Now showing items 1-12 of 12

    • Equality, priority, and aggregation 

      Hirose, Iwao (University of St Andrews, 2004) - Thesis
      In this dissertation, I discuss two distributive principles in moral philosophy: Derek Parfit's Prioritarianism and Egalitarianism. I attempt to defend a version of Egalitarianism, which I call Weighted Egalitarianism. ...
    • Ideals, reasons, and the second person 

      Grahle, André (University of St Andrews, 2014) - Thesis
      The aim of this thesis is to shed light on important aspects of the role ideals play in practical reasoning. In the first chapter an account of ideals as conceptions of admirable ways of being (a true friend, a great ...
    • John Stuart Mill and romanticism 

      Macleod, Christopher (University of St Andrews, 2011-11-30) - Thesis
      This thesis is an examination of the philosophy of John Stuart Mill and its relation to the romantic movement. The Introduction outlines reasons to believe that such an inquiry is sensible: Mill’s readings of the British ...
    • Liberal legitimacy : a study of the normative foundations of liberalism 

      Rossi, Enzo (University of St Andrews, 2008-11-27) - Thesis
      This thesis is a critique of the prominent strand of contemporary liberal political theory which maintains that liberal political authority must, in some sense, rest on the free consent of those subjected to it, and that ...
    • Marriage, contract, and the state 

      Brake, Elizabeth (University of St Andrews, 1999-08) - Thesis
      This thesis is a work of applied moral and political philosophy which analyses the moral value of marriage and argues for a restructuring of the legal institution of marriage in accordance with principles of justice. The ...
    • Moral realism, moral expertise and paternalism 

      Frimannsson, Gudmundur Heidar (University of St Andrews, 1992-07) - Thesis
      In this essay I examine the notion of moral objectivity of moral properties. Moral objectivity seems to be able to resist the arguments of subjectivists. There seem to be true moral sentences and moral facts can explain ...
    • Normativity and law 

      Markwick, Paul (University of St Andrews, 2000) - Thesis
      An action's illegality can be irrelevant to a reason not to perform it. A plausible example of a reason not to assault is that assault causes suffering. Since assault is illegal, the reason pertains to a legally proscribed ...
    • Rejecting moral obligation 

      Robertson, Simon (University of St Andrews, 2005) - Thesis
      The thesis argues that, were there any moral obligations, they would be categorical; but there are no categorical requirements on action; therefore, there are no moral obligations. The underlying claim is that, because of ...
    • The role of well-being in ethics 

      Rodogno, Raffaele (University of St Andrews, 2003) - Thesis
      In this thesis I assess the role of well-being in ethics. In order to do so I reply to a threefold charge against the importance of well-being in ethics. In What We Owe to Each Other Scanlon argues (1) that the concept of ...
    • Two sources of moral reasons 

      Macdonald, Iain Ezra (University of St Andrews, 2010) - Thesis
      One of the core questions in contemporary metaethics concerns the nature and status of moral claims. However, this question presupposes that morality is unified, and that a single metaethical account will suffice. This ...
    • Why should I be moral? : toward a defence of the categoricity and normative authority of moral considerations 

      Hurtig, Kent (University of St Andrews, 2004) - Thesis
      Can we ever be fully practically justified in acting contrary to moral demands? My contention is that the answer is 'no'. I argue that by adopting a 'buck-passing' account of wrongness we can provide a philosophically ...
    • "Why should I be moral?" : a critical assessment of three contemporary attempts to give an extra-moral justification of moral conduct 

      Pedersen, Johnnie R. R. (University of St Andrews, 2007-06-20) - Thesis
      In this dissertation I consider three distinct attempts to answer the normative question “Why should I be moral?”, all of which assume that a successful answer must be capable of arguing someone who is currently not motivated ...