their physical spaces instead of merely focusing on the social space of film festivals. The physical sites, as essential and tangible elements and practices of film festivals (and ones entangled with questions of capital and power), play an essential role in representing films, presenting places, and navigating audiences. As such, they open up a productive route for understanding how festivals shape film cultures. Two major case studies – the International Film Festival Rotterdam (IFFR) and the Shanghai International Film Festival (SIFF) – are analysed in this thesis, along with a case study of SIFF and IFFR during the COVID-19 pandemic. The festival venue is approached in terms of three key considerations in three layers: the geographical locations of film festivals, urban space and film festivals, and event sites of film festivals. This research contributes to the field of film festival studies and engages with the broader field of film cultures by highlighting the role of festival venues in presenting film cultures and drawing attention to the material basis of the global film festival circuit. Given the tremendous impact of film festivals' locations and venues – as material and physical features of festivals – on local and global film cultures, I argue that film festivals' venues should be examined in relation to the festivals' intangible formations. It can help us further understand how film festivals have been shaped by the political economy relating to location and how they occupy urban space and engage with the diversity of exhibition practices and space.Self-identification, group-membership, and the race-gender analogy
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27812
Self-identification is often quickly dismissed as a possible criterion for group-membership. I explore what self-identification might be and how it might figure into group-membership. I set out desiderata for an account of group-membership that considers the analogy between race and gender to have some merit as well as the broad theoretical framework underlying discussions around the nature of race and gender. I argue a constructivist framework of some kind is most appropriate as it has the potential of being maximally inclusive as well as ameliorative. I criticize Haslanger’s ameliorative account, which focuses on social positioning as a membership criterion, based on its lack of recognition of the interactive nature of social groups and its normativity. Haslanger’s account lacks the inclusion of individual “choice” on one’s individual identity. I explore Jenkins’ inclusion problem and argue that her solution of multiple and equally weighted target concepts has some shortcomings as she fails to consider that these concepts might conflict when they are practically applied, and hence cannot be equally weighted. I distinguish between self- identification and self-declaration. I argue that the former has more relevance pertaining to actual group-membership rather than perceived membership. I argue that, especially in the case of race, it cannot be the sole criterion due to arbitrariness objections and the interactivity of social concepts. I further lay out why it cannot be one of many equally weighted criteria: The risk is self-identification will be outweighed by other criteria, which would result in it not figuring into group-membership after all. This risks entrenching historical injustices, and is similar in structure to my objection against Jenkins.
Hence, I put forward that self-identification might come into play when other criteria don’t give a clear indication. This is also where the race-gender analogy might fall apart as the restrictive criteria might differ. However, examining this stipulation is outside the scope of this project. This dissertation aims to contribute to a clearer understanding of race and gender concepts as they have practical policy implications.
2022-11-30T00:00:00ZKopec, Kim LauraSelf-identification is often quickly dismissed as a possible criterion for group-membership. I explore what self-identification might be and how it might figure into group-membership. I set out desiderata for an account of group-membership that considers the analogy between race and gender to have some merit as well as the broad theoretical framework underlying discussions around the nature of race and gender. I argue a constructivist framework of some kind is most appropriate as it has the potential of being maximally inclusive as well as ameliorative. I criticize Haslanger’s ameliorative account, which focuses on social positioning as a membership criterion, based on its lack of recognition of the interactive nature of social groups and its normativity. Haslanger’s account lacks the inclusion of individual “choice” on one’s individual identity. I explore Jenkins’ inclusion problem and argue that her solution of multiple and equally weighted target concepts has some shortcomings as she fails to consider that these concepts might conflict when they are practically applied, and hence cannot be equally weighted. I distinguish between self- identification and self-declaration. I argue that the former has more relevance pertaining to actual group-membership rather than perceived membership. I argue that, especially in the case of race, it cannot be the sole criterion due to arbitrariness objections and the interactivity of social concepts. I further lay out why it cannot be one of many equally weighted criteria: The risk is self-identification will be outweighed by other criteria, which would result in it not figuring into group-membership after all. This risks entrenching historical injustices, and is similar in structure to my objection against Jenkins.
Hence, I put forward that self-identification might come into play when other criteria don’t give a clear indication. This is also where the race-gender analogy might fall apart as the restrictive criteria might differ. However, examining this stipulation is outside the scope of this project. This dissertation aims to contribute to a clearer understanding of race and gender concepts as they have practical policy implications.Perspectival attitudes and assertions
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27798
This thesis examines two types of perspectival attitudes and assertions: those about oneself, such as "I am in Martyrs Kirk Library" or "my house is on fire", and those about matters of personal tastes, such as "Super Mario is a fun game" or "century eggs are disgusting". The aim of this thesis is to challenge some published arguments in favour of the relativist, centred-worlds framework for these attitudes and assertions and to offer novel explanations for relevant phenomena including the inferior status of testimony about taste matters, the acquaintance inference of taste assertions, the connection between de se attitudes and actions, and the non-reducibility of de se attitudes to non-de se attitudes. I argue that the centred-worlds framework is not a well-motivated framework for these two types of attitudes and assertions. In addition, I propose that taste assertions are governed by a special knowledge-why norm, and de se attitudes have impossible-worlds contents.
2023-11-29T00:00:00ZLin, LixiaoThis thesis examines two types of perspectival attitudes and assertions: those about oneself, such as "I am in Martyrs Kirk Library" or "my house is on fire", and those about matters of personal tastes, such as "Super Mario is a fun game" or "century eggs are disgusting". The aim of this thesis is to challenge some published arguments in favour of the relativist, centred-worlds framework for these attitudes and assertions and to offer novel explanations for relevant phenomena including the inferior status of testimony about taste matters, the acquaintance inference of taste assertions, the connection between de se attitudes and actions, and the non-reducibility of de se attitudes to non-de se attitudes. I argue that the centred-worlds framework is not a well-motivated framework for these two types of attitudes and assertions. In addition, I propose that taste assertions are governed by a special knowledge-why norm, and de se attitudes have impossible-worlds contents.Philosophy and the aim for truth
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27737
This thesis seeks to answer the question: Does philosophy aim for truth? To address this question, I must first ask a more general question: What is it to aim for truth? My approach to answering this latter question uses pragmatism as its frame of reference by exploring the practical significance of the aim for truth. Huw Price argues that this aim provides a common purpose that helps us to engage with each other, turning our inquiry into a shared enterprise. (Price 2003) Price’s theory gives an apt description of the practical role of aiming for truth. However, I argue that this aim, conceived as such, is not advantageous to all of our inquiries. This thesis formulates a distinction between shared inquiry that aims for truth — such as scientific inquiry — and personal inquiry that lacks this aim — such as the inquiry into matters of taste. While this distinction is practical, it has many theoretical reverberations that this thesis tries to trace. It cuts across many topics of philosophical concern, such as the mechanics of disagreement, the nature of truth, objectivity, rationality, and knowledge. After dressing up the practical distinction between personal and shared inquiry in these theoretical layers, I apply it to the inquiry to which this thesis belongs. I argue against the popular belief that philosophical inquiry is scientific and thus shared. An analysis of philosophical practices shows that philosophical inquiry is personal. As a result, my thesis concludes that philosophy does not aim for truth.
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZKaspers, TomThis thesis seeks to answer the question: Does philosophy aim for truth? To address this question, I must first ask a more general question: What is it to aim for truth? My approach to answering this latter question uses pragmatism as its frame of reference by exploring the practical significance of the aim for truth. Huw Price argues that this aim provides a common purpose that helps us to engage with each other, turning our inquiry into a shared enterprise. (Price 2003) Price’s theory gives an apt description of the practical role of aiming for truth. However, I argue that this aim, conceived as such, is not advantageous to all of our inquiries. This thesis formulates a distinction between shared inquiry that aims for truth — such as scientific inquiry — and personal inquiry that lacks this aim — such as the inquiry into matters of taste. While this distinction is practical, it has many theoretical reverberations that this thesis tries to trace. It cuts across many topics of philosophical concern, such as the mechanics of disagreement, the nature of truth, objectivity, rationality, and knowledge. After dressing up the practical distinction between personal and shared inquiry in these theoretical layers, I apply it to the inquiry to which this thesis belongs. I argue against the popular belief that philosophical inquiry is scientific and thus shared. An analysis of philosophical practices shows that philosophical inquiry is personal. As a result, my thesis concludes that philosophy does not aim for truth.Thought and predication in Frege and Russell
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27670
This dissertation offers a reappraisal of how Russell’s views about thought and predication around the time of his Principles of Mathematics relate to Frege’s own theorizing about those topics. It does so by telling a story about the encounter of Russell’s world with Frege’s logic. The main protagonist in that story is Russell. Briefly, the story is as follows.
Russell inherited from Moore the elements of the largely atomistic worldview that he upheld around 1903. Underlying that worldview was a model of term combination that we may call the building blocks model. That model was primarily targeted at the composition of atomic propositions (chapter 3). In one respect, the model proved advantageous, in that it prevented Russell from mistaking propositional functions (or what they stand for) for properties in the traditional sense (chapters 1 and 4). In other respects, it had a deleterious effect on Russell’s theorizing. In fact, it would break down even in the case of atomic propositions themselves (chapter 4). However, it was as a model for the kinds of complexity introduced by propositional functions (chapter 5) and that-clauses (chapter 6) that it proved seriously inadequate. By contrast, Frege’s model of complexity derived entirely from his account of generality, and was therefore perfectly suited to functions (chapter 2). Yet, Frege’s relative indifference towards ontological questions, or at any rate his lack of a developed picture of the world comparable to Russell’s, meant that he could avoid any deep commitments with regard to the other two cases (chapters 2 and 7).
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZPereira Mestre Da Conceicao, Jose ManuelThis dissertation offers a reappraisal of how Russell’s views about thought and predication around the time of his Principles of Mathematics relate to Frege’s own theorizing about those topics. It does so by telling a story about the encounter of Russell’s world with Frege’s logic. The main protagonist in that story is Russell. Briefly, the story is as follows.
Russell inherited from Moore the elements of the largely atomistic worldview that he upheld around 1903. Underlying that worldview was a model of term combination that we may call the building blocks model. That model was primarily targeted at the composition of atomic propositions (chapter 3). In one respect, the model proved advantageous, in that it prevented Russell from mistaking propositional functions (or what they stand for) for properties in the traditional sense (chapters 1 and 4). In other respects, it had a deleterious effect on Russell’s theorizing. In fact, it would break down even in the case of atomic propositions themselves (chapter 4). However, it was as a model for the kinds of complexity introduced by propositional functions (chapter 5) and that-clauses (chapter 6) that it proved seriously inadequate. By contrast, Frege’s model of complexity derived entirely from his account of generality, and was therefore perfectly suited to functions (chapter 2). Yet, Frege’s relative indifference towards ontological questions, or at any rate his lack of a developed picture of the world comparable to Russell’s, meant that he could avoid any deep commitments with regard to the other two cases (chapters 2 and 7).The bad guys with the good solutions? Energy elites, transitions, and the 'good life' in Norway
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27583
In this thesis I examine how strategically situated energy industry professionals conceptualise and act upon energy transitions in Norway. Analytically I refer to interlocutors as ‘energy elites’. This allows me to highlight their shared socio-economic, educational, and professional positionalities while showing key distinctions in their perceptions of energy.
I draw on 18 months of ethnographic fieldwork in Oslo between 2018-2020 where I engaged with over 100 industry leaders and experts. I conducted fieldwork at the formal office spaces of Norway’s major energy corporations and in the private spaces that interlocutors inhabited. This allows me to make three main contributions:
Firstly, I use my detailed ethnographic insights to counter dominant scholarly presumptions that see elites as resisting socio-economic changes in order to preserve their own status. I demonstrate that the way my interlocutors engaged with energy transitions involved personal, societal, and ethical considerations of how energy production can ensure a ‘good life’. Thus, I argue that strategic pursuits alone cannot account for the varied ways in which industry professionals engaged with energy transitions.
Secondly, I expand on the regional literature by critically examining dominant narratives of a ‘successful’ Norwegian energy model. I analyse how increasingly industry professionals scrutinised the socio-environmental sustainability of their hydrocarbon and renewable energy production in light of growing climate change concerns.
Lastly, I contribute to the study of energy transitions, as I analyse them as liminal, in-between processes marked by contestation and ambiguity. I suggest that various energy imaginaries make energy transitions uncertain ‘rites of passages’ without clearly defined end goals or pathways. By advancing scholarship on elites, energy, and transitions, my study demonstrates that contested visions of energy futures are united in their desires for a ‘good life’.
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZSeeger, Anna Raphaela Kyra KatharinaIn this thesis I examine how strategically situated energy industry professionals conceptualise and act upon energy transitions in Norway. Analytically I refer to interlocutors as ‘energy elites’. This allows me to highlight their shared socio-economic, educational, and professional positionalities while showing key distinctions in their perceptions of energy.
I draw on 18 months of ethnographic fieldwork in Oslo between 2018-2020 where I engaged with over 100 industry leaders and experts. I conducted fieldwork at the formal office spaces of Norway’s major energy corporations and in the private spaces that interlocutors inhabited. This allows me to make three main contributions:
Firstly, I use my detailed ethnographic insights to counter dominant scholarly presumptions that see elites as resisting socio-economic changes in order to preserve their own status. I demonstrate that the way my interlocutors engaged with energy transitions involved personal, societal, and ethical considerations of how energy production can ensure a ‘good life’. Thus, I argue that strategic pursuits alone cannot account for the varied ways in which industry professionals engaged with energy transitions.
Secondly, I expand on the regional literature by critically examining dominant narratives of a ‘successful’ Norwegian energy model. I analyse how increasingly industry professionals scrutinised the socio-environmental sustainability of their hydrocarbon and renewable energy production in light of growing climate change concerns.
Lastly, I contribute to the study of energy transitions, as I analyse them as liminal, in-between processes marked by contestation and ambiguity. I suggest that various energy imaginaries make energy transitions uncertain ‘rites of passages’ without clearly defined end goals or pathways. By advancing scholarship on elites, energy, and transitions, my study demonstrates that contested visions of energy futures are united in their desires for a ‘good life’.Time, self-consciousness, and categorial unity
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27567
These essays are an attempt to elucidate the notion of a category, which, broadly speaking, is a concept that accounts for the manner in which the constituents of experience are combined or held together. The relation of such concepts to the unity of self-consciousness and the unity of time is explicated in order to consider the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge.
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZSatija, AtulThese essays are an attempt to elucidate the notion of a category, which, broadly speaking, is a concept that accounts for the manner in which the constituents of experience are combined or held together. The relation of such concepts to the unity of self-consciousness and the unity of time is explicated in order to consider the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge.Respectful witness : a midwife adopts an anthropological view on her practice
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27526
This thesis explores midwifery in the United Kingdom (UK) from my perspective both as a midwife and a member of the Association of Radical Midwives (ARM). The rhetoric of contemporary midwifery and the ARM speaks to a relational and social model of care which focusses on the pregnant woman, her baby, and her family.
However, childbirth in the UK is increasingly complex and there are tensions between the provision of care in a medically dominated health care system and the ability of midwives to work as advocates for women. Central to this tension is the self-perception of midwives as a professional group, and their position in a care hierarchy. The majority of midwifery care in the UK is provided through the NHS, although a minority of midwives work outside but alongside the NHS maternity care system.
The ARM was founded in the late 1970s in the UK as a support group for midwives who were concerned about the erosion of their professional role and identity. It remains active and has evolved into a grassroots midwifery organisation which has been influential on the development of UK midwifery over the last forty years. Focussing on the ARM provided me with the lens to examine the challenges that have shaped midwifery and therefore influenced my own practice experiences. To achieve this, I have taken a historical perspective, critically reflecting back on my own practice, the writings of the ARM and a range of ethnographic observations and interviews with midwives who were members of the ARM.
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZMcHugh, Nessa MaryThis thesis explores midwifery in the United Kingdom (UK) from my perspective both as a midwife and a member of the Association of Radical Midwives (ARM). The rhetoric of contemporary midwifery and the ARM speaks to a relational and social model of care which focusses on the pregnant woman, her baby, and her family.
However, childbirth in the UK is increasingly complex and there are tensions between the provision of care in a medically dominated health care system and the ability of midwives to work as advocates for women. Central to this tension is the self-perception of midwives as a professional group, and their position in a care hierarchy. The majority of midwifery care in the UK is provided through the NHS, although a minority of midwives work outside but alongside the NHS maternity care system.
The ARM was founded in the late 1970s in the UK as a support group for midwives who were concerned about the erosion of their professional role and identity. It remains active and has evolved into a grassroots midwifery organisation which has been influential on the development of UK midwifery over the last forty years. Focussing on the ARM provided me with the lens to examine the challenges that have shaped midwifery and therefore influenced my own practice experiences. To achieve this, I have taken a historical perspective, critically reflecting back on my own practice, the writings of the ARM and a range of ethnographic observations and interviews with midwives who were members of the ARM.From evidence to underdetermination : essays in the way of scepticism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27516
Scepticism about justification is the view that justification is impossible. Underdetermination scepticism is scepticism that turns on the idea that our beliefs are underdetermined by the evidence relative to certain sceptical hypotheses. This thesis provides an elucidation and a defence of underdetermination scepticism on an evidentialist framework for justification and a mentalist conception of evidence. The thesis consists of five chapters and a conclusion. Chapter 1 introduces the Underdetermination Argument for scepticism and explains the core concepts of the thesis. Chapter 2 explores the relationship between closure and underdetermination scepticism. Chapter 3 responds to the Infallibility Objection, the idea that the Underdetermination Argument is a bad argument because the inference from sameness of evidence to underdetermination presupposes infallibilism. Chapter 4 responds to the charge that the Underdetermination Argument relies on excessive demands on the cognitive accessibility of evidence. Chapter 5 responds to attempts to resist scepticism on the ground that it is a Moorean fact that our beliefs are justified. The conclusion reviews and generalizes the results of the previous chapters. The upshot is that a significant set of objections against underdetermination scepticism fails. At the end of the day, we might have to take the possibility of living with scepticism seriously – or at least more seriously than we thought.
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZSavino, PaoloScepticism about justification is the view that justification is impossible. Underdetermination scepticism is scepticism that turns on the idea that our beliefs are underdetermined by the evidence relative to certain sceptical hypotheses. This thesis provides an elucidation and a defence of underdetermination scepticism on an evidentialist framework for justification and a mentalist conception of evidence. The thesis consists of five chapters and a conclusion. Chapter 1 introduces the Underdetermination Argument for scepticism and explains the core concepts of the thesis. Chapter 2 explores the relationship between closure and underdetermination scepticism. Chapter 3 responds to the Infallibility Objection, the idea that the Underdetermination Argument is a bad argument because the inference from sameness of evidence to underdetermination presupposes infallibilism. Chapter 4 responds to the charge that the Underdetermination Argument relies on excessive demands on the cognitive accessibility of evidence. Chapter 5 responds to attempts to resist scepticism on the ground that it is a Moorean fact that our beliefs are justified. The conclusion reviews and generalizes the results of the previous chapters. The upshot is that a significant set of objections against underdetermination scepticism fails. At the end of the day, we might have to take the possibility of living with scepticism seriously – or at least more seriously than we thought.Working for each other : an account of the need for work in society
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27440
This dissertation evaluates a need for work. In doing so, it addresses a neglected topic – by systematically exploring the concept of work and its relation to basic needs – and situates that contribution in the context of existing philosophical literature on work and adjacent research in the humanities and social sciences. Second, it offers up new conceptual tools – by arguing for the usefulness of a needs-centred perspective on work – which can aide in our deliberations about how to construct a more human(e) future of work. The project defends an account of a need for work which is grounded in the basic, non-contingent needs we hold, not as individuals, but as a society. It begins by defining work and need, and clarifying the meaning of the question, “Do we need work?” in light of these definitions. It then draws a distinction between the different levels of social life at which we can be understood to hold needs: as individuals, as a community, and as a society. I argue that it is possible, at each of these levels, to ask and answer a different question about work’s relationship to our basic, non-contingent needs. Subsequently, I find that work is important, but not necessary for our ability to meet such needs as individuals and members of a community, since we can do so through non-work activities. It is, however, necessary at the level of society. As a society, we have a need for a shared system of reciprocity to govern how we recognise and communicate about contribution. Work allows us to meet this need by functioning as a signalling mechanism for value. In fulfilling this function, it cannot be straightforwardly replaced by non-work activities, since activities like leisure are not connected to contribution in the same way.
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZThomas, Deryn MairThis dissertation evaluates a need for work. In doing so, it addresses a neglected topic – by systematically exploring the concept of work and its relation to basic needs – and situates that contribution in the context of existing philosophical literature on work and adjacent research in the humanities and social sciences. Second, it offers up new conceptual tools – by arguing for the usefulness of a needs-centred perspective on work – which can aide in our deliberations about how to construct a more human(e) future of work. The project defends an account of a need for work which is grounded in the basic, non-contingent needs we hold, not as individuals, but as a society. It begins by defining work and need, and clarifying the meaning of the question, “Do we need work?” in light of these definitions. It then draws a distinction between the different levels of social life at which we can be understood to hold needs: as individuals, as a community, and as a society. I argue that it is possible, at each of these levels, to ask and answer a different question about work’s relationship to our basic, non-contingent needs. Subsequently, I find that work is important, but not necessary for our ability to meet such needs as individuals and members of a community, since we can do so through non-work activities. It is, however, necessary at the level of society. As a society, we have a need for a shared system of reciprocity to govern how we recognise and communicate about contribution. Work allows us to meet this need by functioning as a signalling mechanism for value. In fulfilling this function, it cannot be straightforwardly replaced by non-work activities, since activities like leisure are not connected to contribution in the same way.Identifying oneself as an element of the objective order : Nagel's question and Evans' response
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27384
Frege leaves us with a task: to elucidate the fundamental character of the way in which we know which spatio-temporal particular is in question when we use the first person by formulating a semantic account of the first person. This investigation takes up this task, approaching it through the following question, Nagel’s question: is it possible for one to identify oneself as an element of the objective order? After thinking through the insights of Elizabeth Anscombe’s 'The First Person' and examining the collapse of Gareth Evans’ response to the question, the investigation draws on Sebastian Rödl’s 'Intentional Transaction' to answer Nagel’s question in the positive by formulating a semantic account of the first person and, as such, resolves its central task.
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZMcGrath, Jack DylanFrege leaves us with a task: to elucidate the fundamental character of the way in which we know which spatio-temporal particular is in question when we use the first person by formulating a semantic account of the first person. This investigation takes up this task, approaching it through the following question, Nagel’s question: is it possible for one to identify oneself as an element of the objective order? After thinking through the insights of Elizabeth Anscombe’s 'The First Person' and examining the collapse of Gareth Evans’ response to the question, the investigation draws on Sebastian Rödl’s 'Intentional Transaction' to answer Nagel’s question in the positive by formulating a semantic account of the first person and, as such, resolves its central task.Affective experience as a source of knowledge
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27364
In analytic philosophy, appropriate sources of knowledge do not include affective experience. In this thesis, I oppose this commonly accepted view and argue in favour of valuing the contribution of affective experience to knowledge. My argument unfolds in two parts. In the first part of the thesis, I propose a positive argument favouring the inclusion of affective experience in our sources of knowledge. My main contribution is the Reflective Model, a novel account of affective experience as a source which responds to the common objections towards the epistemic value of affective experience. This new model is built on the idea that affective experience is a reason- tracking ability, which incorporates a reflective element through internal and social calibration. I illustrate this phenomenon by discussing how members from marginalised groups identify microaggressions through their emotions. In the second part of the thesis, I offer a negative argument: given the negative ethical and practical consequences of excluding affective experience, we should include it in our sources of knowledge. I conceptualise a new form of epistemic injustice, source based epistemic injustice, which highlights unfairness towards knowers who utilise unapproved sources of knowledge like affective experience. In addition, I discuss two applied cases where testimony based on affective experience is unfairly downgraded: testimony about lesser-known illnesses and testimony about everyday racism. I argue that the first case leads to the epistemic exploitation of patients, whilst the second gives rise to dialectical white scepticism, a pernicious form of white scepticism which has not been previously theorised. Altogether, I argue that legitimising affective experience as a source of knowledge would enable us to incorporate a greater number of epistemic contributions in our epistemological system, thus reducing instances of injustice and silencing experienced by members of marginalised groups.
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZJost, Lara ApollineIn analytic philosophy, appropriate sources of knowledge do not include affective experience. In this thesis, I oppose this commonly accepted view and argue in favour of valuing the contribution of affective experience to knowledge. My argument unfolds in two parts. In the first part of the thesis, I propose a positive argument favouring the inclusion of affective experience in our sources of knowledge. My main contribution is the Reflective Model, a novel account of affective experience as a source which responds to the common objections towards the epistemic value of affective experience. This new model is built on the idea that affective experience is a reason- tracking ability, which incorporates a reflective element through internal and social calibration. I illustrate this phenomenon by discussing how members from marginalised groups identify microaggressions through their emotions. In the second part of the thesis, I offer a negative argument: given the negative ethical and practical consequences of excluding affective experience, we should include it in our sources of knowledge. I conceptualise a new form of epistemic injustice, source based epistemic injustice, which highlights unfairness towards knowers who utilise unapproved sources of knowledge like affective experience. In addition, I discuss two applied cases where testimony based on affective experience is unfairly downgraded: testimony about lesser-known illnesses and testimony about everyday racism. I argue that the first case leads to the epistemic exploitation of patients, whilst the second gives rise to dialectical white scepticism, a pernicious form of white scepticism which has not been previously theorised. Altogether, I argue that legitimising affective experience as a source of knowledge would enable us to incorporate a greater number of epistemic contributions in our epistemological system, thus reducing instances of injustice and silencing experienced by members of marginalised groups.The achievement of perceptual presence : to perceive by having access to the world
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27310
This dissertation provides an enactive approach to perception. It argues that perceptual presence is
achieved by perceivers. They do this by having access to the world through the navigation of
sensorimotor contingencies based on their understanding. In developing this view, the dissertation
defends a version of the enactive account of perception that is originally proposed by Alva Noë and
explores how this account challenges and competes with other accounts of perception, including
sense-datum theory, naïve realism, etc. It also argues that Noë’s enactive account is insightful as he
acutely captures certain features of perceptual phenomena and so makes plausible challenges
towards representationalism about perception. However, he fails to provide a clear and detailed
thesis concerning the way we perceive, especially how sensorimotor understanding can help with
the grasp of the two-dimensionality of presence, i.e., the fact that we perceive how things look and
how they really are at the same time. In order to make the enactive approach a better account, the
dissertation provides an improved explanation of the duality of presence. I argue that things are
always practically remote for us. Such remoteness is the root of the duality as we have to cope with
the remoteness by having access to objects through navigating sensorimotor contingencies. Because
presence is achieved in such a way, it has the two-dimensionality feature. The final chapters provide
an extended explication of the means to the achievement of access by drawing out the way that
sensorimotor understanding is procured through perceivers’ acquiring a sort of practical conceptual
knowledge of their perceptual situations. The dissertation thus ends with the argument that concepts
are necessary skills for perceivers to achieve sustaining access to the world.
2022-11-30T00:00:00ZGong, QianrongThis dissertation provides an enactive approach to perception. It argues that perceptual presence is
achieved by perceivers. They do this by having access to the world through the navigation of
sensorimotor contingencies based on their understanding. In developing this view, the dissertation
defends a version of the enactive account of perception that is originally proposed by Alva Noë and
explores how this account challenges and competes with other accounts of perception, including
sense-datum theory, naïve realism, etc. It also argues that Noë’s enactive account is insightful as he
acutely captures certain features of perceptual phenomena and so makes plausible challenges
towards representationalism about perception. However, he fails to provide a clear and detailed
thesis concerning the way we perceive, especially how sensorimotor understanding can help with
the grasp of the two-dimensionality of presence, i.e., the fact that we perceive how things look and
how they really are at the same time. In order to make the enactive approach a better account, the
dissertation provides an improved explanation of the duality of presence. I argue that things are
always practically remote for us. Such remoteness is the root of the duality as we have to cope with
the remoteness by having access to objects through navigating sensorimotor contingencies. Because
presence is achieved in such a way, it has the two-dimensionality feature. The final chapters provide
an extended explication of the means to the achievement of access by drawing out the way that
sensorimotor understanding is procured through perceivers’ acquiring a sort of practical conceptual
knowledge of their perceptual situations. The dissertation thus ends with the argument that concepts
are necessary skills for perceivers to achieve sustaining access to the world.The material life of world cinema : dynamics of ‘discovery’ and ‘rediscovery’ at the Cineteca di Bologna (1960-2018)
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27277
This thesis explores how concepts and canons of world cinema were historically and materially conditioned by European film institutions. Using the Fondazione Cineteca di Bologna as a dynamic case study, it retraces the permutations of world cinema over the last half century, as it shifted from a universalist yet Eurocentric term to a militant phase in which European left-wing intellectuals sought to support and give visibility to Third World oppositional filmmakers and, finally, to a neoliberal phase in which filmmakers and films from the Global South have become dependent on the support of European and North American film institutions. Emphasising its “material life” over these three phases, this thesis argues that world cinema has emerged out of the preceding Third World Cinema, and describes a set of films produced in the so-called Global South and sustained and circulated by film institutions, primarily based in Europe. It focuses on two distinct historical periods, investigating two phenomena that have received scant attention in film historical research thus far. First, it excavates the neglected history of Italian Antifestivals, in particular the Porretta Terme Mostra Internazionale del Cinema Libero and early history of the Cineteca. In the 1960s-1970s period, these Antifestivals revolutionized the conventional festival format, energised innovative theoretical and critical discourses and, above all, crucially contributed to the European “discovery” of Third World Cinema. Second, this thesis explores the impact of film festivals’ rediscoveries of the world cinema canon by analysing the Cineteca’s subsequent phase, beginning with its archival film festival (Il Cinema Ritrovato) before turning to more recent conservative initiatives of the World Cinema Project and the African Film Heritage Project. In conclusion, the thesis concludes with an analysis of the Cineteca’s restoration of Med Hondo’s early films, which illuminate the different modes curators, critics and scholars use to relate to the film-historical past embedded in rediscovered world cinemas.
2022-06-13T00:00:00ZGelardi, AndreaThis thesis explores how concepts and canons of world cinema were historically and materially conditioned by European film institutions. Using the Fondazione Cineteca di Bologna as a dynamic case study, it retraces the permutations of world cinema over the last half century, as it shifted from a universalist yet Eurocentric term to a militant phase in which European left-wing intellectuals sought to support and give visibility to Third World oppositional filmmakers and, finally, to a neoliberal phase in which filmmakers and films from the Global South have become dependent on the support of European and North American film institutions. Emphasising its “material life” over these three phases, this thesis argues that world cinema has emerged out of the preceding Third World Cinema, and describes a set of films produced in the so-called Global South and sustained and circulated by film institutions, primarily based in Europe. It focuses on two distinct historical periods, investigating two phenomena that have received scant attention in film historical research thus far. First, it excavates the neglected history of Italian Antifestivals, in particular the Porretta Terme Mostra Internazionale del Cinema Libero and early history of the Cineteca. In the 1960s-1970s period, these Antifestivals revolutionized the conventional festival format, energised innovative theoretical and critical discourses and, above all, crucially contributed to the European “discovery” of Third World Cinema. Second, this thesis explores the impact of film festivals’ rediscoveries of the world cinema canon by analysing the Cineteca’s subsequent phase, beginning with its archival film festival (Il Cinema Ritrovato) before turning to more recent conservative initiatives of the World Cinema Project and the African Film Heritage Project. In conclusion, the thesis concludes with an analysis of the Cineteca’s restoration of Med Hondo’s early films, which illuminate the different modes curators, critics and scholars use to relate to the film-historical past embedded in rediscovered world cinemas.The terms of being an artist in the early 21st century : the struggle, endurance and affect of visual and performing artists in the UK
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27276
The fact that artists struggle financially and affectively might not surprise many people in the UK, but what is less known is how they put up with those struggles and why they struggle. To explore these issues, this thesis presents an in-depth ethnographic analysis of the struggle, endurance and affect of visual and performing art practitioners in the UK. The ethnographic data are collected through both shadowing ten UK-based visual and performing art practitioners as well as participating in and observing art events during fourteen-months fieldwork between May 2018 and September 2019. This thesis challenges two established explanations of artists’ struggles: struggles are the only thing that people should know about artists; struggles might actually be what artists want, given that art is the thing they want to live for and die for. Instead, I argue that UK-based artists’ struggles can be understood as an integral part of “the ‘terms’ of being an artist in the early 21st century”. That is, these artists model themselves on historical artist figures, the terms of which are freeing themselves from the domination of “Enlightenment-modernity-capitalism” but entailing economic and affective struggles. They sometimes also follow two alternative imperatives (pro-lifestyle and pro-equality), but the more they try to follow two or more contradictory imperatives, the more their efforts come to nothing. By examining themes such as poverty, meritocracy, unconscious bias, relationality and spontaneity, this thesis further contributes to the comparative studies and the interdisciplinary discussions of endurance, affect, inequality, art and human feelings under liberal capitalism.
2022-06-13T00:00:00ZYang, YangThe fact that artists struggle financially and affectively might not surprise many people in the UK, but what is less known is how they put up with those struggles and why they struggle. To explore these issues, this thesis presents an in-depth ethnographic analysis of the struggle, endurance and affect of visual and performing art practitioners in the UK. The ethnographic data are collected through both shadowing ten UK-based visual and performing art practitioners as well as participating in and observing art events during fourteen-months fieldwork between May 2018 and September 2019. This thesis challenges two established explanations of artists’ struggles: struggles are the only thing that people should know about artists; struggles might actually be what artists want, given that art is the thing they want to live for and die for. Instead, I argue that UK-based artists’ struggles can be understood as an integral part of “the ‘terms’ of being an artist in the early 21st century”. That is, these artists model themselves on historical artist figures, the terms of which are freeing themselves from the domination of “Enlightenment-modernity-capitalism” but entailing economic and affective struggles. They sometimes also follow two alternative imperatives (pro-lifestyle and pro-equality), but the more they try to follow two or more contradictory imperatives, the more their efforts come to nothing. By examining themes such as poverty, meritocracy, unconscious bias, relationality and spontaneity, this thesis further contributes to the comparative studies and the interdisciplinary discussions of endurance, affect, inequality, art and human feelings under liberal capitalism.Self-deception and its interaction with introspection
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27275
Self-deception is a tricky phenomenon to define, especially once we realise the further complications its interaction with introspection might lead to. In this dissertation I am to analyse these two phenomena to show their compatibility. In fact, I am going to argue that, although self-deception is an instance where introspection fails whereas the latter can cause the end of a self-deceive state, no problematic interference happens between them. To reach this aim I am going to rely on the studies conducted by Nisbett and Wilson on instances where subjects fail to introspect certain mental states or processes. I will use this to argue that it is then possible for a subject to fail to introspect certain aspects of their mental life and, thusly, self-deceive. In turn, I am going to show how having areas where introspecting gives us the wrong result is not a major problem as it is a characteristic it shares with sense perception, which is something we are used to rely on.
2022-06-13T00:00:00ZGuarrasi, GuglielmoSelf-deception is a tricky phenomenon to define, especially once we realise the further complications its interaction with introspection might lead to. In this dissertation I am to analyse these two phenomena to show their compatibility. In fact, I am going to argue that, although self-deception is an instance where introspection fails whereas the latter can cause the end of a self-deceive state, no problematic interference happens between them. To reach this aim I am going to rely on the studies conducted by Nisbett and Wilson on instances where subjects fail to introspect certain mental states or processes. I will use this to argue that it is then possible for a subject to fail to introspect certain aspects of their mental life and, thusly, self-deceive. In turn, I am going to show how having areas where introspecting gives us the wrong result is not a major problem as it is a characteristic it shares with sense perception, which is something we are used to rely on.Truth, action, and transition on an energy frontline in Lancashire, UK
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27164
Based on thirteen months of ethnographic fieldwork in the northern English region of Lancashire, this doctoral research focuses on practices of truth-making and relations of responsibility within a community resisting the development of a controversial hydraulic fracturing project at Preston New Road (PNR). I explore their lived experiences of protest and energy extraction at a time of anthropogenic climate change and intensifying calls for energy transitions. I examine how collective and intimate encounters with a perceived ‘system’ on the frontline lead my interlocutors to ask fundamental questions about the reality in which they live. Through everyday frontline practices, I show how interlocutors collectively establish, connect, and evidence different dimensions of truth as they resist the extraction of hydrocarbons and search for alternative ways to live. People enter, act through, and leave relations of responsibility to bring about a reality in which they want to live. I thus suggest that examining relations of responsibility and truth as a value that is realised through action can help us understand spaces of conflict and confrontation. Through protesting, monitoring, and maintaining a collective presence at PNR, interlocutors ethically and materially attempt to separate themselves from the hydrocarbon extraction. In doing so, they endeavour to create a rightful reality founded on the generative notions of truth, action, and responsibility. My ethnographic analysis therefore proposes that the energy frontline at PNR can be apprehended as an onto-epistemic frontline where matters of truth set the world in motion. I suggest that when scholars recognise truth as a matter of representation, creative transformation, and persuasive imagination, we can better identify and understand conflicts and possibilities for change.
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZO'Brien, SarahBased on thirteen months of ethnographic fieldwork in the northern English region of Lancashire, this doctoral research focuses on practices of truth-making and relations of responsibility within a community resisting the development of a controversial hydraulic fracturing project at Preston New Road (PNR). I explore their lived experiences of protest and energy extraction at a time of anthropogenic climate change and intensifying calls for energy transitions. I examine how collective and intimate encounters with a perceived ‘system’ on the frontline lead my interlocutors to ask fundamental questions about the reality in which they live. Through everyday frontline practices, I show how interlocutors collectively establish, connect, and evidence different dimensions of truth as they resist the extraction of hydrocarbons and search for alternative ways to live. People enter, act through, and leave relations of responsibility to bring about a reality in which they want to live. I thus suggest that examining relations of responsibility and truth as a value that is realised through action can help us understand spaces of conflict and confrontation. Through protesting, monitoring, and maintaining a collective presence at PNR, interlocutors ethically and materially attempt to separate themselves from the hydrocarbon extraction. In doing so, they endeavour to create a rightful reality founded on the generative notions of truth, action, and responsibility. My ethnographic analysis therefore proposes that the energy frontline at PNR can be apprehended as an onto-epistemic frontline where matters of truth set the world in motion. I suggest that when scholars recognise truth as a matter of representation, creative transformation, and persuasive imagination, we can better identify and understand conflicts and possibilities for change.The nature and rationality of trust and trustworthiness
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27131
Trust and trustworthiness are highly important concepts; Trusting well enables us to achieve things we cannot do alone and to discover things that we cannot check for ourselves. Issues of trust sit in the intersection of ethics and epistemology; it is commonly thought of as a moral good to be trustworthy and trusting the testimony of others can be a valuable source of knowledge.
By trusting too easily, however, we become hopelessly naïve and risk falling prey to scams and lies. Knowing when to trust is therefore of significant practical value.
The aim of this thesis is to come to a greater understanding of these concepts. The first three chapters deal with what trust and trustworthiness are. In the first, I argue that trust is a kind of reliance, rather than a kind of belief. In the second, I argue that trust is specifically reliance on another to be trustworthy. The third chapter presents a theory of trustworthiness according to which being trustworthy is a matter of keeping commitments.
The following two chapters are about the rationality of trust. The first considers various ideas proposed for what justifies trusting someone and shows why they are not successful. The second lays out my own view, on which trust is justified by both evidence and practical reasons addressing another’s trustworthiness.
Finally, I consider the relationship between commitments and responsibility. It is argued that, by accepting a commitment to do something from another, one is absolved of responsibility for ensuring that it is done. This is also found to help explain why holding victims responsible is a mistake.
Ultimately, a holistic theory of trust and trustworthiness is proposed, which I believe has significant advantages over those already in the literature and will be useful in future philosophical research.
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZMitchell, Thomas James ArthurTrust and trustworthiness are highly important concepts; Trusting well enables us to achieve things we cannot do alone and to discover things that we cannot check for ourselves. Issues of trust sit in the intersection of ethics and epistemology; it is commonly thought of as a moral good to be trustworthy and trusting the testimony of others can be a valuable source of knowledge.
By trusting too easily, however, we become hopelessly naïve and risk falling prey to scams and lies. Knowing when to trust is therefore of significant practical value.
The aim of this thesis is to come to a greater understanding of these concepts. The first three chapters deal with what trust and trustworthiness are. In the first, I argue that trust is a kind of reliance, rather than a kind of belief. In the second, I argue that trust is specifically reliance on another to be trustworthy. The third chapter presents a theory of trustworthiness according to which being trustworthy is a matter of keeping commitments.
The following two chapters are about the rationality of trust. The first considers various ideas proposed for what justifies trusting someone and shows why they are not successful. The second lays out my own view, on which trust is justified by both evidence and practical reasons addressing another’s trustworthiness.
Finally, I consider the relationship between commitments and responsibility. It is argued that, by accepting a commitment to do something from another, one is absolved of responsibility for ensuring that it is done. This is also found to help explain why holding victims responsible is a mistake.
Ultimately, a holistic theory of trust and trustworthiness is proposed, which I believe has significant advantages over those already in the literature and will be useful in future philosophical research.Productive being : the continuity between life and action
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27090
What is the relationship between life and agency? Are all agents necessarily living organisms? How are we to understand the phenomena of life and action? This thesis aims to answer these questions against the background of the autopoietic enactive approach in cognitive science. I develop a general conception of productive beings as systems capable of engaging in productive processes. A productive process is understood as a purposive, end-directed kind of self-movement whose cause or source lies in the subject which engages in the process. I argue that the capacity of productive systems to engage in productive processes is inextricably tied to their nature as materially precarious systems. In other words, the autonomous form of productive beings cannot be understood without reference to their materially fragile realisation. I then argue that, given an enactive conception of life and precariousness, productive systems must be understood as living systems. Since agents, on the developed view, are productive systems, I conclude that life is necessary for agency, from an enactive viewpoint. The understanding of this continuity between life and action is explored, throughout the thesis, from different perspectives. Apart from a careful examination of enactive concepts and proposals, the discussion engages Elizabeth Anscombe’s work on agency, Michael Thompson’s reflections on life-forms, Philippa Foot’s notion of natural goodness, Hans Jonas’ philosophy of biology, and Aristotle’s conception of the relationship between form and matter.
2022-11-30T00:00:00ZProkop, Mirko AlexanderWhat is the relationship between life and agency? Are all agents necessarily living organisms? How are we to understand the phenomena of life and action? This thesis aims to answer these questions against the background of the autopoietic enactive approach in cognitive science. I develop a general conception of productive beings as systems capable of engaging in productive processes. A productive process is understood as a purposive, end-directed kind of self-movement whose cause or source lies in the subject which engages in the process. I argue that the capacity of productive systems to engage in productive processes is inextricably tied to their nature as materially precarious systems. In other words, the autonomous form of productive beings cannot be understood without reference to their materially fragile realisation. I then argue that, given an enactive conception of life and precariousness, productive systems must be understood as living systems. Since agents, on the developed view, are productive systems, I conclude that life is necessary for agency, from an enactive viewpoint. The understanding of this continuity between life and action is explored, throughout the thesis, from different perspectives. Apart from a careful examination of enactive concepts and proposals, the discussion engages Elizabeth Anscombe’s work on agency, Michael Thompson’s reflections on life-forms, Philippa Foot’s notion of natural goodness, Hans Jonas’ philosophy of biology, and Aristotle’s conception of the relationship between form and matter.The apriority of logical truth
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27072
I defend the claim that knowledge of logical truths does not depend on experience, that it is a priori knowledge. In chapter I, I introduce and clarify the idea of a priori knowledge, and in chapter II, I respond to a widespread objection to it derived from Quine’s critique of analyticity. In chapter III, I distinguish between two approaches to developing an account of a priori knowledge, one that ties apriority to the cognitive abilities of knowers and another that ties it to features of truths known. I motivate the second approach over the first. In chapter IV, I sketch an outline of how the second approach could lead to an account of the apriority of logical knowledge. In the final three chapters, I develop an account which follows the outline.
In chapter V, I introduce the Fregean idea of logic as a study of the laws of truth which I spell out with the help of the semantic conception of truth developed by Tarski. In chapter VI, I defend an idea found in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus that the signs for logical operations cannot be construed as having objects corresponding to them. The defence proceeds via a defence of Frege’s Context Principle. A consequence of the Tractarian idea is that logical truths are not expressions of thought, that they are truths without a truth-condition. In the last chapter, I spell out the epistemic implications of this idea, that an understanding of truth is accompanied by knowledge of every logical truth and that any acquisition of knowledge by experience therefore presupposes logical knowledge, meaning that logical knowledge itself cannot depend on experience or any other means of learning.
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZLobus, IndrekI defend the claim that knowledge of logical truths does not depend on experience, that it is a priori knowledge. In chapter I, I introduce and clarify the idea of a priori knowledge, and in chapter II, I respond to a widespread objection to it derived from Quine’s critique of analyticity. In chapter III, I distinguish between two approaches to developing an account of a priori knowledge, one that ties apriority to the cognitive abilities of knowers and another that ties it to features of truths known. I motivate the second approach over the first. In chapter IV, I sketch an outline of how the second approach could lead to an account of the apriority of logical knowledge. In the final three chapters, I develop an account which follows the outline.
In chapter V, I introduce the Fregean idea of logic as a study of the laws of truth which I spell out with the help of the semantic conception of truth developed by Tarski. In chapter VI, I defend an idea found in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus that the signs for logical operations cannot be construed as having objects corresponding to them. The defence proceeds via a defence of Frege’s Context Principle. A consequence of the Tractarian idea is that logical truths are not expressions of thought, that they are truths without a truth-condition. In the last chapter, I spell out the epistemic implications of this idea, that an understanding of truth is accompanied by knowledge of every logical truth and that any acquisition of knowledge by experience therefore presupposes logical knowledge, meaning that logical knowledge itself cannot depend on experience or any other means of learning.Affective engagement with narrative
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27056
This thesis takes the work of psychologists James Russell and Lisa Feldman Barrett on core affect and applies it to engagement with narrative. In the first part, I situate core affect in the philosophy of emotion and, drawing on the predictive-processing model of cognition, I explore valence and arousal, the two elements of core affect. The second part relies on Lawrence Barsalou’s research on situated conceptualisation to build a bridge from core affect in philosophy and psychology to affective engagement with narrative. Firstly, I argue that narratives present situated conceptualisations that readers access via their own conceptual frameworks. Secondly, I show that the way that conceptualisations are situated in the narrative can in part explain why readers affectively respond to narratives in the ways that they do. Thirdly, building on the work of R.G. Collingwood and Jenefer Robinson, I explore what it means for some narratives to express affect. In short, this thesis brings an increasingly influential theory of emotion, namely the psychological construction view of emotion, which holds that emotions are constructed out of core affect and emotion concepts, into conversation with models of affective engagement with narrative in aesthetics and offers a framework for thinking about readers’ affective responses to narratives.
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZStudt, Eric MichaelThis thesis takes the work of psychologists James Russell and Lisa Feldman Barrett on core affect and applies it to engagement with narrative. In the first part, I situate core affect in the philosophy of emotion and, drawing on the predictive-processing model of cognition, I explore valence and arousal, the two elements of core affect. The second part relies on Lawrence Barsalou’s research on situated conceptualisation to build a bridge from core affect in philosophy and psychology to affective engagement with narrative. Firstly, I argue that narratives present situated conceptualisations that readers access via their own conceptual frameworks. Secondly, I show that the way that conceptualisations are situated in the narrative can in part explain why readers affectively respond to narratives in the ways that they do. Thirdly, building on the work of R.G. Collingwood and Jenefer Robinson, I explore what it means for some narratives to express affect. In short, this thesis brings an increasingly influential theory of emotion, namely the psychological construction view of emotion, which holds that emotions are constructed out of core affect and emotion concepts, into conversation with models of affective engagement with narrative in aesthetics and offers a framework for thinking about readers’ affective responses to narratives.Modal extensional mereology with an application to social groups
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27047
How does Classical Extensional Mereology (CEM) interact with time and modality? In its first-order logical setting, CEM does not have the formal tools to deal with these dimensions. Nonetheless, it is often charged with endorsing controversial metaphysical theses like mereological essentialism and mereological constantism. Allowing CEM to interact with quantified modal logic (QML) without adding any further mereological commitment clarifies which modal theorems CEM actually implies and eventually undercuts wrong-headed allegations against it. From the logical side, I endorse system KTB of modal logic with constant domain semantics, but several theorems are also provable with the adoption of weaker logics (like KT and even the simplest K). We will also be able to successfully simulate variable domain semantics via the procedure of existential relativisation. From the mereological side, I necessitate the ordering axioms and the strong-supplementation axiom, leaving the door open for four different alternatives to deal with the axiom of unrestricted composition. The mereological results emerging from this setting include the necessity of extensionality principles – which does not lead to mereological essentialism – and the existence of possible fusions even when an actualist version of unrestricted composition is adopted.
In the final part of the thesis, I apply the main findings of modal extensional mereology to group membership. After showing why some standard objections are misguided, I argue that the standard account of social groups based on CEM fails to be satisfactory because it conceives group membership as just parthood. My proposal is to regard group membership as φ-parthood instead. Under this new account, social groups are not just mereological wholes, but mereological wholes with a specified understanding of the parthood relation. Endorsing this novel account allows us to retain an account of social groups based on CEM while avoiding the knockdown objections faced by the standard one.
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZSchirripa, GiuliaHow does Classical Extensional Mereology (CEM) interact with time and modality? In its first-order logical setting, CEM does not have the formal tools to deal with these dimensions. Nonetheless, it is often charged with endorsing controversial metaphysical theses like mereological essentialism and mereological constantism. Allowing CEM to interact with quantified modal logic (QML) without adding any further mereological commitment clarifies which modal theorems CEM actually implies and eventually undercuts wrong-headed allegations against it. From the logical side, I endorse system KTB of modal logic with constant domain semantics, but several theorems are also provable with the adoption of weaker logics (like KT and even the simplest K). We will also be able to successfully simulate variable domain semantics via the procedure of existential relativisation. From the mereological side, I necessitate the ordering axioms and the strong-supplementation axiom, leaving the door open for four different alternatives to deal with the axiom of unrestricted composition. The mereological results emerging from this setting include the necessity of extensionality principles – which does not lead to mereological essentialism – and the existence of possible fusions even when an actualist version of unrestricted composition is adopted.
In the final part of the thesis, I apply the main findings of modal extensional mereology to group membership. After showing why some standard objections are misguided, I argue that the standard account of social groups based on CEM fails to be satisfactory because it conceives group membership as just parthood. My proposal is to regard group membership as φ-parthood instead. Under this new account, social groups are not just mereological wholes, but mereological wholes with a specified understanding of the parthood relation. Endorsing this novel account allows us to retain an account of social groups based on CEM while avoiding the knockdown objections faced by the standard one.Demystifying normativity : morality, error theory, and the authority of norms
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27003
We are subject to many different norms telling us how to act, from moral norms to etiquette rules and the law. While some norms may simply be ignored, we live under the impression that others matter for what we ought to do. How can we make sense of this normative authority some norms have? Does it fit into our naturalist worldview? Many philosophers claim it does not. Normativity is conceived to be distinct from ordinary natural properties, making it mysterious. The mystery fuels a radical yet prominent scepticism about the existence of normative properties: if they are too strange to actually exist, there is nothing we ought to do. Some take this to mean, moreover, that nothing is morally right or wrong. We must critically examine the ideas behind these theories, which put both morality and normativity in general on the line.
The aim of this thesis is to unravel the mystery of normativity. It uncovers and objects to the influential non-natural conception of it, arguing that we can capture normativity with natural properties. In particular, it explores how the authority of norms can be explained by the commitments of the people subject to them. In connection to this, it challenges the conceptual claim behind the view that all moral judgements are mistaken. Finally, it reveals that treating morality as a mere fiction has revolutionary practical implications. This emphasises the importance of the overall conclusion: we need not conceive of either moral or normative properties as too mysterious to exist.
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZGerritsen, ElineWe are subject to many different norms telling us how to act, from moral norms to etiquette rules and the law. While some norms may simply be ignored, we live under the impression that others matter for what we ought to do. How can we make sense of this normative authority some norms have? Does it fit into our naturalist worldview? Many philosophers claim it does not. Normativity is conceived to be distinct from ordinary natural properties, making it mysterious. The mystery fuels a radical yet prominent scepticism about the existence of normative properties: if they are too strange to actually exist, there is nothing we ought to do. Some take this to mean, moreover, that nothing is morally right or wrong. We must critically examine the ideas behind these theories, which put both morality and normativity in general on the line.
The aim of this thesis is to unravel the mystery of normativity. It uncovers and objects to the influential non-natural conception of it, arguing that we can capture normativity with natural properties. In particular, it explores how the authority of norms can be explained by the commitments of the people subject to them. In connection to this, it challenges the conceptual claim behind the view that all moral judgements are mistaken. Finally, it reveals that treating morality as a mere fiction has revolutionary practical implications. This emphasises the importance of the overall conclusion: we need not conceive of either moral or normative properties as too mysterious to exist.Living on through future generations
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/26967
Abstract redacted
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZCecchinato, MattiaAbstract redactedRunning out of time : the temporal case against the kalam
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/26961
In this dissertation, I argue that if the kalam cosmological argument works, then it must work on either the A-theory of time or the B-theory of time. I offer several arguments for thinking that the kalam does not work on either the A-theory of time or the B-theory of time. The two main versions of the A-theory, presentism and the growing block theory, are considered. Even though I argue that the growing block theorist has the greatest chance of making the kalam work, I nonetheless argue that their attempts fail for various reasons. In the end, the kalam is left unsupported by any major theory of time and is therefore vitiated.
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZBray, NathanIn this dissertation, I argue that if the kalam cosmological argument works, then it must work on either the A-theory of time or the B-theory of time. I offer several arguments for thinking that the kalam does not work on either the A-theory of time or the B-theory of time. The two main versions of the A-theory, presentism and the growing block theory, are considered. Even though I argue that the growing block theorist has the greatest chance of making the kalam work, I nonetheless argue that their attempts fail for various reasons. In the end, the kalam is left unsupported by any major theory of time and is therefore vitiated.From immersion to understanding : an essay on virtual art and aesthetic cognitivism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/26910
This dissertation argues against a cognitive devaluation of virtual art. By cognitive devaluation, I am referring to the charge that an art-kind is less artistically valuable than other art-kinds due to it lacking cognitive merits. I argue against this devaluation with three related arguments. The first argument says that virtual artworks can communicate perspectives which are conducive to understanding. I develop this argument by appealing to the standard features of virtual art, as well as to influential thoughts about the cognitive value of other art-kinds, especially literature. The second argument says that the cognitive value of a virtual artwork can sometimes count towards the artistic value of that artwork when appreciating that cognitive value requires appreciating the artistic success found within that artwork. The final argument shows that virtual art is not cognitively pernicious in any relevant sense, as is sometimes thought. If successful, these arguments jointly show that there is no good reason to devalue virtual art relative to other art-kinds on cognitivist grounds.
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZTroesken, ColinThis dissertation argues against a cognitive devaluation of virtual art. By cognitive devaluation, I am referring to the charge that an art-kind is less artistically valuable than other art-kinds due to it lacking cognitive merits. I argue against this devaluation with three related arguments. The first argument says that virtual artworks can communicate perspectives which are conducive to understanding. I develop this argument by appealing to the standard features of virtual art, as well as to influential thoughts about the cognitive value of other art-kinds, especially literature. The second argument says that the cognitive value of a virtual artwork can sometimes count towards the artistic value of that artwork when appreciating that cognitive value requires appreciating the artistic success found within that artwork. The final argument shows that virtual art is not cognitively pernicious in any relevant sense, as is sometimes thought. If successful, these arguments jointly show that there is no good reason to devalue virtual art relative to other art-kinds on cognitivist grounds.Towards a non-uniform epistemology of modality
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/26897
While most theories of a modal epistemology implicitly assume, or sometimes explicitly state, a uniform picture of the epistemology of modality, in this thesis I challenge this basic assumption. I argue that there is not one single epistemology of modality for all ‘domains of discourse’. That is, there is no one single way of coming to know modal propositions with such different content as those of mathematics, logic, physics, or the empirical world. I am not attempting to show that all epistemologies of modality should be non-uniform, but instead I am arguing that three influential modal epistemologies each fail to paint a uniform picture of our epistemic access of the modal realm on their own, but taken together form a coherent non-uniform epistemology of modality.
The counterfactual theory fails to provide an adequate answer to how we attain modal knowledge of necessary mathematical and empirical propositions. These necessary truths, I argue, do not possess the relevant independence from each other to be analysable in terms of counterfactuals. I argue that Williamson is forced to accept a non-uniform epistemology of modality as a result with respect to our knowledge of constitutive truths. Next, I outline Vetter’s possibility-based epistemology of modality and pose three challenges: the access problem, the problem of scope and the generalization problem. The resulting picture is a firmly non-uniform epistemology of modality on at least the level of an epistemology of circumstantial modality and, similar to the counterfactual-based account, the level of essential truths. In the last chapter of this thesis, I discuss Bob Hale’s essentialist modal epistemology. I take on board the essentialist epistemology of necessity, and focus instead on knowledge of possibility on this account. I argue that, on its own, it fails to paint a psychologically plausible picture of how we come to know obvious modal possibility knowledge but instead may plausibly be complemented by other epistemologies of modality.
2022-11-30T00:00:00ZBaron, Moritz Viktor JakobWhile most theories of a modal epistemology implicitly assume, or sometimes explicitly state, a uniform picture of the epistemology of modality, in this thesis I challenge this basic assumption. I argue that there is not one single epistemology of modality for all ‘domains of discourse’. That is, there is no one single way of coming to know modal propositions with such different content as those of mathematics, logic, physics, or the empirical world. I am not attempting to show that all epistemologies of modality should be non-uniform, but instead I am arguing that three influential modal epistemologies each fail to paint a uniform picture of our epistemic access of the modal realm on their own, but taken together form a coherent non-uniform epistemology of modality.
The counterfactual theory fails to provide an adequate answer to how we attain modal knowledge of necessary mathematical and empirical propositions. These necessary truths, I argue, do not possess the relevant independence from each other to be analysable in terms of counterfactuals. I argue that Williamson is forced to accept a non-uniform epistemology of modality as a result with respect to our knowledge of constitutive truths. Next, I outline Vetter’s possibility-based epistemology of modality and pose three challenges: the access problem, the problem of scope and the generalization problem. The resulting picture is a firmly non-uniform epistemology of modality on at least the level of an epistemology of circumstantial modality and, similar to the counterfactual-based account, the level of essential truths. In the last chapter of this thesis, I discuss Bob Hale’s essentialist modal epistemology. I take on board the essentialist epistemology of necessity, and focus instead on knowledge of possibility on this account. I argue that, on its own, it fails to paint a psychologically plausible picture of how we come to know obvious modal possibility knowledge but instead may plausibly be complemented by other epistemologies of modality.Moral decision-making : essays from philosophy and economics
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/26584
This thesis investigates moral decision-making from the two disciplinary angles of philosophy and economics. Moral decision-making includes moral judgements (e.g., judgements as to the moral (im-)permissibility of actions) and moral behaviour (e.g., charitable giving). The topic choice throughout this thesis was primarily motivated by global priorities research, ranging from population ethics to effective charitable giving. The first three chapter primarily focus on experimental philosophy. In them, I (a) investigate the relationship between the dark triad personality traits, psychopathy, Machiavellianism, and narcissism and anti-natalist views, finding that those high on dark triad traits are significantly more likely to endorse anti-natalist views. I also find that this relationship is mediated by depression. Then, I (b) study reflective equilibrium behaviour in the context of population ethics, finding that in accordance with theory, concrete case judgements play a revisionary role with respect to endorsements of general moral principles. Further, I (c) argue that research in psychology and experimental philosophy has not adequately dealt with the issue of incentivisation. I then go on to conduct an empirical showcase of the Bayesian Truth Serum in this context, demonstrating impacts on response behaviour. The last three chapters focus on experimental economics. I (d) analyse charitable giving behaviour under normative uncertainty and show that randomly allocated expert advice is undervalued by donors, though can impact donation behaviour and reduce uncertainty. Then, I (e) investigate the effect of morally demanding charitable solicitations on donor behaviour, finding that while moral arguments raise donations, increases of moral demandingness do not. Lastly, I (f) analyse the predictors of donating to probabilistic and ambiguous charities as opposed to more reliable ones, failing to find an impact of risk and ambiguity uncertainty. Overall, I hope that the work presented in this thesis is able to advance global priorities research into these topics.
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZSchönegger, PhilippThis thesis investigates moral decision-making from the two disciplinary angles of philosophy and economics. Moral decision-making includes moral judgements (e.g., judgements as to the moral (im-)permissibility of actions) and moral behaviour (e.g., charitable giving). The topic choice throughout this thesis was primarily motivated by global priorities research, ranging from population ethics to effective charitable giving. The first three chapter primarily focus on experimental philosophy. In them, I (a) investigate the relationship between the dark triad personality traits, psychopathy, Machiavellianism, and narcissism and anti-natalist views, finding that those high on dark triad traits are significantly more likely to endorse anti-natalist views. I also find that this relationship is mediated by depression. Then, I (b) study reflective equilibrium behaviour in the context of population ethics, finding that in accordance with theory, concrete case judgements play a revisionary role with respect to endorsements of general moral principles. Further, I (c) argue that research in psychology and experimental philosophy has not adequately dealt with the issue of incentivisation. I then go on to conduct an empirical showcase of the Bayesian Truth Serum in this context, demonstrating impacts on response behaviour. The last three chapters focus on experimental economics. I (d) analyse charitable giving behaviour under normative uncertainty and show that randomly allocated expert advice is undervalued by donors, though can impact donation behaviour and reduce uncertainty. Then, I (e) investigate the effect of morally demanding charitable solicitations on donor behaviour, finding that while moral arguments raise donations, increases of moral demandingness do not. Lastly, I (f) analyse the predictors of donating to probabilistic and ambiguous charities as opposed to more reliable ones, failing to find an impact of risk and ambiguity uncertainty. Overall, I hope that the work presented in this thesis is able to advance global priorities research into these topics.Disagreement within contemporary analytic philosophy : a pragmatic perspective
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/26520
In this thesis, I offer a new perspective on the extant disagreement within contemporary analytic philosophy - and, in particular, a perspective which is grounded in both the 2009 and 2020 PhilPapers Surveys of David Bourget and David Chalmers (2014; and forthcoming), as well as a tradition that is often disregarded by contemporary analytic philosophers: Pragmatism. I call it “a pragmatic perspective.” Using that perspective, I work through various aspects of the existing philosophical literatures on disagreement in order to evaluate the discipline’s own. On the one hand, I clarify and extend this literature - especially, as it applies to the discipline. But, several gaps are also found and addressed, including: what pragmatic commitments and policies contemporary analytic philosophers might need to make and enact in order to address their disagreement; how disagreement might affect the possession, transferability, and vindication of various collective epistemic/rational goods (for example, collective knowledge or rational consensus); and what consequences such philosophers might be forced to face - both inside and outside of their discipline - if they are unable to possess, transfer, and vindicate all that many epistemic/rational goods. Overall, my results are more grounded conclusions regarding both the nature and extent of the disagreement within the discipline, as well as a clearer understanding of why contemporary analytic philosophers might be right to worry about it and how they might be able to resolve it.
2022-11-30T00:00:00ZPharr, Quentin ParkerIn this thesis, I offer a new perspective on the extant disagreement within contemporary analytic philosophy - and, in particular, a perspective which is grounded in both the 2009 and 2020 PhilPapers Surveys of David Bourget and David Chalmers (2014; and forthcoming), as well as a tradition that is often disregarded by contemporary analytic philosophers: Pragmatism. I call it “a pragmatic perspective.” Using that perspective, I work through various aspects of the existing philosophical literatures on disagreement in order to evaluate the discipline’s own. On the one hand, I clarify and extend this literature - especially, as it applies to the discipline. But, several gaps are also found and addressed, including: what pragmatic commitments and policies contemporary analytic philosophers might need to make and enact in order to address their disagreement; how disagreement might affect the possession, transferability, and vindication of various collective epistemic/rational goods (for example, collective knowledge or rational consensus); and what consequences such philosophers might be forced to face - both inside and outside of their discipline - if they are unable to possess, transfer, and vindicate all that many epistemic/rational goods. Overall, my results are more grounded conclusions regarding both the nature and extent of the disagreement within the discipline, as well as a clearer understanding of why contemporary analytic philosophers might be right to worry about it and how they might be able to resolve it.Title redacted
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/25773
2022-06-13T00:00:00ZLaurens, Hannah Pleunke ElizabethNostalgia and Chinese new waves
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/25590
This study considers the underexplored uses of nostalgia by filmmakers from the Chinese New Waves. Over the last few decades, Svetlana Boym, Paul Grainge, and many other scholars have argued that nostalgia can be exploited to interweave imagination, longing, and memory in negotiating problems of identity, politics, and history in various communities. However, their arguments have largely been developed through considerations of European and American contexts. This project enters the critical field with a focused investigation into the uses that nostalgia has been put to by Chinese filmmakers. It follows a case-study design, with in-depth analysis of four emblematic films made by leading filmmakers of the Fifth Generation, the Taiwan New Cinema, and the Hong Kong New Wave. It argues that these filmmakers have used distinctive strategies to exploit nostalgia in their recreations of the past, often in order to reflect critically on significant social dilemmas in their filmmaking contexts. On this basis, this study demonstrates that dismissing the nostalgia put to use by these filmmakers risks occluding crucial dimensions of the critical reflections and aesthetic complexity of the Chinese New Waves. Ultimately, it demonstrates that nostalgia can be very “useful” despite its “inauthentic” representations of the past, thereby helping to challenge the perennial dismissal of nostalgia as a corrosive presence in contemporary cultural life.
2022-05-20T00:00:00ZLiu, QuanThis study considers the underexplored uses of nostalgia by filmmakers from the Chinese New Waves. Over the last few decades, Svetlana Boym, Paul Grainge, and many other scholars have argued that nostalgia can be exploited to interweave imagination, longing, and memory in negotiating problems of identity, politics, and history in various communities. However, their arguments have largely been developed through considerations of European and American contexts. This project enters the critical field with a focused investigation into the uses that nostalgia has been put to by Chinese filmmakers. It follows a case-study design, with in-depth analysis of four emblematic films made by leading filmmakers of the Fifth Generation, the Taiwan New Cinema, and the Hong Kong New Wave. It argues that these filmmakers have used distinctive strategies to exploit nostalgia in their recreations of the past, often in order to reflect critically on significant social dilemmas in their filmmaking contexts. On this basis, this study demonstrates that dismissing the nostalgia put to use by these filmmakers risks occluding crucial dimensions of the critical reflections and aesthetic complexity of the Chinese New Waves. Ultimately, it demonstrates that nostalgia can be very “useful” despite its “inauthentic” representations of the past, thereby helping to challenge the perennial dismissal of nostalgia as a corrosive presence in contemporary cultural life.Multi-descriptional physicalism, level(s) of being, and the mind-body problem
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/25521
The main idea of this thesis is multi-descriptional physicalism. According to it, only physical entities are elements of our ontology, and there are different ways to describe them. Higher-level vocabularies (e.g., mental, neurological, biological) truly describe reality. Sentences about higher-level entities are made true by physical entities. Every chapter will develop multi-descriptional physicalism or defend it from objections. In chapter 1, I will propose a new conceptual reductive account that conceptually reduces higher-level entities to physical entities. This conceptual reductive account combines resources from Heil’s truthmaker theory and either a priori physicalism or a posteriori physicalism. In chapter 2, I apply this conceptual reductive account to various debates. Physicalism, the multiple-realisability argument, the prototype theory of concepts, and truthmaker explanations will be discussed. In chapter 3, I will argue that a major aim of metaphysics should be to discover which entities are fundamental and explain why they suffice for the existence of derivative entities. In chapter 4, I will propose a new way to explain why sentences apparently about composite objects are true even though there are no composite objects. It combines resources from Cameron’s truthmaker theory and van Inwagen’s paraphrase strategy. In chapter 5, I will argue that the intuition that the mind and the body are very different does not show that the mind is distinct from the body. This intuition can be explained away by mentioning our dispositions to give non-physical explanations when we are ignorant of physical facts. In chapter 6, I will examine two arguments for the existence of a metaphysically independent level, and I will argue that only a modified version of one of them succeeds. I will argue that methodological principles support the view that there is a metaphysically independent level.
2022-06-13T00:00:00ZIoannou, SavvasThe main idea of this thesis is multi-descriptional physicalism. According to it, only physical entities are elements of our ontology, and there are different ways to describe them. Higher-level vocabularies (e.g., mental, neurological, biological) truly describe reality. Sentences about higher-level entities are made true by physical entities. Every chapter will develop multi-descriptional physicalism or defend it from objections. In chapter 1, I will propose a new conceptual reductive account that conceptually reduces higher-level entities to physical entities. This conceptual reductive account combines resources from Heil’s truthmaker theory and either a priori physicalism or a posteriori physicalism. In chapter 2, I apply this conceptual reductive account to various debates. Physicalism, the multiple-realisability argument, the prototype theory of concepts, and truthmaker explanations will be discussed. In chapter 3, I will argue that a major aim of metaphysics should be to discover which entities are fundamental and explain why they suffice for the existence of derivative entities. In chapter 4, I will propose a new way to explain why sentences apparently about composite objects are true even though there are no composite objects. It combines resources from Cameron’s truthmaker theory and van Inwagen’s paraphrase strategy. In chapter 5, I will argue that the intuition that the mind and the body are very different does not show that the mind is distinct from the body. This intuition can be explained away by mentioning our dispositions to give non-physical explanations when we are ignorant of physical facts. In chapter 6, I will examine two arguments for the existence of a metaphysically independent level, and I will argue that only a modified version of one of them succeeds. I will argue that methodological principles support the view that there is a metaphysically independent level.The Baya and the Mulao : family, gender and ancestral traditions in Luocheng Mulao Autonomous County, China
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/25402
The villagers in Shangnan’an and Xianan’an, two villages in Luocheng Mulao Autonomous County of Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, China, come mainly from an ethnic minority group named the Mulao; further, most of these villagers share the surname Yin. The Baya are female shamans who conduct rituals for these villagers to resolve various personal and familial problems. Drawing on a 14-month stretch of fieldwork in these two villages, this thesis investigates the reasons the Baya have persisted for many generations in this region, despite their practices being forbidden in the period from the late 1950s to the late 1970s. Based on an analysis of the villagers’ kin relationships as well as gender practices in the region, this work argues that the Baya act as mediators between the villagers and their deceased relatives. Their rituals connect the villagers with their ancestors that help tighten kinship bonds under circumstances of changing kin relationships as well as in the face of recent changes to the status of women. The Baya’s rituals also highlight the retention of patrilineal systems in the villages, revealing those traditions that remain even as the influence of patrilineal systems weakens. This thesis thus offers a better understanding of the Mulao, as the Baya are intimately linked to Mulao life in many ways. The importance of this research is not simply in regard to the rituals of the Baya and their connections with kinship and gender: this thesis also contributes to the overall anthropology of China, advancing research on Chinese ethnic minority groups, rural China, and shamanism among Chinese ethnic minority groups.
2022-06-13T00:00:00ZWu, RoujingThe villagers in Shangnan’an and Xianan’an, two villages in Luocheng Mulao Autonomous County of Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, China, come mainly from an ethnic minority group named the Mulao; further, most of these villagers share the surname Yin. The Baya are female shamans who conduct rituals for these villagers to resolve various personal and familial problems. Drawing on a 14-month stretch of fieldwork in these two villages, this thesis investigates the reasons the Baya have persisted for many generations in this region, despite their practices being forbidden in the period from the late 1950s to the late 1970s. Based on an analysis of the villagers’ kin relationships as well as gender practices in the region, this work argues that the Baya act as mediators between the villagers and their deceased relatives. Their rituals connect the villagers with their ancestors that help tighten kinship bonds under circumstances of changing kin relationships as well as in the face of recent changes to the status of women. The Baya’s rituals also highlight the retention of patrilineal systems in the villages, revealing those traditions that remain even as the influence of patrilineal systems weakens. This thesis thus offers a better understanding of the Mulao, as the Baya are intimately linked to Mulao life in many ways. The importance of this research is not simply in regard to the rituals of the Baya and their connections with kinship and gender: this thesis also contributes to the overall anthropology of China, advancing research on Chinese ethnic minority groups, rural China, and shamanism among Chinese ethnic minority groups.The group right to privacy
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/25152
In the age of Big Data Analytics and Covid-19 Apps, the conventional conception of privacy that focuses excessively on the identification of the individual is inadequate to safeguard an individual’s identity and autonomy, when she is targeted on the basis of her interdependent social and algorithmic group affiliations. In order to overcome these limitations, this interdisciplinary research develops a theoretical framework of the group right to privacy (GRP), which is based on privacy as a social value (Pᵥ).
The quadrumvirate formulation of GRP is articulated on the dual lines of the individual’s right as a member of a group and the right of the group itself. An individual’s interest in her social identity and her socially embedded autonomous self is protected through GRP₁. The individual’s right against algorithmic grouping, GRP₂, is motivated by an interest in group-related aspects of informational self-determination. Thirdly, I provide a non-reductionist account of instances where some organized groups may be entitled to privacy in their own right as GRP₃. Lastly, I articulate the collective interest in Mutual Privacy, understood as an aggregate participatory shared public good which is protected through GRP₄. In all four GRP, I carve out a limited exception for contact tracing by Covid-19 Apps during the extraordinary circumstances of the pandemic while safeguarding against the creation of a new normal of erosion of privacy and the rise of post-pandemic simveillance.
To test its efficacy, this theoretical model is critically analysed against the technological challenges posed by Big Data Analytics and Covid-19 Apps. I further examine international privacy legislations to highlight the way this expansive privacy model can be incorporated in the regulatory landscape. In conclusion, this thesis emphasizes that our privacy is not only interdependent in nature, but also existentially cumulatively interlinked and should be protected through the GRP.
2022-06-13T00:00:00ZPuri, AnujIn the age of Big Data Analytics and Covid-19 Apps, the conventional conception of privacy that focuses excessively on the identification of the individual is inadequate to safeguard an individual’s identity and autonomy, when she is targeted on the basis of her interdependent social and algorithmic group affiliations. In order to overcome these limitations, this interdisciplinary research develops a theoretical framework of the group right to privacy (GRP), which is based on privacy as a social value (Pᵥ).
The quadrumvirate formulation of GRP is articulated on the dual lines of the individual’s right as a member of a group and the right of the group itself. An individual’s interest in her social identity and her socially embedded autonomous self is protected through GRP₁. The individual’s right against algorithmic grouping, GRP₂, is motivated by an interest in group-related aspects of informational self-determination. Thirdly, I provide a non-reductionist account of instances where some organized groups may be entitled to privacy in their own right as GRP₃. Lastly, I articulate the collective interest in Mutual Privacy, understood as an aggregate participatory shared public good which is protected through GRP₄. In all four GRP, I carve out a limited exception for contact tracing by Covid-19 Apps during the extraordinary circumstances of the pandemic while safeguarding against the creation of a new normal of erosion of privacy and the rise of post-pandemic simveillance.
To test its efficacy, this theoretical model is critically analysed against the technological challenges posed by Big Data Analytics and Covid-19 Apps. I further examine international privacy legislations to highlight the way this expansive privacy model can be incorporated in the regulatory landscape. In conclusion, this thesis emphasizes that our privacy is not only interdependent in nature, but also existentially cumulatively interlinked and should be protected through the GRP.Consent, epistemic equity and a revised theory of legitimacy
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/24467
In this thesis I argue, against prevailing wisdom in contemporary political philosophy, that consent is a sufficient ground of political legitimacy and I argue for a set of necessary conditions that must be satisfied in order for political consent to be valid. I call this a revised theory of consent. This theory focuses on what consenting is. It does so by arguing that what we call consent is a composite of three mental states. These are (i) recognition, (ii) trust and (iii) willingness and I argue that where (i)-(iii) are present we have consent. I then argue that this consent is valid when it is (a) suitably informed and (b) given freely. This applies in ordinary cases and in ‘high stakes’ cases.
I argue that prior versions of consent theory (what I call PCT's) have failed to demonstrate that consent is sufficient for legitimacy because they place an insurmountably high epistemic burden on consenters. I argue that subjects cannot consent in line with these theories because they cannot know enough about what their consent will authorise. I call this problem the Epistemic Challenge and I argue that in order to defeat it the authority must satisfy The Principle of Epistemic Equity. They do so through meeting the conditions of the revised theory of consent by satisfying certain epistemic and equitable conditions in order to enable subjects to give valid consent. Where these necessary conditions are met I argue that the consent given is sufficient for legitimacy.
In the final two chapters of this work I turn my attention to Joseph Raz’s ‘service conception’. I argue that Raz’s theory implicitly relies on consent — as I define it — and I show that were Raz to embrace the revised theory of consent then the argument of the service conception would be strengthened.
2021-12-01T00:00:00ZMacDougall, Graham DavidIn this thesis I argue, against prevailing wisdom in contemporary political philosophy, that consent is a sufficient ground of political legitimacy and I argue for a set of necessary conditions that must be satisfied in order for political consent to be valid. I call this a revised theory of consent. This theory focuses on what consenting is. It does so by arguing that what we call consent is a composite of three mental states. These are (i) recognition, (ii) trust and (iii) willingness and I argue that where (i)-(iii) are present we have consent. I then argue that this consent is valid when it is (a) suitably informed and (b) given freely. This applies in ordinary cases and in ‘high stakes’ cases.
I argue that prior versions of consent theory (what I call PCT's) have failed to demonstrate that consent is sufficient for legitimacy because they place an insurmountably high epistemic burden on consenters. I argue that subjects cannot consent in line with these theories because they cannot know enough about what their consent will authorise. I call this problem the Epistemic Challenge and I argue that in order to defeat it the authority must satisfy The Principle of Epistemic Equity. They do so through meeting the conditions of the revised theory of consent by satisfying certain epistemic and equitable conditions in order to enable subjects to give valid consent. Where these necessary conditions are met I argue that the consent given is sufficient for legitimacy.
In the final two chapters of this work I turn my attention to Joseph Raz’s ‘service conception’. I argue that Raz’s theory implicitly relies on consent — as I define it — and I show that were Raz to embrace the revised theory of consent then the argument of the service conception would be strengthened.Existence, actuality and logical pluralism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/23504
This work considers data about the intentional nature of human cognition, and traces their consequences for debates in the philosophy and epistemology of logic, and metaphysics. The first part of this work, comprising its first three chapters, investigates the prospect of revising logic in light of de re intentionality, that is, more precisely, in light of the fact that via their cognitive abilities agents can relate to objects that do not exist. We will consider two candidate systems for logical revision, expressions of two forms of logical revisionism, and eventually motivate, from anti-exceptionalist grounds, our preference for one of them. We will start in Ch. 1 by illustrating the anti-exceptionalist methodological framework assumed in this work. Subsequently, in Ch. 2, we will discuss four classically valid principles inadequate to the data of de re intentionality, reject possible attempts, by proponents of so-called realist abstractionist theories of fiction, to deny those data, and present the system P of positive free logic. We will then go on, in Ch. 3, to illustrate the noneist programme of logical revision and a system, N^R, implementing its principles. We will thus argue from anti-exceptionalist grounds that rational theory choice is exercised by choosing N^R. The rest of the chapter is dedicated to defend a realist account about the ontological dependency of the non-existent on the existent. Ch. 4 and Ch. 5 are dedicated to refute attempts, by Timothy Williamson, to reduce disagreements about non-existent objects to cases of merely verbal disagreements. In Ch. 4, we take issue with arguments to the extent that logical disputes about `exists' are genuine only if the parties use it in deductively ways. In Ch. 5 we address his scepticism towards the dispute, about merely possible objects, between actualism and possibilism, and find it unwarranted.
2021-12-01T00:00:00ZRossi, AlessandroThis work considers data about the intentional nature of human cognition, and traces their consequences for debates in the philosophy and epistemology of logic, and metaphysics. The first part of this work, comprising its first three chapters, investigates the prospect of revising logic in light of de re intentionality, that is, more precisely, in light of the fact that via their cognitive abilities agents can relate to objects that do not exist. We will consider two candidate systems for logical revision, expressions of two forms of logical revisionism, and eventually motivate, from anti-exceptionalist grounds, our preference for one of them. We will start in Ch. 1 by illustrating the anti-exceptionalist methodological framework assumed in this work. Subsequently, in Ch. 2, we will discuss four classically valid principles inadequate to the data of de re intentionality, reject possible attempts, by proponents of so-called realist abstractionist theories of fiction, to deny those data, and present the system P of positive free logic. We will then go on, in Ch. 3, to illustrate the noneist programme of logical revision and a system, N^R, implementing its principles. We will thus argue from anti-exceptionalist grounds that rational theory choice is exercised by choosing N^R. The rest of the chapter is dedicated to defend a realist account about the ontological dependency of the non-existent on the existent. Ch. 4 and Ch. 5 are dedicated to refute attempts, by Timothy Williamson, to reduce disagreements about non-existent objects to cases of merely verbal disagreements. In Ch. 4, we take issue with arguments to the extent that logical disputes about `exists' are genuine only if the parties use it in deductively ways. In Ch. 5 we address his scepticism towards the dispute, about merely possible objects, between actualism and possibilism, and find it unwarranted.Bursting out of place : island life on Samothraki after the deluge
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/23495
This thesis is the result of the first ethnographic research in Social Anthropology taking place on Samothraki, the northernmost island of Greece. Remote by location, Samothraki is populated by less than 3,000 residents in a surface area of 180km² and a remarkable – for its circumference – altitude of 1,611m.
The thesis is preoccupied with a catastrophic rainfall that flooded extensive parts of the island overnight on 26 September 2017 and follows the recovery process until 31 December 2018, when my fieldwork was concluded. The extremity as well as the unprecedentedness of this natural disaster, made the recovery from it an emotional, environmental and administrative challenge, while it also exposed pre-existing perceptions of the islanders about their surrounding environment and their interaction with it. Through a comparative analysis of qualitative and quantitative data I collected, I relate these perceptions to the magnitude of the disaster and, furthermore, to the actions that were taken in its aftermath for both reconstruction and prevention of future such incidents. Yet, raising consensus among the islanders and paving the way forward, was subjected to the limitations of state administration and the inefficiencies of disaster management in Greece, as this can be also evidenced by natural disasters that hit other parts of the country during that period and which are brought into the discussion. Simultaneously, plans for the expansion of the tourist sector and further capitalisation on the island’s natural resources, pose as an imminent threat to a landscape that is already suffering from environmental degradation.
The deluge on Samothraki, then, becomes a case study about how island communities in Greece and, more broadly, in Europe can cope with extreme weather phenomena, occurring with increased frequency in the era of climate crisis, and how the subsequent states of emergency can be a potential advantage to restoring environmental balance.
2021-06-28T00:00:00ZKotsira, EleniThis thesis is the result of the first ethnographic research in Social Anthropology taking place on Samothraki, the northernmost island of Greece. Remote by location, Samothraki is populated by less than 3,000 residents in a surface area of 180km² and a remarkable – for its circumference – altitude of 1,611m.
The thesis is preoccupied with a catastrophic rainfall that flooded extensive parts of the island overnight on 26 September 2017 and follows the recovery process until 31 December 2018, when my fieldwork was concluded. The extremity as well as the unprecedentedness of this natural disaster, made the recovery from it an emotional, environmental and administrative challenge, while it also exposed pre-existing perceptions of the islanders about their surrounding environment and their interaction with it. Through a comparative analysis of qualitative and quantitative data I collected, I relate these perceptions to the magnitude of the disaster and, furthermore, to the actions that were taken in its aftermath for both reconstruction and prevention of future such incidents. Yet, raising consensus among the islanders and paving the way forward, was subjected to the limitations of state administration and the inefficiencies of disaster management in Greece, as this can be also evidenced by natural disasters that hit other parts of the country during that period and which are brought into the discussion. Simultaneously, plans for the expansion of the tourist sector and further capitalisation on the island’s natural resources, pose as an imminent threat to a landscape that is already suffering from environmental degradation.
The deluge on Samothraki, then, becomes a case study about how island communities in Greece and, more broadly, in Europe can cope with extreme weather phenomena, occurring with increased frequency in the era of climate crisis, and how the subsequent states of emergency can be a potential advantage to restoring environmental balance.Structural rationality for self-governance : why we ought to have coherent sets of attitudes
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/23440
In this project I argue that, as agents, we have a normative commitment to avoid incoherent combinations of attitudes. To this end, I defend an amended version of Alex Worsnip’s (2020) position on normative requirements of structural rationality. After offering a more uniform account of coherence requirements for Worsnip’s project, I argue against several problem cases thought to prevent the normativity of these requirements. Finally, I advocate to recast Worsnip’s project within a constitutivist account of agency and self- governance. I argue that doing so provides the necessary framework to explain sufficiently why agents are rationally bound to normative coherence requirements.
2021-06-28T00:00:00ZLiBrizzi, JacobIn this project I argue that, as agents, we have a normative commitment to avoid incoherent combinations of attitudes. To this end, I defend an amended version of Alex Worsnip’s (2020) position on normative requirements of structural rationality. After offering a more uniform account of coherence requirements for Worsnip’s project, I argue against several problem cases thought to prevent the normativity of these requirements. Finally, I advocate to recast Worsnip’s project within a constitutivist account of agency and self- governance. I argue that doing so provides the necessary framework to explain sufficiently why agents are rationally bound to normative coherence requirements.Rejuvenating democracy : age, knowledge, and the right to vote
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/23356
At the core of democracy is a simple idea: one person, one vote. However, all democracies disenfranchise citizens below a certain age. What justifies this practice? The answer seems obvious: voting isn’t a children’s game. When citizens head to the ballots, a lot is at stake: who runs the government and what policies are implemented significantly affects the lives of many citizens. According to a widely held view, voting requires a certain competence that children lack. If we take this idea a little further, we may conclude that adult citizens ought to demonstrate a certain level of competence before receiving the right to vote, too. However, most contemporary political philosophers reject this “epistocratic” line of thought. Either for epistemic, moral, or pragmatic reasons, they endorse enfranchising every adult. This raises the central question of this dissertation: can we justify giving the right to vote to all and only citizens above a certain age? I argue that we cannot. To establish this claim, I assess three different voting schemes: Standard Democracy, which gives exactly one vote to all and only citizens above a certain age; Epistocratic Democracy, which gives more voting power to “politically knowledgeable” citizens; and Ageless Democracy, which gives all citizens, regardless of age, the right to cast exactly one vote in democratic procedures. First, I defend Standard Democracy against Epistocratic Democracy. This amounts to an argument that all citizens above a certain age should have equal voting rights. I then evaluate potential justifications for conceding these rights only to citizens above a certain age, and reject them. This amounts to a case for Ageless Democracy. Abandoning the voting age is both a theoretically consistent implication of rejecting Epistocratic Democracy and a practically desirable approach to reinvigorating democratic procedures.
2021-06-28T00:00:00ZHinze, JakobAt the core of democracy is a simple idea: one person, one vote. However, all democracies disenfranchise citizens below a certain age. What justifies this practice? The answer seems obvious: voting isn’t a children’s game. When citizens head to the ballots, a lot is at stake: who runs the government and what policies are implemented significantly affects the lives of many citizens. According to a widely held view, voting requires a certain competence that children lack. If we take this idea a little further, we may conclude that adult citizens ought to demonstrate a certain level of competence before receiving the right to vote, too. However, most contemporary political philosophers reject this “epistocratic” line of thought. Either for epistemic, moral, or pragmatic reasons, they endorse enfranchising every adult. This raises the central question of this dissertation: can we justify giving the right to vote to all and only citizens above a certain age? I argue that we cannot. To establish this claim, I assess three different voting schemes: Standard Democracy, which gives exactly one vote to all and only citizens above a certain age; Epistocratic Democracy, which gives more voting power to “politically knowledgeable” citizens; and Ageless Democracy, which gives all citizens, regardless of age, the right to cast exactly one vote in democratic procedures. First, I defend Standard Democracy against Epistocratic Democracy. This amounts to an argument that all citizens above a certain age should have equal voting rights. I then evaluate potential justifications for conceding these rights only to citizens above a certain age, and reject them. This amounts to a case for Ageless Democracy. Abandoning the voting age is both a theoretically consistent implication of rejecting Epistocratic Democracy and a practically desirable approach to reinvigorating democratic procedures.An in/divisible whole : time, space, and technologies of mediation in the Musée de l'Homme
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/23333
This thesis examines the development of cinema as part of the broader institutional ecology of the Musée de l’Homme between the 1930s and 1960s. In particular, it asks how film was used to analyse, illustrate, promote, and critique the emerging synergistic theorisation of the unity of humanity as – in the words of the museum’s first director, Paul Rivet – an “indivisible whole, not only in space, but also in time”. Film was adopted by the community of the museum in diverse and innovative ways to bridge numerous paradoxes and lacunae that arose in the institution’s mission and practices. These included how to foster feelings of identification between visitors and various kinds of ‘others’ represented in the museum; how to depict shared human connection across scale, from the particular to the universal; and how to interrelate different orders of information, including anthropological theory, scientific data, museum collections, and the perspectives of visitors. Film, here, integrated various facets of the museum in unique medium-specific ways that most fully actualised the institution’s theories. By examining its place in the museum, I analyse film as what I term a ‘technology of mediation’, tracing its singular capacity to bring otherwise discrete ontological orders into relationship. Methodologically, this involves examining film’s position within the expanded field of the museum, and how it was used to interact with and respond to disjunctures in institutional theory and practice. This thesis is the first extended analysis of the use of film in the Musée de l’Homme. It contributes to the study of film in institutional settings beyond ‘the cinema’, highlighting film’s understudied mediatory qualities. It also offers a novel model for engaging with history and theory, not as ‘context’, but rather as a broader institutional assemblage of which film is a part, and centrally mediates.
2021-06-28T00:00:00ZHopmeier, Sophie KennedyThis thesis examines the development of cinema as part of the broader institutional ecology of the Musée de l’Homme between the 1930s and 1960s. In particular, it asks how film was used to analyse, illustrate, promote, and critique the emerging synergistic theorisation of the unity of humanity as – in the words of the museum’s first director, Paul Rivet – an “indivisible whole, not only in space, but also in time”. Film was adopted by the community of the museum in diverse and innovative ways to bridge numerous paradoxes and lacunae that arose in the institution’s mission and practices. These included how to foster feelings of identification between visitors and various kinds of ‘others’ represented in the museum; how to depict shared human connection across scale, from the particular to the universal; and how to interrelate different orders of information, including anthropological theory, scientific data, museum collections, and the perspectives of visitors. Film, here, integrated various facets of the museum in unique medium-specific ways that most fully actualised the institution’s theories. By examining its place in the museum, I analyse film as what I term a ‘technology of mediation’, tracing its singular capacity to bring otherwise discrete ontological orders into relationship. Methodologically, this involves examining film’s position within the expanded field of the museum, and how it was used to interact with and respond to disjunctures in institutional theory and practice. This thesis is the first extended analysis of the use of film in the Musée de l’Homme. It contributes to the study of film in institutional settings beyond ‘the cinema’, highlighting film’s understudied mediatory qualities. It also offers a novel model for engaging with history and theory, not as ‘context’, but rather as a broader institutional assemblage of which film is a part, and centrally mediates.The starry heavens above and the moral law within : Kant’s grounding of freedom in experience by way of a principle of intellectual causality, discovered in his third Critique
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/23264
Kant claims in his third Critique (1790) to have proven that the idea of freedom is scibilium, known with certainty. My aim is simply to take his claim seriously. This involves the attempt, which Kant himself suggests in the first Critique is key to properly understanding a philosopher, to form a plausible ‘idea’ of his system. I do so by interpreting it according to the end that he claims. I contend that Kant realises this claimed outcome by demonstrating the necessary effects of a purely intellectual causality in a certain kind of experience in inner sense: pleasure in beauty. This, I argue, then allows him to complete his proof of the reality of freedom. I also present evidence to suggest that Kant knew what must be involved in this proof much earlier than is generally conceded. It is also my view that this interpretation is of no detriment to the consistency of his philosophical system as a whole; in fact, it allows an understanding that fits with his claims. The arguments involved in this thesis involve opposing the majority view that certain concepts appeared first in Kant’s third Critique and must also challenge accepted perspectives on parts of Kant’s other relevant works. It will be necessary to examine aspects of Kant’s epistemology and metaphysics, his empirical psychology, aesthetics, and his moral and theoretical philosophy. In such a broad body of work as Kant’s, it can be easy to become overwhelmed and lost, or even to find corroboration for views that are at odds with the general trend of his thinking. In a best attempt to avoid this, I will throughout regulate my own idea of his system and constrain my investigations by remaining conscious of his claims, i.e., by way of a thread tethered to Kant’s own claimed conclusion.
2021-06-28T00:00:00ZPaterson, Gareth HughKant claims in his third Critique (1790) to have proven that the idea of freedom is scibilium, known with certainty. My aim is simply to take his claim seriously. This involves the attempt, which Kant himself suggests in the first Critique is key to properly understanding a philosopher, to form a plausible ‘idea’ of his system. I do so by interpreting it according to the end that he claims. I contend that Kant realises this claimed outcome by demonstrating the necessary effects of a purely intellectual causality in a certain kind of experience in inner sense: pleasure in beauty. This, I argue, then allows him to complete his proof of the reality of freedom. I also present evidence to suggest that Kant knew what must be involved in this proof much earlier than is generally conceded. It is also my view that this interpretation is of no detriment to the consistency of his philosophical system as a whole; in fact, it allows an understanding that fits with his claims. The arguments involved in this thesis involve opposing the majority view that certain concepts appeared first in Kant’s third Critique and must also challenge accepted perspectives on parts of Kant’s other relevant works. It will be necessary to examine aspects of Kant’s epistemology and metaphysics, his empirical psychology, aesthetics, and his moral and theoretical philosophy. In such a broad body of work as Kant’s, it can be easy to become overwhelmed and lost, or even to find corroboration for views that are at odds with the general trend of his thinking. In a best attempt to avoid this, I will throughout regulate my own idea of his system and constrain my investigations by remaining conscious of his claims, i.e., by way of a thread tethered to Kant’s own claimed conclusion.Ambiguity, nostalgia, dialectic : Saharan nation-states and the legacy of nomadic pastoralism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/23187
2021-06-28T00:00:00ZPorges, MatthewTranslating identities : 'being a missionary' in Papua New Guinea
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/22134
Many studies of missionaries have taken an historical perspective,
looking particularly at missionaries’ role in colonialism. However,
missionaries are still very much part of contemporary Papua New
Guinea (PNG), with a significant number of expatriate missionary
groups working in PNG. This thesis is a study of a present day
mission in PNG, SIL International, formerly known as the Summer
Institute of Linguistics (SIL). It examines the way in which the
mission community is constructed and the boundaries and divisions
within the community itself. It attempts to challenge some of the
stereotypes of missionaries and show that there are different views of
what it is to ‘be a missionary’ even within the missionary community
itself. I focus particularly on what it means to ‘be a missionary’ and
the ambiguities and ambivalences between the ideals and realities of
mission work.
The focus of the study was on SIL members themselves and their
identities as missionaries rather than the effect of their missionising
on others. This is examined through a number of different themes.
Debates about the fence surrounding the mission station highlighted
the way in which it created both a physical and a symbolic boundary
between those living inside the fence and the people living outside of
it. Related to this were debates regarding the mission station,
Ukarumpa and how SIL members should ‘communicate the gospel’.
SIL’s main goal is Bible translation and the thesis explores the
challenges and problems of translation, both the practical aspects of
Bible translation and translating between cultures. Literacy work is
also an important part of SIL’s goal and is shown to be especially
significant in maintaining a good relationship with the PNG
government. Finally, notions of ‘home’ and ‘belonging’, particularly
in relation to the children of missionaries, and the notion of ‘citizens
of heaven’ is shown to help shape SIL members’ identities as
‘missionaries’.
2006-01-01T00:00:00ZRoberts, E. Mei-LiMany studies of missionaries have taken an historical perspective,
looking particularly at missionaries’ role in colonialism. However,
missionaries are still very much part of contemporary Papua New
Guinea (PNG), with a significant number of expatriate missionary
groups working in PNG. This thesis is a study of a present day
mission in PNG, SIL International, formerly known as the Summer
Institute of Linguistics (SIL). It examines the way in which the
mission community is constructed and the boundaries and divisions
within the community itself. It attempts to challenge some of the
stereotypes of missionaries and show that there are different views of
what it is to ‘be a missionary’ even within the missionary community
itself. I focus particularly on what it means to ‘be a missionary’ and
the ambiguities and ambivalences between the ideals and realities of
mission work.
The focus of the study was on SIL members themselves and their
identities as missionaries rather than the effect of their missionising
on others. This is examined through a number of different themes.
Debates about the fence surrounding the mission station highlighted
the way in which it created both a physical and a symbolic boundary
between those living inside the fence and the people living outside of
it. Related to this were debates regarding the mission station,
Ukarumpa and how SIL members should ‘communicate the gospel’.
SIL’s main goal is Bible translation and the thesis explores the
challenges and problems of translation, both the practical aspects of
Bible translation and translating between cultures. Literacy work is
also an important part of SIL’s goal and is shown to be especially
significant in maintaining a good relationship with the PNG
government. Finally, notions of ‘home’ and ‘belonging’, particularly
in relation to the children of missionaries, and the notion of ‘citizens
of heaven’ is shown to help shape SIL members’ identities as
‘missionaries’.Spatial thought and active experience
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/21984
In the following thesis I attempt to argue that some form of activity is necessary if a subject is to be able to partake in spatial thought and undergo conceptual, spatial experience. I approach this issue by considering a thought experiment of Galen Strawson, concerning the passive creatures that he calls the 'Weather Watchers', and by attempting to demonstrate that such passive creatures could not meet certain requirements necessary for conceptual spatial awareness. I argue against the idea that such passive beings could possess spatial concepts by employing certain transcendental arguments that connect the possession of particular concepts to the having of certain sorts of experience. More specifically, I claim that in order to view oneself as located in space and to make sense of the causal relations holding between oneself and other spatial items, one must possess the concept of a material object. I argue that the possession of this concept is only available to those subjects able to actively interact in certain ways with other objects. Next, I argue that the ability to grasp the distinction between veridical and non-veridical experience is essential if one is to grasp that one's perceptual experience represents something other than one's own states, and that a passive subject will have no means by which it might achieve such a grasp. Parallels are drawn between this approach and that of P. F. Strawson and Gareth Evans. Finally, I attempt to demonstrate that the spatial content of sensation alone is inadequate for full conceptual, spatial awareness. This section draws upon Brian O'Shaughnessy's work on the body image.
2000-01-01T00:00:00ZLindsay, Christopher J.In the following thesis I attempt to argue that some form of activity is necessary if a subject is to be able to partake in spatial thought and undergo conceptual, spatial experience. I approach this issue by considering a thought experiment of Galen Strawson, concerning the passive creatures that he calls the 'Weather Watchers', and by attempting to demonstrate that such passive creatures could not meet certain requirements necessary for conceptual spatial awareness. I argue against the idea that such passive beings could possess spatial concepts by employing certain transcendental arguments that connect the possession of particular concepts to the having of certain sorts of experience. More specifically, I claim that in order to view oneself as located in space and to make sense of the causal relations holding between oneself and other spatial items, one must possess the concept of a material object. I argue that the possession of this concept is only available to those subjects able to actively interact in certain ways with other objects. Next, I argue that the ability to grasp the distinction between veridical and non-veridical experience is essential if one is to grasp that one's perceptual experience represents something other than one's own states, and that a passive subject will have no means by which it might achieve such a grasp. Parallels are drawn between this approach and that of P. F. Strawson and Gareth Evans. Finally, I attempt to demonstrate that the spatial content of sensation alone is inadequate for full conceptual, spatial awareness. This section draws upon Brian O'Shaughnessy's work on the body image.Consequentialism and moral demands
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/21933
The aim of this thesis is to outline a form of consequentialism which denies the deeply unintuitive claim that we have a moral obligation to bring about the best consequences we can. Consequentialism should not be understood primarily as a theory of morality narrowly conceived as focusing on obligation, but instead as a theory of the goodness and choiceworthiness of our actions and practices, and of what there is most reason to do. I begin from the well-rehearsed objection to consequentialism that it is unreasonably demanding, arguing that this constitutes a good objection to the theory in its traditional form, but showing that my favoured form of consequentialism- one which limits itself to claims about value and reasons- is not susceptible to it. I discuss criticisms of consequentialism from influential work in the second half of the twentieth century, showing how the strongest objections outlined therein apply only to consequentialism as a theory of moral obligation, and not to consequentialism as a theory of value. Finally, I outline what a consequentialist should say positively about moral demands, explaining the limited role which the theory should have in shaping our moral obligations. I conclude that consequentialists should not be preoccupied with developing a distinctively consequentialist theory of moral demands.
2006-01-01T00:00:00ZMcElwee, BrianThe aim of this thesis is to outline a form of consequentialism which denies the deeply unintuitive claim that we have a moral obligation to bring about the best consequences we can. Consequentialism should not be understood primarily as a theory of morality narrowly conceived as focusing on obligation, but instead as a theory of the goodness and choiceworthiness of our actions and practices, and of what there is most reason to do. I begin from the well-rehearsed objection to consequentialism that it is unreasonably demanding, arguing that this constitutes a good objection to the theory in its traditional form, but showing that my favoured form of consequentialism- one which limits itself to claims about value and reasons- is not susceptible to it. I discuss criticisms of consequentialism from influential work in the second half of the twentieth century, showing how the strongest objections outlined therein apply only to consequentialism as a theory of moral obligation, and not to consequentialism as a theory of value. Finally, I outline what a consequentialist should say positively about moral demands, explaining the limited role which the theory should have in shaping our moral obligations. I conclude that consequentialists should not be preoccupied with developing a distinctively consequentialist theory of moral demands.Negotiating small differences : conservation organisations and farming in Islay
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/21878
This thesis concerns the relationship between two conservation organisations (Scottish Natural Heritage and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds) and farming people in Islay, Scotland. The historical discourse of this entangled relationship is constructed from interviews, archival research, meetings and events recorded during sixteen months of fieldwork. The principal contestations concerned designated areas for conservation and crop damage caused by protected geese. This historical discourse developed alongside fluctuations in Islay's agricultural economy and concerns over the future of farming. Five sketches introduce the discourse but the analysis is then developed around three symbols that represented conservation and farming - an RSPB nature reserve, designated areas and the goose problem. Farmers' relations with land, government and other farmers are also described in order to reveal their understandings of change and the outside world -both of which conservation organisations came to represent.
The thesis emphasises a perceptual, fluid and diachronic approach to the negotiation of difference and relations of power rather than notions of belonging and marginalisation. It describes how individuals and organisations explained and negotiated difference and how they utilised symbols both to situate themselves and to develop future strategies. Bateson's concepts of tautology and abduction are then used to tease out the underlying assumptions that underpin these practices. This analysis reveals models of connection between the local/ outside world and continuity/ change and the ways in which these were played off against one another in discourse. Although conservationists were often identified with change and the outside world, this identification was gradually reduced because farmers needed to renegotiate their livelihoods in the light of deteriorating economic conditions and also because conservation came to be more associated with the local and with continuity. Because their power could then seem either more negotiable or more inevitable, the influence of conservationists grew.
2005-01-01T00:00:00ZWhitehouse, Andrew J.This thesis concerns the relationship between two conservation organisations (Scottish Natural Heritage and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds) and farming people in Islay, Scotland. The historical discourse of this entangled relationship is constructed from interviews, archival research, meetings and events recorded during sixteen months of fieldwork. The principal contestations concerned designated areas for conservation and crop damage caused by protected geese. This historical discourse developed alongside fluctuations in Islay's agricultural economy and concerns over the future of farming. Five sketches introduce the discourse but the analysis is then developed around three symbols that represented conservation and farming - an RSPB nature reserve, designated areas and the goose problem. Farmers' relations with land, government and other farmers are also described in order to reveal their understandings of change and the outside world -both of which conservation organisations came to represent.
The thesis emphasises a perceptual, fluid and diachronic approach to the negotiation of difference and relations of power rather than notions of belonging and marginalisation. It describes how individuals and organisations explained and negotiated difference and how they utilised symbols both to situate themselves and to develop future strategies. Bateson's concepts of tautology and abduction are then used to tease out the underlying assumptions that underpin these practices. This analysis reveals models of connection between the local/ outside world and continuity/ change and the ways in which these were played off against one another in discourse. Although conservationists were often identified with change and the outside world, this identification was gradually reduced because farmers needed to renegotiate their livelihoods in the light of deteriorating economic conditions and also because conservation came to be more associated with the local and with continuity. Because their power could then seem either more negotiable or more inevitable, the influence of conservationists grew.Revising logic
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/21862
In this thesis I explore the prospects for the revision of classical logic through an analysis of the philosophical arguments offered for and against such change. The body of the thesis is divided into two parts. In Part One I seek to establish a general picture of logical revision. The picture provides a defence of the conceptual possibility of logical revision and an account of the ways it can work. The first chapter is concerned with the comparison of different logical systems. I offer a classification of equivalence classes of logical systems in which a difference between 'rival' and 'non-rival' systems may be articulated. The second chapter is addressed to the 'kinematics' of logic: how logical systems change. Here my principal concern has been to explain the significance of the shared content that may endure through such change. The third chapter addresses the 'dynamics' of logic, exploring the forces that bring about theory change within logic. To this end I offer an account of the broader theoretical context of logical systems, and develop an application of a methodology adequate to describe and analyse logical theory change. Part Two consists of case studies of specific logical reform proposals, and is designed to illustrate the general picture defended in Part One. Four successive chapters address the claims made on behalf of intuitionistic logic, quantum logic, relevant logic and paraconsistent logic. Collectively, the case studies serve to examine the applicability of a general account of logical revision and to explore the finer detail of a variety of different debates within especially illustrative contexts.
2001-01-01T00:00:00ZAberdein, AndrewIn this thesis I explore the prospects for the revision of classical logic through an analysis of the philosophical arguments offered for and against such change. The body of the thesis is divided into two parts. In Part One I seek to establish a general picture of logical revision. The picture provides a defence of the conceptual possibility of logical revision and an account of the ways it can work. The first chapter is concerned with the comparison of different logical systems. I offer a classification of equivalence classes of logical systems in which a difference between 'rival' and 'non-rival' systems may be articulated. The second chapter is addressed to the 'kinematics' of logic: how logical systems change. Here my principal concern has been to explain the significance of the shared content that may endure through such change. The third chapter addresses the 'dynamics' of logic, exploring the forces that bring about theory change within logic. To this end I offer an account of the broader theoretical context of logical systems, and develop an application of a methodology adequate to describe and analyse logical theory change. Part Two consists of case studies of specific logical reform proposals, and is designed to illustrate the general picture defended in Part One. Four successive chapters address the claims made on behalf of intuitionistic logic, quantum logic, relevant logic and paraconsistent logic. Collectively, the case studies serve to examine the applicability of a general account of logical revision and to explore the finer detail of a variety of different debates within especially illustrative contexts.Semantic theory and sentential understanding : a discussion of tacit knowledge and compositionality
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/21834
This essay is an attempt to look critically at some issues arising from the idea that competent speakers of a natural language can tacitly know an extensionally correct theory of meaning for their language. In the first chapter I outline the idea that sentential understanding is to be construed as an ability, and argue that a speaker's tacitly knowing a theorem of a semantic theory should be construed as his possessing an intention to uphold the regularity prescribed by that theorem. I then go on to deal with objections that have been raised against the idea that speakers can have such tacit knowledge by Baker and Hacker, Appiah, and McDowell. In the second chapter I ask whether a similar story can be given concerning tacit knowledge of the axioms of a semantic theory, and come to the conclusion that it cannot: using modifications of arguments by Evans, Wright, and Stich, I show that speakers cannot be ascribed intentional states corresponding to semantic axioms. I then go back to argue that the ascription of such intentional states corresponding to theorems does not violate a plausible constraint on the ascription of such states. In the third chapter I look at the prospects for the use of the notion of tacit knowledge in the justification of the compositionality constraint. Beginning with Evans, I eventually come to the conclusion that tacit knowledge of a semantic theory is a sort of causal explanatory structure, to be found in the abilities which constitute language mastery : this finds expression in Davies' version of the mirror constraint. Inter alia , I sketch responses to difficulties that have been pointed out concerning this account by Wright, Davies, and Sainsbury, but conclude that there are still at least some difficulties looming which stem from the later Wittgenstein's attack on the objectivity of meaning.
1989-01-01T00:00:00ZMiller, Alexander, 1965-This essay is an attempt to look critically at some issues arising from the idea that competent speakers of a natural language can tacitly know an extensionally correct theory of meaning for their language. In the first chapter I outline the idea that sentential understanding is to be construed as an ability, and argue that a speaker's tacitly knowing a theorem of a semantic theory should be construed as his possessing an intention to uphold the regularity prescribed by that theorem. I then go on to deal with objections that have been raised against the idea that speakers can have such tacit knowledge by Baker and Hacker, Appiah, and McDowell. In the second chapter I ask whether a similar story can be given concerning tacit knowledge of the axioms of a semantic theory, and come to the conclusion that it cannot: using modifications of arguments by Evans, Wright, and Stich, I show that speakers cannot be ascribed intentional states corresponding to semantic axioms. I then go back to argue that the ascription of such intentional states corresponding to theorems does not violate a plausible constraint on the ascription of such states. In the third chapter I look at the prospects for the use of the notion of tacit knowledge in the justification of the compositionality constraint. Beginning with Evans, I eventually come to the conclusion that tacit knowledge of a semantic theory is a sort of causal explanatory structure, to be found in the abilities which constitute language mastery : this finds expression in Davies' version of the mirror constraint. Inter alia , I sketch responses to difficulties that have been pointed out concerning this account by Wright, Davies, and Sainsbury, but conclude that there are still at least some difficulties looming which stem from the later Wittgenstein's attack on the objectivity of meaning.Necessity and modal systems: an essay on modal terms
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/21826
The purpose of this paper is to determine if our ordinary-language notions of modal terms furnish a basis for the development of modal logics, and if so, how and to what extent. I shall begin by distinguishing the "use" of a modal term and the "ground" for it. Briefly, the logical relations between statements are due to the uses of their terms, and the grounds for a statement are the reasons we would produce to justify its assertation. In Chapter One I shall distinguish five uses of modal terms, and in Chapter Two I shall enumerate a number of grounds for sentences containing modal terms. In the next two chapters I shall employ the results of Chapter One and Chapter Two in connection with the two most important problems facing modal logic: Iterated modalities and statements in which a quantifier binds a variable which is within the scope of a modal term.
1971-01-01T00:00:00ZEsterline, Albert CrawfordThe purpose of this paper is to determine if our ordinary-language notions of modal terms furnish a basis for the development of modal logics, and if so, how and to what extent. I shall begin by distinguishing the "use" of a modal term and the "ground" for it. Briefly, the logical relations between statements are due to the uses of their terms, and the grounds for a statement are the reasons we would produce to justify its assertation. In Chapter One I shall distinguish five uses of modal terms, and in Chapter Two I shall enumerate a number of grounds for sentences containing modal terms. In the next two chapters I shall employ the results of Chapter One and Chapter Two in connection with the two most important problems facing modal logic: Iterated modalities and statements in which a quantifier binds a variable which is within the scope of a modal term.The owners : creative processes and personhood in the peasant community of San Pablo de Inkawasi (Lambayeque, Peru)
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/21666
This thesis is an exploration of how the Quechua-speaking peasants of the community of
San Pablo de Inkawasi, in the Andes of northern Peru, make, grow or own things, domestic
plants and animals and their own children; and which shows how these creative processes—
and the bond of ownership that emerges from them—are central for articulating local
notions of sociality and personhood. The relation of ownership is also central for giving
meaning to their relations with the generative powers of the landscape and with the colonial
and postcolonial State. The focus of this thesis is on the bond of mastery or ownership,
responding to the necessity of underlining that all creative processes are thought of by the
Inkawasinos as a continuous relationship that long precedes and follows the actual
transformation (for example, the transformation of sheep wool into a poncho). Creative
processes are understood as appropriations—transforming something or someone into one’s
own—that create a permanent bond between creators and their creatures thought of in the
language of kin. The relations created between creators and their creatures, assimilated to
that between parents and children, are used to imagine a plural and unbounded person
composed of relations with humans and other-than-humans. Relations of mastery or
ownership are established not just between people and their belongings, but also between
people and other owners—human or not—including those to which the Inkawasinos belong
themselves: such as the mountains (Sirkakuna) or the Christian deities (Amitunchik). Mastery
has been historically at the centre of the relations with the colonial and post-colonial States,
which allows me to articulate personhood with the particular history of this Andean
community, and with the challenges its members face in a world of increasingly contested
ownership.
