The Race for Muslim Hearts and Minds:
A Social Movement Analysis of the U.S. War on Terror
and Popular Support in the Muslim World

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ABSTRACT

According to conventional wisdom winning hearts and minds is one of the most important goals for defeating terrorism. However, despite repeated claims about U.S. efforts to build popular support as part of the war on terror during the first seven years after 9/11, a steady stream of polls and surveys delivered troubling news. Using a counterinsurgency and social movement informed approach, I explain why the United States performed poorly in the race for Muslim hearts and minds, with a specific focus on problems inherent in the social construction of terrorism, the use of an enemy-centric model while overestimating agency, and the counterproductive effect of policy choices on framing processes.

Popular support plays wide-ranging roles in counterterrorism, including: influencing recruitment, fundraising, operational support, and the flow of intelligence; providing credibility and legitimacy; and, sanctifying or marginalizing violence. Recognizing this the U.S. emphasized public diplomacy, foreign aid, positive military-civilian interactions, democracy promotion, and other efforts targeting populations in the Muslim world.

To explain the problems these efforts had, this thesis argues that how Americans think and talk about terrorism, reflected especially in the rhetoric and strategic narrative of the Bush administration, evolved after 9/11 to reinforce normative and enemy-centric biases undermining both understanding of the underlying conflicts and resulting efforts. U.S. policy advocates further misjudged American agency, especially in terms of overemphasizing U.S. centrality, failing to recognize the importance of real grievances, and overestimating American ability to implement its own policies or control the policies of local governments. Finally, the failure to acknowledge the role of U.S. policies counterproductively impacted contested framing processes influencing the evolution of mobilization. The resulting rhetoric and actions reinforced existing anti-American views, contributed to the perception that the war on terror is really a war on Islam, and undermined natural counter narratives.
To Jennifer

It is still naught but for her smile, her love, and her encouragement...
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

“We are in ... a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma.”
–Ayman al-Zawahiri writing to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, 2005

Seven weeks after the 9/11 terrorists attacks former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke famously asked, “How could a mass murderer who publicly praised the terrorists of September 11 be winning the hearts and minds of anyone? How can a man in a cave out communicate the world’s leading communications society?” Holbrooke argued the battle of ideas would be as important as any other aspect of the current struggle, and lamented, “Every expert in Islam, every analyst of what is happening in the Muslim world, agrees that Osama bin Laden has gained the initial advantage.” This thesis seeks to explain why seven years later, at the end of President George W. Bush’s second term, the United States continued to perform poorly in the race for Muslim hearts and minds despite its superpower advantages.

The logic of a hearts and minds strategy is compelling. Many believe that gaining popular support – and denying it to one’s opponent – through engaging the ideas, attitudes, expectations, and beliefs of the broader public has often proven decisive. Popular support for the cause and actions of groups using terrorism plays a significant role in their ability to recruit new members, raise funds, avoid state enforcement, and carry out operations. Popular sentiment can excuse, sanctify, and glorify or moderate, marginalize, and condemn violent tactics. For governments, the backing of the people increases the flow of intelligence, provides credibility and legitimacy, and generates patience. All of which are necessary to successfully conduct a larger counterterrorism campaign – including necessary aggressive and hard counterterrorism efforts targeting the incorrigible violent core – while providing security, promoting development, and addressing underlying grievances.

Recognizing this logic, U.S. counterterrorism strategy after 9/11 placed increasing emphasis on public diplomacy, foreign aid, positive military-civilian interactions, democracy promotion, and other efforts to win the hearts and minds of targeted populations. Immediately after the 2001 attacks, President Bush made a point of appearing with American Muslim leaders to emphasize that the war on terror was not a war on Islam. He quickly appointed Charlotte Beers, once nicknamed “the most powerful woman in advertising,” to be his first Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy. In the spring of 2002, the United States launched the Arabic-language Radio Sawa, aimed at appealing to Arab youth with popular music, balanced news, and a positive perspective of America. A year later the Arabic-language Alhurra TV followed as a counter to the perceived biases of al-Jazeera and other regional news service thought to promote extremism and anti-Americanism. State Department and USAID resources were increased and retargeted to support the “soft side” of U.S. counterterrorism. The National Security Strategies of 2002 and 2006, and the National Strategies for Combating Terrorism of 2003 and 2006 gave increasing emphasis to diminishing the underlying conditions terrorists seek to exploit and winning the war of ideas. While the U.S. military was involved in two major shooting wars, it also publicly emphasized hearts and minds efforts, such as building schools and digging wells in Africa as well as responding to natural disasters and working to improve local military-civilian relations in South East Asia. As part of the administration’s signature Freedom Agenda, the United States gave high visibility to democracy promotion policies, promising to increase pressure on repressive regimes to liberalize, and trumpeting popular democratic successes such as the Orange Revolution in the Ukraine, the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon, and the large number of civilians who voted in Afghanistan in October 2004 and in Iraq in January 2005, dying their fingers in defiance of terrorist death threats.

While a long list of policy initiatives support the claim that the United States during the first seven years after 9/11 pursued hearts and minds goals, many experts and

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3 I follow President George W. Bush’s language choices and discuss the American response to 9/11 as the “war on terror” instead of calling it the “war on terrorism.” The second phrase is commonly used by others and therefore appears in many of the quotations throughout this thesis. Unless specifically noted there is no intended differentiation between what the two phrases represent, and in my experience they are almost always used interchangeably with the same meaning when discussing post-9/11 American counterterrorism efforts.
observers argued that in the overall context of the war on terror those efforts were given
too low of a priority. Too often population-centric tactics were relatively deprived of
key resources, top-level support, and the necessary follow through to be successful.
Experts and observers also questioned whether concerns for foreign attitudes had
actually been consistently and seriously considered in the shaping of post-9/11 foreign
policy, rhetoric, and actions.

At the same time a steady stream of public opinion polls, expert evaluations, and
other indirect or anecdotal measures suggested that the United States was failing to win
popular support. Immediately after the 9/11 attacks the United States enjoyed
unprecedented levels of international support and sympathy, captured in the 13
September *Le Monde* headline “We Are All Americans.” That support, as measured in
a variety of regularly conducted public opinion polls around the world, quickly declined
below pre-9/11 levels as the United States began its war on terror, and fell dramatically
with the invasion of Iraq. The repeated consensus of experts was that negative views of
the United States “increased sharply” during this time, and that anti-American attitudes
became especially common in the Muslim world. Whereas international opinion of the
United States was mostly positive in the 1990’s, seven years after 9/11 those views were
mostly negative.

If winning hearts and minds is as strategically important as many argue, and if
the United States made increasing efforts to pursue this goal, why did the conventional
wisdom remain that the U.S. was failing? I believe the answer lies in the way we think
about terrorism after 9/11, the assumptions of the overall U.S. approach and capability
to influence attitudes, and the effect of rhetoric and actions in pursuit of the war on
terror. In addressing each of these areas, I will argue that research, analysis, and policy
making would be improved by recognizing that in the current conflict, as with most

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4 Colombani, 2001, "Nous Sommes Tous Américains," *Le Monde*, September 13,
5 Kull, 2007c, "Negative Attitudes Toward the United States in the Muslim World: Do
They Matter?," *Before House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on
International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, U.S. House of
Representatives* (May 17),
oc&pnt=361&nid=&id=. See Chapter Three for analysis of Muslim attitudes towards
the United States.
other cases, terrorist violence is best understood as part of a larger social movement dynamic. Using lessons from the study of insurgencies and popular mobilization this thesis advocates a population-centric approach to counterterrorism and a social movement based model of analysis.

**The Logic of Hearts and Minds**

When this project began I believed that pursuing a hearts and minds strategy, placing emphasis on winning and maintaining the support of broader publics around those using tactics of terrorism, was strongly advisable. I recognize this was and is a bias. Throughout the course of my research, while reading criticisms and exploring the many problems discussed later, I regularly considered whether my conclusion should be that hearts and minds efforts really do not play an important role in determining the success of counterterrorism campaigns. In the end, despite changes of opinion and deeper considerations on many details, I remain convinced governments should strategically and tactically be guided by hearts and minds precepts, and that the difficulties many states have experienced often stem from a failure to successfully adopt a population-centric approach. This includes the United States in the war on terror.

The phrase hearts and minds does not refer to a specific set of policy prescriptions, but instead to the strategic recognition that winning and maintaining the popular support of vital populations is an important goal for state and anti-state actors. The phrase captures the idea that the attitudes and beliefs determining popular support have emotive as well as cognitive aspects. Popular support is a complex influence aggregating many specific dimensions including: who the public wants to win and expects to win; what they are willing to risk or are motivated to do; who they trust and turn to; who has their loyalty and their cooperation; as well as, what they believe when they make a thoughtful assessment and how their prejudices shape gut reactions. As a community level measure it most always involves differences of individual and sub-group opinions and the intensity with which those opinions are held. The level of diversity and disagreement within a contested population is an important concern. As a strategy it involves both proactive and precautionary measures. Actors should take positive steps aimed at winning hearts and minds as well as include the importance of

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popular support as a guiding consideration in the development and implementation of other actions, especially those which may be negatively perceived by or have adverse consequences for key populations.

How this strategic goal is operationalized varies by context. In the classic counterinsurgency version a hearts and minds strategy often meant that the local state should provide the population with security, good governance, and an improving social and economic quality of life. A hearts and minds strategy generally also involves engaging the opposition’s attempts to win over popular support, often referred to as the battle of ideas. In the context of the war on terror the United States is engaged in a counterterrorism campaign against a global insurgency promoting transnational grievances and aspirations while also based in and connected to many different local conflicts with the primary communities whose hearts and minds are contested living under diverse governments. Again, the specifics of a population-centric approach should be different with increased importance given to disaggregating the assorted local conflicts and populations from the violent transnational movement while proactively working to gain the support of credible intermediaries.

Hearts and minds strategies are often misunderstood as targeting those using violence. While it is beneficial to a counterinsurgent or counterterrorist to have anti-state actors disengage and renounce brutality, the focus of a population-centric approach targets the broader populations. This thesis examines efforts to win popular support from the populations potentially sympathetic to those groups targeted by the war on terror – that is the Muslim populations around the world whom militant Islamists allege to fight for, recruit and raise funds from, and generally are active within.

A hearts and minds strategy is also not about “being nice so that they like us,” as it is caricatured by many critics. A classic counterinsurgency campaign aimed at winning popular support must prove to the population that the state will remain the authority in charge, that it has the will and capacity to prevail, and that it is capable of

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8 Other research has looked at government efforts to win hearts and minds domestically, as part of maintaining support for government policies to pursue counterinsurgency or counterterrorism efforts as well as for other agendas. For example: Carruthers, 1995, Winning Hearts and Minds: British Governments, the Media, and Colonial Counter-Insurgency, 1944-1960, London, Leicester University Press.
protecting itself and its charges against violence. Although the differences of countering a transnational insurgency complicate the classic prescriptions, in most cases a global strategy will also involve the use of a state’s coercive force and authority for similar reasons. A population-centric strategy for the war on terror should still include targeted operations to capture or kill terrorist leaders, to disrupt or destroy terrorist operations, and to otherwise engage the violent core to diminish the threat they pose and physically isolate them from the larger population. These efforts are complimentary with a population-centric strategy. For example, the increased intelligence enabled by better relations with vital communities benefits kinetic operations, while carefully targeting the violent extreme can facilitate nonviolent shifts within a movement.

However, as fundamentally an ideological and movement based conflict, similar to classic insurgencies, capturing or killing terrorists and similar operations are “ultimately defensive (keeping today’s terrorists at bay) rather than decisive (preventing future terrorism).” Because a hearts and minds strategy recognizes the importance of the larger communities potentially sympathetic and tied to those using terrorism, it will often involve the use of less force, more narrowly and carefully targeted, and credibly

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9 For example, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual explains: “‘Hearts’ means persuading people that their best interests are served by COIN success. ‘Minds’ means convincing them that the force can protect them and that resisting it is pointless. Note that neither concerns whether people like Soldiers and Marines. Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts. Over time, successful trusted networks grow like roots into the populace. They displace enemy networks, which forces enemies into the open, letting military forces seize the initiative and destroy the insurgents.” United States Army, 2007, The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual: U.S. Army Field Manual No. 3-24: Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press.

10 As the new U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide explains: “COIN is a complex effort that integrates the full range of civilian and military agencies. It is often more population-centric (focused on securing and controlling a given population or populations) than enemy-centric (focused on defeating a particular enemy group). Note that this does not mean that COIN is less violent than any other conflict: on the contrary, like any other form of warfare it always involves loss of life.” "U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide," 2009: 12, United States Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf.

justified so as to maintain legitimacy. Such strategies generally also require actions to
address larger grievances terrorists may be using as mobilizing causes, and even the
creation of opportunities for reconciliation and rehabilitation of those who may turn
away from political violence.

Drawing from the counterinsurgency tradition, hearts and minds efforts are part
of a larger strategic approach balancing concerns about popular perception with other
necessary actions and policies to eliminate, disrupt, deter, and protect against violence
threatening civilian populations and other state interests. Advocacy of a population-
centric strategy is neither to deny that real security threats exist, nor a belief that if a
state simply left things alone those threats would go away. By the time terrorism rises to
the level of a significant national security threat a state is already starting out on the
wrong foot in a context where promising options are severely constrained. The threat
posed in such circumstances generally involves incorrigible elements radicalized to a
cause and dedicated to violent action against whom a state will necessarily need to use
coercive military or law enforcement powers in order to protect its citizens. In the
current context some of these are Islamist militants including members of al-Qaida
motivated by millennial goals, focused on carrying out local and transnational mass
casualty attacks, building upon decades of experience and increasing sophistication,
whose potential threat is magnified by modern technology and globalization. An
optimal U.S. counterterrorism policy in this context requires hard counterterrorism
efforts and military action, coordinated and balanced with the sustained use of other
available tools of national power including diplomacy, law enforcement, financial
regulation, foreign aid, and intelligence.

It is from this perspective that I advocate a population-centric approach for the
war on terror. General Stanley McChrystal, who “spent most of his career since 9/11
leading the U.S.’s most elite counterterrorist element,”13 has warned his troops in

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12 I use the transliteration al-Qaida, unless quoting other sources where I have left in
place the spelling used in the original. I follow the same practice for transliterating other
common Arabic names and words, such as Usama bin Ladin, while leaving quotations
unaltered.
13 Petraeus, 2009, "Afghanistan is Hard all the Time, But It's Doable," The Times,
September 18, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article6839220.ece.
Afghanistan that the danger of pursuing the conventional enemy-centric approach, which seems natural from our cultural thinking, risks being like the “bull that repeatedly charges a matador’s cape – only to tire and eventually be defeated by a much weaker opponent… While a conventional approach is instinctive, that behavior is self-defeating.”\(^\text{14}\) Marine Lt General Wallace Gregson speaking more broadly about the war on terror observed, “hearts and minds are more important than capturing and killing people” because “we don’t have enough ammunition to kill all the terrorists that the enemy can run at us” if we don’t win over the “population from which the terrorist foot soldiers are recruited.”\(^\text{15}\) Finally, retired Army general and former Special Forces commander Ambassador Dell Dailey similarly stressed, “incarcerating or killing terrorists will not end terrorism – it only buys us time.”\(^\text{16}\)

Looking at a conflict from the perspective of anti-state actors illustrates the importance of the struggle for popular support. In order to prevail in the asymmetric conflicts typical of insurgencies or cases involving terrorism, anti-state groups must maintain sources of new recruits and fundraising, as well as conceal and protect themselves from state enforcement. Popular support facilitates these goals, while a lack of it requires anti-state groups to divert additional efforts away from the pursuit of their strategic objectives towards these needs while also taking greater risks from counterinsurgent or counterterrorist efforts.

Recruitment is especially important to anti-state groups involved in long term struggles in order to at least replace members who are captured, killed, or otherwise lost. For groups hoping to take control of political power, as opposed to simply affecting changes within an existing system, recruitment to their greater cause is even more important to ultimately eliminate the asymmetrical advantages of the existing state or system. In a sympathetic popular environment recruitment is an easier process as external communities provide much of the motivation and incentive to radicalize and


\(^\text{15}\) Castelli, 2005, "Winning Hearts and Minds Stressed," InsideDefense.com, June 20, \url{http://defense.iwpnewsstand.com/newsstand_special.asp}.


\textbf{CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION}
join the fight for a larger pool of potential recruits. A sympathetic climate is also likely
to include nonviolent or otherwise less radical organizations aligned with the same or
similar ideology serving as stepping-stones to joining the group using violence. In a less
supportive or even hostile climate the group using terrorism must not only put much
more of its own effort in to the recruitment and radicalization process, the receptive
pool of potential recruits is likely to be significantly smaller, and the chances that
recruitment efforts will expose the group to state enforcement or enable penetration of
the group are significantly higher. The more unfavourable the climate of opinion
becomes for a militant group, the more non-state actors including family, friends,
educators, and religious leaders will lead the effort of discouraging radicalization and
recruitment, as well as encouraging disengagement and deradicalization.

Fundraising follows a similar logic as recruitment. Terrorist groups operating
within a sympathetic climate are more likely to find receptive, even eager sources of
funds from related communities. In a sympathetic climate it is more likely that there
will be ideologically aligned nonviolent groups, better able to escape prosecution under
the law, who may serve as covers (whether knowingly or not) and otherwise enable
funds to flow to violent groups. In a hostile climate such sources of funds dry up forcing
groups using terrorism to put more effort into other methods of raising cash, often
including criminal enterprises carrying their own risks. Terrorist groups without a
sympathetic community for their cause are more likely to turn to coercive means of
extracting funding and resources from their surrounding population, which creates
opportunities for the state to proactively win popular support further decreasing a
terrorist group’s chances of success or long term survival. A less supportive or even
hostile environment again aids the ability of the state to clamp down on sources of
funding while increasing opportunities and acceptance of policies to track the transfers
of funds as a means to expose a terrorist group to other counterterrorism efforts.

Mao’s “fish in the sea” advice for guerrillas was in the context of a broader
supportive population providing concealment for and allowing guerrilla forces relatively
free operation without detection by the state. Similarly, groups using terrorism are less
vulnerable to the state when they can depend on sympathetic communities, and at far
greater risk when these communities are hostile. This effect occurs directly through
active public efforts to protect and conceal or inform on and expose individuals
involved with terrorist groups. This effect also occurs indirectly because militants either find it easier to blend into a community with many others who believe as they do (and show outward manifestations of that belief such as particular forms of dress or patterns of behaviour), or find the popular climate more dangerous when they must take extra efforts not to stand out and be noticeable in a less sympathetic environment.

The climate of popular opinion influences the ability of violent groups to carry out operations as well as how those operations are perceived. A larger public sympathetic to an anti-state group will increase opportunities to prepare for and conduct operations, including members of the public willing to provide information on vulnerabilities or otherwise play small but crucial roles in the success of attacks. A receptive public can amplify the effect of attacks by emphasizing agreement with the goals of a group and magnifying the pressure on a state to change policy or give up power. An unsympathetic public is more likely to report unusual behaviour and disrupt operations, or otherwise act as the crucial omnipresent first line of defence that allows a popular government to overcome the reverse asymmetric advantage that a terrorist can strike anywhere, at anytime changing targets in response to state defences. The moral condemnation of an unsympathetic public can drown out the intended message of an attack; deterring future violence as such tactics prove counterproductive.

A recurring theme in the role popular support plays for recruitment, fundraising, concealment, and carrying out operations involves the direct relationship between public attitudes and the gathering of quality intelligence useful to both state and anti-state actors. The more segments of a population support one side or the other, the more likely they are to give or proactively volunteer quality information as opposed to frustrating intelligence gathering by remaining silent or offering misleading information. The new *U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* explains:

> Without good intelligence, counterinsurgents are like blind boxers wasting energy flailing at unseen opponents and perhaps causing unintended harm. With good intelligence, counterinsurgents are like surgeons cutting out cancerous tissue while keeping vital organs intact. Effective operations are shaped by timely, specific, and reliable intelligence, gathered and analyzed at the lowest possible level and disseminated throughout the force.\(^\text{17}\)

\(^\text{17}\) United States Army, *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, 41,
This is also emphasized from the insurgent’s perspective as Che Guevara wrote: “Nothing gives more help to combatant forces than correct information. This arrives spontaneously from the local inhabitants, who will come to tell its friendly army, its allies, what is happening in various places.”

The value of increased intelligence from gaining popular support is one of the primary reasons that hearts and minds strategies directly strengthen other elements of an overall counterterrorism campaign, while damage from a failure to appropriately balance the coercive and hard aspects of counterterrorism may in the long run be self-defeating.

Popular support also plays a uniquely important role for states, who are expected to continue governing while they pursue a counterterrorism campaign, as it provides legitimacy. The new *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* again explains:

> [L]egitimacy makes it easier for a state to carry out its key functions… Legitimate governance is inherently stable; the societal support it engenders allows it to adequately manage the internal problems, change, and conflict that affect individual and collective well-being. Conversely, governance that is not legitimate is inherently unstable; as soon as the state’s coercive power is disrupted, the populace ceases to obey it.

A state losing public support may find itself unable to maintain the resources and political will necessary to continue to pursue an effective counterterrorism strategy, risking a self-reinforcing feedback loop further undermining the state and benefiting anti-state actors. Ultimately, an unpopular government may fall, potentially enabling those using violence to take power.

In the case of an international actor, such as the United States in the war on terror, legitimacy plays a similar role. The U.S. is largely dependent upon the cooperation of local states for pursuing terrorist activity within their own borders, and the ability of those states to act is in turn influenced by whether their own publics support or are at least tolerant of such actions. The U.S. is also dependent upon the attitudes of publics in third countries, whose governments often are called upon to assist the United States or may be similarly involved in the war on terror for their own reasons – or alternatively may place international pressure hindering U.S. action. Finally, the United States is sensitive to domestic public support. To the extent the Bush administration...

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19 United States Army, *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*. 

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increasingly lost public approval for its prosecution of the war on terror over its last few years it found itself less able to pursue its own desired strategies.

**Analytic Blinders and Traps**

A central argument of this thesis is that how we think about terrorism adversely affects our research, analysis, policymaking, and policy implementation. While later chapters will examine particular biases in greater depth, two that recur repeatedly are introduced here. First, our approach to terrorism is too enemy-centric – we concentrate too much on the actors using terrorism and specifically on their use of violence, often distorting our understanding of important larger dynamics. Second, our thinking is overly influenced by the moral judgments inherent in our condemnation of terrorist violence, prejudicing our evaluations of other actors and actions. While these influences arise from reasonable and desirable roots, individually and in combination they undermine our ability to comprehend and react to the phenomenon of terrorism.

The enemy-centric focus is understandable. It is the threat of violence to our interests – and not the larger related (usually local) social, political, religious, or ideological struggles – which generally make conflicts involving terrorism a priority. The danger is that because eliminating the violent threat motivates the response, understanding of the local situation is disproportionately driven by a narrow focus on the violent actions of these terrorist groups. Too often this becomes a starting point bias, framing and prejudicing evaluations of other actions and actors, as well as assessment of competing histories and explanations. This prejudice particularly undermines a hearts and minds strategy, as it tends to produce a more adversarial approach instead of enabling the understanding necessary to successfully engage with the larger populations connected to a group using tactics of terrorism. Militants targeting the U.S. with violence are appropriately seen as enemies and threats, the problem is in allowing this to counterproductively dominate the focus, distorting analysis and undermining the ultimate security goals by which policies and actions should be measured.

The moral bias in labelling an act as terrorism is also understandable. Inherent in the construct is the intent to condemn and eliminate violence against non-combatants. Unfortunately this normative goal too often and too easily prejudices understanding and evaluation of other aspects of the conflict based upon a simple question of whether
someone or something is associated with or opposed to the group using terrorism. These prejudices accentuate the enemy biases of the enemy-centric focus, more strongly predisposing assessments against other actors, actions, and explanations perceived to be associated with or sympathetic to those using terrorism. The culpability of any actor opposed to the terrorist is diminished while anyone potentially sympathetic to the larger cause or grievances of those using terrorism is treated as suspect. These biases inherent in how we think about terrorism are especially relevant to understanding why hearts and minds efforts and counterterrorism policies in general often experience problems successfully engaging the larger populations necessary for developing good intelligence, decreasing terrorist support, and otherwise combating the threat of extremist violence.

**A Social Movement Perspective**

The academic study of social movements provides a rich research tradition examining the dynamics of why and how populations mobilize outside of normal political structures, based on shared beliefs and around contentious issues, to seek change through a variety of protest repertoires. This thesis argues that examining conflicts involving terrorism from a social movement perspective will improve our understanding of the complex dynamics involved, revealing important aspects of the problems counterterrorism policy faces. This perspective facilitates shifting our analysis from an overly enemy-centric to a more population-centric focus, helping to remedy the normative bias discussed in the previous section, and enabling the development of more effective policies.

This thesis posits that in most cases terrorism is a form of violent protest or a tactic to achieve change chosen by individuals or groups active within a larger social movement dynamic.\(^{20}\) Whereas terrorism analysis and research tends to focus the area of study on the violence – who uses it, who is targeted by it, and how states respond to it – a social movement perspective suggests stepping back to see how a group using tactics of terrorism fits into the larger social context to better understand the motivations and drivers, affinities and conflicts, and choices and limitations for all of the significant actors involved. Recognizing the logic of a hearts and minds approach, a social

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\(^{20}\) Tilly, "Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists."
movement perspective should better focus analysis on what motivates larger populations and how best to win their support.

Consciously applying a social movement framework, as one of multiple approaches available to understanding terrorism, provides new perspective for examining the complicated motivations and interactions typical in the larger contexts where terrorist violence arises. The insights and tools developed in the academic social movement literature serve as “orienting devices” for sorting and making sense of our observations.\(^{21}\) In the same manner, a social movement framework becomes a reorienting device exposing and helping to overcome biases.

The popular impression of social movements within the United States often focuses on the successes of non-violent forms of protest, which in turn are part of the legend of why those movements succeeded. But most of the major U.S. social movements have included more radical or fringe elements that defended, espoused, or employed violent tactics. The civil rights movement included groups such as the Black Panthers, the Weather Underground, and the Symbionese Liberation Army as well as opposition groups equally part of the movement dynamic such as the Klu Klux Klan, White Citizens’ Councils, and Aryan Nation. Internationally civil rights movements have taken more violent turns. For example, the Provisional IRA arguably rose out of the failures of nonviolent protests to address civil rights grievances in 1960’s Ireland coupled with reaction to violent state responses such as the 1972 Bloody Sunday killing of 14 unarmed civilian protesters at a civil rights march.

The study of social movements also includes cases where collective action aimed not only at changing some element of social or political structures – such as providing protections for workers or encouraging a more environmentally conscious mindset – but also cases where the goal of the groups involved was ultimately to take over political power. The American and French revolutions for example have been usefully examined from such a perspective, especially to understand the earlier stages of protest, consciousness raising, and mobilization.\(^{22}\) Such cases remind us that political violence – including acts of terrorism – can play a central role for different purposes in a popular movement.


In reviewing the long history of individuals and groups who have used terrorist tactics, there are many cases that do not easily fit within a social movement explanation. Although small terrorist groups can exist outside of a meaningful larger movement dynamic, I would suggest that these tend to be less dangerous groups either from a perspective of their total capability for violence or from the perspective that they are the least likely to be capable of achieving strategic goals of significant social change or outright state control. The reasons for this are well captured in the earlier section on why popular support is important for the long-term operation and success of groups using terrorist tactics.

While the academic literature studying social movements spans a variety of theoretical schools and approaches, many of which offer interesting potential insights to the study of terrorism, this thesis employs a basic social movement approach drawing upon general concepts and tools from current major trends in that research tradition. This starts with analysis of the grievances and hopes around which a population mobilizes to seek change, and then looks at three dominant explanations for what shapes movements in the current literature: political opportunity structures, mobilizing networks, and framing processes.  

Social movements are often defined by the grievances or causes around which they mobilize. Considering how a population perceives these is important to understanding the dynamics and relationships of the larger conflict. Social movement scholars have emphasized that mobilization is dependent not just on the perception of grievances or a cause, but also on creation of optimism that collective action will be successful. Different elements of a movement, or the same elements at different times in a movement’s history, may describe different grievances or causes as well as different means and goals for bringing about desired change. The history of social movements

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23 These analytic tools are typical of social movement research in the tradition of sociologists and political scientists such as Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, Doug McAdam, William Gamson, John McCarthy, David Snow, and Mayer Zald. This is often referred to as the American research tradition (despite including many researchers from other countries) and differentiated from the European tradition which has focused on “new social movements.” See discussions of the American and European traditions in: Crossley, 2002, Making Sense of Social Movements, Buckingham, Open University Press. Della Porta and Diani, 1999, Social Movements: An Introduction, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers Inc. McDonald, 2006, Global Movements: Action and Culture, Malden, Massachusetts, Blackwell Publishing, 19-41.
suggests populations may mobilize around a broad range of social, political, and ideological grievances, including: lack of access or representation in the political system, non-responsive or corrupt leaders, a failure to solve economic and development problems, and perceived threats to a shared identity.

To explain why movements emerge at a given time or take different forms, researchers often start by looking at changes to the nature of political opportunity structures. Such structures include the relative openness or closure of the political system, the stability or instability of elite alignments, the presence or absence of elite allies, and the state’s capacity and propensity for repression. Many of these factors have also been studied in research on terrorism and political violence, although without focusing on how these influences also shape the sympathies and attitudes of the larger population with relation to groups using violent tactics.

The second major set of factors for understanding social movements is described under the category of mobilizing structures. These include informal structures such as friendship and kinship networks or connections formed around churches or mosques, as well as more formal structures such as labour unions and professionalized activist organizations. These formal and informal networks play a significant role in who joins a movement, the development of identity including in-group and out-group effects, what other issues the movement may adopt or align with beyond the core grievances or cause, how the movement protests and seeks change, conflict and competition within a movement or with countermovement actors, and how states respond to the movement.

One major strain of the academic literature examining formal mobilizing structures has focused on the role played by social movement organizations. Adopting the approach of this thesis, it is useful to think of terrorist groups as a particular form of social movement organization. Like other such organizations, terrorist groups generally have a more formalized structure of responsibilities and procedures for recruiting new members, raising and allocating resources, planning and conducting operations, as well as engaging in strategic communication contests. It is also beneficial to consider how

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24 McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996, "Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes – Toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements," In Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, ed. McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, New York: Cambridge University Press, 10.
terrorist groups may uniquely differ from many other social movement organizations, for example because of their increased need to act clandestinely and in cell structures to avoid more intensive state prosecution.25

The study of framing processes covers the final major set of theoretical tools this thesis adapts from the social movement literature. Framing processes capture the ideational, ideological, and cultural aspects of a social movement, looking at the ways in which groups of people socially construct and make sense of reality. This is the principal focus of movement researchers on the battle of ideas, looking at the contested process over the construction of shared meaning and popular perception that occurs both within a movement as well as between movement elements and state or countermovement actors. Examining the framing dynamics of a movement focuses analysis on how a wide variety of important issues are defined, perceived, and contested. This includes whether various populations perceive themselves to be aggrieved or motivated by a cause and whether they are sufficiently optimistic that collective action may achieve a desired change.

**Chapter Organization**

The analysis of this thesis develops over the following seven chapters. Chapter Two begins with a review of the academic literature related to terrorism, social movements, and insurgencies. This establishes the theoretical base for this thesis of a social movement approach to studying terrorism and hearts and minds efforts informed by the lessons of American and British counterinsurgencies. Chapter Three introduces the background context by first reviewing the wide variety of policies pursued in the first seven years after the September 11 attacks justified as part of a hearts and minds strategy, and then by examining the presumptive argument that the United States performed poorly over this time period in the race for Muslim hearts and minds based

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upon a large body of survey and opinion research. Chapter Four applies a social movement perspective by situating militant Islamists within the larger movement dynamic of political Islam. This analysis examines the grievances and aspirations, mobilizing networks, political opportunity structures, and framing processes influencing popular attitudes and the potential for various forms of contentious action across the Muslim world. Chapter Five examines changes in how Americans talk and think about terrorism after 9/11. The chapter argues that this new social construction undermines the understanding of terrorism and leads to ineffective or counterproductive counterterrorism efforts. Chapter Six argues that the American approach to hearts and minds efforts in the war on terror is based on a flawed conceptual model of the conflict, which detrimentally overestimates U.S. agency and centrality, discounts real grievances driving the larger public’s attitudes, and misconstrues the role played by local governments. Chapter Seven explores how U.S. policy and rhetoric after 9/11 fed the framing of militant Islamists by reinforcing existing grievances with American policies and contributing to perceptions that the war on terror is really a war on Islam. At the same time American actions undermined the intended counter narrative of the United States as a force for good in the world. Chapter Eight concludes the analysis with a summary discussion of the prospects for hearts and minds efforts, the value of a social movement approach to terrorism, and the potential for overcoming the central biases to rescue a normative construction of terrorism.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

The Revolution was effected before the war commenced. The Revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people, – a change in their religious sentiments, of their duties and obligations. This radical change in the principles, opinions, sentiments and affections of the people, was the real American Revolution.

–President John Adams

In order to examine the central question of this thesis, why U.S. hearts and minds efforts in the war on terror over the first seven years after 9/11 often appear to have been unsuccessful, I draw on three areas of literature which are introduced and reviewed in this chapter. As foremost a question about the efficacy of state efforts to respond to terrorism this thesis starts from that literature, understanding terrorism as an identifiable tactic of political violence which often suffers from a number of conceptual challenges and abuses. Although supportive of the dominant theoretical rational actor approaches to studying terrorism, in this thesis I seek to explore how applying tools and insights from the study of social movements would benefit research and understanding of terrorism as well as the development and implementation of counterterrorism efforts. Finally, because of the focus on hearts and minds based efforts in the war on terror, as well as recognizing the strong overlap between insurgencies and the use of terrorism, this thesis incorporates the study of classical and contemporary counterinsurgency literature. The lessons from this literature create guidelines to help evaluate hearts and minds efforts over the last seven years as well as for what a future population-centric strategy of counterterrorism should include when responding to a global insurgency using tactics of terrorism connected with many more local violent conflicts.

Studying Terrorism

The word terrorism derives from the Latin root terrere (“to tremble”) to which the French added the suffix -isme (“to practice”) creating terrorisme (becoming “to cause or create the trembling.”) Following the French Revolution in 1789 the Jacobins

used this term to self-describe their “reign of terror” from which the word comes to English. The label then evolved to describe a particular tactic or form of political violence whose use is primarily identified with sub-state groups seeking a wide variety of goals including national independence, social revolution, ethnic rights, and religious transformation.2 This section examines what terrorism is and how it is understood, the major theoretical approaches to studying terrorism, and how governments respond.

How Do We Understand What Terrorism Is?

Weinberg is certainly not alone in observing that: “Few terms or concepts in contemporary political discourse have proved as hard to define as terrorism.”3 The pursuit of an acceptable definition has been likened to the quest for the holy grail.4 It is a problem that has “vexed the international community”5 for most of the last century,6 caused legal experts to regret that such a concept “was ever inflicted upon us,”7 led

4 "The search for a legal definition of terrorism in some ways resembles the quest for the Holy Grail: periodically, eager souls set out, full of purpose, energy and self-confidence, to succeed where so many others before have tried and failed. Some, daunted by the difficulties and dangers along the way, give up, often declaring the quest meaningless. Others return claiming victory, proudly bearing an object they insist is the real thing but which to everyone else looks more like the same old used cup, perhaps re-decorated in a slightly original way. Still others, soberly assessing the risks, costs and benefits attendant upon the attempt, never set out at all, preferring to devote their energies to humbler but possibly more practical tasks. But the long record of frustrations and failures often seems to spur further efforts..." Levitt, 1986, "Is 'Terrorism' Worth Defining?," Ohio Northern University Law Review 13: 97.
6 Levitt, "Is 'Terrorism' Worth Defining?," 114-5.
diplomats to decide that it is “as a practical matter, insurmountable,” and driven at least one academic to conclude “a comprehensive definition was impossible” (one would simply know it when they saw it). The concept of terrorism is said to be “hopelessly loaded,” “deeply contested,” and “highly subjective.” The term’s use “is often polemical and rhetorical ... meant to condemn an opponent’s cause as illegitimate rather than describe behaviour.” Attempts at definition may become “ethnocentric exercises” as the word’s meaning is too often “relative to one’s political ideology and agenda, and even one’s culture.” Given the depth of the term’s abuse Beinin asks whether it can be “rescued” and whether it is “worth doing so.”

The difficulties posed by attempts to define terrorism, the seeming lack of consensus between definitions, and the perception that a good definition may simply not be possible have all been obstacles to serious research as well as to the acceptance of the research that has been done. While the concept is not easy to define – it is complex, normative, and political – I believe that the academic controversy is inflated, often about other issues, and decreases as the quality of research improves with some

8 Scharf, "Defining Terrorism as the Peacetime Equivalent of War Crimes," 359.
consensus over the tactic’s core features.\textsuperscript{18} Even with popular and political usage, where the term suffers regular abuse, there is a largely consistent (albeit shallower) understanding of the same key features and (especially amongst experts within the same culture) general agreement about what is and is not an actual case of terrorism.

For this thesis I employ two ways of defining the concept: first, viewing it as a social construction to better capture how the public actually uses and reacts to the term as well as what really guides policy makers and the implementation of policy; and second, as an analytically definable phenomenon for academic study.\textsuperscript{19} While there are cases where these approaches do not overlap, both perspectives provide important insight and for my purposes the differences between them are not problematic.

Terrorism can first be usefully understood as a social construct – something that exists and can be so labelled because people behave as if it does, largely displaying a


\textsuperscript{19} My position is that there is an academically interesting concept called terrorism, which demonstrates significant, regular, and recurring features and effects. I believe that most of the time neutral experts can agree with sufficient consistency about what is and is not terrorism. Despite its normative nature and history of abuse, I argue that it is best to label this concept as terrorism. I acknowledge that the act of choosing to use this term, and related language, is a normative one. Terrorism is a pejorative label and this thesis contributes to already strong arguments that this discourse brings an inevitably biasing perspective. Naming an act as terrorism both consciously and subconsciously casts a judgment, affecting wider evaluations. Even if one strives to remain conscious of such effects (recognizing they also occur when not using contested terminology) the discursive choice still draws a response from the subject studied, initiating feedbacks of further biases (drawing one towards certain sources and away from others, affecting the interaction that takes place with those, and influencing the cycle of review through which the research work is created). But the conscious choice to use alternative language is also a normative act, potentially merely a masking move or an equally judgmental reverse evaluation, complete with its own biasing influences. Acts of terrorism – acts that intentionally target non-combatants with violence to indirectly achieve a political purpose – deserve condemnation, even if in context of wider conditions that may deserve sympathy, understanding, and action. In an analytic enterprise that defends making difficult evaluations we should be able to make such judgments. I believe terrorism can be usefully studied as both a socially constructed and an objectively defined phenomenon that exhibits recurring characteristics and processes of interest for academic and policy evaluations. I also recognize that terrorism, like other complex and politically contested phenomena, exhibits contingent and context dependent traits, suffers from blurred boundaries and conceptual confusion, and requires careful attention to a wide range of biasing factors as well as strong caution in the confidence placed in any conclusions.
shared conception of the term’s meaning at least within societal and historical contexts. While there may not be a universally accepted definition or deep understanding, and recognizing cultural differences, many who have written on the subject report that people “know” what one means by terrorism and generally do not have trouble deciding what should and should not be classified as such. The “one knows it when they see it” approach to defining terrorism is a manner of referring to this shared construct.

Within mainstream popular and political discourse in the United States most people accept that terrorism is an appropriate label applied to specific types of political violence. This shared conception is clarified by researchers who, in attempts to define the term, have generated similar lists of features they see as common to how it is used, usually including: violence or the threat of violence; targeting civilians, the innocent, or non-combatants; an aim to terrorize a larger audience in order to change behaviour; and, political or ideological motives.


24 As a starting point for defining terrorism researchers often refer to Wittgenstein’s advice of “let the use of words teach you their meaning.” Wittgenstein, 1953, *Philosophical Investigations*, Translated by Anscombe and Anscombe, Blackwell Publishers, 187.

Examining terrorism as a social construct allows us to easily observe that the term’s meaning is “inherently flexible and ambiguous,” at times “contradictory,” and suffers many forms of abuse. Understanding terrorism as a social construct also allows us to capture: the term’s highly emotional nature (in terms of the reaction it elicits and the pejorative judgment it connotes); the tendency to only apply the term to one’s enemies and similarly the power of the term to shape perceptions about those to whom it is applied; and, the propensity of groups (or those sympathetic) to reject the label when applied to them and to react negatively towards those doing the labelling. Using this approach we may find that the difficulties of definition are part of answering the central question of this thesis. What is most important for this research is that there is a socially recognized phenomenon labelled as “terrorism,” and in attempting to respond to situations identified this way governments are often called upon to use hearts and minds strategies.

I also believe that there is an identifiable phenomenon of interest to academic research, which displays recurring features and effects, and should be labelled as terrorism. While critics often note that there is no consensus definition, which does create some problems, the lack of agreement is neither as great nor as damaging as critics imply – especially considering that other widely accepted complex phenomenon of interest to social science suffer from the same problem. In many cases different

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26 Crenshaw, "Thoughts on Relating Terrorism to Historical Contexts," 8-9.
28 Clyme, 2003, America's Culture of Terrorism, UNC Press, 177.
30 For example: Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 4-5.
31 Maskaliumaite, 2002, "Defining Terrorism in the Political and Academic Discourse," Baltic Defence Review 2 (8): 49. Ken Booth, for example, writes: “Actually, the tensions within the field have been normal. When a hitherto marginal field is thrust into prominence by world events, it is not unusual to discover just how fuzzy key concepts can be, how undeveloped some ideas are, and how irreconcilable can be the differences over praxis. ‘What is terrorism?’", for example, is no more of a conundrum than
definitions largely overlap,\textsuperscript{32} with the disparities in terminology explained by practical focus,\textsuperscript{33} and rarely generate significant differences in whether real world cases would or would not be considered as terrorism.\textsuperscript{34} Further many have noted a growing consensus in academic research and even in international agreements.\textsuperscript{35} Based upon frequently repeated common elements in previous research, I define terrorism in this work as a tactic involving the norm violating use or threat of violence against non-combatants in order to influence wider or other audiences for politically motivated reasons.

Perhaps the most important aspect to emphasize is that terrorism is a tactic, method, or tool and is not defined based on who does something or why they do it.\textsuperscript{36} Consistently using the term in this manner would resolve much of the confusion, abuse, and disagreements that surround the concept. This also emphasizes that terrorism is neither synonymous with nor exclusive to other forms of political violence (such as insurgencies, guerrilla revolutions, or civil wars).\textsuperscript{37}


\textsuperscript{34} Pillar, \textit{Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy}, 16.

\textsuperscript{35} Schmid, "Terrorism - The Definitional Problem.". Young, "Defining Terrorism."


The second defining feature is that the violence used or threatened is norm violating – that is, the action itself, and not the cause in which it is done, is considered illegitimate, illegal, or otherwise normatively unacceptable. This distinction arises in the framing of terrorism as “the peacetime equivalent of war crimes,” which seeks to extend the normative consensus about what is unacceptable in the conduct of war to the more politically contested issue of defining terrorism. Other authors similarly draw upon this norm violating nature in differentiating acts of terrorism from similar, but accepted, uses of military force.

The most important way in which terrorism is norm violating is that the violence threatens “the innocent,” “civilians,” “noncombatants,” or other “out of bound” targets. What separates terrorism from other forms of violence, and causes many to so strongly condemn this tactic, is the sense that targeting innocent civilians or non-combatants violates a universal sense of justice or fairness. Similar to the normative power behind rules of war, the various ways in which terrorism is particularly condemned can be seen as attempts to reinforce the notion that targeting non-combatants cannot be justified.

Terrorism is also differentiated from other forms of violence in its heavily communicative nature. Most commonly labelled cases involve identifiable audiences beyond the direct target, and are often associated with sending a message of terror to...
this wider audience as a coercive leverage seeking to accomplish other purposes such as pressuring governments to change policies.\textsuperscript{45} Many associated elements of terrorism facilitate this, including: the perceived random nature of the attacks on “normal” people (it could happen to anyone); the preference for more dramatic attacks (loud bombs over slow poisons); warnings that attacks will recur (but you never know when); the often cultivated perception of terrorists being a little crazy and fanatical (or otherwise irrational and undeterable); and, the well documented media sophistication of many groups who use terrorism to maximize coverage of attacks. Used in this fashion terrorism is a tactic of persuasion,\textsuperscript{46} propaganda,\textsuperscript{47} or psychological warfare,\textsuperscript{48} and is similar to strategies of coercive diplomacy.\textsuperscript{49} This communicative nature does not require explicit verbal or written messages, and communication may occur tacitly or implicitly through the way in which those using violence can assume that their actions

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{Tuman, Communicating Terror, 23.}
\bibitem{Post, "Conference Document: Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism."
\bibitem{Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 3-4, 13-7. Sloan, "Beating International Terrorism," 2.}

\textbf{CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW}
will be understood or interpreted by target audiences.\textsuperscript{50} While the public focus is often on threatening messages, terrorism also involves other communicative purposes, possibly with different messages for multiple audiences, and perhaps even with the primary intended audience entirely distinct from the population targeted with violence such as larger populations affiliated with the group using tactics of terror.\textsuperscript{51} We can better appreciate the cost-benefit rationality and instrumental logic of terrorism by recognizing that it can be used as a tool of recruitment, to demonstrate strength to a sympathetic audience, or to warn an uninvolved party to stay away as well as a method to gain attention for a cause, to coerce an opponent to give in through threats of continued suffering, or to undermine a regime by highlighting vulnerability or repressiveness.

Terrorism is also an inherently political activity, understood in a broad sense subsuming social, religious, and other ideological aims.\textsuperscript{52} This does not require that we know the political reasons behind a specific attack, instead it highlights that political elements play a fundamental role.\textsuperscript{53} While kidnap-for-ransom and a terrorist hostage-taking may be nearly identical in the particulars of an incident, the political context of the second makes them fundamentally different in terms of understanding: the motivations and likely behaviour of the perpetrators; the role played within larger social contexts; why such incidents will recur or how they can be deterred; and, the reaction of various audiences. Defining terrorism as distinct from strictly criminal behaviour does not deny that many specific forms of terrorism are recognized as crimes,\textsuperscript{54} nor preclude understanding the interactions between the two, including the use of criminal enterprises to fund terrorism, the resulting tendency of some groups to overtime become

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{50} Schelling, \textit{The Strategy of Conflict}, 21, 51. \\
\textsuperscript{53} Crenshaw, "Organized Disorder," 153-4. \\
\textsuperscript{54} Post, "Conference Document: Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism."
\end{flushleft}
more criminal than political (or vice versa), and the potential for general law enforcement approaches to benefit counterterrorism.\(^{55}\)

The final feature of terrorism discussed here is whether there should be any definitional limit either explicitly including or excluding states as a possible agent using tactics of terrorism. Many legal definitions of terrorism implicitly or explicitly exclude states. Critics of the concept often point to this as proof of bias and as part of attempts to use the rhetorical power of the term to protect established authority and delegitimize challengers.\(^{56}\) Such criticisms are reinforced by the often-observed fact that states have been responsible for far greater uses of violence against civilians than any individual or non-state group.\(^{57}\) As a result many terrorism researchers explicitly recognize the greater damage done by states and explicitly include them in their definitions. A primary problem with this rhetorical solution is the term is neither generally nor regularly actually applied in popular, political, or academic discourse to state violence. Instead other terms are used to describe classic examples of state violence – which could arguably meet the definition of terrorism – including genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture, and human rights abuses. These arguably carry similar normative condemnation and perhaps greater legal or diplomatic weight.

That such terms, and the various diplomatic and social enforcement mechanisms behind them, do not readily apply to terrorist violence by non-state actors is in turn a


justification of the need for the term terrorism. A second and more academic problem with including states in the definition of terrorism is that the fundamental differences of power, resources, and privilege enjoyed by states as compared to non-state groups or individual actors creates two very different phenomena of violence to study. Thus research into and academic theories about terrorism would generally need to be specific to either “state terrorism” or “sub-state terrorism,” making the combined concept of marginal use. As a result many academic researchers recognize a rhetorical convention of differentiating “state terror” from sub-state “terrorism” – often again accompanied with explicit observations that “state terror” has caused much greater damage – which is the pattern I follow for this thesis.  

**Theoretical Approaches to Terrorism**

Terrorism research has frequently been criticized for a failure to make explicit and carefully consider the theoretical framework and assumptions used to guide specific studies. Theoretical choices, even if subconscious, affect research in many different ways from changing what questions or explanations are ever considered to determining the focus such that some actors and dynamics are visible (whether important or not) while others are concealed. Reviewing the progression of psychological, root cause, and rational actor based theories as well as the perspective of critical terrorism studies highlights the effects this has had (more often implicitly than explicitly) on informing and guiding understanding of the phenomenon.

Psychological approaches to explaining terrorism dominated much of the earlier academic work and continue to play a significant role in much popular writing. Such

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58 Gibbs, "Conceptualization of Terrorism," 338. Wilkinson, "Can a State be 'Terrorist'?," 13-4. Wilkinson, *Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response*. However, the definition I provide in this thesis does not explicitly exclude states as possible actors because I believe there are limited cases that are sufficiently similar to non-state uses of terrorism in terms of features and effects to justify studying them as the same phenomena. This may especially be the case for weaker states and/or specific forms of coercive violence employed by distinct and often peripheral elements of a state, perhaps with a need to act clandestinely or where the fundamentally different attributes of a state versus sub-state actors do not come into play.

research, often built upon an assumption that anyone who would engage in terrorism must be different, has often looked for a “terrorist personality” or other psychoanalytic explanation of abnormality or pathology. This tradition includes attempts to explain that terrorists commit such devastating acts of extra-normal violence because of “self-destructive urges, fantasies of cleanliness, disturbed emotions combined with problems with authority and the Self, and inconsistent mothering,” while in the case of female terrorists researchers have gone as far as to suggest that they must suffer from fears of dependency or autonomy, penis envy, feelings of powerlessness, and propensities for self sacrifice. Despite its long tradition much of this research has failed to find, or too often even to systematically look for, supporting evidence. Meanwhile those studies that have made empirical claims often suffer from a wide range of serious methodological flaws highlighted in subsequent studies that have failed to replicate original findings or otherwise questioned and contradicted their conclusions.

One result of this research tradition is the frequently repeated conclusion of many experts emphasizing the psychological normalcy of most individuals who engage in terrorism. While the repeated failures and mistakes have perhaps left many in the

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60 Brannan, Esler and Anders Strindberg, "Talking to "Terrorists"," 6.


63 Bruce Hoffman writes: “I have been studying terrorists and terrorism for more than twenty years. Yet I am still always struck by how disturbingly ‘normal’ most terrorists seem when one actually sits down and talks to them. Rather than the wild-eyed fanatics or crazed killers that we have been conditioned to expect, many are in fact highly articulate and extremely thoughtful individuals for whom terrorism is (or was) an entirely rational choice, often reluctantly embraced and then only after considerable reflection and debate.” Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 7. Similarly see: Crenshaw, 1981, "The Causes of Terrorism," *Comparative Politics* 13: 379. Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism," 10. Davis and Jenkins, 2002, *Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on al Qaeda*, Santa Monica, RAND, 5. Frey, 2004, *Dealing with Terrorism – Stick or Carrot?,* Cheltenham, UK, Edward
field with a predisposition against psychological approaches, others emphasize that there remain many ways in which such theories, especially at the level of group and social psychology, can help further the understanding of a number of issues including: the processes by which individuals and groups become radicalized and decide to participate with or support those using violence; the factors influencing decisions to separate from or turn against such groups; and, explanations for how groups and populations process information and react to influence attempts. 

A second general approach to understanding terrorism focuses on identifying and studying the underlying factors contributing to the emergence and course of such violence. Research has focused on a wide range of possible root causes including: poverty, repression, alienation, humiliation, weak or failed states, illegitimate or corrupt governments, rapid or unequal modernization, social injustice, religious and cultural clashes, ethnic separatism and frustrated nationalism, radicalized or extremist ideologies, demographic distortions, endemic crime and drug trafficking, and recent experiences of norm and society weakening violence (civil wars, occupation, revolution, etc). A shallow version of this tradition argues that terrorism is largely explained by

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such causes and that addressing or preventing them should be the principal response, while an equally shallow but common refrain in public discussions is that any consideration of root causes is obviously flawed and simply an excuse for such violence. Deeper research has often raised significant challenges to basic root cause explanations noting that of the very large numbers of people and groups who experience such underlying problems only a very few resort to tactics of terrorism, and in most cases those who participate in acts of terrorism are better off than many of those around them (better educated, coming from higher socio-economic sub-groups, and having greater opportunities). Researchers in turn have put forward a number of more sophisticated root cause theories, for example suggesting that while poverty alone may not be sufficient to explain terrorism that highly unequal development with frustrated rising expectations and greater awareness of relative deprivation may create conditions conducive to small mobilized groups violating norms against violence to act on grievances with larger popular support. While such theories hold some explanatory promise (if not predictive ability) researchers have also cautioned that the typical “root cause” factors likely play complex, contingent, misleading, and even contradictory roles in any specific situation. Because of much explanatory success, and perhaps in some part as a reaction to the failures and exaggerations of psychological approaches, many contemporary experts in the field tend towards rational actor and strategic choice frameworks for understanding terrorism. Those who explicitly defend this theoretical perspective emphasize the collective and instrumental rationality observable when studying the

behaviour of groups using tactics of terrorism.\textsuperscript{71} For example, highlighting where cost benefit decision making is recognizable in the choice to use violence as opposed to other available alternatives perceived as less effective, too costly, or unlikely to succeed in pursuit of distinct goals the groups believe their tactics will systematically help achieve.\textsuperscript{72} Rationality is also demonstrated in learning behaviours and other indications of considered action over time.\textsuperscript{73} Rational actor approaches have been convincingly applied – and supported with empirical data and analysis – to even explain tactics such as suicide terrorism, which popular wisdom often portrays as particularly irrational and crazy.\textsuperscript{74} Rational actor assumptions are central to a number of more specific research approaches including those: highlighting the essentially communicative nature of the terrorism (often emphasizing an intricate relationship to the media);\textsuperscript{75} studying terrorism

as a strategy of insurgency or revolution;\textsuperscript{76} looking at the tactic as a form of coercive bargaining;\textsuperscript{77} or, applying game-theory or other advanced economic forms of analysis.\textsuperscript{78}

A rational actor focus on terrorism helps to illuminate a wide range of tactical and strategic goals. Because much terrorism research often comes from targeted societies, analysis often focuses on how the “terrorizing” violence is meant to either directly compel a political actor into changing behaviour or to influence the “larger


targeted audience” for leverage on that actor as strategies of coercion, intimidation, or attrition. 79 Such a focus also includes discussion of how terrorism may intentionally be used under a propaganda strategy to generate publicity and attract attention to specific grievances perhaps guided by the logic that increased awareness of those issues will lead to sympathy and favourable action. 80 Assuming terrorism to be rational also helps uncover the logic behind the use of violence even in cases where it seems highly unlikely to achieve favourable concessions from those targeted including its use as a strategy of mobilization to attract new supporters to a cause (or discourage an opponent’s supporters) through a number of direct and indirect techniques including: showing (and often exaggerating) the strength or potential of an opposition; highlighting the inability of a government to ensure security and fulfil its other obligations (in turn separating the government from the people); and, triggering an overly repressive backlash by a government (generating opposition to the government and sympathy for its opponents). 81 Coming full circle, examinations of terrorism as a strategic choice return to what may also be viewed as psychological motivations in explaining that terrorism can have an expressive rationality in fulfilling morale boosting or even purely cathartic purposes (whether as retributive violence or simply doing something in response to a shared grievance). 82

While very successful and widely adopted by current research into terrorism the rational actor approach has a number of limitations. 83 As with the study of other phenomena, the real behaviour of any actor or group is constrained by limited and incorrect information, motivated by values that often do not fit neatly into cost-benefit

calculus, and subject to other psychological influences not easily explained or predicted as part of a rational decision making process. This is perhaps especially true for groups who often must operate clandestinely, under high pressure and mortal threat, and often shaped by radicalizing processes of indoctrination.\textsuperscript{84} Cultural, experiential, and ideological differences between the individuals or groups in question and the researcher further complicates and limits the application of rational actor approaches. The use of other approaches should compliment understanding, and often reveal otherwise obscured phenomenon of interest, especially when examining the larger societal context in which terrorism occurs.

A final academic approach to terrorism is represented by a variety of researchers who may be identified under the label of critical terrorism studies.\textsuperscript{85} As with other critical approaches to political science these researchers often adopt a critical attitude of "questioning the question."\textsuperscript{86} They generally focus on the way the concept of terrorism is constructed as part of existing power structures and employed to perpetuate those, as well as how the phenomenon manifests within current ideologies and systems and what influence those have on it and its study. The critical agenda generally is guided by a normative goal of making a better world through this study or as Booth explains being "concerned with the construction of a world politics in which humanly created terrors are progressively marginalized and ultimately eradicated."\textsuperscript{87} These researchers

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{84} Crenshaw, "Decisions to Use Terrorism," 31-6. Della Porta, "Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy," 17-22, 120-6, 59.
\item \textsuperscript{85} Booth, "The Human Faces of Terror.". Breen Smyth, "A Critical Research Agenda for the Study of Political Terror.". Gunning, "Babies and Bathwaters.". Jackson, 2005, \textit{Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism}, Manchester, Manchester University Press. Ranstorp, "Mapping Terrorism Studies after 9/11: An Academic Field of Old Problems and New Prospects." As an exemplar of the topics covered within this field see the journal \textit{Critical Studies on Terrorism}. Of course the field also has its critics, especially in terms of how many critical authors characterize much of the current terrorism research, for example: Horgan and Boyle, 2008, "A Case Against 'Critical Terrorism Studies'," \textit{Critical Studies on Terrorism} 1 (1), April. Jones and Smith, 2009, "We're All Terrorists Now: Critical – or Hypocritical – Studies "on" Terrorism?", \textit{Studies in Conflict & Terrorism} 32 (4), April 1. Weinberg and Eubank, "Problems with the Critical Studies Approach to the Study of Terrorism."
\item \textsuperscript{86} Burke, "The End of Terrorism Studies," 38.
\item \textsuperscript{87} Booth, Ibid."The Human Faces of Terror: Reflections in a Cracked Looking-Glass," 78. Burke similarly suggests “that the desire to eliminate specifically terrorist forms of violence ought to be the core normative end of critical terrorism studies." Burke, "The End of Terrorism Studies," 47.
\end{itemize}
frequently highlight the rhetorical abuses of the label through inconsistent and politicized application (both by generally ignoring state terror as well as by which sub-state groups are so labelled), the arguably disproportionate emotive and connotative power of the language of terrorism, and how public fears are exploited in the pursuit of other political or ideological agenda. Researchers in this tradition regularly question whether the concept of terrorism is appropriate for academic research, especially whether it can be employed as a categorical description of a specific phenomenon in an unbiased and methodologically sound manner. Critical terrorism studies advocates have emphasized the connections between governments and terrorism focused academics warning of “a largely co-opted field of research that is deeply enmeshed with the actual practices of counter-terrorism and the exercise of state power.” However, researchers in the critical terrorism studies tradition do not necessarily advocate abandonment of the term, as Jackson explains:

[T]here is a compelling normative imperative to retain a term that de-legitimises particular kinds of violence directed against civilians and which instrumentalises human suffering for the purposes of influencing an audience.

I similarly advocate that there is an identifiable phenomenon of violence called terrorism that should be the subject of academic study, and in this thesis include work from critical terrorism researchers for examining the biases created by the dominant social construction of terrorism.

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88 Burke, "The End of Terrorism Studies.". Jackson, "The Ghosts of State Terror.". Sluka, "Terrorism and Taboo." In a highly critical review of the new Critical Studies on Terrorism journal and the research agenda it represents, Jones and Smith summaries this theoretical approach as seeking: “to deconstruct what it views as the ambiguity of the word ‘terror,’ its manipulation by ostensibly liberal democratic state actors, and the complicity of ‘orthodox’ terrorism studies in this authoritarian enterprise.” Jones and Smith, "We're All Terrorists Now," 293.

89 Jackson, Gunning and Breen Smyth, The Case for a Critical Terrorism Studies, 8. See also: Gunning, "Babies and Bathwaters," 239-41.

90 Jackson, "An Argument for Terrorism." He continues: “Of course, the normative power of the terrorism label is highly dependent upon its consistent application to all qualifying cases, including cases involving Western states or their allies. The selectivity and bias of terrorism scholars and political leaders in the past has seriously undermined this project by making it appear that the term is reserved solely for enemies of the West. However, I would argue that this provides a reason for critical engagement rather than withdrawal and capitulation in the discursive struggle.”
Responding to Terrorism

Government responses to terrorism can be divided into three general categories: anti-terrorism measures which are “essentially defensive and geared to reducing vulnerability of individuals, property and critical infrastructure” from possible attacks; consequence management plans and steps to mitigate the effects of an attack; and, counterterrorism efforts to proactively deter, disrupt, and otherwise reduce or eliminate the potential for future attacks. The focus of this thesis, on hearts and minds campaigns, falls under the third level of response.

Counterterrorism discussions often concentrate exclusively on elimination of the threat of terrorist violence. But as Pillar emphasizes in his classic work on U.S. counterterrorism policy governments always have other interests that will be involved to varying levels and will generally require consideration of trade-offs in the use of limited resources and in the balancing of potentially contradictory priorities. He summarizes that the fundamental goal of counterterrorism efforts, and thus the primary measure for an effective hearts and minds campaign, “is to save lives (and limbs and property) without unduly compromising other national interests and objectives” noting that “anything other than saving lives is but a means to that end” and that ultimately the “policy must be judged according not only to how many lives it saves but also to how little damage it does to those other interests.”

In analyzing how democracies respond to terrorism researchers often note two contrasting models: a “war model” which places “a stronger emphasis ... on the actual restraint of terror than on the maintenance of liberal democratic rights,” and a “criminal justice model” where “the preservation of democratic principles is a fundamental premise in the fight against terror.” Although a wide range of political factors tend to push states towards more aggressive responses and the “war model,” many commentators have warned that such steps risk sacrificing the very rights states are trying to protect while a significant body of terrorism research tends to support the

greater efficacy of campaigns which although aggressively pursued do not cross liberal
democratic boundaries. The same influences pushing toward a “war model” similarly
favour coercive responses (retaliation, punishment, and efforts to destroy groups using
terrorism) over what can be described as “positive incentives” such as addressing root
causes, working with non-violent protest groups, and providing pathways out of
terrorism. While some proponents admit a wishful bias that positive approaches more
compatible with liberal ideals will be more successful, there is significant research
supporting the conclusion that coercive policies are often ineffective and
counterproductive. Many experts conclude that although the hardcore may not be
reachable the best long-term strategy is a carefully balanced mix of approaches.

In responding to terrorism states have a wide range of instruments to use
including “diplomacy, the criminal justice system, interdiction of financial assets,
military force, and intelligence, as well as possible use of the intelligence apparatus for
cover action.” In most cases the best policy utilizes a mix of these instruments, with
no particular instrument always being appropriate or effective. When well managed the
various instruments should be complimentary with the “whole being greater than the
sum of the parts” – although the history of counterterrorism efforts is full of examples
of various policies working at cross-purposes and with counterproductive results. All
of the instruments are relevant to hearts and minds efforts whether as mechanisms for
positively influencing attitudes or because of the precautionary potential of poorly
considered or carried out operations for losing public support.

Diplomatic efforts offer an obvious means of pursuing a hearts and minds
campaign as well as complimenting each of the other counterterrorism instruments.
Such efforts include bilateral state-to-state diplomacy, initiatives through multilateral
forums, and public diplomacy aimed directly at foreign populations. Diplomatic efforts
aimed at influencing the behaviour of other states can help gain greater cooperation on

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94 Ibid.
95 Davis and Jenkins, *Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism*. Frey, *Dealing with
Terrorism*.
96 Davis and Jenkins, *Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism*. Elshtain, 2003,
98 Ibid., 123.
other counterterrorism programs as well as target problems where states may be passively or actively enabling terrorism. Historically bilateral diplomacy has proven more successful, although even the “mood music” of multilateral diplomacy is often helpful to counterterrorism purposes.99 Diplomatic efforts aimed at foreign populations can more directly fulfill hearts and minds goals of decreasing support for groups using tactics of political violence while increasing cooperation with intelligence, law enforcement, military, and other instruments. The principle limits to diplomacy involve the constraints posed by other (often more important) national priorities as well as the fact that other states may not be willing or able to cooperate sufficiently, or to fulfill promises once made. Public diplomacy is further limited by the reality of the “product being sold” – even without making mistakes, desirable policies can be deeply unpopular with specific populations – as well as by the established perspectives of foreign populations framing and limiting any persuasive efforts.100

While other instruments all have potential for being part of positive hearts and minds efforts when carefully planned, targeted, and implemented they more often are relevant to the central question of this thesis for their potential of negatively affecting popular support. Lists identifying individuals or groups as terrorists are too often politicized (undermining their persuasive benefits),101 economic sanctions can fail to affect targeted leaders (or lead to desired policy changes) while negatively affecting larger populations providing grounds for further radicalization (within targeted states as well as amongst other sympathetic communities),102 and military strikes are easily framed abroad in a negative light (without considering the greater problems when the intelligence on which such actions are based turns out to be wrong).103 Of these instruments the use of military force is often seen as a quick popular move at home (doing something strong in response to horrible atrocities) and the most likely to have counterproductive effects in terms of hearts and minds goals. Pillar observes that terrorism is “the quintessential weapon of the weak against the strong” and powerful

99 Ibid., 75-9.
100 Ibid., xxix, xlvi-xlviii.
101 Ibid., 150-6.
103 Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 106-7.
states are unlikely to prosper by “focusing narrowly on making the weak even weaker.” Similarly Seger argues military retaliation can have a “catch-22” effect:

First, the use of military force confirms the terrorists’ self-image as heroic warriors and martyrs to the cause. It also reinforces the image of the target of their aggression to be an evil enemy and enhances their status with supporters and followers. A major military response may result in additional recruits to the cause of the terrorist organisation to fight what they perceive as the evil aggressor. In addition, large-scale military action may increase demands for revenge, not just from the terrorist organisation but from others who identify with the cause, and this can result in a spiral of revenge and counter-revenge.

The one instrument according to Pillar that when used carefully can minimize the negative attitudinal effects (or even create positive side effects) is the use of covert action guided by good intelligence. Covert operations can pre-empt, disrupt, and defeat terrorist plans and, used in conjunction with other instruments and partners, can help dismantle terrorist operations on a cell-by-cell and terrorist-by-terrorist basis. But even covert operations risk hearts and minds backlashes when revealed or handled clumsily, and in turn are especially potent for fuelling the type of conspiracy theories often used to place all blame for grievances on powerful states and actors.

In Pillar’s discussion of the major fronts on which the above counterterrorism instruments can be focused three are particularly suitable for hearts and minds efforts: addressing the root conditions and issues that give rise to terrorism; manipulating the intentions of those whose use terrorism; and, reducing the ability of those to conduct such attacks. A frequent criticism of counterterrorism policies is they focus too heavily on combating the current groups responsible for violent attacks without giving sufficient if any attention as to how to decrease future radicalization around the same original grievances. Without taking steps to address such root causes, and especially with the likely chance of radicalization caused by other counterterrorism efforts, many experts argue that states are merely perpetuating a cycle of violence. In addressing root causes experts council that governments should be careful so as not to be perceived as rewarding political violence and should realize that the radicalized hard core will

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104 Ibid., 1.
106 Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 119-21.
107 Ibid., 29.
108 Davis and Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism, 28-9. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 30-3.
rarely renounce violence. Many grievances may also be largely outside of the control of the targeted state or even based on policies that are desirable to maintain (although generally there should be other steps which can be taken to address the base strain). Research also shows that the effect of grievances is not straightforward with violence often arising during periods of reform and being initiated by better off sub-groups.109 Many grievances are attributed to the United States merely because of its current position of global dominance and will not change regardless of U.S. policy, or are part of highly complicated problems where changes in any direction may alleviate grievances for some groups while creating or increasing them for others.110

Hearts and minds efforts can also be directed at reducing the capabilities of groups using tactics of terrorism. Decreased popular support may directly dry up resources (recruitment, financial support, concealment, and target information) while aiding counterterrorism efforts by increasing intelligence, patience for reforms, and security for government forces. Focusing on the capabilities of groups suffers from both problems of too little capability to target (as in the case with very small groups) or “too much” capability (as in the case of groups such as Hizballah and Hamas which are simply too large to wipe out and too highly integrated into the populations they claim to represent where they provide a wide range of other social and political services).111

Counterterrorism policy can also seek to manipulate the intentions of groups through the use of hearts and minds type efforts in a number of ways. Such efforts might include communications which aim to deter certain types of attacks,112 creating incentives to pursue non-violent paths for reform (such as supporting peace processes),113 and working with media organizations to reduce the possible propaganda advantages offered by violent attacks.114 The principle limitation for such efforts is the even greater difficulty of influencing the attitudes of radicalized elements as compared to the difficulties discussed throughout this research for attempts to persuade the larger populations potentially sympathetic to such groups.

110 Ibid., 66-9.  
111 Ibid., 33-4.  
112 For example: Davis and Jenkins, *Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism*, xvi.  
114 Frey, *Dealing with Terrorism*, 120-36.
In addition to problems specific to hearts and minds programs discussed in the later section on the study of counterinsurgency, there are a wide range of challenges, limits, and difficulties that affect counterterrorism efforts in general. Counterterrorism efforts are hampered by problems of bureaucratic inertia and turf fighting, as well as the difficulties in a democratic system of sustaining interest, commitment, and consistency especially with attempts to change or redirect policies. These problems are compounded given that counterterrorism efforts, especially those related to hearts and minds programs, necessarily involve a wide range of actors on both the domestic and international front who are also pursuing other agendas with alternative priorities which often work at cross-purposes.\textsuperscript{115} While information for decision-making is never perfect, this problem is compounded in a field where the underground and clandestine nature of the opponent’s activities (often in less than friendly foreign countries) increases the dependence on ambiguous and uncertain intelligence.\textsuperscript{116} Further, once protest has risen to the use of tactics of terrorism attitudes about the grievances involved are usually well entrenched and those who have made the commitment to support or join terrorist networks have undergone processes of radicalization which push against any moderation and make violence as a “way of life” no longer normatively proscribed.\textsuperscript{117} Finally, recognizing that these conflicts are likely to last a long time,\textsuperscript{118} states also must fight the temptation to take short cuts that sacrifice the liberties they value.\textsuperscript{119} As Ignatieff writes, a democracy should “fight with one hand tied behind its back.”\textsuperscript{120}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{c116} Davis and Jenkins, \textit{Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism}, xiii.
\bibitem{c117} Ibid., 3-6.
\end{thebibliography}
Studying Social Movements

To aid investigation of population dynamics shaping attitudes and actions in contested environments where tactics of terrorism and political violence often emerge, this thesis explores possible contributions from the study of social movements. This tradition draws upon a range of academic disciplines including sociology, anthropology, psychology, and political science offering a well-established and conceptually rich body of literature to help inform terrorism research. The social movement literature examines collective action for bringing about social change outside of the normal structures of political governance. Although what a social movement specifically is and is not may suffer from as much definitional inconsistency as the term terrorism, Della Porta and Diani provide a typical description of social movements “as (1) informal networks, based (2) on shared beliefs and solidarity, which mobilize about (3) conflictual issues, through (4) the frequent use of various forms of protest.” In this thesis I argue that our understanding of hearts and minds efforts in counterterrorism campaigns, as well as the general study of political violence, can be improved by the use of a social movement based theory of terrorism. At the same time the general study of social movements may be enriched by more explicitly examining terrorism as part of the larger dynamic of collective action and protest politics.

There are many reasons that the application of social movement theories to terrorism research should be promising. In many cases social movement and terrorism researchers are studying the same larger phenomenon albeit from different perspectives with different foci. The differences between the two are exaggerated in part because of the tendency of social movement researchers to focus on causes of which they approve (either dismissing uses of violence as excesses at the extremes or an understandable response to excessive state repression) while terrorism researchers tend to study groups of whom they disapprove (often with close connections to democratic governments targeted by terrorism).

121 Crossley, Making Sense of Social Movements, 2-6.
122 Della Porta and Diani, Social Movements, 16.
123 Tilly, "Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists."
Although the two research traditions have largely developed separately they share many overlapping influences and interesting parallels. Citations between the two traditions have historically been rare, but studies in both have often cited the same earlier works or drawn upon some of the same theoretical insights from other disciplines. Both traditions have followed similar historical patterns of development and focus starting with psychological based theories that emphasized the irrational and abnormal, root cause theories that gave more mechanistic power to grievances, and then rational actor theories that emphasized the normality of participants and their strategic decision making. That pattern of historical development also included significant

Collapse of a Social Movement: The Interplay of Mobilizing Structures, Framing, and Political Opportunities in the Knights of Labor," In Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, ed. McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, New York: Cambridge University Press, 227. This does not mean that social movements research to date has ignored the role of violence within larger movement dynamics. For example, Ted Gurr’s work and compilations have specifically examined the emergence and use of violence in social movement contexts and include some focus on terrorist groups. Gurr, Why Men Rebel. Gurr, 1989, "The History of Protest, Rebellion, and Reform in America: An Overview," In Violence in America: Protest Rebellion, Reform, ed. Gurr: SAGE. Gurr, 1998, "Terrorism in Democracies: Its Social and Political Bases," In Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, State of Mind, ed. Reich: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Gurr, "Economic Factors.". Gurr and Moore, 1997, "Ethnopolitical Rebellion: A Cross-Sectional analysis of the 1980s with Risk Assessments for the 1990s," American Journal of Political Science 41 (4), October. Exemplifying the potential application of social movement work to the study of political violence, Gurr notes three general observations from the work he has helped collect: “One is the contextual interpretation of political violence: it is a predictable consequence of some kinds of social conditions and conflicts. The second is the recognition that the violence generated by social movements has patterned consequences that are often recognized, and used, by the parties to the conflict. Finally, and more speculatively, the waves of mass violence in our past seem to be connected with larger cycles of political change." Gurr, "The History of Protest, Rebellion, and Reform in America: An Overview," 13.

Crossley, Making Sense of Social Movements, 11. Horgan, "The Search for the Terrorist Personality.". Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism. Morris, 2000, "Reflections on Social Movement Theory: Criticisms and Proposals," Contemporary Sociology 29 (3), May: 445. Richardson, What Terrorists Want. On the social movement side, Gurr specifically addresses this progression with respect to the study of violence in movements: “New ways of thinking about group violence have developed during the last several decades. An earlier generation of theorists tended to think about group violence as social pathology… Disease and breakdown models for understanding group violence have largely been abandoned. Most social scientists and historians now think of serious episodes of group violence as more or less predictable consequences of
parallels in the problems theories in the two traditions encountered: from the lack of empirical support for early psychological theories to the same problems of explaining why specific groups at specific times became active in response to root causes that seemed to be relatively constant and much wider spread as well as why activity did not come from the worst off. The use of similar theories facing similar problems also means that both traditions often raise the same questions: Under what conditions do movements or terrorism arise? What roles do ideology or culture, root causes, state repression, and charismatic leadership play? How does radicalization and recruitment occur? When do larger societies support the group protesting? What causes activity to wane and decrease? What roles do elite allies and opponents, the media, and new technologies play?

Despite the parallels, the social movement literature has in general developed deeper theoretical work both within a rational actor approach and subsequently on more constructivist approaches responding to the limits of rational actor models than most of the terrorism literature. In several cases the theoretical issues highlighted in current terrorism research have been confronted in more depth (if from a different angle) in studies of social movements providing an opportunity to accelerate, compliment, and spur better terrorism work. At the same time examining these issues from the different case focus of terrorism research promises potential paybacks to improve social movement theories.

Applying the larger focus of a social movement perspective (bringing different actors, mechanisms, concepts, and theories into the spotlight) will help address the criticism of much terrorism research for being too focused only on the use of violence to the obscurity of the broader context. Likewise, a broader focus will help emphasize

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127 Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State, 7.

that groups using terrorism are often part of larger movements and directly or indirectly connected to other groups who are making positive contributions to their societies in ways which do not involve normatively censured behaviour (helping to address another major criticism of terrorism research) while also bringing into social movement research a greater focus on the negative potential of movements (helping to address a similar criticism of that literature).\textsuperscript{129}

Although previously rare, terrorism research is increasingly demonstrating the productive potential of situating itself within the social movement literature. This includes: Della Porta’s work on left-wing terrorist groups in Italy and Germany;\textsuperscript{130} Wiktorowicz studies of radical Islamic activism;\textsuperscript{131} and, Leheny’s application to al-Qaeda’s influence on Southeast Asian groups.\textsuperscript{132}

Finally, both bodies of research have produced parallel findings emphasizing the potential for cross replication and development of theories. For example, both terrorism and social movement research has independently observed that individuals from the middle class are more likely to participate in contentious protests or violence.\textsuperscript{133} Likewise both research traditions have had theories challenged and then further

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\textsuperscript{129} For example, McDonald notes that Islamic movements have often been ignored “since most social scientists have understood social movements as modernizers and hence by definition secularizers.” McDonald, \textit{Global Movements}, 170.


\textsuperscript{132} Leheny, "Terrorism, Social Movements, and International Security."

developed by the observation that social movements and terrorist violence are more likely to occur at times of increasing well being,\textsuperscript{134} emphasized the importance of pre-existing social networks for recruitment,\textsuperscript{135} and studied the effects of state violence and repression on group activity.\textsuperscript{136}

**Social Movement Approaches and Concepts**

Overviews of the American social movement literature often identify three principal approaches to studying the phenomenon: collective behaviour, resource mobilization, and political process.\textsuperscript{137} Of these the collective behaviour approach came first and is closely associated with Blumer’s work in the 1950s and 60s.\textsuperscript{138} From the perspective of more recent traditions the collective behaviour approach is characterized by an overly reflexive focus on grievances, deprivation, anomie, and structural strain as explaining movement emergence where such behaviour was further described as irrational, hysterical, or similarly part of “mob psychology” and grouped in with other (non-political) collective behaviours including fashions, crazes, and panics.\textsuperscript{139}

In response to the weaknesses of this previous research the resource mobilization approach, typified by McCarthy and Zald in the 1970s, emphasized a view based on rational actors reacting to relatively constant grievances but emerging because


\textsuperscript{137} In contrast, the European tradition has paid more attention to a philosophical / cultural critique for explaining why social movements evolve, built partially in response to dissatisfaction with Marxist traditions, and focused on the role played by so-called “new social movements” which emerged in the 1960s (environmental, feminist, and peace movements). Classic authors in this tradition include Touraine, Habermas, and Melucci. See discussions of the American and European traditions in: Crossley, *Making Sense of Social Movements*. Della Porta and Diani, *Social Movements*. McDonald, *Global Movements*, 19-41.


of changes in available resources or because of the ability of initiators to reorganize resources to change the cost benefit equation limiting mobilization.\textsuperscript{140} Resources include “tangible assets such as money, facilities, and means of communication” as well as “the intangible or ‘human’ assets” which have included unspecialized labour, organizing and legal skills, and other forms of technical expertise.\textsuperscript{141} Research within this approach emphasizes how the distribution and nature of available resources affects the tactical choices movements make and the consequences of their action for social and political change.

The resource mobilization approach also argues that individuals exist within networks (kinship and friendship as well as professional, educational, and religious organizations) and that the strength of and connections within and between these drive movement recruitment instead of people being “rootless” and “isolated” as the previous collective behaviour research suggested.\textsuperscript{142} Such networks combined with organizational forms and dynamics within movement groups are referred to as “mobilizing structures,” defined as “those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action.”\textsuperscript{143} Della Porta for example discusses the important role that such social networks played for terrorist groups when they were driven underground in terms of recruitment and support as well as their interpretation of reality,\textsuperscript{144} while Wiktorowicz highlights the role played by mosques and prayer groups, NGOs, and professional and student associations in Islamic activism.\textsuperscript{145}


\textsuperscript{143} McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, "Introduction," 3.

\textsuperscript{144} Della Porta, \textit{Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State}, 204.

\textsuperscript{145} Wiktorowicz, ed \textit{Islamic Activism}, 10-3.
The resource mobilization approach has emphasized the role of more formally structured “social movement organizations” as subsets of or principle actors in movements. Given that many different organizations may be active in complimentary and competitive roles, the distribution of resources, opportunities, and other factors between groups will help shape mobilization dynamics. In applying this research to terrorism it is a relatively easy step to consider terrorist groups as a specific type of social movement organization, which is what Robinson does in his study of Hamas and Leheny does in his study of al-Qaeda’s influence on other groups active in Southeast Asia. Likewise Della Porta in part studied the comparative influences on radical versus more moderate organizations and the effect on the use of political violence within a conflict.

The political process approach – typified by the work of Tarrow, McAdam, and Tilly – also emphasizes a rational actor basis of social movements and the role of mobilizing structures. This approach dissents from the emphasis given to formal organizations, instead placing more stress on the relationship between institutional political actors and protest. In this tradition changes in the “political opportunity structure” are used to explain and examine the emergence and evolution of mobilization. Political opportunities have been defined as “consistent – but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national – signals to social or political actors which

147 Leheny, "Terrorism, Social Movements, and International Security.". Robinson, "Hamas as Social Movement."
148 Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State.
either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements” where such signals might include:151

1. The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system
2. The stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity
3. The presence or absence of elite allies
4. The State’s capacity and propensity for repression.152

In assessing the potential for social movement research to contribute to the understanding of terrorism it is worth noting that each of the above is echoed in studies about the use of political violence. Social movement researchers emphasize that in addition to responding to changes in their external environment the actions of social movement actors (including terrorist groups) may also create opportunities for themselves or others (including elites and opponents).153 Della Porta’s application of social movement theories to terrorist groups in Germany and Italy for example concluded that changes in the openness of the political system coupled with the nature of police repression played a significant role in affecting radicalization and the nature of violent protest.154

Proponents of both the resource mobilization and political process approaches overtime have come to recognize that each alternative has something important to contribute and “instead of debating the relative merits” of each position have increasingly turned to new agendas for advancing the study of social movements.155 Perhaps the most useful development building upon these two traditions is research into framing processes started by the work of Snow and his colleagues.156 Drawing upon

151 Tarrow, 1996, "States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social Movements," In Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, ed. McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, New York: Cambridge University Press, 54.
153 Tarrow, Ibid."States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social Movements," 58-60.
154 Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State, 206.
155 McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, "Introduction," 4.
theories in social psychology, rhetoric and dramaturgy, as well as sociology, framing processes are seen as “conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action.” This approach argues that while the above concepts (resources, opportunities, and networks) are necessary they are not fully sufficient explanations and that in addition people must come to perceive themselves as aggrieved and believe that collective action can redress their problems. As Zald explains, frames fill this gap by providing “shorthand interpretations of the world, to locate blame, [and] to suggest lines of actions.” Others have explained that frames influence our interpretation and perception of reality, and are part of how culture and ideology are converted into action and brought into the study of social movements. Frames can pre-exist within a movement context as well as be created and competed over by movement groups, the media, the government, and other actors. Chandler has applied the concept of framing processes to help understand political violence in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, while Wiktorowicz studies the framing competition between al-Qaeda and non-violent Islamic fundamentalists.

