Philosophy Masters Theseshttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/164402024-03-28T21:03:19Z2024-03-28T21:03:19ZSelf-deception and its interaction with introspectionGuarrasi, Guglielmohttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/272752023-03-29T02:06:05Z2022-06-13T00:00:00ZSelf-deception is a tricky phenomenon to define, especially once we realise the further complications its interaction with introspection might lead to. In this dissertation I am to analyse these two phenomena to show their compatibility. In fact, I am going to argue that, although self-deception is an instance where introspection fails whereas the latter can cause the end of a self-deceive state, no problematic interference happens between them. To reach this aim I am going to rely on the studies conducted by Nisbett and Wilson on instances where subjects fail to introspect certain mental states or processes. I will use this to argue that it is then possible for a subject to fail to introspect certain aspects of their mental life and, thusly, self-deceive. In turn, I am going to show how having areas where introspecting gives us the wrong result is not a major problem as it is a characteristic it shares with sense perception, which is something we are used to rely on.
2022-06-13T00:00:00ZGuarrasi, GuglielmoSelf-deception is a tricky phenomenon to define, especially once we realise the further complications its interaction with introspection might lead to. In this dissertation I am to analyse these two phenomena to show their compatibility. In fact, I am going to argue that, although self-deception is an instance where introspection fails whereas the latter can cause the end of a self-deceive state, no problematic interference happens between them. To reach this aim I am going to rely on the studies conducted by Nisbett and Wilson on instances where subjects fail to introspect certain mental states or processes. I will use this to argue that it is then possible for a subject to fail to introspect certain aspects of their mental life and, thusly, self-deceive. In turn, I am going to show how having areas where introspecting gives us the wrong result is not a major problem as it is a characteristic it shares with sense perception, which is something we are used to rely on.An edition of two 15th-century treatises on universalsDeahl, Julian Georgehttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/164862019-04-01T09:22:12Z1974-01-01T00:00:00ZAn edition of William Milverley's 'Universalia Magistri Guilhelmi Milverleii' in Latin with a parallel English translation, together with an edition of John Tarteys' 'Universalia Magistri Johannis Tarteys'.
1974-01-01T00:00:00ZDeahl, Julian GeorgeAn edition of William Milverley's 'Universalia Magistri Guilhelmi Milverleii' in Latin with a parallel English translation, together with an edition of John Tarteys' 'Universalia Magistri Johannis Tarteys'.