2021-01-01T00:00:00ZMartinez Santamaria, LuzThis thesis is an exploration of how the Quechua-speaking peasants of the community of
San Pablo de Inkawasi, in the Andes of northern Peru, make, grow or own things, domestic
plants and animals and their own children; and which shows how these creative processes—
and the bond of ownership that emerges from them—are central for articulating local
notions of sociality and personhood. The relation of ownership is also central for giving
meaning to their relations with the generative powers of the landscape and with the colonial
and postcolonial State. The focus of this thesis is on the bond of mastery or ownership,
responding to the necessity of underlining that all creative processes are thought of by the
Inkawasinos as a continuous relationship that long precedes and follows the actual
transformation (for example, the transformation of sheep wool into a poncho). Creative
processes are understood as appropriations—transforming something or someone into one’s
own—that create a permanent bond between creators and their creatures thought of in the
language of kin. The relations created between creators and their creatures, assimilated to
that between parents and children, are used to imagine a plural and unbounded person
composed of relations with humans and other-than-humans. Relations of mastery or
ownership are established not just between people and their belongings, but also between
people and other owners—human or not—including those to which the Inkawasinos belong
themselves: such as the mountains (Sirkakuna) or the Christian deities (Amitunchik). Mastery
has been historically at the centre of the relations with the colonial and post-colonial States,
which allows me to articulate personhood with the particular history of this Andean
community, and with the challenges its members face in a world of increasingly contested
ownership.‘Americanism in action’ : the 1920s epic western and Hollywood historical cinema
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/21597
This study examines the emergence of epic Western filmmaking in the late silent era. Identified by vocal Hollywood proponents and critics of filmdom morality alike as the most laudable use for the increasingly ubiquitous motion picture, titles such as The Covered Wagon (1923), The Iron Horse (1924), The Pony Express (1925), and The Vanishing American (1925) were hailed for not only the rare ‘authenticity’ they brought to reconstructing America’s constructive nineteenth-century frontier period but the edifying, Americanising ends their doing so could serve. Projecting historical episodes foundational to the nation’s self-image before audiences from across linguistic and cultural divides, they demonstrated, in an apparently unprecedented fashion, a singular social purpose for Hollywood.
And yet, scant attention has since been paid to the films of this important cycle, whether in terms of their remarkable initial popularity or their precipitous subsequent fall from popular grace. This study intervenes here by examining an overlooked cultural phenomenon that pro-cinema advocates of the era consistently placed at the centre of their Hollywood-boosting arguments. Among early film writers and theorists, these epic Westerns were recognised as a new type of distinctly American history, enlarged by cinema’s medium-specific reach to provide the ‘melting pot’s’ diverse filmgoers with inspiring, unifying lessons in the very ‘making’ of their nation. Combining close analyses of their historiographical articulations with readings of their production and reception, this study investigates how their emergence responded to and informed discourses far beyond those traditionally associated with the genre. By tying the nation’s most pervasive form of mass entertainment to publicised aspirations to enlighten and educate the public, studios moved frontier-historical filmmaking to the heart of the period’s most pressing debates around Hollywood: as a social influence; as an Americanising force for national unity; and, even, as a harbinger of world harmony.
2020-12-02T00:00:00ZAdamson, PatrickThis study examines the emergence of epic Western filmmaking in the late silent era. Identified by vocal Hollywood proponents and critics of filmdom morality alike as the most laudable use for the increasingly ubiquitous motion picture, titles such as The Covered Wagon (1923), The Iron Horse (1924), The Pony Express (1925), and The Vanishing American (1925) were hailed for not only the rare ‘authenticity’ they brought to reconstructing America’s constructive nineteenth-century frontier period but the edifying, Americanising ends their doing so could serve. Projecting historical episodes foundational to the nation’s self-image before audiences from across linguistic and cultural divides, they demonstrated, in an apparently unprecedented fashion, a singular social purpose for Hollywood.
And yet, scant attention has since been paid to the films of this important cycle, whether in terms of their remarkable initial popularity or their precipitous subsequent fall from popular grace. This study intervenes here by examining an overlooked cultural phenomenon that pro-cinema advocates of the era consistently placed at the centre of their Hollywood-boosting arguments. Among early film writers and theorists, these epic Westerns were recognised as a new type of distinctly American history, enlarged by cinema’s medium-specific reach to provide the ‘melting pot’s’ diverse filmgoers with inspiring, unifying lessons in the very ‘making’ of their nation. Combining close analyses of their historiographical articulations with readings of their production and reception, this study investigates how their emergence responded to and informed discourses far beyond those traditionally associated with the genre. By tying the nation’s most pervasive form of mass entertainment to publicised aspirations to enlighten and educate the public, studios moved frontier-historical filmmaking to the heart of the period’s most pressing debates around Hollywood: as a social influence; as an Americanising force for national unity; and, even, as a harbinger of world harmony.A defence of Wittgenstein’s radical conventionalism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/21498
The first part of this thesis develops a game-theoretic solution to the rule-following paradox, based on Wittgenstein's suggestion in the Philosophical Investigations that to follow a rule is a practice. I introduce the notion of a basic constitutive practice which I argue can account for the correctness conditions of rule-following and meaning, for indefinitely many cases and without circularity, by identifying correctness with a point on a correlated equilibrium of such a practice. The solution crucially relies on, and makes precise, the Wittgensteinian concepts of training, agreement in judgement and our form of life.
In the second part of the thesis, this solution to the paradox is applied to the problem of mathematical truth. I argue that the essence of Dummett's reading of Wittgenstein as a radical conventionalist is not Dummett's emphasis on decision, but rather the contrast with more moderate forms of conventionalism, whereby an unreduced notion of consequence is appealed to in order to move from stipulated truths to further, more remote truths. Instead of this picture, the radical conventionalist view holds that each truth is a direct expression of the convention and that there is no external criterion at all for the correctness of each step in a mathematical proof except our own practice.
By then identifying mathematical correctness with correctness in basic constitutive practices the view is able to avoid the problems that dogged moderate forms of conventionalism, e.g. Quine's regress problem, as the game-theoretic structure of such practices is able to define correctness for indefinitely many cases without appealing to anything outside itself. Finally, I argue that thus put, common and forceful arguments against radical conventionalism can be answered and conclude that it remains a viable view in the philosophy of mathematics.
2021-06-01T00:00:00ZMatthíasson, Ásgeir BergThe first part of this thesis develops a game-theoretic solution to the rule-following paradox, based on Wittgenstein's suggestion in the Philosophical Investigations that to follow a rule is a practice. I introduce the notion of a basic constitutive practice which I argue can account for the correctness conditions of rule-following and meaning, for indefinitely many cases and without circularity, by identifying correctness with a point on a correlated equilibrium of such a practice. The solution crucially relies on, and makes precise, the Wittgensteinian concepts of training, agreement in judgement and our form of life.
In the second part of the thesis, this solution to the paradox is applied to the problem of mathematical truth. I argue that the essence of Dummett's reading of Wittgenstein as a radical conventionalist is not Dummett's emphasis on decision, but rather the contrast with more moderate forms of conventionalism, whereby an unreduced notion of consequence is appealed to in order to move from stipulated truths to further, more remote truths. Instead of this picture, the radical conventionalist view holds that each truth is a direct expression of the convention and that there is no external criterion at all for the correctness of each step in a mathematical proof except our own practice.
By then identifying mathematical correctness with correctness in basic constitutive practices the view is able to avoid the problems that dogged moderate forms of conventionalism, e.g. Quine's regress problem, as the game-theoretic structure of such practices is able to define correctness for indefinitely many cases without appealing to anything outside itself. Finally, I argue that thus put, common and forceful arguments against radical conventionalism can be answered and conclude that it remains a viable view in the philosophy of mathematics.The meaning of quantifiers and the epsilon calculus : on the logical formalization of dependence relations
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/21474
This work argues that the expressive and inferential powers of quantified logic are not exhausted by the classical quantifiers ∀ and ∃. Indeed, based on both the Model and Proof theoretic semantics frameworks, the work will highlight two relations of dependence as arising within formulas and inferences which are not correctly represented by the standard interpretation of ∀ and ∃. Instead, I will claim that the quantifiers ‘for all’ and ‘there exists’ should be interpreted as choice functions − according to the ε-operator of the Epsilon Calculus. Finally, I will consider as a case study the Set theory formulated in the Epsilon Calculus so as to consider how the choice functions interpretation of quantifiers affects debates concerning impredicative definitions and the logical/combinatorial view of collections.
2020-12-02T00:00:00ZBonatti, NicolaThis work argues that the expressive and inferential powers of quantified logic are not exhausted by the classical quantifiers ∀ and ∃. Indeed, based on both the Model and Proof theoretic semantics frameworks, the work will highlight two relations of dependence as arising within formulas and inferences which are not correctly represented by the standard interpretation of ∀ and ∃. Instead, I will claim that the quantifiers ‘for all’ and ‘there exists’ should be interpreted as choice functions − according to the ε-operator of the Epsilon Calculus. Finally, I will consider as a case study the Set theory formulated in the Epsilon Calculus so as to consider how the choice functions interpretation of quantifiers affects debates concerning impredicative definitions and the logical/combinatorial view of collections.Body, brain, and situation in sensorimotor enactivism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/21473
This thesis tackles issues that arise around Sensorimotor Enactivism’s (SMEn) conception of embodiment. SMEn is a theory that claims that perception is something perceivers do, that requires the possession and execution of practical knowledge about the way sensory information changes after an interaction. One of the key commitments of this view is to the idea that this knowledge—sensorimotor knowledge—depends on details of the body of the perceiver.
The thesis is divided in four parts, each addressing different challenges. Part I sets the stage for the problems that are discussed in the rest of the thesis. I examine SMEn’s claims that perception is active and knowledgeable, as well as its position regarding representations and externalism.
In Part II, I discuss the concern that SMEn is chauvinistic in that it claims that only creatures with bodies like ours can have experiences like ours. I argue that SMEn cannot be said to be chauvinistic because, even if its embodiment claim involves a commitment to an irreducibly perspectival aspect of perceptual experience, Sensorimotor Contingencies (SMCs) are structural descriptions of perceptual systems that already involve information about objects’ invariant features.
In Part III, I defend a predictive approach to SMEn to address the concern that, while it claims that perception is embodied, it leaves out one crucial element of the material basis of perceptual experience: the brain. Although the predictive framework is standardly taken to involve a representational and internalist profile, I argue in favour of the compatibility between SMEn and the Free Energy Approach (FEA).
Part IV addresses a concern that is based on the phenomenological analysis of the body, according to which the body is marked by someone’s social and historical circumstances. I argue that the predictive version of SMEn makes plausible the idea that perceptual experience is social all the way down.
2020-12-02T00:00:00ZClavel Vázquez, María JimenaThis thesis tackles issues that arise around Sensorimotor Enactivism’s (SMEn) conception of embodiment. SMEn is a theory that claims that perception is something perceivers do, that requires the possession and execution of practical knowledge about the way sensory information changes after an interaction. One of the key commitments of this view is to the idea that this knowledge—sensorimotor knowledge—depends on details of the body of the perceiver.
The thesis is divided in four parts, each addressing different challenges. Part I sets the stage for the problems that are discussed in the rest of the thesis. I examine SMEn’s claims that perception is active and knowledgeable, as well as its position regarding representations and externalism.
In Part II, I discuss the concern that SMEn is chauvinistic in that it claims that only creatures with bodies like ours can have experiences like ours. I argue that SMEn cannot be said to be chauvinistic because, even if its embodiment claim involves a commitment to an irreducibly perspectival aspect of perceptual experience, Sensorimotor Contingencies (SMCs) are structural descriptions of perceptual systems that already involve information about objects’ invariant features.
In Part III, I defend a predictive approach to SMEn to address the concern that, while it claims that perception is embodied, it leaves out one crucial element of the material basis of perceptual experience: the brain. Although the predictive framework is standardly taken to involve a representational and internalist profile, I argue in favour of the compatibility between SMEn and the Free Energy Approach (FEA).
Part IV addresses a concern that is based on the phenomenological analysis of the body, according to which the body is marked by someone’s social and historical circumstances. I argue that the predictive version of SMEn makes plausible the idea that perceptual experience is social all the way down.The 'theoretical virtues' theory : towards a joint solution to the meta-descriptive and meta-normative problems
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/21470
There are at least four main problems that the 'theoretical virtues' theory needs to solve. Those are the descriptive, meta-descriptive, normative, and meta-normative problems. The first two problems are about virtue discovery and its methods, and the latter two are about virtue justification and its methods. The principles constituting a solution to the descriptive problem need to adequately describe the order of epistemic priority between the theoretical-explanatory virtues, and their combinations in various degrees, based on the considered judgments of expert natural and social scientists, and philosophers of science, on actual cases of explanatory-theory choice. The principles constituting a solution to the normative problem need to adequately describe the order of epistemic priority that should guide the judgments of both experts and non-experts in rational explanatory-theory choice in science, philosophy, and everyday reasoning. In this study it is argued that the two meta-level problems are prior to the two lower-level problems, and also, that they are interdependent and can be solved jointly. Such a joint solution is explored with the aim of eventually solving the two lower-level problems. After evaluating the most recent solutions that have been proposed to the descriptive and normative problems, the historical philosophy of science method and experimental philosophy of science method are also evaluated for their meta-descriptive and meta-normative potential. After their limitations are examined, it is argued that as part of any adequate solution to the two meta-level problems, the concept of a ‘theoretical-explanatory virtue’ would need to be conceptually re-engineered into, one, combinations of features of explanatory theories, and, two, a set of principles that describe each feature’s and each combination’s weight in an order of epistemic priority. Finally, the proposed solution to the meta-level problems is further developed by utilizing techniques from the methods of philosophical artificial intelligence and reflective equilibrium.
2020-12-02T00:00:00ZSaranteas, PanagiotisThere are at least four main problems that the 'theoretical virtues' theory needs to solve. Those are the descriptive, meta-descriptive, normative, and meta-normative problems. The first two problems are about virtue discovery and its methods, and the latter two are about virtue justification and its methods. The principles constituting a solution to the descriptive problem need to adequately describe the order of epistemic priority between the theoretical-explanatory virtues, and their combinations in various degrees, based on the considered judgments of expert natural and social scientists, and philosophers of science, on actual cases of explanatory-theory choice. The principles constituting a solution to the normative problem need to adequately describe the order of epistemic priority that should guide the judgments of both experts and non-experts in rational explanatory-theory choice in science, philosophy, and everyday reasoning. In this study it is argued that the two meta-level problems are prior to the two lower-level problems, and also, that they are interdependent and can be solved jointly. Such a joint solution is explored with the aim of eventually solving the two lower-level problems. After evaluating the most recent solutions that have been proposed to the descriptive and normative problems, the historical philosophy of science method and experimental philosophy of science method are also evaluated for their meta-descriptive and meta-normative potential. After their limitations are examined, it is argued that as part of any adequate solution to the two meta-level problems, the concept of a ‘theoretical-explanatory virtue’ would need to be conceptually re-engineered into, one, combinations of features of explanatory theories, and, two, a set of principles that describe each feature’s and each combination’s weight in an order of epistemic priority. Finally, the proposed solution to the meta-level problems is further developed by utilizing techniques from the methods of philosophical artificial intelligence and reflective equilibrium.Attitudes first : rationality attributions and the normativity of rationality
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/21448
This thesis has two distinct aims. The first is to shed light on our practice of attributing rationality to others. To begin, Chapter 2 demonstrates that we cannot rely on questions of what rationality requires to make sense of this practice. Chapter 3 explores a different strategy and directly engages with rationality attributions. It lays out some desiderata for an adequate account of such attributions. Chapter 4 develops a novel account of rationality attributions. This account focusses on explicitly mentioning sets of an agent’s attitudes, and also includes a measure for the attribution’s robustness. Thanks to these features, the account meets the desiderata, and also allows for progress on persisting disagreements in the debate. Chapter 5 further illustrates the account by contrasting it with an alternative contextualist understanding of rationality attributions.
The second aim of this thesis is to defend the Normativity of Rationality. In Chapter 6, I consider problems for a reasons-based understanding of the Normativity of Rationality which arise from so-called transmission principles, and point out strategies to defend rationality’s normativity. Chapter 7 provides further support for one of these strategies. Finally, Chapter 8 presents my positive argument. I propose to understand rationality’s normativity in terms of commitment – if you are rationally required to x, you are committed to x. Commitment can avoid the counter-examples of alternative understandings in terms of reasons or ought by combining features of both notions. This makes commitment a promising normative notion in its own right.
2020-12-02T00:00:00ZBastian, LisaThis thesis has two distinct aims. The first is to shed light on our practice of attributing rationality to others. To begin, Chapter 2 demonstrates that we cannot rely on questions of what rationality requires to make sense of this practice. Chapter 3 explores a different strategy and directly engages with rationality attributions. It lays out some desiderata for an adequate account of such attributions. Chapter 4 develops a novel account of rationality attributions. This account focusses on explicitly mentioning sets of an agent’s attitudes, and also includes a measure for the attribution’s robustness. Thanks to these features, the account meets the desiderata, and also allows for progress on persisting disagreements in the debate. Chapter 5 further illustrates the account by contrasting it with an alternative contextualist understanding of rationality attributions.
The second aim of this thesis is to defend the Normativity of Rationality. In Chapter 6, I consider problems for a reasons-based understanding of the Normativity of Rationality which arise from so-called transmission principles, and point out strategies to defend rationality’s normativity. Chapter 7 provides further support for one of these strategies. Finally, Chapter 8 presents my positive argument. I propose to understand rationality’s normativity in terms of commitment – if you are rationally required to x, you are committed to x. Commitment can avoid the counter-examples of alternative understandings in terms of reasons or ought by combining features of both notions. This makes commitment a promising normative notion in its own right.Brain death: what we are and when we die
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/21308
When does a human being cease to exist? For millennia, the answer to this question had remained largely unchanged: death had been diagnosed when heartbeat and breathing were permanently absent. Only comparatively recently, in the 1950s, rapid developments in intensive-care medicine called into question this widely accepted criterion. What had previously been deemed a permanent cessation of vital functions suddenly became reversible. A new criterion of death was needed. It was suggested that the destruction of the brain could indicate the death of the organism in the presence of external life support. Soon the so-called brain death became the new worldwide standard. In recent years, however, doubts about this neurological criterion have been growing. Is brain death really our death? This is the question that this thesis seeks to answer. To this end, we shall connect the medical debate about the definition of death to the philosophical debate about personal identity. While we will find that the destruction of its brain does in fact not correspond to an organism’s death, we shall also ask whether the assumption that we are essentially organisms is correct. May brain death be the ceasing to exist of a different entity? Substituting clinical case reports and considerations about human physiology for the use of thought experiments, the thesis takes a novel and philosophically unconventional approach to the problem of what we essentially are. We shall analyse various pathological conditions and their respective effects on the bodily and mental characteristics of our existence. We will conclude that brain death is indeed our death – but for reasons entirely different from those cited in the original justification of this criterion.
2020-12-02T00:00:00ZMeier, Lukas JostWhen does a human being cease to exist? For millennia, the answer to this question had remained largely unchanged: death had been diagnosed when heartbeat and breathing were permanently absent. Only comparatively recently, in the 1950s, rapid developments in intensive-care medicine called into question this widely accepted criterion. What had previously been deemed a permanent cessation of vital functions suddenly became reversible. A new criterion of death was needed. It was suggested that the destruction of the brain could indicate the death of the organism in the presence of external life support. Soon the so-called brain death became the new worldwide standard. In recent years, however, doubts about this neurological criterion have been growing. Is brain death really our death? This is the question that this thesis seeks to answer. To this end, we shall connect the medical debate about the definition of death to the philosophical debate about personal identity. While we will find that the destruction of its brain does in fact not correspond to an organism’s death, we shall also ask whether the assumption that we are essentially organisms is correct. May brain death be the ceasing to exist of a different entity? Substituting clinical case reports and considerations about human physiology for the use of thought experiments, the thesis takes a novel and philosophically unconventional approach to the problem of what we essentially are. We shall analyse various pathological conditions and their respective effects on the bodily and mental characteristics of our existence. We will conclude that brain death is indeed our death – but for reasons entirely different from those cited in the original justification of this criterion.Virtue education and deliberation : an Aristotelian account
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/21260
Building on a philosophical reconstruction of Aristotle, this dissertation argues
for a non-intellectualist account of virtue education and practical deliberation.
This dissertation will first examine the notion of habituation. It argues that
habituation consists in immersing into a certain cultural context, through which
one will develop one’s unique ethical sense and will know what is noble and
fine. This rules out two intellectualist positions: that habituation gives us a firm
understanding of eudaimonia, and that habituation itself involves the exercise
of the practical intellect.
The non-intellectualised account of habituation is further supported by a topic-specific
study of Aristotle’s conception of children. In cultivating the seeds of
virtues that are accessible even to children, one forms evaluative appearances
about what is and what is not worth-pursuing by generalising from particular
evaluative experiences. These experiences may come from early private
education, perceptions, emotions, imitation of others’ attitudes and behaviour,
and understanding one’s friends’ decisions. These experiences help shape
one’s ethical sense.
Developing friendship (philia) appears to be ethically important, since we learn
about values through friendship, and since practical deliberation is more like
imagining conversations between individuals we are familiar with. This is in
stark contrast to the intellectualist account of excellent deliberation, which
consists in deliberating through a comprehensive conception of human values.
But ultimately, friendship is ethically indispensable because, as a form of
intimate relationship between agents of equal status, it epitomises an
Aristotelian ideal: an egalitarian ethical community. Arguably, this community
constitutes the context for habituation (immersion).
This dissertation shows how opposing positions concerning a variety of
particular issues become an opposition between two philosophical packages,
one of intellectualist and one of non-intellectualist, and why the non-intellectualist one is closer to the truth.
2020-07-27T00:00:00ZChong, I XuanBuilding on a philosophical reconstruction of Aristotle, this dissertation argues
for a non-intellectualist account of virtue education and practical deliberation.
This dissertation will first examine the notion of habituation. It argues that
habituation consists in immersing into a certain cultural context, through which
one will develop one’s unique ethical sense and will know what is noble and
fine. This rules out two intellectualist positions: that habituation gives us a firm
understanding of eudaimonia, and that habituation itself involves the exercise
of the practical intellect.
The non-intellectualised account of habituation is further supported by a topic-specific
study of Aristotle’s conception of children. In cultivating the seeds of
virtues that are accessible even to children, one forms evaluative appearances
about what is and what is not worth-pursuing by generalising from particular
evaluative experiences. These experiences may come from early private
education, perceptions, emotions, imitation of others’ attitudes and behaviour,
and understanding one’s friends’ decisions. These experiences help shape
one’s ethical sense.
Developing friendship (philia) appears to be ethically important, since we learn
about values through friendship, and since practical deliberation is more like
imagining conversations between individuals we are familiar with. This is in
stark contrast to the intellectualist account of excellent deliberation, which
consists in deliberating through a comprehensive conception of human values.
But ultimately, friendship is ethically indispensable because, as a form of
intimate relationship between agents of equal status, it epitomises an
Aristotelian ideal: an egalitarian ethical community. Arguably, this community
constitutes the context for habituation (immersion).
This dissertation shows how opposing positions concerning a variety of
particular issues become an opposition between two philosophical packages,
one of intellectualist and one of non-intellectualist, and why the non-intellectualist one is closer to the truth.How to kill 999 flowers : in defence of logical monism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/21253
How many correct logics are there? For much of logic’s history it was widely assumed that there was exactly one correct logic, a position known as logical monism. However, the monist’s hegemony has recently become increasingly precarious as she has simultaneously come under attack from two sides. On one side she faces logical pluralists who contend that there is more than one correct logic, and on the other she faces logical nihilists who contend that there are no correct logics. This thesis aims to defend monism against the twin threats of pluralism and nihilism.
2021-06-21T00:00:00ZSkinner, JamesHow many correct logics are there? For much of logic’s history it was widely assumed that there was exactly one correct logic, a position known as logical monism. However, the monist’s hegemony has recently become increasingly precarious as she has simultaneously come under attack from two sides. On one side she faces logical pluralists who contend that there is more than one correct logic, and on the other she faces logical nihilists who contend that there are no correct logics. This thesis aims to defend monism against the twin threats of pluralism and nihilism.Disagreement, concepts and convergence : a new theory of political realist legitimacy
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/20893
This thesis argues for a novel conception of political realism as a theory of political legitimacy: the Dual Convergent Conception. The thesis is framed by the thought that one way of theorising about political legitimacy involves working out how reasonable people can achieve a stable political order so that, despite their profound moral differences, they may live together governed by principles they have sufficient moral reason to affirm from within their own point of view. I argue that this ultimately involves making a special sort of argument that takes reasonable disagreement about justice seriously: a Disagreement to Legitimacy argument. This is an argument with two parts. The first part involves finding the best explanation of reasonable disagreement about justice. After arguing against all extant explanations of reasonable disagreement, I develop a novel explanation: Diverse Packages Theory. This explanation makes use of the idea of metalinguistic negotiation and empirical work in developmental psychology on concepts, to argue that the best explanation of reasonable disagreement about justice is that reasonable people possess and use diverse concepts and conceptions of justice. The second part of the Disagreement to Legitimacy argument involves proposing, on the basis of Diverse Packages Theory's explanation, how all reasonable people can have sufficient moral reason to coordinate and continue coordinating over time on coercive principles or rules that order society's basic institutions. I then argue that extant conceptions of political liberalism and political realism cannot show how reasonable people can achieve this. I then argue that by combining certain elements of the political liberal view of convergent agreements, and the political realist focus on a contextually situated acceptance of coercively enforced political principles, the Dual Convergent Conception of political realism can show how reasonable people can achieve a stable political order.
2020-12-02T00:00:00ZSudarshan, SarangaThis thesis argues for a novel conception of political realism as a theory of political legitimacy: the Dual Convergent Conception. The thesis is framed by the thought that one way of theorising about political legitimacy involves working out how reasonable people can achieve a stable political order so that, despite their profound moral differences, they may live together governed by principles they have sufficient moral reason to affirm from within their own point of view. I argue that this ultimately involves making a special sort of argument that takes reasonable disagreement about justice seriously: a Disagreement to Legitimacy argument. This is an argument with two parts. The first part involves finding the best explanation of reasonable disagreement about justice. After arguing against all extant explanations of reasonable disagreement, I develop a novel explanation: Diverse Packages Theory. This explanation makes use of the idea of metalinguistic negotiation and empirical work in developmental psychology on concepts, to argue that the best explanation of reasonable disagreement about justice is that reasonable people possess and use diverse concepts and conceptions of justice. The second part of the Disagreement to Legitimacy argument involves proposing, on the basis of Diverse Packages Theory's explanation, how all reasonable people can have sufficient moral reason to coordinate and continue coordinating over time on coercive principles or rules that order society's basic institutions. I then argue that extant conceptions of political liberalism and political realism cannot show how reasonable people can achieve this. I then argue that by combining certain elements of the political liberal view of convergent agreements, and the political realist focus on a contextually situated acceptance of coercively enforced political principles, the Dual Convergent Conception of political realism can show how reasonable people can achieve a stable political order.Is it OK to make mistakes? : appraisal and false normative belief
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/20854
Sometimes we make mistakes, even when we try to do our best. When those
mistakes are about normative matters, such as what is required, this leads to a
puzzle. This puzzle arises from the possibility of misleading evidence about what
rationality requires. I argue that the best way to solve this puzzle is to distinguish
between two kinds of evaluation: requirement and appraisal. The strategy I
defend connects three distinct debates in epistemology, ethics, and normativity:
the debate over how our theories of epistemic rationality should accommodate
misleading evidence, the debate over the relationship between complying with
requirements and deserving particular appraisals, and the debate over whether
normative ignorance can excuse. Part 1 shows how three apparently plausible
claims about epistemic rationality generate a puzzle when agents have
misleading evidence about what rationality requires. Part 2 solves this puzzle by
distinguishing between evaluations of requirement and appraisal and rejecting
the idea that one is required to conform to the Enkratic Principle. I argue instead
that complying with the Enkratic Principle provides defeasible evidence that the
agent should be positively appraised. One of the consequences of this solution is
that false normative beliefs can sometimes excuse agents from negative appraisal
they would otherwise deserve for violating requirements. Part 3 defends the view
that false normative belief can sometimes excuse against the rival views that false
normative belief always excuses, and that false normative belief never excuses. I
argue that false normative belief can sometimes excuse violations of
requirements, when it is the case that the agent has done what it is reasonable to
expect of her.
2020-07-27T00:00:00ZField, Claire AnneSometimes we make mistakes, even when we try to do our best. When those
mistakes are about normative matters, such as what is required, this leads to a
puzzle. This puzzle arises from the possibility of misleading evidence about what
rationality requires. I argue that the best way to solve this puzzle is to distinguish
between two kinds of evaluation: requirement and appraisal. The strategy I
defend connects three distinct debates in epistemology, ethics, and normativity:
the debate over how our theories of epistemic rationality should accommodate
misleading evidence, the debate over the relationship between complying with
requirements and deserving particular appraisals, and the debate over whether
normative ignorance can excuse. Part 1 shows how three apparently plausible
claims about epistemic rationality generate a puzzle when agents have
misleading evidence about what rationality requires. Part 2 solves this puzzle by
distinguishing between evaluations of requirement and appraisal and rejecting
the idea that one is required to conform to the Enkratic Principle. I argue instead
that complying with the Enkratic Principle provides defeasible evidence that the
agent should be positively appraised. One of the consequences of this solution is
that false normative beliefs can sometimes excuse agents from negative appraisal
they would otherwise deserve for violating requirements. Part 3 defends the view
that false normative belief can sometimes excuse against the rival views that false
normative belief always excuses, and that false normative belief never excuses. I
argue that false normative belief can sometimes excuse violations of
requirements, when it is the case that the agent has done what it is reasonable to
expect of her.Human versus where? : navigating the survival space in the 21st century American survival film
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/20771
This thesis navigates the contents, patterns, limitations and renegotiations of the filmic survival space in 21st century American film. Defined as the audio-visual wilderness
environment in which the human becomes trapped, the survival space withers the human
body, and prevents communication and escape. In interrogating this survival terra incognito,
the thesis identifies ‘survival’ as a distinct, contemporary, and uniquely American, genre,
one that extends beyond cinema and across several media platforms. This thesis necessarily
traverses media forms, placing a variety of survival media in dialogue with film. Beginning
with Cast Away (Robert Zemeckis, 2000), the influential, benchmark hit that established a
model for the survival space in the 21st century, I examine how subsequent survival films,
television shows, video games and internet spaces respond to, update, and adapt this model
and, in so doing, position survival as a multi-media phenomenon.
This genre – and the spaces within it – require critical attention today, not least because
they function as a highly visible cultural response to questions and anxieties within 21st century America. These spaces, which are developed in the post 2000s American survival
film, respond to, and articulate, common cultural anxieties whether concerning the fragility
of our bodies in the technological era, our agency in and outside a rapidly progressing
capitalist society or the fraught relationship between humankind and the natural
environment. In working through what survival means today, the contemporary American
survival film popularises a discourse of survival; one that questions not only how to survive,
live and thrive today, but also where this can take place, ultimately making survival a spatial
concern.
2020-12-02T00:00:00ZLast, CassiceThis thesis navigates the contents, patterns, limitations and renegotiations of the filmic survival space in 21st century American film. Defined as the audio-visual wilderness
environment in which the human becomes trapped, the survival space withers the human
body, and prevents communication and escape. In interrogating this survival terra incognito,
the thesis identifies ‘survival’ as a distinct, contemporary, and uniquely American, genre,
one that extends beyond cinema and across several media platforms. This thesis necessarily
traverses media forms, placing a variety of survival media in dialogue with film. Beginning
with Cast Away (Robert Zemeckis, 2000), the influential, benchmark hit that established a
model for the survival space in the 21st century, I examine how subsequent survival films,
television shows, video games and internet spaces respond to, update, and adapt this model
and, in so doing, position survival as a multi-media phenomenon.
This genre – and the spaces within it – require critical attention today, not least because
they function as a highly visible cultural response to questions and anxieties within 21st century America. These spaces, which are developed in the post 2000s American survival
film, respond to, and articulate, common cultural anxieties whether concerning the fragility
of our bodies in the technological era, our agency in and outside a rapidly progressing
capitalist society or the fraught relationship between humankind and the natural
environment. In working through what survival means today, the contemporary American
survival film popularises a discourse of survival; one that questions not only how to survive,
live and thrive today, but also where this can take place, ultimately making survival a spatial
concern.Why more than what happens matters : robust rights and harmless wronging
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/20770
This thesis examines a range of cases in which it appears one’s rights against harm are violated by another’s behaviour, even though this behaviour has done one no harm. Call these cases of harmless wronging. These cases raise a serious problem for most theories of rights, though the problem is most pronounced on the Interest Theory of Rights. According to that theory, rights necessarily protect their holder’s wellbeing. At first glance, one might think that the person’s wellbeing cannot be said to be protected by the right in cases of harmless wronging because they are not harmed in such cases—so, the necessary condition set for the ascription of a right is not satisfied. I offer a novel, welfare-based explanation of why we have rights against harmless wrongs, the Safety Condition. This holds that for someone to hold a right against us that we not perform some action, we look to whether our performing that action could easily leave them sufficiently worse off to place us under a duty. In addition to extensional accuracy, one reason for this focus on modality—on what might have been—is that it removes an objectionable form of luck from rights. And, it matters that rights do not depend on luck in this objectionable way for this requires that we, as duty-bearers, are sensitive to others’ wellbeing: that we do not only not harm others, but that we could not easily have harmed them.
2020-07-27T00:00:00ZBowen, JosephThis thesis examines a range of cases in which it appears one’s rights against harm are violated by another’s behaviour, even though this behaviour has done one no harm. Call these cases of harmless wronging. These cases raise a serious problem for most theories of rights, though the problem is most pronounced on the Interest Theory of Rights. According to that theory, rights necessarily protect their holder’s wellbeing. At first glance, one might think that the person’s wellbeing cannot be said to be protected by the right in cases of harmless wronging because they are not harmed in such cases—so, the necessary condition set for the ascription of a right is not satisfied. I offer a novel, welfare-based explanation of why we have rights against harmless wrongs, the Safety Condition. This holds that for someone to hold a right against us that we not perform some action, we look to whether our performing that action could easily leave them sufficiently worse off to place us under a duty. In addition to extensional accuracy, one reason for this focus on modality—on what might have been—is that it removes an objectionable form of luck from rights. And, it matters that rights do not depend on luck in this objectionable way for this requires that we, as duty-bearers, are sensitive to others’ wellbeing: that we do not only not harm others, but that we could not easily have harmed them.Echoes of endlessness : time, memory, and experience for heroin users in Scotland
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/20384
Drawing on ethnographic research conducted from September 2016 to September 2017 in a county on the east coast of Scotland, this thesis explores heroin and poly-substance use in relation to time, temporality, and memory. The research took place within an array of recovery services and with individual heroin users, largely employing participant observation and interview methodologies. The first seven months of the research were primarily based in services, for the most part consisting of a third sector needle exchange, a community recovery group, and an under 25s drop-in centre. The latter five months were spent accompanying one scattered group of heroin users in their day to day lives.
In the context of substance use patterns specific to post-industrial Scotland, and among the highest drug-death rates in Europe, the thesis traces time as it becomes entangled with addiction and recovery across intimate, social, and institutional domains. It seeks to excavate related experiences of grief, loss, and trauma, as well as affect, intimacy, and pleasure. The thesis explores perceptions and experiences of unending repetition, which were tied to prevailing medical models of addiction and contradictions inherent in predominant constructions of recovery. In spite of their repetitiveness, however, time and broader life trajectories come to be so incoherent and complex that they are immensely difficult to trace, interpret, and express: for both heroin users and for the myriad medical, judicial, and recovery-oriented institutions they interacted with daily. The work overall attempts to give an ethnographic portrait of how heroin addiction and poly-substance use are composed in time, memory, history, and landscape, while examining contemporary approaches to addiction and recovery in Scotland.
2020-07-27T00:00:00ZRoe, LauraDrawing on ethnographic research conducted from September 2016 to September 2017 in a county on the east coast of Scotland, this thesis explores heroin and poly-substance use in relation to time, temporality, and memory. The research took place within an array of recovery services and with individual heroin users, largely employing participant observation and interview methodologies. The first seven months of the research were primarily based in services, for the most part consisting of a third sector needle exchange, a community recovery group, and an under 25s drop-in centre. The latter five months were spent accompanying one scattered group of heroin users in their day to day lives.
In the context of substance use patterns specific to post-industrial Scotland, and among the highest drug-death rates in Europe, the thesis traces time as it becomes entangled with addiction and recovery across intimate, social, and institutional domains. It seeks to excavate related experiences of grief, loss, and trauma, as well as affect, intimacy, and pleasure. The thesis explores perceptions and experiences of unending repetition, which were tied to prevailing medical models of addiction and contradictions inherent in predominant constructions of recovery. In spite of their repetitiveness, however, time and broader life trajectories come to be so incoherent and complex that they are immensely difficult to trace, interpret, and express: for both heroin users and for the myriad medical, judicial, and recovery-oriented institutions they interacted with daily. The work overall attempts to give an ethnographic portrait of how heroin addiction and poly-substance use are composed in time, memory, history, and landscape, while examining contemporary approaches to addiction and recovery in Scotland.Recovering Indian Third Cinema practice : a study of the 1970s films of Ritwik Ghatak, Mrinal Sen, and Satyajit Ray
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/20375
In this thesis I focus on the cultural politics and film practices of Ritwik Ghatak, Mrinal Sen, and Satyajit Ray in the long 1960s, with the aim of recovering Indian political cinema as Third Cinema practice. I posit the contexts that motivated the radicalisation of their cinema in the 1970s, as an act of counter-Establishment political resistance itself. I use Third Cinema, as a practice and framework, to contextualise and understand Indian political cinema. The prevalence of an auteurist approach in scholarly work has overshadowed the political, intellectual, collective, and emancipatory aspects of these filmmakers’ practices, which my thesis foregrounds. The thesis further argues that Third Cinema is not just an aesthetic choice or film style, but also a praxis and critical framework driven by decolonisation, anti-capitalism, and anti-imperialism. Based on this hypothesis, I argue that Third Cinema can potentially be practiced in any context across geopolitical boundaries, given its emancipatory nature focusing on decolonising culture. However, this connection has so far been critically disregarded both by scholars of Indian cinema and Third Cinema across the world. Most discussions of Third Cinema are restricted to Latin America with occasional reference to African and other ‘minor’ cinemas. The objective of my research is to extend both the canon and discourse of Third Cinema beyond Latin America to engage with contexts previously unnoticed. My thesis does this by situating Indian political cinema in the milieu of Transnational Third Cinema and by including critical writings and film manifestoes from India. Restoring Ghatak, Sen, and Ray’s filmmaking practices within Third Cinema discourse not just recovers them as Third Cinema practitioners but also strengthens Third Cinema as a rigorous critical framework.
2020-07-27T00:00:00ZSen, SanghitaIn this thesis I focus on the cultural politics and film practices of Ritwik Ghatak, Mrinal Sen, and Satyajit Ray in the long 1960s, with the aim of recovering Indian political cinema as Third Cinema practice. I posit the contexts that motivated the radicalisation of their cinema in the 1970s, as an act of counter-Establishment political resistance itself. I use Third Cinema, as a practice and framework, to contextualise and understand Indian political cinema. The prevalence of an auteurist approach in scholarly work has overshadowed the political, intellectual, collective, and emancipatory aspects of these filmmakers’ practices, which my thesis foregrounds. The thesis further argues that Third Cinema is not just an aesthetic choice or film style, but also a praxis and critical framework driven by decolonisation, anti-capitalism, and anti-imperialism. Based on this hypothesis, I argue that Third Cinema can potentially be practiced in any context across geopolitical boundaries, given its emancipatory nature focusing on decolonising culture. However, this connection has so far been critically disregarded both by scholars of Indian cinema and Third Cinema across the world. Most discussions of Third Cinema are restricted to Latin America with occasional reference to African and other ‘minor’ cinemas. The objective of my research is to extend both the canon and discourse of Third Cinema beyond Latin America to engage with contexts previously unnoticed. My thesis does this by situating Indian political cinema in the milieu of Transnational Third Cinema and by including critical writings and film manifestoes from India. Restoring Ghatak, Sen, and Ray’s filmmaking practices within Third Cinema discourse not just recovers them as Third Cinema practitioners but also strengthens Third Cinema as a rigorous critical framework.The rise of grassroots voices : Chinese urban identity and independent filmmaking in the post-1989 era
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/20373
At the beginning of the 1990s, independent Chinese fiction and documentary film works made their first step, marking the rise of Chinese Sixth Generation cinema. Faced with the dominant communist state ideology and commercial values, both the two film types remained “marginal” and even “underground” in Chinese film history. Thus, the purpose of this thesis is to figure out what cinematic subjects and film aesthetics make them an anomaly in relation to Chinese official and commercial cinema. Regardless of their different film types, this study uses the theories of intertextuality to deal with the iconographic signs and film codes shared by them. I shall argue that in the post-1989 era independent Chinese filmmakers root the two film types in marginal urban groups and jishizhuyi [on-the-scene realism]. On the one hand, they concentrate on urbanites’ sufferings against the background of the oppressive political environment and the social upheaval of China’s reform age. On the other hand, they introduce jishizhuyi and neorealism aesthetics to represent social reality, refusing to dissimulate the cruelty of reality. Under the enlightenment of intertextuality, this thesis provides a new angle of view on what and how contemporary Chinese urban identity is shaped in multiple Chinese independent film works. It also exposes the establishment of independent Chinese filmmakers’ speaking rights in the struggle against the official and commercial system.
2020-07-27T00:00:00ZDeng, HuiminAt the beginning of the 1990s, independent Chinese fiction and documentary film works made their first step, marking the rise of Chinese Sixth Generation cinema. Faced with the dominant communist state ideology and commercial values, both the two film types remained “marginal” and even “underground” in Chinese film history. Thus, the purpose of this thesis is to figure out what cinematic subjects and film aesthetics make them an anomaly in relation to Chinese official and commercial cinema. Regardless of their different film types, this study uses the theories of intertextuality to deal with the iconographic signs and film codes shared by them. I shall argue that in the post-1989 era independent Chinese filmmakers root the two film types in marginal urban groups and jishizhuyi [on-the-scene realism]. On the one hand, they concentrate on urbanites’ sufferings against the background of the oppressive political environment and the social upheaval of China’s reform age. On the other hand, they introduce jishizhuyi and neorealism aesthetics to represent social reality, refusing to dissimulate the cruelty of reality. Under the enlightenment of intertextuality, this thesis provides a new angle of view on what and how contemporary Chinese urban identity is shaped in multiple Chinese independent film works. It also exposes the establishment of independent Chinese filmmakers’ speaking rights in the struggle against the official and commercial system.Wandering becomings : free movement, farm labouring and desires of becoming amongst Romanian migrants in the Danish countryside
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/20249
This thesis explores the everyday implications of labour migration within the European Union. Every year many people from Romania travel to work in Danish agriculture to gain a better livelihood. Due to issues of corruption and the risk of poverty, it has become increasingly difficult to make a living in Romania. In Danish agriculture, Romanians now constitute the largest group of migrant farm labourers. This thesis therefore takes up contemporary debates on European transformations and the implications of persisting socio-economic inequalities between EU countries.
To understand the social and individual implications of this migration, this thesis explores how Romanian farm labourers, along with their friends and families, experience and make sense of their lives and work in the Danish countryside. The analyses are based on 15 months of ethnographic fieldwork, which took place across a range of contexts that the farm labourers were part of in Denmark.
By analysing processes of becoming, the thesis analyses the different identities that the farm labourers construct for themselves across these contexts to make sense of their migratory movements. Through these different identities, the thesis argues, the farm labourers were continuously reassessing their social and individual lives within the European political economy and alongside their migratory experiences in the Danish countryside. As such, the thesis shows how the farm labourers’ situational becomings shape their experiences of working and living in Denmark, and how the farm labourers act according to their shifting interpretations of their past, present and future lives.
On the basis of these analyses, this thesis questions whether and in what ways the Romanian farm labourers' becomings are distinct as a result of their migratory experiences. The thesis argues that migrants’ ways of perceiving their becomings as part of their life transitions are influenced by the restraints and opportunities they encounter as migrants. In such a way, analysing migrants’ becomings allows for an exploration of the intersection between their particular ways of becoming and universal ways of becoming as human beings amidst contemporary European transformations.
2020-07-27T00:00:00ZLovelady, Astrid StampeThis thesis explores the everyday implications of labour migration within the European Union. Every year many people from Romania travel to work in Danish agriculture to gain a better livelihood. Due to issues of corruption and the risk of poverty, it has become increasingly difficult to make a living in Romania. In Danish agriculture, Romanians now constitute the largest group of migrant farm labourers. This thesis therefore takes up contemporary debates on European transformations and the implications of persisting socio-economic inequalities between EU countries.
To understand the social and individual implications of this migration, this thesis explores how Romanian farm labourers, along with their friends and families, experience and make sense of their lives and work in the Danish countryside. The analyses are based on 15 months of ethnographic fieldwork, which took place across a range of contexts that the farm labourers were part of in Denmark.
By analysing processes of becoming, the thesis analyses the different identities that the farm labourers construct for themselves across these contexts to make sense of their migratory movements. Through these different identities, the thesis argues, the farm labourers were continuously reassessing their social and individual lives within the European political economy and alongside their migratory experiences in the Danish countryside. As such, the thesis shows how the farm labourers’ situational becomings shape their experiences of working and living in Denmark, and how the farm labourers act according to their shifting interpretations of their past, present and future lives.
On the basis of these analyses, this thesis questions whether and in what ways the Romanian farm labourers' becomings are distinct as a result of their migratory experiences. The thesis argues that migrants’ ways of perceiving their becomings as part of their life transitions are influenced by the restraints and opportunities they encounter as migrants. In such a way, analysing migrants’ becomings allows for an exploration of the intersection between their particular ways of becoming and universal ways of becoming as human beings amidst contemporary European transformations.The dignity of persons : Kantian ethics and utilitarianism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/20205
This work is an attempt to develop a general ethical framework, the product of the synthesis of Kantian ethics and Utilitarianism, giving us a basic account of the dignity of persons and the structure of the moral community. There is a Kantian doctrine of human dignity, and an associated conception of the nature of morality, which together should be taken to provide the basic conceptual framework in ethical theory. However, the conception of morality implicated in the Kantian story recognises not only the dignity of human beings as moral subjects, but also the dignity (the special moral standing) of all sentient beings, who therefore count as persons for moral purposes. This is shown to be the case by means of an argument for Utilitarianism (taken as a technical view in philosophy) being consistent with the basic Kantian framework already in place, argument that involves disassociating Utilitarianism from both Consequentialism and Welfarism and construing it as an Agapist doctrine (i.e. as a philosophy of practical love or rationally-based benevolence).
2020-07-27T00:00:00ZSierra Vélez, LucasThis work is an attempt to develop a general ethical framework, the product of the synthesis of Kantian ethics and Utilitarianism, giving us a basic account of the dignity of persons and the structure of the moral community. There is a Kantian doctrine of human dignity, and an associated conception of the nature of morality, which together should be taken to provide the basic conceptual framework in ethical theory. However, the conception of morality implicated in the Kantian story recognises not only the dignity of human beings as moral subjects, but also the dignity (the special moral standing) of all sentient beings, who therefore count as persons for moral purposes. This is shown to be the case by means of an argument for Utilitarianism (taken as a technical view in philosophy) being consistent with the basic Kantian framework already in place, argument that involves disassociating Utilitarianism from both Consequentialism and Welfarism and construing it as an Agapist doctrine (i.e. as a philosophy of practical love or rationally-based benevolence).The 1950s Hindi film song : between transgression and memory
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/20040
The thesis argues that the film songs in the 1950s, often termed the ‘golden era’ of films and film music, function as an integral narrative device of the cinema’s engagement with the national discourse and with socio-political issues. The songs do this by being a site of ambivalence and struggle rather than resolution. In this way, they engage with the ideological contradictions of the nationalist discourse and the newly-independent Indian nation-state. These are the contradictions of the transition towards modernity -- the tussle between tradition and modernization, Indian identity and westernization, home and the world – which were a part of the anti-colonial nationalist discourse, and continued to be pre-occupations for the policy makers of the newly independent nation-state. These contradictions have been written about in scholarship, both in Film Studies (Prasad 1998; Sarkar 2009; Majumdar 2009; Rajadhyaksha 2009; Vasudevan 2011) as well as from a Political Studies perspective (Chatterjee 1993; Parekh 1991; Kaviraj 2010). However, in the context of 1950s Bombay based Hindi cinema, the significant role of the song sequences in negotiating with these tensions has not been studied in detail; in fact the songs have not been recognised as playing a role in this equation, existing instead on the periphery of theoretical arguments on the film form. The original contribution of the thesis is to examine the significant role of the song in this equation.
2020-07-27T00:00:00ZMagazine, AakshiThe thesis argues that the film songs in the 1950s, often termed the ‘golden era’ of films and film music, function as an integral narrative device of the cinema’s engagement with the national discourse and with socio-political issues. The songs do this by being a site of ambivalence and struggle rather than resolution. In this way, they engage with the ideological contradictions of the nationalist discourse and the newly-independent Indian nation-state. These are the contradictions of the transition towards modernity -- the tussle between tradition and modernization, Indian identity and westernization, home and the world – which were a part of the anti-colonial nationalist discourse, and continued to be pre-occupations for the policy makers of the newly independent nation-state. These contradictions have been written about in scholarship, both in Film Studies (Prasad 1998; Sarkar 2009; Majumdar 2009; Rajadhyaksha 2009; Vasudevan 2011) as well as from a Political Studies perspective (Chatterjee 1993; Parekh 1991; Kaviraj 2010). However, in the context of 1950s Bombay based Hindi cinema, the significant role of the song sequences in negotiating with these tensions has not been studied in detail; in fact the songs have not been recognised as playing a role in this equation, existing instead on the periphery of theoretical arguments on the film form. The original contribution of the thesis is to examine the significant role of the song in this equation.Plato on time as a cosmic phenomenon
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/19958
The thesis presents an original interpretation of the account of time in the Timaeus (37c6-39e2), arguing that time in Plato is best conceived of as a cosmic phenomenon. In Part I, my view is contrasted in crucial respects with the consensus reading, that focuses on the metaphysical definition (time is a moving image of eternity, 37d5) and downplays the importance of the cosmos and the planets in the creation of time. I reject the standard reading of αἰών as ‘eternity’ and take it instead as a feature that is essential to the model qua living being. It follows that the creation of time – being the image of αἰών – is essential to the cosmic living being. Time, however, is best defined as a cosmic phenomenon, because it is constituted by the living motion of the cosmos and identified with the visible revolutions of the planets. In the continuation of the thesis, I examine two essential aspects of Plato’s account that need further enquiry – life and structure. In Part II I focus on the semantic history of αἰών and argue that in Plato, αἰών acquires a paradigmatic function in relation to time, while still retaining the core of its traditional meaning as ‘lifespan’. In fact, αἰών and time are both defined by Plato as totalities of life, although αἰών consists in an undivided unity, whereas time is structured in sequences of parts composing a whole. In Part III I focus on how the planets make the periods of the cosmic soul visible and, as a consequence, display the enumerable structure of time. That structure consists in fact in the visible patterns of changing configurations the planets display. In doing so, they mark out sequences of units, whose optimality makes time the best instantiation of number in the physical world.
2020-07-27T00:00:00ZLazzarini, LorenzoThe thesis presents an original interpretation of the account of time in the Timaeus (37c6-39e2), arguing that time in Plato is best conceived of as a cosmic phenomenon. In Part I, my view is contrasted in crucial respects with the consensus reading, that focuses on the metaphysical definition (time is a moving image of eternity, 37d5) and downplays the importance of the cosmos and the planets in the creation of time. I reject the standard reading of αἰών as ‘eternity’ and take it instead as a feature that is essential to the model qua living being. It follows that the creation of time – being the image of αἰών – is essential to the cosmic living being. Time, however, is best defined as a cosmic phenomenon, because it is constituted by the living motion of the cosmos and identified with the visible revolutions of the planets. In the continuation of the thesis, I examine two essential aspects of Plato’s account that need further enquiry – life and structure. In Part II I focus on the semantic history of αἰών and argue that in Plato, αἰών acquires a paradigmatic function in relation to time, while still retaining the core of its traditional meaning as ‘lifespan’. In fact, αἰών and time are both defined by Plato as totalities of life, although αἰών consists in an undivided unity, whereas time is structured in sequences of parts composing a whole. In Part III I focus on how the planets make the periods of the cosmic soul visible and, as a consequence, display the enumerable structure of time. That structure consists in fact in the visible patterns of changing configurations the planets display. In doing so, they mark out sequences of units, whose optimality makes time the best instantiation of number in the physical world.The monsoon crush : rethinking Indian cinema's art-commerce divide in the context of transnationalism, corporatisation and liberalisation
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/19608
My thesis identifies and establishes the Multiplex Film as a widespread paradigm in contemporary Indian Cinema, by critically examining its emergence from the post-millennium collapse of All-India and Alternative films, often referred to as Indian “art” and “commercial” films, previously well-established and seemingly distinct categories that have historically defined and characterised Indian cinema. I assert that reading pre-millennium Indian films by applying the Rasa analytical method, reveals multiple meeting points between All-India and Alternative Films, which have been obfuscated through a historic misconstruction and mislabelling of these film types; I contend that this interconnectedness expedites their convergence into the Multiplex Film. By tracing the contemporary phenomenon as a product of the Indian government’s economic liberalisation and globalisation policies, and the resultant corporatisation and transnationalism within the 21st century film industries in Mumbai and in other regional filmmaking centres, I present a way of studying Multiplex Films both as Indian Cinema as well as Transnational Cinema, while also contributing to the limited scholarship on the contemporary Indian film industries. My use of rasa in conjunction with generic dramatic principles detailed in the Natyasastra, an ancient Indian treatise on dramaturgy, offers a new Rasa framework that can be used to read any national cinema, as it functions independently of rasa as an aesthetic.
Through a series of forty-five interviews across seven cities with personnel from the Hindi, Bengali, Tamil, Telegu, Marathi and Assamese film industries, including writers, directors, actors, producers, cinematographers, editors, sound designers, distributors, exhibitors, alongside spectator focus groups in metropolitan and smaller cities, in addition to close textual analysis of a range of Indian films, existing scholarship, official government and film industry reports, I re-examine assumptions about Indian film history and show how the earlier two film types are metamorphosed through contemporary socioeconomic, political and industrial shifts into the Multiplex Film.
2020-06-22T00:00:00ZPal, ShornaMy thesis identifies and establishes the Multiplex Film as a widespread paradigm in contemporary Indian Cinema, by critically examining its emergence from the post-millennium collapse of All-India and Alternative films, often referred to as Indian “art” and “commercial” films, previously well-established and seemingly distinct categories that have historically defined and characterised Indian cinema. I assert that reading pre-millennium Indian films by applying the Rasa analytical method, reveals multiple meeting points between All-India and Alternative Films, which have been obfuscated through a historic misconstruction and mislabelling of these film types; I contend that this interconnectedness expedites their convergence into the Multiplex Film. By tracing the contemporary phenomenon as a product of the Indian government’s economic liberalisation and globalisation policies, and the resultant corporatisation and transnationalism within the 21st century film industries in Mumbai and in other regional filmmaking centres, I present a way of studying Multiplex Films both as Indian Cinema as well as Transnational Cinema, while also contributing to the limited scholarship on the contemporary Indian film industries. My use of rasa in conjunction with generic dramatic principles detailed in the Natyasastra, an ancient Indian treatise on dramaturgy, offers a new Rasa framework that can be used to read any national cinema, as it functions independently of rasa as an aesthetic.
Through a series of forty-five interviews across seven cities with personnel from the Hindi, Bengali, Tamil, Telegu, Marathi and Assamese film industries, including writers, directors, actors, producers, cinematographers, editors, sound designers, distributors, exhibitors, alongside spectator focus groups in metropolitan and smaller cities, in addition to close textual analysis of a range of Indian films, existing scholarship, official government and film industry reports, I re-examine assumptions about Indian film history and show how the earlier two film types are metamorphosed through contemporary socioeconomic, political and industrial shifts into the Multiplex Film.Remember the medium! : film, medium specificity, and response-dependence
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/19586
Medium specificity is a theory, or rather a cluster of arguments, in aesthetics that rests on the idea that media are the physical material that makes up artworks, and that this material contains specific and unique features capable of 1) differentiating media from one another, and 2) determining the aesthetic potential and goals of each medium. As such, medium specificity is essential for aestheticians interested in matters of aesthetic ontology and value. However, as Noël Carroll has vehemently and convincingly argued, the theory of medium specificity is inherently flawed and its many applications in art history ill-motivated. Famously, he concluded that we should ‘forget the medium’ entirely. In this thesis, I reject his conclusion and argue that reconstructing a theory of medium specificity, while taking Carroll’s objections into account, is possible. To do so, I offer a reconceptualization of the main theoretical components of medium specificity and ground this new theory in empirical research. I first redefine the medium not as the physical material that makes up artworks but as sets of practices – not the material itself but how one uses the material. I then show that what makes media specific and unique is not certain physical features, but the human responses, which can be empirically investigated, to the combination of practices that constitute media. This relation is one of response-dependence, albeit of a novel kind, which I develop by appealing to social metaphysics. The resulting theory is more complex but also much more flexible and fine-grained than the original and provides insight into a variety of current aesthetic theories.
2020-06-22T00:00:00ZTorregrossa, ClotildeMedium specificity is a theory, or rather a cluster of arguments, in aesthetics that rests on the idea that media are the physical material that makes up artworks, and that this material contains specific and unique features capable of 1) differentiating media from one another, and 2) determining the aesthetic potential and goals of each medium. As such, medium specificity is essential for aestheticians interested in matters of aesthetic ontology and value. However, as Noël Carroll has vehemently and convincingly argued, the theory of medium specificity is inherently flawed and its many applications in art history ill-motivated. Famously, he concluded that we should ‘forget the medium’ entirely. In this thesis, I reject his conclusion and argue that reconstructing a theory of medium specificity, while taking Carroll’s objections into account, is possible. To do so, I offer a reconceptualization of the main theoretical components of medium specificity and ground this new theory in empirical research. I first redefine the medium not as the physical material that makes up artworks but as sets of practices – not the material itself but how one uses the material. I then show that what makes media specific and unique is not certain physical features, but the human responses, which can be empirically investigated, to the combination of practices that constitute media. This relation is one of response-dependence, albeit of a novel kind, which I develop by appealing to social metaphysics. The resulting theory is more complex but also much more flexible and fine-grained than the original and provides insight into a variety of current aesthetic theories.Fiction and its objects
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/19537
This thesis develops a metaphysics of fictional objects that is embedded in a theory of fictional practice and maximally preserves the meanings of our fictional utterances. I begin by asking two questions: How can it be true of a fictional object such as Dune's Paul Atreides that he was born on the planet Caladan to the Lady Jessica (an intrafictional claim), that he was created on Earth by Frank Herbert (an extrafictional claim), and that he does not exist (a nonexistence claim)? If one or more of these is not true, then what is the nature of our assent to these three types of propositions about fictional objects? I argue that fiction's social nature and its basis in imaginative acts provides us with a dualist account of fictional objects: 'Paul Atreides' in the intrafictional and nonexistence claims refers to merely possible people while 'Paul Atreides' in extrafictional claims refers to an actual abstract artifact. I defend imagination's central role in fiction and argue that it's a norm of imagination that it models possibilities. I then define fiction as a social practice necessarily consisting in 1) acts of social imagining, 2) agreement maintained by implicit principles, 3) an aesthetic function or aim, and 4) the creation of abstract artifacts through which it achieves that aim. The result is that intrafictional claims are not assertions about the actual world, but expressions of imaginings that have as their intentional objects possible objects and states of affairs. Extrafictional claims are assertions about the actual abstract artifacts created by fictional practice that bear a picking out relation to the possibilia of fictive imaginings. Finally, nonexistence claims are assertions about the possibilia of our fictive imaginings - assertions that they are not actual. I defend the compatibility of these artifactualist and possibilist accounts and show how their union under the umbrella of a full theory of fiction both explains their intuitive appeal and solves the major issues they encounter individually.
2020-06-22T00:00:00ZWatkins, Ashley EverettThis thesis develops a metaphysics of fictional objects that is embedded in a theory of fictional practice and maximally preserves the meanings of our fictional utterances. I begin by asking two questions: How can it be true of a fictional object such as Dune's Paul Atreides that he was born on the planet Caladan to the Lady Jessica (an intrafictional claim), that he was created on Earth by Frank Herbert (an extrafictional claim), and that he does not exist (a nonexistence claim)? If one or more of these is not true, then what is the nature of our assent to these three types of propositions about fictional objects? I argue that fiction's social nature and its basis in imaginative acts provides us with a dualist account of fictional objects: 'Paul Atreides' in the intrafictional and nonexistence claims refers to merely possible people while 'Paul Atreides' in extrafictional claims refers to an actual abstract artifact. I defend imagination's central role in fiction and argue that it's a norm of imagination that it models possibilities. I then define fiction as a social practice necessarily consisting in 1) acts of social imagining, 2) agreement maintained by implicit principles, 3) an aesthetic function or aim, and 4) the creation of abstract artifacts through which it achieves that aim. The result is that intrafictional claims are not assertions about the actual world, but expressions of imaginings that have as their intentional objects possible objects and states of affairs. Extrafictional claims are assertions about the actual abstract artifacts created by fictional practice that bear a picking out relation to the possibilia of fictive imaginings. Finally, nonexistence claims are assertions about the possibilia of our fictive imaginings - assertions that they are not actual. I defend the compatibility of these artifactualist and possibilist accounts and show how their union under the umbrella of a full theory of fiction both explains their intuitive appeal and solves the major issues they encounter individually.The anatomy of aesthetic experience
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/19508
The primary aim of this thesis is to formulate an intensional definition of aesthetic experience. Its secondary aims are (i) to show how this definition might be used for empirical research and (ii) to better understand other terms that are qualified by ‘aesthetic’ (chiefly, ‘aesthetic properties’ and ‘aesthetic value’). In chapter one, I will explain the nature of the problem we face and why it demands our attention. In chapters two and three, I will critically survey positions in the literature and argue that none adequately characterise aesthetic experience. In chapter four, I will motivate and defend an intensional definition of ‘aesthetic experience’ and an art-based account of ‘aesthetic properties’. The former states, put briefly, that aesthetic experiences are those which acquire a valence when the subject attends to the content of her experience for its own sake and discerns aesthetic properties. The latter states that ‘aesthetic properties’ are those which comprise the value artworks have as works of art. In chapter five, I will use this definition of aesthetic experience to formulate the hypothesis that mindfulness training can augment one’s propensity for having rewarding aesthetic experiences of nature and everyday life. I will then propose how this hypothesis could be empirically investigated. In chapter six, I conclude by examining what my analysis of ‘aesthetic experience’ and ‘aesthetic properties’ reveals about ‘aesthetic value’. I will then, finally, highlight topics requiring further research.
2020-06-22T00:00:00ZUrsell, JamesThe primary aim of this thesis is to formulate an intensional definition of aesthetic experience. Its secondary aims are (i) to show how this definition might be used for empirical research and (ii) to better understand other terms that are qualified by ‘aesthetic’ (chiefly, ‘aesthetic properties’ and ‘aesthetic value’). In chapter one, I will explain the nature of the problem we face and why it demands our attention. In chapters two and three, I will critically survey positions in the literature and argue that none adequately characterise aesthetic experience. In chapter four, I will motivate and defend an intensional definition of ‘aesthetic experience’ and an art-based account of ‘aesthetic properties’. The former states, put briefly, that aesthetic experiences are those which acquire a valence when the subject attends to the content of her experience for its own sake and discerns aesthetic properties. The latter states that ‘aesthetic properties’ are those which comprise the value artworks have as works of art. In chapter five, I will use this definition of aesthetic experience to formulate the hypothesis that mindfulness training can augment one’s propensity for having rewarding aesthetic experiences of nature and everyday life. I will then propose how this hypothesis could be empirically investigated. In chapter six, I conclude by examining what my analysis of ‘aesthetic experience’ and ‘aesthetic properties’ reveals about ‘aesthetic value’. I will then, finally, highlight topics requiring further research.The Chinese film industry : features and trends, 2010-2016
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/19497
The thesis will analyse the evolution of the Chinese film industry between 2010 and 2016. During this period, the Chinese film industry experienced rapid development and underwent massive structural change and expansion. The years 2010 to 2016, also gave rise to a number of important events and phenomena within the Chinese film industry, including technological changes that impacted upon traditional entertainment practices, new Internet-driven innovations, an enormous influx of capital, generous government incentives and an overall explosion in media saturation and popularity.
My research poses the following questions; what are the key features of the Chinese film industry between 2010 and 2016? What developments transpired within the Chinese film industry between the years 2010 and 2016 and how might we understand and rationalise these contemporary trends. This thesis adopts a political economy approach. It is the assertion of my research that developments within the Chinese film industry must be considered within the wider socio-economic and political context of contemporary China. This thesis provides a macro-level study of the contemporary Chinese film industry, with focus given to four key areas of research, namely policy, production, distribution and exhibition. These four study areas provide a fitting entry point to better understand the shifting dynamics of the Chinese film industry between 2010 and 2016.
The intention of this thesis is to map out contemporary trends within the Chinese film industry. My research, aimed at both academics and industry insiders alike, adopts an industry perspective with the aim of both enriching further scholarship on Chinese cinema, while simultaneously serving as a source of knowledge and understanding for those working within the industry. It is hoped that this thesis will enhance further the academic studies on Chinese cinema by providing an industrial bedrock upon which additional analysis can be based, while also providing the industry with insight that will facilitate the continued health and sustainability of cinema in China.
2020-06-22T00:00:00ZDiao, JinuoThe thesis will analyse the evolution of the Chinese film industry between 2010 and 2016. During this period, the Chinese film industry experienced rapid development and underwent massive structural change and expansion. The years 2010 to 2016, also gave rise to a number of important events and phenomena within the Chinese film industry, including technological changes that impacted upon traditional entertainment practices, new Internet-driven innovations, an enormous influx of capital, generous government incentives and an overall explosion in media saturation and popularity.
My research poses the following questions; what are the key features of the Chinese film industry between 2010 and 2016? What developments transpired within the Chinese film industry between the years 2010 and 2016 and how might we understand and rationalise these contemporary trends. This thesis adopts a political economy approach. It is the assertion of my research that developments within the Chinese film industry must be considered within the wider socio-economic and political context of contemporary China. This thesis provides a macro-level study of the contemporary Chinese film industry, with focus given to four key areas of research, namely policy, production, distribution and exhibition. These four study areas provide a fitting entry point to better understand the shifting dynamics of the Chinese film industry between 2010 and 2016.
The intention of this thesis is to map out contemporary trends within the Chinese film industry. My research, aimed at both academics and industry insiders alike, adopts an industry perspective with the aim of both enriching further scholarship on Chinese cinema, while simultaneously serving as a source of knowledge and understanding for those working within the industry. It is hoped that this thesis will enhance further the academic studies on Chinese cinema by providing an industrial bedrock upon which additional analysis can be based, while also providing the industry with insight that will facilitate the continued health and sustainability of cinema in China.Generics, modality, and morality
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/19244
The issues in this dissertation reside at the intersections of, and relationships between,
topics concerning the meaning of generic generalizations, natural language modality,
the nature and role of moral principles, and the place of supererogation in the overall
structure of the normative domain. In ’Generics and Weak Necessity’, I argue
that generics—exception-granting generalizations such as ’Birds fly’ and ’Tigers are
striped’—involve a covert weak necessity modal at logical form. I argue that this improves
our understanding of the variability and diversity of generics. This chapter
also argues that we can account for variability concerning normative generics within
a modal approach to generics. In ’The Genericity of Moral Principles’, I provide evidence
for the view that moral principles are generic generalizations, and, on the basis
of this claim, argue that moral principles do not provide adequate support for reasoning
about the moral statuses of particular cases. In ’Supererogation and the Structure
of the Normative Domain’, I investigate the diversity of the central normative modal
notions and argue that we should distinguish between two senses of supererogation
based different ways deontic modals are sensitive to background information.
2019-12-04T00:00:00ZThakral, RaviThe issues in this dissertation reside at the intersections of, and relationships between,
topics concerning the meaning of generic generalizations, natural language modality,
the nature and role of moral principles, and the place of supererogation in the overall
structure of the normative domain. In ’Generics and Weak Necessity’, I argue
that generics—exception-granting generalizations such as ’Birds fly’ and ’Tigers are
striped’—involve a covert weak necessity modal at logical form. I argue that this improves
our understanding of the variability and diversity of generics. This chapter
also argues that we can account for variability concerning normative generics within
a modal approach to generics. In ’The Genericity of Moral Principles’, I provide evidence
for the view that moral principles are generic generalizations, and, on the basis
of this claim, argue that moral principles do not provide adequate support for reasoning
about the moral statuses of particular cases. In ’Supererogation and the Structure
of the Normative Domain’, I investigate the diversity of the central normative modal
notions and argue that we should distinguish between two senses of supererogation
based different ways deontic modals are sensitive to background information.The textual genealogies of Korean genre cinema
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/19053
South Korean cinema has enjoyed a rise in academic attention since the turn of the twenty-first
century. That said, the way in which the vibrant and tumultuous history of the Korean peninsula
throughout the twentieth century affected the development and evolution of film genre has yet
to be examined in-depth. This thesis therefore seeks to establish histories of Korean film genres
by examining the on-screen shifts and transitions of genre. Focusing on three genres –
melodrama, action, and horror – this thesis illuminates the complex relationships and
interactions occurring within the East Asian region, showing how Korean cinema has interacted
with the genre cinema of its geographic neighbours. At the same time this thesis excavates the
pre-cinematic histories of these genres in an attempt to establish genealogical evidence of genre
form and content as found in folklore, theatre, and other traditional narrative media or
performance. In doing so, this thesis attempts to challenge the assumed universality of genre
terminology by exploring the degree to which such terms are able to map onto cinemas fuelled
by cultural traditions and histories which are largely disparate from the Western films that
historically informed the notions and understandings of particular genres. As such, this thesis
hopes to discuss Korean cinema through an investigation into genre which places emphasis on
Korea’s own cinematic and pre-cinematic histories.
2019-06-24T00:00:00ZMcMorran, Connor AnthonySouth Korean cinema has enjoyed a rise in academic attention since the turn of the twenty-first
century. That said, the way in which the vibrant and tumultuous history of the Korean peninsula
throughout the twentieth century affected the development and evolution of film genre has yet
to be examined in-depth. This thesis therefore seeks to establish histories of Korean film genres
by examining the on-screen shifts and transitions of genre. Focusing on three genres –
melodrama, action, and horror – this thesis illuminates the complex relationships and
interactions occurring within the East Asian region, showing how Korean cinema has interacted
with the genre cinema of its geographic neighbours. At the same time this thesis excavates the
pre-cinematic histories of these genres in an attempt to establish genealogical evidence of genre
form and content as found in folklore, theatre, and other traditional narrative media or
performance. In doing so, this thesis attempts to challenge the assumed universality of genre
terminology by exploring the degree to which such terms are able to map onto cinemas fuelled
by cultural traditions and histories which are largely disparate from the Western films that
historically informed the notions and understandings of particular genres. As such, this thesis
hopes to discuss Korean cinema through an investigation into genre which places emphasis on
Korea’s own cinematic and pre-cinematic histories."Can Michael the Brave love, or not?" : sex and sexuality in Romanian film culture
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/18997
This study seeks to trace a history of the representations of sex and sexuality in the Romanian film culture, specifically in relation to the various political, social, and economic factors that have shaped these representations. The assertion of this thesis is that, within the Romanian film culture, there is a continuity evident over the course of the last century, which takes the form of a tension between an impulse to showcase sexuality in an honest, liberated manner, and, opposing it, a systematic compulsion to conceal matters related to sexuality, due to both a tradition of repressed morality, and to an assortment of political and ideological repressive mechanisms.
One of the aims of this thesis is to introduce more complex ways of understanding visibility and representation in cinema, beyond the confines of a profit-driven global film culture, therefore the study moves both on a national, and a transnational level. On the one hand, it explores the ways in which sexuality as represented in Romanian films could nuance the discussion concerning sexuality in the cinema. On the other, it looks at how sexuality as represented in other film cultures has travelled to, and has been received within, the specific Romanian context. While a national framework can be seen as limiting, it is also aimed to focus the discussion, and to establish a scope of concrete evidence to illustrate how the specificity of the context constructs specific ways in which sexuality is represented and interacted with at a cinematic level. In Dagmar
Herzog’s words, “the nation-state is a logical unit to analyse when we are trying to
understand changes in laws and government policies; and for most of the twentieth
century, it is striking how profound an impact laws have had in shaping national and
local sexual cultures and individuals’ self-conceptions alike, as well as – for instance, in the case of restrictions on contraceptive products – the actual bodily experiences of sex”.
The analysis is divided into three main sections. The first focusses on the period
between the start of the 20th century and the end of the Second World War, looking at
the ways in which the Romanian film culture has communicated with the wider,
American and European one, in terms of regulating film sexuality. The middle section
moves to investigate how the mutations brought by state socialism in terms of ideology
and morality have impacted on the visibility of film sexuality, which has been reduced
to the point of sublimation. The final section explores the post-communist period, and
the ways in which cinema, in the Romanian film culture, has used sex and sexuality to
both reckon with a traumatic past, and alleviate traumas of the present.
2019-12-04T00:00:00ZGadalean, Andrei MihaiThis study seeks to trace a history of the representations of sex and sexuality in the Romanian film culture, specifically in relation to the various political, social, and economic factors that have shaped these representations. The assertion of this thesis is that, within the Romanian film culture, there is a continuity evident over the course of the last century, which takes the form of a tension between an impulse to showcase sexuality in an honest, liberated manner, and, opposing it, a systematic compulsion to conceal matters related to sexuality, due to both a tradition of repressed morality, and to an assortment of political and ideological repressive mechanisms.
One of the aims of this thesis is to introduce more complex ways of understanding visibility and representation in cinema, beyond the confines of a profit-driven global film culture, therefore the study moves both on a national, and a transnational level. On the one hand, it explores the ways in which sexuality as represented in Romanian films could nuance the discussion concerning sexuality in the cinema. On the other, it looks at how sexuality as represented in other film cultures has travelled to, and has been received within, the specific Romanian context. While a national framework can be seen as limiting, it is also aimed to focus the discussion, and to establish a scope of concrete evidence to illustrate how the specificity of the context constructs specific ways in which sexuality is represented and interacted with at a cinematic level. In Dagmar
Herzog’s words, “the nation-state is a logical unit to analyse when we are trying to
understand changes in laws and government policies; and for most of the twentieth
century, it is striking how profound an impact laws have had in shaping national and
local sexual cultures and individuals’ self-conceptions alike, as well as – for instance, in the case of restrictions on contraceptive products – the actual bodily experiences of sex”.
The analysis is divided into three main sections. The first focusses on the period
between the start of the 20th century and the end of the Second World War, looking at
the ways in which the Romanian film culture has communicated with the wider,
American and European one, in terms of regulating film sexuality. The middle section
moves to investigate how the mutations brought by state socialism in terms of ideology
and morality have impacted on the visibility of film sexuality, which has been reduced
to the point of sublimation. The final section explores the post-communist period, and
the ways in which cinema, in the Romanian film culture, has used sex and sexuality to
both reckon with a traumatic past, and alleviate traumas of the present.Partnerships and understanding between Kazakh pastoralists and golden eagles of the Altai mountains : a multi-species ethnography
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/18955
This thesis is a study of the Kazakh tradition of hunting in partnership with golden
eagles in the Altai Mountains of Mongolia. It represents a unique relationship
among the spectrum of human-animal interactions – here eagles live both fully
independent lives in the ‘wild’ and yet, for a time, are brought into the domestic
sphere by Kazakhs and behave, in many ways, as a domesticated animal would.
Kazakhs are able to accomplish this through the deep ethno-ornithological
knowledge of the lives of eagles and a willingness to see eagles as beings with
agency and engage in an intersubjective relationship with them.
Kazakh pastoralists rely entirely on animals for their livelihood, and therefore
communicate with goats, sheep, horses, camels, yaks and eagles on a daily basis.
None of these relationships are of dominance, but rather co-domesticity. The aim
of this thesis is to use the lens of cultivating a relationship with an eagle to better
examine how human-animal interactions make us who we are, and help us
understand the world around us. There are strong parallels in the lives of the
eagles and Kazakhs of the Altai Mountains – both migrate with the seasons and
utilize landscapes in similar ways. Along with notions of ‘domestic’ and ‘wild’,
apprenticeship is a strong theme in this thesis. A Kazakh hunter must apprentice
himself to both his eagle and his human mentor. In turn, the eagle becomes an
apprentice of sorts as it learns to communicate with humans. Layers of
interspecies communication saturate the landscape and challenge the notion of
human exceptionalism. When we think about animals this way, like the Kazakhs do,
truly special human-animal partnerships can occur.
2019-12-04T00:00:00ZMcGough, Lauren MuellerThis thesis is a study of the Kazakh tradition of hunting in partnership with golden
eagles in the Altai Mountains of Mongolia. It represents a unique relationship
among the spectrum of human-animal interactions – here eagles live both fully
independent lives in the ‘wild’ and yet, for a time, are brought into the domestic
sphere by Kazakhs and behave, in many ways, as a domesticated animal would.
Kazakhs are able to accomplish this through the deep ethno-ornithological
knowledge of the lives of eagles and a willingness to see eagles as beings with
agency and engage in an intersubjective relationship with them.
Kazakh pastoralists rely entirely on animals for their livelihood, and therefore
communicate with goats, sheep, horses, camels, yaks and eagles on a daily basis.
None of these relationships are of dominance, but rather co-domesticity. The aim
of this thesis is to use the lens of cultivating a relationship with an eagle to better
examine how human-animal interactions make us who we are, and help us
understand the world around us. There are strong parallels in the lives of the
eagles and Kazakhs of the Altai Mountains – both migrate with the seasons and
utilize landscapes in similar ways. Along with notions of ‘domestic’ and ‘wild’,
apprenticeship is a strong theme in this thesis. A Kazakh hunter must apprentice
himself to both his eagle and his human mentor. In turn, the eagle becomes an
apprentice of sorts as it learns to communicate with humans. Layers of
interspecies communication saturate the landscape and challenge the notion of
human exceptionalism. When we think about animals this way, like the Kazakhs do,
truly special human-animal partnerships can occur.Taking moral indeterminacy seriously : in defence of compatibility between moral realism and indeterminacy
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/18849
Moral indeterminacy appears to be incompatible with moral realism at first glance because moral realists believe that there are objective moral facts in the world, which seem determinate. Given the commitment to objective moral facts, moral realists would want to argue that there can be a considerable amount of convergence on moral matters. However, moral disagreement is too prevalent for realists to be optimistic that there will be convergence sometime in the future. Some moral disagreements seem to remain irresolvable or even faultless. Since it is reasonable to think that moral disagreements arise because there is indeterminacy, moral realists would want to explain indeterminacy without any inconsistency or incompatibility.
I argue that moral realism is compatible with every kind of indeterminacy: metaphysical indeterminacy, semantic indeterminacy, and epistemic indeterminacy. What I contribute to indeterminacy and moral realism debate is that, in contrast with how some philosophers argue that all moral indeterminacy can be reduced to metaphysical indeterminacy or epistemicism, I argue that every kind of indeterminacy has its own place. I show that each kind of indeterminacy is helpful for moral realists to explain different types of moral disagreement: faultless moral disagreement can be explained through semantic indeterminacy; irresolvable moral disagreement can be explained through metaphysical indeterminacy; resolvable disagreement can be explained through epistemicism.
The upshot of my research is that moral realists can still uphold their tenets on moral objectivity and truth while embracing indeterminacy, the cause of disagreement, at the same time. If the strength of a metaethical theory is measured by how much explanation it can provide, my dissertation shows that moral realism wins over anti-realism in this regard.
2019-12-04T00:00:00ZKim, JiwonMoral indeterminacy appears to be incompatible with moral realism at first glance because moral realists believe that there are objective moral facts in the world, which seem determinate. Given the commitment to objective moral facts, moral realists would want to argue that there can be a considerable amount of convergence on moral matters. However, moral disagreement is too prevalent for realists to be optimistic that there will be convergence sometime in the future. Some moral disagreements seem to remain irresolvable or even faultless. Since it is reasonable to think that moral disagreements arise because there is indeterminacy, moral realists would want to explain indeterminacy without any inconsistency or incompatibility.
I argue that moral realism is compatible with every kind of indeterminacy: metaphysical indeterminacy, semantic indeterminacy, and epistemic indeterminacy. What I contribute to indeterminacy and moral realism debate is that, in contrast with how some philosophers argue that all moral indeterminacy can be reduced to metaphysical indeterminacy or epistemicism, I argue that every kind of indeterminacy has its own place. I show that each kind of indeterminacy is helpful for moral realists to explain different types of moral disagreement: faultless moral disagreement can be explained through semantic indeterminacy; irresolvable moral disagreement can be explained through metaphysical indeterminacy; resolvable disagreement can be explained through epistemicism.
The upshot of my research is that moral realists can still uphold their tenets on moral objectivity and truth while embracing indeterminacy, the cause of disagreement, at the same time. If the strength of a metaethical theory is measured by how much explanation it can provide, my dissertation shows that moral realism wins over anti-realism in this regard.Weaving through life : an ethnographic study of the significance of pandanus work to the people of Futuna Island, Vanuatu
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/18695
This thesis investigates how workers of pandanus on Futuna Island engage with and navigate the world around them through their work. Pandanus work is integral to social life: it nurtures, sustains, creates meaning and relations. Through focusing on the handicraft and considering pandanus work as a process: from the upkeep of the plants and the treatment of the leaf materials, the creation of structured artefacts and decorative plaited patterns, to the exchange and sale of baskets and mats and the final discarding of the artefacts, the research explores the complex set of meanings, sensibilities and challenges inherent in this multi-faceted and productive activity.
The ethnographic study fills an important gap in current research by exploring the pandanus baskets and mats used in the everyday rather than the artefacts of ceremonial importance. The quotidian interests and concerns of people in Vanuatu and how these are expressed through activities and material forms creates the very fabric of the thesis and reveals what is important in life on Futuna.
The study is set in a context where local knowledge and ways of doing things are actively reflected on and discussed as people navigate conflicting ideologies and ways of being. I argue that pandanus work is fundamentally a process of production where not only artefacts, but knowledge, subjects and relationships are created, nurtured and developed. Fundamental ideas about life are questioned in processes of pandanus work.
Thus through considering the social, religious, and environmental aspects of pandanus work, the research furthers anthropological understandings of how ideas, beliefs and challenges are explored and explained in the quotidian production and use of plaited mats and baskets in Vanuatu. This project explores how women on Futuna figuratively weave the story of their lives.
2019-12-04T00:00:00ZHazelgrove Planel, LucieThis thesis investigates how workers of pandanus on Futuna Island engage with and navigate the world around them through their work. Pandanus work is integral to social life: it nurtures, sustains, creates meaning and relations. Through focusing on the handicraft and considering pandanus work as a process: from the upkeep of the plants and the treatment of the leaf materials, the creation of structured artefacts and decorative plaited patterns, to the exchange and sale of baskets and mats and the final discarding of the artefacts, the research explores the complex set of meanings, sensibilities and challenges inherent in this multi-faceted and productive activity.
The ethnographic study fills an important gap in current research by exploring the pandanus baskets and mats used in the everyday rather than the artefacts of ceremonial importance. The quotidian interests and concerns of people in Vanuatu and how these are expressed through activities and material forms creates the very fabric of the thesis and reveals what is important in life on Futuna.
The study is set in a context where local knowledge and ways of doing things are actively reflected on and discussed as people navigate conflicting ideologies and ways of being. I argue that pandanus work is fundamentally a process of production where not only artefacts, but knowledge, subjects and relationships are created, nurtured and developed. Fundamental ideas about life are questioned in processes of pandanus work.
Thus through considering the social, religious, and environmental aspects of pandanus work, the research furthers anthropological understandings of how ideas, beliefs and challenges are explored and explained in the quotidian production and use of plaited mats and baskets in Vanuatu. This project explores how women on Futuna figuratively weave the story of their lives.Analogy, rule-following and meaning
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/18627
In this thesis, I argue that meaning something by a linguistic expression should be thought to consist,
not in following a rule, but in drawing an analogy. I argue that using a linguistic expression meaningfully
involves analogically extrapolating from our past experience of that expression, by observing a similarity
between the present instance (that which the expression is being applied to) and previous instances (our
past experiences involving the use of that expression). This is in opposition to the classical account of
meaning, according to which meaning something by a linguistic expression involves following a rule – a
rule stating necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the expression to apply. I argue that there is no
one thing that all meaningful instances of many linguistic expressions have in common, such that its
meaning could be captured in the form of a rule. I claim that the categories corresponding to our
linguistic expressions (containing the objects that any given expression is true of), are defined not in
terms of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, but in terms of family resemblance relationships
between particular instances, such that analogy plays an essential role in every meaningful application of
a linguistic expression. I argue that metaphorical uses of linguistic expressions are clearly dependent on
analogy, and that as we are unable to uphold a principled distinction between the literal and the
metaphorical, that all meaningful uses of language should be thought to depend on analogy. I argue that
conceiving of meaning as governed by analogy, rather than rules, helps to diffuse the rule-following
paradox, laid out by Saul Kripke. I claim that the meaning of every linguistic expression is governed by
analogy, including the word ‘rule’, such that there may be scope to speak of ‘rules’ of meaning, after all.
2018-06-28T00:00:00ZWilliams, Andrew SimeonIn this thesis, I argue that meaning something by a linguistic expression should be thought to consist,
not in following a rule, but in drawing an analogy. I argue that using a linguistic expression meaningfully
involves analogically extrapolating from our past experience of that expression, by observing a similarity
between the present instance (that which the expression is being applied to) and previous instances (our
past experiences involving the use of that expression). This is in opposition to the classical account of
meaning, according to which meaning something by a linguistic expression involves following a rule – a
rule stating necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the expression to apply. I argue that there is no
one thing that all meaningful instances of many linguistic expressions have in common, such that its
meaning could be captured in the form of a rule. I claim that the categories corresponding to our
linguistic expressions (containing the objects that any given expression is true of), are defined not in
terms of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, but in terms of family resemblance relationships
between particular instances, such that analogy plays an essential role in every meaningful application of
a linguistic expression. I argue that metaphorical uses of linguistic expressions are clearly dependent on
analogy, and that as we are unable to uphold a principled distinction between the literal and the
metaphorical, that all meaningful uses of language should be thought to depend on analogy. I argue that
conceiving of meaning as governed by analogy, rather than rules, helps to diffuse the rule-following
paradox, laid out by Saul Kripke. I claim that the meaning of every linguistic expression is governed by
analogy, including the word ‘rule’, such that there may be scope to speak of ‘rules’ of meaning, after all.Vehicle relationism : essays on samethinking and samesaying
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/18564
This thesis is about the nature of samethinking and samesaying. These notions
are broad and capture various distinct but related phenomena. I will focus on
two particular understandings of ‘samethinking’, and on one particular
understanding of ‘samesaying’. Let me address samethinking first. On the first
understanding of ‘samethinking’, samethinking occurs whenever two thoughts
concern the same referent. We may distinguish between two different ways in
which this can occur. First, there are cases in which the sameness of reference is
manifest to the subject. Take for instance the two beliefs BOB DYLAN IS A
MUSICIAN and BOB DYLAN WON A NOBEL PRIZE. In such cases, the sameness of
reference is transparent to the thinker in such a way that she may combine the
two beliefs in an inference and conclude directly from these two beliefs alone
that a musician won a Nobel Prize.
Second, there are cases in which two thoughts concern the same referent, but
where the sameness of reference is not manifest to the subject. Take for instance
the two thoughts BOB DYLAN IS A MUSICIAN and ROBERT ZIMMERMAN WON A
NOBEL PRIZE. ‘Robert Zimmerman’ is Bob Dylan’s birth name, so the two
thoughts concern the same individual. However, unless the thinker has a further
belief to the effect that Bob Dylan is Robert Zimmerman, she may not rationally
infer from these beliefs that a musician won a Nobel Prize. We see, then, that two
pairs of thoughts that are referentially equivalent may nonetheless play different
roles in cognition. In this thesis, I offer a novel account of how to understand the
difference between cases of samethinking such as those above.
The second understanding of ‘samethinking’ that I will discuss in this thesis is a
broader phenomenon. Two thoughts, typically entertained by distinct
individuals or the same individual at different times, can be said to concern the
same subject matter despite differing in their overall semantic properties.
Likewise, it seems that two utterances may concern the same topic despite
differing in their overall semantic properties. Consider for instance someone
uttering the sentence “Whales are fish” in the 18th century, where such an
utterance would generally be regarded as true. If someone today were to utter
the same sentence, however, we would regard it as false. We have reason to
think that the meaning of the term ‘fish’ has changed between then and now.
Even if this is the case, it seems as though the 18th-century person and the
current day individual are, in an interesting way, talking about the same topic
when uttering the sentence. This is the notion of ‘samesaying’ I will address in
this thesis. I shed light on what it is for two thoughts or two utterances to be the
same in this way.
2019-12-04T00:00:00ZVikesdal, Sara KasinThis thesis is about the nature of samethinking and samesaying. These notions
are broad and capture various distinct but related phenomena. I will focus on
two particular understandings of ‘samethinking’, and on one particular
understanding of ‘samesaying’. Let me address samethinking first. On the first
understanding of ‘samethinking’, samethinking occurs whenever two thoughts
concern the same referent. We may distinguish between two different ways in
which this can occur. First, there are cases in which the sameness of reference is
manifest to the subject. Take for instance the two beliefs BOB DYLAN IS A
MUSICIAN and BOB DYLAN WON A NOBEL PRIZE. In such cases, the sameness of
reference is transparent to the thinker in such a way that she may combine the
two beliefs in an inference and conclude directly from these two beliefs alone
that a musician won a Nobel Prize.
Second, there are cases in which two thoughts concern the same referent, but
where the sameness of reference is not manifest to the subject. Take for instance
the two thoughts BOB DYLAN IS A MUSICIAN and ROBERT ZIMMERMAN WON A
NOBEL PRIZE. ‘Robert Zimmerman’ is Bob Dylan’s birth name, so the two
thoughts concern the same individual. However, unless the thinker has a further
belief to the effect that Bob Dylan is Robert Zimmerman, she may not rationally
infer from these beliefs that a musician won a Nobel Prize. We see, then, that two
pairs of thoughts that are referentially equivalent may nonetheless play different
roles in cognition. In this thesis, I offer a novel account of how to understand the
difference between cases of samethinking such as those above.
The second understanding of ‘samethinking’ that I will discuss in this thesis is a
broader phenomenon. Two thoughts, typically entertained by distinct
individuals or the same individual at different times, can be said to concern the
same subject matter despite differing in their overall semantic properties.
Likewise, it seems that two utterances may concern the same topic despite
differing in their overall semantic properties. Consider for instance someone
uttering the sentence “Whales are fish” in the 18th century, where such an
utterance would generally be regarded as true. If someone today were to utter
the same sentence, however, we would regard it as false. We have reason to
think that the meaning of the term ‘fish’ has changed between then and now.
Even if this is the case, it seems as though the 18th-century person and the
current day individual are, in an interesting way, talking about the same topic
when uttering the sentence. This is the notion of ‘samesaying’ I will address in
this thesis. I shed light on what it is for two thoughts or two utterances to be the
same in this way.When others fail to comply : Kant on revolution, self-defence, and lying
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/18339
According to a prominent line of interpretation, Kantians must sometimes choose between leaving individuals defenceless against evil or developing strategies to mitigate the stringency of duties in the face of others’ bad intentions. The thesis reacts to this setup, which unduly privileges Kant’s early critical moral theory at the expense of his mature system. In particular, it vindicates the relevance of Kant’s legal-political philosophy by discussing three cases where others’ noncompliance seems to ground exceptions to duties: political revolution, self-defence, and defensive lying. In addition to considering neglected yet significant passages from Kant, it makes the following main contributions. Chapter 1 analyses Kant’s state of nature as a systemic, inter-individual problem of noncompliance, suggesting that Kant’s political solution (exiting the state of nature) leads to a different version of the problem, involving citizens and sovereign. Turning to political revolution, Chapter 2 introduces an issue affecting both restricted and unrestricted interpretations of its prohibition: while, for Kant, supreme de facto power is at least a necessary condition for a state’s legitimacy, such supremacy is never conclusively established. The chapter also discusses the role of lex permissiva in state foundation, arguing against employing it to justify revolts by introducing a test for principles of non-contingent moral progress. Chapter 3 focuses on self-defence. After examining it in connection to the alleged right of necessity, it explores its juridical and ethical dimensions, with a particular focus on the issue of moderation. It makes room for a narrow state-enforced limitation on defence of individuals’ rights vis-à-vis one another, and, together with Chapter 1, advances a Kantian analysis of violence as unilateral exercise of force or immoderate self-defence. Chapter 4 discusses in detail Kant’s arguments against lying and his 1797 essay On an Alleged Right to Lie. Together with Chapter 3, it highlights Kant’s different attitudes toward the morality of defensive lying and force, putting his verdict on Inquiring Murderer in due philosophical perspective. Building on Chapter 2, it provides an account of how a lie wrongs “humanity as such”, vindicating Kant’s commitment to the idea that progress must happen in principle and on principle.
2019-12-04T00:00:00ZLo Re, StefanoAccording to a prominent line of interpretation, Kantians must sometimes choose between leaving individuals defenceless against evil or developing strategies to mitigate the stringency of duties in the face of others’ bad intentions. The thesis reacts to this setup, which unduly privileges Kant’s early critical moral theory at the expense of his mature system. In particular, it vindicates the relevance of Kant’s legal-political philosophy by discussing three cases where others’ noncompliance seems to ground exceptions to duties: political revolution, self-defence, and defensive lying. In addition to considering neglected yet significant passages from Kant, it makes the following main contributions. Chapter 1 analyses Kant’s state of nature as a systemic, inter-individual problem of noncompliance, suggesting that Kant’s political solution (exiting the state of nature) leads to a different version of the problem, involving citizens and sovereign. Turning to political revolution, Chapter 2 introduces an issue affecting both restricted and unrestricted interpretations of its prohibition: while, for Kant, supreme de facto power is at least a necessary condition for a state’s legitimacy, such supremacy is never conclusively established. The chapter also discusses the role of lex permissiva in state foundation, arguing against employing it to justify revolts by introducing a test for principles of non-contingent moral progress. Chapter 3 focuses on self-defence. After examining it in connection to the alleged right of necessity, it explores its juridical and ethical dimensions, with a particular focus on the issue of moderation. It makes room for a narrow state-enforced limitation on defence of individuals’ rights vis-à-vis one another, and, together with Chapter 1, advances a Kantian analysis of violence as unilateral exercise of force or immoderate self-defence. Chapter 4 discusses in detail Kant’s arguments against lying and his 1797 essay On an Alleged Right to Lie. Together with Chapter 3, it highlights Kant’s different attitudes toward the morality of defensive lying and force, putting his verdict on Inquiring Murderer in due philosophical perspective. Building on Chapter 2, it provides an account of how a lie wrongs “humanity as such”, vindicating Kant’s commitment to the idea that progress must happen in principle and on principle.‘The work of the heart’ : self-transformation amongst the people of Awim, Papua New Guinea
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/18011
This thesis analyses a significant shift in how Awim people in the East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea, conceive of, experience and talk about themselves, their relations with one another, and their world. My ethnographic analysis uses Awim categories to reveal processes of transformation and continuity, in particular the transformation of a ritual form and its eventual abolition.
In the Awim world every living being has a 'heart' (manga) – life itself – that metamorphoses from fruit to seed and from seed to fruit, engendering a container. When 'heart' (manga) is made verb (mangananm), the 'work of the heart' is evinced as the continuing constitution anew of a spiral-form. The ‘work of the heart’ is materially effective thoughts that may be found on the spiral boundaries that traverse the body's flesh, coincide with the finger tips, the words of my mother's brother or dwell between two moving hands in a problem-solving ritual called 'the handshake'.
My analysis begins with people's concerns about the precariousness of the world and problematic relations, which were especially dangerous. Attempts to ‘straighten’ relations were made through ‘the handshake’ ritual, in which two persons stand facing each other shaking hands and expressing their regrets. In presenting three case-studies I describe how ‘the handshake rituals’ were rendered efficacious, and also their limits, which materialized once the problems in the village were deemed to be grounded first in witchcraft and later in sorcery. Conscious of the limits of ‘the handshake’ ritual, people resorted to the revival of a local religious movement called The Michael Angel Ministry. After the Ministry solved the village's problems the people were most interested in preserving Michael's otherwise intermittent power through the restructuring of the Ministry. One of the provisions included the abolition of ‘the handshake’ ritual inside the Ministry and with it a significant shift occurred.
2017-06-20T00:00:00ZBartole, TomiThis thesis analyses a significant shift in how Awim people in the East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea, conceive of, experience and talk about themselves, their relations with one another, and their world. My ethnographic analysis uses Awim categories to reveal processes of transformation and continuity, in particular the transformation of a ritual form and its eventual abolition.
In the Awim world every living being has a 'heart' (manga) – life itself – that metamorphoses from fruit to seed and from seed to fruit, engendering a container. When 'heart' (manga) is made verb (mangananm), the 'work of the heart' is evinced as the continuing constitution anew of a spiral-form. The ‘work of the heart’ is materially effective thoughts that may be found on the spiral boundaries that traverse the body's flesh, coincide with the finger tips, the words of my mother's brother or dwell between two moving hands in a problem-solving ritual called 'the handshake'.
My analysis begins with people's concerns about the precariousness of the world and problematic relations, which were especially dangerous. Attempts to ‘straighten’ relations were made through ‘the handshake’ ritual, in which two persons stand facing each other shaking hands and expressing their regrets. In presenting three case-studies I describe how ‘the handshake rituals’ were rendered efficacious, and also their limits, which materialized once the problems in the village were deemed to be grounded first in witchcraft and later in sorcery. Conscious of the limits of ‘the handshake’ ritual, people resorted to the revival of a local religious movement called The Michael Angel Ministry. After the Ministry solved the village's problems the people were most interested in preserving Michael's otherwise intermittent power through the restructuring of the Ministry. One of the provisions included the abolition of ‘the handshake’ ritual inside the Ministry and with it a significant shift occurred.'Literary spaces without readers' : the paradoxes of being a 'writer' in Havana, Cuba
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/17927
Cuban writers have long struggled for publishing space. Historically that had been because of
repressive control of publishing mechanisms during the colonial period and the time of the Republic,
which, when access was granted, required expensive systems of patronage in order for writers to see
their work in print. While the Revolution advanced literacy rates and took ownership of the
publishing houses, printers, distributors and booksellers, creating cheap books for the pueblo cubano,
trade sanctions and the fall of the U.S.S.R. in 1991 resulted in limited resources for what had been a
well-subsidised publishing system.
The writers I worked with in Havana, though, are a generation newly connected to a global
literary network through internet access, introducing them to market trends and concepts of mass
readership. While they regularly partook in the praxis of writing, through weekly talleres
[workshops], monthly peñas literarias [literary salons] and by publishing digital literary magazines,
their idea of being a writer was being redefined by awareness of publishing systems internationally
and new concepts of economic and cultural value, problematising their self-conception as ‘writer’.
This thesis explores the context of being a writer in Cuba through my interlocutors’
conceptions of economic change, of future, of past, of literary history and of the city of Havana as a
space of creation. In studying how my interlocutors interact with their texts, I question notions of
literary invention and world-making and a sense of relatedness to characters. The writers I worked
with were concerned with reception, with conceptions of audience, cultural value and literary tastes.
This thesis attempts to show what it means to be ‘a writer’ for a group of people who see being a writer
as something they simultaneously are and can never be in Cuba.
2019-06-24T00:00:00ZRosenbaum, MollyCuban writers have long struggled for publishing space. Historically that had been because of
repressive control of publishing mechanisms during the colonial period and the time of the Republic,
which, when access was granted, required expensive systems of patronage in order for writers to see
their work in print. While the Revolution advanced literacy rates and took ownership of the
publishing houses, printers, distributors and booksellers, creating cheap books for the pueblo cubano,
trade sanctions and the fall of the U.S.S.R. in 1991 resulted in limited resources for what had been a
well-subsidised publishing system.
The writers I worked with in Havana, though, are a generation newly connected to a global
literary network through internet access, introducing them to market trends and concepts of mass
readership. While they regularly partook in the praxis of writing, through weekly talleres
[workshops], monthly peñas literarias [literary salons] and by publishing digital literary magazines,
their idea of being a writer was being redefined by awareness of publishing systems internationally
and new concepts of economic and cultural value, problematising their self-conception as ‘writer’.
This thesis explores the context of being a writer in Cuba through my interlocutors’
conceptions of economic change, of future, of past, of literary history and of the city of Havana as a
space of creation. In studying how my interlocutors interact with their texts, I question notions of
literary invention and world-making and a sense of relatedness to characters. The writers I worked
with were concerned with reception, with conceptions of audience, cultural value and literary tastes.
This thesis attempts to show what it means to be ‘a writer’ for a group of people who see being a writer
as something they simultaneously are and can never be in Cuba.Propositional unity and representation : theories of judgement from Kant to Wittgenstein
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/17925
The aim of the thesis is to provide a fresh look at the beginning of the British analytic
tradition, represented by early G. E. Moore and B. Russell and later by a young L. Wittgenstein,
and emphasize especially the way in which this tradition was influenced by Kant’s
transcendental-idealistic epistemology in general, and the notion of judgment in particular. In
doing so, I open my account by focusing on how Moore’s ground-breaking notion of a
“proposition” as a mentally-independent entity emerged out of his critical reflections on Kant’s
account of judgment as a mental activity of bringing representations under the unity of
transcendental apperception. Subsequently, I present Russell as adopting this notion of a
proposition, providing a thoroughgoing analysis of it and, after discovering its philosophical
shortcomings, finally abandoning it in favour of his multiple relation theory of judgment. Based
on the detailed description of the nature and changes within Russell’s multiple relation theory,
I then attempt to disentangle Wittgenstein’s famous, oft discussed argument against it and
introduce the notion of a “proposition” from the Tractatus as Wittgenstein’s attempt at the more
appropriate theory of judgment. Eventually, I illuminate how the approaches to judgement and
proposition under consideration may all be considered particular responses to Kant’s
transcendental-idealistic epistemology, something I do by paying attention in particular to the
notions of unity of single propositions and judgments as opposed to the overall unity within the
body of all propositions or judgments.
2019-06-24T00:00:00ZDankova, ZuzanaThe aim of the thesis is to provide a fresh look at the beginning of the British analytic
tradition, represented by early G. E. Moore and B. Russell and later by a young L. Wittgenstein,
and emphasize especially the way in which this tradition was influenced by Kant’s
transcendental-idealistic epistemology in general, and the notion of judgment in particular. In
doing so, I open my account by focusing on how Moore’s ground-breaking notion of a
“proposition” as a mentally-independent entity emerged out of his critical reflections on Kant’s
account of judgment as a mental activity of bringing representations under the unity of
transcendental apperception. Subsequently, I present Russell as adopting this notion of a
proposition, providing a thoroughgoing analysis of it and, after discovering its philosophical
shortcomings, finally abandoning it in favour of his multiple relation theory of judgment. Based
on the detailed description of the nature and changes within Russell’s multiple relation theory,
I then attempt to disentangle Wittgenstein’s famous, oft discussed argument against it and
introduce the notion of a “proposition” from the Tractatus as Wittgenstein’s attempt at the more
appropriate theory of judgment. Eventually, I illuminate how the approaches to judgement and
proposition under consideration may all be considered particular responses to Kant’s
transcendental-idealistic epistemology, something I do by paying attention in particular to the
notions of unity of single propositions and judgments as opposed to the overall unity within the
body of all propositions or judgments.What justifies belief? : probability, normalcy, and the functional theory
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/17919
‘What justifies belief?’ This question is arguably one of the most important questions
in contemporary epistemology. The first part of this study looks at two very different
answers to the above question, but ultimately finds both of them wanting. According
to probabilistic accounts of justification, the property that makes a belief justified is
some property along the lines of being highly probable. I call this picture of
justification the Lockean View. In contrast, according to the most prominent non-
probabilistic accounts of justification, the property that justifies belief is some
property along the lines of being true in all normal worlds. I call this non-probabilistic
picture of justification the Normalcy View. However, as we will see, both families of
views turn out to be problematic. While probabilistic accounts are incompatible with
an attractive principle called multi premise closure (MPC), non-probabilistic
accounts, I argue, are too demanding and therefore too stingy. This leaves us in a
dilemma; neither probabilistic nor non-probabilistic accounts of justification seem to
be wholly satisfactory. I call this the (MPC)-Stinginess Dilemma.
The second part of this study is concerned with how we should respond to this
dilemma. After considering but rejecting some initial options, I argue that the dilemma
can be avoided if we reject the almost universally accepted monist assumption that
there is only one way for a belief to be justified; or, that there is only one property that
can make a belief justified. Subsequently I develop and defend a novel, pluralist,
theory of epistemic justification. I call it the Functional Theory of Justification. One
upshot of the functional theory is that it makes room for the idea that there is more
than one way for a belief to be justified; or, more precisely, that depending on our
epistemic environment, justification can be realized by different properties.
2019-06-24T00:00:00ZBackes, Marvin‘What justifies belief?’ This question is arguably one of the most important questions
in contemporary epistemology. The first part of this study looks at two very different
answers to the above question, but ultimately finds both of them wanting. According
to probabilistic accounts of justification, the property that makes a belief justified is
some property along the lines of being highly probable. I call this picture of
justification the Lockean View. In contrast, according to the most prominent non-
probabilistic accounts of justification, the property that justifies belief is some
property along the lines of being true in all normal worlds. I call this non-probabilistic
picture of justification the Normalcy View. However, as we will see, both families of
views turn out to be problematic. While probabilistic accounts are incompatible with
an attractive principle called multi premise closure (MPC), non-probabilistic
accounts, I argue, are too demanding and therefore too stingy. This leaves us in a
dilemma; neither probabilistic nor non-probabilistic accounts of justification seem to
be wholly satisfactory. I call this the (MPC)-Stinginess Dilemma.
The second part of this study is concerned with how we should respond to this
dilemma. After considering but rejecting some initial options, I argue that the dilemma
can be avoided if we reject the almost universally accepted monist assumption that
there is only one way for a belief to be justified; or, that there is only one property that
can make a belief justified. Subsequently I develop and defend a novel, pluralist,
theory of epistemic justification. I call it the Functional Theory of Justification. One
upshot of the functional theory is that it makes room for the idea that there is more
than one way for a belief to be justified; or, more precisely, that depending on our
epistemic environment, justification can be realized by different properties.An investigation into Moritz Schlick's foundationalist epistemology
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/17818
Moritz Schlick is an influential figure in the history of philosophy, but his place in the narrative is often confined to having been the man who brought great thinkers together, rather than having been a great thinker himself. In this thesis I argue that Schlick’s ideas deserve greater philosophical recognition, and to this end I focus on his work on the foundations of scientific enquiry. I trace Schlick’s thought from Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre through the prism of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico Philosophicus and into his later work on the form and content of statements. I then look at the Vienna Circle’s so-called “protocol sentences debate” and explain why Schlick felt the need to introduce his controversial account of Konstatierungen, his objective being to find epistemically-guaranteed foundations for our scientific beliefs. The problem with Schlick’s account appears to be that any statement that is epistemically secure cannot be connected appropriately to our network of scientific beliefs, which itself is never immune to revision. I argue that Schlick may have been attempting to bridge this gap with the middle-Wittgensteinian notion of the criteria for the acceptance of a statement as separate from its truth conditions, but I argue that this approach leaves the link between Konstatierungen and science underexplained. Finally, I consider some of the advances made in philosophy since Schlick’s death – Donald Davidson’s arguments against the need for individually-infallible judgements to form the foundations of knowledge, and David Chalmers’ scrutability framework which helps us explicate the connection needed between foundational statements and the system of science. I conclude that there is a viable position within the scrutability framework – “weak phenomenal structuralism” – that allows us to retain Schlick’s emphasis on the role of experience in science and implies that science, as a whole, is well-founded, but individually-guaranteed Konstatierungen must stand wholly outside this system.
2019-06-24T00:00:00ZHealey, Daniel JamesMoritz Schlick is an influential figure in the history of philosophy, but his place in the narrative is often confined to having been the man who brought great thinkers together, rather than having been a great thinker himself. In this thesis I argue that Schlick’s ideas deserve greater philosophical recognition, and to this end I focus on his work on the foundations of scientific enquiry. I trace Schlick’s thought from Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre through the prism of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico Philosophicus and into his later work on the form and content of statements. I then look at the Vienna Circle’s so-called “protocol sentences debate” and explain why Schlick felt the need to introduce his controversial account of Konstatierungen, his objective being to find epistemically-guaranteed foundations for our scientific beliefs. The problem with Schlick’s account appears to be that any statement that is epistemically secure cannot be connected appropriately to our network of scientific beliefs, which itself is never immune to revision. I argue that Schlick may have been attempting to bridge this gap with the middle-Wittgensteinian notion of the criteria for the acceptance of a statement as separate from its truth conditions, but I argue that this approach leaves the link between Konstatierungen and science underexplained. Finally, I consider some of the advances made in philosophy since Schlick’s death – Donald Davidson’s arguments against the need for individually-infallible judgements to form the foundations of knowledge, and David Chalmers’ scrutability framework which helps us explicate the connection needed between foundational statements and the system of science. I conclude that there is a viable position within the scrutability framework – “weak phenomenal structuralism” – that allows us to retain Schlick’s emphasis on the role of experience in science and implies that science, as a whole, is well-founded, but individually-guaranteed Konstatierungen must stand wholly outside this system.Why there can be a human right to internet access
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/17802
In this dissertation, I argue that it is possible to claim a standalone natural human right to internet access. The central argument is in Chapter II. I start my argument by analysing the issue of trans-historical universality of human rights. Human rights are traditionally defined as rights possessed by all human beings in all places at all times. It is claimed that if a human right to X was not possible in the past due to X having been unavailable at that past time, then — on pain of contradicting the universality of human rights — there cannot be a human right to X now, and such human right claim is invalid. If the internet as a historically contingent invention was not available in the past, then there cannot be a human right to internet access. I refute this challenge in chapter II, particularly in section 2.1 and 2.3. On this basis, I develop a framework based on the concept ‘harm’ which I call Theory Alpha (in section 2.5). I argue that Theory Alpha, with its Human Rights Generation Conditionals, provides a philosophical ground to justify human rights such as a right to internet access in a naturalistic approach. Chapter III, by reflecting on the current world, provides some reasons why a human right to internet access is possible according to Theory Alpha. Chapter IV addresses potential objections and issues regarding my Theory Alpha. Particularly, section 4.2 deals with how Theory Alpha would solve the issue concerning universality of human rights. I provide a more detailed preview of the dissertation in section 1.3. I conclude that Theory Alpha provides satisfactory answers to some important questions about human rights and supports that there can be a human right to internet access.
2019-06-24T00:00:00ZHuang, ZhengyueIn this dissertation, I argue that it is possible to claim a standalone natural human right to internet access. The central argument is in Chapter II. I start my argument by analysing the issue of trans-historical universality of human rights. Human rights are traditionally defined as rights possessed by all human beings in all places at all times. It is claimed that if a human right to X was not possible in the past due to X having been unavailable at that past time, then — on pain of contradicting the universality of human rights — there cannot be a human right to X now, and such human right claim is invalid. If the internet as a historically contingent invention was not available in the past, then there cannot be a human right to internet access. I refute this challenge in chapter II, particularly in section 2.1 and 2.3. On this basis, I develop a framework based on the concept ‘harm’ which I call Theory Alpha (in section 2.5). I argue that Theory Alpha, with its Human Rights Generation Conditionals, provides a philosophical ground to justify human rights such as a right to internet access in a naturalistic approach. Chapter III, by reflecting on the current world, provides some reasons why a human right to internet access is possible according to Theory Alpha. Chapter IV addresses potential objections and issues regarding my Theory Alpha. Particularly, section 4.2 deals with how Theory Alpha would solve the issue concerning universality of human rights. I provide a more detailed preview of the dissertation in section 1.3. I conclude that Theory Alpha provides satisfactory answers to some important questions about human rights and supports that there can be a human right to internet access.Building Belize City : autonomy, skill and mobility amongst Belizean and Central American construction workers
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/17441
This thesis ethnographically explores the connections between labour and social life among workers informally employed in the small-scale construction industry of Belize City, the major urban centre of Belize on the Caribbean coast of Central America. It is grounded in participant observation among workers native to Belize as well as those born in Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala who moved to Belize City because of civil wars starting in the 1970s, economic crises and a recent rise in gang-related crime.
The thesis first addresses how work is organized according to builders’ skills, and how skill acquisition is tied to the forms of sociality afforded by workers’ relationship to waged work. Labourers who need to generate income by moving around the city and hustling are excluded from forms of sociality which permit skilled workers to stabilize their employment. Moreover, labour is implicated in personal and social worth, as becomes clear through an examination of male workers’ status, reputations and multiple positionalities as kin.