158 McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, "Introduction," 5-6.
159 Ibid.
162 Zald, "Culture, Ideology, and Strategic Framing," 262.
A Social Movement Theory of Terrorism

By applying theories and ideas developed in the social movement literature to the study of hearts and minds efforts in counterterrorism this thesis will contribute to the construction of a social movement theory of terrorism. Such a theory will not apply to all uses of terrorism and does not seek to reject previous theories, but instead will build upon them using key social movement concepts. This theoretical approach involves two important shifts in focus: first, recognizing that a group using terrorism is most often situated within a larger social movement context; and second, recognizing that violent tactics are but a subset of the broad range of protest repertoires and other actions in which such groups and movements may engage. Counterterrorism hearts and minds efforts should be an especially applicable test case for a social movement approach as both focus on a number of common issues including the attitudes of the larger population, the role of addressing grievances, how issues are perceived, and how state actions can spur or dampen rebellion.

Although many of the cases studied by terrorism researchers are easily identified as a subset of political protest typical of social movements the overlap is not complete. Recognizing terrorism as a tactic (which can be used by almost any actor in many different context for a wide variety of reasons) underscores that there can be cases where political violence is used without any mobilization goal and not as part of a larger collective protest dynamic. At the same time, it should be noted that a social movement theory of terrorism might be usefully applicable to cases where the actor is not part of an existing movement dynamic. For example, terrorism might be intended as an initiator action to create awareness or trigger repression and thereby help spur a movement. Similarly, even cases of state terror may be usefully examined through a social movement perspective given that such tactics are often part of social control efforts to prevent, contain, or quell the emergence of collective action outside of carefully proscribed social structures.

The goal of a social movement based theory of terrorism is not to reject current theories, but instead to build upon them in a complimentary fashion addressing their weaknesses to highlight what they obscure. A social movement theory of terrorism would continue to see groups using tactics of political violence as rational actors, subject to the same type of limits which social psychology discusses for other rational
actors, who are responding to or trying to address grievances (i.e. root causes) or achieve other aspirational goals (e.g. social transformation). This approach also recognizes that current theoretical formations may be better suited for understanding specific cases, such as the strategic thinking of a group using hostage-taking primarily as a coercive leverage to achieve specific demands from a state, where the additional complexity of a social movement approach carries too much cost without providing much (if any) additional explanatory insight.

A social movement theory of terrorism brings the application of the major theoretical constructs currently used in that literature including the role played by resources, political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes as tools for understanding the emergence and evolution of tactics of political violence. Such tools have already been explicitly used by Della Porta to understand terrorist groups in Italy and Germany,\textsuperscript{165} Leheny for studying al-Qaeda,\textsuperscript{166} and Wiktorowicz in tracing the rise of violent Islamic activism.\textsuperscript{167} Others have essentially used some of the same tools such as Stern discussing the role of narratives and cultural histories to understand Chechen violence,\textsuperscript{168} and Ginges in discussing the need to create frames that justify extra-normal violence,\textsuperscript{169} perhaps as Walzer explains through portrayals which dehumanize the other.\textsuperscript{170}

A principal emphasis of a social movement theory of terrorism is that there are two important levels of analysis: the group and the larger social movement.\textsuperscript{171} Too often current terrorism theories focus exclusively on the group using terrorism, or on a binary interaction between that group and state. When these theories consider other actors the group using terrorism remains privileged and largely separated in the analysis. For

\textsuperscript{165} Della Porta, "Political Socialization in Left-Wing Underground Organizations."
\textsuperscript{166} Leheny, "Terrorism, Social Movements, and International Security."
\textsuperscript{168} Stern, "Culture," 35.
\textsuperscript{169} Ginges, "Deterring the Terrorist," 177.
\textsuperscript{170} Walzer, "Five Questions About Terrorism," 6.
\textsuperscript{171} Chandler, "The Explanatory Value of Social Movement Theory."
example, the larger public may be a relatively passive “audience” who at best exerts pressure on the state, or whom the state and terrorist group are in competition over. Alternatively, when a larger public is seen as potential supporters and sympathizers, the group using terrorism is often identified in terms such as being at the top of a pyramid with that population as a base.\(^{172}\)

From a social movement perspective a group using terrorism can be considered similar to other “social movement organizations”\(^{173}\) providing potentially informative and important comparisons to what we know about other groups active within a social movement and emphasizing that the group using terrorism is neither necessarily representative of the movement nor the most important actor within it. The social movement literature discusses how social movement organizations can function as initiators of new movements or act to redirect a movement, as well as how the distribution of resources and opportunities within a movement can lead to competition between social movement organizations (or even counter movements).\(^{174}\) At the same time research may explore ways in which groups who choose to use repertoires of political violence are unique including for example the effects of needing to operate in cell structures or clandestinely.\(^{175}\) A specific movement related question, which Pillar for example considers in his discussion of counterterrorism, is the degree to which a group using terrorism is representative of and embedded within “something larger than itself.”\(^{176}\) An organization such as Hamas which provides a wide range of social


\(^{174}\) Crossley, Making Sense of Social Movements, 30. Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State, 110, 52.

\(^{175}\) Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State, 206.

\(^{176}\) Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 132-3.
services, has a political wing which has successfully taken control of government through open popular election, and is tightly integrated into religious and educational networks poses a very different challenge for a state’s counterterrorism efforts than a group such as Aum Shinrikyo which led a much more isolated existence and was considered at best “odd” by most of those who even knew of its existence.177

Shifting analysis to the level of the social movement highlights a number of other important considerations such as the maturity of the movement,178 the historical context in which it has developed, how the state has chosen to respond to it, and whether there are any connections to other movements either domestically or internationally. This shift of focus reminds the researcher that political violence may only have arisen late in a cycle of protest and that many of the most important grievances, connections, and frames for understanding the conflict may pre-date the existence of a group using terrorism.179 Other actors may continue to be more important to the evolution of protest, and the group using violence may be reacting to these other movement dynamics more than they are influenced by their targeting of a state or its responses to them.180 How a state has chosen to respond to a larger movement (as well as to a group using violence) also becomes very important to understanding the dynamics of violent protest. For example, much social movement research discusses a curvilinear relationship between state repression and radical protest.181

177 Mandaville’s discussion of the Hamas highlights the much more complicated picture of a social movement, political party, provider of charity and social services, and religious organization, and violent militia group using tactics of terrorism that is often obscured by the dominant simple Western characterization of the group as a terrorist organization: Mandaville, 2007, Global Political Islam, London and New York, Routledge, 201-22.
178 For example: McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, "Introduction," 16.
179 Della Porta, "Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy," 110-2.
181 Societies that are open and positively responsive to protest see less violence, as do societies that can exert very high levels of effective repressive social control, whereas less effective but repressive responses tend to trigger greater levels of violence. Crossley, Making Sense of Social Movements, 107, 11-12. Della Porta, "Introduction," 15-7. Della Porta, "Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy," 118 . Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State, 11 . Tarrow, "States and Opportunities," 54 . White, 1989, "From Peaceful Protest to Guerrilla War: Micromobilization of the Provisional Irish Republican Army," The American Journal of Sociology 94 (6), May: 1280-1
The second major shift in focus that a social movement theory of terrorism brings is to widen the spotlight from being exclusively on tactics of violence to the larger possible protest repertoire and other functions which social movements play. It is understandable that the fundamental purpose of counterterrorism is on saving “lives (limbs and property)”\(^{182}\) and similarly that terrorism researchers may be most concerned with studying the particular manifestation of norm-breaking violent behaviour. But a major insight of applying social movement theories is that such behaviour is often intricately interrelated in a larger protest context, and to fully understand the use of political violence one must also study the alternative types of protest available and how choices between these are constrained by and in turn shape the movement dynamic. In applying the study of repertoires of contention to terrorism researchers might consider questions such as: the temporal nature of cycles of protest;\(^{183}\) when and why violent repertoires emerge (especially with relations to political opportunities, resources, and frames);\(^{184}\) what transitions of limits in norm breaking behaviour may occur; how violent as compared to non-violent repertoires diffuse between groups; and, under what conditions violence may trigger a backlash from the larger movement or what influences may lead to a return to non-violent repertoires. At the same time the social movement literature has recognized that violent protests may have unique attributes,\(^{185}\) including costs and other negatives inhibiting its use,\(^{186}\) as well as a number of possible

\(^{185}\) Della Porta, *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State*, 9.
benefits such as how violent acts may themselves spur movements, serve as framing processes, or increase chances of group success.

**Studying Counterinsurgency**

Following the September 11 terrorist attacks the media and many public experts frequently repeated the conventional wisdom that winning hearts and minds is essential to counterterrorism. The authority underlying these claims reflects the persuasive

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prima facie logic about the importance of popular support as well as the perceived consensus of more than a half-century of counterinsurgency literature. However, others caution that there has been a lack of research on efficacy, criticize underlying analytic flaws, highlight historical counterexamples, and note that most uses appear to be a mere stock phrase giving lip service to a trivialized slogan or clichéd formula offering no substantive guidance to those who need it. While much of the

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Carruthers, *Winning Hearts and Minds*, 16.


public discussion of a counterterrorism hearts and minds strategy may be based on at best a shallow understanding of the phrase, the post-9/11 period has seen in-depth examination of the doctrine of population-centric warfare given the rise of complex, violent, and intractable insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as recognition of the threat from transnational terrorist groups. As the counterinsurgency literature provides the most developed thinking about what a hearts and minds strategy should entail, as well as the problems and challenges that will likely be encountered, I examine the central question of this thesis by incorporating lessons and insights from classic and contemporary studies of insurgencies with the previously discussed research into terrorism and social movements. This section examines the idea of a “hearts and minds” approach, the lessons of classic mid-20th century counterinsurgencies, and modern thinking on the implications of confronting transnational, post-Maoist, and virtual insurgents with al-Qaida as the prototype of the new threat.

Understanding Hearts and Minds

As a phrase the hearts and minds construction appears in English at least as early as 1568 and 1570 as well as in early English translations of the Bible. In its general usage it captures the dimensions of emotion and logic underlying attitudinal judgements and beliefs. Modern usage labelling a strategy for prevailing in a conflict by winning the popular support of a contested population is normally attributed to Sir Gerald Templer who used it to describe his approach in Malaya where he served as High Commissioner from 1952 to 1954. Others note that the military principle existed long before


196 Oxford English Dictionary, 1989, Second ed. For example: “Mawgre the heart and minde of all his Barons” dated to 1568 from Richard Grafton’s A Chronicle At Large and meere History of the affayres of England (1809, p200) and (reversed) “…to estrange and alienate the Minds and Hearts of sundry her Majestys Subjects from their dutiful Obedience” dated 1570 from Act 13 Eliz. c. 2. §1. Philippians 4:7 - “And the peace of God, which passeth all understanding, shall keep your hearts and minds…” Etymology discussed in: Safire, 1983, "On Language; Arguendo," The New York Times, 15 May, 6.


199 On 19 April 1891, working as an administrative officer for the British Raj in Balochistan, an area that would later be part of Pakistan, Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman wrote, “My last tour is perhaps the most important I have ever taken.... To be successful on this frontier a man has to deal with the hearts and minds of the people, and not only with their fears. The possession of the country is of vital importance to us, yet we do not go about obtaining it in the right way.... Were it not for my belief in my own system I would not remain here. To be successful requires much labour, and this is what -- and others will not take.” Thornton, 1895, Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman: His Life and Work on Our Indian Frontier. A Memoir, with Selections from His Correspondence and Official Writings, J. Murray, 253.
military leader to give it real tactical substance while also providing the prototypical classic success case.\textsuperscript{200}

Starting in the Vietnam era, critics from both ends of the political spectrum also used the phrase with cynical and ironic connotations.\textsuperscript{201} Advocates of harder military responses used the onomatopoeic acronym WHAM, from “winning hearts and minds,” to emphasize that popular support follows from displays of power and military victory.\textsuperscript{202} Opponents of the Vietnam War gave the phrase an Orwellian connotation as part of critiquing especially “ruthless” and “repressive military tactics” employed under the contradictory logic that the government could win the support of those whom it was bombing.\textsuperscript{203} This critique was represented by protest t-shirts reading, “we will win your hearts and minds or we will kill you,”\textsuperscript{204} and epitomized by the award winning 1974 documentary film, titled \textit{Hearts and Minds}, which focused on the dark side of U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{205}


While the phrase continues to occasionally be employed in a cynical or ironic fashion, a content analysis I conducted for this thesis found that the vast majority of current news media usage in the context of terrorism assumed that winning hearts and minds was positive and beneficial, and almost half of the cases examined categorized references as being “essential” or “very important” to current counterterrorism efforts. In these cases the phrase was generally employed in the classic counterinsurgency manner as meaning attempts to win the support of the population from or within which a group using political violence arises or is active. In this content analysis I also found: in most cases little or no detail was given for what a hearts and minds approach would specifically entail; to the extent that detail was given it covered a very wide and diverse range of prescriptions; and, in many cases the phrase seemed to be merely employed for politically instrumental reasons or because it would have rhetorical power.

The assumed authority of the phrase comes in part from its intuitive logic, as described in Chapter One, for “at first glance it seems a potent prescription.” In the abstract the successful prosecution of a campaign against an insurgency would sensibly seem to depend upon popular support. It seems easy to argue that previous failures are explained by their lack of “serious” or “real” attempts to win hearts and minds – or because of repressive excesses which actively alienated the population. This logic gains credibility because of a generally accurate perception of a current majority consensus

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206 To determine how the phrase is currently used in a terrorism context I conducted a simple content analysis of news media usage between September 11, 2003 and September 12, 2005. Using the Factiva news database all articles that included the phrase hearts and minds within 10 words of the root “terror” (capturing terror, terrorism, terrorist, etc) were reviewed. After eliminating duplicated or reprint articles as well as those judged to be accidental captures 138 articles were evaluated of which 119 focused on government action related to hearts and minds. Of these 112 were scored as using hearts and minds in a positive (94%), negative (4%), or mixed (3%) manner. Similarly 112 were scored as indicating that hearts and minds tactics had an essential (31%), very important (14%), positive (48%), irrelevant (4%), or counterproductive (2%) role to play in counterterrorism. While in 71% of the cases at least some information was given as to what would be prescribed by a hearts and minds approach, my judgment was: the large majority of cases gave little more than a half sentence of such detail; the phrase was often used for political instrumental purposes (to criticize or legitimate current policies); and in many cases the phrase was used merely for its rhetorical power.

207 Shafer, "The Unlearned Lessons of Counterinsurgency," 64.
amongst military analysts and historians supporting population-centric counterinsurgency approaches.\textsuperscript{208}

The endurance and power of the phrase further comes in part from its clever linguistic formation. Like other rhetorical devices, the metaphorical use of related or associated parts is more memorable and interesting than simply saying “popular support.”\textsuperscript{209} While the construction may not be as direct in meaning, it is richer by capturing some of the underlying complexity of the concept (emotional and rational dimensions) that determine not only the simple manifestation of public opinion but also its strength, motivation, persistence, and latitude for change.

**Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism – Connotation and Denotation**

In current usage most people associate a population-centric hearts and minds approach with counterinsurgency. Similarly, many associate hard line and coercive policies of the war on terror with counterterrorism, and especially in academic counterinsurgency literature counterterrorism is often connected with aggressive enemy-centric disrupt and destroy strategies such as special forces capture/kill missions.\textsuperscript{210} Kilcullen, writing in this context, explains:

\textsuperscript{208} This is represented in: the ascendance to “classics” status of historical military studies such as Kitson’s *Low Intensity Operations*, Galula’s *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, Trinquier’s *Modern Warfare*, and perhaps even Nagl’s *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*; the emergence of the Army and Marine Corps new Counterinsurgency Field Manual; and, the frequent focus of military journals on population-centric counterinsurgency discussions. However, the frequent inclusion of articles in these same journals by opponents and critics of the new counterinsurgency consensus, as well as the popularity in some military circles of books explaining that Vietnam could have been won if only domestic support had enabled continued or expanded military operations underscores that this consensus is not unanimous.

\textsuperscript{209} As a metaphor hearts and minds would likely be categorized as either synecdoche (“part stands for the whole”) or metonymy (closely associated with but not actual part of the subject). One could also label it sententia (“quoting a maxim or wise saying to apply a general truth to the situation”). Harris, 2003, *Writing with Clarity and Style*, Pyrczak Pub.

\textsuperscript{210} For example, based upon his experience as an Army Ranger in Iraq in 2003, Andrew Exum describes taking a counterterrorism instead of counterinsurgency approach in 2003: “We had the mentality, in that phase of the war, that we had only to capture or kill a set number of “terrorists” or “deadenders” for the security situation in Iraq to improve. We approached our mission with little regard for how many windows we broke or how many people we incarcerated in our single-minded quest to find the men who we believed were holding Iraq hostage.” Exum, 2009, "On CT vs. COIN," *Small...*
Counter-terrorism, a discipline dating from the early 1970s, focuses on the enemy: the individual terrorist and the network of terrorist operatives. It seeks to destroy this network, proceeding from the assumption that removing the network removes the problem. In these sense, like most conventional warfare, it is ‘enemy-centric.’ On the other hand, classical counter-insurgency, a discipline that emerged in the 1950s but has much older roots in imperial policing and colonial small wars, is ‘population-centric.’ It focuses on the population, seeking to protect it from harm by- or interaction with – the insurgent, competing with the insurgent for influence and control at the grassroots level. Its basic assumption is that insurgency is a mass social phenomenon, that the enemy rides and manipulates a social wave consisting of genuine popular grievances, and that dealing with this broader social and political dynamic, while gaining time for targeted reforms to work by applying a series of tailored, full-spectrum security measures, is the most promising path to ultimately resolve the problem.211

However, these connotations do not cover the full range of possible approaches that have been or could be pursued as part of either a counterinsurgency or counterterrorism strategy.212 For example, during the Vietnam war RAND scholars Nathan Leites and Charles Wolfe Jr explicitly criticized the “hearts and minds” approach and advocated what they called a “cost benefit” strategy prioritizing coercive tactics to deter the population from providing the support insurgents required to continue fighting.213

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211 Kilcullen, The accidental guerilla, xv.
212 The new U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide for example explains: "As noted, there are two basic approaches to COIN strategy: The enemy-centric approach conceptualizes COIN as a contest with an organized enemy, and focuses COIN activity on the insurgent organizations. This approach emphasizes defeat of the enemy as its primary task and other activities as supporting efforts. There are many variants within this approach, including ‘soft’ vs. ‘hard,’ direct vs. indirect, violent vs. non-violent, and decapitation vs. marginalization strategies. This approach can be summarized as ‘first defeat the enemy, and all else will follow.’ The population-centric approach shifts the focus of COIN from defeating the insurgent organization to maintaining or recovering the support of the population. While direct military action against the insurgent organization will definitely be required, it is not the main effort; this approach assumes that the center of gravity is the government’s relationship with and support among the population. It can be summarized as ‘first protect and support the population, and all else will follow.'" "U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide," 14.
213 Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority. Based upon their description of a simple economic model for a population’s interactions with insurgents they advocated the use
Further, the frequently cited classic counterinsurgency studies (Galula, Kitson, McCuen, Townshend, Trinquier, Thomson, etc) contribute to the current consensus by examining the failure of counterinsurgents who did not pursue population-centric strategies.\textsuperscript{214} Similarly, as the previous section on responding to terrorism emphasized, counterterrorism policies can take and have taken many different forms involving a much wider range of efforts than a narrow focus on coercive enemy-centric targeting.\textsuperscript{215}

My focus in the remainder of this thesis will be on counterinsurgency in the common current usage as advising population-centric strategies. However, when writing about counterterrorism I take a much broader perspective when examining both current practices in the war on terror – including efforts justified or informed by hearts and minds prescriptions – as well as how an overall counterterrorism strategy could be developed better implementing the lessons of contemporary counterinsurgency thinking and insights from the study of social movements. Positing that al-Qaida is a global insurgent using tactics of terrorism interconnected with many different local violent conflicts, I explore how the three areas of literature discussed in this chapter may help understand the failures of current efforts as well as help improve analysis and policy of military force against the general population – raising the cost in the population’s economic calculus – to cut off aid, comfort, recruits, and other support perceived as key to sustaining the insurgency. And in criticizing advocates of a hearts and minds approach they ultimately argued on page 128 “that popular preferences simply do not matter.” The current consensus of counterinsurgency theorists finds fault with this prescription noting it is precisely such repressive measures which often give rise to the potential for successful insurgencies in the first place, highlighting the importance of popular perceptions of a state’s legitimacy undermined by such actions, referencing empirical examples of how coercive or repressive force has increased support for insurgents or undermined support for governments, and criticizing their assumptions that rebellion was necessarily illegitimate and dependent upon foreign support. See for example: Shafer, 1988a, \textit{Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy}, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 127-32.\textsuperscript{214} Galula, \textit{Counter-Insurgency Warfare}. Kitson, \textit{Low Intensity Operations}. McCuen, 1966, \textit{The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of Counter-Insurgency}, London, Faber and Faber. Nagl, \textit{Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam}. Shafer, \textit{Deadly Paradigms}. Thompson, 1966, \textit{Defeating Communist insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam}, F. A. Praeger. Townshend, \textit{Britain's Civil Wars}. Trinquier, \textit{Modern Warfare}.\textsuperscript{215} See for example: Frey, \textit{Dealing with Terrorism}. Pedahzur and Ranstorp, "A Tertiary Model.". Wilkinson, \textit{Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response}.\textsuperscript{215}
making with respect to integrating counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in the future.216

**The Classic Counterinsurgency Doctrine**

While the hearts and minds approach has its critics there is a fairly widespread consensus in the current counterinsurgency literature that focusing on popular support is important to prevailing in such conflicts.217 Taillon writes that it has become “virtually an article of faith within the body of knowledge which passes for British ‘doctrine’ of insurgency and counter-insurgency,”218 while Douglas similarly notes that “the US military has almost made a catechism of the idea that if there is an insurgency … then the centre of gravity must be the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people.”219 Therefore it is not surprising that the generally praised new *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* explicitly

216 Writing on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, Andrew Exum suggests: “Success, then, means getting past the COIN versus CT paradigm and thinking about which best practices can be imported from each discipline – and how the two mentalities can be fused with the realities on the ground in Afghanistan to offer policymakers solutions beyond the usual models.” Exum, "On CT vs. COIN." Kilcullen similarly suggests: “If this is true, then both traditional counter-terrorism and classical counter-insurgency are inadequate models for the conflict in which we find ourselves…. Counterinsurgents typically expect intractable and prolonged conflicts to last years or even decades. Clearly, in a confrontation with violent extremism over many countries against diverse local guerrillas and globally oriented terrorists with regional allies, neither approach quite works, though counterinsurgency is much closer to the mark than traditional counterterrorism.” Kilcullen, *The accidental guerilla*, xv.


operationalizes a population-centric approach where the “primary objective is to secure the civilian population rather than destroy the enemy.”

The specifics of what a hearts and minds strategy entails is likely to vary from conflict to conflict, but the essence remains the same: the centre of gravity is the support of the population instead of the traditional military goals of capturing territory or destroying enemy forces. The emphasis placed on this is well represented in classic counterinsurgency writings drawing on positive and negative lessons from mid-20th century conflicts including especially: the British in Palestine, Malaya, Borneo, Kenya, and Ireland; the French in Indochina and Algeria; and, the United States in Greece, the Philippines, and Vietnam. As Mackinlay emphasizes one of the “enduring lessons” from the British experience is that:

The people’s war concept of mobilizing the population was hard to combat through military means alone. Once a population had been mobilized successfully by insurgency, there was a tipping point in the escalating situation after which no lawful counterstrategy was likely to prevail. He proceeds to explain the first of “two essential requirements for success,” which the British took from there experiences, is “a political strategy whose outcome related to winning the support of the ‘vital’ population.” In Malaya Templer emphasized, “the shooting side of this business is only 25 per cent of the trouble and the other 75 per cent lies in getting the people of this country behind us.” In perhaps the seminal classic text Kitson wrote, “Wars of subversion and counter-subversion are fought, in the last resort, in the minds of the people.” Galula’s “first law” was that, “the support of the

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222 As Mackinlay notes, these insurgencies generally involved the global spread of self-determination movements as the old imperial era collapsed and many local populations rose up in nationalist struggles. Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, "Rethinking Counterinsurgency," 9-10.
223 Ibid., 11-2.
224 Ibid. The second essential requirement is cited later in this section.
225 Smith, "General Templer and Counter-Insurgency in Malaya," 65.
226 Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 72.
population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as for the insurgent.”227 While Mockaitis wrote in his review of counterinsurgencies that, “the real objective is the loyalties of disaffected people,”228 and Townsend in his similar volume concluded, “the really decisive battle is for public opinion.”229

The starting logic of much of this literature is that governments must engage the strategy of the insurgents to defeat them.230 Because these conflicts are highly asymmetrical insurgents have learned to leverage the benefits of popular support and the weaknesses governments often exhibit.231 The writings of Mao Tse-Tung are frequently put forward as exemplifying insurgent thinking and his advice that the guerrilla must rely on the people for support “like fish swimming in the water of the population” is probably the most cited (and played with) analogy for explaining insurgency and counterinsurgency tactics.232 Shafer quotes Mao as advising: “Guerrillas are like fish, and the people are the water they swim in. If the temperature of the water is right, the fish will thrive and multiply.”233 In On Guerrilla Warfare, discussing how insurgents should treat the general population and even enemy forces with respect and compassion, Mao again uses the metaphor advising:

Many people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for long in the enemy's rear. Such a belief reveals lack of comprehension of the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops. The former may be likened to water the

227 Galula, Counter-Insurgency Warfare, 74-5.
228 Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 146.
229 Townshend, Britain's Civil Wars, 14.
233 Shafer, Deadly Paradigms, 21.
latter to the fish who inhabit it. How may it be said that these two cannot exist together? It is only undisciplined troops who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish out of its native element cannot live.  

Mao’s precepts were widely embraced by 20th century revolutionaries and, giving a nod to Mao, those studying these insurgences have often referred to them as “people’s wars.” Biddle describes the model of such insurgencies:

A Maoist people's war is, at bottom, a struggle for good governance between a class-based insurgency claiming to represent the interests of the oppressed public and a ruling regime portrayed by the insurgents as defending entrenched privilege. Using a mix of coercion and inducements, the insurgents and the regime compete for the allegiance of a common pool of citizens, who could, in principle, take either side. A key requirement for the insurgents' success, arguably, is an ideological program – people's wars are wars of ideas as much as they are killing competitions – and nationalism is often at the heart of this program. Insurgents frame their resistance as an expression of the people's sovereign will to overthrow an illegitimate regime that represents only narrow class interests or is backed by a foreign government.

As Mao understood, popular support provides insurgents with refuge as well as the ability to refit, refresh, and recruit, while the counterinsurgent depends upon winning popular support in order to deny these benefits. Given the ability of insurgents to hide and act amongst a supportive population the counterinsurgent also depends upon winning hearts and minds in order to generate the intelligence necessary to safely carry out military and enforcement operations.

In order to win popular support most counterinsurgency doctrine advises that government forces must first insure a long term feeling of security as well as provide necessities including food, medical care, and similar basic human needs.

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236 Biddle, "Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon."
Counterinsurgent forces will likely find it beneficial to use information operations to insure the government is seen as addressing such problems and to expose the insurgent as preventing such solutions. Many writers stress that retaining credibility is especially important for the counterinsurgent, and note that here too insurgents have an asymmetric advantage. Galula provides the classic explanation:

> The asymmetrical situation has important effects on propaganda. The insurgent, having no responsibility, is free to use every trick; if necessary, he can lie, cheat, exaggerate. He is not obliged to prove; he is judged by what he promises, not by what he does. Consequently, propaganda is a powerful weapon for him. With no positive policy but with good propaganda, the insurgent may still win.

The counterinsurgent is tied to his responsibilities and to his past, and for him, facts speak louder than words. He is judged on what he does, not on what he says. If he lies, cheats, exaggerates, and does not prove, he may achieve some temporary successes, but at the price of being discredited for good. And he cannot cheat much unless his political structures are monolithic, for the legitimate opposition in his own camp would soon disclose his every psychological maneuver. For him, propaganda can be no more than a secondary weapon, valuable only if intended to inform and not to fool. A counterinsurgent can seldom cover bad or nonexistent policy with propaganda.

However, Betz amongst others have emphasized that Galula is not entirely right:

> There is much wisdom in the injunction that the counterinsurgent must not lie – lest he cause long-term pain to his credibility in return for short-term gain. But the insurgent can also be judged by what he does as well as what he says. The delta between the two is the target of the counterinsurgent propagandist.

Nevertheless, the insurgent still has the advantage of not being responsible for all of the difficulties of governance, often including the competing expectations of multiple groups and very difficult challenges of delivering observable short term progress.

Counterinsurgent forces should also recognize that successful insurgencies mobilize around concrete grievances whether or not such causes are central to the insurgents’ real strategic goals and without a requirement that insurgents remain consistent in what grievances they advocate or exploit. Responding to and addressing

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240 Tomes, "Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare," 27.
these is usually necessary for separating the masses from the insurgency.\textsuperscript{243} At the same time the government must be cautious not to create new sources of alienation for the public. A classic insurgent tactic is to carry out attacks that trigger overly repressive responses with the intent both to sow a general feeling of insecurity as well as to drive a deeper wedge between the population and the government. For these reason it is especially important that counterinsurgent forces at all levels are well trained and disciplined in order to carry out their activities consistent with a population-centric strategy in order to maintain government legitimacy while enabling and participating in other efforts that respond to grievances.\textsuperscript{244}

Counterinsurgency doctrine for countries such as the United States and Great Britain focuses not on their own domestic populations, but on helping the governments of friendly developing states confront insurgencies.\textsuperscript{245} Shafer summarizes the variety of prescriptions to win hearts and minds that made up the core of American and British counterinsurgency doctrine at the end of the Cold War:

> All, however, address the problems of improving threatened states’ performance in three key areas: physical control of territory and populace; penetration of authority throughout the country; and promotion of economic and social development. Put differently, the hearts and minds prescriptions amount to three great oughts. Governments ought to secure the population from insurgent coercion. They ought to provide competent, legal, responsive administration that is free from past abuses and broader in domain, scope and vigor. And they ought to meet rising expectations with higher living standards.\textsuperscript{246}

He further notes that hearts and minds approaches generally emphasize that these three goals must be approached simultaneously as their success is interdependent.\textsuperscript{247} To achieve all of this most classic counterinsurgency literature advises unitary command structures, where military efforts must be subsidiary to and in support of civil efforts, to

\textsuperscript{246}Shafer, "The Unlearned Lessons of Counterinsurgency," 63.
\textsuperscript{247}Ibid.: 63-4.
insure a consistent focus on the ultimate goal of winning hearts and minds.\textsuperscript{248} Templer in Malaya argued that, “any idea that the business of normal civil government and the business of the Emergency are two separate entities must be killed for good and all… the two activities are completely and utterly interrelated.”\textsuperscript{249} While Galula similarly concluded, “Essential though it is, the military action is secondary to the political one, its primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom to work safely with the population.”\textsuperscript{250} According to Mackinlay the second of two “essential lessons” which the British took from their experience was that counterinsurgency requires “an operational capability that was multiagency and multifunctional, under civil control, and capable of implementing a nuanced political strategy.”\textsuperscript{251}

The final element of the doctrine’s logic is that winning popular support is necessary for a lasting victory unless a government is prepared and has the resources to permanently rule by overwhelming force. Without winning hearts and minds any tactical successes will later simply be washed away by the tide of mass opinion.\textsuperscript{252} Victory thus occurs by “drying up the sea”\textsuperscript{253} of popular support through establishing the local government’s legitimacy and ability to provide security, good governance, and economic development which enables it to co-opt more moderate elements of the insurgency while degrading, isolating, and ultimately eliminating the rest.

**Criticisms and Limitations of the Classic Doctrine**

Although the majority consensus supports a population-centric approach to counterinsurgency, the idea of a hearts and minds strategy is not without its critics. Researchers examining the classic cases have put forth arguments about underlying

\textsuperscript{249} As Templer noted in Malaya: “Any idea that the business of normal civil government and the business of the Emergency are two separate entities must be killed for good and all… The two activities are completely and utterly interrelated.” Barber, 1971, *The War of the Running Dogs: How Malaya Defeated the Communist Guerillas, 1948-60*, Collins, 152.
\textsuperscript{250} Galula, *Counter-Insurgency Warfare*, 63.
\textsuperscript{251} Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, "Rethinking Counterinsurgency," 11-2.
\textsuperscript{252} Schell, "What happened to hearts?"
\textsuperscript{253} Galula, *Counter-Insurgency Warfare*, 77. Hoffman, "Lessons from the Past for Iraq's Future."
analytic flaws, contended the dominant doctrine is poorly suited to different forms of insurgency, and suggested modern liberal democracies are unlikely to have the patience or level of commitment required for success. Even supporters stress its limitations and recommend against involvement in conflicts requiring its application.

Shafer’s critical study of U.S. counterinsurgency policy is amongst the better work on the subject before the post-9/11 resurgence in interest. He highlights three general analytic flaws casting doubt on the wisdom of advocating hearts and minds approaches:

At first glance it seems a potent prescription; on closer examination it is transparently flawed. Managerial problems add to the difficulties of course, but the deep reasons are analytic. Hearts and minds analysts’ assumptions cloud assessment of the three issue areas critical to an outside power contemplating support of an insurgency threatened government: the constraints on leverage; intragovernmental limits on reform by the would-be ally; and the nature of relations between government and populace or, conversely, between insurgents and populace. The weaknesses derive from policymakers’ basic assumptions about Third World politics and political change. The resulting miscalculation opens each of the three great oughts to criticism and vitiates many of their key components. Indeed, the prescriptions offered may be irrelevant, impossible, or worse. SHAFER, DEADLY PARADIGMS, 118.

Leverage is the problem of getting the local nation to do what a counterinsurgency strategy requires. Shafer explains that many situations where an external power is involved with counterinsurgency efforts include perverse dynamics where “the more critical the situation, the less leverage the United States can muster” because the dangers of failure limit the ability to coerce the local government, while at the same time “the more ‘reverse leverage’ nominal clients will exercise.”255 This enables local elites to avoid undertaking reforms or pursuing actions they do not perceive to be in their interest, while amplifying the temptation to increase dependence on and demand for American assistance and resources. The intragovernmental constraint involves challenges or limits on the capacity to carry out recommendations as well as willingness to do so. In many situations where insurgencies arise the reforms prescribed by classic doctrine require changes to the distribution of political power and state resources that take away from controlling elites, or the interest groups they represent, as well as

254 Shafer, Deadly Paradigms, 118.
255 Ibid., 118-20.
potentially threatening those elites continued positions of privilege or even survival.\textsuperscript{256} Finally, Shafer notes that because of typical government-population or insurgent-population relationships in many conflicts the assumptions of counterinsurgency prescriptions may be undermined to the degree that the population honestly perceives what the insurgent has to offer as a better social order (“often in terms of social programs, aspirations for the future, and freedom from corruption”) or that they legitimately feel more threatened by the state. In these situations efforts to increase state capability to exercise authority may perversely fuel the conflict and further drive the population away. This especially may occur when the increases in government security capacity outstrip efforts to encourage reform of a government’s past abusive or oppressive patterns of behaviour, as well as when there is insufficient time for overall economic and social development to expand the pool of resource sufficiently for all segments to gain.\textsuperscript{257}

With the resurgence of interest in counterinsurgency doctrine after September 11, Biddle has frequently played an important role in doctrine and theoretical discussions as a check on overenthusiastic claims about the wisdom and promise of the new pursuit of small wars tactics and strategy.\textsuperscript{258} He has raised a variety of concerns and criticisms especially in terms of applying the classic lessons captured by the new \textit{Counterinsurgency Field Manual} to the conflict in Iraq. He presents similar arguments to Shafer about assumptions of a local nation’s claims to legitimacy, compatibility of U.S. and local nation goals, willingness of local elites to compromise their own subgroup’s interest for national well-being, the limits to or lack of guidance for options through which the U.S. can coerce necessary reforms, and the dangers of building up local capacity before reforms take hold. He emphasizes:

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\textsuperscript{256} Ibid., 120-2.
\textsuperscript{257} Ibid., 122-7.
\textsuperscript{258} See for example his U.S Army War College monograph questioning popular and glowing assessments of the success of small special forces units in the initial 2001-2002 campaign in Afghanistan, as well as several later writings challenging the dominant perspective on counterinsurgency operations, the new Counterinsurgency Field Manual, and applicability of these to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Biddle, 2002, "Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy," U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, November. Biddle, "Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon.". Biddle, "The New U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual as Political Science and Political Praxis."
\end{flushright}
The existence of an insurgency in the first place is often a signal of an illegitimate government with strong leadership interests in an unrepresentative distribution of wealth and power. In many cases, leaders will see U.S.-sponsored reforms as a greater threat to their personal well-being – or even survival – than the insurgency.259

Another major criticism Dr Stephen Biddle raises is in the applicability of the lessons from mid-20th century “people’s wars,” which he describes as largely based in nationalist or ideological conflicts where the support of the people was likely more malleable, to current internal wars as communal conflicts involving clashes between ethnic and sectarian groups. When these identity divisions define the splits between government and insurgent forces, and similarly split the larger population, the value of classic counterinsurgency doctrine may be significantly limited, especially as:

[T]he truly uncommitted fraction of the public can be small – and the fighting itself quickly reduces it, as subnational identities harden and frightened civilians turn to their co-ethnics or co-religionists for survival.260

While recognizing that other solutions are also not promising – referencing suggestions of negotiated power-sharing, outside peacekeepers, partition, or simply letting the strong overpower the weak – he concludes

But it is far from clear that the manual’s central prescription of drying up an insurgent’s support base by persuading an uncommitted population to side with the government makes much sense in an identity war where the government’s ethnic or sectarian identification means that it will be seen as an existential threat to the security of rival internal groups, and where there may be little or no supracommunal, national identity to counterpose to the subnational identities over which the war is waged by the time the United States becomes involved.261

In the case of Iraq Biddle believed the best chances for success were in shifting to treating it as a civil war, and “not the people’s war we imagine it to be.”262

Finally, even current supporters of the applicability of classic counterinsurgency doctrine to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan raise significant cautions on its limits. Dr David Kilcullen, the Australian anthropologist and former army officer who served during the Bush administration as a senior advisor to Condoleezza Rice at the Department of State and to General David Petraeus in Iraq, describes the classic

260 Ibid.
261 Ibid.
262 Biddle, "Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon."
doctrine as extremely difficult, resource intensive, and taking a long time while bogging down international forces and not guaranteeing success. This leads him to summarize it as “not recommended” and conclude:

My personal position on counterinsurgency in general, and on Iraq and Afghanistan in particular, could therefore be summarized as “Never again, but….” That is, we should avoid any future large-scale, unilateral military intervention in the Islamic world, for all of the reasons already discussed… And should we find ourselves (by error or necessity) in a similar position once again, then the best practices we have rediscovered in current campaigns represent an effective approach: effective, but not recommended.

Kilcullen and other counterinsurgency advocates similarly worry that the time and resource commitment – as well as inevitable casualties – required for success in current insurgencies may be more than the populations of liberal democracies are willing to support and have the patience to sustain.

Adapting to Contemporary and Transnational Insurgencies

Although the initial post-9/11 discussions on counterinsurgency techniques were based in lessons from the classic mid-20th century cases, a number of academics and military thinkers have recognized that changes in technology, global interconnectedness, and the nature of the dynamics driving many conflicts likely affect fundamental characteristics of current insurgencies and how best to respond to them. This section discusses important potential differences with the contemporary model.

264 Ibid., 269.
265 Ibid., 284.
being in part transnational and virtual, involving multiple disparate vital populations, 
and featuring insurgent groups interconnected through often relatively unstructured 
networks who may pursue qualitatively different goals than in the past. At the same 
time, it is important to emphasize that this modern form of insurgency encompasses and 
interacts with many different locally focused conflicts that are in important ways still 
very much classical insurgencies.

The principle changes in technology, travel, exchange, and overall 
interconnectedness transforming the nature of contemporary insurgency are 
encompassed by the wide variety of drivers and forces typically associated with globalization.267 As Urry writes, “new technologies are producing ‘global times’ in which the distances between places and peoples again seem to be dramatically 
reducing.”268 For example, Lynch describes how the new media and communication 
technologies are connecting Arabic speaking populations across not just the Middle East 
but also immigrants and travellers around the world enabling a vibrant new Arab 
public.269 Emphasizing the complexity of the resulting virtually connected population, 
Lynch believes that this new transnational Arab public is best described by an “image of 
multiple, crosscutting patchworks” rather than “any singular conception of unified 
spatial or temporal locations.”270

Changes driven by technological advancements influence both social 
mobilization and violent conflict, as Kurth Cronin explains:

Most important is the 21st century’s levee en masse, a mass networked 
mobilization that emerges from cyber-space with a direct impact on physical 
reality. Individually accessible, ordinary networked communications such as 
personal computers, DVDs, videotapes, and cell phones are altering the nature

267 Fukuyama, 1989, "The End of History?," The National Interest 16, Summer. Held, 
Contemporary Political Theory 1. Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton, 1999, 
Kehoane, 2002, "The Globalization of Informal Violence, Theories of World Politics, 
and the 'Liberalism of Fear'," Dialog-JO, Spring. Scholte, 2000, Globalization: A 
University Press.
269 Lynch, 2006b, Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, Al-Jazeera, and Middle East 
270 Ibid.
of human social interaction, thus also affecting the shape and outcome of domestic and international conflict. Although still in its early stages, this development will not reverse itself and will increasingly influence the conduct of war. From the global spread of Islamist-inspired terrorist attacks, to the rapid evolution of insurgent tactics in Iraq, to the riots in France, and well beyond, the global, non-territorial nature of the information age is having a transformative effect on the broad evolution of conflict, and we are missing it. We are entering the cyber-mobilization era, but our current course consigns us merely to react to its effects.271

The virtual dimension of modern insurgency facilitates small groups mastering “armed theatre” to promote attacks in the classic tradition of “propaganda of the deed” facilitated by a plethora of TV, video, DVD, and website outlets “to arouse support and foment discord on a global scale.”272 One result of the virtual nature of modern insurgencies is that many attacks are “planned for maximum visibility, not for territorial or military value” with the goal to keep an issue in the news.273 Exemplifying the potential challenges for counterinsurgents is the rapid advancements made by various insurgent groups in Iraq and by the Taliban in Afghanistan for publicizing attacks to distant audiences allowing them to heighten the coercive impact against targeted populations, promote fundraising and other forms of support from sympathetic populations, and at the same time share lessons learned spurring tactical innovation with compatriots.274 Tatham suggests these changes may explain the observation that contemporary insurgents appear to be more successful in asymmetric conflicts than in the past.275

The first significant resulting difference between classic and contemporary insurgencies is in the scope of their objectives changing from territorial to transnational. Mackinlay characterizes past insurgencies as being “primarily monolithic or national in form … working for very specific local goals (like overthrowing a local government)” and deriving “most of their power from the local population.” In contrast, “modern

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insurgent movements are characterized by their complex and global nature” espousing “larger thematic goals, like overthrowing the global order” and drawing upon a transnational base of population support and operational territory. While popularity of some classic insurgencies may have extended to distant parts of the world, or the conflict’s leaders may have taken inspiration and advice from distant revolutionaries pursuing similar ideologies, fighters in the classic model did not primarily seek a shared transnational objective. In the classic cases the national territorial aims provided a constrained geographic area of operation. For the contemporary cases described by Mackinlay’s modern model the insurgent may shift between different territorial areas, bringing originally unrelated groups together, and drawing support from disparate communities outside of the direct control of either a host nation or supporting external power. Further complicating the challenge, the transnational goals of many modern insurgents are based in religion and identity which raises the sectarian in-group/out-group divisions of communal conflicts highlighted by Biddle, decreases the persuasive credibility of counterinsurgent actors, and arguably increases the violent potential especially of terrorist tactics.

Where the first shift is from a single to multiple territories of operation because of transnational goals, the second significant difference is a shift from primarily focusing on a vital population in a locally defined geographic area of operation to a contemporary form of insurgency focused on populations from many different parts of the world who are often connected in and defined only by virtual spaces. McDonald, writing about global social movements, describes how this is a shift from societies which use to be bounded geographically – corresponding to the territories of nation-states – to increasingly global communities whose connections are complex and uncertain. Betz describes this virtual space as an “informational realm in which belligerents contend with words and images to manufacture strategic narratives which

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276 Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, "Rethinking Counterinsurgency," 6-7.
279 McDonald, Global Movements, 9.
are more compelling than those of the other side. ²⁸⁰ These new technologies enable transnational Islamist movements to communicate to the global Muslim population they target – in essence their “virtual ummah”²⁸¹ – often in a “near-instantaneous” manner with increasing sophistication.²⁸²

The shifts from a defined territorial area to a transnational and often virtual focus both facilitate modern insurgents interacting with multiple dispersed populations, again increasing the complexity of the challenge for counterinsurgents and removing the ability to directly manage the vital population that existed in a classical insurgency. Mackinlay describes the disparate populations who he emphasizes are still the “vital ground” in contemporary transnational insurgency:

In the prevailing situation, they comprise Muslim populations who live in and around spaces that are directly involved in the conflict (so-called operational spaces). Further afield there are the concerned populations of Muslim states, the coalition states, and Muslim immigrants who live as minorities in foreign countries. Each of these populations plays an important role in the insurgent and counterinsurgent campaigns. Their support is part of the strategic center of gravity of both sides.²⁸³

Consistent with the Chapter One explanation of why global popular support for a terrorist group shapes the potential threat that group poses he continues:

It is not their physical support that largely sustains the campaign, but rather their political or emotional support. The Palestinian experience shows that when insurgents have strong emotional support, finance and logistics follow. Today, emotional and political support is gained and lost through the interpretation of events rather than the events themselves.²⁸⁴

Although in many areas of conflict local access to new technologies such as the internet which fuel many of the changes Mackinlay highlights is not widespread and may not be for some time, Roy observes that the individuals who have access to these communications mediums become key network nodes communicating ideas and

²⁸⁰ Betz, "The Virtual Dimension of Contemporary Insurgency and Counterinsurgency," 510. For Betz, this virtual space is the contemporary ground for the “war of ideas.”
²⁸² Kilcullen, "Counter-Insurgency Redux," 3.
²⁸⁴ Ibid., 21-2.
information between virtual and local populations. These networked actors potentially exercising a significant influence on local mobilization dynamics.  

The ability of insurgents to exploit a virtual space enabled by disparate communities around the globe creates potential “virtual sanctuaries” for carrying out key operations that a classical counterinsurgent may have been able to suppress or isolate through exercising the local state’s control over its own territory. Kilcullen explains:

Globalized internet communication also enables moral, financial and personnel support, creating a strategic hinterland or “virtual sanctuary” for insurgents. Classical theory deals with “active” and “passive” sanctuaries, methods to quarantine such sanctuaries and their effects on insurgent performance. But it treats sanctuary as primarily a geographical space in which insurgents regroup or receive external support. However, today’s internet-based virtual sanctuary is beyond the reach of counterinsurgent forces or neighboring governments, and its effects are difficult to quarantine… Classical counterinsurgency theory has little to say about such electronic sanctuary.

In addition to leveraging these virtual connections and disparate populations for support, insurgent groups can also exploit the globalized nature of contemporary conflicts by widening the sphere of violence to target citizens from other countries locally or carry out international attacks to affect global audiences:

If other countries give support to the affected government, the insurgents may directly target public opinion there, pressuring them to cease their assistance. Such pressure may be exerted from the affected territory through the kidnap, torture and murder of intervening civilian nationals, often broadcast internationally to reach the population of origin. Alternatively, more direct effect may be achieved through terrorist attacks launched within the intervening country itself (perhaps facilitated by immigrant or other sympathetic community groups).

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s al-Qaida in Iraq conducted several terrorist attacks in this manner, including the 19 August 2003 bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad which led to a significant reduction in UN reconstruction staff and efforts at a

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286 Kilcullen, "Counter-Insurgency Redux," 3. As examples Kilcullen highlights: “Insurgents in Iraq are adept at exploiting global media effects, while the ‘Global Islamic Media Front’ (al-Jabhab al-‘ilamiyah al-islamiyah al-‘alamiyah) and AQ’s as-Sahab media production arm have achieved new heights of professionalism. Internet-based financial transfers, training and recruitment, clandestine communication, planning and intelligence capabilities allow insurgents to exploit virtual sanctuary for more than just propaganda.”
potentially crucial early point of the conflict,\textsuperscript{288} as well as the highly publicized videotaped graphic executions of hostages from several different countries.\textsuperscript{289}

Another effect of the transnational and virtual nature of contemporary conflicts is often an evolution in the insurgents organizational structure. In the classic cases insurgent organization was generally top-down with limited connections to external actors. In the modern context, although local conflicts may still be organized around more traditional structures, the transnational movement and connections between groups are often through complex and relatively unstructured networks with a mix of bottom-up influences and horizontal linkages.\textsuperscript{290} Many of the connections between groups are virtual and the ability of territorially disparate individuals to use new communication technologies to form selective shared communities increases the challenge for counterinsurgents to identify, understand, surveil, and communicate credibly with key populations. As a result a counterinsurgent must find ways to employ the diverse elements of political, security, humanitarian, and economic efforts involved with the same virtual "reach and pervasiveness as the forces it seeks to disarm."\textsuperscript{291}

The threat posed by al-Qaida is likely to become the prototypical model for a contemporary transnational and virtual insurgency. In his 2005 article "Countering Global Insurgency" Kilcullen developed the argument "that the War on Terrorism is actually a campaign against a globalized Islamist insurgency" most closely associated with al-Qaida. He highlighted bin Ladin and Zawahiri's global strategy, the presence of cells linked to the group in at least 40 countries, at least partial responsibility for terrorist attacks conducted in many different regions, and ties to active insurgencies across much of the historic Muslim world.\textsuperscript{292} Mackinlay, who labelled bin Ladin as a


\textsuperscript{289} Hoffman, 2006, "The Use of the Internet by Islamic Extremists," \textit{Testimony presented to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence} (May).


\textsuperscript{291} Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, "Rethinking Counterinsurgency," 2.

\textsuperscript{292} Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency."
global insurgent in an October 2001 article in The Observer;\textsuperscript{293} tracks the development of this contemporary form of insurgency as starting with the PLO, noting their use of attacks that were intended to mobilize a global audience for support and influence.\textsuperscript{294} The response of Muslim foreign fighters who joined the mujahideen against the Soviets in Afghanistan, the so called Afghan Arabs, played a significant role in developing the transnational call for personal involvement and financial support as exemplified by the writings of Abdullah Azzam arguing that jihad in such a case was a personal obligation for Muslims from around the world.\textsuperscript{295} The development of al-Zawahiri’s “far enemy” strategy completed this evolution by attempting to refocus insurgencies supported by Muslims worldwide on global targets in order to accomplish the original goals of overthrowing local regimes.\textsuperscript{296} Mackinlay observes:

In more important ways Bin Laden's organisation has moved significantly beyond the established template of insurgency. Prior to the end of the Cold War a growing number of secular Muslim states were already struggling to contain home-grown Islamic insurgencies. In every case these movements still seek to overthrow their governments. Bin Laden, by contrast is a global insurgent. Spread over more than forty states from Oslo to Jakarta, his support cannot be regarded as a national or even a regional phenomenon.

\textsuperscript{293} Mackinlay, "Tackling bin Laden: Lessons from History."
\textsuperscript{294} Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, "Rethinking Counterinsurgency," 13-20. He further suggests that unlike classical insurgents many modern groups often appear in the short term to be more motivated by goals of raising or maintaining awareness amongst distant populations, or by expressive or cathartic rationales for carrying out violent operations. He describes many Palestinian terrorist attacks, by groups which he believes have no near term hope of achieving their territorial aims against Israel, as at times "retrospectively articulated, suggesting that the driving impulse was instinctive retribution rather than a formal strategic plan.” And continues: “The jihadists succeed in reinforcing their strategic centre of gravity by exploiting the propaganda of their deeds and by reaching and animating the widest audiences. They are stimulated by the journey but careless of their arrival. Their goal-scoring moments arouse revulsion and sadness, but allow an important minority to retrieve self respect and a moment of escape from the degradation of living in a refugee camp or an immigrant ghetto.” Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, "Rethinking Counterinsurgency," 14-8, 20, 31. See also: Betz, "The Virtual Dimension of Contemporary Insurgency and Counterinsurgency," 518. Post, "Conference Document: Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism.". Stern, "The Protean Enemy," 30-1. Tuman, Communicating Terror, 23. Wieviorka, The Making of Terrorism. Wieviorka, "Terrorism in the Context of Academic Research."

\textsuperscript{295} Azzam, 1979, Defense of Muslim Lands: The First Obligation After Iman, Brothers in Ribatt via StreetDawa.com.

\textsuperscript{296} al-Zawahiri, 2006, "Knights Under the Prophet's Banner (written in 2001) " In His Own Words: Translation and Analysis of the Writings of Dr. Ayman Al Zawahiri, ed. Mansfield: TLG Publications.
The arresting photographs of his attacks, beamed around the world by an unwitting but usefully complicit media, have reached a vast audience of potential followers. His constituency is the immigrant and dispossessed, the internally displaced, second generation migrants, refugees and rural communities which have fled from war and famine to unhappy and overcrowded metropolitan areas.\(^{297}\)

Kepel suggests that the original success of Operation Enduring Freedom for eliminating al-Qaida’s safe haven and territorial base of operation in Afghanistan was a “Pyrrhic victory” in that it simply further pushed the organization into a transnational and virtual form made up of individuals, cells, and groups around the world connected by the technologies and intimacies of globalization without a territorial centre of gravity for state power to attack.\(^{298}\)

Although the modern model of insurgency as described by Mackinlay and others creates a number of significant changes and new challenges, it is important to emphasize that many important related conflicts remain largely “classical” in nature. In examining the transnational and virtual evolution of modern insurgency Mackinlay himself notes that these new forms do not exclude previous ones. He writes:

This means that an insurgency, which thrives in a preindustrial society and exploits its grievances, can coexist with postindustrial forms. It is also possible that several different forms of insurgent violence, arguably representing different evolutionary eras, may be manifested in the same state and in the same town. This is particularly the case in states that have become proxy war zones in the U.S. war on terror.\(^{299}\)

Kilcullen similarly recognizes the same influences creating an international environment with a mix of classical and postmodern opponents which he suggests “may be part of what gives today’s ‘hybrid wars’ much of their savagery and complexity.”\(^{300}\)

However, while Mackinlay gives considerable emphasis in his recent writing to discussing the characteristics of and threat from a transnational, post-Maoist, and virtual model of contemporary insurgency, Kilcullen argues that most of those involved in the various related conflicts around the world remain local in their focus and thus those insurgencies still share important aspects of the classical model. He repeatedly and convincingly emphasizes this point based upon both his academic study as well as direct

\(^{297}\) Mackinlay, "Tackling bin Laden: Lessons from History."
\(^{299}\) Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, "Rethinking Counterinsurgency," 7-8.
\(^{300}\) Kilcullen, *The accidental guerilla*, xiv-xv.
experience working with U.S. and Coalition efforts in examining the principle insurgent conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan as well as other modern conflicts in Indonesia, southern Thailand, and Pakistan all with respect to the influence and interaction with the global Islamist insurgency represented by al-Qaida. Kilcullen argues that transnationally focused Islamist insurgents, although strategically important and the cause of our involvement in several conflicts, are “a small, elusive minority” across the various cases he examines. Even in those conflicts where Western forces are directly intervening because of al-Qaida and the war on terror he concludes that most of the local fighters involved are “accidental guerrillas” only “fighting us because we are in his space, not because he wishes to invade ours.” Roy further emphasizes that most of the Islamists movements, despite their transnational rhetoric, continue to follow an evolutionary pattern of returning to a local and national focus:

Despite their claim to be supranational, most Islamist movements have been shaped by national particularities. Sooner or later they tend to express national interests, even under the pretext of Islamist ideology. He explains how the combination of the substantive grievances they rally around and realities of responding to territorially embedded populations ultimately reinforces this local state focus, often separating them from the larger movement, and that this is especially true for those Islamist movements who actually do gain some level of power. Throughout this thesis I will emphasize how most of the insurgencies across.

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301 Ibid. For example, Kilcullen quotes an Afghan provincial governor as explaining, “Ninety percent of the people you call ‘Taliban’ are actually tribals. They’re fighting for loyalty or Pashtun honor, and to profit their tribe.” Kilcullen, The accidental guerilla, 39. Similarly he argues that even amongst al-Qaida’s affiliate in Iraq during the height of the fighting there the group’s foot-soldiers were 95% Iraqi and only interested in fighting the Coalition because they saw it as an occupying force threatening their local interests. Kilcullen, 2007b, "Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt," Small Wars Journal (August 29), _http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/08/anatomy-of-a-tribal-revolt/_.

302 Kilcullen, The accidental guerilla, xiv, 263.

303 Roy, Globalized Islam, 62.

304 Ibid., 62-5. In developing this argument Roy highlights the evolution of groups such as the PLO, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian territories, various Shia groups in Iraq, as well as the strong nationalist turn taken in Iran after the 1979 revolution. Although Iran is frequently portrayed as a “revolutionary power” intent on spreading a Shia Khomeinist version of the transnational Islamist threat through violent means (see Phares cited elsewhere), Roy makes a strong case listing several empirical examples that the pressures of having gained national power largely curbed such impulses and has led Iran to behave in tradional nationalist fashion (further noting that nationalist politics
the Muslim world which both Mackinlay and Kilcullen highlight as well as the related and often larger Islamist movements remain focused on local grievances and do not necessarily share al-Qaida’s transnational aims or strategic approach. As discussed in the next section, contemporary counterinsurgency strategy should not only incorporate classic precepts where they apply to local conflicts (informed by contemporary developments), but should as a first order strategic concern seek to disaggregate local actors and populations from the transnational threat wherever possible.

**Prescriptions for Counterterrorism in Response to a Global Insurgency**

Building upon studies of classic and modern insurgencies, and informed by the study of social movements, the final section of this chapter examines four strategic precepts for how to confront the transnational threat of contemporary insurgencies, concluding that: despite the involvement of geographically disparate vital populations the overall strategy should remain population-centric; given the far greater complexity for achieving unity of effort and message control, counterinsurgents should emphasize unity of understanding; recognizing that the greater transnational danger comes from the aggregation of different conflicts and groups, disaggregation should be a guiding principle; and, that counterinsurgents should learn to embrace the propaganda of the deed, and address the grievances and aspirations as well as engage the framing processes related to the potential mobilization of populations to provide or deny support to an insurgency. Underlying these prescriptions is recognition that many of the conflicts around the world remain to a significant degree locally focused and largely classical in nature, although often benefiting from the virtual connections to multiple populations as well as to transnational movements and groups active in other conflicts. At the same time, it is important to emphasize the uniquely dangerous role that transnational insurgents such as al-Qaida may play in the development of local

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conflicts, in the mobilization of new insurgencies, and in the threat posed by mass casualty terrorist attacks carried out in regions near and far from local battles.

The first and perhaps most important lesson discussed in this section is that emphasizing population-centric approaches remains the best strategy for contemporary counterinsurgencies. The changes resulting from virtual and transnational aspects of modern conflicts may complicate the challenge for counterinsurgents in general, but also reinforces the comparative disadvantages of predominantly enemy-centric strategies. For example, given that multiple populations in disparate regions can provide support from a distance as well as sanctuary in areas that are outside of a state’s control, contemporary insurgents will be more resilient and much more difficult to target with coercive approaches alone, and therefore able to leverage the underlying grievances an enemy-centric strategy leaves unaddressed longer to mobilize greater support from many populations. Focusing on an enemy-centric strategy largely concedes the local and transnational framing contest to the insurgents and aligned movement actors enabling them to portray local and international counterinsurgents as responsible for the continued festering of their problems and therefore enemies of the larger transnational population with the further potential result of encouraging the dangerous aggregation of disparate conflicts. For these reasons and others, researchers examining transnational insurgencies emphasize that the vital ground or centre of gravity for contemporary conflicts remains over key populations whose support can potentially go or be denied to either the insurgent or counterinsurgent forces. Mackinlay concludes that, “In a global insurgency, the population is still the vital ground, but there is not just one population – there are many.” Kilcullen similarly recommends that as in “other counterinsurgencies, the civilized world’s confrontation with takfiri extremism is therefore population-centric.” Recognizing that the vital populations are likely to differ in more than just geography, contemporary counterinsurgents should seek to


CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
understand the different roles played as well as how best to engage with each community. For example, Chapter Four will discuss the different significant roles that diaspora communities can play and how winning the support of those populations may be particularly important to international efforts for recruiting credible intermediaries across the identity group divisions of religion and ethnicity.

Amongst the repeated essential lessons of classic studies is the need for unity of effort in order to integrate security, political, economic, and informational initiatives at different levels of implementation carried out by military and non-military government actors within the local country where an insurgency is being fought. Counterinsurgent theorists have long recognized the difficulty of doing this even for an outside government who has a discretely identifiable collection of military units and non-military agencies working to support the local state. The global scope of conflict for contemporary transnational cases dramatically increasing the involvement of otherwise disparate agencies and actors of a government across different areas of the world where unity of a command focused only on the counterinsurgency becomes impractical without considering the added difficulties of working in coalitions and involving non-

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308 For example, the new U.S. Guide to Counterinsurgency identifies key populations playing different roles in the of the locally affected nation, neighbouring countries, coalition nations, domestically in the U.S., as well as diaspora communities as a unique subset in many regions. "U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide," 19-20.

309 Mackinlay argues that recognizing the need for unity of effort was the “second essential” lesson the British took from their experience in classic insurgencies. Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, "Rethinking Counterinsurgency," 11-2. Echoing Chapter Two of FM3-24 on Unity of Effort, General Patreaus emphasizes the importance for Afghanistan: “It is also essential that we achieve unity of effort, that we coordinate and synchronize the actions of all ISAF and Afghan forces – and those of our Pakistani partners across the border – and that we do the same with the actions of our embassy and international partners, our Afghan counterparts, local governmental leaders, and international and non-governmental organizations. Working to a common purpose is essential in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations.” Patreaus, 2009, "Commander's Remarks at 45th Munich Security Conference," The Future of the Alliance and the Mission in Afghanistan (February 8), United States Central Command, http://www.centcom.mil/en/from-the-commander/commanders-remarks-at-45th-munich-security-conference.html. United States Army, The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 53-77. See also: Crane, Horvath and Nagl, "Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency," 50. Galula, Counter-Insurgency Warfare, 63. Kilcullen, "Counter-Insurgency Redux.". Ladwig, "Managing Counterinsurgency.". Smith, "General Templer and Counter-Insurgency in Malaya," 65, 74-5. Stone, Wars of the Cold War. 132-3
Therefore I suggest that the second major strategic prescription for modern transnational counterinsurgency should be to emphasize unity of understanding, where priority is given to establishing a shared conception of the threat informed by the fundamental importance of pursuing a population-centric strategy and in broad terms what that proactively requires doing and precautionarily advises avoiding. Establishing unity of understanding begins with constructing and consistently advancing a strategic narrative for the conflict, that accurately captures the essential challenges in order to establish the best framework for understanding what is required, and logically as well as naturally encourages actions and messages consistent with population-centric goals aimed at engaging the dynamics mobilizing vital populations. Improving the unity of understanding is important at all levels of government, from those most publicly visible as recognized leaders to the base of military and non-military personnel who ultimately implement many policies and interact on a personal scale with individual members of vital populations, as well as across governments and non-governmental actors. Unity of understanding is the best option available to contemporary counterinsurgents for engaging the much more complicated communications environment where control over a limited national media is no longer meaningful and where every action, from the lowest tactical levels of military engagement to seemingly unrelated domestic comments of national leaders, is now in Kilcullen’s words 100% political as the pervasive presence of technologies enabling global virtual communications magnifies the importance of perception.

Kilcullen explains: “This can be achieved in one country: Malaya, Northern Ireland and other campaigns demonstrated this. But to achieve this level of integration requires excellent governmental stability, unity and restraint. Moreover, it demands extremely close coordination and integration between and within police, intelligence, military, development, aid, information and administrative agencies… At the global level, no world government exists with the power to integrate the actions of independent nations to the degree required by traditional counterinsurgency theory; nor can regional counterinsurgency programs be closely enough aligned to block all insurgent maneuver. This is particularly true when the enemy – as in this case – is not a Maoist-style mass rural movement, but an insurgency operating in small cells and teams with low ‘tactical signature’ in the urban clutter of globalized societies.” Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency," 607.

Kilcullen, "Counter-Insurgency Redux.". Kilcullen, The accidental guerilla, 14.
Encouraging a common diagnosis of the problem across actors, including those who are not under the command of a counterinsurgent, is also the best option available in the contemporary context for approaching the ideals of unity of command or unity of effort prescribed by classic recommendations. Finally, it is important that the unity of understanding advanced creates accurate and realizable expectations for the full range of vital populations involved in the conflict from the local population closest to the insurgency (in order to avoid backlashes from unmet rising expectations) to the domestic population of an international counterinsurgent (to build political support for the type of long term population-centric initiatives required).

The third guiding principle contemporary counterinsurgents should adopt is seeking opportunities to disaggregate the global insurgency where possible, while avoiding actions, policies, and rhetoric that counterproductively encourage aggregation. This includes separating transnational militant movements from both disparate global populations as well as various local insurgencies. Kilcullen explains the importance:

As described, dozens of local movements, grievances and issues have been aggregated (through regional and global players) into a global jihad against the West. These regional and global players prey upon, link and exploit local actors and issues that are pre-existing. What makes the jihad so dangerous is its global nature. Without the ‘series of nested interactions’ … or the ability to aggregate dozens of conflicts into a broad movement, the global jihad ceases to exist. It becomes simply a series of disparate local conflicts that can be addressed at the regional or national level without interference from global enemies such as Al Qaeda.

Encouraging aggregation plays to al-Qa’ida’s operational strategy of mobilizing and connecting Islamist groups:

Al Qa’ida acts as “inciter-in-chief,” or as Ayman al-Zawahiri describes it, al talia al ummah, the “vanguard of the ummah,” a revolutionary party that seeks to build mass consciousness through provocation and spectacular acts of “resistance” to the existing world order. It works through regional affiliates (AQ in Iraq, AQ in the Arabian Peninsula, AQ-Maghreb, Groupe salafiste pour la predication et le combat, Jema’ah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf Group, etc.) to co-opt and aggregate the effects of multiple, diverse local actors in more than 60

countries. It is this ability to aggregate and point all the players in one direction (via propaganda, technical assistance, broad strategic direction, and occasional direct guidance) that gives AQ its strength.\textsuperscript{317}

Tatham similarly explains:

Long-term speaker of the US Congress Tip O'Neil once famously declared that all politics is local; this is not a message that suits AQ. For them, all politics must be global. If we are to think again about winning the hearts and minds battle, a useful start point would be a concerted effort to publicly deconstruct this monolith of global jihad.\textsuperscript{318}

He concludes that instead of playing into al-Qaida’s narrative and framing, we should be developing more nuanced and localized messages tailored to what addresses local contentions mobilization. While generally endorsing the wisdom of a disaggregation strategy, Douglas raises the concern that the “chief weakness” of this approach “may lie in its muted effect on domestic and allied audiences” because they may see the multitude of little conflicts to be far less dangerous and may forgot or be unaware of the potential aggregated threat. Counterinsurgents may therefore need to carefully balance what Douglas terms “selective identification” of successes and important fronts in the transnational counterinsurgency in order to ensure that key populations remain informed.\textsuperscript{319} However, the approach to these should start from an emphasis on disaggregation, highlighting understanding of the local nature of the conflict and working to isolate the transnational insurgents, instead of publicly portraying and framing strategy around the mobilizing spin that these local conflicts are simply another battlefield of the transnational fight.

Following a population-centric strategy, built upon the study of classical cases as well as of social movements, global counterinsurgents should continue to recognize the need for and value of addressing the legitimate mobilizing dynamics that potentially lead disparate populations to support militant actors. As classic counterinsurgents recognized these problems often are based in improving governance, security, and development or as a social movement theory approach explains involves addressing

\textsuperscript{317} Kilcullen, \textit{The accidental guerilla}, 14. Zawahiri has repeatedly described al-Qaida and the global jihadist movement as the “vanguard” of the Islamic Ummah. For example: al-Zawahiri, "His Own Words.". al-Zawahiri, 2007c, "Road to Jerusalem Passes through Cairo (written in 1995)," \textit{Jihadist Websites – OSC Summary} (August 18), Open Source Center.

\textsuperscript{318} Tatham, "Hearts and Minds," 334.

\textsuperscript{319} Douglas, "Waging the Inchoate War," 416.
grievances and aspirations while being aware of the role played by political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes. Mackinlay argues that, “a persistent insurgency that arouses popular sympathy, measured in millions of people, must have a basis of genuine grievance” and therefore to successfully disengage “the sympathetic support of a larger population” requires addressing those problems.\textsuperscript{320} He emphasizes that this must be “more than lip service to “winning the hearts and minds” of a population, and that “the West must shed its desire for quick military victories and instead engage in the larger, underlying political and social dimensions of this global phenomenon.”\textsuperscript{321} Kilcullen similarly explains:

Fundamental to counterinsurgency is an ability to undercut the insurgents’ appeal by discrediting their propaganda, exposing their motives, and convincing at-risk populations to voluntarily reject insurgent cooption and intimidation. In the context of a globalized insurgency this translates into diplomatic initiatives that undercut AQ credibility on issues like Israel/Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Iraq. This cannot simply be “spin”: it demands genuine attempts to address legitimate grievances. This in turn implies political initiatives to construct credible and legitimate alternatives for the world’s Muslim population, instead of the current limited choice between support for AQ or “collaboration with the West.”\textsuperscript{322}

Giving strategic priority to and following through on real actions to address grievances has both an ultimate long-term goal of removing the source of contention as well as a near-term performative purpose of engaging in framing competitions driving mobilization. Betz builds upon this to conclude that to win the war of ideas global counterinsurgents must proactively embrace a concept traditionally associated with terrorists, that is the “propaganda of the deed.” On the precautionary side he warns that the failure to recognize that “deeds speak louder than words,” especially “in a world in which digital images emerge from the theatre of operations and propagate worldwide in a matter of minutes” leaves counterinsurgents “open to propagandic ‘own goals’ of

\textsuperscript{320} Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, "Rethinking Counterinsurgency," 52. He notes: “As previously explained, the vital ground for both sides comprises an array of concerned populations in the operational space. These populations are the strategic centres of gravity for both the insurgents and the opposing forces. If their support, sympathy, and “do-something” activism is terminated, the energy that sustains a campaign is also extinguished. However, the concerned populations are dispersed.” Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, "Rethinking Counterinsurgency," 21.

\textsuperscript{321} Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, "Rethinking Counterinsurgency," x.

\textsuperscript{322} Kilcullen, The accidental guerilla, 15.
huge significance such as Abu Ghraib.”

By recognizing at a strategic level the actions it takes and how those are perceived are fundamentally important to winning hearts and minds will enable international counterinsurgents to better engage the contemporary challenges of a multitude of local conflicts potentially connected by multilayered virtual transnational networks.

Mackinlay suggests that failing to appreciate the necessary paradigm shift in counterinsurgency and continuing to be guided only by classical objectives risks “short-term, local victories” that may do “nothing to quell the overarching insurgency” allowing the threat to continue to grow globally in strength and intensity. At the same time, Kilcullen emphasizes the risk of unintentionally aggregating local groups into a greater global threat by treating them simultaneously as part of the same undifferentiated enemy as well as failing to recognize that the large majority of insurgents involved in various modern conflicts are locally focused. Learning to address the tension between Mackinlay’s and Kilcullen’s warnings, especially considering that in significant details they are in agreement, may be the key challenge of modern counterinsurgency. There is a significant danger that in seeing transnational and virtual insurgency as an entirely new phenomenon that hard earned lessons will be forgotten and old mistakes remade, which includes a vital of warning of the Maoist era of being too quick to see every local fight and opponent as mobilized by and entirely sharing the ideology and aims of the new global enemy. However, there is also a danger of ignoring new dynamics and continuing to pursue strategies that make that a self-fulfilling prophecy by allowing and encouraging such connections to strengthen.

Betz, "The Virtual Dimension of Contemporary Insurgency and Counterinsurgency," 518. Exemplifying this perspective in action, General Stanley McChrystal recommends for Afghanistan: “Many describe the conflict in Afghanistan as a war of ideas, which I believe to be true. However, this is a ‘deeds-based’ information environment where perceptions derive from actions, such as how we interact with the population and how quickly things improve. The key to changing perceptions lies in changing the underlying truths. We must never confuse the situation as it stands with the one we desire, lest we risk our credibility.” McChrystal, 2009a, "COMISAF initial Assessment (Unclassified)," The Washington Post, September 21, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/21/AR2009092100110.html.

Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, "Rethinking Counterinsurgency," x.

Conclusion

To examine why the United States has performed poorly in the race for Muslim hearts and minds this thesis draws broadly from three different research traditions. A review of the counterinsurgency literature, with a specific focus on the lessons learned from American and British experiences of the past century, explains the importance of popular attitudes to counterterrorism efforts as well as what a hearts and minds strategy is likely to entail. Terrorism research clarifies the focus on a subset of political violence related to and conceptually overlapping the study of insurgencies with a history of theoretical development including psychological, root cause, and rational actor approaches. An overview to how governments have responded to terrorism introduces the range of strategies and tactics important to examining U.S. efforts in the war on terror. Finally, adopting a perspective informed by the study of social movements offers a theoretical framework with a number of orienting tools especially useful to examining the population level dynamics driving attitudes and actions in contentious conflicts.
CHAPTER THREE: HEARTS AND MINDS EFFORTS AND CHANGES IN MUSLIM OPINIONS

“Simply put, America’s image in much of the Muslim world remains abysmal.”
– Kohut and Wike, May 2008

The attacks of September 11, 2001, which killed 2,998 people, fundamentally changed American attitudes about the threat posed by terrorism and triggered a war on terror that has defined subsequent American foreign policy. While President Bush wisely emphasized from the start that this would not be a war on Islam, in practical terms, with the exception of the decision to invade Iraq, the war on terror has focused almost exclusively on a range of groups linked by their espousal of a particular set of shared or similar Islamic beliefs. Many have argued that a principal component of the war on terror must be a strategy of winning hearts and minds because of the important role-played by larger Muslim populations in this conflict. As U.S. counterterrorism policy evolved over the seven years after the 9/11 attacks a wide range of specific actions and initiatives were justified and allegedly guided by this goal of winning popular support. Despite these efforts a steady stream of polls and a wide range of expert studies suggest that the United States continued to lose the race for hearts and minds as anti-American attitudes became more widespread and deeply held, especially in the Muslim world. This chapter establishes the background for the analysis of this

1 “Andrew Kohut is the president of the Pew Research Center, the director of the Pew Research Center for the People & The Press, and the director of the Pew Global Attitudes Project. Richard Wike is the associate director of the Pew Global Attitudes Project.” This article introduced their 2007 results: “The 2007 Pew Global Attitudes survey was conducted among representative national samples in all countries except Bolivia, Brazil, China, India, Ivory Coast, Pakistan, South Africa and Venezuela, where the samples were disproportionately or exclusively urban. For more details see www.pewglobal.org.” Kohut and Wike, 2008, ”All the World’s a Stage,” National Interest Online, May 6, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=17502.
thesis by looking at the hearts and minds efforts the United States engaged in during the seven years after 2001, how those were prioritized and pursued compared to other counterterrorism efforts, and how the conventional wisdom that the U.S. is losing the race for hearts and minds was supported by public opinion polls and expert evaluations.

**Hearts and Minds Efforts in the War on Terror**

On September 20, 2001, before a joint session of congress and speaking to the American people, President Bush declared that to fight the war on terror:

> We will direct every resource at our command – every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war – to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.  

Although rhetorical flourish, this description captures the radical shift in focus of American capabilities towards counterterrorism, on a scale not seen before, following the 9/11 attacks. The war on terror, leveraging the capabilities of the U.S. government and accompanied by a dramatic increase in funding, sought to: defeat terrorists and their organizations; deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists; diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit; and, defend U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad. These initiatives have involved: the full weight of executive influence and authority; a wide range of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic efforts; intensive use of overt and covert intelligence activities; the prioritized focus of domestic and international law enforcement and financial regulation; and, extensive military participation in a wide range of local joint operations in addition to two full-scale wars.

Policy leaders, thinkers, and commentators quickly identified that a primary element of the war on terror should be a focus on winning popular support amongst Muslim populations, whether they called it a battle for hearts and minds, a war of ideas, or the ideological centre of gravity for the new long war. The importance of this effort was repeatedly emphasized by administration figures from Bush to Rumsfeld, as well as

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3 Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People."
4 "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism."
by their critics. This “race for Muslim hearts and minds” has also been a repeated concern emphasized by Usama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and many others supportive of their cause. This section introduces many of the major initiatives


6 Examples include: Zawahiri explaining that “In the absence of this popular support the jihadist movement would be crushed in the shadows” in his *Knights Under the Prophet's Banner* as quoted in Gerges, 2006b, *Journey of the Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy*, New York, Harcourt, Inc., 261. A letter from an al-Qaida senior commander
undertaken by the Bush administration through Presidential and Department of State public diplomacy efforts, targeted U.S. foreign aid programs, actions of the Department of Defense, and covert operations.

**Public Diplomacy**

As opposed to traditional diplomacy, consisting principally of interactions between governments in order to advance strategic goals, the focus on hearts and minds has most commonly led to calls for better public diplomacy, engaging “targeted sectors of foreign publics in order to develop support for those same strategic goals.”

The official statements and policy framing of President Bush, as the individual most recognized as representing the United States government internationally, plays perhaps the most important role in public diplomacy. Despite a few initial missteps, such as referring to America’s response as a crusade in the first week after 9/11, President Bush quickly took several actions to emphasize that the war on terror was focused only on violent extremists and not a clash with Islam in general.

This included prominently appearing with American Muslim leaders, emphasizing respect for and commonalities with people of Muslim nations, and repeatedly portraying Islamist terrorists as fringe elements who perverted a good and peaceful religion. President Bush also frequently referenced and gave rhetorical emphasis to his Freedom Agenda, promoting democracy named Atiyah to the leader of al-Qaida in Iraq Abu Musab al-Zarqawi: "Letter Exposes New Leader in Al-Qa'ida High Command," 2006: Combating Terrorism Center, September 25, http://ctc.usma.edu/harmony/pdf/CTC-AtiyahLetter.pdf. The previously cited Zawahiri letter to Zarqawi: al-Zawahiri, "Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi."


and individual rights as a means to counter terrorism, create a better future for people around the world, and improve American credibility internationally.\textsuperscript{10}

The Department of State is the federal agency most closely associated with public diplomacy, with efforts including:

[C]risis management and daily news operations designed to explain U.S. foreign policy positions and actions; strategic information programs designed to more broadly engage, inform, and influence target audiences; and long-term activities, such as exchanges, to promote relationship building and mutual understanding.\textsuperscript{11}

During the Cold War many of the efforts associated with informational aspects of public diplomacy were carried out by the United States Information Agency. When that was consolidated into the State Department during the 1990s, due to the demands of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Chair Jesse Helms who had long opposed the agency, President Clinton created a new position of Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.\textsuperscript{12}

Shortly after the September 11\textsuperscript{th} attacks, President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell underscored the importance of the war of ideas for the new war on terror by appointing Charlotte Beers to this post, the only person to have headed two of the top ten worldwide advertising agencies.\textsuperscript{13} When Beers took over she found that the

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\textsuperscript{12} Evelyn Lieberman was appointed by President Bill Clinton on October 1, 1999 and served until January 19, 2001. President Clinton created the post after the United States Information Agency was reorganized to be part of the Department of State after having long been opposed by the powerful Foreign Relations Chair, Senator Jesse Helms. \\
\textsuperscript{13} Beers had frequently been called “the most powerful woman in advertising.” Elliott, 1999, "THE MEDIA BUSINESS: ADVERTISING; A shift in power for J. Walter Thompson as Madison Avenue's Steel Magnolia climbs aboard," The New York Times, March 9, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B05E4D8103FF93AA35750C0A96F9
\end{flushleft}
remaining USIA staffers “were a demoralized lot, spread across a bureaucracy that cared little about their work” and with an annual budget equal to what the Pentagon spent in a day.\textsuperscript{14} Her tenure at State “included speeches by diplomats and prominent American Muslims to international audiences, a color magazine on Muslim life in America, a series of newspaper ads,” and five television ads showcasing the lives of Muslim Americans that ran over five weeks in a handful of Muslim countries.\textsuperscript{15} She resigned from the post after 18 months as U.S. troops headed into Iraq, which was dominating attention globally and many believed overwhelming the efforts of her limited resources.\textsuperscript{16}

Nine months later, President Bush appointed former Moroccan Ambassador Margaret D. Tutwiler as Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy. Many believed Beers’ difficulties originated from a lack of experience with the institutions and traditions of the Department of State and federal bureaucracy, and hoped that Tutwiler’s resume would lead to more success. Unfortunately at the end of June 2004, just over six months after being appointed, she had also resigned.

Bush did not appoint a replacement to the post until September 2005 when he asked Karen Hughes to return from retirement in Texas. Many viewed the appointment of Hughes as an indication that public diplomacy efforts would finally have significant support from the top, given that she was a long time close associate and advisor to the President since his days as Governor of Texas and had managed the White House’s communication efforts in the first year of the war on terror. This proved at least partially true as she oversaw a near doubling of the public diplomacy budget, pushed through institutional reforms, and was reportedly responsible for changes in Presidential rhetoric

thought to better reach out to Muslim audiences. Over the next two years, before leaving the post at the end of 2007, Hughes built up instant-response and regional media teams to counter misinformation in the Arab media, hired more Arabic speakers to appear on media reaching Muslim audiences, sent out guest speakers who were (sometimes and somewhat) critical of U.S. policy, promoted cultural and educational exchanges, and travelled extensively.17

In early 2008, Bush nominated James Glassman to replace Hughes. Glassman had formerly chaired the Broadcasting Board of Governors, responsible for American efforts such as Alhurra TV and Radio Sawa. Supporters argued that the combination of his previous experience, including a private sector media and journalism career, made him perhaps the most qualified individual nominated to this post. Critics of American public diplomacy efforts also welcomed his appointment, given his honest assessments that “our enemies are eating our lunch in terms of getting the word out in digital technology” and his defence that to have credibility international broadcasting needed to objectively and independently report the news rather than espouse desired American propaganda messages. However, because of opposition from a Republican senator to this perspective, Glassman was not confirmed until June 2008 leaving only a few months in President Bush’s second term and little time to make a significant impact.18

18 Oklahoma Republican Senator Tom Coburn placed a hold on Glassman’s confirmation for several months arguing that insufficient oversight of Voice of America and other U.S. international broadcasting efforts had allowed the broadcast of anti-
A final major component of American public diplomacy efforts in the war on terror was an expansion, or retargeting, of international broadcasting and media efforts. The launch of new U.S. government Arabic broadcasting services in the form of Radio Sawa and Alhurra TV are the most notable. Radio Sawa first broadcast on March 23, 2002 as an attempt to attract new, younger Arabic speaking audiences by featuring pop music and lighter programming interspersed with frequent short newscasts. Alhurra began broadcasting on February 14, 2004, featuring a news and information format similar to BBC or NPR, with the intention of countering the perceived extremist bias and incitement of al-Jazeera and other Arabic news networks. According to some measures, questioned by critics but trumpeted by the U.S. government’s Broadcasting Board of Governors responsible for these initiatives, both Radio Sawa and Alhurra TV have shown some initial success.

Foreign Aid

While terrorism has been described as “propaganda by the deed,” foreign aid efforts have often been called “diplomacy of deeds.” Since 9/11 the efforts of the U.S. Agency for International Development have frequently been justified, increased, retargeted, and publicized (at home and abroad) as measures to improve perceptions of the United States. As means to change the basic conditions from which terrorism arises, or at least which terrorists often exploit, foreign aid and development programs have been emphasized in national security strategies and explicitly highlighted as part...
of the logic for winning the long war.\textsuperscript{22} President Bush and other official representatives prominently mentioned specific aid programs such as money to combat malaria and AIDS, emergency relief in response to the 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia and the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, providing the most support to the UN World Food Program, contributing to a wide variety of educational initiatives, and funding the bulk of reconstruction aid for both Iraq and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{23}

In the first three years after the September 11 attacks, USAID’s budget nearly tripled with more than half of that destined for the Muslim world.\textsuperscript{24} American backed programs specifically targeting Islamic populations and groups included: training for moderate activists and mosque leaders; aid supporting the restoration of Muslim holy sites and antiquities; an Arabic version of Sesame Street stressing religious tolerance as well as providing lessons on literacy; curriculum reform programs reaching from rural schools to Islamic universities; book translation projects; and, grants to Islamic think tanks supporting research showing the compatibility of Islam with democracy and human rights.\textsuperscript{25}

Given the use of the military in many force oriented elements of the war on terror, which both puts American troops in situations where they need the support of local populations as well as risks incidents generating much of the negative press driving increasing anti-Americanism, the prominent use of military assets in foreign aid has been promoted as especially important. According to Marine General Wallace Gregson, in a conflict such as this we need to “explain what we’re about here and get it into something that is properly categorized and puts us on the side of the angels in various areas.” To do that he suggested “providing doctors, engineers, dentists, veterinarians and other aid to enhance the lives of people living in very troubled parts of the world is ‘often far more important than projecting some type of force.’”\textsuperscript{26} Indicative of the potential benefit of such soft power, studies suggest that after the U.S. response to

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{24} Kaplan, "Hearts, Minds, and Dollars."
  \item \textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{26} Castelli, "Winning Hearts and Minds Stressed."
\end{itemize}
the Southeast Asia tsunami in 2004, which was largely delivered by military forces, local opinion of the U.S. rose significantly.\textsuperscript{27} American army doctors and naval hospital ships, amongst a range of other military humanitarian operations, have continued to visit areas in need across Southeast Asia, Africa, South America, and the Caribbean often conducting tens of thousands of medical procedures per trip.\textsuperscript{28}

Both civilian and military foreign aid has also been aimed at a range of capacity building programs to help targeted states security and military forces develop capabilities and increase professionalism to improve counterterrorism, crime fighting, and overall governmental operations.\textsuperscript{29} While most of these programs, with respect to the war on terror, have a primary goal of increasing direct counterterrorism capabilities, at the same time they are consistent with and defended as part of the underlying counterinsurgency logic of a hearts and minds strategy. Many counterinsurgency theorists and practitioners emphasize that to be successful in the battle for hearts and minds one of the three principal things a state must do is provide security for its citizens, while also warning about the damage done to counterinsurgency goals by harsh, repressive, or corrupt government forces. Programs to improve the capabilities


and professionalism of security forces may be just as important in the long run to winning hearts and minds as initiatives directly aimed at feel good priorities, such as fighting disease or responding to disasters.\textsuperscript{30}

**Military Relations with Civilian Populations**

Edward R. Murrow, appointed by John F. Kennedy to head the United States Information Agency after a career as an educator and journalist, stressed that the critical part of international communication was person to person interactions, or as he famously called it “the last three feet."\textsuperscript{31} In the war on terror this last three feet is often between Americans wearing combat boots and Muslim civilians. In addition to the principal conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan, American forces are playing active roles supporting governments confronting threats of Islamist violence across the Muslim world with notable initiatives including the Phase Zero projects in the Sahel and Sahara as well as the varied efforts of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa and the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines.

Proactively military forces play a central role in support of hearts and minds goals through targeted operations, including information or psychological operations, stability and capacity building programs, and a wide range of humanitarian projects including several mentioned in the previous section on foreign aid.\textsuperscript{32} Information or psychological operations campaigns can directly educate, persuade, and influence local populations. Such efforts may involve air dropped flyers warning of impending military action or as “leave behinds” to explain why forces took action against local insurgents, broadcasting of radio programs to provide news on available services or to counter rumours generating tensions between opposing ethnic groups, or even the development of comic books as was done in Iraq to raise awareness of the increasing effectiveness of


\textsuperscript{32} Andrews and Kirk, "Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance."
Iraqi special forces and in the Philippines to educate about counterterrorism efforts. Stability and capacity building operations, such as the European Command’s Phase Zero programs, seek to prevent conflicts from developing in the first place. These serve a basic counterinsurgency hearts and minds goal of aiding local governments to provide security while providing the opportunity to address the underlying grievances and root causes which contribute to the rise of terrorism and political violence. Similarly American military forces have been involved in hearts and minds guided efforts in the Philippines, primarily targeting the Abu Sayyaf Group by helping the Philippine government build long-term local popular support through civil-affairs, humanitarian aid, and security programs.

Given the very visible presence of American military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, both to local populations and rebroadcast across the Muslim world, the daily interaction of those forces is as important to overall hearts and minds goals as any targeted efforts. Perhaps the single most important post-9/11 endeavour with respect to

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this has been the American military’s relearning of and reorientation towards a doctrine
grounded in population-centric counterinsurgency traditions. The *U.S. Army and
Marine Corp Counterinsurgency Field Manual* published in 2007 and written by
General David Petraeus, retired Colonel Conrad Crane, and a collection of younger
military and outside specialists drawing on an especially impressive (for a military
manual) historical and academic study of counterinsurgency is representative of this
broad project.\(^{36}\)

**Covert Operations**

A necessary blind spot for this thesis is the role of covert operations given the
desire to analyze recent activity without waiting a quarter of a century or longer for
projects to be slowly declassified. With the history of previous programs that have come
to light, and the occasional mention or exposure of current covert initiatives, it is fair to
assume that many grey and black operations continue. One specific overarching
program that was officially disclosed to the press, although not in operational detail, is
allegedly named “Muslim World Outreach” intending to influence the debate within
Islam itself. A frequent justification for keeping such programs covert is the perception
of American backing as “radioactive” (as one anonymous U.S. official put it) in the
Islamic world for many moderate Muslims.\(^{37}\)

While this thesis does not attempt to analyze classified programs supporting
hearts and minds goals, I believe the general problems discussed in the following

\(^{36}\) Alderson, "US COIN Doctrine and Practice: An Ally's Perspective.". Betz,
Revised," *The New York Times*, February 8,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/08/washington/08strategy.html. Hoffman, "Neo-
Counterinsurgency," *Foreign Affairs*, November/December,
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/previews/2914/20071101fareviewessay86612a/colin-h-
kahl/coin-of-the-realm.html. The 288 page volume features a number of memorable
lessons underscoring the change in focus the new approach demands of the military,
including for example: “sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is,”
“some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot,” “lose moral legitimacy,
lose the war,” “provoking combat usually plays into the enemy’s hand,” and “an
operation that kills five insurgents is counterproductive if the collateral damage leads to
the recruitment of fifty more.” United States Army, *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps
Counterinsurgency Field Manual.*

\(^{37}\) Kaplan, "Hearts, Minds, and Dollars."
chapters are as likely to manifest in covert operations given that they are widespread throughout other efforts. The same biases of the current construction of terrorism and misconceptions about agency are especially likely to similarly hamper these programs. Covert operations may be even more likely to suffer these problems given the historically demonstrated dangers of lack of diverse oversight as well as backlashes when they are prematurely exposed. However, it is possible that allowing knowledgeable experts who can learn from experience to act without politically charged and short-attention span public scrutiny might avoid some of the problems discussed throughout this thesis.

Assessing Hearts and Minds in Context of the Larger War on Terror

Although a wide range of government officials have talked about the importance of population-centric goals, and a diverse range of initiatives have been launched or justified by these as represented in the above discussion, viewed from the larger context of overall counterterrorism efforts in the war on terror the U.S. government has given inadequate emphasis to hearts and minds.\(^\text{38}\) Ambassador Dell Daily, admired in the military as a Lieutenant General who commanded elite special forces operations to capture and kill terrorists, argues that “our most important task in the war on terrorism is not the ‘destructive’ task of eradicating enemy networks, but the ‘constructive’ task of building legitimacy, good governance, trust, rule of law and tolerance.”\(^\text{39}\) Based on 36 years of active duty in the U.S. Army before becoming the Department of State’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism under Condoleezza Rice, he suggested that “the

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\(^{38}\) For example, in 2004 Shibley Telhami observed: “It’s worse than failing. Failing means you tried and didn’t get better. But at this point, three years after September 11, you can say there wasn’t even much of an attempt, and today Arab and Muslim attitudes toward the U.S. and the degree of distrust in the U.S. are far worse than they were three years ago. Bin Laden is winning by default.” Wright, 2004, "U.S. Struggles to Win Hearts, Minds in the Muslim World: Diplomacy Efforts Lack Funds, Follow-Through," The Washington Post, August 20, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A17134-2004Aug19.html.

kinetic aspect of our counterterrorism policy” should represent only about 15% of the overall effort while 85% should be dedicated to regional diplomacy, law enforcement, and other efforts focused on addressing the grievances and conditions terrorists exploit.\textsuperscript{40} Unfortunately, comparing budgeting in the war on terror and examining the lack of follow through, consistency, or priority given to hearts and minds efforts suggests that too much of the official rhetoric during the years after 9/11 was political lip service meant for domestic audiences.

Despite claims that long-term American strategy is dependent on changing “the conditions that give rise to extremism and terror” and rhetoric about the importance of hearts and minds, a budgetary analysis drastically demonstrates different priorities for U.S. counterterrorism efforts:

In recent years, the Pentagon has received a larger share of the counter-terrorism budget, whereas “indirect action” programs to win the campaign through diplomacy and other nonmilitary means have struggled for funding and attention, according to a review of budget documents and interviews with dozens of current and former U.S. officials. Nonmilitary counter-terrorism programs have budgets that are measured in millions instead of billions, and in many cases are seeing their funding remain flat or drop. Even within the Pentagon, many “soft power” programs, which don’t include direct military action, appear to be getting squeezed out as more money goes to support combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and special forces missions elsewhere. Some top counter-terrorism officials, seeing their noncombat programs languishing, are leaving the government, including a top Pentagon official. Three at the State Department who ran the highly regarded Regional Strategic Initiative are also leaving.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{40} Dailey, "An 'All Elements of Power' Strategy for Combating Terrorism: Remarks at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy."
As an appointed State Department official, Ambassador Dailey’s public comments implied that the government’s efforts were meeting his 15% / 85% split for kinetic versus non-kinetic counterterrorism efforts. However, the State Department’s flagship Regional Strategic Initiative, which Dailey spotlighted in the speech quoted above, and similar programs at the same time suffered from severe budgetary neglect:

The State Department requested $157.5 million for its major counter-terrorism programs this year but received $20 million less than that from Congress... The funding squeeze has meant that the State Department’s Regional Strategic Initiative, a key counter-terrorism program, nearly ceased operations last year for lack of funding just as it was getting off the ground. Its annual budget is about $1 million – roughly what the Pentagon spends on counterterrorism in Iraq every five minutes. “The fact that they can only get $1 million is criminal. It is unconscionable,” said Robert Richer, who retired as associate deputy CIA director for operations in 2005. “Most of the war on terrorism should have nothing to do with guys with guns. But we have walked away from the hearts- and-minds campaign.”

Noting that total U.S. government spending on public diplomacy from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2006 only increased from $1.14 billion to $1.36 billion, Stephen Van Evera argued that “U.S. public diplomacy is failing because the Bush team has put only scant resources into it.” Critics alternatively dramatized the comparison by noting that the annual public diplomacy budget was equal to or less than either what the United States was spending weekly in Iraq or to what the Pentagon spent in a day. Even

43 Van Evera, 2006, "The Bush Administration Is Weak on Terror," AlterNet (November 3), http://www.alternet.org/story/43537/. A State Department official “familiar with public diplomacy efforts who spoke on the condition of anonymity” similarly observed “if this is so important, where’s the money?” Wright, "U.S. Struggles to Win Hearts, Minds in the Muslim World."
44 Kaplan, "Hearts, Minds, and Dollars." Similarly, at a time when the State Department was not allocated money to fill over 1,000 vacancies the U.S. has more musicians in military bands than diplomats. Kristof, 2008a, "Make Diplomacy, Not War," The New York Times, August 9,
focusing on Iraq and Afghanistan, which were the most expensive as well as the top priorities for the Bush administration in the war on terror, demonstrates the same prioritization. According to James Kunder, the acting deputy of USAID and a former marine, in “Iraq and Afghanistan the civilian agencies have received 1.4% of the total money,” whereas classical counterinsurgency doctrine suggests 80% should be non-military.45 Outside of Iraq the total increase in budget allocations for foreign aid and diplomatic efforts was less than 1% from 2001 to 2006.46

Although overall spending on hearts and minds efforts increased during the seven years after 9/11, several other limiting factors prevented this from leading to proportional increases in effective effort. Political leaders often emphasized total dollar amount increases, ignoring that inflation and other new costs limited these increases or effectively led to cuts in actual personnel and activity.47 Perhaps the greatest limiting factor post-9/11 has been significant increases in security concerns and costs, which limit what personnel are able to do as well as often led to net decreases in activity.48 The challenges of deploying personnel to combat zones and other hardship posts, as well as the need to develop new language expertise, has similarly constrained overall efforts.

Further demonstrating that hearts and minds goals were not actually a priority for overall war on terror efforts, those initiatives that were funded and launched suffered from a lack of follow through and high level involvement. An in-depth investigation into the overall efforts to win hearts and minds in the Muslim world by U.S. News and


45 Packer, 2006, "Knowing the Enemy: Can Social Scientists Redefine the 'War on Terror'?," The New Yorker, December 18, http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/12/18/061218fa_fact2. Packer continues: “During Vietnam, his agency had fifteen thousand employees; it now has two thousand. After the end of the Cold War, foreign service and aid budgets were sharply cut. ‘Size matters,’ Kunder said, noting that throughout the civilian agencies there are shortages of money and personnel.” On Iraq, see also: Baker, 2006a, "Democracy in Iraq Not a Priority in U.S. Budget," Washington Post, April 5, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/04/AR2006040401626_pf.html.


48 Ibid., 4-5, 30-3.

Examining hearts and minds efforts overall through 2008 leads to three conclusions. First, the rhetoric of politicians and policy leaders about the importance of hearts and minds goals too often was meant more for domestic consumption, with the unfortunate effect of satiating calls for change without corresponding action.\footnote{Kaplan, "Hearts, Minds, and Dollars."} For example, John Brown with over 20 years of foreign service public diplomacy experience argues that Karen Hughes’s rhetoric was often intended for domestic audiences: Brown, 2006, "Willie Horton Redux: Karen Hughes Breaks Her Silence," John H. Brown's Blog (September 15), PRWatch.org, http://www.prwatch.org/node/5176. Similarly, Mark Lynch argues that the “worst part about [Alhurra] was that its existence misled Congress and many Americans into mistakenly thinking that the US was ‘doing something’ on public diplomacy.” Lynch, 2007b, "Wow, is al-Hurra Doing Something Right?", Abu Aardvark (March 14), http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2007/03/wow_is_alhurra_.html.} Second, those efforts that were seriously pursued faced significantly greater challenges than other aspects of the war on terror because of limited resources and the lack of consistent...
high-level political support. And third, while there was a wide range of post-9/11 initiatives consistent with population-centric strategies, the resource and political balance with coercive or hard counterterrorism efforts was reversed from classic counterinsurgency recommendations. The later chapters of this thesis explain not only why those hearts and minds efforts that were pursued were ineffective, but also why too often the overall strategy of winning popular support was not given the degree of effort many argue that it should.

**Indications of Failure: Muslim Attitudes Since 9/11**

Steven Kull, the Director of the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland, testified to Congress in 2007 that:

> [I]n the world as a whole negative views of the United States have increased sharply in recent years…. Clearly the Muslim world is of particular interest as it is a major source of violence against the US. As you have already heard, it is also an area of the world with particularly negative feelings toward the United States.\(^53\)

In November 2007, when Karen Hughes announced that she would be stepping down as President Bush’s third Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Washington Post reported:

> Public opinion polls show that the image of the United States has declined dramatically in the Muslim world, and elsewhere overseas, during Bush’s presidency. The numbers have not improved during Hughes’s two-year stint – and in some cases have gotten worse.\(^54\)

The steady reporting of such polls and studies, coupled with similar conclusions from a stream of academic and policy experts, government appointed panels, and media commentators has led to a conventional wisdom that the United States is losing the race for Muslim hearts and minds. This section takes a closer look at this presumptive judgment by first looking at the general findings of major polling efforts and expert studies, and then examining the more complicated, sometimes good but also often troubling picture that is exposed by the break out of more specific Muslim attitudes towards the United States, militant Islamist goals, and the use of violence.

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\(^{53}\) Kull, "Negative Attitudes Toward the United States in the Muslim World: Do They Matter?.

\(^{54}\) Kessler and Wright, "Hughes to Leave State Dept. After Mixed Results in Outreach Post."
The Presumptive Argument: We are Losing

After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 the question of “why do they hate us” appeared frequently in American conversations and media commentary. The same underlying drive to understand the sources of Islamist terrorism triggered a significant increase in public opinion research focused on global attitudes especially in the Muslim world. Establishing a base-line comparison, research on this question from the 1990s, although limited, generally found predominantly positive views of the United States. As of early 2008, Marwan Kraidy summarized that since 2001 “numerous polls and surveys have underscored that the image of the United States in the Middle East has

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56 While a wide variety of researchers and organizations have contributed to the study of Muslim attitudes, this thesis draws primarily on the work of three academic and polling groups that have done significant in depth and repeated work. As of early 2008, the Pew Global Attitudes Project, part of the Pew Research Center, had conducted more than 150,000 interviews in 54 countries, with a significant focus on Muslim populations. Leading up to the March 2008 publication of Who Speaks for Islam by John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, the Gallup organization had conducted “50,000 hour-long, face-to-face interviews with residents of more than 35 nations that are predominantly Muslim or have substantial Muslim populations … representing the voices of more than 90 percent of the world’s 1.3 billion Muslims, young and old, educated and illiterate, female and male, living in urban and rural settings.” Finally the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) has conducted a series of in-depth studies of public opinion in Muslim populations using polls, focus groups, and interviews.

steadily deteriorated,"58 while at the same time the "Voice of America reported that international approval of the United States is at an all-time low."59

The Pew Global Attitudes Project, which began in June 2001, is one of the largest and most exhaustive research efforts focusing on attitudes towards the United States. When Andrew Kohut, President of Pew Research, testified before the U.S. House of Representatives in March of 2007, Pew had carried out in-depth interviews of about 110,000 people in 50 countries. His testimony highlighted that global opinion of the United States began to slip in December 2002 with the initial efforts of the war on terror, plunged in June 2003 in the wake of the Iraq war, and then became increasingly entrenched in following years. Kohut emphasized that "while anti-Americanism is a global phenomenon, it is clearly strongest in the Muslim world."60

Daniel Drezner, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, wrote in January 2008:

It’s a truism among foreign policy wonks that during the Bush administration America has seen an erosion of its ability to persuade other countries to do what it wants them to do... [A]s poll after poll shows, the attitudes of people in other countries toward the United States have declined precipitously.61

60 U.S. House of Representatives, 2007b, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Testimony of Andrew Kohut, March 14, http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/koh031407.pdf. Illustrating the decline he reported that based on 1999 and 2000 polling the U.S. was viewed favourably by 75% of the population in Indonesia, 52% in Turkey, 83% in the United Kingdom, and 78% in Germany. Despite an initial outpouring of public sympathy following the 9/11 attacks, by March 2007 those numbers had fallen to 30%, 12%, 56%, and 37% respectively.
61 Drezner, 2008, "Projecting Power," Newsweek Web Exclusive, January 15, http://www.newsweek.com/id/94613/output/print. The quotation was shortened above to place the emphasis on the widespread perception of those who study the issue that attitudes have declined. The full quotation from Drezner places the blame for this on the approach of the Bush administration. The excerpted part is: "The unilateralism, the
While one may suspect such criticisms are tainted by partisan political preferences, others have noted a bipartisan consensus, as Krebs wrote “the Bush administration, Republican presidential candidates, and their Democratic counterparts all agree on the problem – the United States is losing the battle of ideas…” Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, for example, has said that the United States is losing the media war to al-Qaida, is “sitting on the sidelines,” and if graded for efforts in the battle of ideas only “deserves a ‘D’ or a ‘D-plus’.” Rumsfeld’s successor, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, has made similar criticisms, while calling for a “dramatic increase” in non-defence spending for U.S. diplomacy, stating:

We are miserable at communicating to the rest of the world what we are about as a society and a culture, about freedom and democracy, about our policies and our goals… It is just plain embarrassing that Al Qaeda is better at communicating its message on the Internet than America.

A long list of government, think tank, and academic panels and reports similarly observed that through the end of 2008 anti-American attitudes increased to unprecedented levels while making a variety of proposals for what should be done. As a final measure of the conventional wisdom a 2008 Gallup poll found:

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63 Rumsfeld, "New Realities in the Media Age."


Americans’ view of the United States’ position in the world has undergone a complete reversal… Since February 2001, American’s dissatisfaction with the country’s position in the world has more than doubled… The percentage of Americans saying the United States rates favorably in the eyes of the world has declined from 75% in February 2001 to 43% today.68

The internal data of the report notes that the trend lines for both self-identified Republicans and Democrats followed the same pattern.

The More Complicated Picture: Both Good and Bad News

Because general measures of popularity and favourability are relatively common in these studies they serve a useful purpose for longitudinal and transnational comparisons. Although one recent quantitative study reports that terrorist attacks correlate with changes in general public approval,69 such generic measures are only a

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69 Krueger and Maleckova, 2009, "Attitudes and Action: Public Opinion and the Occurrence of International Terrorism," Science 325 (4957), September 18. Summarizing their work: “This paper examines the effect of public opinion in one country toward another country on the number of terrorist attacks perpetrated by people or groups from the former country against targets in the latter country. Public opinion was measured by the percentage of people in Middle Eastern and North African countries who disapprove of the leadership of nine world powers. Count models for 143
rough indication of the cluster of attitudes that determine whether specific populations perceive themselves as similarly aggrieved, share long term objectives, agree on the best tactics to address those grievances, are motivated to take collective action, and are willing to support specific actors pursuing those goals. Further, as the counterinsurgency literature emphasizes, the crucial choice is who the population chooses to support, and not necessarily who they like or don’t like. More in-depth survey work conducted by a number of organizations, especially after the 9/11 attacks, provides some insight on these questions. The rest of this section examines the more complicated, sometimes good, but often troubling picture that emerges from these studies for the United States and its efforts to win popular support in the Muslim world.

Most of the top-level polls commonly referenced as showing increasing anti-Americanism in the Muslim world specifically ask about perceptions of the U.S. government. One alternative suggestion is that Muslim anger is really directed against the current global system as a whole and not specifically against the United States. However, in-depth polling in countries across the Middle East and North Africa by Gallup in 2007 found that the United States and United Kingdom were viewed significantly more negatively than Russia, Germany, France, China, and Japan. What positive attitudes were expressed towards those two countries came largely from Israel and Christian segments of Lebanon.70 A study conducted for the BBC World Service by PIPA and GlobeScan interviewing 26,000 people across 25 different countries found that views of U.S. influence had increasingly grown to be mainly negative at the start of 2007 as compared to data from 2005 and 2006. The strongest attitudes expressed in the BBC study were against the U.S. military presence in the Middle East, viewed by majorities in 23 of 25 countries as provoking more conflict than it prevents.71

pairs of countries were used to estimate the effect of public opinion on terrorist incidents, controlling for other relevant variables and origin-country fixed effects. We found a greater incidence of international terrorism when people of one country disapprove of the leadership of another country.”

Analyzing polls specifically asking about attitudes towards the American people as well as the U.S. government shows another disturbing trend. Historically researchers noted that populations in Muslim majority countries tended to report that they “like Americans, but dislike the government.” Polling in recent years, especially following the 2004 U.S. presidential election, has shown what Kohut has called a “qualitatively different” anti-Americanism as negative perceptions are becoming deeper, more entrenched, and increasingly of the American people as well as of the government.\(^72\)

Shibley Telhami, the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, explains another problematic development noting “Americans should also be troubled that most Arabs surveyed now see the United States as one of the greatest threats to them (second only to Israel).”\(^73\) Kull, calling this “the most important dynamic in the Muslim world today,” testified in 2007:

But now there is also a new feeling about the US that has emerged in the wake of 9-11. This is not so much an intensification of negative feelings toward the US as much as a new perception of American intentions. There now seems to be a perception that the US has entered into a war against Islam itself. I think perhaps the most significant finding of our study is that across the four countries, 8 in 10 believe that the US seeks to “weaken and divide the Islamic world.” We do not have trend-line data to demonstrate that this is something new. But in the focus groups this was described as something that has arisen recently from American anger about 9-11. America is perceived as believing that it was attacked by Islam itself and as having declared war on Islam.\(^74\)

In the 2007 PIPA study, most respondents in all four countries where in-depth surveys were conducted (Egypt, Indonesia, Morocco, and Pakistan) agreed that, “America...
pretends to be helpful to Muslim countries, but in fact everything it does is really part of a scheme to take advantage of people in the Middle East and steal their oil.” Both Pew and Gallup surveys have repeatedly found the same results. This perception plays into al-Qaida’s “far enemy” logic, making the arguments of violent Islamists seem more credible to Muslim populations, strengthening a sense of besieged group identity, and serving to justify violent actions against the United States. Dalia Mogahed, Executive Director of The Center for Muslim Studies at The Gallup Organization, writes that framing the current conflict in this manner “energizes the very perception that fuels sympathy” for terrorism and violent radicals.

The one hearts and minds effort conducted by the United States which has repeatedly generated a few signs of positive progress for attitudes within specific Muslim countries has been foreign aid. Most frequently referenced are studies suggesting that the relatively sizeable response to the 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia led to significantly more positive attitudes of the United States in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. Pew’s surveying suggests a similar, albeit smaller effect to the smaller American emergency response to the October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan as well as to American HIV/AIDS funding for projects in sub-Saharan Africa. One of the studies of changes in Indonesian attitudes after U.S. tsunami aid also suggested a drop

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78 "A Global Look at Public Perceptions of Health Problems, Priorities, and Donors: The Kaiser/Pew Global Health Survey.". Dale, "America's Image.". Kohut and Stokes, America Against the World., p28, 31. Rajapakasa and Dundes, "Can Humanitarianism Instill Good Will?". The United States government pledged nearly $1 billion (US) in aid, including significant logistical and delivery support from the American military. Coupled with private donations, Americans pledged over $2.8 billion. In comparison, the Saudi government initially pledged only $10 million, which was increased to $30 million after an international media outcry and coupled with another nearly $70 million in private donations.
in support for Usama bin Ladin occurring at the same time.\textsuperscript{80} Showing promise for future significant humanitarian efforts, surveys suggest that effective “foreign aid resonates” with local populations,\textsuperscript{81} and that a common criticism in global polling is a perception the United States is “doing too little to help solve the world’s problems.”\textsuperscript{82}

Despite the positive indications of these studies, Andrew Kohut warns:

> Of course, the impact of this humanitarian assistance should not be overstated – most of the same misgivings about America seen throughout the Muslim world can be found in Indonesia and Pakistan, and solid majorities in both countries continue to have a negative impression of the U.S.\textsuperscript{83}

He argues that the only way for America’s image to improve is from similar reactions to major American policy changes.

Examining polling of Muslim attitudes towards Islamist framing, goals, and tactics shows a similar complicated picture of potential good and bad news for U.S. efforts. Polling since 9/11 suggests Islamists broadly have been successful as majorities across the Muslim world are more likely to identify themselves as Muslims first, share common perceptions of grievances, and would like to see Islam play a larger role in government. With respect to specific violent Islamists groups and leaders, significant numbers of Muslims report admiration for al-Qaida and Usama bin Ladin for “standing up” to the United States, but neither fully approve of al-Qaida’s goals nor respond that they wish to live under a regime following al-Qaida’s strict interpretation of Islam.\textsuperscript{84}

Research on support for violent tactics has been mixed, with possible trends suggesting populations in countries that have directly experienced increased violence may be more inclined to turn against its use,\textsuperscript{85} and that majorities across the Muslim world oppose attacks on civilians although they support attacks on occupying forces.

Surveys by Pew, PIPA, and Gallup all reported increases, sometimes dramatic, in individuals self-identifying first as Muslim over their respective nationalities.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{80} Kaplan, "Hearts, Minds, and Dollars."
\item \textsuperscript{81} "A Global Look at Public Perceptions of Health Problems, Priorities, and Donors: The Kaiser/Pew Global Health Survey."
\item \textsuperscript{82} America's Image in the World.
\item \textsuperscript{83} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{84} Telhami, "Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll."
\item \textsuperscript{85} This effect highlighted in the polls below is consistent with Gerges reporting on changes in attitudes in Egypt and Algeria after the domestic experiences of significant Islamist violence during the 1990s. Gerges, Journey of the Jihadist, 91.
\end{itemize}
especially following 2003 and the Iraq war. Related to views that the United States and other powers have negative intentions towards Muslim countries, Kull reports that respondents in their focus groups indicate the “sense of Islam as being under siege has enhanced people’s identification with Islam.” This resurgence of a stronger Islamic identity contributes to the success and spread of political Islam. The shared perception of identity across borders plays a role in the likelihood that individuals may support groups and actions involved in distant struggles. However, some subsequent polling has found a decrease in such identification coupled with the success of local national based Islamists groups, leading Shibley Telhami to propose:

Arabs probably identified themselves after the fall of Baghdad as Muslims first in part because the ‘war on terror’ and the Iraq War were seen to be aimed at weakening the Muslim world, not because they wanted to join together under one government with other Muslims or because they embraced al-Qaeda.

Because the sense of shared identity may increase the likelihood for supporting struggles carried out in other countries, or potentially extremist tactics locally to support those causes, the rise of Muslim first self-identification in Western countries has been a cause of concern. A 2006 Pew Global Attitudes Project survey found similar high levels of Muslims in many European countries increasingly identifying themselves primarily by religion rather than by nationality. However, this research also found that the concerns of Muslims in Europe were more economic than religious or cultural. A 2007 Pew poll focused on Muslims in the United States found that they were “highly assimilated” with American culture, and no more likely to identify with their religion first over nationality than U.S. Christians.

Similar to the rise in Muslim identity, recent polling has found large majorities of Muslims supporting many common goals associated with Islamist movements.

87 Kull, "Negative Attitudes Toward the United States in the Muslim World: Do They Matter?"
including extremists groups such as al-Qaida. For example, the PIPA study of Egypt, Morocco, Indonesia, and Pakistan reports:

Most significantly, large majorities approve of many of al Qaeda’s principal goals. Large majorities in all countries (average 70 percent or higher) support such goals as: “stand up to Americans and affirm the dignity of the Islamic people,” “push the US to remove its bases and its military forces from all Islamic countries,” and “pressure the United States to not favor Israel.”

Equally large majorities agree with goals that involve expanding the role of Islam in their society. On average, about three out of four agree with seeking to “require Islamic countries to impose a strict application of sharia,” and to “keep Western values out of Islamic countries.” Two-thirds would even like to “unify all Islamic countries into a single Islamic state or caliphate.”

Mark Lynch notes that such survey results “represent considerable success” for what he labels “al-Qaeda’s constructivist strategy.” Social movement theorists explain this success as persuading the larger population to increasingly adopt a shared narrative frame for grievances and aspirations necessary to facilitate collective action. Polls conducted for the Pew Global Attitudes Project similarly find large majorities in Muslim countries welcoming “the idea of Islam playing a greater role in political life.”

However, both the PIPA and Pew polls report that even amongst those who share this view, large majorities still view Islamist extremism as a threat to their countries. Consistent with these findings, Telhami reports, “when asked what aspects of al-Qaida they sympathized with most, if any, only 6 percent of Arabs polled identified its advocacy of a puritanical Islamic state” and only 7 percent chose “its methods of operation.” In comparison, 36% chose “confronts the United States” and 20% “stands up for Muslim causes such as the Palestinian issue.” He concludes, “if al-Qaida’s imagined world is Taliban-like and virulently anti-Western, the vision is not shared by most in the Arab world.” Telhami highlights that majorities believe women should have the right to work outside the home and identify Western European

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93 "Support for Terror Wanes Among Muslim Publics."
94 "Muslims Believe US Seeks to Undermine Islam." "Support for Terror Wanes Among Muslim Publics."
countries or the United States as places where they would want to live or have a family member study. Furthermore, several recent surveys, elections, and some anecdotal reporting suggest that Usama bin Ladin, al-Qaida, and others associated with militant Islamist groups are losing popularity in Muslim countries, although some radical local Islamist groups such as Hamas and Hizballah have had notable success in national elections.

Research on Muslim public opinion also shows declining support for terrorist violence, notably including suicide bombings, especially in countries that have direct experience of such attacks. Some studies conducted in the first few years after the September 11 attacks found majorities or near majorities who supported attacks on

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civilians including suicide attacks. In contrast, several more recent surveys found substantial drops in support for suicide bombings and show that “overwhelming majorities” of Muslims worldwide disapprove of attacks against civilians, including specifically attacks by al-Qaida. However, these surveys often find majority support for attacks, including suicide bombings, against U.S. and Western forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, who are “widely perceived as occupiers,” as well as against Israel.97

How often are suicide attacks justified?

The surveys discussed in this section in part represent an effort to infer the likelihood and number of people who may be willing to support or turn against terrorist activity. The PIPA study of attitudes in Morocco, Egypt, Pakistan, and Indonesia


98 Wike, "Musharraf's Support Shrinks, Even as More Pakistanis Reject Terrorism ... and the U.S.."
attempted to more directly measure this by asking during their in-depth surveys three specific questions related to active support for groups that attack Americans:99

    Sometimes speak favorably to your family or friends about groups that attack Americans? Morocco 12%, Egypt 24%, Pakistan 6%, Indonesia 16%
    Would consider contributing money to an organization that may send some of its funds to a group that attacks Americans? Morocco 5%, Pakistan 7%, Indonesia 8%
    Would approve or have mixed feelings if a member of your family were to join such a group? Morocco 3% and 12%, Pakistan 4% and 9%, Indonesia 6% and 5%100

The small percentages answering positively to these questions, shown in the figure above, may be interpreted as good news. These results suggest that very large majorities do not speak favourably of, would not contribute money to, and would be opposed to a family member joining groups that attack Americans. However, if these findings are not merely a result of survey error or similar results found amongst the general American population,101 they potentially still represent millions of people across just the four countries covered in this survey.102 While it is possible and perhaps likely that individuals responding to these questions were often thinking of groups who attack U.S. troops in either Iraq or Afghanistan, and that therefore the numbers willing to support groups who attack American civilians would be much smaller based on the repeated

99 Questions like these, which are more likely to be viewed as incriminating or socially undesirable to answer, pose more significant methodological challenges decreasing the confidence in results. Nonetheless, PIPA’s work provides one of the best direct indications available.
100 Kull, "Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al Qaeda."
101 Near unanimity in opinion polling is rare, especially given variability in interpretation of questions by respondents, and it is possible that some number of these positive responses may be assuming other specific constraints. As an informative comparison, consider Mogahed’s observation: “As a starting point, Muslims do not hold a monopoly on extremist views. While 6% of Americans think attacks in which civilians are targets are ‘completely justified,’ in both Lebanon and Iran, this figure is 2%, and in Saudi Arabia, it’s 4%. In Europe, Muslims in Paris and London were no more likely than were their counterparts in the general public to believe attacks on civilians are ever justified and at least as likely to reject violence, even for a ‘noble cause.’” Mogahed, "Framing the War on Terror."
102 5% of these four countries represents 25.7 million people, based on current population estimates from the CIA’s The World Factbook: Morocco 33.8 million, Egypt 80.3 million, Indonesia 234.7 million, and Pakistan 164.7 million. Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook," https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html.
findings of other surveys, the numbers involved still represent a potentially large radicalized population.

Consistent with these findings, experts from American intelligence agencies continue to publicly state their assessment that recruitment by militant groups is outpacing current counterterrorism efforts. Russell Travers, from the Defense Intelligence Agency and a Deputy Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, wrote in 2005:

There is no question that the extraordinary efforts of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, coupled with those of the U.S. military and other USG elements involved in the offensive war against terrorism, have inflicted huge losses on Al Qaeda. But global conditions are a veritable petri dish for jihadists, and we are not going to succeed by killing these people until they like us. The smart money almost certainly says that terrorists are being created faster than we are killing or capturing them.103

More recently the CIA’s Deputy Director for Intelligence, John A. Kringen, reported to the House Armed Services Committee that while the United States and its allies have succeeded in “disrupting and dismantling terrorist organizations … the supply of people wanting to join those organizations continues and in some areas continues to grow.”104

**Mixed Judgment: Is it Possible both are Losing?**

The complex, sometimes contradictory, picture of attitudes across Muslim populations depicted by survey research over the last several years suggests mixed news for the United States. The bad news is that throughout the Muslim world negative perceptions and anti-American attitudes are very common and becoming entrenched. Perhaps most troubling, large majorities perceive the United States as attacking Islam and seeking to exploit the Muslim world. Many Muslims in North Africa, the Middle East, and Asia as well as in many European countries are more likely than in the past to identify themselves by their religion first instead of by their nationality. They also agree with many Islamist goals, even those of extremist groups such as al-Qaida. For most, the war on terror is perceived as a war on Islam, and the U.S. led invasion of Iraq its

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most dramatic and detested manifestation. Majorities in many countries continue to support attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, including suicide bombings. Small percentages, but still representing numerically significant numbers, are willing to state that they do or would consider offering more direct support to groups generally carrying out attacks on Americans.

The good news is that research on responses to foreign aid shows that targeted efforts can work. Most promising, Usama bin Ladin and al-Qaida are also increasingly unpopular, majorities see militant Islam as a threat, and very few desire to live under the type of puritanical Islamist state espoused by the extremists. Large majorities across the Muslim world generally oppose attacks on civilians, including in many countries dramatic declines in the numbers who once expressed support for suicide bombings.

The problem, as Shibley Telhami explains, is that “seen from this perspective, al-Qaida’s failure does not translate into an American success.” Bin Ladin and al-Qaida are still respected for at least standing up to the United States and affirming the “dignity of the Islamic people.” Given that “America is seen as the greater threat,” when pushed, too many Muslims still side with militants. This is highlighted by the widespread reluctance, noted in even recent surveys, of many Muslims to state that al-Qaida was responsible for the September 11 attacks.

Opportunities continue to exist for U.S. efforts to make a difference, for domestic leaders to make necessary improvements, and for moderate or reformist Islamist movements to win out over violent extremists. However, the mix of continuing real grievances across the Muslim world, the lack too often of more promising alternatives, and a hardening perception that the United States is at war with Islam poses a significant threat that larger numbers of people will decide that their best option is supporting radical Islamists who are at least doing something.

105 Telhami, "Hezbollah's Popularity Exposes al-Qaeda's Failure to Win the Hearts."
106 Kull, "Negative Attitudes Toward the United States in the Muslim World: Do They Matter?.
107 Ibid.
108 "Muslims Believe US Seeks to Undermine Islam." The researchers for PIPA’s four country survey noted: "On average less than one in four believes al Qaeda was responsible for September 11th attacks. Pakistanis are the most sceptical–only 3 percent think al Qaeda did it. There is no consensus about who is responsible for the attacks on New York and Washington; the most common answer is ‘don’t know.’"
CHAPTER FOUR: A SOCIAL MOVEMENT PERSPECTIVE ON POLITICAL ISLAM AND MILITANT ISLAMISTS

“A role in search of an Actor.”
–Gamal Abdel Nasser, 1954

Understanding the rise of political Islam as a popular social movement across the Muslim world is beneficial to the analysis of whether, why, and when Muslim populations will choose to support or turn against the use of political violence by some Islamist groups. The context of accumulated and perceived grievances and aspirations, the histories of previous attempts to address these, and the dynamics shaping current popular movements in turn aid analysis of why hearts and minds efforts aimed at these populations today succeed or fail. This chapter examines why the Muslim world is currently fertile ground for contentious mobilization, how the failure of previous solutions and perceived Islamist successes contribute to the current rise of political Islam as the new alternative, the unique role played by immigrant and diaspora Muslim communities in the West, and how militant groups fit within this context and potentially relate to larger Muslim populations.

Three initial observations are important to emphasize. First, while a shared Islamist ideology unites the primary groups targeted by the current U.S. war on terror, many of the core grievances mobilizing political Islam are non-religious in nature. Groups not motivated by Islamic ideals contested, often violently, many of the same issues well before today’s Islamist groups became significant actors. Understanding

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1 Gamal Abdel Nasser in Falsafat al-Thawra, 1954 cited in: Fuller, 2003, The Future of Political Islam, New York, NY, Palgrave Macmillan, 13. “In the early 1950s Gamal Abdel Nasser remarked that Egypt’s vigorous activism in the Middle East was in response to ‘a role in search of an actor’ – the existence of certain needs and aspirations in the region, a role not being filled.” Although Nasser was referring to himself and Arab nationalism as the actor emerging to take the unfulfilled role, Graham Fuller and others have suggested that political Islam has since emerged to fill the same void to address the still unsolved problems of the Middle East that generated the similar previous mobilizing potential fuelling Nasser’s rise.

2 Emphasizing this, an extensive series of surveys of Muslim populations by Gallup found that militant Islamists are much more likely to give political, instead of religious,
and engaging the Islamic cultural and ideational aspects are important to analyzing the current conflicts, but it remains likely that similar conflicts would still exist had Mohammad never established the Muslim faith. Second, political Islam as an overarching movement includes a wide diversity of groups, with very different opinions on and approaches to the use of violence or electoral politics. These groups descriptively span ideological labels such as liberal, conservative, modernizing, reformist, and fundamentalist. Larger Muslim populations have different opinions about and connections to these various groups, and significant local and regional differences exist between groups often associated with the label. More generally, analysts should remember the common biasing predisposition to see other groups and cultures as more homogenous because of a lack of familiarity, which is likely to occur when making claims about a community including one-fifth of the world’s population. This guidance cautions paying careful attention to the warnings of those with more direct experience about the diversity and pluralism within the Muslim world, without at the same time allowing this to obscure the commonalities and connections that do exist between reasons for condoning attacks, while the large majorities of Muslims who oppose attacks on civilians more often give religious reasons. Esposito and Mogahed, *Who Speaks for Islam*. Fawaz Gerges reports similar experience from his personal interaction and interviews with jihadists around the world. Gerges, *Journey of the Jihadist*, 11. Finally, Olivier Roy explains that in many cases "[T]he key to understanding the contemporary 'territorial' struggle is nationalism and ethnicity, not religion. Two factors give Islam a post hoc importance; the reciprocal rationalization of some conflicts in religious or civilisational terms, and the growing deterritorialisation of Islam, which leads to the political reformulation of an imaginary ummah" Roy, *Globalized Islam*, 44. 3 Fuller, 2008, "A World Without Islam," *Foreign Policy*, January/February, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4094. Olivier Roy emphasized this writing in 1994: “[F]rom Cairo to Tehran, the crowds that in the 1950s demonstrated under the red or national flag now march beneath the green banner. The targets are the same: foreign banks, nightclubs, local governments accused of complacency toward the West. The continuity is apparent not only in these targets but also the participants: the same individuals who followed Nasser or Marx in the 1960s are Islamists today.” Roy, 1994, *The Failure of Political Islam*, Translated by Volk, Harvard University Press, 4. Roy also emphasizes that when proper comparisons are done (between parallel Muslim and non-Muslim majority countries) many of the current problems often attributed to Islam disappear. Roy, *Globalized Islam*, 13-4. See also: Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam*, 70, 145. Smith, 2004a, "Collective Action with and without Islam: Mobilizing the Bazaar in Iran," In *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, ed. Wiktorowicz, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
various groups.\textsuperscript{4} Third, although this discussion will focus on many of the common aspects to the rise and manifestation of political Islam across Muslim populations, one should not forget or ignore that there are significant local and regional variations.\textsuperscript{5} Most Islamist groups and the populations potentially supportive of them focus foremost on local circumstances.\textsuperscript{6} One of the problems of the current approach to the war on terror has been a tendency to aggregate groups into a unified global threat, playing into the “far enemy” logic of a few truly transnationally focused Islamists, and counterproductively encouraging linkages and alliances between them.\textsuperscript{7}

With respect to the focus of this thesis, the primary audience for U.S. hearts and minds efforts is the world’s 1.3 billion Muslims, often referred to as the \textit{Ummah} or “community of believers.”\textsuperscript{8} It is this population which Islamist groups seek to represent and claim to be fighting for, and it is first and foremost this population whose support can either enable militants by providing resources, recruits, and encouragement, or inhibit them by aiding governments in tracking, disrupting, and deterring.

\textsuperscript{6} For example: Roy, 2008, "Iraq will not be a Qaedistan," \textit{International Herald Tribune}, March 7.
\textsuperscript{7} For example: Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency."
\textsuperscript{8} Esposito and Mogahed, \textit{Who Speaks for Islam}. Estimates on the world Muslim population vary significantly, but are often between 1 and 1.5 billion people. Mandaville similarly uses a figure of 1.25 billion. Mandaville, \textit{Global Political Islam}, 4.
Although the actions and attitudes of Muslims around the world are important to the current conflict, to understand the rise of political Islam I will start by focusing on the geographic “Muslim world” – that is those nations with either majority Muslim populations or potentially autonomous majority Muslim regions. These nations are largely found in the area over which various historic Islamic empires ruled, or in neighbouring states that now have majority or near-majority Muslim populations through influence of power, migration, and conversion. This historical zone stretches from North Africa, across the Middle East, up into South and Central Asia, as well as parts of Southeast Asia. It is in these countries where the vast majority of militant Islamist groups employing terrorism are based, nearly all of whom are focused on taking or influencing local power, with several of these conflicts of sufficient intensity to qualify as full scale insurgencies. Finally, although Muslim immigrant communities are of special concern to Western counterterrorism, the large majority of militant

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Islamists involved at a transnational level continue to originate from countries in the
Muslim world itself.\footnote{One measure of the comparative threat is the nationality of Islamist militants who were motivated to travel to fight against Coalition forces in Iraq. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point published a study in 2007 exploiting a collection of captured al-Qaida in Iraq administrative records, known as the Sinjar documents, which included details on the nationalities of foreign fighters who had joined the organization. Of the 595 records analyzed which included nationality information only 1\% (6) were from Western countries (including two from France and one each from Bosnia, Belgium, England, and Sweden). In comparison, about 40\% were fighters from North African countries who had to travel as far as their European counterparts and likely at much greater relative personal expense. Felter and Fishman, 2007, "Al-Qa'ida's Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records," West Point, New York: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, December 19, 6-7, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/pdf/CTCForeignFighter.19.Dec07.pdf. Hafez's analysis of suicide terrorism in Iraq identified up to 7\% of the cases studied (7 or 94) as being Europeans, however he was relying on media reports of nationality and given the propaganda the nationality of European suicide bombers is much more likely to have been highlighted in insurgent propaganda and reported to Western media. Hafez, 2006, "Suicide Terrorism in Iraq: A Preliminary Assessment of the Quantitative Data and Documentary Evidence," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29 (6).}

Muslim populations living in other parts of the world also play important roles in current conflicts, but in significant ways their politicization and recruitment into Islamist movements is often driven by the grievances and aspirations of populations in the historic Muslim world.\footnote{Kepel, 2002, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, Translated by Roberts, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 193. Mandaville, Global Political Islam, 298.} While local grievances and goals are important to the decisions of many to become politically active, whether within or outside of traditional political structures, perceptions of events in former home countries as well as in the Muslim world in general are often more significant for those who support militant movements.\footnote{Several authors focusing on Islamist movements in Europe emphasize the same changes related to globalization discussed in Chapter Two with respect to the evolving transnational and virtual nature of insurgency are responsible for linking Western Muslim communities more tightly with the historic Muslim world and especially Muslim communities from their countries of origin. Gerges, Journey of the Jihadist. Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds. Mandaville, Global Political Islam. Roy, Globalized Islam.} As diaspora communities they may provide funding and other resources or be sources of recruitment for violent and nonviolent Islamist movements. Muslims living in the United States and Europe may play important roles in influencing the
perception of Western nations by Muslims elsewhere. At the same time radicalization amongst these populations has often been a special concern to counterterrorism efforts out of the fear that they pose a greater threat for international attacks because of their ability to pass unnoticed given language skills, cultural familiarity, and nationality or residence status.\footnote{Kilcullen, \textit{The accidental guerilla}, 244-61. Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, "Rethinking Counterinsurgency," 25-6. Roy, \textit{Globalized Islam}, 302-4.}

\textit{Fertile Ground for Contentious Politics and Collective Action}

The idea that the Muslim world is a “role in search of an actor” can be seen in the wide range of social, economic, political, and cultural challenges and problems that have persisted despite the repeated efforts of a succession of governments and ideologies. Albeit with some significant regional variation, large parts of quickly growing Muslim populations across North Africa, the Middle East, and Asia live in relative poverty or economic stagnation with usually limited or stalled prospects for advancement and development, under governments that are generally authoritarian, frequently repressive, and often corrupt.\footnote{"Between Fitna, Fawda and the Deep Blue Sea," 2008, \textit{The Economist}, January 10, http://www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=10499063. "MENA Population: 1950, Now, 2050," 2008, \textit{Middle East Strategy at Harvard} (March 14), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2008/03/mena_population/. Roudi-Fahimi and Kent, 2007, "Challenges and Opportunities – The Population of the Middle East and North Africa," \textit{Population Bulletin} 62 (2), June, http://www.prb.org/pdf07/62.2MENA.pdf.} These conditions are exacerbated by recognition of falling further behind other parts of the world, as well as the excesses often enjoyed by privileged minorities at home including oil wealth which disproportionately benefits a few states with small populations, and by the perception of vulnerability to the forces of globalization driven by a historically antagonistic and currently dominant West threatening to entrench outside exploitation and control. Although these conditions are not unique to Muslim areas of the developing world, and on a number of measures Muslim states do better than others, the frustrations and
grievances experienced provide a strong motivational potential for contentious collective action.\textsuperscript{16}

The Arab Human Development Report, first compiled in 2002 for the United Nations Development Program by a distinguished group of Arab intellectuals in order to increase credibility for its primary Arab target audiences, highlights a wide range of economic and social development challenges facing that core part of the Muslim world. The report notes that one in five people in the nations covered lived on less than $2/day. The GDP of all Arab countries combined ($531.2 billion in 1999) was less than that of a single middle-size European country (Spain at $595.5 billion), while real GDP growth over the period of 1975 to 1998 had been close to stagnant averaging 0.5% per year compared to the global average of 1.3% per year. Highlighting relative deprivation, purchasing power parity (PPP) in real GDP per capita fell in the Arab world from 21.3% to 13.9% of the average OECD citizen during the same time frame. Noting that illiteracy rates remain higher in Arab countries than the rest of the developing world, the study captured in one frequently cited anecdote many other observed problems and challenges by reporting that the Arab world translates about 330 books annually, one fifth of the number that Greece translates.\textsuperscript{17}

Aggravating the development problems facing much of the Muslim world is a cultural memory of historical greatness. Martin Kramer, frequent antagonist of many scholars focusing on the Middle East, wrote at the end of 1999:

In the year 1000, the Middle East was the crucible of world civilization. One could not lay a claim to true learning if one did not know Arabic, the language of science and philosophy. One could not claim to have seen the world’s greatest cities if one had not set eyes upon Baghdad and Cordoba, Cairo and Bukhara. Global trade flourished in the fabulous marketplaces of the Middle East as nowhere else. The scientific scholarship cultivated in its academies was unrivalled. An Islamic empire, established by conquest four centuries earlier, had spawned an Islamic civilization, maintained by the free will of the world’s most creative and enterprising spirits… This supremely urbane civilization cultivated genius. Had there been Nobel Prizes in 1000, they would have gone almost exclusively to Moslems.\textsuperscript{18}

Graham Fuller describes the effect this memory has today:

The deepest underlying source of Muslim anguish and frustration today lies in the dramatic decline of the Muslim world, in over just a few centuries, from the leading civilization in the world for over one thousand years into a lagging, impotent, and marginalized region of the world. This stunning reversal of fortune obsessively shapes the impulses underlying much contemporary Islamist rhetoric.\(^\text{19}\)

A variety of factors make a good claim to partially explaining the shift in historical balances of power, including: the decline of the traditional land based silk route to seafaring trade better exploited by rising European nations and fuelled by their colonization of the new world; Mongol conquests and the emergence of divides within the old Islamic territories; environmental changes affecting the fertile crescent and favouring industrialization elsewhere; and, ultimately the emergence of European economic and colonial control over much of the Muslim world.\(^\text{20}\)

All of which saw the states of the Muslim world arrive late to industrialization and thus suffer the steep challenges frequently discussed for modern developing economies on the periphery of the world capitalist system, struggling to develop industry and find niches in the world market in the face of often overwhelming competition from those who got their first.\(^\text{21}\) Relative to when Western countries industrialized, the Muslim world must catch up with significantly larger and still quickly growing populations that often outstrip marginal gains. Disproportionately young populations, dislocated from traditional support networks having moved to urban areas seeking opportunities promised by the modern era, remain unemployed or underemployed further breeding discontent.

The magnitude of the development problems across the Muslim world is complicated and obscured by significant oil and resource wealth in several states, with Muslim majority nations accounting for seven of the top ten countries with the largest proven oil reserves and all but three members of OPEC.\(^\text{22}\) While domestic production and some transfers to other Muslim nations have helped raise living standards, what

\(^{19}\) Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam*, 1.

\(^{20}\) Ibid., 4-12.


\(^{22}\) Radler, 2006, "Oil Production, Reserves Increase Slightly in 2006," *Oil & Gas Journal* 104 (47), December 18.

CHAPTER FOUR: POLITICAL ISLAM AND MILITANT ISLAMISTS
many call the resource or oil curse has contributed to stunted development and further aggravated grievances. Economists argue that many oil rich states tend to suffer from “Dutch disease” where other productive sectors of the domestic economy are put at a significant disadvantage by increasing the real exchange rate and comparative wage markets, disproportionately attracting talent and investment into oil production, while making other tradable sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing even less competitive in global markets. Through the rentier state effect, the easy stream of oil wealth decreases the incentives that exist in states dependent upon taxation for governments to be more efficient and responsive, enabling regimes to at least temporarily buy off calls for reform. This has led a number of observers to note that international oil prices and progress towards civil and political freedom in these countries often appear to move in opposite directions. In nations without strongly established accountability structures, the frequent result is elite corruption stealing much of the nation’s resource wealth, which likewise undermines incentives that exist elsewhere to invest in broader human development. Dependency on resource wealth also exposes such countries to revenue volatility, driving domestic boom and bust cycles that increase perception and experience of relative deprivation. The timing of the discovery and economic profitability of oil was particularly unfortunate for many Muslim countries, undermining the early stages of other development paths and coming only after Western colonialism and economic penetration had established social, economic, and political structures more susceptible to the negative effects of the

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26 The boom of high oil prices in the 1970’s for example increased expectations but also saw an increase in inflation, corruption, and graft. The following oil price collapse of the 1980’s then necessitated painful cuts which regional political elites tended to disproportionately shift to the larger populations. Sadowski, 2006, "Political Islam: Asking the Wrong Questions?," *Annual Review of Political Science* 9, June: 222.
resource curse along with state borders that concentrated much of that wealth away from large Muslim populations.\(^{27}\)

On top of the economic problems and development challenges facing Muslim populations, the potential for contentious conflict is further cultivated by domestic politics frequently characterized by authoritarian, corrupt, repressive, and incompetent governments. The leaders who took over during the mid-20\(^{th}\) century looked back on at least 100 years of Western domination and in many cases recent direct rule.\(^{28}\) Colonial powers had shaped the area for their own benefit, often excessively oppressing local populations, and to a large extent had failed to “establish responsible local government institutions because they were too busy competing with each other.”\(^{29}\) From the start the newly independent states inherited the same problems as their colonial predecessors including a lack of legitimacy often exacerbated by artificial and arbitrarily drawn borders, poverty, illiteracy, cultural divisions, and scarce money to fund development.\(^{30}\) Unfortunately for even the best-intentioned leaders who came to power under these conditions, history has shown no quick or painless paths to universal prosperity. Governments often increasingly shifted resources to maintain power in the face of

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External power politics over the past century has not been kinder to the Muslim world, with political and social dynamics often shaped by hot and cold wars, as well as the martial socio-political structures resulting from and preceding such conflicts.\footnote{Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State, 256, 66-9. Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, 8-9. Hinnebusch, Syria, 7. Hinnebusch, 2003, The International Politics of the Middle East, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 154. Richards and Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East, 242. Singerman, 2004, "The Networked World of Islamist Social Movements," In Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, ed. Wiktorowicz, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 146-8.} World War One saw the final act of the old Islamic caliphate with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, which had sided with Germany, and the end of the war leaving large parts of the Middle East under European control.\footnote{Woodward, 2006, Hell in the Holy Land: World War I in the Middle East, University Press of Kentucky.} World War Two, principally fought by European protagonists, again played out in part with fighting across North and East Africa as well as in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. The end of the Second World War, and along with it an accelerating end to the era of colonialism, saw the conception of two particularly lasting conflicts in the Muslim world with the partition of India creating a divided Muslim Pakistan and the clash over Kashmir, and the implementation of the
Balfour Agreement creating the modern state of Israel and with it the continuing Palestinian crisis. The Cold War saw Muslim nations caught between and as minor actors in super-power confrontations, with neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union truly concerned about domestic conditions over the priorities of international balancing when deciding where to give or withhold aid and favours. During this time the Muslim world saw more than its share of hot wars, including: various Arab-Israeli conflicts; wars for independence such as in Algeria; civil wars and similar levels of violence over secession such as in Somalia, Bosnia, Lebanon, and East Timor; and, wars between regional powers such as Iran and Iraq, or Eritrea and Ethiopia. The region has repeatedly seen outside large-scale military intervention, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the two gulf wars led by the United States against Iraq, as well as numerous smaller military actions by outside forces.36

Finally, international economic forces after the age of colonialism often associated with or described as globalization have created as much economic disruption and discontent in the Muslim world as in other developing regions.37 Given ancient and recent perceptions of antagonism with Western powers seen as the dominant forces of economic and cultural globalization the perception of threat and feeling of resentment within many Muslim populations is especially strong, and as likely to be aimed at Western powers as at often wealthy and corrupt domestic elites. This perception is fed by regional elites who rightly or wrongly blame a wide range of domestic problems on traditional Western adversaries.38 For many in the Muslim world the impact of this is magnified by a cultural memory that the great Islamic empire has given way to a period of Western domination.39 As Graham Fuller notes, the irony is “even as Westerners feel threatened by Islam, most in the Muslim world feel themselves besieged by the West.”40

36 Hinnebusch, *The International Politics of the Middle East*, 154.
38 Kraidy, "Arab Media and US Policy."
40 Fuller, "The Future of Political Islam."
The Failure of Previous Solutions and Perceived Islamist Successes

Further shaping the current environment for collective action, and especially what alternatives are likely to gain popular support, is the failure of previous popular movements leaving a variety of discredited ideologies in their wake. As the end of the colonial era swept across Asia, the Middle East, and Africa the promise of independence led many to believe that they would soon participate in the prosperity they had seen exported and enjoyed in Western nations. Contemporaneous Islamist thinkers – such as Rashid Rida, Ali Abd al-Raziq, Sayyid Abul-A’la Mawdudi, and Hassan al-Banna – debated the possible role of a renewed Islamic political order as opposed to nationalist approaches.41 However, while these theorists established ideological groundwork for later Islamist activists, for most Muslims the political dimensions of Islam were not of paramount importance and nationalism proved far more attractive as an organizing force as the new Muslim states achieved independence from European colonial rule.42 The failures of these newly independent governments to deliver quickly – because the development challenges they faced were great, the world economy started many of them off in a time of economic depression, and too often domestic elite corruption simply replaced foreign extraction – led in many countries to a perceived need for more authoritarian solutions and a further discrediting of ideologies associated with Western powers.43

Across large parts of the Middle East and North Africa political leaders turned to and promoted Arab Nationalism as a unifying solution, often with socialist ideals replacing the economic liberalism and belief in private property espoused by former Western powers as with Nasser and the other Free Officers who came to power in Egypt and with the Baath party’s ascendancy in Syria and Iraq.44 Cold War dynamics led to

41 Mandaville, Global Political Islam, 49-95.
42 Ibid., 53.
44 Hinnebusch, Syria, 36-7, 55. Richards and Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East, 182-3, 7. Gerges notes that ironically the programs of secular development
socialist ideals influencing Arab intellectuals and elites as many Arab nations aligned with and received aid and advisors from the Soviet Union given American support of Israel. Three principle factors caused the alternative of Arab nationalism to begin to lose its appeal: the failure of new development polices to deliver significant economic improvements; the tendency of these centralized authoritarian governments to close off avenues of political dissent; and, a series of significant foreign policy defeats. The 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict is perhaps the single most important of these, as Arab Nationalist leaders had exploited the Palestinian crises to redirect internal discontent and built up a perception that they would once and for all avenge earlier defeats by vanquishing Israel, only to be stunned by the perceptually crushing defeat of the Six-Day War. While authoritarian governments have remained in power across much of the Muslim world, similar local failures have increasingly delegitimized their rule and encouraged many to look outside current political structures for new hope to address perceived grievances.

Many Islamic activists also criticize the Western dominated global system for failing to protect or equally show concern for Muslims over these years. Foremost is the perceived failure to support the Palestinian people in their grievances against Israel, but Islamists are also quick to list suffering and international inaction to aid primarily Muslim populations in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Somalia, Iraq, the Philippines, Indonesia, established during this time period in states such as Egypt providing “free public education combined with dramatically expanded access to university” enabled “bright young Islamic activists to find each other and to use their relative expanded freedoms to engage with the broader movements then energizing the Arab world.” In social movement theory terms an opening in opportunity space and establishment of networks that enabled mobilization around subsequently perceived grievances. Gerges, Journey of the Jihadist, 43.


46 Gerges, Journey of the Jihadist, 31-2.


48 Mandaeville, Global Political Islam, 98.
Chechnya, Eritrea, Kashmir, Darfur, and the various Central Asian Republics.\textsuperscript{49} In many cases these conflicts are portrayed as Christian or Western powers actively oppressing Muslim populations, while the world turns a blind eye exercising a double standard as compared to other conflicts where the international community was quick to intervene. When Western actors have intervened many Muslims claim that these actions came too late or were motivated by other reasons.\textsuperscript{50}

At the same time other alternatives were being discredited, a building list of perceived successes have increased popular support for Islamic alternatives. The Ramadan war of 1973, fought under the military slogan “God is Great,” was seen at least as redemption if not an Israeli defeat. The 1979 revolution in Iran brought to power what many view as the first truly Islamic state in the modern era, associated with the charismatic leadership of the Ayatollah Khomeini. The Iranian revolution and resulting American hostage crisis were also seen as striking a humiliating blow against Western powers who had backed the Shah’s return to power over the popular Mosaddeq in 1953. At the same time, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan began a decade long war ending with the defeat of a superpower attributed by many in the Muslim world to the strength of Muslim fighters who had travelled to fight from across the world.\textsuperscript{51} Islamist groups in the Palestinian territories and Lebanon have gained in regional popularity for standing up to Israel with some regionally celebrated successes, including in the case of Hizballah being seen as responsible for ending Israel’s occupation of Southern Lebanon in 2000 and then fighting with surprising resilience and possibly strategic success against Israeli forces in the summer of 2006. Finally, at a local level many Islamist movements have proven very successful at effectively delivering social services free of corruption.


\textsuperscript{50} Lawrence, ed 2005, Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden, Translated by Howarth, London: Verso, 86.

Political Islam Emerging as the New Movement

With the continued grievances across the Muslim world, and the failure of previous alternatives, increasingly a variety of movements have emerged around the shared ideological focus that – *al-Islam, huwa al-hall* – “Islam is the solution.” Understanding how and why political Islam appeals to and shapes the opinions of large populations across the Muslim world is important to understanding the potential appeal of those particular militant Islamists who espouse terrorist tactics against both near and far enemies. Examining political Islam from a social movement theory perspective – analyzing the grievances and hopes, mobilizing networks, political opportunity structures, and framing processes – in turn better enables us to understand why hearts and minds strategies targeting these populations may succeed or fail.

Throughout this work, I define political Islam or Islamism synonymously in the same way as Graham Fuller, where “an Islamist is one who believes that Islam as a body of faith has something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslim World and who seeks to implement this idea in some fashion.” In this manner, the terms political Islam or Islamist are neutral in character, and explicitly capture a diverse range of groups and ideologies active today that reject or endorse violence, seek to work within or outside of existing political structures, and take what might be characterized as liberal, conservative, modernizing, reformist, or fundamentalist approaches to the interpretation of Islamic ideals and traditions. Islamist convictions also cover “a broad spectrum” from “those who merely like to see Islam accorded proper recognition in national life and in terms of national

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52 Esposito, "Political Islam." Fuller, "The Future of Political Islam."
53 Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam*, XI-XII. It should be noted that many authors use the term Islamist in a more narrow manner, often for more radical or fundamentalist Islamists whose goals of state control and reformation are more absolute and all encompassing. Roy, *Globalized Islam*, 58. Mandaville, in his book titled *Global Political Islam*, argues that we should not use the term “political Islam” and instead should discuss “Muslim politics” as the first phrase discourages us from recognizing the diversity and pluralism of Islam and encourages dangers of abstraction and unwarranted generalization. However, Mandaville seeks an even wider understanding of mobilization around “the symbols and language of Islam,” whereas this work focuses more on those groups who really do “have as their goal the establishment of an Islamic political order.” Mandaville, *Global Political Islam*, 20-1.
symbols” to “those who want to see the radical transformation of society and politics, by whatever means, into an absolute theocracy.”55 In many cases these variations are accentuated by discrete regional and national versions of or approaches to Islamic faith.56 This is to emphasize that Islamism itself is not a single ideology, “but a religious-cultural-political framework for engagement on issues that most concern politically engaged Muslims.”57

With the focus of this work, as many others, on the use of violent tactics by transnational militant Islamist groups it is important to reinforce that political Islam is not a monolithic movement and that the majority of Islamist groups are non-violent, locally focused, and motivated by improving the condition of Muslim populations.58 Islamist groups include locally focused and transnational dawa movements, such as the essentially non-political Tablighi Jamaat strongest is South Asia and the Nur movement in Turkey, who argue that the solution to many social and political problems in the Muslim world is in the return of individuals to an embrace of Islamic ideals, often promoted through study groups, education, spiritual development, and social good works.59 Islamists also include a wide range of political parties across the Muslim world, who variously oppose, have renounced, or support the limited use of violence, including the Turkish Justice and Development Party, Hizb al-Wasat in Egypt as well as similar Wasatiyya parties in other countries, many local branches of the Muslim


Brotherhood, and Jamaat-I Islami. For many Muslims the appeal of Islamist groups often centres on their calls for reform, justice, and social change including the good works they do, the social welfare services they provide, and their stands against corruption as well as actual lack of corruption in practice. While anti-state Islamist groups across the Muslim world have frequently adopted violent repertoires, including tactics of terrorism, it is also important to emphasize that this is equally true of non-Islamic groups in the same contexts, and that there are significant debates and differences over the use of violence with many Islamists rejecting or renouncing its use. Finally, even within the sub-category of militant Islamist groups using tactics of terrorism “the primary goal of the modern jihadist movement is and always has been the destruction of the secular political and social order in the activists’ home countries and its replacement with authentic Islamic states.”

Most of the violent Islamist groups associated with tactics of terrorism today are best described in this manner as Islamic fundamentalists, in that they “follow a literal and narrow reading of the Qur’an and the traditions of the Prophet” and “believe that they have a monopoly on the sole correct understanding of Islam and demonstrate


intolerance toward those who differ.” While they may not agree on details of strategies and tactics, the fundamentalists largely seek “to re-create a future based on their conceptions of the golden age of early Islam, they share the yearning to ‘go back to the future’ by reimagining the past based on their readings of the fundamental scripts.”\textsuperscript{64} Fundamentalism is not the same as traditionalism, and as Fuller emphasizes while “all fundamentalists are Islamists” not all “Islamists are fundamentalists.”\textsuperscript{65}

Most of the grievances and hopes that make political Islam appealing to many across the Muslim world, are rooted in the same conditions or are even precisely the same as those that energized previous waves of mobilization under secular ideologies. Many of these grievances and hopes are not unique to the Muslim world at all, but are shared across the developing world and in large parts of the developed world as responses to feelings of hopelessness, oppression, and injustice as well as aspirations for a better future.\textsuperscript{66} Fuller observes that “political Islam is not an exotic and distant phenomenon, but one intimately linked to contemporary political, social, economic and moral issues of near universal concern.”\textsuperscript{67} What is often unique, is that Islamists frame these grievances and aspirations in a religious historical and cultural narrative, suggesting that the origins of many problems result from leaving the true path of Islam, and that the solution can be found through the application of practices and policies specifically informed and shaped by Islamic ideals. The depth of these religious social and ideological roots is one of the reasons that the framing of “Islam is the solution” resonates more strongly than alternatives.\textsuperscript{68}

Current political structures across much of the Muslim world favour the emergence of political Islam as a mobilizing force given the closure of other venues of political expression, the support of key elites whether out of genuine belief or instrumental convenience, and the capacity of many states for repression which is often relatively tempered in application to religion. In order to protect their power, many governments across Africa, the Middle East, and Muslim Asia either greatly constrained or outright banned alternative political expression and activity that they saw as

\textsuperscript{64} Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam, 2.
\textsuperscript{65} Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, XI-XII.
\textsuperscript{66} Gerges, Journey of the Jihadist, 40.
\textsuperscript{68} Singerman, "The Networked World of Islamist Social Movements," 151.
threatening. Many observers have noted that this favoured the rise of political Islam, as the Mosque remained one of the few venues where people could gather, exchange ideas, and ultimately organize.69 As Fuller notes, “The state can close the nationalist or socialist party headquarters, but it cannot really close the mosques, which serve as operations centers for Islamist movements.”70 In many places the resulting mobilization first built up around providing social services, which may have seemed non-threatening to political elites and was in part driven by the failure of the state or “retreat of the state” from fulfilling these needs.71 This established strong and credible movement structures before often evolving or expanding into more explicitly political directions. Ruling elites often encouraged such Islamic organization as a balance or alternative outlet to existing politically directed groups those elites perceived as threatening.72 At the same time, endorsement of Islamic causes (a “wrap in the flag” effect) as well as exploitation of distant Muslim suffering (arguably as a distraction) gave many leaders a new source for re-establishing or affirming their legitimacy despite previous failures and frustrations.73 Such elite alignment with and use of Islam further encouraged the development of Islamic movements. In a number of cases, once ruling elites began to perceive groups associated with political Islam as a threat to their power they chose to “out-Islam the Islamists.”74 For example, the Saudis reacted to the 1979 siege of the Great Mosque in Mecca by increasing support to Wahhabist elements domestically and Islamic causes internationally, including funding Sunni missionary work and encouraging jihadists to travel to Afghanistan.75 Where states have brought their full repressive capability to bear on Islamist movements, as in Egypt’s suppression of the

70 Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, 33.
71 Mandaville, Global Political Islam, 109.
72 For example, consider Sadat’s use of the Muslim Brotherhood to offset the Nasserites or Israel’s early support of Hamas to undermine the PLO.
74 Fuller, "The Future of Political Islam."
75 Gerges, Journey of the Jihadist, 104-10. Mandaville, Global Political Islam, 151-68.
Muslim Brotherhood, the result was in part to encourage a more violent and clandestine radicalized movement.\textsuperscript{76}

Mobilizing networks have similarly aided the emergence of transnational Islamists politics. While the mosque – and similar religious study groups, university organizations, and social welfare providers – served as a domestic network for mobilization, the reaction to and use of political Islam by many governments has served to strengthen interstate movement ties. By playing up international Islamic identity through the focus on the plight of coreligionists in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Palestine many governments in the Muslim world have facilitated a sense of transnational Islamist identity. These connections have been strengthened as Islamists were sent into exile or encouraged to go on jihad by states simply happy to have potential troublemakers out of the country. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood, for example, when pushed out of Egypt during the late 50s, 60s, and 70s established connections to, and ideologically cross-pollinated with, emerging Islamist groups across the Middle East.\textsuperscript{77} Likewise, while the Afghan jihad of the 1980s may have temporarily released domestic pressures for change, it established strong international connections amongst radicalized, militarily experienced Islamists emboldened by their success against a superpower.\textsuperscript{78} Kamal el-Said Habib, who was a leading figure during the first generation of Egyptian Islamist radicalization, critically explained that the Afghan jihad “internationalized and militarized the jihadist movement further” putting “religion at the service of war rather than the other way around” with violence replacing “politics as a means of interaction.”\textsuperscript{79} This network of jihadists – who often trained together, shared a common ideological evolution, and fought in places such as Afghanistan, Kashmir, Bosnia, Southeast Asia, and North Africa – plays a powerful role in biasing the development of many Islamic movements across the Muslim world towards a more radical and violent extreme. Success for these militants is associated with taking full

\textsuperscript{77} Habeck, Knowing the Enemy, 33-4. Robinson, "Hamas as Social Movement," 120.  
\textsuperscript{78} Gerges, Journey of the Jihadist, 111.  
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 112.
control of state power and many have a personal memory of their ability to defeat even a superpower. In other cases, differences emerged between various Islamist movements because of religious divides (as with Sunni versus Shia, or Deobandi versus Barelvi), more strongly nationalist local conflicts with competition for local popular support against previous secular nationalist groups (as with Hamas and Hizballah), or the result of being an ethnic minority population fighting for autonomy and independence in several countries on the edge of the historical Muslim world.

While secular movements have previously mobilized around the same or similar grievances and aspirations across the Muslim world, the dynamics of the current context are significantly driven by the unique potency of the long historical, cultural, and intellectual traditions of Islam. The strength of political Islam is that it deeply resonates with Muslim populations providing an explanation for past achievements and the durability of Islamic civilization as well as current problems in the failure to remain true to their faith. Militant Islamists for example draw on a long intellectual history of Muslim thinkers including such frequently cited scholars as Ibn Taymiyyah, Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, Jamal al-din Afghani, Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Sayyid Abul-A’la Mawdudi, Abdallah Azzam, and the Ayatollah Khomeini. In large parts of the Muslim world, Islamism has become the primary vehicle and vocabulary for political discourse, in the same way that Westerners talk about the Magna Carta, the American and French Revolutions, or Hobbes and Locke. Whereas a previous generation of movement leaders struggled to adapt the ideas of Marx and Engels, the current movement discourse draws from the Quran, the hadith, and larger common Islamic cultural and historic traditions.

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81 Although the Iranian revolution and its charismatic leader Ayatollah Khomeini served as an inspiration for many Islamist, the Sunni versus Shia divide is particularly important within militant Islamist movements. Al-Qaida and other militant Islamist groups actually associated with it all follow a salafist interpretation of Sunni Islam and generally see Shia Muslims as apostates. Similarly many Shia militant groups have been motivated by a fear of threats or oppression from Sunni Muslims who in most countries of the Muslim world are a large majority. See the footnote discussion in the Chapter Five section “Aggregating Distinct Groups as a Singular Enemy” for more on this split.
82 Fuller, "The Future of Political Islam."
85 Fuller, "The Future of Political Islam."
One of the uniquely powerful aspects of the Islamic nature of the current mobilization is that it creates under the authority of religious mandate a shared identity transcending state and ethnic boundaries, encouraging Muslims across the world to perceive the experiences of Muslims in other places as also their own. This framing plays an important role in shaping the mobilization of Muslims living in non-Muslim majority countries, such as second and third generation immigrant communities in Western nations.

Finally the narrative framing of the current mobilization in a religious tradition links the political prescriptions and arguments, as well as justifications for mandates to act, with the normative power inherent in the divine.86 Many theorists and analysts have suggested that religious sanctification, especially combined with other politically mobilizing forces such as nationalism, poses both an especially powerful narrative as well as an escalated danger for more violent repertoires.87 It is no longer that Marx

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86 Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, XIII.
explained our economic position and need to overthrow the current political system, instead now God has commanded it.

**Muslim Diaspora Communities in the West**

This chapter has focused on how dynamics across the geographic Muslim world, defined by countries or regions with Muslim majority populations, are important for understanding the development and drivers of political Islam. This section now focuses on the unique role played by diaspora and immigrant Muslim communities living in Western Europe and the United States. Islamist mobilization occurs in these communities for a combination of reasons related to local conditions as well as the transnational dynamics discussed in the previous sections. From an international counterterrorism perspective Western Muslim communities are of particular importance because of the threat of attacks carried out by local actors as well as because of the promising potential for Muslim communities in the West to act as credible intermediaries with the larger Muslim world.  

Although there have been Muslims living in the West for centuries the large post-colonial era migrations beginning in the late 1950s and peaking in the 1970s, followed by the second and third generation Muslims who have come of age in the West over the last two decades, account for the majority of Western Muslim populations and are of particular importance to this analysis. Estimates of the number of Muslims living in the West vary from 8 to over 20 million in Western Europe and from 2 to 7 million in the United States (making them a small percentage of either the global

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Muslim population or the overall population of the West). As with looking at the Muslim world as a whole, it is important to emphasize the diversity within and between Muslim populations across Western Europe and the United States coming from very different countries, at different times, for different reasons, and retaining different approaches to Islam and levels of religiosity, varying degrees of assimilation in their new countries, and varied connections to Muslim communities globally.

Grievances and aspirations typical of immigrant experiences are a significant factor in understanding dynamics and attitudes within Muslim communities in the West today. For many Muslims the challenges of this experience were heightened by significant language barriers with the general populations of their new countries as well as differences in skin colour, religious practices, and cultural traditions that heightened barriers to integration. These influences also reinforced immigrant ghettoization as newer arrivals tended to settle around specific large urban areas with those who had come earlier. As economic pressures at home drove many of these migrations, Muslim immigrants tended to start from disadvantaged positions at the bottom of the labour chain. These new immigrants often experienced relatively limited prospects for advancement as well as stalled or failed assimilation efforts, too frequently leaving them “disenfranchised, unemployed, and alienated.”

Differences between how Western countries have approached Muslim immigration further shapes the challenges and opportunities faced, with European observers emphasizing: France’s particular problems from the interaction of its aggressively secular tradition of laicism with traditional Muslim public displays of religious faith; backlashes and isolation arising

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from Britain’s very different approach of focusing on multi-faith tolerance; as well as, the structural difficulties created by Germany’s legal assumptions that many immigrants are only temporary “guest workers” who will return to their home countries.92

Second and third generation Muslims in the West have also faced similar challenges as previous immigrant communities of rediscovering and shaping their identity, as well as handling adversity and conflict. Constrained by community isolation, and facing reactionary pressures from other populations who often perceive them as culturally and economically threatening, these new generations of Muslims in the West have struggled to overcome obstacles and assert their own sense of community pride, while responding to real and perceived humiliations or experiences of racism.93 Disproportionately in comparison to other populations, and including even those Muslim immigrants who have obtained higher education in their new homes, the new younger generation often suffers from much higher unemployment and perceived limited prospects contributing to social unrest, delinquency, and at the extreme recruitment into radical and militant groups.94 Echoing the experience of populations across much of the Muslim world, many Muslim diaspora communities in the West experienced the raised hopes and then failures of previous liberal state endorsed solutions. Discussing France as an example, Kepel observes:

The success of Islamist ideology among this new generation also benefited from disappointed hopes in the great cause of the 1980s. In France, the SOS-Racisme movement had sought to bring all young people together, regardless of creed or color, in a great groundswell of protest against racism… but in the end had petered out, leaving memories of spectacular initiatives that had had no real effect on society.95

Congruent with a religious reawakening noted amongst other faiths as well as with the rise of political Islam across the Muslim world, many of these immigrant communities saw resurgence in Islamic identity especially amongst second and third generation Muslims. Frequently this rediscovered, or in significant ways reconstructed Islamic faith is detached from the unique historical and local cultural traditions of their parents’ generation and home countries, creating a more universal Islamic self-identity which

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93 Roy, Globalized Islam, 18.
95 Kepel, Jihad, 195.
some suggest is predisposed towards affiliation with transnational Islamic causes and Islamist movements.96

To understand Islamist mobilization, especially amongst Muslim Europeans, it is important to recognize the often-antagonistic connections between countries of origin and destination for specific Muslim immigrant communities. For a variety of reasons related to established patterns of migration and commerce, as well as geography, shared second languages, and inter-government relations many waves of immigration have been between specific nations and their former colonial rulers (for example, from North Africa and the Levant to France; and from Egypt, Palestine, and South Asia to Great Britain). While several of the factors encouraging this phenomenon ease the immigrant experience, the complicated legacy dynamics involved create many stresses driving contentious mobilization. Continued grievances and frustrations experienced by identity communities “back home” serve as an important additional source of conflict. At the same time the distance shrinking or freeing effects of globalization and especially communications technologies – from satellite TV programs which diaspora communities can watch and call into live to the multitude of connections created by the internet – enable Muslims around the world to remain intimately aware of and connected to events and communities in their countries of origin.97

The French and Algerian experience exemplifies this dynamic. After gaining independence following a particularly painful war, often studied by counterinsurgents for what not to do, many Algerians migrated to France because of the lack of economic opportunities and continuing violent conflict at home. Lingering resentments on both sides, coupled with the multitude of other challenges faced by immigrants, has generated continuing discord and undermined assimilation efforts. Pecastaing explains how this mix creates conditions on which militant Islamist groups have fed writing about an al-Qaida affiliated cell of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in France:98

The roots of the GSPC lie in the several million economic immigrants who began to leave northern Africa for Europe when decolonization began in the 1960s. Islamism came to France with this diaspora, but its current virulence

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97 Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public, 30.
cannot be explained by uprootedness alone. The GSPC gets its edge from the trauma of the Algerian civil war, which has pitted a repressive military regime against religious radicals and has accounted for more than 100,000 deaths since the early 1990s. Some of those who fled the violence brought its baggage with them. The intolerance they encountered in France fed their rage, while the peaceful majority in their new communities looked the other way and condoned the radicals' tactics. State terror and exile defined the basic matrix that bred Bourtí's cell.\footnote{Pecastaing, 2004, "The Secret Agents: Life Inside an al Qaeda Cell," \textit{Foreign Affairs} (January/February), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59553/camille-pecastaing/the-secret-agents-life-inside-an-al-qaeda-cell.}

Emphasizing the observation made by others that Islamist doctrine is often an afterthought for groups like this, she notes that “the militants’ anger seems to have no deeper eschatological root” and that their “ideological chatter” consisted of little more than “gossip about Osama bin Laden and sound bites from Ibn Taymiyya and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, radical Muslim theologians from ages past” caring more about shallow symbolism than ideological depth.\footnote{Ibid.}

Political Islam has a more direct relationship with many more recent arrivals to Muslim diaspora communities in the West. While the failure of previous movements and government solutions across the Muslim world often contributed to the economic and security conditions driving much immigration, later immigrants were often part of the Islamic revival in their home countries who were then effectively exiled by subsequent authoritarian repression of threatening Islamist movements. These more politicized immigrants, well versed in Islamist ideology and motivated to continue pursuing their cause, found conditions in many Muslim diaspora communities ripe for mobilization and receptive to the sense of pride as well as aspirations for a better future created by a rediscovery of an Islamic identity and mission.\footnote{Gerges, \textit{Journey of the Jihadist}, 235. Kepel, \textit{Jihad}, 195. Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, "Rethinking Counterinsurgency," 22-4.} While these activists reinforce a Muslim-first self-identity and focus on grievances tied to the geographic Muslim world, they also transplanted the Islamist explanation that many of the problems of immigrant communities stemmed from a failure to follow a pure form of Islam which was particularly amenable to the deterritorialized and reconstructed faith
that many second and third generation Muslims were already embracing.\textsuperscript{102} While many of the movements that took hold were non-violent, especially with respect to the Western countries in which they lived, some of the Islamist activists were associated with militant groups with an evolving transnational focus.\textsuperscript{103}

The potential militant Islamist mobilization of Muslims living in Europe and the United States poses a number of significant dangers – while these communities also often play vital roles for countering such threats – which can be described in three sets including: conflicts in other parts of the world; terrorist attacks at home; and, the role played by radicalized Western militants returning after participating in foreign conflicts.\textsuperscript{104} For conflicts around the world, including those in which Western states are directly involved, diaspora communities can be important sources of funding, recruitment, technical assistance, and popular support for insurgents. Alternatively, they may be a source of legitimacy for state actors and encouragement for local populations to exercise patience waiting for reforms and other initiatives to take hold. Building on the technological advancements that facilitate communication, commerce, and travel disparate distant communities can enable smaller militant groups to persist longer with greater effect (or discourage them) as well as amplify (or counter) propaganda and ideological efforts to gain the support of other vital populations. Activists recruited from Western communities often bring advantages of better education, relatively greater financial resources, as well as better access to and expertise with global media and communication technologies, while at the same time the involvement of individuals


\textsuperscript{103} Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, "Rethinking Counterinsurgency," 22-3.