Through ethnography both on and off the worksite, the research shows the entanglement of work, friendship and kinship ties, providing an analysis of the social, personal and economic differences these entail. The study foregrounds relationships in the lives of those born in the city as well as recently arrived migrants, while privileging subjective accounts which reveal multiple ways of experiencing the urban environment. This experience of working and living in Belize City is revealed through the future aspirations and ambitions that are conveyed through personal narratives. The thesis captures this plurality of perspectives through the idea of autonomy, a condition valued by workers which serves as a tool for understanding their circumstances at large and the relations between their work and daily life.
2018-12-07T00:00:00ZTroccoli, GiuseppeThis thesis ethnographically explores the connections between labour and social life among workers informally employed in the small-scale construction industry of Belize City, the major urban centre of Belize on the Caribbean coast of Central America. It is grounded in participant observation among workers native to Belize as well as those born in Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala who moved to Belize City because of civil wars starting in the 1970s, economic crises and a recent rise in gang-related crime.
The thesis first addresses how work is organized according to builders’ skills, and how skill acquisition is tied to the forms of sociality afforded by workers’ relationship to waged work. Labourers who need to generate income by moving around the city and hustling are excluded from forms of sociality which permit skilled workers to stabilize their employment. Moreover, labour is implicated in personal and social worth, as becomes clear through an examination of male workers’ status, reputations and multiple positionalities as kin.
Through ethnography both on and off the worksite, the research shows the entanglement of work, friendship and kinship ties, providing an analysis of the social, personal and economic differences these entail. The study foregrounds relationships in the lives of those born in the city as well as recently arrived migrants, while privileging subjective accounts which reveal multiple ways of experiencing the urban environment. This experience of working and living in Belize City is revealed through the future aspirations and ambitions that are conveyed through personal narratives. The thesis captures this plurality of perspectives through the idea of autonomy, a condition valued by workers which serves as a tool for understanding their circumstances at large and the relations between their work and daily life.Challenging political mythology : representations of the rural in post-communist Hungarian cinema
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/17429
This thesis examines the ways in which the rural functions as a site of counter-narrative in
post-communist Hungarian cinema. I argue that within the post-communist generation there
exists a number of filmmakers producing cinema, varied in style, that utilise the rural as a
space through which to challenge the multifarious political myths that have risen in the
ideological wake of communism. By scrutinising nine diverse examples of post-millennial
Hungarian cinema set in rural locations, Hungarian or otherwise, this thesis poses the
following questions: What can one learn about Hungary’s post-communist experience
through cinematic representations of the rural? How do these films complicate the prevalent
narratives of Hungary’s past and present? Who is telling these stories, and why are these
alternative narratives valuable to an understanding of contemporary Hungarian society?
Employing a cultural studies perspective, this thesis maintains that the films under analysis
respond to the specific socio-historiographical conditions of their making, contesting the
dominant political myths pertaining to post-communist life, the understanding and
application of national history and Hungary’s national self-perception within a now global,
post-communist setting. Confronting both internal and external political myths, these films
provide an alternative mode of discourse through which to better understand post-millennial
Hungary and the ongoing process of transition.
I divide my analysis into three areas of interest. First, I examine the political myths
surrounding Hungary’s return to the West, questioning how cinematic representations of the
rural challenge the mythopoeic narratives of Hungary’s capitalist assimilation. I then explore
the myths of Hungarian national history, examining the ways in which filmmakers utilise the rural to query and contest contemporary Hungarian memory politics. Finally, I examine the
consequences of post-communist political myths and the role that rural representation plays
in bringing these consequences to the fore.
2018-06-28T00:00:00ZMann, PhilipThis thesis examines the ways in which the rural functions as a site of counter-narrative in
post-communist Hungarian cinema. I argue that within the post-communist generation there
exists a number of filmmakers producing cinema, varied in style, that utilise the rural as a
space through which to challenge the multifarious political myths that have risen in the
ideological wake of communism. By scrutinising nine diverse examples of post-millennial
Hungarian cinema set in rural locations, Hungarian or otherwise, this thesis poses the
following questions: What can one learn about Hungary’s post-communist experience
through cinematic representations of the rural? How do these films complicate the prevalent
narratives of Hungary’s past and present? Who is telling these stories, and why are these
alternative narratives valuable to an understanding of contemporary Hungarian society?
Employing a cultural studies perspective, this thesis maintains that the films under analysis
respond to the specific socio-historiographical conditions of their making, contesting the
dominant political myths pertaining to post-communist life, the understanding and
application of national history and Hungary’s national self-perception within a now global,
post-communist setting. Confronting both internal and external political myths, these films
provide an alternative mode of discourse through which to better understand post-millennial
Hungary and the ongoing process of transition.
I divide my analysis into three areas of interest. First, I examine the political myths
surrounding Hungary’s return to the West, questioning how cinematic representations of the
rural challenge the mythopoeic narratives of Hungary’s capitalist assimilation. I then explore
the myths of Hungarian national history, examining the ways in which filmmakers utilise the rural to query and contest contemporary Hungarian memory politics. Finally, I examine the
consequences of post-communist political myths and the role that rural representation plays
in bringing these consequences to the fore.Andean women's oppositional filmmaking : on and off-screen practices and politics
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/17383
This thesis examines the work of three women, active in the production of oppositional cinema in the Andes in the last third of the 20th century: Beatriz Palacios, María Barea and Domitila Chungara. A focus on women’s contributions is crucial for the examination of political film practices and politics in artisanal production contexts. However, to date, the privileging of auteurist and formalist approaches in Latin American political cinema scholarship —which foreground the products over the processes— has overshadowed women’s involvement and, also, the active and creative participation of indigenous and working-class subjects. To correct this gap and to restore the emancipatory and collective dimension of these cinematic practices —consistent with the decolonial principles of Latin American Third Cinema— I focus on women’s labour in production, distribution, and exhibition. To allow for the excavation of this hidden and complex scenario, I use oral histories, personal archives, and interviews—counter-sites to the domain of state archives, cinephilic journals, and auteurist scholarship. Inscribing Palacios, Barea and Chungara’s practices and politics into official history contributes not only to recover their figures but to situate the research field of Andean political cinema in a more rigorous framework of understanding.
2019-06-24T00:00:00ZSeguí, IsabelThis thesis examines the work of three women, active in the production of oppositional cinema in the Andes in the last third of the 20th century: Beatriz Palacios, María Barea and Domitila Chungara. A focus on women’s contributions is crucial for the examination of political film practices and politics in artisanal production contexts. However, to date, the privileging of auteurist and formalist approaches in Latin American political cinema scholarship —which foreground the products over the processes— has overshadowed women’s involvement and, also, the active and creative participation of indigenous and working-class subjects. To correct this gap and to restore the emancipatory and collective dimension of these cinematic practices —consistent with the decolonial principles of Latin American Third Cinema— I focus on women’s labour in production, distribution, and exhibition. To allow for the excavation of this hidden and complex scenario, I use oral histories, personal archives, and interviews—counter-sites to the domain of state archives, cinephilic journals, and auteurist scholarship. Inscribing Palacios, Barea and Chungara’s practices and politics into official history contributes not only to recover their figures but to situate the research field of Andean political cinema in a more rigorous framework of understanding.Kantian constructivism : a restatement
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/17374
This thesis provides a restatement of Kantian constructivism, with the aim of avoiding some of the objections and clearing up some of the ambiguities that have haunted previous versions of the view. I restate Kantian constructivism as the view that morality’s normativity has its source in the form of second-personal reasoning, a mode of practical reasoning in which we engage when we address demands person-to-person.
By advancing a position about the source of moral normativity, Kantian constructivism addresses a metaethical question, albeit one that is distinct from the questions that many traditional metaethical positions, such as moral realism, focus on. Kantian constructivism has an advantage over competing views of the source of moral normativity when it comes to answering the so-called Normative Question, which I interpret as the question of why we are rationally required to do what we take to be our moral obligation. Kantian constructivism can answer this question because, unlike its competitors, it does not conceive of practical reason as a receptive faculty that is determined by external inputs. Instead, it regards the very form of second-personal reasoning as grounding the fact that morality is normative, thus explaining morality’s rational authority.
Although second-personal reasoning is fundamentally distinct from the merely first-personal mode of reasoning that we must engage in insofar as we are agents, all those agents whom we would ordinarily consider bound by moral obligations seem to engage in it. Indeed, although it involves irreducibly second-personal notions, such as accountability and the authority to address legitimate demands, second-personal reasoning is not to be mistaken for a social practice. Instead, it can be applied to purely self-regarding contexts, such as that of committing oneself to a personal project and thereby holding oneself accountable for pursuing it, as well as to interactions with others.
2019-06-24T00:00:00ZSchaab, Janis DavidThis thesis provides a restatement of Kantian constructivism, with the aim of avoiding some of the objections and clearing up some of the ambiguities that have haunted previous versions of the view. I restate Kantian constructivism as the view that morality’s normativity has its source in the form of second-personal reasoning, a mode of practical reasoning in which we engage when we address demands person-to-person.
By advancing a position about the source of moral normativity, Kantian constructivism addresses a metaethical question, albeit one that is distinct from the questions that many traditional metaethical positions, such as moral realism, focus on. Kantian constructivism has an advantage over competing views of the source of moral normativity when it comes to answering the so-called Normative Question, which I interpret as the question of why we are rationally required to do what we take to be our moral obligation. Kantian constructivism can answer this question because, unlike its competitors, it does not conceive of practical reason as a receptive faculty that is determined by external inputs. Instead, it regards the very form of second-personal reasoning as grounding the fact that morality is normative, thus explaining morality’s rational authority.
Although second-personal reasoning is fundamentally distinct from the merely first-personal mode of reasoning that we must engage in insofar as we are agents, all those agents whom we would ordinarily consider bound by moral obligations seem to engage in it. Indeed, although it involves irreducibly second-personal notions, such as accountability and the authority to address legitimate demands, second-personal reasoning is not to be mistaken for a social practice. Instead, it can be applied to purely self-regarding contexts, such as that of committing oneself to a personal project and thereby holding oneself accountable for pursuing it, as well as to interactions with others.Exclusion and reappropriation: experiences of contemporary enclosure among children in three East Anglian schools
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/17157
Transformations of the landscapes which children inhabit have significant impacts on their lives; yet, due to the limited economic visibility of children’s relationships with place, they have little stake in those transformations. Their experience, therefore, illustrates in an acute way the experience of contemporary enclosure as a mode of subordination. Following fieldwork in three primary schools in South Cambridgeshire, UK, we offer an ethnographic account of children’s experiences of socio-spatial exclusion. Yet, we suggest that such exclusion is by no means an end-point in children’s relationships with place. Challenging assumptions that children are disconnected from nature, we argue that through play and imaginative exploration of their environments, children find ways to rebuild relationships with places from which they find themselves excluded.
2016-10-01T00:00:00ZIrvine, Richard D. G.Lee, ElsaStrubel, MirandaBodenhorn, BarbaraTransformations of the landscapes which children inhabit have significant impacts on their lives; yet, due to the limited economic visibility of children’s relationships with place, they have little stake in those transformations. Their experience, therefore, illustrates in an acute way the experience of contemporary enclosure as a mode of subordination. Following fieldwork in three primary schools in South Cambridgeshire, UK, we offer an ethnographic account of children’s experiences of socio-spatial exclusion. Yet, we suggest that such exclusion is by no means an end-point in children’s relationships with place. Challenging assumptions that children are disconnected from nature, we argue that through play and imaginative exploration of their environments, children find ways to rebuild relationships with places from which they find themselves excluded.Quantifier expressions and information structure
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/17137
Linguists and philosophers of language have shown increasing interest in the expressions that refer to quantifiers: determiners like ‘every’ and ‘many’, in addition to determiner phrases like ‘some king’ and ‘no cat’. This thesis addresses several puzzles where the way we understand quantifier expressions depends on features that go beyond standard truth conditional semantic meaning.
One puzzle concerns the fact that it is often natural to understand ‘Every king is in the yard’ as being true if (say) all of the kings at the party are in the yard, even though the standard truth conditions predict it to be true if and only if every king in the universe is in the yard. Another puzzle emerges from the observation that ‘Every American king is in the yard’ sounds odd relative to contexts where there are no American kings, even though the standard truth conditions predict it to be trivially true. These puzzles have been widely discussed within linguistics and philosophy of language, and have implications for topics as diverse as the distinction between semantics and pragmatics and the ontological commitments of ordinary individuals. Yet few attempts have been made to incorporate discussions from the linguistics literature into the philosophical literature. This thesis argues that attending to the linguistics literature helps to address these puzzles. In particular, my solutions to these puzzles rely on notions from work on information structure, an often overlooked area of linguistics. I will use these notions to develop a new theory of the pragmatics of ordinary discourse, in the process of resolving the puzzles.
In the first two chapters, I provide accessible overviews of key notions from the literature on quantifier expressions and information structure. In the third chapter, I discuss the problem of contextual domain restriction. In the fourth chapter, I consider the problems posed by empty restrictors. In the final chapter, I tackle the issue of category mistakes.
2019-06-24T00:00:00ZMankowitz, PoppyLinguists and philosophers of language have shown increasing interest in the expressions that refer to quantifiers: determiners like ‘every’ and ‘many’, in addition to determiner phrases like ‘some king’ and ‘no cat’. This thesis addresses several puzzles where the way we understand quantifier expressions depends on features that go beyond standard truth conditional semantic meaning.
One puzzle concerns the fact that it is often natural to understand ‘Every king is in the yard’ as being true if (say) all of the kings at the party are in the yard, even though the standard truth conditions predict it to be true if and only if every king in the universe is in the yard. Another puzzle emerges from the observation that ‘Every American king is in the yard’ sounds odd relative to contexts where there are no American kings, even though the standard truth conditions predict it to be trivially true. These puzzles have been widely discussed within linguistics and philosophy of language, and have implications for topics as diverse as the distinction between semantics and pragmatics and the ontological commitments of ordinary individuals. Yet few attempts have been made to incorporate discussions from the linguistics literature into the philosophical literature. This thesis argues that attending to the linguistics literature helps to address these puzzles. In particular, my solutions to these puzzles rely on notions from work on information structure, an often overlooked area of linguistics. I will use these notions to develop a new theory of the pragmatics of ordinary discourse, in the process of resolving the puzzles.
In the first two chapters, I provide accessible overviews of key notions from the literature on quantifier expressions and information structure. In the third chapter, I discuss the problem of contextual domain restriction. In the fourth chapter, I consider the problems posed by empty restrictors. In the final chapter, I tackle the issue of category mistakes.Sosa on epistemic value : a Kantian obstacle
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/17082
In recent work, Sosa proposes a comprehensive account of epistemic value based on an axiology for attempts. According to this axiology, an attempt is better if it succeeds, better still if it is apt (i.e., succeeds through competence), and best if it is fully apt, (i.e., guided to aptness by apt beliefs that it would be apt). Beliefs are understood as attempts aiming at the truth. Thus, a belief is better if true, better still if apt, and best if fully apt. I raise a Kantian obstacle for Sosa's account, arguing that the quality or worth of an attempt is independent of whether it succeeds. In particular, an attempt can be fully worthy despite being a failure. I then consider whether Sosa's competence-theoretic framework provides the resources for an axiology of attempts that does not place so much weight on success. I discuss the most promising candidate, an axiology grounded in the competence of attempts, or what Sosa calls adroitness. An adroit attempt may fail. I raise doubts about whether an adroitness-based axiology can provide a plausible explanation of the worthiness of subjects' beliefs in epistemically unfortunate situations, such as the beliefs of the brain in a vat. I conclude by speculating that the notion of a belief's fit with what the subject has to go on, a notion missing from Sosa's competence-theoretic framework, is crucial to explaining epistemic worth.
2018-02-17T00:00:00ZMcGrath, MatthewIn recent work, Sosa proposes a comprehensive account of epistemic value based on an axiology for attempts. According to this axiology, an attempt is better if it succeeds, better still if it is apt (i.e., succeeds through competence), and best if it is fully apt, (i.e., guided to aptness by apt beliefs that it would be apt). Beliefs are understood as attempts aiming at the truth. Thus, a belief is better if true, better still if apt, and best if fully apt. I raise a Kantian obstacle for Sosa's account, arguing that the quality or worth of an attempt is independent of whether it succeeds. In particular, an attempt can be fully worthy despite being a failure. I then consider whether Sosa's competence-theoretic framework provides the resources for an axiology of attempts that does not place so much weight on success. I discuss the most promising candidate, an axiology grounded in the competence of attempts, or what Sosa calls adroitness. An adroit attempt may fail. I raise doubts about whether an adroitness-based axiology can provide a plausible explanation of the worthiness of subjects' beliefs in epistemically unfortunate situations, such as the beliefs of the brain in a vat. I conclude by speculating that the notion of a belief's fit with what the subject has to go on, a notion missing from Sosa's competence-theoretic framework, is crucial to explaining epistemic worth.Anthropocene East Anglia
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/16919
As we find ourselves in a geological epoch of our own making, it becomes necessary to reconsider the temporal scale of ethnographic enquiry; the effect of human behaviour is shown as a mark in deep time. Focusing on the East Anglian fenland, UK, this article considers the importance of thinking about long-term environmental change for the understanding of human life. First, the article explores the way in which human geological agency has transformed the landscape. It then goes on to argue that while the scale of such changes can only be understood against the backdrop of geological time, social life in the region nevertheless demonstrates ‘temporal lockin’, which is defined in the article as an increasing fixation with the landscape of a single point in history. The consequence of such temporal lock-in is that long-term environmental variability becomes, literally, unthinkable; yet surface-level certainties of the present are called into question when the timescale of deep history is brought into view.
2017-03-01T00:00:00ZIrvine, Richard D.G.As we find ourselves in a geological epoch of our own making, it becomes necessary to reconsider the temporal scale of ethnographic enquiry; the effect of human behaviour is shown as a mark in deep time. Focusing on the East Anglian fenland, UK, this article considers the importance of thinking about long-term environmental change for the understanding of human life. First, the article explores the way in which human geological agency has transformed the landscape. It then goes on to argue that while the scale of such changes can only be understood against the backdrop of geological time, social life in the region nevertheless demonstrates ‘temporal lockin’, which is defined in the article as an increasing fixation with the landscape of a single point in history. The consequence of such temporal lock-in is that long-term environmental variability becomes, literally, unthinkable; yet surface-level certainties of the present are called into question when the timescale of deep history is brought into view.Curating film history : film museums and archives in the age of new media
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/16894
As analogue film approaches obsolescence and new modes of engaging with moving images through digital media displace traditional cinema-going practices, film archives and museums acquire increasing prominence in the cultural scene. These institutions preserve audiovisual works, apparatuses and techniques from the past, exhibiting them as artefacts and records of a cinematic time before the “digital turn.” While media and art scholars have addressed the appearance of film, video and digital media artworks in the contemporary art museum, insufficient attention has been dedicated to film museums as sites of moving-image exhibition and historical mediation. This study explores the work of film archivists and curators, with particular attention to the exhibition of early and silent films through different media, institutional settings and
historical narratives, shaping contemporary audience’s interpretation. This research examines three institutions—the EYE Filmmuseum (EYE) in Amsterdam, the George Eastman Museum (GEM) in Rochester, NY and the National Fairground Archive (NFA) in Sheffield (UK)—that have recently experimented with innovative film exhibition practices, advancing compelling new models of film curatorship. Through archival research, historical analysis and interviews with curators, this study focuses not just on present curatorial work at these archives, but also on their institutional histories and shifting understanding of moving-image historicity. The EYE, the GEM and the NFA represent three alternative curatorial strategies, respectively exhibiting early and silent films through practices of “crowd-curatorship,” “fine art
curatorship” and “modern cine-variety pastiche,” mediating between these archival records and new media cultures. The present research advances a double contribution. On one hand, it proposes a more refined theoretical framework to understand film curatorship within the context of contemporary film historiographical debates. On the other, it provides film museums with a critical analysis of alternative exhibition strategies, highlighting the cultural politics at play within the historical interpretation and exhibition of archival films.
2017-05-11T00:00:00ZIngravalle, GraziaAs analogue film approaches obsolescence and new modes of engaging with moving images through digital media displace traditional cinema-going practices, film archives and museums acquire increasing prominence in the cultural scene. These institutions preserve audiovisual works, apparatuses and techniques from the past, exhibiting them as artefacts and records of a cinematic time before the “digital turn.” While media and art scholars have addressed the appearance of film, video and digital media artworks in the contemporary art museum, insufficient attention has been dedicated to film museums as sites of moving-image exhibition and historical mediation. This study explores the work of film archivists and curators, with particular attention to the exhibition of early and silent films through different media, institutional settings and
historical narratives, shaping contemporary audience’s interpretation. This research examines three institutions—the EYE Filmmuseum (EYE) in Amsterdam, the George Eastman Museum (GEM) in Rochester, NY and the National Fairground Archive (NFA) in Sheffield (UK)—that have recently experimented with innovative film exhibition practices, advancing compelling new models of film curatorship. Through archival research, historical analysis and interviews with curators, this study focuses not just on present curatorial work at these archives, but also on their institutional histories and shifting understanding of moving-image historicity. The EYE, the GEM and the NFA represent three alternative curatorial strategies, respectively exhibiting early and silent films through practices of “crowd-curatorship,” “fine art
curatorship” and “modern cine-variety pastiche,” mediating between these archival records and new media cultures. The present research advances a double contribution. On one hand, it proposes a more refined theoretical framework to understand film curatorship within the context of contemporary film historiographical debates. On the other, it provides film museums with a critical analysis of alternative exhibition strategies, highlighting the cultural politics at play within the historical interpretation and exhibition of archival films.Is Weak Supplementation analytic?
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/16818
Mereological principles are often controversial; perhaps the most stark contrast is between those who claim that Weak Supplementation is analytic—constitutive of our notion of proper parthood—and those who argue that the principle is simply false, and subject to many counterexamples. The aim of this paper is to diagnose the source of this dispute. I’ll suggest that the dispute has arisen by participants failing to be sensitive to two different conceptions of proper parthood: the outstripping conception and the non-identity conception. I’ll argue that the outstripping conception (together with a specific set of definitions for other mereological notions), can deliver the analyticity of Weak Supplementation on at least one sense of ‘analyticity’. I’ll also suggest that the non-identity conception cannot do so independently of considerations to do with mereological extensionality.
The research and writing of this paper was supported in part by a 2017-2018 Leverhulme Research Fellowship from the Leverhulme Trust.
2021-08-01T00:00:00ZCotnoir, AaronMereological principles are often controversial; perhaps the most stark contrast is between those who claim that Weak Supplementation is analytic—constitutive of our notion of proper parthood—and those who argue that the principle is simply false, and subject to many counterexamples. The aim of this paper is to diagnose the source of this dispute. I’ll suggest that the dispute has arisen by participants failing to be sensitive to two different conceptions of proper parthood: the outstripping conception and the non-identity conception. I’ll argue that the outstripping conception (together with a specific set of definitions for other mereological notions), can deliver the analyticity of Weak Supplementation on at least one sense of ‘analyticity’. I’ll also suggest that the non-identity conception cannot do so independently of considerations to do with mereological extensionality.Refugee law and states' obligations
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/16743
The current legal definition of the term ‘refugee’ fails to recognise the centrality of refugees’ hardship and in doing so draws morally arbitrary distinctions between different types of refugees. I use Wiggins’ 1987 paper to give us reason to think that hardship ought to be central to morality. From here I make hardship the core of a modified legal definition of the term ‘refugee’. Then I explore moral obligations that states have to refugees in virtue of their hardship. First, I ask whom states are obligated to and show that the only morally relevant distinguishing feature between refugees is the ‘level’ of hardship they experience. Second, I ask what kinds of moral and legal obligations states have to refugees. I argue that states’ moral obligations to ‘give refuge’ are perfect duties and that states’ legal obligations differ for different types of refugees.
2016-06-23T00:00:00ZWalker, JessicaThe current legal definition of the term ‘refugee’ fails to recognise the centrality of refugees’ hardship and in doing so draws morally arbitrary distinctions between different types of refugees. I use Wiggins’ 1987 paper to give us reason to think that hardship ought to be central to morality. From here I make hardship the core of a modified legal definition of the term ‘refugee’. Then I explore moral obligations that states have to refugees in virtue of their hardship. First, I ask whom states are obligated to and show that the only morally relevant distinguishing feature between refugees is the ‘level’ of hardship they experience. Second, I ask what kinds of moral and legal obligations states have to refugees. I argue that states’ moral obligations to ‘give refuge’ are perfect duties and that states’ legal obligations differ for different types of refugees.Personal identity and practical reason
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/16607
In this thesis, I argue that the interdependence between personal identity and practical concerns is overstated. In paradigmatic places where philosophers and common sense suggest that personal identity constrains how we should reason and care, or vice versa, the two spheres are in fact neutral to each other. I defend this claim by considering four specific cases. First, a rough characterization of the distinction between the complex and the simple view is that the former takes personal identity to consist in other relations, whereas the latter does not. I argue that the extreme claim according to which the complex view fails to give reasons for future-directed concern can be resisted. We maintain forward-looking attitudes and projects not because someone will be us, but because we relate to future selves in other, more important ways. Second, I argue that intuitions in a range of popular imaginary cases are contaminated by practical concerns whose relevance for personal identity is far from straightforward. Third, I argue that on a closer look, the complex versus simple distinction is confused. It thus cannot be what grounds differences in judgements on what matters. Debates about personal identity should be framed in terms of better understood notions. Finally, I argue that it is not a constraint on rational transformative choice that decision-maker and transforming individual are identical. Moreover, whether we are deciding for ourselves or for others - the importance of informed consent for transformative treatments is not diminished by the decision-maker's failure to projectively imagine the outcomes.
2018-06-28T00:00:00ZHummel, Patrik AlexanderIn this thesis, I argue that the interdependence between personal identity and practical concerns is overstated. In paradigmatic places where philosophers and common sense suggest that personal identity constrains how we should reason and care, or vice versa, the two spheres are in fact neutral to each other. I defend this claim by considering four specific cases. First, a rough characterization of the distinction between the complex and the simple view is that the former takes personal identity to consist in other relations, whereas the latter does not. I argue that the extreme claim according to which the complex view fails to give reasons for future-directed concern can be resisted. We maintain forward-looking attitudes and projects not because someone will be us, but because we relate to future selves in other, more important ways. Second, I argue that intuitions in a range of popular imaginary cases are contaminated by practical concerns whose relevance for personal identity is far from straightforward. Third, I argue that on a closer look, the complex versus simple distinction is confused. It thus cannot be what grounds differences in judgements on what matters. Debates about personal identity should be framed in terms of better understood notions. Finally, I argue that it is not a constraint on rational transformative choice that decision-maker and transforming individual are identical. Moreover, whether we are deciding for ourselves or for others - the importance of informed consent for transformative treatments is not diminished by the decision-maker's failure to projectively imagine the outcomes.Authenticity, performance and the construction of self : a journey through the terrestrial and digital landscapes of men's tailored dress
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/16576
This thesis explores high-end and bespoke menswear, tailoring and fashion, asking the question - why do some men choose to spend large sums of money to have clothes made for them? Using tailors and high-end menswear as a lens, this thesis unpacks how men construct their notion of self in the digital and terrestrial worlds through the clothes that they wear and the identities they perform. Based on twelve months’ terrestrial fieldwork in London and twenty-four months’ concurrent digital fieldwork with Instagram, this thesis examines notions of dress, performance and the individual across a multi-dimensional fieldsite set within a blended digital and terrestrial landscape. The fieldwork comprised visiting and interviewing tailors, and observing inside their workshops and at their fashion shows. In addition, the analyst-as-client built relationships with tailors, and constructed a digital self within Instagram through the publication of self-portraits and images of clothing.
This thesis is presented in four chapters, flanked by an Introduction and Conclusion. These chapters move from an exploration of terrestrial research in the first two, to an analysis of digital research in the latter two. Five major motifs emerge in this thesis: the importance of the anthropology of clothing and adornment within western society; the nature of the individual in a digitised world; the difficulty in conducting western-centric fieldwork without an element of digital analysis; a methodological restructuring of digital anthropology; and the idea that a digital self can acquire agency. This thesis employs a pioneering blended methodology which brings together the fields of digital anthropology, visual anthropology and material culture to question how selves are constructed in a rapidly changing and increasingly digitised modernity. In conclusion, the thesis argues that individuals construct multiple digital selves and a sense of identity (around the notion of ‘authentic individualism’) that is illusory.
2018-12-07T00:00:00ZBluteau, Joshua MaxThis thesis explores high-end and bespoke menswear, tailoring and fashion, asking the question - why do some men choose to spend large sums of money to have clothes made for them? Using tailors and high-end menswear as a lens, this thesis unpacks how men construct their notion of self in the digital and terrestrial worlds through the clothes that they wear and the identities they perform. Based on twelve months’ terrestrial fieldwork in London and twenty-four months’ concurrent digital fieldwork with Instagram, this thesis examines notions of dress, performance and the individual across a multi-dimensional fieldsite set within a blended digital and terrestrial landscape. The fieldwork comprised visiting and interviewing tailors, and observing inside their workshops and at their fashion shows. In addition, the analyst-as-client built relationships with tailors, and constructed a digital self within Instagram through the publication of self-portraits and images of clothing.
This thesis is presented in four chapters, flanked by an Introduction and Conclusion. These chapters move from an exploration of terrestrial research in the first two, to an analysis of digital research in the latter two. Five major motifs emerge in this thesis: the importance of the anthropology of clothing and adornment within western society; the nature of the individual in a digitised world; the difficulty in conducting western-centric fieldwork without an element of digital analysis; a methodological restructuring of digital anthropology; and the idea that a digital self can acquire agency. This thesis employs a pioneering blended methodology which brings together the fields of digital anthropology, visual anthropology and material culture to question how selves are constructed in a rapidly changing and increasingly digitised modernity. In conclusion, the thesis argues that individuals construct multiple digital selves and a sense of identity (around the notion of ‘authentic individualism’) that is illusory.Invariance and intensionality : new perspectives on logicality
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/16573
What are logical notions? According to a very popular proposal, a logical notion is something invariant under some “transformation” of objects, usually permutations or isomorphisms. The first chapter is about extending “invariance” accounts of logicality to intensional notions, by asking for invariance under arbitrary permutations of both possible worlds and objects. I discuss the results one gets in this extended theory of invariance, and how to fix many technical issues.
The second chapter is about setting out a better theory of logicality. I discuss the limits of invariance frameworks, and the need for a theory of logicality with a more solid philosophical ground. I believe that the concept of information can play a major role in defining what logic is and what logical notions are. I spell out this intuition, by designing a new test for logicality. A notion is logical iff it behaves in a certain way, by checking only “structural aspects of information”, and it does so under arbitrary transformations of its “informational inputs”.
In the last chapter I explore some interesting features of my theory. I show how, contrary to standard invariance, in mine logical notions tend to stay persistent across different models of information. I also spell out an intermediate notion of quasi-logicality to make sense of the formality of “world-sensitive” notions: notions whose behaviour changes across worlds. I finally propose a case study: deontic modals. I discuss how one can argue for their quasi-logicality, in my framework. The dissertation is concluded with a technical appendix, in which I prove that my theory is a restriction of standard permutation invariance (at least for a class of items) when we model the space of information in a certain way: as a set of complete powersets of some sets.
2018-12-07T00:00:00ZGrossi, MarcoWhat are logical notions? According to a very popular proposal, a logical notion is something invariant under some “transformation” of objects, usually permutations or isomorphisms. The first chapter is about extending “invariance” accounts of logicality to intensional notions, by asking for invariance under arbitrary permutations of both possible worlds and objects. I discuss the results one gets in this extended theory of invariance, and how to fix many technical issues.
The second chapter is about setting out a better theory of logicality. I discuss the limits of invariance frameworks, and the need for a theory of logicality with a more solid philosophical ground. I believe that the concept of information can play a major role in defining what logic is and what logical notions are. I spell out this intuition, by designing a new test for logicality. A notion is logical iff it behaves in a certain way, by checking only “structural aspects of information”, and it does so under arbitrary transformations of its “informational inputs”.
In the last chapter I explore some interesting features of my theory. I show how, contrary to standard invariance, in mine logical notions tend to stay persistent across different models of information. I also spell out an intermediate notion of quasi-logicality to make sense of the formality of “world-sensitive” notions: notions whose behaviour changes across worlds. I finally propose a case study: deontic modals. I discuss how one can argue for their quasi-logicality, in my framework. The dissertation is concluded with a technical appendix, in which I prove that my theory is a restriction of standard permutation invariance (at least for a class of items) when we model the space of information in a certain way: as a set of complete powersets of some sets.The dual nature of causation : two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/16561
In this dissertation, I propose a reductive account of causation. This account may be stated as follows:
Causation: 𝘤 is a cause of 𝘦 within a possibility horizon ℋ iff
a) 𝘤 is process-connected to 𝘦, and
b) 𝘦 security-depends on 𝘤 within ℋ.
More precisely, my suggestion is that there are two kinds of causal relata: instantaneous events (defined in Chapter 4) and possibility horizons (defined in Chapter 5). Causation is a ternary relation between two actual instantaneous events – the cause 𝘤 and the effect 𝘦 – and a possibility horizon ℋ.
I argue that causation has a dual nature: on the one hand, a cause must be connected to its effect via a genuine process; on the other hand, a cause must make a difference to its effect.
The first condition – namely, the condition of process-connection (defined in Chapter 6) – captures the sense in which a cause must be connected to its effect via a genuine process. This condition allows my account to separate causation from mere correlation, distinguish genuine causes from preempted backups, and capture how a cause must be at the right level of detail relative to its effect (Chapter 7).
The second condition – namely, the condition of security-dependence (defined in Chapter 8) – captures the sense in which a cause must make a difference to its effect. This condition allows my account to yield intuitively correct verdicts on the counterexamples to the transitivity and intrinsicness of causation, resolve the problem of profligate omissions, accommodate structurally isomorphic but causally different cases, and handle contrastive causal claims (Chapter 9 and 10).
Finally, my proposed account of causation logically entails restricted versions of three important principles of causal reasoning concerning the sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation, and the transitivity and intrinsicness of causation (Chapter 11).
2018-06-28T00:00:00ZTouborg, Caroline TorpeIn this dissertation, I propose a reductive account of causation. This account may be stated as follows:
Causation: 𝘤 is a cause of 𝘦 within a possibility horizon ℋ iff
a) 𝘤 is process-connected to 𝘦, and
b) 𝘦 security-depends on 𝘤 within ℋ.
More precisely, my suggestion is that there are two kinds of causal relata: instantaneous events (defined in Chapter 4) and possibility horizons (defined in Chapter 5). Causation is a ternary relation between two actual instantaneous events – the cause 𝘤 and the effect 𝘦 – and a possibility horizon ℋ.
I argue that causation has a dual nature: on the one hand, a cause must be connected to its effect via a genuine process; on the other hand, a cause must make a difference to its effect.
The first condition – namely, the condition of process-connection (defined in Chapter 6) – captures the sense in which a cause must be connected to its effect via a genuine process. This condition allows my account to separate causation from mere correlation, distinguish genuine causes from preempted backups, and capture how a cause must be at the right level of detail relative to its effect (Chapter 7).
The second condition – namely, the condition of security-dependence (defined in Chapter 8) – captures the sense in which a cause must make a difference to its effect. This condition allows my account to yield intuitively correct verdicts on the counterexamples to the transitivity and intrinsicness of causation, resolve the problem of profligate omissions, accommodate structurally isomorphic but causally different cases, and handle contrastive causal claims (Chapter 9 and 10).
Finally, my proposed account of causation logically entails restricted versions of three important principles of causal reasoning concerning the sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation, and the transitivity and intrinsicness of causation (Chapter 11).The power and the glory : belief, sacramentality and native Andean Catholic priests in Talavera, Peru
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/16549
In Talavera, a small town in the rural south-central Peruvian Andes, Catholicism is deeply rooted in local institutions, society and history. I explore Talaveran Catholicism primarily through the eyes of the priests and the core parish community, and in doing so seek to contribute to the anthropology of Christianity, including the anthropology of Catholicism, and the anthropology of the Andes. Engaging with dominant models in the anthropology of Christianity of Christianity as a religion of conversion and radical discontinuity, I argue that in Talavera, such models no longer ring true for local Catholics: instead, Christian conversion is long forgotten and taken for granted, while Christianity is an important source of continuity with the past. This is related to the activities of the current generation of Catholic priests in Talavera, who are locally native and who by and large tend to be more sympathetic to local Andean Catholic traditions as a result—but without subscribing to dominant anthropological framings for pro-Andean sentiment. Instead, I draw on David Brown’s formulation of Christian tradition to argue for a new anthropological model views the ‘syncretic’ aspects of Andean Catholicism as simply part of Catholicism in general. Following the emphasis on incorporating theology, I subsequently argue that we need to take seriously Catholic notions of sacramentality as an ontological transformation—a theme throughout the majority of the thesis. I argue that sacramentality underlies how Catholic priests can be simultaneously divine and human through the sacrament of ordination; structures clerical-lay relations in Catholic parishes by creating the space for lay assistants to carry out the work of priests without becoming priests themselves; and causes membership of the Catholic Church, thereby leaving belief to carry out the work of improving, rather than effecting, one’s Catholic-ness.
2018-12-07T00:00:00ZLee, Christine Shen-ChirngIn Talavera, a small town in the rural south-central Peruvian Andes, Catholicism is deeply rooted in local institutions, society and history. I explore Talaveran Catholicism primarily through the eyes of the priests and the core parish community, and in doing so seek to contribute to the anthropology of Christianity, including the anthropology of Catholicism, and the anthropology of the Andes. Engaging with dominant models in the anthropology of Christianity of Christianity as a religion of conversion and radical discontinuity, I argue that in Talavera, such models no longer ring true for local Catholics: instead, Christian conversion is long forgotten and taken for granted, while Christianity is an important source of continuity with the past. This is related to the activities of the current generation of Catholic priests in Talavera, who are locally native and who by and large tend to be more sympathetic to local Andean Catholic traditions as a result—but without subscribing to dominant anthropological framings for pro-Andean sentiment. Instead, I draw on David Brown’s formulation of Christian tradition to argue for a new anthropological model views the ‘syncretic’ aspects of Andean Catholicism as simply part of Catholicism in general. Following the emphasis on incorporating theology, I subsequently argue that we need to take seriously Catholic notions of sacramentality as an ontological transformation—a theme throughout the majority of the thesis. I argue that sacramentality underlies how Catholic priests can be simultaneously divine and human through the sacrament of ordination; structures clerical-lay relations in Catholic parishes by creating the space for lay assistants to carry out the work of priests without becoming priests themselves; and causes membership of the Catholic Church, thereby leaving belief to carry out the work of improving, rather than effecting, one’s Catholic-ness.Human predation and animal sociality : the transformational agency of ‘wolf people’ in Mongolia
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/16520
This chapter examines the recent proliferation of ‘wolf people’ following the advent of the Mongolian gold rush. By analysing ethnographic and historical material on the position of wolves in Mongolian cosmology, I demonstrate how these beings call into question the relationship between animality and humanity. Concealed in human bodies and destined to a solitary life of greed, ‘wolf people’ challenge the human potential for peaceful and productive living. Demonstrating the importance of moving away from a human-centred perspective on morality, I argue that relations between humans and animals reveal how personhood is a matter of persuasion.
2016-11-14T00:00:00ZHigh, Mette M.This chapter examines the recent proliferation of ‘wolf people’ following the advent of the Mongolian gold rush. By analysing ethnographic and historical material on the position of wolves in Mongolian cosmology, I demonstrate how these beings call into question the relationship between animality and humanity. Concealed in human bodies and destined to a solitary life of greed, ‘wolf people’ challenge the human potential for peaceful and productive living. Demonstrating the importance of moving away from a human-centred perspective on morality, I argue that relations between humans and animals reveal how personhood is a matter of persuasion.An edition of two 15th-century treatises on universals
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/16486
An edition of William Milverley's 'Universalia Magistri Guilhelmi Milverleii' in Latin with a parallel English translation, together with an edition of John Tarteys' 'Universalia Magistri Johannis Tarteys'.
1974-01-01T00:00:00ZDeahl, Julian GeorgeAn edition of William Milverley's 'Universalia Magistri Guilhelmi Milverleii' in Latin with a parallel English translation, together with an edition of John Tarteys' 'Universalia Magistri Johannis Tarteys'.How natural is a unified notion of time? Temporal experience in early Greek thought
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/16428
2017-05-10T00:00:00ZSattler, Barbara MichaelaMaking renting right : ethics of economy in the Edinburgh private rented sector
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/16294
Recent decades have seen a shift in Scotland in terms of the provision of housing and housing-related services from the public sector to the private sector. In statistical terms, the proportion of Scottish households in the private rented sector has doubled during the past ten years.
This thesis unpacks anthropologically the private rented sector as a locally-found concept in Edinburgh, largely through the medium of ‘property management’, another locally-found concept. Key questions concern how the private rented sector in Edinburgh is ‘managed’ at the vernacular level, how the ethics of property management take shape in Edinburgh in the context of this ongoing shift from the public to the private sectors, and how the property relations within the sector relate to existing debates in economic anthropology. The primary ethnographic material, based upon fieldwork in 2014 and 2015, is of an Edinburgh letting agency as archetypal property managers, though other material either was produced in conjunction with Shelter Scotland or stemmed from the tracing of further connections within the field. Engaging with the broader anthropology of ethics, a core conclusion is that processes of property management rest ultimately upon practices of ethics that take place at the ‘ordinary’ level.
A parallel aim is to consider how anthropologists might produce ethnography of an economic ‘sector’, such as the private rented sector. Borrowing from Actor-Network Theory, I propose occupying a range of different vantage points in a given economic sector within a socially defined locale, such as the city, by following the connections encountered in the field, and then by allowing actors to perform both the social and the economic by tracing their associations through the production of the ethnographic text.
2018-06-28T00:00:00ZBridgman, Benjamin JohnRecent decades have seen a shift in Scotland in terms of the provision of housing and housing-related services from the public sector to the private sector. In statistical terms, the proportion of Scottish households in the private rented sector has doubled during the past ten years.
This thesis unpacks anthropologically the private rented sector as a locally-found concept in Edinburgh, largely through the medium of ‘property management’, another locally-found concept. Key questions concern how the private rented sector in Edinburgh is ‘managed’ at the vernacular level, how the ethics of property management take shape in Edinburgh in the context of this ongoing shift from the public to the private sectors, and how the property relations within the sector relate to existing debates in economic anthropology. The primary ethnographic material, based upon fieldwork in 2014 and 2015, is of an Edinburgh letting agency as archetypal property managers, though other material either was produced in conjunction with Shelter Scotland or stemmed from the tracing of further connections within the field. Engaging with the broader anthropology of ethics, a core conclusion is that processes of property management rest ultimately upon practices of ethics that take place at the ‘ordinary’ level.
A parallel aim is to consider how anthropologists might produce ethnography of an economic ‘sector’, such as the private rented sector. Borrowing from Actor-Network Theory, I propose occupying a range of different vantage points in a given economic sector within a socially defined locale, such as the city, by following the connections encountered in the field, and then by allowing actors to perform both the social and the economic by tracing their associations through the production of the ethnographic text.Indigenous routes : interfluves and interpreters in the upper Tapajós river (c. 1750 to c. 1950)
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/16099
This thesis is an ethnographic account of the indigenous history and colonization of the upper Tapajós river in Brazil. Research was conducted using archival materials in which I searched for the different conceptualizations of river movements and routes, of either Indians or colonizers. During the period of penetration in the region called “Mundurucânica”, several native groups living in the savannah and at the riverbanks, started to be used as a labour-force, but above all, they worked as interpreters thereby enabling colonization on these Amazonian rivers around the Tapajós. If, on one hand, native groups were violated by colonization, on the other, they have shaped and influenced the penetration, demonstrating their active involvement in this
historical process. With the arrival of Franciscan priests and the ultimate establishment of the Cururu Mission, exchanges between indigenous people and colonizers became impregnated with mythical fragments. These relations of displacements and encounters between indigenous groups—that in turn influenced colonization efforts—with local cultural values and practices is still a relatively little explored topic in anthropology. This thesis synthesises the history of the colonization of a region of the Brazilian Amazonian rainforest from the point of view of its indigenous inhabitants. It considers the pacification of the Indians in the 18th and 19th
centuries, presenting ethnographic material of the indigenous groups that have moved into the Tapajós region and examines their social logic of interethnic contact. I analyze fragments of material culture, myths and naming such as they appear in the
literature so as to track down the spatial dynamics of indigenous Amazonia and its landscape transformations.
2018-12-07T00:00:00ZBelik, DanielThis thesis is an ethnographic account of the indigenous history and colonization of the upper Tapajós river in Brazil. Research was conducted using archival materials in which I searched for the different conceptualizations of river movements and routes, of either Indians or colonizers. During the period of penetration in the region called “Mundurucânica”, several native groups living in the savannah and at the riverbanks, started to be used as a labour-force, but above all, they worked as interpreters thereby enabling colonization on these Amazonian rivers around the Tapajós. If, on one hand, native groups were violated by colonization, on the other, they have shaped and influenced the penetration, demonstrating their active involvement in this
historical process. With the arrival of Franciscan priests and the ultimate establishment of the Cururu Mission, exchanges between indigenous people and colonizers became impregnated with mythical fragments. These relations of displacements and encounters between indigenous groups—that in turn influenced colonization efforts—with local cultural values and practices is still a relatively little explored topic in anthropology. This thesis synthesises the history of the colonization of a region of the Brazilian Amazonian rainforest from the point of view of its indigenous inhabitants. It considers the pacification of the Indians in the 18th and 19th
centuries, presenting ethnographic material of the indigenous groups that have moved into the Tapajós region and examines their social logic of interethnic contact. I analyze fragments of material culture, myths and naming such as they appear in the
literature so as to track down the spatial dynamics of indigenous Amazonia and its landscape transformations.The semantic error problem for epistemic contextualism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/16059
2017-03-22T00:00:00ZGreenough, Patrick MichaelKindermann, DirkKeep it tight : family, learning and social transformation in New Mexico, United States
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/16008
This dissertation examines learning as part of social transformation in a semi-rural town in New Mexico, United States. It incorporates a focus on young people through direct work with children and observations in school and argues that each person’s understanding is historically emergent from what sense they make of the events of their personal history as this unfolds over time in intersubjective relations with others. This has implications for the ways in which Hispano/a and Latino/a people living in “Bosque Verde” make sense of concepts like respect, hard work and obligation, as well as how they think about family and children’s wellbeing.
The ways in which people experience and understand getting older and their movements from child to adult/parent and from parent to grandparent/elder are central to this process of making sense. As people age, what they know to be true transforms, as does how they perceive the effects of social change. For people living in Bosque Verde, this includes both the experience of contemporary social and economic shifts in New Mexico and the United States, as well as how people there have made sense of social marginalisation over the past century and back into the more distant past.
Parents and elders manifest historical consciousness of these transformations in part through their concerns for children and their vulnerability in an insecure and unequal world. Children, however, constitute their own ideas about family, hard work, care and respect in ways that potentially transform their meaning, as well as the possibilities of their own futures. This thesis therefore describes ‘keeping it tight’ in Bosque Verde as a microhistorical process that shapes how people understand and experience social relationships over the lifetime. This process, in turn, influences how people living there make sense of the past and imagine the future for themselves and others.
2018-12-07T00:00:00ZHurst, Elizabeth MaryThis dissertation examines learning as part of social transformation in a semi-rural town in New Mexico, United States. It incorporates a focus on young people through direct work with children and observations in school and argues that each person’s understanding is historically emergent from what sense they make of the events of their personal history as this unfolds over time in intersubjective relations with others. This has implications for the ways in which Hispano/a and Latino/a people living in “Bosque Verde” make sense of concepts like respect, hard work and obligation, as well as how they think about family and children’s wellbeing.
The ways in which people experience and understand getting older and their movements from child to adult/parent and from parent to grandparent/elder are central to this process of making sense. As people age, what they know to be true transforms, as does how they perceive the effects of social change. For people living in Bosque Verde, this includes both the experience of contemporary social and economic shifts in New Mexico and the United States, as well as how people there have made sense of social marginalisation over the past century and back into the more distant past.
Parents and elders manifest historical consciousness of these transformations in part through their concerns for children and their vulnerability in an insecure and unequal world. Children, however, constitute their own ideas about family, hard work, care and respect in ways that potentially transform their meaning, as well as the possibilities of their own futures. This thesis therefore describes ‘keeping it tight’ in Bosque Verde as a microhistorical process that shapes how people understand and experience social relationships over the lifetime. This process, in turn, influences how people living there make sense of the past and imagine the future for themselves and others.In-between worlds : exploring trauma through fantasy
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/16004
While fantasy as a genre is often dismissed as frivolous and inappropriate, it is highly relevant in representing and working through trauma. The fantasy genre presents spectators with images of the unsettled and unresolved, taking them on a journey through a world in which the familiar is rendered unfamiliar. It positions itself as an in-between, while the consequential disturbance of recognized world orders lends this genre to relating stories of trauma themselves characterized by hauntings, disputed memories, and irresolution. Through an examination of films from around the world and their depictions of individual and collective traumas through the fantastic, this thesis outlines how fantasy succeeds in representing and challenging histories of violence, silence, and irresolution. Further, it also examines how the genre itself is transformed in relating stories that are not yet resolved. While analysing the modes in which the fantasy genre mediates and intercedes trauma narratives, this research contributes to a wider recognition of an understudied and underestimated genre, as well as to discourses on how trauma is narrated and negotiated.
2018-01-01T00:00:00ZShields, AmberWhile fantasy as a genre is often dismissed as frivolous and inappropriate, it is highly relevant in representing and working through trauma. The fantasy genre presents spectators with images of the unsettled and unresolved, taking them on a journey through a world in which the familiar is rendered unfamiliar. It positions itself as an in-between, while the consequential disturbance of recognized world orders lends this genre to relating stories of trauma themselves characterized by hauntings, disputed memories, and irresolution. Through an examination of films from around the world and their depictions of individual and collective traumas through the fantastic, this thesis outlines how fantasy succeeds in representing and challenging histories of violence, silence, and irresolution. Further, it also examines how the genre itself is transformed in relating stories that are not yet resolved. While analysing the modes in which the fantasy genre mediates and intercedes trauma narratives, this research contributes to a wider recognition of an understudied and underestimated genre, as well as to discourses on how trauma is narrated and negotiated.Counting the Particles : Entity and Identity in the Philosophy of Physics
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15988
I would like to attack a certain view: The view that the concept of identity can fail to apply to some things although, for some positive integer n, we have n of them. The idea of entities without self-identity is seriously entertained in the philosophy of quantum mechanics (QM). It is so pervasive that it has been labelled the Received View (French and Krause 2006. Identity in Physics: A Historical, Philosophical, and Formal Analysis. Oxford: Oxford UP: 105). I introduce the Received View in Section 1. In Section 2 I explain what I mean by entity (synonymously, by object and thing), and I argue that supporters of the Received View should agree with my characterization of the corresponding notion of entity (object, thing). I also explain what I mean by identity, and I show that supporters of the Received View agree with my characterization of that notion. In Section 3 I argue that the concept of identity, so characterized, is one with the concept of oneness. Thus, it cannot but apply to what belongs to a collection with n elements, n being a positive integer. In Section 4 I add some considerations on the primitiveness of identity or unity and the status of the Identity of Indiscernibles. In Section 5 I address the problem of how reference to indiscernible objects with identity can be achieved.
2017-04-01T00:00:00ZBerto, FrancescoI would like to attack a certain view: The view that the concept of identity can fail to apply to some things although, for some positive integer n, we have n of them. The idea of entities without self-identity is seriously entertained in the philosophy of quantum mechanics (QM). It is so pervasive that it has been labelled the Received View (French and Krause 2006. Identity in Physics: A Historical, Philosophical, and Formal Analysis. Oxford: Oxford UP: 105). I introduce the Received View in Section 1. In Section 2 I explain what I mean by entity (synonymously, by object and thing), and I argue that supporters of the Received View should agree with my characterization of the corresponding notion of entity (object, thing). I also explain what I mean by identity, and I show that supporters of the Received View agree with my characterization of that notion. In Section 3 I argue that the concept of identity, so characterized, is one with the concept of oneness. Thus, it cannot but apply to what belongs to a collection with n elements, n being a positive integer. In Section 4 I add some considerations on the primitiveness of identity or unity and the status of the Identity of Indiscernibles. In Section 5 I address the problem of how reference to indiscernible objects with identity can be achieved.There’s plenty of Boole at the bottom : a reversible CA against information entropy
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15960
“There’s Plenty of Room at the Bottom”, said the title of Richard Feynman’s 1959 seminal conference at the California Institute of Technology. Fifty years on, nanotechnologies have led computer scientists to pay close attention to the links between physical reality and information processing. Not all the physical requirements of optimal computation are captured by traditional models—one still largely missing is reversibility. The dynamic laws of physics are reversible at microphysical level, distinct initial states of a system leading to distinct final states. On the other hand, as von Neumann already conjectured, irreversible information processing is expensive: to erase a single bit of information costs ~3 × 10−21 joules at room temperature. Information entropy is a thermodynamic cost, to be paid in non-computational energy dissipation. This paper addresses the problem drawing on Edward Fredkin’s Finite Nature hypothesis: the ultimate nature of the universe is discrete and finite, satisfying the axioms of classical, atomistic mereology. The chosen model is a cellular automaton (CA) with reversible dynamics, capable of retaining memory of the information present at the beginning of the universe. Such a CA can implement the Boolean logical operations and the other building bricks of computation: it can develop and host all-purpose computers. The model is a candidate for the realization of computational systems, capable of exploiting the resources of the physical world in an efficient way, for they can host logical circuits with negligible internal energy dissipation.
2016-12-01T00:00:00ZBerto, FrancescoTagliabue, JacopoRossi, Gabriele“There’s Plenty of Room at the Bottom”, said the title of Richard Feynman’s 1959 seminal conference at the California Institute of Technology. Fifty years on, nanotechnologies have led computer scientists to pay close attention to the links between physical reality and information processing. Not all the physical requirements of optimal computation are captured by traditional models—one still largely missing is reversibility. The dynamic laws of physics are reversible at microphysical level, distinct initial states of a system leading to distinct final states. On the other hand, as von Neumann already conjectured, irreversible information processing is expensive: to erase a single bit of information costs ~3 × 10−21 joules at room temperature. Information entropy is a thermodynamic cost, to be paid in non-computational energy dissipation. This paper addresses the problem drawing on Edward Fredkin’s Finite Nature hypothesis: the ultimate nature of the universe is discrete and finite, satisfying the axioms of classical, atomistic mereology. The chosen model is a cellular automaton (CA) with reversible dynamics, capable of retaining memory of the information present at the beginning of the universe. Such a CA can implement the Boolean logical operations and the other building bricks of computation: it can develop and host all-purpose computers. The model is a candidate for the realization of computational systems, capable of exploiting the resources of the physical world in an efficient way, for they can host logical circuits with negligible internal energy dissipation.Simple hyperintensional belief revision
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15955
I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional belief revision operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting similar operators in doxastic and epistemic logics, as well as in standard AGM belief revision theory. (Revised) belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; revising by inconsistent information does not perforce lead to trivialization; and revision can be subject to ‘framing effects’: logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. Such results are obtained without resorting to non-classical logics, or to non-normal or impossible worlds semantics. The framework combines, instead, a standard semantics for propositional S5 with a simple mereology of contents.
2018-02-05T00:00:00ZBerto, F.I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional belief revision operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting similar operators in doxastic and epistemic logics, as well as in standard AGM belief revision theory. (Revised) belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; revising by inconsistent information does not perforce lead to trivialization; and revision can be subject to ‘framing effects’: logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. Such results are obtained without resorting to non-classical logics, or to non-normal or impossible worlds semantics. The framework combines, instead, a standard semantics for propositional S5 with a simple mereology of contents.Conceivability and possibility : some dilemmas for Humeans
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15953
The Humean view that conceivability entails possibility can be criticized via input from cognitive psychology. A mainstream view here has it that there are two candidate codings for mental representations (one of them being, according to some, reducible to the other): the linguistic and the pictorial, the difference between the two consisting in the degree of arbitrariness of the representation relation. If the conceivability of P at issue for Humeans involves the having of a linguistic mental representation, then it is easy to show that we can conceive the impossible, for impossibilities can be represented by meaningful bits of language. If the conceivability of P amounts to the pictorial imaginability of a situation verifying P, then the question is whether the imagination at issue works purely qualitatively, that is, only by phenomenological resemblance with the imagined scenario. If so, the range of situations imaginable in this way is too limited to have a significant role in modal epistemology. If not, imagination will involve some arbitrary labeling component, which turns out to be sufficient for imagining the impossible. And if the relevant imagination is neither linguistic nor pictorial, Humeans will appear to resort to some representational magic, until they come up with a theory of a ‘third code’ for mental representations.
This research is published within the Project ‘The Logic of Conceivability’, funded by the European Research Council (ERC CoG), Grant Number 681404.
2018-06-01T00:00:00ZBerto, FrancescoSchoonen, TomThe Humean view that conceivability entails possibility can be criticized via input from cognitive psychology. A mainstream view here has it that there are two candidate codings for mental representations (one of them being, according to some, reducible to the other): the linguistic and the pictorial, the difference between the two consisting in the degree of arbitrariness of the representation relation. If the conceivability of P at issue for Humeans involves the having of a linguistic mental representation, then it is easy to show that we can conceive the impossible, for impossibilities can be represented by meaningful bits of language. If the conceivability of P amounts to the pictorial imaginability of a situation verifying P, then the question is whether the imagination at issue works purely qualitatively, that is, only by phenomenological resemblance with the imagined scenario. If so, the range of situations imaginable in this way is too limited to have a significant role in modal epistemology. If not, imagination will involve some arbitrary labeling component, which turns out to be sufficient for imagining the impossible. And if the relevant imagination is neither linguistic nor pictorial, Humeans will appear to resort to some representational magic, until they come up with a theory of a ‘third code’ for mental representations.Taming the runabout imagination ticket
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15952
The ‘puzzle of imaginative use’ (Kind and Kung in Knowledge through imagination, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016) asks: given that imagination is arbitrary escape from reality, how can it have any epistemic value? In particular, imagination seems to be logically anarchic, like a runabout inference ticket: one who imagines A may also imagine whatever B pops to one’s mind by free mental association. This paper argues that at least a certain kind of imaginative exercise—reality-oriented mental simulation—is not logically anarchic. Showing this is part of the task of solving the puzzle. Six plausible features of imagination, so understood, are listed. Then a formal semantics is provided, whose patterns of logical validity and invalidity model the six features.
This research is published within the project ‘The Logic of Conceivability’, funded by the European Research Council (ERC CoG), Grant Number 681404.
2018-03-13T00:00:00ZBerto, FrancescoThe ‘puzzle of imaginative use’ (Kind and Kung in Knowledge through imagination, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016) asks: given that imagination is arbitrary escape from reality, how can it have any epistemic value? In particular, imagination seems to be logically anarchic, like a runabout inference ticket: one who imagines A may also imagine whatever B pops to one’s mind by free mental association. This paper argues that at least a certain kind of imaginative exercise—reality-oriented mental simulation—is not logically anarchic. Showing this is part of the task of solving the puzzle. Six plausible features of imagination, so understood, are listed. Then a formal semantics is provided, whose patterns of logical validity and invalidity model the six features.Truth in fiction, impossible worlds, and belief revision
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15951
We present a theory of truth in fiction that improves on Lewis's [1978] ‘Analysis 2’ in two ways. First, we expand Lewis's possible worlds apparatus by adding non-normal or impossible worlds. Second, we model truth in fiction as (make-believed) belief revision via ideas from dynamic epistemic logic. We explain the major objections raised against Lewis's original view and show that our theory overcomes them.
Franz Berto’s research was funded by the European Research Council (ERC CoG), Consolidator grant no. 681404, ‘The Logic of Conceivability’. Christopher Badura’s research was funded by the Ruhr University Research School PLUS, funded by Germany’s Excellence Initiative [DFG GSC 98/3].
2018-02-27T00:00:00ZBadura, ChristopherBerto, FrancescoWe present a theory of truth in fiction that improves on Lewis's [1978] ‘Analysis 2’ in two ways. First, we expand Lewis's possible worlds apparatus by adding non-normal or impossible worlds. Second, we model truth in fiction as (make-believed) belief revision via ideas from dynamic epistemic logic. We explain the major objections raised against Lewis's original view and show that our theory overcomes them.A pluralistic solution to the relationalism versus representationalism debate
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15877
A great deal of philosophy of perception literature has been concerned with determining the fundamental philosophical account of perception. The overwhelming majority of contemporary work in this area has advocated for either a relational view of perception (broadly known as relationalism) or a representational view of perception (broadly known as representationalism). Each of these views is argued by its proponents to constitute the fundamental philosophical account of perception. These arguments are often framed in a manner suggesting that relationalism and representationalism are incompatible with one another on the grounds that if one theory explains all that we would like a philosophical theory of perception to explain, then the other theory is at best screened off as explanatorily redundant. This is known as a screening off argument, and has been utilised by both sides of the relationalism versus representationalism debate. The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that both the utilisation of this argument in the philosophy of perception, as well as the explanatory methodology underpinning this utilisation, are misguided. This is accomplished by proposing instead that a methodology called explanatory pluralism, which holds that the best explanation of a given phenomenon is determined by what it is about that phenomenon one wishes to understand, should be applied to the debate in question. Once this plausible methodology is applied, I argue, instances that appeared to settle the relationalism versus representationalism debate decisively in favour of one view or the other instead become instances that shape the contours of a view according to which relationalism and representationalism are in fact compatible. I identify and argue for such instances, using them to support the conclusion that relationalism and representationalism are complementary explanations of perception and are, therefore, compatible.
2018-12-07T00:00:00ZBlack, Paul AndrewA great deal of philosophy of perception literature has been concerned with determining the fundamental philosophical account of perception. The overwhelming majority of contemporary work in this area has advocated for either a relational view of perception (broadly known as relationalism) or a representational view of perception (broadly known as representationalism). Each of these views is argued by its proponents to constitute the fundamental philosophical account of perception. These arguments are often framed in a manner suggesting that relationalism and representationalism are incompatible with one another on the grounds that if one theory explains all that we would like a philosophical theory of perception to explain, then the other theory is at best screened off as explanatorily redundant. This is known as a screening off argument, and has been utilised by both sides of the relationalism versus representationalism debate. The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that both the utilisation of this argument in the philosophy of perception, as well as the explanatory methodology underpinning this utilisation, are misguided. This is accomplished by proposing instead that a methodology called explanatory pluralism, which holds that the best explanation of a given phenomenon is determined by what it is about that phenomenon one wishes to understand, should be applied to the debate in question. Once this plausible methodology is applied, I argue, instances that appeared to settle the relationalism versus representationalism debate decisively in favour of one view or the other instead become instances that shape the contours of a view according to which relationalism and representationalism are in fact compatible. I identify and argue for such instances, using them to support the conclusion that relationalism and representationalism are complementary explanations of perception and are, therefore, compatible.Normalcy, justification, and the easy-defeat problem
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15846
Recent years have seen the rise of a new family of non-probabilistic accounts of epistemic justification. According to these views—we may call them Normalcy Views—a belief in P is justified only if, given the evidence, there exists no normal world in which S falsely beliefs that P. This paper aims to raise some trouble for this new approach to justification by arguing that Normalcy Views, while initially attractive, give rise to problematic accounts of epistemic defeat. As we will see, on Normalcy Views seemingly insignificant pieces of evidence turn out to have considerable defeating powers. This problem—I will call it the Easy-Defeat Problem—gives rise to a two-pronged challenge. First, it shows that the Normalcy View has counterintuitive implications and, second, it opens the door to an uncomfortable skeptical threat.
2018-08-20T00:00:00ZBackes, MarvinRecent years have seen the rise of a new family of non-probabilistic accounts of epistemic justification. According to these views—we may call them Normalcy Views—a belief in P is justified only if, given the evidence, there exists no normal world in which S falsely beliefs that P. This paper aims to raise some trouble for this new approach to justification by arguing that Normalcy Views, while initially attractive, give rise to problematic accounts of epistemic defeat. As we will see, on Normalcy Views seemingly insignificant pieces of evidence turn out to have considerable defeating powers. This problem—I will call it the Easy-Defeat Problem—gives rise to a two-pronged challenge. First, it shows that the Normalcy View has counterintuitive implications and, second, it opens the door to an uncomfortable skeptical threat.Comments on Brian Epstein's The Ant Trap
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15806
The Ant Trap is a terrific book, which opens up new opportunities to use philosophical methods in the social realm, by drawing on the tools and techniques of contemporary metaphysics. Epstein uses concepts of dependence, constitution, and grounding, of parts and whole, of membership and kindhood, both to clarify existing accounts of social reality and to develop an account of his own. Whilst I admire the general strategy, I take issue with some aspects of Epstein’s implementation, notably his distinction between grounding and anchoring. I recommend that he give up this distinction, which is not crucial to his project.
2017-02-13T00:00:00ZHawley, KatherineThe Ant Trap is a terrific book, which opens up new opportunities to use philosophical methods in the social realm, by drawing on the tools and techniques of contemporary metaphysics. Epstein uses concepts of dependence, constitution, and grounding, of parts and whole, of membership and kindhood, both to clarify existing accounts of social reality and to develop an account of his own. Whilst I admire the general strategy, I take issue with some aspects of Epstein’s implementation, notably his distinction between grounding and anchoring. I recommend that he give up this distinction, which is not crucial to his project.Mapping constellations : early cinema in the Balkans, archives and cultural memory
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15687
Is cinema ‘the most modern, technologically dependent and Western of all the arts’ (1995) as David Parkinson seems to suggest? My thesis addresses and problematizes this often evoked misconception on the art of cinema, with the aim to offset, or if not slightly shift, the dominant perspective through which early cinema history is observed, by positing the analysis through Balkan “haptical lenses”, and tracing regional cultural traditions that pre-date first cinema projections. This study examines the specific geopolitical position of the Balkan space at the beginning of twentieth century and the multi-cultural identity of the communities that influence and shape the development of cinema in the region, through the contemporary prism of archives, preservation and cultural memory. The intermingling, contamination and fusion of artistic traditions from East and West resulted in a unique regional visual culture, to which, at the end of the nineteenth century, the arrival of cinema added yet another layer of expression.
In the first part of the thesis I outline the theoretical framework and historical context of the region,
and provide a close analysis of visual culture in its relation to the haptic. The second part focuses on
the concepts of Balkanism, semi-colonialism and the gaze, which it addresses through an analysis of
selected footage and images, produced by both foreign companies and local filmmakers, throughout
the region. The third part is a study of local cinema pioneers, within the context of global filmmaking
at the time, through the advent of modernity and self-reflection. Finally, a close reading of texts from
newspapers, journals and books at the time provides the basis for an exploration of the arrival of
cinema in the Balkans and its reception by local audiences.
By building on phenomenological theory and visual culture in the Balkans and transnational studies,
as well as combining theoretical and empirical evidence from both fields, this thesis establishes a
strong theoretical and historical basis that can inform further research on film reception studies and
embodied vision.
2016-01-01T00:00:00ZGrgić, AnaIs cinema ‘the most modern, technologically dependent and Western of all the arts’ (1995) as David Parkinson seems to suggest? My thesis addresses and problematizes this often evoked misconception on the art of cinema, with the aim to offset, or if not slightly shift, the dominant perspective through which early cinema history is observed, by positing the analysis through Balkan “haptical lenses”, and tracing regional cultural traditions that pre-date first cinema projections. This study examines the specific geopolitical position of the Balkan space at the beginning of twentieth century and the multi-cultural identity of the communities that influence and shape the development of cinema in the region, through the contemporary prism of archives, preservation and cultural memory. The intermingling, contamination and fusion of artistic traditions from East and West resulted in a unique regional visual culture, to which, at the end of the nineteenth century, the arrival of cinema added yet another layer of expression.
In the first part of the thesis I outline the theoretical framework and historical context of the region,
and provide a close analysis of visual culture in its relation to the haptic. The second part focuses on
the concepts of Balkanism, semi-colonialism and the gaze, which it addresses through an analysis of
selected footage and images, produced by both foreign companies and local filmmakers, throughout
the region. The third part is a study of local cinema pioneers, within the context of global filmmaking
at the time, through the advent of modernity and self-reflection. Finally, a close reading of texts from
newspapers, journals and books at the time provides the basis for an exploration of the arrival of
cinema in the Balkans and its reception by local audiences.
By building on phenomenological theory and visual culture in the Balkans and transnational studies,
as well as combining theoretical and empirical evidence from both fields, this thesis establishes a
strong theoretical and historical basis that can inform further research on film reception studies and
embodied vision.Title redacted
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15677
2016-01-01T00:00:00ZRandall, Leonard AveryEssentialism in Aristotle, Kripke and Fine : differences in explanatory purposes
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15633
In this dissertation I compare the different forms of essentialism that we find in Aristotle, Saul Kripke and Kit Fine. I argue that there is a clear difference in explanatory purpose between Aristotle’s essentialism on the one side and Kripke’s and Fine’s essentialism on the other, while the last two have closely connected explanatory purposes. Aristotle’s essentialism is mainly concerned with questions of substance, in particular in what sense essences are substances. In contrast, Kripke’s ‘modal essentialism’ and Fine’s ‘definitional essentialism’, as I dub them, are both primarily concerned with questions of modality, in particular where metaphysical necessity has its place or source. Both associate metaphysical necessity closely with essence, though in different ways. While Fine claims (implicitly) that his essentialism is broadly Aristotelian in spirit, I argue that there are substantial differences between them, in particular with respect to their conceptions of real definition and related notions. And it is exactly the difference in explanatory purpose between fine’s and Aristotle’s essentialism that explains these substantial differences. I show how closely Fine’s and Kripke’s essentialism are connected, despite clear differences with respect to their conceptions of essential properties; and further where and why Aristotle’s essentialism differs from Kripke’s and Fine’s essentialism with respect to the kinds of properties that count as essential (apart from differences in that respect between Kripke and Fine). I further argue for a systematic (though imperfect correspondence between the kinds of properties of individuals considered to be essential in Kripke and Fine, and certain kinds of causal relations in the broad Aristotelian sense. I conclude that there is good reason to hold, that Aristotle’s essentialism has basically a different subject matter than Kripke’s and Fine’s essentialism, contrary to a widespread assumption. And I identify several issues for future research to complete my comparison.
2017-01-01T00:00:00ZSattler, WolfgangIn this dissertation I compare the different forms of essentialism that we find in Aristotle, Saul Kripke and Kit Fine. I argue that there is a clear difference in explanatory purpose between Aristotle’s essentialism on the one side and Kripke’s and Fine’s essentialism on the other, while the last two have closely connected explanatory purposes. Aristotle’s essentialism is mainly concerned with questions of substance, in particular in what sense essences are substances. In contrast, Kripke’s ‘modal essentialism’ and Fine’s ‘definitional essentialism’, as I dub them, are both primarily concerned with questions of modality, in particular where metaphysical necessity has its place or source. Both associate metaphysical necessity closely with essence, though in different ways. While Fine claims (implicitly) that his essentialism is broadly Aristotelian in spirit, I argue that there are substantial differences between them, in particular with respect to their conceptions of real definition and related notions. And it is exactly the difference in explanatory purpose between fine’s and Aristotle’s essentialism that explains these substantial differences. I show how closely Fine’s and Kripke’s essentialism are connected, despite clear differences with respect to their conceptions of essential properties; and further where and why Aristotle’s essentialism differs from Kripke’s and Fine’s essentialism with respect to the kinds of properties that count as essential (apart from differences in that respect between Kripke and Fine). I further argue for a systematic (though imperfect correspondence between the kinds of properties of individuals considered to be essential in Kripke and Fine, and certain kinds of causal relations in the broad Aristotelian sense. I conclude that there is good reason to hold, that Aristotle’s essentialism has basically a different subject matter than Kripke’s and Fine’s essentialism, contrary to a widespread assumption. And I identify several issues for future research to complete my comparison.'Homeawayness' : experiencing moments of home among Chinese labour migrants
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15594
Migration is a major feature of contemporary human life, while making home is
ubiquitous. Being away from home creates a space for a migrant to rethink home and to
make a home beyond something fixed, spatial, and material. This thesis concerns home
and home making in the world of movement. It aims to investigate the ways in which
labour migrants make home on their journey away from home, a home through which
they express and fulfil themselves while making sense of the world.
Based on fieldwork in the Chaoshan region in South China, I approach individual
migrants from two practices of migration that have affected the region in the last 150
years: the historical international Nanyang (Southeast Asia) migration (1860s to 1970s)
and the contemporary internal rural-urban migration (1980s to present). Specifically, my
fieldwork includes participant observation through working in a toy factory with migrant
workers and living together with them for a year, as well as some months of archival
research of remittance family letters (qiaopi) in a local archive.
To study these two different strands of Chinese migration is not aimed primarily at
comparing or contrasting them; rather it is an attempt to explore the universal human
capacity to make home in a variety of ways beyond socio-cultural or historical constraint.
I argue that one experiences and makes sense of home in moments of being, while
making home, making self (and vice versa) is a continual process. One is constantly in a
process of self-negotiation, oscillating between identities that are being imposed and self-
recognised, between one’s reality and one’s imagination, between one’s past and one’s
future, and between one’s rootedness and one’s cosmopolitan openness.
I conclude the thesis by proposing five keywords for studying home-in-movement:
homeawayness, moments of being, interiority, cosmopolitan imagination, and walking
knowledge.
2018-01-01T00:00:00ZChen, ShuhuaMigration is a major feature of contemporary human life, while making home is
ubiquitous. Being away from home creates a space for a migrant to rethink home and to
make a home beyond something fixed, spatial, and material. This thesis concerns home
and home making in the world of movement. It aims to investigate the ways in which
labour migrants make home on their journey away from home, a home through which
they express and fulfil themselves while making sense of the world.
Based on fieldwork in the Chaoshan region in South China, I approach individual
migrants from two practices of migration that have affected the region in the last 150
years: the historical international Nanyang (Southeast Asia) migration (1860s to 1970s)
and the contemporary internal rural-urban migration (1980s to present). Specifically, my
fieldwork includes participant observation through working in a toy factory with migrant
workers and living together with them for a year, as well as some months of archival
research of remittance family letters (qiaopi) in a local archive.
To study these two different strands of Chinese migration is not aimed primarily at
comparing or contrasting them; rather it is an attempt to explore the universal human
capacity to make home in a variety of ways beyond socio-cultural or historical constraint.
I argue that one experiences and makes sense of home in moments of being, while
making home, making self (and vice versa) is a continual process. One is constantly in a
process of self-negotiation, oscillating between identities that are being imposed and self-
recognised, between one’s reality and one’s imagination, between one’s past and one’s
future, and between one’s rootedness and one’s cosmopolitan openness.
I conclude the thesis by proposing five keywords for studying home-in-movement:
homeawayness, moments of being, interiority, cosmopolitan imagination, and walking
knowledge.Not-the-Troubles : an anthropological analysis of stories of quotidian life in Belfast
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15591
To understand the complexity of life in a city one needs to consider a spectrum of
experience. Belfast has a history of conflict and division, particularly in relation to the
Troubles, reflected in comprehensive academic studies of how this has affected, and
continues to affect, the citizens. But this is a particular mode of representation, a
vision of life echoed in fictional literature. People’s quotidian lives can and do
transcend the grand narratives of the Troubles that have come to dominate these
discourses. Anthropology has traditionally accorded less epistemological weight to
fleeting and superficial encounters with strangers, but this mode of sociality is a
central feature of life in the city. The modern stranger navigates these relationships
with relative ease. Communicating with others through narrative – personal stories
about our lives – is fundamental to what it is to be human, putting storytelling at the
heart of anthropological study. Engagements with strangers may be brief encounters
or build into acquaintanceship, but these superficial relationships are not trivial. How
we interact with strangers – our public presentation of the self to others through the
personal stories we share – can give glimpses into the private lives of individuals.
Listening to stories of quotidian life in Belfast demonstrates a range of people’s
existential dilemmas and joys that challenges Troubled representations of life in the
city. The complexity, size and anonymity of the city means the anthropologist needs
different ways of reaching people; this thesis is as much about exploring certain
anthropological methodologies as it is about people and a place. Through methods
of walking, performance, human-animal interactions, my body as a research subject,
and using fictional literature as ethnographic data, I interrogate the close
relationship between method, data and analysis, and of knowledge-production and
knowledge-dissemination. I present quotidian narratives of Belfast’s citizens that are
Not-the-Troubles.
2018-01-01T00:00:00ZLane, KarenTo understand the complexity of life in a city one needs to consider a spectrum of
experience. Belfast has a history of conflict and division, particularly in relation to the
Troubles, reflected in comprehensive academic studies of how this has affected, and
continues to affect, the citizens. But this is a particular mode of representation, a
vision of life echoed in fictional literature. People’s quotidian lives can and do
transcend the grand narratives of the Troubles that have come to dominate these
discourses. Anthropology has traditionally accorded less epistemological weight to
fleeting and superficial encounters with strangers, but this mode of sociality is a
central feature of life in the city. The modern stranger navigates these relationships
with relative ease. Communicating with others through narrative – personal stories
about our lives – is fundamental to what it is to be human, putting storytelling at the
heart of anthropological study. Engagements with strangers may be brief encounters
or build into acquaintanceship, but these superficial relationships are not trivial. How
we interact with strangers – our public presentation of the self to others through the
personal stories we share – can give glimpses into the private lives of individuals.
Listening to stories of quotidian life in Belfast demonstrates a range of people’s
existential dilemmas and joys that challenges Troubled representations of life in the
city. The complexity, size and anonymity of the city means the anthropologist needs
different ways of reaching people; this thesis is as much about exploring certain
anthropological methodologies as it is about people and a place. Through methods
of walking, performance, human-animal interactions, my body as a research subject,
and using fictional literature as ethnographic data, I interrogate the close
relationship between method, data and analysis, and of knowledge-production and
knowledge-dissemination. I present quotidian narratives of Belfast’s citizens that are
Not-the-Troubles.Bailando bajo la lluvia : dancing amongst Mexicanos and Mexican Americans in Northern California
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15587
This thesis is a study of dancing and dancing events amongst Mexicanos and Mexican Americans in northern California. The study posits that dancing can be approached as a broader form of activity which encompasses a variety of individual dance styles. In adopting this approach, the aim is to move the understanding of dancing away from a practice set apart from the everyday and used principally as a tool and site fo4r the construction and maintenance of identification, dancing instead emerges as an activity threaded through the everyday in a variety of forms, an activity in which practitioners engage for many varied and overlapping reasons throughout the course of their lives.
Three principal themes are explored in the work. The first addresses the practitioners’ understanding of dancing and highlights the place of movement, music, and ‘sentir la música/el ritmo’ in this. This understanding is revealed to be flexible, multiple, and shifting, the result of attunement and responsiveness as the practitioners interacted with one another and the world around then, the second themes addresses learning and points to the presence of two different by interconnected experiences of dance enskilment, ‘learning to dance’ and ‘just dancing’. These are principally differentiated through the intent of the practitioners but are further differentiated through the understanding and sensory experience of the learning, the subject of enskilment and the value this is given, and dynamics between the practitioners. The third theme looks at dancing and dancing events as a relational process and explores the variety of relations, both those experienced as ‘positive’ and those as ‘negative’, that practitioners foster and articulate within dancing and how the explore a range of concrete activity before, during, and after dancing events to do so. Together these themes p-provide and understanding of dancing as a broader activity and process that complements work which focuses on individual dance forms and specific issues related to these
2018-01-01T00:00:00ZLoney, MargaretThis thesis is a study of dancing and dancing events amongst Mexicanos and Mexican Americans in northern California. The study posits that dancing can be approached as a broader form of activity which encompasses a variety of individual dance styles. In adopting this approach, the aim is to move the understanding of dancing away from a practice set apart from the everyday and used principally as a tool and site fo4r the construction and maintenance of identification, dancing instead emerges as an activity threaded through the everyday in a variety of forms, an activity in which practitioners engage for many varied and overlapping reasons throughout the course of their lives.
Three principal themes are explored in the work. The first addresses the practitioners’ understanding of dancing and highlights the place of movement, music, and ‘sentir la música/el ritmo’ in this. This understanding is revealed to be flexible, multiple, and shifting, the result of attunement and responsiveness as the practitioners interacted with one another and the world around then, the second themes addresses learning and points to the presence of two different by interconnected experiences of dance enskilment, ‘learning to dance’ and ‘just dancing’. These are principally differentiated through the intent of the practitioners but are further differentiated through the understanding and sensory experience of the learning, the subject of enskilment and the value this is given, and dynamics between the practitioners. The third theme looks at dancing and dancing events as a relational process and explores the variety of relations, both those experienced as ‘positive’ and those as ‘negative’, that practitioners foster and articulate within dancing and how the explore a range of concrete activity before, during, and after dancing events to do so. Together these themes p-provide and understanding of dancing as a broader activity and process that complements work which focuses on individual dance forms and specific issues related to theseTaking meaning out of context : essays on the foundations of natural language semantics
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15555
David Lewis articulated minimal constraints on a formal theory of natural language
semantics that have been widely adopted by subsequent theorists: compositionality
and sentence truth in a given context. In the process, Lewis distinguished between the
compositional semantic value of an expression and its propositional content relative
to a context. This dissertation consists of a series of essays in which I address several
questions that arise from this distinction, including how we should understand semantic
values, how we should understand propositional content, and how we should understand
the relation between them.
Related to this, I explore and address a number of interesting and unresolved
methodological issues that arise in relation to context-sensitivity, and provide an
account of the role of speaker intentions in a formal theory of natural language
semantics. Additionally, I provide a detailed analysis of the role of context in a theory
of natural language semantics and its connection to various aspects of language use and
communication. I also motivate coherence with syntactic structure (in the tradition of
generative grammar) as an additional constraint on a formal theory of natural language
semantics and assess its import for how we theorize about tense and modality and
issues related to the syntax-semantics interface, including covert structure and logical
form.
In broad strokes, this dissertation addresses issues concerning the aims, scope and
criteria of a theory of natural language semantics. I approach these issues from the
perspective of generative grammar, a theoretical framework that aims to characterize
our understanding of natural language independent of its use. These essays help to
clarify what should be expected of a formal theory of natural language semantics and
its contribution to theories of speech acts and communication.
2018-01-01T00:00:00ZCameron, Matthew DunbarDavid Lewis articulated minimal constraints on a formal theory of natural language
semantics that have been widely adopted by subsequent theorists: compositionality
and sentence truth in a given context. In the process, Lewis distinguished between the
compositional semantic value of an expression and its propositional content relative
to a context. This dissertation consists of a series of essays in which I address several
questions that arise from this distinction, including how we should understand semantic
values, how we should understand propositional content, and how we should understand
the relation between them.
Related to this, I explore and address a number of interesting and unresolved
methodological issues that arise in relation to context-sensitivity, and provide an
account of the role of speaker intentions in a formal theory of natural language
semantics. Additionally, I provide a detailed analysis of the role of context in a theory
of natural language semantics and its connection to various aspects of language use and
communication. I also motivate coherence with syntactic structure (in the tradition of
generative grammar) as an additional constraint on a formal theory of natural language
semantics and assess its import for how we theorize about tense and modality and
issues related to the syntax-semantics interface, including covert structure and logical
form.
In broad strokes, this dissertation addresses issues concerning the aims, scope and
criteria of a theory of natural language semantics. I approach these issues from the
perspective of generative grammar, a theoretical framework that aims to characterize
our understanding of natural language independent of its use. These essays help to
clarify what should be expected of a formal theory of natural language semantics and
its contribution to theories of speech acts and communication.Kant's concept of the good
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15554
This dissertation asks what Kant means when he talks about the good, and what role this concept plays in his ethical theory. It is divided into three chapters. The first examines the context in which this question was first asked, namely in a review of Kant’s ‘Groundwork’ by H. A. Pistorius. I analyse this review and Kant’s direct response to it in his ‘Critique of Practical Reason’, where he clarifies that the good is the “necessary object of the faculty of desire” and that it can only be determined “after and by means of” the moral law. I argue that traditional law-first and good-first readings of these passages both fail, and that instead we should prefer Stephen Engstrom’s reading which takes the food as an a priori concept of practical reason, whose content is determined by the moral law. The remaining chapters investigate this view, and specifically the strong guise of the good thesis to which it commits Kant. In the second I clarify the guise of the good and the specific version of it to which Engstrom’s view is committed, which is one that holds all willing to aim at satisfying a condition of universal validity. I argue that self-conceit and despondency are two notions from Kant’s psychology which provide a model for how non-moral willing can aim at universal validity. In the third chapter, I use this general framework to try and explain specific cases of non-moral willing. Ii find that the framework can adequately explain away diabolical willing as mere evil willing. It can also deal with frailty, though this requires departure from Engstrom’s and Reath’s views and the introduction of ‘persistent illusion’. It has the same trouble dealing with listlessness that all Kantian views do. I conclude that Engstrom’s view of the good is viable.
2018-01-01T00:00:00ZTonissen, Bas Ben MartienSnedegar, JustinThis dissertation asks what Kant means when he talks about the good, and what role this concept plays in his ethical theory. It is divided into three chapters. The first examines the context in which this question was first asked, namely in a review of Kant’s ‘Groundwork’ by H. A. Pistorius. I analyse this review and Kant’s direct response to it in his ‘Critique of Practical Reason’, where he clarifies that the good is the “necessary object of the faculty of desire” and that it can only be determined “after and by means of” the moral law. I argue that traditional law-first and good-first readings of these passages both fail, and that instead we should prefer Stephen Engstrom’s reading which takes the food as an a priori concept of practical reason, whose content is determined by the moral law. The remaining chapters investigate this view, and specifically the strong guise of the good thesis to which it commits Kant. In the second I clarify the guise of the good and the specific version of it to which Engstrom’s view is committed, which is one that holds all willing to aim at satisfying a condition of universal validity. I argue that self-conceit and despondency are two notions from Kant’s psychology which provide a model for how non-moral willing can aim at universal validity. In the third chapter, I use this general framework to try and explain specific cases of non-moral willing. Ii find that the framework can adequately explain away diabolical willing as mere evil willing. It can also deal with frailty, though this requires departure from Engstrom’s and Reath’s views and the introduction of ‘persistent illusion’. It has the same trouble dealing with listlessness that all Kantian views do. I conclude that Engstrom’s view of the good is viable."Los toros guapos" : "good-looking bulls", animal life, ethics and professional know-how on an Andalusian bull-breeding estate
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15550
This thesis take the form of an ethnographic exploration of a bull-breeding estate called
Partido de Resina (formerly Pablo Romero) in the countryside near Seville in Andalusia.
The estate, founded in 1885, produces fighting bulls for taurine events in Southern France,
Spain and Portugal. At the heart of the thesis is the life cycle of the fighting animals, every
chapter being anchored to a particular point in the bull-breeding calendar and the lives of
the stock. Each chapter draws out specific qualities of the world of the bulls from the
perspective of Partido de Resina, rooting the bulls and their people in a wider Spanish and
Andalusian landscape and history, with a focus on technical know-how and everyday
ethics after the 2008 financial crisis. The professionals who care for the Partido de Resina
bulls, cows, and calves are the human protagonists of this project; their working routines,
hopes, concerns, and stories described through their interactions with the animals which
they look after.
The core anthropological argument in the thesis is to show how different ethnographically
salient forms of life emerge on and around the estate, sometimes weighted towards
individual animals, sometimes towards bits of taurine bodies, or breeds, types, lineages,
cohorts, and other groupings of stock. The varied, dynamic presence of animal life is
contextualised in the literature of the 'animal turn' in anthropology, which has drawn non-
human life into the ethnographic foreground. A case is made for a nuanced and contextual
ethnographic attention to animal life and interiority as it emerges in the field, without an a
priori emphasis on animal personhood or subjectivity. In foregrounding the qualities and
concerns encountered and worked through during both routine livestock maintenance and
extraordinary, definitive events like bullfights, the emergent, multiple character of taurine
forms of existence become apparent.
2018-01-01T00:00:00ZIrvine, RobinThis thesis take the form of an ethnographic exploration of a bull-breeding estate called
Partido de Resina (formerly Pablo Romero) in the countryside near Seville in Andalusia.
The estate, founded in 1885, produces fighting bulls for taurine events in Southern France,
Spain and Portugal. At the heart of the thesis is the life cycle of the fighting animals, every
chapter being anchored to a particular point in the bull-breeding calendar and the lives of
the stock. Each chapter draws out specific qualities of the world of the bulls from the
perspective of Partido de Resina, rooting the bulls and their people in a wider Spanish and
Andalusian landscape and history, with a focus on technical know-how and everyday
ethics after the 2008 financial crisis. The professionals who care for the Partido de Resina
bulls, cows, and calves are the human protagonists of this project; their working routines,
hopes, concerns, and stories described through their interactions with the animals which
they look after.
The core anthropological argument in the thesis is to show how different ethnographically
salient forms of life emerge on and around the estate, sometimes weighted towards
individual animals, sometimes towards bits of taurine bodies, or breeds, types, lineages,
cohorts, and other groupings of stock. The varied, dynamic presence of animal life is
contextualised in the literature of the 'animal turn' in anthropology, which has drawn non-
human life into the ethnographic foreground. A case is made for a nuanced and contextual
ethnographic attention to animal life and interiority as it emerges in the field, without an a
priori emphasis on animal personhood or subjectivity. In foregrounding the qualities and
concerns encountered and worked through during both routine livestock maintenance and
extraordinary, definitive events like bullfights, the emergent, multiple character of taurine
forms of existence become apparent.The sickness : sociality, schooling, and spirit possession amongst Amerindian youth in the savannahs of Guyana
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15549
The goal of this thesis is to explore the recent changes in the social landscape of a
Wapishana village, due to long-term separation from kin. I consider the impact of a recent
educational shift from small scale community based education to regional boarding schools on
family life and community structure amongst Amerindian people in the hinterland of Region 9,
Guyana. Furthermore, the project analyzes an emergent form of spirit possession that affects
almost exclusively young women who live in the dormitories, locally referred to as the sickness.
Using the sickness as an analytical lens, the thesis examines the ways in which young Amerindian
women navigate a shift in expectations from their parents and communities as well as how they
experience this rapid social change and transformation.
Various vantage points employed in the analysis of the sickness help to illustrate the
complexities of the current lived reality of Amerindian life. By exploring the experience of
kinship and community in the Wapishana village of Sand Creek, it is possible to demonstrate
how these relationships are produced and reproduced in everyday life through the sharing of
space and substance. Furthermore, it is necessary to consider different aspects of the Creole and
Amerindian notions of the spiritual world and their intervowenness in Wapishana lives, drawing
out human and non-human agency and how they effect change in the world. Additionally,
drawing on the anthropology of education, the thesis identifies the influence the state has on
people’s lives through institutionalized education, and locates this process within the wider
context of historical indigenous residential schools. The ethnographic data on the experience of
the sickness is put in dialogue and contrasted with other conceptions of spiritual vulnerability in
Amerindian communities, examples of ‘mass hysteria’ in schools or other institutional settings in
other parts of the world, and the Afro-Caribbean experience of spirit possession. Finally,
through an analysis of the etiology of the sickness, the final chapter draws on Amazonian literature
to examine the embodiment of gender and the local gendered history of knowledge production
in the area.
The sickness is a phenomenon that permeates life in Southern Guyana for Amerindian
youth, their families, and their communities. Undoubtedly, these various themes found in
Wapishana young women’s lives influence one another, irrespective of an ultimate manifestation
of spirit possession. In the concluding section I show how these themes can be placed in the
wider Amazonian framework of alterity and ‘Other-becoming’, illustrating how this
phenomenon provides a productive tool for the analysis of the experience of rapid social change
among Amerindian youth and the impact of these transformations throughout the region.
2018-01-01T00:00:00ZStafford-Walter, Courtney RoseThe goal of this thesis is to explore the recent changes in the social landscape of a
Wapishana village, due to long-term separation from kin. I consider the impact of a recent
educational shift from small scale community based education to regional boarding schools on
family life and community structure amongst Amerindian people in the hinterland of Region 9,
Guyana. Furthermore, the project analyzes an emergent form of spirit possession that affects
almost exclusively young women who live in the dormitories, locally referred to as the sickness.
Using the sickness as an analytical lens, the thesis examines the ways in which young Amerindian
women navigate a shift in expectations from their parents and communities as well as how they
experience this rapid social change and transformation.
Various vantage points employed in the analysis of the sickness help to illustrate the
complexities of the current lived reality of Amerindian life. By exploring the experience of
kinship and community in the Wapishana village of Sand Creek, it is possible to demonstrate
how these relationships are produced and reproduced in everyday life through the sharing of
space and substance. Furthermore, it is necessary to consider different aspects of the Creole and
Amerindian notions of the spiritual world and their intervowenness in Wapishana lives, drawing
out human and non-human agency and how they effect change in the world. Additionally,
drawing on the anthropology of education, the thesis identifies the influence the state has on
people’s lives through institutionalized education, and locates this process within the wider
context of historical indigenous residential schools. The ethnographic data on the experience of
the sickness is put in dialogue and contrasted with other conceptions of spiritual vulnerability in
Amerindian communities, examples of ‘mass hysteria’ in schools or other institutional settings in
other parts of the world, and the Afro-Caribbean experience of spirit possession. Finally,
through an analysis of the etiology of the sickness, the final chapter draws on Amazonian literature
to examine the embodiment of gender and the local gendered history of knowledge production
in the area.
The sickness is a phenomenon that permeates life in Southern Guyana for Amerindian
youth, their families, and their communities. Undoubtedly, these various themes found in
Wapishana young women’s lives influence one another, irrespective of an ultimate manifestation
of spirit possession. In the concluding section I show how these themes can be placed in the
wider Amazonian framework of alterity and ‘Other-becoming’, illustrating how this
phenomenon provides a productive tool for the analysis of the experience of rapid social change
among Amerindian youth and the impact of these transformations throughout the region.Becoming the centaur : developing non-dominant human-horse relationships in Yorkshire
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15548
This project will add to and build upon the existing anthropological literature on
human-animal relations by challenging how categories such as ‘nature’, ‘culture’,
‘ethics’, ‘domestication’, and ‘kinship’ are deployed in a multispecies ethnography. I
will use the knowledge practices of natural horsemanship in the UK as a lens to
explore them through ideas of domination, the role of exemplars, personhood,
becoming-with, ideas of freedom and control, the role of touch and embodied
learning, mutual emotional responses, and the development of ‘skilled visions’. By
building on the emergent anthropological field of multi-species ethnography through
this ethically charged life-world, I propose to investigate natural horsemanship so that
the outcome is relevant to the anthropological community, but also of interest for
animal behaviourists, welfare experts, biologists, the ‘part-time-practitioners’ who
were my informants, and more broadly, to the general public with an interest in
human-animal relationships. It will hopefully provide new insights on multi-species
ethnographies; expanding the potential of such endeavours by creating new
anthropological theory on areas such as animal welfare, ethical worlding, kin-like
relationships, and how the horse as an agentive subject in these relationships can
affect these outcomes. This knowledge can then engage with branches of biological
and veterinary science and provide detailed knowledge for animal welfare experts. It
will consequently provide critical reflections on present equine training and welfare in
the UK.
2018-01-01T00:00:00ZFerrier, Kirsty Roisin CameronThis project will add to and build upon the existing anthropological literature on
human-animal relations by challenging how categories such as ‘nature’, ‘culture’,
‘ethics’, ‘domestication’, and ‘kinship’ are deployed in a multispecies ethnography. I
will use the knowledge practices of natural horsemanship in the UK as a lens to
explore them through ideas of domination, the role of exemplars, personhood,
becoming-with, ideas of freedom and control, the role of touch and embodied
learning, mutual emotional responses, and the development of ‘skilled visions’. By
building on the emergent anthropological field of multi-species ethnography through
this ethically charged life-world, I propose to investigate natural horsemanship so that
the outcome is relevant to the anthropological community, but also of interest for
animal behaviourists, welfare experts, biologists, the ‘part-time-practitioners’ who
were my informants, and more broadly, to the general public with an interest in
human-animal relationships. It will hopefully provide new insights on multi-species
ethnographies; expanding the potential of such endeavours by creating new
anthropological theory on areas such as animal welfare, ethical worlding, kin-like
relationships, and how the horse as an agentive subject in these relationships can
affect these outcomes. This knowledge can then engage with branches of biological
and veterinary science and provide detailed knowledge for animal welfare experts. It
will consequently provide critical reflections on present equine training and welfare in
the UK."You want me to do what?!" : a reasonable response to overly demanding moral theories
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15546
This thesis is about demandingness objections. It is claimed that various
moral theories ask too much of moral agents, and for that reason should be
rejected or modified accordingly. In the first chapter, I consider what this
objection entails, particularly distinguishing it from Bernard Williams's integrity
objection. The second chapter investigates several attempts to undermine
the objection. I contend that their arguments for a more burdensome
conception of morality fail, and that accepting their `extreme' view would
leave us unable to explain much of our moral phenomenology. In the third
chapter, I analyse what features of a moral theory make it susceptible to
demandingness objections. Through this discussion I highlight social factors
(the conduct and expectations of one's community) and psychological factors
as potential candidates for generating the problem. Making use of these
potential diagnoses, in chapter four, I examine (but ultimately reject) the
responses to demandingness objections by Richard Miller and Liam Murphy,
which can provide verdicts sensitive to these features.
In the fifth chapter, I examine the concept of blame and its relationship
to moral wrongness. Noting this relationship and how an action's difficulty
can affect whether we deem conduct blameworthy, I consider a recent proposal
by Brian McElwee, that the difficulty of certain actions explains why
they are too demanding. I reject this proposal, instead regarding difficulty
as providing excuse conditions. However, through the discussion I draw
attention to the fact that sub-optimal behaviour often does not need an
excuse, suggesting that there is no `default' obligation to do the best. In
the final chapter, I offer a way to consider how obligations are generated,
utilising the concept of reasonableness. By incorporating this concept, and
giving it a relativistic analysis, I suggest a theory can avoid demandingness
objections.
2018-01-01T00:00:00ZSlater, JoeThis thesis is about demandingness objections. It is claimed that various
moral theories ask too much of moral agents, and for that reason should be
rejected or modified accordingly. In the first chapter, I consider what this
objection entails, particularly distinguishing it from Bernard Williams's integrity
objection. The second chapter investigates several attempts to undermine
the objection. I contend that their arguments for a more burdensome
conception of morality fail, and that accepting their `extreme' view would
leave us unable to explain much of our moral phenomenology. In the third
chapter, I analyse what features of a moral theory make it susceptible to
demandingness objections. Through this discussion I highlight social factors
(the conduct and expectations of one's community) and psychological factors
as potential candidates for generating the problem. Making use of these
potential diagnoses, in chapter four, I examine (but ultimately reject) the
responses to demandingness objections by Richard Miller and Liam Murphy,
which can provide verdicts sensitive to these features.
In the fifth chapter, I examine the concept of blame and its relationship
to moral wrongness. Noting this relationship and how an action's difficulty
can affect whether we deem conduct blameworthy, I consider a recent proposal
by Brian McElwee, that the difficulty of certain actions explains why
they are too demanding. I reject this proposal, instead regarding difficulty
as providing excuse conditions. However, through the discussion I draw
attention to the fact that sub-optimal behaviour often does not need an
excuse, suggesting that there is no `default' obligation to do the best. In
the final chapter, I offer a way to consider how obligations are generated,
utilising the concept of reasonableness. By incorporating this concept, and
giving it a relativistic analysis, I suggest a theory can avoid demandingness
objections."Doctors of our knowledge" : kinship, research, and embodiment in an Amerindian village in Guyana
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15545
Ethnography of how people in Surama—a mostly Makushi, Amerindian Village in the North
Rupununi of Region 9 in Guyana—conceive of “work” as social formation, “development” as a local
manifestation, and knowledge tied to being supports an argument that foreign power is obviated
through the formation of similar bodied kin in the community.
The focus on a single community, Surama, is a methodological choice born out of previous
anthropological understandings of community-settlements as fluid, comprised of consanguineal kin,
and leadership as non-coercive and limited to each community. Today, Amerindian Villages are
spatially fixed, and administered by Village Councils—the most local branch of government. To
understand how people in Amerindian Villages conceive of politics and kinship today, I had to myself
become more familiar. I resided in one community, with one family. I took part both in what my
hosts described as “tradition”, and “development”.
People in Surama described tensions in changing ways of being social. While they champion sociality
associated with “tradition”, they manifested “development” as a contribution to the wider world. In
this way, they carried what they considered proper social personhood, sharing and willingful
contributions, to the wider world.
People in Surama conceive of “tradition” and “culture” through a history of mediating outside
researchers’ and policy-makers’ interest in their lives. They recognize foreign interest in their visible
knowledge of the forest, and share this knowledge through these concepts. Simultaneously, these
concepts keep certain ways of knowing distant from researchers. Embodied ways of knowing and
interacting with persons in the forest are called “belief”, and are limited to believers. My hosts
maintained this as a fundamental difference in our ways of knowing. Their knowing is a doing with
kin; ours is writing about that doing. Through extending their knowing and ways of being social to
researchers, however, they turn us into similar bodied kin.
2018-01-01T00:00:00ZArze, SebastianEthnography of how people in Surama—a mostly Makushi, Amerindian Village in the North
Rupununi of Region 9 in Guyana—conceive of “work” as social formation, “development” as a local
manifestation, and knowledge tied to being supports an argument that foreign power is obviated
through the formation of similar bodied kin in the community.
The focus on a single community, Surama, is a methodological choice born out of previous
anthropological understandings of community-settlements as fluid, comprised of consanguineal kin,
and leadership as non-coercive and limited to each community. Today, Amerindian Villages are
spatially fixed, and administered by Village Councils—the most local branch of government. To
understand how people in Amerindian Villages conceive of politics and kinship today, I had to myself
become more familiar. I resided in one community, with one family. I took part both in what my
hosts described as “tradition”, and “development”.
People in Surama described tensions in changing ways of being social. While they champion sociality
associated with “tradition”, they manifested “development” as a contribution to the wider world. In
this way, they carried what they considered proper social personhood, sharing and willingful
contributions, to the wider world.
People in Surama conceive of “tradition” and “culture” through a history of mediating outside
researchers’ and policy-makers’ interest in their lives. They recognize foreign interest in their visible
knowledge of the forest, and share this knowledge through these concepts. Simultaneously, these
concepts keep certain ways of knowing distant from researchers. Embodied ways of knowing and
interacting with persons in the forest are called “belief”, and are limited to believers. My hosts
maintained this as a fundamental difference in our ways of knowing. Their knowing is a doing with
kin; ours is writing about that doing. Through extending their knowing and ways of being social to
researchers, however, they turn us into similar bodied kin.Assertion : the context sensitivity dilemma
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15543
It looks as though many philosophers assume that the intuitive variability of proper assertion with practical stakes motivates the following dilemma: either (1) we embrace a knowledge norm of assertion (KNA), and are forced into a view that takes knowledge, or ‘knowledge’ to be sensitive to practical stakes, or (2) we stick to our classical invariantist (CI) guns, but then KNA goes out the window and we get practical sensitivity in the normativity of assertion. Let us dub this The Sensitivity Dilemma.
This dissertation aims to bring this implicitly assumed dilemma to centre stage in order to then take a step back. It is argued here that the Sensitivity Dilemma is a false dilemma: a biconditional knowledge norm of assertion, I argue, is perfectly compatible with Classical Invariantism. And, more ambitiously, the dissertation aims to offer independent reason to believe that, if Classical Invariantism and KNA are true, shiftiness in assertability is exactly what we should expect. To this effect, I put forth a functionalist rationale for KNA, in a classical invariantist framework. I argue that not only are the data at hand friendly to CI and KNA, but, if we look at the main epistemic function of assertion, KNA readily follows.
I begin by arguing that the Sensitivity Dilemma rests on deontic equivocation. To this effect, Chapter #1draws an important distinction between epistemic norms and mere norms with epistemic content. In the light of this distinction, I argue that a knowledge norm for assertion need not imply context sensitivity of either knowledge/knowledge attribution or proper assertion. Now, say that it turns out that the knowledge norm of assertion, in its biconditional form, is perfectly compatible with the shiftiness data. Does that also mean that KNA is correct? The answer, of course, is ‘no’. After all, empirical adequacy is shared by several of the competing views on the market. We need further reasons to believe KNA is the correct account. Chapter #2 looks at several extant attempts to provide a rationale for KNA, and finds them wanting.
In Chapter #3, I offer an alternative answer to the rationale question: assertion, I argue, is governed by a particular epistemic norm in virtue of serving a particular epistemic function. More precisely, according to the proposed account, a biconditional knowledge norm of assertion drops right out of the assertion’s epistemic function of generating testimonial knowledge. Chapters #4 and #5 defend, in turn, the necessity and sufficiency directions of KNA against the classical objections in the literature. I argue that: (1) The necessity claim involved in KNA scores better than weaker norms when it comes to both accommodating linguistic data and explaining how a speaker can be blameless, yet in breach of the norm, and (2) The sufficiency direction of KNA survives the intuitive need for more than knowledge in cases put forth by Jessica Brown and Jennifer Lackey, since the latter is not sourced the epistemic norm governing assertion, but in further norms with epistemic content stepping n and raising the bar.
Last but not least, in Chapter #6 I argue that several theoretical virtues, such as simplicity and prior plausibility, favour my functionalist account over extant competing explanations of the shiftiness data.
2018-01-01T00:00:00ZSimionescu, Mona IoanaIt looks as though many philosophers assume that the intuitive variability of proper assertion with practical stakes motivates the following dilemma: either (1) we embrace a knowledge norm of assertion (KNA), and are forced into a view that takes knowledge, or ‘knowledge’ to be sensitive to practical stakes, or (2) we stick to our classical invariantist (CI) guns, but then KNA goes out the window and we get practical sensitivity in the normativity of assertion. Let us dub this The Sensitivity Dilemma.
This dissertation aims to bring this implicitly assumed dilemma to centre stage in order to then take a step back. It is argued here that the Sensitivity Dilemma is a false dilemma: a biconditional knowledge norm of assertion, I argue, is perfectly compatible with Classical Invariantism. And, more ambitiously, the dissertation aims to offer independent reason to believe that, if Classical Invariantism and KNA are true, shiftiness in assertability is exactly what we should expect. To this effect, I put forth a functionalist rationale for KNA, in a classical invariantist framework. I argue that not only are the data at hand friendly to CI and KNA, but, if we look at the main epistemic function of assertion, KNA readily follows.
I begin by arguing that the Sensitivity Dilemma rests on deontic equivocation. To this effect, Chapter #1draws an important distinction between epistemic norms and mere norms with epistemic content. In the light of this distinction, I argue that a knowledge norm for assertion need not imply context sensitivity of either knowledge/knowledge attribution or proper assertion. Now, say that it turns out that the knowledge norm of assertion, in its biconditional form, is perfectly compatible with the shiftiness data. Does that also mean that KNA is correct? The answer, of course, is ‘no’. After all, empirical adequacy is shared by several of the competing views on the market. We need further reasons to believe KNA is the correct account. Chapter #2 looks at several extant attempts to provide a rationale for KNA, and finds them wanting.
In Chapter #3, I offer an alternative answer to the rationale question: assertion, I argue, is governed by a particular epistemic norm in virtue of serving a particular epistemic function. More precisely, according to the proposed account, a biconditional knowledge norm of assertion drops right out of the assertion’s epistemic function of generating testimonial knowledge. Chapters #4 and #5 defend, in turn, the necessity and sufficiency directions of KNA against the classical objections in the literature. I argue that: (1) The necessity claim involved in KNA scores better than weaker norms when it comes to both accommodating linguistic data and explaining how a speaker can be blameless, yet in breach of the norm, and (2) The sufficiency direction of KNA survives the intuitive need for more than knowledge in cases put forth by Jessica Brown and Jennifer Lackey, since the latter is not sourced the epistemic norm governing assertion, but in further norms with epistemic content stepping n and raising the bar.
Last but not least, in Chapter #6 I argue that several theoretical virtues, such as simplicity and prior plausibility, favour my functionalist account over extant competing explanations of the shiftiness data.'Mesa' and carnival : a word and an event which illustrate aspects of the Quechua view of the world and man's position in it, based upon fieldwork in the Cochabamba Valley, Bolivia
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15536
1980-01-01T00:00:00ZCummings, Peter Lionel VickeryExploratio intentionis
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15534
1986-01-01T00:00:00ZCrawford, J. M. B.The nature and causes of allomorphy in Cuzco Quechua : with special reference to the marking of person and the 'empty morph' ni-
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15505
It is the purpose of this thesis to examine the reasons why Cuzco Quechua, an Amerindian language of Latin America, uses allomorphs, or multiple forms, to represent the minimal semantic units of the language (or morphemes). Starting from the Initial hypothesis that the relatively minor role of allomorphy in contemporary Cuzco Quechua indicates the earlier absence of that allomorphy, the motivation for the introduction and retention of allomorphy is examined, as this relates to a number of characteristic types; Vowel Deletion, affecting final suffixes, Consonant Cluster Simplification and Vowel Dissimilation, affecting suffixes of the verb stem, and the potential allomorphy of the suffixes of Person, pronominal and verbal. Such allomorphy proves to be the result of attempts to contain new morphological developments within existing structural preferences of syllable configuration, and to limit the potential for semantic ambiguity, arising out of identity of form, or homonymy. The unanticipated result of such a study is the implication in all cases considered of an earlier process of affixation, leading to the formation of untypical morph-forms, Allomorphy is seen to be the by-product of compensatory change, introduced to modify the results of previous developments, In particular, the role of the 'empty morph', ni, of nominal Person is found to be implicated in the derivational history of all Quechua suffixes of Person, and its origin imputed to an early role of the verb ni-, 'to say', used with auxiliary function. Based on the evidence of allomorphy, the conclusion is drawn that many of the suffixes of Cuzco Quechua owe their origin to syntactic forms of expression, indicating that the role of the syntactic construction in this typically agglutinative language was formerly more significant than is now recognised.
1994-01-01T00:00:00ZCorbett, Anne F.It is the purpose of this thesis to examine the reasons why Cuzco Quechua, an Amerindian language of Latin America, uses allomorphs, or multiple forms, to represent the minimal semantic units of the language (or morphemes). Starting from the Initial hypothesis that the relatively minor role of allomorphy in contemporary Cuzco Quechua indicates the earlier absence of that allomorphy, the motivation for the introduction and retention of allomorphy is examined, as this relates to a number of characteristic types; Vowel Deletion, affecting final suffixes, Consonant Cluster Simplification and Vowel Dissimilation, affecting suffixes of the verb stem, and the potential allomorphy of the suffixes of Person, pronominal and verbal. Such allomorphy proves to be the result of attempts to contain new morphological developments within existing structural preferences of syllable configuration, and to limit the potential for semantic ambiguity, arising out of identity of form, or homonymy. The unanticipated result of such a study is the implication in all cases considered of an earlier process of affixation, leading to the formation of untypical morph-forms, Allomorphy is seen to be the by-product of compensatory change, introduced to modify the results of previous developments, In particular, the role of the 'empty morph', ni, of nominal Person is found to be implicated in the derivational history of all Quechua suffixes of Person, and its origin imputed to an early role of the verb ni-, 'to say', used with auxiliary function. Based on the evidence of allomorphy, the conclusion is drawn that many of the suffixes of Cuzco Quechua owe their origin to syntactic forms of expression, indicating that the role of the syntactic construction in this typically agglutinative language was formerly more significant than is now recognised.Sexual violence : dynamics, aftermath and intervention
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15413
This thesis examines the nature of sexual violence, the trauma experienced by survivors, how report rate for this type of crime can be increased, and how secondary victimisation of survivors can be prevented. Laboratory examination of the attributions made about survivors of sexual violence found that they not only differ from those made about survivors of non-sexual crimes, but also that negative attitudes are strongly related to the gender-role attitudes of the attributor. Empirical research also suggested that providing written information may not be sufficient to alter negative attitudes. Results of a general public crime survey (N=266) suggest that the trauma experienced by survivors of sexual violence is higher than that of survivors of other crime types. Specific examination of the experiences and recovery of survivors of sexual violence (N=42) found that severe assaults, recent victimisation, and assault by a known offender, are related to high levels of symptomatology. Negative self-attributions and perceptions were also found to be related to high levels of symptomatology, and these cognitions were found to be the strongest predictors of recovery. Unlike previous findings with other subject groups, self-blame was not found to be related to increased control. Examination of post-assault factors suggests that the low report rate for sexual crimes may be due to lack of faith in the police and fear of Criminal Justice interactions. In addition, it was found that dissatisfaction with report decision was highly related to levels of symptomatology. A model of how assault factors, survivor cognitions and post-assault interactions may relate to each other and symptomatology is presented. The findings of the survey and laboratory research are discussed in terms of their implications for successful support of survivors, increasing report rate for sexual crimes, the prevention of secondary victimisation, and future psychological research.