\textsuperscript{104} Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds, 250-1. Kilcullen, The accidental guerilla, 246. Leiken, "Europe's Angry Muslims.". Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, "Rethinking Counterinsurgency," 25-6. Mandaville, Global Political Islam, 261. Roy, Globalized Islam, 302-4. Several commentators have suggested that Muslim immigrants in the United States are better integrated and assimilated than Muslim immigrants in Europe, and therefore that Europe faces a significantly greater threat of domestic Islamist terrorism than the United States. Leiken, "Europe's Angry Muslims.". Roy, Globalized Islam, 100. This is supported by polling such as Pew’s 2007 efforts which found that American Muslims were more concerned about the dangers of Islamic extremism and less likely to be supportive of the use of suicide bombings under any conditions than European Muslims. "Muslim Americans," 52-4.
from these communities in counterinsurgent and counterterrorism efforts can bring
greater cultural familiarity, crucial language skills, and a more recognizable “in-group
face” to help promote official efforts.\textsuperscript{105}

At home militants mobilized from Western Muslim communities pose a
particularly dangerous threat for conducting domestic terrorist attacks.\textsuperscript{106} As native or
long-time residents they generally speak Western languages, arouse much less suspicion
knowing how to culturally pass, and can move between Western countries without
concerns for visas or other more extensive identity checks. Militants recruited or
radicalized from Western Muslim communities are more familiar with security practices
and potential vulnerabilities, and may be able to take longer to prepare for attacks
without arousing suspicion. Homegrown terrorists who have not had direct connections
with transnational groups are harder for counterterrorism agencies to discover, as they
have not raised suspicions because of their travel to visit or other communication
contacts with known terrorist networks. Whereas radicalized militants who have made
contact with transnational networks pose greater dangers in terms of the potential
training they have received, improved access to information about how to better carry
out an attack, potential guidance for overcoming the mistakes learned from previous
attempts, connections to key enablers or others willing to assist in an attack, and
possible financial or other resource support.\textsuperscript{107} Offsetting the danger of domestic
Islamist terrorist attacks, many threats and planned attacks over the last several years
have been disrupted by the actions of members of Muslim communities who discovered
plots or identified suspicious behaviour and then worked with authorities. Proactively
the most credible influences discouraging radicalization or encouraging individuals to
disengage from militant groups are other members of the same community bound by
kinship and friendship, or exercising the authority of parents and respected community
or religious leaders.\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{105} Kilcullen, \textit{The accidental guerilla}, 244-61. Londeno and DeYoung, 2008, "Al-Qaeda
in Iraq Figure Was a Swedish Citizen," \textit{The Washington Post}, October 17,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/16/AR2008101603615.html.
\textsuperscript{106} Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, "Rethinking Counterinsurgency," 25-6.
\textsuperscript{107} Kilcullen, \textit{The accidental guerilla}, 246.
\textsuperscript{108} Horgan, \textit{The Psychology of Terrorism}. 
Radicalized Westerners who participated in distant conflicts, including those who travelled to fight against Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, pose a final unique threat upon their return having gained experience and knowledge as well as making transnational connections to militant groups. Based upon the experiences of previous generations of foreign fighters some of these individuals may return more radicalized to a cause, inspired by a belief that violent tactics can bring about local change, and better able to either carry out attacks themselves or perhaps even more dangerous having prestige and credibility within radical networks based upon their foreign experience enabling them to become leaders and recruiters creating an expanded terrorist threat. Alternatively, the negative experiences of disillusioned foreign fighters who discovered that jihadist propaganda did not accurately portray conditions or grievances may be especially convincing intermediaries as they more intimately know and understand the thinking and language of radicalized groups, and have the credibility of someone whose been there and done that.

Although most of the concern about immigrant Muslim communities in the West has focused on the potential threat violent radicalization may pose as well as how to counter that threat often with the help of these communities, less work has discussed the positive potential for Western Muslim communities to play as credible communicators between the West and the larger Muslim world. Discussing this potential Kepel writes:

The most important battle in the war for Muslim minds during the next decade will be fought not in Palestine or Iraq but in these communities of believers on the outskirts of London, Paris, and other European cities, where Islam is already a growing part of the West. If European societies are able to integrate these Muslim populations, handicapped as they are by dispossession, and steer them toward prosperity, this new generation of Muslims may become the Islamic vanguard of the next decade, offering their co-religionists a new vision of the faith and a way out of the dead-end politics that has paralyzed their countries of origin.

109 Leiken, "Europe's Angry Muslims."
110 Kilcullen, The accidental guerilla, 244-61. It is worth emphasizing that this training effect of foreign jihads is part of al-Qaida’s core strategy. In Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner Ayman al-Zawahiri writes: “A Jihadist movement needs an arena that would act like an incubator where its seeds would grow and where it can acquire practical experience in combat, politics and organizational matters.” al-Zawahiri, "His Own Words.". Devji, 2005, Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 62-3.
As Kepel explains this may be a slow process, but it is also one that in many ways is already occurring as Muslims from immigrant communities in the West begin to take positions of political power demonstrating the potential promise of the Western liberal approach especially in comparison to the opportunities that remain forbidden across large parts of the Muslim world. Kepel calls this an Andalusia in reverse, playing on contemporary Islamist calls for retaking Spanish territory that was once part of the historic Islamic caliphate at a time when “intellectual influence came from the Muslim Orient” to medieval Spain, as compared to a new possibility where Western Muslim populations serve as conduit for constructive innovation back to the historic Muslim world.\textsuperscript{112} The influence of disparate Muslim communities in the West is likely to be complex and not easily swayed by Western governments who have long contentious histories and structural problems to overcome as well as other potentially reactionary communities to serve at the same time. Mackinlay summarizes the dangers, difficulties, and opportunities writing:

> A global Muslim community that asserts its personality in the world arena and challenges the U.S. strategic concept of a war against terror (which narrowly seeks military outcomes in Iraq and Afghanistan and eschews the larger Muslim dimension) represents a potentially hostile community that is established in every concerned state and region. At the same time, the global Muslim community is an intuitive actor that cannot be addressed or threatened, cannot negotiate, and can only be reached from within through the same informal systems that animate it and hold it together. It would be impossible for non-Muslim actors to enter the community’s consciousness along its internal nervous systems. Change has to come from within, and will be led by Muslims. The West needs the support of the Muslim community. The strategic challenge is to change core Muslim attitudes toward the West in harmony with other Western interests and objectives.\textsuperscript{113}

Muslims in the West include many different populations, living in different countries, with unique concerns and problems as well as different connections and histories with potentially radicalized Muslims around the world all of which complicates the challenge for Western states of motivating these communities as credible intermediaries. However, at a simplified level, it is likely that the more supportive and positive Muslim communities in the West are about their experiences and perceptions of Western governments the more positive leverage they will exert through transnational networks

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., 294-5.
\textsuperscript{113} Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, "Rethinking Counterinsurgency," 41-2.
congruent with Western hearts and minds goals, while the more negative their experience and the more they perceive Western states as hypocritically exploiting or threatening the Muslim world the more their influence will manifest in increased support for more dangerous militant radicalization.

Revisiting Militant Islam and Potential Popular Support

The logic of a hearts and minds strategy indicates that a top-level focus of counterterrorism planning and efforts should be on the larger vital populations whose potential support for or opposition to terrorist groups plays a significant role in the dynamics of these conflicts. This includes already mobilized elements of those populations sympathetic to actors using terrorism (what Waldmann calls the “radical milieu”), mobilized but unsympathetic elements (social movement participants who do not support violent tactics), and the generally larger populations who could become mobilized. Whether American rhetoric and action influences the evolution of movement dynamics in such a way that these populations shift towards or away from groups using tactics of terrorism is a measure of the success or failure of population-centric goals.

Evaluation of this is aided by examining the grievances and aspirations of a population as well as the mobilizing networks, political opportunity structures, and framing processes that influence the dynamics of collective and contentious action.

The previous sections of this chapter have explored the grievances underlying mobilization across much of the Muslim world. One of the observations worth re-emphasizing is that individuals often do not choose to support Islamist movements because of obscure long-term goals or in-depth ideological justifications, but instead because they perceive that these groups will better help address grievances and achieve

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other shared short-term aspirations. \(^{117}\) However, the study of social movements also suggests that as individuals adopt the identity and perspective of a movement they are likely to begin to embrace other attitudes and values. \(^{118}\)

A focus on mobilizing structures reinforces the importance of kinship and friendship as well as other formal and informal networks. \(^{119}\) Examination of mobilizing structures also places emphasis on the role of social movement organizations in shaping, mobilizing, and directing the evolution of a larger movement. Militant Islamist groups can be usefully understood as social movement organizations who are often in competition with other aspects of the larger movement as well as state and counter-movement actors over resources, networks, and framing contests. \(^{120}\) Later chapters of this thesis will return to the argument that a potential failure of U.S. hearts and minds objectives is seen in strengthening or encouraging aggregation and networking both of militants with non-militant Islamist actors locally as well as of different militant Islamist groups internationally contrary to the strategic principles derived from studies of contemporary counterinsurgency. \(^{121}\)

Analyzing political opportunity structures highlights the role played by the relative openness of the political system, elite alignments and allies, and state repression. The evolution of movement dynamics across the Muslim world have been significantly guided by governments that severely restrict political access, elites who have sought to maintain their own positions of privilege, as well as widespread and violent authoritarian oppression of any challengers including non-violent moderates. Hearts and minds goals are affected to the degree that American rhetoric or policy


\(^{118}\) Gerges, *Journey of the Jihadist*, 115.


\(^{121}\) Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency."
encourages or discourages such moves, and to the degree that local populations perceive or attribute responsibility for these to the United States.122

Highlighting framing processes with respect to hearts and minds objectives may be considered a means of evaluating the war of ideas from a social movement perspective. Framing processes play three important roles in the evolution of movement dynamics: diagnosing problems in need of redress, including attributing responsibility and targets of blame; offering specific strategies and tactics as solutions that will remedy grievances and achieve aspirations; and, providing a motivational rationale for individuals and groups to support and participate in mobilization.123 Evaluation of the relationship between U.S. policies and rhetoric with movement evolution respecting the support of militant Islamists occurs along three further dimensions of the degree to which Muslim populations: adopt Islamist narratives about grievances and aspirations; attribute blame and intentionality to the United States or Western actors; and, support individual calls for and justifications of the use of violent tactics. It is especially the mix of these three that determines the threat to the United States. For example, adoption of an overarching “Islam is the solution” frame and acceptance of an individual, nonviolent duty of dawa (or a “call to God”) does not increase the threat of violence, and may arguably decrease it.124 However, increased attribution of Muslim grievances to Western influences, coupled with perceptions that these were intentional actions as part of a historic “Jewish-Crusader” war on Islam, and acceptance of particular militant Islamist arguments for an individual obligation of defensive jihad significantly increase the threat of violence.125 Similarly, while changes in local violence are relevant to U.S. humanitarian or local security goals, increased support for violence as part of al-Qaida’s far enemy logic, because of stronger perceptions that the United States is supporting

123 Wiktorowicz, "Introduction: Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory," 16.
apostate regimes and thus an impediment to local militant Islamist goals, is a significant concern.\textsuperscript{126}

In situating political Islam within a social movement framework this chapter repeatedly emphasizes that Islamist groups are not monolithic and that the majority are locally focused and non-violent. At the same time, emphasizing the diversity within political Islam should not excuse or marginalize the importance of those Islamists who employ and sanctify the use of terrorist tactics. The use of political violence, including terrorism, against both domestic and foreign enemies, plays a significant role in conflicts across the Muslim world. Groups using terrorism may only represent “a thin wedge of the overall Islamic political spectrum” but they have the power to set or significantly influence the broader agenda, and in the process are responsible for much death and suffering.\textsuperscript{127}


\textsuperscript{127} Fuller, \textit{The Future of Political Islam}, xi, 10.
CHAPTER FIVE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TERRORISM

“America is not winning its war on terrorism. We are not even discussing it intelligently.”
– Joseph Nye, November 2006

Simply identifying groups as terrorists and acts as terrorism serves a beneficial function of helping to enforce a societal norm to protect the public against the use of coercive violence by raising opportunity costs, deterring others from choosing similar tactics, and enabling government action. However, the same normative and connotative power of the language of terrorism has also long been criticized as the source of much trouble. This chapter argues that problematic elements of how Americans in general have come to talk and think about terrorism after 9/11 – that is the social construction of terrorism – contribute to the difficulties the United States has winning hearts and minds in the Muslim world. Particular attention is given in this analysis to the strategic narrative the Bush administration advanced for the war on terror, which played a significant role in shaping the overall changes to the public’s social construction, but was also constrained by that same public as well as influenced by the media and other opinion leaders. Contrary to the recommendations for contemporary counterinsurgencies discussed in Chapter Two, these changes encouraged highly normative analysis favouring an enemy-centric instead of population-centric approach and promoting a public understanding that counterproductively constrained the pursuit of hearts and minds goals. The resulting rhetoric and policies encouraged aggregation of otherwise disparate conflicts, undermined the strong pursuit of policies to address

mobilizing grievances and aspirations, and damaged efforts to productively engage in the framing competition of the war of ideas. The chapter begins with an analysis of the post 9/11 social construction of terrorism, emphasizing the Bush administration’s strategic narrative, and then examines how in combination the elements of this construction undermine understanding of population-centric dynamics and adversely affect the implementation of hearts and minds efforts.

**Thinking About Terrorism After 9/11**

The attacks of 11 September 2001 triggered changes in how the public, government officials, and political leaders in America think and talk about terrorism, discussed here as the social construction of terrorism. These changes include: the framing of a war on terror as the most appropriate response; the focus on an amorphous and aggregated Islamic enemy; the presumption that this terrorist enemy primarily targets the United States, threatening especially devastating attacks; and, the intensity of related moral judgments. In turn this altered the frames of references, constraints on what was and was not appropriate to consider, and presumptions for decision-making. Much of this occurred without debate or conscious consideration through a complex dialectic process between political elites, more attentive members of the public, and the general public at large. At first the emotional response and unfolding drama of the attacks themselves and fears about what was coming next largely drove the evolution in thinking. Over time, the strategic narrative employed by political leaders and the resulting policy choices – reacting to the same influences and constrained by the public

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4 The perspective of my analysis builds on a constructivist approach as describe by Wendt where, “the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by … shared ideas rather than given by nature” and “foreign policy behavior is often determined primarily by domestic politics, the analogue to individual personality, rather than by the international system.” Wendt, 1999, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge University Press, 1-2.
mood – further shaped this transformation. Intermixed, the news and entertainment media reflected and reinforced as well as nudged and focused the new thinking.

Creating the Post 9/11 Construction and Strategic Narrative

How the public thinks and talks about terrorism plays a significant role in influencing and constraining the selection, formation, implementation, and analysis of national policy and strategy. As an interactively produced and complex construct, with emotional and rational dimensions, as well as a variety of positively and negatively associated concepts, how the public thinks about terrorism is not easily determined through opinion polls or surveys. Instead, following a methodology established by constructivist academic works, I argue the public’s understanding can be evaluated as it is reflected in the statements of political leaders, government officials, opinion makers, and other members of the public who are highly involved in or attentive to political and security issues as well as through the related content of news and entertainment media.5 At the same time all of these actors also play a significant interactive role in the creation and shaping of the larger public’s understanding, confounding the separation of reflection from catalyst and instigator.6

The strategic narrative for the war on terrorism advanced by the Bush administration after 9/11 not only guided decision making and policy implementation for the vast national security apparatus directly under the President’s command, but also

5 The assumption of my approach is that the success of each of these actors to a significant degree is dependent upon their ability to align themselves with the general opinion and attitudes of the larger public or the respective sub-groups they represent. Using the same or similar approaches: Lustick, *Trapped in the War on Terror*, 9-10. Sobel, 2001, *The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy Since Vietnam: Constraining the Colossus*, 12-4. Vlahos, 2006, "The Long War: A Self-Fulfilling prophecy of Protracted Conflict – and Defeat," National Interest online (September 5), http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=11982. Further, I principally focus on the public statements of senior political leaders arguing that these are more important for shaping U.S. strategic narrative for the war on terror than possible private beliefs or rarely read strategic documents that have been stripped of emotive language. As Marc Lynch argues, “The methodological argument encoded in this book is that what people say in public matters more for shaping political identities and strategies than their private beliefs or internal deliberations.” Lynch, *Voices of the New Arab Public*, 27, 72.

6 Fortunately, the focus of this thesis is on examining the adverse effects of the construction, rather than determining the degree to which each actor was separately responsible for which changes.
played a central role in shaping the public’s understanding of terrorism, the threat faced, and how best to respond. Freedman explains that strategic narratives in this context are “compelling story lines which can explain events convincingly and from which inferences can be drawn.”\(^7\) He observes that these narratives are strategic in that “they do not arise spontaneously but are deliberately constructed or reinforced out of the ideas and thoughts that are already current.”\(^8\) These narratives evolve from the rhetorical framing policy leaders use to describe a threat and justify a related cluster of responses as well as the significant actions they take which have their own performative aspects. Arquilla and Ronfeldt explain that “stories communicate a sense of cause, purpose, and mission” and “express aims and methods as well as cultural dispositions – what ‘we’ believe in, and what we mean to do, and how.”\(^9\) Social movement theory approaches narratives from the perspective of examining framing processes and the formation of shared meaning built on language and symbolism that resonates with particular audiences to drive mobilization.\(^10\) In a similar manner Vlahos stresses the importance of strategic narratives in the context of national security for compelling subsequent action:

> In war, narrative is much more than just a story. Narrative may sound like a fancy literary word, but it is actually the foundation of all strategy, upon which all else – policy, rhetoric, and action – is built. War narratives need to be identified and critically examined on their own terms, for they can illuminate the inner nature of the war itself.\(^11\)

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\(^8\) Freedman, \textit{The Transformation of Strategic Affairs}, 22.

\(^9\) Arquilla and Ronfeldt, \textit{Networks and Netwars}, 328.


He further explains that the strategic narrative becomes an “organizing framework for policy” which makes specific important assumptions “appear to be self-evident and undeniable,” in turn constraining the ability to criticize the resulting policy choices and serving as a guide for how “the war is to be argued and described.”\textsuperscript{12} As Freedman cautions, strategic narratives “are not necessarily analytical” and “may rely on appeals to emotion, or on suspect metaphors and dubious historical analogies.”\textsuperscript{13} Given its privileged position and powerful public advocates, when successful a strategic narrative exercises significant influence on the overall public construction of a threat. Because this narrative and the larger construction play a considerable role in public rhetoric as well as how strategies are pursued and individual actions carried out by actors at all levels of implementation they exercise significant influence on the pursuit of population-centric strategies. Freedman remarks that the importance of strategic narratives “is implied with every reference to a battle for ‘hearts and minds’,”\textsuperscript{14} recognizing that the overarching narrative establishes the framework for how a government engages in the war of ideas and shapes the individual messages and actions involved in the framing competitions driving contested mobilization.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{Focusing on the Bush Administration’s Strategic Narrative for the War on Terror}

In order to analyze how the American public came to understand the terrorist threat following 9/11 this chapter gives the most weight to exploring the strategic narrative employed by President Bush and leading members of his team responsible for...

\textsuperscript{13} Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, 23.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 24.
\textsuperscript{15} The new U.S. Guide to Counterinsurgency recognizes the importance of this: “The influence strategy must cascade down from a set of strategic narratives from which all messages and actions should be derived. The narratives of the affected government and supporting nations will be different but complimentary. Messages and actions must address ideological, social, cultural, political, and religious motivations that influence or engender a sense of common interest and identity among the affected population and international stakeholders. They should also counter insurgents’ ideology in order to undermine their motivation and deny them popular support and sanctuary (both physical and virtual). In doing so, counterinsurgents should seek to expose the tensions in motivation (between different ideologies or between ideology and self-interest) that exist across insurgent networks.” "U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide," 20.
policy related to terrorism and national security. As the elected executive, directly responsible for the national response, the Bush administration was central to shaping the evolving construction through official statements and actions. Given the realities of partisan politics and political benefits stemming from broader public approval, they were also very attentive to the national mood. The success of the administration in this regard is supported by consistently high approval ratings with respect to the handling of terrorism, victories in the 2002 and 2004 elections as well as on related legislative issues, and the observation that their principle partisan opponents largely echoed or made similar statements when talking about terrorism. Focusing on the Bush administration’s strategic narrative further enables this chapter to examine how the problems discussed directly undermined hearts and minds goals and the pursuit of a population-centric approach given that this narrative represents President Bush’s

16 I conducted a simple statistical analysis for this thesis finding that President Bush consistently has been rated significantly higher for his handling of terrorism than his overall job approval rating. Details of this analysis are in the following paragraph and related footnotes.
priorities, policy choices, and public rhetoric while serving as guidance to key members of his national security team.

The methodological approach of this chapter for studying the public’s social construction of terrorism posits that the complex nature of this construct can be understood to a significant degree by examining it through the reflection found in the public statements of opinion leaders. In order to empirically test confidence in the assessment that the Bush administration’s rhetorical framing of terrorism after 9/11 accurately represented how the larger public came to think about terrorism during this time I conducted a simple statistical analysis comparing President Bush’s overall job approval rating to public approval for his handling of terrorism. I examined six years of data from two different national polling firms using 111 surveys where both questions were asked in the same survey and with the questions remaining consistent over the full time period for longitudinal comparisons.19 Suggesting that the public particularly identified with his approach to terrorism, as opposed to simply having a favourable or unfavourable opinion of his performance in general, approval for President Bush’s handling of terrorism was usually significantly higher – and never lower – than his overall job approval.20 Further, comparing fluctuations between the two questions demonstrates that increases in the relatively higher approval for his handling of terrorism came at times corresponding to periods where he focused on terrorism in repeated public statements.21

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19 This analysis was based on six years of CBS News/New York Times data (77 polls from November 2001 to October 2007, 26 of which included their specific terrorism question) and three and a half years of USA Today/Gallup Poll data (38 polls from January 2003 to May 2007 all of which included both their general and terrorism approval questions). Archival polling data available on the PollingReport.com website.

20 Approval of President Bush’s handling of terrorism was never lower in either poll than his overall approval rating, in the CBS/NYT Poll approval of his handling of terrorism averaged 15.8 percentage points higher than his overall favourability rating and in the USA/Gallup Poll the net difference averaged 9.0 points. In both polls President Bush had a generally net positive post-9/11 overall approval rating into 2005, with some exceptions during the 2004 Presidential election in the CBS/NYT poll. Both polls also only begin to show regular net negative ratings of his handling of terrorism from mid-2006 on, and then by only an average of 2 points over the last year of available USA/Gallup data (through 6 May 2007) and an average of 9 points over the last year of available CBS/NYT data (through 16 October 2007).

21 For example, and of significant note to the analysis of speeches later in this chapter, during the three months leading into to the 2006 elections both polls show up turns with
In order to examine the Bush administration’s strategic narrative I focus in this chapter on the public statements made by President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Secretaries of State Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice. This chapter includes specific reference to 63 different speeches given over seven years after reviewing the complete set of official transcripts for those officials published during the Bush administration by the White House, Department of Defense, and Department of State for references to or discussions of the war on terror. My analysis of those statements in conjunction with other texts representing or giving insight into the larger public construction looked for recurring themes, how arguments developed over time, indications of how the resulting narrative was enforced and employed, and how the core elements of the administration’s strategic narrative were represented in the public discourse of other opinion leaders, experts, and the news and entertainment media.

net positive ratings for President Bush’s handling of terrorism (an average of +6.6 in the CBS/NYT polls, and +4.5 in the USA/Gallup polls). This is important as it was during this time that President Bush made several public speeches specifically focused on the war on terror and threat of terrorism that are included in the analysis of this thesis. It is likely that to some degree the positive reaction shown in these polls is indicative that these speeches (and related messaging efforts) were consistent with and positively received by the general public. During the same period of time his overall favourability or approval ratings in these polls changed much less. Further, while earlier increases in his approval ratings correlated with general success by the Republican Party, in the fall of 2006 while approval of President Bush’s handling of terrorism went up at a time when he gave several highly publicized speeches on the topic, the Democratic Party achieved significant mid-term election victories capturing control of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives.

The Trauma of 9/11 as a Catalyst for Change

The September 11 attacks may not have “changed everything,” however with respect to the American experience and approach to terrorism they changed a lot.²³ Many followed and virtually experienced the attacks and their aftermath unfold, with horrifying visual imagery, through the immediacy of live news coverage. These images were then repeated on seemingly endless loops in the background over the following weeks when almost nothing unrelated was discussed. For most Americans the attacks were a generational trauma and powerful catalyst for rethinking as George Lakoff describes:

The people who did this got into my brain, even three thousand miles away. All those symbols were connected to more of my identity than I could have realized. To make sense of this, my very brain had to change. And change it did, painfully. Day and night. By day, the consequences flooded my mind; by night, the images had me breathing heavily, nightmares keeping me awake. Those symbols lived in the emotional centers of my brain. As their meanings changed, I felt emotional pain. It was not just me. It was everyone in this country, and many in other countries. The assassins managed not only to kill thousands of people but to reach in and change the brains of people all over America. It is remarkable to know that two hundred million of my countrymen feel as wrenches as I do.²⁴

The traumatic nature of the attacks triggered the potential of a shared national identity to bring people together through generosity of spirit at a time of need as well as collective demand for revenge on a grand scale.\textsuperscript{25}

\textit{The Constraining Influence of the General Public}

The contribution of the general public to the process of social construction is blunt. It does not provide specific direction on choices between policy options or engage in discernable nuanced argument over optimal framing. Instead, the public’s reaction shaped the evolving construction of terrorism after 9/11 by setting and enforcing expectations as to what type of general response would be appropriate or inappropriate. The American public reacted angrily and quickly to denounce anyone perceived as sympathetic to or insufficiently outraged by those responsible for the attacks.\textsuperscript{26} Despite a few calls for patience and a rethinking of policy, or restraint on overseas military actions, for most in the United States:

\begin{quote}
[T]he attacks were outrages against the people of America, far surpassing in infamy even the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Such an insult to American honor… cried for immediate and spectacular vengeance to be inflicted by America’s own armed forces.\textsuperscript{27}
\end{quote}

\footnotesize

\textsuperscript{26} For example: “In what was perhaps the most widely reported case of a media personality recanting remarks on the attacks, Bill Maher, host of ABC’s late-night discussion program \textit{Politically Incorrect}, reacted to the White House’s characterization of the hijackers of the planes that crashed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon as ‘cowardly.’ Maher paid for his candor: stations pulled his program, advertisers cancelled, the White House criticized his comments, and ultimately, his program was cancelled. Maher’s case was the most visible example, but hardly the only one, of the media company executives censoring themselves or their employees in the months and years following the September 11 attacks.” Drushel, 2006, "Politically (In)corrected: Electronic Media Self-Censorship Since the 9/11 Attacks," In \textit{Language, Symbols, and the Media: Communication in the Aftermath of the World Trade Center Attack}, ed. Denton: Transaction Publishers. p204-5

\textsuperscript{27} Speaking to a British audience, Howard continued: “And who can blame Americans? In their position the British would have felt exactly the same way.” Howard, 2002,
Had the Bush administration chosen a path perceived as falling short of a grand response, the power of the public would have found voice and been exercised through competing political elites to force a change of course.

The general attitude of the American public has continued to demand that the government prioritize efforts to insure a sense of security against future threats. CIA counterterrorism expert Paul Pillar wrote:

Regardless of the actual level of jihadist strength overseas, one of the main reasons U.S. leaders will continue to have to give high priority to counterterrorism is that most Americans… will almost certainly continue to place far more emphasis on deaths due to terrorism than on drownings in bathtubs or the like – and they will expect their leaders to formulate policy accordingly.  

Security expert Bruce Schneier similarly observes, the “problem is that our nation’s leaders are giving us what we want. Party affiliation notwithstanding, appearing tough on terrorism is important.”

**Whomever Was in Power Would Lead**

While the public at large exercises general influence, the attitudes and predispositions of whoever happened to be in political power at the time would play an especially significant role in shaping the specific framing and understanding of terrorism. The 2000 U.S. presidential elections, the closest in American history, brought to power a national security team that included dominant individuals who long advocated a more aggressive American posture.  

Given popular receptivity the statements, framing, and policies of these individuals had substantial influence on the emerging new social construction of terrorism. Many have argued that whoever held


office would have responded in the short-term on a similarly aggressive scale. However, the choices to pursue a generalized war on terror against an undifferentiated global terrorist enemy, involving a with us or against us American diplomacy, and including the invasion of Iraq were not, and instead are reflective of the perspectives of key members of the Bush team.

The Media Reinforced, Reflected, and Reified

The primary influence of the news media immediately following the attacks was in saturation coverage, highlighting every minor development, and often replaying the attacks themselves. Several critics have suggested that the extent and focus of this coverage, especially the repetitive attack footage, contributed to a national feeling of fear and a predisposition for harder, more aggressive counterterrorism policies. Others observed that the coverage also frequently followed long established patterns for covering the Muslim world reinforcing associations between Islam and militant images of gun-toting bearded terrorists, heavily veiled women, angry crowds, and “death to America” chants.

At the time some coverage also focused on the very questions that many critics have since raised, including detailed discussions of why many in Muslim majority countries express grievances with the United States as well as on the arguments of Usama bin Ladin. A 27 September 2001 Christian Science Monitor piece, typical of the “why do they hate us” stories, informed:

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31 Lustick, *Trapped in the War on Terror*, 68.
32 Ibid.
Most Arabs and Muslims knew the answer, even before they considered who was responsible... And voices across the Muslim world are warning that if America doesn’t wage its war on terrorism in a way that the Muslim world considers just, America risks creating even greater animosity... And they do not share Mr. Bush’s view that the perpetrators did what they did because “they hate our freedoms.” Rather, they say, a mood of resentment toward America and its behavior around the world has become so commonplace in their countries that it was bound to breed hostility, and even hatred. And the buttons that Mr. bin Laden pushes in his statements and interviews – the injustice done to the Palestinians, the cruelty of continued sanctions against Iraq, the presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia, the repressive and corrupt nature of US-backed Gulf governments – win a good deal of popular sympathy.35

Although political elites and attentive members of the public were or generally became familiar with these arguments, relatively they did not have much influence on shaping emerging changes to the construction.36 Key opinion shapers dismissed them as inappropriate or wrong, while the far greater attention given to re-playing the attacks and discussing possible future threats had a larger effect. This is consistent with previous research and observations that the media is better at telling the public what to worry about, through its coverage of potentially fear-raising topics, than it has proven to be in telling people what to think about those issues.37

35 Ford, "Why Do They Hate Us?." See also: Zakaria, "The Politics of Rage."
36 For example, discussing Said’s criticisms of Western prejudices and essentializing attitudes towards the Muslim world, Matthew Yglesias argues: “I’m skeptical that … more widespread knowledge of Edward Said’s work would have posed some kind of substantial stumbling block to the effort to sell the country on the Iraq War. The main intellectual drivers behind America’s post-9/11 approach to the Middle East were, if not Said experts, at least broadly familiar with the general thrust of his work (I’d put myself in that category as well) which is precisely why you see things like The Weekly Standard publishing an Edward Said takedown piece by Stanley Kurtz on their October 8, 2001 issue. Then they took another whack at Said in their November 12, 2001 issue. And Frank Foer offered a sweeping dismissal of Middle East Studies as a discipline in the December 3, 2001 issue of The New Republic tracing the field’s flaws to none other than Said. In general, this was a period when ‘Arabist’ became a term of disapprobation and it temporarily became conventional wisdom that foreign service professionals’ judgment was mostly corrupted by excessive solicitousness of the opinions of foreign governments. Elites were generally familiar with the broad set of ideas that called the wisdom of invading Iraq into question – from Middle East studies thinking to the realist tradition of international relations analysis to the mainstream opinion of the U.S. Army officer’s corps – it just came to be generally accepted that these strands of thought were mistaken.” Yglesias, 2008b, "The Said Factor," The Atlantic (September 11), http://matthewyglesias.theatlantic.com/archives/2008/05/the_said_factor.php.
37 Lustick, Trapped in the War on Terror, 102. Tatham, "Hearts and Minds," 333.
Media coverage following 9/11 was also largely a response to what the public was willing to consume. Detractors of the war in Iraq have argued that for at least a year “Bush was off limits for criticism, even satire and humor,” with some suggesting this represents manipulation or a failure of the media to do their job. While a subdued level of critical coverage increased the influence of the administration on shaping the public understanding, a simpler explanation is that during a time of national crisis the American public itself constrained reporting through a preference for a more unified and nationally supportive tone of coverage.

The entertainment media also serves as a proxy for the public’s mood and thinking, especially as it is directly profit sensitive and “responds to public beliefs, prejudices, worries, and fascinations by incorporating them into the narratives offered in television shows, films, novels, and feature articles.” After an initial reluctance to release already produced content thought to be too closely related to the attacks out of concerns for public sensitivity, the industry “lunged aggressively into the preparation and distribution of films and television dramas depicting threats of catastrophic terrorism against the United States” having determined that was what the public desired. This included frequent special episodes of long-running television series and several new shows specifically about terrorism or agencies fighting terrorists including The

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Film and TV production has also cast a more critical perspective on the war on terror. Michael Moore’s Oscar winning documentary \textit{Fahrenheit 9/11} is one of the most prominent examples, as well as films such as \textit{Syriana}, \textit{Munich}, and \textit{Rendition}.

Television programming has also portrayed stories critical or at least more nuanced to
the dominant narrative.\textsuperscript{46} Because films, television programs, and novels are open to consumer selection (not many conservatives went to Michael Moore’s film to be persuaded) observation of what is produced is often a better measure of what segments of the public are already thinking as well of changes in the public mood over time. Similar to news media, the contribution to shaping attitudes and beliefs may be more at the margins by providing others material and ideas to pass on to friends or highlight when considering arguments, than in directly shaping or setting attitudes.

\textbf{The Shift to a War on Terror}

The most significant change in American thinking about terrorism after 9/11 is represented by a shift to an overall war on terror approach to counterterrorism.\textsuperscript{47} For

\textsuperscript{46} Although without the mass market reach of 24, a particularly subversive storyline was featured in the third season of the new \textit{Battlestar Galactica}, portraying the good guys with whom the audience identifies as insurgents fighting an occupation, suffering torture, and “willing to blow themselves up in their fight for freedom.” Falconer, 2006, "Galactica Continues to Assault Comfortable Sensibilities,” (November 21), HollywoodNorthReport.com, \url{http://www.hollywoodnorthreport.com/article.php?Article=3834}. Solove, 2008, "Battlestar Galactica Interview Transcript (Part 1),” (March 2), Concurring Opinions, \url{http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2008/03/battlestar_gala_4.html}.

\textsuperscript{47} President Ronald Reagan may have been the first U.S. president to declare a war on terrorism, however given the dramatic change in prioritization, global focus, and public understanding post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism policies are best understood as a discrete and new approach. Davis, 2005, "New Name for 'War on Terror'," \textit{BBC News}, July 27, \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4719169.stm}. Levenson, 2004, "The War on What, Exactly? Why the Press Must be Precise," \textit{Columbia Journalism Review} (6), November/December, \url{http://cjrarchives.org/issues/2004/6/voices-levenson.asp}. A comparison of statements by former New York City mayor Rudy Giuliani illustrates the dramatic nature of the shift. After the convictions were announced for those tried for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing Mayor Giuliani declared that the verdict “demonstrates that New Yorkers won’t meet violence with violence, but with a far greater weapon – the law.” Kleinfield, 1994, "Explosion at the Twin Towers: The Reaction; Convictions Greeted with Jubilation and Big Sighs," \textit{The New York Times}, March 5, \url{http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B02E4DB113AF936A35750C0A9629 58260}. By the time he was a primary candidate for the Republican Presidential nomination, Giuliani spoke so often about the need to pursue a very aggressive war on terror that Democratic Senator Joseph Biden joked there are only three things in a Giuliani sentence, “a noun and a verb and 9/11.” Associated Press, 2007, "Democratic Rivals Target Hillary Rodham Clinton in Debate as she Strengthens her Lead," \textit{International Herald Tribune}, October 30,
large segments of the general public, framing the American response as a “war” made immediate sense given the perceived magnitude of the attack by foreign actors who, many Americans learned for the first time, had already publicly declared war on the United States and were behind previous significant terrorist attacks and plots against American interest abroad.  

From the administration’s perspective a war response made most sense as they quickly expected to take military action not only against al-Qaida and the government hosting them in Afghanistan, but also in other countries as part of their rapidly developing grand strategy to go on the offensive against terrorism and states who support terrorist groups or pose a threat of supplying them with weapons of mass destruction. Levenson summarizes Bush’s declaration of a war on terror, its expansive goals, and the immediately following media reinforcement and adoption of this frame: 

Then on September 20, 2001, President Bush, in his defining address to Congress, recast the metaphor as a literal war. He painted in broad strokes. “Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda,” he said, “but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.” The enemy he described was as amorphous as the war’s scope. They were, he said, the heirs of Nazism and totalitarianism whose murderous ideology valued only power. They hated the American way of life, freedom, elections, and the press, and they intended to purge vast regions of the Middle East and Asia of Jews and Christians. He then bifurcated the world into two camps: those who were with the United States, and those who were with the terrorists. Beginning the following day, the American press wove “war on terror” into tens of thousands of news reports, features, and editorials to describe the logic for policies ranging from the Homeland Security Act to the Iraq war.  

The war on terror framing became the central and defining logic and rhetoric of the Bush administration’s strategic narrative, and promptly entered into the common discourse not just in the United States but also around the world. Jackson argued in 2005:


49 Levenson, ”The War on What, Exactly?"
To a great extent, this project of rhetorically constructing a massive counter-terrorism campaign has been highly successful; the ‘war on terrorism’ is now the dominant political narrative in America, enjoying widespread bipartisan and public support. Individuals and social actors from across the spectrum now speak the language of the ‘war on terrorism’ and accept its assumptions, its forms of knowledge and its policy prescriptions; and those who oppose it are largely ignored, silenced and excluded from the policy debate. Even more critically, the ‘war on terrorism’ is embedded into the institutions and practice of national security and law enforcement, the legal system, the legislative and executive processes and increasingly, the wider political culture; it is now fully institutionalised and normalised.\(^{50}\)

For the next seven years the war on terror and the larger strategic narrative employed by President Bush continued to shape public and political thinking.

The Bush administration had choices in how to frame their response to 9/11, including: continuing to use a criminality framework emphasizing law enforcement and intelligence work;\(^ {51}\) defining the challenge as an emergency as the British had done in Palestine, Ireland, Cyprus, and Malaya or as a confrontation as described by General Sir Rupert Smith;\(^ {52}\) or, declaring a more narrow war on al-Qaida.\(^ {53}\) These alternatives would have emphasized other priorities and response options, composing a different strategic narrative, and leading the emerging social construction down a different path. However, the magnitude of the terrorist attacks and effect on the American public

\(^{50}\) Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*, 2-3. Jackson’s conclusion that the discourse of the war on terror “is now fully institutionalised and normalised” echoes Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s original work in *The Social Construction of Reality*. One of the dramatic elements of the American response to 9/11 and changes to the social construction of terrorism is how quickly these changes occurred. Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*.

\(^{51}\) In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks then Secretary of State Colin Powell reportedly argued within the administration that this be treated as a crime, while during the first few hours of that day administration spokesmen referred to it as a crime. Lakoff and Frisch, 2006, "Five Years After 9/11: Drop the War Metaphor," CommonDreams.org, September 11, http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0911-20.htm.


created pressures favouring a relatively expansive response, with which the Bush administration’s preference was easily compatible.\textsuperscript{54}

\textit{The War on Terror as a Real War, Not a Metaphor}

Another question that has arisen about the administration’s framing, providing insight into how the public thinks about the overall problem, is whether the war on terror is meant as a metaphor or a real war. Several commentators and critics have treated it metaphorically, similar to the “war on drugs” or the “war on poverty,”\textsuperscript{55} assuming it is merely meant to indicate a high level of commitment, an aggressive approach, and the mobilizing idea of an “us” and a “them.”\textsuperscript{56} Some of those making this assumption presuppose it is nonsensical to declare war on a noun or an emotional state,\textsuperscript{57} while others intentionally cast it as a metaphor with the goal of facilitating a shift in public thinking under a different framing.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{54} Vlahos, "The Fall of Modernity: Has the American Narrative Authored its own Undoing?." In late summer 2005 the Department of Defense briefly decided to recast the war on terror as the “global struggle against violent extremism.” The quick speed with which administration officials publicly repudiated this change is an example emphasizing the power of public opinion for constraining the pursuit of U.S. strategy. This rhetorical roll back included emphatic statements from the President and others that there had been no change in strategy and reassurance that it still was the war on terror. Froomkin, 2005, "War: The Metaphor," \textit{The Washington Post}, August 4. Stevenson, 2005, "President Makes It Clear: Phrase Is 'War on Terror'," \textit{The New York Times}, August 4, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/04/politics/04bush.html. \textsuperscript{55} In this tradition, Guy Raz notes: “In fact, on Sept. 10, 2001, President Bush declared a new ‘war on illiteracy for the young’ at a Florida elementary school.” Raz, 2006, "Defining the War on Terror," \textit{NPR: All Things Considered}, November 1, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6416780. \textsuperscript{56} Levenson, "The War on What, Exactly?." \textsuperscript{57} Part of this stream of commentary is the belief that it is impossible to achieve victory over a tactic. Howard explains that even if the phrase was not meant rhetorically (as in the war on crime) “‘terror’ as such could not be an adversary. We cannot be at war with an abstract noun. This was not a pedantic quibble: as any scientist can tell us, if we misdiagnose the problem we are not likely to come up with a solution.” Howard, "A Long War?", 7-8, 11-2. However both President Bush and Vice President Cheney, for example, have explicitly stated that victory over terror is the end goal they envision. Cheney, "Vice President's Remarks to the Manhattan Institute, Manhattan Institute, New York, New York.". "There Is No Doubt in My Mind. Not One Doubt: Excerpts From an Interview with President Bush on Dec. 20, 2001," 2002, \textit{Washington Post}, February 3, http://nucnews.net/nucnews/2002nn/0202nn/020203nn.htm#160. \textsuperscript{58} Lakoff and Frisch, "Five Years After 9/11."
President Bush, other members of his administration, and many public advocates have made clear from the start they believe and perceive this as a very real war even if there is not a traditional battlefield or other familiar classic elements. During his 2004 re-election campaign, President Bush directly addressed this issue while comparing his approach to his opponents:

And [Senator Kerry’s] policies make that clear. He says the war on terror is primarily a law enforcement and intelligence-gathering operation. His top foreign policy advisor says the war is just a metaphor, like the war on poverty… My outlook was changed on September the 11th… I’ll never forget the evil of the enemy and the suffering of our people. I know we’re not fighting a metaphor.

Secretary Rumsfeld similarly emphasized that this is a real war in 2005:

Let there be no mistake, we are a nation at war, against terrorist enemies who are seeking our surrender or our retreat. It is a war. The President properly determined after September 11th that the United States no longer could deal with terrorists killing our people as we had in the past in the traditional law enforcement sense. Indeed, the only way to defeat terrorism is to go on the attack. That’s exactly what our coalition has done and is doing in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere around the world… We need all elements of national power to win this war, but make no mistake, it is a war.

59 Garton Ash, 2006, "Stop calling it the ‘war on terror’, The term was wrong from the start, and now it's linked with a disastrous real war in Iraq," Los Angeles Times, November 2, http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-ash2nov02,0,174776.story?coll=la-opinion-center.
61 Rumsfeld, 2005, "Remarks at Greater Dallas Chamber of Commerce," (August 2), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3856. Adding an element of irony to these remarks, after resigning as Secretary of Defense, Rumsfeld reportedly said: “I don’t think I would have called it the war on terror. I don’t mean to be critical of those who have. Certainly, I have used the phrase frequently. Why do I say that? Because the word ‘war’ conjures up World War II more than it does the Cold War. It creates a level of expectation of victory and an ending within 30 or 60 minutes of a soap opera. It isn’t going to happen that way. Furthermore, it is not a ‘war on terror.’ Terror is a weapon of choice for extremists who are trying to destabilize regimes and
The view that the war on terror is a real war strengthens the framing and association effects of the public construction of terrorism. How strongly individuals hold this perception is one of the better measures of how strongly they have adopted the full construction as described in this chapter.\footnote{Rumsfeld, 2006c, "Remarks by Secretary Rumsfeld at the Army War College," (March 27), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1206.}

**Much More Threatening and Primarily Targeting the United States**

The second major shift in American thinking about terrorism came with the perception that terrorists are primarily focused on targeting the United States and pose an especially grave threat.\footnote{Jenkins, *Unconquerable Nation*, 11.} Before 9/11 most Americans saw terrorism as a tactic used by a variety of diverse groups, sometimes against the United States overseas by foreign actors and on rare occasions within the United States by generally isolated domestic extremists, but much more often a threat to other countries and other people. In comparison to the Cold War threats of nuclear war, or even a conventional military confrontation, terrorism was simply not a national security priority. After 9/11 the perception of terrorism changed dramatically. Now, when Americans talk about terrorism, they almost always think of a foreign enemy whose major targets at least include – if not primarily focus on – the United States,\footnote{It should be noted this is largely a change in degree and not a fundamental shift. Terrorism was abstract to many Americans before 9/11 because they were generally not the ones targeted. When they were targeted the other was similarly seen as an enemy – the major difference is that after 9/11 terrorism has come to represent an aggregated Islamic enemy. Talking about how terrorism implied an enemy in its traditional usage see: Kapitan, 2003, "The Terrorism of 'Terrorism'," In *Terrorism and International Justice*, ed. Sterba: Oxford, 4.} and who are perceived as posing the greatest security threat both at home and abroad. For most Americans a war on terror simply made sense having collectively come to a recognition that the United

\begin{quote}
(through) a small group of clerics, impose their dark vision on all the people they can control. So ‘war on terror’ is a problem for me.” Thomas, 2006b, "Donald Rumsfeld w/ Cal Thomas: Transcript," (December 11), Townhall.com, http://www.townhall.com/Columnists/CalThomas/2006/12/11/donald_rumsfeld_w_cal_thomas_transcript. On the other hand, see Phares for making a conservative critique of the phrase war on terror for not being encompassing enough: Phares, *The Confrontation*, 255.
\end{quote}
States faced a global enemy intent on killing as many Americans and other Westerners as possible as part of a larger clash of cultures.

**The United States is the Primary Target**

Following 9/11 the stream of news articles addressing the question of “why do they hate us” was one signal of the widespread perception that those responsible were focused on the United States. While rhetoric immediately following the attacks understandably centred on the threat to America, the degree to which the administration and the larger public came to see the conflict as one in which the United States was the core target is emphasized by later political and public statements.\(^{65}\) For example, Vice President Cheney regularly described the “United States and the American people” as the terrorists’ “primary target,” as in an August 2005 speech:

> At this moment, all branches of the armed services are fighting the new war against one of our most ruthless enemies. Those who attacked America have proven their eagerness to kill innocent men, women, and children by the thousands. They are looking to obtain weapons of mass destruction by any means they can find. They would not hesitate to use such weapons at the first opportunity. And their prime target is our country.\(^{66}\)

Emphasizing that their focus is on the United States and Americans, President Bush stated in 2004 the U.S. was in a global war with an enemy “determined to … make our country into a battlefield.”\(^{67}\) A week later he added, “we are dealing with killers who have made the death of Americans the calling of their lives” and that Americans were “fighting these terrorists … in Afghanistan and Iraq and beyond so we do not have to


face them in the streets of our own cities." Secretary Rumsfeld similarly framed the conflict as a war between the United States and terrorist enemies seeking “our surrender or our retreat.” That this is their ultimate aim is reinforced by political language describing other goals merely as stepping stones enabling further attacks against America, as President Bush explained in September 2006, “At this moment, terrorists and extremists are fighting to overthrow moderate governments in the region, so they can take control of countries and use them as bases from which to attack America.”

**With Us or Against Us**

Accompanying the post 9/11 view that the United States is the central actor is the explicit framing that everyone must choose sides, you are either supportive of the current U.S. war on terror or you are with the terrorists. In his 20 September 2001 address President Bush cast the conflict in these direct terms: “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” Secretary of State Powell echoed this the following year, “In this global campaign against terrorism, no country has the luxury of remaining on the sidelines. There are no sidelines.” Such statements could have been viewed at the time as simply part of expected rhetorical rallying cries for domestic audiences or high-pressure diplomatic efforts to encourage other nations to support expected military action. However, the Bush administration approach to diplomacy after 9/11 has been widely seen as embracing this stark choice as an intentional contrast to the style of preceding U.S. administrations. In the following years key members of the administration have

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69 Rumsfeld, "Remarks at Greater Dallas Chamber of Commerce."
70 Bush, "President Bush Discusses Global War on Terror."
71 Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People."
repeatedly reiterated this policy, as President Bush did during an April 2002 talk saying, “I’ve tried to speak as clearly as I possibly can. You’re either with us or you’re not with us. You’re either with us or you’re against us.”74 Similarly, during a March 2004 address he said, “There is no neutral ground – no neutral ground – in the fight between civilization and terror, because there is no neutral ground between good and evil, freedom and slavery, and life and death.”75

The trauma of the 9/11 attacks, coupled with highly normative condemnation of and repulsion towards the use of terrorism, made this unambiguous and simple division a natural and compelling way to approach the conflict for most Americans.76 In turn this reinforced the existing predispositions of key Bush administration decision makers to continue to approach the war on terror in this manner.77 As part of this approach, the Bush administration has often led with public pressure that potential allies, and

76 The “with us or against us” rhetorical framing of the war on terror has also regularly been part of the more highly normative “good versus evil” framing discussed later in this chapter, as in a 2002 speech where the President indicated that anyone who is not with the United States is evil, saying: “Well, you’ve probably learned by now, I don’t believe there’s many shades of gray in this war. You’re either with us or against us; you’re either evil or you’re good.” Bush, 2002f, "Remarks by the President at Scott McCallum for Governor Reception," (February 11), The White House Office of the Press Secretary, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020211-9.html.
77 President Bush and other members of his administration continue to describe the larger war on terror in these terms, although with less frequency after the Iraq war became increasingly unpopular. For example: Bush, "President Bush Discusses Global War on Terror." Bush, 2008a, "Interview of the President by Mona Shazli, Dream TV, Egypt," (May 12), The White House Office of the Press Secretary, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/05/20080512-12.html.
especially Muslim nations and groups, who do not actively support American efforts will be “held accountable.”

**Threatening the Destruction of the United States**

In addition to focusing on the United States as the primary target, large segments of the American public after 9/11 came to see the threat as especially grave, even existential, transcendent, or the third world war. Using President Bush’s language, Vlahos describes this element of the public’s construction of terrorism:

So we are, as our own government tells us, in a war of civilizations – a national testing in which we will emerge triumphant, the true beacon and best hope of humankind or else find ourselves destroyed, the detritus of history. This is not simply inflated rhetoric. It is avowed American policy. In the president’s own words, it is nothing less than “the unfolding of a global ideological struggle, our time in history,” pitting “progress” and “freedom” against a “mortal danger to all humanity,” the “enemy of civilization.” Moreover, “the call of history has come to the right country,” and “the defense of freedom is worth the sacrifice.” Ultimately the “evil ones” will be destroyed, and “this great country will lead

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78 Bush, 2001d, "President Welcomes President Chirac to White House," (November 6), The White House Office of the Press Secretary, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011106-4.html. For example, at a 2002 press conference, President Bush said, “Almost every day is a new phase, in some ways, because we’re reminding different countries which may be susceptible to al Qaeda, that you’re either with us or against us. And so we’re constantly working on bolstering confidence amongst some nations which may sometimes forget that either you’re with us or you’re with the terrorists.” Bush, 2002b, "President Bush, President Kwasniewski Hold Joint Press Conference," (July 17), The White House Office of the Press Secretary, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020717-3.html. Similar language about needing to make a choice to be with us or with the terrorists has been used by the administration when pressuring Palestinian leaders, the Iranian government, and other Muslim actors. The implicit threat of that statement has been made more clearly on a number of occasions, as President Bush did during a 2006 speech concluding, “Two nations, Afghanistan and Pakistan, made very different decisions – with very different results.” Bush, "President Bush Discusses Global War on Terror." This threat was explicitly part of the President’s 20 September speech launching the war on terror: “From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.” Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People." Vice President Cheney similarly said, “Some may question whether we mean it – but the doubters do not include the members of the Taliban.” Cheney, 2007e, "Vice President’s Remarks to the Central Command, Special Operations Command, and the 6th Air Mobility Wing," (September 14), The White House Office of the Vice President, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/09/20070914-7.html.
the world to safety, security, and peace,” a millennial world where “free peoples will own the future.”

Whalid Phares, who regularly appeared on television after 9/11 as a terrorism expert and often gives lectures to U.S. government audiences, exemplifies this framing, in his words, of “the threat as existential,” where liberal democracies are in “a fight for their existence” – and he means that “the very existence of societies, either physical or cultural, [is] at risk” in this “world confrontation.” Phares emphasizes the strength, determination, and unity of the enemy as opposed to the divisions and confusion within the West:

After five years of battling around the world, from Kabul to Beirut, from Bali to New York City, the forces of Jihadism and their allies have shown unequivocally that they are primarily driven by sheer ideology and a determination to crush their opponents absolutely. With modern roots going back to the 1920s and the 1970s, the terror networks have at their disposal oil power, financial empires, regular armies, militias, underground connections, radical clerics, influential media, madrassas, regimes, circles within governments, biochemical arms, a totalitarian ideology, wide webs of collaborators and sympathizers within the Free World, and, potentially, nuclear weapons. That is one camp. On the other side, democracies are divided on the inside as to the principles of the War on Terror; are divided among each other as to the policies to adopt toward the terrorist threat, particularly the Jihadist one; and are tackling the crisis in a confused way…

For Phares the urgent question in this “global conflict over the future of humanity” is “will the peoples of the world live under the diktat of the Salafists and Khumeinists and the regimes they are establishing, or will they not?” Fortunately, from his perspective, Phares is encouraged that the general American public, thanks to the effort of those spreading the message about the threat, now “perceives the conflict as being about survival.”

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79 Vlahos, "The Fall of Modernity: Has the American Narrative Authored its own Undoing?"
80 Phares, The Confrontation, 16.
81 Ibid., 14.
82 Ibid., 17.
83 Ibid., 13.
84 Ibid., 16.
85 Ibid., 6.
86 Ibid., 92. Reading Phares, and his praise of the media for persuading the American public of the threat, it is easy to see where Shahid Alam concludes that “every day … America’s politicians, press, and pundits” explain that Islamist terrorists “want to destroy” the United States “because they hate our values, our way of life, our
As the Bush administration built its case for Iraq becoming the second major front of the war on terror, the casualties from a chemical, biological, or nuclear attack most frequently measured the threat of terrorism to the United States.\textsuperscript{87} Much of the American public accepted the reality of this danger; especially given the combination of the anthrax attacks in the month after 9/11,\textsuperscript{88} which President Bush had described as “a second wave of terrorist attacks”\textsuperscript{89} and many at the time still assumed to be the work of foreign terrorists,\textsuperscript{90} and evidence that al-Qaida had actively pursued biological and nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{91} President Bush’s October 2002 speech laying out the case for war with Iraq exemplifies the threat as perceived at the time:

We’ve experienced the horror of September the 11th. We have seen that those who hate America are willing to crash airplanes into buildings full of innocent people. Our enemies would be no less willing, in fact, they would be eager, to use biological or chemical, or a nuclear weapon. Knowing these realities, America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof – the smoking gun – that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.\textsuperscript{92}

Demonstrating that the perception of this threat was not a partisan issue, Senator John Kerry frequently spoke of the dangers of nuclear terrorism during the 2004 presidential

\textsuperscript{87} For example: Bush, "President Welcomes President Chirac to White House."
\textsuperscript{89} Allen, 2001, "Bush to Urge Nations to Fight Terrorism with Deeds," Ibid., November 4. However, in his weekly radio address President Bush clearly stated that the government did not know if the anthrax attacks had been carried out by domestic or international terrorists.
\textsuperscript{91} Proof for the later was dramatically demonstrated by captured documents from Afghanistan publicly released by CNN’s Mike Boettcher in January 2002 with the summary that the “al Qaeda terrorist organization was building a serious weapons program with a heavy emphasis on developing a nuclear device.” Boettcher and Arnesen, 2002, "Al Qaeda Documents Outline Serious Weapons Program," CNN (January 25), http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/01/24/inv.al.qaida.documents/.
election.\textsuperscript{93} That contest was a good reflection of majority perceptions on the threat of terrorism as both candidates, informed by millions of dollars spent on polling and focus groups, competed about who would be tougher in fighting the war on terror.\textsuperscript{94} Similarly reflecting the bipartisan consensus of the threat posed, the Democratic Vice-Chair of the 9/11 Commission Lee Hamilton said, “We know what terrorists want to do: they want to kill as many Americans as possible.”\textsuperscript{95}

By looking at the rhetoric of conservative figures writing or speaking directly for their partisan base it is also clear that the comments of members of the Bush administration are not merely reflective of a more radicalized side of the partisan spectrum. Newt Gingrich, for example, has criticized the administration for not sufficiently explaining to the American public that the threat faced is really World War


\textsuperscript{94} As the contest approached election day Senator Kerry often claimed that he would fight “a smarter, more effective, tougher war on terror” primarily differentiated by increased help from allies around the world. Although some Kerry supporters, and many Bush backers, believed that Kerry’s approach would be “softer.” Bush’s perspective was likely closer to a significant majority of the public, as CNN noted, “Numerous polls show the threat of terrorism to be Bush’s strongest issue.” "Bush, Kerry Spar Over Terrorism," 2004, CNN (October 19), http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/10/18/election.main/. See also: Balz and Broder, 2006, "More GOP Districts Counted as Vulnerable: Number Doubled Over the Summer," Washington Post, September 3, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/02/AR2006090200975_pf.html. Bowman, 2006, "The 9/11 Hangover Continues to Shape Public Opinion," Roll Call (September 6), http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.24865/pub_detail.asp. "Clinton's Team Aids Kerry on Military.". Geraghty, "Me Too, Me Too!.". Lustick, Trapped in the War on Terror, 24. Navarrette, "Kerry's Dilemma.". Sanger and Wilgoren, "Kerry Says War in Iraq has Allowed Bigger Threats to Grow." The fact that Republicans faired poorly in the 2006 election, despite having again made the war on terror a central part of their election message, had much more to do with American disapproval of the handling and state of the war in Iraq. This is emphasized by the focus of Democrats on separating Iraq from larger concerns about terrorism and frequently arguing that Iraq had actually worsened the threat of terrorism.

Three.96 Popular right wing radio talk show host Dennis Prager has said the threat is “far more serious” than the Second World War’s Nazis and the Cold War’s Soviet Communism.97 During the 2008 Republican Presidential primary, former Governor Mitt Romney argued, “Radical Islam has one goal: to replace all modern Islamic states with a worldwide caliphate while destroying the United States and converting all non-believers, forcibly, if necessary, to Islam.”98 In the same race former Governor Mike Huckabee argued Islamofascism was “the greatest enemy this country’s ever faced”99 and that it is hard for Americans to “understand what Islamic terrorists are about, that they really do want to kill every last one of us and destroy civilization as we know it.”100 Finally, the ultimate Republican nominee, Senator John McCain, regularly called “the threat of radical Islamic terrorism” the “transcendent challenge of our time.”101

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97 He wrote: “The existence of an unprecedentedly large number of people wishing to destroy decent civilization as we know it – and who celebrate their own deaths – poses a threat the likes of which no civilization in history has had to confront. The evils committed by Nazism and Communism were, of course, greater than those committed by radical Islam. There has been no Muslim Gulag and no Muslim Auschwitz. But the threat is far more serious.” Prager, 2006, "Islamic Threat is Greater than German & Soviet Threats Were," Real Clear Politics (March 28), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2006/03/islamic_threat_is_greater_than.html.


101 He further argued: “Any president who does not regard this threat as transcending all others does not deserve to sit in the White House, for he or she does not take seriously enough the first and most basic duty a president has — to protect the lives of the American people.” Hirsh, 2008b, "The World According to John McCain," Newsweek, April 7, http://www.newsweek.com/id/129660.
An Islamic Caliphate as the New Threat Measure

Although the threat of terrorists using some type of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear device has remained part of the public discourse, after the failure to find weapons of mass destructions in Iraq descriptions of the danger posed by terrorists noticeably shifted to an emphasis on the regional or global territorial goals espoused by some militant Islamists. Discussion of the goals to re-establish either a historic regional caliphate, or even of creating a global caliphate, serve to aggregate the threat of many diverse conflicts, alleviate the dissonance of the world’s remaining superpower being so gravely threatened by making the conflict global in scale, and legitimize American military involvement in Iraq and other parts of the world as being more easily recognizable as confrontations with the group that carried out the 9/11 attacks. References to caliphate goals also play to an increased level of knowledge about Islamist terrorists, especially among the more involved and highly attentive members of the public who often serve as a bridge between elites and the general population in the formation of collective attitudes. For example, in an August 2005

102 The aggregating of diverse groups together by emphasizing the goals of some Islamists for establishing a regional caliphate is discussed in the next section. Of note, the espoused territorial caliphate goals of many groups are actually more local than generally claimed by American politicians or as understood by attentive members of the public. For example, Jemaah Islamiyah “seeks the establishment of an Islamic caliphate spanning southern Thailand, Singapore, Brunei, and the southern Philippines” – an area which arguably makes sense geographically, culturally, and ethnically especially when viewed not strictly from a religious spectrum, but also as a more traditional nationalist-separatist goal. "Country Reports on Terrorism 2007," 2007, ed Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism: United States Department of State, April, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/. Explaining the use of this threat as part of a framing to make the war on terror seem like World War Two, Vlahos notes: “The Defense Department’s ‘Long War’ briefing has even suggested that the Islamofascist – like the Nazi – dream of a super-caliphate is but steps away from evil reality.” Vlahos, 2007a, "Losing Mythic Authority," The National Interest (April 25), http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=14148.

103 As discussed in chapters three and four, the social movement focus of this thesis argues that the aspirations for a regional or global caliphate is not a significant driver of terrorism, not a real goal for the majority of those actually involved in fighting, and very rarely a supported goal of the larger populations potentially supportive of terrorist groups. However, highly attentive members of the public are increasingly aware that re-establishing a caliphate is discussed in the writings of certain key militant ideological leaders and part of many Islamist groups’ official long term goals. As such this becomes a powerful rhetorical tool to use in reinforcing the threat posed and directing both
speech Secretary Rumsfeld used the goal of establishing a global caliphate to represent the threat the U.S. faces:

We’ve now seen well the future they envision. They’ve made their intentions clear… We’ve heard their plan. As the cleric in Britain said to the world after last month’s bombing in London, he said, “I would like to see the Islamic flag fly not only over Number 10 Downing Street, but over the whole world.”

Vice President Cheney has similarly used the goal of establishing a caliphate as an alternative mechanism for explaining how terrorists might acquire weapons of mass destruction in order to carry out devastating attacks on the United States:

This enemy also has a set of clear objectives… Their goal in that region is to seize control of a country… The terrorists believe that by controlling one country, they will be able to target and overthrow other governments in the region, and ultimately to establish a totalitarian empire that encompasses a region from Spain, across North Africa, through the Middle East and South Asia, all the way around to Indonesia. They have made clear, as well, their ultimate ambitions: to arm themselves with chemical, biological and even nuclear weapons; to destroy Israel; to intimidate all Western countries; and to cause mass death here in the United States.

In other speeches Vice President Cheney has used descriptions of the caliphate goal as part of his argument that the U.S. is the prime target of a destructive, totalitarian, global enemy as well as being a central part of the conflict in Iraq.

understanding and efforts in a specific direction. For example, Devji writes: “Yet the caliphate is not a political vision so much as a metaphysical category. It remains only an ideal, with neither a description nor any concrete plan to set it up. And in fact the caliphate’s role thus far is simply conceptual, allowing the jihad to abandon the political geography of the Cold War, made up of national states grouped into various alliances, for a completely de-territorialized and even anti-geographical space, since the caliphate imagined by the jihad possesses neither centre nor periphery.” Devji, Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity, 84.


106 Cheney, 2006a, "Vice President's Remarks at a Rally for the Troops," (January 6), Office of the Vice President,
Terrorists as a Foreign “Them” – An Amorphous (Islamic) Enemy

The third major change in the public construction is the perception that the wide variety of Islamist groups identified as using tactics of terror are actually part of the same threat and presumed to be working together.\textsuperscript{107} While many Americans recognize there are many different local groups around the world who are using or have used tactics of terrorism, after 9/11 the groups that are talked about are generally perceived as sharing the same ideology and together seeking the same long-term goals. As with other changes in American thinking, there are important elements of truth in this perception underscored by the social movement approach of this thesis emphasizing commonalities and connections between a variety of different conflicts and the larger mobilization occurring in the Muslim world. However, especially when combined with other biases discussed in this chapter, the tendency to see these groups as part of an aggregated, and especially undifferentiated threat is counterproductive for identifying and understanding the important relevant population dynamics as well as for developing and implementing effective counterterrorism strategies.


\textsuperscript{107} The terrorist groups Americans were most familiar with before 9/11, and most likely to recall, were even with generally limited knowledge largely separate. Americans were as likely to think and talk about the IRA, the Unabomber, and Timothy McVeigh when considering the threat of terrorism. However, even before 9/11 many Americans had begun to focus on the threat of “Islamic terrorism,” as emphasized by initial widespread assumptions that the Oklahoma City bombings must have been the work of an Islamic group. For more on pre-9/11 American coverage of Islamist terrorism see especially the new introduction in: Said, \textit{Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World}. As an example of public experts portraying diverse Islamist groups as all working together in unison see Phares who frequently makes us versus them comparisons where we are divided and they are united, including, after talking about the may advantages the jihadists “from Kabul to Beirut, from Bali to New York City” have and their wide webs of collaborators and sympathizers, writing “That is one camp. On the other side, democracies are divided on the inside as to the principles of the War on Terror; are divided among each other as to the policies to adopt towards the terrorist threat, particularly the Jihadist one; and are tackling the crisis in a confused way. While the authoritarians and the Jihadists are moving forward, converging on their enemy and penetrating its defenses, the other side (which it wants to destroy or take over) has many fragments, and each one of them has its own little wars on terror.” Phares, \textit{The Confrontation}, 16.
Aggregating Distinct Groups as a Singular Enemy

Writing in the Guardian, Max Hastings argues that the statements and policies of President Bush especially represent this aggregated perspective:

In his regular radio address to the American people on Saturday he linked the British alleged aircraft plotters with Hizbullah in Lebanon, and these in turn with the insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. All, said the president of the world’s most powerful nation, share a “totalitarian ideology”, and a desire to “establish a safe haven from which to attack free nations.” ... Bush has chosen to lump together all violent Muslim opposition to what he perceives as Western interests everywhere in the world, as part of a single conspiracy. He is indifferent to the huge variance of interests that drives the Taliban in Afghanistan, insurgents in Iraq, Hamas and Hizbullah fighting the Israelis. He simply identifies them as common enemies of the United States.\textsuperscript{108}

President Bush’s shaping of this aggregating perception began with his overall strategic framing immediately following the 9/11 attacks. In his 20 September 2001 address he said, “Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”\textsuperscript{109}

While this could have indicated that the U.S. would confront the many different groups who use the tactic of terrorism, over time the rhetoric and policies of the administration and other opinion leaders clearly aggregated diverse Islamist groups into a single common threat. In an August 2005 speech Secretary Rumsfeld explicitly defined the enemy as a network of several groups including al-Qaeda operating on six continents who “seek to impose their dark vision on the future of our world.”\textsuperscript{110} President Bush similarly often speaks of the opponent as a singular enemy, interchangeably in short statements mixing the plots and threats of diverse groups linked only by a common Islamic faith, without regard for a lack of evidence of collaboration, and much evidence


\textsuperscript{110} Rumsfeld, "Remarks at Greater Dallas Chamber of Commerce."
of intergroup animosity and significantly different ideological goals. This most frequently occurs in the grouping Sunni and Shia groups who have been mutually deeply critical, carried out attacks against one another, and at the violent extremes are often separated by religious ideology that sees the others as apostate enemies of true Islam.

111 For examples of President Bush speaking of a singular enemy and mixing disparate Sunni and Shia groups see: Balz and Abramowitz, 2006, "President Tries to Win Over a War-Weary Nation," Washington Post, September 12, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/11/AR2006091101416.html. Bush, 2006e, "President Bush Discusses Progress in the Global War on Terror," (September 7), The White House Office of the Press Secretary, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060907-2.html. Bush, 2006h, "President's Radio Address," (August 12), The White House Office of the Press Secretary, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/08/20060812.html. Many other political and opinion leaders have similarly mixed diverse terrorist groups in this way, as Secretary Rumsfeld did suggesting that the Hizballah attack on the American marine barracks in Lebanon in 1982 was part of the same historical threat and movement as al-Qaida’s subsequent attacks and caliphate goals. Rumsfeld, 2006b, "Radio Interview with Secretary Rumsfeld on the Charlie Brennan Show, KMOX," (September 11), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), http://www.defenselink.mil/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3719. In a 2006 article Newt Gingrich even more directly ties these various groups together and asserts they are increasingly collaborating with other enemies of the United States as part of a global threat which he elsewhere labels as a third world war. For Gingrich this threat includes not just terrorist groups such as al-Qaida, Hizballah, and Hamas but also many Muslim majority states such as Iran, Pakistan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia as well as non-Muslim states who are also opposed to the United States including Cuba, Venezuela, and the rest of the Non-Aligned Movement. Gingrich, "Lessons from the First Five Years of the War: Where Do We Go from Here?"

Both an example and a symptom of this tendency to aggregate very different Islamist groups into a single threat was illustrated by Jeff Stein, Congressional Quarterly’s national security expert. In late 2006, five years after 9/11, at the end of lengthy interviews he asked several high level Washington counterterrorism officials whether they knew “the difference between a Sunni and a Shiite” and then followed up with questions about whether specific Muslim groups and states were one or the other. Disturbingly he found “most American officials [he] interviewed don’t have a clue” including “not just intelligence and law enforcement officials, but also members of Congress who have important roles overseeing our spy agencies.” Although admitting it was a classic “gotcha” question, he also noted, “It seems silly to have to argue that officials responsible for counterterrorism should be able to recognize” the importance of the difference and asked, “How can they do their jobs without knowing the basics.”


113 Stein, 2006a, "Can You Tell a Sunni from a Shiite?", The New York Times, October 17, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/17/opinion/17stein.html. While the officials he discussed in his original article were either Republicans or Republican appointees, he noted in an article two months later that incoming House intelligence committee Chair Silvestre Reyes, a Democrat, thought al-Qaida included both Sunni and Shia, but was predominately Shia. Stein, 2006b, "Democrats' New Intelligence Chairman Needs a Crash Course on al Qaeda," CQ.com (December 8), Congressional Quarterly, http://public.cq.com/public/20061211_homeland.html. Given the otherwise critical attention given to speeches by President Bush, I should note that in a 5 September 2006 policy speech on terrorism he clearly delineated Shia and Sunni terrorists, discussing them as representing “different faces of the same threat.” Bush, "President Discusses
A principal factor contributing to the perception of all militant Islamist groups as being part of the same general threat is simply a manifestation of ignorance and time. Americans in general, and even key government officials, have limited time to understand the problem, and from an out-group perspective the differences between Islamist groups seem minor compared to the commonalities.\footnote{114} The tendency to aggregate is also an effect the original framing and subsequent evolution of the war on terror, including especially the war in Iraq, as being aimed at all terrorist groups of global reach. The aggregation of terrorists and associated enemies further helps to justify perceptions of an especially grave threat to the world’s only superpower.\footnote{115} Finally, the tendency to aggregate by the public and the administration is in part related to seeing al-Qaida’s attacks on the United States as the same threat that faces Israel from Hamas and Hizballah, as well as being part of the United States’ long running conflict with Shia Iran. Indicative of this last motivation, American political and opinion leaders have frequently linked or jointly highlighted al-Qaida associated attacks with attacks by other groups on Israel.\footnote{116} The Bush administration also prominently

Global War on Terror." However, a wide range of relevant policy experts commonly vet such speeches, and a scripted speech is not the same as the informal question and answer context in which Stein identified official ignorance. President Bush had been extensively criticized in the past for statements he allegedly made leading up to the war in Iraq failing to recognize the difference. In keeping with the social construction analysis of this chapter, I believe the use of the Sunni and Shia details in this policy speech are reflective of the growing awareness by attentive and more highly involved segments of the public. Stein’s editorial is also indicative of that, as its rhetorical power and frequent subsequent citing stemmed from many highly attentive segments of the public already being aware of the difference.\footnote{114} In a similar fashion, Americans were more likely to aggregate all communist nations together as part of a single global threat during the Cold War, and arguably it was not until the late 1960s or early 1970s that President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger began to appreciate (for example) the potential differences between communist China and the Soviet Union leading to diplomatic moves to drive a wedge between the two.\footnote{115} Vlahos, "The Long War: A Self-Fulfilling prophecy of Protracted Conflict – and Defeat."\footnote{116} For example: Bush, "President's Radio Address.". Cheney, "Vice President’s Remarks to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee 2006 Policy Conference." As previously noted, al-Qaida has been critical of both Hamas and Hizballah, the principle Islamist groups threatening Israel, and both of these groups have been highly critical of al-Qaida including Hizballah’s spiritual leader quickly and publicly denouncing the 9/11 attacks. "Analysis: Osama bin Laden Attacks Hizballah's Nasrallah and Shiite Iran.". Saab and Riedel, "Hezbollah and Al Qaeda.". Sulmasy, "War on al Qaeda."
made Iran part of the “Axis of Evil” despite evidence Iran and al-Qaida were enemies and published reports that Iran helped the United States immediately following 9/11.117

**Driving the Assumption that Islam Must be Part of the Problem**

The common perception of a homogenized terrorist threat encourages Americans to perceive the enemy as motivated principally by their religion instead of the many different local causes driving conflict or recognizing that violent non-Islamic groups have mobilized around the same causes.118 Sizeable minorities, at times even majorities, believe that Islam itself is a principal part of the problem (instead of a shared characteristic of different groups lumped together by the construction) and that most Muslims are presumptively suspect, even while also generally recognizing that they should not publicly say so.119 The American perception of Arabs and Muslims as being disproportionately associated with or prone to terrorism was long established before 9/11.120 As a result of the 9/11 attacks and subsequent popular reactions these stereotypes became stronger, more common, and more threatening. Media portrayals and commentary too often falsely imply that the 9/11 attacks were widely embraced and

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118 Emphasizing the category error involved Kilcullen and others highlight not only that violent non-Islamist groups have carried out attacks for the same causes, but that a variety of research supports that whether or not an individual supports or carries out violent attacks is correlated with radicalization and political views, and not with level of religiosity. Kilcullen, *The accidental guerilla*, 250-1.


120 This is represented by entertainment stereotypes, arguably disproportionate coverage of terrorism in news stories about the Middle East, and policy and academic discussions focusing on a clash of civilizations or the dangers of “Islamic terrorism.” For example: Esposito, "Political Islam." Esposito, 1992, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality*, New York, Oxford University Press. Said, *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World*. 

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supported by majorities in the Muslim world.\textsuperscript{121} The war on terror framing of the conflict, aggregating only Islamist groups together as the targeted enemy, reinforces those perceptions. The fact that these groups actually share some level of historical and ideological commonalities and connections provides a foundation of some truth and protection from charges of prejudice. Three years after 9/11, almost half of Americans were willing to answer polling questions that the United States “government should restrict the civil liberties of Muslims.”\textsuperscript{122}

**More Highly Normative: Absolute Rejection and Moral Condemnation**

The final change to the public’s social construction of terrorism discussed in this chapter is an intensification of the normative condemnation against those identified as terrorists. The moral condemnation of violence against non-combatants is part of the beneficial societal goal of eliminating the use of this tactic. However, as the later sections of this thesis argue, problems result from a combination of the intensified normative judgment, aggregated views of all associated with Islamic terrorism as part of the threat and therefore morally complicit, and the narrative that these aggregated and associated actors pose an especially grave threat principally targeting the United States.

In the modern era terrorism has always been a highly normative and pejorative term.\textsuperscript{123} However, before the 9/11 attacks discussions of terrorism and consideration of those so labelled in the United States often allowed for a greater degree of ambiguity and acceptance that, at least in some cases, those called terrorists might also be freedom fighters. Segments of the American public, to the consternation of the British, refused to strongly condemn the IRA and in some cases actively provided support to their cause. The Chechen guerrillas were viewed sympathetically, with more focus on Russian atrocities than Chechen terrorist attacks.\textsuperscript{124} After 9/11 American tolerances for any such ambiguity quickly disappeared.

\textsuperscript{121} Gerges, *Journey of the Jihadist*, 5.
\textsuperscript{122} Friedlander, "Fear factor: 44 percent of Americans queried in Cornell national poll favor curtailing some liberties for Muslim Americans."
\textsuperscript{123} Kapitan, "The Terrorism of 'Terrorism'," 3-4.
A Conflict Between Good and Evil, Civilization and Barbarity

Examining the rhetoric used in discussing the war on terror illustrates the strengthening of a more absolutist moral condemnation of terrorism after 9/11. The enemy of the war on terror is frequently described by political leaders from both parties as fundamentally evil and morally depraved, as individuals who hate all that is good and find enjoyment in barbaric acts. This is an enemy that plots “evil and destruction,” “rejoices in the murder of innocent, unsuspecting human beings,” “will cut off a person’s head like that, and not even care about it,” is a “mortal danger to all humanity,” the “enemy of civilization,” and embraces a “creed” that “rejoices in suicide, incites murder, and celebrates every death we mourn.” In this discourse the focus is almost always on the reprehensible violence of terrorism, and rarely on the broader context that might directly acknowledge similar atrocities committed by those locally opposed to the terrorists in question, or recognize that many groups who use

September 11th War on Terror to Chechnya, "Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 24 (1).

125 The “good versus evil” narrative plays not only to shared secular cultural conceptions about morality, but in the United States especially speaks to and resonates with a very large religious audience. Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, 66.

126 Lustick, Trapped in the War on Terror, 122-3. It is perhaps fitting that many of the more radical Islamists similarly see the fight as “a titanic struggle between absolutes of good and evil.” Gerges, Journey of the Jihadist, 43.

127 Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People."


131 Bush, "President Discusses Global War on Terror."

132 Bush, "President Bush Reaffirms Resolve to War on Terror, Iraq and Afghanistan."
tactics of terrorism (or those associated with them) also engage in a wider range of positive actions such as providing social services and humanitarian care.

Defining terrorists by a focus on the most reprehensible acts in combination with ascribing to them motivations based on hatred and opposition to ideals seen as universal goods reinforces the stereotype that they are fundamentally crazy and incomprehensible. President Bush has said, “the depth of their hatred is equaled by the madness of the destruction they design.” While Vice President Cheney has observed, “Some might look at these ambitions and wave them off as extreme and mad. Well, these ambitions are, indeed, extreme and mad. They are also real, and we must not wave them off.” Although reinforced by the language of the war on terror, the common perception of terrorists as somehow pathological and insane is not new. However, at a time when greater understanding is called for because of the increased appreciation of the threat posed to the United States it is important that this view continues to drown out the repeated conclusions of those who study terrorism that “the most outstanding common characteristic of terrorists is their normality.”

The framing of the construction makes clear that we are good and they are evil, contrasting their depravity with our noble values. At a February 2002 luncheon President Bush told the audience, “I see things pretty clearly, in just plain terms… this

134 Cheney, "Vice President’s Remarks to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee 2006 Policy Conference."
is a war of good versus evil.” In an April 2002 speech, he explained, “They hate us, because we’re free… They hate the thought that we educate everybody… They hate the fact that we… believe in the dignity of every person… And the only way they know to express themselves is through killing, cold-blooded killing.” Framing the conflict in these terms reinforces the overall narrative of the war on terror as cast in binary and polarized terms of an “us” and a “them,” which in turn makes an enemy-centric focus only seem natural:

No longer is this a political conflict, a cultural conflict or a conflict over specific policies, it is simply a struggle between good and evil. This is a powerful way of forcing people to choose the side of the United States; after all, no one deliberately chooses to be on the side of evil. In any moral conflict, one always wants to be on the side of good.

Acceptance of the good versus evil, civilized versus barbaric narrative strengthens the perception that in the war on terror there can be no negotiation and no accommodation with the enemy or, more importantly for this thesis, those who may not choose our side.

**Conclusion**

How the general public, political leaders, decision makers, and those responsible for implementing and analyzing American policy think and talk about terrorism largely determines what the U.S. approach to counterterrorism will be and how that approach will actually be carried out. This in turn, to the degree that American rhetoric and policy influences attitudes and perceptions in the Muslim world, plays a significant role in the success or failure of American hearts and minds goals.

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137 Bush, "Remarks by the President at Connecticut Republican Committee Luncheon."
138 Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*, 63.
139 Ibid., 69.
140 Similarly, “the radical evil argument is a familiar strategy for silencing liberal dissent.” Ibid. See also: Aune, 2003, "The Argument from Evil in the Rhetoric of Reaction," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 6 (3), Fall: 521. “The argument from evil is thus double-edged: it can be remarkably powerful in mobilizing people for action, yet it is extremely corrosive of democratic politics, since it undermines the possibility of a loyal opposition. A common bumper sticker now in Texas – I do not know what organization promotes it – reads, ‘There are Americans, and there are Liberals’”
This section has focused on four important changes to how terrorism is thought about and discussed in the United States. First, after 9/11 most Americans now accept that the appropriate and best response is a U.S. led war on terror – not metaphorically, but very much a real war with a binary division of us versus them, where you are either for us or against us. Second, most Americans now perceive terrorism globally as much more threatening – measured by mass casualty attacks, a desire to use weapons of mass destructions, as well as regional and global territorial ambitions – with that threat ultimately or principally targeting the United States. Third, when most Americans talk or think about terrorism they are concerned about a foreign, aggregated, and amorphous Islamic enemy, which is presumptively working together toward the same ultimate goals. Fourth, all of this thinking is much more highly normative, less tolerant of ambiguity, and defined by a framing of good versus evil where our side is always defending noble, universal ideals and they simply enjoy employing reprehensible tactics.