1997-01-01T00:00:00ZEdward, Katherine E.This thesis examines the nature of sexual violence, the trauma experienced by survivors, how report rate for this type of crime can be increased, and how secondary victimisation of survivors can be prevented. Laboratory examination of the attributions made about survivors of sexual violence found that they not only differ from those made about survivors of non-sexual crimes, but also that negative attitudes are strongly related to the gender-role attitudes of the attributor. Empirical research also suggested that providing written information may not be sufficient to alter negative attitudes. Results of a general public crime survey (N=266) suggest that the trauma experienced by survivors of sexual violence is higher than that of survivors of other crime types. Specific examination of the experiences and recovery of survivors of sexual violence (N=42) found that severe assaults, recent victimisation, and assault by a known offender, are related to high levels of symptomatology. Negative self-attributions and perceptions were also found to be related to high levels of symptomatology, and these cognitions were found to be the strongest predictors of recovery. Unlike previous findings with other subject groups, self-blame was not found to be related to increased control. Examination of post-assault factors suggests that the low report rate for sexual crimes may be due to lack of faith in the police and fear of Criminal Justice interactions. In addition, it was found that dissatisfaction with report decision was highly related to levels of symptomatology. A model of how assault factors, survivor cognitions and post-assault interactions may relate to each other and symptomatology is presented. The findings of the survey and laboratory research are discussed in terms of their implications for successful support of survivors, increasing report rate for sexual crimes, the prevention of secondary victimisation, and future psychological research.Emotional state, event-related impact and blame cognitions : a study of secondary victims of murder
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15412
Previous studies have found a relationship between attributions of blame and traumatic events such as crime, illness, and accidents/disasters, albeit inconclusive as to the benefits or detriments of self- and other-blame on adjustment outcome (e.g., Janoff-Bulman, 1979; Joseph, Brewin, Yule & Williams, 1991,1993; Derry & McLachlan, 1995; Frazier & Schauben, 1994). The effects of attributions of blame on the adjustment outcome of family members bereaved through murder has been neglected. Therefore, little is known about such benefits to adjustment in this population. In addition, no longitudinal research has been conducted so little is known about this process of adjustment. A retrospective longitudinal study investigated emotional state and event-related impact, attributions of blame, control and just world cognitions, revenge and disabling distress. Thirty-four family members, recruited from "Families of Murdered Children", were interviewed and completed four psychological measures. They were followed up six and twelve months later. On all three occasions, subjects showed high levels of negative emotional state and event-related impact, especially older, female and support seeking subjects. Self-blame and feelings of revenge were linked to higher levels of negative emotional state and event-related impact, especially in female subjects. Control and just world cognitions were not related to emotional state and event-related impact. Negative emotional state at Time 1 was predictive of poor overall adjustment at Time 2 and Time 3, while gender was predictive of poor overall adjustment at Time 2. Subjects suffering from distress that interfered with their daily lives at Time 3 had higher negative emotional state and event-related impact at Time 1, Time 2 and Time 3. In order to further investigate the effects of blame attributions on mood, a randomised between-subjects laboratory study was conducted. Eighty-seven undergraduates were assigned to one of three writing conditions (self-blame, other-blame and no blame/control) with mood being assessed before and after writing. Results showed that negative mood had been cognitively induced, however, no condition effects occurred. The mood effect was greater for women than men. Implications for theory, practice and future research in relation to the main findings are discussed.
1998-01-01T00:00:00ZRowland, Ann-Stacy KahlerPrevious studies have found a relationship between attributions of blame and traumatic events such as crime, illness, and accidents/disasters, albeit inconclusive as to the benefits or detriments of self- and other-blame on adjustment outcome (e.g., Janoff-Bulman, 1979; Joseph, Brewin, Yule & Williams, 1991,1993; Derry & McLachlan, 1995; Frazier & Schauben, 1994). The effects of attributions of blame on the adjustment outcome of family members bereaved through murder has been neglected. Therefore, little is known about such benefits to adjustment in this population. In addition, no longitudinal research has been conducted so little is known about this process of adjustment. A retrospective longitudinal study investigated emotional state and event-related impact, attributions of blame, control and just world cognitions, revenge and disabling distress. Thirty-four family members, recruited from "Families of Murdered Children", were interviewed and completed four psychological measures. They were followed up six and twelve months later. On all three occasions, subjects showed high levels of negative emotional state and event-related impact, especially older, female and support seeking subjects. Self-blame and feelings of revenge were linked to higher levels of negative emotional state and event-related impact, especially in female subjects. Control and just world cognitions were not related to emotional state and event-related impact. Negative emotional state at Time 1 was predictive of poor overall adjustment at Time 2 and Time 3, while gender was predictive of poor overall adjustment at Time 2. Subjects suffering from distress that interfered with their daily lives at Time 3 had higher negative emotional state and event-related impact at Time 1, Time 2 and Time 3. In order to further investigate the effects of blame attributions on mood, a randomised between-subjects laboratory study was conducted. Eighty-seven undergraduates were assigned to one of three writing conditions (self-blame, other-blame and no blame/control) with mood being assessed before and after writing. Results showed that negative mood had been cognitively induced, however, no condition effects occurred. The mood effect was greater for women than men. Implications for theory, practice and future research in relation to the main findings are discussed.The concept of the Outlook Tower in the work of Patrick Geddes
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15402
As an academic, a scholar and a thinker Patrick Geddes worked in a wide and diverse range of intellectual fields. He was active in biology and botany, geography, sociology, what came to be called town planning, history and the theory and practice of the social sciences. As a man of practical affairs and action he was a patron of art and architecture, rescuer of the Old Town in Edinburgh, founder and funder of the Edinburgh Summer School and a College in Montpellier. As well as Edinburgh he was active in London, Paris, Dublin, America, India, Jerusalem and Montpellier. This protean diversity has called for the two responses from interpreters of his work. The first was to stress the town planning component at the expense of the rest. He has been monopolised by the town planners chiefly through the influence of Lewis Mumford and to a lesser extent Patrick Abercrombie and Frank Mears. The second was to explain his polymathic diversity as the work of an extraordinary personality: such studies have been biographical with a tendency to flattery. This thesis seeks to understand Patrick Geddes as part of the cultural and intellectual life of Scotland. The origins of his town planning work is examined as part of the particular traditions and history of Edinburgh just as his regional planning analyses are seen as part of the tradition of resistance to the cultural domination of London, the imperial metropolis. The role of the Outlook Tower is interpreted as a component of his general theory of pedagogy especially as his concept of the museum relates to this theory. The analyses of his attempt to create a Scottish Renaissance help explain the weakness of his more general sociological and ecological theories.
1987-01-01T00:00:00ZCuthbert, MichaelAs an academic, a scholar and a thinker Patrick Geddes worked in a wide and diverse range of intellectual fields. He was active in biology and botany, geography, sociology, what came to be called town planning, history and the theory and practice of the social sciences. As a man of practical affairs and action he was a patron of art and architecture, rescuer of the Old Town in Edinburgh, founder and funder of the Edinburgh Summer School and a College in Montpellier. As well as Edinburgh he was active in London, Paris, Dublin, America, India, Jerusalem and Montpellier. This protean diversity has called for the two responses from interpreters of his work. The first was to stress the town planning component at the expense of the rest. He has been monopolised by the town planners chiefly through the influence of Lewis Mumford and to a lesser extent Patrick Abercrombie and Frank Mears. The second was to explain his polymathic diversity as the work of an extraordinary personality: such studies have been biographical with a tendency to flattery. This thesis seeks to understand Patrick Geddes as part of the cultural and intellectual life of Scotland. The origins of his town planning work is examined as part of the particular traditions and history of Edinburgh just as his regional planning analyses are seen as part of the tradition of resistance to the cultural domination of London, the imperial metropolis. The role of the Outlook Tower is interpreted as a component of his general theory of pedagogy especially as his concept of the museum relates to this theory. The analyses of his attempt to create a Scottish Renaissance help explain the weakness of his more general sociological and ecological theories.Humiliation : a theme in ecclesiastical folklore
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15390
This work is an investigation into the background of a phemomenon found in the field of folklore, namely, public shame. In particular, the Spanish Inquisition provides the context for an enquiry into why a people accepted the humiliation of its fellows in the name of religion. The main quarry of the Inquisition were apostate Jews, who, after forcible conversions to Christianity, were spied on and betrayed whenever the slightest deviation from Catholic dogma was perceived. Contrition, expressed by public exhibition in an auto-de-fe or by burning, was held to be Penance. The enquiry shows the development of public penance from the appearance of Jewish monotheism through to the first centuries of Christianity (Chapter II). In the Christian era, penance was a voluntary act of self-humiliation, but later innovations from the Celtic Church modified its stringencies. Meanwhile the Spanish Church maintained the older, harsher forms (Chapter III). The Papal Inquisition of 1232 insisted on public penance by the wearing of "crosses", and its whole machinery of inquisition passed to the Spanish Inquisition (Chapter IV). Then, the Jewish persecution by the Spanish Church from 303 to 1480 is traced. Forcible conversion of Jews in 1391 split Spanish society into Old Christians and New, from which grew the problem of heresy (apostasy). By 1478 converso Jews held important positions in Church and State (Appendix A), and the Church thought it saw, through apostates, a threat to both the purity of the Faith and to Spanish sovereignty. Reacting to heresy, the Inquisition carried its penalties to such extremes as to suggest that its chief motivation was fear (Chapter V) . Chapters VI and VII set out the extent of the public humiliation of accused persons: Chapter VIII deals with the strong correspondence between the components of a "craze" such as the witchhunts of sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe, and the principal elements of the Inquisition. The origins of both seem to lie in the realm of imaginary fear and hatred.
1983-01-01T00:00:00ZGuy, John PurchaseThis work is an investigation into the background of a phemomenon found in the field of folklore, namely, public shame. In particular, the Spanish Inquisition provides the context for an enquiry into why a people accepted the humiliation of its fellows in the name of religion. The main quarry of the Inquisition were apostate Jews, who, after forcible conversions to Christianity, were spied on and betrayed whenever the slightest deviation from Catholic dogma was perceived. Contrition, expressed by public exhibition in an auto-de-fe or by burning, was held to be Penance. The enquiry shows the development of public penance from the appearance of Jewish monotheism through to the first centuries of Christianity (Chapter II). In the Christian era, penance was a voluntary act of self-humiliation, but later innovations from the Celtic Church modified its stringencies. Meanwhile the Spanish Church maintained the older, harsher forms (Chapter III). The Papal Inquisition of 1232 insisted on public penance by the wearing of "crosses", and its whole machinery of inquisition passed to the Spanish Inquisition (Chapter IV). Then, the Jewish persecution by the Spanish Church from 303 to 1480 is traced. Forcible conversion of Jews in 1391 split Spanish society into Old Christians and New, from which grew the problem of heresy (apostasy). By 1478 converso Jews held important positions in Church and State (Appendix A), and the Church thought it saw, through apostates, a threat to both the purity of the Faith and to Spanish sovereignty. Reacting to heresy, the Inquisition carried its penalties to such extremes as to suggest that its chief motivation was fear (Chapter V) . Chapters VI and VII set out the extent of the public humiliation of accused persons: Chapter VIII deals with the strong correspondence between the components of a "craze" such as the witchhunts of sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe, and the principal elements of the Inquisition. The origins of both seem to lie in the realm of imaginary fear and hatred.Quichua tales from Cañar, Ecuador
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15389
The thesis comprises a classification and analysis of 64 tales told by Indian inhabitants of the rural communities around the highland town of Canar, Southern Central Ecuador, The informants all had Quichua as their mother tongue and, with the exception of 4 texts, used it in the telling of the tales. These were tape-recorded, transcribed with the help of a Quichua assistant, and are presented in full together with English translations. The classification of texts is based largely upon criteria of contents, although both genre and tale structure are also taken into account, all three considerations being closely interrelated. Classification according to content owes something of theory and method to the Finnish-American school led by Aarne and Thompson (Thompson 1955-58, Aarne and Thompson 1951). The discussion of genre definition takes Bascom's article (1965) as a starting point, and also takes into account more recent statements on the subject. The consideration of structure as a criterion at the classification stage is in accordance with the arguments of Propp (1968) and Dundes (1962b, 1964). The classification scheme resulted in a breakdown of the tales into four sections (A-D), The largest of these is Section A, whose 32 tales will be shown to adhere to a common structural framework, whilst the sub-sections into which they are divided reflect their differences in surface content. Sections B and C are both examples of tale cycles, bound by this definition to be grouped together. Section D comprises humorous tales, largely borrowings from mestizo culture, with little in common on grounds of structure. The analysis seeks to examine the relationship between tales within the sections, at the levels of both structure and content if this is appropriate; where it is not, remarks are confined to content alone. The analysis of both structure and content calls for some comparisons to be drawn with material from elsewhere. Such comparisons are confined to the Ecuadorean highlands, to a lesser extent Peru, and incidental reference is made to other geographical areas, especially where borrowings are concerned, Structural analysis was most applicable to Section A, an apparently heterogeneous group of legends and folktales which, it is argued, are bound together by common underlying features of structure. These features appear to derive from the local legends of the area, and have then encouraged the adoption and development of certain folktales whose structure was compatible with such already existing forms. The theoretical basis for this approach is to be found in Dundes (cit.), Maranda and Kongas Maranda (1971), and Hymes (1971). The breakdown of texts to reveal their structure takes both the 'syntagmatic' and the 'paradigmatic' aspects of the latter into account (see Dundee's intro, to Propp 1968:xi-xii). In order to reveal more clearly the paradigmatic characteristics of the texts, and the structural affinities that exist between tales at this level, use is made of Levi-Straussian terminology and the methods he uses for the schematic cross-comparison of tales have been adapted (Levi-Strauss 1970, 1972), Analysis of content follows two main lines: in the case of the legendary material it is particularly appropriate to examine the relationship that apparently exists between the local belief system and oral narrative. In the case of folktales, it is relevant to consider content on comparative lines, examining the nature and/or distribution of episodes as they occur in Canar and as they are found elsewhere in Andean narrative tradition. The works of Morote Best were particularly useful for this purpose (1950b, 1953b, 1954, 1957, 1958a, 1958b). The main aim of the thesis is therefore to analyse the structure and content of the tales in order to show the underlying relationships that bind them within a coherent system of narrative tradition. Some connections at both these levels are also to be seen between sections as well as within them, and these are pointed out. Material introduced from outside was adopted, it is suggested, for its compatibility with that which was already there. In addition to this, possible social and cultural reasons for the appeal of particular kinds of tale in the area are discussed as relevant.
1979-01-01T00:00:00ZHoward-Malverde, Rosaleen E.The thesis comprises a classification and analysis of 64 tales told by Indian inhabitants of the rural communities around the highland town of Canar, Southern Central Ecuador, The informants all had Quichua as their mother tongue and, with the exception of 4 texts, used it in the telling of the tales. These were tape-recorded, transcribed with the help of a Quichua assistant, and are presented in full together with English translations. The classification of texts is based largely upon criteria of contents, although both genre and tale structure are also taken into account, all three considerations being closely interrelated. Classification according to content owes something of theory and method to the Finnish-American school led by Aarne and Thompson (Thompson 1955-58, Aarne and Thompson 1951). The discussion of genre definition takes Bascom's article (1965) as a starting point, and also takes into account more recent statements on the subject. The consideration of structure as a criterion at the classification stage is in accordance with the arguments of Propp (1968) and Dundes (1962b, 1964). The classification scheme resulted in a breakdown of the tales into four sections (A-D), The largest of these is Section A, whose 32 tales will be shown to adhere to a common structural framework, whilst the sub-sections into which they are divided reflect their differences in surface content. Sections B and C are both examples of tale cycles, bound by this definition to be grouped together. Section D comprises humorous tales, largely borrowings from mestizo culture, with little in common on grounds of structure. The analysis seeks to examine the relationship between tales within the sections, at the levels of both structure and content if this is appropriate; where it is not, remarks are confined to content alone. The analysis of both structure and content calls for some comparisons to be drawn with material from elsewhere. Such comparisons are confined to the Ecuadorean highlands, to a lesser extent Peru, and incidental reference is made to other geographical areas, especially where borrowings are concerned, Structural analysis was most applicable to Section A, an apparently heterogeneous group of legends and folktales which, it is argued, are bound together by common underlying features of structure. These features appear to derive from the local legends of the area, and have then encouraged the adoption and development of certain folktales whose structure was compatible with such already existing forms. The theoretical basis for this approach is to be found in Dundes (cit.), Maranda and Kongas Maranda (1971), and Hymes (1971). The breakdown of texts to reveal their structure takes both the 'syntagmatic' and the 'paradigmatic' aspects of the latter into account (see Dundee's intro, to Propp 1968:xi-xii). In order to reveal more clearly the paradigmatic characteristics of the texts, and the structural affinities that exist between tales at this level, use is made of Levi-Straussian terminology and the methods he uses for the schematic cross-comparison of tales have been adapted (Levi-Strauss 1970, 1972), Analysis of content follows two main lines: in the case of the legendary material it is particularly appropriate to examine the relationship that apparently exists between the local belief system and oral narrative. In the case of folktales, it is relevant to consider content on comparative lines, examining the nature and/or distribution of episodes as they occur in Canar and as they are found elsewhere in Andean narrative tradition. The works of Morote Best were particularly useful for this purpose (1950b, 1953b, 1954, 1957, 1958a, 1958b). The main aim of the thesis is therefore to analyse the structure and content of the tales in order to show the underlying relationships that bind them within a coherent system of narrative tradition. Some connections at both these levels are also to be seen between sections as well as within them, and these are pointed out. Material introduced from outside was adopted, it is suggested, for its compatibility with that which was already there. In addition to this, possible social and cultural reasons for the appeal of particular kinds of tale in the area are discussed as relevant.Mimesis, mirror and mask : modern imaginaries of self and other
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15388
This dissertation set out to investigate the thesis that the Modern Western Self has "created" Self as a self-creating, creative category, and in denying all possibilities of originality to the Other, has "created" the Other as an essentially imitative creature, a mirror-image of Self. I have in particular compared the conceptualisations of "woman", "child" and "primitive" as Other with specific reference to the British colonial experience in Ireland and the overseas territories. I argue that these ideas go back to a conceptualisation of the human self as dual, consisting of self and mask, and self and social roles. I discuss the development of this discourse against the background of the growth of imperialism which coincided with a didactic discourse and the spread of syphilis which led to an increased control of children's and women's sexuality, and was a key concept in the conceptualisations of the notions of age groups, genders, classes, and "races". Starting point for my discussion of imitation is Aristotle's conceptualisation of mimesis in the performative arts in Poetica, and Modern debates on his ideas. I propose that the notion of "imitation" as an attribute of the Other needs to be historicised and situated within the development of what has been called a domesticated imperialism, i.e. an imperialism built on the domestic idea which unites people under the symbolic roof of the imperial "home" but separates them in terms of age, gender, class, and "race". This domesticated imperialism has its roots in the mercantile imperialism which developed from the sixteenth century onwards and came to full fruition in the nineteenth century. It attributed a special role to reproductive sexuality in that it was through the control of inter- and intra-sex sexual relations that boundaries between ages, classes and "races" could be maintained or broken down; the rhetoric of the Other's imitativeness was therefore closely tied up with the rhetoric of control of the Other's sexuality. While my investigations have confirmed the significance of the notions of creativity and createdness, originality and imitativeness for ideas of Selfhood and Otherness, they have established that notions of "womanhood" as opposed to "manhood", "childhood" as opposed to "adulthood", "primitivity" as opposed to "civilisation" are always impinged upon by age, gender, sexual object choice, marital status, occupation, ethnicity, "race", class, religious affiliation etc.. They have made clear that Self and Other engage in a number of relations rather than merely being oppositional, and that creativity and createdness, originality and imitativeness can, to various degrees, be associated with either category. However, towards the end of the nineteenth century an academic discourse developed which conceptualised Self and Other as antithetical and mutual exclusive, if sometimes complementary categories. This discourse which established the supremacy of the Western adult male of independent means developed partially in reaction to public debates which questioned the primacy of the father and recognised the creative powers of the sexual, social and/or "racial" Other for the socialisation of the Self Recent studies of the Other in post-colonial theory, gender studies and social anthropology are still largely predicated on dichotomous models developed as part of this discourse in that they conventionally portray the Other as a mirror-image of the Self There is thus a congruence between (i) ideas on the relationship between Self and Other; (ii) ideas on the study of Self and Other; and (iii) ideas on the analysis of Self and Other. The dissertation proceeds to discuss the benefits of a theoretical perspective that dissolves these dichotomies through an analysis of nineteenth century discourses which acknowledged that Self and Other were mutually constituted, and a critical assessment of recent theories in psychoanalysis, anthropology and gender studies on the relation between Self and Other, with particular reference to the notion of performance which allows us to reestablish a link with Aristotle's Poetica. The dissertation goes on to question the opposition between originality and imitativeness, and concludes with the suggestion that the very concept of Self and Other needs qualification.
1997-01-01T00:00:00ZCeuppens, Godelieve BambiThis dissertation set out to investigate the thesis that the Modern Western Self has "created" Self as a self-creating, creative category, and in denying all possibilities of originality to the Other, has "created" the Other as an essentially imitative creature, a mirror-image of Self. I have in particular compared the conceptualisations of "woman", "child" and "primitive" as Other with specific reference to the British colonial experience in Ireland and the overseas territories. I argue that these ideas go back to a conceptualisation of the human self as dual, consisting of self and mask, and self and social roles. I discuss the development of this discourse against the background of the growth of imperialism which coincided with a didactic discourse and the spread of syphilis which led to an increased control of children's and women's sexuality, and was a key concept in the conceptualisations of the notions of age groups, genders, classes, and "races". Starting point for my discussion of imitation is Aristotle's conceptualisation of mimesis in the performative arts in Poetica, and Modern debates on his ideas. I propose that the notion of "imitation" as an attribute of the Other needs to be historicised and situated within the development of what has been called a domesticated imperialism, i.e. an imperialism built on the domestic idea which unites people under the symbolic roof of the imperial "home" but separates them in terms of age, gender, class, and "race". This domesticated imperialism has its roots in the mercantile imperialism which developed from the sixteenth century onwards and came to full fruition in the nineteenth century. It attributed a special role to reproductive sexuality in that it was through the control of inter- and intra-sex sexual relations that boundaries between ages, classes and "races" could be maintained or broken down; the rhetoric of the Other's imitativeness was therefore closely tied up with the rhetoric of control of the Other's sexuality. While my investigations have confirmed the significance of the notions of creativity and createdness, originality and imitativeness for ideas of Selfhood and Otherness, they have established that notions of "womanhood" as opposed to "manhood", "childhood" as opposed to "adulthood", "primitivity" as opposed to "civilisation" are always impinged upon by age, gender, sexual object choice, marital status, occupation, ethnicity, "race", class, religious affiliation etc.. They have made clear that Self and Other engage in a number of relations rather than merely being oppositional, and that creativity and createdness, originality and imitativeness can, to various degrees, be associated with either category. However, towards the end of the nineteenth century an academic discourse developed which conceptualised Self and Other as antithetical and mutual exclusive, if sometimes complementary categories. This discourse which established the supremacy of the Western adult male of independent means developed partially in reaction to public debates which questioned the primacy of the father and recognised the creative powers of the sexual, social and/or "racial" Other for the socialisation of the Self Recent studies of the Other in post-colonial theory, gender studies and social anthropology are still largely predicated on dichotomous models developed as part of this discourse in that they conventionally portray the Other as a mirror-image of the Self There is thus a congruence between (i) ideas on the relationship between Self and Other; (ii) ideas on the study of Self and Other; and (iii) ideas on the analysis of Self and Other. The dissertation proceeds to discuss the benefits of a theoretical perspective that dissolves these dichotomies through an analysis of nineteenth century discourses which acknowledged that Self and Other were mutually constituted, and a critical assessment of recent theories in psychoanalysis, anthropology and gender studies on the relation between Self and Other, with particular reference to the notion of performance which allows us to reestablish a link with Aristotle's Poetica. The dissertation goes on to question the opposition between originality and imitativeness, and concludes with the suggestion that the very concept of Self and Other needs qualification.Curandeirismo in the Reconcavo of Bahia : a study in cultural syncretism based on the fusion of African, indigenous and European curing practices
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15384
The study records thaumaturgic methods of curing and preventing illness and misfortune as practiced by curandeiros (curers, folk doctors) using an ethnographic-linguistic approach based on fieldwork in the Reconcavo area of the State of Bahia in Northeast Brazil. The Reconcavo is a fairly narrow strip of land surrounding the Bay of All the Saints with its social and economic focus at Salvador, the capital of Bahia State. The study is structured to give particular attention to an examination of the religious based on which these practices may be founded, to include condomble, a religion of African origin which became rooted in this area with the importation of slaves, principally from west Africa from the middle of the sixteenth century to the middle of the of the nineteenth; Catholicism as introduced by the Portuguese and other Iberian colonizers; indigenous religions and Spiritism. Points of similarity in curing methods that may have existed among African, Puropean and indigenous cultures represented in the Reconcavo are also examined in an attempt trace how some of these similarities may have fused in a gradual process of syncretism to produce corandeirismo as it exists in the area today. The study is concluded with an assessment of the extent to which curandeirismo is practiced in the Reconcavo and the likelihood of its survival. Proceeding from a brief historical survey of the Reconcavo and its colonization, development and economy, the writer examines the different religious currents brought by colonization and population movement, giving a resume of the main doctrines of Spiritism and an account of traditional Candomble to include an exposition of the patterns of belief on which the present Candomble de caboclo is based. He then discusses the persistence and evolution of African religion in Brazil, and the dual role of the priest and curer in African-based religion. Aspects of the curing process such as ritual beating, fumigation, bathing and symbolic purgation of evil are then examined, together with details of ritual procedure and the incantations which accompany many of them. Powders and herbs, their properties and uses are then analysed, the function and composition of amulets in preventing and curing illness is then studied, as is the use of curing prayers, a number of which are transcribed and annotated. The study is illustrated with maps and photographs. Herbs employed in the rituals discussed are listed in appendices, and there is a glossary of non-English terms
1976-01-01T00:00:00ZWilliams, Paul V. A.The study records thaumaturgic methods of curing and preventing illness and misfortune as practiced by curandeiros (curers, folk doctors) using an ethnographic-linguistic approach based on fieldwork in the Reconcavo area of the State of Bahia in Northeast Brazil. The Reconcavo is a fairly narrow strip of land surrounding the Bay of All the Saints with its social and economic focus at Salvador, the capital of Bahia State. The study is structured to give particular attention to an examination of the religious based on which these practices may be founded, to include condomble, a religion of African origin which became rooted in this area with the importation of slaves, principally from west Africa from the middle of the sixteenth century to the middle of the of the nineteenth; Catholicism as introduced by the Portuguese and other Iberian colonizers; indigenous religions and Spiritism. Points of similarity in curing methods that may have existed among African, Puropean and indigenous cultures represented in the Reconcavo are also examined in an attempt trace how some of these similarities may have fused in a gradual process of syncretism to produce corandeirismo as it exists in the area today. The study is concluded with an assessment of the extent to which curandeirismo is practiced in the Reconcavo and the likelihood of its survival. Proceeding from a brief historical survey of the Reconcavo and its colonization, development and economy, the writer examines the different religious currents brought by colonization and population movement, giving a resume of the main doctrines of Spiritism and an account of traditional Candomble to include an exposition of the patterns of belief on which the present Candomble de caboclo is based. He then discusses the persistence and evolution of African religion in Brazil, and the dual role of the priest and curer in African-based religion. Aspects of the curing process such as ritual beating, fumigation, bathing and symbolic purgation of evil are then examined, together with details of ritual procedure and the incantations which accompany many of them. Powders and herbs, their properties and uses are then analysed, the function and composition of amulets in preventing and curing illness is then studied, as is the use of curing prayers, a number of which are transcribed and annotated. The study is illustrated with maps and photographs. Herbs employed in the rituals discussed are listed in appendices, and there is a glossary of non-English termsAn anthropology of the 'New Age' : with special reference to Glastonbury, Somerset
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15383
This thesis is an anthropological study of the New Age movement, in the area of Glastonbury, Somerset, England. It is based upon one year's participant observation in Glastonbury from October 1989 to November 1990. The thesis looks at the philosophy of living which these people, referred to as 'New Agers', have adopted, and which they believe to present an alternative to the values of mainstream Western society. I examine how they combine their ideas with the pressures of living as a sub-culture within British society. I begin this thesis by posing the question, what is the New Age?' In doing so 1 raise questions about the classification of groups, notions of community, and the boundary of the group. Introducing my ethnographic example of the New Age movement in Glastonbury, I attempt to provide a backdrop in the context of locality. I then proceed to present the ethnography under the themes of holism and individualism. The analytical commentary that follows the ethnography discusses individualism and holism with reference to Louis Dumont's work. In contrast to Dumont I present the two ideas as a complement rather than mutually exclusive. I conclude by looking at the New Age movement within the wider historical context of Utopian groups.
1992-01-01T00:00:00ZPrince, Ruth E. C.This thesis is an anthropological study of the New Age movement, in the area of Glastonbury, Somerset, England. It is based upon one year's participant observation in Glastonbury from October 1989 to November 1990. The thesis looks at the philosophy of living which these people, referred to as 'New Agers', have adopted, and which they believe to present an alternative to the values of mainstream Western society. I examine how they combine their ideas with the pressures of living as a sub-culture within British society. I begin this thesis by posing the question, what is the New Age?' In doing so 1 raise questions about the classification of groups, notions of community, and the boundary of the group. Introducing my ethnographic example of the New Age movement in Glastonbury, I attempt to provide a backdrop in the context of locality. I then proceed to present the ethnography under the themes of holism and individualism. The analytical commentary that follows the ethnography discusses individualism and holism with reference to Louis Dumont's work. In contrast to Dumont I present the two ideas as a complement rather than mutually exclusive. I conclude by looking at the New Age movement within the wider historical context of Utopian groups.Discussing "human rights" : an anthropological exposition on "human rights" discourse
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15382
This thesis examines how the displaced Sudanese in Egypt, Kenya, and the United Kingdom discuss the topic of "Human Rights". Whereas many studies on "Human Rights" are primarily concerned with the opinions of outsiders, an attempt is made here to provide an alternative perspective in that the focus of this dissertation is on how the displaced Sudanese, themselves, discuss "Human Rights" in view of their situation as exiles. The thesis begins by tracing the historical evolution of the 'Western' concept of "Human Rights" and investigating the historical relationship between Anthropology and "Human Rights". Attention is paid to the role of the doctrine of "cultural relativism" in the discipline of Anthropology. After briefly looking at Sudan's geographical and social makeup, I explain the difficulties I encountered as an independent scholar conducting research on "Human Rights" and Sudan. This is followed by descriptions of the fieldwork locations. What comes next is the heart and soul of the thesis. After giving brief descriptions of the interviewees, 1 analyse how the interviews were conducted and explain how the issue of "Politics" dominated practically every discussion with the interviewees. Next, excerpts from nineteen interviews are presented for the reader to get acquainted with the conversations between the Interviewees and myself. Finally, an examination is made of how "Human Rights" is employed as a manipulative device (or tool) by the interviewees. This is essentially the crux of the study. The chief aim of the thesis is to present various ways the notion of "Human Rights" can be (and is) interpreted and utilised by the displaced Sudanese in the context of their own circumstances as exiles.
1997-01-01T00:00:00ZBajor, William J.This thesis examines how the displaced Sudanese in Egypt, Kenya, and the United Kingdom discuss the topic of "Human Rights". Whereas many studies on "Human Rights" are primarily concerned with the opinions of outsiders, an attempt is made here to provide an alternative perspective in that the focus of this dissertation is on how the displaced Sudanese, themselves, discuss "Human Rights" in view of their situation as exiles. The thesis begins by tracing the historical evolution of the 'Western' concept of "Human Rights" and investigating the historical relationship between Anthropology and "Human Rights". Attention is paid to the role of the doctrine of "cultural relativism" in the discipline of Anthropology. After briefly looking at Sudan's geographical and social makeup, I explain the difficulties I encountered as an independent scholar conducting research on "Human Rights" and Sudan. This is followed by descriptions of the fieldwork locations. What comes next is the heart and soul of the thesis. After giving brief descriptions of the interviewees, 1 analyse how the interviews were conducted and explain how the issue of "Politics" dominated practically every discussion with the interviewees. Next, excerpts from nineteen interviews are presented for the reader to get acquainted with the conversations between the Interviewees and myself. Finally, an examination is made of how "Human Rights" is employed as a manipulative device (or tool) by the interviewees. This is essentially the crux of the study. The chief aim of the thesis is to present various ways the notion of "Human Rights" can be (and is) interpreted and utilised by the displaced Sudanese in the context of their own circumstances as exiles.The implications of manioc cultivation in the culture and mythology of the Machiguenga of South Eastern Peru
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15381
The aim of this thesis to effect an introduction to the place of manioc (Manihot esculenta Crantz) in the culture of the Machiguenga Indians of the Peruvian rain forest. The main substance of my work finds its focus in a myth, the narrative of which was recorded during fieldwork on location in the Urubamba region of south east Peru. My thesis will attempt to examine the role of manioc and the justification of its description as a 'sacred plant' the Machiguenga. The evidence I put forward to demonstrate the significance of manioc comes under the following headings: a) manioc cultivation and dietary uses b) manioc plant taxonomy c) the manioc myth itself, which I have transcribed and translated from my recordings. Whilst the anthropological structures of the myth are examined, no attempt will be made to deal in detail with the vocabulary and morphology of the Machiguenga language. While conceding that it is vital to show the connection between the material use of manioc and the belief structure surrounding it, material already collected would suggest a more ambitious piece of work than a Master of Philosophy degree would allow, and I hope in the future to undertake full-scale investigation into this largely untouched aspect of Machiguenga social and religious organization. The present work aims only at an introduction to the people and their use of manioc, and the presentation of the manioc myth.
1986-01-01T00:00:00ZLewington, AnnaThe aim of this thesis to effect an introduction to the place of manioc (Manihot esculenta Crantz) in the culture of the Machiguenga Indians of the Peruvian rain forest. The main substance of my work finds its focus in a myth, the narrative of which was recorded during fieldwork on location in the Urubamba region of south east Peru. My thesis will attempt to examine the role of manioc and the justification of its description as a 'sacred plant' the Machiguenga. The evidence I put forward to demonstrate the significance of manioc comes under the following headings: a) manioc cultivation and dietary uses b) manioc plant taxonomy c) the manioc myth itself, which I have transcribed and translated from my recordings. Whilst the anthropological structures of the myth are examined, no attempt will be made to deal in detail with the vocabulary and morphology of the Machiguenga language. While conceding that it is vital to show the connection between the material use of manioc and the belief structure surrounding it, material already collected would suggest a more ambitious piece of work than a Master of Philosophy degree would allow, and I hope in the future to undertake full-scale investigation into this largely untouched aspect of Machiguenga social and religious organization. The present work aims only at an introduction to the people and their use of manioc, and the presentation of the manioc myth.Language in a dependent society : Belize, Central America
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15380
In Belize the medium of instruction in schools is English, despite the fact that the pupils do not speak English as their first language. Some Spanish-speakers would like to see Spanish used as a medium of instruction in schools too. Other Spanish- speakers think this would lessen their chances in national and international socioeconomic and political circumstances where English is the dominant language. The evaluation of language use in schools is just one aspect of a multitude of attitudes Belizeans have about language in their lives. These language attitudes are an expression of Belizean responses to the socioeconomic dynamic in Belizean society. Their attitudes are determined by sociocultural, socioeconomic and political allegiances. There is some conflict between those whose stake is in the status quo in Belize, whereby it is economically dependent on its historic links with the United States, the Commonwealth, the United Kingdom and the European Economic Community, and those Spanish speakers, who have prospered from the production of sugar-cane and come to vie with the Creoles for socioeconomic predominance, who feel that their interests would be better served by developing economic and cultural links with Latin American countries. This more or less overt tension in Belizean society means that there is no recognition of an emergent Belizean identity which brings together Creole and Hispanic cultural manifestations and has Belizean Creole as its linguistic expression. The strengths of the languages involved lie in the economic base and potential of the respective speakers. Whatever the outcome of these forces Belizeans would benefit from positively acknowledging the linguistic diversity in their nation and fostering their achievements in two or more languages, as this linguistic flexibility could be one of their main resources in responding to the developments in their geopolitical and economic situation.
1988-01-01T00:00:00ZWelsh, ElizabethIn Belize the medium of instruction in schools is English, despite the fact that the pupils do not speak English as their first language. Some Spanish-speakers would like to see Spanish used as a medium of instruction in schools too. Other Spanish- speakers think this would lessen their chances in national and international socioeconomic and political circumstances where English is the dominant language. The evaluation of language use in schools is just one aspect of a multitude of attitudes Belizeans have about language in their lives. These language attitudes are an expression of Belizean responses to the socioeconomic dynamic in Belizean society. Their attitudes are determined by sociocultural, socioeconomic and political allegiances. There is some conflict between those whose stake is in the status quo in Belize, whereby it is economically dependent on its historic links with the United States, the Commonwealth, the United Kingdom and the European Economic Community, and those Spanish speakers, who have prospered from the production of sugar-cane and come to vie with the Creoles for socioeconomic predominance, who feel that their interests would be better served by developing economic and cultural links with Latin American countries. This more or less overt tension in Belizean society means that there is no recognition of an emergent Belizean identity which brings together Creole and Hispanic cultural manifestations and has Belizean Creole as its linguistic expression. The strengths of the languages involved lie in the economic base and potential of the respective speakers. Whatever the outcome of these forces Belizeans would benefit from positively acknowledging the linguistic diversity in their nation and fostering their achievements in two or more languages, as this linguistic flexibility could be one of their main resources in responding to the developments in their geopolitical and economic situation."Nganampalampa - definitely all ours" : the contestation and appropriation of Uluru (Ayers Rock) by tourists and aborigines
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15378
The thesis examines the response of Aborigines (Anangu) to the situation of mass tourism at Ulunu (Ayers Rock) in central Australia. When tourists visit Ulunu, the harsh environment brings them into a sudden, often unpleasant, awareness of their own bodies. This corporeal consciousness affects the interest they have in regard to those living there long term (Anangu, Park rangers, and workers in the tourism industry). Consequently, the questions tourists ask about Anangu focus on how they cope with life in this harsh area. To Anangu, though, Ulunu and the surrounding area is a political and ideological landscape. They wish to educate tourists about the meanings the land has for them, using stories from the Tjukurpa (Dreaming) to illustrate how Anangu see their place in the world: as rightful owners and custodians of Ulunu. Unfortunately, tourists have experienced a shift from the familiar, intellectual realm to a physical realm of senses and body processes, and their interest is not in Anangu ideology and politics, but in the maintenance of Anangu bodies. A tension occurs when Anangu force tourists to consider Aboriginal culture through their message of not climbing Ulunu, the intended activity for the majority of tourists. This message articulates the differences between Anangu and tourists, and in recent years it has become more strident, to the extent of altering Tjukurpa stories to illustrate it. Anangu engagement with tourism is used to promote political messages; but the success of this endeavour depends on the tourists' own experience of the landscape. Further, the thesis offers an ethnography and analysis of the lives and communities that constitute various categories of white workers in the area and demonstrates their attitudes both towards each other, and to Anangu and tourists.
1999-01-01T00:00:00ZFleet, KimThe thesis examines the response of Aborigines (Anangu) to the situation of mass tourism at Ulunu (Ayers Rock) in central Australia. When tourists visit Ulunu, the harsh environment brings them into a sudden, often unpleasant, awareness of their own bodies. This corporeal consciousness affects the interest they have in regard to those living there long term (Anangu, Park rangers, and workers in the tourism industry). Consequently, the questions tourists ask about Anangu focus on how they cope with life in this harsh area. To Anangu, though, Ulunu and the surrounding area is a political and ideological landscape. They wish to educate tourists about the meanings the land has for them, using stories from the Tjukurpa (Dreaming) to illustrate how Anangu see their place in the world: as rightful owners and custodians of Ulunu. Unfortunately, tourists have experienced a shift from the familiar, intellectual realm to a physical realm of senses and body processes, and their interest is not in Anangu ideology and politics, but in the maintenance of Anangu bodies. A tension occurs when Anangu force tourists to consider Aboriginal culture through their message of not climbing Ulunu, the intended activity for the majority of tourists. This message articulates the differences between Anangu and tourists, and in recent years it has become more strident, to the extent of altering Tjukurpa stories to illustrate it. Anangu engagement with tourism is used to promote political messages; but the success of this endeavour depends on the tourists' own experience of the landscape. Further, the thesis offers an ethnography and analysis of the lives and communities that constitute various categories of white workers in the area and demonstrates their attitudes both towards each other, and to Anangu and tourists.Cultured action theatre in selected regions of anglophone and francophone Cameroon
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15377
This study is primarily concerned with notions of identity and conceptions of development in Cameroonian village, city and national theatre performances, as well as audience responses to them. What I call 'Cultural Action Theatre' is different in many respects from Theatre for Development: the latter is dominated by theatre activists, is short-lived and involves enormous cost and organisation; the former is produced by members of a community, is long-lived and less costly. The messages in performances are analysed and given meanings by the audience, whose responses are determined by contemporary political events. These events also affect the nature of theatre performances. Performances suggest that Cameroonians are dissatisfied with the economic and political relationship between Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon and between Cameroon and developed countries. The study reveals that Cultural Action Theatre is used by oppressed people (e.g. women) to convey messages to their superiors (men, chiefs and politicians), and that oppressed groups produce more theatre than privileged groups. Disadvantaged Anglophone theatre practitioners use a direct style to convey practical problems whereas Francophones use a subtle style to express predominantly philosophical issues. This theatre deals with issues of local, regional and national identity and also with political leadership and morality. The choice of a particular language in any given performance is also crucial in engendering different cultural and political identities. This study argues that to mobilise people for action, a play must appeal to their sense of identity and to portray the advantages that would arise from their action. Theatre practitioners at all levels in Cameroon are concerned with different causes of national underdevelopment and hence conceive of the notion and the practice of development from different angles. The main body of the thesis is divided into two parts. The introduction to the thesis briefly describes the geography of Cameroon, the historical influences on the domains of education, society, economy and politics, and on the Anglophone and Francophone zones of Cameroon, and it discusses terminologies and concepts and my methodology. Part one consists of two chapters. Chapter one describes village performances in selected regions in Anglophone and Francophone zones. Chapter two is concerned with city performances in the respective selected zones. Part two, chapter 3-6, concentrates on national performances. Chapter three describes political leaders and development in Anglophone and Francophone National performances. Chapter four focuses on women and their role in national performances. Chapter five examines cultural and political identities in national performances. Chapter six is concerned with morality, ethics and national sentiments in national performances. The conclusion summarises my findings.
1994-01-01T00:00:00ZTanyi-Tang, AnneThis study is primarily concerned with notions of identity and conceptions of development in Cameroonian village, city and national theatre performances, as well as audience responses to them. What I call 'Cultural Action Theatre' is different in many respects from Theatre for Development: the latter is dominated by theatre activists, is short-lived and involves enormous cost and organisation; the former is produced by members of a community, is long-lived and less costly. The messages in performances are analysed and given meanings by the audience, whose responses are determined by contemporary political events. These events also affect the nature of theatre performances. Performances suggest that Cameroonians are dissatisfied with the economic and political relationship between Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon and between Cameroon and developed countries. The study reveals that Cultural Action Theatre is used by oppressed people (e.g. women) to convey messages to their superiors (men, chiefs and politicians), and that oppressed groups produce more theatre than privileged groups. Disadvantaged Anglophone theatre practitioners use a direct style to convey practical problems whereas Francophones use a subtle style to express predominantly philosophical issues. This theatre deals with issues of local, regional and national identity and also with political leadership and morality. The choice of a particular language in any given performance is also crucial in engendering different cultural and political identities. This study argues that to mobilise people for action, a play must appeal to their sense of identity and to portray the advantages that would arise from their action. Theatre practitioners at all levels in Cameroon are concerned with different causes of national underdevelopment and hence conceive of the notion and the practice of development from different angles. The main body of the thesis is divided into two parts. The introduction to the thesis briefly describes the geography of Cameroon, the historical influences on the domains of education, society, economy and politics, and on the Anglophone and Francophone zones of Cameroon, and it discusses terminologies and concepts and my methodology. Part one consists of two chapters. Chapter one describes village performances in selected regions in Anglophone and Francophone zones. Chapter two is concerned with city performances in the respective selected zones. Part two, chapter 3-6, concentrates on national performances. Chapter three describes political leaders and development in Anglophone and Francophone National performances. Chapter four focuses on women and their role in national performances. Chapter five examines cultural and political identities in national performances. Chapter six is concerned with morality, ethics and national sentiments in national performances. The conclusion summarises my findings.Social stratification among the Zaghawa Muslim community in the Sudan
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15375
This thesis is concerned with the social organization of the Zaghawa Muslim community in the Northern Darfur province of the Republic of the Sudan. The Zaghawa are internally divided into two distinct groups beri and mai. The former constitute the majority of the Zaghawa society whereas the latter are a minority group of hereditarly and occupationally specialized craftsmen (blacksmiths, hunters, potters, healers and diviners). Although the two groups claim to be adherents of Islam, the beri are of the belief that the mal are pagans and religiously Impure. To avoid being contaminated by the mal, the beri adopt endo-gamous marriages, residential segregation and restricted comnensality. The thesis critically examines the literature on caste and considers the divergent views on whether caste is confined to India or a universal phenomenon which can possibly be encountered in Africa as well. The author maintains that the narrow definition of the term caste as a unique phenomenon confined to India is inappropriate for there exist many societies outside India which share the structural and cultural features of the Indian caste system. Hence he suggests that the term caste should be broadly defined to embrace any society which displays the characteristic features of caste irrespective of its geographical location. Despite the Zaghawa being broadly divided into beri and mai, sociologically more Important Is their categorization into kire bor, miskin and mal. The thesis explains how the Zaghawa society represents a caste-like system and shows how both the marginal kire bor and miskin are able to achieve social mobility whereas It Is impossible for the mal to do so. The study also focuses on the role of the kinship solidarity and village membership in maintaining social security and community welfare, It also examines how the Zaghawa traditionally respond to drought and famine and explains why their traditional institutions of coping with famine failed to save them from the late famine disaster which occured in the African Sahel.
1988-01-01T00:00:00ZMohamed-Salih, El Tigani MustafaThis thesis is concerned with the social organization of the Zaghawa Muslim community in the Northern Darfur province of the Republic of the Sudan. The Zaghawa are internally divided into two distinct groups beri and mai. The former constitute the majority of the Zaghawa society whereas the latter are a minority group of hereditarly and occupationally specialized craftsmen (blacksmiths, hunters, potters, healers and diviners). Although the two groups claim to be adherents of Islam, the beri are of the belief that the mal are pagans and religiously Impure. To avoid being contaminated by the mal, the beri adopt endo-gamous marriages, residential segregation and restricted comnensality. The thesis critically examines the literature on caste and considers the divergent views on whether caste is confined to India or a universal phenomenon which can possibly be encountered in Africa as well. The author maintains that the narrow definition of the term caste as a unique phenomenon confined to India is inappropriate for there exist many societies outside India which share the structural and cultural features of the Indian caste system. Hence he suggests that the term caste should be broadly defined to embrace any society which displays the characteristic features of caste irrespective of its geographical location. Despite the Zaghawa being broadly divided into beri and mai, sociologically more Important Is their categorization into kire bor, miskin and mal. The thesis explains how the Zaghawa society represents a caste-like system and shows how both the marginal kire bor and miskin are able to achieve social mobility whereas It Is impossible for the mal to do so. The study also focuses on the role of the kinship solidarity and village membership in maintaining social security and community welfare, It also examines how the Zaghawa traditionally respond to drought and famine and explains why their traditional institutions of coping with famine failed to save them from the late famine disaster which occured in the African Sahel.Economic crisis and the relevance of matriliny and chiefship among the Asante of Pranum District, Ghana
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15374
This thesis explores the continued relevance of matriliny among the present-day Asante of Pranum District in Ghana. At the core of this investigation is Domeabra-Owerriman Traditional Area which is in a state of crisis caused by the decline in cocoa production and the superimposition, by government edict, of the World Bank's 'Structural Adjustment Programme'. An examination of household economic strategy in Domeabra-Owerriman reveals that, as in the traditional past, in the face of ecological and economic catastrophes Asante continue to invoke matrilineal notions. These days such notions are especially pertinent in respect of the organisation of overseas migration. The thesis reviews the organisation of the traditional chiefship institution, and examines its continued relevance to Asante. Engaging with the anthropological literature on matriliny, it argues that, in the present-day world, chiefship crucially supplies legitimacy and value to matriliny, and thus underpins it as an important institution for the articulation of Asante affairs. As a citizen of Domeabra-Owerriman myself, an overseas migrant in both Norway and Britain, and a recent contestant for a local chieftaincy, my own vivid impression and experiences supply much by way of the ethnography reported in this thesis.
1999-01-01T00:00:00ZKwabiah, Baafour Kwaku Adomako-AttahThis thesis explores the continued relevance of matriliny among the present-day Asante of Pranum District in Ghana. At the core of this investigation is Domeabra-Owerriman Traditional Area which is in a state of crisis caused by the decline in cocoa production and the superimposition, by government edict, of the World Bank's 'Structural Adjustment Programme'. An examination of household economic strategy in Domeabra-Owerriman reveals that, as in the traditional past, in the face of ecological and economic catastrophes Asante continue to invoke matrilineal notions. These days such notions are especially pertinent in respect of the organisation of overseas migration. The thesis reviews the organisation of the traditional chiefship institution, and examines its continued relevance to Asante. Engaging with the anthropological literature on matriliny, it argues that, in the present-day world, chiefship crucially supplies legitimacy and value to matriliny, and thus underpins it as an important institution for the articulation of Asante affairs. As a citizen of Domeabra-Owerriman myself, an overseas migrant in both Norway and Britain, and a recent contestant for a local chieftaincy, my own vivid impression and experiences supply much by way of the ethnography reported in this thesis.Development agencies and their clients : the case of the En Nahud smallholder agricultural project (ENSAP), Sudan
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15260
This thesis is concerned with rural development in Ghubeish village communities in En Nahud district, Northern Kordofan, Sudan. The area currently experiences an intervention in its traditional rain-fed agriculture by an NGO and is supposedly an area where rural development is underway. The thesis has to make use of an 'eclectic approach' which, in my view, is theoretically grounded to provide a holistic account of the development process. The 'eclectic approach' is an amlagam of the micro- and macro-approaches to development. Traditional anthropological approaches to development are mostly predicated on the too narrow premises of micro-models (e.g. transactional, actor-oriented etc.), and this renders them ill-equipped to take any account of the macro-level processes (such as local government, agencies etc.), which come directly to bear on the local scene. This, plainly, does not fully grasp the totality of the development enterprise (micro and macro). Despite being viewed as polar opposites, both the micro- and macro-approaches are necessary for the study of rural development at the local level. Rather than detracting from theoretical strength, combining such models in an overall 'eclectic approach' adds to the vigour of the theoretical analysis. Ten villages were selected for the present study, with between 274 and 1957 inhabitants. The population is from the Hamar tribe, which has historically witnessed a long process of transformation from semi-pastoralism to sedentary agriculture, combining subsistence and cash crop production. The basis of agriculture is predominantly traditional, using simple implements in a savannah environment. The majority of the inhabitants are smallholder farmers cultivating less than thirty makhamas (1 makhamas = 1.79 acres), though a significant proportion are large landowners. In addition to household labour hired labour and sharaka (share- cropping) contribute to the overall structure of the farming system. Despite the fact that land remains plentiful, expansion of the area under cultivation was restricted by capital shortage (which gave rise to informal and exploitative credit systems), and the simplicity of the agricultural technique. The intention this thesis is to bring to the foreground the views and perceptions of the people in these villages who are affected by the development project and to compare them with those held by the agency itself. It is shown that some of the respective views square and others diverge, whilst closer communication works to bridge the misunderstanding and misplaced stereotyping held by both sides. The study also shows that the government authority tends to ignore the villagers in their remoteness despite its plans for community development. Evaluation of the project shows that over the limited period of three years (mid-term) of project implementation the agency has partly succeeded in its experiment with institutionalising a low-cost and sustainable credit/extension system appropriate to the needs of smallholder farmers. But, on balance, it had had a limited impact towards reaching its goal of raising, significantly, smallholders' income.
1994-01-01T00:00:00ZAdam, Abdel Raouf MohamedThis thesis is concerned with rural development in Ghubeish village communities in En Nahud district, Northern Kordofan, Sudan. The area currently experiences an intervention in its traditional rain-fed agriculture by an NGO and is supposedly an area where rural development is underway. The thesis has to make use of an 'eclectic approach' which, in my view, is theoretically grounded to provide a holistic account of the development process. The 'eclectic approach' is an amlagam of the micro- and macro-approaches to development. Traditional anthropological approaches to development are mostly predicated on the too narrow premises of micro-models (e.g. transactional, actor-oriented etc.), and this renders them ill-equipped to take any account of the macro-level processes (such as local government, agencies etc.), which come directly to bear on the local scene. This, plainly, does not fully grasp the totality of the development enterprise (micro and macro). Despite being viewed as polar opposites, both the micro- and macro-approaches are necessary for the study of rural development at the local level. Rather than detracting from theoretical strength, combining such models in an overall 'eclectic approach' adds to the vigour of the theoretical analysis. Ten villages were selected for the present study, with between 274 and 1957 inhabitants. The population is from the Hamar tribe, which has historically witnessed a long process of transformation from semi-pastoralism to sedentary agriculture, combining subsistence and cash crop production. The basis of agriculture is predominantly traditional, using simple implements in a savannah environment. The majority of the inhabitants are smallholder farmers cultivating less than thirty makhamas (1 makhamas = 1.79 acres), though a significant proportion are large landowners. In addition to household labour hired labour and sharaka (share- cropping) contribute to the overall structure of the farming system. Despite the fact that land remains plentiful, expansion of the area under cultivation was restricted by capital shortage (which gave rise to informal and exploitative credit systems), and the simplicity of the agricultural technique. The intention this thesis is to bring to the foreground the views and perceptions of the people in these villages who are affected by the development project and to compare them with those held by the agency itself. It is shown that some of the respective views square and others diverge, whilst closer communication works to bridge the misunderstanding and misplaced stereotyping held by both sides. The study also shows that the government authority tends to ignore the villagers in their remoteness despite its plans for community development. Evaluation of the project shows that over the limited period of three years (mid-term) of project implementation the agency has partly succeeded in its experiment with institutionalising a low-cost and sustainable credit/extension system appropriate to the needs of smallholder farmers. But, on balance, it had had a limited impact towards reaching its goal of raising, significantly, smallholders' income.Anthropology and development planning, with special reference to a large-scale agricultural project in Sudan
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15257
This thesis is concerned with rural development in Nuba peasant communities of the Southern Kordofan region, Sudan. Peasants have always been considered by planners as scapegoats for the failure of state-designed rural development schemes in Third World societies. This plainly does not grasp the cause of such failure. The thesis argues against both the practice and theoretical foundations on which rural development planning is based. The author maintains that empirical investigation at the grassroots level is badly needed to fully grasp and explain the total situation of the indigenous communities and their forms of organisation. The author singles out one Nuba peasant society located at Habila, where rural development is currently underway; he examines the roots of the failure of the state-initiated Habila scheme to arouse the popular participation of the poor Nuba peasants. The Nuba are primarily subsistence farmers cultivating dura, cotton, sesame, tobacco and vegetables. The majority have professed Islam, though a few are still Pagans and Christians. The thesis aims to bring to the foreground some of the socio-economic and cultural factors which have direct bearing on rural development. Underpinning the theoretical analysis are cultural and strategic perspectives relating to social action. Failure of economists to provide a sufficient explanation for the poor response of the Nuba peasants to the cooperative schemes of Habila has stimulated such perspectives which, the author contends, are badly needed for examining development situations at the level of the local community. The author concludes that the dissolution of the traditional forms of cooperation as a result of the commercialisation of the economy is mainly responsible for the failure of the Habila cooperative schemes to attract local peasants. But, ironically the scheme itself seems to perpetuate the same problems which it aims to mitigate, included here are the trends of labour migration and the ideology of consumerism.
1989-01-01T00:00:00ZAdam, Abdel Raouf MohamedThis thesis is concerned with rural development in Nuba peasant communities of the Southern Kordofan region, Sudan. Peasants have always been considered by planners as scapegoats for the failure of state-designed rural development schemes in Third World societies. This plainly does not grasp the cause of such failure. The thesis argues against both the practice and theoretical foundations on which rural development planning is based. The author maintains that empirical investigation at the grassroots level is badly needed to fully grasp and explain the total situation of the indigenous communities and their forms of organisation. The author singles out one Nuba peasant society located at Habila, where rural development is currently underway; he examines the roots of the failure of the state-initiated Habila scheme to arouse the popular participation of the poor Nuba peasants. The Nuba are primarily subsistence farmers cultivating dura, cotton, sesame, tobacco and vegetables. The majority have professed Islam, though a few are still Pagans and Christians. The thesis aims to bring to the foreground some of the socio-economic and cultural factors which have direct bearing on rural development. Underpinning the theoretical analysis are cultural and strategic perspectives relating to social action. Failure of economists to provide a sufficient explanation for the poor response of the Nuba peasants to the cooperative schemes of Habila has stimulated such perspectives which, the author contends, are badly needed for examining development situations at the level of the local community. The author concludes that the dissolution of the traditional forms of cooperation as a result of the commercialisation of the economy is mainly responsible for the failure of the Habila cooperative schemes to attract local peasants. But, ironically the scheme itself seems to perpetuate the same problems which it aims to mitigate, included here are the trends of labour migration and the ideology of consumerism.Entitlement in mathematics
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14980
This first half of this thesis investigates the epistemological foundations of mathematical theories, with special attention devoted to two questions: (1) how can we have a warrant for the satisfiability and consistency of mathematical theories, and (2) given we conceive of mathematical judgement as objective - as being concerned with a realm of abstract entities - can we have a warrant for thinking that such a realm of entities exists? In Chapter 2, two kinds of mathematical scepticism are developed. The regress sceptic argues that we can have a warrant for accepting neither the satisfiability nor the consistency of a mathematical theory. The I-II-III sceptic maintains that there can be no warrant for thinking that a realm of abstract entities exists if mathematical judgement is conceived as being objective. The notions of entitlement of cognitive project and entitlement of substance - recently introduced into the literature by Crispin Wright - are invoked to respond to the mathematical regress and I-II-III sceptic. This is done in Chapters 3 and 4. The distinctive feature of an entitlement is its non-evidential nature. What is relevant is not the presence of positive evidence, but rather the absence of sufficient countervailing evidence. The second half of the thesis explores and develops certain aspects of this proposal. Chapter 5 develops the notion of entitlement of cognitive project by investigating two of its three defining clauses. Chapter 6 draws a picture of a wider philosophical framework of which entitlement can be regarded an integrated part. In so doing entitlement is discussed in light of the internalism/externalism distinction and the distinction between monism and pluralism about epistemic value. Chapter 7 tables two fundamental challenges to the entitlement proposal - firstly, whether entitlement is an epistemic notion of warrant at all, and secondly, whether the notion of rationality associated with it is epistemic in nature or of some other kind?
2005-01-01T00:00:00ZPedersen, Nikolaj J.This first half of this thesis investigates the epistemological foundations of mathematical theories, with special attention devoted to two questions: (1) how can we have a warrant for the satisfiability and consistency of mathematical theories, and (2) given we conceive of mathematical judgement as objective - as being concerned with a realm of abstract entities - can we have a warrant for thinking that such a realm of entities exists? In Chapter 2, two kinds of mathematical scepticism are developed. The regress sceptic argues that we can have a warrant for accepting neither the satisfiability nor the consistency of a mathematical theory. The I-II-III sceptic maintains that there can be no warrant for thinking that a realm of abstract entities exists if mathematical judgement is conceived as being objective. The notions of entitlement of cognitive project and entitlement of substance - recently introduced into the literature by Crispin Wright - are invoked to respond to the mathematical regress and I-II-III sceptic. This is done in Chapters 3 and 4. The distinctive feature of an entitlement is its non-evidential nature. What is relevant is not the presence of positive evidence, but rather the absence of sufficient countervailing evidence. The second half of the thesis explores and develops certain aspects of this proposal. Chapter 5 develops the notion of entitlement of cognitive project by investigating two of its three defining clauses. Chapter 6 draws a picture of a wider philosophical framework of which entitlement can be regarded an integrated part. In so doing entitlement is discussed in light of the internalism/externalism distinction and the distinction between monism and pluralism about epistemic value. Chapter 7 tables two fundamental challenges to the entitlement proposal - firstly, whether entitlement is an epistemic notion of warrant at all, and secondly, whether the notion of rationality associated with it is epistemic in nature or of some other kind?The context principle and implicit definitions : towards an account of our a priori knowledge of arithmetic
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14916
This thesis is concerned with explaining how a subject can acquire a priori knowledge of arithmetic. Every account for arithmetical, and in general mathematical knowledge faces Benacerraf's well-known challenge, i.e. how to reconcile the truths of mathematics with what can be known by ordinary human thinkers. I suggest four requirements that jointly make up this challenge and discuss and reject four distinct solutions to it. This will motivate a broadly Fregean approach to our knowledge of arithmetic and mathematics in general. Pursuing this strategy appeals to the context principle which, it is proposed, underwrites a form of Platonism and explains how reference to and object-directed thought about abstract entities is, in principle, possible. I discuss this principle and defend it against different criticisms as put forth in recent literature. Moreover, I will offer a general framework for implicit definitions by means of which - without an appeal to a faculty of intuition or purely pragmatic considerations - a priori and non-inferential knowledge of basic mathematical principles can be acquired. In the course of this discussion, I will argue against various types of opposition to this general approach. Also, I will highlight crucial shortcomings in the explanation of how implicit definitions may underwrite a priori knowledge of basic principles in broadly similar conceptions. In the final part, I will offer a general account of how non-inferential mathematical knowledge resulting from implicit definitions is best conceived which avoids these shortcomings.
2005-01-01T00:00:00ZEbert, Philip A.This thesis is concerned with explaining how a subject can acquire a priori knowledge of arithmetic. Every account for arithmetical, and in general mathematical knowledge faces Benacerraf's well-known challenge, i.e. how to reconcile the truths of mathematics with what can be known by ordinary human thinkers. I suggest four requirements that jointly make up this challenge and discuss and reject four distinct solutions to it. This will motivate a broadly Fregean approach to our knowledge of arithmetic and mathematics in general. Pursuing this strategy appeals to the context principle which, it is proposed, underwrites a form of Platonism and explains how reference to and object-directed thought about abstract entities is, in principle, possible. I discuss this principle and defend it against different criticisms as put forth in recent literature. Moreover, I will offer a general framework for implicit definitions by means of which - without an appeal to a faculty of intuition or purely pragmatic considerations - a priori and non-inferential knowledge of basic mathematical principles can be acquired. In the course of this discussion, I will argue against various types of opposition to this general approach. Also, I will highlight crucial shortcomings in the explanation of how implicit definitions may underwrite a priori knowledge of basic principles in broadly similar conceptions. In the final part, I will offer a general account of how non-inferential mathematical knowledge resulting from implicit definitions is best conceived which avoids these shortcomings.The true, the good, and the beautiful : the dark side of humanist science ; a study in the anthropology of science and social history
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14915
How do we systematise our knowledge without undermining mores and beliefs that have thus far guided our conduct? How do we account for free will in a cosmos made of molecules and universal laws? Is a metaphysical rebellion against the absurdity of a universe devoid of ethical significance unavoidable? Is this rebellion inevitably leading to the organization of the world in exclusively human terms? These are the problems that have been tackled among others by Dostoevskij, Kafka, Dickens, and Camus, thinkers who framed questions of paramount importance without finding persuasive answers (Davison 1997; Dodd 1992; Lary 1973). These are the same problems that many bio-scientists have grappled with in the past and I analyze the solutions they have identified. This work of mine could be seen as a follow-up to the qualitative survey carried out by Kerr, Cunningham-Burley, and Amos in 1998 among British scientists and clinicians with a well-established reputation. That investigation looked into the way the latter distance themselves from the dark shadow of eugenics and revealed that die equation of old eugenics and new genetics is deemed irrational because; scientific knowledge has grown by leaps and bounds ever since o the socio-political circumstances are radically different as coercion is unthinkable and the final decision rests with the individual who is protected by the principle of informed choice; o the aims of eugenics simply cannot be technically met; o the new genetics involves therapeutic aims as opposed to eugenics that concentrated on the alteration of the human gene pool; o the application of science is not necessarily one of scientists' main concerns; My contention is that these objections are too facile and unpersuasive. I submit that there is an obvious connection between how the existential and humanistic side of science failed to prove humanitarian, namely benevolent, compassionate and ultimately useful - the good -, the effort by several academicians to ground ethics on scientific evidence - the true -, And our incapacity to confront abnormality - the beautiful. This connection is eugenics. Eugenics is the scientific response to modern existential angst and social predicaments and is here to stay.
2004-01-01T00:00:00ZFait, StefanoHow do we systematise our knowledge without undermining mores and beliefs that have thus far guided our conduct? How do we account for free will in a cosmos made of molecules and universal laws? Is a metaphysical rebellion against the absurdity of a universe devoid of ethical significance unavoidable? Is this rebellion inevitably leading to the organization of the world in exclusively human terms? These are the problems that have been tackled among others by Dostoevskij, Kafka, Dickens, and Camus, thinkers who framed questions of paramount importance without finding persuasive answers (Davison 1997; Dodd 1992; Lary 1973). These are the same problems that many bio-scientists have grappled with in the past and I analyze the solutions they have identified. This work of mine could be seen as a follow-up to the qualitative survey carried out by Kerr, Cunningham-Burley, and Amos in 1998 among British scientists and clinicians with a well-established reputation. That investigation looked into the way the latter distance themselves from the dark shadow of eugenics and revealed that die equation of old eugenics and new genetics is deemed irrational because; scientific knowledge has grown by leaps and bounds ever since o the socio-political circumstances are radically different as coercion is unthinkable and the final decision rests with the individual who is protected by the principle of informed choice; o the aims of eugenics simply cannot be technically met; o the new genetics involves therapeutic aims as opposed to eugenics that concentrated on the alteration of the human gene pool; o the application of science is not necessarily one of scientists' main concerns; My contention is that these objections are too facile and unpersuasive. I submit that there is an obvious connection between how the existential and humanistic side of science failed to prove humanitarian, namely benevolent, compassionate and ultimately useful - the good -, the effort by several academicians to ground ethics on scientific evidence - the true -, And our incapacity to confront abnormality - the beautiful. This connection is eugenics. Eugenics is the scientific response to modern existential angst and social predicaments and is here to stay.Some aspects of the evolutionary origin of human behaviour and their implications for the study of Christian ethics
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14823
1974-10-01T00:00:00ZCromie, Richard MarlinAn application of certain thomistic metaphysical and epistemological theories to the contemporary clash between naturalistic and non-naturalistic ethics
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14821
1953-08-01T00:00:00ZTulloch, Doreen MaryEthical realism in British and American protestantism from 1920 to 1950
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14818
1966-01-01T00:00:00ZShoop, William GeorgeThe ethological roots of morality
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14816
1978-07-01T00:00:00ZButler, Emma FrancisThe theory of rational decision and the foundations of ethics
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14814
The primary concern of this thesis is to investigate what light (if any) the theory of rational decision can throw on certain problems in first-order ethics. In particular, it examines whether given a correct theory of decision we can determine which of the two major rivals in the field of contemporary ethics, utilitarianism and contractarianism, is the more adequate moral theory. I begin by outlining what I call orthodox decision theory and note from this theory together with a minimal characterization of what it is to make a moral judgement we can deduce utilitarianism. The apparent conflict between utilitarianism and our moral intuitions is then examined. I criticize a common response made by utilitarians to this conflict, namely, their recourse to the distinction between rule and act utilitarianism. But I then ask the question of whether this conflict really matters? I conclude that in a sense it does not. I then turn from a consideration of the implications of utilitarianism to its foundations, particularly, its foundations in orthodox decision theory. I attempt to establish that orthodox theory has empirical content and that it has been falsified. I also consider the theory from the normative standpoint and construct a prima facie case against it. I now consider the dispute between the contractarian and the utilitarian and note that it is essentially decision theoretic in character. From a consideration of what was found to be mistaken about orthodox theory I now argue for a defence of the selection rule for rational choice presupposed by contractarianism and thereby offer a (partial) defence of a contractarian theory of justice.
1983-07-01T00:00:00ZSowden, Lanning PatrickThe primary concern of this thesis is to investigate what light (if any) the theory of rational decision can throw on certain problems in first-order ethics. In particular, it examines whether given a correct theory of decision we can determine which of the two major rivals in the field of contemporary ethics, utilitarianism and contractarianism, is the more adequate moral theory. I begin by outlining what I call orthodox decision theory and note from this theory together with a minimal characterization of what it is to make a moral judgement we can deduce utilitarianism. The apparent conflict between utilitarianism and our moral intuitions is then examined. I criticize a common response made by utilitarians to this conflict, namely, their recourse to the distinction between rule and act utilitarianism. But I then ask the question of whether this conflict really matters? I conclude that in a sense it does not. I then turn from a consideration of the implications of utilitarianism to its foundations, particularly, its foundations in orthodox decision theory. I attempt to establish that orthodox theory has empirical content and that it has been falsified. I also consider the theory from the normative standpoint and construct a prima facie case against it. I now consider the dispute between the contractarian and the utilitarian and note that it is essentially decision theoretic in character. From a consideration of what was found to be mistaken about orthodox theory I now argue for a defence of the selection rule for rational choice presupposed by contractarianism and thereby offer a (partial) defence of a contractarian theory of justice.Moral realism, moral expertise and paternalism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14812
In this essay I examine the notion of moral objectivity of moral properties. Moral objectivity seems to be able to resist the arguments of subjectivists. There seem to be true moral sentences and moral facts can explain actions and occurrences in the world. Values seem best accounted for in objective terms and persons can have interests or good independently of their desires. It seems to be reasonable to think of the nature of moral value in terms of consequences. Knowledge requires truth so the objectivity of moral properties makes moral knowledge possible. Moral knowledge should be accounted for in similar terms as other kinds of knowledge. The major requirement on moral knowledge is coherence. Moral expertise is both possible and plausible and so are moral experts. Paternalism is possible because our values can conflict: autonomy can conflict with general welfare. Paternalism is making someone do what is in his own interest. This seems best thought of in terms of the consequences for his good. The justification of paternalistic interventions seems best based on the weighing of the consequences of the intervention and the decision of the agent. One thing which must be taken into this weighing is the rationality of the decision of the agent. Rationality is basically thought of as the maximization of good. Autonomy is part of everyone's good. It can conflict with the agent's general or overall welfare. But the importance of autonomy for every agent creates a presumption against paternalism. But paternalism can maximize autonomy and paternalism can be justified to secure some minimal autonomy. So paternalism and autonomy seem to be compatible.
1992-07-01T00:00:00ZFrimannsson, Gudmundur HeidarIn this essay I examine the notion of moral objectivity of moral properties. Moral objectivity seems to be able to resist the arguments of subjectivists. There seem to be true moral sentences and moral facts can explain actions and occurrences in the world. Values seem best accounted for in objective terms and persons can have interests or good independently of their desires. It seems to be reasonable to think of the nature of moral value in terms of consequences. Knowledge requires truth so the objectivity of moral properties makes moral knowledge possible. Moral knowledge should be accounted for in similar terms as other kinds of knowledge. The major requirement on moral knowledge is coherence. Moral expertise is both possible and plausible and so are moral experts. Paternalism is possible because our values can conflict: autonomy can conflict with general welfare. Paternalism is making someone do what is in his own interest. This seems best thought of in terms of the consequences for his good. The justification of paternalistic interventions seems best based on the weighing of the consequences of the intervention and the decision of the agent. One thing which must be taken into this weighing is the rationality of the decision of the agent. Rationality is basically thought of as the maximization of good. Autonomy is part of everyone's good. It can conflict with the agent's general or overall welfare. But the importance of autonomy for every agent creates a presumption against paternalism. But paternalism can maximize autonomy and paternalism can be justified to secure some minimal autonomy. So paternalism and autonomy seem to be compatible.Art and understanding
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14810
The essay explores topics related to the objectivity and rationality of aesthetics. Initially, the nature of objectivity is considered. The question is raised: what is it for something to be objective? Various metaphysical objections to the view that value is an objective, feature of the world are considered. These include the idea that what truly exists is coincident with that which is subject-independent; that will and cognition are distinct autonomous mental faculties; that value is, epistemologically, a 'queer' commodity the experience of which is qualitatively distinct from sense-experience. Thereafter, aesthetic concepts are investigated more closely. The idea that the meaning of an expression is secured by a definition is challenged. It is argued that the practical impossibility of defining aesthetic terms does not preclude their having a precise meaning in discussion. In particular, the view that understanding is a mental process involving the grasp of something like a definition is criticized. The idea that the sense of a concept is, like the notes of music, influenced by its whole context is introduced. Aesthetic concepts, it is argued, are governed by conditions no less than concepts such as 'intelligent', 'resourceful', and the like. Finally, the view that aesthetic value, being a disposition of the will is cognitively ungoverned is investigated. It is concluded that in so far as the disposition of the will is sensitive to, i. e., can be modified by, means that deserve, in virtue of their wide currency, to be counted rational the will is cognitively constrained.
1989-07-01T00:00:00ZReid, NeilThe essay explores topics related to the objectivity and rationality of aesthetics. Initially, the nature of objectivity is considered. The question is raised: what is it for something to be objective? Various metaphysical objections to the view that value is an objective, feature of the world are considered. These include the idea that what truly exists is coincident with that which is subject-independent; that will and cognition are distinct autonomous mental faculties; that value is, epistemologically, a 'queer' commodity the experience of which is qualitatively distinct from sense-experience. Thereafter, aesthetic concepts are investigated more closely. The idea that the meaning of an expression is secured by a definition is challenged. It is argued that the practical impossibility of defining aesthetic terms does not preclude their having a precise meaning in discussion. In particular, the view that understanding is a mental process involving the grasp of something like a definition is criticized. The idea that the sense of a concept is, like the notes of music, influenced by its whole context is introduced. Aesthetic concepts, it is argued, are governed by conditions no less than concepts such as 'intelligent', 'resourceful', and the like. Finally, the view that aesthetic value, being a disposition of the will is cognitively ungoverned is investigated. It is concluded that in so far as the disposition of the will is sensitive to, i. e., can be modified by, means that deserve, in virtue of their wide currency, to be counted rational the will is cognitively constrained.A philosophical commentary on Schiller's 'Letters on the aesthetic education of man'
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14809
This work provides a detailed philosophical exposition of Schiller's Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man. (1795). In the introduction, the author's aims and methodology are briefly stated. There then follows a survey of those books in English with chapters on the treatise. The introduction concludes with an outline of Kant's critical system, and a summary of his theories of aesthetic judgement, art and beauty. The main body of the work consists of an exegesis of Schiller's text. Its 27 Letters are divided, for convenience, into three parts. In part one (Letters 1 - 9) we follow Schiller as he describes the afflictions of civilization and their cure. From a critique of Contemporary society, he argues for a political revolution resting upon the psycho-ethical reform of the individual. Such reform involves feeling becoming harmonized with reason, through the educative power of beauty and art. In part two (Letters 10 - 17) we follow Schiller as he considers the essential nature of man and beauty. He constructs an a priori model of our fundamental human nature, and asserts the need for, a corresponding model of ideal beauty, if man's dual nature is to be fully realized in a harmoniously integrated manner. In part three (Letters 18 - 27), we follow Schiller as he describes the psychological development of the individual and species from a sensuous to a rational condition, through the mediation of the aesthetic. The exposition is accompanied by assessment and criticism; attention is given to Schiller's changing methodology; and Schiller's ideas and theoretical perspectives are related, where derivative, to those of Kant and Fichte. The conclusion commences with a recapitulation of the main arguments in each Letter. This is followed by an evaluation of the Aesthetic Letters, identifying those specific theories of contemporary relevance, and with the potential for further theoretical development.
1990-07-01T00:00:00ZMurray, Patrick TimothyThis work provides a detailed philosophical exposition of Schiller's Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man. (1795). In the introduction, the author's aims and methodology are briefly stated. There then follows a survey of those books in English with chapters on the treatise. The introduction concludes with an outline of Kant's critical system, and a summary of his theories of aesthetic judgement, art and beauty. The main body of the work consists of an exegesis of Schiller's text. Its 27 Letters are divided, for convenience, into three parts. In part one (Letters 1 - 9) we follow Schiller as he describes the afflictions of civilization and their cure. From a critique of Contemporary society, he argues for a political revolution resting upon the psycho-ethical reform of the individual. Such reform involves feeling becoming harmonized with reason, through the educative power of beauty and art. In part two (Letters 10 - 17) we follow Schiller as he considers the essential nature of man and beauty. He constructs an a priori model of our fundamental human nature, and asserts the need for, a corresponding model of ideal beauty, if man's dual nature is to be fully realized in a harmoniously integrated manner. In part three (Letters 18 - 27), we follow Schiller as he describes the psychological development of the individual and species from a sensuous to a rational condition, through the mediation of the aesthetic. The exposition is accompanied by assessment and criticism; attention is given to Schiller's changing methodology; and Schiller's ideas and theoretical perspectives are related, where derivative, to those of Kant and Fichte. The conclusion commences with a recapitulation of the main arguments in each Letter. This is followed by an evaluation of the Aesthetic Letters, identifying those specific theories of contemporary relevance, and with the potential for further theoretical development.The nature and value of art
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14807
This thesis examines the nature and value of art. It is primarily concerned to advance an argument which makes sense of the significance we ordinarily afford art, rather than rendering it merely aesthetic and thus cognitively trivial. Contrary to philosophical orthodoxy, it is argued that 'art' does not have two distinct senses. Rather, we should understand art as an inherently evaluative, evolving cultural practice. Thus, I argue, 'art' is essentially a cluster concept. I consider an account of art according to which it is in the pleasure art affords, that its value lies. However, though we derive pleasure even from apparently unpleasant artworks, the mark of art's value lies elsewhere. That is, the pleasure we derive from art is the result of an artwork's being of value in some other way. Through critically assessing the standard accounts of art's value, I argue that art's pleasures are primarily cognitive. Furthermore, I argue, the cognitive value of art arises primarily from the engagement of our imagination and interpretation of artworks. That is, we enjoy the imaginative activity of engaging with artworks and the promotion of particular imaginative understandings. Furthermore, as imaginative understanding is of fundamental importance in grasping the nature of our world and others, art may have a distinctive significance. That is, art may afford insights into and thus promote our imaginative understandings of our world and others. Thus, through the promotion of imaginative understanding, art may cultivate our moral understanding. Therefore, art is of profound significance and import.
1995-07-01T00:00:00ZKieran, Matthew LaurenceThis thesis examines the nature and value of art. It is primarily concerned to advance an argument which makes sense of the significance we ordinarily afford art, rather than rendering it merely aesthetic and thus cognitively trivial. Contrary to philosophical orthodoxy, it is argued that 'art' does not have two distinct senses. Rather, we should understand art as an inherently evaluative, evolving cultural practice. Thus, I argue, 'art' is essentially a cluster concept. I consider an account of art according to which it is in the pleasure art affords, that its value lies. However, though we derive pleasure even from apparently unpleasant artworks, the mark of art's value lies elsewhere. That is, the pleasure we derive from art is the result of an artwork's being of value in some other way. Through critically assessing the standard accounts of art's value, I argue that art's pleasures are primarily cognitive. Furthermore, I argue, the cognitive value of art arises primarily from the engagement of our imagination and interpretation of artworks. That is, we enjoy the imaginative activity of engaging with artworks and the promotion of particular imaginative understandings. Furthermore, as imaginative understanding is of fundamental importance in grasping the nature of our world and others, art may have a distinctive significance. That is, art may afford insights into and thus promote our imaginative understandings of our world and others. Thus, through the promotion of imaginative understanding, art may cultivate our moral understanding. Therefore, art is of profound significance and import.The structures and significance of mimesis in Adorno's "Aesthetic Theory"
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14778
This thesis starts from the point of departure of asking why Aesthetic Theory is difficult to read. In answering this question it is argued that the difficulty of the work is a function of the unusual claims Adorno makes about the relation between art and philosophy, and that the presentation of these arguments exemplifies these claims. This complimentary relation between form and content has implications for the way Adorno can be understood as engaging the idea of mimesis. Aesthetic Theory should be understood as a theory of mimesis in modern art and as a mimetic work itself. Given this idea, the question of the readability of the work emerges as inseparable from the explicit claims Adorno makes for mimesis. If the work ultimately cannot be understood because Adorno does not define his concepts, or it is unexplainable for any other reason, then mimesis will be shown to be untenable. The issue of the readability of Aesthetic Theory is explored in the Introduction through a discussion of issues arising from the recent history of Adorno's reception. Particular attention is paid to the differences between critics who have emphasised the significance of the particular claims Adorno makes against those who emphasise his method. Chapter I rejects this distinction while it argues that the character of Adorno's writing is uneven, that is to say, Aesthetic Theory cannot usefully be read in a uniform way.
Chapter I considers different aspects of this lack of uniformity and argues that the identity of Aesthetic Theory as 'philosophy' is often tenuous as it moves in and out of other modes of argument. Chapters 2 and 3 look at different aspects of the identity of Aesthetic Theory as philosophy. Chapter 2 explains the strategic significance of the work as a continuation of a tradition of philosophy from Hegel onwards. This tradition, it is argued, has explicitly understood the problem of philosophy as recognising itself as experience while it attempts to describe experience. Chapter 3 extends this theme into a consideration of philosophical form. If philosophy is understood as a mode of experience then its form as well as its content is significant. Through a consideration of Heidegger and Derrida, Chapter 3 examines the uniqueness of the philosophical form of Aesthetic Theory. Having made this distinction. Chapter 4 reads Aesthetic Theory as philosophical form, describing aspects of it as mimetic. Chapters 5 and 6 then give detailed readings of parts of Aesthetic Theory which are particularly relevant for an understanding of Adorno's theory of the mimetic potential of modern art. The concluding chapter argues that the internal consistency of Aesthetic Theory in its practice and definition of the crisis of mimesis in modernism has significant implications for the practice of art history and criticism of twentieth-century art.
1997-07-01T00:00:00ZHooker, RichardThis thesis starts from the point of departure of asking why Aesthetic Theory is difficult to read. In answering this question it is argued that the difficulty of the work is a function of the unusual claims Adorno makes about the relation between art and philosophy, and that the presentation of these arguments exemplifies these claims. This complimentary relation between form and content has implications for the way Adorno can be understood as engaging the idea of mimesis. Aesthetic Theory should be understood as a theory of mimesis in modern art and as a mimetic work itself. Given this idea, the question of the readability of the work emerges as inseparable from the explicit claims Adorno makes for mimesis. If the work ultimately cannot be understood because Adorno does not define his concepts, or it is unexplainable for any other reason, then mimesis will be shown to be untenable. The issue of the readability of Aesthetic Theory is explored in the Introduction through a discussion of issues arising from the recent history of Adorno's reception. Particular attention is paid to the differences between critics who have emphasised the significance of the particular claims Adorno makes against those who emphasise his method. Chapter I rejects this distinction while it argues that the character of Adorno's writing is uneven, that is to say, Aesthetic Theory cannot usefully be read in a uniform way.
Chapter I considers different aspects of this lack of uniformity and argues that the identity of Aesthetic Theory as 'philosophy' is often tenuous as it moves in and out of other modes of argument. Chapters 2 and 3 look at different aspects of the identity of Aesthetic Theory as philosophy. Chapter 2 explains the strategic significance of the work as a continuation of a tradition of philosophy from Hegel onwards. This tradition, it is argued, has explicitly understood the problem of philosophy as recognising itself as experience while it attempts to describe experience. Chapter 3 extends this theme into a consideration of philosophical form. If philosophy is understood as a mode of experience then its form as well as its content is significant. Through a consideration of Heidegger and Derrida, Chapter 3 examines the uniqueness of the philosophical form of Aesthetic Theory. Having made this distinction. Chapter 4 reads Aesthetic Theory as philosophical form, describing aspects of it as mimetic. Chapters 5 and 6 then give detailed readings of parts of Aesthetic Theory which are particularly relevant for an understanding of Adorno's theory of the mimetic potential of modern art. The concluding chapter argues that the internal consistency of Aesthetic Theory in its practice and definition of the crisis of mimesis in modernism has significant implications for the practice of art history and criticism of twentieth-century art.Dialectics of contingency : Nietzsche's philosophy of art
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14775
This thesis examines the function of art in Nietzsche's philosophy. Its primary concern is with Nietzsche's turn to art as the means to counter what he terms metaphysics. Metaphysics is a metonym for the system of beliefs sustaining our culture whereby human judgements about the world are perceived as uncovering an objective truth antecedent to those judgements, with an implicit faith in the possibility of exhausting the totality of these antecedent truths. This thesis consequently has two principal strands. The first is to analyse Nietzsche's criticism of metaphysics. The second is to explore the way in which, using a specific understanding of art, Nietzsche attempts to reconcile extreme scepticism towards all forms of human knowledge with a continued belief in their necessity. The thesis argues that Nietzsche lays an importance on art as providing an aesthetic education to replace the misguided theoretical orientation of metaphysics. Nietzsche criticises metaphysics for its inability to recognise that its interpretations are mere interpretations, that logic and the rational serve as means to make the world meaningful from the human perspective. My thesis explores how he sees art, and in particular the tragic, as constituting a mode of world interpretation which declares its status as such. I argue that for Nietzsche this is crucial inasmuch as a failure to recognise the contingency of our interpretations results in a refusal to give value in any interpretations. For Nietzsche the advent of the Modern age heralds the danger of such refusal, and hence I argue that his turn to art is a response to the specifically Modern temptation to descend into mere cynical Nihilism.
1993-07-01T00:00:00ZRampley, MatthewThis thesis examines the function of art in Nietzsche's philosophy. Its primary concern is with Nietzsche's turn to art as the means to counter what he terms metaphysics. Metaphysics is a metonym for the system of beliefs sustaining our culture whereby human judgements about the world are perceived as uncovering an objective truth antecedent to those judgements, with an implicit faith in the possibility of exhausting the totality of these antecedent truths. This thesis consequently has two principal strands. The first is to analyse Nietzsche's criticism of metaphysics. The second is to explore the way in which, using a specific understanding of art, Nietzsche attempts to reconcile extreme scepticism towards all forms of human knowledge with a continued belief in their necessity. The thesis argues that Nietzsche lays an importance on art as providing an aesthetic education to replace the misguided theoretical orientation of metaphysics. Nietzsche criticises metaphysics for its inability to recognise that its interpretations are mere interpretations, that logic and the rational serve as means to make the world meaningful from the human perspective. My thesis explores how he sees art, and in particular the tragic, as constituting a mode of world interpretation which declares its status as such. I argue that for Nietzsche this is crucial inasmuch as a failure to recognise the contingency of our interpretations results in a refusal to give value in any interpretations. For Nietzsche the advent of the Modern age heralds the danger of such refusal, and hence I argue that his turn to art is a response to the specifically Modern temptation to descend into mere cynical Nihilism.Realism, reference and the growth of scientific knowledge
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14770
In Chapter 1, I discuss the background to the problems which confront a realist account of the growth of scientific knowledge. At the beginning of Chapter 2, I explain in what sense relativism constitutes a challenge to this account. Four interconnected questions are then posed which are said to underlie the realist position. The chapter finishes with an explanation of how some of them arise in an actual case study. Chapter 3 deals with a general argument of Quine's for the view that reference is inscrutable. In reply I maintain that the argument does not hold good, either with respect to interpreting our own language or when it comes to translating an alien language. With Chapter 4, I begin to answer the four questions. I explain how Tarski's theory of truth can be seen as a correspondence theory. It is argued, however, that Tarski's theory itself presupposes theories of reference and extension, and certain recent attempts to overcome this lacuna are criticized. In the next chapter I draw an analogy between natural kind predicates, which are of particular importance in science, and proper names, and offer cluster theories of reference for both. This answers the third most basic of the four questions. These theories are defended against criticisms made by Kripke and Putnam, Chapter 6 aims to answer the second most basic question by considering in detail how we can understand what earlier scientific theories were about. I develop some arguments of Davidson's as a counter to Quine's doctrine of the indeterminacy of translation of sentences. I claim that although translation might in fact be indeterminate, Quine, through concentrating on behavioural evidence to the exclusion of other physical evidence, has failed to show that it is, and that in any case indeterminacy of sentence translation does not imply inscrutability of reference of terms. Finally, in Chapter 7, I sum up ray explication of the realist's account of the growth of science with respect to natural kind predicates. I then consider two cases of theory change of different sorts and suggest how my work might be extended.
1979-07-01T00:00:00ZSmith, Peter JamesIn Chapter 1, I discuss the background to the problems which confront a realist account of the growth of scientific knowledge. At the beginning of Chapter 2, I explain in what sense relativism constitutes a challenge to this account. Four interconnected questions are then posed which are said to underlie the realist position. The chapter finishes with an explanation of how some of them arise in an actual case study. Chapter 3 deals with a general argument of Quine's for the view that reference is inscrutable. In reply I maintain that the argument does not hold good, either with respect to interpreting our own language or when it comes to translating an alien language. With Chapter 4, I begin to answer the four questions. I explain how Tarski's theory of truth can be seen as a correspondence theory. It is argued, however, that Tarski's theory itself presupposes theories of reference and extension, and certain recent attempts to overcome this lacuna are criticized. In the next chapter I draw an analogy between natural kind predicates, which are of particular importance in science, and proper names, and offer cluster theories of reference for both. This answers the third most basic of the four questions. These theories are defended against criticisms made by Kripke and Putnam, Chapter 6 aims to answer the second most basic question by considering in detail how we can understand what earlier scientific theories were about. I develop some arguments of Davidson's as a counter to Quine's doctrine of the indeterminacy of translation of sentences. I claim that although translation might in fact be indeterminate, Quine, through concentrating on behavioural evidence to the exclusion of other physical evidence, has failed to show that it is, and that in any case indeterminacy of sentence translation does not imply inscrutability of reference of terms. Finally, in Chapter 7, I sum up ray explication of the realist's account of the growth of science with respect to natural kind predicates. I then consider two cases of theory change of different sorts and suggest how my work might be extended.Realism and idealism in the theory of value
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14766
This thesis defends an account of value which emphasizes the central place occupied by experiences among the objects of evaluation, a point that is particularly stark in the case of aesthetic value, to which a chapter is devoted that adumbrates the wider understanding of value subsequently defended. More generally it is argued that values do not transcend the attitudes and institutions in which they are embodied. They nonetheless enjoy in virtue of their structuring by norms of consistency, stability and deference enough in the way of objectivity to do justice to various phenomenological considerations often thought to favour realism. It is argued however that this level of objectivity is compatible with the rejection of any form of reductive naturalism and, more generally, of cognitivism- views which should indeed, it is argued, be rejected in favour of an expressivistic understanding of value.
1995-07-01T00:00:00ZLenman, JamesThis thesis defends an account of value which emphasizes the central place occupied by experiences among the objects of evaluation, a point that is particularly stark in the case of aesthetic value, to which a chapter is devoted that adumbrates the wider understanding of value subsequently defended. More generally it is argued that values do not transcend the attitudes and institutions in which they are embodied. They nonetheless enjoy in virtue of their structuring by norms of consistency, stability and deference enough in the way of objectivity to do justice to various phenomenological considerations often thought to favour realism. It is argued however that this level of objectivity is compatible with the rejection of any form of reductive naturalism and, more generally, of cognitivism- views which should indeed, it is argued, be rejected in favour of an expressivistic understanding of value.Wittgensteinian fideism and the linguistic turn in post-war British philosophy of religion
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14759
The intention of this dissertation is to provide a descriptive account of the changes that occurred in British philosophy of religion after it began to be influenced by the so- called 'revolution in philosophy' in the nineteen fifties. This had produced a re-invigoration of empiricism in mainstream philosophy in the early decades of the twentieth century, and had led to an interest in the nature and status of the meaning of language, and the means by which this meaning could be justified. This debate entered the philosophy of religion in the form of the verification principle, which denied meaning to any language which could not demonstrate how it was to be verified. Some philosophers were then criticised for allegedly utilising the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and claiming that religion was what he meant by a language-game or a form of life, and that meant religious belief could only be criticised by criteria that arose within the same language-game or form of life, so denying validity to any criterion that attempted to adjudicate meaning in all forms of discourse. The work of the philosopher most often associated with this position, D.Z. Phillips, will be discussed, and an argument made that this is an inadequate characterisation of his work. An account will then be given of what Wittgenstein himself understood by the terms, language-game and form of life, and that in fact this possible interpretation raises the possibility that what is signified by these terms may have the unavoidable effect of opening up religious language to criticism of a kind related to the empiricist critique, rather than closing it off.
1998-08-01T00:00:00ZSouter, AdrianThe intention of this dissertation is to provide a descriptive account of the changes that occurred in British philosophy of religion after it began to be influenced by the so- called 'revolution in philosophy' in the nineteen fifties. This had produced a re-invigoration of empiricism in mainstream philosophy in the early decades of the twentieth century, and had led to an interest in the nature and status of the meaning of language, and the means by which this meaning could be justified. This debate entered the philosophy of religion in the form of the verification principle, which denied meaning to any language which could not demonstrate how it was to be verified. Some philosophers were then criticised for allegedly utilising the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and claiming that religion was what he meant by a language-game or a form of life, and that meant religious belief could only be criticised by criteria that arose within the same language-game or form of life, so denying validity to any criterion that attempted to adjudicate meaning in all forms of discourse. The work of the philosopher most often associated with this position, D.Z. Phillips, will be discussed, and an argument made that this is an inadequate characterisation of his work. An account will then be given of what Wittgenstein himself understood by the terms, language-game and form of life, and that in fact this possible interpretation raises the possibility that what is signified by these terms may have the unavoidable effect of opening up religious language to criticism of a kind related to the empiricist critique, rather than closing it off.The Kantian defence of freedom : with special reference to eighteenth-century determinism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14758
1954-08-01T00:00:00ZLewis, Walter L.What structuralism could not be
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14756
Frege's arithmetical-platonism is glossed as the first step in developing the thesis; however, it remains silent on the subject of structures in mathematics: the obvious examples being groups and rings, lattices and topologies. The structuralist objects to this silence, also questioning the sufficiency of Fregean platonism is answering a number of problems: e.g. Benacerraf's Twin Puzzles of Epistemic and Referential Access. The development of structuralism as a philosophical position, based on the slogan 'All mathematics is structural' collapses: there is no single coherent account which remains faithful to the tenets of structuralism and solves the puzzles of platonism. This prompts the adoption of a more modest structuralism, the aim of which is not to solve the problems facing arithmetical-platonism, but merely to give an account of the 'obviously structural areas of mathematics'. Modest strucmralism should complement an account of mathematical systems; here, Frege's platonism fulfils that role, which then constrains and shapes the development of this modest structuralism. Three alternatives are considered; a substitutional account, an account based on a modification of Dummett's theory of thin reference and a modified from of in re structuralism. This split level analysis of mathematics leads to an investigation of the robustness of the truth predicate over the two classes of mathematical statement. Focussing on the framework set out in Wright's Truth and Objectivity, a third type of statement is identified in the literature: Hilbert's formal statements. The following thesis arises: formal statements concern no special subject matter, and are merely minimally truth apt; the statements of structural mathematics form a subdiscourse - identified by the similarity of the logical grammar - displaying cognitive command. Thirdly, the statements of mathematics which concern systems form a subdiscourse which has both cognitive command and width of cosmological role. The extensions of mathematical concepts are such that best practice on the part of mathematicians either tracks or determines that extension - at least in simple cases. Examining the notions of response dependence leads to considerations of indefinite extensibility and intuitionism. The conclusion drawn is that discourse about structures and mathematical systems are response dependent but that this does not give rise to any revisionary arguments contra intuitionism.
1998-05-01T00:00:00ZFerguson, StephenFrege's arithmetical-platonism is glossed as the first step in developing the thesis; however, it remains silent on the subject of structures in mathematics: the obvious examples being groups and rings, lattices and topologies. The structuralist objects to this silence, also questioning the sufficiency of Fregean platonism is answering a number of problems: e.g. Benacerraf's Twin Puzzles of Epistemic and Referential Access. The development of structuralism as a philosophical position, based on the slogan 'All mathematics is structural' collapses: there is no single coherent account which remains faithful to the tenets of structuralism and solves the puzzles of platonism. This prompts the adoption of a more modest structuralism, the aim of which is not to solve the problems facing arithmetical-platonism, but merely to give an account of the 'obviously structural areas of mathematics'. Modest strucmralism should complement an account of mathematical systems; here, Frege's platonism fulfils that role, which then constrains and shapes the development of this modest structuralism. Three alternatives are considered; a substitutional account, an account based on a modification of Dummett's theory of thin reference and a modified from of in re structuralism. This split level analysis of mathematics leads to an investigation of the robustness of the truth predicate over the two classes of mathematical statement. Focussing on the framework set out in Wright's Truth and Objectivity, a third type of statement is identified in the literature: Hilbert's formal statements. The following thesis arises: formal statements concern no special subject matter, and are merely minimally truth apt; the statements of structural mathematics form a subdiscourse - identified by the similarity of the logical grammar - displaying cognitive command. Thirdly, the statements of mathematics which concern systems form a subdiscourse which has both cognitive command and width of cosmological role. The extensions of mathematical concepts are such that best practice on the part of mathematicians either tracks or determines that extension - at least in simple cases. Examining the notions of response dependence leads to considerations of indefinite extensibility and intuitionism. The conclusion drawn is that discourse about structures and mathematical systems are response dependent but that this does not give rise to any revisionary arguments contra intuitionism.Intuitionistic semantics and the revision of logic
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14755
In this thesis I investigate the implications, for one's account of mathematics, of holding an anti-realist view. The primary aim is to appraise the scope of revision imposed by anti-realism on classical inferential practice in mathematics. That appraisal has consequences both for our understanding of the nature of mathematics and for our attitude towards anti-realism itself. If an anti-realist position seems inevitably to be absurdly revisionary then we have grounds for suspecting the coherence of arguments canvassed in favour of anti-realism. I attempt to defend the anti-realist position by arguing, i) that it is not internally incoherent for anti-realism to be a potentially revisionary position, and ii) that an anti-realist position can, plausibly, be seen to result in a stable intuitionistic position with regard to the logic it condones. The use of impredicative methods in classical mathematics is a site of traditional intuitionistic attacks. I undertake an examination of what the anti-realist attitude towards such methods should be. This question is of interest both because such methods are deeply implicated in classical mathematical theory of analysis and because intuitionistic semantic theories make use of impredicative methods. I attempt to construct the outlines of a set theory which is anti-realistically acceptable but which, although having no antecedent repugnance for impredicative methods as such, appears to be too weak to offer an anti-realistic vindication of impredicative methods in general. I attempt to exonerate intuitionistic semantic theories in their use of impredicative methods by showing that a partial order relying on the nature of our grasp of the intuitionistic meaning stipulations for the logical constants precludes a possible circularity.
1992-07-01T00:00:00ZWeiss, BernhardIn this thesis I investigate the implications, for one's account of mathematics, of holding an anti-realist view. The primary aim is to appraise the scope of revision imposed by anti-realism on classical inferential practice in mathematics. That appraisal has consequences both for our understanding of the nature of mathematics and for our attitude towards anti-realism itself. If an anti-realist position seems inevitably to be absurdly revisionary then we have grounds for suspecting the coherence of arguments canvassed in favour of anti-realism. I attempt to defend the anti-realist position by arguing, i) that it is not internally incoherent for anti-realism to be a potentially revisionary position, and ii) that an anti-realist position can, plausibly, be seen to result in a stable intuitionistic position with regard to the logic it condones. The use of impredicative methods in classical mathematics is a site of traditional intuitionistic attacks. I undertake an examination of what the anti-realist attitude towards such methods should be. This question is of interest both because such methods are deeply implicated in classical mathematical theory of analysis and because intuitionistic semantic theories make use of impredicative methods. I attempt to construct the outlines of a set theory which is anti-realistically acceptable but which, although having no antecedent repugnance for impredicative methods as such, appears to be too weak to offer an anti-realistic vindication of impredicative methods in general. I attempt to exonerate intuitionistic semantic theories in their use of impredicative methods by showing that a partial order relying on the nature of our grasp of the intuitionistic meaning stipulations for the logical constants precludes a possible circularity.Belief and action
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14754
The role of "believes" is identified by finding a unique and unparaphraseable use of the term that is integral to the structure of important forms of language. This role can only be roughly indicated here. Roughly, "believes" identifies someone's reasons for doing or thinking something or what he counts as success in certain activities, without committing the speaker to accepting them; and so it allows the possibility of mistake. Standard objections to dispositional accounts are reviewed and found unconvincing. The central difficulty is found to be that dispositional accounts give no satisfactory explanation of the fact what it is (part of) an explanation of action to cite the agent's beliefs. It is argued that causal accounts have the same deficiency, that the role or point of "believes" in language is not satisfactorily explained. It is concluded that neglect of this central question vitlates even the real strengths of these accounts. The relation between different questions about belief is explored, and analogous questions about other cases, especially artefacts, are considered. Explanations of actions are discussed to bring out the role of "believes." This appears in explaining the relation between the "point or purpose" of an action and the actions of which it consists at a lower level of description. "Believes" identifies what governs this relation while allowing the possibility of mistake. Ryle's claims about thinking are considered, and an interpretation of the notion of an adverbial verb is suggested. The central difficulty concerns the cases of the thinking of le Penseur or of Eucild. Although it seems important that we should be able to say what the constituents of thinking are here, we cannot do so, since the relevant vocabulary is not adapted to giving the constituents of anything. These activities have their own "objects" as well as their own criteria of success. Activities, "objects", and criteria of success are bound up together, and do not connect in any simple way with the vocabulary that we try to connect them with in asking what their constituents are. This far from unique. Music provides another relevant example. The last chapters examine various contexts in which "believes" is important. Topics considered are reasons, evaluations, assertions, belief and the will, internationality, and speech-act accounts. In each case particular doctrines are critically examined.
1976-01-01T00:00:00ZPehrson, Claud W. P.The role of "believes" is identified by finding a unique and unparaphraseable use of the term that is integral to the structure of important forms of language. This role can only be roughly indicated here. Roughly, "believes" identifies someone's reasons for doing or thinking something or what he counts as success in certain activities, without committing the speaker to accepting them; and so it allows the possibility of mistake. Standard objections to dispositional accounts are reviewed and found unconvincing. The central difficulty is found to be that dispositional accounts give no satisfactory explanation of the fact what it is (part of) an explanation of action to cite the agent's beliefs. It is argued that causal accounts have the same deficiency, that the role or point of "believes" in language is not satisfactorily explained. It is concluded that neglect of this central question vitlates even the real strengths of these accounts. The relation between different questions about belief is explored, and analogous questions about other cases, especially artefacts, are considered. Explanations of actions are discussed to bring out the role of "believes." This appears in explaining the relation between the "point or purpose" of an action and the actions of which it consists at a lower level of description. "Believes" identifies what governs this relation while allowing the possibility of mistake. Ryle's claims about thinking are considered, and an interpretation of the notion of an adverbial verb is suggested. The central difficulty concerns the cases of the thinking of le Penseur or of Eucild. Although it seems important that we should be able to say what the constituents of thinking are here, we cannot do so, since the relevant vocabulary is not adapted to giving the constituents of anything. These activities have their own "objects" as well as their own criteria of success. Activities, "objects", and criteria of success are bound up together, and do not connect in any simple way with the vocabulary that we try to connect them with in asking what their constituents are. This far from unique. Music provides another relevant example. The last chapters examine various contexts in which "believes" is important. Topics considered are reasons, evaluations, assertions, belief and the will, internationality, and speech-act accounts. In each case particular doctrines are critically examined.Second-order logic is logic
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14753
"Second-order logic" is the name given to a formal system. Some claim that the formal system is a logical system. Others claim that it is a mathematical system. In the thesis, I examine these claims in the light of some philosophical criteria which first motivated Frege in his logicist project. The criteria are that a logic should be universal, it should reflect our intuitive notion of logical validity, and it should be analytic. The analysis is interesting in two respects. One is conceptual: it gives us a purchase on where and how to draw a distinction between logic and other sciences. The other interest is historical: showing that second-order logic is a logical system according to the philosophical criteria mentioned above goes some way towards vindicating Frege's logicist project in a contemporary context.
1997-06-01T00:00:00ZFriend, Michèle Indira"Second-order logic" is the name given to a formal system. Some claim that the formal system is a logical system. Others claim that it is a mathematical system. In the thesis, I examine these claims in the light of some philosophical criteria which first motivated Frege in his logicist project. The criteria are that a logic should be universal, it should reflect our intuitive notion of logical validity, and it should be analytic. The analysis is interesting in two respects. One is conceptual: it gives us a purchase on where and how to draw a distinction between logic and other sciences. The other interest is historical: showing that second-order logic is a logical system according to the philosophical criteria mentioned above goes some way towards vindicating Frege's logicist project in a contemporary context.A 4-valued theory of classes and individuals
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14739
1971-07-01T00:00:00ZBrady, Ross ThomasA developed description of the Kierkegaardian art object
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14736
1998-08-01T00:00:00ZKoterbay, ScottThe effect of Bergson's thought on French Roman Catholic philosophy and literary theory up to 1939, with detailed reference to the work of Jacques Maritain, Maurice Blondel, Charles Peguy and Charles Du Bos
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14734
Most research into Bergson's influence to date has failed to take enough account of the philosopher's interest in the spiritual of meta-physical dimension of life. In seeking to interpret Bergson's thought many have focused upon 'la durée réelle' or 'l'élan vital' as the key concepts in his whole philosophy. If, instead, one were to begin with Bergson's main continuing preoccupation at first inchoate and only later more fully developed with spiritual activity in life, then the whole philosophy hangs together as a tapestry of one harmonious piece. Not only can it be clearly seen why Bergson opposes Kant and the positivists so vehemently, but it can also be understood why he eventually set his sights upon The two sources of morality and religion. In the eyes of many critics this work, far from completing a natural progression of thought, stands outside the main body of work as something ill-fitting and almost cavalier. This thesis attempts to redress the balance by demonstrating how the spiritual and religious interpretation of life is central to Bergson's thought. Having established this, I have assumed it likely that a lively Catholic interest in Bergson is something quite logical and natural. This proved to be the case. After all, the Catholics in France stood to gain or lose most by the introduction in intellectural circles of a new philosophical 'spiritualism'. They would obviously themselves have a vested interest in the discrediting of materialist and positivist philosophies. However, scholars have not seen the connection between Bergson and Christian thought very clearly and no detailed research into this particular field has been undertaken. I have consequently attempted to review both the general field of Catholic reactions in a largely chronological way and also the detailed ways in which Bergson's thought had on impact upon Catholic writers. My main conclusion from this research is that Bergson's work lent itself to adaptation and alteration to something more orthodox in Catholic terms. However it was some time before it was viewed in a favourable enough light for anything like this to be attempted. Much prejudice and misinterpretation surrounded Bergson for some years. Eventually, however, his theories made deep inroads into the mainstream of Catholic thought. His theories of perception and intuition, of movement and change, of static and dynamic religion, helped bring about a significant change in the development of twentieth century religious thought.
1978-01-01T00:00:00ZHarris, Robert GeoffreyMost research into Bergson's influence to date has failed to take enough account of the philosopher's interest in the spiritual of meta-physical dimension of life. In seeking to interpret Bergson's thought many have focused upon 'la durée réelle' or 'l'élan vital' as the key concepts in his whole philosophy. If, instead, one were to begin with Bergson's main continuing preoccupation at first inchoate and only later more fully developed with spiritual activity in life, then the whole philosophy hangs together as a tapestry of one harmonious piece. Not only can it be clearly seen why Bergson opposes Kant and the positivists so vehemently, but it can also be understood why he eventually set his sights upon The two sources of morality and religion. In the eyes of many critics this work, far from completing a natural progression of thought, stands outside the main body of work as something ill-fitting and almost cavalier. This thesis attempts to redress the balance by demonstrating how the spiritual and religious interpretation of life is central to Bergson's thought. Having established this, I have assumed it likely that a lively Catholic interest in Bergson is something quite logical and natural. This proved to be the case. After all, the Catholics in France stood to gain or lose most by the introduction in intellectural circles of a new philosophical 'spiritualism'. They would obviously themselves have a vested interest in the discrediting of materialist and positivist philosophies. However, scholars have not seen the connection between Bergson and Christian thought very clearly and no detailed research into this particular field has been undertaken. I have consequently attempted to review both the general field of Catholic reactions in a largely chronological way and also the detailed ways in which Bergson's thought had on impact upon Catholic writers. My main conclusion from this research is that Bergson's work lent itself to adaptation and alteration to something more orthodox in Catholic terms. However it was some time before it was viewed in a favourable enough light for anything like this to be attempted. Much prejudice and misinterpretation surrounded Bergson for some years. Eventually, however, his theories made deep inroads into the mainstream of Catholic thought. His theories of perception and intuition, of movement and change, of static and dynamic religion, helped bring about a significant change in the development of twentieth century religious thought.Procedures and outcomes: a defence and development of J. L. Austin's conception of speech acts
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14729
This work's main thesis is that a theory of action provides a more appropriate framework than a theory of language for furthering the purpose of Austin's conception of speech acts. The main purpose of that conception was the elucidation of the species of language-use that is exemplified by illocutionary acts and is distinct from those species exemplified by locutionary and perlocutionary acts. Austin's conception of locutionary acts isolates those features of a speech act situation which are amenable to subsumption under a theory of language. This conception is expounded, developed and defended in Chapter One. The orthodox "reject-and-replace" view of the relationship between Austin's performative-constative distinction and his distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts threatens several of Austin's insights concerning the type of theory appropriate for developing his conception of speech acts. In Chapter Two the performative-constative distinction is expounded, the "reject-and-replace" is shown to be false, and an alternative view, which retrieves the threatened insights, is advanced. Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts, and his parallel distinction between locutionary meaning and illocutionary force, are also established in the course of defending them against objections. The terms in which Austin drew the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts - those of a conventional act distinct from its non-conventional outcomes indicate the theoretical framework required for a development of his conception. In Chapter Three this distinction is expounded and a partial analysis is made of the concepts of some outcomes of acts, viz., effects, consequences and results. Illocutionary acts are not constituted in toto by agents' bodily movements - a point captured in Austin's thesis that illocutionary acts are conventional acts. In Chapter Pour the interpretation customarily imposed on that thesis is discussed and shown to be unfaithful. An alternative interpretation is constructed from points in Austin's own lectures. The solution to the problem of the constitution of illocutionary acts provided by this interpretation is that such acts are constituted by the conventional procedures as part of which locutionary acts are performed. Some other suggested solutions are canvassed. In Chapter Five an account is given of the conventional procedures constitutive of illocutionary acts. In Chapter Six the claim embodied in the main thesis of this work is defended against the counter-claims implicit in Schiffer's, Strawson's and Searle's work. In the Appendix Austin's performative-constative distinction and his later views on truth are defended. An analytical table of contents is included.
1977-01-01T00:00:00ZKeenan, Michael GarthThis work's main thesis is that a theory of action provides a more appropriate framework than a theory of language for furthering the purpose of Austin's conception of speech acts. The main purpose of that conception was the elucidation of the species of language-use that is exemplified by illocutionary acts and is distinct from those species exemplified by locutionary and perlocutionary acts. Austin's conception of locutionary acts isolates those features of a speech act situation which are amenable to subsumption under a theory of language. This conception is expounded, developed and defended in Chapter One. The orthodox "reject-and-replace" view of the relationship between Austin's performative-constative distinction and his distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts threatens several of Austin's insights concerning the type of theory appropriate for developing his conception of speech acts. In Chapter Two the performative-constative distinction is expounded, the "reject-and-replace" is shown to be false, and an alternative view, which retrieves the threatened insights, is advanced. Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts, and his parallel distinction between locutionary meaning and illocutionary force, are also established in the course of defending them against objections. The terms in which Austin drew the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts - those of a conventional act distinct from its non-conventional outcomes indicate the theoretical framework required for a development of his conception. In Chapter Three this distinction is expounded and a partial analysis is made of the concepts of some outcomes of acts, viz., effects, consequences and results. Illocutionary acts are not constituted in toto by agents' bodily movements - a point captured in Austin's thesis that illocutionary acts are conventional acts. In Chapter Pour the interpretation customarily imposed on that thesis is discussed and shown to be unfaithful. An alternative interpretation is constructed from points in Austin's own lectures. The solution to the problem of the constitution of illocutionary acts provided by this interpretation is that such acts are constituted by the conventional procedures as part of which locutionary acts are performed. Some other suggested solutions are canvassed. In Chapter Five an account is given of the conventional procedures constitutive of illocutionary acts. In Chapter Six the claim embodied in the main thesis of this work is defended against the counter-claims implicit in Schiffer's, Strawson's and Searle's work. In the Appendix Austin's performative-constative distinction and his later views on truth are defended. An analytical table of contents is included.Trial and error and the idea of progress
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14722
1973-01-01T00:00:00ZPirie, MadsenJoseph Glanvill and the seventeenth century reaction against enthusiasm
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14720
1968-01-01T00:00:00ZWaller, Marian JoanIntuitionism and David Hume's philosophy of religion
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14719
Humean philosophy has been defined in the following ways. (a) A system based on the classical influence of Cicero. (b) An attempt to offer a parallel in moral philosophy to Sir Isaac Newton's contribution to the physical sciences. (c) Intuitionism based on the Shaftesbury/Hutcheson tradition. If we consider Hume's scholarly output as a whole, it would appear difficult to select one work and claim that it represents a definitive, final position. The approach which is taken in this study is that of following the development of Hume's thinking, from his early education through to that stage in his career which saw the completion of his major philosophical works. For a significant part of the later period of his career he broke no new ground in his philosophical studies; but was content to revise his earlier works, turning attention instead to literature, history and religious disputes. When this approach is followed it becomes obvious that the secular interpretation of Humean philosophy, which has gained a great deal of acceptance this century, is far from convincing. Hume in fact wrote a fairly conservative work on natural Religion. Moreover, his Intuitionism makes little sense without the religious foundation which Shaftesbury and Hutcheson had taken for granted. What new, significant contribution did Hume make? His work can be looked upon as a fine example of 'applied philosophy', anticipating the insights of modern clinical psychology at a number of points. It is important to see Hume as working in an educational tradition. Scottish, humanistic, Reformed. His family was Presbyterian, and the young Hume would have received a good Christian training. Although he was not considered an outstandingly bright pupil, he attended Edinburgh University at an early age, and soon developed a voracious appetite for reading scholarly literature on his own. The deeply introspective side of his philosophical studies may well have come from his Presbyterian background.
1995-07-01T00:00:00ZMacRae, Malcolm HerbertHumean philosophy has been defined in the following ways. (a) A system based on the classical influence of Cicero. (b) An attempt to offer a parallel in moral philosophy to Sir Isaac Newton's contribution to the physical sciences. (c) Intuitionism based on the Shaftesbury/Hutcheson tradition. If we consider Hume's scholarly output as a whole, it would appear difficult to select one work and claim that it represents a definitive, final position. The approach which is taken in this study is that of following the development of Hume's thinking, from his early education through to that stage in his career which saw the completion of his major philosophical works. For a significant part of the later period of his career he broke no new ground in his philosophical studies; but was content to revise his earlier works, turning attention instead to literature, history and religious disputes. When this approach is followed it becomes obvious that the secular interpretation of Humean philosophy, which has gained a great deal of acceptance this century, is far from convincing. Hume in fact wrote a fairly conservative work on natural Religion. Moreover, his Intuitionism makes little sense without the religious foundation which Shaftesbury and Hutcheson had taken for granted. What new, significant contribution did Hume make? His work can be looked upon as a fine example of 'applied philosophy', anticipating the insights of modern clinical psychology at a number of points. It is important to see Hume as working in an educational tradition. Scottish, humanistic, Reformed. His family was Presbyterian, and the young Hume would have received a good Christian training. Although he was not considered an outstandingly bright pupil, he attended Edinburgh University at an early age, and soon developed a voracious appetite for reading scholarly literature on his own. The deeply introspective side of his philosophical studies may well have come from his Presbyterian background.The philosophy of common sense
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14717
1958-01-01T00:00:00ZGrave, Selwyn Alfred GraveThe religion of Thomas Hobbes
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14713
1954-04-01T00:00:00ZColes, D. M. T.Content and computation : a critical study of some themes in Jerry Fodor's philosophy of mind
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14711
In this thesis I address certain key issues in contemporary philosophy of mind and psychology via a study of Jerry Fodor's hugely important contributions to the discussion of those issues. The issues in question are: (i) the nature of scientific psychology; (ii) the individuation of psychological states for the purposes of scientific psychological explanation; and (iii) the project of naturalising mental content. I criticise many of Fodor's most significant and provocative claims but from within a framework of shared assumptions. I attempt to motivate and justify many of these shared assumptions. Chapter 1 constitutes an overview of the key themes in Fodor's philosophy of mind. In Chapter 2 an account of scientific psychology within the orthodox computationalist tradition is developed according to which that discipline is concerned with explaining intentionally characterised cognitive capacities. Such explanations attribute both semantic and syntactic properties to subpersonal representational states and processes. In Chapters 3 and 5 Fodor's various arguments for the conclusion that scientific psychology does (or should) individuate psychological states individualistically are criticised.I argue that there are pragmatic reasons why scientific psychology should sometimes attribute contents that are not locally supervenient. In Chapter 4 I consider Marr's theory of vision and conclude that the contents that Marr attributes to the states of the visual module are locally supervenient. Inconsistency is avoided by stressing the continuity of scientific psychological content with folk psychological content. In Chapter 6 I develop an account of the project of naturalising mental content that vindicates that project. In Chapter 7 I address the question of whether Fodor's theory of content constitutes a successful engagement in that project. I argue for a negative answer before drawing some morals as to how we should proceed in the light of the failure of Fodor's theory.
1997-06-01T00:00:00ZCain, MarkIn this thesis I address certain key issues in contemporary philosophy of mind and psychology via a study of Jerry Fodor's hugely important contributions to the discussion of those issues. The issues in question are: (i) the nature of scientific psychology; (ii) the individuation of psychological states for the purposes of scientific psychological explanation; and (iii) the project of naturalising mental content. I criticise many of Fodor's most significant and provocative claims but from within a framework of shared assumptions. I attempt to motivate and justify many of these shared assumptions. Chapter 1 constitutes an overview of the key themes in Fodor's philosophy of mind. In Chapter 2 an account of scientific psychology within the orthodox computationalist tradition is developed according to which that discipline is concerned with explaining intentionally characterised cognitive capacities. Such explanations attribute both semantic and syntactic properties to subpersonal representational states and processes. In Chapters 3 and 5 Fodor's various arguments for the conclusion that scientific psychology does (or should) individuate psychological states individualistically are criticised.I argue that there are pragmatic reasons why scientific psychology should sometimes attribute contents that are not locally supervenient. In Chapter 4 I consider Marr's theory of vision and conclude that the contents that Marr attributes to the states of the visual module are locally supervenient. Inconsistency is avoided by stressing the continuity of scientific psychological content with folk psychological content. In Chapter 6 I develop an account of the project of naturalising mental content that vindicates that project. In Chapter 7 I address the question of whether Fodor's theory of content constitutes a successful engagement in that project. I argue for a negative answer before drawing some morals as to how we should proceed in the light of the failure of Fodor's theory.Attitudes and their attributions
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14692
This doctoral dissertation is on the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions. To be more precise, it is mainly concerned with various kinds of analyses of singular propositional attitude ascriptions. These are sentences of the general form 'X Øs that a is F', where 'X' can be replaced by the name of the person who is in the particular mental state, 'Ø' can be replaced by a propositional attitude verb, like 'believe', 'doubt', 'hope', 'desire', etc., 'a' can be replaced by the name of the individual/object about whom/which the particular attitude is held, and 'F' can be replaced by the name of the property that the individual/object is said to have. The dissertation takes belief to be a paradigmatic example of a propositional attitude, and, thus, focuses mainly on the semantics of ascriptions of beliefs. The thesis it defends is that while a correct analysis of belief ascriptions in general involves a relation between the believer and the proposition which is believed (and which can be regarded as the reference of the 'that'-clause of the belief report), a semantic distinction still needs to be made between de re and de dicto beliefs. This distinction can be made by distinguishing between two different kinds of propositions -- Russellian propositions corresponding to de re beliefs, and Fregean propositions corresponding to de dicto beliefs. This approach is motivated by arguing that the recent proposals of the 'hybrid' type concerning the semantics of belief reports, advocated by such philosophers as Schiffer, Crimmins, Richard, etc., fail. These proposals fail because of overgeneralisation, and, therefore, fail to capture the de re/de dicto distinction. Therefore, if the de re/de dicto distinction is genuine, and the propositions occurring within these two kinds of reports are essentially different, then a single account of belief ascriptions cannot be given. We need two different semantical accounts to capture the distinction. A de re report is best understood by a semantics of the broadly Russellian variety, while a de dicto belief report is best understood by a semantics of the Fregean variety.
1996-07-01T00:00:00ZSen, ManidipaThis doctoral dissertation is on the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions. To be more precise, it is mainly concerned with various kinds of analyses of singular propositional attitude ascriptions. These are sentences of the general form 'X Øs that a is F', where 'X' can be replaced by the name of the person who is in the particular mental state, 'Ø' can be replaced by a propositional attitude verb, like 'believe', 'doubt', 'hope', 'desire', etc., 'a' can be replaced by the name of the individual/object about whom/which the particular attitude is held, and 'F' can be replaced by the name of the property that the individual/object is said to have. The dissertation takes belief to be a paradigmatic example of a propositional attitude, and, thus, focuses mainly on the semantics of ascriptions of beliefs. The thesis it defends is that while a correct analysis of belief ascriptions in general involves a relation between the believer and the proposition which is believed (and which can be regarded as the reference of the 'that'-clause of the belief report), a semantic distinction still needs to be made between de re and de dicto beliefs. This distinction can be made by distinguishing between two different kinds of propositions -- Russellian propositions corresponding to de re beliefs, and Fregean propositions corresponding to de dicto beliefs. This approach is motivated by arguing that the recent proposals of the 'hybrid' type concerning the semantics of belief reports, advocated by such philosophers as Schiffer, Crimmins, Richard, etc., fail. These proposals fail because of overgeneralisation, and, therefore, fail to capture the de re/de dicto distinction. Therefore, if the de re/de dicto distinction is genuine, and the propositions occurring within these two kinds of reports are essentially different, then a single account of belief ascriptions cannot be given. We need two different semantical accounts to capture the distinction. A de re report is best understood by a semantics of the broadly Russellian variety, while a de dicto belief report is best understood by a semantics of the Fregean variety.Objectivity and realism : meeting the manifestation challenge
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14685
The anti-realist maintains that all thoughts that we may entertain are thoughts whose truth-values we can in principle come to recognise. The realist refuses to make any such claim about the limits of our thinking. The anti-realist purports to arrive at her position on the basis of considerations which relate to the manifestability of understanding, i.e. the idea that grasp of thoughts must be manifested in linguistic abilities. Thus she argues against the realist that this requirement cannot be met unless truth is understood not to extend beyond what we can know. Turning the tables, I argue that it is the antirealist who cannot vindicate her position on these grounds. Some thoughts are apt for objective truth; their truth cannot be equated with their current assertibility. Our grasp of such thoughts is not yet manifested in our ability to assert or deny sentences. Once we have identified patterns of linguistic usage which display our grasp of such thoughts however, it transpires that there is no reason either to believe that their truth-values can in principle be recognised.
1999-08-01T00:00:00ZRosenkranz, SvenThe anti-realist maintains that all thoughts that we may entertain are thoughts whose truth-values we can in principle come to recognise. The realist refuses to make any such claim about the limits of our thinking. The anti-realist purports to arrive at her position on the basis of considerations which relate to the manifestability of understanding, i.e. the idea that grasp of thoughts must be manifested in linguistic abilities. Thus she argues against the realist that this requirement cannot be met unless truth is understood not to extend beyond what we can know. Turning the tables, I argue that it is the antirealist who cannot vindicate her position on these grounds. Some thoughts are apt for objective truth; their truth cannot be equated with their current assertibility. Our grasp of such thoughts is not yet manifested in our ability to assert or deny sentences. Once we have identified patterns of linguistic usage which display our grasp of such thoughts however, it transpires that there is no reason either to believe that their truth-values can in principle be recognised.Realism: a critical analysis of some arguments by Michael Dummett
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14680
CHAPTER ONE This thesis is a critical analysis of arguments which Michael Dummett has developed against realism. Dummett characterizes realism as the thesis that the meaning of sentences should be analyzed in terms of the notions oftruth and falsity which obey the classical principle of bivalence. Before examining Dummett's arguments against realism, I consider the two models Dummett proposes for analyzing the content of assertions and examine his thesis that the realist notion of truth is induced for some sentences by their use as constituents in compound sentences.
CHAPTER TWO I begin the examination of Dummett's arguments against realism by noting that Dummett allows in his recent work that a Tarskian truth-theory, couched in terms of a non-classical notion of truth, may act within a theory of meaning as the theory of reference yielding an inductive specification of truth- conditions. I then present Dummett's distinction between modest and full- blooded theories of meaning and suggest that the difference between them lies in the fact that the latter type possesses, while the former type lacks, a theory of sense, which Dummett conceives of as a series of correlations between practical abilities and T-sentences. I then consider the manifestation form of the argument against realism and argue that it fails on several counts. I then consider the acquisition form of the argument and point out the disputable assumptions about language-acquisition on which it is based. In the concluding section I question whether a theory of meaning which makes due allowance for idealization in the study of semantic competence should require a theory of sense of the kind Dummett suggests and question why the theory of reference should be responsive to the particular practical abilities which Dumniett emphasizes.
CHAPTER THREE In this chapter I complete the discussion of Dummett's arguments against realism and argue that Dummett has no satisfactory line of defence against my principal reaction to the manifestation form of the argument against realism. I then present Dummett's distinction between demonstrations and canonic al proofs his general distinction between between direct and indirect verifications. Then consider Dummett's attempts to characterize mathematical truth in terms of canonical proof and general truth in terms of direct verification. I conclude by outlining a problem which confronts a verificationist theory meaning of the kind Dummett espouses and show that there is a flaw in his argument that a verificationist theory of meaning leads to a rejection of classical logic.
CHAPTER FOUR I begin this chapter by examining Dummett's claim that reductionism is neither necessary nor sufficient for anti-realism. I argue that there is a sense in which reductionism is necessary and claim that there is a way of uniformly characterizing anti-realist positions on a number of subjects in terms of the thesis that a sentence is true in virtue of the evidence existing for it. I then consider Dummett's claim that a realist interpretation of counterfactuals involves asserting the unrestricted validity of the law of conditional excluded middle. I conclude by arguing that the anti-realist cannot acknowledge the defeasibility of evidence for empirically undecidable sentences and at the same time meet a legitimate demand that he explain in terms which do not beg any questions his conception of truth for such sentences.
1981-07-01T00:00:00ZMenzies, Peter CharlesCHAPTER ONE This thesis is a critical analysis of arguments which Michael Dummett has developed against realism. Dummett characterizes realism as the thesis that the meaning of sentences should be analyzed in terms of the notions oftruth and falsity which obey the classical principle of bivalence. Before examining Dummett's arguments against realism, I consider the two models Dummett proposes for analyzing the content of assertions and examine his thesis that the realist notion of truth is induced for some sentences by their use as constituents in compound sentences.
CHAPTER TWO I begin the examination of Dummett's arguments against realism by noting that Dummett allows in his recent work that a Tarskian truth-theory, couched in terms of a non-classical notion of truth, may act within a theory of meaning as the theory of reference yielding an inductive specification of truth- conditions. I then present Dummett's distinction between modest and full- blooded theories of meaning and suggest that the difference between them lies in the fact that the latter type possesses, while the former type lacks, a theory of sense, which Dummett conceives of as a series of correlations between practical abilities and T-sentences. I then consider the manifestation form of the argument against realism and argue that it fails on several counts. I then consider the acquisition form of the argument and point out the disputable assumptions about language-acquisition on which it is based. In the concluding section I question whether a theory of meaning which makes due allowance for idealization in the study of semantic competence should require a theory of sense of the kind Dummett suggests and question why the theory of reference should be responsive to the particular practical abilities which Dumniett emphasizes.
CHAPTER THREE In this chapter I complete the discussion of Dummett's arguments against realism and argue that Dummett has no satisfactory line of defence against my principal reaction to the manifestation form of the argument against realism. I then present Dummett's distinction between demonstrations and canonic al proofs his general distinction between between direct and indirect verifications. Then consider Dummett's attempts to characterize mathematical truth in terms of canonical proof and general truth in terms of direct verification. I conclude by outlining a problem which confronts a verificationist theory meaning of the kind Dummett espouses and show that there is a flaw in his argument that a verificationist theory of meaning leads to a rejection of classical logic.
CHAPTER FOUR I begin this chapter by examining Dummett's claim that reductionism is neither necessary nor sufficient for anti-realism. I argue that there is a sense in which reductionism is necessary and claim that there is a way of uniformly characterizing anti-realist positions on a number of subjects in terms of the thesis that a sentence is true in virtue of the evidence existing for it. I then consider Dummett's claim that a realist interpretation of counterfactuals involves asserting the unrestricted validity of the law of conditional excluded middle. I conclude by arguing that the anti-realist cannot acknowledge the defeasibility of evidence for empirically undecidable sentences and at the same time meet a legitimate demand that he explain in terms which do not beg any questions his conception of truth for such sentences.The individual and the absolute: a re-examination of some points in British Idealist philosophy
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14675
1973-10-01T00:00:00ZIslam, AminulThe background and use of the term 'idea' by Malebranche, Locke and Leibniz
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14672
The general distinction between uses of the term "idea" which we draw is between occurrences in the mind and dispositions for them as opposed to concepts. Locke uses "idea" in the first way, Malebranche uses it in the second. Leibniz allows that the mind is infinite and that dispositions in the body correspond to dispositions in the mind; thus he is able to maintain that idea are both concepts and dispositions in the mind.
We explain concepts in terms of conventional rules, for the most part linguistic and especially mathematical. We call a system of conventional rules an objective structure and, as those who took ideas to be concepts held that they are concepts of divine science, we treat God as the unique objective structure. The question in seventeenth century theories of ideas is how that body of knowledge comprising ideas and their relations is applicable to thing.
In the first four chapters, we consider concepts and the Cartesian programme to reduce the description of everything but that which applies concepts to mathematical descriptions. Descartes, Malebranche, and Leibniz held that the lack of simplicity and exactness in human knowledge arises from the correspondence between microscopic activities in the body and mental occurrences. With occurrences in the body explained mechanically, it was held, the world can be described with maximum simplicity and exactness. Extended things are law-obeying configurations to which concepts are applied; thinking things are rule-following things by virtue of applying these concepts. But the parts played by convention and behaviour are left out of their accounts and, omitting these, the world cannot be shown to be anything more than a diagram, perhaps portrayed only in the mind of the investigator. In the antepenultimate chapter, we discuss two related views which led the rationalists to maintain that all rational beings naturally follow a unique objective structure: their position on the correspondence between the activity of the body and occurrences in the mind (illustrated in their theories of vision) and the view that divine science is the standard for all scientific formulations. In the penultimate chapter, we present evidence that rationalist accounts of cognition were in fact modelled on rule-governed activity, Plato's theory of knowledge and Ideas is compared with rationalist accounts and is found to have less relevance to rule-governed activity, Kant, we admit, saw the relevance of rules, but no more than the rationalists. In the ninth chapter, we discuss Malebranche's vision in God (which most clearly presents ideas as concepts), its relation to Descartes' and Leibniz's positions and its dependent on occasionalism.
In the fifth chapter, we argue against Chomsky's innatist position and, more generally, claims in the behavioural and social sciences to explain human knowledge in terms of internalized components and covert activities. It is also maintained that Chomsky's innatism bears little resemblance to that of seventeenth century rationalism. We discuss in the sixth through the eighth chapters the Scholastic back-ground to the use of the term "idea" and theories of ideas. In the sixth chapter, the pervasive influence of Suarez is established, as is the prevalence of nominalism in the seventeenth century and its connection with Gaszendism and eventually Locke. Suarez combined aspects of Thomism and nominalism, Thomism was concerned with so-called spiritual objects of knowledge, which roughly act as standards and are the contribution of the knower to what is known; rationalism's account of knowledge maintained these aspects of Thomism, nominalism, on the other hand, presented what we shall call a causal or genetic account of knowledge (according to which our knowledge arises from causal relations and operations of the intellect) and was concerned with so-called material objects got from sensation (while allowing for spiritual operations). The distinction between spiritual and material objects and faculties is introduced in the sixth chapter. In the seventh chapter, we discuss the bridge between these facilities, the intellectus agens, which served as an objective structure in Thomist accounts. In the eight chapter, we discuss uses of “spiritual”, “idea” and “mind”, beginning with Scholastic uses, but concentrating on the differences between Descartes and Gassendi. Locke’s causal account is discussed in the final chapter. We emphasise his divergence from Cartesianism, such as his view on the narrow compass of the understanding, his treatment of mathematical ideas as signs and his reliance on mental dispositions. Locke’s position suffers from the omission of concepts.
1978-01-01T00:00:00ZEsterline, Albert CrawfordThe general distinction between uses of the term "idea" which we draw is between occurrences in the mind and dispositions for them as opposed to concepts. Locke uses "idea" in the first way, Malebranche uses it in the second. Leibniz allows that the mind is infinite and that dispositions in the body correspond to dispositions in the mind; thus he is able to maintain that idea are both concepts and dispositions in the mind.
We explain concepts in terms of conventional rules, for the most part linguistic and especially mathematical. We call a system of conventional rules an objective structure and, as those who took ideas to be concepts held that they are concepts of divine science, we treat God as the unique objective structure. The question in seventeenth century theories of ideas is how that body of knowledge comprising ideas and their relations is applicable to thing.
In the first four chapters, we consider concepts and the Cartesian programme to reduce the description of everything but that which applies concepts to mathematical descriptions. Descartes, Malebranche, and Leibniz held that the lack of simplicity and exactness in human knowledge arises from the correspondence between microscopic activities in the body and mental occurrences. With occurrences in the body explained mechanically, it was held, the world can be described with maximum simplicity and exactness. Extended things are law-obeying configurations to which concepts are applied; thinking things are rule-following things by virtue of applying these concepts. But the parts played by convention and behaviour are left out of their accounts and, omitting these, the world cannot be shown to be anything more than a diagram, perhaps portrayed only in the mind of the investigator. In the antepenultimate chapter, we discuss two related views which led the rationalists to maintain that all rational beings naturally follow a unique objective structure: their position on the correspondence between the activity of the body and occurrences in the mind (illustrated in their theories of vision) and the view that divine science is the standard for all scientific formulations. In the penultimate chapter, we present evidence that rationalist accounts of cognition were in fact modelled on rule-governed activity, Plato's theory of knowledge and Ideas is compared with rationalist accounts and is found to have less relevance to rule-governed activity, Kant, we admit, saw the relevance of rules, but no more than the rationalists. In the ninth chapter, we discuss Malebranche's vision in God (which most clearly presents ideas as concepts), its relation to Descartes' and Leibniz's positions and its dependent on occasionalism.
In the fifth chapter, we argue against Chomsky's innatist position and, more generally, claims in the behavioural and social sciences to explain human knowledge in terms of internalized components and covert activities. It is also maintained that Chomsky's innatism bears little resemblance to that of seventeenth century rationalism. We discuss in the sixth through the eighth chapters the Scholastic back-ground to the use of the term "idea" and theories of ideas. In the sixth chapter, the pervasive influence of Suarez is established, as is the prevalence of nominalism in the seventeenth century and its connection with Gaszendism and eventually Locke. Suarez combined aspects of Thomism and nominalism, Thomism was concerned with so-called spiritual objects of knowledge, which roughly act as standards and are the contribution of the knower to what is known; rationalism's account of knowledge maintained these aspects of Thomism, nominalism, on the other hand, presented what we shall call a causal or genetic account of knowledge (according to which our knowledge arises from causal relations and operations of the intellect) and was concerned with so-called material objects got from sensation (while allowing for spiritual operations). The distinction between spiritual and material objects and faculties is introduced in the sixth chapter. In the seventh chapter, we discuss the bridge between these facilities, the intellectus agens, which served as an objective structure in Thomist accounts. In the eight chapter, we discuss uses of “spiritual”, “idea” and “mind”, beginning with Scholastic uses, but concentrating on the differences between Descartes and Gassendi. Locke’s causal account is discussed in the final chapter. We emphasise his divergence from Cartesianism, such as his view on the narrow compass of the understanding, his treatment of mathematical ideas as signs and his reliance on mental dispositions. Locke’s position suffers from the omission of concepts.The ideas of the Sophists in Plato's dialogues
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14667
Aiming, in contrast to the traditional attitude, to arrive at general distinction of the role of the Sophists and the Sophistic Movement, this research concentrates on the individual Sophists rather than Socrates in five of Plato's dialogues: the Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias Major, Euthydemus and Republic I. The thinking of six individual Sophists is examined in detail by contrasting the historical Sophists and the Sophists as portrayed by Plato in his dialogues. In addition to this the study considers whether or not Plato's logical validity is consistent in developing an argument between Socrates and the individual Sophists. Chapter I attempts to contrast the meaning of Callicles' physis with the Homeric hero's power and honour in unrivalled strength and prowess, closely interrelated with one's competitive excellence (ὰρϵϮή). Chapter II investigates the thinking of the two Sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, finding it to be closely interrelated with the logic and ontology of the Eleatics in the respect of developing their systematic fallacies. Chapter III shows that Hippias, as polymath, has derived his basic ideas from the natural philosophers, Heraclitus and Empedocles, and shows how this helps to explain his idea of physis and "the natural continuous bodies of being". Chapter IV discusses how Protagoras' claim to be a teacher of the art of politics and of making men good citizens can be coherently justifiable through his use of myth and argument. Chapter V clarifies how Thrasymachus' definition of justice as "justice and the just are the other fellow's good" leads to his other proposition "justice is nothing other than the interest of the stronger" in the actual world, involving the courage to look the real facts in the face rather than hide behind the name of justice. In particular Socrates' ineffectiveness is well displayed in dealing with the powerful claim of the moral sceptic, for his counterattack falls short of refuting Thrasymachus' position in this dialogue.
1992-07-01T00:00:00ZChang, K. -C.Aiming, in contrast to the traditional attitude, to arrive at general distinction of the role of the Sophists and the Sophistic Movement, this research concentrates on the individual Sophists rather than Socrates in five of Plato's dialogues: the Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias Major, Euthydemus and Republic I. The thinking of six individual Sophists is examined in detail by contrasting the historical Sophists and the Sophists as portrayed by Plato in his dialogues. In addition to this the study considers whether or not Plato's logical validity is consistent in developing an argument between Socrates and the individual Sophists. Chapter I attempts to contrast the meaning of Callicles' physis with the Homeric hero's power and honour in unrivalled strength and prowess, closely interrelated with one's competitive excellence (ὰρϵϮή). Chapter II investigates the thinking of the two Sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, finding it to be closely interrelated with the logic and ontology of the Eleatics in the respect of developing their systematic fallacies. Chapter III shows that Hippias, as polymath, has derived his basic ideas from the natural philosophers, Heraclitus and Empedocles, and shows how this helps to explain his idea of physis and "the natural continuous bodies of being". Chapter IV discusses how Protagoras' claim to be a teacher of the art of politics and of making men good citizens can be coherently justifiable through his use of myth and argument. Chapter V clarifies how Thrasymachus' definition of justice as "justice and the just are the other fellow's good" leads to his other proposition "justice is nothing other than the interest of the stronger" in the actual world, involving the courage to look the real facts in the face rather than hide behind the name of justice. In particular Socrates' ineffectiveness is well displayed in dealing with the powerful claim of the moral sceptic, for his counterattack falls short of refuting Thrasymachus' position in this dialogue.Remembering dreams
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14663
This thesis concludes that our commonplace conviction that dreams are dreamt during sleep and remembered or forgotten upon waking is, at best, a speculative hypothesis open to a very reasonable scepticism. The conclusion follows from a defence of the Dispositional Analysis, that to remember or forget a dream is to retain or lose an ability acquired during sleep to tell without invention or inference a fictitious story as if of events witnessed and deeds done. According to the Dispositional Analysis everyday talk about dreams being dream during sleep stands open to contradiction by empirical evidence supporting Globot's Hypothesis that the content of our awakening narratives is explained by peculiarities in the manner of awakening. According to the Dispositional Analysis, our ordinary assumption that 'telling a dream' is an exercise of memory can only be tested within a theory enabling us to predict whilst a person is asleep what, if any, dream he would tell, if awoken in a normal manner, prompted to say what appeal's to have happened (no matter how incredible or unimaginable), and not distracted. Chapter One ("Events Witnessed and Deeds Done") argues that sober reflection on what we already know shows that, in 'telling a dream', a person usually does not remember perceptions and actions from sleep. In Chapter Two ("The Unimagined and Unimaginable") argues that the ability to tell a dream cannot be reduced to memory of thoughts and intentions directed towards images. The conclusion drawn from Part One (What Appeals To Be Remembered) is not merely that there is no general account of what beaming consist in, as if the fact that we do not remember illusory perceptions, thoughts or images shows that we do remember something else, some irreducible mental activity. The conclusion is that when we 'remember dreams' we generally remember nothing of what happened during sleep. Chapter Three ("'Actions' During Sleep") argues that the scientific study of sleepwalking, sleeptalking, night terrors, prearranged 'signalling' during sleep fail to support die hypothesis that a person remembers thoughts and intentions from sleep. Chapter Four ('"Perceptions During Sleep"), it is argued that neither evidence of physiological activity peripheral to the central nervous system (e.g. eye movements, muscular twitches, penes erections, etc.) interpreted as 'covert behaviour' during sleep, nor evidence of neurological activity of the forebrain interpreted as critical responses to internally generated 'stimuli' supports the Received Opinion that dreams are episodes remembered from sleep. Part Two ("Scientific Studies of Sleep and Dreaming"), concludes that experimental sleep research is consistent with the conclusion that a person telling a dream is typically not remembering mental acts, events, states or processes from sleep. Part Three ("The Dispositional Analysis") questions the implications of the conclusion that the Received Opinion is false. Chapter Five ("Dreaming Without Experience") argues that our conviction that dreams are dreamt or 'occur' during sleep is an empirical hypothesis which survives the falsification of die Received Opinion. The conclusion drawn here departs both from that of Malcolm's (1959) argument that the concept of dreaming is not a theoretical concept and from that of Squires' (1973) argument that dreaming is a bad theoretical concept. Chapter Six, argues that assumptions about the causal explanation of telling a dream whilst central to our talk about dreams being dreamt or occurring during sleep cannot not explain our commonplace conviction that dreams are remembered from sleep. In particular, it is argued against Dennett (1976) that a causal-cum-representational analysis of remembering dreams does not escape the need to distinguish between the everyday notion of memory appropriate to retaining an ability to tell a dream and a technical notion of storage in short-term 'memory'. The Conclusion ("A Truth of Underwhelming Importance?") reflects upon the gap forced by the thesis between the unreasoning confidence of our awakening conviction that dreams are remembered from sleep and the speculative justification accorded to it by the Dispositional Analysis. It recommends an uneasy resignation to die conclusion that our undoubting faith that something is remembered reduces to nothing more substantial than the hypothesis that 'telling a dream' is the exercise of an unconsciously acquired and retained disposition to awake with a merely apparent memory of episodes occurring during sleep.
1994-07-01T00:00:00ZRobertson, MichaelThis thesis concludes that our commonplace conviction that dreams are dreamt during sleep and remembered or forgotten upon waking is, at best, a speculative hypothesis open to a very reasonable scepticism. The conclusion follows from a defence of the Dispositional Analysis, that to remember or forget a dream is to retain or lose an ability acquired during sleep to tell without invention or inference a fictitious story as if of events witnessed and deeds done. According to the Dispositional Analysis everyday talk about dreams being dream during sleep stands open to contradiction by empirical evidence supporting Globot's Hypothesis that the content of our awakening narratives is explained by peculiarities in the manner of awakening. According to the Dispositional Analysis, our ordinary assumption that 'telling a dream' is an exercise of memory can only be tested within a theory enabling us to predict whilst a person is asleep what, if any, dream he would tell, if awoken in a normal manner, prompted to say what appeal's to have happened (no matter how incredible or unimaginable), and not distracted. Chapter One ("Events Witnessed and Deeds Done") argues that sober reflection on what we already know shows that, in 'telling a dream', a person usually does not remember perceptions and actions from sleep. In Chapter Two ("The Unimagined and Unimaginable") argues that the ability to tell a dream cannot be reduced to memory of thoughts and intentions directed towards images. The conclusion drawn from Part One (What Appeals To Be Remembered) is not merely that there is no general account of what beaming consist in, as if the fact that we do not remember illusory perceptions, thoughts or images shows that we do remember something else, some irreducible mental activity. The conclusion is that when we 'remember dreams' we generally remember nothing of what happened during sleep. Chapter Three ("'Actions' During Sleep") argues that the scientific study of sleepwalking, sleeptalking, night terrors, prearranged 'signalling' during sleep fail to support die hypothesis that a person remembers thoughts and intentions from sleep. Chapter Four ('"Perceptions During Sleep"), it is argued that neither evidence of physiological activity peripheral to the central nervous system (e.g. eye movements, muscular twitches, penes erections, etc.) interpreted as 'covert behaviour' during sleep, nor evidence of neurological activity of the forebrain interpreted as critical responses to internally generated 'stimuli' supports the Received Opinion that dreams are episodes remembered from sleep. Part Two ("Scientific Studies of Sleep and Dreaming"), concludes that experimental sleep research is consistent with the conclusion that a person telling a dream is typically not remembering mental acts, events, states or processes from sleep. Part Three ("The Dispositional Analysis") questions the implications of the conclusion that the Received Opinion is false. Chapter Five ("Dreaming Without Experience") argues that our conviction that dreams are dreamt or 'occur' during sleep is an empirical hypothesis which survives the falsification of die Received Opinion. The conclusion drawn here departs both from that of Malcolm's (1959) argument that the concept of dreaming is not a theoretical concept and from that of Squires' (1973) argument that dreaming is a bad theoretical concept. Chapter Six, argues that assumptions about the causal explanation of telling a dream whilst central to our talk about dreams being dreamt or occurring during sleep cannot not explain our commonplace conviction that dreams are remembered from sleep. In particular, it is argued against Dennett (1976) that a causal-cum-representational analysis of remembering dreams does not escape the need to distinguish between the everyday notion of memory appropriate to retaining an ability to tell a dream and a technical notion of storage in short-term 'memory'. The Conclusion ("A Truth of Underwhelming Importance?") reflects upon the gap forced by the thesis between the unreasoning confidence of our awakening conviction that dreams are remembered from sleep and the speculative justification accorded to it by the Dispositional Analysis. It recommends an uneasy resignation to die conclusion that our undoubting faith that something is remembered reduces to nothing more substantial than the hypothesis that 'telling a dream' is the exercise of an unconsciously acquired and retained disposition to awake with a merely apparent memory of episodes occurring during sleep.The concept of application
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14660
1960-01-01T00:00:00ZStoothoff, Robert H."Re-designing the nation" : politics and Christianity in Papua New Guinea's national parliament
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14580
My thesis addresses how Christianity can constitute itself as a creative force and a form of governance across different scales. I carried out 12 months of fieldwork between 2013 and 2015 in Papua New Guinea’s National Parliament (Port Moresby). My interlocutors were bureaucrats, liberal professionals and pastors who formed a group known as the Unity Team. The Unity Team, spearheaded by the Speaker of the 9th Parliament, Hon. Theodor Zurenuoc, were responsible for controversial initiatives, such as the destruction and dismantling of traditional carvings from Parliament in 2013, which they considered ungodly and evil, and the placement of a donated KJV Bible in the chamber of Parliament in 2015.
My interlocutors regard Christianity as central to eliciting modern subjects and institutions. They consider Christianity to be a universal form of discernment, contrasted to particularistic forms of knowing and relating which are thought to create corruption and low institutional performance. I show how the Unity Team regarded Christianity as more than a way of doing away with satanic forces and building a Christian self. They expected Christianity to be a frame of reference informing work ethics, infusing citizenship and, finally, productive of a public and national realm. By exploring Christianity ethnographically, I offer a contribution to Anthropological discussions concerning politics, bureaucracy, citizenship, and nation-making.
2018-06-28T00:00:00ZSantos da Costa, PriscilaMy thesis addresses how Christianity can constitute itself as a creative force and a form of governance across different scales. I carried out 12 months of fieldwork between 2013 and 2015 in Papua New Guinea’s National Parliament (Port Moresby). My interlocutors were bureaucrats, liberal professionals and pastors who formed a group known as the Unity Team. The Unity Team, spearheaded by the Speaker of the 9th Parliament, Hon. Theodor Zurenuoc, were responsible for controversial initiatives, such as the destruction and dismantling of traditional carvings from Parliament in 2013, which they considered ungodly and evil, and the placement of a donated KJV Bible in the chamber of Parliament in 2015.
My interlocutors regard Christianity as central to eliciting modern subjects and institutions. They consider Christianity to be a universal form of discernment, contrasted to particularistic forms of knowing and relating which are thought to create corruption and low institutional performance. I show how the Unity Team regarded Christianity as more than a way of doing away with satanic forces and building a Christian self. They expected Christianity to be a frame of reference informing work ethics, infusing citizenship and, finally, productive of a public and national realm. By exploring Christianity ethnographically, I offer a contribution to Anthropological discussions concerning politics, bureaucracy, citizenship, and nation-making.The Hardtowners : an ethnographic study focused on a group of long-term unemployed one-parent families living within a Dundee council estate
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14334
This is an ethnographic description and investigation of life on a Scottish council estate. It is based on five unemployed one-parent life histories focusing on their experiences, knowledge and emotions in and around a local community centre. The study's expressed focal point is the Gentleman Robber community centre, within the hardtown community in the city of Dundee. The study touches on locally important representations and key issues such as: work, morality, boredom, kinship, spatiality and violence. At the tables in the community centre, the local narrative montage often focused on the enjoyment of violence or the negative marginal stigmatism faced, while, for example, collecting one's social benefits or attending the local doctor. It reflected a dichotomy of Us/Them relations linked to a local fragmentation of identity and issues of deservingness. I found that in a daily emphasis of their own exclusion the Hardtowners often voiced a feeling and embodiment of opposition through local story telling. It is a fragmented and stressful everyday life, with individual skill and network connections deciding individual status in the community. Links and networks last for as long as they are deemed useful and flexibility in trading, cooperation, networking and violence is one of the local guiding lights for success. The ethnographic narrative is described though a fragmented, contextually faithful discourse, with cinematic influences. This imparts a slice of daily experientialism found in the fragmented and stressful lives of the individuals born into and living on benefit in a Western European welfare society.
2004-01-01T00:00:00ZRode, PaulinaThis is an ethnographic description and investigation of life on a Scottish council estate. It is based on five unemployed one-parent life histories focusing on their experiences, knowledge and emotions in and around a local community centre. The study's expressed focal point is the Gentleman Robber community centre, within the hardtown community in the city of Dundee. The study touches on locally important representations and key issues such as: work, morality, boredom, kinship, spatiality and violence. At the tables in the community centre, the local narrative montage often focused on the enjoyment of violence or the negative marginal stigmatism faced, while, for example, collecting one's social benefits or attending the local doctor. It reflected a dichotomy of Us/Them relations linked to a local fragmentation of identity and issues of deservingness. I found that in a daily emphasis of their own exclusion the Hardtowners often voiced a feeling and embodiment of opposition through local story telling. It is a fragmented and stressful everyday life, with individual skill and network connections deciding individual status in the community. Links and networks last for as long as they are deemed useful and flexibility in trading, cooperation, networking and violence is one of the local guiding lights for success. The ethnographic narrative is described though a fragmented, contextually faithful discourse, with cinematic influences. This imparts a slice of daily experientialism found in the fragmented and stressful lives of the individuals born into and living on benefit in a Western European welfare society.Sexual discourse about elderly people in Japan and Britain
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14256
This thesis attempts to pursue and envisage the concrete pathway relating elderly people's sexuality at a discourse level in a broader socio-political context in Japan and Britain as modernised industrial societies. Three key facets may greatly enrich not only academic discourse on elderly people's sexuality but the various meanings regarding being old in modernised industrial societies. (1) Change in sexual discourse about elderly people demonstrates human sexuality and so allows us to forge ties with scientific data, medicine and sexology. (2) At the same time, we can appreciate that at a superficial level, changes in discourse refer to most basic heterosexual, married and age-stratified gendered relationships. (3) Notwithstanding such change in discourse, involving the move from asexuality to sexuality, one particular discursive idea, namely the 'critical view' of elderly people's sexuality, has always existed as a background notion. We address the first and second points from the social constructionist view. On the first point, the elderly population are capable of initiating themselves the fresh thinking that reflects changes in discourses, with the soon-to-be-old middle aged as catalysts. However, with regard to the third point, considerations of the incomplete nature of the change in discourses are closely related to the question of the elderly's own unique biological position. Elderly people's own unique biological position is beyond social constructionists' reach. A look beyond the positions of biological essentialism and social constructionism may provide us with the opportunity to view elderly people's sexual and sensual fulfilment from a perspective that would otherwise be impossible. Such analyses are important in listening to noises of elderly people's sexuality within "an ensemble of" highly modernised and industrialised societies. We may dare to refer to these noises as the freedom of being marginal.
2005-01-01T00:00:00ZOh, KazumiThis thesis attempts to pursue and envisage the concrete pathway relating elderly people's sexuality at a discourse level in a broader socio-political context in Japan and Britain as modernised industrial societies. Three key facets may greatly enrich not only academic discourse on elderly people's sexuality but the various meanings regarding being old in modernised industrial societies. (1) Change in sexual discourse about elderly people demonstrates human sexuality and so allows us to forge ties with scientific data, medicine and sexology. (2) At the same time, we can appreciate that at a superficial level, changes in discourse refer to most basic heterosexual, married and age-stratified gendered relationships. (3) Notwithstanding such change in discourse, involving the move from asexuality to sexuality, one particular discursive idea, namely the 'critical view' of elderly people's sexuality, has always existed as a background notion. We address the first and second points from the social constructionist view. On the first point, the elderly population are capable of initiating themselves the fresh thinking that reflects changes in discourses, with the soon-to-be-old middle aged as catalysts. However, with regard to the third point, considerations of the incomplete nature of the change in discourses are closely related to the question of the elderly's own unique biological position. Elderly people's own unique biological position is beyond social constructionists' reach. A look beyond the positions of biological essentialism and social constructionism may provide us with the opportunity to view elderly people's sexual and sensual fulfilment from a perspective that would otherwise be impossible. Such analyses are important in listening to noises of elderly people's sexuality within "an ensemble of" highly modernised and industrialised societies. We may dare to refer to these noises as the freedom of being marginal.John Brown : freedom and imposture in the early twentieth-century trans-Caribbean
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14251
2016-12-02T00:00:00ZWardle, HuonRemaking selves and remaking public space : combating sexual harassment in Cairo post 2011
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14155
This thesis focuses on the work of a social movement based in Cairo that dedicated itself to the addressing and reducing sexual harassment, or taḥarush in the streets. Based on a year and five months of fieldwork, this thesis elaborated upon the genesis of the movement, its ethos, and the methods it deployed to tackle taḥarush. It is argued that the movement deployed methods which encouraged members of Egyptian society to revisit and rework their ethical standpoints with reference to taḥarush, and as such public behaviour. In this way, members of Egyptian society were asked to become more aware of their roles within society itself. Firstly, such methods had to be tested by movement members themselves.
The movement became known for two main activities: raising awareness and patrols. Both methods serve as ways by which the movement reshaped both people and the public spaces they occupied. Spaces are defined by the people who pass through them, and by acting on a given space, people can change how it is perceived. The movement designated itself a safe space, encouraging members to ponder ideas from society with the goal of changing society ‘for the better’.
What my research revealed was that lack of consensus regarding definitions embedded in movement ethos contributed to conflict between members and discontinuity between ethos and its enactment. Government pressures required changes to the structure and internal functioning of the movement, and in addition to the initial ethical project regarding taḥarush, members found themselves learning to embody and perform roles associated with employed positions.
The turmoil experienced both within in and outside of the movement is put back into the context of Egypt post 2011, to tease out the sense of temporality embedded in their struggle to survive the political climate of the time.
2018-06-01T00:00:00ZFernandez, SandraThis thesis focuses on the work of a social movement based in Cairo that dedicated itself to the addressing and reducing sexual harassment, or taḥarush in the streets. Based on a year and five months of fieldwork, this thesis elaborated upon the genesis of the movement, its ethos, and the methods it deployed to tackle taḥarush. It is argued that the movement deployed methods which encouraged members of Egyptian society to revisit and rework their ethical standpoints with reference to taḥarush, and as such public behaviour. In this way, members of Egyptian society were asked to become more aware of their roles within society itself. Firstly, such methods had to be tested by movement members themselves.
The movement became known for two main activities: raising awareness and patrols. Both methods serve as ways by which the movement reshaped both people and the public spaces they occupied. Spaces are defined by the people who pass through them, and by acting on a given space, people can change how it is perceived. The movement designated itself a safe space, encouraging members to ponder ideas from society with the goal of changing society ‘for the better’.
What my research revealed was that lack of consensus regarding definitions embedded in movement ethos contributed to conflict between members and discontinuity between ethos and its enactment. Government pressures required changes to the structure and internal functioning of the movement, and in addition to the initial ethical project regarding taḥarush, members found themselves learning to embody and perform roles associated with employed positions.
The turmoil experienced both within in and outside of the movement is put back into the context of Egypt post 2011, to tease out the sense of temporality embedded in their struggle to survive the political climate of the time.The specificity of the aesthetics of slowness in contemporary Romanian cinema
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14124
Contemporary Romanian cinema, particularly in its internationally successful instances, displays formal characteristics that have often led to its being seen in terms of the so-called Slow Cinema trend in contemporary cinema. This thesis proposes that there is something distinctive about slowness in contemporary Romanian films, similar to and yet different from Slow Cinema. Through a detailed analysis of films made by Cristi Puiu and Cristian Mungiu, two of the most representative contemporary Romanian filmmakers, Romanian slow films emerge as a less stringent form of slowness characterised by tension.
This thesis first looks at some of the ways in which slowness can be developed in film - through the use of the long take and the trope of waiting along with the use of stillness and silence. Within this slowness an attitude of contemplation emerges, a characteristic that is key to Slow Cinema. Through close textual analysis of a number of films with a reputation for slowness, both classic and more recent examples, this thesis looks at how the techniques used to develop slowness in film allow for variation and how they can be used not only to create this attitude of contemplation but also to create tension. While this aspect has been less discussed with the more prevalent focus on Slow Cinema and its themes of contemplation, tension can be identified in a variety of films, both those considered part of Slow Cinema and those considered slow films.
The distinctiveness of slowness in contemporary Romanian cinema is partly to do with its being rooted in Romanian culture. This study looks at Romanian cinematic and cultural inheritance, specifically at how slowness figures in this history.
This thesis contributes to the existing body of research on contemporary Romanian cinema addressing its most salient characteristic, its sense of slowness, by placing it in relation to wider discussions about slowness and Slow Cinema as well as by linking its distinctiveness to wider cultural notions and practices of temporal organisation as well as the social history of the nation.
2018-06-28T00:00:00ZPopa, Emilia DianaContemporary Romanian cinema, particularly in its internationally successful instances, displays formal characteristics that have often led to its being seen in terms of the so-called Slow Cinema trend in contemporary cinema. This thesis proposes that there is something distinctive about slowness in contemporary Romanian films, similar to and yet different from Slow Cinema. Through a detailed analysis of films made by Cristi Puiu and Cristian Mungiu, two of the most representative contemporary Romanian filmmakers, Romanian slow films emerge as a less stringent form of slowness characterised by tension.
This thesis first looks at some of the ways in which slowness can be developed in film - through the use of the long take and the trope of waiting along with the use of stillness and silence. Within this slowness an attitude of contemplation emerges, a characteristic that is key to Slow Cinema. Through close textual analysis of a number of films with a reputation for slowness, both classic and more recent examples, this thesis looks at how the techniques used to develop slowness in film allow for variation and how they can be used not only to create this attitude of contemplation but also to create tension. While this aspect has been less discussed with the more prevalent focus on Slow Cinema and its themes of contemplation, tension can be identified in a variety of films, both those considered part of Slow Cinema and those considered slow films.
The distinctiveness of slowness in contemporary Romanian cinema is partly to do with its being rooted in Romanian culture. This study looks at Romanian cinematic and cultural inheritance, specifically at how slowness figures in this history.
This thesis contributes to the existing body of research on contemporary Romanian cinema addressing its most salient characteristic, its sense of slowness, by placing it in relation to wider discussions about slowness and Slow Cinema as well as by linking its distinctiveness to wider cultural notions and practices of temporal organisation as well as the social history of the nation.The moral (im)possibilities of being an applied anthropologist in development : an exploration of the moral and ethical issues that arise in theory and practice
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13958
My broadest aim in this thesis is to explore some of the central ethical concerns of social anthropologists vis-a-vis the phenomena of development. In particular, what I want to bring out and examine is the dynamics of the 'moral experience' and 'moral force' of anthropologists in this area. I go about this by considering the historical unfolding of the anthropological conceptual and evaluative apprehension of planned social and economic change. On this basis, I also consider the nature of the critiques and contributions that social anthropology has generated. I also make an attempt to review the major conceptual moral controversies and agendas that are intrinsic to development from an anthropological perspective. Whilst the concepts and values that emanate from social anthropology are multi-faceted and many stranded, I believe that the anthropological standpoint is both distinctive and potentially counter hegemonic. I look specifically at the moral resources that can be unearthed from the emerging field of 'development ethics' which is largely articulated in terms of the maxims that are fundamental to Western moral and political traditions. I attempt to set out the terrain of the ethical deliberation of anthropologists involved in development in terms of some of the moral difficulties of Western society. I argue that Western moral reasoning, as a result of deep disagreements about the sources of value human life and society, tends to rely upon procedural, instrumental and coercive ethical frameworks. On this basis, one of my assertions is that communitarian arguments, whilst also being needed as a healthy antidote to the excesses of liberal individualism, also constitute a reflection of the aspirations of people(s), many of whom are beleaguered by the alienation, atomism and instrumentalism of modern society. The communitarian perspective also underpins a political commitment to supporting those besieged indigenous communities that struggle to defend their integrity in the face of the aggressive intrusions of the market mentality. This may involve supporting the maintenance of 'traditional' versions of moral reasoning, well being, and sociality (such as indigenous life-worlds), collective rights in the face of the fragmentary and individuating neo-liberal development policies, and to support the 'construction of new associative networks such as 'new social movements' that represent the aspirations, and embody the values, of marginalised and disempowered social groups.
2004-01-01T00:00:00ZMacLullich, ChristopherMy broadest aim in this thesis is to explore some of the central ethical concerns of social anthropologists vis-a-vis the phenomena of development. In particular, what I want to bring out and examine is the dynamics of the 'moral experience' and 'moral force' of anthropologists in this area. I go about this by considering the historical unfolding of the anthropological conceptual and evaluative apprehension of planned social and economic change. On this basis, I also consider the nature of the critiques and contributions that social anthropology has generated. I also make an attempt to review the major conceptual moral controversies and agendas that are intrinsic to development from an anthropological perspective. Whilst the concepts and values that emanate from social anthropology are multi-faceted and many stranded, I believe that the anthropological standpoint is both distinctive and potentially counter hegemonic. I look specifically at the moral resources that can be unearthed from the emerging field of 'development ethics' which is largely articulated in terms of the maxims that are fundamental to Western moral and political traditions. I attempt to set out the terrain of the ethical deliberation of anthropologists involved in development in terms of some of the moral difficulties of Western society. I argue that Western moral reasoning, as a result of deep disagreements about the sources of value human life and society, tends to rely upon procedural, instrumental and coercive ethical frameworks. On this basis, one of my assertions is that communitarian arguments, whilst also being needed as a healthy antidote to the excesses of liberal individualism, also constitute a reflection of the aspirations of people(s), many of whom are beleaguered by the alienation, atomism and instrumentalism of modern society. The communitarian perspective also underpins a political commitment to supporting those besieged indigenous communities that struggle to defend their integrity in the face of the aggressive intrusions of the market mentality. This may involve supporting the maintenance of 'traditional' versions of moral reasoning, well being, and sociality (such as indigenous life-worlds), collective rights in the face of the fragmentary and individuating neo-liberal development policies, and to support the 'construction of new associative networks such as 'new social movements' that represent the aspirations, and embody the values, of marginalised and disempowered social groups.What do I know? scepticism : reasoning and knowledge
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13770
This thesis concerns approaches to solving the problem of paradoxical sceptical arguments from ignorance within contemporary epistemology. In chapter 1, I critically discuss three frameworks for approaching the sceptical problem, and argue that theoretical responses are unsatisfactory. In chapter 2, I critically examine recent accounts of sceptical hypotheses, and argue against them on the grounds of generality, and in favour of my own account. In chapter 3, I critically examine recent accounts of the epistemic principles underwriting sceptical arguments from ignorance, and argue against them on the grounds of generality, and in favour of my own account. In chapter 4, I critically evaluate the adequacy of resolutions to sceptical paradoxes suggested by three prominent versions of epistemological contextualism. In chapter 5, I examine a central objection to the error theories implied by contextualist resolutions of sceptical paradoxes, which focuses on the notion of semantic blindness. Two assessments of the objection are set out, and contextualist responses to each. I argued that considerations of semantic blindness count against contextualist resolutions of sceptical paradoxes in favour of invariantists. In chapter 6, I assess the potential for an invariantist to provide an adequate error-theory concerning, and resolving, sceptical paradoxes. I critically assess approaches based on aspects of the heuristics and biases paradigm, and of dual-process theories of mindreading. I propose, instead, a novel anti-sceptical error-theory in terms of the default-interventionist model of dual-process theory of judgement and reasoning, together with my conclusions from chapters 2 and 3.
2018-06-28T00:00:00ZCarrick, LaurenceThis thesis concerns approaches to solving the problem of paradoxical sceptical arguments from ignorance within contemporary epistemology. In chapter 1, I critically discuss three frameworks for approaching the sceptical problem, and argue that theoretical responses are unsatisfactory. In chapter 2, I critically examine recent accounts of sceptical hypotheses, and argue against them on the grounds of generality, and in favour of my own account. In chapter 3, I critically examine recent accounts of the epistemic principles underwriting sceptical arguments from ignorance, and argue against them on the grounds of generality, and in favour of my own account. In chapter 4, I critically evaluate the adequacy of resolutions to sceptical paradoxes suggested by three prominent versions of epistemological contextualism. In chapter 5, I examine a central objection to the error theories implied by contextualist resolutions of sceptical paradoxes, which focuses on the notion of semantic blindness. Two assessments of the objection are set out, and contextualist responses to each. I argued that considerations of semantic blindness count against contextualist resolutions of sceptical paradoxes in favour of invariantists. In chapter 6, I assess the potential for an invariantist to provide an adequate error-theory concerning, and resolving, sceptical paradoxes. I critically assess approaches based on aspects of the heuristics and biases paradigm, and of dual-process theories of mindreading. I propose, instead, a novel anti-sceptical error-theory in terms of the default-interventionist model of dual-process theory of judgement and reasoning, together with my conclusions from chapters 2 and 3.Introduction : testing freedom
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13681
2016-12-02T00:00:00ZLino e Silva, MoisesWardle, HuonIII - Contractarianism as a political morality
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13679
Contractarianism initially made its mark, in the seventeenth century, as a sort of theory of everything in ethics. But gradually philosophers became convinced that there were resources available outside contractarianism for settling important moral questions—for instance, ideas of human rights and the moral equality of persons. Then Rawls revived contractarianism with a more modest aim—namely, as a theory of justice. But even this agenda for contractarianism has been called into question, most notably by G.A. Cohen, who contends that we have other tools at our disposal for identifying the true conception of justice. So the question remains: how should contractarianism be construed if it is to provide answers to questions that cannot be answered in some other way? In my essay I offer a very simple answer: contractarianism should be construed as a political morality. I arrive at this answer by starting with contractarianism as a theory of everything and paring away the unappealing layers of contractarianism so understood. I begin by describing what contractarianism is. Then I dispense with contractarianism as a theory of state legitimacy, as a theory of interpersonal morality, and as a theory of justice. Finally, I distinguish political morality from the other already-mentioned areas of morality, and argue that contractarianism is a sensible theory of its grounds.
2016-05-26T00:00:00ZSachs, Benjamin AlanContractarianism initially made its mark, in the seventeenth century, as a sort of theory of everything in ethics. But gradually philosophers became convinced that there were resources available outside contractarianism for settling important moral questions—for instance, ideas of human rights and the moral equality of persons. Then Rawls revived contractarianism with a more modest aim—namely, as a theory of justice. But even this agenda for contractarianism has been called into question, most notably by G.A. Cohen, who contends that we have other tools at our disposal for identifying the true conception of justice. So the question remains: how should contractarianism be construed if it is to provide answers to questions that cannot be answered in some other way? In my essay I offer a very simple answer: contractarianism should be construed as a political morality. I arrive at this answer by starting with contractarianism as a theory of everything and paring away the unappealing layers of contractarianism so understood. I begin by describing what contractarianism is. Then I dispense with contractarianism as a theory of state legitimacy, as a theory of interpersonal morality, and as a theory of justice. Finally, I distinguish political morality from the other already-mentioned areas of morality, and argue that contractarianism is a sensible theory of its grounds.The Grotian concept of a right
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13678
2016-06-01T00:00:00ZSkorupski, John MariaSense, incomplete understanding, and the problem of normative guidance
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13674
Frege seems committed to the thesis that the senses of the fundamental notions of arithmetic remain stable and are stably grasped by thinkers throughout history. Fully competent practitioners grasp those senses clearly and distinctly, while uncertain practitioners see them, the very same senses, “as if through a mist”. There is thus a common object of the understanding apprehended to a greater or lesser degree by thinkers of diverging conceptual competence. Frege takes the thesis to be a condition for the possibility of the rational intelligibility of mathematical practice. I argue however that the idea that senses could be grasped as a matter of degree is in tension with the constitutive theses that Frege held with regard to sense. Given those theses, there can in fact be no such thing as misty grasp of sense, since any uncertainty as to the logical features of a given sense will entail that one is getting hold of a different sense or of no sense at all. I consider various ways of resolving the tension and conclude that Frege’s thesis cannot be defended if we take it to be a thesis about our competence with concepts. This leaves unresolved what I call the problem of normative guidance, that is, the problem of explaining how the fundamental notions of logic and arithmetic can provide inferential guidance to thinkers.
2017-01-01T00:00:00ZPedriali, Walter B.Frege seems committed to the thesis that the senses of the fundamental notions of arithmetic remain stable and are stably grasped by thinkers throughout history. Fully competent practitioners grasp those senses clearly and distinctly, while uncertain practitioners see them, the very same senses, “as if through a mist”. There is thus a common object of the understanding apprehended to a greater or lesser degree by thinkers of diverging conceptual competence. Frege takes the thesis to be a condition for the possibility of the rational intelligibility of mathematical practice. I argue however that the idea that senses could be grasped as a matter of degree is in tension with the constitutive theses that Frege held with regard to sense. Given those theses, there can in fact be no such thing as misty grasp of sense, since any uncertainty as to the logical features of a given sense will entail that one is getting hold of a different sense or of no sense at all. I consider various ways of resolving the tension and conclude that Frege’s thesis cannot be defended if we take it to be a thesis about our competence with concepts. This leaves unresolved what I call the problem of normative guidance, that is, the problem of explaining how the fundamental notions of logic and arithmetic can provide inferential guidance to thinkers.The nexus of control: intentional activity and moral accountability
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13660
There is a conceptual knot at the intersection of moral responsibility and action theory. This knot can be expressed as the following question: What is the relationship between an agent’s openness to moral responsibility and the intentional status of her behaviour? My answer to this question is developed in three steps. I first develop a control-backed account of intentional agency, one that borrows vital insights from the cognitive sciences – in the form of Dual Process Theory – in understanding the control condition central to the account, and demonstrate that this account fares at least as well as its rivals in the field. Secondly, I investigate the dominant positions in the discussion surrounding the role of control in moral responsibility. After consideration of some shortcomings of these positions – especially the inability to properly account for so-called ambivalence cases – I defend an alternative pluralist account of moral responsibility, in which there are two co-extant variants of such responsibility: attributability and accountability. The latter of these will be shown to have a necessary control condition, also best understood in terms of a requirement for oversight (rather than conscious or online control), and in terms of the workings of the dual system mechanism. I then demonstrate how these two accounts are necessarily related through the shared role of this kind of control, leading to my answer to the original question: if an agent is open to moral accountability based on some activity or outcome, this activity or outcome must necessarily have positive intentional status. I then apply this answer in a consideration of certain cases of the use of the Doctrine of Double Effect.
2018-06-28T00:00:00ZConradie, NiëlThere is a conceptual knot at the intersection of moral responsibility and action theory. This knot can be expressed as the following question: What is the relationship between an agent’s openness to moral responsibility and the intentional status of her behaviour? My answer to this question is developed in three steps. I first develop a control-backed account of intentional agency, one that borrows vital insights from the cognitive sciences – in the form of Dual Process Theory – in understanding the control condition central to the account, and demonstrate that this account fares at least as well as its rivals in the field. Secondly, I investigate the dominant positions in the discussion surrounding the role of control in moral responsibility. After consideration of some shortcomings of these positions – especially the inability to properly account for so-called ambivalence cases – I defend an alternative pluralist account of moral responsibility, in which there are two co-extant variants of such responsibility: attributability and accountability. The latter of these will be shown to have a necessary control condition, also best understood in terms of a requirement for oversight (rather than conscious or online control), and in terms of the workings of the dual system mechanism. I then demonstrate how these two accounts are necessarily related through the shared role of this kind of control, leading to my answer to the original question: if an agent is open to moral accountability based on some activity or outcome, this activity or outcome must necessarily have positive intentional status. I then apply this answer in a consideration of certain cases of the use of the Doctrine of Double Effect.Quatenus and Spinoza's monism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13545
I examine Spinoza’s use of the term quatenus. It is, I argue, an operator working in the context of a broader logical theory and blocking certain inferences that, according to critics such as Pierre Bayle, lead Spinoza’s metaphysical system into absurdities. I reconstruct this crucial theory from some treatises on logic to which Spinoza had access. I then show how a later logical theory—that of the Port-Royal Logic—does not permit Bayle’s troublesome inferences to be blocked by the use of terms like quatenus. Most likely Bayle was thinking in terms of the later theory, Spinoza in terms of the earlier.
2018-04-01T00:00:00ZDouglas, AlexanderI examine Spinoza’s use of the term quatenus. It is, I argue, an operator working in the context of a broader logical theory and blocking certain inferences that, according to critics such as Pierre Bayle, lead Spinoza’s metaphysical system into absurdities. I reconstruct this crucial theory from some treatises on logic to which Spinoza had access. I then show how a later logical theory—that of the Port-Royal Logic—does not permit Bayle’s troublesome inferences to be blocked by the use of terms like quatenus. Most likely Bayle was thinking in terms of the later theory, Spinoza in terms of the earlier.The role of well-being in ethics
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13350
In this thesis I assess the role of well-being in ethics. In order to do so I reply to a threefold charge against the importance of well-being in ethics. In What We Owe to Each Other Scanlon argues (1) that the concept of well-being plays very little role in the thinking of an agent; (2) that no unified theory of well-being can be found; (3) that welfarism is false. In Part I, I argue that the concept of well-being does play an explanatorily and justificatorily important role in the thinking of a rational agent. I arrive at this conclusion by distinguishing levels of thinking activity as well as by considering the implicit rather than explicit role well-being plays in our deliberation. I conclude this part of the thesis by illustrating the relation between the idea of well-being, its parts and its sources. In Part II, I put forward a unified theory of well-being and I do so by taking on board with a slight modification Scanlon's own buck-passing account of value. I argue that something is a part of a person's good if, and only if, there is reason for this person to desire it. I claim that this account does not fall prey to the 'scope problem'. I also discuss a number of different though connected issues such as the defence of the claim that well-being is itself a normative notion and issues concerning the various parts of well-being. In Part III, I begin to sketch the normative role of well-being both first-personally and impartially. With Scanlon, I agree that welfarism is false. Yet, I argue in favour of a moderate form of welfarism, a view that takes a positive function of each individual's well-being to afford the ultimate criterion of practical reason.
2003-01-01T00:00:00ZRodogno, RaffaeleIn this thesis I assess the role of well-being in ethics. In order to do so I reply to a threefold charge against the importance of well-being in ethics. In What We Owe to Each Other Scanlon argues (1) that the concept of well-being plays very little role in the thinking of an agent; (2) that no unified theory of well-being can be found; (3) that welfarism is false. In Part I, I argue that the concept of well-being does play an explanatorily and justificatorily important role in the thinking of a rational agent. I arrive at this conclusion by distinguishing levels of thinking activity as well as by considering the implicit rather than explicit role well-being plays in our deliberation. I conclude this part of the thesis by illustrating the relation between the idea of well-being, its parts and its sources. In Part II, I put forward a unified theory of well-being and I do so by taking on board with a slight modification Scanlon's own buck-passing account of value. I argue that something is a part of a person's good if, and only if, there is reason for this person to desire it. I claim that this account does not fall prey to the 'scope problem'. I also discuss a number of different though connected issues such as the defence of the claim that well-being is itself a normative notion and issues concerning the various parts of well-being. In Part III, I begin to sketch the normative role of well-being both first-personally and impartially. With Scanlon, I agree that welfarism is false. Yet, I argue in favour of a moderate form of welfarism, a view that takes a positive function of each individual's well-being to afford the ultimate criterion of practical reason.Corporate agency and possible futures
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13302
We need an account of corporate agency that is temporally robust – one that will help future people to cope with challenges posed by corporate groups in a range of credible futures. In particular, we need to bequeath moral resources that enable future people to avoid futures dominated by corporate groups that have no regard for human beings. This paper asks how future philosophers living in broken or digital futures might re-imagine contemporary debates about corporate agency. It argues that the only temporally robust account is moralised extreme collectivism, where full moral personhood is accorded (only) to those corporate groups that are reliably disposed to respond appropriately to moral reasons.
2018-05-03T00:00:00ZMulgan, TimWe need an account of corporate agency that is temporally robust – one that will help future people to cope with challenges posed by corporate groups in a range of credible futures. In particular, we need to bequeath moral resources that enable future people to avoid futures dominated by corporate groups that have no regard for human beings. This paper asks how future philosophers living in broken or digital futures might re-imagine contemporary debates about corporate agency. It argues that the only temporally robust account is moralised extreme collectivism, where full moral personhood is accorded (only) to those corporate groups that are reliably disposed to respond appropriately to moral reasons.Rejecting moral obligation
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13225
The thesis argues that, were there any moral obligations, they would be categorical; but there are no categorical requirements on action; therefore, there are no moral obligations. The underlying claim is that, because of this, morality itself rests on a mistaken view of normativity. The view of categoricity I provide rests on there being 'external reasons' for action. Having explained the connections between oughts (in particular the ought of moral obligation) and reasons for action in the first part of the thesis, I then develop and defend a version of reasons internalism that I call 'recognitional internalism'. The basic idea, which is not itself incompatible with categoricity, is that to have a reason one must be able to recognise that one has that reason. However, I work this basic claim into a substantive truth-condition for reason-statements and argue that the reasons one is able to recognise are controlled by one's subjective motives. I use this to argue that there are no categorical moral obligations. Nonetheless, I also argue that the substantive challenge internalism poses morality is importantly different, indeed more pressing, than usually thought. This is to justify the objective supremacy of the reasons for action constitutive of moral obligation.
2005-01-01T00:00:00ZRobertson, SimonThe thesis argues that, were there any moral obligations, they would be categorical; but there are no categorical requirements on action; therefore, there are no moral obligations. The underlying claim is that, because of this, morality itself rests on a mistaken view of normativity. The view of categoricity I provide rests on there being 'external reasons' for action. Having explained the connections between oughts (in particular the ought of moral obligation) and reasons for action in the first part of the thesis, I then develop and defend a version of reasons internalism that I call 'recognitional internalism'. The basic idea, which is not itself incompatible with categoricity, is that to have a reason one must be able to recognise that one has that reason. However, I work this basic claim into a substantive truth-condition for reason-statements and argue that the reasons one is able to recognise are controlled by one's subjective motives. I use this to argue that there are no categorical moral obligations. Nonetheless, I also argue that the substantive challenge internalism poses morality is importantly different, indeed more pressing, than usually thought. This is to justify the objective supremacy of the reasons for action constitutive of moral obligation.Contemporary ethical naturalism : a comparative metaethical evaluation of expressivism and Cornell realism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13224
This thesis contains a critical discussion of two metaethical theories: expressivism, as developed in the works of Simon Blackburn, and Cornell realism, as presented by Richard Boyd and David Brink. In the introduction, a distinction is made between external and internal accommodation projects for moral discourse and it is argued that the external accommodation project should be guided by acceptance of methodological naturalism. Expressivism and Cornell realism are then subjected to an extended comparative evaluation, and an answer is sought to the question of which of the two should be favoured. The main conclusion of the thesis is that Cornell realism is rationally preferable to expressivism. This conclusion is arrived at by looking at how well the two theories, respectively, explain various deeply embedded features of moral discourse. Explaining such features is what the internal accommodation project for moral discourse consists in. The assertoric surface-form of moral discourse and the supervenience of moral predicates on natural predicates receive special attention in the study. It is argued that expressivism and Cornell realism do equally well on the issue of moral supervenience. But whereas expressivism is still vulnerable to a particular argument from the philosophy of language (the Frege-Geach point), Cornell realism can fend off the criticism that most persistently has been directed at it from this area of philosophy. In a comparative evaluation involving the selected issues, Cornell realism therefore fares better than expressivism.
2005-01-01T00:00:00ZSonderholm, JornThis thesis contains a critical discussion of two metaethical theories: expressivism, as developed in the works of Simon Blackburn, and Cornell realism, as presented by Richard Boyd and David Brink. In the introduction, a distinction is made between external and internal accommodation projects for moral discourse and it is argued that the external accommodation project should be guided by acceptance of methodological naturalism. Expressivism and Cornell realism are then subjected to an extended comparative evaluation, and an answer is sought to the question of which of the two should be favoured. The main conclusion of the thesis is that Cornell realism is rationally preferable to expressivism. This conclusion is arrived at by looking at how well the two theories, respectively, explain various deeply embedded features of moral discourse. Explaining such features is what the internal accommodation project for moral discourse consists in. The assertoric surface-form of moral discourse and the supervenience of moral predicates on natural predicates receive special attention in the study. It is argued that expressivism and Cornell realism do equally well on the issue of moral supervenience. But whereas expressivism is still vulnerable to a particular argument from the philosophy of language (the Frege-Geach point), Cornell realism can fend off the criticism that most persistently has been directed at it from this area of philosophy. In a comparative evaluation involving the selected issues, Cornell realism therefore fares better than expressivism.Why should I be moral? : toward a defence of the categoricity and normative authority of moral considerations
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13223
Can we ever be fully practically justified in acting contrary to moral demands? My contention is that the answer is 'no'. I argue that by adopting a 'buck-passing' account of wrongness we can provide a philosophically satisfying answer to the familiar 'why should I be moral?'. In working my way toward the buck-passing account of wrongness, I outline (and, to some degree, defend) the metaethical and 'metanormative' assumptions on which my theory stands. I also consider and reject the 'internalist' (or as it can also be described, the neo-Humean) answer to 'why should I be moral?'. The account I end up with is decidedly non-consequentialist and it is consistent with common-sense morality. It also provides a way of showing why moral considerations (in competition with non-moral considerations) are overridingly normative in a way that is consistent with our best current understanding of what practical reason requires of us.
2004-01-01T00:00:00ZHurtig, KentCan we ever be fully practically justified in acting contrary to moral demands? My contention is that the answer is 'no'. I argue that by adopting a 'buck-passing' account of wrongness we can provide a philosophically satisfying answer to the familiar 'why should I be moral?'. In working my way toward the buck-passing account of wrongness, I outline (and, to some degree, defend) the metaethical and 'metanormative' assumptions on which my theory stands. I also consider and reject the 'internalist' (or as it can also be described, the neo-Humean) answer to 'why should I be moral?'. The account I end up with is decidedly non-consequentialist and it is consistent with common-sense morality. It also provides a way of showing why moral considerations (in competition with non-moral considerations) are overridingly normative in a way that is consistent with our best current understanding of what practical reason requires of us.Legal paternalism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13222
Legal paternalism is the interference by the state in the choice or choices of citizens, for the good of those citizens. There are strong intuitions for and against paternalism, which correspond to the value we place on well-being and self-determination, respectively. This thesis takes as a starting point a certain balance between these two values, and explores its ramifications at a number of levels. Paternalism is taken to be justified only when the choices in question are not expressions of self-determination. I first explore what it takes for a choice not to be an expression of self-determination through a discussion of voluntariness and its relationship to compatibilism in discussions of freedom of the will. I conclude that which choices are expressions of self-determination is a matter to be settled in the practical domain. This idea is explored in a discussion of decision-making competence. Finally, I outline the positive normative ethical evaluation of self-determination which provides the justification for the anti-paternalist stance.
2003-01-01T00:00:00ZBatstone, AislinnLegal paternalism is the interference by the state in the choice or choices of citizens, for the good of those citizens. There are strong intuitions for and against paternalism, which correspond to the value we place on well-being and self-determination, respectively. This thesis takes as a starting point a certain balance between these two values, and explores its ramifications at a number of levels. Paternalism is taken to be justified only when the choices in question are not expressions of self-determination. I first explore what it takes for a choice not to be an expression of self-determination through a discussion of voluntariness and its relationship to compatibilism in discussions of freedom of the will. I conclude that which choices are expressions of self-determination is a matter to be settled in the practical domain. This idea is explored in a discussion of decision-making competence. Finally, I outline the positive normative ethical evaluation of self-determination which provides the justification for the anti-paternalist stance.Naturalism, normativity, and the 'open question' argument
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13218
The 'open question' argument, as it has come to be known, was popularized by G. E. Moore. However, it is universally recognized that his presentation of it is unconvincing, as it is based on dubious metaphysics, semantics and epistemology. Yet, philosophers have not confined the argument to the history books, and it continues to influence and shape modern meta-ethics. This thesis asks why this is the case, and whether such an influence is justified. It focuses on three main positions, analytic naturalism, non-analytic naturalism and supernaturalism. It concludes that the 'open question' argument challenges all three.
2003-01-01T00:00:00ZFisher, Andrew DavidThe 'open question' argument, as it has come to be known, was popularized by G. E. Moore. However, it is universally recognized that his presentation of it is unconvincing, as it is based on dubious metaphysics, semantics and epistemology. Yet, philosophers have not confined the argument to the history books, and it continues to influence and shape modern meta-ethics. This thesis asks why this is the case, and whether such an influence is justified. It focuses on three main positions, analytic naturalism, non-analytic naturalism and supernaturalism. It concludes that the 'open question' argument challenges all three.Aesthetic antirealism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13217
A puzzle is generated by two intuitions about artworks: 1. There is no prima facie reason to take artworks to be mind-independent objects; 2. Aesthetic judgments are objective. These intuitions seem to be in tension, for if artworks or their aesthetic properties are mind-dependent, how can aesthetic judgments be objective? The common solution to the puzzle lies in rejecting or revising one of the two intuitions. Typically, realists reject 1, and many antirealists reject 2. I develop an antirealist aesthetic theory that accommodates both intuitions, focusing on critical disagreement between epistemically optimal judges, realist difficulties with supervenience and response-dependence, the role of imagination in the experience of artworks, and the metaphorical quality of aesthetic discourse. The hallmark of realism, namely the mind-independence of aesthetic qualities, is an untenable commitment that yields an impoverished view of artworks. A cognitivist anti-realism is available which preserves the objectivity of aesthetic discourse and yields a richer conception of artworks and our interaction with them.
2003-06-01T00:00:00ZCooke, Brandon L.A puzzle is generated by two intuitions about artworks: 1. There is no prima facie reason to take artworks to be mind-independent objects; 2. Aesthetic judgments are objective. These intuitions seem to be in tension, for if artworks or their aesthetic properties are mind-dependent, how can aesthetic judgments be objective? The common solution to the puzzle lies in rejecting or revising one of the two intuitions. Typically, realists reject 1, and many antirealists reject 2. I develop an antirealist aesthetic theory that accommodates both intuitions, focusing on critical disagreement between epistemically optimal judges, realist difficulties with supervenience and response-dependence, the role of imagination in the experience of artworks, and the metaphorical quality of aesthetic discourse. The hallmark of realism, namely the mind-independence of aesthetic qualities, is an untenable commitment that yields an impoverished view of artworks. A cognitivist anti-realism is available which preserves the objectivity of aesthetic discourse and yields a richer conception of artworks and our interaction with them.Philosophical perspectives on the stigma of mental illness
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13193
This thesis is concerned with philosophical perspectives on the stigma of mental illness, with each chapter exploring different philosophical issues. Chapter one delineates the central concept around which the rest of the work revolves: the stigma of mental illness. It provides an outline of the stigma mechanism, how it applies to mental illness, why it is such a large public health concern and what has been done so far to combat it.
Chapter two is concerned with the application of recent literature in the philosophy of implicit bias to the topic of mental illness. It suggests that we have hitherto been preoccupied with explicit formulations of the stigma mechanism, but argues that there are distinctive issues involved in combatting forms of discrimination in which the participants are not cognisant of their attitudes or actions, and that anti-stigma initiatives for mental illness should take note.
Chapter three applies the philosophical literature concerning the ethics of our epistemic practices to the stigma of mental illness. It contains an analysis of how epistemic injustice- primarily in the forms of testimonial injustice and stereotype threat- affects those with mental illnesses.
The fourth chapter brings in issues in the philosophy of science (particularly the philosophy of psychiatry) to explore the possibility of intervening on the stigma process to halt the stigma of mental illness. The first candidate (preventing labelling) is discounted, and the second (combatting stereotype) is tentatively endorsed.
The fifth chapter is concerned with how language facilitates the stigma of mental illness. It suggests that using generics to talk about mental illness (whether the knowledge structure conveyed is inaccurate or accurate) is deeply problematic. In the former, it conveys insidious forms of social stereotyping. In the latter, it propagates misinformation by presenting the category as a quintessential one.
2018-06-28T00:00:00ZNowak, Lisa RebeccaThis thesis is concerned with philosophical perspectives on the stigma of mental illness, with each chapter exploring different philosophical issues. Chapter one delineates the central concept around which the rest of the work revolves: the stigma of mental illness. It provides an outline of the stigma mechanism, how it applies to mental illness, why it is such a large public health concern and what has been done so far to combat it.
Chapter two is concerned with the application of recent literature in the philosophy of implicit bias to the topic of mental illness. It suggests that we have hitherto been preoccupied with explicit formulations of the stigma mechanism, but argues that there are distinctive issues involved in combatting forms of discrimination in which the participants are not cognisant of their attitudes or actions, and that anti-stigma initiatives for mental illness should take note.
Chapter three applies the philosophical literature concerning the ethics of our epistemic practices to the stigma of mental illness. It contains an analysis of how epistemic injustice- primarily in the forms of testimonial injustice and stereotype threat- affects those with mental illnesses.
The fourth chapter brings in issues in the philosophy of science (particularly the philosophy of psychiatry) to explore the possibility of intervening on the stigma process to halt the stigma of mental illness. The first candidate (preventing labelling) is discounted, and the second (combatting stereotype) is tentatively endorsed.
The fifth chapter is concerned with how language facilitates the stigma of mental illness. It suggests that using generics to talk about mental illness (whether the knowledge structure conveyed is inaccurate or accurate) is deeply problematic. In the former, it conveys insidious forms of social stereotyping. In the latter, it propagates misinformation by presenting the category as a quintessential one.The phrasal implicature theory of metaphors and slurs
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13189
This thesis develops a pragmatic theory of metaphors and slurs. In the pragmatic
literature, theorists mostly hold the view that the framework developed by Grice is
only applicable to the sentence-level pragmatic phenomena, whereas the subsentential
pragmatic phenomena require a different approach. In this thesis, I argue against
this view and claim that the Gricean framework, after some plausible revisions, can
explain subsentential pragmatic phenomena, such as metaphors and slurs.
In the first chapter, I introduce three basic theses I will defend and give an
outline of the argument I will develop. The second chapter discusses three claims
on metaphor that are widely discussed in the literature. There I state my aim to
present a theory of metaphor which can accommodate these three claims. Chapter 3
introduces the notion of "phrasal implicature", which will be used to explain phrase-level
pragmatic phenomena with a Gricean approach. In Chapter 4, I present my
theory of metaphor, which I call "phrasal implicature theory of metaphor" and
discuss certain aspects of the theory. The notion of phrasal implicature enables a
new conception of what-is-said and a different approach to the semantics-pragmatics
distinction. Chapter 5 looks into these issues. In Chapter 6, I compare my theory
of metaphor with three other theories. Finally, in Chapter 7, I develop a phrasal
implicature theory of slurs, which I argue outperforms its rivals in explaining various
uses of slurs.
2018-06-28T00:00:00ZYavuz, AlperThis thesis develops a pragmatic theory of metaphors and slurs. In the pragmatic
literature, theorists mostly hold the view that the framework developed by Grice is
only applicable to the sentence-level pragmatic phenomena, whereas the subsentential
pragmatic phenomena require a different approach. In this thesis, I argue against
this view and claim that the Gricean framework, after some plausible revisions, can
explain subsentential pragmatic phenomena, such as metaphors and slurs.
In the first chapter, I introduce three basic theses I will defend and give an
outline of the argument I will develop. The second chapter discusses three claims
on metaphor that are widely discussed in the literature. There I state my aim to
present a theory of metaphor which can accommodate these three claims. Chapter 3
introduces the notion of "phrasal implicature", which will be used to explain phrase-level
pragmatic phenomena with a Gricean approach. In Chapter 4, I present my
theory of metaphor, which I call "phrasal implicature theory of metaphor" and
discuss certain aspects of the theory. The notion of phrasal implicature enables a
new conception of what-is-said and a different approach to the semantics-pragmatics
distinction. Chapter 5 looks into these issues. In Chapter 6, I compare my theory
of metaphor with three other theories. Finally, in Chapter 7, I develop a phrasal
implicature theory of slurs, which I argue outperforms its rivals in explaining various
uses of slurs.Constructing gender in contemporary anthropology
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13183
This thesis explores the ways in which gender and contemporary anthropology interact, with the special emphasis on the areas frequently referred to as "poststructuralist" or "postmodern." More specifically, I look at one aspect which postmodern approaches and feminist theories have in common: questioning of the dominant narratives. This questioning then leads through a series of constructed realities (or hyperrealities) to the realization of the importance of the concept of difference(s) in all its aspects. The ethnographic examples are from the Republics of Slovenia (primarily concerning feminist groups and scholars) and Macedonia (the region of Prespa, in the southwestern part of the country). In both countries the fall of communism has created a sort of a power hiatus, filled with questions about identity, the future and ways to organize the newly emerging societies (since both countries became independent in 1991). In that regard, both countries are hyper real. After the Introduction, I outline the debates surrounding "postmodern" approaches in anthropology, different theoretical assumptions, as well as the area(s) where these approaches can inform anthropological research. I start with the overview of the working definitions of "postmodernism" and the attitudes towards it that characterize current anthropological theory, continuing with what I regard to be the most illustrative examples of it being misunderstood and misrepresented, and concluding with the meeting point of postmodern anthropology and the study of gender. In the following chapters I present the results of my field research in Macedonia and in Slovenia, concluding with the theoretical implications of contemporary anthropological approaches to the study of gender, as well as the reasons for presenting it as basically a social construct. In Conclusion, I point out at the fact that gender studies seem to be the only area where postmodernism and anthropology interact in the most positive way, primarily through the full exploration of the concept of difference(s).
1996-01-01T00:00:00ZBoŝkoviḱ, AleksandarThis thesis explores the ways in which gender and contemporary anthropology interact, with the special emphasis on the areas frequently referred to as "poststructuralist" or "postmodern." More specifically, I look at one aspect which postmodern approaches and feminist theories have in common: questioning of the dominant narratives. This questioning then leads through a series of constructed realities (or hyperrealities) to the realization of the importance of the concept of difference(s) in all its aspects. The ethnographic examples are from the Republics of Slovenia (primarily concerning feminist groups and scholars) and Macedonia (the region of Prespa, in the southwestern part of the country). In both countries the fall of communism has created a sort of a power hiatus, filled with questions about identity, the future and ways to organize the newly emerging societies (since both countries became independent in 1991). In that regard, both countries are hyper real. After the Introduction, I outline the debates surrounding "postmodern" approaches in anthropology, different theoretical assumptions, as well as the area(s) where these approaches can inform anthropological research. I start with the overview of the working definitions of "postmodernism" and the attitudes towards it that characterize current anthropological theory, continuing with what I regard to be the most illustrative examples of it being misunderstood and misrepresented, and concluding with the meeting point of postmodern anthropology and the study of gender. In the following chapters I present the results of my field research in Macedonia and in Slovenia, concluding with the theoretical implications of contemporary anthropological approaches to the study of gender, as well as the reasons for presenting it as basically a social construct. In Conclusion, I point out at the fact that gender studies seem to be the only area where postmodernism and anthropology interact in the most positive way, primarily through the full exploration of the concept of difference(s).Proper names and possible worlds
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13083
In this essay a theory of proper names is developed and
applied to the construction of quantified modal logics and to a
discussion of problems concerning identity across possible worlds.
The theory is then used to aid discussion of essentialism, empty
singular terms, quantification into epistemic contexts, and Frege’ s
problem with identity .
In the first chapter, after a preliminary discussion of
Russell’s and Frege’s theories of names, a theory is developed. It
is argued that in the giving of a name a relation is established
between the name and what is named. That relation is the sense of
the name. It is also argued that names can be given to imaginary,
fictional, and other such non-existent things.
The second chapter is devoted to a discussion of Quine’s
programme for eliminating singular terms. It is there argued that
the programme cannot be justified.
The third chapter centres around the construction of
logical systems to deal with identity across possible worlds. It is
assumed that once a name is given and its sense thereby established
the name is a rigid designator. Quantificational systems are constructed
without modal operators yet in terms of which cross world identity
can be discussed. Modal operators are then introduced to facilitate
a discussion of essentialism and identity. At each point the formal
systems are constructed in accordance with clearly stated assumptions
about constant singular terms, the domains of quantification, and the
interpretation of modal operators
1975-01-01T00:00:00ZGirle, Roderic AllenIn this essay a theory of proper names is developed and
applied to the construction of quantified modal logics and to a
discussion of problems concerning identity across possible worlds.
The theory is then used to aid discussion of essentialism, empty
singular terms, quantification into epistemic contexts, and Frege’ s
problem with identity .
In the first chapter, after a preliminary discussion of
Russell’s and Frege’s theories of names, a theory is developed. It
is argued that in the giving of a name a relation is established
between the name and what is named. That relation is the sense of
the name. It is also argued that names can be given to imaginary,
fictional, and other such non-existent things.
The second chapter is devoted to a discussion of Quine’s
programme for eliminating singular terms. It is there argued that
the programme cannot be justified.
The third chapter centres around the construction of
logical systems to deal with identity across possible worlds. It is
assumed that once a name is given and its sense thereby established
the name is a rigid designator. Quantificational systems are constructed
without modal operators yet in terms of which cross world identity
can be discussed. Modal operators are then introduced to facilitate
a discussion of essentialism and identity. At each point the formal
systems are constructed in accordance with clearly stated assumptions
about constant singular terms, the domains of quantification, and the
interpretation of modal operatorsThe cinematic corpography of war : re-mapping the war film through the body
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13075
In this thesis, I explore the ways the sensory experience of war is staged as a corporeal apprehension of space in the Hollywood war film. Placing an emphasis on films that foreground tactile, and sonic experience in combat as a key dimension of symbolic meaning in the depiction of war, I move beyond the emphasis on optics and weaponised vision that has largely dominated contemporary writing on war and cinema in order to highlight the wider sensory field that is powerfully evoked in this genre.
In my conception of war cinema as representing a somatic experience of space, I am applying a term recently developed by Derek Gregory within the theoretical framework of Critical Geography. What he calls “corpography” implies a constant re-mapping of landscape through the soldier’s body. Gregory’s assumptions can be used as a connection between already established theories of cartographic film narration and ideas of (neo)phenomenological film experience, as they also imply the involvement of the spectator’s body in sensuously grasping what is staged as a mediated experience of war. While cinematic codes of war have long been oriented almost exclusively to the visual, the notion of corpography can help to reframe the concept of film genre in terms of expressive movement patterns and genre memory, avoiding reverting to the usual taxonomies of generic texts.
The thesis focuses on selected films exemplary of the aesthetic continuities and changes in American cinema’s audio-visual representation of war (with each chapter centring on a specific military conflict and historical constellation): All Quiet on the Western Front (1930), Paths of Glory (1957), Objective, Burma! (1945), Fury (2014), Men in War (1957), The Boys in Company C (1978), Rescue Dawn (2006), and Zero Dark Thirty (2012).
2017-06-22T00:00:00ZRositzka, EileenIn this thesis, I explore the ways the sensory experience of war is staged as a corporeal apprehension of space in the Hollywood war film. Placing an emphasis on films that foreground tactile, and sonic experience in combat as a key dimension of symbolic meaning in the depiction of war, I move beyond the emphasis on optics and weaponised vision that has largely dominated contemporary writing on war and cinema in order to highlight the wider sensory field that is powerfully evoked in this genre.
In my conception of war cinema as representing a somatic experience of space, I am applying a term recently developed by Derek Gregory within the theoretical framework of Critical Geography. What he calls “corpography” implies a constant re-mapping of landscape through the soldier’s body. Gregory’s assumptions can be used as a connection between already established theories of cartographic film narration and ideas of (neo)phenomenological film experience, as they also imply the involvement of the spectator’s body in sensuously grasping what is staged as a mediated experience of war. While cinematic codes of war have long been oriented almost exclusively to the visual, the notion of corpography can help to reframe the concept of film genre in terms of expressive movement patterns and genre memory, avoiding reverting to the usual taxonomies of generic texts.
The thesis focuses on selected films exemplary of the aesthetic continuities and changes in American cinema’s audio-visual representation of war (with each chapter centring on a specific military conflict and historical constellation): All Quiet on the Western Front (1930), Paths of Glory (1957), Objective, Burma! (1945), Fury (2014), Men in War (1957), The Boys in Company C (1978), Rescue Dawn (2006), and Zero Dark Thirty (2012).Time, fixity, and the metaphysics of the future
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12951
Philosophers who work on time often ignore the implications their doctrines have for the common sense intuition that the past is fixed and the future not. Similarly, those who work on fatalism, and whose arguments often imply an assertion or denial of the common sense intuition, rarely take into account the implicit dependence their arguments have upon specific theories of time. I take the intuition, and its relation to the nature of time, seriously. In Part I of my thesis, I investigate the relations between the dynamic and static theories of time, on the one hand, and the intuition, on the other. I argue that the so called 'pure' forms of these theories, inasmuch as they both posit an ontological temporal symmetry, cannot do justice to the intuition. The 'pure' B-Theory, with its denial of objective temporal becoming, cannot allow for a robust sense in which the future is non-fixed. The 'pure' A-Theory, according to which only the present exists, acknowledges the robustness of the asymmetry, but cannot provide a ground for it. I conclude Part I of my thesis with the claim that only a conception of time according to which the past exists and the future does not, can account for the intuition. In Part II, I discuss those fatalistic arguments which rely upon the determinateness of future truth as their key premise, and argue that these fail either because they rely on an illegitimate modal concept, or because they rely on a key undefended assumption. Finally, in the Epilogue, I provide a more detailed sketch of the account of time posited at the end of Part I, and suggest that it can also provide a more thoroughgoing rejection of the logical fatalistic argument.
2005-01-01T00:00:00ZDiekemper, JosephPhilosophers who work on time often ignore the implications their doctrines have for the common sense intuition that the past is fixed and the future not. Similarly, those who work on fatalism, and whose arguments often imply an assertion or denial of the common sense intuition, rarely take into account the implicit dependence their arguments have upon specific theories of time. I take the intuition, and its relation to the nature of time, seriously. In Part I of my thesis, I investigate the relations between the dynamic and static theories of time, on the one hand, and the intuition, on the other. I argue that the so called 'pure' forms of these theories, inasmuch as they both posit an ontological temporal symmetry, cannot do justice to the intuition. The 'pure' B-Theory, with its denial of objective temporal becoming, cannot allow for a robust sense in which the future is non-fixed. The 'pure' A-Theory, according to which only the present exists, acknowledges the robustness of the asymmetry, but cannot provide a ground for it. I conclude Part I of my thesis with the claim that only a conception of time according to which the past exists and the future does not, can account for the intuition. In Part II, I discuss those fatalistic arguments which rely upon the determinateness of future truth as their key premise, and argue that these fail either because they rely on an illegitimate modal concept, or because they rely on a key undefended assumption. Finally, in the Epilogue, I provide a more detailed sketch of the account of time posited at the end of Part I, and suggest that it can also provide a more thoroughgoing rejection of the logical fatalistic argument.Rule-following: conventionalism, scepticism and rationality
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12950
The thesis argues, in lie main, for both a negative and positive agenda to Wittgenstein's rule-following remarks in both his Philosophical Investigations and Remarks on the foundations of Mathematics. The negative agenda is a sceptical agenda, different than as conceived by Kripke, that is destructive of a realist account of rules and contends that the correct application of a rule is not fully determined in an understanding of the rule. In addition to these consequences, this negative agenda opens Wittgenstein to Dummett's charge of radical conventionalism (a charge that also, but differently, applies to certain mid-period views and this is addressed in the first chapter). These negative consequences are left unresolved by Kripke's sceptical solution and, notably, are wrongly assessed by those that dissent from a sceptical reading (e.g., McDowell). The positive agenda builds on these negative considerations arguing that although there is no determination in the understanding of a rule of what will count as a correct application in so far unconsidered situations, we are still able to follow a rule correctly. This seems to involve an epistemic leap, from an underdetermined understanding to a determinate application, and, in respect of this appearance, involves what Wittgenstein calls following a rule "blindly" in an epistemic sense. Developing this view, of following a rule blindly, involves developing an account of an alternative rational response to rule instruction, one that need not involve a role for interpreting or inferring, but all the same allows for correctness in rule application in virtue of enabling agreement in rule application.
2003-01-01T00:00:00ZPanjvani, CyrusThe thesis argues, in lie main, for both a negative and positive agenda to Wittgenstein's rule-following remarks in both his Philosophical Investigations and Remarks on the foundations of Mathematics. The negative agenda is a sceptical agenda, different than as conceived by Kripke, that is destructive of a realist account of rules and contends that the correct application of a rule is not fully determined in an understanding of the rule. In addition to these consequences, this negative agenda opens Wittgenstein to Dummett's charge of radical conventionalism (a charge that also, but differently, applies to certain mid-period views and this is addressed in the first chapter). These negative consequences are left unresolved by Kripke's sceptical solution and, notably, are wrongly assessed by those that dissent from a sceptical reading (e.g., McDowell). The positive agenda builds on these negative considerations arguing that although there is no determination in the understanding of a rule of what will count as a correct application in so far unconsidered situations, we are still able to follow a rule correctly. This seems to involve an epistemic leap, from an underdetermined understanding to a determinate application, and, in respect of this appearance, involves what Wittgenstein calls following a rule "blindly" in an epistemic sense. Developing this view, of following a rule blindly, involves developing an account of an alternative rational response to rule instruction, one that need not involve a role for interpreting or inferring, but all the same allows for correctness in rule application in virtue of enabling agreement in rule application.Knowledge, lies and vagueness : a minimalist treatment
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12921
Minimalism concerning truth is the view that that all there is to be said concerning truth is exhausted by a set of basic platitudes. In the first part of this thesis, I apply this methodology to the concept of knowledge. In so doing, I develop a model of inexact knowledge grounded in what I call minimal margin for error principles. From these basic principles, I derive the controversial result that epistemological internalism and internalism with respect to self-knowledge are untenable doctrines. In the second part of this thesis, I develop a minimal theory of vagueness in which a rigorous but neutral definition of vagueness is shown to be possible. Three dimensions of vagueness are distinguished and a proof is given showing how two of these dimensions are equivalent facets of the same phenomenon. From the axioms of this minimal theory one can also show that there must be higher-order vagueness, contrary to what some have argued. In the final part of this thesis, I return to issues concerning the credentials of truth-minimalism. Is truth-minimalism compatible with the possibility of truth-value gaps? Is it right to say that truth-minimalism is crippled by the liar paradox? With respect to the former question, I develop a novel three-valued logical system which is both proof-theoretically and truth-theoretic ally well-motivated and compatible with at least one form of minimalism. With respect to the second question, a new solution to the liar paradox is developed based on the claim that while the liar sentence is meaningful, it is improper to even suppose that this sentence has a truth-status. On that basis, one can block the paradox by restricting the Rule of Assumptions in Gentzen-style presentations of the sentential sequent calculus. The first lesson of the liar paradox is that not all assumptions are for free. The second lesson of the liar is that, contrary to what has been alleged by many, minimalism concerning truth is far better placed than its rival theories to solve the paradox.
2002-01-01T00:00:00ZGreenough, PatrickMinimalism concerning truth is the view that that all there is to be said concerning truth is exhausted by a set of basic platitudes. In the first part of this thesis, I apply this methodology to the concept of knowledge. In so doing, I develop a model of inexact knowledge grounded in what I call minimal margin for error principles. From these basic principles, I derive the controversial result that epistemological internalism and internalism with respect to self-knowledge are untenable doctrines. In the second part of this thesis, I develop a minimal theory of vagueness in which a rigorous but neutral definition of vagueness is shown to be possible. Three dimensions of vagueness are distinguished and a proof is given showing how two of these dimensions are equivalent facets of the same phenomenon. From the axioms of this minimal theory one can also show that there must be higher-order vagueness, contrary to what some have argued. In the final part of this thesis, I return to issues concerning the credentials of truth-minimalism. Is truth-minimalism compatible with the possibility of truth-value gaps? Is it right to say that truth-minimalism is crippled by the liar paradox? With respect to the former question, I develop a novel three-valued logical system which is both proof-theoretically and truth-theoretic ally well-motivated and compatible with at least one form of minimalism. With respect to the second question, a new solution to the liar paradox is developed based on the claim that while the liar sentence is meaningful, it is improper to even suppose that this sentence has a truth-status. On that basis, one can block the paradox by restricting the Rule of Assumptions in Gentzen-style presentations of the sentential sequent calculus. The first lesson of the liar paradox is that not all assumptions are for free. The second lesson of the liar is that, contrary to what has been alleged by many, minimalism concerning truth is far better placed than its rival theories to solve the paradox.Quine and Boolos on second-order logic : an examination of the debate
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12920
The aim of this thesis is to examine the debate between Quine and Boolos over the logical status of higher-order logic-with Quine taking the position that higher-logic is more properly understood as set theory and Boolos arguing in opposition that higher-order logic is of a genuinely logical character. My purpose here then will be to stay as neutral as possible over the question of whether or not higher-order logic counts as logic and to instead focus on the exposition of the debate itself as exemplified in the work of Quine and Boolos. Chapter I will be a detailed consideration of Quine's conception of logic and its place within the wider context of his philosophy. Only once this backdrop is in place will I then examine his views on higher-order logic. In Chapter II, I turn to Boolos's response to Quine-his attempt to examine the extent to which we may want to count higher-order logic as logic and the extent to which we may want to count it as set theory. With each point Boolos raises, I attempt to give what I think would have been Quine's reply. Finally, in Chapter III, I consider Boolos's attempt to show that monadic second-order logic (MSOL) should be understood as pure logic as it does not commit us to the existence of classes, as we may take the standard interpretation of MSOL to do. I discuss here some of the major reactions to Boolos's plural interpretation (Resnik, Parsons, and Linnebo), and conclude with more speculative remarks on what Quine's own response might have been. Throughout this thesis, my primary method has been one of close textual analysis.
2005-01-01T00:00:00ZMorris, SeanThe aim of this thesis is to examine the debate between Quine and Boolos over the logical status of higher-order logic-with Quine taking the position that higher-logic is more properly understood as set theory and Boolos arguing in opposition that higher-order logic is of a genuinely logical character. My purpose here then will be to stay as neutral as possible over the question of whether or not higher-order logic counts as logic and to instead focus on the exposition of the debate itself as exemplified in the work of Quine and Boolos. Chapter I will be a detailed consideration of Quine's conception of logic and its place within the wider context of his philosophy. Only once this backdrop is in place will I then examine his views on higher-order logic. In Chapter II, I turn to Boolos's response to Quine-his attempt to examine the extent to which we may want to count higher-order logic as logic and the extent to which we may want to count it as set theory. With each point Boolos raises, I attempt to give what I think would have been Quine's reply. Finally, in Chapter III, I consider Boolos's attempt to show that monadic second-order logic (MSOL) should be understood as pure logic as it does not commit us to the existence of classes, as we may take the standard interpretation of MSOL to do. I discuss here some of the major reactions to Boolos's plural interpretation (Resnik, Parsons, and Linnebo), and conclude with more speculative remarks on what Quine's own response might have been. Throughout this thesis, my primary method has been one of close textual analysis.A vindication of logical necessity against scepticism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12919
Some philosophers dispute the claim that there is a notion of logical necessity involved in the concept of logical consequence. They are sceptical about logical necessity. They argue that a proper characterisation of logical consequence - of what follows from what - need not and should not appeal to the notion of necessity at all. Quine is the most prominent philosopher holding such a view. In this doctoral dissertation, I argue that scepticism about logical necessity is not successful. Quine's scepticism takes three forms. Firstly, he is often interpreted as undermining, in his classic paper 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', the very intelligibility of notions such as meaning, necessity, and analyticity. If the notion of necessity is meaningless, it is clear that ascriptions of logical necessity are also meaningless. In the thesis, I defend Quine's criticism of these notions by situating it in its historical context and emphasising that the real target in those writings is not the intelligibility of these notions as such, but only their Platonistic interpretation. I agree with Quine that a good theory about meaning, necessity, or analyticity must avoid such an ontological commitment. Secondly, Quine advocates, in the same paper, a holistic picture of knowledge and claims that in this picture, ascriptions of logical necessity are superfluous. I then show that holism a la Quine is committed to admit the necessity of statements of logical consequence. Thirdly, there is Quine's substitutional account of logical consequence (as exposed in his (1970)). He contends that this theory makes no use of logical necessity, thus showing its superfluousness. I show that any plausible account of logical consequence needs to appeal to logical necessity, thus undercutting Quine's claim - and, more generally, undercutting scepticism about logical necessity.
2002-01-01T00:00:00ZPhilie, PatriceSome philosophers dispute the claim that there is a notion of logical necessity involved in the concept of logical consequence. They are sceptical about logical necessity. They argue that a proper characterisation of logical consequence - of what follows from what - need not and should not appeal to the notion of necessity at all. Quine is the most prominent philosopher holding such a view. In this doctoral dissertation, I argue that scepticism about logical necessity is not successful. Quine's scepticism takes three forms. Firstly, he is often interpreted as undermining, in his classic paper 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', the very intelligibility of notions such as meaning, necessity, and analyticity. If the notion of necessity is meaningless, it is clear that ascriptions of logical necessity are also meaningless. In the thesis, I defend Quine's criticism of these notions by situating it in its historical context and emphasising that the real target in those writings is not the intelligibility of these notions as such, but only their Platonistic interpretation. I agree with Quine that a good theory about meaning, necessity, or analyticity must avoid such an ontological commitment. Secondly, Quine advocates, in the same paper, a holistic picture of knowledge and claims that in this picture, ascriptions of logical necessity are superfluous. I then show that holism a la Quine is committed to admit the necessity of statements of logical consequence. Thirdly, there is Quine's substitutional account of logical consequence (as exposed in his (1970)). He contends that this theory makes no use of logical necessity, thus showing its superfluousness. I show that any plausible account of logical consequence needs to appeal to logical necessity, thus undercutting Quine's claim - and, more generally, undercutting scepticism about logical necessity.Davidson's third dogma
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12917
2001-01-01T00:00:00ZHough, Gerard MichaelImmunity to error through misidentification and the trilemma about the self
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12916
The thesis addresses the issues of error through misidentification and immunity to error through misidentification in relation to the problem of the first person. First, it provides an explanation of error through misidentification. Secondly, it shows that there are two possible ways of understanding immunity to error through misidentification. It is then argued that the first understanding of immunity to error through misidentification leads to what is labelled "the trilemma about the self". That is to say, either we provide an explanation of immunity to error through misidentification, but we subscribe to two contentious metaphysical views about the self-the Cartesian and the Idealist; or else we hold the view that the self is identical with a human being, but we have no explanation of immunity to error through misidentification. It is then shown that in order to solve the trilemma, a different understanding of immunity to error through misidentification must be offered. After discussing various possible understandings of immunity to error through misidentification, a sound account of it is finally provided. Moreover, it is shown how non-inferential, introspection-based mental self-ascriptions can comply with it, in such a way that they turn out to be logically immune to error through misidentification. Finally, by drawing on Evans' and Peacocke's accounts of the possession conditions of the first person concept-in which IEM I-judgements play a central role-, it is shown that it is a concept of a human being who thinks of herself as such. Hence, our first person concept is firmly anti-Cartesian and anti-Idealist. As a consequence, it is maintained that not only is there no need to hold the Cartesian and the Idealist metaphysics of the self in order to explain why some I-judgements can be immune to error through misidentification, but it is also argued that one can no longer be either Cartesian or Idealist. For that would expose one to conceptual incoherence.
2001-01-01T00:00:00ZColiva, AnnalisaThe thesis addresses the issues of error through misidentification and immunity to error through misidentification in relation to the problem of the first person. First, it provides an explanation of error through misidentification. Secondly, it shows that there are two possible ways of understanding immunity to error through misidentification. It is then argued that the first understanding of immunity to error through misidentification leads to what is labelled "the trilemma about the self". That is to say, either we provide an explanation of immunity to error through misidentification, but we subscribe to two contentious metaphysical views about the self-the Cartesian and the Idealist; or else we hold the view that the self is identical with a human being, but we have no explanation of immunity to error through misidentification. It is then shown that in order to solve the trilemma, a different understanding of immunity to error through misidentification must be offered. After discussing various possible understandings of immunity to error through misidentification, a sound account of it is finally provided. Moreover, it is shown how non-inferential, introspection-based mental self-ascriptions can comply with it, in such a way that they turn out to be logically immune to error through misidentification. Finally, by drawing on Evans' and Peacocke's accounts of the possession conditions of the first person concept-in which IEM I-judgements play a central role-, it is shown that it is a concept of a human being who thinks of herself as such. Hence, our first person concept is firmly anti-Cartesian and anti-Idealist. As a consequence, it is maintained that not only is there no need to hold the Cartesian and the Idealist metaphysics of the self in order to explain why some I-judgements can be immune to error through misidentification, but it is also argued that one can no longer be either Cartesian or Idealist. For that would expose one to conceptual incoherence.Formal causation and mental representation : a thomistic proposal
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12915
In the past years, the relevance of Thomas Aquinas's theory of cognition for contemporary debates on epistemology has been widely discussed. That theory claims that mind and world are formally identical and that this relationship overcomes various problems associated with scepticism concerning mental representation. The proposal, however, is grounded on the idea that the world can act on the mind through a relation of formal causation. This thesis attempts to develop a Thomistic theory of formal causation which may be suitable for a realist account of mental representation and which may meet the requirements prompted by current discussions. The suggested view is grounded on Aquinas's metaphysics, according to which the world is constituted of substances. The claim that change is possible since substances are hylomorphically constituted (viz., metaphysically composed of form and matter) is defended. Aquinas's claim that some substances have forms which may act independently of matter is also supported. The paradigmatic examples are human souls, i.e. the forms of human beings, whose higher cognitive capacity, i.e. thinking, can be in principle carried on without the need of any material organ. A Thomistic theory of causation is subsequently proposed. It is argued that hylomorphism explains the distinction among four species of causes (material, formal, final and efficient). Aquinas's attempt to explain causal relations conditionally is developed along the lines suggested by John Mackie's INUS conditional analysis. Jaegwon Kim's implementation of Mackie's proposal through an object-based metaphysics of events is then adapted to the hylomorphical account of substances. On these grounds, a theory of formal causation can be proposed and applied to Aquinas's theory of mental representation. The ensuing proposal is offered not in the spirit of historical exegesis but as a substantive philosophical account and it is Thomistic only in the broad sense that it is built on Aquinas's metaphysics and is consistent with his claims on causation.
2003-01-01T00:00:00ZDe Anna, GabrieleIn the past years, the relevance of Thomas Aquinas's theory of cognition for contemporary debates on epistemology has been widely discussed. That theory claims that mind and world are formally identical and that this relationship overcomes various problems associated with scepticism concerning mental representation. The proposal, however, is grounded on the idea that the world can act on the mind through a relation of formal causation. This thesis attempts to develop a Thomistic theory of formal causation which may be suitable for a realist account of mental representation and which may meet the requirements prompted by current discussions. The suggested view is grounded on Aquinas's metaphysics, according to which the world is constituted of substances. The claim that change is possible since substances are hylomorphically constituted (viz., metaphysically composed of form and matter) is defended. Aquinas's claim that some substances have forms which may act independently of matter is also supported. The paradigmatic examples are human souls, i.e. the forms of human beings, whose higher cognitive capacity, i.e. thinking, can be in principle carried on without the need of any material organ. A Thomistic theory of causation is subsequently proposed. It is argued that hylomorphism explains the distinction among four species of causes (material, formal, final and efficient). Aquinas's attempt to explain causal relations conditionally is developed along the lines suggested by John Mackie's INUS conditional analysis. Jaegwon Kim's implementation of Mackie's proposal through an object-based metaphysics of events is then adapted to the hylomorphical account of substances. On these grounds, a theory of formal causation can be proposed and applied to Aquinas's theory of mental representation. The ensuing proposal is offered not in the spirit of historical exegesis but as a substantive philosophical account and it is Thomistic only in the broad sense that it is built on Aquinas's metaphysics and is consistent with his claims on causation.Vagueness and identity
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12912
The main focus of this thesis is indeterminate identity and its relations to vague objects and to imprecise designation. Evans's argument concerning indeterminate-identity statements is often regarded as a proof that vague objects cannot exist. In chapter I I try to argue that the argument may be refuted by vague objects theorists. In chapter II I present various accounts of what indeterminate identity between objects may consist in and three different characteristics of it. I argue that there are objects whose identity is indeterminate and that such indeterminacy is ontic in the sense that it concerns individuation and spatio-temporal boundaries of objects. I also formulate the argument showing that (independently of Evans's argument) terms designating indeterminately identical objects cannot be precise designators. Chapter III is devoted to problems concerning vagueness and identity-over-time. The indeterminate answer to the questions concerning diachronic identity in puzzling cases can be regarded as the correct response by both endurantists and perdurantists. However, while for perdurantists the whole vagueness of persistence conditions is a conceptual matter, for endurantists it deserves the name of "ontic vagueness". Chapter IV focuses on questions concerning vagueness and identity-at-a-time. I offer a new solution to the problem of the many, according to which in each case in which the problem arises there is - contrary to appearances - only one (vague) object present. The problem arises because each such object has many precisifications, which nevertheless have no ontological significance. I also propose a new account of what it takes for an object to be vague. Chapter V deals with indeterminate identity in the domain of quanta. The first part investigates the various problems concerning identity and individuation of quantum particles, whereas the second part is devoted to analysis and critique of E. J. Lowe's example of alleged indeterminate identity-over-time between electrons.
2001-01-01T00:00:00ZOdrowąż-Sypniewska, JoannaThe main focus of this thesis is indeterminate identity and its relations to vague objects and to imprecise designation. Evans's argument concerning indeterminate-identity statements is often regarded as a proof that vague objects cannot exist. In chapter I I try to argue that the argument may be refuted by vague objects theorists. In chapter II I present various accounts of what indeterminate identity between objects may consist in and three different characteristics of it. I argue that there are objects whose identity is indeterminate and that such indeterminacy is ontic in the sense that it concerns individuation and spatio-temporal boundaries of objects. I also formulate the argument showing that (independently of Evans's argument) terms designating indeterminately identical objects cannot be precise designators. Chapter III is devoted to problems concerning vagueness and identity-over-time. The indeterminate answer to the questions concerning diachronic identity in puzzling cases can be regarded as the correct response by both endurantists and perdurantists. However, while for perdurantists the whole vagueness of persistence conditions is a conceptual matter, for endurantists it deserves the name of "ontic vagueness". Chapter IV focuses on questions concerning vagueness and identity-at-a-time. I offer a new solution to the problem of the many, according to which in each case in which the problem arises there is - contrary to appearances - only one (vague) object present. The problem arises because each such object has many precisifications, which nevertheless have no ontological significance. I also propose a new account of what it takes for an object to be vague. Chapter V deals with indeterminate identity in the domain of quanta. The first part investigates the various problems concerning identity and individuation of quantum particles, whereas the second part is devoted to analysis and critique of E. J. Lowe's example of alleged indeterminate identity-over-time between electrons.On having meaning in mind
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12911
There have traditionally been two views as to what makes it the case that a singular term has the prepositional content that it does. According to Descriptivism, the content of a term is descriptive since it is given by a cluster of descriptive properties commonly associated with it. According to Referentialism, the content of a term is singular since it is determined by the object it picks out. It follows that empty terms can have descriptive, but not singular, content. If narrow content is what intrinsic duplicates have in common, then descriptive content is arguably narrow. Singular content, however, is wide since intrinsic duplicates who inhabit different environments express different singular contents by the same terms. On the face of it, the arguments against Descriptivism and Semantic Internalism - the view that content is narrow - seem convincing, but a worry persists, namely how to reconcile Semantic Externalism - the view that content is wide - with the kind of Privileged Access speakers enjoy with respect to the contents of their occurrent attitudes. By thorough examination of those arguments I find space for an intermediate position. What we learn is not that reference cannot go by properties, but rather which properties mediate reference. Kripke's Modal Argument proves that we need rigidified descriptive properties, Putnam's Twin Earth Argument shows that we better include causal properties, and Burge's Arthritis Argument highlights that we frequently invoke properties involving reference to other speakers. What is more, considerations about the behaviour of singular terms in intentional contexts strongly suggest that their propositional contents cannot be exhausted by their referents. By deploying so-called Two-Dimensionalism, as developed by Stalnaker, Kaplan, Evans, Davies, and others, I argue that singular content is knowable only after relevant empirical information about the actual world is in, and so is not subject to Privileged Access. Descriptive content, however, is a priori knowable since it is independent of which possible world is actual. But if that is so, then descriptive content constrained by rigidity, causality and other-dependence must also be a priori. All it takes is knowledge of how to describe various thought experiments. Although the latter kind of content is not object-dependent, as is singular content, it is wide in that it fails to be shared by duplicates who are embedded in distinct physical or social environments. So, we should expect compatibility between Semantic Externalism and Privileged Access only if Rigidified Causal Descriptivism is adopted.