The following section of this chapter will focus on how these changes, especially in combination, undermine the understanding of terrorism and resulting efforts to respond. The counterproductive effects are particularly problematic for the population-centric efforts of hearts and minds goals informed by the counterinsurgency tradition and insights of a social movement approach. However, it should be emphasized, that many of these changes are reactions to underlying realities of the current threat posed by a variety of groups employing tactics of terrorism. Those responsible for 9/11 see themselves and have publicly declared that they are at war with the United States. Key leaders, many members, and ideological enablers shared across different militant Islamist groups do perceive the United States as important enemy. While there are important local differences and divisions between Islamist groups and conflicts, there are also important commonalities and connections. And if the language of evil has any meaning, I cannot imagine that it would be inappropriate for describing the videotaped beheading of hostages.\footnote{President Bush used similar language in his 2003 State of the Union Address speaking of horrible acts of torture committed by the former Iraqi regime saying, “If this is not evil, then evil has no meaning.” Bush, 2003c, "President Delivers 'State of the Union'," (January 28), The White House Office of the Press Secretary, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html. However, a}
This basis in fact for many aspects of the post-9/11 construction of terrorism criticized in this chapter for their exaggeration makes the difficulties discussed in the next section much more challenging to overcome. Even many experts and specialists, let alone policy makers or general members of the public, strongly resist or instinctively react against the arguments made here, empowered by a focus on and presumption starting from these realities. Changes in thinking about terrorism have raised recognition of real threats, and increased resources and priorities for responding. The common social desire to normatively reject the use of terror against civilians and non-combatants is at the fundamental root of why the discourse of terrorism carries with it such power and problems, especially when strengthened by the raw emotional reaction of a public attacked on a generationally unprecedented level.

**Undermines Understanding and Efforts**

While serving as the three-star general in charge of Marine Corps forces in the Pacific region, Lt Gen. Wallace Gregson called the war on terror an inaccurate label leading to the wrong policies:

This war has a popular label and a political label, but it’s not accurate… Terrorism is a means of power projection, it’s a weapon, it’s a tool of war. Think of it as our enemy’s stealth bomber. This is no more a war on terrorism than World War II was a war on submarines. It’s not just semantics… Words have meaning. And these words are leading us down to the wrong concept.142

Long time RAND terrorism scholar Brian Jenkins similarly argues that how we think about terrorism undermines our ability to understand the problem:

Action films rarely inquire into the mindsets or motives of villains. The villains are simply presented as bad guys, foils for superheroes. Cyclops is always a monster. Dragons breathe fire. Witches are wicked. One need not ask why. We are likewise inclined to see terrorists as fiends, wild-eyed expressions of evil, diabolical but two-dimensional, some how alien – in a word, inhuman. Government officials routinely denounce terrorists as mindless fanatics, savage barbarians, or, more recently, “evil-doers” – words that dismiss any intellectual

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142 Castelli, "Winning Hearts and Minds Stressed."
content. The angry rhetoric may resonate with apprehensive homeland audiences, but it impedes efforts to understand the enemy.\footnote{Jenkins, \textit{Unconquerable Nation}, 53.} Professor Michael Howard contends that how political leaders define a problem in terms of the overall strategic narrative plays a significant role in how we respond, and particularly argues that the labelling for the current conflict influences how seriously our militaries take the problem in terms of their long range planning and how they “adjust their thinking, equipment, and training accordingly.”\footnote{Howard, "A Long War?," 9.} These critiques, and many others like them, conclude that how we talk and think about terrorism – the public construction of terrorism – can adversely affect understanding of the problem, and resulting actions. This section examines the problems caused by how terrorism is conceptualized in the United States after 9/11, reinforced by the strategic narrative of the war on terror, by examining how: the social construction functions in general; the dissonance caused by the dominant construction undermines understanding of important dynamics underlying many cases of terrorism; and, the enemy-centric focus resulting from the current approach impedes the population-centric perspective recommended by counterinsurgency and social movement theory leading to counterproductive rhetoric and policies.

**How the Construction Functions in General**

Put simply, “language matters, because it can determine how we think and act.”\footnote{Lakoff and Frisch, "Five Years After 9/11." Similarly, talking about strategic narratives, Freedman notes: “Intellectuals through the ages have been animated by the conviction that language and the construction of ideas matter.” Freedman, \textit{The Transformation of Strategic Affairs}, 23. See also: Jackson, \textit{Writing the War on Terrorism}, 21.} At an individual level, the social construction of terrorism influences how we understand the phenomenon by establishing frames of reference, triggering (or impeding) associations, and setting our baseline presumptions for evaluation. These constraints are consciously and subconsciously self-enforced and socially re-enforced. At a societal level, the post-9/11 construction establishes the expectation that political leaders and government agencies will treat terrorism as amongst the most important national security concerns, focusing the resulting efforts on certain counterterrorism
strategies while limiting or discouraging the consideration and development of others. Within the partisan competition between political parties the majority adoption of the construction constrains what is acceptable and unacceptable to consider and advocate. For the bureaucratic competition between agencies the promotion of this understanding establishes resource and reward incentives to conform and act in a similarly consistent manner. Subsequent policy development, implementation, and supporting analysis are further constrained and directed by the same influences, especially given that the individuals who carry out and direct these duties are themselves guided by the public construction of terrorism. These effects are reinforced by the specific endorsement and promotion of the construction by key policy leaders of the Bush administration and other opinion shapers who advanced the strategic narrative of the war on terror described above.

Frames and Filters Thinking and Discussion

The social construction of terrorism serves as a starting point for thinking about and understanding the problem. It determines what is focused on for consideration and discussion, and as a result what is by default left out of the frame of reference. In part this is the result of the power of definition and importance of how we choose to discuss something:

[O]ur way of speaking plays an active role in creating and changing our perceptions, our cognition and our emotions. First, as something particularly human, language moulds how we see the world; it is the main determinant of our perceptions, our access to concrete reality. From knowing the difference between an apple and a hand grenade, to knowing what to do with each in relevant situations, language shapes our understanding of the world around us.

146 Tuman, Communicating Terror.
147 Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, 21-2. Casebeer similarly explains how narratives shape our understanding and actions: “Reasoning by metaphor and analogy, a research program explored by Mark Johnson, George Lakoff, Giles Fauconnier, and Mark Turner, argues that our most complex mental tasks are usually carried out not by the ‘classical mechanics’ of rational actor theory (where stories really have no place), but rather by a set of analogy making and metaphor mapping abilities that form the core of human cognition. Exploration into the ‘story-telling mind’ is a research program that combines metaphor and analogy into an examination of the powerful grip narrative has on human cognition; narratives can restructure our mental spaces in ways that profoundly affect our reasoning ability and, ultimately, what we make of the world. Think of the grip that the ‘Jihad versus McWorld’ narrative has on Al Qaeda and how this affects the way they think about the future. As Mark Turner notes, ‘Story is a basic
The war on terror has become the natural background frame shaping the perception and consideration of all issues related to terrorism:

It is assumed without debate or public questioning that terrorism is a problem of the sort that must be addressed by a “war.” The War on Terror has thus achieved the status of a background narrative. It is used by members of the attentive public as the source for categories, questions to be considered, and criteria for evaluating options.148

Defining the frame of reference, and prioritizing the importance of elements within it, leads to a series of secondary effects discussed in later sections of this chapter. These include: what those involved in analyzing threats or implementing policies choose to collect information on and learn more about to inform and guide their duties; the choice of which experts and agencies to turn to for guidance and implementation; what information is passed on to higher level decision makers, who often only have time for concise briefings of key information, and how they in turn contextualize, consider, and evaluate what they understand; and, creating an iterative cycle, what subsequent actions are taken as well as who is responsible for and involved in implementing those.

The social construction also drives the associations and oppositions elicited, and whether our normative responses are positively or negatively predisposed.149 The language habitually used to discuss and frame a phenomenon also has important and powerful emotive effects. Certain phrases and associations “can make us feel anxious, fearful, angry or joyful.”150 Building upon the emotional trauma of the American experience of 9/11 and subsequent focus on other particularly threatening or despised acts of terrorism, the emotional power associated with the new social construction of terrorism is particularly strong.

One of the reasons examining the influences of public thinking about terrorism is important is that social constructions are generally perceived as natural, normalized as the way things are expected to be, and unquestioned by most people.151 This has the
effect of creating presumptions and biases for evaluation and action that are especially powerful given their instinctive application and the reflexive resistance when they are challenged. The unquestioned nature of social constructions coupled with their influence on framing and filtering our thinking and discourse has important implications for the consideration of how we respond to terrorism. The construction affects how we think, by influencing what is and is not associated, and by making some choices “appear perfectly reasonable and commonsensical while others appear absurd.”¹⁵² In the context of counterterrorism these effects presumptively privilege not just the consideration of enemy-centric over population-centric approaches, but even the underlying collection and evaluation of information that subsequently tends to make certain suggestions or evaluations seem obvious and other ones irrational and unacceptable based quite logically on what is (and is not) put forward for deliberation.

With respect to changes in the social construction of terrorism, Americans are aware that after 9/11 things are different, as emphasized by political denunciations of a “pre-9/11” or “September 10” worldview.¹⁵³ But most perceive this as simply a direct consequence of changes to the objective reality of the threat faced. Individual actors and the public at large thus unconsciously frame and filter thinking and discussion about terrorism. Even where notable disagreements remain about aspects of the threat faced, what generates it, and how best to respond, other important elements of the new construction remain shared and unquestioned. The evolved public construction of

of Reality. In his classic book, The Construction of Social Reality, John Searle repeatedly explores the social construction of money, examining the intricate ways the concept of currency is dependent upon entirely socially created norms and expectations, which in many senses are purely arbitrary from an external perspective yet almost never questioned. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality.

¹⁵² Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, 22. See also: Foucault, 1977, Discipline and Punishment: The Birth of the Prison, New York, Vintage Books.

terrorism serves to constrain and define what can be contested and the chances for success of alternative approaches and understandings.

Research into communication as well as social and cognitive psychology focusing on information processing, persuasion, and attitude change provides theoretical explanations and repeated experimental findings supporting the influence of shared constructions on our understanding, beliefs, and actions. A common element of cognitive processing models is that individuals rely on heuristics (short cuts, simple guides, “rules of thumb,” and common sense) to help filter and process information and guide judgments to come to “sufficiently accurate” assessments given constrained resources. Such heuristics are generally used as the default mode of processing and enable individuals to focus more highly involved central processing either on that information or those decisions deemed particularly important, as well as to enable individuals to simultaneously carry out other tasks. These heuristics also play a role in helping to determine what other information may be relevant for more involved or focused examination of an issue. The import of the social construction of terrorism is to help establish, direct, or reinforce specific heuristics that may come in play over the range of consideration of issues related to terrorism. The more that the social construction, or strategic narrative, on which these heuristics are based fails to accurately describe and define the threat the more likely that these heuristics will encourage counterproductive shortcuts and biased analysis. Similar theories and

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155 Such heuristics might include an assumption that violent Islamist groups seek to attack the United States and are likely to be working with other Islamist groups, both of which would tend to lead one to be less critical of information that is supportive, to interpret ambiguous information as being consistent, and to be dismissive of information that runs contrary. Other heuristics could include: presumptions that anyone who deals with terrorist groups are supportive of them and part of the problem;
research also suggests how individuals modify their behaviour, attitudes, and information processing out of motivations to avoid social isolation or to evaluate whether their opinions are correct by reference to those around them. These influences may help trigger the use of heuristic or more intensive processing paths for cognitive evaluation, as well as guide when and how an individual is willing to speak up on a controversial topic. This self-censorship in turn shapes the observed reality for other assumptions about terrorists real motivations leading to the discounting or ignoring of other claims they make; beliefs that anyone who appears sympathetic with, to be justifying, or expressing understanding of the grievances or goals allegedly motivating a terrorist group either doesn’t get it or is part of the problem; or, the assumption that all Islamists seek similar long term goals which are incompatible with liberal values leading to both the aggregation of potential diverse groups and the dismissal of alternative paths to countering the long term threat.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TERRORISM

individuals, influencing their social and evaluative judgments about what ideas to consider and what ideas are commonly held to be valid, as well indirectly by what is marginalized or obscured.

Guides and Constrains National Strategy and Policy

How the public and political leaders talk and think about terrorism, especially the perceptions of the threat posed to the United States and the strong emotional response motivating government action, places terrorism at or near the top of the national agenda while guiding and constraining subsequent action. The way the problem is framed by both the social construction and strategic narrative described above creates political capital and incentives for politicians and bureaucracies to pursue specific strategies, while constraining or discouraging others. Of course, the language of terrorism has long had a particularly politically charged effect. After 9/11 the way American political leaders and the public framed and came to understand terrorism strengthened and modified the existing normative construction of the term. The war on terror now functions “to normalize and legitimize the current counter-terrorist approach,” “to empower the authorities and shield them from criticism,” and to marginalize or disadvantage dissenting opinions or alternate approaches. This

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157 “Expressed another way, we can say that language has a reality-making effect; it is a way of constructing reality and not merely reflecting it. Because language affects perception, cognition and emotion, it inevitably also affects concrete political action; it has consequences for social processes and structures.” Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, 23.

158 “It is clear from surveying the literature on terrorism, as well as the public debate, that what one calls things matters. There are few neutral terms in politics, because political language affects the perceptions of protagonists and audiences, and such effect acquires a greater urgency in the drama of terrorism. Similarly, the meaning of terms change to fit a changing context. Concept follows politics.” Crenshaw, ed 1995b, Terrorism in Context, University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 7.

thinking further sets and constrains the agenda, rewarding particularly hard and
aggressive counterterrorism approaches with domestic support and political resources,
while devaluing and limiting other actions important to a population-centric strategy as
described at the end of Chapter Two.

Research into the effect and influence of public opinion on foreign policy
provides a number of possible theoretical explanations for the influence of the social
construction of terrorism as well as some suggestive empirical support.\textsuperscript{160} Noelle-
Neumann takes a strong view arguing that public opinion is a “powerful force capable
of resolving conflicts, [and] toppling governments.”\textsuperscript{161} Media studies have suggested
that modern 24-hour news coverage provides a “policy forcing” mechanism and create
potential for real time knowledge and feedback allowing public opinion to influence
foreign policy.\textsuperscript{162} Public choice arguments apply economic theories to argue that
especially in a two party system politicians adopt and advocate positions reflective of
majority viewpoints in order to maximize their electoral chances.\textsuperscript{163}

Poliheuristic theory provides a more specific explanation for how the public
construction serves to constrain and guide American counterterrorism policy consistent

Sobel, \textit{The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy Since Vietnam}. Wittkopf,
University Press.

\textsuperscript{161} Noelle-Neumann, 1993, \textit{The Spiral of Silence: Public Opinion – Our Social Skin},
of public opinion as a powerful force capable of resolving conflicts, toppling
governments, and oppressing individuals who resist until the “dead member falls from
the social body” has been uncovered in more and more new areas: in the stories of the
Bible and in Homer, in the unwritten laws of antiquity, in fairy tales as well as in the
present. In recent years, history has taught us a great lesson in public opinion through
the breakdown of Marxism in Eastern Europe. Aristotle maintained that a king who
loses the support of his people is no longer a king. No longer a king, no longer a
dictator, no longer a ruler.”

\textit{Journal of Communication} 52, December. Gilboa, 2005, "Global Television News and
Foreign Policy: Debating the CNN Effect," \textit{International Studies Perspectives} 6 (3),
August.

with the normative aspects of widely held attitudes on an important subject, in
suggesting that political leaders apply a two-step process to decision making:

During the first stage, the set of possible options is reduced by applying a
“noncompensatory principle” to eliminate any alternative with an unacceptable
return on a critical, typically political, decision dimension. Once the choice set
has been reduced to alternatives that are acceptable to the decision maker, the
process moves to a second stage, during which the decision maker uses more
analytic processing in an attempt to minimize risks and maximize benefits.¹⁶⁴

How the public talks and thinks about terrorism constrains the choices deemed
acceptable in the first stage, especially as proponents of poliheuristic theory even when
examining foreign policy questions generally posit that “domestic politics are ‘the
essence of decision’ because decision-makers almost always try to avoid choices that
could bring political damage to themselves.”¹⁶⁵ Thus counterterrorism strategies,

beyond the aggressive disrupt and destroy focused tactics, associated with elements of
an overall population-centric approach are often taken out of or deemphasized for
consideration. This influence is repeated in the second stage to the degree that the
decision maker themselves, as well as those advising and assisting them, share the
perspective of the social construction of terrorism constraining and biasing how they
evaluate the remaining choices.

Consistent with this explanation, Joseph Nye explains why focuses on soft
power, have received little attention compared to hard counterterrorism in the post-9/11
environment:

Soft power is an analytical term, not a political slogan and perhaps that is why,
not surprisingly, it has taken hold in academic analysis, and in other places like
Europe, China and India, but not in the American political debate. Especially in
the current political climate, it makes a lousy slogan – post 9/11 emotions left
little room for anything described as “soft.” We may need soft power as a
nation, but it is a difficult political sell for politicians. Bill Clinton captured the
new mindset of the American people when he said that the electorate would
always choose “strong and wrong” over “timid and right.”¹⁶⁶

Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (1), February.
¹⁶⁵ Sandal, Zhang, James and James, 2006, "Poliheuristic Theory in Comparative
Perspective: Theory and Evidence for Turkey and China," In Annual Meeting of the
International Studies Association, San Diego, California, March,
http://web.missouri.edu/~umcaspolswww/papers/Zhang_ISA2006.pdf. See also: Mintz,
"How Do Leaders Make Decisions?."
¹⁶⁶ Nye, "Our Impoverished Discourse."
The constraints created by the current thinking are both self-enforced, as politicians and other policy-makers are very much attuned to public attitudes and potential consequences, as well as reinforced by political partisans, pundits, and other opinion shapers and highly attentive members of the public who draw upon the power of general public attitudes.\(^{167}\)

Although bureaucratic level decision makers in executive, military, and intelligence agencies involved in efforts related to the war on terror are more insulated from the electoral implications, they are likely influenced in a similar way to the degree that they share the general public construction and as they are more directly sensitive to the strategic narrative as advanced by the administration in power. From a top-down perspective, the adoption and promotion of the dominant construction by the current administration’s strategic narrative, as well as politicians more generally, creates an environment in which the influences and rewards of resources and responsibilities encourage consistent action, favour those bureaucratic agencies already so predisposed, and neglect those who do not adapt. While from the bottom-up, individuals holding ideas and attitudes consistent with the public construction collectively influence the orientation and actions of their agencies.

**The Cognitive Dissonance of Studying Terrorism**

The highly normative and oppositional nature of how we talk and think about terrorism generates individual and social biases that discourage and constrain efforts to understand the phenomenon. In the preface to *The Psychology of Terrorism* John Horgan asks:

Where do we begin to try to understand such an act? Indeed, why even *try* to understand it? Perhaps we might be better off just to condemn it. Maybe attempts to understand such behaviour might detract from the sense of outrage and shock that seems a more appropriate and justifiable reaction than any supposed intellectual debate?\(^{168}\)

At the end of that work he argues:

A crucial imperative here involves recognizing the social, political and psychological conditions in which we are more likely to condone actions against terrorists that in the long run do more harm than good. In the immediate climate post-11 September, to convey this statement would probably have led to (and

\(^{167}\) Der Derian, “9/11 and Its Consequences for the Discipline,” 90.

probably still does in certain quarters) a view about the analyst that ‘understanding terrorism’ equates to somehow ‘forgiving’ the terrorist and sympathizing with his plight. Of course it should never imply such identification with the aggressor, but it reflects a reality of political violence – terrorists frequently claim victimization as a justification for further violence (often conducted on behalf of a ‘represented’ community).\(^\text{169}\)

This section analyzes in more depth the personal and social disapproval with “understanding terrorism” after 9/11 that Horgan references in passing, and then examines how this moral discomfort with really understanding terrorism undermines the population-centric approach needed to win Muslim hearts and minds.\(^\text{170}\)

**It Feels Wrong to Understand**

Our strong inclination is to morally denounce and unambiguously reject the use of terrorism. However, especially in the context of terrorism arising out of broad and long-running societal conflicts with complex related grievances, understanding the dynamics contributing to terrorism and potential public support for or sympathy with those using violent tactics often requires recognizing and appreciating that there are “no white hats or black hats.”\(^\text{171}\) This in turn generates uncomfortable and problematic ethical concerns associated with the observation that “to understand is to forgive.”\(^\text{172}\) Deeply exploring these conflicts one often realizes that cycles of blame, shared

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\(^\text{169}\) Ibid., 167.
\(^\text{170}\) Writing in 2005 Horgan was largely focused on an academic audience, possibly including a policy audience that was already particularly receptive to a more rigorous and challenging understanding of terrorism. This section argues that from a larger American public perspective, as well as from a focus on the approach of the Bush administration, the biases against an open and critical understanding of terrorism remain stronger and more persistent than Horgan’s language of “probably still does in certain quarters” would imply.
\(^\text{171}\) Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy*.
\(^\text{172}\) The idea that knowledge leads to forgiveness is captured in the French phrase *tout comprendre c’est tout pardonner*, drawing upon the human tendency to be more likely to forgive or to perceive mitigating circumstances the more we understand the particular history behind, contributing factors of, and context around bad behaviour. In his philosophical study of forgiveness in interpersonal and political contexts, Charles Griswold emphasizes the complexity and distinctions of aspects related to mitigating blame through exculpatory factors that may lead to excusing or diminished responsibility as well as those that lead to forgiveness. He writes: “The difficulties arise in part because of the sheer complexity of the concept of voluntary action. One could argue that there are always mitigating excuses, that wrong-doing is never just voluntary; there is always a story about how one ended up doing the evil deed.” Griswold, 2007, *Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration*, Cambridge University Press, 7.
responsibility, mutual misunderstanding, and some good deeds and intentions on all sides make absolute moral judgments unsatisfying. Jenkins explains this presumption working against more nuanced analysis of the problem:

The understanding of terrorism itself can arouse suspicions. “Understanding” simply connotes comprehension, but “to be understanding” suggests something less judgmental, a softening of attitude toward punishment and retribution, substandard zeal in pursuing dangerous evildoers. Terrorists are not to be understood but to be eradicated.173

For individuals it therefore often feels wrong to understand the complex factors contributing to terrorism – because of the association between “being understanding” with mitigating, forgiving, and condoning. Both individually and socially this leads many to reject or diminish consideration of explanations that could be interpreted as sympathetic with those using violence, while favouring explanations more consistent with clear-cut denunciation of those employing terrorism.174 Hegghammer suggests that this effect of the more highly emotional and normative construction of terrorism after 9/11 has hindered the learning needed to more effectively respond:

More than six years after 9/11, the study of jihadism is still in its infancy. Why has it taken so long to develop? One reason, of course, is that we started almost from scratch. Another factor is that it takes time for primary sources to emerge. But the most important reason is no doubt that the emotional outrage at al-Qaeda’s violence has prevented us from seeing clearly. Societies touched by terrorism are always the least well placed to understand their enemies. It is only when we see the jihadists not as agents of evil or as religious fanatics, but as humans, that we stand a chance of understanding them.175

173 Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation, 57. See also: Kapitan, "The Terrorism of 'Terrorism'," 8.
174 These tendencies are consistent with psychological theories about the resolution of cognitive dissonance. Individuals and social groups tend to reject information that increases dissonance – in this case information that increases understanding of underlying conflict dynamics, grievances, past histories, and multi-sided responsibilities for blameworthy acts. Individuals and social groups also tend to display confirmation biases for information consistent with the dominant construction of terrorism – for example, evidence that the motives and goals of those labelled as terrorists are as reprehensible as their means. However, undermining predictive value, cognitive dissonance may also explain the opposite reaction of some people who become stronger critics of their own government’s actions in response to the dissonant information of previous grievances contributing to current political violence.
Richardson argues that American political leaders have framed the issue to delegitimize any consideration or need for understanding of underlying grievances that drive the larger potentially supportive populations who are key to hearts and minds goals. The discomfort created by the dominant construction of terrorism over consideration of the deeper dynamics driving contentious action both creates subconscious as well as conscious influences to constrain, redirect, self-censor, or at least exercise strong caution in approaching such issues.

To understand and to be understanding are of course different concepts. This thesis argues that we need to do a better job of understanding terrorism, which likely involves being more understanding of larger potentially sympathetic populations, but does not require less of a moral denunciation of the use of terrorist tactics nor necessitate a moral judgment that specific U.S. policies were wrong. Indeed, we will perhaps most often come to the decision that specific U.S. policies are desirable, however using the knowledge that comes from a better understanding to take other actions to decrease or protect against the threat of violence, while also increasing counterterrorism efforts directly targeting those who may pose such threats.

176 “The president put it this way: ‘In fact, we’re not facing a set of grievances that can be soothed and addressed. We’re facing a radical ideology with unalterable objectives: to enslave whole nations and intimidate the world. No act of ours invited the rage of the killers – and no concession, bribe or act of appeasement would change or limit their plans for murder.’ In so saying the President delegitimized any effort to engage with the grievances that might have fueled support for bin Laden.” Richardson, What Terrorists Want, 196. quoting Bush, 2005d, "President Discusses War on Terror at National Endowment for Democracy," (October 6), The White House Office of the Press Secretary, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051006-3.html. Here Richardson is also making a larger criticism of the tendency of the Bush administration to frame the war on terror in religious moral language of good and evil where God is on our side. She cites several cases where President Bush explicitly invokes God in framing arguments that the terrorists represent all that is evil.

177 The degree of caution exercised even by those academics and experts who raise this problem is indicative of the strength of these forces. The introduction (and often subsequent discussion) of these criticisms is very frequently accompanied by explicit emphasis that this is not to suggest that anyone other than the terrorists are morally to blame. For example, Michael Scheuer discusses the grievances he says motivate al-Qaida as “predicate conditions,” rhetorically decontaminating and distancing his assessment from casting blame on those U.S. policies. John Horgan puts quotes around the word “represents” to disconnect the potentially sympathetic larger population and the terrorist groups alleging to act in their name.
Post-9/11 thinking and talking about terrorism demonstrates a classic dissonance resolution to the discomfort caused by considering that at least intelligible grievances may have contributed to support for groups using tactics of terrorism. News media reports on “why do they hate us” have often listed the consistent history of specific policy complaints being raised in the Muslim world, and experts – including some from the U.S. intelligence, defence, and diplomatic communities – have regularly made the same point. However, the official and strongly defended judgment of the Bush administration is that any claim that terrorism or radical support is caused by U.S. policies, or indeed by anything other than a hatred of freedom and love of destruction, is simply wrong, misguided, and counterproductive. Reflecting and constrained by the predispositions of the general public, political leaders and supportive opinion elites have repeatedly spoken about the need for moral clarity and a “clear understanding” of this point. For example, President Bush has said, “In the war on terror, there is no place for confusion and no substitute for victory.”178 Secretary Rumsfeld similarly has spoken out against questioning of this position in a manner serving to rhetorically reinforce agreement arguing, “Any kind of moral and intellectual confusion about who and what is right or wrong can severely weaken the ability of free societies to persevere.”179

The problem this thesis highlights is the tendency, especially pronounced in the United States in the current war on terror, of allowing a desire for unambiguous moral blame to lead to antagonism towards any analysis that may be perceived as

179 Tyson, 2006, "Rumsfeld Assails Critics of War Policy," Washington Post, August 30. A sophisticated version of these arguments recognizes an important distinction between moral responsibility for violent actions and the “predicate factors,” “root causes,” or “exploited and enabling grievances” that contribute to understanding the context and dynamics driving the use of and support for political violence. However, political leaders responsible for maintaining broad support for difficult policies, from a public that generally does not have the time or opportunity to engage in nuanced consideration of these issues, may understandably prefer a simplified explanation. Casting moral judgments on terrorism in a black and white manner is also far from unique to the Bush administration, being a consistent bipartisan practice of previous U.S. administrations as well as of other world leaders.
complicating that clarity. For example, after key points of the declassified 2006 National Intelligence Estimate on *Trends in Global Terrorism* were cited as concluding that the Iraq war had increased terrorist recruitment, President Bush warned that accepting this type of thinking would increase the threat to the United States by buying “into the enemy’s propaganda” and that “if this ever becomes the mind set of the policymakers in Washington, it means we’ll go back to the old days of waiting to be attacked and then respond.”

**They are Evil: No Understanding (Apologists) Allowed**

Too often the current approach to talking and thinking about terrorism aggressively discourages a deeper understanding by turning the normative power of this discourse on those who advocate alternative viewpoints, morally denouncing and rejecting them as complicit in or even outright supporters of terrorism. Kapitan describes the effects of the public construction of terrorism writing:

> Because of its negative connotation, the ‘terrorist’ label automatically discredits any individuals or groups to which it is affixed. It dehumanizes them, places them outside the norms of acceptable social and political behavior, and portrays them as people who cannot be reasoned with. By delegitimizing any individuals or groups described as ‘terrorist,’ the rhetoric: erases any incentive an audience might have to understand their point of view so that questions about the nature and origins of their grievances and the possible legitimacy of their demands will

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180 Bush, "President Bush Discusses Global War on Terror." See also: "Declasified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate 'Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States'," 2006, (April), http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf. Secretary Rumsfeld similarly argues for rejection of explanations that American policies contribute to the rise of terrorism, noting that to accept this is to “return to the destructive view that America – not the enemy – is the real source of the world’s trouble.” Tyson, "Rumsfeld Assails Critics of War Policy."

181 Bianco, 2006, "Understanding v. Appeasement," *TheAbsurdReport.com* (August 2), http://www.theabsurdreport.com/2006/understanding-v-appeasement/. Kamiya, 2006, "Why We Can't Win the 'War on Terror'," *Salon* (September 15), http://www.salon.com/books/review/2006/09/15/richardson/print.html. Walid Phares’s writings exemplify this aspect of the post-9/11 social construction labelling those who disagree with the idea of a unified global jihad focused on destroying the United States as “blind to jihad or Jihadophiles themselves,” suggesting that those promoting these ideas are potentially responsible “for the defeat of the free world,” and argues that even six years after 9/11 “the bulk of the cultural establishment, a majority of artistic talents and celebrities, and a segment of the political elite are blocking the full mobilization of liberal democracies in what may be a fight for their existence.” Phares, *The Confrontation*, 5, 14.
not even be raised; deflects attention away from policies that might have contributed to their grievances; [and] repudiates any calls to negotiate with them… If individuals and groups are portrayed as irrational, barbaric, and beyond the pale of negotiation and compromise, then asking why they resort to terrorism is viewed as pointless, needlessly accommodating, or, at best, mere pathological curiosity.  

Jenkins, despite coming from a very different perspective, reaches a very similar conclusion:

But if terrorists could not be dismissed as crazies, they could instead be elevated to the realm of evil. Evil is a powerful concept. It resonates with those who have a Manichaean view of the world and is popular with those who see the devil not as a theological abstraction but as a real-world operator. This view also discourages research: Evil people are just evil. No further explanation is required, no deeper inquiry is necessary. To explore the mind set or the decision making of evil doers is to try to fathom evil itself – it is futile and unnecessary. In this view, any inquiry that suggests taking terrorists out of the evil-incarnate category also undermines the inquirer’s claim on good.

To a significant degree the problem each of these experts cite is inherent in our desire for terrorism to be a strongly normative construct. Because we want our language about terrorism to assist us in enforcing a societal prohibition against violent political attacks on civilians, we make it much more likely that the power of that language will be used against efforts to understand underlying dynamics.

This problem is heightened by the more highly normative construction of terrorism in the U.S. after 9/11 framing the war on terror as a morally simple battle between good and evil:

To stand up to evil you have to be morally strong. If you’re weak, you let evil triumph, so that weakness is a form of evil in itself, as is promoting weakness. Evil is inherent, an essential trait, that determines how you will act in the world. Evil people do evil things. No further explanation is necessary. There can be no social causes of evil, no religious rationale for evil, no reasons or arguments for evil.

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182 Kapitan, "The Terrorism of 'Terrorism'," 6-7.
183 Kapitan may be fairly described as coming from a “critical” academic tradition, as highlighted by his involvement with “a diverse community of engaged philosophers and philosophically oriented intellectuals” publishing on the web as part of the CognitiveDissidents.org project. Jenkins has been a Captain with the U.S. Army Special Forces who served in Vietnam, a Deputy Chairman of the security consulting firm Kroll Associates, and an advisor in many positions to national and international government commissions and boards.
184 Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation, 57.
185 Lakoff, "Metaphors of Terror."
Jackson similarly explains:

Second, the language of good and evil suppresses questions: we don’t need to ask what the motivations or aims of the terrorists were if they are ‘evil’, as ‘evil’ is its own motivation and its own self-contained explanation. Evil people do not have any politics and there is no need to examine their causes or grievances. Evil people do what they do simply because they are evil. Clearly, the use of this language is a way of encouraging quiescence and displacing more complex understandings of political and social events.\textsuperscript{186}

The temptation and easy path is to stop with the moral denunciation and the labelling of terrorists as evil, when what is needed is complimentary action to insure an as unbiased and open assessment as possible of the particular problems faced in responding to a terrorist threat.\textsuperscript{187} Yglesias argues:

This notion that in order to preserve the terrorists moral culpability for their atrocities we need to believe that their actions are somehow uncaused is daft… To be sure, there are some implacable opponents out there who we’ll have to do our best to kill. But there are also lots of other people out there – placable opponents, young kids with unformed views, fence-sitters, whatever – and our actions do, indeed, play a role in whether or not they become implacable opponents. This matters. It probably matters more than anything else. And the domination of Western politics by people who don’t understand that is going, one day, to get an awful lot of Americans killed.\textsuperscript{188}

Kinsley observes that political and partisan predispositions of the Bush administration and many of their supporters reinforce the tendency of the post-9/11 public construction of terrorism to focus on an its “all-about-evil” explanation and avoid examination of what motivates and generates support for terrorist acts. He argues that examination of the detailed grievances of Muslim populations violates a long-standing taboo against

\textsuperscript{186} Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, 69.
\textsuperscript{187} Michael Kinsley articulates: “Calling terrorists ‘evil’ requires no courage and justifies no self-congratulatory puffing. It’s just not a problem. But it’s also not a solution. There are many people, unfortunately, who would be happy to hijack four airplanes, fly them into crowded buildings, and kill 3,000 Americans. In terms of malign intent, they all are evil. But only one of them managed to actually do it. The concept of evil tells you nothing about why – among the many evils wished upon the United States – this one actually happened. Nor does ‘evil’ help us to figure out how to stop evil from visiting itself upon us again.” Kinsley, 2002, "Deliver Us From Evil," Slate (September 19), http://www.slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2071148.
“blaming America first.” Thus the explanation is “evil” with “nothing else to discuss,” as he concludes:

They are so afraid of the fallacy of “toute comprendre c’est tout pardonner” that they fall right into it: In order to avoid the danger that understanding terrorism might lead to excusing terrorism, they put understanding itself beyond the pale. This is not just anti-intellectual, but actually a hindrance to the war on terrorism. Blocking any deeper understanding of the terrorist’s mentality and motives cannot be good for the war effort.

One manifestation of this aspect of the dominant construction has been to cast as suspect and significantly constrain the influence of those perceived as sympathetic to populations in the Muslim world. This especially includes those labelled as “Arabists” (used with a negative connotation) at the Department of State or in divisions of U.S. intelligence agencies long tasked with studying Muslim countries. Another social manifestation and enforcement of this aspect of the construction is the common rhetorical move to denounce and discredit examination of contributing factors by labelling those who advocate such an approach as “apologists” or “appeasers.”

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190 Kinsley, "Deliver Us From Evil."
The Construction Biases and Constrains the Understanding Needed

How we talk and think about terrorism works to constrain and bias our understanding at individual and social levels, through mechanisms that are subconscious and conscious. At a basic level, the degree to which we accept the common collective framing of terrorism, focusing on evil actors seeking goals that are on face unjustifiable, decreases the motivation for a wide range of people – from political leaders and government agency decision makers to low-level military and government personnel – involved in the actual implementation and development of policies related to the war on terror to fully critically consider what gives rise to and drives the potential support for groups using tactics of terrorism from larger populations. The binary division of the conflict, coupled with the repeated simple narrative that Western states are defending civilization and universal ideals while terrorists seek totalitarian oppression achieved through death and destruction, creates a presumption that anyone or any population who might be sympathetic with them or choose to provide support to them is an enemy – with the effect of significantly devaluing any other possible explanation for such sympathies or support. As the discussion of lessons from classic and contemporary insurgencies as well as the study of social movements in Chapter Two emphasizes, without a pervasive population-centric understanding of the strategy needed to counter a global insurgency and the potential related disparate local conflicts we will not achieve the recommended unity of effort, and instead will often end up with a wide range of rhetoric and action running counter to overall strategic goals.

At a more advanced or in-depth level, where the dynamics driving groups using terrorism and populations related to them are considered, how we talk and think about terrorism enables confirmation biases and suppression of dissonant information to filter, frame, and focus our understanding of the phenomenon. The result again emphasizes an enemy and threat-centric perspective over the population-centric approach recommended by a social movement and counterinsurgency foundation. In part this occurs because of what we do and do not tend to study and analyze, coupled with how


194 Richardson, What Terrorists Want, 194.
we initially understand and assess those elements, their relevance, and the connecting agency. These biases make it more likely that in analyzing and developing responses we will seek out and embrace information that is consistent with the overall enemy-centric construction, while passing over or raising the bar for information that is inconsistent.

For example, consider the often-asserted criteria for assessing the threat of terrorists that we should “listen to what they say,” “read what they write,” and “take them at their word.” On its own this measure is neutral and presumptively appropriate advice. However, in practice in U.S. political and policy debates since 9/11, it has more been used as a rhetorical trump card to highlight evidence consistent with the dominant construction while rarely given equal weight to dissonant evidence. This occurs in who is and is not listened to or read, what particular speeches or writings are chosen, and how ambiguous or contradictory information is portrayed and interpreted. A young radical British Muslim, without connections to any international group, saying that “Islam will conquer the White House” and “Downing Street” is put forward as proof of global Islamist aspirations, while the repeated focus on local issues and divisions between Islamist groups is deemphasized in public discussions of the threat. Denunciations of Hizballah by al-Qaida leaders and al-Qaida by Hizballah leaders

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196 Roy, "Iraq will not be a Qaedaistan."

does not undercut allegations that they are working towards the same global goals, as are indications that Hizballah is focused on local nationalist political goals, rather than being part of some Islamist alliance seeking a global caliphate. We highlight calls for violence in response to the publication of Danish cartoons deemed insulting to the prophet Mohammad, and interpret subsequent mass protests as proof that majorities in the Muslim world support such violence, while ignoring prominent Muslim leaders who called for non-violent protest and the fact that the vast majority of the protests were peaceful. I do not believe this is generally used deceitfully, with conscious awareness of the biased and inconsistent application, but instead is a simple manifestation of how the construction functions to filter and focus our understanding. Information consistent with expectations is heuristically sorted as credible and confirming, while information that is inconsistent is not reported, unconsciously discounted, or more critically examined with a presumption of being suspect.

Another example of how the construction constrains and biases our understanding is shown in what is studied and analyzed. Because of his importance to militant Islamists for establishing arguments about an individual Islamic duty to engage in violent jihad and his enmity towards the United States, policy elites and others highly engaged in discussions about the war on terror have become increasingly familiar with the name Sayyid Qutb. But these same people are not familiar with many prominent

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198 For example: “Sayyed Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, Hizbollah’s spiritual founding father, dismissed Al Qaeda’s claim that its attacks had been religiously sanctioned. In dozens of interviews, sermons, and lectures immediately after September 11, Fadlallah, one of the most prominent radical Shiite clerics, called Al Qaeda’s bombings “suicide” rather than “martyrdom operations,” and thus deemed them illegitimate.” Gerges, Journey of the Jihadist, 189.

199 For example, in a radio address after the summer 2006 conflict between Israel and Hizballah, Bush mentioned attacks and threats from other terrorist groups and then referred to Hizballah as the terrorists “who hide behind civilians in Lebanon.” He immediately continued “They are seeking to spread their totalitarian ideology. They're seeking to take over countries like Afghanistan and Iraq so they can establish safe havens from which to attack free nations.” Bush, "President's Radio Address."

200 Roy, Globalized Islam, 63.
201 Phares, The Confrontation, 16.
Islamists who have renounced al-Qaida,\textsuperscript{203} such as Egyptian Yusuf al-Qaradawi who has a “hugely popular program on al-Jazeera” which “advances an Islamist understanding of all aspects of life” and is “singularly anti-bin Laden.”\textsuperscript{204} Similarly, consistent with the construction, policy elites are more likely to think of the Muslim Brotherhood for its historical connections to al-Qaida through the splinter group Egyptian Islamic Jihad, than for the modern sharp split between the two over theology and violent methods.\textsuperscript{205} In national security discussions Hamas’s historic connections to the Muslim Brotherhood are given more weight to describe the overall Islamist threat than the extensive efforts of the Muslim Brotherhood to participate in electoral politics in Egypt and Syria are seen as potential for moderation and non-violent inclusion of Islamist movements.\textsuperscript{206}

Some normative bias resulting from labelling acts as terrorism or groups as terrorists is understandable given our associated desire to denounce and discourage political violence directed against civilians and non-combatants. While understanding a problem and being understanding are distinct, there is often an inevitable connection as deeper exploration creates ambiguity and complexity at odds with simple and unequivocal moral condemnation. Unfortunately the changes in American thinking about terrorism after 9/11 have strengthened the absolutist normative tendencies favouring enemy-centric approaches and undermining the pervasive understanding of

\textsuperscript{203} Mandaville, \textit{Global Political Islam}, 255-6. Gerges highlights the release of eight manuscripts since early 2002 by senior leaders of Egyptian Islamic Jihad (from which Ayman al-Zawahiri had split) criticizing bin Ladin’s global jihad, two of which were specific to the September 11 attacks. Gerges, \textit{Journey of the Jihadist}, 214.

\textsuperscript{204} Lynch, \textit{Voices of the New Arab Public}, 86. Gerges also notes that Qaradawi endorsed a September 2001 fatwa that American Muslims should fight with the U.S. in Afghanistan even though the U.S. was invading a Muslim country. Gerges, \textit{Journey of the Jihadist}, 204.


\textsuperscript{206} Khalil, "Al-Qaeda & the Muslim Brotherhood.". Leiken and Brooke, 2007, "The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood," \textit{Foreign Affairs} 86 (2), March/April.
population-centric dynamics important for engaging the vital larger populations who play a key role in enabling or countering the rising terrorist threat, reinforcing aggregation instead of disaggregation, and damaging efforts to engage in key framing contests.

**Encourages an Enemy instead of a Population-centric Focus**

The underlying argument of this thesis is that the choice of vital populations to either provide or deny support to violent groups plays an important role in how dangerous such groups become as well as in the success or failure of counterterrorism efforts. Although the ability of states to influence the dynamics driving popular support is constrained, lessons from the study of counterinsurgencies and social movements emphasize the need for a population-centric approach to more fully understand these conflicts and pursue effective policies. Problematically, significant aspects of how Americans talk and think about terrorism encourage an enemy-centric approach. In part this predisposition is a result of the modern normative nature of the concept as well as the tendency to focus on the violence and potential threat. Key aspects of the changes in how Americans think about terrorism after 9/11, reinforced by the strategic narrative employed by the Bush administration, exaggerate this tendency, including the adoption of a war approach to combat an amorphous and aggregated enemy who is seen as posing an especially grave threat primarily targeting the U.S. in a conflict viewed as a transcendent, generational struggle between civilization and barbarity. The result runs counter to the four strategic precepts discussed in Chapter Two of adopting a population-centric strategy, seeking unity of understanding of the challenge in a manner that promotes rhetoric and actions consistent with that approach, while working to disaggregate instead of aggregating the potential transnational threat, and embracing propaganda of the deed through taking steps to address the legitimate grievances and aspirations of wider populations while engaging productively in the framing contests driving mobilization. The exaggerated focus on the violent international threat to the United States emphasizes preference for an enemy-centric approach. The tendencies to apply a rigid moral framework where all actors are either on the side of good or the side of evil creates shifts in presumption and evaluation working against our ability to encourage understanding leading to constructive engagement with key populations. The
propensity to see populations and groups who show any sympathy or have any association with groups using terrorism as presumptively antagonists counterproductively encourages aggregation, while de-emphasizing efforts that may promote disaggregation, and similarly discourages support and follow through for programs to address the grievances and aspirations of these populations. The overall enemy-centric approach, which de-emphasizes appreciation for the perspective of vital Muslim populations, damages proactive efforts to engage in the war of ideas, while increasing the chances for mistakes that reinforce the framing promoted by militant Islamists.

We Focus on the Violence, the Terrorists, and the Threat to Us

Applying the label of terrorism to a conflict presumptively frames and defines the problem in line with our construction of the concept. We then instinctively focus on the use or threat of violence by those identified as terrorists, with our motivation driven primarily by any threat to ourselves or to those with whom we identify. The principle actors, presumed to have the most agency, become ourselves and the terrorists. Our understanding and knowledge about the conflict, as well as the timeline for events we consider as important, starts with when we became aware of the terrorist threat and branches out defined by that threat. To the extent that we expand what we know about the conflict our understanding is driven by these priorities and presumptions. We evaluate new information and other actors from a presumptive negative bias against those with any association to the use violence, while assuming opposition to those who use violence is a positive. Thus, populations who share grievances with those using violence are likely part of the problem, while governments or other actors opposed to them are presumptive allies – even if the same government has often been responsible for its own atrocities or the grievances giving rise to the conflict. While these tendencies have long been a part of the construction and resulting approach to terrorism, the changes discussed in this chapter exaggerate the effect.

Given the focus on the threat of violent Islamist groups potentially targeting the United States, the post 9/11 construction of terrorism more strongly encourages a presumption that other actors motivated by either an Islamic revival or ideals of political Islam are enablers of a dangerous trend. Islamic political parties are frequently discussed as only providing cover and legitimacy for violent Islamist actors, and are
suspected of only supporting democratic institutions as a means to take power before revealing their true authoritarian and expansionist nature (Islamic democracy interpreted as “one man, one vote, one time”). Islamic NGOs, charities, and missionary organizations – “claiming” to provide relief services to the oppressed or suffering populations – are suspected of being mere fronts for terrorist financing and facilitation, and otherwise intent on radicalizing at risk populations to violent extremist views supportive of Islamist terrorism. Moderate, liberal, or reformist Islamic groups are suspected of being fronts, apologists, or figments of Western liberal imagination.\textsuperscript{207}

Changing focus to a larger social movement perspective, which does not privilege those groups using terrorist tactics to target the United States as the principal actors, may provide a different understanding. While many of these other Islamic groups have connections to extremists using or supportive of violence, those connections are often secondary, individual, and not necessarily part of their central motivations. Instead, extremists groups advocating violence become just one of several relevant actors, in turn illuminating that the various groups are often to varying degrees in disagreement with each other about appropriate means and desired goals. Although these groups may be intertwined and mutually sympathetic to a degree that should cause concern, the choice to see them all as presumptively part of the threat risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy creating a much larger danger.\textsuperscript{208} An alternative approach of exploiting and over time increasing the divisions between them, while making sure to understand and act in accordance with the dynamics driving larger popular attitudes, may often offer a more promising path to non-violent alternatives for most while isolating violent radicals and building support for other counterterrorism efforts targeting them. Repeated studies of how terrorist and insurgent conflicts come to an end emphasize the importance of opening political paths away from violence, rather than dividing everyone into binary camps with those on the other side seen as irredeemable.

The post-9/11 construction of terrorism further feeds the problems of this enemy-centric focus by de-rationalizing the larger conflicts. In explicitly rejecting

\textsuperscript{207} For example, Baran argues that non-violent Islamist movements are a dangerous gateway to more violent organizations, playing “a crucial role in indoctrinating Muslims with radical ideology.” Baran, 2005, "Fighting the War of Ideas," \textit{Foreign Affairs} 84 (6), November-December.

explanations that real or perceived grievances have anything to do with the emergence or threat of terrorism, the dominant construction and its promotion through the strategic narrative employed by key decision makers discourages understanding of the population-centric dynamics influencing popular support. As Scheuer explains, “It’s much easier to tell Americans that crazy people are after you and tomorrow morning your daughter is going to have to go to school in a burqa,”209 than to engage in real debate and consideration of how American policies and efforts contribute to the problem.

The shift to viewing the U.S. conflict with terrorism as a war, and for the large majority of Americans after 9/11 a real war, is the most direct way in which current thinking and talking about terrorism encourages an enemy-centric approach.210 Put simply, the traditional view of a war requires an enemy. The rhetoric used to motivate action during a war, the historical comparisons drawn, the tendency to focus coverage and discussion on military options, and the common preference for patriotic unity all strengthen the presumption that the approach will be enemy-centric. As an example an analysis of five speeches President Bush gave in 2006 building support for his policies shows the consistent use of very traditional war language, all of which triggering associations that emphasize an enemy-centric approach.211 Framing the conflict as a war encourages a “with us or against us” binary division, especially when “they” are seen as continuing to threaten the United States with especially destructive attacks. The

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210 This is highlighted in the very traditional wartime language used by President Bush and other opinion leaders discussed in the first half of this chapter. Similar meta-analysis of the war language used to describe the war on terror can be found in: Hess and Justus, "(Re)Defining the Long War," 5. Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism.

211 “Obviously, the term ‘war’ is the central element in the acronym GWOT. But the presence of other language also points toward a very traditional conceptualization of the current fight against terrorism. In the narrative contained within the speeches: ‘allies’ form a ‘coalition’ that use a ‘clear plan’ to stay on the ‘offensive’ in order to ‘defend civilization’ and ‘win the war’ all aimed at the end goal of ‘complete victory’ within a ‘global campaign.’ This narrative is juxtaposed with that of the terrorists, which characterizes them as ‘enemies’ and their ‘terrorist allies’ who utilize ‘propaganda,’ ‘strategy,’ and pursue ‘weapons of mass destruction’ as part of a larger effort to ‘defeat’ our troops through ‘multiple attacks’ with the final goal of creating a ‘violent political utopia’ and ‘forcing America to retreat.’” Hess and Justus, "(Re)Defining the Long War," 5.
associations that are triggered by and seem natural to this framing reinforce perceptions
and tendencies to view and approach this as a simple conflict in which any who may
support or sympathize with those threatening America are enemies and part of the
problem.

How Americans think and talk about terrorism in recent years has also increased
the tendency to de-localize the understanding of these conflicts.\(^{212}\) By emphasizing, and
often greatly exaggerating, the international connections between and cohesiveness of
the various militant Islamist groups as well as framing their goals as centred on
establishing an international caliphate and attacking global actors (primarily the United
States) the construction again devalues understanding of the important and generally
much more local dynamics driving potential popular support. More attention is paid to
and information privileged that supports or is related to these global connections and
international threats. In turn policies, actions, and rhetoric are driven by this focus, with
significantly less attention given to addressing issues that are important to the key local
populations – often with the net result of undermining hearts and minds goals. As Drum
writes:

> [W]e’re trying to force a hundred little propaganda wars, each of which requires
a media and intelligence strategy all its own, into the more familiar straitjacket
of a single broad-based military war (the “war on terror,” “Islamofascism”). But
that broader war is a chimera, and refusing to acknowledge this in a serious way
is just making things worse.\(^{213}\)

Kilcullen similarly concludes:

> Our too-willing and heavy-handed interventions in the so-called War on
Terrorism to date have largely played into the hands of this AQ exhaustion
strategy, while creating tens of thousands of accidental guerrillas and tying us
down in a costly (and potentially unsustainable) series of interventions.\(^{214}\)

The social movement perspective employed by this thesis recognizes that there are
important international connections and ideological ties between various violent
Islamist groups, however an important insight from this perspective for security goals is

\(^{212}\) Gardels, 2006, "De-Globalize the Jihad," Huffington Post (September 29),
\(^{213}\) Drum, 2006, "Global Counterinsurgency Revisited..." Political Animal (December
18), Washington Monthly,
\(^{214}\) Kilcullen, The accidental guerilla, 264.
that taking actions that reinforce these connections and ties is generally counterproductive.\textsuperscript{215}

**Risk Distortion Shifts Presumption Against Hearts and Minds**

The 9/11 attacks significantly changed the American perception of the threat of terrorism. Before the attacks the common perception was that “terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead,” whereas now it is assumed that “terrorists want a lot of people watching \textit{and} a lot of people dead.”\textsuperscript{216} The American perception of the threat is heightened by a fear of what type of unprecedented attack could happen next.\textsuperscript{217} The construction of the terrorism, calibrated by the trauma of 9/11, emphasizes this change by focusing on the possibility of especially lethal mass casualty attacks using chemical, biological, radiological, or even nuclear devices and also by focusing on regional and global territorial goals. The war on terror is thus part of a “global ideological struggle” where the enemy is a “mortal danger to all humanity”\textsuperscript{218} following “in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism.”\textsuperscript{219}

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\textsuperscript{216} Emphasis in original. While Jenkins is widely cited for the first observation, and is quoted here for both, he references works (including his own) before 9/11 that were noting the increasing intended lethality of terrorist attacks starting in the mid-1980s. He also emphasizes that while many terrorist groups now seek high lethality attacks this is not true of all terrorist groups. Jenkins, "International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict," 15. Jenkins, \textit{Unconquerable Nation}, 8-9.
\textsuperscript{217} This is heightened by the often repeated observation, “What we also know is that a terrorist can attack at any time, at any place, using any conceivable technique, and it’s not possible to defend at every point, at every minute of the day or night against every conceivable technique.” Rumsfeld, 2004, "Secretary Rumsfeld Town Hall Meeting at Ft. Campbell, KY," (September 14), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2397.
\textsuperscript{218} Vlahos, "The Long War: A Self-Fulfilling prophecy of Protracted Conflict – and Defeat." Isaac Chotiner summarizes that this is a tendency that is neither unique to the United States or to our conflict with terrorism: “All societies, not just our own, tend to overstate the dangers they face. If this weren’t the case, after all, it would be harder to motivate people to fight and die. […] Terrorism is certainly a serious danger, and if Islamic fundamentalists can get their hands on a nuclear weapon, perhaps we would be in existential danger. But it’s worth remembering that even the Sandinistas were billed as a threat to our way of life, and we have a (sometimes understandable) tendency to overstate our own peril.” Chotiner, 2007, "How Big a Threat?," \textit{The Plank from The}
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One of the problems with concentrating on the most dramatic potential devastation as a measure of the terrorist threat is that it shifts the presumptive appropriate framework further towards an enemy-centric focus. This is reflected in the approach portrayed as necessary by Fox’s hit series, which “for all its fictional liberties, ‘24’ depicts the fight against Islamist extremism much as the Bush administration has defined it: as an all-consuming struggle for America’s survival that demands the toughest of tactics.”220 Especially when coupled with the view that all Islamist groups are part of the same aggregated threat and generally working together, this increases the presumption that any specific group, or associated and potentially sympathetic population, is an especially dangerous enemy who must be fought rather than engaged. As Vlahos explains, “If we explicitly fight ‘Islamofascists’ we must just as explicitly oppose everyone who supports or even sympathizes with Muslim resistance.”221

The presumption shift towards an enemy-centric focus from these influences is driven by understandable and often admirable motivations. Those involved in American counterterrorism efforts, from politicians and agency heads through individual analysts and military personnel, as a rule are guided by desires to protect the general public. This attitude was expressed by a former master sergeant now working at one of the national counterterrorism watch centres charged with detecting and reacting to security breaches of American transportation services who explained that he was motivated by making sure that no one will hurt Americans, “not on my watch, not while I’m standing

219 Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People."
220 Mayer, "Whatever It Takes: The Politics of the Man Behind '24'."
221 Vlahos, "The Long War: A Self-Fulfilling prophecy of Protracted Conflict – and Defeat." He continues: “Already the narrative of the Long War has won over the faithful. Freerepublic.com is probably the biggest ‘red’ community blog. Most talk on the war there moves quickly to declarations like: ‘History shows that wars only end with a totally defeated enemy otherwise they go on … Either Islam or us will quit in total destruction.’ Or another: ‘Will it take an American Hiroshima to awaken the majority, to mobilize our masses against the Islamic quest of world domination?’” Although the views of these partisans are representative only of a more extreme perception of the threat, they still dramatize the tendencies inherent in how terrorism is currently popularly constructed.
here."\textsuperscript{222} As with quantitative research, efforts to decrease the error rate for false negatives (the failure to accurately detect a threat) often come at the cost of increasing the error rate for false positives (identifying a threat that is not actually there).\textsuperscript{223} As the dominant construction increases the perception of the risk from failing to prevent a threat individuals are more likely to adopt an enemy-centric perspective, especially when they do not similarly perceive an increased risk from mistakenly identifying threats that are not actually there.\textsuperscript{224} Feeding this bias is that a decision maker faced with briefings from a proponent of the enemy-centric focused perspective (highlighting grave potential threats) versus a proponent of the population-centric perspective (arguing that the dangers from a specific group are much more locally focused) may rationally choose to act on the warnings of the first to be safe given the relative dangers.\textsuperscript{225} Fallows explains this presumption:

> It takes little courage to warn that bad things might happen... If you’re wrong, everyone is happy. Moreover, since you can always say that the crisis hasn’t happened yet, it’s very hard for a gloomy prediction to be proved incorrect. But to claim that a certain fear or threat is exaggerated is to subject oneself to


\textsuperscript{223} In the same way that it is possible to reduce both false positives and false negatives through better experiment design, the unity of understanding recommended in Chapter Two for contemporary counterinsurgencies would help individuals involved at every layer to better understand and recognize real threats as well as opportunities for engagement.

\textsuperscript{224} Ron Suskind explains how the Bush administration, and especially Vice-President Cheney, was motivated in this manner to respond to even a 1\% threat of a devastating terrorist attack as if the danger were a certainty. As several critics have pointed out the statistical mistake the “Cheney doctrine” makes is a failure to appreciate the downside risks of preemptive action. Suskind, 2006, \textit{The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11}, New York, Simon & Schuster.

\textsuperscript{225} As Ian Lustic explains: “Within the government this particular mechanism is known colloquially as CYA – ‘cover your ass.’ In the War on terror it operates, within regular departments, the intelligence community, the military, and law enforcement agencies throughout the country, to weaken and slow our system’s capacity to distinguish useful from wasteful activity. With an enemy imagined as totally ruthless, infinitely cunning, and interested in inflicting as much damage as possible on America, every attack that anyone can imagine occurring eventually becomes a threat that must be considered and countered.” Lustick, \textit{Trapped in the War on Terror}, 89.
disproof – it’s a “falsifiable hypothesis,” in scientific terms – and, worse, to blame and ridicule if the nightmare you said probably wouldn’t happen does.\textsuperscript{226} The post-9/11 construction reinforces this tendency by establishing that a global dire threat is the accepted reality, placing the presumption of proof on those who would argue otherwise. At the same time it empowers those who believe the dire threat is real through the fear of “what if they are right” coupled with normative trumps that their opponents either still have a “pre-9/11” world view or are undermining the moral clarity necessary to defeat this evil.\textsuperscript{227} Unfortunately, a population-centric view warns that the actions now being taken are likely to make the problem worse and possibly risk creating a self-fulfilling prophecy.\textsuperscript{228}

A final problem caused by measuring the threat of terrorism in terms of the most damaging potential future attacks is that this creates a disconnect with understanding the perspectives of key local Muslim populations. Those populations make their judgments about the relative culpability and threat posed by various groups, through their own selective filters, and in terms of local conflict contexts often dominated by long histories of violence, terror, oppression, and other sources of grievances by actors on all sides. Violence by local groups Americans label as terrorists is measured first by what they have actually done, not what some global amorphous Islamist threat might do, and tempered or justified in relation to what opposing groups or states have done. Because


\textsuperscript{227} Discussing the demagogic uses of the war on terror to promote specific policies: Brzezinski, "Terrorized by 'War on Terror.'" As an example of this demagogic approach see the writings of Walid Phares who reguarly alleges that anyone who disagrees with the dominant construction of a unified global jihadist movement threatening the survival of Western society is either “blind to jihad or a jihadophile.” Phares, \textit{The Confrontation}, 14. For example: “One has to realize that immense obstacles will be put in the way of building an enlightened defense of the homeland. The resistance will naturally come from the already indoctrinated and influenced elements in the country and within the layers of institutions. The Jihadophiles will use all their political and academic power to protect the Jihadists, and the latter will use all their financial and diplomatic resources to protect Jihadism.” Phares, \textit{The Confrontation}, 154.

\textsuperscript{228} David Kilcullen, for example, argues that al-Qaida and Islamists terrorists do not themselves pose an existential threat, however our reaction to them risks creating much greater dangers. He compares this to the at most 2,000 people killed by anarchists terrorists a century ago but triggering World War I because of how states responded to a single assassination. Fallows, 2006b, "Declaring Victory," \textit{The Atlantic Monthly} (September), September, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200609/fallows_victory.
the enemy-centric focus tends to ignore or actively discount these other factors, it becomes significantly more difficult for Americans to appreciate why Muslim populations do not clearly reach the same judgments. In turn this increases the likelihood that Americans will reach the conclusion that given populations or specific groups within those are part of the problem and thus opponents, while also making it less likely that proactive messaging efforts aimed at these populations will be developed in a manner that meaningfully connects and persuades.

**Moral Shunning Shifts Presumption Against Hearts and Minds**

The highly normative nature of current thinking and talking about terrorism creates a similar shift favouring an enemy-centric over population-centric approach. The normative discourse of the war on terror regularly warns that states must never reward terrorism or negotiate with terrorists, and that any accommodation is simply a display of weakness repeating the mistakes of appeasement, legitimizing those who use terror, and encouraging future attacks. In a March 2004 speech, President Bush explained:

> No concession will appease their hatred. No accommodation will satisfy their endless demands. Their ultimate ambitions are to control the peoples of the Middle East, and to blackmail the rest of the world with weapons of mass terror. There can be no separate peace with the terrorist enemy. Any sign of weakness or retreat simply validates terrorist violence, and invites more violence for all nations. The only certain way to protect our people is by early, united, and decisive action.

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229 For example, in commenting on Talal Asad’s book *On Suicide Bombing* Power emphasizes the disconnect which occurs between the American and Muslim perspectives. The American perspective sees these conflicts as morally unambiguous with suicide terrorism as clearly one of the most reprehensible forms of violence that must be denounced and opposed. The perspective of many in the Muslim world may recognize the horror of suicide attacks but also perceives many acts by the U.S. and allied nations, such as Israel’s use of cluster bombs in Lebanon, as also worthy of strong moral criticism. While she maintains and defends the moral distinctions that underlie the more sophisticated American arguments such as the intent of primarily targeting civilians, she also recognizes the problems caused by the failure of Americans to appreciate the alternative perspective. Power, "Our War on Terror."


231 Bush, "President Bush Reaffirms Resolve to War on Terror, Iraq and Afghanistan." Similarly, in a May 2008 speech before the Israeli Knesset, President Bush said: “Some seem to believe we should negotiate with terrorists and radicals, as if some ingenious argument will persuade them they have been wrong all along. We have heard this
While in the abstract this reasoning is persuasive, in the complex and messy reality of most cases where tactics of terror emerge it places policy makers in a polarized trap. The terrorist groups focused on in the war on terror have become more threatening because larger Muslim populations share and identify with many of the grievances and causes they claim to represent. Problematically, normative prescriptions from this part of the strategic narrative and dominant construction require avoiding the appearance of negotiation and accommodation, which in turn discourages action on or engagement with less radical elements and the larger potentially supportive population over the issues that are often most important to them. Reinforcing this trap, political and other opinion leaders after 9/11 have frequently denounced suggestions that specific policies or grievances give rise to terrorism as absurd, inaccurate, and counterproductive. A cumulative effect of these problems is to favour adoption of an enemy-centric approach, which is less likely to raise uncomfortable contradictions and provides prescriptions that feel more natural and consistent with the dominant construction.

Also reinforcing the presumption to adopt an enemy-centric approach, is the repeated message of the administration’s strategic narrative and desire inherent in the normative construction of terrorism to unambiguously divide actors as being either “with us” or “with the terrorists,” as “a war of good versus evil.” When local populations and specific groups fail to clearly reject militant Islamists, and worse tend to show varying levels of understanding for and sympathy with those using violence, Americans in turn are predisposed to categorize these populations as opponents and part of the problem. Although many government actors and specific policies take a more sophisticated approach towards Muslim populations, actively emphasizing that reaching out to them is an important goal in the conflict, this predisposition limits those efforts.

foolish delusion before. As Nazi tanks crossed into Poland in 1939, an American senator declared: ‘Lord, if only I could have talked to Hitler, all of this might have been avoided.’ We have an obligation to call this what it is – the false comfort of appeasement, which has been repeatedly discredited by history.” Bush, 2008b, "President Bush Addresses Members of the Knesset," (May 15), The White House Office of the Press Secretary, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/05/20080515-1.html. Of note, in this speech President Bush included radicals in those we are prohibited from engaging, which is an example of the tendency of this discursive approach to be expanded to those we perceive as associated with terrorists.

232 Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People."
233 Bush, "President’s Remarks at ‘Congress of Tomorrow’ Lunch."
serves as a constraint for how far and what specific groups policy makers are willing to engage, and increases the tendency for general rhetoric and policies to end up alienating these target populations.

An example of how these related attitudes have undermined American efforts to effectively communicate with the larger Muslim world after 9/11 is found in the U.S. government’s ignoring, discrediting, and at times shunning of al-Jazeera. Prior to 9/11 al-Jazeera was seen as a great success story, breaking authoritarian censorship across the Middle East and encouraging the type of diverse perspectives, citizen engagement, and critical examination important to building the civil society base that enables political liberalization and democratization. However, after 9/11 al-Jazeera was quickly reframed as complicit with terrorism for broadcasting statements from Usama bin Ladin and giving greater coverage to the death and destruction caused by American military attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq. American officials saw this as encouraging support for or showing too much sympathy with the terrorist enemy, and quickly lumped al-Jazeera in with radical Muslim clerics and fundamentalist madrassas as part of the problem. Despite al-Jazeera having by far the largest audience and most

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235 Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public, 19-21, 213-6. For example: Ralph Peters wrote in the New York Post on 21 June 2004, “Al-Jazeera has become the most powerful ally of terror in the world – even more important than Saudi financiers. We’re foolish if we do not recognize it as such.” Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public, 19. One repeated criticism of al-Jazeera was for allegedly showing video of hostages being beheaded by terrorists in Iraq, which through repetition reinforced the belief of many Americans that al-Jazeera sided with al-Qaida. However, al-Jazeera’s management has “bitterly denied that it had ever aired a video of a hostage being beheaded” and even offered a reward to any critic who could document such a broadcast. Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public, 233.

236 Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public. Tatham, Losing Arab Hearts and Minds. For example: “Rumsfeld became increasingly exasperated with the channel as the Iraq
credibility in the Muslim world, over time relatively few American officials would appear on, agree to be interviewed by, or provide information to the network. Instead amongst the United States first major hearts and minds initiatives after 9/11 was launching Radio Sawa and Alhurra Television as alternatives to the perceived biases of existing Arabic news services (meaning for many al-Jazeera). A fundamental mistake of this American effort was the belief that Muslim populations were desperate for unbiased reporting in the same way Cold War populations of the Eastern Bloc were looking for an alternative to the tightly controlled official propaganda of their own governments news media, instead of recognizing that in the age of satellite broadcasts the Arabic speaking world already had a plethora of choices spanning a range of

adventure went bad. In early 2004, according to Fox News, he began equating its news coverage of Iraq with murder: ‘We are being hurt by Al-Jazeera in the Arab world,’ he said. ‘There is no question about it. The quality of the journalism is outrageous – inexcusably biased – and there is nothing you can do about it except try to counteract it.’ He said it was turning Arabs against the United States. ‘You could say it causes the loss of life,’ he added. ‘It’s causing Iraqi people to be killed’ by inflaming anti-American passions and encouraging attacks against Iraqis who assist the Americans, he added.’ Cole, 2005, "Did Bush Plan to Bomb al-Jazeera," Salon (November 30), http://dir.salon.com/story/opinion/feature/2005/11/30/al_jazeera/index.html. Armstrong, 2006, "'Arrogance and Stupidity': The Fallout from an Honest Statement," MountainRunner (October 22), http://www.mountainrunner.us/2006/10/arrogance_and_s.html. Krieger, 2006, "Voice of America," Newsweek, August 29, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/14560221/site/newsweek/. Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public, 250. Tatham, Losing Arab Hearts and Minds, 10-1. Tatham, "Hearts and Minds," 332. For example, Kenneth Tomlinson of the Broadcasting Board of Governors stated: “Our competitive edge in the Middle East is our very dedication to truth and free and open debate. And we will stand out like a beacon of light in a media market dominated by sensationalism and distortion… We will challenge the voices of hate and repression with truth and the voices of tolerance and moderation. The people will hear free and open discussions not just about conflict in the Middle East, but also about subjects critical to that region’s future.” Shelby, "U.S. Launches Arabic Satellite Television Broadcasts Feb. 14: Alhurrah Aims to Deliver 'Accuracy' and 'Free and Open Debate'."

Kujawa, "Panel Urges Renewed Public Diplomacy Efforts to Engage Muslim World." Tatham, Losing Arab Hearts and Minds, 169. Tatham explains a specific instance of how the inclination to avoid Arab media compounded other problems when President Bush sought to address Muslim audiences about the Abu Ghraib photos but chose to do so through the American Alhurra: "That US President George W Bush should have chosen to explain the US regret at the abuses of Abu Ghraib on a US government funded Arabic language channel that is uniformly ignored throughout the Middle East was construed by many as being entirely counter-productive and indicative of the unwillingness to engage Arab media." Tatham, "Hearts and Minds," 334.
Muslim populations did not and do not perceive al-Jazeera as particularly biased (especially given its tradition of being critical of and taking on many Arab and Middle Eastern governments), while on the other hand those same populations view American broadcasting as official U.S. propaganda.

The American response to al-Jazeera also demonstrates further differences between an enemy-centric and population-centric approach. Instead of seeing al-Jazeera as an opportunity to engage with the key population and the coverage on al-Jazeera as reflective of the attitudes and interests of its audience, American officials cast it as the enemy and saw anyone associated with it as presumptively suspect. Instead of seeing al-Jazeera’s coverage as a measure of the challenges the U.S. faced in winning over support from Muslim populations, American officials collected, often exaggerated, and reframed out of context examples of alleged support by al-Jazeera for terrorism, justifying their antagonism and preference for working through other outlets. In this context of American criticism, mistakes that led to the bombing of al-Jazeera facilities in both Afghanistan and Iraq were easily framed within the Muslim world as proof that the U.S. war on terror was really a larger war on all things Islam. The enemy-centric approach to al-Jazeera by the U.S. military included promoting Dorrance Smith to Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. Al-Jazeera had been temporarily kicked out of Iraq while he was a senior official responsible for media under the Coalition Provisional Authority, and he had written in the Wall Street Journal that:

The collaboration between the terrorists and Al-Jazeera is stronger than ever. While the precise terms of that relationship are virtually unknown, we do know

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241 Hroub, "Al-Jazeera may Transmit Islamist Rhetoric, But That's the Middle East's Reality.". Kujawa, "Panel Urges Renewed Public Diplomacy Efforts to Engage Muslim World."  
CHAPTER FIVE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TERRORISM

this: Al-Jazeera and the terrorists have a working arrangement that extends beyond a modus vivendi. 244

Neither of which were promising for Smith’s predisposition to constructively engage in public diplomacy with the Muslim world. 245 Perhaps this animosity and shunning could be defended if al-Jazeera’s record had really been as biased and supportive of terrorism as some American officials have described. However, as many media and regional experts who speak Arabic and have followed the channel emphasize, despite some mistakes and biases reflective of its audience, al-Jazeera’s actual coverage has been much more balanced and often critical of militant Islamists. 246

A similar example of how the strategic narrative of the war on terror and the related public construction undermines pursuit of a population-centric approach is found in the history of the Sunni awakening movements that many credit with playing a crucial role in reversing the course of the Iraq war and dealing a possibly crushing blow

245 Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public, 214.
246 See generally: Ibid. Lynch emphasizes that “virtually every issue that American critics claim is ignored by the Arab media in fact has been covered” (p9) by al-Jazeera, and that although the channel reflects the biases of its audience its coverage is overall much more objective than American critics contend and arguably better than the American Fox News (p47-49). He further highlights a wide range of programs and episodes regularly giving voice to a wide range of opinions for and against the invasion as well as supportive and critical of the subsequent occupation, including regular appearances by Iraqi figures supporting the invasion and continued Coalition operations. (p11, 211-2) Lynch’s study of al-Jazeera’s content and approach includes analysis of the “transcripts from 976 episodes of the five most important al-Jazeera talk shows broadcast between January 1999 and June 2004” as well as a secondary collection of “al-Jazeera programs dealing specifically with Iraq.” (p9) “American Forum: The Media and Islam.”. Driscoll, 2006, "Al-Jazeera: A Thorn in a Side, a Catalyst for Change, or Both?,” Eccentric Star: A Public Diplomacy Weblog (October 30), http://eccentricstar.typepad.com/public_diplomacy_weblog_n/2006/10/aljazeera_a_tho. html. Macleod, "Tearing Down the Walls." One anecdote demonstrating the disconnect between American perceptions of al-Jazeera as exaggerating every excuse to discredit the U.S. is shown by al-Jazeera’s “first, and most visible, response to the revelations of sexual torture of Iraqis by Americans in Abu Ghraib prison” which was broadcast on the very popular discussion show hosted by Faisal al-Qassem who used it to lunch a critical show focused on conditions in Arab prisons. Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public, 9.
to al-Qaida in Iraq. For the first several years of the war almost all insurgent and terrorist attacks in Iraq, and especially all Sunni groups, were often lumped together as part of the terrorist insurgency portrayed as led by al-Qaida in Iraq. The strategic narrative as advanced by the Bush administration and described above made it clear that there was no possible benefit from negotiating with terrorists, especially not those connected with al-Qaida, and that to do so would was immoral and would simply repeat the mistakes of appeasement encouraging our enemies in their global pursuit. The resulting guidance and general predisposition framed Sunni insurgents in Iraq as radical Islamist terrorists who needed to be defeated as irreconcilable enemies of democracy and peace in Iraq, and who would be carrying out terrorist attacks in the United States if we were not fighting them there. This did not change until the U.S. military began to shift emphasis to a counterinsurgency informed population-centric strategy – in part under the leadership of General Petraeus and an emerging cohort of other military thinkers associated with the new Counterinsurgency Field Manual and in part as a


249 Bush, "President Bush Reaffirms Resolve to War on Terror, Iraq and Afghanistan." Bush, "President Bush Addresses Members of the Knesset." Neumann, "Negotiating With Terrorists."

250 Bush, "President's Remarks in Greeley, Colorado." The resonance of the fighting “terrorists abroad so we do not have to face them here at home” framing with the general public is emphasized by its frequent repetition. Bush, "President’s Remarks in Des Moines, Iowa."
bottom up relearning by units frustrated with the course of the war. The military started to increasingly reach out to traditional local leadership structures connected with some of these insurgent groups, recognizing that most of the insurgents were not motivated by a shared embrace of al-Qaida’s violent transnational goals, but by local self interest which through circumstances of convenience and shared short term sectarian concerns led the groups to fight together. Emphasizing that the resulting shift in Sunni tribal groups against al-Qaida in Iraq could have occurred earlier but for the enemy-centric approach supported by the war on terror narrative, a number of observers highlight earlier attempts by Sunni tribes to reach out to the U.S. government as well as earlier initiatives by the same insurgent groups to oppose the influence of al-Qaida in Iraq in their areas. It is likely that even if a population-centric approach had been fully employed from the start of the Iraq war that many of these Sunni groups would still have initially taken up arms against the Coalition, especially given sectarian fears about how they would be treated under a Shia dominated government and ties to the regime structure the invasion had overturned. However, it is also likely that the strategic narrative of the war on terror, which the Iraq war was intimately connected with from the start, increased the amount of conflict and sectarian tension, while missing earlier opportunities to disaggregate the overall threat.

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251 Alderson, "US COIN Doctrine and Practice: An Ally's Perspective.". Crane, Horvath and Nagl, "Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency.". Hoffman, "Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?.". Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, "Rethinking Counterinsurgency," 43-4. McCary, "The Anbar Awakening." Note: McCary and others emphasize that the Anbar Awakening started and was already showing significant success well before the “surge” of new troops arrived in mid-2007 emphasizing that this did not occur from a show of force that some may associate with enemy-centric strategies, even though the surge is largely characterized as part of the larger counterinsurgency efforts initiated by General Patraeus.
252 Kilcullen, "Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt.". Long, "The Anbar Awakening." Of note this thesis many of the articles examining the Anbar Awakening highlight the importance of important aspects of why the effort was successful that are complimentary with the tool set proposed by a social movement theory approach, including especially the important roles played by kinship and friendship networks, elite alliances, and grievances and aspirations for driving mobilization.
254 McCary for example emphasizes that part of the Awakening movement was disillusionment with al-Qaida in Iraq and especially the groups particularly violent tactics and goals. McCary, "The Anbar Awakening," 51-3.
Overall the normative biases of post-9/11 talking and thinking about terrorism strongly favours hard counterterrorism policies, even when expert opinion appears to support a more diversified and engaged approach consistent with the counterinsurgency lessons described in Chapter Two.\footnote{255} This effect is consistent with both the general influences of the social construction discussed in this chapter as well as specifically the normative presumption shift to engaging in an enemy-centric approach. Unfortunately, the rigidity of approach that these biases encourage prevents analysts and advocates from drawing upon the lessons of historical cases that argue against an overemphasis on enemy-centric efforts, and instead examining or pursuing incremental engagement and population-centric policies that may encourage less radicalized groups to turn towards non-violent paths away from terrorism.\footnote{256}

**Population Viewed as Part of the Problem not Part of the Solution**

In discussing the American approach to terrorism after 9/11 – and particularly the construction of an amorphous, aggregated, worldwide Islamist enemy – Hasting quotes a proverb attributed to Ali ibn Abu Talib, cousin to the Prophet Mohammed,\footnote{257} saying “He who has a thousand friends has not a friend to spare, and he who has one enemy will meet him everywhere.”\footnote{258} Hasting’s criticism is that the perspective typical in American thinking, and frequently endorsed by the rhetoric of the Bush administration, of a largely interconnected global Islamist enemy is both substantively incorrect and highly counterproductive. This part of the post-9/11 construction of...
terrorism leads to a tendency to see large parts of the world’s Muslim population, and almost all groups motivated by Islam as presumptively suspect. This is reinforced by the sympathies with and connections between many Muslim populations with local Islamist groups who are in some manner connected to militant activity. Frequent media images of crowds and large public gatherings in the Muslim world associated with causes seen as related to terrorism (or opposing those seen as allies in the war on terror) bolster this perception.  

Although American politicians and other opinion leaders frequently claim that the conflict in the war on terror is only with extremist elements who have hijacked a peaceful religion, the constant aggregating and connecting of so many different groups creates a strong tendency for the public at large to at least quietly conclude that many Muslims in these countries must really be supportive of al-Qaida’s goals. The statements of political leaders to the contrary are seen as transparent political

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259 Michael Vlaho explains: “All give a curt nod upfront to the distinction between the majority of peaceful Muslims and a core of radicals. But that distinction quickly fades before the relentless imagery of chanting Muslim throngs and the fiery mullahs driving them—blending and folding into our memory of the same images of pilgrim crowds in Mecca, of worshippers everywhere: this is Islam, the terror comes out of Islam, the enemy is everywhere in Islam, it is all about Islam. That such savagery is so intimately coterminous and widespread within civilization is the true mark of a failed civilization. Ralph Peters is characteristically more direct: ‘We are without doubt witnessing something without precedent, the crash of a once great, still proud civilization, that of Middle Eastern Islam. The terrorist problems we face from the Middle East are not America’s fault. It’s the fault of the extreme failure of Middle Eastern civilization.’” Vlahos, "The Fall of Modernity: Has the American Narrative Authored its own Undoing?" Quoting Ralph Peters on the Lehrer Newshour on 8/21/2006.

260 Michael Vlahos explains: “The Great Muslim War advances this transformation. They say that the dark side is only evil radicals—and their supporters. But listen closely: except for the tiny handful of ‘moderate Muslims’ we anoint, all Islamists and their communities are declared evil radicals. And if hundreds of millions so sympathize, then truthfully, is not the dark side the entire Muslim world? To make sure the point is not missed, war commentators are quick to add that Islam’s civilization is decayed and failed. But this is no simple fight with the Muslim world and Islamic civilization. This is a global war, and the very survival of our civilization is at stake. Us versus them is not Americans versus Muslims but civilization and its enemies. Thus our transfigured narrative can keep its titular universalism as it expands the enemy ‘other’ beyond raggtag Takfiris to something really big: the Demiurge, the great Evil. If we are civilization, then the full enemy, in our unspoken logic, is the entire amniotic sea of dark humanity birthing and succoring attackers. Universalism is bent to the service of grand struggle.” Ibid.
correctness as nearly all Islamists are denounced as part of the problem. After all, if the global militant Islamist movement is focused on ultimately causing us great harm and is a barbaric enemy of civilization rejoicing in violent atrocities, and so many Muslims around the world often express sympathy for or are connected with local Islamist groups and their causes, then it seems only rational to recognize that something must be deeply wrong with their religion and culture. Even if the connections and support for the terrorist atrocities is indirect, a step removed, or conflicted by the victims of many attacks also being Muslim, the gravity of the potential threat perceived and absolute moral condemnation of terrorism magnifies the degree of attributed guilt. If the problem is also with them, then in the war on terror it makes simple sense for many Americans to treat them as enemies.

President Bush and other opinion leaders have frequently compared the war on terror to the Cold War as a measure of how great and important the struggle is with the aggregated militant Islamist enemy. As part of this framing, President Bush and other opinion leaders often describe the conflict in clash of civilization terms that reflect the same narrative framing that radical Islamists promote. In his 1949 book, *Social Justice in Islam*, Sayyid Qutb predicted that the ultimate showdown would be “between Islam, on the one hand, and the Western and Eastern blocs, on the other.” Viewing the war on terror as a civilizational clash further undermines adoption of population-centric approaches as understanding and engaging their values and perspectives becomes antithetical to our ideals.

Similarly, the aggregated and prejudicial view is also reinforced by the use of intentionally disparaging labels such as “Islamofascist,” which has no true correspondence with the actual ideology of any particular group other than representing the lumping of often very diverse actors into a homogenized whole associated with

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261 The only Muslims who are not denounced are those recognized by American political and opinion leaders as “moderates.” However, the functional definition of moderates in this case is “pro-Western.” In too many cases this means the United States aligns with existing power structures responsible for the grievances driving contentions action in local conflicts. At the same time many non-violent Muslim groups avoid pro-American positions and statements in order to maintain local credibility with the result of being labelled as extremists and reinforcing the view that all Muslim groups are part of the problem.

condemned previous enemies. While defenders of the term attempt to draw analogies between the excesses of violent terrorism and authoritarian nature of Salifists’ religious world views with the embrace of violence and totalitarianism by Fascists, critics...
emphasize that these claimed similarities are simply common to most “armed revolutionary movements” and ignore that the ideologies of the violent Islamists and Fascists have almost nothing in common. Larison explains that the term is applied as

the treatment (or likely execution) of hostages. Use of the term Islamofacism, especially with heightened focus by most on the prototype of al-Qaida, would counterproductively promote association with that extreme across all cases as well as encourage rhetoric and action more likely to aggregate when contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine advises the opposite underscoring the danger given that our language shapes how we respond (with which Howard agrees). (2) In defending the Islamic portion of the term, Howard seeks to redirect charges of bias by quickly noting that fanatics have also committed abominations in the name of Christianity. But significantly he does not show that we productively called those groups some version of “Christofascists,” which I suspect many Christians would find blasphemous and may take offense at in an analogous situation. Howard also acknowledges that the term fascist “is a general term of abuse” in contemporary usage, which explains why it is likely to cause offense. As Howard recognizes, our labels matter because they both shape our own thinking and play a larger role in the virtual narrative competition that is a very real part of contemporary counterinsurgency. Even if Islamofascist provided deeper specificity, it would not be wise to use. (3) Both Bush and Howard apply the label to a much larger population of groups than the narrow group of violent transnational terrorists who might meet the description Howard gives of fanatics “who reject our values and will stop at nothing to destroy them.” This aggregated and undifferentiated thinking about the conflict early on in Iraq retarded our ability to identify and then to understand the important structural and motivational differences between Shia and Sunni groups generally as well as within the multitude of groups making up those factions. Overcoming this mindset was a significant part of efforts to engage with currently reconcilable groups while increasing coercive force on irreconcilable elements. The significant differences between Shia and Sunni groups, despite both using at times similar types of terrorist violence and being associated with Islamist ideologies, meant that reconciliation efforts on each side were often very different. The success of the Sons of Iraq, Awakening Councils, and related efforts on the Sunni side played a very significant role in decreasing violence, turning the tide against the remaining Sunni rejectionists, and created space and opportunities for confidence building measures with the Shia led government. The Shia side has also involved a wide range of targeted application of force while at the same time encouraging outreach to and negotiation with elements of the Shia insurgency in order to calm communitarian violence, increase confidence in the government, bring competing Shia groups together in meaningful power sharing arrangements conducive to political development, and reconciling former violent actors into the system while keeping pressure on other parts of the networks to degrade and deny their ability to undermine the whole project. The Shia side of the equation has also involved recognition of potentially much greater Shia violence that was in part avoided by proactive engagement with religious leaders who share ties and religious ideology with some who Bush and Howard label as Islamofascists.