2001-01-01T00:00:00ZKallerstrup, JesperThere have traditionally been two views as to what makes it the case that a singular term has the prepositional content that it does. According to Descriptivism, the content of a term is descriptive since it is given by a cluster of descriptive properties commonly associated with it. According to Referentialism, the content of a term is singular since it is determined by the object it picks out. It follows that empty terms can have descriptive, but not singular, content. If narrow content is what intrinsic duplicates have in common, then descriptive content is arguably narrow. Singular content, however, is wide since intrinsic duplicates who inhabit different environments express different singular contents by the same terms. On the face of it, the arguments against Descriptivism and Semantic Internalism - the view that content is narrow - seem convincing, but a worry persists, namely how to reconcile Semantic Externalism - the view that content is wide - with the kind of Privileged Access speakers enjoy with respect to the contents of their occurrent attitudes. By thorough examination of those arguments I find space for an intermediate position. What we learn is not that reference cannot go by properties, but rather which properties mediate reference. Kripke's Modal Argument proves that we need rigidified descriptive properties, Putnam's Twin Earth Argument shows that we better include causal properties, and Burge's Arthritis Argument highlights that we frequently invoke properties involving reference to other speakers. What is more, considerations about the behaviour of singular terms in intentional contexts strongly suggest that their propositional contents cannot be exhausted by their referents. By deploying so-called Two-Dimensionalism, as developed by Stalnaker, Kaplan, Evans, Davies, and others, I argue that singular content is knowable only after relevant empirical information about the actual world is in, and so is not subject to Privileged Access. Descriptive content, however, is a priori knowable since it is independent of which possible world is actual. But if that is so, then descriptive content constrained by rigidity, causality and other-dependence must also be a priori. All it takes is knowledge of how to describe various thought experiments. Although the latter kind of content is not object-dependent, as is singular content, it is wide in that it fails to be shared by duplicates who are embedded in distinct physical or social environments. So, we should expect compatibility between Semantic Externalism and Privileged Access only if Rigidified Causal Descriptivism is adopted.War in peace : the American Legion and the continuing service of film
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12704
2018-01-01T00:00:00ZRice, TomEssays on the nature and roles of knowledge
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12601
This dissertation is comprised of five independent essays on the theme of the nature and roles
of knowledge. The essays are intended to be free-standing pieces of work and should be read
as such. Contents: 1. An Existential Argument For Pragmatic Encroachment --
2. Environmental Luck Gettier Cases And The Metaphysical Roles Of Knowledge --
3. Might The Simulation Heuristic Influence Knowledge Attributions? --
4. Excuses And Epistemic Norms --
5. From Moore's Paradox To The Knowledge Norm Of Belief And Beyond
2015-06-25T00:00:00ZHughes, NicholasThis dissertation is comprised of five independent essays on the theme of the nature and roles
of knowledge. The essays are intended to be free-standing pieces of work and should be read
as such. Contents: 1. An Existential Argument For Pragmatic Encroachment --
2. Environmental Luck Gettier Cases And The Metaphysical Roles Of Knowledge --
3. Might The Simulation Heuristic Influence Knowledge Attributions? --
4. Excuses And Epistemic Norms --
5. From Moore's Paradox To The Knowledge Norm Of Belief And BeyondA bitter pill for closure
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12409
The primary objective of this paper is to introduce a new epistemic paradox that puts pressure on the claim that justification is closed under multi premise deduction. The first part of the paper will consider two well-known paradoxes—the lottery and the preface paradox—and outline two popular strategies for solving the paradoxes without denying closure. The second part will introduce a new, structurally related, paradox that is immune to these closure-preserving solutions. I will call this paradox, The Paradox of the Pill. Seeing that the prominent closure-preserving solutions do not apply to the new paradox, I will argue that it presents a much stronger case against the claim that justification is closed under deduction than its two predecessors. Besides presenting a more robust counterexample to closure, the new paradox also reveals that the strategies that were previously thought to get closure out of trouble are not sufficiently general to achieve this task as they fail to apply to similar closure-threatening paradoxes in the same vicinity.
2017-11-18T00:00:00ZBackes, MarvinThe primary objective of this paper is to introduce a new epistemic paradox that puts pressure on the claim that justification is closed under multi premise deduction. The first part of the paper will consider two well-known paradoxes—the lottery and the preface paradox—and outline two popular strategies for solving the paradoxes without denying closure. The second part will introduce a new, structurally related, paradox that is immune to these closure-preserving solutions. I will call this paradox, The Paradox of the Pill. Seeing that the prominent closure-preserving solutions do not apply to the new paradox, I will argue that it presents a much stronger case against the claim that justification is closed under deduction than its two predecessors. Besides presenting a more robust counterexample to closure, the new paradox also reveals that the strategies that were previously thought to get closure out of trouble are not sufficiently general to achieve this task as they fail to apply to similar closure-threatening paradoxes in the same vicinity.Frege's case for the logicality of his basic laws
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12252
Frege wanted to show that arithmetical truths are logical by proving them from purely logical basic laws. But how do we know that these basic laws are logical? Frege uses generality and undeniability to make a prima facie case for logicality—if a truth is general and undeniable, then it’s likely logical. I argue that Frege could, did, and had to make a deeper case for why we’re right in recognizing his basic laws as logical. Implicit in his work is a view of logical laws as epistemically analytic—his arguments for his basic laws serve to elicit a reflective awareness of the fact that understanding them is sufficient for recognizing them to be true. This view both fits with Frege’s comments concerning the connection between logic, truth, and normativity, and serves to explain why and in what sense he took logic to be general and conceptually undeniable.
In my view, semantics must play a distinctive role in any rational reconstruction of Frege’s case for logicality—the aforementioned “reflective awareness” must be an explicit appreciation of how the truth of formulas expressing Frege’s laws follows quickly from his stipulations governing terms which figure in those formulas. Opposing this view is the elucidatory interpretation of Thomas Ricketts, Warren Goldfarb, and Joan Weiner, which holds that Frege’s arguments for his basic laws can’t be taken at face value, and must serve the merely elucidatory purpose of easing us into the language. Another reading is the correctness interpretation of Richard Heck and Jason Stanley, which holds that Frege’s primary purpose in his arguments is justifying the claim that Frege’s axioms, qua formulas, are true. I argue against both of these interpretations, and in doing so clarify the role and limits of semantics in Frege’s enterprise.
2017-06-22T00:00:00ZYates, AlexanderFrege wanted to show that arithmetical truths are logical by proving them from purely logical basic laws. But how do we know that these basic laws are logical? Frege uses generality and undeniability to make a prima facie case for logicality—if a truth is general and undeniable, then it’s likely logical. I argue that Frege could, did, and had to make a deeper case for why we’re right in recognizing his basic laws as logical. Implicit in his work is a view of logical laws as epistemically analytic—his arguments for his basic laws serve to elicit a reflective awareness of the fact that understanding them is sufficient for recognizing them to be true. This view both fits with Frege’s comments concerning the connection between logic, truth, and normativity, and serves to explain why and in what sense he took logic to be general and conceptually undeniable.
In my view, semantics must play a distinctive role in any rational reconstruction of Frege’s case for logicality—the aforementioned “reflective awareness” must be an explicit appreciation of how the truth of formulas expressing Frege’s laws follows quickly from his stipulations governing terms which figure in those formulas. Opposing this view is the elucidatory interpretation of Thomas Ricketts, Warren Goldfarb, and Joan Weiner, which holds that Frege’s arguments for his basic laws can’t be taken at face value, and must serve the merely elucidatory purpose of easing us into the language. Another reading is the correctness interpretation of Richard Heck and Jason Stanley, which holds that Frege’s primary purpose in his arguments is justifying the claim that Frege’s axioms, qua formulas, are true. I argue against both of these interpretations, and in doing so clarify the role and limits of semantics in Frege’s enterprise.Mnemonic communities : politics of World War II memory in Thai screen culture
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12247
This thesis examines the politics of World War II memory in Thai screen culture with special reference to films and television series produced between the 1970s and the 2010s. Framed by memory studies and film studies approaches, the thesis hopes to answer 1) how WW II memory on screen is related to other memory texts: monuments, museums and commemorative rituals and 2) how the memory is coded by various genres: romance, biopic, combat film and horror. The project relies on a plurimedial network which has not yet been extensively studied by film scholars in Thailand.
Through the lens of memory studies, the on-screen memory is profoundly intermingled with other sites of memory across Thailand and beyond. It potentially is counter-memory and vernacular memory challenging the state’s official memory. The politics of WWII memory are also engaged with cultural politics in Thailand in terms of class, gender and ethnicity. The politics of commoners and trauma are given more voice in WWII memory compared to other moments of the national past, which are dominated by the royal-nationalism.
From film studies perspectives, the genres mediating WWII memory are shaped by traditions of Thai-Thai and transnational screen culture; the Thai WWII combat film is a newly proposed genre. The thesis also explores directors, the star system, exhibition and reception. The findings should prove that WWII memory on Thai screen serves their roles in memory institutions which construct and maintain mnemonic communities as well as the roles in entertainment and media institutions.
Another crucial implication of the research is that politicising WWII memory on the Thai screen can illuminate how memory and visual texts travel. The research likewise manifests its contributions to a better understanding of how Thai screen culture can be positioned within both global memory culture and global screen culture.
2018-06-28T00:00:00ZPrasannam, NatthanaiThis thesis examines the politics of World War II memory in Thai screen culture with special reference to films and television series produced between the 1970s and the 2010s. Framed by memory studies and film studies approaches, the thesis hopes to answer 1) how WW II memory on screen is related to other memory texts: monuments, museums and commemorative rituals and 2) how the memory is coded by various genres: romance, biopic, combat film and horror. The project relies on a plurimedial network which has not yet been extensively studied by film scholars in Thailand.
Through the lens of memory studies, the on-screen memory is profoundly intermingled with other sites of memory across Thailand and beyond. It potentially is counter-memory and vernacular memory challenging the state’s official memory. The politics of WWII memory are also engaged with cultural politics in Thailand in terms of class, gender and ethnicity. The politics of commoners and trauma are given more voice in WWII memory compared to other moments of the national past, which are dominated by the royal-nationalism.
From film studies perspectives, the genres mediating WWII memory are shaped by traditions of Thai-Thai and transnational screen culture; the Thai WWII combat film is a newly proposed genre. The thesis also explores directors, the star system, exhibition and reception. The findings should prove that WWII memory on Thai screen serves their roles in memory institutions which construct and maintain mnemonic communities as well as the roles in entertainment and media institutions.
Another crucial implication of the research is that politicising WWII memory on the Thai screen can illuminate how memory and visual texts travel. The research likewise manifests its contributions to a better understanding of how Thai screen culture can be positioned within both global memory culture and global screen culture.Being German and being Paraguayan in Nueva Germania : arguing for “contextual epistemic permissibility” and “methodological complementarity”
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12180
This thesis involves a collaborative study of emic articulations and quotidian ways of ‘being German’ and ‘being Paraguayan’ in Nueva Germania, a rural municipality in Paraguay. An argument is made that the social categories focused upon during this thesis, were evoked according to different contexts. While many claimed that Germanness or Paraguayanness were key categories, essentialistic characteristics that defined them and others as people of a certain kind, in other situations these social divisions were disregarded or even contradicted. This leads me to the theoretical conclusion that social categories, and epistemic frameworks more broadly, should not be understood as universally relevant or as universally applicable, and should not be treated as such. The thesis therefore proposes to assume ‘contextual epistemic permissibility’ as a key axiom for use within anthropology and in the wider social sciences.
The possible theoretical and methodological consequences of such an assumption are elaborated upon. Different theories of self, social action, and agency are debated in the course of this thesis: it is asked which might best analytically accommodate the assumption of contextual epistemic permissibility. Furthermore, in order to reflect the multiplicity of emic epistemic frameworks, the thesis proposes that a notion of ‘analytical and representative complementarity’ be introduced, rather than monistic theoretical models. Such complementarity is practised in the thesis through the use of different multiscalar analyses (for example, the use of different theories of nationalism), and through the simultaneous use of different forms of representation.
The above theoretical divagations are intertwined and related to the individual stories of twelve people from Nueva Germania, and are presented with both textual and photographic means. The stories were created through a collaborative process. Each project participant was free to decide upon the subject of their account, and therefore the resulting stories are able to cover a variety of different themes, at the same time introducing the reader to individual histories, struggles, opinions, plans, and critiques. Some elements of these accounts directly relate to the theoretical debates focused upon within the thesis while other elements of the individual stories are left to speak for themselves, and for the reader to make sense of independently. The photographs and texts, in their intertextual presentation, allow for an embodiment of the argument concerning representational complementarity.
2017-12-20T00:00:00ZKurzwelly, JonatanThis thesis involves a collaborative study of emic articulations and quotidian ways of ‘being German’ and ‘being Paraguayan’ in Nueva Germania, a rural municipality in Paraguay. An argument is made that the social categories focused upon during this thesis, were evoked according to different contexts. While many claimed that Germanness or Paraguayanness were key categories, essentialistic characteristics that defined them and others as people of a certain kind, in other situations these social divisions were disregarded or even contradicted. This leads me to the theoretical conclusion that social categories, and epistemic frameworks more broadly, should not be understood as universally relevant or as universally applicable, and should not be treated as such. The thesis therefore proposes to assume ‘contextual epistemic permissibility’ as a key axiom for use within anthropology and in the wider social sciences.
The possible theoretical and methodological consequences of such an assumption are elaborated upon. Different theories of self, social action, and agency are debated in the course of this thesis: it is asked which might best analytically accommodate the assumption of contextual epistemic permissibility. Furthermore, in order to reflect the multiplicity of emic epistemic frameworks, the thesis proposes that a notion of ‘analytical and representative complementarity’ be introduced, rather than monistic theoretical models. Such complementarity is practised in the thesis through the use of different multiscalar analyses (for example, the use of different theories of nationalism), and through the simultaneous use of different forms of representation.
The above theoretical divagations are intertwined and related to the individual stories of twelve people from Nueva Germania, and are presented with both textual and photographic means. The stories were created through a collaborative process. Each project participant was free to decide upon the subject of their account, and therefore the resulting stories are able to cover a variety of different themes, at the same time introducing the reader to individual histories, struggles, opinions, plans, and critiques. Some elements of these accounts directly relate to the theoretical debates focused upon within the thesis while other elements of the individual stories are left to speak for themselves, and for the reader to make sense of independently. The photographs and texts, in their intertextual presentation, allow for an embodiment of the argument concerning representational complementarity.Aasenîkon! Makushi travelogues from the borderlands of Southern Guyana
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12167
This ethnographic account focuses on the conceptions and practices of movement, as narrated by the Makushi people who live along the triple frontier of southern Guyana. The journeys - individual experiences, in particular of women – depict visits to other Makushi communities, to their neighbours and cities in Guyana, Brazil and Venezuela. The travelogues disclose Makushi premises on knowledge and its acquisition: gender, age, temporality and alterity. Exploring these concepts in practice, the ethnography points out the value the Makushi attribute to their encounters with others, situations in which risk and unpredictability are creatively incorporated as part of their sociality.
2017-12-08T00:00:00ZGrund, Lisa KatharinaThis ethnographic account focuses on the conceptions and practices of movement, as narrated by the Makushi people who live along the triple frontier of southern Guyana. The journeys - individual experiences, in particular of women – depict visits to other Makushi communities, to their neighbours and cities in Guyana, Brazil and Venezuela. The travelogues disclose Makushi premises on knowledge and its acquisition: gender, age, temporality and alterity. Exploring these concepts in practice, the ethnography points out the value the Makushi attribute to their encounters with others, situations in which risk and unpredictability are creatively incorporated as part of their sociality.A challenge to the permissibility of procreation
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12095
The Non-Identity Problem (the NIP) raises a series of problems to the morality of procreation. The NIP, I believe, highlights a fundamental problem concerning the justifiability of procreation. In chapter 1, I introduce the NIP and show that the logic of the NIP does not rule out the anti-natalist claim. Moreover, there are reasons, which are independent of its capacity to solve the NIP, to accept the anti-natalist claim. However, the anti-natalist claim poses a serious justificatory challenge to the permissibility of procreation. To see whether we can restore the permissibility of procreation, I examine the impersonal pro-natalist claim in chapter 2 and argue that there is not only no good reason to believe that whatever makes life worth living gives us an impersonal reason to procreate but good reason not to believe that. In chapter 3, I examine the justifications for the right to procreate and argue that most promising ground – that is, parenting interest – fails to establish a moral right to procreate. Therefore, the justification of procreation is in trouble, at least, at the individual level because there is a reason against procreation out of concern for possible people and no impersonal reason to procreate and the moral significance of parenting interests fails to justify imposing the harm of coming into existence. This is, nevertheless, a somewhat moderate conclusion because it does not defend that procreation is all-things-considered wrong. More works need to be done to show why procreation is morally permissible (or impermissible).
2017-12-08T00:00:00ZSu, Yu-TingThe Non-Identity Problem (the NIP) raises a series of problems to the morality of procreation. The NIP, I believe, highlights a fundamental problem concerning the justifiability of procreation. In chapter 1, I introduce the NIP and show that the logic of the NIP does not rule out the anti-natalist claim. Moreover, there are reasons, which are independent of its capacity to solve the NIP, to accept the anti-natalist claim. However, the anti-natalist claim poses a serious justificatory challenge to the permissibility of procreation. To see whether we can restore the permissibility of procreation, I examine the impersonal pro-natalist claim in chapter 2 and argue that there is not only no good reason to believe that whatever makes life worth living gives us an impersonal reason to procreate but good reason not to believe that. In chapter 3, I examine the justifications for the right to procreate and argue that most promising ground – that is, parenting interest – fails to establish a moral right to procreate. Therefore, the justification of procreation is in trouble, at least, at the individual level because there is a reason against procreation out of concern for possible people and no impersonal reason to procreate and the moral significance of parenting interests fails to justify imposing the harm of coming into existence. This is, nevertheless, a somewhat moderate conclusion because it does not defend that procreation is all-things-considered wrong. More works need to be done to show why procreation is morally permissible (or impermissible).Living with Durham Cathedral : understanding the dynamic relationships between a community and their cathedral
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12034
Cathedrals today are no longer sites of just religious worship, they must be many things to many people such as tourist attractions, heritage centres, and meeting places. Today, Durham Cathedral in the north-east of England is home to almost 900 people engaged on site, of which almost 700 are volunteers. Add to that number over 700,000 visitors and about 1,700 religious services annually, and a complex image of life within Durham Cathedral begins to take shape. Drawing on 14 months of ethnographic fieldwork between August 2013 and September 2014, this thesis takes a phenomenological approach in exploring the dynamic relationships that exist between a 900-year-old building and those who regularly come into contact with that building. It will consider the complex negotiations that take place between the many parts of the community and the building in a constantly changing environment, and will focus on the role sound, light, time, and space play in the constant challenge of change and negotiation. Finally, it will consider how buildings are not only constructed but are also cultivated through being built and rebuilt, spaces negotiated and improvised, as well as filled with stories and memories.
The importance of this research is not just in observing and understanding the types of change and negotiation that occur between a building and those who inhabit it, but also in understanding the altering roles of religious buildings as they cope with the changing demands of running a site of both historical and continuing social, religious, and financial pressures, Durham Cathedral is a place that gives space to differing communities, allowing people to find in the building what they need from the building and as a result of this, Durham Cathedral is not a place in which life happens, it is a place with which life happens.
2017-06-29T00:00:00ZCalvert, Arran JamesCathedrals today are no longer sites of just religious worship, they must be many things to many people such as tourist attractions, heritage centres, and meeting places. Today, Durham Cathedral in the north-east of England is home to almost 900 people engaged on site, of which almost 700 are volunteers. Add to that number over 700,000 visitors and about 1,700 religious services annually, and a complex image of life within Durham Cathedral begins to take shape. Drawing on 14 months of ethnographic fieldwork between August 2013 and September 2014, this thesis takes a phenomenological approach in exploring the dynamic relationships that exist between a 900-year-old building and those who regularly come into contact with that building. It will consider the complex negotiations that take place between the many parts of the community and the building in a constantly changing environment, and will focus on the role sound, light, time, and space play in the constant challenge of change and negotiation. Finally, it will consider how buildings are not only constructed but are also cultivated through being built and rebuilt, spaces negotiated and improvised, as well as filled with stories and memories.
The importance of this research is not just in observing and understanding the types of change and negotiation that occur between a building and those who inhabit it, but also in understanding the altering roles of religious buildings as they cope with the changing demands of running a site of both historical and continuing social, religious, and financial pressures, Durham Cathedral is a place that gives space to differing communities, allowing people to find in the building what they need from the building and as a result of this, Durham Cathedral is not a place in which life happens, it is a place with which life happens.Early eighteenth-century British moral philosophers and the possibility of virtue
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11973
The general aim of this thesis is to further undermine the convention that British moral philosophy of the early eighteenth century is best conceived as a struggle between rationalist and sentimentalist epistemologies. I argue that the philosophers considered here (Samuel Clarke, Francis Hutcheson, Gilbert Burnet, John Balguy and John Gay) situated their moral epistemologies within the wider framework of an attempt to prove the ‘reality’ of virtue in terms of virtue being an achievable, practical endeavour. To this end, they were as much concerned with the attributes that motivated or caused God to create in the way that he did – his communicable attributes - as they were with our own natural moral abilities. I maintain that this concern led Clarke, Burnet and Balguy to look beyond a rationalist epistemology in an attempt to account for the practical possibility of moral action. I claim that it led Hutcheson to develop a moral theory that reflected a realist theistic metaphysics that went some way beyond an appeal to providential naturalism. I argue that it led Gay to try to synthesise the approaches of rival moral schemes in order to offer a unified account of agency and obligation. The thesis has three key objectives: 1) to examine the relationship of rationalism to obligation and motivation in the work of Clarke, Burnet and Balguy, and 2) to explore the relative roles of sense and judgment in the moral epistemologies of Hutcheson, Burnet, Balguy and Gay and to (re) examine the nature of Hutcheson’s moral realism, and 3) to investigate the theistic metaphysical claims made by all parties with respect to their arguments about moral realism.
2017-10-02T00:00:00ZVeitch, EmmaThe general aim of this thesis is to further undermine the convention that British moral philosophy of the early eighteenth century is best conceived as a struggle between rationalist and sentimentalist epistemologies. I argue that the philosophers considered here (Samuel Clarke, Francis Hutcheson, Gilbert Burnet, John Balguy and John Gay) situated their moral epistemologies within the wider framework of an attempt to prove the ‘reality’ of virtue in terms of virtue being an achievable, practical endeavour. To this end, they were as much concerned with the attributes that motivated or caused God to create in the way that he did – his communicable attributes - as they were with our own natural moral abilities. I maintain that this concern led Clarke, Burnet and Balguy to look beyond a rationalist epistemology in an attempt to account for the practical possibility of moral action. I claim that it led Hutcheson to develop a moral theory that reflected a realist theistic metaphysics that went some way beyond an appeal to providential naturalism. I argue that it led Gay to try to synthesise the approaches of rival moral schemes in order to offer a unified account of agency and obligation. The thesis has three key objectives: 1) to examine the relationship of rationalism to obligation and motivation in the work of Clarke, Burnet and Balguy, and 2) to explore the relative roles of sense and judgment in the moral epistemologies of Hutcheson, Burnet, Balguy and Gay and to (re) examine the nature of Hutcheson’s moral realism, and 3) to investigate the theistic metaphysical claims made by all parties with respect to their arguments about moral realism.Stories of the invisible mine : ethnographic account of stakeholder relations at the Frieda River Project, Papua New Guinea
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11971
Located amid tropical rainforest, in an upper tributary of the Sepik River, the Frieda River area is home to one of the biggest undeveloped gold and copper deposits in the Pacific. Exploration of Frieda’s rich deposits has been ongoing since it began in 1969, bringing together unlikely partners in a process of preparing for a large-scale resource extraction project. This thesis offers an ethnographic account of stakeholder relations as they were unfolding at Frieda over forty years after the first company arrived on the banks of the River. It presents the key stakeholders of the Frieda River Project as outcomes of relations which produced them, emergent from an interplay between prescribed roles and expectations of responsibilities, and on the ground activities of forming and negotiating social relations. Through an ethnographic study of the Payamo it describes a process through which the Frieda River Project’s local stakeholders mobilized a range of complex and contested relations to turn Frieda’s rich deposits into development, and to make the mine at Frieda happen. This study provides an ethnographic insight into complex and contested processes of planning for a resource extraction project as they were actually taking place. It proposes an analytical framework of looking at a mine as a social relation and argues that although it might not yet have the appearance which would make it visible to the company and the government, from the perspective of its indigenous stakeholders the Frieda River Mine is already happening, but it has not yet revealed itself.
2015-08-01T00:00:00ZSkrzypek, Emilia ELocated amid tropical rainforest, in an upper tributary of the Sepik River, the Frieda River area is home to one of the biggest undeveloped gold and copper deposits in the Pacific. Exploration of Frieda’s rich deposits has been ongoing since it began in 1969, bringing together unlikely partners in a process of preparing for a large-scale resource extraction project. This thesis offers an ethnographic account of stakeholder relations as they were unfolding at Frieda over forty years after the first company arrived on the banks of the River. It presents the key stakeholders of the Frieda River Project as outcomes of relations which produced them, emergent from an interplay between prescribed roles and expectations of responsibilities, and on the ground activities of forming and negotiating social relations. Through an ethnographic study of the Payamo it describes a process through which the Frieda River Project’s local stakeholders mobilized a range of complex and contested relations to turn Frieda’s rich deposits into development, and to make the mine at Frieda happen. This study provides an ethnographic insight into complex and contested processes of planning for a resource extraction project as they were actually taking place. It proposes an analytical framework of looking at a mine as a social relation and argues that although it might not yet have the appearance which would make it visible to the company and the government, from the perspective of its indigenous stakeholders the Frieda River Mine is already happening, but it has not yet revealed itself.A long way home : cinema and the cultural map of America, 2001-2011
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11866
This thesis addresses a set of transformations in the symbolic construction of America, as reflected by a number of films released during what is commonly referred to as the post 9/11 period. Following a rich debate in the field of American literary studies, the study investigates the self-image of the nation as projected by four representative films of the decade. Throughout the chapters, the central hypothesis of the thesis is that the cultural symbology of the nation, its symbolic map, continues to act as a territorialising force within the diegetic universes of the texts. In so doing, the meta-narrative of America stands in opposition to a deterritorialising tendency that - as a body of recent critical scholarship attests - inform the post 9/11 context, a tendency borne out of a new, shared awareness of historical violence within the national community. As it displaces codified social boundaries, and established links between individual and communities, such deterritorialising rhetoric threaten the symbolic coherence of the world. The conflict between long-standing symbologies of the nation and the impact of a new cultural milieu thus emerges in the cinema as a representational impasse, whose different textual outcomes are addressed in the main chapters of this thesis. In order to investigate the interplay of different symbolic maps, the present study focuses on four spatial signifiers - the house, the village, the city and the land - and derives its methodological tools from a body of scholarship largely comprised within the so-called 'spatial turn'. The terms of this theoretical engagement are specified in the first part the thesis, while the conclusion expands on the direction of the research, and connects the study to other related disciplinary discourses, both in Film studies and American studies.
2014-12-01T00:00:00ZCicchetti, PasqualeThis thesis addresses a set of transformations in the symbolic construction of America, as reflected by a number of films released during what is commonly referred to as the post 9/11 period. Following a rich debate in the field of American literary studies, the study investigates the self-image of the nation as projected by four representative films of the decade. Throughout the chapters, the central hypothesis of the thesis is that the cultural symbology of the nation, its symbolic map, continues to act as a territorialising force within the diegetic universes of the texts. In so doing, the meta-narrative of America stands in opposition to a deterritorialising tendency that - as a body of recent critical scholarship attests - inform the post 9/11 context, a tendency borne out of a new, shared awareness of historical violence within the national community. As it displaces codified social boundaries, and established links between individual and communities, such deterritorialising rhetoric threaten the symbolic coherence of the world. The conflict between long-standing symbologies of the nation and the impact of a new cultural milieu thus emerges in the cinema as a representational impasse, whose different textual outcomes are addressed in the main chapters of this thesis. In order to investigate the interplay of different symbolic maps, the present study focuses on four spatial signifiers - the house, the village, the city and the land - and derives its methodological tools from a body of scholarship largely comprised within the so-called 'spatial turn'. The terms of this theoretical engagement are specified in the first part the thesis, while the conclusion expands on the direction of the research, and connects the study to other related disciplinary discourses, both in Film studies and American studies.Mandeville, Hutcheson, and Hume on pride and honour
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11863
Pride has been a problematic passion in many moral systems for it has been seen as having harmful consequences at an individual and political level. This thesis will argue that is a philosophical tradition that has seen self-love and its manifestation, pride, can be useful in society. This been said, each and every author that speaks about pride considers the conditions under which the love that we feel towards ourselves and the desire to be esteemed by others are justified. In other words, pride can be given under circumstances and in degrees that make it due or undue.
Mandeville and Hume saw self-love and due pride, respectively, as supplementing moral duty, prudence and reason in guiding us to moral ends. Hutcheson too, allowed for a sense of honour that displays pride to naturally accompany the attitudes that are approved of by the moral sense. Therefore, what had been a neglected passion in most accounts of morals, became an important means of transforming our passions into social standards.
This introduction will first explain the idea that the anatomy of the passions became paramount for the study of human nature. The idea behind this is that the passions transform and substitute each other as motivations. Second, I shall provide insight into the attitudes towards pride that shaped Mandeville, Hume, Hutcheson's theories, paying special attention to the French Neo-Augustinians and Protestants.
2014-09-01T00:00:00ZBarrenechea Dominguez, BihotzPride has been a problematic passion in many moral systems for it has been seen as having harmful consequences at an individual and political level. This thesis will argue that is a philosophical tradition that has seen self-love and its manifestation, pride, can be useful in society. This been said, each and every author that speaks about pride considers the conditions under which the love that we feel towards ourselves and the desire to be esteemed by others are justified. In other words, pride can be given under circumstances and in degrees that make it due or undue.
Mandeville and Hume saw self-love and due pride, respectively, as supplementing moral duty, prudence and reason in guiding us to moral ends. Hutcheson too, allowed for a sense of honour that displays pride to naturally accompany the attitudes that are approved of by the moral sense. Therefore, what had been a neglected passion in most accounts of morals, became an important means of transforming our passions into social standards.
This introduction will first explain the idea that the anatomy of the passions became paramount for the study of human nature. The idea behind this is that the passions transform and substitute each other as motivations. Second, I shall provide insight into the attitudes towards pride that shaped Mandeville, Hume, Hutcheson's theories, paying special attention to the French Neo-Augustinians and Protestants.Secretly familiar : public secrets of a post traumatic diaspora
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11830
In
1979,
the
socio-political
landscape
of
Iran
was
transformed
beyond
recognition.
After
years
of
conflict
between
the
Shah
and
a
myriad
of
political
opposition
groups,
it
seemed
that
the
people
had
indeed
triumphed
over
an
authoritarian
monarch.
As
is
now
widely
known,
their
short
lived
victory
transformed
into
a
systematic
programme
of
terror
that
turned
back
on
and
attacked
those
that
the
Islamic
Republic
deemed
contrary
to
its
values.
The
‘bloody
decade’
of
the
1980s
saw
thousands
of
executions
and
disappearances
under
the
cloak
of
the
war
with
neighbouring
Iraq.
The
records
of
these
massacres
are
still
largely
unreliable
and/or
incomplete.
The
programme
of
terror
in
question,
that
ensued
and
persists
up
to
the
present
day,
has
instigated
a
sprawling
transnational
Diaspora
with
a
familiar
but
rarely
divulged
public
secret.
My
doctoral
thesis
comprises
two
main
parts
in
relation
to
these
events.
They
are
connected
by
the
running
theme
of
alternative
narratives
of
past
violence,
and
a
post-traumatic
political
activism.
This
is
an
intimate
ethnography
that
examines
global
processes
(revolution,
Diaspora,
transnational
activism)
from
the
vantage
point
of
local
and
particular
histories
of
Lur,
former
Fadaiyan
guerilla
fighters
in
Oslo.
In
the
second
part
of
this
work,
these
histories
are
located
within
the
collective
movement
of
the
Iran
Tribunal,
a
literal
attempt
to
make
secrets
public
and
to
bring
together
subjective
experiences
of
violence
into
a
truth-‐telling
process.
Opening
up
a
new
space
for
critical
reflection,
this
study
proposes
an
alternative
lens
of
analysis
of
tumultuous
historical
processes.
With
regards
to
their
actors,
efforts
are
made
to
better
understand
how
lives
and
narratives
are
ordered
around
the
characteristic
disorder
of
violence,
fear
and
Diaspora
itself,
and
how
subjective
traumas
manifest
into
collective,
and
in
this
case
transnational,
movements.
My
ethnography
of
disordered
and
interrupted
lives
works
to
inform
studies
of
such
critical
contemporary
realities
as
well
as
to
ethnographically
introduce
the
Iranian
Diasporas’
public
secret
of
violence
for
wider
anthropological
enquiry,
and
to
contribute
towards
its
critical
analysis.
2015-05-01T00:00:00ZShafafi, PardisIn
1979,
the
socio-political
landscape
of
Iran
was
transformed
beyond
recognition.
After
years
of
conflict
between
the
Shah
and
a
myriad
of
political
opposition
groups,
it
seemed
that
the
people
had
indeed
triumphed
over
an
authoritarian
monarch.
As
is
now
widely
known,
their
short
lived
victory
transformed
into
a
systematic
programme
of
terror
that
turned
back
on
and
attacked
those
that
the
Islamic
Republic
deemed
contrary
to
its
values.
The
‘bloody
decade’
of
the
1980s
saw
thousands
of
executions
and
disappearances
under
the
cloak
of
the
war
with
neighbouring
Iraq.
The
records
of
these
massacres
are
still
largely
unreliable
and/or
incomplete.
The
programme
of
terror
in
question,
that
ensued
and
persists
up
to
the
present
day,
has
instigated
a
sprawling
transnational
Diaspora
with
a
familiar
but
rarely
divulged
public
secret.
My
doctoral
thesis
comprises
two
main
parts
in
relation
to
these
events.
They
are
connected
by
the
running
theme
of
alternative
narratives
of
past
violence,
and
a
post-traumatic
political
activism.
This
is
an
intimate
ethnography
that
examines
global
processes
(revolution,
Diaspora,
transnational
activism)
from
the
vantage
point
of
local
and
particular
histories
of
Lur,
former
Fadaiyan
guerilla
fighters
in
Oslo.
In
the
second
part
of
this
work,
these
histories
are
located
within
the
collective
movement
of
the
Iran
Tribunal,
a
literal
attempt
to
make
secrets
public
and
to
bring
together
subjective
experiences
of
violence
into
a
truth-‐telling
process.
Opening
up
a
new
space
for
critical
reflection,
this
study
proposes
an
alternative
lens
of
analysis
of
tumultuous
historical
processes.
With
regards
to
their
actors,
efforts
are
made
to
better
understand
how
lives
and
narratives
are
ordered
around
the
characteristic
disorder
of
violence,
fear
and
Diaspora
itself,
and
how
subjective
traumas
manifest
into
collective,
and
in
this
case
transnational,
movements.
My
ethnography
of
disordered
and
interrupted
lives
works
to
inform
studies
of
such
critical
contemporary
realities
as
well
as
to
ethnographically
introduce
the
Iranian
Diasporas’
public
secret
of
violence
for
wider
anthropological
enquiry,
and
to
contribute
towards
its
critical
analysis.Russell's metaphysical accounts of logic
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11744
Bertrand Russell’s works on logic, despite his reputation as a founder of mathematical logic, appear unnecessarily metaphysical and even naïve to contemporary logicians and philosophers. He offered several accounts of logic whilst pursuing the goal of logicism, the view of mathematics as reducible to logic. In their attempts to explain why those accounts look naïve nowadays, many commentators have sought one or another simple philosophical doctrine which can characterise his conception of logic. Instead of thus assuming a coherent theme underlying his works on logic, I propose to understand them as a shift from a conception of logic towards another. By looking into books, papers and manuscripts which he wrote during the period from 1898 to 1918, I argue that he inherited an antique, metaphysical conception of logic from his idealist predecessors and, through his attempts to replace some idealistic features of the conception with his realist alternatives, he became more sympathetic to—though never fully convinced of—a linguistic conception of logic, which was proposed by some of his contemporary logicians and has been widely accepted since then.
2017-12-08T00:00:00ZIto, RyoBertrand Russell’s works on logic, despite his reputation as a founder of mathematical logic, appear unnecessarily metaphysical and even naïve to contemporary logicians and philosophers. He offered several accounts of logic whilst pursuing the goal of logicism, the view of mathematics as reducible to logic. In their attempts to explain why those accounts look naïve nowadays, many commentators have sought one or another simple philosophical doctrine which can characterise his conception of logic. Instead of thus assuming a coherent theme underlying his works on logic, I propose to understand them as a shift from a conception of logic towards another. By looking into books, papers and manuscripts which he wrote during the period from 1898 to 1918, I argue that he inherited an antique, metaphysical conception of logic from his idealist predecessors and, through his attempts to replace some idealistic features of the conception with his realist alternatives, he became more sympathetic to—though never fully convinced of—a linguistic conception of logic, which was proposed by some of his contemporary logicians and has been widely accepted since then.Commutative justice
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11605
The purpose of this thesis is to present a conception of commutative justice. Commutative justice is defined as that part of justice in transfer (as opposed to justice in acquisition as well as distributive or rectificatory justice), which deals with transferring goods via market exchanges. Thus, this thesis examines which conditions a market exchange has to fulfil in order to be called just.
Whereas traditionally speaking conditions like non-coercion or non-deception have received most attention – i.e. conditions focusing on the act of exchanging itself – the thesis’ focus is a different one. It argues that we necessarily also have to take into account the consequences of a certain market exchange in order to judge whether it is just. Therefore, the thesis proceeds to analyze how problematic market outcomes like externalities, the formation of monopolies, violations of the Lockean proviso, inequality, and commodification affect the justice of the market exchanges which gave rise to them.
The thesis finds that we need to broaden our conception of commutative justice – but only a little. Whereas the issues of externalities, violations of the Lockean proviso, and inequalities do not affect whether a certain market exchange is just, monopolization and commodification do. In order to be commutatively just, a market exchange must not only fulfil the traditional conditions of non-coercion, non-deception, etc., but it also must not bring about certain forms of monopoly nor further certain kinds of commodification. This conclusion leaves open the idea that, say, inequality or externalities could be relevant to distributive justice if not commutative justice.
2016-12-01T00:00:00ZMildenberger, Carl DavidThe purpose of this thesis is to present a conception of commutative justice. Commutative justice is defined as that part of justice in transfer (as opposed to justice in acquisition as well as distributive or rectificatory justice), which deals with transferring goods via market exchanges. Thus, this thesis examines which conditions a market exchange has to fulfil in order to be called just.
Whereas traditionally speaking conditions like non-coercion or non-deception have received most attention – i.e. conditions focusing on the act of exchanging itself – the thesis’ focus is a different one. It argues that we necessarily also have to take into account the consequences of a certain market exchange in order to judge whether it is just. Therefore, the thesis proceeds to analyze how problematic market outcomes like externalities, the formation of monopolies, violations of the Lockean proviso, inequality, and commodification affect the justice of the market exchanges which gave rise to them.
The thesis finds that we need to broaden our conception of commutative justice – but only a little. Whereas the issues of externalities, violations of the Lockean proviso, and inequalities do not affect whether a certain market exchange is just, monopolization and commodification do. In order to be commutatively just, a market exchange must not only fulfil the traditional conditions of non-coercion, non-deception, etc., but it also must not bring about certain forms of monopoly nor further certain kinds of commodification. This conclusion leaves open the idea that, say, inequality or externalities could be relevant to distributive justice if not commutative justice.Voice, History and Vertigo : Doing justice to the dead through imaginative conversation
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11599
2014-09-01T00:00:00ZRapport, Nigel JulianKnowledge-how : linguistic and philosophical considerations
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11566
This thesis concerns the nature of knowledge-how, in particular the question of how we ought to combine philosophical and linguistic considerations to understand what it is to know how to do something. Part 1 concerns the significance of linguistic evidence. In chapter 1, I consider the range of linguistic arguments that have been used in favour of the Intellectualist claim that knowledge-how is a species of propositional knowledge. Chapter 2 considers the idea that sentences of the form ‘S knows how to V’ involve a free relative complement, and the relation between this claim and the Objectualist claim that knowledge-how is a kind of objectual knowledge. Chapter 3 argues that Intellectualism about knowledge-how faces a problem of generality in accounting for the kinds of propositions that are known in knowledge-how, which is analogous to the generality problem for Reliabilism. Part 2 turns to philosophical considerations, offering an extended inquiry into the point of thinking and talking about knowledge-how. Chapter 4 considers why we should want to work with a concept of knowledge, isolating two hypotheses: i) that thinking and talking about knowledge-how helps us to pool skills, and ii) that thinking and talking about knowledge-how helps us to engage in responsible practices of co-operation. Chapter 5 criticises the former hypothesis by arguing against the suggestion that there is a knowledge-how norm on teaching. Chapter 6 offers an indirect argument for the latter hypothesis, arguing for a knowledge-how norm on intending. Part 3, which consists of chapter 7, offers a positive account of knowledge-how which takes into account both philosophical and linguistic considerations. According to what I will call the Interrogative Capacity view, knowing how to do something consists in a certain kind of ability to answer the question of how to do it.
2017-12-08T00:00:00ZHabgood-Coote, JoshuaThis thesis concerns the nature of knowledge-how, in particular the question of how we ought to combine philosophical and linguistic considerations to understand what it is to know how to do something. Part 1 concerns the significance of linguistic evidence. In chapter 1, I consider the range of linguistic arguments that have been used in favour of the Intellectualist claim that knowledge-how is a species of propositional knowledge. Chapter 2 considers the idea that sentences of the form ‘S knows how to V’ involve a free relative complement, and the relation between this claim and the Objectualist claim that knowledge-how is a kind of objectual knowledge. Chapter 3 argues that Intellectualism about knowledge-how faces a problem of generality in accounting for the kinds of propositions that are known in knowledge-how, which is analogous to the generality problem for Reliabilism. Part 2 turns to philosophical considerations, offering an extended inquiry into the point of thinking and talking about knowledge-how. Chapter 4 considers why we should want to work with a concept of knowledge, isolating two hypotheses: i) that thinking and talking about knowledge-how helps us to pool skills, and ii) that thinking and talking about knowledge-how helps us to engage in responsible practices of co-operation. Chapter 5 criticises the former hypothesis by arguing against the suggestion that there is a knowledge-how norm on teaching. Chapter 6 offers an indirect argument for the latter hypothesis, arguing for a knowledge-how norm on intending. Part 3, which consists of chapter 7, offers a positive account of knowledge-how which takes into account both philosophical and linguistic considerations. According to what I will call the Interrogative Capacity view, knowing how to do something consists in a certain kind of ability to answer the question of how to do it.In search of images : Uruguayan cinema, 1960-2010
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11417
This thesis investigates fifty years of Uruguayan cinema in order to revisit the
relationship between cinema and nation, at a time in which transnational flows are
putting into question the concept of nation and, more precisely, that of national
cinema. This investigation also contributes to current discussions on the changing
nature of cinema, generated by the fast adoption of digital technology and the
imminent disappearance of film stock. Through the case of Uruguay, I explore the
construction of national identity not only through the text, but also through the –
filmic, digital and/or analogue – materiality of film. This approach incorporates aspects
which are not usually studied together to contribute to the analysis of Uruguayan
cinema in a manner potentially applicable to other nations with similar characteristics;
that is to say, nations without an established film heritage and filmmaking tradition.
Informed by writings on film, cultural, historical and archival studies, this thesis
approaches films as ‘hybrid’ rather than ‘pure’ or ‘authentic’ texts and media. I argue
that both the text and materiality of films absorb, influence and reflect the dynamic
processes involved in the construction of national identity. Rather than seeking for
authenticity and homogeneity, this thesis stresses the necessity to focus on
discontinuity and diversity. Therefore, it analyses lost and under-researched short,
documentary, animation and institutional films and videos, alongside feature fiction
films.
First, I present a theoretical discussion on the relationship between nation and
cinema, the concept of hybridity in film studies, and the importance of technology for
production, preservation and access. This is followed by four chronological chapters in
which the hybrid text and materiality of films are analysed in contexts of social and
political upheaval; dictatorship, resistance and exile; transition; and neo-liberalism and
globalisation. This thesis demonstrates that the ties between cinema and nation have
not necessarily loosened in the global and digital age, and still deserve critical
attention.
2014-01-01T00:00:00ZTadeo Fuica, BeatrizThis thesis investigates fifty years of Uruguayan cinema in order to revisit the
relationship between cinema and nation, at a time in which transnational flows are
putting into question the concept of nation and, more precisely, that of national
cinema. This investigation also contributes to current discussions on the changing
nature of cinema, generated by the fast adoption of digital technology and the
imminent disappearance of film stock. Through the case of Uruguay, I explore the
construction of national identity not only through the text, but also through the –
filmic, digital and/or analogue – materiality of film. This approach incorporates aspects
which are not usually studied together to contribute to the analysis of Uruguayan
cinema in a manner potentially applicable to other nations with similar characteristics;
that is to say, nations without an established film heritage and filmmaking tradition.
Informed by writings on film, cultural, historical and archival studies, this thesis
approaches films as ‘hybrid’ rather than ‘pure’ or ‘authentic’ texts and media. I argue
that both the text and materiality of films absorb, influence and reflect the dynamic
processes involved in the construction of national identity. Rather than seeking for
authenticity and homogeneity, this thesis stresses the necessity to focus on
discontinuity and diversity. Therefore, it analyses lost and under-researched short,
documentary, animation and institutional films and videos, alongside feature fiction
films.
First, I present a theoretical discussion on the relationship between nation and
cinema, the concept of hybridity in film studies, and the importance of technology for
production, preservation and access. This is followed by four chronological chapters in
which the hybrid text and materiality of films are analysed in contexts of social and
political upheaval; dictatorship, resistance and exile; transition; and neo-liberalism and
globalisation. This thesis demonstrates that the ties between cinema and nation have
not necessarily loosened in the global and digital age, and still deserve critical
attention.History, kinship and comunidad : learning to live together amongst Amahuaca people on the Inuya River in the Peruvian Amazon
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11373
This thesis examines the processes through which Amahuaca people began living in
Native Communities where they have legal titles to land, and are organized through the
‘corporate’ body of elected officials mandated by Peruvian law. The thesis focuses on the
period beginning in 1953 when the Summer Institute of Linguistics established the first
mission among Amahuaca people at the headwaters of the Inuya River in Eastern Peru.
This initiated a period of continuous contact between Amahuaca people and wider
Peruvian society. By taking a historical approach to understanding contemporary life
among Amahuaca people, the thesis engages with the problem of how they have come to
understand their past and how this is expressed today. The primary narrative is that
through their engagement with the Summer Institute of Linguistics, Amahuaca people
have learned to live together. This notion of living together stands in sharp contrast to the
ways they often appear in the literature, which focuses on the lack of large villages and
any overarching social and political organization. Through an analysis of the
transformations Amahuaca people have undergone as a result of their decision to
participate in the SIL’s project, the thesis challenges this notion of lack and sets out an
alternate way of perceiving of Amahuaca sociality. The analysis begins with a series of
collective ceremonies in the 1960s, which were the only moments when Amahuaca
people were said to coordinate activities at a level beyond the extended family. Taking
this as an entry point, the thesis tracks the movement of a specific group of families
through time and space to explore the types of relationships they were engaged in during
this period of massive change. The overall aim is to locate continuities in the ways
Amahuaca people relate with one another and the wider world to better understand how
processes of transformation might be understood as the outcome of particular
relationships people made over the past half-century. Today, the same families who lived
in the first mission are spread out from the headwaters of the Inuya and Mapuya Rivers to
the provincial capital of Atalaya. The overarching narrative of becoming civilized is
given geographic significance based on this movement from the headwaters to the larger
rivers and towns; however, most of these families reside in one of two Amahuaca Native
Communities (Comunidades Nativas) located near the midpoint between these two poles.
One of the major themes of the thesis is to understand how people negotiate living
together in a Native Community as a formulation of becoming other.
Transformation, Native Community, Peruvian Amazonia, Government, History,
Amahuaca, Sociality, Missionization
2014-01-01T00:00:00ZHewlett, Christopher ErikThis thesis examines the processes through which Amahuaca people began living in
Native Communities where they have legal titles to land, and are organized through the
‘corporate’ body of elected officials mandated by Peruvian law. The thesis focuses on the
period beginning in 1953 when the Summer Institute of Linguistics established the first
mission among Amahuaca people at the headwaters of the Inuya River in Eastern Peru.
This initiated a period of continuous contact between Amahuaca people and wider
Peruvian society. By taking a historical approach to understanding contemporary life
among Amahuaca people, the thesis engages with the problem of how they have come to
understand their past and how this is expressed today. The primary narrative is that
through their engagement with the Summer Institute of Linguistics, Amahuaca people
have learned to live together. This notion of living together stands in sharp contrast to the
ways they often appear in the literature, which focuses on the lack of large villages and
any overarching social and political organization. Through an analysis of the
transformations Amahuaca people have undergone as a result of their decision to
participate in the SIL’s project, the thesis challenges this notion of lack and sets out an
alternate way of perceiving of Amahuaca sociality. The analysis begins with a series of
collective ceremonies in the 1960s, which were the only moments when Amahuaca
people were said to coordinate activities at a level beyond the extended family. Taking
this as an entry point, the thesis tracks the movement of a specific group of families
through time and space to explore the types of relationships they were engaged in during
this period of massive change. The overall aim is to locate continuities in the ways
Amahuaca people relate with one another and the wider world to better understand how
processes of transformation might be understood as the outcome of particular
relationships people made over the past half-century. Today, the same families who lived
in the first mission are spread out from the headwaters of the Inuya and Mapuya Rivers to
the provincial capital of Atalaya. The overarching narrative of becoming civilized is
given geographic significance based on this movement from the headwaters to the larger
rivers and towns; however, most of these families reside in one of two Amahuaca Native
Communities (Comunidades Nativas) located near the midpoint between these two poles.
One of the major themes of the thesis is to understand how people negotiate living
together in a Native Community as a formulation of becoming other.
Transformation, Native Community, Peruvian Amazonia, Government, History,
Amahuaca, Sociality, MissionizationBlok laif : an ethnography of a Mosbi settlement
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11367
This thesis is about urban sociality in the context of an urban settlement in
Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea. I explore issues of urban life through
everyday stories of settlers who reside in a settlement (also known as a blok) at
Nine Mile, Port Moresby. I present settlers’ ideas of work and money through
their income generating efforts as well as their perception about giving. This
thesis explores settlement notions of the forms that relatedness takes through
everyday interactions of eating together, sharing and thinking of one another.
These actions in turn inform ideas of personhood and gender. I use blok ideas
to rethink assumptions about the meaning of land and place in an urban
setting. Furthermore I seek to use blok understandings of kinship,
personhood and gender to portray an urban sociality that is entwined in
relations.
2015-01-01T00:00:00ZHukula, Fiona Sonia KarejoThis thesis is about urban sociality in the context of an urban settlement in
Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea. I explore issues of urban life through
everyday stories of settlers who reside in a settlement (also known as a blok) at
Nine Mile, Port Moresby. I present settlers’ ideas of work and money through
their income generating efforts as well as their perception about giving. This
thesis explores settlement notions of the forms that relatedness takes through
everyday interactions of eating together, sharing and thinking of one another.
These actions in turn inform ideas of personhood and gender. I use blok ideas
to rethink assumptions about the meaning of land and place in an urban
setting. Furthermore I seek to use blok understandings of kinship,
personhood and gender to portray an urban sociality that is entwined in
relations.Guyana and its El Dorados : forest resources and the REDD+ initiative from the perspective of Wakokoa and Isseruru
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11364
This thesis explores the likely outcome of implementing REDD+ initiative in two
Amerindian villages in Guyana.
The dissertation is based on eighteen months fieldwork in Wakokoa and Isseruru villages.
The aim is to understand how they conceptualise their landscape amidst global pressure to
reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation.
An ethnographic perspective is provided on the villagers’ perception of their land use
practices and inter/intra group relationships. Specifically, I highlight the socio-economic
transformations of the villages; showing how mining has come to replace traditional
farming as their main source of income and the extent to which this contributes to their
‘development’. In Isseruru, I discuss how women’s access to the mines via kinship networks
has allowed them to assert their autonomy in both social and economic spheres and this
serves as an avenue for a transformation of traditional gender ideals. I suggest that forging
ties with spiritual forces in the landscape continues to play a significant role in settling land
disputes and regularising land use practices. I argue that rapid changes in Isseruru are
somewhat in contrast to the situation in Wakokoa which does not have mines on its titled
land but is involved in selective logging.
Local perceptions and practice are in a number of ways at odds with international plans to
transform forest use towards carbon neutrality and, in their current form, do not fit well
under the Guyana/Norway payment for ecosystems service agreement. However, I argue
that when this agreement became part of the nation-state development agenda it failed to
consider the actual importance of the landscape to forest-dependent communities.
By documenting actual forest-use in the villages and its relation to local cultural ideas, the
dissertation contributes to anthropological understandings of Guyanese Amerindians and
their land use practices vis-à-vis the expectation of REDD+ in Guyana.
2016-01-01T00:00:00ZObermuller, LauraJanThis thesis explores the likely outcome of implementing REDD+ initiative in two
Amerindian villages in Guyana.
The dissertation is based on eighteen months fieldwork in Wakokoa and Isseruru villages.
The aim is to understand how they conceptualise their landscape amidst global pressure to
reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation.
An ethnographic perspective is provided on the villagers’ perception of their land use
practices and inter/intra group relationships. Specifically, I highlight the socio-economic
transformations of the villages; showing how mining has come to replace traditional
farming as their main source of income and the extent to which this contributes to their
‘development’. In Isseruru, I discuss how women’s access to the mines via kinship networks
has allowed them to assert their autonomy in both social and economic spheres and this
serves as an avenue for a transformation of traditional gender ideals. I suggest that forging
ties with spiritual forces in the landscape continues to play a significant role in settling land
disputes and regularising land use practices. I argue that rapid changes in Isseruru are
somewhat in contrast to the situation in Wakokoa which does not have mines on its titled
land but is involved in selective logging.
Local perceptions and practice are in a number of ways at odds with international plans to
transform forest use towards carbon neutrality and, in their current form, do not fit well
under the Guyana/Norway payment for ecosystems service agreement. However, I argue
that when this agreement became part of the nation-state development agenda it failed to
consider the actual importance of the landscape to forest-dependent communities.
By documenting actual forest-use in the villages and its relation to local cultural ideas, the
dissertation contributes to anthropological understandings of Guyanese Amerindians and
their land use practices vis-à-vis the expectation of REDD+ in Guyana.Being : a dialetheic interpretation of the late Heidegger
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11353
In my thesis, I present a novel interpretation of the so-called second
Heidegger. In the first chapter I discuss the paradox of being, according to
which talking and thinking about being leads to a contradiction. I also show
that the late Heidegger endorses dialetheism, accepting the contradiction of
being as a true one. In the second chapter, I present a comparison between
Heidegger and Meinong. First of all, I discuss some similarities between
Heidegger’s account of intentionality and Meinong’s account of intentionality,
and Heidegger’s ontology and Meinong’s ontology. Secondly, I interpret
Heidegger’s being as a special case in Meinong’s ‘Theory of Objects’. In the
third chapter, after showing that, according to Heidegger, being is identical to
nothingness, I present a paraconsistent mereological system that makes
formal sense of Heidegger’s metaphysics. In this mereological system, the
totality is taken to be the mereological sum of everything that is and the
complement of the totality is interpreted as nothingness, namely what we
obtain removing all things from the totality. Since, according to Heidegger,
nothingness is being, the complement of totality is taken to be being as well.
Finally, in the fourth and last chapter, I discuss Heidegger’s theory of
grounding. I show that the early Heidegger endorses a particularly strong form
of foundationalism. Moreover, I present two paraconsistent versions of
foundationalism (called para-foundationalism 1.0 and para-foundationalism
2.0) that can accommodate the inconsistent views endorsed by the second
Heidegger.
2017-01-01T00:00:00ZCasati, FilippoIn my thesis, I present a novel interpretation of the so-called second
Heidegger. In the first chapter I discuss the paradox of being, according to
which talking and thinking about being leads to a contradiction. I also show
that the late Heidegger endorses dialetheism, accepting the contradiction of
being as a true one. In the second chapter, I present a comparison between
Heidegger and Meinong. First of all, I discuss some similarities between
Heidegger’s account of intentionality and Meinong’s account of intentionality,
and Heidegger’s ontology and Meinong’s ontology. Secondly, I interpret
Heidegger’s being as a special case in Meinong’s ‘Theory of Objects’. In the
third chapter, after showing that, according to Heidegger, being is identical to
nothingness, I present a paraconsistent mereological system that makes
formal sense of Heidegger’s metaphysics. In this mereological system, the
totality is taken to be the mereological sum of everything that is and the
complement of the totality is interpreted as nothingness, namely what we
obtain removing all things from the totality. Since, according to Heidegger,
nothingness is being, the complement of totality is taken to be being as well.
Finally, in the fourth and last chapter, I discuss Heidegger’s theory of
grounding. I show that the early Heidegger endorses a particularly strong form
of foundationalism. Moreover, I present two paraconsistent versions of
foundationalism (called para-foundationalism 1.0 and para-foundationalism
2.0) that can accommodate the inconsistent views endorsed by the second
Heidegger."Others before self" : Tibetan pedagogy and childrearing in a Tibetan children's village in the Indian Himalaya
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11352
This anthropological study examines ontogeny of ideas about self and others and approaches
human capacity for intersubjectivity as emergent in the course of life, by looking at how it is shaped
through mediation of the world by others and by processes at the group level. The empirical focus
is the ecology of concepts used by Tibetan children and adults in their daily life in a Tibetan
residential school in India, where people’s conduct and children’s upbringing and schooling are
informed by the Tibetan and Buddhist models and theories of self, mind, learning, causation and
history. The aim of this study is to identify - through a close ethnographic description and analysis
- the core aspects of learning as conceptualized and lived experience within contemporary Tibetan
Buddhist education system, derived from one of the oldest wisdom traditions in the world and
crystallizing within a modern nation-state Asia. Tibetan Children’s Villages (TCV) was one of the
first Tibetan school networks aiming to provide formal lay education for children that sprang up
in exile following the fourteenth Dalai Lama’s flight to India in 1959.
Chapter 1 outlines the theoretical and methodological aspects of the study and sets forth
the research agenda that shaped the study design and kinds of engagement that were possible with
the study participants and the field. A short description of the geographical and climate conditions
in the field site is complemented by a snapshot of the social topography of the direct
neighbourhood of the school, where fieldwork was conducted over 11 months (February –
December) in 2013 and 3 months (June – September) in 2014. A brief review of debates and
sources from different bodies of anthropological literature bearing on the ethnographic material
has been added to clarify the orientation of the analysis and the research findings.
Chapter 2 explores the phenomenon of Tibetan lay education in exile and the concept of
education that developed as a result of a shift from monastic centres of learning towards
contemporary Tibetan lay schools in India. Through an ethnographic exploration of the theoretical
model of learning and pedagogical devices such as Tibetan debate, the chapter shows the mind as
the locus of schooling practices. It also demonstrates how, through daily ritual practices and debate,
this becomes a lived experience in a contemporary Tibetan school in the Indian Himalaya. The
chapter discusses ethnographic categories of mind, mind stream and mental karmic imprints, based
on interviews focusing on the Tibetan policy document detailing education strategy and goals.
These are shown to be informed by Tibetan Buddhist theory of learning and an understanding of
the inner subjective experience as the source of knowing. To contextualize the understanding of
mind in a contemporary Tibetan school in India, the chapter provides an ethnographic description
and analysis of the Tibetan dialectical debate (riglam) classes in TCV. Riglam is an ancient debating
tradition developed in India and preserved and further developed in Tibet and Tibetan monasteries
and now also in schools in exile.
Chapter 3 is an exploration of the ethnographic category of ‘history’ in the school. ‘History’
is shown to emerge out of the continuum of time – the un-tensed present. Drawing on the notion
of the mind imprints, patterning and habituation, and the imagery of the seed, coming ‘alive’ and
bearing fruit in the right circumstances, the chapter describes how the making of ‘history’ is
inscribed in the bodies of TCV inhabitants through daily bodily practices - bodily discipline, or
conduct (chöpa).
Chapter 4 focuses on TCV as a place and on the embeddedness of TCV within other
places. Through the discussion of the use of space and space-enabled operations, such as e.g.
spatio-temporally co-located sport games, the chapter outlines conceptualisation of a TCV-place
as expressed through the idioms of ‘floating’ and ‘going out of bounds’. This also leads to a
discussion of transgressions involving the use of electronic devices, tattoos and hairstyles, leaving
school, and the discourse and practices around the concept of ‘pure Tibetans’. The ethnographic
material highlighting an ontogenesis of space opens the way to discuss the embodied practice of
interdependence among TCV inhabitants, the practice that challenges the usefulness of analytical
categories of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ for an anthropological analysis of the experience of growing up
and living in TCV.
Chapters 5 and 6 look closely at the idea of others being essential in the ontogenesis of
beings. Chapter 5 is based on examples of teasing and games that involve directing attention of
infants and children to other people, and bringing other people’s ‘gaze’ (seeing you) to bear on the
decisions made for self. In this way it draws an outline of a particular kind of pedagogic effort
directed at infants and toddlers, and traces this pedagogy in other, later stages of the schooling
experience in TCV.
Chapter 6 focuses specifically on grammatical constructions that seemed to be salient in
the interactions between TCV inhabitants (adults and children). These included: 1) addresseebound
verb use, and, specifically, I-for-you inversion in questions; 2) the use of honorific forms
for others (multiplicity and gradation of terms) and its proscription for self-referential statements;
3) evidentiality markers denoting direct or indirect experience and the salience of personal
connection to the subject/object/action. Such ethnographic exploration of the perspective
inversion in everyday language use and everyday interactions leads to the review of some tacit
assumptions about the ‘subject’ in subjectivity and intersubjectivity used as heuristic devices. The
chapter also explores the utility, feasibility and implications of including the dialogical dimension
of being in the anthropological inquiry.
The conclusion of the thesis focuses on the question of intersubjectivity not as given, but
as ‘teased out’ and formed through practices involving both the constitution of self and the
simultaneous and inevitable constitution of others. It also posits the necessity of ethnographic
exploration of different practices that might be involved in bringing forth intersubjectivity, and
questions about the resulting ‘intersubjectivities’. Discussion of different aspects of the experience
of living and growing up in a TCV campus developed in the previous chapters, i.e. the theory of
learning and understanding of “mind”, inner subjective experience and karmic imprints; discipline
and temporal frameworks predicated on the ideas of karmic causation; dependent arising; training
of awareness, attention and ethical judgement and the ideas of self, leads to a particular reading of
the TCV slogan “Others Before Self”. The analysis, which starts with an exploration of the ideology
of education expressed through a policy document building upon particular Buddhist premises, is
thus brought full circle, with lived Buddhist experience animating the ubiquitous TCV formula for
a human being.
2017-01-01T00:00:00ZByłów-Antkowiak, KatarzynaThis anthropological study examines ontogeny of ideas about self and others and approaches
human capacity for intersubjectivity as emergent in the course of life, by looking at how it is shaped
through mediation of the world by others and by processes at the group level. The empirical focus
is the ecology of concepts used by Tibetan children and adults in their daily life in a Tibetan
residential school in India, where people’s conduct and children’s upbringing and schooling are
informed by the Tibetan and Buddhist models and theories of self, mind, learning, causation and
history. The aim of this study is to identify - through a close ethnographic description and analysis
- the core aspects of learning as conceptualized and lived experience within contemporary Tibetan
Buddhist education system, derived from one of the oldest wisdom traditions in the world and
crystallizing within a modern nation-state Asia. Tibetan Children’s Villages (TCV) was one of the
first Tibetan school networks aiming to provide formal lay education for children that sprang up
in exile following the fourteenth Dalai Lama’s flight to India in 1959.
Chapter 1 outlines the theoretical and methodological aspects of the study and sets forth
the research agenda that shaped the study design and kinds of engagement that were possible with
the study participants and the field. A short description of the geographical and climate conditions
in the field site is complemented by a snapshot of the social topography of the direct
neighbourhood of the school, where fieldwork was conducted over 11 months (February –
December) in 2013 and 3 months (June – September) in 2014. A brief review of debates and
sources from different bodies of anthropological literature bearing on the ethnographic material
has been added to clarify the orientation of the analysis and the research findings.
Chapter 2 explores the phenomenon of Tibetan lay education in exile and the concept of
education that developed as a result of a shift from monastic centres of learning towards
contemporary Tibetan lay schools in India. Through an ethnographic exploration of the theoretical
model of learning and pedagogical devices such as Tibetan debate, the chapter shows the mind as
the locus of schooling practices. It also demonstrates how, through daily ritual practices and debate,
this becomes a lived experience in a contemporary Tibetan school in the Indian Himalaya. The
chapter discusses ethnographic categories of mind, mind stream and mental karmic imprints, based
on interviews focusing on the Tibetan policy document detailing education strategy and goals.
These are shown to be informed by Tibetan Buddhist theory of learning and an understanding of
the inner subjective experience as the source of knowing. To contextualize the understanding of
mind in a contemporary Tibetan school in India, the chapter provides an ethnographic description
and analysis of the Tibetan dialectical debate (riglam) classes in TCV. Riglam is an ancient debating
tradition developed in India and preserved and further developed in Tibet and Tibetan monasteries
and now also in schools in exile.
Chapter 3 is an exploration of the ethnographic category of ‘history’ in the school. ‘History’
is shown to emerge out of the continuum of time – the un-tensed present. Drawing on the notion
of the mind imprints, patterning and habituation, and the imagery of the seed, coming ‘alive’ and
bearing fruit in the right circumstances, the chapter describes how the making of ‘history’ is
inscribed in the bodies of TCV inhabitants through daily bodily practices - bodily discipline, or
conduct (chöpa).
Chapter 4 focuses on TCV as a place and on the embeddedness of TCV within other
places. Through the discussion of the use of space and space-enabled operations, such as e.g.
spatio-temporally co-located sport games, the chapter outlines conceptualisation of a TCV-place
as expressed through the idioms of ‘floating’ and ‘going out of bounds’. This also leads to a
discussion of transgressions involving the use of electronic devices, tattoos and hairstyles, leaving
school, and the discourse and practices around the concept of ‘pure Tibetans’. The ethnographic
material highlighting an ontogenesis of space opens the way to discuss the embodied practice of
interdependence among TCV inhabitants, the practice that challenges the usefulness of analytical
categories of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ for an anthropological analysis of the experience of growing up
and living in TCV.
Chapters 5 and 6 look closely at the idea of others being essential in the ontogenesis of
beings. Chapter 5 is based on examples of teasing and games that involve directing attention of
infants and children to other people, and bringing other people’s ‘gaze’ (seeing you) to bear on the
decisions made for self. In this way it draws an outline of a particular kind of pedagogic effort
directed at infants and toddlers, and traces this pedagogy in other, later stages of the schooling
experience in TCV.
Chapter 6 focuses specifically on grammatical constructions that seemed to be salient in
the interactions between TCV inhabitants (adults and children). These included: 1) addresseebound
verb use, and, specifically, I-for-you inversion in questions; 2) the use of honorific forms
for others (multiplicity and gradation of terms) and its proscription for self-referential statements;
3) evidentiality markers denoting direct or indirect experience and the salience of personal
connection to the subject/object/action. Such ethnographic exploration of the perspective
inversion in everyday language use and everyday interactions leads to the review of some tacit
assumptions about the ‘subject’ in subjectivity and intersubjectivity used as heuristic devices. The
chapter also explores the utility, feasibility and implications of including the dialogical dimension
of being in the anthropological inquiry.
The conclusion of the thesis focuses on the question of intersubjectivity not as given, but
as ‘teased out’ and formed through practices involving both the constitution of self and the
simultaneous and inevitable constitution of others. It also posits the necessity of ethnographic
exploration of different practices that might be involved in bringing forth intersubjectivity, and
questions about the resulting ‘intersubjectivities’. Discussion of different aspects of the experience
of living and growing up in a TCV campus developed in the previous chapters, i.e. the theory of
learning and understanding of “mind”, inner subjective experience and karmic imprints; discipline
and temporal frameworks predicated on the ideas of karmic causation; dependent arising; training
of awareness, attention and ethical judgement and the ideas of self, leads to a particular reading of
the TCV slogan “Others Before Self”. The analysis, which starts with an exploration of the ideology
of education expressed through a policy document building upon particular Buddhist premises, is
thus brought full circle, with lived Buddhist experience animating the ubiquitous TCV formula for
a human being.Memory, belief and time
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11169
I argue that what evidence an agent has does not supervene on how she currently is. Agents do not always have to infer what the past was like from how things currently seem; sometimes the facts about the past are retained pieces of evidence that can be the start of reasoning. The main argument is a variant on Frank Arntzenius’s Shangri La example, an example that is often used to motivate the thought that evidence does supervene on current features.
2016-01-08T00:00:00ZWeatherson, Brian JamesI argue that what evidence an agent has does not supervene on how she currently is. Agents do not always have to infer what the past was like from how things currently seem; sometimes the facts about the past are retained pieces of evidence that can be the start of reasoning. The main argument is a variant on Frank Arntzenius’s Shangri La example, an example that is often used to motivate the thought that evidence does supervene on current features.Biosocial selfhood : overcoming the ‘body-social problem’ within the individuation of the human self
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11144
In a recent paper, Kyselo (2014) argues that an enactive approach to selfhood can overcome ‘the body-social problem’: “the question for philosophy of cognitive science about how bodily and social aspects figure in the individuation of the human individual self” (Kyselo, 2014, p. 4; see also Kyselo and Di Paolo (2013)). Kyselo’s claim is that we should conceive of the human self as a socially enacted phenomenon that is bodily mediated. Whilst there is much to be praised about this claim, I will demonstrate in this paper that such a conception of self ultimately leads to a strained interpretation of how bodily and social processes are related. To this end, I will begin the paper by elucidating the body-social problem as it appears in modern cognitive science and then expounding Kyselo’s solution, which relies on a novel interpretation of Jonas’s (1966/2001) concept of needful freedom. In response to this solution, I will highlight two problems which Kyselo’s account cannot overcome in its current state. I will argue that a more satisfactory solution to the body-social problem involves a re-conception of the human body as irrevocably socially constituted and the human social world as irrevocably bodily constituted. On this view, even the most minimal sense of selfhood cannot privilege either bodily or social processes; instead, the two are ontologically entwined such that humans are biosocial selves.
2018-07-01T00:00:00ZHiggins, JoeIn a recent paper, Kyselo (2014) argues that an enactive approach to selfhood can overcome ‘the body-social problem’: “the question for philosophy of cognitive science about how bodily and social aspects figure in the individuation of the human individual self” (Kyselo, 2014, p. 4; see also Kyselo and Di Paolo (2013)). Kyselo’s claim is that we should conceive of the human self as a socially enacted phenomenon that is bodily mediated. Whilst there is much to be praised about this claim, I will demonstrate in this paper that such a conception of self ultimately leads to a strained interpretation of how bodily and social processes are related. To this end, I will begin the paper by elucidating the body-social problem as it appears in modern cognitive science and then expounding Kyselo’s solution, which relies on a novel interpretation of Jonas’s (1966/2001) concept of needful freedom. In response to this solution, I will highlight two problems which Kyselo’s account cannot overcome in its current state. I will argue that a more satisfactory solution to the body-social problem involves a re-conception of the human body as irrevocably socially constituted and the human social world as irrevocably bodily constituted. On this view, even the most minimal sense of selfhood cannot privilege either bodily or social processes; instead, the two are ontologically entwined such that humans are biosocial selves.The play, language and lore of Brazilian children in the Recôncavo of Bahia
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11126
The study records and examines the play, language of Brazilian children in the Recôncavo area of the state of Bahia in Northeast Brazil, using an ethnographic-linguistic approach based on fieldwork, there in 1973-1974. The Recôncavo is a fairly narrow strip of land surrounding the Bay of All the Saints, with its social and economic focus at Salvador, the capital of Bahia state. Play, language and lore are studied in the context of the history and social background of the Recôncavo, one of the earliest Indian-inhabited areas to be settled and colonised by the Portuguese, and one of the most densely African-populated once the Portuguese began to import negro labour to Brazil from Africa, a practice which spanned some three hundred years. Other factors examined are the continuing influences of European immigration at social levels and more recent cultural links with the United States.
Children's spontaneous play and imitative behaviour are classified and discussed as far as this is possible but the writer concentrates largely on more organised games detailing and commenting on the procedures and language involved, and, where relevant, indicating parallels and similarities in European and African games, as well as indigenous customs as far as these have been recorded. To facilitate discussion and comparison these into game preliminaries, games of speed and skill, duelling games and tests of strength, games of reflex control, forfeits and guessing, pretending, make-believe and acting games, progressing through infant rhymes and recreations to sung circle games and dramatic dialogues and sketches. Language as popularly employed by children outside their games is then examined and children's riddles and their use of poetic, language are discussed in two subsequent chapters,
Popular juvenile lore and the language and practices associated with it are then studied: the writer first details in chronological order a number of recurring popular festivals in which children are particularly involved and then examines occasional customs and beliefs.
The terminology employed in games is listed alphabetically in an appendix with explanations in English. There is also an appendix of game, names with chapter
references.
1978-01-01T00:00:00ZWilliams, Rosalind MaryThe study records and examines the play, language of Brazilian children in the Recôncavo area of the state of Bahia in Northeast Brazil, using an ethnographic-linguistic approach based on fieldwork, there in 1973-1974. The Recôncavo is a fairly narrow strip of land surrounding the Bay of All the Saints, with its social and economic focus at Salvador, the capital of Bahia state. Play, language and lore are studied in the context of the history and social background of the Recôncavo, one of the earliest Indian-inhabited areas to be settled and colonised by the Portuguese, and one of the most densely African-populated once the Portuguese began to import negro labour to Brazil from Africa, a practice which spanned some three hundred years. Other factors examined are the continuing influences of European immigration at social levels and more recent cultural links with the United States.
Children's spontaneous play and imitative behaviour are classified and discussed as far as this is possible but the writer concentrates largely on more organised games detailing and commenting on the procedures and language involved, and, where relevant, indicating parallels and similarities in European and African games, as well as indigenous customs as far as these have been recorded. To facilitate discussion and comparison these into game preliminaries, games of speed and skill, duelling games and tests of strength, games of reflex control, forfeits and guessing, pretending, make-believe and acting games, progressing through infant rhymes and recreations to sung circle games and dramatic dialogues and sketches. Language as popularly employed by children outside their games is then examined and children's riddles and their use of poetic, language are discussed in two subsequent chapters,
Popular juvenile lore and the language and practices associated with it are then studied: the writer first details in chronological order a number of recurring popular festivals in which children are particularly involved and then examines occasional customs and beliefs.
The terminology employed in games is listed alphabetically in an appendix with explanations in English. There is also an appendix of game, names with chapter
references.Emerging peoples : Marubo myth-chants
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11121
This thesis explores the ontological grounds of the interrelations between music and myth among the Marubo, one of the several native peoples of the Pano linguistic family who live not far from the adventitious border between Brazil and Peru, in South Western Amazonia. The thesis lies within the disciplinary boundaries of social anthropology but, inasmuch as it focuses on myth and music, its theoretical and methodological limits overlap any discipline that may relate to these two themes. In brief, it portrays the Marubo as they express themselves and are themselves expressed in their saiti festivals and myth-chants. In their native language, saiti designates a specific festival where myths are performed in a specific musical and choreographic form, the form that establishes the ontological origins of these peoples and those of the world where they live.
2001-01-01T00:00:00ZWerlang, GuilhermeThis thesis explores the ontological grounds of the interrelations between music and myth among the Marubo, one of the several native peoples of the Pano linguistic family who live not far from the adventitious border between Brazil and Peru, in South Western Amazonia. The thesis lies within the disciplinary boundaries of social anthropology but, inasmuch as it focuses on myth and music, its theoretical and methodological limits overlap any discipline that may relate to these two themes. In brief, it portrays the Marubo as they express themselves and are themselves expressed in their saiti festivals and myth-chants. In their native language, saiti designates a specific festival where myths are performed in a specific musical and choreographic form, the form that establishes the ontological origins of these peoples and those of the world where they live.Mobilisation and identity within the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11104
This thesis examines political mobilisation into secular groups within Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. It focuses on context and identity in order to find out why and how Palestinians in the camps mobilise into these groups. The thesis uses a framework that incorporates three levels of analysis: structural; organisational; and individual. An ethnographic methodology is deployed involving interviews and participant observation in refugee camps in Lebanon. The thesis starts by looking at what sort of theoretical framework is necessary in order to understand the three key levels of analysis, including literature focusing on opportunities and constraints; human needs; resources; recruitment; social construction; and identity. The next focus is on context, looking at both the legal issues surrounding refugees - international, regional and local - as well as the historical context. The last three chapters examine the three levels of analysis individually, using them in conjunction with ethnographic research data to find out why and how Palestinians in the
camps mobilise. The conclusion shows that, contrary to what one would imagine from most of the mobilisation literature, the Palestinians in the camps are not mobilising as would be expected. Instead the ethnographic research results found that the political groups within the camps are not as politically and militarily active as would be presumed. Mobilisation into these political groups is happening for different reasons than in previous findings – focusing instead on solidarity and social issues. This change has happened for contextual and financial reasons, including the end of the Civil War and the Palestinian Revolution in Lebanon, as well as a severe lack of resources available to the political groups. The research results found that although there is still mobilisation into the political groups, there was also disillusionment among many youths at the political groups' inability to facilitate their return to Palestine from Lebanon, as well as dismay at what they saw as disunity between the Palestinian political groups.
2005-01-01T00:00:00ZSiemer, Maria AlexandraThis thesis examines political mobilisation into secular groups within Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. It focuses on context and identity in order to find out why and how Palestinians in the camps mobilise into these groups. The thesis uses a framework that incorporates three levels of analysis: structural; organisational; and individual. An ethnographic methodology is deployed involving interviews and participant observation in refugee camps in Lebanon. The thesis starts by looking at what sort of theoretical framework is necessary in order to understand the three key levels of analysis, including literature focusing on opportunities and constraints; human needs; resources; recruitment; social construction; and identity. The next focus is on context, looking at both the legal issues surrounding refugees - international, regional and local - as well as the historical context. The last three chapters examine the three levels of analysis individually, using them in conjunction with ethnographic research data to find out why and how Palestinians in the
camps mobilise. The conclusion shows that, contrary to what one would imagine from most of the mobilisation literature, the Palestinians in the camps are not mobilising as would be expected. Instead the ethnographic research results found that the political groups within the camps are not as politically and militarily active as would be presumed. Mobilisation into these political groups is happening for different reasons than in previous findings – focusing instead on solidarity and social issues. This change has happened for contextual and financial reasons, including the end of the Civil War and the Palestinian Revolution in Lebanon, as well as a severe lack of resources available to the political groups. The research results found that although there is still mobilisation into the political groups, there was also disillusionment among many youths at the political groups' inability to facilitate their return to Palestine from Lebanon, as well as dismay at what they saw as disunity between the Palestinian political groups.Italian entrepreneurs of the construction business in a time of economic recession : ideas, strategies and movements
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11088
This thesis is based on an ethnographic study of entrepreneurs of the construction business in Lombardy, Northern Italy. The aim is to gain some understanding of this business, of entrepreneurialism, and of individuals in a non-stereotypical light through a full and complex account of their daily lives. The aim is to reveal the thoughts, actions and strategies of particular local actors in their everyday contingency and contradictoriness. No attempt is made to simplify the complexity of their understandings and practices for the sake of producing a single encompassing and consistent image.
Many similarities were found between the practices of entrepreneurialism and those of the discipline of anthropology. Knowledge and information are constantly sought after but are recognised as emerging in unexpected places and times and as being socially negotiated. Apprenticeship is often used as a methodology, and learning often happens through experience. Contextual application of knowledge is seen as essential. In order to exchange information and knowledge, to collaborate with other businessmen or to simply get a job, trust is fundamental and constantly negotiated. Personal relationships and trust become particularly important in an uncertain market situation, as ways to face risk. Trust is acquired slowly and accorded contextually, through face-to-face interaction and cultivated relationships, but also through positive recommendations or simply a feeling of sympathy. Knowledge, apprenticeship, trust and risk are key themes of the thesis.
The blurred borders between the distinct individual personalities of my informants and their collective identities and commonalities are also discussed. The personality of an entrepreneur is seen as ideally complex, in which many (possibly contradictory) characteristics can be expected to be present, but also ideally balanced, each manifesting itself in specific situations. The ethnography also explores the fragility of the entrepreneur, in apparent contradiction to their strong and charismatic personalities. It is seen to be despite and because of their positions of power that they also feel vulnerable: their discourse is imbued with their fears for their businesses in a difficult period of economic crisis.
Finally, through a ubiquitous desire to control markets and the future, we also encounter forms of corruption; corruption that is often condemned verbally but nevertheless is present in the business world and amplified by public and media discourses. The mechanisms by which work that is put out to tender is subject to possible manipulation are examined, and the ideas of the entrepreneurs about these practices are described—again demonstrating how thoughts and practices are often self-contradictory in their contextual relevance and application.
2017-06-22T00:00:00ZSischarenco, ElenaThis thesis is based on an ethnographic study of entrepreneurs of the construction business in Lombardy, Northern Italy. The aim is to gain some understanding of this business, of entrepreneurialism, and of individuals in a non-stereotypical light through a full and complex account of their daily lives. The aim is to reveal the thoughts, actions and strategies of particular local actors in their everyday contingency and contradictoriness. No attempt is made to simplify the complexity of their understandings and practices for the sake of producing a single encompassing and consistent image.
Many similarities were found between the practices of entrepreneurialism and those of the discipline of anthropology. Knowledge and information are constantly sought after but are recognised as emerging in unexpected places and times and as being socially negotiated. Apprenticeship is often used as a methodology, and learning often happens through experience. Contextual application of knowledge is seen as essential. In order to exchange information and knowledge, to collaborate with other businessmen or to simply get a job, trust is fundamental and constantly negotiated. Personal relationships and trust become particularly important in an uncertain market situation, as ways to face risk. Trust is acquired slowly and accorded contextually, through face-to-face interaction and cultivated relationships, but also through positive recommendations or simply a feeling of sympathy. Knowledge, apprenticeship, trust and risk are key themes of the thesis.
The blurred borders between the distinct individual personalities of my informants and their collective identities and commonalities are also discussed. The personality of an entrepreneur is seen as ideally complex, in which many (possibly contradictory) characteristics can be expected to be present, but also ideally balanced, each manifesting itself in specific situations. The ethnography also explores the fragility of the entrepreneur, in apparent contradiction to their strong and charismatic personalities. It is seen to be despite and because of their positions of power that they also feel vulnerable: their discourse is imbued with their fears for their businesses in a difficult period of economic crisis.
Finally, through a ubiquitous desire to control markets and the future, we also encounter forms of corruption; corruption that is often condemned verbally but nevertheless is present in the business world and amplified by public and media discourses. The mechanisms by which work that is put out to tender is subject to possible manipulation are examined, and the ideas of the entrepreneurs about these practices are described—again demonstrating how thoughts and practices are often self-contradictory in their contextual relevance and application.Heavenly and grotesque imageries (re)created in the carnival of Oruro, Bolivia
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11084
The dissertation focuses on the creation of imageries in the Carnival of Oruro, in Central-Western Bolivia, where images from different sources are formed and transformed through the development of the festival over time. The production of mythological narratives, religious figures, choreographic performances, costumes, and masks gives place to a complex of icons representing natural and supernatural beings, all of which are intertwined in the enactment of carnival in Oruro. Following the imposition of a strict dichotomy between good and evil, "heavenly" and "infernal" imageries are constructed to depict a prescribed and proscribed behaviour, respectively. However, the morality underpinning such constructs is often contradicted by the actual behaviour of the individuals involved. The hyperactivity of the lower bodily stratum epitomises an
effective degradation of the elevated during the local celebration of the festival, rendering Bakhtin's approach appropriate for a study of the Oruro Carnival. Parallel to an analysis of the Carnival Parade, the dissertation provides a reflection on the discourses and practices inherent to the construction of a Bolivian national and cultural identity through the development of the festival. The symbolic oppositions observed in the
Oruro Carnival Parade are linked to the transfigured images, which are analysed in relation to changes in the socio-cultural composition of the participants. Focusing upon the actual behaviour of the social actors involved, as much as upon representational activities, I intend to provide an insight into the relationship between the official imagery and the chaotic enactment of popular culture during carnival.
2003-01-01T00:00:00ZSanjinés, Paul Gonzalo AraozThe dissertation focuses on the creation of imageries in the Carnival of Oruro, in Central-Western Bolivia, where images from different sources are formed and transformed through the development of the festival over time. The production of mythological narratives, religious figures, choreographic performances, costumes, and masks gives place to a complex of icons representing natural and supernatural beings, all of which are intertwined in the enactment of carnival in Oruro. Following the imposition of a strict dichotomy between good and evil, "heavenly" and "infernal" imageries are constructed to depict a prescribed and proscribed behaviour, respectively. However, the morality underpinning such constructs is often contradicted by the actual behaviour of the individuals involved. The hyperactivity of the lower bodily stratum epitomises an
effective degradation of the elevated during the local celebration of the festival, rendering Bakhtin's approach appropriate for a study of the Oruro Carnival. Parallel to an analysis of the Carnival Parade, the dissertation provides a reflection on the discourses and practices inherent to the construction of a Bolivian national and cultural identity through the development of the festival. The symbolic oppositions observed in the
Oruro Carnival Parade are linked to the transfigured images, which are analysed in relation to changes in the socio-cultural composition of the participants. Focusing upon the actual behaviour of the social actors involved, as much as upon representational activities, I intend to provide an insight into the relationship between the official imagery and the chaotic enactment of popular culture during carnival.The creation of real food and real people : gender complementarity among the Menku of Central Brazil
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11062
The thesis aims to provide a first ethnographic description of the Menkü of Central Brazil by focussing on their non-hierarchical gender-complementarity as it realises itself in relationships of production and reproduction. The first part of the thesis comprises of an introduction to the group from a historical point of view by providing a description of the Menkü's historical experiences during this century. This is followed by a description of the settlement, and the social spaces it encompasses. The second part focusses on the creation of real food by firstly elaborating social and physical aspects of material production. Secondly, it explores the
metaphysical aspects of production and reproduction by uncovering the relationships human beings engage in with the world of masters of the elements, animals and ancestors. The third part of the thesis investigates processes underlying the creation of real people by focussing on
Menkü life cycle, kinship and social organisation. A person's life is depicted in the way
it is geared towards the acquisition of gendered skills of production and reproduction, which are fully manifested by the married couple. An outline of the Menkü system of classificatory marriage reveals the stress on the married couple from another point of view. It will be shown that the ideal marriage partners are identified by a conflation of gender and affinity. The last chapter explores the generation of sociality as it reveals itself in happiness, abundance and togetherness. It shows the extent to which a high communal morale is preconditioned upon non-hierarchical gender-relationships.
2000-01-01T00:00:00ZPauli, GiselaThe thesis aims to provide a first ethnographic description of the Menkü of Central Brazil by focussing on their non-hierarchical gender-complementarity as it realises itself in relationships of production and reproduction. The first part of the thesis comprises of an introduction to the group from a historical point of view by providing a description of the Menkü's historical experiences during this century. This is followed by a description of the settlement, and the social spaces it encompasses. The second part focusses on the creation of real food by firstly elaborating social and physical aspects of material production. Secondly, it explores the
metaphysical aspects of production and reproduction by uncovering the relationships human beings engage in with the world of masters of the elements, animals and ancestors. The third part of the thesis investigates processes underlying the creation of real people by focussing on
Menkü life cycle, kinship and social organisation. A person's life is depicted in the way
it is geared towards the acquisition of gendered skills of production and reproduction, which are fully manifested by the married couple. An outline of the Menkü system of classificatory marriage reveals the stress on the married couple from another point of view. It will be shown that the ideal marriage partners are identified by a conflation of gender and affinity. The last chapter explores the generation of sociality as it reveals itself in happiness, abundance and togetherness. It shows the extent to which a high communal morale is preconditioned upon non-hierarchical gender-relationships.Leave us alone, we do not want your help. Let us live our lives : indigenous resistance and ethnogenesis in Nueva Vizcaya (colonial Mexico)
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11060
This thesis looks at the people of Nueva Vizcaya’s history of resistance to
incorporation into the state during the colonial age, and how this history is
connected to the contemporary context in the Sierra Tarahumara. To do this, I use
and frame the concepts of community, resistance, violence, ethnogenesis,
territory and history as intertwined in such a way that the Sierra Tarahumara and
its inhabitants cannot be completely disassociated one from another.
By looking at the engagements between colonizers and native people of the
colonial North of the Nueva España –Tarahumara and other native indigenous
people of the Sierra Madre Occidental– in history, and frame the narratives about
these historical encounters, drawing colonial accounts, modern narratives and
other sources, I contest in this work, allows to frame indigenous societies agency
in history.
In addition, this thesis endeavors to engage with the broader discussion about
ethnogenesis, indigenous resistance to colonialism, native community and
ecological conflicts in Nueva Vizcaya and in the Sierra Tarahumara.
Finally, this research wants to make sense of the contemporary conflicts over land
rights that indigenous communities of the Sierra Tarahumara face today, and
connect them with the history of the colonial encounters of the people of the
Nueva Vizcaya. I propose that these encounters, in the colonial time of the
conquest of the Nueva Vizcaya, and in the national period, are largely a
consequence of a colonial process of ethnogenesis that taxonomically indexed
native people in categories related to colonial labor needs and control over the
territory, which I frame as tarahumarizacíon and raramurización.
2017-06-22T00:00:00ZRivera Acosta, Juan ManuelThis thesis looks at the people of Nueva Vizcaya’s history of resistance to
incorporation into the state during the colonial age, and how this history is
connected to the contemporary context in the Sierra Tarahumara. To do this, I use
and frame the concepts of community, resistance, violence, ethnogenesis,
territory and history as intertwined in such a way that the Sierra Tarahumara and
its inhabitants cannot be completely disassociated one from another.
By looking at the engagements between colonizers and native people of the
colonial North of the Nueva España –Tarahumara and other native indigenous
people of the Sierra Madre Occidental– in history, and frame the narratives about
these historical encounters, drawing colonial accounts, modern narratives and
other sources, I contest in this work, allows to frame indigenous societies agency
in history.
In addition, this thesis endeavors to engage with the broader discussion about
ethnogenesis, indigenous resistance to colonialism, native community and
ecological conflicts in Nueva Vizcaya and in the Sierra Tarahumara.
Finally, this research wants to make sense of the contemporary conflicts over land
rights that indigenous communities of the Sierra Tarahumara face today, and
connect them with the history of the colonial encounters of the people of the
Nueva Vizcaya. I propose that these encounters, in the colonial time of the
conquest of the Nueva Vizcaya, and in the national period, are largely a
consequence of a colonial process of ethnogenesis that taxonomically indexed
native people in categories related to colonial labor needs and control over the
territory, which I frame as tarahumarizacíon and raramurización.The sense of belonging and the migration trajectories of the members of the Latin American community in Edinburgh.
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11005
This thesis is the outcome of my twelve-month ethnographic fieldwork among Latin Americans in Edinburgh. Using life story interviews, participant observation and online communication technologies, the research aims to explore the senses of belonging that different Latin Americans in Edinburgh have claimed at different moments of their lives and the dynamics of concurrent identities – the maintenance and reconstruction of national identity as well as the emergence of Latin American identity. It also addresses the multiplicity of reasons why various individuals have chosen to belong to the Latin American 'community' in Edinburgh and scrutinises their manifold home-making processes. Moreover, this thesis hopes to contribute to the studies on Latin Americans and to a debate regarding whether members of communities should be treated as individuals or as collective actors.
2017-06-22T00:00:00ZSokół-Klepacka, MartaThis thesis is the outcome of my twelve-month ethnographic fieldwork among Latin Americans in Edinburgh. Using life story interviews, participant observation and online communication technologies, the research aims to explore the senses of belonging that different Latin Americans in Edinburgh have claimed at different moments of their lives and the dynamics of concurrent identities – the maintenance and reconstruction of national identity as well as the emergence of Latin American identity. It also addresses the multiplicity of reasons why various individuals have chosen to belong to the Latin American 'community' in Edinburgh and scrutinises their manifold home-making processes. Moreover, this thesis hopes to contribute to the studies on Latin Americans and to a debate regarding whether members of communities should be treated as individuals or as collective actors.Fathermen : predicaments in fatherhood, masculinity and the kinship lifecourse. Dominica, West Indies
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/10999
Fathermen is an ethnographic journey in the kinship lives of men on the island of Dominica, West
Indies. It traces the various complexities, conundra and contradictions Dominican men encounter
and create as they navigate relational life trajectories. These are termed kinship predicaments:
moments in kin-lives that trouble hegemonic concepts of fatherhood and masculine personhood;
that spark ambivalence between dominant ideals and lived experiences; that provoke quarrels
between mothers’ expectations and fathers’ practices; and expose incongruities between
established norms and emerging forms. Seeking to transcend the historical and contemporary
circumscriptions that stereotype Caribbean fathers as absent studs or patriarchal authoritarians,
this enquiry asks how Dominican men chart their own paths of paternal becoming. Developing an
intuitive participatory methodology, referred to as the ethnography of relation, Fathermen
commutes into the kin-worlds of Caribbean men, seeking to understand fatherhood through deep
dialogue as it is built from the ground up. Organising its chapters around local idioms through
which Dominicans frame kinship, Fathermen features discussions on: the romantic and conjugal
tensions that precede/inform parenting; the ‘mystic’ bodily affects that draw men into
reproduction; the vexed norm of paternal provision; Caribbean fathers’ emergent nurturant
practices; the classed politics of paternal recognition; and, finally, men’s ambivalent
intergenerational experiences of becoming grandfathers. Fathermen argues that it often takes a
lifetime to realise fatherhood, with many Dominican men unable to resolve its many paradoxes
within their mortal spans. Whilst it contends that men are ‘tied’ tighter into kin-life as they grow
along their paternal journeys, ambivalences persist. Yet still, amidst angst and complexity,
Fathermen is nonetheless an ethnography of love, dedication, familial vitality, creativity and
humour.
2017-01-01T00:00:00ZPhilogene Heron, AdomFathermen is an ethnographic journey in the kinship lives of men on the island of Dominica, West
Indies. It traces the various complexities, conundra and contradictions Dominican men encounter
and create as they navigate relational life trajectories. These are termed kinship predicaments:
moments in kin-lives that trouble hegemonic concepts of fatherhood and masculine personhood;
that spark ambivalence between dominant ideals and lived experiences; that provoke quarrels
between mothers’ expectations and fathers’ practices; and expose incongruities between
established norms and emerging forms. Seeking to transcend the historical and contemporary
circumscriptions that stereotype Caribbean fathers as absent studs or patriarchal authoritarians,
this enquiry asks how Dominican men chart their own paths of paternal becoming. Developing an
intuitive participatory methodology, referred to as the ethnography of relation, Fathermen
commutes into the kin-worlds of Caribbean men, seeking to understand fatherhood through deep
dialogue as it is built from the ground up. Organising its chapters around local idioms through
which Dominicans frame kinship, Fathermen features discussions on: the romantic and conjugal
tensions that precede/inform parenting; the ‘mystic’ bodily affects that draw men into
reproduction; the vexed norm of paternal provision; Caribbean fathers’ emergent nurturant
practices; the classed politics of paternal recognition; and, finally, men’s ambivalent
intergenerational experiences of becoming grandfathers. Fathermen argues that it often takes a
lifetime to realise fatherhood, with many Dominican men unable to resolve its many paradoxes
within their mortal spans. Whilst it contends that men are ‘tied’ tighter into kin-life as they grow
along their paternal journeys, ambivalences persist. Yet still, amidst angst and complexity,
Fathermen is nonetheless an ethnography of love, dedication, familial vitality, creativity and
humour.The source of modal truth
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/10949
This thesis concerns the source of modal truth. I aim to answer the question: what is
it in virtue of which there are truths concerning what must have been the case as a
matter of necessity, or could have been the case but isn't.
I begin by looking at a dilemma put forward by Simon Blackburn which attempts to
show that any realist answer to this question must fail, and I conclude that either horn
of his dilemma can be resisted. I then move on to clarify the nature of the
propositions whose truth I am aiming to find the source of.
I distinguish necessity de re from necessity de dicto, and argue for a counterpart
theoretic treatment of necessity de re. As a result, I argue that there is no special
problem concerning the source of de re modal facts. The problem is simply to
account for what it is in virtue of which there are qualitative ways the world could
have been, and qualitative ways it couldn't have been.
I look at two ways to answer this question: by appealing to truthmakers in the actual
world, or by appealing to non-actual ontology. I develop a theory of truthmakers, but
argue that it is unlikely that there are truthmakers for modal truths among the
ontology of the actual. I look at the main possibilist ontology, David Lewis' modal
realism, but argue that warrant for that ontology is unobtainable, and that we
shouldn't admit non-actual possibilia into our ontology.
I end by sketching a quasi-conventionalist approach to modality which denies that
there are modal facts, but nevertheless allows that we can speak truly when we use
modal language.
2006-01-01T00:00:00ZCameron, Ross P.This thesis concerns the source of modal truth. I aim to answer the question: what is
it in virtue of which there are truths concerning what must have been the case as a
matter of necessity, or could have been the case but isn't.
I begin by looking at a dilemma put forward by Simon Blackburn which attempts to
show that any realist answer to this question must fail, and I conclude that either horn
of his dilemma can be resisted. I then move on to clarify the nature of the
propositions whose truth I am aiming to find the source of.
I distinguish necessity de re from necessity de dicto, and argue for a counterpart
theoretic treatment of necessity de re. As a result, I argue that there is no special
problem concerning the source of de re modal facts. The problem is simply to
account for what it is in virtue of which there are qualitative ways the world could
have been, and qualitative ways it couldn't have been.
I look at two ways to answer this question: by appealing to truthmakers in the actual
world, or by appealing to non-actual ontology. I develop a theory of truthmakers, but
argue that it is unlikely that there are truthmakers for modal truths among the
ontology of the actual. I look at the main possibilist ontology, David Lewis' modal
realism, but argue that warrant for that ontology is unobtainable, and that we
shouldn't admit non-actual possibilia into our ontology.
I end by sketching a quasi-conventionalist approach to modality which denies that
there are modal facts, but nevertheless allows that we can speak truly when we use
modal language.Kant on love
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/10833
2016-12-01T00:00:00ZRinne, PärttyliTitle redacted
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/10830
2017-06-22T00:00:00ZParis, Panagiotis S.Dancing into darkness : cosmopolitanism and 'peripherality' in the Greek goth scene
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/10829
This thesis discusses concepts of cosmopolitism and peripherality in
the Greek and wider European goth scene. The research took place
primarily in Greece but extended to Germany, the United Kingdom and
online as I followed the movement of Athenian goths who were searching
for connectivity, hybridity and their cosmopolitan selves.
In living a hybrid cosmopolitan identity, goths regularly challenge
national stereotypes and transgress international boundaries. But
sometimes the complexities of goth cosmopolitan identity may also
contain unpalatable aspects, such as hard-core Greek or German
nationalism and views that verge on xenophobia or anarchism that are
seemingly at odds with the ‘open’ and ‘egalitarian’ persona put forward by
Athenian goths. It is through performance (particularly dance) that
Athenian goths choose to express their beliefs and desires, blending
aspects of the contemporary goth scene with twists of ‘traditional’ Greek
ideas. Often performance, with all its paradoxes and hybrid
contradictions, says more than words.
Movement is at the centre of goth identity; the movement of ideas
on social media, the physical movement of goths to overseas festivals and
the exchange of opinions among goths at nightclubs in Athens all
contribute to a hybrid cosmopolitan identity of a group of people who
reside both on the geographical periphery of Europe and on the periphery
of their own society. Goth identity is hybrid and complex with layers of
peripherality being channelled toward becoming an ever-developing
cosmopolitan subject. This thesis focuses on the core aspects of the goth
life-project which aim for individuality, connectivity, movement and
inclusivity. Being able to creatively display one’s hybrid cosmopolitanism
is the very essence of what it is to be goth.
2017-06-22T00:00:00ZKarampampas, PanasThis thesis discusses concepts of cosmopolitism and peripherality in
the Greek and wider European goth scene. The research took place
primarily in Greece but extended to Germany, the United Kingdom and
online as I followed the movement of Athenian goths who were searching
for connectivity, hybridity and their cosmopolitan selves.
In living a hybrid cosmopolitan identity, goths regularly challenge
national stereotypes and transgress international boundaries. But
sometimes the complexities of goth cosmopolitan identity may also
contain unpalatable aspects, such as hard-core Greek or German
nationalism and views that verge on xenophobia or anarchism that are
seemingly at odds with the ‘open’ and ‘egalitarian’ persona put forward by
Athenian goths. It is through performance (particularly dance) that
Athenian goths choose to express their beliefs and desires, blending
aspects of the contemporary goth scene with twists of ‘traditional’ Greek
ideas. Often performance, with all its paradoxes and hybrid
contradictions, says more than words.
Movement is at the centre of goth identity; the movement of ideas
on social media, the physical movement of goths to overseas festivals and
the exchange of opinions among goths at nightclubs in Athens all
contribute to a hybrid cosmopolitan identity of a group of people who
reside both on the geographical periphery of Europe and on the periphery
of their own society. Goth identity is hybrid and complex with layers of
peripherality being channelled toward becoming an ever-developing
cosmopolitan subject. This thesis focuses on the core aspects of the goth
life-project which aim for individuality, connectivity, movement and
inclusivity. Being able to creatively display one’s hybrid cosmopolitanism
is the very essence of what it is to be goth.Being and thinking in the social world : phenomenological illuminations of social cognition and human selfhood
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/10640
At least since the time of Aristotle, it has been widely accepted that “man is by nature a social animal”. We eat, sleep, talk, laugh, cry, love, fight and create in ways that integrally depend on others and the social norms that we collectively generate and maintain.
Yet in spite of the widely accepted importance of human sociality in underlying our daily activities, its exact manifestation and function is consistently overlooked by many academic disciplines. Cognitive science, for example, regularly neglects the manner in which social interactions and interactively generated norms canalise and constitute our cognitive processes. Without the inescapable ubiquity of dynamic social norms, any given agent simply could not cognise as a human.
In this thesis, I aim to use a range of insights – from phenomenology, social psychology, neuroscience, cultural anthropology and gender studies – to clarify the role of sociality for human life. More specifically, the thesis can be broadly separated into three parts. I begin (chapters 1 and 2) with a broad explanation of how human agents are fundamentally tied to worldly entities and other agents in a way that characterises their ontological existence. In chapters 3 and 4, I criticise two recent and much-discussed theories of social cognition – namely, we-mode cognition and participatory sense-making – for failing to make intelligible the social constitution of human existence. In the later chapters (5-7), I then propose foundations for a more satisfactory theory of social cognition, as well as explicating a view of human selfhood as ‘biosocial’, such that even the autonomy of biological bodies is socially codified from a human perspective.
Taken together, the aforementioned chapters should contribute to calls for a new direction in social cognitive science, whilst also yielding novel insights into the nature of human selfhood.
2017-06-22T00:00:00ZHiggins, JoeAt least since the time of Aristotle, it has been widely accepted that “man is by nature a social animal”. We eat, sleep, talk, laugh, cry, love, fight and create in ways that integrally depend on others and the social norms that we collectively generate and maintain.
Yet in spite of the widely accepted importance of human sociality in underlying our daily activities, its exact manifestation and function is consistently overlooked by many academic disciplines. Cognitive science, for example, regularly neglects the manner in which social interactions and interactively generated norms canalise and constitute our cognitive processes. Without the inescapable ubiquity of dynamic social norms, any given agent simply could not cognise as a human.
In this thesis, I aim to use a range of insights – from phenomenology, social psychology, neuroscience, cultural anthropology and gender studies – to clarify the role of sociality for human life. More specifically, the thesis can be broadly separated into three parts. I begin (chapters 1 and 2) with a broad explanation of how human agents are fundamentally tied to worldly entities and other agents in a way that characterises their ontological existence. In chapters 3 and 4, I criticise two recent and much-discussed theories of social cognition – namely, we-mode cognition and participatory sense-making – for failing to make intelligible the social constitution of human existence. In the later chapters (5-7), I then propose foundations for a more satisfactory theory of social cognition, as well as explicating a view of human selfhood as ‘biosocial’, such that even the autonomy of biological bodies is socially codified from a human perspective.
Taken together, the aforementioned chapters should contribute to calls for a new direction in social cognitive science, whilst also yielding novel insights into the nature of human selfhood.Re-making urban space : writing social realities in the British city
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/10606
In this thesis I investigate the narrative rendering of urban experiences and the place of
agency within these renderings, looking in particular at the personal stories of urban
dwellers. Grounded in anthropological fieldwork in Britain - in the town of Romford
(Essex) to the east of London - but also relying on written sources on British social
realities, this thesis challenges the idea and practice of a traditional place-based
ethnography, calling in turn for an anthropological appreciation of the individual writing
of human experience. This I define as the considered ordering of the forms in terms of
which individuals experience their lives. I recognise that such ‘writing’, conceived as a
cognitive pursuit, is possible within speech and not, as some may have it, the exclusive
preserve of literary culture. In allowing that individuals may exercise authorship over
their lives in this way, I find it is possible, as well as potentially illuminating, to compare
individuals’ writings, their personal accounts of their lives, with other genres for writing
the reality of urban and peri-urban milieux in Britain. I hear significant correspondences
between each story-genre, especially as regards the impacts of town planning on urban
space for the populations that inhabit it, and discuss the possible theoretical implications
of this correspondence. I focus extensively on two such genres in addition to personal
stories: the sociological - examining Michael Young and Peter Willmott’s sociological
classic text ‘Family and Kinship in East London’ - and the literary - a reading of the work
of English poet and journalist John Betjeman. Running through the thesis is also an
appreciation of the figure of the amateur, both as a real actor and as a metaphor for the
postmodernist approach to culture to which I also subscribe.
2003-01-01T00:00:00ZJames, IanIn this thesis I investigate the narrative rendering of urban experiences and the place of
agency within these renderings, looking in particular at the personal stories of urban
dwellers. Grounded in anthropological fieldwork in Britain - in the town of Romford
(Essex) to the east of London - but also relying on written sources on British social
realities, this thesis challenges the idea and practice of a traditional place-based
ethnography, calling in turn for an anthropological appreciation of the individual writing
of human experience. This I define as the considered ordering of the forms in terms of
which individuals experience their lives. I recognise that such ‘writing’, conceived as a
cognitive pursuit, is possible within speech and not, as some may have it, the exclusive
preserve of literary culture. In allowing that individuals may exercise authorship over
their lives in this way, I find it is possible, as well as potentially illuminating, to compare
individuals’ writings, their personal accounts of their lives, with other genres for writing
the reality of urban and peri-urban milieux in Britain. I hear significant correspondences
between each story-genre, especially as regards the impacts of town planning on urban
space for the populations that inhabit it, and discuss the possible theoretical implications
of this correspondence. I focus extensively on two such genres in addition to personal
stories: the sociological - examining Michael Young and Peter Willmott’s sociological
classic text ‘Family and Kinship in East London’ - and the literary - a reading of the work
of English poet and journalist John Betjeman. Running through the thesis is also an
appreciation of the figure of the amateur, both as a real actor and as a metaphor for the
postmodernist approach to culture to which I also subscribe.Realities of an 'Orkney way' : communicating perceptions of renewable energy in Orkney, Scotland
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/10471
Orkney is currently home to over 400 wind turbines and a growing marine energy industry, developing cutting edge technology for what could be called a global energy transition. Situated off the north tip of the Scottish mainland, the archipelago is also home to a long-standing local population of just over 21,000 inhabitants. In fact, habitation in these islands stretches back over 5,000 years, a connection expressed by the local population. This thesis rests at the intersection of these two points of interest: energy and locality. Drawing from ethnographic fieldwork conducted between October 2013 and October 2014, this thesis analyses the communication of perceptions of renewable energy in the archipelago. It takes into consideration the specificity of one particular network of relations: the individuals employed or otherwise involved in the development and production of this energy while situating the specificity of these perceptions within the larger body of residents. Here, collective history, the importance of place, and maintenance of identity are intimately tied up in the range of perspectives present, as well as within the very promotion of the industry. The relationship between individual perception and collective affirmation, the existence of multiple spheres of realities, the simplification of realities in the communication meaning, and the relationship between nodes of interaction are all analysed. While far from a constantly discussed occurrence, the presence of renewable energy in Orkney has provided residents with a mobilising force, an impetus for discussions of the self, of identity and belonging, of the importance of place, and of the relationship between the past, present and future.
2017-06-22T00:00:00ZFriend, SaraOrkney is currently home to over 400 wind turbines and a growing marine energy industry, developing cutting edge technology for what could be called a global energy transition. Situated off the north tip of the Scottish mainland, the archipelago is also home to a long-standing local population of just over 21,000 inhabitants. In fact, habitation in these islands stretches back over 5,000 years, a connection expressed by the local population. This thesis rests at the intersection of these two points of interest: energy and locality. Drawing from ethnographic fieldwork conducted between October 2013 and October 2014, this thesis analyses the communication of perceptions of renewable energy in the archipelago. It takes into consideration the specificity of one particular network of relations: the individuals employed or otherwise involved in the development and production of this energy while situating the specificity of these perceptions within the larger body of residents. Here, collective history, the importance of place, and maintenance of identity are intimately tied up in the range of perspectives present, as well as within the very promotion of the industry. The relationship between individual perception and collective affirmation, the existence of multiple spheres of realities, the simplification of realities in the communication meaning, and the relationship between nodes of interaction are all analysed. While far from a constantly discussed occurrence, the presence of renewable energy in Orkney has provided residents with a mobilising force, an impetus for discussions of the self, of identity and belonging, of the importance of place, and of the relationship between the past, present and future.Acta and omissions
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/10385
I identify and examine the grounds on which we describe an
agent's non-doing as an omission to do X, and a cause of Y. I
distinguish between the formal and material aspects of an omission.
This is useful in setting aside obvious differences between actions
and omissions, which some writers take to be significant, in
particular the view that an omission can be identified with whatever
action an agent performs or movement he makes when he omits to X. In
fact, he need not make a bodily movement, perform some other action in
order to prevent himself from doing X, or decide not to perform X. It
is by no means certain that any omission is timeable, and most are
certainly not. I note difficulties for any account of intention that
is meant to embrace intentional omissions as well as actions. I do
not offer a single, all-embracing account of omissions, because I
think it is impossible to provide one.
I acknowledge the importance of the role of expectation in
identifying omissions, particularly as causes, but argue that there
are sorts of omissions which are not identified by the presence of
defeated expectation. I take the view that some omissions are in an
important way indistinguishable from actions and may therefore be
regarded as causes. Also that some non-doings which are not omissions
may be regarded as causes. I criticise the ability of traditional
analyses of causality to comprehend the possibility of omissive
causation and expound alternative accounts of what constitutes a cause in order to do justice to that possibility. I find useful Collingwood's account of what it is to speak of causality in terms
appropriate to a practical natural science; that is, in the language
of means and ends.
1989-01-01T00:00:00ZDonald, Alexander PaulI identify and examine the grounds on which we describe an
agent's non-doing as an omission to do X, and a cause of Y. I
distinguish between the formal and material aspects of an omission.
This is useful in setting aside obvious differences between actions
and omissions, which some writers take to be significant, in
particular the view that an omission can be identified with whatever
action an agent performs or movement he makes when he omits to X. In
fact, he need not make a bodily movement, perform some other action in
order to prevent himself from doing X, or decide not to perform X. It
is by no means certain that any omission is timeable, and most are
certainly not. I note difficulties for any account of intention that
is meant to embrace intentional omissions as well as actions. I do
not offer a single, all-embracing account of omissions, because I
think it is impossible to provide one.