265 Codevilla, explains that Fascism “was an aggressively secular, socialist, nationalist movement that organized society in a corporatist way and stressed modernization” and that the “closest thing to a fascist movement in the Islamic world is the Ba'aath party of
“a demon word designed to generate visceral, irrational reaction.”\textsuperscript{266} From the counterinsurgency informed perspective encouraging a unity of understanding that advances population-centric actions this is, again in Larison’s words, “precisely the opposite of the careful, deliberate, and informed responses we need to cultivate.”\textsuperscript{267} He concludes that the purpose of those who use the label is to “group together the many regimes and groups they wish to cast as a cohesive, united enemy, conflating mutually hostile forces into a single, undifferentiated mass.”\textsuperscript{268} Used in this manner the term continues to reinforce the perception that all Muslims are part of the problem, undermining population-centric goals by eroding the understanding and motivation to pursue them as well as by giving insult to the larger vital populations in the conflict, including especially domestic diaspora groups whose support plays many crucial roles. Ignatius writes:

\begin{quote}
The notion that we are fighting “Islamic fascists” blurs the conflict, widening the enemy to many if not all Muslims. It’s as if we were to call Hitler and Mussolini “Christian fascists,” implying that it is their religion, not resistance to transcendence, that is the root cause of the problem. The revolution that began in Iran in 1979 must be contained so that it doesn’t destabilize the region more than it already has. But it will only be broken from within, by people who are at last ready to transcend.\textsuperscript{269}
\end{quote}

The result is to make every Muslim movement becoming part of our larger enemy, as Vlahos explains:

\begin{quote}
The real Cold War analogy is in the Soviet metaphor itself. Thus the “Islamo-fascist” threat equals the Soviet threat, requiring an equivalent struggle. But unlike the Cold War, our survival now depends not on deterrence but literally on destruction. This story has remarkable implications for alternative communities.
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
Syria and Iraq” whose founders “imitated Fascism's aggressive rejection of religion, its nationalism and socialism.” Codevilla, \textit{Advice to War Presidents: A Remedial Course in Statecraft}, 25-6. Larison similarly writes: “The key problem with the label is its stunning ignorance of both fascism and jihadism. Fascism was a specific, secular, modernizing ideology – what historian Stanley Payne has called ‘revolutionary hyper-nationalism’ – that emerged out of Europe’s ruins in WWI. It was focused above all on exalting the nation. Search in vain for any resemblance to a transnational, religious movement that claims to seek the restoration of a theocratic state. In art and architecture, fascists were champions of modernism; jihadists clearly have no such interests. The valorization of war and death that Hitchens cites in his defense as proof of the similarity between the two is common to all armed revolutionary movements.”
\end{flushright}

\textsuperscript{266} Larison, “Term Limits.”
\textsuperscript{267} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{268} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{269} Ignatius, "Are We Fighting 'Islamic Fascists'?."
Our Islamofascist branding makes every movement of Muslim resistance an attack on us. Yet most resistance instead speaks to local yearnings. By seeing an enemy of civilization in every Muslim non-state actor, we unthinkingly widen the struggle. Alternative communities are indelible in the “evil” world landscape painted by the global war on terrorism – the ongoing metamorphosis of the global other into the Mordor of our imagination. In a separate article Vlahos similarly concludes that the adoption of this construction of the threat leads us to an enemy-centric approach treating Muslim populations at large as part of the problem for showing sympathy with what they locally see as resistance movements fighting grievances generally ignored by Americans.

This predisposition to view the populations of many Muslim populations as part of the problem undermines American efforts to win hearts and minds and discourages adoption of a population-centric approach by: obscuring the key local differences in the related conflicts; constraining policies to engage moderates and address motivating grievances; and, encouraging rhetoric and action that counterproductively feeds the wrong dynamics. For example, the strategic narrative as applied to the build up for the Iraq war by the Bush administration regularly linked al-Qaida to Iraq as part of the central justification for the war. This helped reinforce the misperception of many Americans that Saddam Hussein was connected to the 9/11 attacks. For American troops in Iraq this was constantly reinforced by visual and verbal references linking 9/11 to their service, and reminders that they were deployed as part of the war on terror. Tatham concludes this had the unfortunate consequence during the initial invasion and subsequent occupation of undermining the type of positive interactions with Iraqi civilians needed for a population-centric strategy because many U.S. troops regarded Iraqis (and Arabs in general) “not as innocent people but as enemies – enemies who, the
U.S. media had told them, had collaborated with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda to mount the horrific attacks on the World Trade Center.”

Former CIA analyst Paul Pillar warns that the oversimplified aggregation of diverse groups with different ideologies leads to a misunderstanding of what is really needed for counterterrorism policy in each specific case. Fukuyama argues that “it makes no sense to lump together” these diverse groups, while Gardels concludes that this aggregation confuses “the solutions by obfuscating the causes.” Other experts have noted the results of this approach are policies and strategies that largely only target the symptoms (violence) and not the underlying causes and dynamics. As to the effect adoption of this perspective has on policy makers, Dickey relates a story told by anthropologist and counterterrorism expert Scott Atran about discussing the radicalization of European Muslim youth:

In Washington last year he was briefing White House staffers on his findings when a young woman who worked for Vice President Dick Cheney said in the sternest tough-guy voice she could muster, “Don’t these young people realize that the decisions they make are their responsibility, and that if they choose violence against us, we’re going to bomb them?” Atran was dumbfounded. “Bomb them?” he asked. “In Madrid? In London?”

The predisposition to see large parts of the population, and especially potentially moderate Muslim groups, as inherently aligned with much more violent and potentially implacable Islamist militants discourages engagement efforts and support for reforms that may contribute to shifting the evolution of the larger movement towards non-violent participation within political structures. Vlahos concludes, “So, in the end, our

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274 Tatham, Losing Arab Hearts and Minds, 50-1.
275 Balz and Abramowitz, "President Tries to Win Over a War-Weary Nation."
276 Gardels, "De-Globalize the Jihad."
277 Kapitan, "The Terrorism of 'Terrorism'," 17-8.
278 Dickey, 2008b, "'Jihadi Cool': Comic Book Action Heroes may be Better Weapons Against Terror than Bullets or Bombs," Newsweek Web Exclusive (April 15), http://www.newsweek.com/id/132147. Anthropologist and Department of Defense advisor Montgomery McFate relates a similar anecdote of how American troops in Iraq counterproductively adopted the same enemy-centric focus, as described by Packer: “[S]he was told by one Marine Corps officer, ‘My marines were almost wholly uninterested in interacting with the local population. Our primary mission was the security of Camp Fallujah. We relieved soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division, and their assessment was that every local was participating or complicit with the enemy. This view was quickly adopted by my unit and framed all of our actions (and reactions).’” Packer, "Knowing the Enemy: Can Social Scientists Redefine the 'War on Terror'?"
dark narrative prevents us from distinguishing reform and resistance movements we can live with from groups we absolutely must destroy.”

Another result of this presumption shift is that American leaders tend to side with and publicly support local elites to a degree that they are able to increase repression and avoid addressing the underlying grievances motivating contentious mobilization. Over the long term this has the very counterproductive effects of more strongly identifying the United States with the enemies of popular movements, further losing the race for hearts and minds, while also pushing these movements towards more violent methods and anti-system goals. Such policies and rhetorical stances also disadvantage moderate elements who may have been sympathetic with the United States outright, or who at least supported the types of democratic, nonviolent, and reform-oriented paths American goals also favour.

**Conclusion**

The highly normative nature of how we talk and think about terrorism, and especially the specific changes after 9/11 discussed in the first half of this chapter, create a series of biases undermining both the understanding of terrorism and the resulting efforts to respond. The public construction frames and filters thinking and discussion of issues related to terrorism, focusing attention on certain aspects of the problem and not others, generating or impeding specific associations, and establishing presumptions for how information is evaluated and understood. This construction is strongly influenced by the strategic narrative advanced by the Bush administration, which further serves to reinforce the constraints and adverse effects on resulting rhetoric and policy. At a national level these effects constrain the strategies and tactics politicians and decision makers consider, strongly favouring aggressive and hard counterterrorism policies and ignoring or devaluing many efforts more consistent with the recommendations of a population-centric approach drawing on the lessons of counterinsurgencies and the study of social movements.

The biases and predispositions of the current construction of terrorism also discourage efforts to understand the larger complex dynamics surrounding cases where

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279 Vlahos, "The Long War: A Self-Fulfilling prophecy of Protracted Conflict – and Defeat."
terrorism emerges, especially as these dynamics relate to potentially sympathetic populations. In part these biases come from the dissonance caused by recognizing and considering the reasons why larger populations may turn to or be sympathetic with the use of violence in response to grievances coupled with the desire to unambiguously denounce and reject terrorism while seeing ourselves as defending good from evil. Too often the result is a rejection of at least certain types of understanding necessary for a population-centric approach, and greater emphasis on the violence as well as the culpability and threatening intentions of those who employ it. The resulting understanding of the problem in turn again constrains and guides responses towards a more enemy-centric approach.

How Americans talk and think about terrorism, especially after 9/11, also creates a number of direct influences favouring an enemy-centric over population-centric approach to understanding and responding to terrorism. The framing of discussion about the issue focuses on the violence, the terrorists, and the personalized threat. The tendency to measure that risk in terms of especially grave possible threats as well as the accompanying moral shunning of the normative construct both shift the presumption towards an enemy-centric approach. As part of how the threat tends to be constructed, potentially sympathetic populations are generally seen opponents instead of possibly being part of the solution.

Ian Lustick has argued that “without a comparably serious understanding of the motivations and predicaments of al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups we are doomed to suffer self-inflicted wounds more devastating than anything we do to our foes.” As Chapter Two explains encouraging unity of understanding throughout all levels of government and allied effort for the conflict faced based upon an accurate understanding of the threat and possible roles of vital populations is essential for creating the synergies of consistent action without risking mistakes that undermine overall goals. It is not sufficient that a few experts “get it” or even that the U.S. military as a whole appears to be largely moving towards an institutional appreciation of population-centric counterinsurgency given that there are too many other important actors from highly visible public officials down to the regular government personnel who carry out much of the development and implementation of policy as well as other

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280 Lustick, *Trapped in the War on Terror*, 122.
aligned non-governmental actors and other Coalition governments. Unfortunately the way Americans talk and think about terrorism after 9/11, the shared public construction that has been specifically endorsed and promoted by the Bush administration’s strategic narrative, undermines this deeper understanding. The result is a more enemy-centric approach to counterterrorism that repeats many of the same mistakes criticized by fifty years of counterinsurgency literature and increases the chances U.S. action will create self-fulfilling prophecies.

The worst problems discussed in this chapter emerge out of the exaggeration and combination of changes in how terrorism is perceived. It is true that there are connections between many different militant Islamist groups, and that larger Muslim populations often are sympathetic with and to varying degrees supportive of some of the actions and goals of these groups. There are also strong reasons for enforcing a societal rule normatively insisting on a blanket rejection of violent tactics targeting civilians and non-combatants. It is true that many militant Islamist groups see the United States as an enemy and some of these have prioritized carrying out mass casualty attacks against American and other Western interests. And there are good arguments that the U.S. response needs to include aggressive, hard counterterrorism options targeting the most threatening militant Islamists. To maintain public support this may require seeing the country as engaged in a military conflict. However, mixed together in the manner that has occurred in the United States after 9/11 these observations, with often significant exaggeration and misunderstanding reinforced by the strategic narrative of the Bush administration, create a bias of incorrectly seeing most Muslims as part of an especially grave threat, morally culpable for attacks that have occurred, and part of the enemy in a real war threatening destruction of the United States. In combination these attitudes and biases help to explain why the war on terror, from the perspective of the lessons of American and British counterinsurgencies and the study of social movements, has too often: disproportionately focused on enemy-centric and coercive counterterrorism policies; underfunded and underprioritized population-centric efforts failing to address important grievances and aspirations; counterproductively encouraged aggregation of disparate groups increasing the overall threat while failing to pursue options that would disaggregate conflicts; and reinforced the narrative framing of militant Islamists while undermining the intended counterframing for engaging in the war of ideas.
CHAPTER SIX: FLAWED MODELS AND LIMITS TO AGENCY

“How could a mass murderer who publicly praised the terrorists of September 11 be winning the hearts and minds of anyone? How can a man in a cave out communicate the world’s leading communications society?”

—Richard Holbrooke, 28 October 2001

Richard Holbrooke’s question captures common and recurring frustrations as repeated surveys of Muslim attitudes have frequently reported increasing or deepening anti-Americanism. This chapter argues that part of the answer to this question is that the national counterterrorism strategy advocated by the Bush administration was based on a flawed model for pursuing hearts and minds goals, while at the same time that those who pose Holbrooke’s question expect too much and overestimate American agency for influencing the central dynamics driving popular support. The chapter begins by examining the model underlying the Bush administration’s approach and argues that it overemphasizes American centrality while ignoring or misunderstanding the important role of larger populations who mobilize around real grievances. The second half of the chapter examines how the frequently repeated question of how the United States could possibly be losing to terrorists in the competition for popular attitudes overestimates American and local state agency to influence the dynamics driving popular mobilization.

The Problems of an Enemy and State-centric Model

In order to understand why the United States performed poorly in the competition for hearts and minds during the first seven years after the September 11 attacks this section argues that the overall strategic approach of the Bush administration did not sufficiently appreciate the central importance of popular support and mobilization to the conflict. The conceptual model for international terrorist threats the administration advanced largely did not prioritize or provide inherent support for the type of hearts and minds initiatives that were needed. The Bush administration’s

1 Holbrooke, "Get the Message Out."
strategic model is first described by looking at the 2003 and 2006 editions of the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, which is consistent with the strategic narrative for the war on terror as discussed in the previous chapter. The section then explores how the model gives too much emphasis to the United States and al-Qaida, while underestimating the difficulty of changing attitudes by failing to appreciate the role that real grievances play in mobilization. The section ends with a discussion of how this model could be improved by incorporating insights from the study of counterinsurgencies and social movements.

**The Bush Model for Counterterrorism with Respect to Hearts and Minds**

Chapter Five discusses the importance of the strategic narrative advanced by political leaders for a conflict emphasizing that it is the foundation on which “policy, rhetoric, and action” are built. The strategic narrative in turn plays a central role as the framework for guiding and constraining policy choices and implementation, establishing priorities and resource allocations, and shaping how other government actors prepare for and pursue the missions that the narrative establishes as important. In order to understand the model for countering the terrorist threat informing and often represented in the Bush administration’s narrative for the war on terror with respect to hearts and minds goals this section focusing primarily on the two versions of the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* published by the White House in 2003 and 2006. The extensive review of public statements made by President Bush and key members of his administration for the previous chapter serves as a background foundation to identify important themes in these two documents consistent with the administration’s overall public framing of the war on terror. Approached from a counterinsurgency and social movement theory informed perspective, three important aspects emerging from analyzing these documents are discussed here.

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2 Vlahos, "The Long War: A Self-Fulfilling prophecy of Protracted Conflict – and Defeat."
4 "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.". "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism."
To begin with, both versions the Bush administration’s *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* reflect an enemy-centric instead of population-centric approach to combating terrorism, emphasizing the United States as playing the central or leading role with the full capability to affect all necessary goals which are largely focused on terrorist groups disconnected from larger populations.\(^5\) The enemy-centric framing of these documents is especially apparent in what they do not discuss and in comparison to population-centric counterinsurgency texts. For example, the preface and executive summary of the new *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide* published in January 2009 repeatedly emphasizes a population-centric perspective highlighting that insurgencies are fundamentally about assisting local governments to “serve their populations” and are “primarily a political struggle,” “understanding of the ‘human terrain’ is essential,” attitudes of the “contested population” influence the “probability of success,” and “historically COIN campaigns have almost always been more costly,\(^5\)

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\(^5\) The discussion of the post-9/11 social construction of terrorism in the previous chapter provides many examples of how this model manifests in the official and public discourse that guides U.S. counterterrorism policy. A war framing creates traditional assumptions of a simple us versus them binary division, where the United States and its terrorist enemy are naturally the principal combatants. Hess and Justus, "(Re)Defining the Long War," 5. Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*, 63. Repeated claims that the United States is the primary target of plots threatening especially grave devastation by a generally aggregated terrorist enemy reinforces these central roles. For example: Cheney, 2005a, "Vice President's Remarks at a Rally for the Troops," (May 11), Office of the Vice President, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/05/20070511-5.html. Cheney, "Vice President's Remarks at the 73rd National Convention of the Military Order of the Purple Heart." The assumption that the U.S. shares primary agency in the conflict is seen in the reciprocal language emphasizing the United States as the “right country” to be answering the “call of history” in the “global ideological struggle [of] our time” and that “this great country will lead the world to safety, security, and peace.” Vlahos, "The Fall of Modernity: Has the American Narrative Authored its own Undoing?." The secondary role given to other actors is consistent with the “with us or against us” language demanding that others must choose and will be held “accountable” for their choices. It is also reflected in the rhetorical assumptions that those actors are choosing between the pursuit of freedom and democracy versus the embrace of senseless killing and totalitarian rule. For example: Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People.". Bush, "President Bush, President Kwasniewski Hold Joint Press Conference.". Bush, "Remarks by the President at Connecticut Republican Committee Luncheon.". Bush, "President Bush Reaffirms Resolve to War on Terror, Iraq and Afghanistan.". Bush, "President Bush Discusses Global War on Terror."
more protracted and more difficult than first anticipated." In comparison the introduction to the 2003 strategy document emphasizes direct action against the terrorist enemy, stating:

> While we appreciate the nature of the difficult challenge before us, our strategy is based on the belief that sometimes the most difficult tasks are accomplished by the most direct means. Ours is a strategy of direct and continuous action against terrorist groups, the cumulative effect of which will initially disrupt, over time degrade, and ultimately destroy the terrorist organizations. The more frequently and relentlessly we strike the terrorists across all fronts, using all the tools of statecraft, the more effective we will be. The United States, with its unique ability to build partnerships and project power, will lead the fight against terrorist organizations of global reach. By striking constantly and ensuring that terrorists have no place to hide, we will compress their scope and reduce the capability of these organizations.

This is not to imply that the 2003 strategy fails to mention any non-directly enemy focused aspects of the war on terror, as it does for example briefly discuss the “war of ideas” and importance of denying support to terrorists (although focused on state sponsorship). However, in comparison to population-centric counterinsurgency documents the emphasis is very heavily from an enemy-centric perspective. This is further demonstrated in the 2003 strategy document’s discussion of the nature of the terrorist threat describing a structure of terrorism essentially disconnected and independent of larger populations. The only population-centric reference in this part of the document is a brief mention of underlying conditions that terrorists exploit, but even

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6 "U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide." This new guide – published jointly by the Departments of State and Defense and the U.S. Agency for International Development – demonstrates how far the U.S. government’s understanding and institutional prioritization of counterinsurgency has come over the seven years covered by this thesis. The guide not only provides an excellent summary of the classic counterinsurgency lessons, but also reflects thinking about the new challenges posed by contemporary insurgencies that exploit the transnational and virtual dimensions of a more globalized world. However, the rapid evolution in counterinsurgency thinking was not reflected in the public statements and overall strategy of the Bush administration with respect to the war on terror. In part this is a result of the fact that the driving force behind re-learning of counterinsurgency lessons and understanding how those changed in a modern environment emerged out of the U.S. military as a reaction to the course of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The apparent success of a shift to population-centric counterinsurgency practices in Iraq was not widely recognized until the last year of President Bush’s two terms in office, leaving little chance for it to become part of a larger shift in approach to counterterrorism especially with the pressures of an election year.

here the emphasis is on the terrorists, reinforces that terrorists are not really motivated by these concerns, and stresses the need to change a larger belief that terrorism is acceptable as opposed to addressing those underlying grievances.\(^8\) In comparison, the document gives significantly more emphasis to the importance of: terrorists having physical environments in which they can freely operate;\(^9\) state sponsorship of terrorism; and, the interconnections between terrorist groups.\(^10\) The 2006 version of the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* similarly places emphasis on an enemy-centric perspective. This is perhaps most strongly shown in the introductory section titled “Today’s Realities in the War on Terror” that identifies nine successes and seven remaining challenges. All of the successes listed are measures from an enemy-centric approach, including depriving al-Qaida of safe haven through the invasion of Afghanistan, “aggressively prosecuting the war against terrorists in Iraq,” significantly degrading the al-Qaida network by capturing and killing its leadership, and highlighting the number of nations that have joined the fight on terrorism.\(^11\) Similarly, at least five of the seven challenges are enemy-centric focusing on terrorist networks, attacks that have occurred or the threat of attacks including terrorist intentions to use weapons of mass destruction, and the continued state sponsorship of terrorism by Syria and Iran. The final two challenges discuss the war of ideas, but even then focusing on terrorists and not the larger population, noting that terrorists have twisted the fight for freedom in Iraq into a rallying cry and that they have gotten more sophisticated about using the internet and media for propaganda and communication.\(^12\)

Part of the enemy-centric focus of the two national strategy documents, which emerges in comparison to population-centric approaches, is that the Bush administration strategy views states as the principle external enabler for terrorists instead of seeing

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\(^8\) On grievances the document writes: “At the base, underlying conditions such as poverty, corruption, religious conflict and ethnic strife create opportunities for terrorists to exploit. Some of these conditions are real and some manufactured. Terrorists use these conditions to justify their actions and expand their support. The belief that terror is a legitimate means to address such conditions and effect political change is a fundamental problem enabling terrorism to develop and grow.” Ibid., 6.

\(^9\) It is important to note that the document is not talking about a permissive environment in terms of Mao’s supportive population, but instead is focused on state sponsors, failed states, or liberal and tolerant European laws.

\(^10\) "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," 5-10.


\(^12\) Ibid., 4.
mobilized populations as the key potential support base. For example, a classic Maoist counterinsurgency perspective focuses on the ability of the insurgent to move freely within the people as playing a vital role for sanctuary while contemporary theorists highlight how globalization has created virtual sanctuaries amongst disparate populations in other countries. In comparison, when the 2003 document discusses terrorist sanctuary it focuses first on state sponsorship, then weak of failed states, and finally European countries where terrorists exploit the legal protections of “liberal, and tolerant societies.”13 Further, when the 2003 document discusses how to accomplish its second top-level goal of denying terrorists sponsorship, support, and sanctuary all of the objectives it outlines are state-centric and not population-centric, including: ending the state sponsorship of terrorism; working on international standards of accountability to hold states to; and, strengthening and sustaining the effort of other states to fight terrorism.14 The 2006 strategy document similarly continues an emphasis on state sponsorship, highlighted in the titles of three of its four short-term priorities: “deny WMD to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them,” “deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states,” and “deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror.”15 The 2006 strategy document does give emphasis to a presumptively population-centric approach over the long term focused on promoting effective democracy as the answer to the four sources of terrorism that it discusses.16 However, even in this section of the document it does not explain how these four sources of terrorism lead to larger populations providing important support to terrorists. The section also does not explain how democracy promotion is part of the “war of ideas” to change attitudes amongst potentially supportive populations (especially in the short term), and instead focuses on explaining

13 "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," 8. Similarly, all of the funding sources for terrorists that the document explicitly mentions are either from state enablers or criminal activity, with no mention of popular support being a source of funding.
14 Ibid., 17-22.
15 "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," 11-7. Emphasizing the enemy-centric focus and not population-centric focus of the 2006 strategy document the first short term priority mentioned is “prevent attacks by terrorist networks” followed by the three listed above. No mention is made under any of these four priorities of the important role that the attitudes of larger populations may play in achieving the objectives or for enabling terrorists.
16 Ibid., 9-11.
how once effective democracy has been achieved that will eliminate the problems giving rise to terrorist violence.\textsuperscript{17} This demonstrates that the thinking behind the strategy remains focused on state structures instead of on the importance of popular attitudes and mobilization dynamics. Chapter Seven explores how the Bush administration in 2005 and 2006 perceived democracy promotion as its key to engaging the war of ideas, and the negative consequences for overall attempts to win hearts and minds that resulted from problems in how this effort was conceived and the administration’s reactions to subsequent events.

Consistent with the strategic narrative advanced by the Bush administration discussed in the previous chapter, to the extent that both national security documents raise grievances that are potential mobilizing factors for popular support to terrorism the discussion focuses on portraying those as on face illegitimate or essentially unrelated to the rise of terrorist violence. This again underscores the enemy-centric focus when compared to counterinsurgency documents that stress that popular support for groups using violence is generally driven by real grievances that must be addressed in order for the state to prevail. For example, half of the 2003 document’s very short discussion of underlying conditions of terrorism simply says, “The belief that terror is a legitimate means to address such conditions and effect political change is a fundamental problem enabling terrorism to develop and grow.”\textsuperscript{18} While I agree that this is an important normative goal, it does not reflect or explain a population-centric understanding of what causes violent mobilization. Similarly, the third of four overall goals of the 2003 strategy is to “diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit” which begins by emphasizing that terrorists have little in common with those who experience legitimate grievances, although it then goes on to say that the U.S. will provide support and aid to local nations to address those conditions. By so strongly distancing grievances from the emergence of violence the document, and similar frequent rhetoric from the administration, creates the impression that these efforts really are not that important to the war on terror. In the same manner, in its brief discussion of the war of ideas, the 2003 document emphasizes:

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,” 6. In the six-page section on the nature of terrorism underlying conditions are discussed in a short 60-word paragraph, half of which is above.
We must use the full influence of the United States to delegitimize terrorism and make clear that all acts of terrorism will be viewed in the same light as slavery, piracy, or genocide: behavior that no respectable government can condone or support and all must oppose. In short, with our friends and allies, we aim to establish a new international norm regarding terrorism requiring non-support, non-tolerance, and active opposition to terrorists.\footnote{Ibid., 23-4.}

This establishes that what is most important in the “war of ideas” is delegitimizing terrorism, rather than engaging what larger populations are actually thinking and talking about, considering why those populations may be sympathetic to militants, or responding to the actual arguments put forward by terrorist groups.\footnote{Chapter Seven includes a discussion of the long history of grievances that these groups have consistently advanced, as well as the related resistance of American policy makers for acknowledging that U.S. policies could have anything to do with this.} The one specific exception is that the 2003 document includes a paragraph on addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an important part of the war of ideas.\footnote{“National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,” 24.} However, the language merely echoes long standing U.S. policy, and as Chapter Seven will further discuss the actual resulting administration public rhetoric and actions after 9/11 served to reinforce related grievances and militant framing of this issues. Indicative of the failures with respect to addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a manner consistent with engaging in the war of ideas, the 2006 document drops all mention of this priority with the exception of noting that al-Qaida plotted the 9/11 attacks during a time when the peace process was actively being pursued as a reason that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict really isn’t an important cause of terrorism.\footnote{The 2006 document notes: “Terrorism is not simply a result of Israeli-Palestinian issues. Al-Qaida plotting for the September 11 attacks began in the 1990s, during an active period in the peace process.” “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,” 9.}

The 2006 strategy document, again echoing much of the Bush administration’s public rhetoric, puts more effort into casting the mobilizing causes of terrorists as so obviously repulsive that a reader (or listener) cannot help but wonder why anyone would ever support them. For example:

What unites the movement is a common vision, a common set of ideas about the nature and destiny of the world, and a common goal of ushering in totalitarian rule. What unites the movement is the ideology of oppression, violence, and hate.\footnote{Ibid., 5.}
In discussing the sources of terrorism the 2006 document emphasizes: political alienation, grievances that can be blamed on others, subcultures of conspiracy and misinformation, and an ideology that justifies murder. While all of these are important factors for understanding the current rise of violent conflict, the framing and lack of discussion of other factors emphasizes the view that there really isn’t any good reason for larger populations to be sympathetic to militant groups who use terrorist tactics. For example, there is no discussion of militant groups: providing extensive social services largely free of corruption; developing from non-violent groups in response to violent government repression; or, protecting related populations from other violent groups, especially in ethnic and sectarian conflicts where state security has broken down or the state is actively supporting the other groups. This is not to argue that terrorism is justified, but to underscore that the framing and model advanced by the Bush administration largely precludes understanding of the much more complicated realities in which terrorism emerges as a violent tactic (and rarely the only tactic) and why larger populations may provide support to militant groups. As the counterinsurgency literature emphasizes, understanding the motivations of larger populations, and often addressing the underlying grievances, is essential to eliminating the use of violence as well as enabling coercive efforts targeting the radicalized hardcore elements. Chapter Seven will illustrate how the lack of appreciation for the larger dynamics and long running historical grievances led to counterproductive action and rhetoric detrimentally reinforcing the mobilizing frames of militant movements.

Finally, I should emphasize that the discussion above is not meant to suggest that the Bush administration or the United States did not pursue any population-centric initiatives. As Chapter Three describes, many different initiatives, policies, and diplomatic efforts were undertaken during these years consistent with and justified by hearts and minds goals. Some of these, such as the U.S. militaries development and implementation of new counterinsurgency doctrine stand out as particularly

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24 Ibid., 9-10. The 2006 document implicitly acknowledges that grievances such as poverty, hostility to U.S. policy in Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and other counterterrorism efforts contribute to terrorism. However, minimizes these contributions by mentioning that they do not necessarily lead to terrorism and following with strong talking point arguments to cast them as simplistic and misinformed under the lead of what does and does not cause terrorism followed by where today’s terrorism comes from. "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," 9.
However, as that chapter also emphasizes, many observers have criticized the Bush administration for not giving sufficient resources or priority to those especially in comparison to enemy-centric efforts, for leaving many of the proposed initiatives in development or otherwise unrealized, and for not providing consistent follow through or top level support to others. From a strategic narrative perspective the above analysis of the Bush administration’s principal strategy documents for combating terrorism helps to explain the preference for enemy-centric approaches and relative lack of emphasis and attention to population-centric efforts. Recalling the importance of unity of understanding to enable unity of effort for population-centric goals from Chapter Two’s discussion of new counterinsurgency strategic precepts further helps to explain how given the overall strategic narrative and model for counterterrorism advanced by the Bush administration the resulting hodgepodge of hearts and minds efforts likely failed to achieve the desired reinforcing synergy that would have been possible under a population-centric framework. At the same time, despite many promising hearts and

25 Consistent with the focus of this chapter I would emphasize that the military’s new counterinsurgency doctrine was not developed with the intent of informing global counterterrorism efforts nor did the Bush administration subsequently adapt its counterterrorism strategy to match. Further, the development of the military’s counterinsurgency doctrine was largely an institutional effort, which did not emerge from the administrations strategic narrative for the war on terror. Instead, it as driven by military leaders such as General Patreaus as well as a bottom up effort of lower level military personnel who perceived the previous strategy as failing and possibly contributing to the rising violence. Giving respect to President Bush, I should emphasize that he appointed Secretary of Defense Robert Gates as well as promoting General Patreaus, who at a leadership level perhaps deserve the most credit for the change in course in Iraq and implementing the new counterinsurgency approach. The apparent success of this strategy in Iraq did not become apparent in tracking of violence levels until early to mid-2008, when there was less than a year left in President Bush’s final term of office leaving little opportunity for a significant reframing of counterterrorism strategy, especially given the political pressures of an election year. Finally, application of a population-centric counterinsurgency approach in Iraq and Afghanistan is arguably the most important place to start, and there are subsequent indications that appreciation of a shared conception of counterinsurgency across U.S. agencies – unity of understanding – is occurring as emphasized by the January 2009 joint publication of the new U.S. Guide to Counterinsurgency by the Departments of State and Defense and the U.S. Agency for International Development as one of the last acts of the leaderships of those institutions at the end of the Bush presidency. What remains to be seen is whether the population-centric understanding reflected in that document becomes an overall approach to the war on terror with top-level support by the new and subsequent administrations.
minds initiatives, the lack of overall unity of understanding of a population-centric strategy likely contributed to counterproductive mistakes and own goals in the war of ideas.

**Too Much Emphasis on the United States and Al-Qaeda**

The assumption that the United States and al-Qaeda are the primary actors in this conflict makes initial sense. Americans are responding to what remains the largest single act of sub-state terrorism by almost a factor of 10 when measured in casualties, from a terrorist group that has publicly declared war on the United States. That group is also responsible for several other plots targeting U.S. interests. The U.S. government is responsible for taking action to protect American safety and national security, and in the context of terrorism al-Qaeda and its affiliates (or those it inspires) pose the greatest current threat. However, while it makes sense that the U.S. is motivated by potential attacks from these terrorist groups, the fundamental mistake is therefore assuming that in the larger context the U.S. is also the principle actor with the greatest agency. A repeated theme of this thesis is that a narrow focus on the United States and its terrorist enemy obscures and ignores many of the key dynamics actually determining how much of a threat international terrorism poses.

This mistake is not unique to the war on terror. Shafer explains that in other counterinsurgency conflicts over the past century the United States has regularly overestimated its agency in terms of ability to carry out its intended policies, influence local actors, and bring about required changes consistent with prevailing American strategy.26 Lang argues the root problems underlying the failure of humanitarian interventions are found in dilemmas, including overemphasis, of state agency.27 It is an understandable reaction of people who are threatened or attacked to assume and attribute causality and agency focused on themselves and their own situation. At a time when the United States is universally recognized as the world’s sole superpower, it is not only Americans who assume the U.S. has relatively dominant capability to pursue and achieve its foreign policy objectives.

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26 Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms*. Shafer, "The Unlearned Lessons of Counterinsurgency."
As discussed in the previous chapter, the enemy-centric perspective of the Bush administrations strategic narrative for the war on terror tends to encourage an emphasis on coercive counterterrorism efforts directly targeting terrorist groups. To the extent that hearts and minds strategies are pursued they are often approached simply as an extension of this binary thinking, positioning Muslim populations as part of the ground over which the U.S. and al-Qaida are fighting. Even when these Muslim populations are themselves given greater agency, the United States is still generally seen as the central actor directly competing for their support with terrorists. It is from this framing that Richard Holbrooke’s question resonates; with most Americans simply dumbfounded this is even a competition.

The flaw in this thinking is that the United States is not a central actor with relatively significant agency in the dynamics driving popular attitudes and mobilization in different social conflicts across much of the Muslim world, even if groups such as al-Qaida often focus their criticisms on the United States as part of their far enemy strategy or if local movements include anti-American rhetoric as part of their protests. Instead, as Chapter Four discusses, Islamist mobilization is the result of long running conflicts, mostly local in origin and focus, built on a history of failures and disappointments, over a wide range of long festering grievances, involving many other actors who by virtue of their more proximate and immediate roles exercise greater influence and capability to affect changes than the United States. The attitudes and beliefs of individuals in these contexts are highly contested and much more directly influenced by a wide range of local actors who are not driven by the same simple counterterrorism priorities of the United States and whose position gives them much more access, credibility, and import. Focusing on the personal beliefs influencing whether Egyptian youth join Islamist groups Wickham observes, “such ostensibly private rank-orderings are routinely the target of intensive ideological contestation, as government leaders, parents, religious clergy, movement organizers, and others compete for the ‘hearts and minds’ of their constituents.”

Many Islamist grievances do involve the United States or the West in general, but these often have as much or more to do with complaints over the last century or more of history as they do about current factors over which the U.S. may have

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immediate and direct influence. The substance and specifics of these grievances with the United States are driven by local conditions and ideological debates over which the United States has little credibility or ability to engage. Much of the blame ascribed to the United States and other Western nations is about the relative economic and political state of development in the Muslim world, which are problems that cannot be quickly and easily addressed, and are in many cases a function of the current global economic system.

Blaming or even attacking the United States and other international actors is often more an instrumental tactic in a competition between local or regional actors in the pursuit of local or regional goals. Doran explains that al-Qaida’s 9/11 attacks were an attempt to win a framing competition influencing mobilization within the Muslim world as part of a conflict that is “somebody else’s civil war.” Observing that this is “an intra-Muslim ideological battle [and] a struggle for hearts and minds” Doran is concerned “it is not altogether clear that Americans understand fully this war’s true dimensions.” He emphasizes, “the fight over religion among Muslims is but one of a number of deep and enduring regional struggles that originally had nothing to do with the United States and even today involve it only indirectly.”

The urgent question facing many Muslim populations is not a simple choice of whether to support the United States or al-Qaida where one option brings a return to normal peace and prosperity and the other involves fears of unpredictable violence. Instead, these populations are frustrated by long histories of grievances and failed aspirations. They are focused on their own contentious challenges, attempting to find solutions for economic hardship, social disruption, political repression, local violence, and perceived threats to culture and identity. The choice to support an Islamist group opposed by the United States may have much more to do with favouring an organization that provides needed social services free of corruption. The choice to express anger at the United States may be intertwined within a cluster of other unrelated beliefs that are part of a larger collective action seeking to pressure local elites to respect basic human rights, allow greater political representation, and make progress on basic economic conditions. Participating in an organized protest against a government who is a U.S. ally in the war on terror may be driven by the repressive policies of that

29 Doran, "Somebody Else's Civil War."
government and failure to deliver economic improvements, with only secondary opposition to the United States because of its support for that government or the fact that the primary organizers were Islamist. The important point is the dynamics involved are far from simple situations where the U.S. and a terrorist enemy are the central actors and the choice key populations face merely involves comparing the two.

**Changing Attitudes is Difficult: Recognizing Real Mobilizing Grievances**

The second major problem with the simple United States versus al-Qaida model of agency as applied to hearts and minds objectives is that it greatly simplifies what is involved in winning popular support. The enemy-centric focus of the Bush administration’s strategic model, which is also implicit in the question raised by critics of the administration such as Richard Holbrooke, makes the choice for Muslim populations seem obvious because the only alternatives it considers are support for the United States (promoting democracy, peace, prosperity, and freedom) versus support for al-Qaida (representing a movement for totalitarian rule, oppression, violence, and hate). This binary framing ignores that Muslim populations who are sympathetic to al-Qaida may actually be supporting local movements and groups (left unmentioned by the model or the question) pursuing much more desirable goals from their perspective, and only expressing opposition to the United States because they see America as supporting a local actor (usually an authoritarian government) denying those aspirations for a better life. Similarly, even if not using a binary model, by overemphasizing U.S. centrality to the question of what Muslim populations choose advocates obscure that Muslim opinions are also based upon choices of what competing path offers the best perceived chances for addressing their grievances and achieving their aspirations. These decisions are influenced by the complicated contexts of social networks and opportunities, local government actions and elite decisions. Recognizing that the United States may only be a scapegoat or tangential actor who is associated with one or another set of beliefs, where those competing choices each involve much more complicated sets of logical and emotional attitudes, helps to emphasize the limits to what American efforts can accomplish.

The underlying focus of Richard Holbrooke’s question, as well as of the dominant “us versus them” framing of the war on terror, demonstrates the U.S.
misconception that the central choice is whether they like Americans. For example, in October 2001 President Bush said:

[How]ow do I respond when I see that in some Islamic countries there is vitriolic hatred for America? I’ll tell you how I respond: I’m amazed. I’m amazed that there is such misunderstanding of what our country is about, that people would hate us. I am, I am – like most Americans, I just can’t believe it. Because I know how good we are, and we’ve go to do a better job of making our case.\(^{30}\)

While whether they like Americans or not is part of the question, by overemphasizing America’s centrality advocates and analysts miss several other factors that are important to the dynamics of who populations in the Muslim world support and how contentious, and sometimes violent, mobilization develops.

The focus of most discussions about winning hearts and minds is on changing attitudes. Does the larger population in general have a positive or negative opinion of the United States? Do they tend to support or oppose those using tactics of terrorism, especially in terms of targeting American or other Western interests? Are they inclined to support anti-state groups or the local government and other forces allied with the U.S. against those using tactics of terrorism? These are important questions and the answers to them are a partial reflection of the success or failure of population-centric objectives.

Captured by the phrase hearts and minds is recognition that the factors underlying these attitudes also have emotional as well as cognitive dimensions. Feelings of sympathy for a group perceived as oppressed or the upwelling of pride associated with the actions of someone seen as “standing up for” one’s group will influence logical concerns about the tactics used or disagreement with ultimate end state goals. Repulsion at atrocities, whether caused by terrorist attacks or the result of military collateral damage, can trump or colour rational examination. Analysis of hearts and minds goals therefore should also consider the wide range of affective dimensions from the perspectives of key local populations.

Lessons from the study of classic counterinsurgencies emphasize success at winning hearts and minds is based upon securing improvements at a number of societal levels for the population in question – recognizing that the grievances and aspirations motivating the public are often based in real problems, whether or not those issues are

really what motivates the insurgent leaders. Shafer describes these as the three great oughts of counterinsurgency, recommending improvements in security, good governance, and development.\(^ {31}\) Explained from a social movement theory perspective, for a local state to win back the popular support of a potentially mobilized population requires convincing the public that supporting the government provides the best hope for addressing shared grievances and aspirations.\(^ {32}\)

Recognizing these needs and how they interconnect contains two further lessons for attempts to win hearts and minds as applied to counterterrorism. Foremost is that the process is complicated because of the wide range of necessary actions and improvements requiring concurrent attention and success. Because much of the necessary improvements are at the local level, and dependent upon the capability and willingness of a local state to successfully pursue these goals, the ability of the U.S. to influence the process is constrained. Because serious terrorist threats tend to only arise later in these conflicts, providing improvements while countering anti-state forces often requires the use of hard military and security measures which themselves often risk or exacerbate public backlash and alienation.\(^ {33}\)

The second implication of this counterinsurgency insight is that changing attitudes will be an even more complicated process than simply successful emotional and cognitive persuasion, because the determinants of popular support are also dependent upon the population’s perception of underlying improvements in the conditions which gave rise to the potential for political violence in the first place: insecurity, lack of good governance, and aspirations for a better life. The larger population may continue to give their support to other groups challenging the current system if they do not believe the local state is best able or sufficiently seeking to make these improvements. This may include continuing to support groups who use tactics of terrorism and in part espouse a fundamentalist and anti-western ideology, even if the population does not embrace the tactics, ideology, or all of the ultimate end goals sought. For the United States winning hearts and minds will therefore often also involve

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32 Kilcullen makes a similar prescriptive analysis in arguing that U.S. counterterrorism should adopt a global insurgency perspective of the threat. See especially: Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency," 611-2.
33 Hoffman, "Beyond Public Diplomacy."
helping to create better alternatives for the local population to support. In many current conflicts the ground reality is often that local states suffer from corruption, a lack of legitimacy, and a history of repression. At the same time larger Islamist social movements include elements that are more responsively and successfully providing basic social services, largely free of corruption, and supporting a sense of pride for traditional identities. Unfortunately, in important cases these larger Islamist movements are also part of or associated with more radical groups or militant wings espousing the need for violent attacks in order to achieve long-term goals.

These combined insights highlight the importance of recognizing that winning hearts and minds is much more than just changing attitudes. It involves recognizing that the opinions often used as measures of success or failure in pursuing a hearts and minds strategy are based on rational and affective dimensions, are related to real underlying grievances and aspirations, and are shaped by a wide range of social dynamics. To a significant extent, these attitudes may ultimately be more of a reflection of agreeing with a movement that seems to offer the best hope of addressing underlying grievances and achieving aspirations, than the result of careful analysis of the available facts on the specific issue of whether the United States is really to blame. Developing successful overall strategies to change these attitudes will therefore require engaging in all of the contributing levels, which the following sections explain is dependent upon the actions of many players, with limited opportunity for American influence.

**A Counterinsurgency and Social Movement Informed Model**

Shifting to a counterinsurgency understanding of winning hearts and minds begins to correct for many of the problems of an enemy and state-centric model of agency. It places central emphasis on the attitudes of the larger population around the group using tactics of terrorism. This approach stresses the importance of popular support as a force multiplier either aiding terrorist groups by providing recruitment, resources, concealment, and sanctification of violent tactics, or aiding government forces by providing intelligence, discouraging recruits, isolating terrorists, and stigmatizing violent tactics. The American and British counterinsurgency tradition further emphasizes the centrality of the local government and the need for real improvements to local conditions for determining success, while analysis of the
The evolution of contemporary counterinsurgencies highlights the additional complications stemming from globalization. This shift in focus begins to address the problems of overestimating American agency while underappreciating the importance of local actors and ignoring the difficulties inherent in working with local governments to pursue strategic goals. Recognition of the need for real improvements underscores that popular attitudes are based in large part on perceptions about local grievances, the responsiveness of local governments, and expectations about what path will best lead to communal aspirations. Adapting a counterinsurgency model to understand the war on terror also begins to place more emphasis on the wide range of local Islamist terrorist and insurgent groups who are actually responsible for the vast majority of sub-state political violence and terrorist attacks. Finally, the lessons of American counterinsurgencies in the last century also cautions against overemphasizing the guiding ideals and end-state goals of an insurgency’s ideological leaders, and ignoring the driving motivations and actual desires of the average recruit and larger populations supporting them.

The study of social movements provides significant further general benefits for understanding terrorism and specifically for examining why hearts and minds efforts since 9/11 have often been ineffective. A social movement approach to analyzing terrorism shifts the focus further to not just stress the importance of larger publics, but to explain that in many cases it is dynamics driving social mobilization that create the potential for the success of or even lead to the emergence of related more radical anti-state elements advocating violent tactics. A social movement analysis focuses on: the grievances and hopes of the larger population; the political opportunities shaping the conflict dynamics (including access to political structures, elite alignments and allies, and levels of state repression); the mobilizing networks within the society related to the conflict; and, the framing processes drawing on cultural and ideological elements creating perceptions of grievances and aspirations, and defining legitimate tactics to address and obtain those. A social movement approach enables examination of the contemporary transnational and virtual dynamics where groups such as al-Qaida may have the most influence on the evolution of identity and political violence, as well as the more local, often national level conflict dynamics driven by the problems facing particular states and how individual governments have responded. This helps to explain...
the commonalities, connections, and ideological ties between anti-state groups active across the Muslim world, without ignoring the important differences and local contexts. A social movement approach also emphasizes that many of the important conflict dynamics may not be related to the use of violence at all. Given that core grievances often have much more to do with basic social services, economic opportunities, and political participation it is not surprising to find from a social movement perspective that Islamist groups are very active at all of these levels. While some of these Islamist groups are also tied to violent groups, many reject the use of violence, especially attacks on civilians. Many of these Islamist groups, while generally part of the same Islamic awakening or belief that Islam has something to say about political structures, do not share the fundamentalist beliefs of al-Qaida. From the enemy-centric model perspective the activities of Islamist groups participating in or agitating for electoral politics, providing social services, and evangelizing for a resurgence of Islamic ideals are too often seen as part of the same existential threat – indeed, from the war on terror model discussed above, these other efforts are often thought to be merely covers and deceptions to achieve radical goals, instead of honest efforts to improve the well being of the individuals served. From a social movement perspective analysis may show that some of these are linked, however it may emphasize divisions that can be exploited and emphasized, potential allies or sympathetic elements who have more local credibility, and possible alternative paths that may help influence the conflict dynamics away from violence. The social movement perspective also helps to explain how the enemy-centric model can counterproductively create enemies that did not exist before, fail to engage in meaningful ideological debates, and ignore the important underlying grievances and aspirations that must be addressed for a mobilized population to consider alternatives. Finally, a social movement perspective helps to explain the more limited and constrained role of the United States and other Western actors in most of the relevant dynamics.

The shift in focus encouraged by the counterinsurgency and social movement perspectives, placing more emphasis on local conflicts and local actors, is not intended as an argument that there is no significant threat of international terrorism. Violent attacks by local groups on international interests serve a multitude of instrumental goals, including: generating significant publicity and media coverage both locally and
internationally; embarrassing the local state, highlighting weakness, and encouraging overreactions that can drive the larger public toward the anti-state group; building a source of pride amongst members of the group as well as larger populations who see international actors as part of the problem; and, as signs of solidarity with a radical international Islamist movement including al-Qaida. The U.S. and other Western actors are also significantly threatened by continued al-Qaida led or inspired attacks, consistent with the far-enemy framing, which has shown some success in spreading to other regions as previously locally focused violent Islamist groups have pledged allegiance to or otherwise aligned themselves with al-Qaida. A special concern to the U.S. and other Western nations is the threat from homegrown terrorist cells, whether drawn from radicalized members of diaspora communities or converts, who may initiate attacks entirely on their own inspired by the ideology of violent Islamists or who may gain increased capability by making connections to and training with al-Qaida affiliated individuals or groups. For these homegrown radicals the local conflict dynamics and targets are the West. However, the argument of this thesis is, that in each of these cases the enemy-centric model obscures and misdirects more than it is beneficial. Adapting understanding to include insights from counterinsurgency and social movement studies improves analysis, explains previous failures, and perhaps may help avoid future problems. While there is a threat to U.S. and Western actors, policy advocates need to understand that in most cases the role the United States plays is limited and constrained, as the rest of this chapter discusses in more depth, and that most of the important dynamics driving these conflicts are at the local level within the relationships and actions of larger publics, other movement elements, and local governments.

**Overestimating American Agency**

The next problem helping to explain America’s failure over the past seven years is that advocates overestimate the United States’ ability to effectively implement the prescribed actions and do not appreciate the even greater challenges when working with local partners. Analysis of foreign policy often highlights the gap between ideal implementation when a state is conceived of as a unified actor and the significantly constrained reality imposed by a myriad of conglomerate agencies, with different bureaucratic cultures and perspectives, separately pursuing official policy as well as
their own institutional goals and self-preservation. Implementation of foreign policy by these various agencies occurs in a context where resources are limited, domestic politics and partisanship constrain action, and the available skills, capabilities, and attitudes of individuals ultimately mediate what is actually accomplished. All of these constraints come into play for the pursuit of hearts and minds goals in the war on terror.

**Starting on the Wrong Foot and Failing to Appreciate the Past**

Perhaps the largest challenge facing hearts and minds efforts targeting terrorism is serious terrorist threats rarely emerge spontaneously from otherwise peaceful and stable conditions. Counterterrorism efforts are generally initiated only after terrorism has risen to the level of a national security threat, by which time concerned international actors are attempting to address problems with long and difficult histories where their own credibility is usually already damaged. As Robert Coonrod, former Deputy Director of the Voice of America, wrote in 2007:

> Rising interest in public diplomacy in Washington is confirmation that something has already gone seriously wrong. All the theory would suggest otherwise - that public diplomacy is best used as an instrument to reduce the probability or severity of international conflict; yet, interest in and support for public diplomacy only rises in times of serious conflict.34

To make matters worse, several of the underlying drivers of conflict in the current context are likely to get worse for some time, continuing to generate conditions ripe for exploitation by violent extremists.35

The dynamics of popular attitudes in much of the Muslim world are shaped by at best official neglect and a series of government mistakes, and too frequently by violent state repression and sanctioned terror. Muslims in many Western countries have their own remembered histories of grievances which coupled with a growing sense of Islamic identity may heighten sensitivities to the troubles facing their coreligionists around the world. Populations potentially supportive of those using tactics of terrorism remember a history of deceit, perceived injustice, and serial disappointments at the hands of governments as well as sequential movements promising a better future. At the heart of

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35 Kaplan, "Hearts, Minds, and Dollars."
many violent conflicts are real multi-sided grievances where all parties bear some blame, although rarely acknowledging their own contributions and usually too quick to emphasize or misinterpret those of others. In such cases suspicions and biases, angers and alliances, and judgments and self-justifications are often entrenched before efforts to change attitudes are ever initiated.

Unfortunately, one result of the focus encouraged by the binary enemy-centric model, is to obscure or hide much of the important preceding history shaping such conflicts. Consider competing perspectives on the U.S. military experience in Lebanon in the early 1980s, which continue to undermine American efforts interacting with populations in the Levant as well as across the wider Muslim world today. From the U.S. perspective, American troops took part in an internationally sanctioned operation, driven by the humanitarian goal of ending a civil war tearing apart what had been an exemplar of the modern Arab world. The one thing most Americans remember was a suicide attack by Islamic terrorists on 23 October 1983 killing 241 U.S. marines in their barracks on a peacekeeping mission. Americans more familiar with the events of that time may recall the series of Westerners taken hostage in Lebanon over the 1980s, an earlier suicide attack on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, or (if they are very well versed) perhaps even the near-simultaneous similar 23 October attack on French troops that were also part of the international force. Americans with specialized expertise may explain the context behind the attack on the U.S. marine barracks by emphasizing the highly fractured nature of the Lebanese civil war at that time, perhaps noting that amongst the atrocities committed by all sides were massacres in two Palestinian refugee camps by Lebanese Christian militias carried out in an area under Israeli control which local factions may have associated blame for with the U.S., or even suggesting that an ultimate source of Lebanon’s problems may be the confessional electoral system established by the French. But American policy makers are also quick to place the 1983 suicide-bombings in the context of a long history of attacks associated with Hizballah as an international terrorist group that is described as an Iranian proxy, keeping the focus on unjustified terrorist violence by an internationally sanctioned Islamist terrorist group.

From the perspective of Lebanese populations potentially sympathetic to those responsible for the 23 October attacks the American military intervention was not a neutral, non-combatant peacekeeping operation. Instead it was part of a long series of policies and actions to support Israel and pro-Western minority right-wing militias, aligned with an unpopular government, kept in power by an unjust colonial arrangement. From this perspective the largely U.S. and French military intervention was timed to favour one set of factions in the civil war and seen as an extension of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon earlier that year. Given that French colonial troops had only left 36 years earlier, France’s participation signalled that this was merely a continuation of Western domination of the region and support for a confessional political system and geographic boundaries designed to keep pro-Western minorities in control of the Lebanese government. Antagonistic Lebanese populations also saw U.S. involvement as a continuation of a previous U.S. military mission in 1958 to prop up another unpopular right-wing Christian President and in context of consistent strong American support for Israel who had conducted various military operations and strikes inside Lebanon since at least 1968. American and French forces were not seen as impartial non-combatants, but simply further outside participants, no different than Syria or Israel, in the Lebanese civil war. Before the October suicide attacks, American military forces were already perceived to have been responsible for attacking civilian populations. For example, a month before the barracks’ attack, U.S. warships shelled the Druze-dominated Chouf mountains south of Beirut in support of Lebanese Army factions battling Syrian-backed militias in the battle at Souk el-Gharb, during which that village was largely destroyed. While American officials described the naval bombardment as a “defensive action” striking militias in the mountains south of Beirut,\footnote{Friedman, 1983, "Two U.S. Warships Again Bombard Artillery Batteries Outside Beirut," \textit{The New York Times}, September 21.} by taking sides in this manner the U.S. became in the “eyes of the rest of the Lebanese population, just another militia and
thus fair game.” In a military study of the lessons for marine peacekeeping based on the 1982 to 1983 deployment to Lebanon, Major Ronald Baczkowski reached the conclusion that, with the employment of naval shelling at Souk el-Gharb, “The neutrality of U. S. ground forces, already in question, now had clearly been lost.” The use of big naval guns (which would not be described today as precision weapons) in this and later actions was seen as indiscriminate strikes on civilian areas firing shells that many today recall as “flying Volkswagens.” This is not to say that all Lebanese opposed American action and certainly not to suggest that most Lebanese supported the suicide-attacks, hostage takings, or other terrorist acts. Instead this is meant to emphasize that the local attitudes which American hearts and minds efforts confront today often remember a different historical narrative, have reasons they see as justified to be at least suspicious if not antagonistic, and have their own long series of violent atrocities committed by many sides to temper relative moral condemnation to those new atrocities driving American perceptions.

Part of the problem underlying the difference in perspectives is the asymmetry in influence and effect. Put figuratively, America is an 800-pound gorilla whose minor movements have lasting impact on other populations. Most Americans, including too often those making and implementing policy decisions, do not remember or appreciate local perceptions of past intentional (as well as unintentional, wrongly attributed, or misunderstood) American actions that had little to no effect in the United States but may have had or been perceived to have significant effect in other countries. The unfortunate exception is those rare events that cause America significant pain. Americans remember Iranian revolutionaries taking U.S. diplomatic staff hostage in 1979 for 444 days, in clear violation of international norms, but rarely remember U.S. involvement in overthrowing a democratically elected and popular Prime Minister in


40 Blanford, "U.S. Warship Stirs Lebanese Fear of War."
1953 to re-install an unpopular, but pro-Western monarch. 41 American policy makers and defence personnel rightly remember the 12 October 2000 suicide attack on the USS Cole in Yemen killing 17 sailors in peacetime, but appeared not to appreciate the 1980’s legacy of naval shelling when placing the USS Cole off the coast of Lebanon in March 2008 with the stated intent of sending a message of support to the Lebanese government during a time of factional political wrangling with many regional observers suggesting the move had just the opposite effect. 42

Americans are quicker to remember positive contributions, without sufficiently appreciating that key local populations may not view those as favourably. In response to criticism that Israel historically receives the largest share of U.S. foreign aid, 43 American political leaders and other commentators often respond that Egypt, a Muslim country, historically receives the second largest share of aid. However, local critics note that this is mostly military aid earmarked to specific projects (as compared to unrestricted Israeli aid implicitly signalling that only Israel can be trusted) and largely contributes to keeping in power an undemocratic, authoritarian regime with a long history of domestic repression. 44 Similarly, Americans generally perceive the 1991 U.S. war with Iraq as liberating Kuwait and protecting the region from further Iraqi aggression, while many Arabs perceived America as motivated by a desire to retain access to and indirect control of the region’s oil wealth – especially given American support for Saddam after he began an earlier war with Iran that killed a half million or more fighters and civilians during the preceding decade.

Limits of Bureaucratic and Human Action

Overestimating Coordination and Underestimating Time

Since 9/11 a wide range of policy experts and panels have highlighted the need for a comprehensive communication strategy in order to engage in the battle of ideas and win popular support in the war on terror. Many of these argue that to be effective American messaging efforts should be coordinated across agencies, consistent with policy efforts, and integrated into the full cycle of policy development and implementation. Subsequent studies have found that U.S. efforts over the following years continue to fall far short of such coordination, consistency, or integration.45 While part of the problem is that hearts and minds strategies have not generally had true top-level priority and support since 9/11, the many efforts that have been undertaken have themselves been hampered by the actual limits of foreign policy action as compared to ideal assumptions.

A significant part of the difficulties with coordination is simply the vast number of disparate agencies and size of the bureaucracies involved in the war on terror and related foreign policy. The principle actors under the authority of the executive branch involved in any comprehensive communication strategy to engage popular attitudes in the Muslim world would include: activity directly controlled by White House staff, including Presidential statements, the White House communication office, cabinet officials, the National Security Council, and various official surrogates and representatives authorized to speak for the administration; the Departments of Defense, with its partially autonomous services and commands, multitude of subordinate agencies, and numerous joint operations conducted with a wide range of international partners; the Department of State, with career staff and political appointees working from D.C. as well as in embassies in almost every country around the world where public diplomacy and related staff report locally and do not fall directly under the coordination of those leading the same efforts back in Washington;\(^{46}\) the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), which is semi-autonomous from State and has a politically appointed bi-partisan board each somewhat able to pursue their own agendas, while overseeing a competing conglomerate of historically different agencies; the United States Agency for International Development involved with or contributing to a wide range of new as well as long-standing initiatives often implemented by a mix of NGOs and foreign agencies; and, the intelligence agencies, involved in covert and semi-covert related activity, separate from each other and without input from, coordination with, or even the knowledge of most other actors.\(^{47}\) The vast extent of coordination problems for projecting a consistent message becomes even more apparent when one adds to this mix the range of other official government actors who on occasion will legitimately be perceived overseas as representing the United States or who fund and operate programs significantly affecting Muslim populations important to hearts and minds efforts, let alone the wide range of private or semi-private contractors involved in key activities who still are often perceived as representative of or synonymous with the U.S.


\(^{47}\) For example: GAO, "U.S. Public Diplomacy: Intragency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy."
government. Summarizing the problem of oversight and organization, Joseph Nye comments:

Many official instruments of soft power – public diplomacy, broadcasting, exchange programs, development assistance, disaster relief, military to military contacts – are scattered around the government and there is no overarching strategy or budget that even tries to integrate them with hard power into an overarching national security strategy.\(^48\)

Repeated GAO studies over the last five years have detailed the launch of initiatives and panels to address the lack of communication coordination for U.S. hearts and minds efforts in the war on terror, only to note that these were left unfulfilled, disbanded without action being taken, were not involved with or did not influence actions that were taken, or continue to be in their initial stages of development.\(^49\) An in-depth investigation into American hearts and minds efforts in April 2005 noted:

The inevitable turf wars also came into play. The war of ideas cut across otherwise-neat lines of responsibility in bureaucratic Washington. At the Pentagon and the NSC, public-affairs staffers warily eyed psyop officers who argued that public diplomacy, press relations, and psychological operations should be united under a single information strategy. White House veterans of tough political campaigns brought a short-term, manage-the-news outlook to what others thought would take a generation to fix. As a result, by mid-2004 – nearly three years after 9/11 – the government still had no one in charge of winning the war of ideas and no strategy for winning it. That summer, Government Accountability Office investigators told Congress they found public diplomacy staffers without guidance and a department short of linguists and information officers.\(^50\)

Focusing more deeply on the multitude of U.S. government actors involved, consider just the counterterrorism efforts of the U.S. intelligence agencies. The 9/11 Commission Report, as well as numerous other hearings and panels, identified the lack

\(^48\) Nye, "Our Impoverished Discourse."
\(^50\) Kaplan, "Hearts, Minds, and Dollars."
of coordination and information sharing between the 16 national level intelligence agencies as one of the significant problems leading up to al-Qaida’s attacks. These findings led to legislation and executive action publicized with much fanfare to create a more unified effort under a Director for National Intelligence. However, the reality five years after 9/11 was what another report described as “a counterterrorism infrastructure … so immense and unwieldy that many looking at it from the outside, and even some on the inside, have trouble understanding how it works or how much safer it has made the country.”

Part of that reorganization created a new National Counterterrorism Center intended to focus the efforts of America’s intelligence agencies with relation to terrorism, however at the same time:

[I]nstitutions historically charged with protecting the nation have produced a new generation of bureaucratic offspring – the Pentagon’s Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) and Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT), the Treasury Department’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA), and the FBI’s National Security Service (NSS), to name a few – many with seemingly overlapping missions.

Many of these new organizations simply represent larger institutions protecting traditional units (now renamed) who had focused on this problem set before as well as bureaucratically responding to the increased available resources for everything terrorism post 9/11. The result is an “ad hoc construction, adding layer upon layer with none taken away” leaving “intelligence and security agencies competing for turf.”

Many of the basic problems involved in reorienting the United States to engage a war for hearts and minds in the Muslim world are simply difficult and take years to address, problems that are magnified by the delays of bureaucratic, uncoordinated, resource constrained action. For example, the lack of fluent linguists for key languages such as Arabic, Pashto, Urdu, and Farsi was frequently noted after the 9/11 attacks.

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52 Ibid.
The State Department estimates it takes roughly a year in the classroom full-time and a year in country to get to a level 3 on a 5-point scale in Modern Standard Arabic. Developing programs to train the variety of necessary languages needed is a daunting task. The government must recruit sufficient numbers of individuals who: are able to fluently learn a target language; have other necessary expertise; and, are willing to set aside their careers for several years with uncertain long-term pay back. Considering these difficulties it is perhaps not surprising that evaluations of U.S. government efforts continue to highlight a lack of needed language skills in many key positions. Limited follow through, bureaucratic delays, a lack of resources, security concerns, a lack of sufficient incentives, and competing priorities have compounded these difficulties.

*Human Limits*

Further constraining the reality of implementation of a hearts and minds strategy is the human limits of the individuals who collectively represent the United States. With the American military deployed in two major combat zones, 18 year old privates fresh
out of training and army captains in their early 20s are frequently the face in the last three feet of diplomacy playing the key role for local counterinsurgency goals as well as the U.S.’s global image because of the immediacy of international media coverage. The private is expected to make instant judgments on when to shoot in self-defence, to protect a scared foreigner neither of whom speaks the other’s language, and to conduct daily activities such as driving through town with respect while knowing that at any instant a sniper or improvised explosive device (IED) could kill the person sitting next to them in the passenger seat.\(^{57}\) At the same time, young captains are frequently placed in roles similar to colonial viceroys, in charge of large sectors with near-autonomy, able to “call down devastating American firepower one day and approve multimillion-dollar projects the next.”\(^{58}\)

Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl became one of the celebrated young military intellectuals of the U.S. Army’s post-9/11 efforts to learn and better implement a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy. His Oxford PhD comparing British and American military experiences with insurgencies was completed between serving in combat operations in Iraq during the terms of both Presidents Bush, and led to him playing a significant role in contributing to the new *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*. Nagl personally highlights the tendency to underestimate the difficulty of what is required of military personnel for winning hearts and minds. In an interview about his first posting to the current conflict in Iraq he admitted to thinking he understood something about counterinsurgency until he started doing it and that it was “far more difficult than [he] had imagined it could be.” Discussing the challenges of stray tank rounds, lethal force at check points, the danger of car bombers, and other problems he noted, “Killing an insurgent today may be satisfying, but if in doing so you convince all the members of his clan to fight you to the death, you’ve actually taken three steps backwards.”\(^{59}\) The difficulties and challenges of population-centric strategies when

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\(^{59}\) "Interview with LTC John A. Nagl (January 9)," 2007, *Operational Leadership Experiences in the Global War On terrorism*, Combat Studies Institute,
considering the reality of the human beings required to implement them under often life threatening conditions has led many observers to emphasize that successful counterinsurgency operations are much harder to pursue than generally assumed and to question whether at times the required standards may be practically speaking almost unachievable.

**Bureaucracy, Culture, and Politics**

The institutional and cultural traditions of various agencies and organizations within the U.S. government, and the interaction of perceptions about these with other policy makers and the public in general, further work to constrain the ability to implement idealized strategies for winning hearts and minds. Several knowledgeable observers have explained that influential board members on the BBG after 9/11 chose to create entirely new broadcasting efforts for the Arab world in the form of Radio Sawa and Alhurra TV, instead of reinvigorating the existing VOA Arabic which arguably would have been faster and built upon years of experience and established credibility, in large part because of political disagreements with the staff of VOA.60 The current Secretary of Defense has noted the State Department’s Public Diplomacy efforts remain horribly underfunded, which others suggest is a direct result of conservative perceptions that career State Department staff are too sympathetic to foreign perspectives. Efforts by the Department of Defense to launch larger information operations capabilities were similarly shut down in response to liberal opposition. Many within the military as well as outside observers argue the 20th century American experience (victories in “world wars” and suffering with insurgencies) lead to an institutional focus on large conventional conflict and lack of developed capability needed for the type of ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This institutional culture, reinforced by the biases of


the social construction of terrorism, helps to explain the lack of early focus on winning popular support, resistance and occasionally outright opposition to adopting counterinsurgency approaches, and a continuing emphasis on developing hard power.61

**Competing Priorities**

Another factor constraining U.S. capabilities to carry out programs aimed at winning popular support in the Muslim world is competing priorities. Discussions of strategic communication and pursuing hearts and minds goals too often fail to recognize the constraints that come with the inevitable trade-offs not only of other counterterrorism priorities, but also the influence of the full range of other related priorities for the national government.62 Arguments about the benefits of allowing Pakistan to pursue a slower, counterinsurgency friendly strategy in the FATA versus making more cross-border military strikes against suspected al-Qaida senior leadership facilities become increasingly more complicated when recognizing the very real concerns about the stability of Pakistan’s government, progress in peace talks between Pakistan and Indian, long term control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, the influence of developments in Pakistan on both Iranian and Chinese military posture, and the effect of developments in Pakistan on immigrant communities in Europe who may be at heightened risk of radicalization and recruitment by terrorist networks.

A direct example of competing priorities constraining American hearts and minds efforts since 9/11 has been the trade-off created by decisions to significantly heighten security and limit exposure for American embassies and diplomatic missions around the world.63 At the same time that overall diplomatic budgets have increased, threats based in part on increased anti-Americanism have in many regions, especially in

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63 Ibid.
countries with significant Muslim populations, resulted in significantly increased security costs. Such additional precautions make maintaining former levels of activity more costly, often offsetting the increased budgets intended to new and additional targeted hearts and minds efforts. Because of the inherent difficulty in protecting against terrorism, where the attacker has the luxury of adapting to refocus on the least protected target, post-9/11 diplomatic security measures have often resulted in cancellation or scaling-back of previous outreach efforts and limiting visitors able to partake in public access activity at embassies themselves. Increased security concerns have also made it harder for the State Department and other U.S. Agencies to fill posts in key regions, leaving many missions unstaffed or staffed with individuals lacking necessary language skills, while also leading to shortened tours of duty undermining local knowledge and contacts. Security concerns have also at times precluded State and USAID from publicizing American sponsorship of programs, limiting the good will generated for the United States. Finally, the need to quickly reinforce physical security at many embassies has created visible perceptions of these as hardened, defensive, military facilities reinforcing an image of Fortress America – unapproachable, militaristic, and distrustful – the opposite of what diplomatic efforts wish to portray. All of these security effects have made it difficult for American diplomats to merely continue pre-9/11 levels of outreach, while frustrating and constraining initiatives to increase hearts and minds efforts.

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64 The GAO notes that the Department of State rates the threat level for terrorism as “critical” or “high” in 80 percent of posts in the Muslim world, compared with 34 percent of posts elsewhere.
65 GAO, "U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges."
66 Ibid.
**Overestimating Local Agency**

The problem of misunderstanding agency strikes twice when turning to the local governments most involved with the conflicts driving Islamist terrorism. Consistent with the binary “us versus them” war on terror model, too often these local governments are considered only as secondary players who partner with and support the United States in the battle with terrorism, instead of as central players in their own long-running, local social and political conflicts involving much more than terrorism where the U.S. and other Western nations are tangentially involved actors. When they are considered American strategies too often treat local governments as unitary actors with the capability and willingness to fully and consistently implement U.S. strategy as advocates idealize it, instead of recognizing that they face all of the same limits to agency as well as having their own opinions, competing agendas, and imperfections. This is compounded by the reality that important domestic constituencies and the local state itself are usually directly involved with various sides of the underlying conflict. The unspoken assumption is too often what the United State’s wishes to do is “fully determined action, whereas what other people do is simply a consequence of that action, with no independent or autonomous ‘agency’ of its own.”

**Limits to Capacity**

Local governments face similar problems of bureaucracies and internally competitive agencies, the inertia of culture and conflicts of competing goals and priorities, as well as the ultimate mediating role of individuals all of which constrain and limit the ability of these states. In almost all cases these local governments have greater resource constraints and budget limits, while facing much more profound challenges of meeting their citizens basic needs. The challenges facing these states often play a significant roll in driving the conflict dynamics. Complicating the agency problem for the war on terror is that many of the governments the United States chooses to work with are some of the least capable with the greatest institutional challenges. Daniel Byman summarize the problem in “Going to War with the Allies You Have”:

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Potential U.S. allies in counterinsurgencies linked to al-Qaida frequently suffer from four categories of structural problems: illegitimate (and often repressive) regimes; civil-military tension manifested by fears of a coup; economic backwardness; and discriminatory societies. Because of these problems, allies often stray far from the counterinsurgency (COIN) ideal, both militarily and politically... Washington must recognize that its allies, including those in the security forces, are often the source of the problem as well as the heart of any solution.... [T]he ally’s structural problems and distinct interests have daunting implications for successful U.S. counterinsurgency efforts. The nature of regimes and of societies feeds an insurgency, but the United States is often hostage to its narrow goals with regard to counterinsurgency and thus becomes complicit in the host-nation’s self-defeating behavior. Unfortunately, U.S. influence often is limited as the allies recognize that America’s vital interests with regard to fighting al-Qaida-linked groups are likely to outweigh any temporary disgust or anger at an ally’s brutality or failure to institute reforms. Training, military-to-military contacts, education programs, and other efforts to shape their COIN capabilities are beneficial, but the effects are likely to be limited at best.70

These problems are well illustrated by some of the countries the United States turned to immediately after the 9/11 attacks including Pakistan and the five Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In exchange for military basing and other support in the war on terror, the United States provided billions of dollars of economic and military assistance to these countries, in part tying local perceptions of the U.S. to the actions of these governments. Problematically these countries are largely authoritarian regimes, with histories of domestic repression, poor economic outlooks, and large youth populations vulnerable to the appeal of radical movements.71 While the United States continues to provide advice and encouragement to these countries to pursue actions consistent with overall U.S. strategy, including efforts to win over popular support, the U.S. by association inherits blame for their previous mistakes and becomes partially hostage to their current and future actions as well as being limited by the constraints on their capability, willingness, and competing priorities. The same problems and limits are repeated around the world as the United States chooses to work with a multitude of countries perceived as important to winning the war on terror. Recalling that terrorism rarely rises to a national

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71 GAO, "Central and Southwest Asian Countries: Trends in U.S. Assistance and Key Economic, Governance, and Demographic Characteristics ".

CHAPTER SIX: FLAWED MODELS AND LIMITS TO AGENCY
security threat without a long history of conflict, contention, and mistakes on all sides, it should be no surprise that most of these partners are far from perfect.

The countries most involved in the conflicts generating terrorism often face significant problems of legitimacy, ethnic tensions, rapidly growing populations, a lack of economic opportunities coupled with daunting challenges for development, weak political structures, histories of coups and failed promises, along with legacies of colonial or at least Western economic penetration fanned today by the rapidly changing social and economic influences of globalization. The high levels of corruption in many of these states demonstrate one example of how these problems constrain both local capability as well as U.S. efforts to improve its image in the battle for hearts and minds. Corruption fuels the social conflict underlying insurgencies and terrorism by magnifying inequalities, increasing frustration with official services, and decreasing popular support for the governments with whom the United States often must work. Local officials skimming off or diverting U.S. aid undermines the positive impact of many hearts and minds efforts, further limiting the efficacy of programs intended to address the problems of poverty, promote development, and strengthen civil society. Just how much this constrains U.S. efforts to win hearts and minds is emphasized by Iraq, where in 2006 Foreign Policy’s Commitment to Development Index estimated that just 10 cents on the dollar of aid to Iraq went to its intended purpose due to corruption and security overhead. Similarly, U.S. efforts in Afghanistan are constrained by the reality that those who have gained power since the overthrow of the Taliban generally learned their political outlook and governing skills as insurgent leaders fighting first against the Soviets and then in a long civil war where bribery, smuggling, personal armies, and authoritarian leadership were key to survival. At the same time, in many of the key local conflicts, the problems caused by corruption of official services and

resulting public dissatisfaction are often leveraged by Islamist groups who provide otherwise lacking social services while stressing a religiously based purity from graft, bribery, and fraud. In the persuasive framing debate at the core of the battle of ideas this efficacy and lack of corruption becomes compelling observable evidence supporting the Islamist narrative that problems in the Muslim world arise because regimes have turned away from Islamic ideals. As actors generally challenging the current system from outside, Islamist groups are able to criticize all of these problems while portraying themselves as offering compelling solutions.

**Limits to Willingness**

Even if partners in the war on terror are capable of effectively pursuing desired strategies, American goals are often frustrated by a lack of their willingness to do so. Local governments have their own agendas and assessments of what actions are in their best interests. The U.S. is often focused on a limited set of issues, notably the threat posed by international terrorist attacks. Local governments meanwhile are concerned about a different set of risks from these conflicts and other related problems rationally leading them to different decisions. Local actors, who are closer and more intimately involved, also have a presumptively compelling argument of a better understanding to justify reaching different conclusions – even if, from the U.S. perspective, it seems clear that the actions of many of these governments are at least exacerbating their problems. To the extent that recognition of limits to U.S. agency includes the necessity of planning for mistakes, any strategy should recognize that local partners inevitably also take actions that in retrospect turn out to be unwise.

A significant limit on the willingness of local governments to take actions desired by the United States arises out of self-preservation. The very changes that counterinsurgency prescriptions recommend for improving the responsiveness of local government and opening meaningful space for political participation frequently threaten either the ability of ruling elites to remain in power or at least come at a direct trade off in cost to the resources that they and their key constituencies enjoy:

Compounding this challenge is that our instrument of change is often the very regime and security forces that are part of the structural problem in the first place. The United States cannot by itself foster economic development in Algeria or political reform in Uzbekistan. Such measures require local regimes to take action. For many local interlocutors, reform is more threatening than the
insurgency: Political reform would throw them out of power, military reform might increase the chances of a coup, economic reform would lessen opportunities for corruption, and social reform would hinder their group’s hold on power. Not surprisingly, foreign leaders often turn the United States down when it presses for reform. At times, they may half-heartedly embrace reform, going through the motions (and taking U.S. money and resources) but perverting the outcome to ensure the stability of the status quo.75

U.S. association with these local governments, coupled with either the perceived failure of the U.S. to encourage local reform or the perception that the U.S. is supportive of the status quo and not serious about reform, undermines hearts and minds goals and opens up additional opportunities for anti-state groups to argue that the U.S. is part of the problem.

Existing anti-Americanism within local populations further plays into limiting local agency from the U.S. perspective in two important ways. First, local governments concerned about being tarnished by association with the United States may either outright reject participation with U.S. programs and advice,76 or frequently limit public recognition of U.S. aid and involvement.77 Second, local governments feeling threatened by other forces often use anti-Americanism as a pressure valve, exploiting opportunities to criticize Western actions in order to redirect local tensions.78 While some visible independence may be important for maintaining local credibility, and may arguably be beneficial in the long run, these factors at least complicate American efforts and in many cases are part of the overall problem.

**Moral Hazard and Enabling Counterproductive Action**

The structure of the relationship between the United States and its local partners in the war on terror encourages a moral hazard problem. Because local partners know

75 Byman, "Going to War with the Allies You Have," 27.
that the United States is dependent upon them without easy alternatives, they are less likely to fear negative consequences from not following through on U.S. desires and more likely to take risks on the assumption that American dependency will guarantee additional U.S. support when needed:

U.S. support of a government often makes it less necessary for the regime to undertake the reforms required to gain popular support. U.S. backing comes with a degree of legitimacy as well as with financial and other resources. Thus empowered, governments can put off land reform, stop reining in corruption, and avoid other changes that would hurt the insurgent cause. In Uzbekistan, for example, the regime used the U.S. embrace to enhance its legitimacy, even as it cracked down on dissent at home. Ironically, the United States may be tarred with the brush of a brutal ally, even if it is urging that ally to reform.  

The failure to anticipate and account for this problem in part emerges from the simple model problems of forgetting that one’s partners have full individual agency, coupled with the distortion of perspective that places the U.S. at the centre of action instead of recognizing that the local states are much more deeply involved, with longer histories establishing their own preferred courses of actions and perspectives. Involved mostly at a distance, without the lifetime of expertise and nuanced knowledge local actors have, the United States government becomes susceptible to the manipulations of local political actors frustrating attempts to carefully manage policy implementation and political outcomes in these conflicts. This manipulation in part manifests as local partners frequently take purely superficial actions to appear to go along with U.S. requests or recommendations, producing no meaningful change at the local level. In turn this reinforces feelings of local resentment, as local actors are better able to see through the misdirection and often assume the American complicity. 

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79 Byman, "Going to War with the Allies You Have," 28.
81 Greenway, 2006, "Straying from a Failed Course," The Boston Globe, October 31, http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2006/10/31/straying_from_a_failed_course/. Recounting: “My favorite example of American innocence abroad, recounted by Peter Galbraith in his book ‘the end of Iraq,’ is the tale of an American coming up to Kurdistan to bully the Kurds into giving up their militia, the Peshmerga. The Kurds agree to disband their militia, and form instead three separate units, a rapid reaction force, a counter terrorism strike force, and a mountain ranger unit. The official leaves, saying ‘how important it was that the Kurds, masters of Iraq’s largest militia, were willing to give it up for the sake of national unity,’ Galbraith writes. However, ‘Some doubt may have crept into his mind [when he] asked for the
Pakistan as an Exemplar

Pakistan, which has been simultaneously described as “perhaps the most important U.S. partner in the war on terrorism” and a “state mired in instability and uncertainty,” exemplifies the agency problems of capacity and will discussed in this section. In the first six years after the 9/11 attacks Pakistan received as much as $20 billion in U.S. aid while also playing a central role in many U.S. war on terror efforts. As a Muslim state created by the end of British colonialism, located in one of the cross roads of the Cold War, with its own continuing history of governance and development problems, Pakistan is not surprisingly home to a range of violent and non-violent Islamist groups typifying the complex social and political dynamics found elsewhere in the Muslim world. Pakistan’s military and security forces have historically provided significant support to Islamist elements including (with American backing) to the mujahideen fighting the Soviets (who became al-Qaeda and the Taliban as well as returning to join many other Islamist groups around the globe). Many believe that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) continues to have significant ties to the Taliban, possibly other individuals connected with al-Qaeda, and almost certainly to Islamist insurgent and terrorist groups fighting against India over the Kashmir, although recent events emphasize that these ties do not constitute government control.

Complicating and constricting U.S. action is the competing policy reality that Pakistan is a nuclear armed country, who proliferated in defiance of international norms and was responsible for sharing nuclear technology with other marginalized states, whose conflicts with India may have seen the two closer to a nuclear exchange than any other belligerents, and where concerns about the current government falling – whatever its

Kurdish translation of mountain rangers. ‘Peshmerga,’ was the reply. ... Had he asked he would have discovered that rapid reaction force and counterterrorism strike force are also rendered into Kurdish as Peshmerga.”

problems – always raise the spectre of radical elements taking control of a nuclear arsenal.\textsuperscript{85}

Immediately after 9/11, geographically located between Afghanistan and deep water, Pakistan played a key role in supporting American led efforts to overthrow the Taliban government. With its regional influence Pakistan then helped to encourage broader ethnic support and provide initial legitimacy for the new Afghan government. However, seven years later the limits to Pakistan’s capabilities are also apparent with Taliban forces and al-Qaïda operatives using large parts of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) for safe havens to support attacks against Coalition and Afghan government forces as well as for operations elsewhere. At the same time, the indigenous rise of Islamists opposed to the Pakistani government, some of whom are blamed for the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto when she returned to challenge President Musharraf in elections encouraged by the United States, highlight the domestic threat to the Pakistani government itself and further limit its ability to pursue American objectives.\textsuperscript{86} In response the United States has provided Pakistan with billions of dollars of military and development aid. Unfortunately, a combination of security problems, corruption, and competing domestic priorities have seen little of that aid go to its intended purposes.\textsuperscript{87}


\textsuperscript{87} Observers have repeatedly emphasized that much of the U.S. aid has gone to support Pakistan’s conventional military forces which are primarily positioned against India, with relatively little of the aid going to counterinsurgency trained forces for use in the Pakistan – Afghanistan border areas or for development purposes. Miller, 2007, "Pakistan Fails to Aim Billions in U.S. Military Aid at Al Qaeda," \textit{Los Angeles Times}, November 5, http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/front/la-fg-uspakistan5nov05,1,368356.story. Rohde, Gall, Schmitt and Sanger, 2007, "U.S.
and less positive credit attributed to the United States because of Pakistani concerns about anti-Americanism.\textsuperscript{88} Part of the problem is that American policy makers talk and think as if Pakistan is a controllable element of their strategic thinking, while failing to appreciate just how different each country’s interests often are.\textsuperscript{89} While addressing any of the wide range of economic, social, and political problems limiting Pakistan’s ability to help in the wider war on terror alone would be challenging, as with other counterinsurgencies experts also emphasize that as much as possible all of these goals should be pursued at the same time.\textsuperscript{90}

Further illustrating the differences between perspectives, competing priorities, and lack of control over action is Pakistani military efforts in the FATA.\textsuperscript{91} Some critics have argued that Pakistan has often been too quick to arrange truces with FATA based militants, choosing to avoid conflict and surrender large areas to the control of Islamists who allow Taliban elements and al-Qaeda operatives safe haven.\textsuperscript{92} Other observers suggest that Pakistan’s go-slow approach is actually consistent with the same


\textsuperscript{89} Fair, "U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Assassination, Instability, and the Future of U.S. Policy."