I acknowledge the importance of the role of expectation in
identifying omissions, particularly as causes, but argue that there
are sorts of omissions which are not identified by the presence of
defeated expectation. I take the view that some omissions are in an
important way indistinguishable from actions and may therefore be
regarded as causes. Also that some non-doings which are not omissions
may be regarded as causes. I criticise the ability of traditional
analyses of causality to comprehend the possibility of omissive
causation and expound alternative accounts of what constitutes a cause in order to do justice to that possibility. I find useful Collingwood's account of what it is to speak of causality in terms
appropriate to a practical natural science; that is, in the language
of means and ends.Kaale belongings and Evangelical becomings : faith, commitment and social outreach among the Finnish Kaale (Finnish Roma)
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/10314
Grounded in a theoretical debate between anthropological studies on Roma/Gypsies and anthropological studies of Christianity, the focus of this thesis is on the experience of social and religious life among members of a traditional minority in Finland, the Finnish Kaale/Finnish Roma, a population of approximately 13.000 people living in Finland and Sweden. Over the past decades, the processes of urbanisation and sedentarisation have led to shifts in the ways in which the social lives of Kaale families are lived. A shift towards individualisation is interlinked with the continuous importance placed on family and kin belonging, which come together in a re-assessment of people’s central attachments in the world. At the same time, over the same period of time, a large number of this population have converted to Pentecostal and charismatic movements in the country, leading to subtle changes in the shape of social relations within and outside their own community: between believers and non-believers, between Kaale and non-Kaale. Making use of participant observation, interviews, conversion stories and individual life histories among Finnish Kaale living in the capital city of Helsinki and in Eastern parts of the country, this ethnography provides an insight into the multiple, overlapping and complex ways in which Kaale belonging is understood and into the ways in which Pentecostal religious life takes shape among born-again Kaale. Furthermore, looking specifically at the practice of Evangelism and missionary work, which defines the life of Pentecostal Kaale believers, the role of faith as an enhanced engagement with the world is analysed. A conversation therefore emerges also on the role of Pentecostal belonging in mobilising believers in relation to the world around them and, more specifically, on the way in which Pentecostal faith provides an avenue for a further social engagement and social mobilisation of individual Kaale believers.
2017-06-22T00:00:00ZRoman, Raluca BiancaGrounded in a theoretical debate between anthropological studies on Roma/Gypsies and anthropological studies of Christianity, the focus of this thesis is on the experience of social and religious life among members of a traditional minority in Finland, the Finnish Kaale/Finnish Roma, a population of approximately 13.000 people living in Finland and Sweden. Over the past decades, the processes of urbanisation and sedentarisation have led to shifts in the ways in which the social lives of Kaale families are lived. A shift towards individualisation is interlinked with the continuous importance placed on family and kin belonging, which come together in a re-assessment of people’s central attachments in the world. At the same time, over the same period of time, a large number of this population have converted to Pentecostal and charismatic movements in the country, leading to subtle changes in the shape of social relations within and outside their own community: between believers and non-believers, between Kaale and non-Kaale. Making use of participant observation, interviews, conversion stories and individual life histories among Finnish Kaale living in the capital city of Helsinki and in Eastern parts of the country, this ethnography provides an insight into the multiple, overlapping and complex ways in which Kaale belonging is understood and into the ways in which Pentecostal religious life takes shape among born-again Kaale. Furthermore, looking specifically at the practice of Evangelism and missionary work, which defines the life of Pentecostal Kaale believers, the role of faith as an enhanced engagement with the world is analysed. A conversation therefore emerges also on the role of Pentecostal belonging in mobilising believers in relation to the world around them and, more specifically, on the way in which Pentecostal faith provides an avenue for a further social engagement and social mobilisation of individual Kaale believers.Bougainville revisited : understanding the crisis and U-Vistract through an ethnography of everyday life in Nagovisi
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/10289
This thesis offers an ethnographic study of everyday life in Nagovisi of Southwest
Bougainville. The study focuses on aspects of how the Nagovisi construe social
relations with a specific focus on vernacular categories and ideologies. The thesis
deals with ideas about land, perceptions about the fluid nature of Nagovisi sociality,
movement, and U-Vistract. The study is primarily based on thirteen months of field
research I conducted in the Nagovisi between September 2011 and November of
2012.
Through the exploration of the various thematic issues in the individual
chapters the thesis offers a comparative scope for a tangential re-evaluation of the
mine related crisis on the island. The focus on Noah Musinku and the Kingdom of
Papala further illustrates this comparative scope by drawing an analogy between
Panguna and U-Vistract and the complex entanglements and interrelationships
between ideas relating to land, history, myth, relatedness, social unpredictability, and
notions about wealth. It deals with the question of how persons, land and
knowledge are mutually constitutive, and how each can affect the other as a result of
history, and movement in time and space.
By focusing on Nagovisi notions of the unpredictability of talk, knowledge, and
the implication this bears on the nature of how people relate to each other and
different places the thesis deals with what has long been proven a recalcitrant
problem in PNG anthropological literature in which local life worlds are
characterised by a fluidity of social forms.
2015-01-01T00:00:00ZKenema, SimonThis thesis offers an ethnographic study of everyday life in Nagovisi of Southwest
Bougainville. The study focuses on aspects of how the Nagovisi construe social
relations with a specific focus on vernacular categories and ideologies. The thesis
deals with ideas about land, perceptions about the fluid nature of Nagovisi sociality,
movement, and U-Vistract. The study is primarily based on thirteen months of field
research I conducted in the Nagovisi between September 2011 and November of
2012.
Through the exploration of the various thematic issues in the individual
chapters the thesis offers a comparative scope for a tangential re-evaluation of the
mine related crisis on the island. The focus on Noah Musinku and the Kingdom of
Papala further illustrates this comparative scope by drawing an analogy between
Panguna and U-Vistract and the complex entanglements and interrelationships
between ideas relating to land, history, myth, relatedness, social unpredictability, and
notions about wealth. It deals with the question of how persons, land and
knowledge are mutually constitutive, and how each can affect the other as a result of
history, and movement in time and space.
By focusing on Nagovisi notions of the unpredictability of talk, knowledge, and
the implication this bears on the nature of how people relate to each other and
different places the thesis deals with what has long been proven a recalcitrant
problem in PNG anthropological literature in which local life worlds are
characterised by a fluidity of social forms.Liberal trusteeship : preparatory work for an epistemic defence of non-egalitarian liberalism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/10251
This thesis examines some epistemic defences of democracy put forward by David Estlund, Michael Fuerstein, Cheryl Misak, and Fabienne Peter, as well as a critique of democracy raised by Jason Brennan. It then develops an epistemic defence of a moderately non-egalitarian system, which it proposes to call liberal trusteeship. According to the proposed theory, the power to draft laws ought to be separated from the power to enact those drafts into law. The former power ought to be vested in trustees, who are essentially specialists that have inquired extensively into a given matter, and the latter power ought to be vested in a democratically elected parliament. Subsequently, this thesis argues that parliament should nevertheless have the prerogative to ultimately override trustees on ethics and pass its own legislation regulating moral matters; that the criteria for selecting trustees should be determined by jury courts; and that parliament and jury courts should be given some powers to influence the composition of trustee committees, so that the political process can guard against the risk that trustees might be biased or corrupt.
The above proposal is grounded on three principal claims. Firstly, this thesis argues that moral authority and legitimacy ought to be reserved for the political system that strikes the best balance between competence and equality. Secondly, it argues that liberal trusteeship is more likely than democracy to determine correctly what ought to be done in light of the progress of open and vigorous inquiry into a given matter. Thirdly, and as a result, it argues that liberal trusteeship is likely to exercise power sufficiently more competently than democracy, such that its moderate deviation from political equality will be justified. In the light of this, the thesis concludes that liberal trusteeship would strike a better balance between competence and equality than democracy.
2017-06-22T00:00:00ZDagkas-Tsoukalas, VladimirosThis thesis examines some epistemic defences of democracy put forward by David Estlund, Michael Fuerstein, Cheryl Misak, and Fabienne Peter, as well as a critique of democracy raised by Jason Brennan. It then develops an epistemic defence of a moderately non-egalitarian system, which it proposes to call liberal trusteeship. According to the proposed theory, the power to draft laws ought to be separated from the power to enact those drafts into law. The former power ought to be vested in trustees, who are essentially specialists that have inquired extensively into a given matter, and the latter power ought to be vested in a democratically elected parliament. Subsequently, this thesis argues that parliament should nevertheless have the prerogative to ultimately override trustees on ethics and pass its own legislation regulating moral matters; that the criteria for selecting trustees should be determined by jury courts; and that parliament and jury courts should be given some powers to influence the composition of trustee committees, so that the political process can guard against the risk that trustees might be biased or corrupt.
The above proposal is grounded on three principal claims. Firstly, this thesis argues that moral authority and legitimacy ought to be reserved for the political system that strikes the best balance between competence and equality. Secondly, it argues that liberal trusteeship is more likely than democracy to determine correctly what ought to be done in light of the progress of open and vigorous inquiry into a given matter. Thirdly, and as a result, it argues that liberal trusteeship is likely to exercise power sufficiently more competently than democracy, such that its moderate deviation from political equality will be justified. In the light of this, the thesis concludes that liberal trusteeship would strike a better balance between competence and equality than democracy.Proof, rigour and informality : a virtue account of mathematical knowledge
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/10249
This thesis is about the nature of proofs in mathematics as it is practiced, contrasting the informal proofs found in practice with formal proofs in formal systems. In the first chapter I present a new argument against the Formalist-Reductionist view that informal proofs are justified as rigorous and correct by corresponding to formal counterparts. The second chapter builds on this to reject arguments from Gödel's paradox and incompleteness theorems to the claim that mathematics is inherently inconsistent, basing my objections on the complexities of the process of formalisation. Chapter 3 looks into the relationship between proofs and the development of the mathematical concepts that feature in them. I deploy Waismann's notion of open texture in the case of mathematical concepts, and discuss both Lakatos and Kneebone's dialectical philosophies of mathematics. I then argue that we can apply work from conceptual engineering to the relationship between formal and informal mathematics. The fourth chapter argues for the importance of mathematical knowledge-how and emphasises the primary role of the activity of proving in securing mathematical knowledge. In the final chapter I develop an account of mathematical knowledge based on virtue epistemology, which I argue provides a better view of proofs and mathematical rigour.
2017-06-22T00:00:00ZTanswell, Fenner StanleyThis thesis is about the nature of proofs in mathematics as it is practiced, contrasting the informal proofs found in practice with formal proofs in formal systems. In the first chapter I present a new argument against the Formalist-Reductionist view that informal proofs are justified as rigorous and correct by corresponding to formal counterparts. The second chapter builds on this to reject arguments from Gödel's paradox and incompleteness theorems to the claim that mathematics is inherently inconsistent, basing my objections on the complexities of the process of formalisation. Chapter 3 looks into the relationship between proofs and the development of the mathematical concepts that feature in them. I deploy Waismann's notion of open texture in the case of mathematical concepts, and discuss both Lakatos and Kneebone's dialectical philosophies of mathematics. I then argue that we can apply work from conceptual engineering to the relationship between formal and informal mathematics. The fourth chapter argues for the importance of mathematical knowledge-how and emphasises the primary role of the activity of proving in securing mathematical knowledge. In the final chapter I develop an account of mathematical knowledge based on virtue epistemology, which I argue provides a better view of proofs and mathematical rigour.Reflective luck and meta-epistemological scepticism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/10205
In this thesis, I argue that a particular type of epistemic luck, called “reflective luck”,
motivates a meta-epistemological challenge to externalism about justification. I argue
that the meta-epistemological challenge consists in a substantive philosophical challenge
to externalism that entails the rejection of a naturalized epistemology. However, I
contend that the philosophical challenge to the externalist analysis of justification should
be tempered with an anti-sceptical intuition that we do have knowledge of putatively true
propositions. To this end, I argue that an externalist analysis of justification is best able
to accommodate our anti-sceptical intuitions; externalism, I argue, is the best way of
accommodating commonsense.
Although externalism is preserved and survives the meta-epistemological challenge, it is
not unscathed. Specifically, I contend that externalism deprives us of adequate
internalist epistemic grounds to think that we have externalistically justified beliefs. I
identify that in principle this is not a problem for externalism, because externalism can
respond in a number of ways (one way is to abandon the concept of justification as
essential to knowledge), but that nonetheless an adequate epistemology ought to do
justice to the legitimacy of the meta-epistemological challenge. However,
accommodating this legitimacy and preserving putative knowledge is not possible within
the traditional absolutist framework for doing epistemology. My conclusion is that
externalism is correct, but that the kind of externalist knowledge we have is not
especially fine-grained or perfect; this should put pressure on the absolutist framework
for doing epistemology.
2014-01-01T00:00:00ZNeil, Charles AnthonyIn this thesis, I argue that a particular type of epistemic luck, called “reflective luck”,
motivates a meta-epistemological challenge to externalism about justification. I argue
that the meta-epistemological challenge consists in a substantive philosophical challenge
to externalism that entails the rejection of a naturalized epistemology. However, I
contend that the philosophical challenge to the externalist analysis of justification should
be tempered with an anti-sceptical intuition that we do have knowledge of putatively true
propositions. To this end, I argue that an externalist analysis of justification is best able
to accommodate our anti-sceptical intuitions; externalism, I argue, is the best way of
accommodating commonsense.
Although externalism is preserved and survives the meta-epistemological challenge, it is
not unscathed. Specifically, I contend that externalism deprives us of adequate
internalist epistemic grounds to think that we have externalistically justified beliefs. I
identify that in principle this is not a problem for externalism, because externalism can
respond in a number of ways (one way is to abandon the concept of justification as
essential to knowledge), but that nonetheless an adequate epistemology ought to do
justice to the legitimacy of the meta-epistemological challenge. However,
accommodating this legitimacy and preserving putative knowledge is not possible within
the traditional absolutist framework for doing epistemology. My conclusion is that
externalism is correct, but that the kind of externalist knowledge we have is not
especially fine-grained or perfect; this should put pressure on the absolutist framework
for doing epistemology.Report to the dancefloor : journeys by experience and writing into raving and anthropology
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9949
This work is an ethnography about raving. As such, it is based on the
author's actual, inter-subjective and historical experience of that
contemporary international social phenomenon in Britain and in Goa (India)
during the late 1980s and 1990s. It is written from the position of an involved,
participating subject over time. This ethnographic approach and the emphasis
placed upon subjective experience, history and knowledge 'from
within' throughout the work is aimed, critically speaking, at tendencies
within contemporary forms of anthropology which favour academic
introspection, inter-textuality, textual notions concerning social life and overinterpretation.
This commitment to ethnography is also used in the final
section of the work, within a critical-historical appreciation of the discipline,
to argue for a re-statement of Malinowski's radical 'science' of ethnography in
the face of a routinisation of 'science' as a legitimating discourse within the
discipline during the twentieth century.
Furthermore, the ethnographic approach is also set out, in a way which
attempts to make the work relevant not only to practitioners of anthropology,
as a way of producing public knowledge and accounts of social life which are
very different, ethically and politically, from those produced within other
public practices and contexts, such as by the media and government agencies.
Representations and accounts produced by such public agencies are situated
and questioned in the work through attaching them, as loaded products, to
Michel Foucault's political notion of modern 'governmentality ' Within
such a politicised account of representation, the author has used long-established,
humanist notions surrounding the practice of ethnography,
regarding participation and empathy, in order to produce accounts of
raving as a human social practice. These humanised and politicised
accounts of the phenomenon are offered as a contrast to the predominating
public accounts of the practice, produced through distanced and disinterested
discourses, which mainly focus upon its ability to animate certain powerful
social categories and forms of exclusion, such as 'the criminal' and 'the addict',
and socio-political discourses, such as that on 'drugs' and 'the war against
drugs'. This contrast, and the opposition and demand for human tolerance
it expresses, forms part of a wider project within the work which resists dehumanisation;
that is, the treatment of human beings and their practices in
terms of self-serving discourses (monologues) as opposed to the humanising
and politicising effects of experience, interaction and
empathy/understanding (dialogue).
Within this general framework surrounding the politics and ethics
of representation, other areas which are explored are the position/role
of the anthropologist and the use of subjectivity within the
research process, the use of creative writing as a source of
humanised ethnographic knowledge about diverse social worlds, and an
exploration into the possible uses and limits of academic theorisation.
1998-01-01T00:00:00ZReeves, BarryThis work is an ethnography about raving. As such, it is based on the
author's actual, inter-subjective and historical experience of that
contemporary international social phenomenon in Britain and in Goa (India)
during the late 1980s and 1990s. It is written from the position of an involved,
participating subject over time. This ethnographic approach and the emphasis
placed upon subjective experience, history and knowledge 'from
within' throughout the work is aimed, critically speaking, at tendencies
within contemporary forms of anthropology which favour academic
introspection, inter-textuality, textual notions concerning social life and overinterpretation.
This commitment to ethnography is also used in the final
section of the work, within a critical-historical appreciation of the discipline,
to argue for a re-statement of Malinowski's radical 'science' of ethnography in
the face of a routinisation of 'science' as a legitimating discourse within the
discipline during the twentieth century.
Furthermore, the ethnographic approach is also set out, in a way which
attempts to make the work relevant not only to practitioners of anthropology,
as a way of producing public knowledge and accounts of social life which are
very different, ethically and politically, from those produced within other
public practices and contexts, such as by the media and government agencies.
Representations and accounts produced by such public agencies are situated
and questioned in the work through attaching them, as loaded products, to
Michel Foucault's political notion of modern 'governmentality ' Within
such a politicised account of representation, the author has used long-established,
humanist notions surrounding the practice of ethnography,
regarding participation and empathy, in order to produce accounts of
raving as a human social practice. These humanised and politicised
accounts of the phenomenon are offered as a contrast to the predominating
public accounts of the practice, produced through distanced and disinterested
discourses, which mainly focus upon its ability to animate certain powerful
social categories and forms of exclusion, such as 'the criminal' and 'the addict',
and socio-political discourses, such as that on 'drugs' and 'the war against
drugs'. This contrast, and the opposition and demand for human tolerance
it expresses, forms part of a wider project within the work which resists dehumanisation;
that is, the treatment of human beings and their practices in
terms of self-serving discourses (monologues) as opposed to the humanising
and politicising effects of experience, interaction and
empathy/understanding (dialogue).
Within this general framework surrounding the politics and ethics
of representation, other areas which are explored are the position/role
of the anthropologist and the use of subjectivity within the
research process, the use of creative writing as a source of
humanised ethnographic knowledge about diverse social worlds, and an
exploration into the possible uses and limits of academic theorisation.Against type E
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9895
It’s generally assumed that a compositional semantic theory will have to recognise a semantic category of expressions which serve simply to pick out some one object: e-type expressions. Kripke’s views about names (Kripke, 1980), Kaplan’s about indexicals and demonstratives (Kaplan, 1989), the standard Tarskian semantics for bound variables (Tarski, 1956), Heim and Kratzer’s Strawsonian view about definites (Heim and Kratzer, 1998), even an (admittedly somewhat unpopular) analysis of indefinites (namely Fodor and Sag, 1982), assume as much.
In this thesis, I argue that recent advances in the semantics of names and of quotation, and in metaphysics, give good reason to doubt there is such a category. I do so in two parts. In the first part, comprising about two thirds of the thesis, I combine two recent views, one from semantics and one from metaphysics. From semantics, I take over predicativism about names, the view, as one might have guessed, that names are predicates. From metaphysics, I take over the doctrine that there are temporal parts. Putting them together, I hold that the semantic contribution of the name ’Joan’, in a sentence like ’Joan is a barrister’, is a predicate, and in particular (and somewhat roughly) a predicate the extension of which is Joan’s temporal parts. Names are not, as is commonly thought, e-type expressions.
In the second part, building on the first, I further undermine the existence of a semantically important category of e-type expressions by arguing that a construction which might be thought to mandate such a category, namely de re attitude ascriptions, in fact, when properly analysed, does not do so. I argue this by considering the nature of transparent occurrences of expressions in opaque contexts in general, and in particular by considering the phenomenon of mixed quotation. I present a new theory of it, and show how it can be parlayed into a new Fregean theory of de re attitude ascriptions. The thesis overall, then, will provide strong evidence against the semantic importance of e-type expressions either in language, or in (our reporting of) thought.
2016-12-01T00:00:00ZMcKeever, MatthewIt’s generally assumed that a compositional semantic theory will have to recognise a semantic category of expressions which serve simply to pick out some one object: e-type expressions. Kripke’s views about names (Kripke, 1980), Kaplan’s about indexicals and demonstratives (Kaplan, 1989), the standard Tarskian semantics for bound variables (Tarski, 1956), Heim and Kratzer’s Strawsonian view about definites (Heim and Kratzer, 1998), even an (admittedly somewhat unpopular) analysis of indefinites (namely Fodor and Sag, 1982), assume as much.
In this thesis, I argue that recent advances in the semantics of names and of quotation, and in metaphysics, give good reason to doubt there is such a category. I do so in two parts. In the first part, comprising about two thirds of the thesis, I combine two recent views, one from semantics and one from metaphysics. From semantics, I take over predicativism about names, the view, as one might have guessed, that names are predicates. From metaphysics, I take over the doctrine that there are temporal parts. Putting them together, I hold that the semantic contribution of the name ’Joan’, in a sentence like ’Joan is a barrister’, is a predicate, and in particular (and somewhat roughly) a predicate the extension of which is Joan’s temporal parts. Names are not, as is commonly thought, e-type expressions.
In the second part, building on the first, I further undermine the existence of a semantically important category of e-type expressions by arguing that a construction which might be thought to mandate such a category, namely de re attitude ascriptions, in fact, when properly analysed, does not do so. I argue this by considering the nature of transparent occurrences of expressions in opaque contexts in general, and in particular by considering the phenomenon of mixed quotation. I present a new theory of it, and show how it can be parlayed into a new Fregean theory of de re attitude ascriptions. The thesis overall, then, will provide strong evidence against the semantic importance of e-type expressions either in language, or in (our reporting of) thought.Perspectives on what to believe : the information-sensitivity of the doxastic 'should' and its implications for normative epistemology
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9890
This thesis explores the extent to which the doxastic ‘should’ is information-sensitive and the implications of this for a number of debates in normative epistemology. The doxastic ‘should’ is a special case of the deontic modal ‘should’ and occurs in sentences such as ‘You shouldn’t believe everything you read online’. In the recent semantics literature, it has been suggested that the deontic ‘should’ is information-sensitive, meaning that sentences of the form ‘S should do A’ are relativized to information-states. After a short introductory chapter, I survey the relevant semantics literature in chapter 2 and provide a simplified contextualist semantics for the doxastic ‘should’, according to which the truth-conditions of sentences containing the doxastic ‘should’ vary with the information-state provided by their context of utterance.
In chapters 3 to 6, I discuss the different kinds of information-states the doxastic ‘should’ can be relativized to and how the respective relativization matters for normative epistemology. Chapter 3 argues that the doxastic ‘should’ has a subjective and an objective sense and that this distinction solves the apparent conflict between subjective epistemic norms and the truth norm for belief. Chapter 4 addresses the question of how one should react to misleading higher-order evidence. I propose that two seemingly opposing views on this issue, Steadfastness and Concilliationism, are both correct. In a sense of ‘should’ that is relativized to one’s first-order evidence, one should remain steadfast in the face of misleading higher-order evidence, but in another sense, which is relativized to one’s higher-order evidence, one shouldn’t. In chapters 5 and 6, I argue that when we advise others on what they should believe, we talk about what they should believe in light of their and our joint evidence. Chapter 7 concludes this thesis with a defence of contextualist semantics for the doxastic ‘should’ against truth-relativist challenges.
2016-12-01T00:00:00ZBecker, Sebastian Josef AlbrechtThis thesis explores the extent to which the doxastic ‘should’ is information-sensitive and the implications of this for a number of debates in normative epistemology. The doxastic ‘should’ is a special case of the deontic modal ‘should’ and occurs in sentences such as ‘You shouldn’t believe everything you read online’. In the recent semantics literature, it has been suggested that the deontic ‘should’ is information-sensitive, meaning that sentences of the form ‘S should do A’ are relativized to information-states. After a short introductory chapter, I survey the relevant semantics literature in chapter 2 and provide a simplified contextualist semantics for the doxastic ‘should’, according to which the truth-conditions of sentences containing the doxastic ‘should’ vary with the information-state provided by their context of utterance.
In chapters 3 to 6, I discuss the different kinds of information-states the doxastic ‘should’ can be relativized to and how the respective relativization matters for normative epistemology. Chapter 3 argues that the doxastic ‘should’ has a subjective and an objective sense and that this distinction solves the apparent conflict between subjective epistemic norms and the truth norm for belief. Chapter 4 addresses the question of how one should react to misleading higher-order evidence. I propose that two seemingly opposing views on this issue, Steadfastness and Concilliationism, are both correct. In a sense of ‘should’ that is relativized to one’s first-order evidence, one should remain steadfast in the face of misleading higher-order evidence, but in another sense, which is relativized to one’s higher-order evidence, one shouldn’t. In chapters 5 and 6, I argue that when we advise others on what they should believe, we talk about what they should believe in light of their and our joint evidence. Chapter 7 concludes this thesis with a defence of contextualist semantics for the doxastic ‘should’ against truth-relativist challenges.The Portuguese conquest of the Amazon Estuary : identity, war, frontier (1612-1654)
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9790
The Portuguese conquest and colonization of Brazil was mediated by the Tupi-Guarani societies that inhabited the Atlantic coast in a discontinuous pattern from the estuary of the River Plate to the mouth of the Amazon. In fact, the extension of Portuguese occupation coincides with the limits of expansion of these Tupi-Guarani societies in most regions, suggesting a historical relation with deep potential implications.
This work studies the conquest and construction of the Portuguese colonial frontier in the Lower Amazon and its estuary at the beginning of the XVIIth century, aiming to unveil the nature of the relations between Portuguese and Amerindian societies. The starting point is the hypothesis that the presence of Tupinamba societies from the Brazilian northeast, and of many other groups linked with them through language and culture, helped the Portuguese cause in their dispute for the control of the southern Amazon shores with other European competitors trading in the region. However, this very same dependency on the Tupinamba also acted as a brake on the Portuguese conquest as it headed north. This is supposed by the fact that almost no Tupi-Guarani traces have been recorded on the northern shore of the Amazon.
After analyzing native American dynamics in Brazil and Guayana, this work presents a detailed study of the battles and skirmishes fought by opposed European interests, and their natives allies, in the Amazon from 1616 to 1632. The last part is devoted to the analysis of the process of cultural construction on the colonial frontier, through conquest mechanisms that were also deployed on other colonial American frontiers. Among these mechanisms I emphasise the implementation of a set of institutions and the construction of a negative and savage native alterity through narratives that have been reproduced by the regional historiography.
2016-12-01T00:00:00ZIbáñez-Bonillo, PabloThe Portuguese conquest and colonization of Brazil was mediated by the Tupi-Guarani societies that inhabited the Atlantic coast in a discontinuous pattern from the estuary of the River Plate to the mouth of the Amazon. In fact, the extension of Portuguese occupation coincides with the limits of expansion of these Tupi-Guarani societies in most regions, suggesting a historical relation with deep potential implications.
This work studies the conquest and construction of the Portuguese colonial frontier in the Lower Amazon and its estuary at the beginning of the XVIIth century, aiming to unveil the nature of the relations between Portuguese and Amerindian societies. The starting point is the hypothesis that the presence of Tupinamba societies from the Brazilian northeast, and of many other groups linked with them through language and culture, helped the Portuguese cause in their dispute for the control of the southern Amazon shores with other European competitors trading in the region. However, this very same dependency on the Tupinamba also acted as a brake on the Portuguese conquest as it headed north. This is supposed by the fact that almost no Tupi-Guarani traces have been recorded on the northern shore of the Amazon.
After analyzing native American dynamics in Brazil and Guayana, this work presents a detailed study of the battles and skirmishes fought by opposed European interests, and their natives allies, in the Amazon from 1616 to 1632. The last part is devoted to the analysis of the process of cultural construction on the colonial frontier, through conquest mechanisms that were also deployed on other colonial American frontiers. Among these mechanisms I emphasise the implementation of a set of institutions and the construction of a negative and savage native alterity through narratives that have been reproduced by the regional historiography.The way of the unfinished : approaching migrant lives in São Paulo through resonance
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9785
In following several international migrants in the city of São Paulo, I found that inarticulate moments of hesitation, uncertainty, or suspension punctuated their trajectories. These fleeting and subtle instances revealed that people’s lives were pervaded by a certain ‘messiness’ that pointed out the limits of understanding life and the world through scientific standards of generalisation and coherence.
Requiring a different attitude concerning the making of anthropology, ‘messiness’ compelled my ethnographic account to admit that: firstly, people, places and situations, held a ‘mystery’ that my efforts of scientific disclosure could never clarify completely; secondly, each attempt to live in the world became a very singular experimentation.
In order to ethnographically do justice to the ‘mystery’ and ‘singularity’ I found in the lives I followed in São Paulo, this account found in Levinas’s work inspiration to develop a phenomenological approach. This phenomenological approach combined two movements. The first movement searched for a way of incorporating the faltering occasions of inarticulacy in people’s lives through imagination, signalling the limits of understanding these lives through objective knowledge, and proposing to appreciate them through processes of human recognition. This procedure was crafted as a ‘poetics of resonance’, an aesthetic operation converting lived experience into written expression in a way that imagination can offer a sense of what it is to live a particular life or experience in its richness. The second movement in this phenomenological approach refers to the recognition of a human life in its singularity, attempting to substantiate it ethnographically in the form of particular ‘life-journeys’, which is an approximation to what Levinas described as ‘uniqueness’.
As follows, seven specific life-journeys are presented, organised as ‘journeys of being’, ‘in-be(ing)tween journeys’, and ‘journeys of becoming’, according to the elements of affiliation each research participant stressed in their respective course shared with me.
From the richness of these ethnographic particulars, insights for migration and urban studies were derived from the phenomenological approach undertaken. The ethnographic evidence questioned a sense of complexity based on categorisation in migration studies and suggested that for the portrayed life-journeys a concept of immensity is more appropriate than a concept of identity. Concerning theories about the urban, the mobility manifested by the life-journeys in São Paulo and beyond conveyed, not a city of ethnic neighbourhoods, but a city of ‘rough’ experimentation, according to people’s positionality and their ability to find their own ways in the city and in the world.
2016-10-07T00:00:00ZToji, SimoneIn following several international migrants in the city of São Paulo, I found that inarticulate moments of hesitation, uncertainty, or suspension punctuated their trajectories. These fleeting and subtle instances revealed that people’s lives were pervaded by a certain ‘messiness’ that pointed out the limits of understanding life and the world through scientific standards of generalisation and coherence.
Requiring a different attitude concerning the making of anthropology, ‘messiness’ compelled my ethnographic account to admit that: firstly, people, places and situations, held a ‘mystery’ that my efforts of scientific disclosure could never clarify completely; secondly, each attempt to live in the world became a very singular experimentation.
In order to ethnographically do justice to the ‘mystery’ and ‘singularity’ I found in the lives I followed in São Paulo, this account found in Levinas’s work inspiration to develop a phenomenological approach. This phenomenological approach combined two movements. The first movement searched for a way of incorporating the faltering occasions of inarticulacy in people’s lives through imagination, signalling the limits of understanding these lives through objective knowledge, and proposing to appreciate them through processes of human recognition. This procedure was crafted as a ‘poetics of resonance’, an aesthetic operation converting lived experience into written expression in a way that imagination can offer a sense of what it is to live a particular life or experience in its richness. The second movement in this phenomenological approach refers to the recognition of a human life in its singularity, attempting to substantiate it ethnographically in the form of particular ‘life-journeys’, which is an approximation to what Levinas described as ‘uniqueness’.
As follows, seven specific life-journeys are presented, organised as ‘journeys of being’, ‘in-be(ing)tween journeys’, and ‘journeys of becoming’, according to the elements of affiliation each research participant stressed in their respective course shared with me.
From the richness of these ethnographic particulars, insights for migration and urban studies were derived from the phenomenological approach undertaken. The ethnographic evidence questioned a sense of complexity based on categorisation in migration studies and suggested that for the portrayed life-journeys a concept of immensity is more appropriate than a concept of identity. Concerning theories about the urban, the mobility manifested by the life-journeys in São Paulo and beyond conveyed, not a city of ethnic neighbourhoods, but a city of ‘rough’ experimentation, according to people’s positionality and their ability to find their own ways in the city and in the world.Debating irony and the ironic as a social phenomenon and a human capacity
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9747
What follows is a set of paired articles, followed by a statement by both authors where they debate their distinct positions. Both articles treat irony, but while Rapport looks to it as a possible liberal virtue, a means of dealing with radical difference in a modern democracy, including the illiberal, Stade approaches irony from an ontological position that considers social relationships and cultural contingencies to be but one facet of human existence and irony and alienation to have an existential depth, the study of which can facilitate a rapprochement between sociocultural and philosophical anthropology. The paired articles are pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, perhaps: irony as world-mocking as well as world-tolerant.
2014-11-01T00:00:00ZRapport, Nigel JulianStade, RonaldWhat follows is a set of paired articles, followed by a statement by both authors where they debate their distinct positions. Both articles treat irony, but while Rapport looks to it as a possible liberal virtue, a means of dealing with radical difference in a modern democracy, including the illiberal, Stade approaches irony from an ontological position that considers social relationships and cultural contingencies to be but one facet of human existence and irony and alienation to have an existential depth, the study of which can facilitate a rapprochement between sociocultural and philosophical anthropology. The paired articles are pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, perhaps: irony as world-mocking as well as world-tolerant.The foundations of linguistics : mathematics, models, and structures
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9584
The philosophy of linguistics is a rich philosophical domain which encompasses various disciplines. One of the aims of this thesis is to unite theoretical linguistics, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of science (particularly mathematics and modelling) and the ontology of language. Each part of the research presented here targets separate but related goals with the unified aim of bringing greater clarity to the foundations of linguistics from a philosophical perspective.
Part I is devoted to the methodology of linguistics in terms of scientific modelling. I argue against both the Conceptualist and Platonist (as well as Pluralist) interpretations of linguistic theory by means of three grades of mathematical involvement for linguistic grammars. Part II explores the specific models of syntactic and semantics by an analogy with the harder sciences. In Part III, I develop a novel account of linguistic ontology and in the process comment on the type-token distinction, the role and connection with mathematics and the nature of linguistic objects.
In this research, I offer a structural realist interpretation of linguistic methodology with a nuanced structuralist picture for its ontology. This proposal is informed by historical and current work in theoretical linguistics as well as philosophical views on ontology, scientific modelling and mathematics.
2016-11-30T00:00:00ZNefdt, Ryan MarkThe philosophy of linguistics is a rich philosophical domain which encompasses various disciplines. One of the aims of this thesis is to unite theoretical linguistics, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of science (particularly mathematics and modelling) and the ontology of language. Each part of the research presented here targets separate but related goals with the unified aim of bringing greater clarity to the foundations of linguistics from a philosophical perspective.
Part I is devoted to the methodology of linguistics in terms of scientific modelling. I argue against both the Conceptualist and Platonist (as well as Pluralist) interpretations of linguistic theory by means of three grades of mathematical involvement for linguistic grammars. Part II explores the specific models of syntactic and semantics by an analogy with the harder sciences. In Part III, I develop a novel account of linguistic ontology and in the process comment on the type-token distinction, the role and connection with mathematics and the nature of linguistic objects.
In this research, I offer a structural realist interpretation of linguistic methodology with a nuanced structuralist picture for its ontology. This proposal is informed by historical and current work in theoretical linguistics as well as philosophical views on ontology, scientific modelling and mathematics.A response to external world scepticism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9502
In this thesis I give a response to external world scepticism. I first argue that
scepticism arises when we accept that it is an empirical question whether I
am in a sceptical scenario, that is, a scenario in which my beliefs are
coherent, and yet my empirical beliefs are false. The idea that it is an
empirical question whether I am in a sceptical scenario gets its plausibility
from the realist claim that our empirical beliefs have an objective subject
matter. I then attempt to give a response to scepticism that is compatible
with this realist claim. Three promising responses to scepticism are
considered, but are found to be inadequate. Seeing why these responses are
inadequate helps us to appreciate some of the conditions on an adequate
response to scepticism. By drawing on the work of Donald Davidson I
develop a response to scepticism that is compatible with the realist claim,
and that meets these conditions. According to this response, when we get
clear about the concept of belief we see that sceptical scenarios are a
conceptual impossibility. Thus, just as it is not an empirical question
whether I am a married bachelor, it is not an empirical question whether I
am in a sceptical scenario, and the argument for scepticism breaks down.
2015-01-01T00:00:00ZThorpe, JoshuaIn this thesis I give a response to external world scepticism. I first argue that
scepticism arises when we accept that it is an empirical question whether I
am in a sceptical scenario, that is, a scenario in which my beliefs are
coherent, and yet my empirical beliefs are false. The idea that it is an
empirical question whether I am in a sceptical scenario gets its plausibility
from the realist claim that our empirical beliefs have an objective subject
matter. I then attempt to give a response to scepticism that is compatible
with this realist claim. Three promising responses to scepticism are
considered, but are found to be inadequate. Seeing why these responses are
inadequate helps us to appreciate some of the conditions on an adequate
response to scepticism. By drawing on the work of Donald Davidson I
develop a response to scepticism that is compatible with the realist claim,
and that meets these conditions. According to this response, when we get
clear about the concept of belief we see that sceptical scenarios are a
conceptual impossibility. Thus, just as it is not an empirical question
whether I am a married bachelor, it is not an empirical question whether I
am in a sceptical scenario, and the argument for scepticism breaks down.Bridging worlds : movement, relatedness and social change in two communities of Cartagena de Indias Bay
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9499
The island of Barú, located along the Atlantic coast of Colombia, has occupied, since the
colonial era, a geographical and social interstitial position. The island was a strategic space
in key processes and events of colonial and national modernity. Its inhabitants have combined
movement and interaction across geographical spaces and social groups with retreat and
relative closure.
The historical experiences of dislocation and of marginality have shaped local modes of
relatedness and particular ways of signifying and narrating “family”, masculinities and
femininities, the divine and the wondrous.
State and capital’s progressive encroachment over the Island trans-territory has recently
undergone a conspicuous acceleration. Moreover, new religious organizations have
influenced the ways in which people think and talk about identity, local forms of sociality and
religiosity.
“Development” and ethnicity-based identity politics have functioned as identity-,
community- and memory (re-)making devices. Various political and economic actors
currently envision and try to implement projects of “place” which commoditize the island and
aim to reshape local subjectivities and relational modes according to market-oriented values.
2015-01-01T00:00:00ZBasso, CristinaThe island of Barú, located along the Atlantic coast of Colombia, has occupied, since the
colonial era, a geographical and social interstitial position. The island was a strategic space
in key processes and events of colonial and national modernity. Its inhabitants have combined
movement and interaction across geographical spaces and social groups with retreat and
relative closure.
The historical experiences of dislocation and of marginality have shaped local modes of
relatedness and particular ways of signifying and narrating “family”, masculinities and
femininities, the divine and the wondrous.
State and capital’s progressive encroachment over the Island trans-territory has recently
undergone a conspicuous acceleration. Moreover, new religious organizations have
influenced the ways in which people think and talk about identity, local forms of sociality and
religiosity.
“Development” and ethnicity-based identity politics have functioned as identity-,
community- and memory (re-)making devices. Various political and economic actors
currently envision and try to implement projects of “place” which commoditize the island and
aim to reshape local subjectivities and relational modes according to market-oriented values.A fragmented world
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9498
Objects often manifest themselves in incompatible ways across perspectives
that are on a par. Phenomena of this kind have been responsible for crucial
revisions to our conception of the world, both philosophical and scientific.
The standard response to them is to deny that the way things appear from
different perspectives are ways things really are out there, a response that
is based on an implicit metaphysical assumption that the world is a unified whole. This dissertation explores the possibility that this assumption is
false, that the world is fragmented instead of unified. On the proposed understanding
of such worldly fragmentation, there is a notion of co-obtainment
according to which two facts may obtain without co-obtaining. Since not every
fact that obtains also co-obtains with every other fact, two incompatible
facts may both obtain, as long as they do not co-obtain in the introduced
sense. The possibility of such fragmentation sheds new light on a range of
phenomena. It allows us to explore a view of time that takes the notion of
passage as its defining primitive. It bolsters a no-subject view of experience
against the objection that it leads to solipsism. It allows a realist view about
colours to withstand the objection from conflicting appearances. And, it
makes room for a view on which things really have the properties that are
attributed to objects and events across different frames of reference, such as
length, mass, duration and simultaneity. Overall, fragmentalism changes the
way in which the manifest image feeds into an objective conception of the
world: what is manifest to us is not misleading in what sort of properties it
shows the world to have, it's only misleading in making it seem more unified
than it really is.
2015-01-01T00:00:00ZLipman, Martin A.Objects often manifest themselves in incompatible ways across perspectives
that are on a par. Phenomena of this kind have been responsible for crucial
revisions to our conception of the world, both philosophical and scientific.
The standard response to them is to deny that the way things appear from
different perspectives are ways things really are out there, a response that
is based on an implicit metaphysical assumption that the world is a unified whole. This dissertation explores the possibility that this assumption is
false, that the world is fragmented instead of unified. On the proposed understanding
of such worldly fragmentation, there is a notion of co-obtainment
according to which two facts may obtain without co-obtaining. Since not every
fact that obtains also co-obtains with every other fact, two incompatible
facts may both obtain, as long as they do not co-obtain in the introduced
sense. The possibility of such fragmentation sheds new light on a range of
phenomena. It allows us to explore a view of time that takes the notion of
passage as its defining primitive. It bolsters a no-subject view of experience
against the objection that it leads to solipsism. It allows a realist view about
colours to withstand the objection from conflicting appearances. And, it
makes room for a view on which things really have the properties that are
attributed to objects and events across different frames of reference, such as
length, mass, duration and simultaneity. Overall, fragmentalism changes the
way in which the manifest image feeds into an objective conception of the
world: what is manifest to us is not misleading in what sort of properties it
shows the world to have, it's only misleading in making it seem more unified
than it really is.The perpetual return of the ancestors : an ethnographic account of the Southern Tepehuan of Mexico and their deities
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9478
This thesis is an ethnographic account of the different ritual domains of
interaction between the O’dam of Northern Mexico and their gods. For the
O’dam, also known as the Southern Tepehuan, gods, divinities, and different
types of spirits have an ancestral character since they are considered as the
original inhabitants of the world. It is possible to identify three groups of deities
which the O’dam interact with within different ceremonial contexts. Firstly, there
are the native ceremonial centres known as xiotalh patios, where the O’dam
engage with the gods of agriculture, and hunt. Here, children are initiated in
maize-eating, young men are initiated in deer hunting, and the kinship groups
renew their vows with the gods of maize. Secondly, within the context of the
church and the courthouse, the O’dam interact with the Christian deities through
a complex organisation inherited from the Spanish cofradías and cabildos. This
group of deities is associated with European activities such as breeding
livestock, going to school, and participating in local politics. These relationships
between the O’dam and the Christian deities are mainly reproduced by the
participation in church festivals. And thirdly, in the domain of the forest the
O’dam conduct retreats during five weeks in which they interact with deities and
spirits associated with different types of diseases. Since this is the context of
shamanic initiation, it is here that individuals learn how to master the spirits
responsible for inflicting illnesses, emerging from the retreats with stronger
souls which are more resilient to harm. In this work, I approach these three
different domains of interaction between the O’dam and their deities from the
perspective of ceremonial leaders and shamans, as well as from the
perspective of what can be defined as an ‘ordinary person’.
2015-01-01T00:00:00ZReyes Valdez, Jorge AntonioThis thesis is an ethnographic account of the different ritual domains of
interaction between the O’dam of Northern Mexico and their gods. For the
O’dam, also known as the Southern Tepehuan, gods, divinities, and different
types of spirits have an ancestral character since they are considered as the
original inhabitants of the world. It is possible to identify three groups of deities
which the O’dam interact with within different ceremonial contexts. Firstly, there
are the native ceremonial centres known as xiotalh patios, where the O’dam
engage with the gods of agriculture, and hunt. Here, children are initiated in
maize-eating, young men are initiated in deer hunting, and the kinship groups
renew their vows with the gods of maize. Secondly, within the context of the
church and the courthouse, the O’dam interact with the Christian deities through
a complex organisation inherited from the Spanish cofradías and cabildos. This
group of deities is associated with European activities such as breeding
livestock, going to school, and participating in local politics. These relationships
between the O’dam and the Christian deities are mainly reproduced by the
participation in church festivals. And thirdly, in the domain of the forest the
O’dam conduct retreats during five weeks in which they interact with deities and
spirits associated with different types of diseases. Since this is the context of
shamanic initiation, it is here that individuals learn how to master the spirits
responsible for inflicting illnesses, emerging from the retreats with stronger
souls which are more resilient to harm. In this work, I approach these three
different domains of interaction between the O’dam and their deities from the
perspective of ceremonial leaders and shamans, as well as from the
perspective of what can be defined as an ‘ordinary person’.Expanding individualism : moral responsibility for social structural harms
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9473
The central concern of this thesis is the examination of individual agents’ moral responsibilities
in large-scale social structures. I begin with a discussion of the emergence of social structural
harm and the history of the collective responsibility debate. I suggest that previous attempts to
make accurate responsibility ascriptions in cases of social structural harm have fallen short,
leaving responsibility for the harm caused underdetermined. Arguing that collectivist approaches
to large-scale harms are inadequate, because those participating in social structures cannot satisfy
the criteria for responsibility-bearing groups required by these accounts, I turn to an attempt to
provide an individualist account of responsibility in these cases presented by Young. I argue that
there are many interesting ideas in her work that support an account of collective responsibility
for social structures, but that her specific attempt to develop a new kind of non-moral
responsibility ultimately fails. I therefore examine an alternative account of joint responsibility
based on agent motivation and attitude presented by Bjornsson, who focusses on the reasons why
agents become involved and complicit in collective harms. Through the further development of
Bjornsson’s discussion of the importance of agent motivation and participation in harmful
practices, and Young’s analysis of the relationship between individual agents and social
structures, I suggest an alternative approach to analysing social structural harm: expanded
individualism. To support this account, I analyse the ways in which agents come to be involved
in these harms in a blameworthy manner, and the reasons why participation makes individuals
responsible for addressing the harms caused by the social structures in which they participate.
2015-01-01T00:00:00ZCurzon, Rebecca Elizabeth MaryThe central concern of this thesis is the examination of individual agents’ moral responsibilities
in large-scale social structures. I begin with a discussion of the emergence of social structural
harm and the history of the collective responsibility debate. I suggest that previous attempts to
make accurate responsibility ascriptions in cases of social structural harm have fallen short,
leaving responsibility for the harm caused underdetermined. Arguing that collectivist approaches
to large-scale harms are inadequate, because those participating in social structures cannot satisfy
the criteria for responsibility-bearing groups required by these accounts, I turn to an attempt to
provide an individualist account of responsibility in these cases presented by Young. I argue that
there are many interesting ideas in her work that support an account of collective responsibility
for social structures, but that her specific attempt to develop a new kind of non-moral
responsibility ultimately fails. I therefore examine an alternative account of joint responsibility
based on agent motivation and attitude presented by Bjornsson, who focusses on the reasons why
agents become involved and complicit in collective harms. Through the further development of
Bjornsson’s discussion of the importance of agent motivation and participation in harmful
practices, and Young’s analysis of the relationship between individual agents and social
structures, I suggest an alternative approach to analysing social structural harm: expanded
individualism. To support this account, I analyse the ways in which agents come to be involved
in these harms in a blameworthy manner, and the reasons why participation makes individuals
responsible for addressing the harms caused by the social structures in which they participate.Disagreement and philosophical method
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9458
This dissertation is primarily concerned with the subjects of disagreement,
argument, and the methodology of philosophy. The first chapter sets out and
attempts to answer the question of what the connection between disagreement
and disputing is. The second chapter is primarily a investigation into the nature
of verbal disputes. The answer the chapter puts forward is that there is a
justificatory relation (or at least we behave as if there is one) between disagreeing
and disputing, so that, for example, if two parties do not disagree in the right
way, then they (prima facie) should not dispute. In the second chapter I will look at
a few theories of verbal disputes, and I will discuss some of the features such a
theory should have. I go on to explicitly endorse a version of David Chalmers's
theory of verbal disputes, and defend it from some potential objections. The third
chapter is a defence of the method of conceptual analysis in philosophy. I
introduce some potential objections to the Canberra plan style of conceptual
analysis, and show how a different conception of conceptual analyses could get
over these problems. The conception of conceptual analysis I argue for is heavily
inspired by Rudolf Carnap's system of explication. The main way Carnapian
explication would differ from the Canberra plan style of conceptual analysis is in
the way that it would allow one to move further away from the original concept
in analysing it, by balancing closeness to the original concept against other
specific criteria.
2015-01-01T00:00:00ZCook, JamesThis dissertation is primarily concerned with the subjects of disagreement,
argument, and the methodology of philosophy. The first chapter sets out and
attempts to answer the question of what the connection between disagreement
and disputing is. The second chapter is primarily a investigation into the nature
of verbal disputes. The answer the chapter puts forward is that there is a
justificatory relation (or at least we behave as if there is one) between disagreeing
and disputing, so that, for example, if two parties do not disagree in the right
way, then they (prima facie) should not dispute. In the second chapter I will look at
a few theories of verbal disputes, and I will discuss some of the features such a
theory should have. I go on to explicitly endorse a version of David Chalmers's
theory of verbal disputes, and defend it from some potential objections. The third
chapter is a defence of the method of conceptual analysis in philosophy. I
introduce some potential objections to the Canberra plan style of conceptual
analysis, and show how a different conception of conceptual analyses could get
over these problems. The conception of conceptual analysis I argue for is heavily
inspired by Rudolf Carnap's system of explication. The main way Carnapian
explication would differ from the Canberra plan style of conceptual analysis is in
the way that it would allow one to move further away from the original concept
in analysing it, by balancing closeness to the original concept against other
specific criteria.How is the culpability we assign to recklessness best accounted for in criminal law?
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9457
In order to be properly applied, criminal law must determine what conduct warrants
punitive action. Figuring out exactly how one must act to be criminally liable is a
difficulty that faces any legal system. In many jurisdictions criminal recklessness is
regarded as an important notion for liability. However, recklessness is difficult to define,
and attempts at this exercise have been a problem in legal philosophy since the mid-twentieth century, and persist today (Crosby 2008). This thesis discusses accounts of
recklessness with the aim of defining it in a way that overcomes several problems which
have arisen in recent legal history. It is widely accepted, as well as prima facie intuitive,
that people can be culpable for acts committed recklessly. Despite this, whether or not a
state of mind is reckless is difficult to define, let alone define in a way that is not only
conceptually sound, but also pragmatically apt.
Recklessness occurs when an agent engages in some risky activity, but factors like
the agent’s attitude and whether the risk is foreseen have been cited as relevant when
ascertaining their recklessness. I discuss some difficulties in legally framing
recklessness, before criticising some definitional manoeuvres made by judges and
scholars in the past. With some problems in previous accounts noted, I consider the
foundations of culpability in general. I suggest that two accounts of culpability – the
agency theory and the choice theory – are both plausible, and each correlates to a
prominent contemporary position on recklessness (and criminal law in general). After
serious consideration of both positions, I conclude that the position advocated by
Antony Duff, which I see as in keeping with the agency theory of culpability, is both
more generally useful for criminal law and much more coherent with our everyday
practices of blaming and punishing.
2014-01-01T00:00:00ZSlater, JoeIn order to be properly applied, criminal law must determine what conduct warrants
punitive action. Figuring out exactly how one must act to be criminally liable is a
difficulty that faces any legal system. In many jurisdictions criminal recklessness is
regarded as an important notion for liability. However, recklessness is difficult to define,
and attempts at this exercise have been a problem in legal philosophy since the mid-twentieth century, and persist today (Crosby 2008). This thesis discusses accounts of
recklessness with the aim of defining it in a way that overcomes several problems which
have arisen in recent legal history. It is widely accepted, as well as prima facie intuitive,
that people can be culpable for acts committed recklessly. Despite this, whether or not a
state of mind is reckless is difficult to define, let alone define in a way that is not only
conceptually sound, but also pragmatically apt.
Recklessness occurs when an agent engages in some risky activity, but factors like
the agent’s attitude and whether the risk is foreseen have been cited as relevant when
ascertaining their recklessness. I discuss some difficulties in legally framing
recklessness, before criticising some definitional manoeuvres made by judges and
scholars in the past. With some problems in previous accounts noted, I consider the
foundations of culpability in general. I suggest that two accounts of culpability – the
agency theory and the choice theory – are both plausible, and each correlates to a
prominent contemporary position on recklessness (and criminal law in general). After
serious consideration of both positions, I conclude that the position advocated by
Antony Duff, which I see as in keeping with the agency theory of culpability, is both
more generally useful for criminal law and much more coherent with our everyday
practices of blaming and punishing.Foundational issues in the metaphysics of David Lewis
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9454
Few contributions in the field of metaphysics can be compared, for their depth and impact, to
the work of the American philosopher David K. Lewis. A feature of this work, which partly
explain its great appeal, is its systematicity. Lewis’s views on intrinsicality, naturalness,
supervenience, mind and modality, to mention just a few themes, constitute a unified and
connected body of doctrines. As Lewis himself acknowledged in the introduction to the first
volume of collected papers: “I should have liked to be a piecemeal, unsystematic philosopher,
offering independent proposals on a variety of topics. It was not to be” (Lewis 1983, p. XI).
Surely there is an element of beauty in this systematicity. But there is also an element of
precariousness. For a body of doctrines has some vital organs: claims or assumptions that are so
central to the life of the system that, if one were to reject them, the system as a whole would
likely collapse. This seems to be true, in particular, of Lewis’s metaphysical system. What I
present here are two investigations concerning, respectively, the problem of ontic vagueness and
the existence of a fundamental level. I believe that the evaluation of these two issues is of vital
importance for assessing the tenability of Lewis’s systematic metaphysics.
There is a general worry lurking behind my discussion, which it’s worth making explicit
here. The worry is that, if the justification for Lewis’s claims on ontic vagueness and
fundamentality turned out to be wanting or otherwise unsatisfactory, and if I am right to think
that these theses are part of a number of central claims constituting the basis of his metaphysical
system, then it seems we should start being suspicious of the very tenability of the Lewisian
metaphysics as a whole.
What I will be arguing for in the two main chapters of this dissertation provides, in my view,
enough material for a modest defense of Lewis’s views on ontic vagueness and fundamentality.
I will clarify the content of this modest defense, and explain its significance for the development
of the contemporary debate in metaphysics, as well as for a redefinition of a kind of Lewisian
metaphysics, in a brief note at the end of the introduction.
2014-01-01T00:00:00ZNappo, FrancescoFew contributions in the field of metaphysics can be compared, for their depth and impact, to
the work of the American philosopher David K. Lewis. A feature of this work, which partly
explain its great appeal, is its systematicity. Lewis’s views on intrinsicality, naturalness,
supervenience, mind and modality, to mention just a few themes, constitute a unified and
connected body of doctrines. As Lewis himself acknowledged in the introduction to the first
volume of collected papers: “I should have liked to be a piecemeal, unsystematic philosopher,
offering independent proposals on a variety of topics. It was not to be” (Lewis 1983, p. XI).
Surely there is an element of beauty in this systematicity. But there is also an element of
precariousness. For a body of doctrines has some vital organs: claims or assumptions that are so
central to the life of the system that, if one were to reject them, the system as a whole would
likely collapse. This seems to be true, in particular, of Lewis’s metaphysical system. What I
present here are two investigations concerning, respectively, the problem of ontic vagueness and
the existence of a fundamental level. I believe that the evaluation of these two issues is of vital
importance for assessing the tenability of Lewis’s systematic metaphysics.
There is a general worry lurking behind my discussion, which it’s worth making explicit
here. The worry is that, if the justification for Lewis’s claims on ontic vagueness and
fundamentality turned out to be wanting or otherwise unsatisfactory, and if I am right to think
that these theses are part of a number of central claims constituting the basis of his metaphysical
system, then it seems we should start being suspicious of the very tenability of the Lewisian
metaphysics as a whole.
What I will be arguing for in the two main chapters of this dissertation provides, in my view,
enough material for a modest defense of Lewis’s views on ontic vagueness and fundamentality.
I will clarify the content of this modest defense, and explain its significance for the development
of the contemporary debate in metaphysics, as well as for a redefinition of a kind of Lewisian
metaphysics, in a brief note at the end of the introduction.Davidson, interpretation and values
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9452
The broad aim of this research is to outline, assess and elaborate on Davidson’s work on
radical interpretation and its connections to his understanding of values, and particularly on
his understanding of the nature of ethical judgments and concepts.
The central idea that I consider is that the principle of charity must play much the same role
in the attribution of values to a speaker as it does in the attribution of beliefs. This is taken
to show that certain general claims about the content of propositional attitudes, which
Davidson thinks follow from the consideration of radical interpretation, can be applied to
values as well as beliefs.
2014-01-01T00:00:00ZPayne, SimonThe broad aim of this research is to outline, assess and elaborate on Davidson’s work on
radical interpretation and its connections to his understanding of values, and particularly on
his understanding of the nature of ethical judgments and concepts.
The central idea that I consider is that the principle of charity must play much the same role
in the attribution of values to a speaker as it does in the attribution of beliefs. This is taken
to show that certain general claims about the content of propositional attitudes, which
Davidson thinks follow from the consideration of radical interpretation, can be applied to
values as well as beliefs.Schellenberg on the epistemic force of experience
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9389
According to Schellenberg, our perceptual experiences have the epistemic force they do because they are exercises of certain sorts of capacity, namely capacities to discriminate particulars—objects, property-instances and events—in a sensory mode. She calls her account the ‘‘capacity view.’’ In this paper, I will raise three concerns about Schellenberg’s capacity view. The first is whether we might do better to leave capacities out of our epistemology and take content properties as the fundamental epistemically relevant features of experiences. I argue we would. The second is whether Schellenberg’s appeal to factive and phenomenal evidence accommodates the intuitive verdicts about the bad case that she claims it does. I argue it does not. The third is whether Schellenberg’s account of factive evidence is adequate to capture nuances concerning the justification for singular but non demonstrative perceptual beliefs, such as the belief that’s NN, where NN is a proper name. I argue it is not. If I am right, these points suggest a mental-state-first account of perceptual justification, rather than a capacity-first account, and one which treats the good and bad cases alike in respect of justification and complicates the relation between perceptual content and what one is justified in believing.
2016-04-01T00:00:00ZMcGrath, MatthewAccording to Schellenberg, our perceptual experiences have the epistemic force they do because they are exercises of certain sorts of capacity, namely capacities to discriminate particulars—objects, property-instances and events—in a sensory mode. She calls her account the ‘‘capacity view.’’ In this paper, I will raise three concerns about Schellenberg’s capacity view. The first is whether we might do better to leave capacities out of our epistemology and take content properties as the fundamental epistemically relevant features of experiences. I argue we would. The second is whether Schellenberg’s appeal to factive and phenomenal evidence accommodates the intuitive verdicts about the bad case that she claims it does. I argue it does not. The third is whether Schellenberg’s account of factive evidence is adequate to capture nuances concerning the justification for singular but non demonstrative perceptual beliefs, such as the belief that’s NN, where NN is a proper name. I argue it is not. If I am right, these points suggest a mental-state-first account of perceptual justification, rather than a capacity-first account, and one which treats the good and bad cases alike in respect of justification and complicates the relation between perceptual content and what one is justified in believing.Understanding Bernard Williams's criticism of Aristotelian naturalism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9315
In Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (henceforth ELP) Williams claims that holding a naturalistic
Aristotelian ethical theory is no longer an option for us—we cannot believe what Aristotle believed
about human beings. It is the purpose of this thesis to understand what Williams means by this claim
and to evaluate whether or not it constitutes a pressing argument against Aristotelian naturalism.
The modern Aristotelian (represented here by Martha Nussbaum, Philippa Foot and Rosalind
Hursthouse) seems to be untouched by the claim as presented—they do not have to hold Aristotle’s
view of human nature. The Aristotelian approaches human nature, not from an “outside” perspective,
like the scientist, but from an “inside” perspective—from the point of view of an ethically engaged
agent. The method does not seek to use a theory-independent notion of human nature to vindicate the
Aristotelian claim that the properly functioning human being is virtuous. Rather, the Aristotelian is
engaged in a project of using the notions of virtue that we already possess, to paint a picture of the
kind of lives that we can all identify with, and endorse as properly functioning.
However, there is a reading of Williams’s claim, which I draw from his replies to Nussbaum
(in Mind, World and Ethics) and his essay “St Just’s Illusion”, according to which he accuses the
Aristotelian, who attempts to reach human nature from the “inside”, of forgetting, that part of that
reflection from the inside, will constitute a consciousness of oneself as an evolved creature.
Understanding that human beings are evolved creatures, a “bricolage of powers and instincts”, should
temper one’s reflection on the idea that any one life could constitute proper human functioning, as it
must make us aware of the many lives that it is possible for a human being to lead.
2016-06-01T00:00:00ZAddison, MichaelIn Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (henceforth ELP) Williams claims that holding a naturalistic
Aristotelian ethical theory is no longer an option for us—we cannot believe what Aristotle believed
about human beings. It is the purpose of this thesis to understand what Williams means by this claim
and to evaluate whether or not it constitutes a pressing argument against Aristotelian naturalism.
The modern Aristotelian (represented here by Martha Nussbaum, Philippa Foot and Rosalind
Hursthouse) seems to be untouched by the claim as presented—they do not have to hold Aristotle’s
view of human nature. The Aristotelian approaches human nature, not from an “outside” perspective,
like the scientist, but from an “inside” perspective—from the point of view of an ethically engaged
agent. The method does not seek to use a theory-independent notion of human nature to vindicate the
Aristotelian claim that the properly functioning human being is virtuous. Rather, the Aristotelian is
engaged in a project of using the notions of virtue that we already possess, to paint a picture of the
kind of lives that we can all identify with, and endorse as properly functioning.
However, there is a reading of Williams’s claim, which I draw from his replies to Nussbaum
(in Mind, World and Ethics) and his essay “St Just’s Illusion”, according to which he accuses the
Aristotelian, who attempts to reach human nature from the “inside”, of forgetting, that part of that
reflection from the inside, will constitute a consciousness of oneself as an evolved creature.
Understanding that human beings are evolved creatures, a “bricolage of powers and instincts”, should
temper one’s reflection on the idea that any one life could constitute proper human functioning, as it
must make us aware of the many lives that it is possible for a human being to lead.What is a schema? : Invited contribution to symposium on Philippe Descola
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9165
Comment on Descola, Philippe. 2013. Beyond nature and culture. Translated by Janet Lloyd with a foreword by Marshall Sahlins. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
2014-01-01T00:00:00ZToren, ChristinaComment on Descola, Philippe. 2013. Beyond nature and culture. Translated by Janet Lloyd with a foreword by Marshall Sahlins. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Reply to Blackson
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9120
Thomas Blackson argues that interest-relative epistemologies cannot explain the irrationality of certain choices when the agent has three possible options. I argue that his examples only refute a subclass of interest-relative theories. In particular, they are good objections to theories that say that what an agent knows depends on the stakes involved in the gambles that she faces. But they are not good objections to theories that say that what an agent knows depends on the odds involved in the gambles that she faces. Indeed, the latter class of theories does a better job than interest-invariant epistemologies of explaining the phenomena he describes.
2016-01-01T00:00:00ZWeatherson, Brian JamesThomas Blackson argues that interest-relative epistemologies cannot explain the irrationality of certain choices when the agent has three possible options. I argue that his examples only refute a subclass of interest-relative theories. In particular, they are good objections to theories that say that what an agent knows depends on the stakes involved in the gambles that she faces. But they are not good objections to theories that say that what an agent knows depends on the odds involved in the gambles that she faces. Indeed, the latter class of theories does a better job than interest-invariant epistemologies of explaining the phenomena he describes.Feminist methodologies in moral philosophy
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9107
This thesis develops a critique of the methodology of mainstream academic moral philosophy,
based on insights from feminist and more generally anti-oppressive political thought. The thesis
consists of two parts.
In the first, I loosely characterise a certain dominant methodology of philosophy, one based
on giving an important epistemological role to existing, 'pre-theoretical' moral attitudes, such as
intuitions. I then argue that such methodologies may be critiqued on the basis of theories that
identify these moral attitudes as problematically rooted in oppressive social institutions, such as
patriarchy and white supremacy; that is, I identify these attitudes as ideological, and so a poor
guide to moral reality.
In the second part, I identify and explore of a number of themes and tendencies from
feminist, anti-racist, and other anti-oppressive traditions of research and activism, in order to draw
out the implications of these themes for the methodology of moral philosophy. The first issue I
examine is that of how, and how much, moral philosophers should use abstraction; I eventually
use the concept of intersectionality to argue for the position that philosophers need to use less, and
a different type of, abstraction. The second major theme I examine is that of ignorance, in the
context of alternative epistemologies: standpoint epistemology and epistemologies of ignorance. I
argue that philosophers must not take themselves to be well placed to understand, using solitary
methodologies, any topic of moral interest. Finally, I examine the theme of transformation in moral
philosophy. I argue that experiencing certain kinds of personal transformation may be an essential
part of developing accurate ethical views, and I draw out the political implications of this position
for the methodology of moral philosophy.
2016-06-23T00:00:00ZMarkey, Bren AprilThis thesis develops a critique of the methodology of mainstream academic moral philosophy,
based on insights from feminist and more generally anti-oppressive political thought. The thesis
consists of two parts.
In the first, I loosely characterise a certain dominant methodology of philosophy, one based
on giving an important epistemological role to existing, 'pre-theoretical' moral attitudes, such as
intuitions. I then argue that such methodologies may be critiqued on the basis of theories that
identify these moral attitudes as problematically rooted in oppressive social institutions, such as
patriarchy and white supremacy; that is, I identify these attitudes as ideological, and so a poor
guide to moral reality.
In the second part, I identify and explore of a number of themes and tendencies from
feminist, anti-racist, and other anti-oppressive traditions of research and activism, in order to draw
out the implications of these themes for the methodology of moral philosophy. The first issue I
examine is that of how, and how much, moral philosophers should use abstraction; I eventually
use the concept of intersectionality to argue for the position that philosophers need to use less, and
a different type of, abstraction. The second major theme I examine is that of ignorance, in the
context of alternative epistemologies: standpoint epistemology and epistemologies of ignorance. I
argue that philosophers must not take themselves to be well placed to understand, using solitary
methodologies, any topic of moral interest. Finally, I examine the theme of transformation in moral
philosophy. I argue that experiencing certain kinds of personal transformation may be an essential
part of developing accurate ethical views, and I draw out the political implications of this position
for the methodology of moral philosophy.Full-bloodedness, modesty and minimalist truth
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9032
This thesis discusses the central ideas that surround Michael Dummett’s claim that there is an incompatibility between a truth-conditional conception of meaning and a minimalist conception of truth. These ideas are brought into relation to the work of John McDowell and Donald Davidson, as all three philosophers can be better understood by locating them within Dummett’s dialectic regarding the incompatibility. Dummett’s argument crucially depends upon the assumption that a meaning-theory should be full-blooded in nature, against McDowell’s insistence that a meaning-theory can only ever be modest. The main contention of this thesis is that neither Dummett nor McDowell is successful in establishing their strong contentions regarding the form that a meaning-theory should take. McDowell only wants to provide trivial answers to questions about the constitutive nature of the meanings and competency of particular items in a language. Dummett, on the other hand, wants to provide a reductive account of the central concepts that concern the philosophy of language. What this thesis will argue is that once both of these claims have been rejected, the position Dummett and McDowell jointly dictate is in fact the position that we should read Davidson as occupying, who lies in a conceptual space between the extremes of maximal full-bloodedness and modesty. This is an understanding of Davidson that is contrary to how McDowell reads him, who has been an influential commentator of Davidson. How Davidson should actually be interpreted is achieved by understanding how he has the resources to avoid Dummett’s claim of an incompatibility between a truth-conditional conception of meaning and a minimalist conception of truth.
2016-06-23T00:00:00ZBillinge, DanielThis thesis discusses the central ideas that surround Michael Dummett’s claim that there is an incompatibility between a truth-conditional conception of meaning and a minimalist conception of truth. These ideas are brought into relation to the work of John McDowell and Donald Davidson, as all three philosophers can be better understood by locating them within Dummett’s dialectic regarding the incompatibility. Dummett’s argument crucially depends upon the assumption that a meaning-theory should be full-blooded in nature, against McDowell’s insistence that a meaning-theory can only ever be modest. The main contention of this thesis is that neither Dummett nor McDowell is successful in establishing their strong contentions regarding the form that a meaning-theory should take. McDowell only wants to provide trivial answers to questions about the constitutive nature of the meanings and competency of particular items in a language. Dummett, on the other hand, wants to provide a reductive account of the central concepts that concern the philosophy of language. What this thesis will argue is that once both of these claims have been rejected, the position Dummett and McDowell jointly dictate is in fact the position that we should read Davidson as occupying, who lies in a conceptual space between the extremes of maximal full-bloodedness and modesty. This is an understanding of Davidson that is contrary to how McDowell reads him, who has been an influential commentator of Davidson. How Davidson should actually be interpreted is achieved by understanding how he has the resources to avoid Dummett’s claim of an incompatibility between a truth-conditional conception of meaning and a minimalist conception of truth.An argument for anti-perfectionism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9007
In political philosophy, perfectionism is the view that it is the job of the state to best enable its citizens to live good or flourishing lives. It claims that certain lives can be judged to be sound, and thus instructs governments to promote those lives using state institutions etc. Anti-perfectionism denies this. It says that it is not the job of the state to promote good lives. Instead it should restrict itself to securing basic rights and duties, a threshold level of resources and so on. Citizens should be left to adopt pursuits however they see fit. For some anti-perfectionists, this is precisely because we cannot judge any putative life to be sound. However, many are not sceptics, and justify state neutrality for other reasons.
All accounts of anti-perfectionism must overcome what has been called the asymmetry objection: what justifies the imbalance inherent in anti-perfectionism? Why believe that the state is permitted to act on judgements about justice, but not on judgements about flourishing? My thesis argues that attempts to respond to the asymmetry objection have failed thus far. Further, I offer an account of political morality that can overcome the problem.
The first four chapters of the thesis clarify the debate between perfectionists and anti-perfectionists, narrowing the former down into its most plausible form. Chapters five and six focus on two failed attempts to vindicate anti-perfectionism – Brian Barry’s argument from scepticism and Jonathan Quong’s Rawlsian approach. In the final chapter I put forward a much more promising argument in favour of anti-perfectionism – justice as a set of constraints.
2016-06-23T00:00:00ZMcDevitt, PatrickIn political philosophy, perfectionism is the view that it is the job of the state to best enable its citizens to live good or flourishing lives. It claims that certain lives can be judged to be sound, and thus instructs governments to promote those lives using state institutions etc. Anti-perfectionism denies this. It says that it is not the job of the state to promote good lives. Instead it should restrict itself to securing basic rights and duties, a threshold level of resources and so on. Citizens should be left to adopt pursuits however they see fit. For some anti-perfectionists, this is precisely because we cannot judge any putative life to be sound. However, many are not sceptics, and justify state neutrality for other reasons.
All accounts of anti-perfectionism must overcome what has been called the asymmetry objection: what justifies the imbalance inherent in anti-perfectionism? Why believe that the state is permitted to act on judgements about justice, but not on judgements about flourishing? My thesis argues that attempts to respond to the asymmetry objection have failed thus far. Further, I offer an account of political morality that can overcome the problem.
The first four chapters of the thesis clarify the debate between perfectionists and anti-perfectionists, narrowing the former down into its most plausible form. Chapters five and six focus on two failed attempts to vindicate anti-perfectionism – Brian Barry’s argument from scepticism and Jonathan Quong’s Rawlsian approach. In the final chapter I put forward a much more promising argument in favour of anti-perfectionism – justice as a set of constraints.The epistemic province of photography
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/8963
This thesis argues that photographs enhance the repertoire of seeing the way eyeglasses, microscopes and telescopes do. This kinship is based on these devices sharing a feature called transparency. Transparent devices facilitate visual information about objects without interrupting the causal link between the object and our eyes, and do so by maintaining a belief independent and similarity preserving counterfactual dependence on that object. Handmade pictures also offer visual information about objects, but because handmade pictures depend on the perceptual experiences of their makers, they interrupt the causal link between the object represented and our eyes. Consider how a drawing can represent the misperceptions and hallucinations of its illustrator, but in contrast, photographs do not reproduce the contents of hallucinations or misperceptions had by their photographers. I use transparency to map the epistemic province of photographs, arguing that photographs are not just ontologically similar to microscopes and telescopes, but also epistemically akin to them, –perhaps even more than they are like other picture types. This is illustrated by two further comparisons. The first is technological: while cameras define the information scope of photographs, handmade pictures are not subject to pre-sets that strictly limit their representational scope in the same way. The second comparison shows how photographs and handmade pictures are subject to different sceptical hypotheses: handmade pictures are susceptible to scepticism about their illustrator, –i.e., as we might question the credibility of someone giving testimony– but photographs are not beholden to scepticism about their photographer. I conclude with a proposal on the epistemology of photography, where contrary to the character of other picture types, photographs provide genuine perceptual knowledge about objects.
2016-06-23T00:00:00ZDe Asis, Ines Nicole EchevarriaThis thesis argues that photographs enhance the repertoire of seeing the way eyeglasses, microscopes and telescopes do. This kinship is based on these devices sharing a feature called transparency. Transparent devices facilitate visual information about objects without interrupting the causal link between the object and our eyes, and do so by maintaining a belief independent and similarity preserving counterfactual dependence on that object. Handmade pictures also offer visual information about objects, but because handmade pictures depend on the perceptual experiences of their makers, they interrupt the causal link between the object represented and our eyes. Consider how a drawing can represent the misperceptions and hallucinations of its illustrator, but in contrast, photographs do not reproduce the contents of hallucinations or misperceptions had by their photographers. I use transparency to map the epistemic province of photographs, arguing that photographs are not just ontologically similar to microscopes and telescopes, but also epistemically akin to them, –perhaps even more than they are like other picture types. This is illustrated by two further comparisons. The first is technological: while cameras define the information scope of photographs, handmade pictures are not subject to pre-sets that strictly limit their representational scope in the same way. The second comparison shows how photographs and handmade pictures are subject to different sceptical hypotheses: handmade pictures are susceptible to scepticism about their illustrator, –i.e., as we might question the credibility of someone giving testimony– but photographs are not beholden to scepticism about their photographer. I conclude with a proposal on the epistemology of photography, where contrary to the character of other picture types, photographs provide genuine perceptual knowledge about objects.Self-esteem, dreams & indignation : lessons from an emerging middle-class private high school in Northeast Brazil
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/8867
This thesis provides an ethnography of the final year at an emerging middle-class private high school in the Northeast of Brazil. It draws on 15 months of fieldwork, including participant observation in the classroom wherein I followed students whilst they prepared for vestibular (the university entrance exam). Students’ movements through Fortaleza, one of the world’s most unequal cities, produced knowledge about the kind of person that one could and should be in the future. Private schooling appeared to provide a route for students to realise that metaphorical (and perhaps physical) movement. Vestibular served as a sort of rite of passage that could transform (emerging middle-class) youth into (middle-class) adults. Students and teachers characterised vestibular as a luta (fight) that could be won with enough training, flexibility and commitment. Good or high self-esteem was needed to overcome laziness and endure this luta and, thus, teachers and students worked on producing better self-esteem through affective work. Dreams (aspirations for the future) also played a critical role: the school encouraged students to engage in time work, to imagine appropriate future(s) into which students could channel their energies in the present. This version of individual power differed from the political and economic power structures portrayed in the classroom. Students grew indignant as, through curriculum and pedagogy, they came to understand that they were oppressed and that Brazil was underdeveloped and not quite modern. The university entrance exam served as a national meritocratic ritual that portrayed Brazil as becoming modern with governable and governing citizens. Students resisted these assertions and/but their cynicisms belied hope for better imagined futures. Using the classroom as container, this thesis presents a portrait of people and ideas in formation during a post-Lula era.
2016-06-23T00:00:00ZWisdahl, MicheleThis thesis provides an ethnography of the final year at an emerging middle-class private high school in the Northeast of Brazil. It draws on 15 months of fieldwork, including participant observation in the classroom wherein I followed students whilst they prepared for vestibular (the university entrance exam). Students’ movements through Fortaleza, one of the world’s most unequal cities, produced knowledge about the kind of person that one could and should be in the future. Private schooling appeared to provide a route for students to realise that metaphorical (and perhaps physical) movement. Vestibular served as a sort of rite of passage that could transform (emerging middle-class) youth into (middle-class) adults. Students and teachers characterised vestibular as a luta (fight) that could be won with enough training, flexibility and commitment. Good or high self-esteem was needed to overcome laziness and endure this luta and, thus, teachers and students worked on producing better self-esteem through affective work. Dreams (aspirations for the future) also played a critical role: the school encouraged students to engage in time work, to imagine appropriate future(s) into which students could channel their energies in the present. This version of individual power differed from the political and economic power structures portrayed in the classroom. Students grew indignant as, through curriculum and pedagogy, they came to understand that they were oppressed and that Brazil was underdeveloped and not quite modern. The university entrance exam served as a national meritocratic ritual that portrayed Brazil as becoming modern with governable and governing citizens. Students resisted these assertions and/but their cynicisms belied hope for better imagined futures. Using the classroom as container, this thesis presents a portrait of people and ideas in formation during a post-Lula era.Perceiving and participating in cultural heritage : an ethnography about the process of preservation of Ouro Preto, Brazil
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/8825
This thesis discusses the promises and pitfalls of city preservation in Ouro Preto, a Brazilian city preserved nationally and hailed as a UNESCO World Heritage site. Using interviews, archival material, ethnographic observations, and the analysis of public meetings on city preservation in Ouro Preto in 2013, I study how the city’s legacy as a national treasure of monumental architecture has endured until now, despite different coexisting standards of living, perceptions and uses of the city, and views of the past. In Ouro Preto, while fluctuating populations of tourists and students live mainly in the historic city centre, permanent residents often build their homes in underprivileged and marginalised areas and benefit little from their cultural heritage. Spatial exclusion and preservation policies, allegedly favouring outsiders, boost the divide between residents and newcomers, echoing the colonial past of the city. Disputes around the preservation of the cityscape invited widespread participation. One expectation of increased grassroots participation in cultural heritage sites is that it could expose varied and fluid perspectives of the city, and consequently allow for corresponding, more inclusive uses. However, when looking at local participatory practices in heritage policies, I consider the challenge for grassroots meetings to include different citizens and viewpoints, when the ability to disagree in public debates and participation are restricted by socio-economic conditions. The ethnographic character of this research offers a platform to investigate anthropological questions regarding the role, limits and expectations around cultural heritage and participatory practices in a context of varied socio-economic levels and fluid perceptions of aesthetics, history, and everyday uses of public spaces in a fragmented city.
2016-06-23T00:00:00ZDe Souza Santos, Andreza AruskaThis thesis discusses the promises and pitfalls of city preservation in Ouro Preto, a Brazilian city preserved nationally and hailed as a UNESCO World Heritage site. Using interviews, archival material, ethnographic observations, and the analysis of public meetings on city preservation in Ouro Preto in 2013, I study how the city’s legacy as a national treasure of monumental architecture has endured until now, despite different coexisting standards of living, perceptions and uses of the city, and views of the past. In Ouro Preto, while fluctuating populations of tourists and students live mainly in the historic city centre, permanent residents often build their homes in underprivileged and marginalised areas and benefit little from their cultural heritage. Spatial exclusion and preservation policies, allegedly favouring outsiders, boost the divide between residents and newcomers, echoing the colonial past of the city. Disputes around the preservation of the cityscape invited widespread participation. One expectation of increased grassroots participation in cultural heritage sites is that it could expose varied and fluid perspectives of the city, and consequently allow for corresponding, more inclusive uses. However, when looking at local participatory practices in heritage policies, I consider the challenge for grassroots meetings to include different citizens and viewpoints, when the ability to disagree in public debates and participation are restricted by socio-economic conditions. The ethnographic character of this research offers a platform to investigate anthropological questions regarding the role, limits and expectations around cultural heritage and participatory practices in a context of varied socio-economic levels and fluid perceptions of aesthetics, history, and everyday uses of public spaces in a fragmented city.Necessitism, contingentism and theory equivalence
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/8814
Two main questions are addressed in this dissertation, namely: 1. What is the correct higher-order modal theory; 2. What does it take for theories to be equivalent.
The whole dissertation consists of an extended argument in defence of the joint truth of two higher-order modal theories, namely, Plantingan Moderate Contingentism, a higher-order necessitist theory advocated by Plantinga (1974) and committed to the contingent being of some individuals, and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism, a higher-order necessitist theory advocated by Williamson (2013) and committed to the necessary being of every possible individual.
The case for the truth of these two theories relies on defences of the following metaphysical theses: i) Thorough Serious Actualism, according to which no things could have been related and yet be nothing, ii) Higher-Order Necessitism, according to which necessarily, every higher-order entity is necessarily something. It is shown that Thorough Serious Actualism and Higher-Order Necessitism are both implicit commitments of very weak logical theories.
Prima facie, Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are jointly inconsistent. The argument for their joint truth thus relies also on showing i) their equivalence, and ii) that the dispute between Plantingans and Williamsonians is merely verbal. The case for i) and ii) relies on the Synonymy Account, an account of theory equivalence developed and defended in the dissertation. According to the account, theories are equivalent just in case they have the same structure of entailments and commitments, and the occupiers of the places in that structure are the same propositions. An immediate consequence of the Synonymy Account is that proponents of synonymous theories are engaged in merely verbal disputes. The Synonymy Account is also applied to the debate between noneists and Quineans, revealing that what is in question in that debate is what are the expressive resources available to describe the world.
2016-06-23T00:00:00ZJacinto, BrunoTwo main questions are addressed in this dissertation, namely: 1. What is the correct higher-order modal theory; 2. What does it take for theories to be equivalent.
The whole dissertation consists of an extended argument in defence of the joint truth of two higher-order modal theories, namely, Plantingan Moderate Contingentism, a higher-order necessitist theory advocated by Plantinga (1974) and committed to the contingent being of some individuals, and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism, a higher-order necessitist theory advocated by Williamson (2013) and committed to the necessary being of every possible individual.
The case for the truth of these two theories relies on defences of the following metaphysical theses: i) Thorough Serious Actualism, according to which no things could have been related and yet be nothing, ii) Higher-Order Necessitism, according to which necessarily, every higher-order entity is necessarily something. It is shown that Thorough Serious Actualism and Higher-Order Necessitism are both implicit commitments of very weak logical theories.
Prima facie, Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are jointly inconsistent. The argument for their joint truth thus relies also on showing i) their equivalence, and ii) that the dispute between Plantingans and Williamsonians is merely verbal. The case for i) and ii) relies on the Synonymy Account, an account of theory equivalence developed and defended in the dissertation. According to the account, theories are equivalent just in case they have the same structure of entailments and commitments, and the occupiers of the places in that structure are the same propositions. An immediate consequence of the Synonymy Account is that proponents of synonymous theories are engaged in merely verbal disputes. The Synonymy Account is also applied to the debate between noneists and Quineans, revealing that what is in question in that debate is what are the expressive resources available to describe the world.Saying nothing : in defence of syntactic and semantic underdetermination
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/8630
According to the Encoding Model, speakers communicate by encoding the propositions they want to communicate into sentences, in accordance with the conventions of a language L. By uttering a sentence that encodes p, the speaker says that p. Communication is successful only if the audience identifies the proposition that the speaker intends to communicate, which is achieved by decoding the uttered sentence in accordance with the conventions of L.
A consequence of the Encoding Model has been the proliferation of underdetermination arguments, each of which concludes against some linguistic theory T, on the grounds that, were T true, audiences would be unable to know what was said by utterances of some particular linguistic form, and therefore unable to know what speakers intended to communicate by these utterance. The result, if we accept the conclusion of these arguments, is radical restriction of the domain of viable linguistic theory.
This Thesis defends an alternative model according to which there need be nothing encoded in an uttered sentence – nothing that is said by its utterance – for the audience to retrieve. Rather, there are indefinitely many ways to interpret uttered sentences – indefinitely many routes to the propositions that speaker intend to communicate – which proceed through different interpretations of what is said.
2016-06-23T00:00:00ZBowker, MarkAccording to the Encoding Model, speakers communicate by encoding the propositions they want to communicate into sentences, in accordance with the conventions of a language L. By uttering a sentence that encodes p, the speaker says that p. Communication is successful only if the audience identifies the proposition that the speaker intends to communicate, which is achieved by decoding the uttered sentence in accordance with the conventions of L.
A consequence of the Encoding Model has been the proliferation of underdetermination arguments, each of which concludes against some linguistic theory T, on the grounds that, were T true, audiences would be unable to know what was said by utterances of some particular linguistic form, and therefore unable to know what speakers intended to communicate by these utterance. The result, if we accept the conclusion of these arguments, is radical restriction of the domain of viable linguistic theory.
This Thesis defends an alternative model according to which there need be nothing encoded in an uttered sentence – nothing that is said by its utterance – for the audience to retrieve. Rather, there are indefinitely many ways to interpret uttered sentences – indefinitely many routes to the propositions that speaker intend to communicate – which proceed through different interpretations of what is said.The path to ethnogenesis and autonomy : Kallawaya-consciousness in plurinational Bolivia
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/8600
This thesis examines the construction of ethnic identity, autonomy and indigenous citizenship in plurinational Bolivia. In 2009, the Kallawayas, an Andean indigenous nation, took advantage of legislation in Bolivia’s new constitution to begin a process of legally constituting themselves as autonomous from the state. The objective of Indigenous Autonomy in the constitution is to allow indigenous nations and peoples to govern themselves according to their conceptions of ‘Living Well’. Living well, for the Kallawayas is understood in terms of what it means to be runa, a person living in the ayllu (the traditional Andean community). The Kallawayas are noted as healers, and sickness and health is understood as related to the maintenance of a ritual relationship of reciprocity with others in the ayllu, both living humans and ancestors, remembered in the landscape. Joint ritual relations with the landscape play an important role in joining disparate Kallawaya ayllus with distinct traditions and languages (Aymara, Quechua and the Kallawaya language Macha Jujay are spoken) together as an ethnic group. However, Kallawaya politics has followed the trajectory of national peasant politics in recent decades of splitting into federations divided along class and ethnic lines. The joint ritual practices which traditionally connected the Kallawaya ayllus adapted to reflect this new situation of division between three sections of Kallawaya society. This has meant that the Kallawayas are attempting political autonomy as an ethnic group when they have never been more fractured. This thesis then examines the meaning of autonomy and the Good Life for a politically divided and ethnically diverse indigenous people.
2016-06-23T00:00:00ZAlderman, JonathanThis thesis examines the construction of ethnic identity, autonomy and indigenous citizenship in plurinational Bolivia. In 2009, the Kallawayas, an Andean indigenous nation, took advantage of legislation in Bolivia’s new constitution to begin a process of legally constituting themselves as autonomous from the state. The objective of Indigenous Autonomy in the constitution is to allow indigenous nations and peoples to govern themselves according to their conceptions of ‘Living Well’. Living well, for the Kallawayas is understood in terms of what it means to be runa, a person living in the ayllu (the traditional Andean community). The Kallawayas are noted as healers, and sickness and health is understood as related to the maintenance of a ritual relationship of reciprocity with others in the ayllu, both living humans and ancestors, remembered in the landscape. Joint ritual relations with the landscape play an important role in joining disparate Kallawaya ayllus with distinct traditions and languages (Aymara, Quechua and the Kallawaya language Macha Jujay are spoken) together as an ethnic group. However, Kallawaya politics has followed the trajectory of national peasant politics in recent decades of splitting into federations divided along class and ethnic lines. The joint ritual practices which traditionally connected the Kallawaya ayllus adapted to reflect this new situation of division between three sections of Kallawaya society. This has meant that the Kallawayas are attempting political autonomy as an ethnic group when they have never been more fractured. This thesis then examines the meaning of autonomy and the Good Life for a politically divided and ethnically diverse indigenous people.Fidelity, Capture and the Sound Advertisement : Julius Pinschewer and Rudi Klemm's "Die chinesische Nachtigall"
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/8575
Examines the first sound advertising film in Germany (1928)
ISBN: 978-3-7065-5356-8. Edited by Sema Colpan, Lydia Nsiah, Joachim Schätz, Siegfried Mattl (Hrsg.)
2014-04-01T00:00:00ZCowan, MichaelExamines the first sound advertising film in Germany (1928)The infliction of descent : an overview of the Capanahua descendants’ explanations of the generative process
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/8566
This thesis traces the ways of explaining the generative process by the eastern Peruvian descendants of the Capanahua. These predominately Spanish-speaking people tend to emphasize the discontinuity with their ancestors, a little known Panoan-speaking indigenous population of the Western Amazon. Based on ethnographic fieldwork and transcriptions of recorded conversations, this presentation follows and reconstructs a salient frustrative-generative dynamic in a wide range of representations, wherein alterations of self-containment or perceptibility incept the processes of differentiation and discontinuity. These processes guide a local conception of “descent” as infliction.
Implications of this dynamic are examined for the formulations of kinship. The familial relations, explicitly based on notions of consanguinity and filiation – are cast in an ambiguous, if not predominately negative light. Procreation is formulated in predatory, parasitic terms, and shares dynamics with pathogenic causality and aetiology. As such, it does not naturally contribute to reproduction and continuity, but rather frustrates it by introducing difference into the vertical axis. Such results also produce horizontal differences and hierarchies, encoded as the person’s divergent, hidden “descent” in the always “mixed” social life.
This image of the generative process is instrumental to understanding the villagers’ explanations of the acculturative processes. Because representations of acculturation focuses on the idiom of procreation and its frustrative results, it appears as the very function of procreative dynamics. This produces a series of associations between the progeny and sociality, focusing on their inherently “third” or external position and perpetual dividuality of belonging/containing. Such ambiguity might be tamed and everted, to produce cleansing or encompassment that counteracts the divisive continuity of time (qua descent, history, or kinship). In a contemporary context, these formulations are seen reflected in the villagers’ construal of the Peruvian state as the urban environment that is hierarchically closer to the ideal originality and beautiful imperishability than the smaller, isolated unities of rural ancestors.
2016-06-23T00:00:00ZKrokoszyński, ŁukaszThis thesis traces the ways of explaining the generative process by the eastern Peruvian descendants of the Capanahua. These predominately Spanish-speaking people tend to emphasize the discontinuity with their ancestors, a little known Panoan-speaking indigenous population of the Western Amazon. Based on ethnographic fieldwork and transcriptions of recorded conversations, this presentation follows and reconstructs a salient frustrative-generative dynamic in a wide range of representations, wherein alterations of self-containment or perceptibility incept the processes of differentiation and discontinuity. These processes guide a local conception of “descent” as infliction.
Implications of this dynamic are examined for the formulations of kinship. The familial relations, explicitly based on notions of consanguinity and filiation – are cast in an ambiguous, if not predominately negative light. Procreation is formulated in predatory, parasitic terms, and shares dynamics with pathogenic causality and aetiology. As such, it does not naturally contribute to reproduction and continuity, but rather frustrates it by introducing difference into the vertical axis. Such results also produce horizontal differences and hierarchies, encoded as the person’s divergent, hidden “descent” in the always “mixed” social life.
This image of the generative process is instrumental to understanding the villagers’ explanations of the acculturative processes. Because representations of acculturation focuses on the idiom of procreation and its frustrative results, it appears as the very function of procreative dynamics. This produces a series of associations between the progeny and sociality, focusing on their inherently “third” or external position and perpetual dividuality of belonging/containing. Such ambiguity might be tamed and everted, to produce cleansing or encompassment that counteracts the divisive continuity of time (qua descent, history, or kinship). In a contemporary context, these formulations are seen reflected in the villagers’ construal of the Peruvian state as the urban environment that is hierarchically closer to the ideal originality and beautiful imperishability than the smaller, isolated unities of rural ancestors.From the astonished spectator to the spectator in movement : exhibition advertisements in 1920s Germany and Austria
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/8555
Lorsque les foires commerciales, phénomène nouveau et en voie de professionnalisation, se sont répandues après la première guerre mondiale dans des villes telles que Vienne, Francfort, Berlin et Düsseldorf, elles se sont souvent tournées vers le film comme moyen publicitaire, employant fréquemment des experts en animation ou des cinéastes d’avant-garde. En examinant les films publicitaires faits pour ces évènements, cet essai explore quelques unes des relations changeantes, dans les années 1920, entre le cinéma et la culture des foires commerciales. Les films adoptent souvent une stratégie de l’étonnement qui est commune à la publicité imprimée, aux expositions technologiques du 19ième siècle et au cinéma d’attraction des premiers temps. Mais, ils tendent aussi à illustrer un nouveau paradigme du film comme médium qui peut à la fois interpeler le spectateur et le contrôler. Cette idée du film comme moyen de direction du spectateur est en phase avec les nouvelles théories de la publicité qui sont apparues après la guerre et qui ont trouvé leur terrain d’essai précisément dans le milieu des foires commerciales.
2014-08-01T00:00:00ZCowan, MichaelLorsque les foires commerciales, phénomène nouveau et en voie de professionnalisation, se sont répandues après la première guerre mondiale dans des villes telles que Vienne, Francfort, Berlin et Düsseldorf, elles se sont souvent tournées vers le film comme moyen publicitaire, employant fréquemment des experts en animation ou des cinéastes d’avant-garde. En examinant les films publicitaires faits pour ces évènements, cet essai explore quelques unes des relations changeantes, dans les années 1920, entre le cinéma et la culture des foires commerciales. Les films adoptent souvent une stratégie de l’étonnement qui est commune à la publicité imprimée, aux expositions technologiques du 19ième siècle et au cinéma d’attraction des premiers temps. Mais, ils tendent aussi à illustrer un nouveau paradigme du film comme médium qui peut à la fois interpeler le spectateur et le contrôler. Cette idée du film comme moyen de direction du spectateur est en phase avec les nouvelles théories de la publicité qui sont apparues après la guerre et qui ont trouvé leur terrain d’essai précisément dans le milieu des foires commerciales.The meanings of sobreparto : postpartum illness and embodiment of emotions among Andean migrants in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/8524
This thesis concerns a postpartum condition known as sobreparto among female Andean migrants in the lowland city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia. While sobreparto is a traditionally Andean illness, its occurrence in the lowland city of Santa Cruz opens up new dimensions of analysis. In addition to exposing transformations of the traditional understandings of health, illness, and the body, the study of this phenomenon in an atypical setting sheds new light on issues such as migration, social networks, biomedicalisation, or gender patterns. By means of narratives of lives interrupted by sobreparto, it is possible to locate this condition within a wider frame of life trajectories, exposing motifs beyond the temporarily dysfunctional body. I argue that the narratives of sobreparto can be used as a springboard for a study of transformations in the understandings of motherhood and womanhood, migration and social networks, as well as emotions. Looking at these processes through the lens of a postpartum illness also reveals the connections between the ill body, the troubled mind, and imperfect social relationships. On the one hand, sobreparto can be analysed at the micro-level – in terms of an understanding of the body, individual reproductive histories, or the availability of other people’s support. On the other hand, sobreparto constitutes a commentary on phenomena occurring at the macro-level, such as large-scale internal migration in Bolivia or the increasing domination of biomedicine as a model of health and illness. The city of Santa Cruz offers a unique setting for scrutinising these changes using a traditionally Andean postpartum illness as a point of departure. Being much more than a postpartum bodily dysfunction, sobreparto, therefore, can be used as a lens through which it is possible to see the interplay of social and political macro- and micro-processes in people’s lives at the time of reproduction.
2016-06-23T00:00:00ZKuberska, KarolinaThis thesis concerns a postpartum condition known as sobreparto among female Andean migrants in the lowland city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia. While sobreparto is a traditionally Andean illness, its occurrence in the lowland city of Santa Cruz opens up new dimensions of analysis. In addition to exposing transformations of the traditional understandings of health, illness, and the body, the study of this phenomenon in an atypical setting sheds new light on issues such as migration, social networks, biomedicalisation, or gender patterns. By means of narratives of lives interrupted by sobreparto, it is possible to locate this condition within a wider frame of life trajectories, exposing motifs beyond the temporarily dysfunctional body. I argue that the narratives of sobreparto can be used as a springboard for a study of transformations in the understandings of motherhood and womanhood, migration and social networks, as well as emotions. Looking at these processes through the lens of a postpartum illness also reveals the connections between the ill body, the troubled mind, and imperfect social relationships. On the one hand, sobreparto can be analysed at the micro-level – in terms of an understanding of the body, individual reproductive histories, or the availability of other people’s support. On the other hand, sobreparto constitutes a commentary on phenomena occurring at the macro-level, such as large-scale internal migration in Bolivia or the increasing domination of biomedicine as a model of health and illness. The city of Santa Cruz offers a unique setting for scrutinising these changes using a traditionally Andean postpartum illness as a point of departure. Being much more than a postpartum bodily dysfunction, sobreparto, therefore, can be used as a lens through which it is possible to see the interplay of social and political macro- and micro-processes in people’s lives at the time of reproduction.Love and madness in Plato's Phaedrus
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/8424
The central thesis of the dissertation is that in the Phaedrus philosophy is presented as a kind of madness in a strict sense, that is to say, the claim is not that philosophy is necessarily unappreciated by the many, hence considered by their standards as insane, but that the philosophical soul is in a way not in rational control, but in a state of mind that can fairly be defined as madness, and that the philosophical life is arranged in order to visit or revisit this state of mind.
Socrates’ account of eros and madness is based on his account of the soul, thus the first chapter shall give a close reading of Socrates’ account of the soul. The second chapter, in turn, interprets Socrates’ account of eros in light of his account of the soul. The third chapter, again, looks into Socrates’ depiction of eros as a certain kind of madness in light of the first two chapters, focusing respectively on the following three characterizations: madness as the opposite of sōphrosunē, madness as the opposite of tekhnē, and madness as the core of the best human life, namely, the philosophical life.
This dissertation, hopefully, gives a faithful interpretation of Socrates’ account of eros in the Phaedrus on the one hand, on the other hand reveals the rationale behind Socrates’ conception of eros and its highest form, philosophy, as a kind of divine madness. By doing so, I wish to contribute to our understanding of Plato’s Socrates and his life as a paradigm of philosophy.
2016-06-23T00:00:00ZFan, LiThe central thesis of the dissertation is that in the Phaedrus philosophy is presented as a kind of madness in a strict sense, that is to say, the claim is not that philosophy is necessarily unappreciated by the many, hence considered by their standards as insane, but that the philosophical soul is in a way not in rational control, but in a state of mind that can fairly be defined as madness, and that the philosophical life is arranged in order to visit or revisit this state of mind.
Socrates’ account of eros and madness is based on his account of the soul, thus the first chapter shall give a close reading of Socrates’ account of the soul. The second chapter, in turn, interprets Socrates’ account of eros in light of his account of the soul. The third chapter, again, looks into Socrates’ depiction of eros as a certain kind of madness in light of the first two chapters, focusing respectively on the following three characterizations: madness as the opposite of sōphrosunē, madness as the opposite of tekhnē, and madness as the core of the best human life, namely, the philosophical life.
This dissertation, hopefully, gives a faithful interpretation of Socrates’ account of eros in the Phaedrus on the one hand, on the other hand reveals the rationale behind Socrates’ conception of eros and its highest form, philosophy, as a kind of divine madness. By doing so, I wish to contribute to our understanding of Plato’s Socrates and his life as a paradigm of philosophy.Acting and understanding
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/8417
This thesis concerns the question of what it is for a subject to act. It answers this question in three steps. The first step is taken by arguing that any satisfactory answer must build on the idea that an action is something predicable of the acting subject. The second step is taken by arguing in support of an answer which does build on this idea, and does so by introducing the idea that acting is doing something which is an exercise of a particular kind of disposition on the part of the acting subject. The third step is taken by arguing that the disposition in question must be of a kind which is exercised in conditions in which the acting subject thinks they are acting. From this vantage point the thesis develops many further commitments: That action is constitutively subject to a mode of explanation that mentions the kind of disposition just mentioned; that any case of acting requires a veridical representation of a means by which the action is performed; and that a problem about the underspecified nature of desire ascriptions can be solved by appeal to the conceptual materials made available by these investigations. The thesis finally develops several objections to the account it gives, both substantive and methodological, and explains why these objections ought to be rejected.
2016-06-23T00:00:00ZBlomberg Stathopoulos, Alexander C.This thesis concerns the question of what it is for a subject to act. It answers this question in three steps. The first step is taken by arguing that any satisfactory answer must build on the idea that an action is something predicable of the acting subject. The second step is taken by arguing in support of an answer which does build on this idea, and does so by introducing the idea that acting is doing something which is an exercise of a particular kind of disposition on the part of the acting subject. The third step is taken by arguing that the disposition in question must be of a kind which is exercised in conditions in which the acting subject thinks they are acting. From this vantage point the thesis develops many further commitments: That action is constitutively subject to a mode of explanation that mentions the kind of disposition just mentioned; that any case of acting requires a veridical representation of a means by which the action is performed; and that a problem about the underspecified nature of desire ascriptions can be solved by appeal to the conceptual materials made available by these investigations. The thesis finally develops several objections to the account it gives, both substantive and methodological, and explains why these objections ought to be rejected.The capacities of anyone : accommodating the universal human subject as value and in space
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/8343
2014-03-01T00:00:00ZRapport, Nigel JulianChronicle of a quest : silence after killing
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/8235
After the “flamboyant fever dream” and ontological experimentations of The Act of Killing (2013), Joshua Oppenheimer’s latest film, The Look of Silence comes as something of a shock. A poetic, intimate film, it relies on more traditional documentary styles, interviews and observation in particular. At the same time, the film illustrates the challenges of documentary testimony, both practical (in terms of collection, credibility and deployment) and existential (as a hybrid of truth and fiction). The challenges and oscillation offer a way of expressing the conditions of the survivors, caught between a past they know to be true and the amnesiac historiography that surrounds them. Although such strategies produce a similar destabilization of ontological and epistemological certainty akin to those found in Killing, there is nonetheless a departure as the sobriety confers a moral authority that enables this film to be deployed in social justice projects.
2015-01-01T00:00:00ZTorchin, LeshuAfter the “flamboyant fever dream” and ontological experimentations of The Act of Killing (2013), Joshua Oppenheimer’s latest film, The Look of Silence comes as something of a shock. A poetic, intimate film, it relies on more traditional documentary styles, interviews and observation in particular. At the same time, the film illustrates the challenges of documentary testimony, both practical (in terms of collection, credibility and deployment) and existential (as a hybrid of truth and fiction). The challenges and oscillation offer a way of expressing the conditions of the survivors, caught between a past they know to be true and the amnesiac historiography that surrounds them. Although such strategies produce a similar destabilization of ontological and epistemological certainty akin to those found in Killing, there is nonetheless a departure as the sobriety confers a moral authority that enables this film to be deployed in social justice projects.Anthropology in the vernacular : an ethnography of doing knowledge on Choiseul Island, Solomon Islands
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/7822
This thesis absorbs and reflects on Choiseul Island responses and caution towards the making of anthropological knowledge. Initial interests that can easily become familiar to anthropology as research topics such as village life, local cosmology and local alternatives to cosmologies of climate and ecology, make way here for another activity of working through Choiseul responses to anthropology. In taking seriously the precautions and the considerations of people in this Solomon Islands locality, anthropology is invited to put a stoppage to practices that it would consider ordinary and part of anthropological knowledge making. This impasse for the discipline is outlined and explored in various chapters, in which usual styles of ethnography and topic-making take formation in respect of a Choiseul world that does not fit easily into encapsulation by anthropology. Effects for the discipline of anthropology are given consideration, within a wider view of imagining how an alternative anthropology in the vernacular can also entail an obviation of anthropology itself in favour of new forms of cultural sensitivity.
2015-11-30T00:00:00ZTracey, Jonathan M.This thesis absorbs and reflects on Choiseul Island responses and caution towards the making of anthropological knowledge. Initial interests that can easily become familiar to anthropology as research topics such as village life, local cosmology and local alternatives to cosmologies of climate and ecology, make way here for another activity of working through Choiseul responses to anthropology. In taking seriously the precautions and the considerations of people in this Solomon Islands locality, anthropology is invited to put a stoppage to practices that it would consider ordinary and part of anthropological knowledge making. This impasse for the discipline is outlined and explored in various chapters, in which usual styles of ethnography and topic-making take formation in respect of a Choiseul world that does not fit easily into encapsulation by anthropology. Effects for the discipline of anthropology are given consideration, within a wider view of imagining how an alternative anthropology in the vernacular can also entail an obviation of anthropology itself in favour of new forms of cultural sensitivity.Essentialism, nominalism, and modality: the modal theories of Robert Kilwardby & John Buridan
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/7820
In the last 30 years there has been growing interest in and a greater appreciation of the unique contributions that medieval authors have made to the history of logic. In this thesis, we compare and contrast the modal logics of Robert Kilwardby and John Buridan and explore how their two conceptions of modality relate to and differ from modern notions of modal logic. We develop formal reconstructions of both authors' logics, making use of a number of different formal techniques.
In the case of Robert Kilwardby we show that using his distinction between per se and per accidens modalities, he is able to provide a consistent interpretation of the apodictic fragment of Aristotle's modal syllogism and that, by generalising this distinction to hypothetical construction, he can develop an account of connexive logic.
In the case of John Buridan we show that his modal logic is a natural extension of the usual Kripke-style possible worlds semantics, and that this modal logic can be shown to be sound and complete relative to a proof-theoretic formalisation of Buridan's treatment of the expository syllogism.
2015-11-30T00:00:00ZJohnston, Spencer C.In the last 30 years there has been growing interest in and a greater appreciation of the unique contributions that medieval authors have made to the history of logic. In this thesis, we compare and contrast the modal logics of Robert Kilwardby and John Buridan and explore how their two conceptions of modality relate to and differ from modern notions of modal logic. We develop formal reconstructions of both authors' logics, making use of a number of different formal techniques.
In the case of Robert Kilwardby we show that using his distinction between per se and per accidens modalities, he is able to provide a consistent interpretation of the apodictic fragment of Aristotle's modal syllogism and that, by generalising this distinction to hypothetical construction, he can develop an account of connexive logic.
In the case of John Buridan we show that his modal logic is a natural extension of the usual Kripke-style possible worlds semantics, and that this modal logic can be shown to be sound and complete relative to a proof-theoretic formalisation of Buridan's treatment of the expository syllogism.In the name of the tourist : landscape, heritage, and social change in Chinchero
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/7793
This thesis examines social change in the Quechua-speaking town of Chinchero (Peru), located 30 km away from the city of Cuzco. It does so by studying the conditions created by touristic development in the Region. It is an ethnography that builds on, and dialogues with, previous ethnographies done in Chinchero before. It focuses on issues of landscape and cultural heritage, as these are some of the domains most affected by the changes brought about by tourism, among other forms of modernization. The thesis looks at processes of re-territorialization and social exclusion that have followed the reconversion of the Inca ruins into an Archaeological Park. It also studies the town´s reputed textile tradition in a context of growing commercialization. Over the last few years, coinciding with a surge in tourism in the region, the tourist demand for “authentic” indigenous crafts has fostered significant changes in the textile production of Chinchero. The multiplication of weaving centers where the ethnicity is performed for the tourist gaze, plus the social implications of this new mode of social organization, comes into scrutiny.
Another major focus of attention is the project of the New International Airport of Cuzco in Chinchero land. The airport is a direct consequence of tourist development in the Region. This thesis explores processes of social disruption and environmental conflict as the project is deeply dividing the community and raising expectations of progress that that are unlikely to be met. Additionally, the airport intersects with issues of indigeneity and the redefinition of the ethnic identity as the project engages with the supposed incompatibility between being indigenous, and thus “traditional”, and being modern, a process that involves the commercialization of “ancestral” land and the heavy reworking of a landscape where the ancestors and other-than-human forces still dwell.
2015-11-30T00:00:00ZGarcia, PabloThis thesis examines social change in the Quechua-speaking town of Chinchero (Peru), located 30 km away from the city of Cuzco. It does so by studying the conditions created by touristic development in the Region. It is an ethnography that builds on, and dialogues with, previous ethnographies done in Chinchero before. It focuses on issues of landscape and cultural heritage, as these are some of the domains most affected by the changes brought about by tourism, among other forms of modernization. The thesis looks at processes of re-territorialization and social exclusion that have followed the reconversion of the Inca ruins into an Archaeological Park. It also studies the town´s reputed textile tradition in a context of growing commercialization. Over the last few years, coinciding with a surge in tourism in the region, the tourist demand for “authentic” indigenous crafts has fostered significant changes in the textile production of Chinchero. The multiplication of weaving centers where the ethnicity is performed for the tourist gaze, plus the social implications of this new mode of social organization, comes into scrutiny.
Another major focus of attention is the project of the New International Airport of Cuzco in Chinchero land. The airport is a direct consequence of tourist development in the Region. This thesis explores processes of social disruption and environmental conflict as the project is deeply dividing the community and raising expectations of progress that that are unlikely to be met. Additionally, the airport intersects with issues of indigeneity and the redefinition of the ethnic identity as the project engages with the supposed incompatibility between being indigenous, and thus “traditional”, and being modern, a process that involves the commercialization of “ancestral” land and the heavy reworking of a landscape where the ancestors and other-than-human forces still dwell.Testimony, context, and miscommunication.
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/7705
This thesis integrates the epistemology of testimony with work on the epistemology, psychology, and metaphysics of language. Epistemologists of testimony typically ask what conditions must be met for an agent to gain testimonial justification or knowledge that p given that p has been asserted, and this assertion has been understood. Questions regarding the audience's ability to grasp communicated contents are largely ignored. This is a mistake. Work in the philosophy of language (and related areas) suggests that the determination and recovery of communicated contents is far from straightforward, and can go wrong in many ways. This thesis investigates the epistemology of testimony in light of this work, with a special focus on miscommunication.
The introduction provides a brief overview of some relevant work on testimony, the philosophy of language, and psychology, and argues that there is good reason to investigate the three. One obvious problem in this area is that if testimonial knowledge requires knowledge of what is said then the risk of miscommunication will block testimonial knowledge. Chapter two argues that testimonial knowledge does not require knowledge of what is said. The remaining four chapters discuss problems which do to arise from miscommunication. Chapters three and four focus on the epistemic uncertainty of communication with context sensitive terms. Chapter three argues that many beliefs formed on the basis of context sensitive testimony are unsafe and insensitive. Chapter four argues that speakers often have plausible deniability about the contents of their assertions. Chapters five and six explore types of miscommunication which arise as a result of background mental states affecting our linguistic understanding. Chapter five explores the social/ethical consequences of this, arguing that certain groups are disproportionately subject to harmful misinterpretation. Chapter six argues that testimonial anti-reductionists make the wrong predictions about a range of cases of cognitive penetration.
2015-11-30T00:00:00ZPeet, AndrewThis thesis integrates the epistemology of testimony with work on the epistemology, psychology, and metaphysics of language. Epistemologists of testimony typically ask what conditions must be met for an agent to gain testimonial justification or knowledge that p given that p has been asserted, and this assertion has been understood. Questions regarding the audience's ability to grasp communicated contents are largely ignored. This is a mistake. Work in the philosophy of language (and related areas) suggests that the determination and recovery of communicated contents is far from straightforward, and can go wrong in many ways. This thesis investigates the epistemology of testimony in light of this work, with a special focus on miscommunication.
The introduction provides a brief overview of some relevant work on testimony, the philosophy of language, and psychology, and argues that there is good reason to investigate the three. One obvious problem in this area is that if testimonial knowledge requires knowledge of what is said then the risk of miscommunication will block testimonial knowledge. Chapter two argues that testimonial knowledge does not require knowledge of what is said. The remaining four chapters discuss problems which do to arise from miscommunication. Chapters three and four focus on the epistemic uncertainty of communication with context sensitive terms. Chapter three argues that many beliefs formed on the basis of context sensitive testimony are unsafe and insensitive. Chapter four argues that speakers often have plausible deniability about the contents of their assertions. Chapters five and six explore types of miscommunication which arise as a result of background mental states affecting our linguistic understanding. Chapter five explores the social/ethical consequences of this, arguing that certain groups are disproportionately subject to harmful misinterpretation. Chapter six argues that testimonial anti-reductionists make the wrong predictions about a range of cases of cognitive penetration."¡Yo soy Aymara, yo soy calle!" : a study of young people re-imagining indigeneity and resisting marginalisation in El Alto, Bolivia
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/7504
This thesis explores the new self-narratives which are currently being created by young
alteños with experience of living and/or working on the streets. These young people are
projecting their visions for the future and challenging their marginal status by going
back to their roots, looking to the history, myths, legends and practices of their ancestors
for inspiration. They are constantly affirming and reaffirming their connections both to
the older generations and to Pachamama (Mother Earth). These connections, rather than
being threatened by the urbanity of their present existence, are actually enhanced by it.