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid.


counterinsurgency strategies to win over popular support that the United States is advocating in Iraq and likely including in its training of Pakistani forces. Some of these criticize the U.S. for pushing for hard military action focused only on short-term concerns about al-Qaida, without appropriate weight given to the long-term rise of Islamist militants or the stability of Pakistan. Alternatively, other critics argue that it is Pakistan’s political elites and military that are too focused on their own short-term survival, without sufficient care to the long-term emergence of Islamist threats in the country. Untangling these competing assessments is not necessary to emphasize the complexity, limits to certainty, and other constraints challenging American strategy involving Pakistan.

**Conclusion**

The basic explanation of a hearts and minds strategy has a compelling logic. If in the process of combating groups using tactics of terrorism the actions of a state further radicalize larger populations, the number of terrorists killed or captured, and the resources of the group denied or destroyed may quickly be outweighed by the flow of new recruits and new support. On the other hand, if a state can win back popular support, then larger publics may tend to provide crucial intelligence enabling more successful counterterrorism operations, while discouraging recruits, helping to dry up support, and stigmatizing the use of violent tactics. In the current context of the United State’s war on terror, where rising levels of anti-Americanism are perceived to be fuelling Islamist terrorism globally, the pursuit of a hearts and minds strategy seems

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95 For example: Bennett-Jones, "US Policy Options Toward Pakistan: A Principled and Realistic Approach."
particularly appropriate. However, while the logic seems simple, the reality of implementing such a strategy proves to be much more difficult, and the ability of American actions to actually influence the important underlying dynamics are more limited than generally assumed. Problems with current American approaches relate to the use of an overly simplistic enemy-centric model for counterterrorism, the reality that significant terrorist threats usually only develop after a long history of previous conflict, a failure to recognize the full range of factors underlying successful efforts to change attitudes, overestimation of American agency, and a misunderstanding of local government capacity and will. The failure of the Bush administration to appreciate these challenges and constraints has led to overly optimistic attempts that do not sufficiently engage the depth of long term, incremental, proactive, and pervasive effort needed. At the same time, similar misconceptions by critics, risk derailing beneficial efforts undertaken by pre-judging them before they have had a full chance to make positive benefits or because other actions have overwhelmed their contributions. The challenges explored here are not an argument against the wisdom of pursuing hearts and minds to influence attitudes and guide policy, but a warning that efforts to build popular support are often much more difficult than first assumed, best employed as a long-term and proactive strategy, and beyond the capability of state actors to significantly control.
CHAPTER SEVEN: U.S. POLICY AND CONTESTED FRAMING PROCESSES

“When one nation is bombing another, it is difficult to convince the bombed of the virtue of the bombers.”

–Becker 2001

The great paradox of most American efforts to respond to Muslim anger is the frequent observation that the primary factor driving anti-Americanism is the perception of U.S. policies coupled with a refusal to recognize this by American leaders. Experts and surveys, within and outside of the government, repeatedly emphasize it is not U.S. values or our freedoms generating hostility in the Muslim world, but instead a long history of policies fuelling resentments and perceived as hostile, reinforced and exacerbated by the rhetoric and actions of post-9/11 America. At the same time, political leaders have insisted it is American freedoms, values, way of life, and embrace of democracy at home and support for these abroad motivating the terrorist to attack. They have often suggested the United States only need to better explain its own good nature and improve use of the internet, countering extremist propaganda and Arab media distortions, for Muslim populations to appreciate America’s basic decency and many positive global contributions.

1 Becker, "A Nation Challenged."
2 For example: Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People." This framing of the conflict has been pervasive throughout the war on terror. For further discussion see: Aslan, "Why Do They Hate Us?.”. Esposito, 2008, "Iraq: America in Muslim Eyes," Middle East Strategy at Harvard (March 20), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2008/03/iraq_america_muslim_eyes/.
The insistence of American political leaders for following this approach may have better maintained domestic support for important policies, as it is comfortably compatible with the dominant construction discussed in Chapter Five including especially the normative biases and enemy-centric focus. Unfortunately, as a social movement informed analysis helps to explain, the resulting messages and manner in which policies were pursued severely undermined U.S. hearts and minds goals in the Muslim world. This chapter examines three key framing contests during the first seven years after 9/11 shaping the evolution of attitudes and mobilization important to whether larger populations provide or deny support to militant Islamist groups. This analysis shows that the United States reinforced the perception of existing Muslim grievances against the U.S., feeding Islamist arguments that the war on terror is really a war on Islam, and counterproductively undermining the United States’ own intended counter narrative. Rhetoric and policies intended to win hearts and minds as well as more general actions that should be guided by such concerns are both shown to have been part of the problem.

**The Truth Political Leaders Refuse to Acknowledge: Policies Matter**

A long series of surveys and opinion polls, government specialists and outside experts explain it is U.S. policies and not American values primarily driving anger and resentment in the Muslim world. In 2003 the Department of State’s Bureau for

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Intelligence and Research concluded, “the belief that the U.S. is hostile toward Muslim countries was the single largest component of anti-American sentiments in all 10 countries” they surveyed, which a 2006 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report built upon noting, “All of our panelists agreed that U.S. foreign policy is the major root cause behind anti-American sentiments among Muslim populations and that this point needs to be better researched, absorbed, and acted upon by government officials.” The 2003 Department of State appointed Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World (more commonly known as the Djerijian Report) observed, “Surveys show clearly that specific American policies profoundly affect attitudes toward the United States.” Michael Scheuer, head of the pre-9/11 Usama bin Ladin unit at CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, argues:

We need to acknowledge that we are at war, not because of who we are, but because of what we do. We are confronting a jihad that is inspired by the tangible and visible impact of our policies… We have a dozen years of reliable polling in the Middle East, and it shows overwhelming hostility to our policies – and at the same time it shows majorities that admire the way we live, our ability to feed and clothe our children and find work… In the long run, we’re not safer because we’re still operating on the assumption that we’re hated because of our freedoms, when in fact we’re hated because of our actions in the Islamic world.


6 GAO, "U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges."

7 Djerejian, "Changing Minds Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World," 22. Note the Djerejian Report specifically highlighted: “It is not, however, the mandate of the Advisory Group to advise on foreign policy itself.” (p22)

8 Scheuer, a 22-year veteran of the CIA, was Chief of the bin Ladin unit (aka Alec Station) from 1996 to 1999. From September 2001 to November 2004 he served as a special advisor to the Chief of that unit. While still a senior intelligence officer he published two books anonymously: Scheuer, *Through Our Enemy’s Eyes*. Scheuer, *Imperial Hubris*.

9 Silverstein, 2006b, "Six Questions for Michael Scheuer on National Security," *Harper's Magazine* (August 23), http://www.harpers.org/sb-seven-michael-scheuer-1156277744.html. Scheuer makes the same argument in both of his published books, including *Through Our Enemy’s Eyes* which was completed before 9/11 out of a project
Andrew Kohut, President of the Pew Research Center, concludes based on their considerable polling, “Dislike of America undoubtedly reflects dislike of U.S. policies in the Middle East.” In his surveys of Muslim populations Shibley Telhami, of the University of Maryland, has directly asked whether attitudes towards the U.S. are based more on American policy or American values. Across multiple years he has reliably found overwhelming majorities responding it is the policies and not the values. Gallup’s extensive research also highlights that it is policy and not Western values, reporting that Muslim populations hold more negative views of the U.S. and U.K., while at the same time reporting more positive views of France and Germany than even some other Muslim states. Gallup further focused their studies to compare the views of more religiously extremist Muslims to the responses of relative moderates and found, “The real difference between those who condone terrorist acts and all others is about politics, not piety.” They noted that the more radicalized were much more likely to cite American policies as justification for violence and much less likely to give religious justifications. And, in an October 2004 videotape, Usama bin Ladin directly responded to this debate saying that it was American policies “contrary to Bush’s claim that we

to inform policy makers about the threat posed by Usama bin Ladin and al-Qaida. Scheuer, Through Our Enemy's Eyes. Scheuer, Imperial Hubris.
In 2008 80% said policy while 12% said values, which is similar to the 2006 numbers of 70% and 11% respectively. Telhami, "Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll."
Mogahed, "Framing the War on Terror." These groups were identified based on the level of religiosity and political radicalization of the individual responder, using Gallup’s survey data “representing more than 90% of the global Muslim population.” Of related significance Gallup found: “[T]here was no correlation between level of religiosity and extremism among respondents.” Gallup probed respondents further and asked both those who condoned and condemned extremist acts why they said what they did. The responses contradict the conventional wisdom. For example, in Indonesia, the largest Muslim majority country in the world, many of those who condemned terrorism cited humanitarian or religious justifications to support their response. On the other hand, not a single respondent in Indonesia who condoned the attacks of 9/11 cited the Quran for justification. Instead, this group’s responses were markedly secular and worldly.
hate freedom,” and continuing “Let him tell us why we did not attack Sweden for example.”

This is not to argue that value related issues play no role. As discussed in Chapter Four, social and economic disruptions threatening traditional interpersonal networks are a significant part of the underlying dynamics generating mobilization, and often these are blamed on forces of globalization which many connect with Western values or see the U.S. as leading. Further, majorities of Islamists do oppose and denounce many Western associated values. As a framing of “Islam is the solution” shapes the identity and beliefs of mobilized populations related religious attitudes are also likely to acquire greater salience. Thus, individuals who increasingly identify themselves with Islamic traditional ideas (in many cases because of non-religious grievances) may be motivated to oppose specific elements of liberal Western society in the same way that Western religious conservatives do (such as increased tolerance of pornography, changing gender roles, separation of church and state, and acceptance of homosexuality). Further, as mobilized groups increasingly see the U.S. and other Western nations as the cause of their problems and as actors who seek to suppress them, these groups may increasingly turn against Western values and Western backed solutions, such as the promotion of democracy. The important point to emphasize is the repeated finding that specific U.S. policies play a much larger role in driving anti-American mobilization than value issues, and that to some significant degree evidence of opposition to Western values derives from opposition to Western policies.

In striking comparison to the repeated emphasis of polls and experts who highlight the roll of American polices for generating resentment in the Muslim world, American political leaders have with equal frequency rejected this explanation, instead concentrating on hatred for American values. This is highlighted by the numerous

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ways in which post-9/11 hearts and minds efforts have focused on anti-American attitudes as a public relations problem to be solved by better communication efforts. For example, to demonstrate that he was taking action to win hearts and minds, President Bush prominently appointed to the position of Undersecretary of Public Diplomacy first a high profile advertising executive (Charlotte Beers), later the person most closely associated with running communications for his successful political campaigns (Karen Hughes), and finally someone whose previous career was also in publishing, editing, and broadcasting (James Glassman). Perhaps more telling of internal thinking about what U.S. political leaders were willing and not willing to consider when examining how best to engage in hearts and minds efforts is the pattern of establishing panels and advisory bodies whose mandates have not directed (nor enabled) them to explore the effect of or suggest modifications to U.S. foreign policy.

2008. After maverick candidate Congressman Ron Paul suggested that opposition to U.S. policies motivated al-Qaida, former NYC Mayor Rudy Giuliani, who had spent much of 2007 viewed as the presumptive nominee, interrupted to angrily denounce that statement as “absurd.” Giulani went on to insist that Paul retract his remark, “as the crowd applauded wildly.” Martin, "Paul's 9/11 Explanation Deserves to be Debated." Wright and Kamen, "U.S. Outreach to Islamic World Gets Slow Start, Minus Leaders: Effort Involves No Muslims; Hughes Will Not Arrive Until Fall.". Zaharna, "Tools of Engagement." A key GAO report includes an oblique criticism of the refusal of political leaders to consider the role of policy: “All of our panellists agreed that U.S. foreign policy is the major root cause behind anti-American sentiments among Muslim populations and that this point needs to be better researched, absorbed, and acted upon by government officials.” GAO, "U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges." See also: Klein, 2002, "America is Not a Hamburger: President Bush's Attempts to Rebrand the United States are Doomed," The Guardian, March 14. Although the appointment of former Moroccan Ambassador Margaret Tutwiler does not fit with this pattern, hers was the lowest profile appointment and lasted a mere six months before she resigned. For specific criticisms of various appointees to this post that they are too focused on advertising and branding: Fisk, 2006b, "The Age of Terror - A Landmark Report," The Independent, October 8, http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-the-age-of-terror--a-landmark-report-418953.html. Garfield, 2007, "Scuttle Diplomacy: Bob Garfield Interviewing Price Floyd," National Public Radio (June 1), http://www.onthemedia.org/transcripts/2007/06/01/01.

For example, pollster John Zogby explained: “I had the privilege of serving on the congressionally-created Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy with several distinguished colleagues in 2003. The commission did an admirable job – but our mandate did not include any discussion of U.S. policy in the region. And that is an unfortunate blind spot – because it is America’s policy that remains the core problem.”
Based on my research I believe that there are three general explanations for why U.S. political leaders, especially in the years after 9/11, are so reluctant to discuss American policies as contributing to resentment. First is the highly normative and enemy-centric manner in which terrorism is socially constructed and the war on terror approached after 9/11 as discussed in Chapter Five. Focusing on their hatred of our values is part of the good versus evil, civilization versus barbarity narrative underlying moral rejection of terrorism, reassurance of our own innocence, and our calls for others to choose sides. To focus on possibly legitimate grievances disruptively moves the terrorists from mad fanatics into a rational political realm, and triggers the dissonance and aversion discussed with the fear that understanding will lead to condoning their goals, shift blame to the victim, cause confusion about the clarity of the war, and encourage future attacks. Repeated surveys actually show that many Americans, in some cases majorities, agree when prompted that American policies are at least partially motivating Muslim resentment and terrorist attacks. Howev

However, the biases discussed of the social construction help to explain why majorities also are quick to punish political or opinion leaders who voice such ideas and continue to support an approach to the war on terror that largely excludes significant consideration of the role U.S. policies play.

Zogby, "Slip Sliding Away." The Djerejian report specifically highlighted that “It is not, however, the mandate of the Advisory Group to advise on foreign policy itself.” Djerejian, "Changing Minds Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World," 22. A GAO report requested to focus on State Department public diplomacy efforts made prominent mention of the need of political leaders and policy makers to understand and more fully consider the roll of policies. GAO, "U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges." See also discussion of what was and was not focused on and acted upon in: Kaplan, "Hearts, Minds, and Dollars." Based on his 22-year career with the CIA, Scheuer argues that political pressure from both Republican and Democratic administrations, who refuse to question the central policies generating Muslim resentment, has significantly constrained or limited public mention of the roll played by American foreign policy in official government reports, specifically discussing the unclassified 2006 National Intelligence Estimate on Trends in Global Terrorism: "Behind the NIE: Scheuer Parses the Intelligence from the Politics," 2006, The National Interest Online (September 28), http://www.nationalinterest.org/PrinterFriendly.aspx?id=12318. See also: Scheuer, Imperial Hubris.

Second, to officially recognize that American actions may be part of the problem is to undermine and threaten long-term policies in the Middle East supported by both political parties. In the same manner, political leaders after 9/11 avoided recognition of the negative influences of American policy because to do so would legitimize criticism of their own policy decisions. Finally, political leaders have found pragmatic benefits to maintaining domestic and international support for America’s war on terror and other major policies in the Middle East from framing the clash as one in which terrorists threaten core Western values. Popular sentiment in the U.S. and other European countries is more likely to support hard counterterrorism efforts and military intervention in defence of nearly universally shared liberal values as opposed to defending specific policies however strong the arguments for them may be.

The failure to recognize officially or in major strategies that past and present American policies play a significant role in Muslim anger at the United States has left U.S. public diplomacy and many other hearts and minds efforts simply repeating and trying to improve on messages that the U.S. respects, is not threatening, and is making positive contributions to the Muslim world. Unfortunately, for many Muslims, these positive messages are judged to be hypocritical propaganda out of sync with the reality of how they perceive and experience American policies on a daily basis. The Defense Science Board, which advises the Secretary of Defense, stressed in its repeated reports that “actions trump words” and that political leaders and practitioners need to be aware that “what we do matters more than what we say.” Or as Zarhana explained, “What America does, through its policies and practices in Iraq and Palestine, speaks louder than all of the official statements coming out of Washington.”

21 For example: Arkin, "Rumsfeld's Incomplete Information War."
22 Carruthers, Winning Hearts and Minds.
The Importance of Framing Processes

A social movement analysis of the contested framing processes common to many of the current mobilization dynamics across the Muslim world helps to explain how the rhetoric and actions which result from a refusal to recognize the important role played by policies is a significant factor in explaining the poor performance of the United States in the race for Muslim hearts and minds. This analysis may be thought of as a social movement informed approach for evaluating an important aspect of the war of ideas as it applies to population-centric strategies.

One insight from the study of social movements is that the existence of grievances alone is not sufficient to explain why particular groups of people choose to take collective action at a specific time nor the form or direction that such mobilization follows. Researchers have noted that movements can develop without an appreciable change in underlying grievances, and that similarly aggrieved populations may pursue very different forms of collective action. Helping to explain these observations, social movement theory has emphasized the role played by framing processes, that is the “conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action.” Within a social movement context, framing processes are important for shaping perceptions of collective identity, creating a common understanding of being aggrieved, and legitimizing the belief that a specific course of action in pursuit of particular shared goals can bring about a better future. Or as Zald explains, “frames work to provide shorthand interpretations of the world, to locate blame, to suggest lines of actions.” As individuals come to accept and be persuaded by a movement’s frames they begin to

25 Explaining the importance of this Casebeer writes: “A grand counter-terrorism strategy would benefit from a comprehensive consideration of the stories terrorists tell; understanding the narratives which influence the genesis, growth, maturation and transformation of terrorist organizations will enable us to better fashion a strategy for undermining the efficacy of those narratives so as to deter, disrupt and defeat terrorist groups.” Casebeer and Russell, "Storytelling and Terrorism."


perceive conditions and events through the filter of those frames, which in turn encourages identification with the movement and increases the likelihood of adopting other movement frames, and becoming more supportive of or mobilized to participate with the movement. The success of a frame depends upon how well it resonates with individuals and the larger public, which Benford and Snow explain as the frame having “empirical credibility, experiential commensurability, and narrative fidelity.”

The insistence of U.S. political leaders that it is values and not policies is an example of a framing process. For domestic American audiences, this frame resonates on many levels: it is reinforced empirically by the highlighting of selected reference to the statements of militant Islamists denouncing Western values; it is experientially consistent with media coverage of Muslim countries focusing on the rejection or lack of protection for these values; and, it is consistent with the dominant construction of terrorism and repeated related discourse. This analysis is consistent with the success of this aspect of the current construction of the war on terror being adopted by the majority of Americans, creating perceptions of identity in opposition to a terrorist enemy, placing unambiguous blame on that enemy, and encouraging or justifying the responses of the war on terror as a social movement approach would highlight. However, if we presume that political leaders are intentionally attempting to use this as a framing narrative to appeal in the Muslim world (perhaps as an alternative explanation of their observed refusal to acknowledge the role of U.S. policies), we can also understand why it fails for that population. As many experts and reports have noted, the “its our values and not our policies” rhetoric of U.S. leaders has been consistently rejected by audiences in the Muslim world because it simply does not resonate. Again, using Benford and Snow’s three criteria: populations in the Muslim world judge this non-credible as they are familiar with widespread respect and aspiration for many of these same values; it is not consistent with their daily personal or media experience, which highlights the perceived negative affect of U.S. and Western policies not opposition to Western values; and, they

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are more directly aware that it is not a full and true reflection of even militant Islamist narratives that dominantly centre on grievances with American policy.29

Within a dynamic of collective action framing processes are often contested at many levels. Actors within a movement generally are attempting to attract and mobilize new members by persuading individuals in the larger population of the compelling nature of how the movement frames identity, grievances, and solutions. Competing elements within a movement often contest the meaning and application of accepted frames or advocate for different frames to influence the direction of a movement. And, counter-movement actors (such as the state or groups mobilized in opposition) often are attempting to undermine or otherwise refute specific frames, as well as their interpretation and application, in order to reduce the appeal of a movement to both already mobilized individuals as well as others in the larger population. While these contests are generally intentional in nature, with movements refining frames as well as consciously choosing when and how to apply them, important actors may also unintentionally use rhetoric or take action that either encourages the acceptance of a movement’s frames or causes other unintended consequences as individuals interpret those events through the perspective of specific frames.

From the perspective of U.S. counterterrorism priorities three criteria assist in evaluating the results of these framing contests: whether various Muslim populations are more or less likely to blame the United States (or Western actors in general) for the grievances they perceive; whether they choose to pursue or support more violent or non-violent strategies to achieve their goals; and, whether and to the extent they identify with specific other populations and groups who may encourage or enhance (or discourage and diminish) the threat posed. The United States has a security interest in the result of these framing contests to the degree that various mobilized groups come to believe violent strategies are necessary and attacks threatening international interests are legitimate and beneficial. From a social movement perspective one of the most important aspects of a successful counterterrorism hearts and minds strategy is influencing these framing contests in a direction that decreases the short and long-term security threats; or conversely, proactively avoids or mitigates action that has the

29 Benford and Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements.". Snow and Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization."
opposite effect. Such influence may be direct in terms of engaging in contested framing processes, or indirect in terms of shaping rhetoric and actions with consideration of how those will be viewed through the perception of specific frames or to either reinforce or disrupt specific frames.

The following sections of this chapter examine how U.S. rhetoric and action have counterproductively contributed to three important framing contests: by reinforcing existing grievances with U.S. policy used by militant Islamist groups as motivators and justification for their vision and tactics; by validating militant Islamists’ argument that the United States is involved in a war on Islam, which again justifies anti-U.S. attacks and serves to radicalize Muslim populations; and, by undermining the natural counter frames, which are the core message of U.S. hearts and minds efforts, that generate admiration and goodwill for the United States.

Reinforcing Existing Anti-American Grievances

Over the preceding decades dominant narratives across much of the Muslim world related to economic, political, and social problems have increasingly attributed blame to the United States.30 These criticisms often were the result of local elites seeking to displace anger on an external scapegoat, Cold War divisions and propaganda, and the inevitable resentment of a global superpower whose status, actions, and rhetoric (often unintentionally and unknowingly) had local implications. The long history of U.S. policies and actions in these countries, especially when interpreted and filtered by local perspectives, provided evidence for these accusations. These complaints often alleged that the United States supported their enemies in oppressing local populations, exerted control through complicit governments or hegemonic interventions, and exploited local resources.

As part of the “Islam is the solution” meta-framing, Islamists have argued that the Muslim world needs to return to Islamic values, often in an idealized purity, both individually and in their governments. Related to this, many Islamists emphasize grievances that encourage a shared Islamic identity, reinforce that Western (or non-

30 Anti-Americanism has a long history in the Arab and Muslim world dating back to at least the 1950’s when it “was originally promoted by ‘progressive’ secularists rather than by Islamists.” Kinnane, 2004, "Winning over the Muslim Mind," National Interest (75), Spring: 95.
Islamic) influences are often to blame, and establish that rejection of those influences is part of the solution to a better future. The history of anti-American grievances has long easily been incorporated into this Islamist framing.

Following 9/11 this framing has been reinforced by U.S. reaffirmation of many contentious policies including support for Israel and opposition to Palestinian groups, connections with authoritarian regimes and perceived tolerance of their abuses in exchange for support of the war on terror, an increased military presence widely viewed as asserting American hegemony, and continued rhetoric about America’s strategic need to maintain access to and a regular supply of cheap oil. The result is an opinion climate across the Muslim world where people are “suspicious of American power” and believe that the “true purpose of the war on terrorism” is “American control of Middle East oil and U.S. domination of the world.”

The following two sections further explain the history of anti-American grievances and how post-9/11 American rhetoric and policies have provided strong evidence for militant Islamists to use in supporting their framing arguments to the detriment of U.S. hearts and minds goals.

A Long History of Anger at U.S. Policies

In discussing the success of al-Qaida’s arguments blaming America for Muslim grievances, Lia observed, “there is some truth to” them. This is not a comfortable conclusion for Americans to draw, and given the absolutist moral climate after 9/11 a very unpopular position for political leaders to publicly recognize or for the average American involved with analyzing, developing, or implementing policy to incorporate into their endeavours. Problematically most Americans, including many of those involved in deciding upon and contributing to policy, are unfamiliar with the history of

31 America's Image in the World.
33 Many of these policies may have been (or continue to be) objectively beneficial from a U.S., global, or even local perspective. Those highlighting anti-American grievances are likely to distort, exaggerate, and fabricate while ignoring positive American contributions. However, the bottom line remains that the widespread acceptance of these criticisms is a constraint limiting U.S. hearts and minds efforts, especially when the development of those efforts and U.S. policy in general fails to account for these attitudes and often reinforces them.
U.S. involvement in the Muslim world and how various policies and interventions are often viewed from a local perspective. However, to understand the failure of American hearts and minds efforts to prevent further erosion in popular support in the Muslim world (let alone make significant gains) it is important to recognize that there is a long history of American policies providing tangible ground to justify suspicion of and antagonism to the United States from the perspective of individuals living in the Muslim world.

Probably the single most important continuing and long running area of U.S. policy generating resentment and anti-American biases across the Muslim world is American support for Israel. Graham Fuller writes:

It is impossible to discuss relations between the Muslim world and the West without examining the impact of the establishment of the state of Israel... The creation and role of the Israeli state is the single most emotionally charged and violently contested issue between East and West. Partisans on both sides are often extreme and uncompromising... While most peoples of the developing world retain some historical memory and grievance from the colonial period, for the Muslim world, and especially the Arab world, the establishment of Israel and its Western-supported dominance remains a source of fierce hostility toward the powers of the West as a form of neo-imperialism.

As early as 1946, at a time when many in the Muslim world saw the United States as a champion opposing the colonial era, the Islamist writer Sayyid Qutb argued that U.S. support for the establishment of Israel proved America’s “treachery” and “duplicity,” and Gerges further reports that “every Islamist and jihadist” he has interviewed over many years “has made a point of condemning America’s policies toward Israel.”

Ayman al-Zawahiri explained in *Knights Under the Prophets Banner*, published shortly after the 9/11 attacks, that to mobilize the greater Muslim nation required rallying them under slogans with which they identified:

The Muslim nation will not participate with [jihad] unless the slogans of the mujahideen are understood by the masses of the Muslim nation. The one slogan that has been well understood by the nation and to which it has been responding for the past 50 years is the call for the jihad against Israel. In addition to this

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34 Hamid, "Why Do They Hate Us?.". Stein, "Can You Tell a Sunni from a Shiite?."  
slogan, the nation in this decade is geared against the US presence. It has responded favourably to the call for the jihad against the Americans.\textsuperscript{37}

In social movement terminology Zawahiri understood the resonance of the Palestinian issue with Muslim populations and potential as a framing process to motivate Islamist mobilization.

Muslim populations are very aware: Israel receives the most U.S. foreign aid;\textsuperscript{38} the United States has repeatedly used its Security Council position to prevent criticism or international action against Israel;\textsuperscript{39} at times of crisis the U.S. has provided emergency military and economic support to Israel; and, the United States has provided political support at times when Israel has launched military campaigns or other operations against neighbouring countries or the occupied territories.\textsuperscript{40} Muslim populations perceive Western outrage against terrorist attacks on Israel as hypocritical when the same nations at most offer softened criticisms of Israeli actions that kill civilians or entrench what is feared to be a permanent conquest of occupied territory.

Attitudes and in-group/out-group sympathies established and reinforced by the long-running Israeli-Palestinian crisis carry over to Muslim framing and understanding of other “East-West” interactions and moral judgments to the significant disadvantage of U.S. counterterrorism and especially hearts and minds efforts.

Another principal source of anti-American sentiment across the Muslim world was the posture, implementation, and effect of many U.S. Cold War policies. Beginning at least with the Eisenhower Doctrine, announced in 1957 aimed at deterring Soviet

\textsuperscript{37} al-Zawahiri, "His Own Words," 209-10.
\textsuperscript{38} The standard American response that Egypt traditionally receives the second most foreign aid is not persuasive to many Muslim populations, especially those who are increasingly mobilized, given criticisms that this aid merely helps to prop up an authoritarian regime. Aid to Egypt is also seen as a bribe to split a united Arab front, allowing Israel to continue to oppress the Palestinians and maintain control of occupied territory in violation of international norms. For example: Zuhur, \textit{Egypt: Security, Political, and Islamist Challenges}, 18-21.
\textsuperscript{39} John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt argue: “Since 1982, the United States has vetoed 32 United Nations Security Council resolutions that were critical of Israel, a number greater than the combined total of vetoes cast by all the other Security Council members.” Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006, "The Israel Lobby," \textit{London Review of Books} (March 23), http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/mear01_.html.
influence, the U.S. increasingly exercised its military, economic, and diplomatic capabilities regularly throughout the Muslim world. Despite rhetoric about promoting the “self-government and independence” of the new nations of the Middle East, American actions were generally guided by superpower geopolitical strategy and not concern for impact on local populations. For example, at a time when Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s pan-Arab Nationalism had captured the imagination and hopes of majorities across the Middle East, the U.S. opposed this movement and those aligned with it because “Eisenhower feared” that a regional power vacuum “had allowed Nasser to spread his pan-Arab policies and form dangerous alliances with Jordan and Syria” opening “the Middle East to Soviet influence.” The history of Western colonial and economic control over the Middle East as well as support for Israel also provided an opportunity exploited by Soviet diplomacy and propaganda during the Cold War further laying the foundation of modern anti-American attitudes. Secular Arab regimes, such as the Nasserist and Baathist ones, facing daunting development challenges and legitimacy deficits, similarly contributed to the current received historical perception of the United States long before the rise of current militant Islamist groups.

The role America has historically played as a regional hegemon also contributes to current anti-Americanism. Over the past half century, during and after the Cold

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42 Of interest to this thesis, the above quotation is from the Office of the Historian at the Department of State’s Bureau of Public Affairs on “The Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957.” This article also notes the Eisenhower Doctrine “was motivated in part by an increase in Arab hostility toward the West.” U.S. Department of State, 2008, The Eisenhower Doctrine [cited October 20 2008], http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/82548.htm.
War, the U.S. used economic, diplomatic, and military influence and interventions in the pursuit of a variety of strategic goals from maintaining a regional military balance to protecting global access to and uninterrupted supplies of oil.\textsuperscript{46} With polls indicating that Muslim anti-Americanism has increased significantly with the current U.S. military actions in Iraq, it is useful to recall that many in the Muslim world remember the U.S. as supporting Saddam during his invasion and war against Iran in the 1980’s over the course of which a half million or more died. Allegations about American and Western supplies and intelligence supporting Saddam’s use of chemical weapons undermined the primary U.S. rationale for the 2003 war with Iraq for many in the region.\textsuperscript{47} The deployment of the U.S. Navy to the Persian Gulf towards the end of that war in the 1980’s to protect Iraq’s distribution of oil from Iranian threats reinforced perceptions that America’s primary concern was access to oil.\textsuperscript{48} Many (and not only Muslims) series of terrorist attacks on U.S. interests, many of which were in or related to the Muslim world, to provide empirical data in support of this observation. Eland, 1998, "Does U.S. Intervention Overseas Breed Terrorism? The Historical Record," \textit{CATO Foreign Policy Briefing No. 50} (December 17), CATO, http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbrie ffs/fpb-050es.html. \textsuperscript{46} Fisk, 2006a, "Double Standards of Morality: The Age of Terror," \textit{CounterPunch} (October 9), http://www.counterpunch.org/fisk10092006.html. \textsuperscript{47} Ibid. \textsuperscript{48} Towards the end of the Iraq-Iran war the USS Vincennes accidently shot down Iran Air Flight 655 killing 290 passengers and crew, which remains a particularly tragic example of the type of “collateral incidents” resulting from America’s military involvement in overseas conflicts. The credibility of the United States was particularly damaged by this incident as the U.S. initially insisted that the airliner was following an unusual flight pattern, appearing to descend towards the U.S. naval vessel, and neither responding to nor transmitting appropriate civilian radio signals. Some even suggested the Iranians contrived the event. The U.S. was slow to admit that these claims were not true. However, the formal U.S. investigation known as the Fogarty Report ultimately found: “The data from USS Vincennes’s tapes, information from USS Sides and reliable intelligence information, corroborate the fact that TN 4131 [the Iranian aircraft] was on a normal commercial air flight plan profile, in the assigned airway, squawking Mode III 6760, on a continuous ascent in altitude from take-off at Bandar Abbas to shoot down.” Fogarty, 1988, "Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Downing of a Commercial Airliner by the U.S.S. Vincennes (CG49) on July 3, 1988," http://press.princeton.edu/books/rochlin/chapter_09.html. Perceptions of U.S. attitudes toward Muslim civilians were not helped by the statements of then Vice-President George H. W. Bush who reportedly said in response to questions about the incident, “I’ll never apologize for the United States of America. Ever. I don’t care what the facts are.” "Perspectives," 1988, \textit{Newsweek}, August 15. Although the U.S. did not formally
similarly believe the United States went to war with Iraq in 1991 out of concerns over control of oil and not altruistically to liberate Kuwait and prevent further aggression by Saddam. Perceived American indifference to the suffering of Iraqi citizens during the following decade of sanctions reinforced the belief that the United States did not care about Muslim citizens, as did incidents such as when U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright was asked by 60 minutes, “We have heard that half a million children have died. I mean, that is more children than died in Hiroshima. And, you know, is the price worth it?” And responded, “I think that it is a very hard choice, but the price, we think, the price is worth it.”

The continuing presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia for the decade after the 1991 war not only was one of the most frequently mentioned grievances of bin Ladin, but also for some proof of his earlier arguments. Leading up to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait bin Ladin had given speeches in Saudi mosques warning of the danger Saddam posed. Before the American intervention, bin Ladin attempted to persuade the Saudi ruling elite to reject America’s offer, as it would be a religious outrage to have infidel troops in the country, and use the mujahideen from the successful war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. He warned that if American troops were allowed to base

admit responsibility or apologize, in 1996 an agreement with Iran was reached involving a payment of $61.8 million in compensation for the Iranians killed.

49 Hornberger, "Why Do they Hate us?" For example, in Usama bin Ladin's 26 December 2001 audio statement Nineteen Students he said, “Every day, from east to west, our umma of 1200 million Muslims is being slaughtered, in Palestine, in Iraq, Somalia, Western Sudan, Kashmir, the Philippines, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Assam. We do not hear their voices, yet as soon as the victim rises up and offers himself on behalf of his religion, people are outraged.” bin Laden, 2005a, "Nineteen Students (26 December 2001)," In Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden, ed. Lawrence, London: Verso, 153.

50 Richman, 2003, "Albright 'Apologizes'," (November 7), The Future of Freedom Foundation, http://www.fff.org/comment/com0311c.asp. Recognizing the disastrous effect of her comment on public diplomacy, and providing another anecdote that hearts and minds strategies are limited by the human failings of even very experienced diplomats, Madeleine Albright wrote in her memoirs: “I must have been crazy; I should have answered the question by reframing it and pointing out the inherent flaws in the premise behind it. Saddam Hussein could have prevented any child from suffering simply by meeting his obligations... As soon as I had spoken, I wished for the power to freeze time and take back those words. My reply had been a terrible mistake, hasty, clumsy and wrong. Nothing matters more than the lives of innocent people. I had fallen into the trap and said something I simply did not mean. That was no one’s fault but my own.” Albright, 2003b, Madam Secretary, Miramax Books, 275.
country they would not leave, despite public assurances at the time to the contrary from both the Saudis and the U.S. Domestic opposition to the presence of U.S. troops then served to boost bin Ladin and al-Qaida’s credibility and popularity.  

Some have suggested that populations in the Arab world (or maybe developing and less powerful countries in general) are particularly susceptible to conspiracy theories. This allegedly accounts for some of the difficulties the U.S. is having with hearts and minds (especially given, as the highlighted conspiracies often explain, that as a superpower the U.S. should be able to control everything). However, while conspiracy theories and rumour are problems challenging hearts and minds efforts, the history of American involvement in the Arab and larger Muslim world provides repeated lessons that the U.S. often has attempted covert schemes to overthrow regimes and control events. For example, in 1953 the CIA working with Britain’s SIS helped overthrow the elected and popular government in Iran led by Mohammed Mossadegh to protect Western petroleum companies from plans to nationalize the oil industry.

Reinforcing These Narratives

The actions and rhetoric of the United States after 9/11 have often reinforced these historical grievances. The American public, responding as a nation that had suffered the single largest terrorist attack in history and the first major attack of any kind on its shores in over 50 years, was quickly supportive of a much more aggressive military and diplomatic posture to pursue a war on terror. The result was even closer alignment with Israel as well as other nations combating Islamist terrorist groups, greater reliance on authoritarian but cooperative Muslim-majority states, and a significant increase in U.S. military forces stationed and active in Muslim countries.

52 For example: Fuller, The Future of Political Islam.
53 Ansari, Confronting Iran, 27-53. De Luce, "The Spectre of Operation Ajax.". Martin, "Paul's 9/11 Explanation Deserves to be Debated.". Risen, "Secrets of History." This also emphasizes how the difference in selective perspectives undermines U.S. hearts and minds efforts. In general Americans are simply unaware of the Mossadegh history, and even for those who are it is at most a minor event in the distant past. Especially for Iranians, but also for many other politically informed Muslims, it is a commonly remembered event that is part of a larger history proving their perception of American manipulation of the region for its own purposes.
Militant Islamist groups were quick to exploit and spin these actions as consistent with their anti-American framing narratives, while many in the Muslim world came to independent similar interpretations based on acceptance of the same or related existing frames.

America’s support for Israel historically has been the most contentious issue driving negative attitudes towards the United States in the Muslim world. Even closer U.S.-Israeli ties inevitably aggravated these perceptions after 9/11 as the American public responded to al-Qaida’s attacks with greater support and sympathy for others facing similar threats and a broader consensus that Israel was a crucial ally against a common global enemy. The American perception aggregating all Islamist terrorist groups as part of that common threat, coupled with the absolutist normative climate condemning those who use terrorism, further drove American policy to shun negotiation with Hamas at the very time that group was ascendant in Palestinian politics. The United States was also willing to be more tolerant of aggressive Israeli policies including expanded settlements in the West Bank, construction of a wall at points deep into Palestinian territory, targeted assassinations, and various forms of collective punishment as countermeasures to terrorist attacks. The result is that post-9/11 surveys of Muslim populations find even stronger opinions of American bias, where consistent majorities believe the U.S. is “seeking to expand Israel’s territory” and disagreeing with assertions that “the U.S. genuinely seeks to create an independent and viable Palestinian state.”

Part of the Bush administration’s post-9/11 attempts to generate good will and win popular support in the Muslim world was the high profile Freedom Agenda centred on encouraging democratic elections. Despite the resistance of other key regional

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54 Mead, 2008, "The new Israel and the Old," *Foreign Affairs* (July/August). A common myth in American discourse is that the Palestinian issue was not important to Usama bin Ladin or al-Qaida before 9/11, however the frequent and prominent focus on this issue in pre-9/11 writings and speeches from bin Ladin and other key al-Qaida leaders strongly refutes this perception. Hegghammer, "Jihadi Studies."
55 Mearsheimer and Walt, "The Israel Lobby."
56 Fisk, "Double Standards of Morality: The Age of Terror."
57 Kull, "Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al Qaeda."
58 "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism." As Chapter Six discusses, democracy promotion at the start of 2006 was the Bush administration’s answer for how to engage in the war of ideas and address the sources of terrorism over the long term.
players, the Bush administration pushed for Palestinian elections as an exemplar of this policy and out of a belief that elections would spur progress on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, this policy encountered its largest setback when Hamas and not Fatah decisively won a majority in the January 2006 voting for the Palestinian Legislative Council. The American administration, caught by surprise according to several sources, quickly reversed course on reform moving to isolate and destabilize the newly elected parliament.\(^59\) This highly negative reaction, especially viewed from the critically predisposed perspective of various Muslim populations, more than offset any positive effects of the overall campaign, undermining the intended American hearts and minds message, and reinforcing militant Islamist framing that the United States only supports ideas such as democracy promotion to further its control of the region.\(^60\)


The American response to Israel’s summer 2006 invasion of southern Lebanon similarly did more to reinforce existing framing of the U.S. as seeking (along with Israel) to control and dominate the region without concern for the suffering of primarily Muslim civilian populations. Although triggered by Hizballah provocations, which generated some Muslim criticism of the group and opened an opportunity for American influence operations, the size and extent of the Israeli response convinced many it was long planned. Significant civilian suffering and casualties during the fighting between Hizballah and Israel led to widespread calls for a temporary ceasefire to allow civilians to escape the area and to pursue diplomatic solutions. However U.S. diplomatic moves, including statements and presumably pressure by American Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton, were seen as preventing international action and “green lighting” continued Israeli operations, contributing to anti-American attitudes. Further reinforcing for many Muslims that the U.S. was not only supportive of Israel’s operation, but that this was part of a wider American plan for the region, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice responded to a series of questions about America’s plans given through Egyptian elections, published in: Ibrahim, ed 2007, *The Al Qaeda Reader*, Translated by Ibrahim, New York: Broadway Books, 116-36.


62 However, several sources have emphasized that reports of Israeli “massacres,” “genocide,” or “war crimes” were unsupported, gross exaggerations, or fabrications. Reporting also emphasized that while Israel unleashed a pre-planned military operation to “destroy” Hizballah, it was careful to avoid targeting much civilian infrastructure while also attempting to limit civilian causalities. It is also true that Hizballah, as a non-state militia designated by several countries as a terrorist organization, operated freely from southern Lebanon attacking Israel, and concealing assets and fighters within civilian communities to use those as human shields. Arkin, 2006a, "Facts and Myths About the Israel-Hezbollah War," *Early Warning* (September 19), Washington Post, http://blog.washingtonpost.com/earlywarning/2006/09/facts_and_myths_about_the_isra.html. Arkin, 2006c, "Shock and Awe in Lebanon," *Early Warning* (September 18), Washington Post, http://blog.washingtonpost.com/earlywarning/2006/09/shock_and_awe_in_lebanon.html.

63 Umansky, 2006, "Israel's 'All Clear',' Slate (July 20), http://www.slate.com/id/2146207/.

the devastation in Beirut and southern Lebanon saying, “What we’re seeing here, in a sense, is the growing – the birth pangs of a new Middle East and whatever we do we have to be certain that we’re pushing forward to the new Middle East not going back to the old one.”65 After the fighting stopped, U.S. efforts consistent with a hearts and minds strategy also proved lacking, as promised American humanitarian aid was slow to arrive while Hizballah quickly and efficiently delivered much more aid, leading many to observe that they won the post-conflict narrative battle.66 Based on his polling of the region, Shibley Telhami explained the overall framing effect U.S. rhetoric and actions during the conflict had noting, “many in the region conclude that the Lebanon war is America’s war,” and “most Arabs surveyed now see the United States as one of the greatest threats to them.”67

Broader American policy over the last seven years has also frequently reinforced previous complaints. Prior to 9/11 Usama bin Ladin and others regularly pointed to the American military presence in the Muslim world as indications of U.S. intentions to exert historic Western imperial control. Since 9/11 the United States has invaded and occupied Afghanistan and Iraq, significantly expanded the U.S. presence with new bases and increased troop levels in several other Muslim majority countries, played a significant military support (and sometimes direct) role in several other conflicts (notably in the Horn of Africa and Southeast Asia), and intentionally used military shows of force as part of diplomatic moves in other areas (such as prominently and

66 In an ironic postscript demonstrating counterproductive American actions consistent with the enemy-centric bias, in early 2007 as part of efforts to use financial weapons against terrorist groups the U.S. announced sanctions against a Hizballah associated Lebanese construction firm that had been involved with much of the post-conflict rebuilding. From a counterterrorism perspective this probably had little effect on Hizballah’s terrorist capabilities, while from a hearts and minds perspective it provided proof to Lebanese audiences that the U.S. doesn’t care about human suffering or attempts to rebuild. "Washington's Weird Way of Trying to Make Friends in Lebanon," 2007, The Daily Star, February 22, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/printable.asp?art_ID=79748&cat_ID=17. Also see David Kilcullen’s discussion of how effective and intelligent Hizballah was about post-conflict aid: Packer, "Knowing the Enemy: Can Social Scientists Redefine the 'War on Terror'?.”
67 Telhami, "Hezbollah's Popularity Exposes al-Qaeda's Failure to Win the Hearts."
intentionally stationing the USS Cole off of the coast of Lebanon during political negotiations there).

Many in the Muslim world perceive these military actions as consistent with Islamist framing that the U.S. is simply continuing to exercise hegemonic control and insure its capability to exploit regional oil reserves consistent with pre-9/11 framing of American intentions.\textsuperscript{68} For example, in his letter October 2002 letter \textit{Why We are Fighting You} bin Ladin writes, “You steal our wealth and oil at paltry prices because of your international influence and military threats. This theft is indeed the biggest theft ever witnessed by mankind in the history of the world.”\textsuperscript{69} Despite repeated U.S. insistence that such theories are “utter nonsense,”\textsuperscript{70} the Iraq war especially is perceived by many as motivated in large part by oil given that Iraq has the second largest oil reserves behind American ally Saudi Arabia.\textsuperscript{71} President Bush (similar to previous


\textsuperscript{69} bin Ladin, "Why We are Fighting You: Osama bin Laden's Letter to Americans (October 2002)," 199. Bin Ladin’s letter was a response to a public letter signed by 60 American thinkers titled \textit{What We’re Fighting For} published in February 2002 which led to a response letter from 153 prominent Saudi scholars titled \textit{How We Can Coexist}. Bin Ladin’s letter chastises the Saudis for “prostrations” to the West, and a “theologically invalid and cowardly response.” Ibrahim, ed \textit{The Al Qaeda Reader}, 196.


\textsuperscript{71} For example, these suspicions are reinforced by news of decisions to award significant contracts to American and Western oil companies in Iraq on a no-bid basis. Altman, 2008, "High Energy Thursday: A Peculiar Deal for Some of Iraq's Oil," \textit{International Herald Tribune: Managing Globalization} (June 19), http://blogs.iht.com/tribtalk/business/globalization/?p=744. Kramer, 2008a, "Deals with
Presidents) frequently publicized diplomatic pressure on oil producing allies such as Saudi Arabia to increase production of oil in order to keep prices low feeds these perceptions.\textsuperscript{72}

Short-term U.S. priorities after 9/11, especially with respect to the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the larger war on terror, led the United States to increase support for a variety of authoritarian regimes across the Muslim world. This again validated pre-existing criticisms and reinforced the larger frames of radical Islamist groups, especially as these generally corrupt and oppressive governments are labelled as apostates by militant Islamists and framed as a central part of the problem that a return to Islam will solve. In order to quickly initiate and supply military operations in Afghanistan, land-locked in an area where the U.S. had no historic military basing, Pakistan was elevated to the role of a crucial American ally while the United States also quickly sought and reached agreements with Central Asian states to the north of Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{73} Problematically all of these governments had continuing troubled relations with their own Muslim populations and varying reputations for human rights abuses and autocratic rule undermining American claims that the invasion of Afghanistan and the war on terror in general were part of a larger defence of freedom and not a war on Islam.\textsuperscript{74} A letter from bin Ladin To Our Brothers in Pakistan for

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\textsuperscript{72} Exemplary of bin Ladin’s frequent criticism of this subject, in a March 1997 interview with CNN’s Peter Arnett, explained that if the Islamist movement were to take over control of Saudi Arabia, “As for oil, it is a commodity that will be subject to the price of the market according to supply and demand. We believe that the current prices are not realistic due to the Saudi regime playing the role of a US agent and the pressures exercised by the US on the Saudi regime to increase production and flooding the market that caused a sharp decrease in oil prices.” Lawrence, ed \textit{Messages to the World}, 46.
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\textsuperscript{73} Bases were established for U.S. troops in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan while security arrangements enabling other military activity were made with other states such as Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan.
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\textsuperscript{74} Symbolic of the long-term rights abuses and problems in these countries was the May 2005 brutal suppression by the government of Uzbekistan of a popular uprising in the city of Andijon along the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border. On 13 and 14 May, following months of growing protests and unrest, government forces killed hundreds of mostly unarmed civilians, including many children. While international condemnation prompted the U.S. to break off its basing agreement after this incident, reporting since indicates the U.S. has continued military ties to Uzbekistan as well as with similar countries in the region.
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example, broadcast internationally on 24 September 2001, quickly initiated these themes. The tension between the ideals of the administration’s Freedom Agenda and the realities that many key states in the war on terror were far from liberal has repeatedly caused problems undermining U.S. hearts and minds goals over the last seven years. Reliance on Middle Eastern governments including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait with respect to the war in Iraq as well as several other Muslim majority states such as Egypt, Algeria, and Libya for other aspects of the war on terror have led to the United States often ignoring or only softly criticizing abuses by those governments while exaggerating any signs of liberal progress, even when from local vantage points such steps were transparently superficial. As with the American u-turn on Hamas’ election victory, these examples again provide evidence for militant Islamist claims that Western promotion of democracy and human rights are only superficial covers for maintaining regional control.


terrorism and political violence, over the long run the inherent problems of autocratic rule are central to the grievances mobilizing contentious collective action. Further, the repressive manner in which authoritarian governments respond to social movements has a strong influence on radicalizing populations, encouraging clandestine networks, and particularly contributing to the adoption of violent repertoires. Finally, from a framing perspective strengthening the perception that the U.S. supported authoritarian regimes was especially problematic for U.S. hearts and minds goals. Central to the security concerns of the United States, with respect to conflicts that in many cases were largely local, is countering al-Qaida’s far enemy logic justifying attacks on international actors as necessary to solve a wide range of popularly held local grievances. Unfortunately, repeated association with and perceptions the United States was actively supporting through military, economic, and diplomatic means the vary authoritarian governments these populations had problems with provides validation for this framing. Especially as many authoritarian regimes noticeably used the war on terror and post-9/11 international sentiments to crack down on domestic Islamist groups or their own minority Muslim populations.

Repeated surveys and polls conducted by Pew, Gallup, and others reinforce the negative effect U.S. rhetoric and actions after 9/11 have had in terms of reinforcing the overarching Islamist frame that American policy is biased against Muslims and really driven by desires to protect and strengthen Israel, control oil and other natural resources, and prevent Muslim states from gaining power to challenge U.S. and Western domination. Shibley Telhami, for example, reported anti-U.S. Muslim opinions had continued to harden in 2008. When asked what two factors they believe are most important in driving American policy very few responded promoting democracy (4%), spreading human rights (4%), promoting peace and stability (6%), fighting terrorism (7%), or preventing the spread of nuclear weapons (12%), while much larger numbers

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said preserving regional and global dominance (30%), weakening the Muslim world (33%), protecting Israel (47%), and controlling oil (50%).

**Contributing to a War on Islam Frame**

The most significant framing failure for the United States was the lack of appreciation for how predisposed Muslim audiences were to see American actions as engaging in a wider war on Islam, and then pursuing a balance of polices and a rhetorical style feeding this perception. A significant element of militant Islamist framing, especially of groups such as al-Qaida advocating a far enemy logic, has long been arguments that the United States intentionally sought to oppress and subjugate Muslim populations, did not respect and deliberately was undermining Islamic values, and was actively continuing a Judeo-Christian crusade against Islam. Following the 9/11 attacks, fearing that the United States would react harshly to Muslims in general, many in the Muslim world were primed to be very attentive for evidence of America’s

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79 Indyk, 2006, "Lebanese Public Opinion Amidst a New Cycle of Violence," (December 1), The Brookings Institution, http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/20061201.pdf. Telhami, 2006a, "Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey (with Zogby International)," (November), University of Maryland, http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/2006Lebanon.pdf. Telhami, "Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll." See also: Kohut, "American Public Diplomacy in the Islamic World." The prevailing opinion among people in this region is that the United States ignores the interests of their countries in deciding its international policies. This view is as dominant in Turkey (74%), a NATO ally, as it is in Lebanon (77%). More specifically, the Pew survey finds a strong sense among most of the countries surveyed that U.S. policies serve to increase the formidable gap between rich and poor countries. Moreover, sizable minorities feel the United States does too little to help solve the world’s problems.


81 Ibrahim, ed The Al Qaeda Reader. Lawrence, ed Messages to the World.
“real intentions.” Coupled with existing suspicions and biases against U.S. policy, this predisposed Muslim populations to undervalue American rhetoric or actions intended to counter a war on Islam frame, while being more likely to believe sinister explanations. Such an environment most likely required game changing disruptive moves by the United States to reassure Muslim populations and win the struggle for popular support. Some mistakes (isolated use of crusader language) and unpopular but expected actions (invading Afghanistan) may have done only limited short-term damage to opinions of the United States, or could have been offset by high level pursuit of other hearts and minds efforts (significantly increased economic aid and strong engagement through regional media). However, the overall American rhetorical and diplomatic approach and major policy choices, especially the invasion of Iraq, significantly contributed to the “war on terror” being viewed increasingly as a “war on Islam.”

As this frame grew in acceptance across Muslim populations, U.S. foreign policy had the counterproductive effect of increasing “the potential recruiting pool (let alone sympathy) for groups like al Qaeda.” Kull explains how Papa’s surveys support this evolution in the framing contest:

For decades, polls in the Muslim world and the statements of Muslim leaders have shown a variety of resentments about US policies… But now there is also a new feeling about the US that has emerged in the wake of 9-11. This is not so much an intensification of negative feelings toward the US as much as a new perception of American intentions. There now seems to be a perception that the US has entered into a war against Islam itself… in the focus groups this was described as something that has arisen recently from American anger about 9-11. America is perceived as believing that it was attacked by Islam itself and as having declared war on Islam.

Kull’s continued testimony is consistent with social movement theory explanations about how these changing perceptions led to the success of other aspects of militant Islamist framing. Their repeated surveys found increased Muslim self-identity linked to an increasingly shared “sense of Islam as being under siege.” Even though the U.S. and al-Qaida are both “seen as largely illegitimate,” Muslim populations have come to see

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83 Kull, "Negative Attitudes Toward the United States in the Muslim World: Do They Matter?"
the U.S. as a greater threat. This leads to increasing demands for the United States to withdraw its troops (a long-term al-Qaida goal advocated as a solution Islamists should seek) and widespread support for attacks on American troops. Highlighting the basic logic of a hearts and minds approach, Kull observes:

However, anti-American feeling can lead Muslims to suppress their moral doubts about al Qaeda. This makes it politically more difficult for governments to take strong action against al Qaeda, it makes general publics more likely to passively accept al Qaeda and it creates an environment where it is more likely that individuals will cross the threshold into actively supporting al Qaeda. In other words it gives al Qaeda more room to maneuver.  

He also notes that the combination of increased anti-Americanism with the perception that al-Qaida is at least standing up to the U.S., while itself not being strong enough to take control of local countries, leads many to spend less time examining al-Qaida’s faults. U.S. efforts to win over Muslim attitudes were always going to be challenging given pre-existing Muslim biases as well as other structural problems and sources of grievances outside of American control. However, the diplomatic approach of the Bush administration and the decision to invade Iraq greatly fuelled these dangers. Examining these choices from a framing process perspective helps to explain why American hearts and minds efforts have had little positive influence, while Islamist groups have succeeded in arguing that the U.S. is leading a war on Islam.

**Rhetorical Choices**

During the 2000 presidential election then Governor of Texas George W. Bush campaigned under a promise of a humble approach to foreign policy:

If we’re an arrogant nation, they’ll resent us; if we’re a humble nation, but strong, they’ll welcome us. And our nation stands alone right now in the world in terms of power, and that’s why we’ve got to be humble, and yet project strength in a way that promotes freedom.

However, after the September 11 attacks President Bush and his administration adopted an aggressive international posture, demanding that other nations choose sides, rejecting...
multilateral diplomacy and institutions, establishing a doctrine of pre-emptive war, and boldly promising a new, post-9/11 approach to fighting terror. Bush’s war on terror was notably broad in its goals, not seeking simply to target Usama bin Ladin and al-Qaeda, but as part of an ideological struggle on the scale of the Cold War targeting all terrorist groups with global reach. In practice, over the following seven years, U.S. rhetoric and policy have focused exclusively on violent Islamist groups. This combination of an expansive description of the threat that in operational reality transparently focuses on Muslims has provided frequent evidence for those arguing that the U.S. is really pursuing a war on Islam, undermining U.S. hearts and minds efforts, and giving the advantage to anti-American groups in the contest for popular support.

The phrase war on terror has frequently been criticized as part of the problem generating fear and antagonism. The tendency of Bush administration figures and others representing the United States to use the phrase in the context of a larger clash of civilizations narrative where (Western supported) freedom and democracy are threatened by or being defended against evil, hateful others (who always happen to be Muslim) reinforces the framing that the U.S. is merely using terrorism to justify the pursuit of other goals. Contributing to this perception is a series of statements, which

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87 Recognizing the importance of the President’s words and their ability to strongly influence the outcome of conflicts, Douglas Feith wrote, “Victory or defeat can hinge on the president’s words as much as on the military plans of his generals or the actions of their troops on the ground.” Feith, 2008, "How Bush Sold the War," The Wall Street Journal, May 27, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121184655427621367.html.
89 Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency."
90 For example, Dalia Mogahed of Gallup argues that, “Defining the current conflict as a battle between Western values and ‘radical Islam’ misses the root cause of terrorism while energizing the very perception that fuel sympathy for it – that Islam itself is under attack. These findings begin to expose the danger of acting on the Cold War-war on terror analogy.” Mogahed, "Framing the War on Terror." See also: Kraidy, "Arab Media and US Policy," 10-1.
91 Although there were various attempts by parts of the government to change the language used to describe the war on terrorism in order to mitigate such counterproductive effects, such as aborted attempts to talk about a “Global Struggle Against Violent Extremists” and later advice by the National Counterterrorism Center to avoid public use of terms such as Islamic terrorism, these were generally quickly denounced or ignored by more senior administration officials. At the same time, terms such as Islamofacism were often widely used, which many criticized as being intended
individually may have been unintentional, but taken collectively appear to be persuasive proof of America’s true attitude. Some of this rhetoric reinforces militant Islamist framing that this is simply an extension of a millennial conflict between Christianity and Islam, as when President Bush warned Americans the week after 9/11 that “this crusade, this war on terrorism, is going to take awhile.”


and similar “crusade” comments to justify their framing, as bin Ladin did in what was probably his first public statement, a 24 September 2001 letter To Our Brothers in Pakistan, after Bush’s first post-9/11 public mention of the term. In another repeated use of this comment, Bin Ladin stated:

Bush left no room for doubts or media opinion. He stated clearly that this war is a Crusader war. He said this in front of the whole world so as to emphasize this fact. … When Bush says that, they try to cover up for him, then he said he didn’t mean it. He said, ‘crusade.’ Bush divided the world into two: ‘either with us or with terrorism’ … The odd thing about this is that he has taken the words right out of our mouths.

As bin Ladin also mentioned, Bush’s frequent use of “with us or against us” diplomacy along with other rhetoric that aggregates all opponents (“axis of evil” or tying Saddam to al-Qaida) has created self-fulfilling, polarizing forces. For many Muslim populations this is especially true when American rhetoric has demanded that they choose sides when the other side includes groups they perceive as defending and providing for other Muslims (such as in Palestine, Lebanon, Kashmir, and Chechnya), while the American side includes traditional enemies or at least antagonists (Israel, India, Russia, and a series of authoritarian governments). Many Muslims also believe that the U.S. exposed its true intentions when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice described damage in Lebanon from the summer of 2006 Hizballah-Israel conflict as simply the “birth pangs” of a new Middle East. Senior al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri responded in a July 2006 statement that the pain of this transformation is being felt by Muslims who were being forcefully reshaped in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan by “the Zionist-Crusader aggression,” and then called on “all


94 Aslan, "Why Do They Hate Us?"

95 Hirsh, "The Great Conflater."


97 Kaplan, Ibid. "There are Worse Things than the Status Quo: Condi's Witless Optimism about the Middle East," (July 24), http://www.slate.com/id/2146392/.
oppressed and wronged people in the world, the victims of Western oppressive civilization led by America: [to] Stand by Muslims in the face of this injustice which humanity has never witnessed before.” Both bin Ladin’s and Zawahiri’s statements exemplify how American rhetorical mistakes are consciously used by militant Islamists to support framing processes in order to encourage shared identity, heighten perceptions of grievances, and advocate movement specific solution steps.

The Bush administration’s rhetorical style is in part a manifestation of the more highly normative and enemy-centric construction of terrorism discussed in Chapter Five, and emphasizes the ways in which that construction undermines U.S. hearts and minds goals. Similar statements by other prominent American personalities have likewise reinforced Islamist framing. Many of the statements that have caused problems were meant for domestic audiences, but in the modern media reality are simultaneously broadcast to and critically re-interpreted by concerned international populations. The overall effect is that messages and actions not intended to be part of American hearts and minds effort are interpreted by Muslim populations as indications the U.S. is antagonistic to Islam and poses a significant threat, reinforcing the “war on Islam” narrative advanced by radical Islamists, while often overwhelming the limited intentional attempts of American diplomacy and policies to counter this frame.

The Iraq War as the Real Proof

The war in Iraq is the single most important factor in explaining the failure of the United States in the race for Muslim hearts and minds after September 11. The results of repeated surveys and polls, as well as the near consensus judgment of experts from a wide range of perspectives is that the U.S. invasion and subsequent occupation

99 Perhaps recognizing that the rhetorical approach of his administration has contributed to the problem, President Bush reportedly told The Times in a 2008 exclusive interview: “I think that in retrospect I could have used a different tone, a different rhetoric.” Phrases such as “bring them on” or “dead or alive”, he said, “indicated to people that I was, you know, not a man of peace.” Baldwin and Baker, 2008, "President Bush Regrets His Legacy as Man Who Wanted War," The Times, June 11, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article4107327.ece.
100 Defense Science Board, "Strategic Communication."
of Iraq has done more to increase anti-American opinions around the Muslim world, while undermining U.S. credibility and reinforcing the framing narratives of violent Islamists than any other issue, including continued Muslim perceptions of unconditional American support for Israel.\(^\text{102}\) Andrew Kohut, of Pew Global, testified “Iraq is the key problem” driving current anti-American attitudes and responsible for many in Muslim countries seeing the U.S. as a threat to Islam.\(^\text{103}\) Al-Qaida expert Peter Bergen concludes the invasion of Iraq confirmed “for many Muslims bin Laden’s contention that the United States was at war with Islam.”\(^\text{104}\)

Gerges illustrates the dramatic effect of the decision to invade Iraq shortly after Afghanistan had on reversing Muslim support for America after the 9/11 attacks:

When Russian troops invaded Kabul, the call for jihad echoed from almost every corner and mosque in Arab and Muslim lands. At least fifty thousand faithful flooded into Afghanistan; they had the blessings of the religious and the ruling establishments. A comparatively deafening silence followed the United States’ war on the Taliban and Al Qaeda… No religious authority lent his name and the legitimacy to repelling the American troops. In response to an inquiry from the most senior Muslim chaplain in the U.S. army, a group of leading Islamic scholars issued a fatwa on September 27, 2001, directing that American Muslims were obliged to serve in the armed forces of their country, even when the United States was at war with a Muslim nation. Yusuf Qardawi, one of the best known conservative Islamic scholars – someone who has never hesitated to criticize American foreign policies – endorsed the fatwa.\(^\text{105}\)

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\(^\text{103}\) America’s Image in the World. See also: Kohut and Stokes, *America Against the World*, p172-6


\(^\text{105}\) Gerges, *Journey of the Jihadist*, 203-4. Lynch describes Qaradawi as a moderate Islamist from Egypt with a “hugely popular program on al-Jazeera,” but also cautions that while he may be a “democrat … he is not a liberal.” Lynch, *Voices of the New Arab*
However, after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, “the same Qardawi who had forcefully
denounced bin Laden and his cohorts now accused the Bush administration of declaring
war on Islam.”

The decision to quickly turn focus towards Iraq after the successful toppling of
the Taliban in Afghanistan also framed and reframed understanding of American
actions in that country. For many Muslims who opposed U.S. military action in
Afghanistan, the war in Iraq, without believable links to al-Qaida, was dramatic proof
that the U.S. war on terror was nothing more than an excuse to dominate the Muslim
world. Many others, who had potentially been willing to see the invasion of Afghanistan
as an understandable U.S. reaction to 9/11, especially as acceptance of al-Qaida’s
responsibility and close relationship with the Taliban became more widespread, were
also now more likely to be persuaded by militant Islamist framing that the U.S. was a
threat. Coupled with the shift in resources and attention, Iraq further undermined
subsequent U.S. efforts to win popular support in Afghanistan and portray positive steps
there to others across the Muslim world.

Sentiment across the Muslim world was already primed for an adverse reaction
to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq based upon 10 years of focus upon the humanitarian
crisis in Iraq caused by international sanctions and enforced in part by periodic U.S. and

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*Public, 27, 86-8.* Kepel similarly relates that “Sheikh Qaradawi, whom I met in October
2001 in Qatar, could not find words harsh enough to blame those guilty for the 9/11

*Gerges, Journey of the Jihadist,* 242.

explains the initial view as the Taliban fell in Afghanistan often portrayed a Muslim
face as “the first images were broadcast of Arab jihad fighters being … taken prisoner
… [by] fellow Muslims whom the jihadists were supposedly delivering from the
infidels.” Kepel, *The War for Muslim Minds,* 120.

*Gerges* explains that after the September 11 attacks not only had general Muslim
attitudes turned against al-Qaida, but that even the militant Islamist circles he had
contact with in Egypt and Lebanon condemned al-Qaida and that the “general
realignment within the jihadist family [had] turned decidedly against the global jihad.”
He was ready to conclude that in the movement split between local and global jihadists
“Al Qaeda [was] unquestionably the real loser… Until, that is, the second war in Iraq.”
Gerges, *Journey of the Jihadist,* 229.

U.K. air strikes. Reporting on extensive coverage and discussion of the crisis by Arab media, Lynch describes the backdrop this created:

American diplomats could argue all they wanted that the dying babies on Arab television sets were Saddam’s fault, or that there weren’t as many as he claimed, but these arguments carried little weight compared to the horrifying pictures coming out of Baghdad. Insufficient attention to growing Arab anger during the 1990s by the Clinton administration, punctuated by Ambassador Albright’s comment which seemed to imply that the death of a half million Iraqi children was an acceptable price, further biased the rhetorical and perceptual ground faced by the Bush administration. Unfortunately both the Clinton administration during the 1990s to maintain the sanctions regime and then the Bush administration leading up to the Iraq war focused much of their diplomatic efforts in the region privately on heads of state instead of engaging Arab publics directly through the media they were watching. Demonstrating the failure to appreciate the importance of a population-centric approach for the global counterinsurgency being fought under the war on terror, the Bush administration accepted the requests of Arab governments that they only provide private assurances of support allowing them to publicly oppose the war in Iraq. If Usama bin Ladin’s organization was nearly defeated by early 2002, the Iraq war has driven radicalization and recruitment, reinvigorating al-Qaida and the violent side of the larger Islamist movement with which it is associated. Senior news analyst

110 Tatham, Losing Arab Hearts and Minds, 22-30.
111 Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public, 106.
112 Ibid., 101-6. Albright, Madam Secretary, 275.
113 Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public, 121-2, 56.
114 Ibid., 156-7. Tatham, Losing Arab Hearts and Minds, 25. For shaping the attitudes of the larger public, Lynch emphasizes that the public positions of these governments were much more important that reports of private discussions. Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public, 27, 72.
Daniel Schorr observed, “The president has said that Iraq is the central battleground in the war against terrorism. But the intelligence agencies suggest that if this is so, it is only because the war has made it so.” The publicly released version of the 2006 National Intelligence Estimate on *Trends in Global Terrorism*, to which he was referring, notes in part:

> We also assess that the global jihadist movement – which includes al-Qa’ida, affiliated and independent terrorist groups, and emerging networks and cells – is spreading and adapting to counterterrorism efforts. The Iraq conflict has become the “cause célèbre” for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement.\(^\text{117}\)

Of significant interest to the approach of this thesis, the understanding of factors driving the jihadist movement portrayed in the NIE is highly congruent with a social movement theory perspective on terrorism and especially the framing processes discussed in this chapter. The NIE for example notes:

> Four underlying factors are fueling the spread of the jihadist movement: (1) Entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice, and fear of Western domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness; (2) the Iraq “jihad;” (3) the slow pace of real and sustained economic, social, and political reforms in many Muslim majority nations; and (4) pervasive anti-US sentiment among most Muslims – all of which jihadists exploit.

What militant Islamists are exploiting is the ability to use evidence of these underlying factors in support of their framing narratives to influence popular attitudes and encourage mobilization. A series of studies examining the background and motivations


for individuals who travelled to Iraq to join anti-Coalition forces lend strong support to the explanation that radicalization and willingness to participate in violence – explained here by framing processes – was most often driven by opposition to specific U.S. policies, especially the invasion of Iraq, as compared to alternative explanations such as long-standing previous involvement with violent Islamist networks. ¹¹⁸ This is also consistent with the profile of foreign fighters in Iraq put together by the Department of Defense “based upon debriefings of 48 foreign members of al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) currently in U.S. custody.” ¹¹⁹

Examining how the Iraq war contributed to acceptance of framing arguments that the “war on terror” was really a “war on Islam” helps to explain the contemporaneous sharp increase in anti-American attitudes across the Muslim world, shifts in at least short-term popular support or acceptance of militant Islamist groups and their violent tactics, and the resulting revival and resurgence of al-Qaida fuelled by the radicalization of a new generation of recruits. ¹²⁰ The population-centric social


¹²⁰ Perceptions that American opposition to Iraq were part of a broader war on Islam were already common in al-Qaida statements in the 1990s. For example, in al-Qaida’s 1998 declaration of war against the United States, America’s alleged aggression against the people of Iraq was very prominently highlighted arguing that, “There is no clearer evidence than America’s ceaseless aggression against the Iraqi people,” suggesting that over 1 million Iraqi’s had been killed “at the hands of the Crusader-Jewish alliance,” and that this was to aid Israel by destroying Iraq, “the strongest neighboring Arab state, and their endeavor to fragment all the states of the region” and “continuation of the brutal Crusader occupation of the Peninsula.” bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, Taha, Hamza and
movement approach employed by this thesis emphasizes the importance of understanding how rhetoric and actions are viewed and interpreted from the perspective of the key populations who may provide or deny support to anti-state actors, considering their pre-existing biases, who they identify with, and how they will receive information. Adopting this perspective it is easier to see how many in the Muslim world were likely to be at least suspicious of U.S. action, more concerned about the immediate effect on average Iraqi citizens, and likely to base their judgments on formal and informal communication networks that would be much more critical of American action and much more likely to include viewpoints from those actively opposing the U.S. Recognizing this, and based on the extensive international polling the Pew Research Center had already conducted, Andrew Kohut stated before the war that, “The unpopularity of a potential war with Iraq can only further fuel hostilities – almost no matter how well such a war goes.”

The first challenge facing the United States was that a war with Iraq was hard to sell as a direct and understandable reaction to al-Qaeda’s attacks on September 11, and was widely perceived as a “war of choice.” While many Americans were willing to accept that Saddam may have or might cooperate with bin Ladin or others like him, and therefore Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction posed a threat justifying a pre-emptive war, from the Muslim world perspective this appeared to be too ridiculous to be the real explanation. Emile Nakhleh, who served for 15 years with the CIA and retired in mid-2006 as the Director of the Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program, observed, “Everyone in the Middle East knew it was a joke.”

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121 Kohut, "American Public Diplomacy in the Islamic World.”


123 Silverstein, "Six Questions for Dr. Emile A. Nakhleh on the CIA and the Iraq War."
Although the argument tying Saddam to 9/11 was likely intended first and foremost to generate domestic support for the war, its effect in the Muslim world—being perceived as simply not credible—was to strengthen the relative position of competing framing arguments that the U.S. actually sought to use the war on terror as a cover to subjugate the Muslim world, exploit its resources, and strengthen America’s Israeli allies. Since the first U.S.-Iraq war bin Ladin had been disputing American claims that Iraq’s WMD programs guided its actions as not credible given previous U.S. support for the use of those in the 1980’s, and instead framing America’s conflict with Iraq as part of a hegemonic and crusader war on Islam. In a January 2004 audio tape to the Iraqi people bin Ladin described the “occupation of the crusaders” as having been carried out “under the pretext” of “weapons of mass destruction,” but that it is clear this is a “religious-economic war” to “set the stage for controlling and dominating the whole world” and “due to the presence of the largest oil reserves.” And in a 29 October 2004 address by bin Ladin, he describes that the real motivation for the war was to “remove a former collaborator, and install a new one who will help steal Iraq’s oil” and that Bush knew before the invasion that “everything he needed” to remove Iraqi “weapons of mass destruction – assuming they existed” could be accomplished without invading.

Anti-American framing narratives gained further support in the run-up and subsequent events of the Iraq war given the multitude of competing justifications provided by just Bush administration insiders, let alone supportive and opposing political figures in the United States and across the globe. Later shifts in justification, especially those forced by the failure to find weapons of mass destruction (which itself was especially damaging), only reinforced Muslim suspicions, provided fodder for a

124 Lawrence, ed Messages to the World, 60, 6-7, 148, 53.
125 Ibid., 214.
126 Ibid., 243.
wide range of conspiracies, and gave credibility to anti-American radicals whose arguments remained relatively consistent.

Another frequently repeated justification for the war, which similarly fed anti-American framing arguments, was the idea that an invasion of Iraq was justified as part of a revolutionary project to transform the Middle East. On its own the idea of a Western power seeking to militarily reshape the Middle East was unlikely to be well received by those who may be on the receiving end of “collateral damage.” But, making things worse for hearts and minds goals in the Muslim world, this project was closely associated with a group of Bush administration advisors who saw it as key to the long-term defence of Israel. Phrases such as “the road to Jerusalem leads through Baghdad,” along with rumoured or actual plans associated with this justification, resonated strongly with a wide range of existing interconnected Islamist frames tying U.S. military action against Iraq as part of defending Israel and a larger Judeo-Christian crusader war on Islam. Although addressed to the American people, bin Ladin’s 18 October 2003 message titled Israel, Oil, and Iraq, exemplifies the interconnected arguments of al-Qaida’s regular framing of this issue. The result of Muslim perceptions of this connection was a hardening of attitudes against the United States and

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128 For example, Doran explained how both secular and Islamist opponents to the war in Iraq focused on “Western conspiracies” to explain international affairs and U.S. action. Doran, "Somebody Else's Civil War."
130 Tatham explains: “In 1996 three leading members of Bush’s Administration had contributed to a discussion paper entitled ‘A Clean Break: a New Strategy for Saving the Realm,’ published by the Jerusalem-based Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies. The paper, which was presented to the then Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, made a number of recommendations. Chief among these was the removal of Saddam Hussein from power (a protective measure for the Israeli state), the adoption of a more robust neo-conservative line with Syria, and a total abandonment of the Oslo peace agreements.” Tatham, Losing Arab Hearts and Minds, 27. Further describing the basis of the conspiracy theory, Kepel further describes the document as allegedly calling for a “shock to the system” of existing Arab governments and promoting a democratic alternative which would be accomplished by eliminating Saddam’s regime in Iraq. Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds, 64-9.
biasing future interpretation of events with respect to Iraq.\textsuperscript{132} Condoleezza Rice’s descriptions of suffering associated with the 2006 Israeli-Hizballah conflict as the “birth pangs” of a new Middle East discussed previously (at a time when at least 400 Lebanese civilians had been killed and a half million turned into refugees) similarly contributed to these fears that the invasion of Iraq, war on terror, and American support for Israel were all part of the same “war on Islam.”\textsuperscript{133}

The war in Iraq further encouraged acceptance of al-Qaida’s narrative by confirming long-standing warnings. As Michael Scheuer explains:

Iraq was the perfect execution of a war that demanded jihad to oppose it. You had an infidel power invading and occupying a Muslim country and it was perceived to be unprovoked... The war has validated everything bin Laden said: that the United States will destroy any strong government in the Arab world, that it will seek to destroy Israel’s enemies, that it will occupy Muslim holy places, that it will seize Arab oil, and that it will replace God’s law with man’s law.\textsuperscript{134}


Reinforcing this perspective was the memory in the Arab world that Saddam Hussein
and Washington had been allies, with the U.S. using Saddam to offset Iran and (as the
regional theory went) keep the region divided to insure American access to Middle
Eastern oil, at least until Saddam dared challenge U.S. power and America pursued
other means of exerting control.\footnote{Doran, "Somebody Else's Civil War."}

While the belief that the United States would be broadly welcomed as liberators
appears perhaps crazy in hindsight, it remains arguably compelling proof of the good

Unfortunately, poor planning and bad decisions coupled with predictable resentment quickly turned whatever initial good will may have existed into a multi-sided insurgency and civil war.\footnote{Joseph Collins, a retired U.S. Army colonel, who served as a special assistant to Paul Wolfowitz, and was appointed as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense by Donald Rumsfeld, detailed a particularly damning litany of failures in planning and execution of the War in Iraq in a 2008 Paper for the National Defense University. Collins, "Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath."}


U.S. military and political leaders first denied that there was any significant opposition, beyond a “few dead enders” in their “last throes.”\footnote{Van Evera, "The Bush Administration Is Weak on Terror."} On the other hand, populations in the neighbouring Arab countries as well as the rest of the Muslim world, culturally more familiar with the various actors and following media channels emphasizing different aspects of the conflict, were quicker to recognize the reality on the ground that significant numbers of Iraq’s, from diverse backgrounds, were fighting American and coalition forces (as well as each other). Media and insurgent propaganda coverage of the rise of an indigenous insurgency, joined by other Muslims answering a militant Islamist call to defensive jihad, served to fortify the narrative framing of the U.S. war in Iraq as an occupation and part of a war on Islam.\footnote{Bin Ladin’s 19 October 2003}
message to the Iraqi people, titled *Quagmires of the Tigris and Euphrates*, congratulated the Iraqi resistance and those answering the jihadist call casting them as the defenders of Islam, equating their restoration of Muslim pride with the “descendants of the great knights who brought Islam as far east as China,” while continuing to reinforce the framing of the conflict as the response to a Jewish-Crusader alliance.140

American hearts and minds efforts attempting to portray the United States as seeking peaceful coexistence with Islam and as a force for good across the Muslim world, promoting human rights and democracy (discussed further in the following section), were constantly undermined by the drumbeat of bad news coming out of Iraq that received far more media and public attention than isolated U.S. public diplomacy and aid efforts.141 In-group/out-group identification underlines why Muslims around the world are more likely to sympathize with and adopt the perspective of their coreligionists than the United States.142 Since the invasion Iraqi civilians have suffered the hardships of daily life in the midst of a violent insurgency or civil war, an experience that Muslims around the world have shared through global media and extending the effect that the invasion of Iraq has had for militant Islamist framing to many other local conflicts.

While this section has focused on the many ways in which the invasion of Iraq has reinforced anti-American frames in the Muslim world, this is not the complete story. Over the course of the subsequent invasion the United States has taken actions mitigating many Muslim complaints, helping to make real improvements for various populations in Iraq, and demonstrating traits that are admirable. While overall the net effect of the Iraq war over this period has been largely negative, it has not been universally damaging. The U.S. military for example appears to be doing a significantly better job of working with different ethnic and religious groups within Iraq, fostering at least initial improved relations and cooperation that may help improve America’s

standing compared to the status quo in the future. At the same time, while violent
Islamist groups in Iraq may have gained short-term support by “standing up to” the
United States and have seen success at growing adoption of parts of their anti-American
frames, they have also suffered their own popularity disasters with growing majorities
opposing violent attacks on civilians and continuing to reject fundamentalist ideals for
an Islamic state. The dominant use of terrorist tactics may ultimately in many cases be
self-defeating for specific elements of a movement.

Consistent with these framing arguments for how the invasion of Iraq was
perceived by many in the Muslim world, polls following the invasion show a significant
increase in anti-American attitudes accompanied by suspicions of America’s true
intentions and fears that the U.S. will attack other Muslim countries. Suggesting limits
to the success of violent Islamist groups to build upon these attitudes for their broader
goals, surveys also generally find broader support only for violent attacks on American
troops, perceived as legitimate targets occupying a Muslim country, but continued
opposition to attacks against civilians. Muslim populations also generally continue to
only support Usama bin Ladin and al-Qaida to the extent that they are seen as standing
up for and defending Muslims, while continuing to reject the group’s long-term
ideological goals and idealized form of a fundamentalist Islamic state. However, from a
hearts and minds perspective, even the limited short-term support coupled with
intensified opposition to the United States poses considerable security problems as it
constrains the cooperation of local governments, provides some security cover and
likely increased resources, and creates conditions that are more favourable to the
radicalization and recruitment of new members for terrorist groups than if the larger
population was not at all supportive and instead exercised greater condemnation of
violent extremism as a path for achieving shared goals.\(^\text{143}\)

From a population-centric perspective, examining how rhetoric and events
surrounding the U.S. invasion of Iraq played to existing and contested framing
processes given established and likely intragroup connections, the observed changes in

attitudes and opinions across the Muslim world make sense. Jeff Stein, Congressional Quarterly’s national security editor observes, “Iraq is the recruiting poster for al Qaeda. It’s not our way of life or religions or anything else. It’s our support for corrupt and repressive governments, and the war in Iraq. Everybody knows this, but nobody in the Bush administration can say it.”\textsuperscript{144} The invasion of the Iraq war generated a sharp increase in anti-American attitudes, which likely will abate some merely as time passes from the initial invasion. Opinions will likely further improve to the extent that the United States continues to draw down troops and to the degree the Iraqi government proves to be truly independent.\textsuperscript{145} However, this expected improvement in America’s standing should not conceal that the Iraq war has fundamentally reshaped how the U.S. is viewed by many in the Muslim world and provided strong support for at least another generation of the narrative that the United States is a threat to Muslim countries.\textsuperscript{146}

The post-9/11 Bush administration rhetoric and decision to invade Iraq have all contributed to reinforcing the frame that the United States is really pursuing a war on Islam. As a result of American policy actions, especially the invasion of Iraq, and as part of this framing the United States is seen as “unpredictable and dangerous,”\textsuperscript{147} and as the biggest threat to Muslim countries.\textsuperscript{148} When PIPA’s 2007 opinion poll in the Muslim world asked what they thought the primary purpose of the war on terror was, the least number of respondents in all countries surveyed chose “to protect itself from terrorist attacks” with significantly larger numbers choosing either “to achieve political and military domination to control the Middle East” or “to weaken and divide the

\textsuperscript{144} Stein, "Who Can You Believe in the Torture Wars?.