Specifically, this thesis addresses the creativity employed by young alteños as they
make a claim to modernity through working as shoe-shiners, conducting rituals such as
the ch'alla to Pachamama, participating in festivals to create collectivity and belonging,
and politicising indigenous culture in hip-hop at La Casa Juvenil de las Culturas Wayna
Tambo in El Alto. This thesis explores the hopes and ambitions of young alteños; the
ways they conceive of the future. Whilst it is true that the Presidency of Evo Morales
has acted as a catalyst in the processes of re-evaluation of indigenous culture currently
underway in Bolivia, this thesis proposes that, in the case of young people in El Alto,
they do not merely accept his authority, but are constantly questioning, challenging and
- where necessary - opposing, the changes introduced. Therefore, this thesis
investigates the ways in which young alteños navigate and re-imagine categories of
“indigeneity,” “authenticity” and “modernity” - how they affect and are affected by
them in their everyday lives. It asks what it means to be young and Aymara today, in El
Alto, and argues that there is no contradiction being both 'Aymara' and 'Street.' In using
a youth-centred methodology, this thesis aims to give a direct voice to these young
people and weight to their claims as agents of change in contemporary Bolivia.
2013-01-01T00:00:00ZHarrison, Charlotte RoseThis thesis explores the new self-narratives which are currently being created by young
alteños with experience of living and/or working on the streets. These young people are
projecting their visions for the future and challenging their marginal status by going
back to their roots, looking to the history, myths, legends and practices of their ancestors
for inspiration. They are constantly affirming and reaffirming their connections both to
the older generations and to Pachamama (Mother Earth). These connections, rather than
being threatened by the urbanity of their present existence, are actually enhanced by it.
Specifically, this thesis addresses the creativity employed by young alteños as they
make a claim to modernity through working as shoe-shiners, conducting rituals such as
the ch'alla to Pachamama, participating in festivals to create collectivity and belonging,
and politicising indigenous culture in hip-hop at La Casa Juvenil de las Culturas Wayna
Tambo in El Alto. This thesis explores the hopes and ambitions of young alteños; the
ways they conceive of the future. Whilst it is true that the Presidency of Evo Morales
has acted as a catalyst in the processes of re-evaluation of indigenous culture currently
underway in Bolivia, this thesis proposes that, in the case of young people in El Alto,
they do not merely accept his authority, but are constantly questioning, challenging and
- where necessary - opposing, the changes introduced. Therefore, this thesis
investigates the ways in which young alteños navigate and re-imagine categories of
“indigeneity,” “authenticity” and “modernity” - how they affect and are affected by
them in their everyday lives. It asks what it means to be young and Aymara today, in El
Alto, and argues that there is no contradiction being both 'Aymara' and 'Street.' In using
a youth-centred methodology, this thesis aims to give a direct voice to these young
people and weight to their claims as agents of change in contemporary Bolivia.Common human reason in Kant : a study in Kant’s moral psychology and philosophical method
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/7445
In my thesis I explain why the common, pre-theoretical understanding of morality is an important part of Kant’s ethics, and I critically evaluate what the strengths and weaknesses are of doing ethics with the common perspective as a point of reference.
In chapter 1, I discuss the significance of common rational capacities for the deduction in Groundwork III as well as for the Fact of Reason. Attention to the fundamental role of common rational capacities in the Second Critique reveals that Kant intends to provide further warrant for the Fact than its introspective self-evidence.
In chapter 2, I discuss what it means for a rational agent to be endowed with common rational capacities. The agent has everything she needs to reason on her own about what she ought to do and act from rational judgements. Furthermore, I critically evaluate Kant’s claim that his ethics spells out fundamental, pre-theoretical convictions.
In chapter 3, I discuss Kant’s conception of rationalizing (“Vernünfteln”). I analyse rationalizing as a process of self-deception in which an agent tries to justify or excuse violations of the moral law. This can lead to loss of the reliable use of common rational capacities. I discuss what help critical practical philosophy and moral education can afford against rationalizing.
In chapter 4, I argue that Kant saw dialogical engagement with ordinary agents as an important way of obtaining data concerning the correct starting point of practical philosophy. Kant demands that whatever we get from dialog and observation has to be isolated from its contingent elements. I conclude that the main problem for Kant’s method is how we can, on the one hand, exclude non-rational content, and, on the other hand, be open to what other agents actually have to say about morality.
2015-11-30T00:00:00ZSticker, MartinIn my thesis I explain why the common, pre-theoretical understanding of morality is an important part of Kant’s ethics, and I critically evaluate what the strengths and weaknesses are of doing ethics with the common perspective as a point of reference.
In chapter 1, I discuss the significance of common rational capacities for the deduction in Groundwork III as well as for the Fact of Reason. Attention to the fundamental role of common rational capacities in the Second Critique reveals that Kant intends to provide further warrant for the Fact than its introspective self-evidence.
In chapter 2, I discuss what it means for a rational agent to be endowed with common rational capacities. The agent has everything she needs to reason on her own about what she ought to do and act from rational judgements. Furthermore, I critically evaluate Kant’s claim that his ethics spells out fundamental, pre-theoretical convictions.
In chapter 3, I discuss Kant’s conception of rationalizing (“Vernünfteln”). I analyse rationalizing as a process of self-deception in which an agent tries to justify or excuse violations of the moral law. This can lead to loss of the reliable use of common rational capacities. I discuss what help critical practical philosophy and moral education can afford against rationalizing.
In chapter 4, I argue that Kant saw dialogical engagement with ordinary agents as an important way of obtaining data concerning the correct starting point of practical philosophy. Kant demands that whatever we get from dialog and observation has to be isolated from its contingent elements. I conclude that the main problem for Kant’s method is how we can, on the one hand, exclude non-rational content, and, on the other hand, be open to what other agents actually have to say about morality.Normativity and law
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/7363
An action's illegality can be irrelevant to a reason not to perform it. A plausible
example of a reason not to assault is that assault causes suffering. Since assault
is illegal, the reason pertains to a legally proscribed action. Still, assault's
illegality is irrelevant in this case: the reason would pertain (assault would cause
suffering; we would have reason not to assault) even if assault were not legally
proscribed.
On the other hand, it appears that a reason can be one that derives from
the interposition of law. This thesis is about reasons of this second type (legal
reasons). In particular, it is about their formal features. For example, it is about
their individuating conditions (when are p and q two legal reasons rather than
one?) and about how legal reasons can be second-order rather than first-order
(what follows when p is a reason not to have another reason figure in
deliberation about action?). Most particularly, however, it is about their identity
conditions (if p is a reason, when and only when is p a legal reason?).
I argue against three widely-accepted claims about the nature of legal
reasons: (i) p is a legal reason only if p is a content-independent reason (chapters
5 and 6); (ii) if p is a legal reason to ¢, p could be a complete reason to ¢ or a
part of a complete reason to ¢ (chapters 2, 3 and 4); (iii) a legal reason p has a
significant formal feature when p is an exclusionary reason (chapter 8). I also
argue that one argument to the conclusion that analytical jurisprudence must pay
special to attention moral legal reasons - an argument seen in recent work by R.
A. Duff - is unconvincing (chapter 7).
2000-01-01T00:00:00ZMarkwick, PaulAn action's illegality can be irrelevant to a reason not to perform it. A plausible
example of a reason not to assault is that assault causes suffering. Since assault
is illegal, the reason pertains to a legally proscribed action. Still, assault's
illegality is irrelevant in this case: the reason would pertain (assault would cause
suffering; we would have reason not to assault) even if assault were not legally
proscribed.
On the other hand, it appears that a reason can be one that derives from
the interposition of law. This thesis is about reasons of this second type (legal
reasons). In particular, it is about their formal features. For example, it is about
their individuating conditions (when are p and q two legal reasons rather than
one?) and about how legal reasons can be second-order rather than first-order
(what follows when p is a reason not to have another reason figure in
deliberation about action?). Most particularly, however, it is about their identity
conditions (if p is a reason, when and only when is p a legal reason?).
I argue against three widely-accepted claims about the nature of legal
reasons: (i) p is a legal reason only if p is a content-independent reason (chapters
5 and 6); (ii) if p is a legal reason to ¢, p could be a complete reason to ¢ or a
part of a complete reason to ¢ (chapters 2, 3 and 4); (iii) a legal reason p has a
significant formal feature when p is an exclusionary reason (chapter 8). I also
argue that one argument to the conclusion that analytical jurisprudence must pay
special to attention moral legal reasons - an argument seen in recent work by R.
A. Duff - is unconvincing (chapter 7).The development of pre-Hispanic art forms in Peru : seen as an outgrowth of textile techniques and their influence upon art forms and depiction of symbols
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/7359
Pre-Hispanic geometric art
forms In Peru
and the Andean Area
are taken to be
an
outgrowth of textile techniques. Textiles
and
fibre
arts predate ceramics
by
several millennia
In the Central Andean Area. The artist who created these textiles developed
an art style which
was to go
largely
unaltered until the arrival of the Spaniards. The foundations
of the Andean
art
form date to the Pre-ceramic. The restrictive, rather
Inflexible
nature of the warp and the weft
of the cloth
(the
geometric grid) was to influence the methods of represention that were to
follow. Geometric designs
were well suited to fit Into the rigid
framework. A
series of
conventions were
developed for the representation of symbols.
With the development
of ceramics, there was
leeway for
a new style to come
Into being.
However, this was not to be the case. The
potter
borrowed
extensively
from the weaving
tradition and
Its
associated styles
(only in Moche times did the potter make a
break the highly
geometric style
developed
centuries
before,
and even then this break
with tradition was a short
lived one).
The pre-Columbian artist often portrayed birds,
cats, fish and reptiles.
Many of these
designs were used
frequently and repeatedly throughout the centuries,
but none,
I
would
maintain. was represented as
frequently as the double-headed serpent, and with so
few variants.
Andean art
Is
a truly distinctive art
form;
very different from European art, and through Its
geometricity
It
conveyed and still conveys a totally different
approach to nature and the world
surrounding Andean man.
1988-01-01T00:00:00ZMacKay, W. IainPre-Hispanic geometric art
forms In Peru
and the Andean Area
are taken to be
an
outgrowth of textile techniques. Textiles
and
fibre
arts predate ceramics
by
several millennia
In the Central Andean Area. The artist who created these textiles developed
an art style which
was to go
largely
unaltered until the arrival of the Spaniards. The foundations
of the Andean
art
form date to the Pre-ceramic. The restrictive, rather
Inflexible
nature of the warp and the weft
of the cloth
(the
geometric grid) was to influence the methods of represention that were to
follow. Geometric designs
were well suited to fit Into the rigid
framework. A
series of
conventions were
developed for the representation of symbols.
With the development
of ceramics, there was
leeway for
a new style to come
Into being.
However, this was not to be the case. The
potter
borrowed
extensively
from the weaving
tradition and
Its
associated styles
(only in Moche times did the potter make a
break the highly
geometric style
developed
centuries
before,
and even then this break
with tradition was a short
lived one).
The pre-Columbian artist often portrayed birds,
cats, fish and reptiles.
Many of these
designs were used
frequently and repeatedly throughout the centuries,
but none,
I
would
maintain. was represented as
frequently as the double-headed serpent, and with so
few variants.
Andean art
Is
a truly distinctive art
form;
very different from European art, and through Its
geometricity
It
conveyed and still conveys a totally different
approach to nature and the world
surrounding Andean man.Roots of/routes to : practice and performance of identity in the Isle of Man
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/7297
This thesis takes as its ethnographic focus the Isle of Man, a British Crown Dependency. In the 1960s, the Manx government faced an economic crisis. The response was to open the Island to international banking, becoming an 'offshore' financial centre. The new industry sector has encouraged substantial immigration, to the extent that the Island-born are now in the minority. The Island now has economic success on one hand, but a new 'identity' crisis of cultural confidence on the other, raising the question 'what is it (now), to be Manx?' The Manx have always accepted incomers and are not, or ever have been, a clearly defined ethnic group. Rather 'Manxness' is an idea, a set of values, a way of relating to place and to each other. Defined thus, 'Manx identity' could be, and has been, shared with incomers. The current situation is, however, perceived as substantially different in its speed and volume, resulting in concerns that Manx culture and identity is disappearing under the weight of an alien cultural import. Reaction is demonstrated in renewed interest in the Manx Gaelic language and other 'traditiona1' pursuits, with individuals selecting routes to identification with place that satisfy personal motivations. Included in this performance of culture are members of the 'incomer' group blamed for its demise, while many Island-born show little concern. Through subtle analysis of this complex context, I add to anthropological understanding of 'identity' and 'way of life' by juxtaposing personal and collective responses to this process of change, and investigating the importance of scales of difference. And, in a disciplinary context that has shifted attention from bounded to boundless 'homes', I ask how far anthropological constructions go in explicating how and why our informants still struggle to strike a meaningful balance between their roots of and routes to identity
2004-01-01T00:00:00ZLewis, SusanThis thesis takes as its ethnographic focus the Isle of Man, a British Crown Dependency. In the 1960s, the Manx government faced an economic crisis. The response was to open the Island to international banking, becoming an 'offshore' financial centre. The new industry sector has encouraged substantial immigration, to the extent that the Island-born are now in the minority. The Island now has economic success on one hand, but a new 'identity' crisis of cultural confidence on the other, raising the question 'what is it (now), to be Manx?' The Manx have always accepted incomers and are not, or ever have been, a clearly defined ethnic group. Rather 'Manxness' is an idea, a set of values, a way of relating to place and to each other. Defined thus, 'Manx identity' could be, and has been, shared with incomers. The current situation is, however, perceived as substantially different in its speed and volume, resulting in concerns that Manx culture and identity is disappearing under the weight of an alien cultural import. Reaction is demonstrated in renewed interest in the Manx Gaelic language and other 'traditiona1' pursuits, with individuals selecting routes to identification with place that satisfy personal motivations. Included in this performance of culture are members of the 'incomer' group blamed for its demise, while many Island-born show little concern. Through subtle analysis of this complex context, I add to anthropological understanding of 'identity' and 'way of life' by juxtaposing personal and collective responses to this process of change, and investigating the importance of scales of difference. And, in a disciplinary context that has shifted attention from bounded to boundless 'homes', I ask how far anthropological constructions go in explicating how and why our informants still struggle to strike a meaningful balance between their roots of and routes to identityImages of the Dai : the aesthetics of gender and identity in Xishuangbanna
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/7293
This thesis is based on fieldwork carried out m Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture, Yunnan Province, China. The main focus of the work is the Dai people, one of China's fifty-five so called 'Minority Nationalities'. I aim to paint a picture of the complex processes through which Dai ways of being and images of them are created and recreated. This is not to suggest that the Dai constitute a bounded group. Although Chinese official discourse presents a static, rigid picture of the so-called 'Minority Nationalities', I hope to have demonstrated that the everyday experiences of those in Banna are governed by a fluid and dynamic relationality. Images of 'Minority Nationalities' abound in China, these images are multiple and often contradictory. The Dai are known throughout China for their beauty, a beauty often portrayed as highly erotic. In this thesis I explore the implications of this image and the role of the Dai in its formation and continuity. With this in mind I examine the ways that the striking Dai aesthetic is used in the intricate power plays of Xishuangbanna. This work examines aspects of the Dai lived aesthetic and as such it has chapters on tattoo, architecture and feminine beauty. Dai aesthetic knowledge is interlaced with strands of moral, philosophical and cosmological insight, thus this work also includes a chapter on morality, autonomy and cooperation. The penultimate chapter uses vivid ethnography of the Water Splashing festival as a example of play of identities in Xishuangbanna. The Conclusion reiterates that the processes by which images, identities and aesthetic understandings are generated, and by which limits are explored and transgressed in Xishuangbanna are dialogic in character.
2002-01-01T00:00:00ZKomlosy, AnouskaThis thesis is based on fieldwork carried out m Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture, Yunnan Province, China. The main focus of the work is the Dai people, one of China's fifty-five so called 'Minority Nationalities'. I aim to paint a picture of the complex processes through which Dai ways of being and images of them are created and recreated. This is not to suggest that the Dai constitute a bounded group. Although Chinese official discourse presents a static, rigid picture of the so-called 'Minority Nationalities', I hope to have demonstrated that the everyday experiences of those in Banna are governed by a fluid and dynamic relationality. Images of 'Minority Nationalities' abound in China, these images are multiple and often contradictory. The Dai are known throughout China for their beauty, a beauty often portrayed as highly erotic. In this thesis I explore the implications of this image and the role of the Dai in its formation and continuity. With this in mind I examine the ways that the striking Dai aesthetic is used in the intricate power plays of Xishuangbanna. This work examines aspects of the Dai lived aesthetic and as such it has chapters on tattoo, architecture and feminine beauty. Dai aesthetic knowledge is interlaced with strands of moral, philosophical and cosmological insight, thus this work also includes a chapter on morality, autonomy and cooperation. The penultimate chapter uses vivid ethnography of the Water Splashing festival as a example of play of identities in Xishuangbanna. The Conclusion reiterates that the processes by which images, identities and aesthetic understandings are generated, and by which limits are explored and transgressed in Xishuangbanna are dialogic in character.Sistemas regionais, relações interétnicas e movimentos territoriais : os Tapajó e além na história ameríndia
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/7288
Esse artigo considera o nascimento de um território ameríndio complexo no Baixo Amazonas no final do século XVII. Esse território, identificado pela região dos rios Madeira/Tapajós, pode ser vista como uma zona tribal, fora do contato direto com a sociedade colonial, entretanto conectada a ela. A guerra entre os Tapajó (costa sul, ao redor da foz do rio Tapajós) e os Aruaque (costa norte, ao redor do lago Saracá), que já ocorria durante grande parte do século dezessete, chegou a um ápice no inicio de 1660. Com envolvimento europeu, a guerra acabou gerando consequências para o potencial coletivo de ambas partes, que ficou muito reduzido. Considerando as relações de alianças e combates, esse artigo confronta as transformações internas e externas no Baixo Amazonas, focando na nação tapajó. Será que esses grandes povos se dividiram em etnias diferentes, ou se reagruparam na zona tribal, ou ainda, será que diminuíram e perderam poder?
2015-08-04T00:00:00ZHarris, MarkEsse artigo considera o nascimento de um território ameríndio complexo no Baixo Amazonas no final do século XVII. Esse território, identificado pela região dos rios Madeira/Tapajós, pode ser vista como uma zona tribal, fora do contato direto com a sociedade colonial, entretanto conectada a ela. A guerra entre os Tapajó (costa sul, ao redor da foz do rio Tapajós) e os Aruaque (costa norte, ao redor do lago Saracá), que já ocorria durante grande parte do século dezessete, chegou a um ápice no inicio de 1660. Com envolvimento europeu, a guerra acabou gerando consequências para o potencial coletivo de ambas partes, que ficou muito reduzido. Considerando as relações de alianças e combates, esse artigo confronta as transformações internas e externas no Baixo Amazonas, focando na nação tapajó. Será que esses grandes povos se dividiram em etnias diferentes, ou se reagruparam na zona tribal, ou ainda, será que diminuíram e perderam poder?Indexicality, transparency, and mental files
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/7286
Francois Recanati’s Mental Files (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) presents a picture of the mind on which mental representations are indexical and transparent. I dispute this picture: there is no clear case for regarding mental representations as indexical, and there are counterexamples to transparency.
2014-01-01T00:00:00ZBall, Derek NelsonFrancois Recanati’s Mental Files (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) presents a picture of the mind on which mental representations are indexical and transparent. I dispute this picture: there is no clear case for regarding mental representations as indexical, and there are counterexamples to transparency.Love and hate among the people without things : the social and economic relations of the Enxet people of Paraguay
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/7281
This thesis
examines the
social and economic relations of the Enxet indigenous
people of the Paraguayan Chaco
region who place a
high
value on egalitarianism,
generosity and personal autonomy.
However, during the twentieth century their land has
been
colonized
by
cattle ranchers and they have been
obliged to enter the market
economy.
While
anthropologists
have
proposed a range of theories to explain
indigenous
social and economic relations, the main concern of this thesis is to examine
how the
Enxet themselves explain their social
behaviour. The Enxet
make salient use of
"emotion
words" when
discussing their social and economic practices.
For instance,
a
fundamental
dichotomy in Enxet thought is between "love"
and
"hate"
and much of their discourse
centres on these two concepts.
The Enxet
seek to create
"good/beautiful"
people who
know how to act appropriately.
In
certain contexts they should practise
"love"
while
in
other contexts
"hate" is
acceptable.
Enxet
social organization should not be understood as a structure but
as a process,
as something that is being
continually created.
I
will consider
different
aspects of this
process through an examination of
kinship,
co-residence, marital relations,
"brideservice"
and
inter-community
contact, and
I
will
describe how
economic transactions are
key
elements
in the generation of
"loving"
social relations.
However,
self-centred practices
create many challenges to a
harmonious
community
life
and
I
will consider
how the
Enxet
strive to overcome them. Of
particular
interest
will
be demand
sharing which
responds,
in
part, to a strongly-held egalitarian ethic
but
can also provoke
disharmony
and
discomfort in
community
life. I
will also
discuss
commodity relations within
Enxet
communities and challenge the common assumption that money
is
necessarily
destructive
of
indigenous
social relations.
I
will conclude that the overriding goal of the Enxet is the attainment of
tranquillity in both their personal and social
lives. For the Enxet,
economic relations are
not about gaining material wealth
but
about
living
well with other people.
They
recognize
that personal affective comfort
is dependent on engendering tranquillity in
other people.
Therefore, the "emotion
words" they use to explain their social
behaviour
should not
be
regarded as merely referring to "feelings" but
as encompassing an aesthetics of social
behaviour.
2000-01-01T00:00:00ZKidd, Stephen WilliamThis thesis
examines the
social and economic relations of the Enxet indigenous
people of the Paraguayan Chaco
region who place a
high
value on egalitarianism,
generosity and personal autonomy.
However, during the twentieth century their land has
been
colonized
by
cattle ranchers and they have been
obliged to enter the market
economy.
While
anthropologists
have
proposed a range of theories to explain
indigenous
social and economic relations, the main concern of this thesis is to examine
how the
Enxet themselves explain their social
behaviour. The Enxet
make salient use of
"emotion
words" when
discussing their social and economic practices.
For instance,
a
fundamental
dichotomy in Enxet thought is between "love"
and
"hate"
and much of their discourse
centres on these two concepts.
The Enxet
seek to create
"good/beautiful"
people who
know how to act appropriately.
In
certain contexts they should practise
"love"
while
in
other contexts
"hate" is
acceptable.
Enxet
social organization should not be understood as a structure but
as a process,
as something that is being
continually created.
I
will consider
different
aspects of this
process through an examination of
kinship,
co-residence, marital relations,
"brideservice"
and
inter-community
contact, and
I
will
describe how
economic transactions are
key
elements
in the generation of
"loving"
social relations.
However,
self-centred practices
create many challenges to a
harmonious
community
life
and
I
will consider
how the
Enxet
strive to overcome them. Of
particular
interest
will
be demand
sharing which
responds,
in
part, to a strongly-held egalitarian ethic
but
can also provoke
disharmony
and
discomfort in
community
life. I
will also
discuss
commodity relations within
Enxet
communities and challenge the common assumption that money
is
necessarily
destructive
of
indigenous
social relations.
I
will conclude that the overriding goal of the Enxet is the attainment of
tranquillity in both their personal and social
lives. For the Enxet,
economic relations are
not about gaining material wealth
but
about
living
well with other people.
They
recognize
that personal affective comfort
is dependent on engendering tranquillity in
other people.
Therefore, the "emotion
words" they use to explain their social
behaviour
should not
be
regarded as merely referring to "feelings" but
as encompassing an aesthetics of social
behaviour.Recombination and paradox
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/7139
2015-08-01T00:00:00ZUzquiano, GabrielThrough the food lens : the politics of everyday life in urban Burkina Faso
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/7117
The
subject of the thesis is the everyday
life
of several
Muslim
and one
Christian
family
residing
in different
parts of
Bobo-Dioulasso, the second
largest town in
Burkina Faso,
situated
in the south west, on the axis
between Mali
and
Ivory Coast.
Through
ethnographic
descriptions
of
food
events
I
explore
larger issues
of
everyday existence
in
urban
West Africa. The joint
use of
`traditional'
and
`western'
foods
shows that the average
Burkinabe
shifts
between
several worlds
in
which s/he
feels
more or
less
comfortable.
One is the home,
where eating and other practices
are traditional and safe, the other the outside world, where one
is
always at risk of
the unknown.
At the same time the outside world
is
a space
invested
with
expectations, excitement and possibility of success.
I
explore the ways
in
which
people negotiate
between
the `traditional'
world, which they know
and understand,
and the `modern'
ways of
life, to which, while with
hesitation
and apprehension,
they aspire.
In
order to understand people's everyday actions,
I
analyse their
everyday
lives,
starting
from the home life
and everyday
feeding
practices, through
celebrations and rituals, and their relationship with and
ideas
about the outside world
through the media.
Finally, I
explore people's
ideas
about the future they aspire to,
both for themselves and
for their families.
2005-01-01T00:00:00ZDebevec, LizaThe
subject of the thesis is the everyday
life
of several
Muslim
and one
Christian
family
residing
in different
parts of
Bobo-Dioulasso, the second
largest town in
Burkina Faso,
situated
in the south west, on the axis
between Mali
and
Ivory Coast.
Through
ethnographic
descriptions
of
food
events
I
explore
larger issues
of
everyday existence
in
urban
West Africa. The joint
use of
`traditional'
and
`western'
foods
shows that the average
Burkinabe
shifts
between
several worlds
in
which s/he
feels
more or
less
comfortable.
One is the home,
where eating and other practices
are traditional and safe, the other the outside world, where one
is
always at risk of
the unknown.
At the same time the outside world
is
a space
invested
with
expectations, excitement and possibility of success.
I
explore the ways
in
which
people negotiate
between
the `traditional'
world, which they know
and understand,
and the `modern'
ways of
life, to which, while with
hesitation
and apprehension,
they aspire.
In
order to understand people's everyday actions,
I
analyse their
everyday
lives,
starting
from the home life
and everyday
feeding
practices, through
celebrations and rituals, and their relationship with and
ideas
about the outside world
through the media.
Finally, I
explore people's
ideas
about the future they aspire to,
both for themselves and
for their families.The social life of miraa : farming, trade, and consumption of a plant stimulant in Kenya
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/7108
This thesis traces the paths and trajectories that one substance - the plant stimulant Catha
edulis (Forssk.), known in Kenya as 'miraa' - takes in the course of its 'social life' from
production, through exchange, to its points of consumption. The thesis attempts to draw out
the richness in this social life through an in-depth ethnographic examination of these
trajectories, emphasising in particular their socially-embedded nature. By following an
approach influenced by the volume The social life of things (Appadurai [ed.] 1986) the thesis
is able to tease out much of the significance the substance has for those people who animate
its social life. The trajectories covered vary greatly in range, from those involving local
consumption in the area in which it is grown - the Nyambene Hills district of Kenya - to
those that take it thousands of miles away to Europe and North America. The vast range of
the substance allows for the generation of many different meanings and associations, and
many of these are brought out over the course of the thesis. The trade of the substance (trade
that relies much on trust) and its consumption are seen as in many ways socially cohesive,
while in other respects socially divisive: while substances like miraa can build bridges, they
can also build fences. Of especial importance to the thesis is the character of Nicholas,
whose relationship with miraa demonstrates how individuals can take on board shared
meanings concerning a substance, whilst creating many new meanings of their own through
processes of convergence and divergence. The study addresses both the significance of miraa
and its social life for wider debates in anthropology and its significance within the lives of
farmers, traders, and consumers, and anyone engaged in debating its merits.
2003-01-01T00:00:00ZCarrier, NeilThis thesis traces the paths and trajectories that one substance - the plant stimulant Catha
edulis (Forssk.), known in Kenya as 'miraa' - takes in the course of its 'social life' from
production, through exchange, to its points of consumption. The thesis attempts to draw out
the richness in this social life through an in-depth ethnographic examination of these
trajectories, emphasising in particular their socially-embedded nature. By following an
approach influenced by the volume The social life of things (Appadurai [ed.] 1986) the thesis
is able to tease out much of the significance the substance has for those people who animate
its social life. The trajectories covered vary greatly in range, from those involving local
consumption in the area in which it is grown - the Nyambene Hills district of Kenya - to
those that take it thousands of miles away to Europe and North America. The vast range of
the substance allows for the generation of many different meanings and associations, and
many of these are brought out over the course of the thesis. The trade of the substance (trade
that relies much on trust) and its consumption are seen as in many ways socially cohesive,
while in other respects socially divisive: while substances like miraa can build bridges, they
can also build fences. Of especial importance to the thesis is the character of Nicholas,
whose relationship with miraa demonstrates how individuals can take on board shared
meanings concerning a substance, whilst creating many new meanings of their own through
processes of convergence and divergence. The study addresses both the significance of miraa
and its social life for wider debates in anthropology and its significance within the lives of
farmers, traders, and consumers, and anyone engaged in debating its merits.Causation and responsibility : four aspects of their relation
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/7060
The concept of causation is essential to ascribing moral and legal responsibility since the only way an
agent can make a difference in the world is through her acts causing things to happen. Yet the extent
and manner in which the complex features of causation bear on responsibility ascriptions remain
unclear. I present an analysis of four aspects of causation which yields new insights into different
properties of responsibility and offers increased plausibility to certain moral views.
Chapter I examines the realist assumption that causation is an objective and mind-independent
relation between space-time located relata – a postulate meant to provide moral assessment with a
naturalistic basis and make moral properties continuous with a scientific view of the world. I argue that
such a realist stance is problematic, and by extension so are the views seeking to tie responsibility
attributions to an objective relation.
Chapter II combines the context sensitivity of causal claims with the plausible idea that
responsibility ascriptions rest on the assessment of causal sequences relating agents and consequences.
I argue that taking context sensitivity seriously compels us to face a choice between moral contrastivism
and a mild version of scepticism, viz. responsibility is not impossible, but ultimately difficult to identify
with confidence. I show why the latter view is preferable.
Chapter III explores the concern that group agents would causally (and morally) overdetermine
the effects already caused by their constituent individuals. I argue that non-reductive views of agency
and responsibility lack a coherent causal story about how group agents impact the world as relatively
independent entities. I explain the practical importance of higher-order entities and suggest a fictionalist
stance towards group agency talk.
Chapter IV analyses the puzzle of effect selection – if causes have infinitely many effects, but
only one or a few are mentioned in causal claims, what determines their selection from the complete set
of consequents? I argue that the criteria governing the difference between effects and by-products lack
clarity and stability. I use the concerns about appropriate effect selection to formulate an epistemic
argument against consequentialism.
2015-06-25T00:00:00ZTarnovanu, HoriaThe concept of causation is essential to ascribing moral and legal responsibility since the only way an
agent can make a difference in the world is through her acts causing things to happen. Yet the extent
and manner in which the complex features of causation bear on responsibility ascriptions remain
unclear. I present an analysis of four aspects of causation which yields new insights into different
properties of responsibility and offers increased plausibility to certain moral views.
Chapter I examines the realist assumption that causation is an objective and mind-independent
relation between space-time located relata – a postulate meant to provide moral assessment with a
naturalistic basis and make moral properties continuous with a scientific view of the world. I argue that
such a realist stance is problematic, and by extension so are the views seeking to tie responsibility
attributions to an objective relation.
Chapter II combines the context sensitivity of causal claims with the plausible idea that
responsibility ascriptions rest on the assessment of causal sequences relating agents and consequences.
I argue that taking context sensitivity seriously compels us to face a choice between moral contrastivism
and a mild version of scepticism, viz. responsibility is not impossible, but ultimately difficult to identify
with confidence. I show why the latter view is preferable.
Chapter III explores the concern that group agents would causally (and morally) overdetermine
the effects already caused by their constituent individuals. I argue that non-reductive views of agency
and responsibility lack a coherent causal story about how group agents impact the world as relatively
independent entities. I explain the practical importance of higher-order entities and suggest a fictionalist
stance towards group agency talk.
Chapter IV analyses the puzzle of effect selection – if causes have infinitely many effects, but
only one or a few are mentioned in causal claims, what determines their selection from the complete set
of consequents? I argue that the criteria governing the difference between effects and by-products lack
clarity and stability. I use the concerns about appropriate effect selection to formulate an epistemic
argument against consequentialism.The foodpaths of Chawpirana people : an ethnography of living inbetweenness in the Bolivian Andes
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/7048
This thesis explores the everyday lives of the people of Cabreca ethnographically. Cabreca is
an Andean hamlet in the chawpirana of Northern Potosí in Bolivia. The chawpirana is a zone
which lies in-between the highlands (puna) and the valleys. Chawpi is the Quechua word for
middle/centre, rana means zone. While much anthropological work has been carried out in
puna and valley, the chawpirana has so far been neglected. Through an ethnography from the
middle I consider what it means to live in this in-between position.
My analysis focuses on the everyday spheres of the home, childhood, agricultural tasks and
pastoralism, food and movement. The themes that emerge from my ethnography are local
Cabreca ways of learning and knowing; feeding, reciprocity and the maintenance of
relationships between humans, animals, plants and spirits; flexibility; and mobility. The latter
two demonstrate the distinctiveness of the chawpirana particularly well: Cabrequeños move
extensively within the zone as their fields lie in the surroundings of the hamlet. The flexibility
of their households is manifested through these movements.
This study is an ethnography which pays attention to detail and provides minute descriptions
of everyday activities in Cabreca. The emphasis on ethnographic detail is created in
interaction with the intimacy which developed between Cabrequeños and me during 13
months of participant-observation. While living in a Cabreca household I had access to the
daily activities and particularly to those which women typically carry out. My experience is
embedded into anthropological literature on dwelling, kinship, ways of knowing, work,
embodied practice, reciprocity, and sharing.
2014-01-01T00:00:00ZNell, CorneliaThis thesis explores the everyday lives of the people of Cabreca ethnographically. Cabreca is
an Andean hamlet in the chawpirana of Northern Potosí in Bolivia. The chawpirana is a zone
which lies in-between the highlands (puna) and the valleys. Chawpi is the Quechua word for
middle/centre, rana means zone. While much anthropological work has been carried out in
puna and valley, the chawpirana has so far been neglected. Through an ethnography from the
middle I consider what it means to live in this in-between position.
My analysis focuses on the everyday spheres of the home, childhood, agricultural tasks and
pastoralism, food and movement. The themes that emerge from my ethnography are local
Cabreca ways of learning and knowing; feeding, reciprocity and the maintenance of
relationships between humans, animals, plants and spirits; flexibility; and mobility. The latter
two demonstrate the distinctiveness of the chawpirana particularly well: Cabrequeños move
extensively within the zone as their fields lie in the surroundings of the hamlet. The flexibility
of their households is manifested through these movements.
This study is an ethnography which pays attention to detail and provides minute descriptions
of everyday activities in Cabreca. The emphasis on ethnographic detail is created in
interaction with the intimacy which developed between Cabrequeños and me during 13
months of participant-observation. While living in a Cabreca household I had access to the
daily activities and particularly to those which women typically carry out. My experience is
embedded into anthropological literature on dwelling, kinship, ways of knowing, work,
embodied practice, reciprocity, and sharing.Ideals, reasons, and the second person
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/7043
The aim of this thesis is to shed light on important aspects of the role ideals play in
practical reasoning. In the first chapter an account of ideals as conceptions of
admirable ways of being (a true friend, a great athlete, a perfect dandy) is provided,
distinguishing proper ideals from bad and incomplete ones. In the second chapter, it
is shown what it takes for a person to have an ideal. The phenomenon of ideal
possession reveals a complex dispositional structure at the centre of which lies a kind
of affective desire, a feeling of a calling to be the way conceptualised by the ideal.
Admiration for ideal ways of being observed in real and imaginative others can,
under certain conditions, trigger such a desire. In the third chapter, the normative
implications of ideal possession are examined. To have an ideal comes with a
standing vocational reason to pursue one’s ideal. This standing reason, in turn, gives
rise to a steady supply of case-dependent vocational reasons to act and to feel in
certain ways; reasons that ultimately guide one’s attempts at living up to one’s ideal.
Finally, the fourth chapter investigates the contribution of a pursuit of ideals to the
quality of one’s life. The main focus is on the kind of recognition that successful
idealists are likely to receive from actual admirers. It is argued that second-personal
expressions of admiration can endow the idealist with petitionary reasons to
maintain or develop her admirable properties. The result is the doubling of reasons:
The interplay of both ideal-based vocational reasons and admiration-based
petitionary reasons pulling in the same direction, helping the idealist to live a life in
which her individual and social natures are better reconciled with each other – a life
which is not necessarily happier, but likely more meaningful.
2014-01-01T00:00:00ZGrahle, AndréThe aim of this thesis is to shed light on important aspects of the role ideals play in
practical reasoning. In the first chapter an account of ideals as conceptions of
admirable ways of being (a true friend, a great athlete, a perfect dandy) is provided,
distinguishing proper ideals from bad and incomplete ones. In the second chapter, it
is shown what it takes for a person to have an ideal. The phenomenon of ideal
possession reveals a complex dispositional structure at the centre of which lies a kind
of affective desire, a feeling of a calling to be the way conceptualised by the ideal.
Admiration for ideal ways of being observed in real and imaginative others can,
under certain conditions, trigger such a desire. In the third chapter, the normative
implications of ideal possession are examined. To have an ideal comes with a
standing vocational reason to pursue one’s ideal. This standing reason, in turn, gives
rise to a steady supply of case-dependent vocational reasons to act and to feel in
certain ways; reasons that ultimately guide one’s attempts at living up to one’s ideal.
Finally, the fourth chapter investigates the contribution of a pursuit of ideals to the
quality of one’s life. The main focus is on the kind of recognition that successful
idealists are likely to receive from actual admirers. It is argued that second-personal
expressions of admiration can endow the idealist with petitionary reasons to
maintain or develop her admirable properties. The result is the doubling of reasons:
The interplay of both ideal-based vocational reasons and admiration-based
petitionary reasons pulling in the same direction, helping the idealist to live a life in
which her individual and social natures are better reconciled with each other – a life
which is not necessarily happier, but likely more meaningful.Manioc beer and the Word of God : faces of the future in Makuma, Ecuador
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/7031
How can anthropologists describe the relationship between Christian and Amazonian ontologies? Based on a 13 months-long fieldwork, this ethnography of the
Evangelical mission town of Makuma in lowland Ecuador describes the relationship
between the Shuar and North American missionaries. In Makuma “Christianity”
and “Shuar” both refer to ways of relating particularity to a universal but put different emphases either on the body or on belief, and on relation or on boundaries. I argue that these are constituted by “technologies of introjection of the future”. For
Shuar people, these technologies range from manioc beer to powerful hallucinogens
which serve to anchor a perceived chronic instability of Amazonian bodies. Shuar
Christians avoid using any of these, which complicates their participation in social
life. All the alternatives they have found revolve around the Bible. As another “technology of introjection of the future”, the Bible appears to Makuma Christians as a
text addressed to them personally by a God come from a future beyond the future to
help them live that future in the present. They translate the Bible into the Shuar language and document the world from the Bible’s perspective to stabilise the relationship between God, themselves, and Shuar people. Both “technologies of introjection
of the future” are distinct but can be made to work together. I present various forms
of cooperation between Shuar and missionaries (Bible translation, maintenance of a
hydroelectric powerplant) alongside attempts to articulate a new relationship
between the Shuar, God, and the Church that would bypass the missionaries (Islam,
adventism, or indigenous churches). These are judged by the Shuar for their effects
on kinship. I conclude the thesis with a more abstract definition of “technologies of
incorporation of the future” which enables their articulation with capitalism and colonialism and opens up broader comparative horizons.
2015-01-01T00:00:00ZCova, VictorHow can anthropologists describe the relationship between Christian and Amazonian ontologies? Based on a 13 months-long fieldwork, this ethnography of the
Evangelical mission town of Makuma in lowland Ecuador describes the relationship
between the Shuar and North American missionaries. In Makuma “Christianity”
and “Shuar” both refer to ways of relating particularity to a universal but put different emphases either on the body or on belief, and on relation or on boundaries. I argue that these are constituted by “technologies of introjection of the future”. For
Shuar people, these technologies range from manioc beer to powerful hallucinogens
which serve to anchor a perceived chronic instability of Amazonian bodies. Shuar
Christians avoid using any of these, which complicates their participation in social
life. All the alternatives they have found revolve around the Bible. As another “technology of introjection of the future”, the Bible appears to Makuma Christians as a
text addressed to them personally by a God come from a future beyond the future to
help them live that future in the present. They translate the Bible into the Shuar language and document the world from the Bible’s perspective to stabilise the relationship between God, themselves, and Shuar people. Both “technologies of introjection
of the future” are distinct but can be made to work together. I present various forms
of cooperation between Shuar and missionaries (Bible translation, maintenance of a
hydroelectric powerplant) alongside attempts to articulate a new relationship
between the Shuar, God, and the Church that would bypass the missionaries (Islam,
adventism, or indigenous churches). These are judged by the Shuar for their effects
on kinship. I conclude the thesis with a more abstract definition of “technologies of
incorporation of the future” which enables their articulation with capitalism and colonialism and opens up broader comparative horizons.Projecting peripheries : allegories of marginality in post-communist Romanian cinema
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/6951
This thesis addresses aspects of Romanian society and cinema, by analyzing post-communist films through the perspective of marginality. The central hypothesis of this study refers to the ways in which films illustrate conditions of post-communist Romanian society, as they consider representations of the periphery through the angle of allegories of marginality. Following a long tradition, especially in literary studies, where it refers to the
overt insertion of symbolic meanings, allegory refers in this study to a less noticeable delivery, by using a postmodern interpretation of the concept. This translates to detecting a latent meaning in films, by interpreting them in a broader context pertaining both to the film’s circumstances (production, distribution and reception), and to the broader framework of the film’s content. What connects post-communist Romanian films is a
concern for matters of marginality, as they focus on dissensions in society,
intergenerational conflicts, youth and limited opportunities of social movement, and the use of satire as a way of handling the bleak conditions of life. Aiming to provide a realistic representation of post-communist life, new wave Romanian films focus on the mundane reality of everyday life. The films discussed in this thesis expand beyond the scope of the new wave, and present a diversity of aesthetic approaches and relating perspectives on allegory—from distinct to obscure—defined by the contextual conditions of post-communism.
2015-06-25T00:00:00ZIacob, RalucaThis thesis addresses aspects of Romanian society and cinema, by analyzing post-communist films through the perspective of marginality. The central hypothesis of this study refers to the ways in which films illustrate conditions of post-communist Romanian society, as they consider representations of the periphery through the angle of allegories of marginality. Following a long tradition, especially in literary studies, where it refers to the
overt insertion of symbolic meanings, allegory refers in this study to a less noticeable delivery, by using a postmodern interpretation of the concept. This translates to detecting a latent meaning in films, by interpreting them in a broader context pertaining both to the film’s circumstances (production, distribution and reception), and to the broader framework of the film’s content. What connects post-communist Romanian films is a
concern for matters of marginality, as they focus on dissensions in society,
intergenerational conflicts, youth and limited opportunities of social movement, and the use of satire as a way of handling the bleak conditions of life. Aiming to provide a realistic representation of post-communist life, new wave Romanian films focus on the mundane reality of everyday life. The films discussed in this thesis expand beyond the scope of the new wave, and present a diversity of aesthetic approaches and relating perspectives on allegory—from distinct to obscure—defined by the contextual conditions of post-communism.Knowing best? : an ethnographic exploration of the politics and practices of an international NGO in Senegal
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/6930
This thesis explores the social and political relations of an international non-governmental organisation (NGO) based in Senegal. NGOs and international development have been the subject of research from a number of different perspectives, including the politics (and anti-politics) of development, post-development, structural violence and the ‘everyday lives’ of NGO participants and workers (Ferguson 1990; Escobar 1995; Farmer 2004; Bornstein 2005; Hilhorst 2003). The present study builds on this scholarship through an ethnographic exploration of the networks of people involved with Tostan, an American NGO based in Senegal whose developmental objective is to engender social change among rural groups in Senegal (particularly those that practice female genital cutting), using a human rights education framework.
Through identification and scrutiny of the organisation’s macro- and micro-level social relations, I critically examine how ‘development’ operates as a cultural and political process. I focus analytically on conceptions of knowledge and ignorance, particularly the ways in which these constructions are acted upon and utilised by different actors within the organisation. I argue that, as an NGO (and thus a ‘moral actor,’ Guilhot 2005: 6) within the contemporary donor-driven development industry, a key preoccupation for Tostan as an organisation is the management of perception, or a concern for the ‘spectacle of development’ (Allen 2013). Flowing from this argument is the assertion that the activities carried out by actors at every level of the organisation to produce and re-produce particular narratives through strategic knowing and unknowing are as significant (if not more so) as the formal programmatic activities implemented by the organisation ‘on the ground.’
As David Mosse argues, development involves not only social work, but also the conceptual work of ‘enrolment, persuasion, agreement and argument that lies behind the consensus and coherence necessary to sustain authoritative narratives and networks for the continued support of policy’ (Mosse 2005: 34). As I argue here, NGO actors work to (re)produce, project and protect particular narratives, through the strategic exercise of knowledge and ignorance, in order to access or consolidate positions of power within the politics of aid. Drawing on critical theories of development and human rights (e.g. Sachs 1992; Escobar 1991, 1995; Guilhot 2005, inter alia), within a political context succinctly described by Ellen Foley (2010: 9) as ‘the neoliberalization of just about everything,’ I explore how actors across the organisation are linked in a web of cultural and political presuppositions, values, and motivations.
2015-06-25T00:00:00ZNí Mhórdha, MáireThis thesis explores the social and political relations of an international non-governmental organisation (NGO) based in Senegal. NGOs and international development have been the subject of research from a number of different perspectives, including the politics (and anti-politics) of development, post-development, structural violence and the ‘everyday lives’ of NGO participants and workers (Ferguson 1990; Escobar 1995; Farmer 2004; Bornstein 2005; Hilhorst 2003). The present study builds on this scholarship through an ethnographic exploration of the networks of people involved with Tostan, an American NGO based in Senegal whose developmental objective is to engender social change among rural groups in Senegal (particularly those that practice female genital cutting), using a human rights education framework.
Through identification and scrutiny of the organisation’s macro- and micro-level social relations, I critically examine how ‘development’ operates as a cultural and political process. I focus analytically on conceptions of knowledge and ignorance, particularly the ways in which these constructions are acted upon and utilised by different actors within the organisation. I argue that, as an NGO (and thus a ‘moral actor,’ Guilhot 2005: 6) within the contemporary donor-driven development industry, a key preoccupation for Tostan as an organisation is the management of perception, or a concern for the ‘spectacle of development’ (Allen 2013). Flowing from this argument is the assertion that the activities carried out by actors at every level of the organisation to produce and re-produce particular narratives through strategic knowing and unknowing are as significant (if not more so) as the formal programmatic activities implemented by the organisation ‘on the ground.’
As David Mosse argues, development involves not only social work, but also the conceptual work of ‘enrolment, persuasion, agreement and argument that lies behind the consensus and coherence necessary to sustain authoritative narratives and networks for the continued support of policy’ (Mosse 2005: 34). As I argue here, NGO actors work to (re)produce, project and protect particular narratives, through the strategic exercise of knowledge and ignorance, in order to access or consolidate positions of power within the politics of aid. Drawing on critical theories of development and human rights (e.g. Sachs 1992; Escobar 1991, 1995; Guilhot 2005, inter alia), within a political context succinctly described by Ellen Foley (2010: 9) as ‘the neoliberalization of just about everything,’ I explore how actors across the organisation are linked in a web of cultural and political presuppositions, values, and motivations.Paranormal tourism in Edinburgh : storytelling, appropriating ghost culture and presenting an uncanny heritage
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/6922
The paranormal industry in Edinburgh has become a thriving niche within the country’s tourist market. While ghost walks have been explored in anthropology from the perspective of spectacle, this thesis investigates and analyses the cultural framework which has furthered the success of the industry. Namely, the ways in which the paranormal industry have appropriated the beliefs and practices of an overarching ghost culture: a community of believers, investigators, mediums, and all those who actively attempt to engage with the paranormal.
The increased visibility of the paranormal within popular culture has spurred a wide interest in the unknown and unexplained. Ghost hunting television shows and the prevalence of ghost stories has inspired the desire for unique experiences, and for audiences to contextualise the supernatural within their own lives. The paranormal industry has grown to accommodate this intense, active enthusiasm for all things spectral, and belief has become a commodity.
This burgeoning fascination in ghosts has become an important aspect of how Scotland is sold as a destination. While commercial paranormal industries exist in other cities around the world, the historical perception of Scotland as other has created a precedent for the connection between Scottish national identity and the spectral. This thesis further investigates the ways in which the tourist industry continues to solidify the connection between Scottish heritage and the paranormal.
2015-06-25T00:00:00ZHolzhauser, ElizabethThe paranormal industry in Edinburgh has become a thriving niche within the country’s tourist market. While ghost walks have been explored in anthropology from the perspective of spectacle, this thesis investigates and analyses the cultural framework which has furthered the success of the industry. Namely, the ways in which the paranormal industry have appropriated the beliefs and practices of an overarching ghost culture: a community of believers, investigators, mediums, and all those who actively attempt to engage with the paranormal.
The increased visibility of the paranormal within popular culture has spurred a wide interest in the unknown and unexplained. Ghost hunting television shows and the prevalence of ghost stories has inspired the desire for unique experiences, and for audiences to contextualise the supernatural within their own lives. The paranormal industry has grown to accommodate this intense, active enthusiasm for all things spectral, and belief has become a commodity.
This burgeoning fascination in ghosts has become an important aspect of how Scotland is sold as a destination. While commercial paranormal industries exist in other cities around the world, the historical perception of Scotland as other has created a precedent for the connection between Scottish national identity and the spectral. This thesis further investigates the ways in which the tourist industry continues to solidify the connection between Scottish heritage and the paranormal.Aristotle on mathematical objects
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/6864
My thesis is an exposition and defence of Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics. The
first part of my thesis is an exposition of Aristotle’s cryptic and challenging view on
mathematics and is based on remarks scattered all over the corpus aristotelicum. The
thesis’ central focus is on Aristotle’s view on numbers rather than on geometrical figures.
In particular, number is understood as a countable plurality and is always a number
of something. I show that as a consequence the related concept of counting is based
on units. In the second part of my thesis, I verify Aristotle’s view on number by applying
it to his account of time. Time presents itself as a perfect test case for this project
because Aristotle defines time as a kind of number but also considers it as a continuum.
Since numbers and continuous things are mutually exclusive this observation seems to
lead to an apparent contradiction. I show why a contradiction does not arise when
we understand Aristotle properly. In the third part, I argue that the ontological status
of mathematical objects, dubbed as materially [hulekos, ÍlekÀc] by Aristotle, can only
be defended as an alternative to Platonism if mathematical objects exist potentially enmattered
in physical objects. In the fourth part, I compare Aristotle’s and Plato’s views
on how we obtain knowledge of mathematical objects. The fifth part is an extension of
my comparison between Aristotle’s and Plato’s epistemological views to their respective
ontological views regarding mathematics.
In the last part of my thesis I bring Frege’s view on numbers into play and engage
with Plato, Aristotle and Frege equally while exploring their ontological commitments
to mathematical objects. Specifically, I argue that Frege should not be mistaken for
a historical Platonist and that we find surprisingly many similarities between Frege
and Aristotle. After having acknowledged commonalities between Aristotle and Frege,
I turn to the most significant differences in their views. Finally, I defend Aristotle’s
abstractionism in mathematics against Frege’s counting block argument. This whole
project sheds more light on Aristotle’s view on mathematical objects and explains why
it remains an attractive view in the philosophy of mathematics.
2015-06-01T00:00:00ZGühler, JanineMy thesis is an exposition and defence of Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics. The
first part of my thesis is an exposition of Aristotle’s cryptic and challenging view on
mathematics and is based on remarks scattered all over the corpus aristotelicum. The
thesis’ central focus is on Aristotle’s view on numbers rather than on geometrical figures.
In particular, number is understood as a countable plurality and is always a number
of something. I show that as a consequence the related concept of counting is based
on units. In the second part of my thesis, I verify Aristotle’s view on number by applying
it to his account of time. Time presents itself as a perfect test case for this project
because Aristotle defines time as a kind of number but also considers it as a continuum.
Since numbers and continuous things are mutually exclusive this observation seems to
lead to an apparent contradiction. I show why a contradiction does not arise when
we understand Aristotle properly. In the third part, I argue that the ontological status
of mathematical objects, dubbed as materially [hulekos, ÍlekÀc] by Aristotle, can only
be defended as an alternative to Platonism if mathematical objects exist potentially enmattered
in physical objects. In the fourth part, I compare Aristotle’s and Plato’s views
on how we obtain knowledge of mathematical objects. The fifth part is an extension of
my comparison between Aristotle’s and Plato’s epistemological views to their respective
ontological views regarding mathematics.
In the last part of my thesis I bring Frege’s view on numbers into play and engage
with Plato, Aristotle and Frege equally while exploring their ontological commitments
to mathematical objects. Specifically, I argue that Frege should not be mistaken for
a historical Platonist and that we find surprisingly many similarities between Frege
and Aristotle. After having acknowledged commonalities between Aristotle and Frege,
I turn to the most significant differences in their views. Finally, I defend Aristotle’s
abstractionism in mathematics against Frege’s counting block argument. This whole
project sheds more light on Aristotle’s view on mathematical objects and explains why
it remains an attractive view in the philosophy of mathematics.Generics in context : generalisation, context and communication
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/6606
This thesis consists of four chapters and an introduction.
The first chapter is concerned with cases of purported genericity which are true despite only a minority of the kind in question satisfying the predicated property and whose predicated property is somehow striking. I argue that such cases are pathological, and hence shouldn’t be used as evidence for claims about the nature of genericity or the semantics of generics. In particular, these cases pose no difficulty for theorists who want to solve the problem of variability (the main obstacle in providing an adequate theory of generics), at least in part, by appeal to the linguistic property of quantifiers known as (contextual) domain restriction.
The second chapter is devoted to defending a quantificational analysis of generics in which the logical form of generics contains an unpronounced quantifier expression Gen. The chapter defends the original argument of Carlson (1989), the multiple readings argument, which has recently come under scrutiny. In addition, it provides a novel argument in favour or Gen. This chapter also responds to various objections to the quantificational analysis, in particular to the linguistic evidence offered in favour of the kind-predication analysis.
The third chapter defends the positive view that the unpronounced quantifier expression Gen is an indexical. The chapter argues that a given generic sentence expresses different generalisations in different contexts of utterance. A semantics for generics which treats Gen as an indexical A-quantifier is given. The indexical approach advocated has many virtues which are outlined in the chapter. Objections to the view are also addressed.
The fourth chapter discusses two further classes of generics -existential generics and indexical singular generics. Diagnoses of the issues arising from these classes of data is given, and their relation to the positive view developed in the third chapter is outlined.
2014-04-01T00:00:00ZSterken, RachelThis thesis consists of four chapters and an introduction.
The first chapter is concerned with cases of purported genericity which are true despite only a minority of the kind in question satisfying the predicated property and whose predicated property is somehow striking. I argue that such cases are pathological, and hence shouldn’t be used as evidence for claims about the nature of genericity or the semantics of generics. In particular, these cases pose no difficulty for theorists who want to solve the problem of variability (the main obstacle in providing an adequate theory of generics), at least in part, by appeal to the linguistic property of quantifiers known as (contextual) domain restriction.
The second chapter is devoted to defending a quantificational analysis of generics in which the logical form of generics contains an unpronounced quantifier expression Gen. The chapter defends the original argument of Carlson (1989), the multiple readings argument, which has recently come under scrutiny. In addition, it provides a novel argument in favour or Gen. This chapter also responds to various objections to the quantificational analysis, in particular to the linguistic evidence offered in favour of the kind-predication analysis.
The third chapter defends the positive view that the unpronounced quantifier expression Gen is an indexical. The chapter argues that a given generic sentence expresses different generalisations in different contexts of utterance. A semantics for generics which treats Gen as an indexical A-quantifier is given. The indexical approach advocated has many virtues which are outlined in the chapter. Objections to the view are also addressed.
The fourth chapter discusses two further classes of generics -existential generics and indexical singular generics. Diagnoses of the issues arising from these classes of data is given, and their relation to the positive view developed in the third chapter is outlined.Liberalism & internally illiberal minority cultures : a plea for a substantive exit rights strategy
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/6604
This dissertation seeks to answer the following question: does a commitment to liberalism require state remediation of illiberal practices of illiberal minority cultures that only affect their own members? Put differently, it asks: should the state deny illiberal minority cultures such as those of the Amish, Ultra-Orthodox Jews, Pueblo Indians, et cetera the freedom to be
internally illiberal from a liberal viewpoint?
The answer proposed by this dissertation is a qualified ‘no’. Assuming that liberalism is
fundamentally committed to the protection of individual freedom, I argue that states should allow illiberal minority cultures to be internally illiberal in order to respect the individual freedom of citizens with illiberal conceptions of the good. At the same time, I propose limits to this toleration in order to protect the individual freedom of (more) progressive-minded citizens, as well as to guard children from severely harmful cultural practices. Whether the state should tolerate illiberal practices of illiberal minority cultures that only affect their own
members, I claim, should depend on whether the following conditions are met:
(i) Their adult members are guaranteed substantive exit rights, i.e. rights to a realistic ability to change cultural affiliations.
(ii) The cultural communities in question do not engage in illiberal practices that inflict severe harm on children.
To realise condition (i), which forms the core of this dissertation’s ‘substantive exit rights strategy’, I argue that the state should take five measures. These include making an autonomy-facilitating education compulsorily for children, providing particular groups of defectors with financial assistance, and ensuring that the liberal majority culture is open to
ex-members of illiberal minority cultures. By contrast, condition (ii) is not considered to be central to this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy, the reason being that it is dubious
whether liberalism’s core commitment to the protection of individual freedom alone can
justify a ban on cultural practices that severely harm children. Even so, it will become clear that adding this condition renders this approach more plausible.
My central claim is that this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy better protects the individual freedom of members of illiberal minority cultures than the main rival liberal strategies, as proposed by Will Kymlicka and Chandran Kukathas. Whereas Kymlicka gives members of these groups too little liberty to engage in illiberal practices, I argue that Kukathas makes the opposite mistake of granting them too much liberty. In both cases, we will see that the individual freedom of some members of illiberal minority cultures is not appropriately protected. This holds true, I conclude, regardless of whether individual
freedom is construed as personal autonomy or in a less demanding way, namely as ability to
live (autonomously or non-autonomously) in accordance with one’s conception of the good.
2014-06-01T00:00:00ZDe Vries, BoukeThis dissertation seeks to answer the following question: does a commitment to liberalism require state remediation of illiberal practices of illiberal minority cultures that only affect their own members? Put differently, it asks: should the state deny illiberal minority cultures such as those of the Amish, Ultra-Orthodox Jews, Pueblo Indians, et cetera the freedom to be
internally illiberal from a liberal viewpoint?
The answer proposed by this dissertation is a qualified ‘no’. Assuming that liberalism is
fundamentally committed to the protection of individual freedom, I argue that states should allow illiberal minority cultures to be internally illiberal in order to respect the individual freedom of citizens with illiberal conceptions of the good. At the same time, I propose limits to this toleration in order to protect the individual freedom of (more) progressive-minded citizens, as well as to guard children from severely harmful cultural practices. Whether the state should tolerate illiberal practices of illiberal minority cultures that only affect their own
members, I claim, should depend on whether the following conditions are met:
(i) Their adult members are guaranteed substantive exit rights, i.e. rights to a realistic ability to change cultural affiliations.
(ii) The cultural communities in question do not engage in illiberal practices that inflict severe harm on children.
To realise condition (i), which forms the core of this dissertation’s ‘substantive exit rights strategy’, I argue that the state should take five measures. These include making an autonomy-facilitating education compulsorily for children, providing particular groups of defectors with financial assistance, and ensuring that the liberal majority culture is open to
ex-members of illiberal minority cultures. By contrast, condition (ii) is not considered to be central to this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy, the reason being that it is dubious
whether liberalism’s core commitment to the protection of individual freedom alone can
justify a ban on cultural practices that severely harm children. Even so, it will become clear that adding this condition renders this approach more plausible.
My central claim is that this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy better protects the individual freedom of members of illiberal minority cultures than the main rival liberal strategies, as proposed by Will Kymlicka and Chandran Kukathas. Whereas Kymlicka gives members of these groups too little liberty to engage in illiberal practices, I argue that Kukathas makes the opposite mistake of granting them too much liberty. In both cases, we will see that the individual freedom of some members of illiberal minority cultures is not appropriately protected. This holds true, I conclude, regardless of whether individual
freedom is construed as personal autonomy or in a less demanding way, namely as ability to
live (autonomously or non-autonomously) in accordance with one’s conception of the good.The agential fork : the hidden consequences of agency for plenitude in David Lewis' thesis of genuine modal realism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/6551
In this dissertation, I argue that David Lewis' abductive argument for Genuine Modal Realism (GMR) has the unwelcome, and hidden, implication of being unable to
accommodate agent causation theories of free will. This is because of his formulation of plenitude, which basically says that every way that a world or a part of a world could be is the way that some world, or part of some world is. This formulation tacitly assumes
that chance and nomological principles are sufficient to account for everything that happens at worlds. However, agent causation theories argue that free will is neither reducible to chance nor determined by physics. My argument recasts a fork argument made by Andrew Beedle. I proceed by arguing that chance-based principles evince an ontologically distinct kind of modality than agent causation principles. However,
plenitude only accounts for the physics/chance-based kind of modality. There is no similar principle of plenitude that can be given for agential modality that does not
collapse into the chance-based principle. But even if such a principle could be found, it would violate the doctrine in GMR that claims worlds are causally isolated. If no agential plenitude principle can be found and there is agential modality, then plenitude fails. If there is no agency at our world, and Lewis’ original formulation of plenitude is correct, then GMR implies no agency at any
world. This is the fork: If there is agency and GMR holds, then either plenitude fails, or isolation fails. But if there is no agency, and GMR holds, then there is no agency at any possible world. The latter prong is too strong a claim for an abductive argument like GMR. The
former proves that GMR cannot accommodate agent-causation theories. GMR loses its neutrality either way, to its detriment.
2015-06-25T00:00:00ZCole, Marc WilliamIn this dissertation, I argue that David Lewis' abductive argument for Genuine Modal Realism (GMR) has the unwelcome, and hidden, implication of being unable to
accommodate agent causation theories of free will. This is because of his formulation of plenitude, which basically says that every way that a world or a part of a world could be is the way that some world, or part of some world is. This formulation tacitly assumes
that chance and nomological principles are sufficient to account for everything that happens at worlds. However, agent causation theories argue that free will is neither reducible to chance nor determined by physics. My argument recasts a fork argument made by Andrew Beedle. I proceed by arguing that chance-based principles evince an ontologically distinct kind of modality than agent causation principles. However,
plenitude only accounts for the physics/chance-based kind of modality. There is no similar principle of plenitude that can be given for agential modality that does not
collapse into the chance-based principle. But even if such a principle could be found, it would violate the doctrine in GMR that claims worlds are causally isolated. If no agential plenitude principle can be found and there is agential modality, then plenitude fails. If there is no agency at our world, and Lewis’ original formulation of plenitude is correct, then GMR implies no agency at any
world. This is the fork: If there is agency and GMR holds, then either plenitude fails, or isolation fails. But if there is no agency, and GMR holds, then there is no agency at any possible world. The latter prong is too strong a claim for an abductive argument like GMR. The
former proves that GMR cannot accommodate agent-causation theories. GMR loses its neutrality either way, to its detriment.The unity of action
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/6550
This thesis develops a disjunctivist approach to action as an alternative to the standard causal theory, or 'causalism'. The standard theory promotes a concept of action as constituted by a bodily event joined to certain mental conditions by a bond of causation. A disjunctivist approach, in contrast, claims that action must be distinguished by more than merely its etiology: action and mere movement are fundamentally different kinds. Recent objections to the causal theory of action are first surveyed, and the common causalist assumption claiming Aristotle as the progenitor of the causal theory is examined and dismissed. More refined interpretations of Aristotle's thought on action yield two different concepts: action as change, and action as a unified psychophysical process. The latter in particular is argued to hold promise as a basis for developing the disjunctivist approach to action. The remainder of the thesis therefore considers a contemporary account of psychophysicality, known as 'embodiment theory' (Hanna and Maiese 2009), with the conclusion that the intelligibility of the account depends on appeal to a recent variant of top-down causation (Steward 2012). The thesis also concludes that consideration of the concept of an animal agent makes it entirely unsurprising that the mental and physical are always found together in voluntary movement, and that the embodiment theory’s central notion of ‘property fusion’ potentially complements a naturalistic variant of top-down causation in explanations of agency.
2015-06-25T00:00:00ZChik, Janice TzulingThis thesis develops a disjunctivist approach to action as an alternative to the standard causal theory, or 'causalism'. The standard theory promotes a concept of action as constituted by a bodily event joined to certain mental conditions by a bond of causation. A disjunctivist approach, in contrast, claims that action must be distinguished by more than merely its etiology: action and mere movement are fundamentally different kinds. Recent objections to the causal theory of action are first surveyed, and the common causalist assumption claiming Aristotle as the progenitor of the causal theory is examined and dismissed. More refined interpretations of Aristotle's thought on action yield two different concepts: action as change, and action as a unified psychophysical process. The latter in particular is argued to hold promise as a basis for developing the disjunctivist approach to action. The remainder of the thesis therefore considers a contemporary account of psychophysicality, known as 'embodiment theory' (Hanna and Maiese 2009), with the conclusion that the intelligibility of the account depends on appeal to a recent variant of top-down causation (Steward 2012). The thesis also concludes that consideration of the concept of an animal agent makes it entirely unsurprising that the mental and physical are always found together in voluntary movement, and that the embodiment theory’s central notion of ‘property fusion’ potentially complements a naturalistic variant of top-down causation in explanations of agency.Working towards “a production of well-being” : an ethnography on craftsmanship among the Lulesámi in Norway
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/6538
This thesis is an ethnographic study of craftsmanship among the Lulesámi in Northern Norway. The study, which is based on an apprentice-style methodology, focuses in particular on the role and significance of making and wearing the gáppte, a characteristic Sámi dress. While the gáppte is often employed to visually define and distinguish the Sámi in relation to other people, my aim is to move beyond such a common interpretation and unfold the garment’s everyday aspects and explore how its production and use are interwoven with the Lulesámi’s emphasis and ongoing creation of personal and social well-being.
The chapters address, in their different ways, the three main themes of this study. The first is concerned with the various ways in which the gáppte and its use affect people’s sense of self and relations to others, and the factors influencing such diverse experiences. The second theme focuses on how the learning to make the garment, rather than involving a fixed set of skills, is based on an ongoing practical and sensuous engagement with the world. I demonstrate that novices not only learn the technical skills of producing a garment to be worn, but that they are also encouraged to develop certain social skills and virtues for living a good life. The third theme is constituted by an examination of the productive activities within the domestic sphere, which often go unnoticed as they cannot easily be seen or measured through tangible evidence, but which affirm and strengthen the making of a convivial society.
Through the analysis I draw and build on current anthropological debates on material culture by showing how craftsmanship is a self-transforming experience which encompasses a complete way of being, traversing and merging immaterial and material realms of life. I also wish to contribute to feminist debates by drawing attention to how the ‘personal’ and ‘domestic’ are intimately intertwined with larger historical, political and social processes.
2015-06-25T00:00:00ZGustafsson, AnnaThis thesis is an ethnographic study of craftsmanship among the Lulesámi in Northern Norway. The study, which is based on an apprentice-style methodology, focuses in particular on the role and significance of making and wearing the gáppte, a characteristic Sámi dress. While the gáppte is often employed to visually define and distinguish the Sámi in relation to other people, my aim is to move beyond such a common interpretation and unfold the garment’s everyday aspects and explore how its production and use are interwoven with the Lulesámi’s emphasis and ongoing creation of personal and social well-being.
The chapters address, in their different ways, the three main themes of this study. The first is concerned with the various ways in which the gáppte and its use affect people’s sense of self and relations to others, and the factors influencing such diverse experiences. The second theme focuses on how the learning to make the garment, rather than involving a fixed set of skills, is based on an ongoing practical and sensuous engagement with the world. I demonstrate that novices not only learn the technical skills of producing a garment to be worn, but that they are also encouraged to develop certain social skills and virtues for living a good life. The third theme is constituted by an examination of the productive activities within the domestic sphere, which often go unnoticed as they cannot easily be seen or measured through tangible evidence, but which affirm and strengthen the making of a convivial society.
Through the analysis I draw and build on current anthropological debates on material culture by showing how craftsmanship is a self-transforming experience which encompasses a complete way of being, traversing and merging immaterial and material realms of life. I also wish to contribute to feminist debates by drawing attention to how the ‘personal’ and ‘domestic’ are intimately intertwined with larger historical, political and social processes.Modes of association and differentiation in Mauritius : an account of identity in a situation of socio-cultural heterogeneity
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/6455
This Thesis details the anthropological investigation of socio-cultural heterogeneity in Mauritius, a small island republic in the Indian Ocean. I introduce the island, its population, climate and other salient features in the Introduction, where I also reveal something of the author's intentions, interests and ideology.
Although Mauritius has been relatively infrequently written about by anthropologists or other social scientists, when Mauritian social diversity has been discussed it has been conducted on the presumption that difference is synonymous with division. Consequently, in Chapter 1, I develop a critique of this assumption, which has found its way into the texts and discourses of both sociologists and state bureaucrats. I collapse these two categories' products into one, by drawing upon Foucault's notion of 'governmentality', and critique widespread views of Multiculturalism as being founded on the alleged coevalness of difference and division. I also introduce my three main analytical tools: intersubjectivity, transcendence and creolization.
Chapter 2 portrays individuals' identity, agreeing that at times those Mauritians that I met did draw divisions between one another, but that this was far from predictable, nor universally practised. Chapter 3 continues this project, by focusing on specific forms of the expression of division, but again I highlight the unanticipated nature of division and difference. Chapter 4 further clouds the picture by noting that even where individuals might be thought to be unproblematically employing ethnic - or caste - based strategies in, for example, the workplace, the use of such tools was again unforseeable, and not always successful. Even where they were successful in securing advantage, there are wider costs not previously noted in the ethnographic record.
Chapter 5 is the culmination of my argument. Through a fine-grained portrayal of a number of ethnographic moments, I point up the unifying and shared practices which have hitherto been excerpted from ethnographic accounts of Mauritius (or other 'plural' societies). These unifying features are as relevant to my understanding of Mauritian society as divisions, I claim, and I reflect on the contrast between 'banal' unities and governmental notions of Multiculturalism.
The Conclusion draws together the threads of the Thesis and charts where it fits in terms of wider anthropological and political trends.
1999-01-01T00:00:00ZHills, MilsThis Thesis details the anthropological investigation of socio-cultural heterogeneity in Mauritius, a small island republic in the Indian Ocean. I introduce the island, its population, climate and other salient features in the Introduction, where I also reveal something of the author's intentions, interests and ideology.
Although Mauritius has been relatively infrequently written about by anthropologists or other social scientists, when Mauritian social diversity has been discussed it has been conducted on the presumption that difference is synonymous with division. Consequently, in Chapter 1, I develop a critique of this assumption, which has found its way into the texts and discourses of both sociologists and state bureaucrats. I collapse these two categories' products into one, by drawing upon Foucault's notion of 'governmentality', and critique widespread views of Multiculturalism as being founded on the alleged coevalness of difference and division. I also introduce my three main analytical tools: intersubjectivity, transcendence and creolization.
Chapter 2 portrays individuals' identity, agreeing that at times those Mauritians that I met did draw divisions between one another, but that this was far from predictable, nor universally practised. Chapter 3 continues this project, by focusing on specific forms of the expression of division, but again I highlight the unanticipated nature of division and difference. Chapter 4 further clouds the picture by noting that even where individuals might be thought to be unproblematically employing ethnic - or caste - based strategies in, for example, the workplace, the use of such tools was again unforseeable, and not always successful. Even where they were successful in securing advantage, there are wider costs not previously noted in the ethnographic record.
Chapter 5 is the culmination of my argument. Through a fine-grained portrayal of a number of ethnographic moments, I point up the unifying and shared practices which have hitherto been excerpted from ethnographic accounts of Mauritius (or other 'plural' societies). These unifying features are as relevant to my understanding of Mauritian society as divisions, I claim, and I reflect on the contrast between 'banal' unities and governmental notions of Multiculturalism.
The Conclusion draws together the threads of the Thesis and charts where it fits in terms of wider anthropological and political trends.Second-order logic : ontological and epistemological problems
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/6407
In this thesis I provide a survey over different approaches to second-order logic
and its interpretation, and introduce a novel approach. Of special interest are the
questions whether (a particular form of) second-order logic can count as logic in some
(further to be specified) proper sense of logic, and what epistemic status it occupies.
More specifically, second-order logic is sometimes taken to be mathematical, a mere
notational variant of some fragment of set theory. If this is the case, it might be
argued that it does not have the "epistemic innocence" which would be needed
for, e.g., foundational programmes in (the philosophy of) mathematics for which
second-order logic is sometimes used. I suggest a Deductivist conception of logic,
that characterises logical consequence by means of inference rules, and argue that
on this conception second-order logic should count as logic in the proper sense.
2006-01-01T00:00:00ZRossberg, MarcusIn this thesis I provide a survey over different approaches to second-order logic
and its interpretation, and introduce a novel approach. Of special interest are the
questions whether (a particular form of) second-order logic can count as logic in some
(further to be specified) proper sense of logic, and what epistemic status it occupies.
More specifically, second-order logic is sometimes taken to be mathematical, a mere
notational variant of some fragment of set theory. If this is the case, it might be
argued that it does not have the "epistemic innocence" which would be needed
for, e.g., foundational programmes in (the philosophy of) mathematics for which
second-order logic is sometimes used. I suggest a Deductivist conception of logic,
that characterises logical consequence by means of inference rules, and argue that
on this conception second-order logic should count as logic in the proper sense.Once upon a time outside the West : rethinking the western in global contexts
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/6355
This project argues for rethinking the western as a global genre, rather than one rooted in a particular construction of the American West. First, by considering the western's global origins through an examination of early cinema, I challenge the singular connection to an American origin. Through tracing an alternative history of the genre in early cinema, we can see that the assumed connections between America and the western can be challenged by way of examples from France, Argentina, and Australia. Moving to the post-war and contemporary periods, this project highlights the popular and political uses of the genre by way of examples from Germany, Latin America, Spain and Italy, and Australia. These case studies identify how considering the western as a global popular genre allows it to address local political concerns across a range of national and transnational contexts. To situate the different contexts, this thesis relies on the broad theoretical framework of transculturation, following Mary Louise Pratt, to consider how the western 'selects' and 'invents' from particular historical, cultural, and political moments, often as part of asymmetrical power relations. Each case study also seeks to provide a theoretical framework specific to the local context, such as the theories and practices of Third Cinema in Latin America, in order to suggest ways of addressing the western outside of Hollywood. By shifting the western away from a central origin point, this thesis shows how the genre becomes meaningful on a global scale in terms of key issues of identity, political critique, and representations of space.
2014-05-13T00:00:00ZWessels, ChelseaThis project argues for rethinking the western as a global genre, rather than one rooted in a particular construction of the American West. First, by considering the western's global origins through an examination of early cinema, I challenge the singular connection to an American origin. Through tracing an alternative history of the genre in early cinema, we can see that the assumed connections between America and the western can be challenged by way of examples from France, Argentina, and Australia. Moving to the post-war and contemporary periods, this project highlights the popular and political uses of the genre by way of examples from Germany, Latin America, Spain and Italy, and Australia. These case studies identify how considering the western as a global popular genre allows it to address local political concerns across a range of national and transnational contexts. To situate the different contexts, this thesis relies on the broad theoretical framework of transculturation, following Mary Louise Pratt, to consider how the western 'selects' and 'invents' from particular historical, cultural, and political moments, often as part of asymmetrical power relations. Each case study also seeks to provide a theoretical framework specific to the local context, such as the theories and practices of Third Cinema in Latin America, in order to suggest ways of addressing the western outside of Hollywood. By shifting the western away from a central origin point, this thesis shows how the genre becomes meaningful on a global scale in terms of key issues of identity, political critique, and representations of space.Cosmetic Japaneseness : cultural erasure and cultural performance in Japanese film exports (2000-2010)
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/6354
Since the introduction of film to Japan in the 1890s, Japanese cinema has been continually influenced by transnational processes of film production, distribution, promotion, and reception. This has led inevitably to questions about the inherent nationality of Japan’s film culture, despite the fact that Japanese cinema has often been subjected to analyses of its fundamental ‘Japaneseness’. This study seeks to make an original contribution to the field of Japanese film studies by investigating the contradictory ways in which Japan has functioned as a global cinematic brand in the period 2000 to 2010, and how this is interrelated with modes of promotion and reception in the English-speaking markets of the UK and the USA.
Through textual and empirical analyses of seven films from the selected period and the non-Japanese consumption of them, this thesis argues that contemporary film exports are culturally-decentred in regards to their industrial and, to some extent, aesthetic dimensions. This results from contradictory modes of ‘cultural erasure’ and ‘cultural performance’ in the production of certain films, whereby aesthetic traces of cultural specificity are concealed or emphasised in relation to external commercial interests. Despite strategies of cultural erasure, explicit cinematic representations of cultural specificity remain highly valued as export commodities. Moreover, in the case of contemporary Japanese film exports, there are significant issues of ‘cultural ownership’ to be accounted for given the extent to which non-national industrial consortia (film producers, financers, DVD distributors, film festivals) have invested in the promotion and in some cases the production of Japanese films. Thus, both in relation to the aesthetic erasure of Japaneseness and their non-Japanese commercial identities, recent film exports can be viewed as non-national cultural products that have a commercial and cinematic identity connected to external influences as much as internal ones.
2014-06-26T00:00:00ZDorman, AndrewSince the introduction of film to Japan in the 1890s, Japanese cinema has been continually influenced by transnational processes of film production, distribution, promotion, and reception. This has led inevitably to questions about the inherent nationality of Japan’s film culture, despite the fact that Japanese cinema has often been subjected to analyses of its fundamental ‘Japaneseness’. This study seeks to make an original contribution to the field of Japanese film studies by investigating the contradictory ways in which Japan has functioned as a global cinematic brand in the period 2000 to 2010, and how this is interrelated with modes of promotion and reception in the English-speaking markets of the UK and the USA.
Through textual and empirical analyses of seven films from the selected period and the non-Japanese consumption of them, this thesis argues that contemporary film exports are culturally-decentred in regards to their industrial and, to some extent, aesthetic dimensions. This results from contradictory modes of ‘cultural erasure’ and ‘cultural performance’ in the production of certain films, whereby aesthetic traces of cultural specificity are concealed or emphasised in relation to external commercial interests. Despite strategies of cultural erasure, explicit cinematic representations of cultural specificity remain highly valued as export commodities. Moreover, in the case of contemporary Japanese film exports, there are significant issues of ‘cultural ownership’ to be accounted for given the extent to which non-national industrial consortia (film producers, financers, DVD distributors, film festivals) have invested in the promotion and in some cases the production of Japanese films. Thus, both in relation to the aesthetic erasure of Japaneseness and their non-Japanese commercial identities, recent film exports can be viewed as non-national cultural products that have a commercial and cinematic identity connected to external influences as much as internal ones.Knowledge of modality by imagining
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/6351
Assertions about metaphysical modality (hereafter modality) play central roles in philosophical theorizing. For example, when philosophers propose hypothetical counterexamples, they often are making a claim to the effect that some state of affairs is possible. Getting the epistemology of modality right is thus important. Debates have been preoccupied with assessing whether imaginability—or conceivability, insofar as it’s different—is a guide to possibility, or whether it is rather intuitions of possibility—and modal intuitions more generally—that are evidence for possibility (modal) claims. The dissertation argues that the imagination plays a subtler role than the first view recognizes, and a more central one than the second view does. In particular, it defends an epistemology of metaphysical modality on which someone can acquire modal knowledge in virtue of having performed certain complex imaginative exercises.
2014-06-26T00:00:00ZStrohminger, MargotAssertions about metaphysical modality (hereafter modality) play central roles in philosophical theorizing. For example, when philosophers propose hypothetical counterexamples, they often are making a claim to the effect that some state of affairs is possible. Getting the epistemology of modality right is thus important. Debates have been preoccupied with assessing whether imaginability—or conceivability, insofar as it’s different—is a guide to possibility, or whether it is rather intuitions of possibility—and modal intuitions more generally—that are evidence for possibility (modal) claims. The dissertation argues that the imagination plays a subtler role than the first view recognizes, and a more central one than the second view does. In particular, it defends an epistemology of metaphysical modality on which someone can acquire modal knowledge in virtue of having performed certain complex imaginative exercises.Carnap's conventionalism : logic, science, and tolerance
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/6334
In broadest terms, this thesis is concerned to answer the question of whether the view that arithmetic is analytic can be maintained consistently. Lest there be much suspense, I will conclude that it can. Those who disagree claim that accounts which defend the analyticity of arithmetic are either unable to give a satisfactory account of the foundations of mathematics due to the incompleteness theorems, or, if steps are taken to mitigate incompleteness, then the view loses the ability to account for the applicability of mathematics in the sciences. I will show that this criticism is not successful against every view whereby arithmetic is analytic by showing that the brand of "conventionalism" about mathematics that Rudolf Carnap advocated in the 1930s, especially in Logical Syntax of Language, does not suffer from these difficulties. There, Carnap develops an account of logic and mathematics that ensures the analyticity of both. It is based on his famous "Principle of Tolerance", and so the major focus of this thesis will to defend this principle from certain criticisms that have arisen in the 80 years since the book was published. I claim that these criticisms all share certain misunderstandings of the principle, and, because my diagnosis of the critiques is that they misunderstand Carnap, the defense I will give is of a primarily historical and exegetical nature.
Again speaking broadly, the defense will be split into two parts: one primarily historical and the other argumentative. The historical section concerns the development of Carnap's views on logic and mathematics, from their beginnings in Frege's lectures up through the publication of Logical Syntax. Though this material is well-trod ground, it is necessary background for the second part. In part two we shift gears, and leave aside the historical development of Carnap's views to examine a certain family of critiques of it. We focus on the version due to Kurt Gödel, but also explore four others found in the literature. In the final chapter, I develop a reading of Carnap's Principle - the `wide' reading. It is one whereby there are no antecedent constraints on the construction of linguistic frameworks. I argue that this reading of the principle resolves the purported problems. Though this thesis is not a vindication of Carnap's view of logic and mathematics tout court, it does show that the view has more plausibility than is commonly thought.
2014-06-26T00:00:00ZFriedman-Biglin, NoahIn broadest terms, this thesis is concerned to answer the question of whether the view that arithmetic is analytic can be maintained consistently. Lest there be much suspense, I will conclude that it can. Those who disagree claim that accounts which defend the analyticity of arithmetic are either unable to give a satisfactory account of the foundations of mathematics due to the incompleteness theorems, or, if steps are taken to mitigate incompleteness, then the view loses the ability to account for the applicability of mathematics in the sciences. I will show that this criticism is not successful against every view whereby arithmetic is analytic by showing that the brand of "conventionalism" about mathematics that Rudolf Carnap advocated in the 1930s, especially in Logical Syntax of Language, does not suffer from these difficulties. There, Carnap develops an account of logic and mathematics that ensures the analyticity of both. It is based on his famous "Principle of Tolerance", and so the major focus of this thesis will to defend this principle from certain criticisms that have arisen in the 80 years since the book was published. I claim that these criticisms all share certain misunderstandings of the principle, and, because my diagnosis of the critiques is that they misunderstand Carnap, the defense I will give is of a primarily historical and exegetical nature.
Again speaking broadly, the defense will be split into two parts: one primarily historical and the other argumentative. The historical section concerns the development of Carnap's views on logic and mathematics, from their beginnings in Frege's lectures up through the publication of Logical Syntax. Though this material is well-trod ground, it is necessary background for the second part. In part two we shift gears, and leave aside the historical development of Carnap's views to examine a certain family of critiques of it. We focus on the version due to Kurt Gödel, but also explore four others found in the literature. In the final chapter, I develop a reading of Carnap's Principle - the `wide' reading. It is one whereby there are no antecedent constraints on the construction of linguistic frameworks. I argue that this reading of the principle resolves the purported problems. Though this thesis is not a vindication of Carnap's view of logic and mathematics tout court, it does show that the view has more plausibility than is commonly thought.Logic in theory and in practice : the normative status of logic
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/6329
In my thesis, I address the question ʽWhat normative status does logic have?', to argue that logical normativity is of a weak sort, and that its constraining power is similar to that of recommendations. The thesis first discusses the notion of logical validity and logical formality, then asks whether logic is a priori and whether it can provide a priori norms for thinking. Subsequently, the issue of the bridge principles linking formal logic to informal reasoning is addressed, jointly with a brief discussion of the deontic operators included in the bridge principles. Then, the thesis addresses three criticisms of the normative role of logic with respect to rational reasoning. The first criticism is discussed in the fourth chapter; it starts from the consideration of the cognitive limitations of human agents and discusses a model of rationality that takes those limitations into account. The second criticism is analyzed in the fifth chapter; it is motivated by the empirical studies in the psychology of reasoning, and discusses human reasoning from a descriptive point of view, lending support to the model of rationality presented in the fourth chapter. The third criticism, presented in the sixth and final chapter, addresses the normative role of logic from an a priori point of view, showing how the epistemic paradoxes are crucial for determining what normative import logic has on rational reasoning. The final chapter defends the main thesis that logic has a weak import on our reasoning, which resembles a recommendation rather than an obligation.
2015-06-25T00:00:00ZCelani, LauraIn my thesis, I address the question ʽWhat normative status does logic have?', to argue that logical normativity is of a weak sort, and that its constraining power is similar to that of recommendations. The thesis first discusses the notion of logical validity and logical formality, then asks whether logic is a priori and whether it can provide a priori norms for thinking. Subsequently, the issue of the bridge principles linking formal logic to informal reasoning is addressed, jointly with a brief discussion of the deontic operators included in the bridge principles. Then, the thesis addresses three criticisms of the normative role of logic with respect to rational reasoning. The first criticism is discussed in the fourth chapter; it starts from the consideration of the cognitive limitations of human agents and discusses a model of rationality that takes those limitations into account. The second criticism is analyzed in the fifth chapter; it is motivated by the empirical studies in the psychology of reasoning, and discusses human reasoning from a descriptive point of view, lending support to the model of rationality presented in the fourth chapter. The third criticism, presented in the sixth and final chapter, addresses the normative role of logic from an a priori point of view, showing how the epistemic paradoxes are crucial for determining what normative import logic has on rational reasoning. The final chapter defends the main thesis that logic has a weak import on our reasoning, which resembles a recommendation rather than an obligation.Cinema of exposure : female suffering and spectatorship ethics
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/6312
This thesis explores the intersection of phenomenological, bio-political and ethical facets of
spectatorship in relation to female suffering and gendered violence in contemporary film
produced in Europe (mainly drawing on examples from France) and the United States. I
argue that the visceral and affective cinematic embodiment of female pain plays a vital role
in determining the political and ethical relationships of spectators to the images onscreen.
Drawing on phenomenological theory, feminist ontology and ethics (primarily the work of
Hélène Cixous), as well as the ethical philosophies of Gilles Deleuze and Jean-Luc Nancy, I
establish the bio-political and ethical positions and responsibilities of spectators who
encounter female suffering in film. In doing so, I highlight the ways in which adopting a
phenomenological approach to theorizing and practicing spectatorial perception can open up
new areas of ethical engagement with (and fields of vision within) controversial modes of
filmmaking such as European New Extremism and body horror.
I analyze how suffering female bodies embody contemporary corporeal, socio-political and
ethical problematics in what I define as the “cinema of exposure.” I argue that through
processes of psychosomatic disturbance, films within the cinema of exposure encourage
spectators to employ a haptic, corporeally situated vision when watching women experience
pain and trauma onscreen. I explore how encounters with these suffering female bodies
impact spectators as political and ethical subjects, contributing a crucial bio-political
dimension to existing work on spectatorial engagement with cinematic affect.
The goal of this thesis is to highlight the continued importance of feminist critiques of
gendered and sexualized violence in film by attending to the emotional, physical, political
and ethical resonances of mediated female suffering. This thesis contributes productively to
those areas of film and media studies, women’s studies and feminist philosophy that explore
the construction of female subjectivity within contemporary culture.
2014-12-01T00:00:00ZScott, KathleenThis thesis explores the intersection of phenomenological, bio-political and ethical facets of
spectatorship in relation to female suffering and gendered violence in contemporary film
produced in Europe (mainly drawing on examples from France) and the United States. I
argue that the visceral and affective cinematic embodiment of female pain plays a vital role
in determining the political and ethical relationships of spectators to the images onscreen.
Drawing on phenomenological theory, feminist ontology and ethics (primarily the work of
Hélène Cixous), as well as the ethical philosophies of Gilles Deleuze and Jean-Luc Nancy, I
establish the bio-political and ethical positions and responsibilities of spectators who
encounter female suffering in film. In doing so, I highlight the ways in which adopting a
phenomenological approach to theorizing and practicing spectatorial perception can open up
new areas of ethical engagement with (and fields of vision within) controversial modes of
filmmaking such as European New Extremism and body horror.
I analyze how suffering female bodies embody contemporary corporeal, socio-political and
ethical problematics in what I define as the “cinema of exposure.” I argue that through
processes of psychosomatic disturbance, films within the cinema of exposure encourage
spectators to employ a haptic, corporeally situated vision when watching women experience
pain and trauma onscreen. I explore how encounters with these suffering female bodies
impact spectators as political and ethical subjects, contributing a crucial bio-political
dimension to existing work on spectatorial engagement with cinematic affect.
The goal of this thesis is to highlight the continued importance of feminist critiques of
gendered and sexualized violence in film by attending to the emotional, physical, political
and ethical resonances of mediated female suffering. This thesis contributes productively to
those areas of film and media studies, women’s studies and feminist philosophy that explore
the construction of female subjectivity within contemporary culture.Las condenadas : an ethnography of sexuality and violence in Bolivia
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/6278
This is an ethnographic study of discourses and experiences concerning sexual
exchanges among kin “who are too closely related to marry each other” (OED), or what
in lay language is called “incest”. I investigate the ways in which a certain kind of
incest, that between older men and younger women, primarily from different
generations, is experienced by women of predominantly rural origin, who have been
hospitalized in the major public psychiatric hospital in Bolivia, in Sucre. In this sense, this
research is as much a study of incest as it is of psychiatric institutionalization. These
experiences will be considered in the context of a wider field of ethnic, class and gender
discourses that are produced by medical staff, community organizations, as well as
national judicial institutions.
The category of 'incest' is problematized in terms of how kinship is constructed,
not only as a series of dynamic discourses (as practices whose effect is the production of
events) but also as mobile experiences, however socially regulated. With this in mind, I
present an account of Andean concepts and treatment of incest, as well as of legal and
medical categories. Specifically, I focus on the play between discourses in the context
of the psychiatric hospital, the judicial court and the communities of selected inmates. I
show how the inmates’ experiences of intergenerational incest and sexual violence in
general are related to the dominant ethnic, class and gender narratives produced by
medical staff, community organizations, and judicial institutions.
2014-12-18T00:00:00ZBorda Niño, Adriana CarolinaThis is an ethnographic study of discourses and experiences concerning sexual
exchanges among kin “who are too closely related to marry each other” (OED), or what
in lay language is called “incest”. I investigate the ways in which a certain kind of
incest, that between older men and younger women, primarily from different
generations, is experienced by women of predominantly rural origin, who have been
hospitalized in the major public psychiatric hospital in Bolivia, in Sucre. In this sense, this
research is as much a study of incest as it is of psychiatric institutionalization. These
experiences will be considered in the context of a wider field of ethnic, class and gender
discourses that are produced by medical staff, community organizations, as well as
national judicial institutions.
The category of 'incest' is problematized in terms of how kinship is constructed,
not only as a series of dynamic discourses (as practices whose effect is the production of
events) but also as mobile experiences, however socially regulated. With this in mind, I
present an account of Andean concepts and treatment of incest, as well as of legal and
medical categories. Specifically, I focus on the play between discourses in the context
of the psychiatric hospital, the judicial court and the communities of selected inmates. I
show how the inmates’ experiences of intergenerational incest and sexual violence in
general are related to the dominant ethnic, class and gender narratives produced by
medical staff, community organizations, and judicial institutions.Construction and representation of identities in football museums: a comparative study
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/6275
This thesis aims at providing a cross-cultural study of how football museums represent and construct identities, both collective and personal. The research is based on a multi-sited ethnography at selected football museums in the UK, Germany, and China, employing participant observation, photographic recording and online research methods. This investigation sharpens an anthropological awareness of constructions of multiple layered identities by examining football museums’ exhibiting practices and activity programmes, as well as their built environments and cultural settings. The research also offers a perspective on museum visitors, who consume football museums with diverse personal and collective identity claims. Looking into the largely under-explored terrain of football museums, this research joins continuing anthropological efforts to understand identity work while also exploring continuing tensions inherent in a marriage between museums and football. The thesis contributes to the research field of football/sports museums with an ethnographic emphasis and a cross-cultural range.
2015-06-01T00:00:00ZYang, JingThis thesis aims at providing a cross-cultural study of how football museums represent and construct identities, both collective and personal. The research is based on a multi-sited ethnography at selected football museums in the UK, Germany, and China, employing participant observation, photographic recording and online research methods. This investigation sharpens an anthropological awareness of constructions of multiple layered identities by examining football museums’ exhibiting practices and activity programmes, as well as their built environments and cultural settings. The research also offers a perspective on museum visitors, who consume football museums with diverse personal and collective identity claims. Looking into the largely under-explored terrain of football museums, this research joins continuing anthropological efforts to understand identity work while also exploring continuing tensions inherent in a marriage between museums and football. The thesis contributes to the research field of football/sports museums with an ethnographic emphasis and a cross-cultural range.A phenomenological-enactive theory of the minimal self
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/6043
The purpose of this project is to argue that we possess a minimal self. It will demonstrate that minimal selfhood arrives early in our development and continues to remain and influence us throughout our entire life. There are two areas of research which shape my understanding of the minimal self: phenomenology and enactivism. Phenomenology emphasizes the sense of givenness, ownership, or mineness that accompanies all of our experiences. Enactivism says there is a sensorimotor coupling that occurs between us and the environment in a way which modulates the dynamic patterns of our self development; the laying down of these basic patterns helps make us who we are and gives rise to the phenomenological, experiential mineness. Drawing on these two core ideas, I will be arguing for a Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self (abbreviated PEMS). I will be emphasizing the role of the body and the role of affects (moods, feelings, and emotions) as the most important components relevant to understanding minimal selfhood. Put more concretely, the set of conditions which constitute the PEMS view are: (i) The minimal self is the experiential subject; the minimal sense of self is present whenever there is awareness. It is the subjectivity of experience, the sense of mineness, or givenness which our experiences contain. (ii) The phenomenological part of the PEMS view turns on the idea of a bodily and dynamic integration of sensorimotor coupling and affective experience. It is, ontologically speaking, the lived body in enactive engagement with the environment. It is this embodied subject which anchors and forms the foundation for the later ‘narrative’ self, which emerges from it and which is continually influenced by it. It is the subject enactively engaged with others, dependent on sensorimotor processes and affects. We have an identity, but it emerges from relational and dynamic processes.
2014-06-26T00:00:00ZWelch, BrettThe purpose of this project is to argue that we possess a minimal self. It will demonstrate that minimal selfhood arrives early in our development and continues to remain and influence us throughout our entire life. There are two areas of research which shape my understanding of the minimal self: phenomenology and enactivism. Phenomenology emphasizes the sense of givenness, ownership, or mineness that accompanies all of our experiences. Enactivism says there is a sensorimotor coupling that occurs between us and the environment in a way which modulates the dynamic patterns of our self development; the laying down of these basic patterns helps make us who we are and gives rise to the phenomenological, experiential mineness. Drawing on these two core ideas, I will be arguing for a Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self (abbreviated PEMS). I will be emphasizing the role of the body and the role of affects (moods, feelings, and emotions) as the most important components relevant to understanding minimal selfhood. Put more concretely, the set of conditions which constitute the PEMS view are: (i) The minimal self is the experiential subject; the minimal sense of self is present whenever there is awareness. It is the subjectivity of experience, the sense of mineness, or givenness which our experiences contain. (ii) The phenomenological part of the PEMS view turns on the idea of a bodily and dynamic integration of sensorimotor coupling and affective experience. It is, ontologically speaking, the lived body in enactive engagement with the environment. It is this embodied subject which anchors and forms the foundation for the later ‘narrative’ self, which emerges from it and which is continually influenced by it. It is the subject enactively engaged with others, dependent on sensorimotor processes and affects. We have an identity, but it emerges from relational and dynamic processes.On rights and demands : how theorists of rights can benefit from taking demands seriously
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/5892
This thesis explores the normative significance of making a rights-backed, authorized demand as a right holder. Rights, I argue, enable their holders to make a special kind of demand which comes with a special force. It is, in other words, one of rights’ functions that they are demands-enabling. I single out what sort of demands I am interested in exploring. I also look at how these special demands are normatively significant. I call them rights-backed, authorized demands. They are normatively significant, first, because of the interesting role they play in other agents’ practical-reasoning, and , second, because the very making of these demands, as a matter of rights, is empowering in an abstract way. I go on to contrast my view with other ‘demand theories’ in existence and conclude that my view is substantively different. In particular, existing demand theories of rights all fail to sufficiently highlight the importance of actual demands, and instead focus on the ‘status’ of ‘being in a position’ to make demands. I argue that this focus is a fundamental mistake. I also consider how my view can contribute to some related literature on rights. First, I argue that my view highlights a new function which rights have: it has interesting implications on the shape of the long-standing debate between the will and interest theory of rights. Second, I argue that my view provides us with a new way to counter one of the most discussed criticisms of the existence of welfare human rights, which is the argument that rights must correlate with some specific duties as a necessary existence condition, and that human welfare rights fail on this mark. I conclude that if human rights indeed have a demand-related function as I argue, it weakens the intuitive appeal of this criticism.
2014-12-01T00:00:00ZHo, Kin TingThis thesis explores the normative significance of making a rights-backed, authorized demand as a right holder. Rights, I argue, enable their holders to make a special kind of demand which comes with a special force. It is, in other words, one of rights’ functions that they are demands-enabling. I single out what sort of demands I am interested in exploring. I also look at how these special demands are normatively significant. I call them rights-backed, authorized demands. They are normatively significant, first, because of the interesting role they play in other agents’ practical-reasoning, and , second, because the very making of these demands, as a matter of rights, is empowering in an abstract way. I go on to contrast my view with other ‘demand theories’ in existence and conclude that my view is substantively different. In particular, existing demand theories of rights all fail to sufficiently highlight the importance of actual demands, and instead focus on the ‘status’ of ‘being in a position’ to make demands. I argue that this focus is a fundamental mistake. I also consider how my view can contribute to some related literature on rights. First, I argue that my view highlights a new function which rights have: it has interesting implications on the shape of the long-standing debate between the will and interest theory of rights. Second, I argue that my view provides us with a new way to counter one of the most discussed criticisms of the existence of welfare human rights, which is the argument that rights must correlate with some specific duties as a necessary existence condition, and that human welfare rights fail on this mark. I conclude that if human rights indeed have a demand-related function as I argue, it weakens the intuitive appeal of this criticism.Specialist knowledge practices of craftsmen and clerics in Senegal
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/5790
This article examines the specialized knowledge practices of two sets of culturally recognized ‘experts’ in Senegal: Islamic clerics and craftsmen. Their respective bodies of knowledge are often regarded as being in opposition, and in some respects antithetical, to one another. The aim of this article is to examine this claim by means of an investigation of how knowledge is conceived by each party. The analysis attempts to expose local epistemologies, which are deduced from an investigation of ‘expert’ knowledge practices and indigenous claims to knowledge. The social processes of knowledge acquisition and transmission are also examined with reference to the idea of initiatory learning. It is in these areas that commonalities between the bodies of knowledge and sets of knowledge practices are to be found. Yet, despite parallels between the epistemologies of both bodies of expertise and between their respective modes of knowledge transmission, the social consequences of ‘expertise’ are different in each case. The hierarchical relations of power that inform the articulation of the dominant clerics with marginalized craftsmen groups serve to profile ‘expertise’ in different ways, each one implying its own sense of authority and social range of legitimacy.
Special Issue: Knowledge in Practice: Expertise and the Transmission of Knowledge. Guest Editor: Kai Kresse and Trevor H. J. Marchand
2009-02-01T00:00:00ZDilley, Roy MartinThis article examines the specialized knowledge practices of two sets of culturally recognized ‘experts’ in Senegal: Islamic clerics and craftsmen. Their respective bodies of knowledge are often regarded as being in opposition, and in some respects antithetical, to one another. The aim of this article is to examine this claim by means of an investigation of how knowledge is conceived by each party. The analysis attempts to expose local epistemologies, which are deduced from an investigation of ‘expert’ knowledge practices and indigenous claims to knowledge. The social processes of knowledge acquisition and transmission are also examined with reference to the idea of initiatory learning. It is in these areas that commonalities between the bodies of knowledge and sets of knowledge practices are to be found. Yet, despite parallels between the epistemologies of both bodies of expertise and between their respective modes of knowledge transmission, the social consequences of ‘expertise’ are different in each case. The hierarchical relations of power that inform the articulation of the dominant clerics with marginalized craftsmen groups serve to profile ‘expertise’ in different ways, each one implying its own sense of authority and social range of legitimacy.The sensorimotor theory of perceptual experience
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/5544
The sensorimotor theory is an influential, non-mainstream account of perception and perceptual consciousness intended to improve in various ways on orthodox theories. It is often taken to be a variety of enactivism, and in common with enactivist cognitive science more generally, it de-emphasises the theoretical role played by internal representation and other purely neural processes, giving theoretical pride of place instead to interactive engagements between the brain, non-neural body and outside environment.
In addition to offering a distinctive account of the processing that underlies perceptual consciousness, the sensorimotor theory aims to offer a new and improved account the logical and phenomenological character of perceptual experience, and the relation between physical and phenomenal states. Since its inception in a 2001 paper by O’Regan and Noë, the theory has prompted a good deal of increasingly prominent theoretical and practical work in
cognitive science, as well as a large body of secondary literature in philosophy of cognitive science and philosophy of perception. In spite of its influential character, many of the theory’s most basic tenets are incompletely or ambiguously defined, and it has attracted a number of prominent objections.
This thesis aims to clarify the conceptual foundations of the sensorimotor theory, including the key theoretical concepts of sensorimotor contingency, sensorimotor mastery, and presence-as-access, and defends a particular understanding of the respective theoretical roles of internal representation and behavioural capacities. In so doing, the thesis aims to highlight the sensorimotor theory’s virtues and defend it from some leading criticisms, with particular attention to a response by Clark which claims that perception and perceptual experience plausibly depend on the activation of representations which are not intimately involved in bodily engagements between the agent and environment. A final part of the thesis offers a sensorimotor account of the experience of temporally extended events, and shows how with reference to this we can better understand object experience.
2014-12-01T00:00:00ZSilverman, DavidThe sensorimotor theory is an influential, non-mainstream account of perception and perceptual consciousness intended to improve in various ways on orthodox theories. It is often taken to be a variety of enactivism, and in common with enactivist cognitive science more generally, it de-emphasises the theoretical role played by internal representation and other purely neural processes, giving theoretical pride of place instead to interactive engagements between the brain, non-neural body and outside environment.
In addition to offering a distinctive account of the processing that underlies perceptual consciousness, the sensorimotor theory aims to offer a new and improved account the logical and phenomenological character of perceptual experience, and the relation between physical and phenomenal states. Since its inception in a 2001 paper by O’Regan and Noë, the theory has prompted a good deal of increasingly prominent theoretical and practical work in
cognitive science, as well as a large body of secondary literature in philosophy of cognitive science and philosophy of perception. In spite of its influential character, many of the theory’s most basic tenets are incompletely or ambiguously defined, and it has attracted a number of prominent objections.
This thesis aims to clarify the conceptual foundations of the sensorimotor theory, including the key theoretical concepts of sensorimotor contingency, sensorimotor mastery, and presence-as-access, and defends a particular understanding of the respective theoretical roles of internal representation and behavioural capacities. In so doing, the thesis aims to highlight the sensorimotor theory’s virtues and defend it from some leading criticisms, with particular attention to a response by Clark which claims that perception and perceptual experience plausibly depend on the activation of representations which are not intimately involved in bodily engagements between the agent and environment. A final part of the thesis offers a sensorimotor account of the experience of temporally extended events, and shows how with reference to this we can better understand object experience.The liberal treatment of difference : an untimely meditation on culture and civilization
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/5217
John Stuart Mill’s liberal vision included a notion of “civil advancement” whereby the free expression of a diversity of opinion would result not only in an initial collision of difference but also in an eventual consolidation as truth. The work of this article is to explore the ways and extents in which such liberalism can translate into a cosmopolitan anthropology. Is toleration of difference the appropriate anthropological ethic, or can one hypothesize a liberal “magnanimous” overcoming of difference? In a wide-ranging discussion, the voice of Mill is juxtaposed against those of C. P. Snow, Ernest Gellner, Stevie Smith, and Karl Popper. Much commentary would suggest that liberalism is passé. A political context dominated by renascent particularisms, militant religions, and resurgent ethnicities spells the collapse, it is told, of any Enlightenment project of liberal-humanist universalism. “Cultures are not options.” Notwithstanding, the argument is made here that as “opinion” grades into “knowledge,” so “culture” grades into “civilization” and local community (polis) into global society (cosmos). Difference may become a step along the way to a recognition of universal human truth.
2011-10-01T00:00:00ZRapport, Nigel JulianJohn Stuart Mill’s liberal vision included a notion of “civil advancement” whereby the free expression of a diversity of opinion would result not only in an initial collision of difference but also in an eventual consolidation as truth. The work of this article is to explore the ways and extents in which such liberalism can translate into a cosmopolitan anthropology. Is toleration of difference the appropriate anthropological ethic, or can one hypothesize a liberal “magnanimous” overcoming of difference? In a wide-ranging discussion, the voice of Mill is juxtaposed against those of C. P. Snow, Ernest Gellner, Stevie Smith, and Karl Popper. Much commentary would suggest that liberalism is passé. A political context dominated by renascent particularisms, militant religions, and resurgent ethnicities spells the collapse, it is told, of any Enlightenment project of liberal-humanist universalism. “Cultures are not options.” Notwithstanding, the argument is made here that as “opinion” grades into “knowledge,” so “culture” grades into “civilization” and local community (polis) into global society (cosmos). Difference may become a step along the way to a recognition of universal human truth.Rulers and rascals : the politics of gold mining in Mongolian Qing history
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/4913
This article examines the politics of gold mining in the Mongolian cultural region during the Qing period and today. By drawing on archival material and accounts by travellers of the period, the authors situate the current mining boom within its greater historical context. Since the exploration of gold has been surrounded by enduring notions of exclusivity and purity, the article shows how mining for gold has historically been closely related to Mongolian practices of political rulership. By examining the current mining boom in Mongolia from a broader historical perspective, the article argues that this extractive economy involves much more than a search for profit.
M1 - Article
2010-01-01T00:00:00ZHigh, MetteSchlesinger, JonathanThis article examines the politics of gold mining in the Mongolian cultural region during the Qing period and today. By drawing on archival material and accounts by travellers of the period, the authors situate the current mining boom within its greater historical context. Since the exploration of gold has been surrounded by enduring notions of exclusivity and purity, the article shows how mining for gold has historically been closely related to Mongolian practices of political rulership. By examining the current mining boom in Mongolia from a broader historical perspective, the article argues that this extractive economy involves much more than a search for profit.Renaissance of the lost Leco : ethnohistory of the Bolivian foothills from Apolobamba to Larecaja
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/4867
The Leco from North of La Paz were considered to have disappeared by the end of the 20th century; however in 1997, two groups of Leco re-emerged independently from each other, one in Larecaja and one in Apolo. In the former the claim was less violent than in the latter, where Quechua peasants share language, culture and kinship, and refuse to recognize the land rights and the identity of their “Indigenous Leco” neighbours.
The thesis aims to understand ethnohistorically both resurgences, and tries to go beyond essentialism to understand the heterogeneous melting pot from where the Apoleños come.
Apolobamba, because it connects highlands and lowlands, received Andean influences (puquina, aymara and quechua) early on. Its inhabitants, the Chuncho of the Incas then the Spaniards, show hybrid ethnolinguistic and socio-cultural features. The ethnic diversity was reduced in the 18th century Franciscan Missions, where the ethnolinguistic border between an Andean South and the “savages” of the North was drawn at the Tuichi river. The liberal Republican period, with the construction of a national identity, once again shrank regional diversity and increased “Andeanization”. Apolistas and then Apoleños emerged from these interethnic mixes defined more geographically than ethnically.
The Leco revival happens in an auspicious national and international context, but the Leco language was still spoken two or three generations ago on the Mapiri’s banks. It raises the question of social transformation and continuity: are we dealing with a case of acculturation, ethnogenesis, camouflage or resistance?
2014-06-26T00:00:00ZFerrié, FrancisThe Leco from North of La Paz were considered to have disappeared by the end of the 20th century; however in 1997, two groups of Leco re-emerged independently from each other, one in Larecaja and one in Apolo. In the former the claim was less violent than in the latter, where Quechua peasants share language, culture and kinship, and refuse to recognize the land rights and the identity of their “Indigenous Leco” neighbours.
The thesis aims to understand ethnohistorically both resurgences, and tries to go beyond essentialism to understand the heterogeneous melting pot from where the Apoleños come.
Apolobamba, because it connects highlands and lowlands, received Andean influences (puquina, aymara and quechua) early on. Its inhabitants, the Chuncho of the Incas then the Spaniards, show hybrid ethnolinguistic and socio-cultural features. The ethnic diversity was reduced in the 18th century Franciscan Missions, where the ethnolinguistic border between an Andean South and the “savages” of the North was drawn at the Tuichi river. The liberal Republican period, with the construction of a national identity, once again shrank regional diversity and increased “Andeanization”. Apolistas and then Apoleños emerged from these interethnic mixes defined more geographically than ethnically.
The Leco revival happens in an auspicious national and international context, but the Leco language was still spoken two or three generations ago on the Mapiri’s banks. It raises the question of social transformation and continuity: are we dealing with a case of acculturation, ethnogenesis, camouflage or resistance?How to commit to an individual : logic, objects and ontology
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/4527
In this thesis I propose an improved theory of ontological commitment, one which is neutral on epistemology. Although Quine's quantificational criterion of ontological commitment has many advantages over its competitors, like its univocal treatment of being and existence, its clear account of ontological reduction and its capacity to accommodate implicit commitments, I argue that it has a fatal flaw: the inability to account for ontological commitment to individuals. Quine's choice of a first-order language of regimentation without constants is so entwined with his holist epistemology that imputations of existence cannot be made except to objects-qua-F, qua some wholly third-personal description. Commitments of those who believe that minds reach out directly to objects by means of acquaintance or introspection, encoded in language by constants, are ungrammatical in Quine's language. This breakdown of grammaticality, on my view, is an avoidable result of Quine's behaviourism and holist epistemology filtering into his choice of canonical language. I opt for a broader conception of ontological commitments as incurred by formalised theories with one or more semantic categories of categorematic objectual expressions, whose function is to stand for objects. I expand the language of regimentation at least to first-order logic with constants and identity. This preserves the attractive features of Quine's position. It retains its elegant treatment of reduction and implicit ontological commitments, and its capacity to explain away Meinongian confusions, without being beholden to global holism. My canonical language makes room for acquaintance and first-personal methods as sources of ontological commitment. It has the advantage of allowing theories like Quine's, which confine themselves to objects-qua-F, to be regimented as well as non-holist theories whose criteria of ontological commitment are 'to be is to be the referent of a name' or 'to be is to be the value of a constant or variable'.
2014-06-26T00:00:00ZJanssen, F. M.In this thesis I propose an improved theory of ontological commitment, one which is neutral on epistemology. Although Quine's quantificational criterion of ontological commitment has many advantages over its competitors, like its univocal treatment of being and existence, its clear account of ontological reduction and its capacity to accommodate implicit commitments, I argue that it has a fatal flaw: the inability to account for ontological commitment to individuals. Quine's choice of a first-order language of regimentation without constants is so entwined with his holist epistemology that imputations of existence cannot be made except to objects-qua-F, qua some wholly third-personal description. Commitments of those who believe that minds reach out directly to objects by means of acquaintance or introspection, encoded in language by constants, are ungrammatical in Quine's language. This breakdown of grammaticality, on my view, is an avoidable result of Quine's behaviourism and holist epistemology filtering into his choice of canonical language. I opt for a broader conception of ontological commitments as incurred by formalised theories with one or more semantic categories of categorematic objectual expressions, whose function is to stand for objects. I expand the language of regimentation at least to first-order logic with constants and identity. This preserves the attractive features of Quine's position. It retains its elegant treatment of reduction and implicit ontological commitments, and its capacity to explain away Meinongian confusions, without being beholden to global holism. My canonical language makes room for acquaintance and first-personal methods as sources of ontological commitment. It has the advantage of allowing theories like Quine's, which confine themselves to objects-qua-F, to be regimented as well as non-holist theories whose criteria of ontological commitment are 'to be is to be the referent of a name' or 'to be is to be the value of a constant or variable'.