\textsuperscript{145} Recent polls showing a levelling or even occasional slight improvement of attitudes towards the United States in various countries are probably representative of this predicted effect. To some degree this is likely a “regression to the mean” phenomenon where extremes posted at the height of the lead up and initial stages of the Iraq war regress back to more representative actual levels that are still themselves considerable increases in anti-American attitudes from before the war. Separating out actual improvements because of changes in American policy versus simple subsiding of anger about the war over time is one of the many measurement challenges for evaluating the success or failure of hearts and minds efforts.


\textsuperscript{147} Marder, "What About Anti-American Views After Bush and Iraq."

\textsuperscript{148} Telhami, "Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll."
Islamic religion and its people.”\textsuperscript{149} This demonstrates just how much the United States has failed to win the framing battle over the true intentions of its actions.\textsuperscript{150} From a hearts and minds perspective as Muslim populations increasingly see the U.S. as threatening, especially given the United States position as the sole global superpower, they are more likely to align with and give at least short term support to those actors perceived as defending Islam and standing up to the United States. In turn this enables more successful recruitment by violent groups and constrains the ability of local governments to support U.S. counterterrorism efforts.

\textbf{Undermining Natural Counter Frames}

The third major framing failure is exposed by examining how American policies and rhetoric since 9/11 have undermined core qualities historically admired around the world and central to the counter narratives U.S. hearts and minds efforts have attempted to advance. In his September 20, 2001 speech to the American people, President Bush said, “I ask you to uphold the values of America, and remember why so many have come here. We are in a fight for our principles, and our first responsibility is to live by them.”\textsuperscript{151} Unfortunately, from the perspective of many around the world and in the United States, the American government failed to live up to that in its subsequent decisions and pursuit of the war on terror. Instead, policies and rhetoric have too often undermined natural strengths, further contributing to rising anti-American attitudes and an erosion of popular support for and cooperation with U.S. counterterrorism efforts despite near universal sympathy and good will directed toward the United States immediately after the 9/11 attacks.

A central theme of proactive U.S. hearts and minds efforts over the last seven years has been to portray the United States as an exemplar and force for good in the

\textsuperscript{149} “Muslims Believe US Seeks to Undermine Islam.”
\textsuperscript{150} Esposito, "Iraq: America in Muslim Eyes."
world, a nation caring for others and promoting universal ideals of freedom, democracy, and human rights, where people of all religions and background are treated equally and live together peacefully.\footnote{For example: Freeman, 2006, "Why Not Let them Hate Us, As Long As They Fear Us? Remarks to the United States Information Agency Alumni Association by Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr. (USFS, Ret.)," Middle East Policy Council (October 4), http://www.mepc.org/whats/whynot.asp.} These messages largely build on traits and values that a long history of surveys and research indicate individuals in Muslim and other countries around the world admire about the United States, even if they also historically have had long held grievances with specific American policies.\footnote{Silverstein, "Six Questions for Michael Scheuer on National Security."} Unfortunately a series of tactical and rhetorical choices for how the U.S. pursued the war on terror and diplomatically positioned itself have damaged these long-held perceptions.\footnote{Kean and Hamilton, 2007, "Are We Safer Today? Six Years After 9/11 and Three Years After the 9/11 Report, Is the U.S. Ready to Get Serious About Terrorism?," Washington Post, September 9, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/07/AR2007090702050.html.} Sacrificing moral high ground has weakened America’s counter framing in the contested processes ultimately influencing the shape and direction of collective mobilization in the Muslim world. In conjunction with reinforcing existing grievances and contributing to a war on Islam narrative, this explains a significant part of the overall failure of the U.S. in the race for Muslim hearts and minds.

This section examines two areas of U.S. policy after 9/11 illustrating how American rhetoric and action has undermined natural counter frames. The first is largely a failure to sufficiently consider and value hearts and minds in the development, pursuit, and defence of other policies by looking at the counterproductive effects on Muslim attitudes resulting from the U.S. approach to detainees in the war on terror, including disparaging the Geneva Conventions, the use of rendition and torture, Guantanamo, and Abu Ghraib. The second is an example of the failure to consistently pursue a proactive hearts and minds strategy in terms of democracy promotion, a post-9/11 goal that has suffered from unrealistic expectations setting, embarrassing reversals, and hypocrisy in application. Both of these examples are representative of other policy choices and rhetorical approaches employed by the United States after 9/11.
Post-9/11 Detainee Policy

With the decision to invade Afghanistan and aggressively pursue a larger war on terror targeting al-Qaida and similar groups globally one of the many complicated and challenging problems the United States suddenly had to face was how to handle a large number of unconventional detainees. Key members of the Bush administration believed the type of individuals being detained by U.S. and cooperating governments were qualitatively different from what international agreements had been developed to deal with in the past. Many of those detained were not caught on a traditional battlefield, were not part of an organized structure that might agree to a negotiated end of hostilities, and did not share international conceptions about conflict underlying the traditional separation of sanctioned combat from illegitimate violence. At the same time, many of those detained could provide valuable tactical or strategic information important to protecting forces and civilian populations while quickly bringing an end to hostilities, some may have had knowledge that could help prevent expected near-term international acts of mass casualty terrorism, and a few were involved to varying degrees with the 9/11 attacks or other atrocities around the world. Many were detained by and were nationals of foreign governments whose treatment of them if the United States did not take them or simply repatriated them straight away would vary, often without correlation to actual culpability, from indifference to the draconian. Finally, the widely differing circumstances of capture and how these individuals came to U.S. control meant that knowledge of their specific situations, past actions, and potential importance was often fragmentary, of varying credibility, and alternatively exaggerated or surprisingly understated. None of which was made any easier by the involvement and lack of coordination between a wide range of hastily mobilized conventional and special military units, as well as intelligence and law enforcement agencies involved in handling these detainees at many different locations while also focused on everything from active combat and helping build a new civil structure, to chasing down a torrent of

reported terrorist threats and responding to emotionally charged political pressure at home.\textsuperscript{156}

Under any approach sorting out the flood of incoming detainees, and developing operational and legal processes was going to be difficult and inevitably involve mistakes. The preference of the Bush administration was that none of those mistakes would increase or fail to counter short-term threats to the United States, and that any processes developed or authorities recognized would not constrain their ability to act as they may determine necessary in the future. Those involved in making these decisions were driven by the best intentions of protecting Americans and U.S. interests. However, consistent with the more highly normative and enemy-centric construction discussed in Chapter Five, the administration was also characterized by a preference for a harder and more militaristic response to terrorism, a tendency to refuse to re-examine major decisions once made and to become entrenched when defending them, and a lack of appreciation for how actions and rhetoric were perceived by foreign audiences and the effect this had on the development of long-term security threats. From the perspective of influencing popular attitudes in the Muslim world, the decisions and rhetoric of the Bush administration with respect to detainee policy significantly undermined the intended counter framing of the United States as a force for good and exemplar of shared ideals, while providing much propaganda for Islamist militants arguing that the war on terror is really a war on Islam.

Continuing a diplomatic posture established before 9/11, the Bush administration’s approach to detainee issues was characterized by a rejection and disparaging of international laws and norms as inappropriate constraints on American sovereignty, ineffective for achieving their nominal goals, and a threat to U.S. security.\textsuperscript{157} Philip Carter observes that of the wide variety of legal options for how

\textsuperscript{156} Chris Mackey’s personal account of his experience as a military interrogator in Afghanistan during the year after 9/11 illustrates these problems while being consistent with many other government and news media investigations. Mackey and Miller, 2004, \textit{The Interrogators: Task Force 500 and America's Secret War Against Al Qaeda}, New York, Back Bay Books.

President Bush could have handled the “prisoner’s dilemma” of detainees based upon previous precedents and debates, the administration’s choice was to “sanction a wholesale abandonment of the law.” The President signed:

[A] blanket statement of policy that the men captured in Afghanistan would not be subject to the Geneva Conventions, and that by executive fiat, they would all be declared “unlawful enemy combatants,” a category that does not exist in international law.

Under the advice of politically appointed White House, Justice Department, and Pentagon lawyers President Bush also signed a secret finding determining “that none of the provisions of Geneva apply to our conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere throughout the world.” Carter concludes, “For all intents and purposes, these memoranda gutted the Geneva Conventions.” While many of the specific decisions were kept secret, and only slowly leaked or otherwise released to the public, the rhetoric and actions of the Bush administration with respect to detainee issues were widely interpreted as reflecting the same attitudes and opinions, with rejection of the Geneva Conventions widely discussed.

The Bush administrations decisions to discard traditional interpretations of international law were largely driven by two factors: an expectation that they would want to hold many detainees long after hostilities ceased in Afghanistan, and a belief that less restrained (i.e. coercive or “enhanced”) interrogation techniques were

bin Laden, "Why We are Fighting You: Osama bin Laden's Letter to Americans (October 2002)."

158 This finding also claimed “the authority under the Constitution to suspend Geneva as between the United States and Afghanistan” (although declining to do so at the time).


necessary to protect Americans from the new terrorist threat.\textsuperscript{161} Power argues that the highly charged rhetorical framing of the war on terror, that is the social construction discussed in Chapter Five, enabled the “executive branch to remove itself from traditional legal frameworks and consolidate power in imperial fashion.”\textsuperscript{162} An indication of how far the administration was willing or desired to go is found in the legal opinion requested by then White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales that the threshold for the existing statutory ban on torture was only met if pain rises “to the level of death, organ failure, or the permanent impairment of a significant body function.”\textsuperscript{163}

\textsuperscript{161} Phillippe Sands explains that the Bush administration’s legal decisions with respect to the Geneva conventions were driven by a pre-existing decision that coercive interrogations were necessary. Sands, 2008b, "The Green Light," \textit{Vanity Fair} (May), http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/05/guantanamo200805. Noting these motivations, Crispin Black also reflects that the history of British use of similar detention and interrogation policies failed and proved counterproductive with Northern Ireland. Black, 2007, "How Not to Win Hearts and Minds: Aside from the Moral Case, There's a Good Intelligence-Based Argument Against Rendition," \textit{The Guardian}, February 15, http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/crispin_black/2007/02/we_need_to_be_absolutely.html.

\textsuperscript{162} She continues arguing, “the torture, kidnappings and indefinite detentions carried out at the behest of senior administration officials have blurred the moral distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ on which much of Bush’s logic rested.” The result she claims is that even many of our allies have found it harder to “contribute military and even financial resources” out of fear of too close of an association with American objectives. Power, "Our War on Terror."

\textsuperscript{163} Yoo, 2002, "U.S. Dept. of Justice Memo from Deputy Assistant Attourney General John Yoo to Albert R. Gonzales, White House Counsel dated August 1," http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/doj/bybee80102ltr.html. Discussing the “remarkable example of textual interpretation run amok” necessary to get to this judgment (“less ‘lawyering as usual’ than the work of some bizarre literary deconstructionist”), Peter Brooks cynically notes, “Even Abu Ghraib doesn’t make it to torture under this definition.” Brooks, 2005, "The Plain Meaning of Torture?," \textit{Slate} (February 9), http://www.slate.com/id/2113314/. Another reflection of the administration approach was recounted in 2008 Senate hearings: “The CIA, which had authority to use harsh interrogation techniques on suspected terrorist detainees, advised U.S. military officials at Guantanamo in 2002 on how far they could go in extracting information from captives there, documents released at a Senate hearing Tuesday show. ‘If the detainee dies you’re doing it wrong,’ Jonathan Freedman, chief counsel to the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, told a meeting of officials on Oct. 2, 2002, according to minutes from the meeting.” Strobel, 2008, "CIA Advised Military on Questioning at Guantanamo," \textit{McClatchy Washington Bureau} (June 17), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/110/story/41329.html. See also: Beutler, 2008, "If the Detainee Dies, You're Doing it Wrong," \textit{Mother Jones} (June 18),
Many members of the military, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies as well as some members of the administration raised concerns and pushed back against the more aggressive approach to detention and interrogations at the time for moral and pragmatic reasons. Despite these warnings, and without reliable proof such methods were effective, the administration moved forward because of the preferences of key administration leaders reinforced by the emotionally laden fears and uncertainties of the time.\footnote{164}

While the Bush administration repeatedly insisted any interrogation methods used did not violate U.S. or applicable international law, and that the United States “does not torture,” what is important from a hearts and minds perspective is the

\footnote{http://www.motherjones.com/news/update/2008/06/rumsfeld-guantanamo-torture-techniques-hearing.html. Those hearings, as have other recent investigations, also produced documents and other evidence indicating the decisions about interrogations methods were initiated from the top levels of the administration, contradicting previous accounts which had suggested that requests for permission to use such approaches arose from below. Warrick, 2008, "Report Questions Pentagon Accounts: Officials Looked Into Interrogation Methods Early On," \textit{Washington Post}, June 17, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/16/AR2008061602779.html.}

\footnote{164 The reality that the administration’s decisions were made without reliable proof that such methods were more effective, while many of those with expertise and experience resisted, only makes the resulting loss of credibility more tragic. A study by the National Defense Intelligence College released in 2006 presents perhaps the best indication of an insider consensus that there is not reliable proof for the efficacy of enhanced interrogation methods. Intelligence Science Board, 2006, \textit{Educing Information: Interrogation: Science and Art}, Washington, DC, National Defense Intelligence College Press. The fact that the CIA abandoned waterboarding years before political pressure became significant, but while still reportedly capturing several more high value and high-level al-Qaida detainees, is likely a further indirect reflection of their judgment of the utility of these measures. Consistent with this interpretation, CIA and administration resistance to legislation and official statements that certain practices are torture are much more likely based in fears of exposing specific individuals to legal jeopardy. See also: Eggen and Pincus, 2007, "FBI, CIA Debate Significance of Terror Suspect," \textit{Washington Post}, December 18, \url{http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/17/AR2007121702151_pf.html}. Morgan, 2000, "The Utilitarian Justification of Torture," \textit{Punishment & Society} 2 (2). Shane, 2008, "Inside a 9/11 Mastermind's Interrogation," \textit{The New York Times}, June 22, \url{http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/22/washington/22ksm.html}. Strobel, "CIA Advised Military on Questioning at Guantanamo." Warrick, "Report Questions Pentagon Accounts: Officials Looked Into Interrogation Methods Early On."}
consensus international opinion that the methods used were torture.\textsuperscript{165} Many reports of alleged U.S. abuse of detainees are certainly false, greatly exaggerated, and intentional propaganda.\textsuperscript{166} Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups are responsible for far worse, as illustrated by the grisly murders of Daniel Pearl, Kenneth Bigley, and many, many more local victims whose names are not known internationally but who were tortured and killed in “hostage slaughterhouses” in Iraq and other countries.\textsuperscript{167} It is also likely true, contrary to widely held international perceptions, that the United States only approved and used “enhanced interrogation” methods for a very limited number of detainees and stopped using the most controversial of those practices by 2003.\textsuperscript{168} A careful reading of


\textsuperscript{166} Especially from a social movement theory perspective, emphasizing the long historical context out of which many violent groups emerge, one should not forget that many Islamist groups have a long experience of challenging authoritarian governments with long records of abusive interrogation and detention practices. These groups and movements have certainly learned lessons that are passed down in various fashions for confronting and effectively challenging these governments. One example of this is the so-called Manchester Document, an al-Qaeda manual that details formalized resistance techniques for members who are taken into custody, which includes guidance for making false and frequent claims of torture and abuse. This is not to say that all detainee claims are false, but to emphasize that determining the truth in these situations is very complex. Intelligence Science Board, \textit{Educating Information: Interrogation: Science and Art}.


\textsuperscript{168} In February 2008, CIA Director Michael Hayden, testified before a public Congressional hearing: “In the life of the CIA detention program, we have held fewer
specific allegations and officially investigated incidents of abuses suggests three categories of cases: the use of highly controversial “enhanced” interrogation methods – some of which clearly rose to the level of torture – approved for use by the Bush administration for a small number of detainees in the first few years of the conflict (for example, waterboarding which the CIA admits was used on three individuals); the somewhat wider use of relatively less abusive but still controversial methods generally initiated at lower levels with some official blessing and likely some influence from top level decisions that have subsequently been officially rescinded and legally banned (for example, various sleep deprivation tactics); and, the potentially inevitable abuses, generally unrelated to interrogations and only tangentially related to official decisions through the effects of the enemy-centric social construction, that arose in local contexts from a combination of conflict dehumanization, poor and overcrowded conditions, frustrated anger at a foreign enemy, and a failure of command oversight (for example, Abu Ghraib and similar officially investigated and punished cases of abuse in Afghanistan). My judgment is that the vast majority of the tens of thousands of detainees who have been in U.S. custody over the past seven years have been well treated in keeping with both official U.S. policy and international norms, even for those

169 According to a 2005 Justice Department memo, released in 2009, the CIA waterboarded 83 times in August 2002, and Khalid Sheikh Mohamed 183 times in March 2003. This contradicts a widely cited December 2007 story that Mohamed was only waterboarded once for 35 seconds after which he answered every question asked and provided information that disrupted several plots. The Justice memo also cast doubts on Bush administration claims that the use of “enhanced” interrogation methods was kept strictly within established guidelines – which according to the Justice memo would have been significantly fewer times that used on these two detainees. Individuals involved with the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah claim that he provided all of the ultimately useful information before he was ever waterboarded, while critics of the policy note that Mohamed’s waterboarding began very soon after his capture. Stack, 2009, "Is Waterboarding Effective? CIA Did It 266 Times on Two Prisoners," The Christian Science Monitor, April 20, http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0420/p99s01-duts.html.
cases where the Bush administration claimed that international treaties and agreements did not apply. Unfortunately, the international perception that the United States now regularly tortures detainees directly undermines the central counter narrative of American hearts and minds efforts. Peter Bergen observes:

If, as the president explained in a speech last year, the United States is today engaged “in the decisive ideological struggle of the twenty-first century,” right now we are on the losing side of the battle of ideas. Garrett, for one, understands why. “Interrogation techniques that violate human decency ... can weaken others supporting us in fighting terrorism and can actually create more enemies,” he says. In other words, Bush’s legal strategy in the war on terrorism has been counterproductive. And the consequences for our safety are real.170

Air Force Colonel Morris Davis, who from 2005 to 2007 was the chief prosecutor for the military commissions at Guantanamo Bay, explains the fundamental problem is that the United States has surrendered the moral high ground and can no longer respond that Americans “don’t do stuff like that.”171

With respect to a social movement analysis of how this effects important contested framing processes, Chris Zambeli explains the prominent role government torture has played in Islamist narratives:

Radical Islamist literature and discourse is replete with references to torture. The infamous al-Qaeda training manual “Military Studies in the Jihad against the Tyrants,” more commonly referred to as the “Manchester Document,” includes

170 "Brad Garrett, a former FBI agent who obtained uncoerced confessions from two notorious terrorists – Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and Mir Aimal Kansi, killer of two CIA employees outside agency headquarters that same year – told [Bergen] that 'coercive interrogation techniques have proven to be ineffective in producing reliable intelligence.'” Bergen, "War of Error: How Osama Bin Laden Beat George W. Bush."

171 Colonel Davis’s makes this point with a dramatic anecdote: “Twenty-seven years ago, in the final days of the Iran hostage crisis, the C.I.A.’s Tehran station chief, Tom Ahern, faced his principal interrogator for the last time. The interrogator said the abuse Mr. Ahern had suffered was inconsistent with his own personal values and with the values of Islam and, as if to wipe the slate clean, he offered Mr. Ahern a chance to abuse him just as he had abused the hostages. Mr. Ahern looked the interrogator in the eyes and said, ‘We don’t do stuff like that.’ Today, Tom Ahern might have to say: ‘We don’t do stuff like that very often.’ Or, ‘We generally don’t do stuff like that.’ That is a shame. Virtues requiring caveats are not virtues. Saying a man is honest is a compliment. Saying a man is ‘generally’ honest or honest ‘quite often’ means he lies. The mistreatment of detainees, like honesty, is all or nothing: We either do stuff like that or we do not. It is in our national interest to restore our reputation for the latter.” Davis, 2008, "Unforgivable Behavior, Inadmissible Evidence," The New York Times, February 17, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/17/opinion/17davis.html.
references to the oppression and torture endured by Muslims at the hands of “apostate” rulers whose prisons are “equipped with the most modern torture devices.”

After 9/11 militant Islamists were very quick to criticize perceived U.S. hypocrisy on human rights with respect to the treatment of detainees. For example, in his October 2002 letter, *Why We are Fighting You*, Usama bin Ladin wrote:

> You have claimed to be the “vanguards of human rights,” and your Ministry of Foreign Affairs issues annual reports containing statistics of those countries that violate any human rights. However, all these things vanished when the mujahedin hit you [on 9/11], and you proceeded to implement the same methods of those governments you used to curse… What happens in Guantanamo is a historical embarrassment to America and its values, and it screams in your faces – you hypocrites: What is the value of your signature on any agreement or treaty?

Al-Qaida second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has similarly frequently criticized American treatment of detainees. He has also used reports that the U.S. has turned over detainees to authoritarian governments where they were subsequently tortured to link the U.S. more strongly with these despised “apostate” rulers further undermining U.S. counter narratives, especially undercutting claims that the U.S. is promoting reforms in these countries. These arguments also feed militant Islamist frames connected to the far enemy justification for attacks on the U.S. and other Western targets.

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172 Hegghammer, "Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi Arabia.". Zambelis, "Is There a Nexus between Torture and Radicalization?." Consistent with a social movement theory perspective on the evolution of political violence, many researchers have noted that the violent state repression is often related to generating more violent forms of collective action. Della Porta, *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State*. Della Porta, ed *Social Movements and Violence*.

173 bin Laden, "Why We are Fighting You: Osama bin Laden's Letter to Americans (October 2002)," 206.


175 For example: “American hypocrisy, which calls for democracy even as it considers [Egyptian president] Hosni Mubarak to be one of its closest friends, and which sends detainees to be tortured in Egypt, exports tools of torture to Egypt and spends millions to support the security organs and their executioners in Egypt, even as the American State Department, in its annual report on human rights, criticizes the Egyptian
The U.S. military detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba has come to embody international criticisms of American detainee policies over the seven years since 9/11 visually represented by the iconic images of detainees in orange jump suits, blindfolded by goggles, restrained with disposable plastic ties, and encaged behind open-air chain linked fences and razor wire upon arrival at Camp X-Ray in January 2002. The U.S. administration often responded to reports of abuse and challenges to its far-reaching legal opinions with uncompromising defiance and by emphasizing the peril posed by these detainees who were repeatedly described as “hard core, well-trained terrorists,” “all of whom were captured on a battlefield,” and the “worst of the worst.” Many were dedicated Islamist militants who supported al-Qaida’s government because it tortures detainees!” “Interview with Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri,” Al-Sahab Media, May 5, 2007 cited in Zambelis, “Is There a Nexus between Torture and Radicalization?.” See also: al-Zawahiri, "Ayman al-Zawahiri Interview Four Years After 9/11 (September 2005)," 178, 86.

176 Emphasizing the conclusion of Chapter Six, that American agency to control its hearts and minds efforts is constrained by outside factors, the international media continues to illustrate stories about Guantanamo with images of Camp X-Ray from 2002, despite the fact that this was a temporary holding facility only used for a few months (11 January to 29 April 2002) while permanent facilities were constructed. However, it is also likely that at least some of the motivation for the media (whether conscious or unconscious) to continue to use Camp X-Ray pictures is because they are consistent with the larger story of American abuse, which in part is fed by the larger decisions of the U.S. administration and therefore something which a different approach might have changed. Expressing consternation with the media on this see the column by the United States Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy covering Europe: Graffy, 2006, "Guantanamo is Not a Spa, but Neither is it a Torture Camp," The Guardian, March 22, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/mar/22/comment.guantanamo.

177 Various administration figures have frequently invoked hyperbole when describing the threat posed by Guantanamo detainees. For example, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers said, “These are people that would gnaw through hydraulic lines in the back of a C-17 to bring it down. So these are very, very dangerous people.” Northam, 2007, "Freed from Gitmo, Where do Detainees go?," NPR Morning Edition (July 30), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=12344597. The reaction of government spokespersons to the suicides of three detainees at Guantanamo exemplified how the Bush administration’s tendency to respond aggressively to any criticism in a manner which forced others to choose between seemingly unreasonable extremes undermined its overall credibility and reinforced binary polarizations driving potentially supportive or neutral audiences away. From the perspective of this thesis, the most ironic of these were comments by Assistant Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy Colleen Graffy’s characterization of the suicides: “It was a good PR (public relations) move designed to attract attention”. The commander of the detention facilities
international goals, travelled from countries around the Muslim world before 9/11 to train at camps in Afghanistan often run by or connected to al-Qaida with the intention of returning home or going elsewhere, and chose after 9/11 to fight with the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan.\(^{178}\) However, as evidence accumulated questioning the culpability, circumstances of capture, and threat posed by a significant number of the detainees held at Guantanamo, the government’s credibility in responding to other allegations was also undermined.\(^{179}\) A McClatchy investigation found:

at Guantanamo, Rear Admiral Harry B Harris Jr. similarly contributed to the negative media reaction stating: “They are smart. They are creative, they are committed… I believe this was not an act of desperation, but an act of asymmetrical warfare waged against us.” Shafi, 2006, "View: The 'Suiciders' have Suicided!," \textit{Daily Times}, June 15, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006\%5C06\%5C15\%5Cstory_15-6-2006_pg3_3.

\(^{178}\) While the credibility of the U.S. government with respect to detainees may be internationally at an all time low, claims that all of the detainees at Guantanamo are there unjustly are equally unbelievable. For example: Felter and Brachman, 2007, "An Assessment of 516 Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) Unclassified Summaries," \textit{CTC Report} (July 25), http://ctc.usma.edu/csrt/CTC-CSRT-Report-072407.pdf.

\(^{179}\) The actual threat posed by the detainees held at Guantanamo remains an issue of contention. In his dissent to the 5-4 Supreme Court decision in \textit{Boumediene v. Bush} Justice Antonin Scalia warned that by likely leading to the release of further detainees the Court’s decision will “almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed.” Supreme Court of the United States, 2008, \textit{Boumediene et al. v. Bush, President of the United States, et al.} (October Term), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/07pdf/06-1195.pdf. Republican presidential nominee, Senator John McCain, likewise criticized the decision and referred to reports also cited by Justice Scalia that 30 released detainees “have already tried to attack America again.” A \textit{Washington Post} “Fact Checker” article criticized Senator McCain’s statement, referring to “The latest Pentagon ‘fact sheet’ on ‘former GTMO detainee terrorist trends,’ dated June 13” which “states that 37 former Guantanamo detainees are ‘confirmed or suspected’ of having returned to ‘terrorist activities’ since their release. It puts the so-called recidivism rate at ‘between 5 and 7 percent.’” Dobbs, 2008, "The Fact Checker: From GITMO to the Battlefield," \textit{Washington Post}, June 30, http://blog.washingtonpost.com/fact-checker/2008/06/from_gitolmo_to_the_battlefield.html. A Seton Hall School of Law study, co-authored by a law professor representing two detainees, found “that 45 percent of 516 Guantanamo detainees examined had committed hostile acts against the United States or its allies, and that only 8 percent of them had been al Qaida fighters.” A study completed in part as a response by West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center, working from the same unclassified transcripts and documents released from Guantanamo military tribunals, “found that while the tribunals determined that 56 percent of the men had committed or supported hostile acts – such as direct combat, manning the front lines or planning combat operations – 73 percent of them posed a
Bush administration officials knew within months of opening the Guantanamo detention center that many of the prisoners there weren’t “the worst of the worst.” From the moment that Guantanamo opened in early 2002, former Secretary of the Army Thomas White said, it was obvious that at least a third of the population didn’t belong there.\textsuperscript{180}

The reality that not all detainees at Guantanamo were dangerous al-Qaida masterminds was underscored as the U.S. began repatriations in 2004, with over two-thirds of the 234 transferred in the first 18 months simply designated “for release.”\textsuperscript{181} In other cases, despite U.S. agreements requiring that receiving countries prosecute and continue to detain specific detainees, most “were held very briefly in the home countries, were never tried, and those that were tried were often acquitted.”\textsuperscript{182} Although the United States was generally only returning those determined to be the least dangerous, or on whom the U.S. had the least information, this reinforced the perception that America was holding individuals without good cause. The undermining of American credibility made other accusations plausible, leaving even populations sympathetic to the United States unsure of whom to believe, and once again offsetting any positive effects of other U.S. hearts and minds efforts.\textsuperscript{183}


\textsuperscript{181} As of mid-2005 the U.S. had released 234 detainees, of which 167 were designated “for release” and 67 were to be “transferred to other governments” for continued detention. U.S. Department of Defense, 2005, "Eight More Guantanamo Detainees Released or Transferred," America.gov (July 20), http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2005/July/20050720174600adyenne0.488476.html.

\textsuperscript{182} Northam, "Freed from Gitmo, Where do Detainees go?." With respect to the effect on undermining U.S. hearts and minds efforts: “So America spends millions of dollars bolstering public diplomacy and sponsoring chipper radio and television broadcasts to the Islamic world – and then undoes it all with Guantánamo.” Kristof, 2008c, "When We Torture," The New York Times, February 14, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/14/opinion/14kristof.html. Similarly see: Dickey, "Bush's 10 Commandments."
abandoned its reputation for protecting principles of justice and defending human rights. The administration’s response to such criticism continued to be characterized by adamant denials, an insistence on the need for secrecy, and assertions of essentially unchecked presidential power to determine and oversee the entire process. With respect to the rights and legal procedures covering detainees at Guantanamo Bay this created an escalating domestic fight, paralleling international criticisms, where the administration’s refusal to compromise its interpretation and repeated efforts to make meaningless any judicial or legislative setbacks served to further internationally undermine the counter framing of U.S. hearts and minds efforts.

Peter Bergen notes:

But Bush’s decision to operate outside the boundaries of U.S. and international law has been worse than simply unnecessary; it has also actively harmed American interests. For one thing, by refusing to bring terrorists to trial, we have passed up valuable opportunities to dispassionately present evidence of Al Qaeda’s bloodlust to the world at large. Moreover, Bush’s legal approach to the war on terrorism has torpedoed America’s good reputation around the world. While domestic coverage of alleged Guantanamo abuses and arguments about appropriate legal procedures has been mixed, international coverage has been far more uniformly negative to the extent that, “Outside of the United States, ‘Guantanamo’ is a

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\(^{184}\) While many criticisms have been exaggerated, were based on rumor, or were false claims for propaganda purposes, the findings of various government investigations and official records of different agencies support the central truth of several specific allegations. The eight-month McClatchy investigation published in June 2008 provides a good introduction to many of these criticisms. Lasseter, 2008c, "Guantanamo: Beyond the Law," McClatchy Washington Bureau (June 15), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/detainees/story/40334.html. See also: Bazelon and Lithwick, 2008, "A Few Good Soldiers: More Members of the Military Turn Against the Terror Trials," Slate (May 13), http://www.slate.com/id/2191301/. Carter, "The Road to Abu Ghraib: The Biggest Scandal of the Bush Administration Began at the Top."

\(^{185}\) Phillip Carter, notes other parallels in the administrations approach to legal decisions about the detainee issue and its general approach to other issues of governing and political campaigning, noting an “all or nothing,” “with us or against us,” combating the existential threat of the post-9/11 world mentality. Carter, "The Road to Abu Ghraib: The Biggest Scandal of the Bush Administration Began at the Top."

by-word for torture, authoritarian abuse and injustice.” As part of this process, Guantanamo has become the embodiment of all criticisms of American detainee policy, including notably the controversy over officially sanctioned torture based largely on the “enhanced” interrogation approaches used by CIA for high value detainees who were not even held at Guantanamo at the time. Joseph Nye concludes:

The effects of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks have also thrown us off course. Since the shock of those attacks, the U.S. has been exporting fear and anger rather than the country’s more traditional values of hope and optimism. Guantanamo Bay has become a more powerful global icon than the Statue of Liberty.

Recognition of the damage the international perception of Guantanamo has done to the United States is supported by reports that key administration officials sought, unsuccessfully, to convince President Bush to close the facility, including Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. In a January 2008 interview, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

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188 Horton, "The Great Guantanamo Puppet Theater." From a social movement theory perspective, one of the factors which the American approach has not given sufficient appreciation to is that other populations are less likely to be first sympathetic to and give the benefit of the doubt to American troops in the same way as U.S. citizens. For the same reason that in-group and out-group affiliations make Americans more likely to see things from the perspective of U.S. troops, many Muslim populations are more likely to identify with and see things from the perspective of those who are detained.

189 The U.S. military runs the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay with detainees under the control of the Department of Defense. Military interrogations are governed by the U.S. Army Field Manual on Interrogation, sometimes referred to as FM 34-52. When the U.S. congress moved to ban torture it extended the limits governing military interrogations, based upon approaches specifically outlined in the Army manual, to cover other U.S. government agencies.

190 Nye, 2007, "Recovering America's 'Smart Power'," The Korea Times, December 18, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2007/12/137_15729.html. Similarly, Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, the former chair and vice chair of the 9/11 Commission, explained just prior to the sixth anniversary of al-Qaida’s attacks: “No word is more poisonous to the reputation of the United States than Guantanamo. Fundamental justice requires a fair legal process before the U.S. government detains people for significant periods of time, and the president and Congress have not provided one. Guantanamo Bay should be closed now.” Kean and Hamilton, "Are We Safer Today?"

191 In 2006 Colin Powell said of his concerns about the current approach to detainee policy: “Part of the war on terror is an ideological and political struggle. Our moral posture is one of our best weapons. We’re not doing so well on the public-diplomacy front. This would be the wrong signal to send the world.” Zakaria, 2006, "American Morality Back in Play," Buffalo News, September 19,
Staff Admiral Mike Mullen said, “I'd like to see [Guantanamo] shut down” because “more than anything else it’s been the image – how Gitmo has become around the world, in terms of representing the United States.”

Where Guantanamo has become a continuing symbol of international complaints about America’s approach to detainees after 9/11, the scandal of Abu Ghraib stands out as the most damaging single incident. Mark Bowden observed:

A committee of devils scheming to thwart American intentions in Iraq could have done no worse than turning a group of loutish, leering U.S. soldiers loose with a camera on bound, hooded, naked Iraqi prisoners. The U.S. intervention in Iraq is troubled, to say the least, and now our own forces have handed our enemies a propaganda coup that trumps their best efforts. The photos from Abu Ghraib prison portray Americans as exactly the sexually obsessed, crude, arrogant, godless occupiers that our enemies say we are... There are predictions (including one by Karl Rove, no less) that it will take a generation to repair the damage to America’s image in the Middle East.

Especially harmful about Abu Ghraib was the undeniable proof of photographs showing what had been done if not why:

There were images of a man standing hooded on a box with wires attached to his hands; of guards leering as they forced naked men to simulate sexual acts; of a man led around on a leash by a female soldier; of a dead Iraqi detainee, packed in ice; and more... The images aroused worldwide indignation, and illustrated in graphic detail both the lengths to which the United States would go to get intelligence, and the extent to which those efforts had been corrupted by the exigencies of the difficult war in Iraq.


193 Bowden, "Lessons of Abu Ghraib."

194 Carter, "The Road to Abu Ghraib: The Biggest Scandal of the Bush Administration Began at the Top." Compounding the damage was that the detainees in this case were
Undermining U.S. efforts and providing a boon to militants in the contest over narrative framing, these images have become staple items of anti-American Islamist propaganda:

Al Qaeda confederates, such as the Ansar al-Islam terror network operating inside Iraq, have incorporated the pictures from Abu Ghraib into their recruiting literature. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s Tawhid and Jihad movement has also benefitted from the Abu Ghraib scandal, citing abuses of Iraqi women there as the justification for the kidnapping and beheading of several Western hostages. It is clear that Abu Ghraib has given Iraqi insurgents – and, potentially, terrorists around the world – a new raison d’etre.

General Taguba, who was responsible for the official investigation, responded to a request of how he characterized the acts depicted saying, “That’s not abuse. That’s torture.”

The fundamental problem for U.S. hearts and minds efforts was that this scandal occurred in a climate where America’s detainee policy was already under scrutiny as the subject of widespread criticisms and allegations of abuse. Defenders of the administration’s overall approach argued that Abu Ghraib was the result of a few bad apples, or maybe a local failure of command to maintain appropriate discipline and control. However, given assumptions established by previous incidents and the administration’s style of response, for many people the argument that this was at least a clearly not “high value terrorists” who might have knowledge of an imminent international attack, but at worst low level fighters in Iraq and in too many cases representative of the large number of innocent civilians detained under the American led occupation. Scelfo and Nordland, 2004, "Beneath the Hoods: Many of the Tortured at Abu Ghraib Were Common Criminals, Not Terrorists," Newsweek, July 19, http://www.newsweek.com/id/54447.


However, even if Abu Ghraib was a local failure of command and not a direct result of interrogation policies employed in Iraq or elsewhere, many have made compelling arguments that it was the result of too few troops trying to handle too many detainees, which was the result of administration decisions to fight the Iraq war with a smaller force and a failure to prepare for difficulties after Saddam was toppled. Carter, "The Road to Abu Ghraib: The Biggest Scandal of the Bush Administration Began at the Top."
result of top-level legal decisions and “gloves off” directives, and more likely reflective of standard procedure was unfortunately more persuasive even if subsequent investigations suggest that it had little to nothing to do with American interrogation practices. From the perspective of populations in the Muslim world no argument was needed, Abu Ghraib was simply another example of U.S. attitudes and further proof of

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198 Serrano, 2004, "Prison Interrogators' Gloves Came Off Before Abu Ghraib," Los Angeles Times, June 9, http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jun/09/world/fg-prison9. Although the conclusions of their investigation was long delayed by political concerns, released after the 2008 Presidential elections were completed, the Senate Armed Services Committee released a bipartisan report strongly endorsed by both Chairman Carl Levin (D) and Ranking Member John McCain (R) which contradicts the claim detainee abuse was a low level problem: “The abuse of detainees in U.S. custody cannot simply be attributed to the actions of ‘a few bad apples’ acting on their own. The fact is that senior officials in the United States government solicited information on how to use aggressive techniques, redefined the law to create the appearance of their legality, and authorized their use against detainees. Those efforts damaged our ability to collect accurate intelligence that could save lives, strengthened the hand of our enemies, and compromised our moral authority.” Senate Armed Services Committee, 2008, "Senate Armed Services Committee Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody (Part 3 - Conclusions)," U.S. Senate, December 11, xii, http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/supporting/2008/Detainees.121108.pdf. And with respect to Abu Ghraib concludes: “The abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib in late 2003 was not simply the result of a few soldiers acting on their own. Interrogation techniques such as stripping detainees of their clothes, placing them in stress positions, and using military working dogs to intimidate them appeared in Iraq only after they had been approved for use in Afghanistan and at GTMO. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s December 2, 2002 authorization of aggressive interrogation techniques and subsequent interrogation policies and plans approved by senior military and civilian officials conveyed the message that physical pressures and degradation were appropriate treatment for detainees in U.S. military custody. What followed was an erosion in standards dictating that detainees be treated humanely.” Senate Armed Services Committee, "Senate Armed Services Committee Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody (Part 3 - Conclusions)," xxix.

American hypocrisy.\textsuperscript{200} The damage done to general U.S. efforts to influence international public opinion were exacerbated by a slow response from the administration, which put more effort into denying the significance of Abu Ghraib and protecting top level officials by maintaining ignorance and plausible deniability. In total defence mode, the administration then failed to aggressively pursue or allow the type of thorough top to bottom investigations many argue were needed in order to begin to re-establish American credibility.\textsuperscript{201}

The photos of Abu Ghraib were a tipping point primed by the context of previous allegations and stories of American detainee abuse. The dramatic illustrations, proving Western oppression and depravity against Muslims, fed jihadist-framing narratives energizing a new wave of movement radicalization and recruitment.\textsuperscript{202} As Fareed Zakaria explains:

> This is a case of more than just bad public relations. Ask any soldier in Iraq when the general population really turned against the United States and he will say, “Abu Ghraib.” A few months before the scandal broke, Coalition Provisional Authority polls showed Iraqi support for the occupation at 63 percent. A month after Abu Ghraib, the number was 9 percent.\textsuperscript{203}

\textsuperscript{200} While abuses at Abu Ghraib shocked many in the United States and Europe, for many in the Middle East these were simply the common behaviour of governments. Unfortunately, from a hearts and minds perspective, this supported the argument that the United States was no different, undermining a core counter narrative.Zambelis, "Is There a Nexus between Torture and Radicalization?."

\textsuperscript{201} Bowden, "Lessons of Abu Ghraib.". Carter, "The Road to Abu Ghraib: The Biggest Scandal of the Bush Administration Began at the Top.". Hersch, "The General's Report.". Zakaria, "Pssst... Nobody Loves a Torturer."

\textsuperscript{202} Kaplan, "It's Not Who We Are, It's What We Do: What Can Terrorists Teach Us?.". Mora and Shattuck, "Self-Inflicted Wounds.". Former senior military interrogator Mathew Alexander, who served in Iraq and was part of the team that located Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, writes: “As a senior interrogator in Iraq, I conducted more than three hundred interrogations and monitored more than one thousand. I heard numerous foreign fighters state that the reason they came to Iraq to fight was because of the torture and abuse at Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay. Our policy of torture and abuse is Al-Qaeda’s number one recruiting tool. These same insurgents have killed hundreds, if not thousands, of our troops in Iraq, not to mention Iraqi civilians. Torture and abuse are counterproductive in the long term and, ultimately, cost us more lives than they save," Alexander, 2009, "Torture's Rendition," \textit{National Interest Online} (April 23), http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=21354.

\textsuperscript{203} Alberto Mora, who was the General Counsel to the Navy from 2001 to 2006, and former Ambassador John Shattuck similarly wrote: “There are other serving military officials who maintain that the leading causes of U.S. combat deaths in Iraq are, respectively, Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo, as gauged by their effectiveness in
Carter similarly concludes:

There is no doubt that the abuses at Abu Ghraib stand as an indelible stain on the honor of the American military. What is less clear is the degree to which the resulting scandal has damaged our national security and undermined our efforts to bring peace to Iraq and win the war against radical terrorism – a war that is as much a fight for the political and moral high ground as it is a shooting war that pits American soldiers against Islamist ones. America suffered a huge defeat the moment those photographs became public. Copies of them are now sold in souks from Marrakesh to Jakarta, vivid illustrations of the worst suspicions of the Arab world: that Americans are corrupt and power-mad, eager to humiliate Muslims and mock their values. The acts they document have helped to energize the insurgency in Iraq, undermining our rule there and magnifying the risks faced by our soldiers each day. If Osama bin Laden had hired a Madison Avenue public relations firm to rally Arabs hearts and minds to his cause, it’s hard to imagine that it could have devised a better propaganda campaign. 204  

From a larger hearts and minds strategic perspective, the images (and worse allegations to which they gave credence 205 ) pushed moderate Muslim populations further against the U.S., provided more space and potential support for extremists, and made it harder for friendly Muslim governments to cooperate with American priorities. 206  

Consistent with the military’s adoption of more population-centric counterinsurgency approaches, one positive counter note going forward is that the U.S.

stimulating the recruitment and fielding of jihadists on the battlefield.” Mora and Shattuck, "Self-Inflicted Wounds." 204  

Carter, "The Road to Abu Ghraib: The Biggest Scandal of the Bush Administration Began at the Top." 205  

Militant Islamist have taken advantage of growing acceptance of allegations that the U.S. has abused detainees by making even more extreme claims. For example, in a January 2006 audiotaped message bin Laden extended a “truce offer” to the Americans, cited U.S. opinion polls about disapproval of the Iraq war, and included the claim that, “As for the torturing of men, this has reached a point to where burning chemical acids and electrical drills to dismember them are utilized. And whenever they [the Americans] give up on [interrogating] them, they sometimes kill them by drilling them in the head. Read, if you will, the humanitarian reports that enumerate the horrors [committed] in the Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, and Baghram prisons.” bin Laden, 2007a, "Bin Laden's Truce Offer to the Americans (January 2006)," in The Al Qaeda Reader, ed. Ibrahim, New York: Broadway Books, 222. While there are no humanitarian reports making such claims about American abuses, there are reports criticizing the U.S. and there have been separate frequent reports that various Shia and Sunni militias in Iraq have committed such depraved acts. For an audience that finds bin Ladin credible, and is primed to believe the worst of the U.S., his connection of these suggests that the U.S. is actually behind these atrocities. 206  

military is emphasizing the importance of the detainee mission to overall hearts and minds goals. The military has strengthened training and policies to prevent future scandals such as Abu Ghraib and is initiating proactive programs within detention facilities to specifically counter radicalization amongst detainees.\textsuperscript{207} Given that as of early 2008 the United States continued to detain over 20,000 individuals in Iraq and Afghanistan such initiatives may be crucial to preventing even further damage to U.S. hearts and minds goals, and may win back a little of the ground lost by Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, and overall American detainee policy in the first six years.\textsuperscript{208}

Unfortunately, these steps only represent the re-learning of old counterinsurgency lessons. Based upon his experiences as an officer in the French Army in Indochina and Algeria, Roger Trinquier warned future counterinsurgents in 1964 that:

One of the first problems encountered, that of lodging the individuals arrested, will generally not have been anticipated. Prisons, designed essentially to accommodate offenders against common law, will rapidly become inadequate and will not meet our needs. We will be compelled to intern the prisoners under improvised, often deplorable conditions, which will lead to justifiable criticism our adversaries will exploit. From the beginning of hostilities, prison camps should be set up according to the conditions laid down by the Geneva Convention. They should be sufficiently large to take care of all prisoners until the end of the war.

One is left to wonder if from the beginning of hostilities in the war on terror what would have happened if Trinquier’s advice had been pursued.

Zambeli summarizes how the coupling of current international assumptions about U.S. detainee policy with systematic torture by American supported authoritarian

\textsuperscript{207} Based on his own military experience, the Washington Post’s Philip Carter explains the importance of such programs for population-centric strategies: “[D]etention operations are absolutely critical for counterinsurgency. When you get them wrong, you lose. Marine Maj. Gen. Doug Stone has instituted a number of innovations in his command of Task Force 134 (the entity in charge of detentions in Iraq), and Yingling’s battalion will play a key role in implementing those. Detention facilities can be leveraged to win hearts and minds (see David Galula’s experience in China). They can also be used to harvest human intelligence and build informant networks. The military police and military intelligence communities now call this ‘COIN inside the wire.’” Carter, 2008, "Dissent in the Army," Intel Dump (April 25), WashingtonPost.com, http://blog.washingtonpost.com/inteldump/2008/04/dissent_in_the_army.html.

regimes became a powerful and widely accepted framing narrative for the view of a U.S. led war on Islam driving mobilization for militant groups:

Explicit references to accounts of torture in the region by al-Qaeda and other militants helps sustain the narrative that Muslims and Islam as a whole are under siege by a hostile U.S.-led campaign. These messages also resonate with wide segments of society in U.S.-backed authoritarian regimes in the region. […]

Based on the discourse of al-Qaeda and other radical Islamist organizations, the current trajectory of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East will continue to serve as a battle cry for militants to take up arms against the United States. The prevalence of systematic torture and the persistence of authoritarianism in countries the United States counts as loyal allies will facilitate this process. These conditions will also provide al-Qaeda’s highly-effective media and propaganda wings with ample material to implicate the United States in the activities of regional security services.209

Over the seven years since 9/11 U.S. detainee policy has come to be represented by rejection of U.S. and international law and hypocrisy on the U.S. promotion of human rights, official endorsement of coercive interrogation techniques seen as contributing to worse abuses, and the legacies of Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib. The related decisions were made with the best of intentions by administration officials seeking to protect Americans from unknown future threats. The perceptions are also unfair to the overwhelming majority of American military personnel who honourably upheld the high standards to which they were trained in humanely carrying out detainee missions consistent with international norms under often-difficult circumstances. Unfortunately, from a hearts and minds perspective the result of official U.S. policy positioning and rhetoric has been to undermine the natural counter narrative of the United States as a force for good, which defends and promotes human rights, while reinforcing the belief that the U.S. is part of a war on Islam.

**Hypocrisy on Democracy Promotion**

While the United States has commenced, expanded, or redirected a wide range of policies after 9/11 under the broad justification of a hearts and minds strategy, the principal initiative of the Bush administration was a highly publicized program to promote democratization in the Middle East and other Muslim countries:

In a November 6, 2003, speech to the National Endowment for Democracy, President George W. Bush announced the launch of what is now known as the

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209 Zambelis, "Is There a Nexus between Torture and Radicalization?."
“Freedom Agenda,” an ambitious policy to improve the long-term stability of Arab states and reduce the appeal of extremist ideology by advancing democratic transformation in the region. This new strategy, a response to the attacks of 9-11, represented a major shift in the traditional U.S. foreign policy approach to the Middle East.²¹⁰

Robin Wright described the overall initiative as “the most ambitious U.S. effort to transform the Islamic world,” observing that “President Bush used bold language last November in pledging to end six decades of U.S. policy that opted for stability in the oil-rich region over promoting liberty, including in such key allies as Egypt.”²¹¹

Reporting on the emphasis the Bush administration gave this agenda, Steven Cook noted in mid-2006 that “President Bush, his two Secretaries of State, and a variety of other senior officials have spoken publicly and forcefully in favour of change in the Arab world” while committing “approximately $386 million to supporting democratic reform in the Middle East.”²¹² Similarly, in early 2008 during the “first extended tour of the Middle East” of his Presidency, Bush reportedly placed “the promotion of democracy and freedom at the top of his public agenda.”²¹³

After only five years it is arguably too early to evaluate whether the variety of programs and projects established under this agenda will contribute to the long-term processes of democratization.²¹⁴ However, from a hearts and minds perspective, this

²¹¹ Wright, "U.S. Struggles to Win Hearts, Minds in the Muslim World."
²¹⁴ Towards the end of their term Bush officials increasingly echoed the arguments of democratization experts that these are generational projects, likely to progress through periods of advancement and retrenchment making any evaluation based on short-term trends suspect. However, as a hearts and minds solution for problems related to a lack of popular support this also implies that any positive effects dependent upon reaching later stages of democratization cannot be advanced as solutions for short-term challenges. In many cases, proponents of democratization commit the fallacy of assuming that their long-term end-states will solve short-term problems, whereas in reality the short-term
section argues that the Bush administration’s Freedom Agenda over the short-term undermined the central counter narrative it was in part intended to further of establishing the United States as a positive force promoting human rights and political development in the Muslim world. The initial rhetoric of the Bush administration created exaggerated expectations that quickly collided with other U.S. government priorities and preferences, reinforcing pre-existing perspectives that the United States only hypocritically talks of human rights and democracy while actually supporting authoritarian regimes and continuing to control, oppress, and exploit the Muslim world.  

The bold rhetoric and framing of the administration set high expectations: during a speech in Prague, President Bush promised the Secretary of State was going to “send a directive to every U.S. ambassador in an un-free nation” to “seek out and meet with activists for democracy;”  

elections would be (the only) “path to independence and dignity” for the Palestinian people;  

and, “the war in Iraq would unleash a tsunami of democracy in the Middle East.”  

Sean Yom continues:


Bush, "President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East."

The “freedom agenda” made a tremendous splash in many Arab countries, where it sparked extensive media coverage, political gossip, and academic attention. Although many Arab journalists and intellectuals approached the budding initiative with skepticism, more than a handful of democratic activists in the region saw a historic opportunity to assemble unprecedented American support for their campaigns for liberal reforms. Likewise, back in Washington, many advocates of democratization – from Bush administration officials to think tanks and policy analysts – invested considerable hope in the inevitability of democratic progress.²¹⁹

At the same time, militant Islamists who reject the idea of U.S. promoted democracy were responding to these framing appeals with traditional arguments that the United States only talks about such reforms as a means to distract Muslims from seeking real change in order to prop up apostate regimes who insure America’s supply of cheap oil and enable continued U.S. hegemony. These are demonstrated in bin Laden’s October 2002 statement:

The freedom and democracy that you call to is for yourselves and the white race only; as for the rest of the world, you impose upon them your monstrous, destructive policies and governments, which you call “America’s Allies.” Yet you prevent them from establishing democracies. When the Islamic party in Algeria wanted to practice democracy and they won the election, you unleashed your agents in the Algerian army on them, attacking them with tanks and guns, imprisoning them and torturing them – a new lesson from the “American book of democracy”!!!²²⁰

Building on this framing, in an al-Sahab produced interview released on the 11 September 2005, Ayman al-Zawahiri responded to a question about America’s new freedom agenda, saying:

America does not want to spread freedom. Rather it aims at occupying our countries, spreading corruption and promiscuity, encouraging missionary activity for the distorted Christianity, and calling for the spread of a new Islam that will facilitate its assault and promote its corrupt and corrupting collaborators – an Islam without jihad, without resistance, and without [the principle of] enjoying good and forbidding evil.²²¹

²²⁰ bin Laden, "Why We are Fighting You: Osama bin Laden's Letter to Americans (October 2002)," 205. For a short summary of the 1990 and 1991 Algerian elections which seemed set to bring Islamists into political power and led to a Western supported, or at least quietly tolerated, military coup see: Mandaville, *Global Political Islam*, 93-5.
For the administration’s supporters the “Arab spring” of 2005 reinforced their confidence in the new Freedom Agenda, only to see the promise of democratic progress sequentially crash over the following 12 months:

In the fall of 2005, sectarian gridlock returned to paralyze Lebanon, President Mubarak’s “reelection” turned out to be little more than a rigged plebiscite, terrorist attacks in Jordan sidelined the palace’s democratic reform project, the House of Saud promised no more electoral trials, and civil conflict in Iraq intensified. Ironically, though, what chilled American democracy promotion the most were democratic events. In November 2005, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (the Muslim Brotherhood) captured nearly a fifth of Egypt’s parliament during general elections, greatly outnumbering the few seats that went to the secular liberal parties championed by American advocates. And in January 2006, Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, better known as Hamas, won general elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council, defeating the incumbent Fatah organization that both Israel and the U.S. had quietly endorsed. Such results dampened the exuberance of neoconservative pundits in Washington. Some concluded that perhaps the Arabs were indeed not ready for democracy after all; why else would they elect groups to power that seemed so virulently anti-Israeli and anti-Western?

These disappointments, fears of what Islamists might do if they were more successful in fully democratic elections, and the pressure of other priorities in the war on terror reversed much of the momentum for bold action promoting democracy. As previously discussed, the especially negative reaction to the electoral success of Hamas particularly undermined U.S. claims of honestly promoting democracy.

Part of the problem leading to the creation of unrealistic expectations was that the Bush administration turned to democracy promotion as a proactive strategy for two short-term problems, in addition to justifying it as part of a root cause solution to the

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222 “Euphoria swept across legions of observers of Arab politics two years ago. A series of unusual scenes on the streets of the Middle East nurtured an inspiring story line of an emerging ‘Arab spring’ that mimicked the earlier triumph of democracy from the Philippines to Prague: mass demonstrations in Lebanon; joint rallies of Egyptian Islamists and liberals against the Mubarak regime; and elections in Iraq, the Palestinian territories, Lebanon, Egypt and even Saudi Arabia. Many of the most deeply entrenched Arab regimes appeared to be on the verge of losing their authoritarian grip. Symbolized by purple fingers in Iraq, orange t-shirts in Lebanon and the single word kifaya (‘enough’) in Egypt, the fall of the Arab equivalent of the Berlin Wall seemed at hand.” Hamzawy and Brown, 2007, "Arab Spring Fever," The National Interest 91 (40), August 29, http://www.nationalinterest.org/General.aspx?id=92&id2=15374.

223 Yom, "The Dilemmas of American Democracy Promotion in the Arab World."

224 One State Department Official suggested to David Rose, “With Hamas’s [unexpected] election victory, the freedom agenda was dead.” Rose, "The Gaza Bombshell."
underlying conditions of terrorism.\textsuperscript{225} First, after the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq the administration needed a new justification in order to buttress especially domestic support for continued significant military operations in a growingly complex insurgency and civil war. Because the U.S. public was assumed to have limited tolerance for a long-term military commitment, language about democracy promotion often predicted dramatic short-term successes.\textsuperscript{226} Second, instead of following what it deemed to be the failed negotiation strategy of previous administrations, the Bush team had decided elections would be its response to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But again, as continued short-term violence in that conflict generated increased pressure for action the administration rhetorically focused on the promise of dramatic changes to be brought about by Palestinian ballots. Recognition that many violent Islamists were in part motivated by, or at least exploited concerns over, the Israeli-Palestinian crisis similarly created pressures to frame democracy promotion as promising short-term successes given the lack of sustained, high-level pressure from the administration for traditional negotiations.\textsuperscript{227}

Also contributing to the creation of exaggerated expectations by the administration’s initial rhetoric and framing was a lack of appreciation for the challenges facing democracy promotion in the Middle East and the severe limits on

\textsuperscript{225} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{226} Cofman Wittes and Yerkes, "The Middle East Freedom Agenda," 32. Douglas Feith, who was Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under from July 2001 to August 2005, observes: “This change can be quantified: In the year beginning with his first major speech about Iraq – the Sept. 12, 2002 address to the U.N. General Assembly – Mr. Bush delivered nine major talks about Iraq. There were, on average, approximately 14 paragraphs per speech on Saddam’s record as an enemy, aggressor, tyrant and danger, with only three paragraphs on promoting democracy. In the next year – from September 2003 to September 2004 – Mr. Bush delivered 15 major talks about Iraq. The average number of paragraphs devoted to the record of threats from Saddam was one, and the number devoted to democracy promotion was approximately 11.” Feith, "How Bush Sold the War."

\textsuperscript{227} Highlighting the dramatic shifts in policy on this issue in the 2003 the Bush administration listed as one of its primary initiatives for engaging in the war of ideas working towards a just settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In 2006 the next version of the same national strategy document only mentioned the conflict to say that it was not really a cause of terrorism because al-Qaida had planned the 9/11 attacks during a period of activity in the peace process. "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.". "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism."
American agency for contributing to or encouraging necessary reforms and foundational civil structures. Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway explain:

Another consequence of the shortage of experience and expertise in democracy promotion in the Arab world is that the new community of enthusiasts of such work frequently evidences unrealistic ideas about how much impact outside actors can expect to have when they try to alter the political direction of other societies. Some people appear to believe that if enough people in Washington decide the Middle East needs to become democratic, democratization will happen, just by the force of the American will alone. Yet the most basic, consistent lesson coming out of the experience of democracy promotion in other regions is that external actors, even very determined ones employing significant resources, rarely have a decisive impact on the political direction of other societies.

Their conclusion is that democratization in the Middle East will be a “long, uncertain journey” with “no assurance of success.” During the indeterminate phases of democratization there are even reasons to believe that violence and terrorism may increase. Because of these difficulties, and the very limited influence for “external actors to encourage recalcitrant, entrenched governments to open up their political systems to real competition” Carothers and Ottaway note that “Western governments inevitably feel the temptation not to push for real democratization, or even not

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228 Part of the problem was also an almost “fetish” focus on voting and election over the harder long-term requirements of establishing the structures, traditions, and confidence of deep civil society structures. This was especially highlighted by the focus of the administration on balloting as a solution in Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

229 Carothers and Ottaway, Uncharted Journey, 10.

230 Ibid., 266-7. The election of Islamist parties, as well as opposition to U.S. advocated policies, has caused some to question whether populations in the Muslim world actually support democracy. This is reinforced by the perception that Islamists, too often defined in the Western perception by the extremes of groups like al-Qaida, seek a religious led theocracy instead of true representative democratic governance. However a wide series of surveys and polls finds that large majorities across the Muslim world support democracy and believe that it can work in their own countries. Further, the continuing strengthening of democratic traditions in Muslim majorities countries such as Turkey and Indonesia especially, as well as Bangladesh, Mali, and Senegal provide positive examples. "Islamic Extremism.". Kohut, "American Public Diplomacy in the Islamic World."

necessarily very hard for limited liberalization.”232 This in part appears to again explain the actions of the Bush administration following the setbacks of 2005 and 2006. Unfortunately, from a hearts and minds perspective, the continued aspirational rhetoric contrasted against at best superficial regional progress and transparent American acquiescence undermines the intended U.S. counter framing and reinforces perceptions of hypocrisy.

How hard the administration was willing to push for real changes to the political structures of many Muslim majority countries is further limited by the current realities of who would benefit and competing short-term priorities in the war on terror. Many regional observers suggest that given current popular preferences coupled with relative organizational strengths the reality of any significant political liberalization in the short-term would often be electoral victories by Islamist parties.233 Democratization experts emphasize that what is needed for long term progress are institutional changes creating political liberalization and a robust civil society, the necessary neutrality of which also requires dealing with the victors whomever they are if the process is to be credible and sustainable. Unfortunately, the Bush administration took a factional approach to

232 Carothers and Ottaway, Uncharted Journey, 262-3. They similarly argue: “Unfortunately, Western democracy promoters, particularly in the United States, often feel under great pressure to demonstrate that they are accomplishing rapid results. Consequently, they feel driven to focus on what are often superficial manifestations of political change, such as whether a country holds elections, rather than the actual degree of political competition that the elections truly entail.” Carothers and Ottaway, Uncharted Journey, 262.

233 This is what happened with the 2006 Palestinian elections where Hamas was more organized and more popular. Of significant note, as with Islamist parties in many other countries, Hamas’s strengths were not inherently religious. Especially compared to Fatah, Hamas was viewed as non-corrupt and much better at providing social services even when not the government. There is some indication in recent elections, such as Pakistan, that especially hard-core Islamist parties are not popular. But, the successes of other parties in these cases builds upon a relative organization development not found in many authoritarian Muslim countries. As chapter four discusses, many authoritarian regimes have severely oppressed all oppositional groups, which for cultural and historic reasons has favoured the current strength of Islamist movements as the only real alternative. In part this is because authoritarian governments are restricted in their ability to oppress or control religious figures and mosques, and in part because many regional authoritarian governments used Islamist parties to offset previous nationalist and socialist oppositions. Telhami, 2006c, "In the Mideast, the Third Way is a Myth," Washington Post, February 17, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/16/AR2006021601576.html. See also: Esposito, "Political Islam."
democracy promotion, where further U.S. support is dependent upon voters electing the right people.\textsuperscript{234} The biases inherent in this approach are consistent with the dominant construction of terrorism discussed in Chapter Five that establishes the war on terror as the most important priority, perceives all Islamists as inherently suspect and probably part of the threat to the United States, and demands that others choose either our side or their side. The resulting reaction to the Palestinian and Lebanese elections especially undermined American credibility.\textsuperscript{235} Graham Fuller, employing a social movement understanding of political Islam, further argues that the failure to welcome and engage with Islamist electoral successes has a counterproductive effect of pushing these movements in a more violent and non-democratic direction while also reinforcing the success of their framing of the U.S. as involved in a war on Islam.\textsuperscript{236} U.S. support for democratization efforts was also constrained in the short-term by competing strategic priorities tied to the cooperation of the authoritarian regimes Islamist oppositions threaten to replace, including both war on terror objectives as well as broader interests such as maintaining reliable oil supplies.\textsuperscript{237} However, the transparency of these constraints, often highlighted in muted responses to clearly anti-democratic moves, has the counterproductive effect of reinforcing perceptions of America’s ties to and support of authoritarian regimes due to the contrast with and emphasized by heightened expectations of the new Freedom Agenda democracy promotion rhetoric.

\textsuperscript{235} Noting the opinions of Efraim Halevy, former chief of the Mossad, that the failure to recognize and negotiate with Hamas was especially damaging for the U.S. and Israel, as well as for the long-term development of Palestinian democracy. Rozen, 2008, "Israel's Mossad, Out of the Shadows," \textit{Mother Jones}, February 19, http://www.motherjones.com/washington_dispatch/2008/02/israel-mossad-out-of-the-shadows.html. See also: Cook, "U.S. Policy: Hypocrisy, Principles, and Reform in the Middle East."  
\textsuperscript{237} Carothers and Ottaway, \textit{Uncharted Journey}, 253. Zunes for example observed that the speech “appeared to be designed for the domestic U.S. audience,” as “few of the foreign delegations or international journalists present could take seriously his rhetoric regarding the promotion of democracy in the Middle East, given the reality of U.S. policy in the region.” Zunes, 2006, "Bush at the UN: Annotated," \textit{FPIF Commentary} (September 20), Foreign Policy in Focus, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/3531.
President Bush’s September 2006 address to the United Nations General Assembly was representative of exaggerated claims of progress, the gaps between the administration’s rhetoric and policies, and the biased nature of whom the U.S. supports. In the speech he hailed the “important steps” taken by several Middle East regimes, naming and highlighting specific progress in Algeria, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain, Yemen, and Egypt. However, each of these cases has been criticized as minor moves that were often blatantly superficial, and in some cases part of larger programs representing an actual retrenchment of authoritarian power. For example, President Bush started by noting, “Algeria has held its first competitive presidential election.” In contrast, opposition parties claimed vote rigging and the independent newspaper El Watan observed that President Bouteflika’s 83.49% re-election “is a result worthy of [North Korea’s] Kim II Sung.” President Bush praised UAE’s announcements that “half of the seats in its Federal National Council will be chosen by elections,” which critics noted was for a body that is purely consultative. Jordanian elections were for a lower house of parliament that “cannot initiate legislation and cannot enact laws without the approval of the upper house, which is appointed by the king,” and even then those elections were marred by “the highly unrepresentative drawing of assembly districts in favour of the monarchy as well as restrictions on the political platforms parties can advocate in order to take part.” Similarly, the praised reforms in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were minor expansions of enfranchisement that removed no significant power from the royal families. The most  

238 Bush, "President Bush Addresses United Nations General Assembly."
241 Zunes, "Bush at the UN: Annotated."
243 Zunes, "Bush at the UN: Annotated." Bush’s praise for Kuwait was particularly hypocritical given as he highlighted the inclusion of women while overall only a minority of the country’s population is still allowed to vote, whereas in the Palestinian
striking gap between U.S. praise and reality was Egypt where President Bush hailed “multiparty presidential elections.” Zunes described these:

Last year’s presidential elections in Egypt were even worse than Yemen’s in that the U.S.-backed Mubarak regime declared the largest opposition party illegal, effectively banned independent candidates, severely restricted media access and publication rights of opposition campaigns, and refused to allow international observers. Only 23% of the electorate bothered to go to the polls, and Mubarak won re-election with an improbable 88% of the vote. Government security forces beat up and arrested protestors demanding more open elections, and the runner up in the presidential race received a five-year jail sentence.  

President Mubarak has continued to reinforce authoritarian control of the government through changes to the constitution, renewing the 27-year-old state of emergency, and further intimidating and oppressing opposition groups. At the same time the U.S. continues to provide at most muted criticism often mixed with praise. Following a 

244 Zunes, "Bush at the UN: Annotated." Consolatore similarly describes: "The problem is that Mubarek was only ‘almost’ elected because the balloting didn't quite amount to a legitimate contest, even if it was the first ever in which Egyptian voters had a choice of candidates for president. Unwilling to come down on a ‘moderate,’ secular Arab ally, as it did on Iran in June, the Bush administration declared the Egyptian vote ‘an important step toward holding fully free and fair competitive multiparty elections.’ But the actual process was so ridden with irregularities, manipulations, and outright fraud that it more resembled, as one influential blogger (known simply by the Arab woman’s name Baheyya) put it, a presidential selection spectacle. Even to register, the candidates had to clear an array of hurdles on an authoritarian bureaucracy could dream up. For example, challengers had to obtain approval of sixty-five members of parliament, which, thanks to rigged elections, is conveniently controlled by a two-thirds majority of Mubarek's National Democratic Party (NDP)." Consolatore, 2005, "Living with Democracy in Egypt," The Humanist 65 (6), November/December: 7-8. 

245 For example, during a January 2008 visit and joint appearance with President Mubarak, President Bush emphasized the “vital strategic partnership” of the two countries, while appearing to praise both steps by the government for democratic reform as well as “progress toward greater political openness” being led by other members of civil society “determined to build a democratic future.” The diplomatic language of the speech probably was intended as subtle criticism of the regime and encouragement of opposition elements, however in comparison to the far blunter language used for Palestinian and Lebanese results the administration does not like and aspirational democracy promotion rhetoric the speech was easy for critics to frame as further hypocrisy. Bush, 2008c, "President Bush Meets with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt," (January 16), The White House Office of the Press Secretary, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/01/20080116-2.html. For further
visit by President Bush in January 2008, the Egyptian regime cracked down again on opposition parties for municipal elections in April, with Mubarak’s ruling party running unopposed for 90% of the 52,000 seats. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to contest about 10% (5754) of the seats as independents, succeeded in obtaining court rulings ordering authorities to allow 2,664 of those candidates to stand, but ultimately called for a boycott after only being allowed by election officials to actually field 20.246


speech was consistent with the administration’s policies in general, and especially its faction-driven approach to democracy promotion.\textsuperscript{249} The silence or criticism of the Bush administration when dealing with democratic results it does not like coupled with the praise it heaps in “up is down” statements on minor steps by largely authoritarian regimes who are otherwise helpful to broader American policies reinforces a perception of an American double standards, hypocrisy, and lack of seriousness on what is suppose to be its central transformative policy in the larger war of ideas.\textsuperscript{250} While one insight of the social movement approach is that much of the underlying dynamics are local in nature, the Bush administration at times seems to have gone out of its way to reinforce perceptions of its hypocrisy across the Muslim world including notable examples throughout the Maghreb, in the core of the Middle East, not forgetting Persian Iran, up through South and Central Asia, and back down to Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{251}

The Bush administration chose to pursue democratization in the Muslim world for a complex variety of reasons. Unfortunately the realities of unexpected setbacks with the success of Islamist parties, competing security priorities better supported over the short-term by authoritarian governments, and the inherent difficulties with limited

\textsuperscript{250}Abramowitz, "Bush Nudges Mideast on Democracy: Dissidents Skeptical, Saying U.S. Has Overlooked Abuses."  
external influence that make democracy promotion a long-term unpredictable process have led to a significant rollback of American effort. However sincere the United States’ initial rhetoric and however valuable the actual programs initiated will be over the long-term,\(^{252}\) the perceptual short-term effect has been to severely undermine U.S. credibility and intended counter narratives,\(^{253}\) while reinforcing the old framing that the U.S. really only supports authoritarian regimes and seeks to control the Muslim world.\(^{254}\) From a social movement perspective the actions of the United States over the last few years with respect to democracy promotion have not only been counterproductive with respect to American attempts to engage in framing contests, but have also undermined moderate Islamists who more directly advocated from within the movement for non-violent collective action to reform political systems. U.S. diplomatic choices have also encouraged or provided space for authoritarian regimes to continue

\(^{252}\) Sean Yom concluded, “Clearly, the Bush White House’s words outstripped deeds.” Yom, "The Dilemmas of American Democracy Promotion in the Arab World." However, several experts also suggest that many of the lower level programs initiated by the administration may produce beneficial results over the long term. Wittes and Coffman note that diplomacy is an inevitably compromised tool for democracy promotion because of competing priorities and the slow process by which democratization occurs. Thus, they are more forgiving of the hyped initial rhetoric and failure to follow through in key cases. They specifically praise the administration’s flagship program, the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) which has made some progress even as “diplomatic efforts to support democratic development have lagged behind US assistance to governments and civil society groups.” Cofman Wittes and Yerkes, "The Middle East Freedom Agenda," 32. See also: Abramowitz, "Bush Nudges Mideast on Democracy: Dissidents Skeptical, Saying U.S. Has Overlooked Abuses.". Chu Miniter, 2007, "Why George Bush's 'Freedom Agenda' Is Here to Stay," Foreign Policy (August), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3959. Problematically, these are long term possibilities that are contingent on a wide range of factors. Even if this potential is fulfilled, the analysis of this chapter remains that the short-term effect of the overall approach to democracy promotion has been to contribute to an increase in anti-American attitudes and an undermining of intended counter frames. The long-term expectations of these initiatives would be more promising if the initial rhetoric of the U.S. had been better calibrated, absent highly visible reversals after Islamist successes, and coupled with more consistent pressure on regimes to take serious steps towards political liberalization even if on slow time-lines.


\(^{254}\) Carothers and Ottaway, Uncharted Journey, 252-3.
repressive policies known to contribute to more extremist movement evolution over the long term. These effects are supported by the range of polls and surveys conducted over the past few years consistently finding majorities in Muslim countries who do not believe that “the United States is serious about spreading democracy in their region” and very small percentages (often only 5 to 10%) who respond that the United States is trustworthy.

Emile Nakhleh, who retired in mid-2006 as the head of the CIA’s unit focusing on the analysis of political Islam, speaking specifically on the effect of American detainee policies and the failures of U.S. democracy promotion for the future threat of Islamist violence, observes:

> We’ve lost a generation of goodwill in the Muslim world. The President’s democratization and reform program for the Middle East has all but disappeared, except for official rhetoric. That was the centerpiece of the President’s policies for the region, and now no one is talking about it. We have lost credibility across the Islamic world regarding “democracy” and “representative government” and “justice.” We are devising new rules and regulations for holding people without charge. The FBI has been at Guantánamo for years, and no charges have been brought against anyone. The Islamic world says “you talk about human rights, but you’re holding people without charging them.” The Islamic world has always viewed the war on terror as a war on Islam and we have not been able to disabuse them of that notion. Because of Guantánamo, Abu Ghraib, and other abuses we have lost on the concepts of justice, fairness and the rule of law, and that’s the heart of the American idea. That’s very serious, and that’s where I see the danger in the years ahead.

From a proactive perspective the Freedom Agenda and American promotion of democratization in the Muslim world was supposed to reinforce the perception of the United States as a force for good and as an exemplar of universally admired ideas—which historically surveys and research found behind the positive attitudes many in the Muslim world had about the U.S. It is also not difficult to understand the damage done to that counter narrative by the rhetoric, decisions, and unfortunate events shaping

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255 Yom, "The Dilemmas of American Democracy Promotion in the Arab World."
256 Telhami’s 2008 polling finds that only 4% in the countries he surveyed believed that promoting democracy was amongst the two most important factors driving American policy in the Middle East as compared to 30% for preserving regional and global dominance, 33% for weakening the Muslim world, 47% for protecting Israel, and 50% for controlling oil. Telhami, "Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll." See also: Esposito, "It's the Policy, Stupid: Political Islam and US Foreign Policy." Esposito, "Iraq: America in Muslim Eyes."
257 Silverstein, "Six Questions for Dr. Emile A. Nakhleh on the CIA and the Iraq War."
perception of America’s post-9/11 detention policies. To the extent that American actions and rhetoric with respect to detainee policy and democracy promotion are representative of the larger post-9/11 war on terror, dominated by an enemy-centric approach and overly normative judgments, these examples help to explain how the United States failed to successfully put forward a consistently credible positive narrative to counter the negative framing of continued controversial policies and the perception that America’s war on terror was really a war on Islam.

**Conclusion**

Speaking to a congressional committee in 1963 as the Director of the United States Information Agency (USIA) Edward Murrow observed:

[A]bove all, it is what we do – not what we say – that has the greatest impact overseas. USIA can explain, interpret, clarify, synthesize, and project, but we cannot change the unchangeable or do the undoable. The United States of America cannot and should not try to please everyone on this planet; we have, and will always have, some policies that are unpalatable to some people. We are, then, and properly so, prisoners of policy… But given intelligent and effective American policies, supported by Congress and the American people, we can make an important contribution to the achievement of our objectives.  

Despite the lessons about public diplomacy Murrow and others had learned a half-century before, American political leaders after 9/11 have too often continued to ignore the role of U.S. policy in shaping international attitudes and the significant part those opinions play in whether strategic objectives are achieved. This chapter explores how a significant component in answering the question of why America has been losing the race for Muslim hearts and minds involves understanding the role played by the actions and rhetoric employed in the pursuit of post-9/11 U.S. policy. While a very long history of policy grievances with the United States in the Muslim world contributes to the current challenges of anti-American attitudes, central elements of U.S. foreign policy with respect to the war on terror and the invasion of Iraq have reinforced those existing complaints, validated new ones, and undermined historic strengths. This chapter has explored how post-9/11 American rhetoric and policy has reinforced

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259 Kean and Hamilton, "Are We Safer Today?."
existing grievances, contributed to views that the war on terror is really a war on Islam, and undermined America’s natural counter narratives.

Employing a social movement theory approach focusing on the importance of framing processes highlights how U.S. rhetoric and action reinforced and validated the narrative arguments of violent Islamists, while undermining counter frames intended to defend the U.S. as a force for good built upon American ideals long admired in the Muslim world. Framing processes and other concepts from the study of social movements serve as orienting tools aiding analysis of the complex dynamics through which policy and rhetorical choices shape the evolution of collective action and influence decisions to support or turn against violent tactics.

In looking at the contested nature of these framing processes there are many examples of how al-Qaida and associated radical Islamists have successfully used the rhetoric and actions of the United States to support their claims in a manner that better reaches out to Muslim populations gaining them some short-term support while decreasing the support given to the United States. In many cases al-Qaida’s gains have come more from the exploitation of America’s mistakes than superior communication skills or success at convincing Muslim populations of their own long-term goals. Unfortunately, in addition to mistakes, too often American post 9/11 policies overall have also confirmed al-Qaida’s framing arguments.

The refusal of political leaders to recognize publicly and in guiding strategy that U.S. policies are a significant source of Muslim anger has many counterproductive and detrimental effects. It prevents appropriate evaluation of the actual costs and benefits of alternatives while undercutting the ability for policies to be developed in a manner to more effectively achieve other goals while building support or limiting resentment. It constrains the potential effectiveness of targeted American efforts to win hearts and minds by reinforcing a lack of credibility, misdiagnosing the problem, and limiting  

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engagement on the real issues. It increases the likelihood further rhetoric and action will exacerbate existing resentment and hostility, while enabling other actors to continue to exploit anti-Americanism in the pursuit of their goals, often posing increasing threats to U.S. and global security. While the opinion of other populations should not determine U.S. policies, the bottom line is given the impact foreign attitudes have on increasing or decreasing security threats, the attitudes and beliefs of other populations should be a consideration.²⁶²

²⁶² Logan, "The False Hope of Public Diplomacy."
CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

“On September 11, we experienced another one of those days in our national life – a day that will be forever seared in our hearts and minds.”
-Laura Bush, April 2002

The goal of this thesis has been to answer the question: Why did the United States perform so poorly in the race for Muslim hearts and minds over the first seven years after 9/11? The answer is found in how we think and talk about terrorism after that attack, the limits to and misunderstandings of U.S. agency, and the effect of American rhetoric and policy choices. Analyzing U.S. hearts and minds efforts, as well as the larger war on terror, from a perspective informed by lessons from studies of counterinsurgencies and social movements exposes and helps to explain many of the resulting problems. The biases of an overly enemy-centric focus and a highly normative moral analysis repeatedly appear in discussing these explanations. This thesis shows how these biases have: limited understanding of the dynamics driving the key conflicts; favoured a counterproductive balance of counterterrorism efforts; overestimated U.S. agency with negative consequences; and, contributed to policy choices reinforcing opposition frames and undermining intended counter narratives. This chapter concludes with an overall assessment of U.S. hearts and minds efforts including future prospects, an evaluation of the value of a social movement theory approach applied to terrorism research, and a discussion of the potential for rescuing a normative conception of terrorism.

Assessing Hearts and Minds

The logic of a population-centric approach to counterterrorism highlights the important role popular support plays in the long-term potential threat posed by a violent movement. The ideas, attitudes, beliefs, and expectations of broader publics are significant determinants of whether a violent movement is able to attract new recruits, raise resources, avoid state enforcement, and carry out operations. Popular sentiment

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can excuse, sanctify, and glorify or moderate, marginalize, and condemn violent tactics. For governments the support of the people increases the flow and quality of intelligence, provides credibility and legitimacy, and generates patience. All of which are necessary for successfully conducting a larger counterterrorism campaign, including aggressive efforts targeting the incorrigible violent core, while providing security, promoting development, addressing underlying grievances, and engaging in necessary framing competitions. This section revisits the evaluation of this thesis in order to highlight the central conclusions about U.S. hearts and minds efforts and discuss their prospects going forward.

The Evaluation of this Thesis

After the 9/11 attacks the United States reoriented resources towards counterterrorism on an unprecedented scale. President Bush, with overwhelming domestic support, directed the use of “every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war” to detect, disrupt, and destroy terrorist networks while denying, diminishing, and deterring future threats.² Many within and outside of the U.S. government argued that an essential component of this larger war on terror needed to be a focus on winning hearts and minds of general populations across the Muslim world. This resulted in a wide range of public diplomacy initiatives, significant increases in and retargeting of foreign aid, fundamental changes in military doctrine to stress the lessons of counterinsurgency, and reportedly a wide range of covert programs. However, in comparison to other elements of the larger war on terror, experts frequently observed that hearts and minds efforts were a secondary priority, too often constrained by relatively limited resources, and out of balance in comparison to classic counterinsurgency recommendations suggesting that the hard or kinetic side of the fight should be the small part of the total effort.

Studies of Muslim attitudes repeatedly reinforced the conclusion that the United States performed poorly in the race for Muslim hearts and minds during this time period by reporting increasingly negative views of the United States as compared to the preceding decade. Much of this research highlights the U.S. invasion of Iraq, stronger

² Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People."
association with authoritarian regimes, increased support for Israel, and coercive
counterterrorism policies as increasing negative attitudes and contributing to a
perception that the United States is actually engaged in a war on Islam. Limited good
news for the U.S. is found in positive reactions to American humanitarian efforts, a lack
of support for the long term goals of Usama bin Ladin and al-Qaida, as well as negative
reactions to increases in terrorist violence observed in several specific Muslim countries
e specially following local attacks.

To aid analysis of why the United States appears to have performed poorly this
thesis examines militant Islamists and the potential for popular support as part of a
larger social movement focused on the rise of political Islam across the Muslim world.
This approach stresses the importance of understanding dynamics from the perspective
not of the United States or violent groups using tactics of terrorism, but instead from the
vantage of larger populations with a specific concern for their grievances and
aspirations as well as the mobilizing networks, political opportunity structures, and
framing contests that influence and shape movement evolution. Much of the Muslim
world is fertile ground for contentious collective action given a wide range of long
running economic and development problems, high levels of political repression at the
hands of generally authoritarian and unpopular governments, regular intra- and
interstate violence, a history of Western colonial and economic domination, and
perceptions of threats to cultural identity. Previous ideologies, movements, and
governments have sequentially failed in attempts to address these problems, with many
current governments most notable only for their efficiency at safeguarding power.
Outside of Muslim majority countries diaspora communities also play an important role
in these dynamics with their own local grievances and aspirations connecting with
transnational movements as well as communities in their countries of origin enabled by
the global virtual connections.

Across the Muslim world political Islam is the dominant mobilizing force
currently shaping popular attitudes with respect to these issues, building upon the
relatively open space allowed for religion, and employing framing narratives grounded
in cultural and religious traditions that strongly resonate with Muslim populations. The
perceived previous successes of Islamist groups, especially with respect to successfully
delivering local services free of corruption as well as striking successful blows against
local enemies and global oppressors, contribute to the credibility of Islamist movements as promising alternatives. Militant Islamists are one part of this larger mobilization, often competing and disagreeing with other movement actors over significant issues such as the use of violence, participation in electoral politics, and interpretations of what Islam as a political solution really means.

Although discussion of terrorism has long been highly normative, the attacks of September 11 generated significant changes in the way Americans talk and think about the concept. This occurred through an interactive process including the general public, highly attentive individuals, political leaders, and the media. The social construction of terrorism in the United States after 9/11 became more highly normative, shifting to assume that a war on terror was the most appropriate response, and perceiving a threat of especially devastating attacks as primarily focused on the United States from a generally aggregated, amorphous, and Islamic terrorist enemy. The strategic narrative advanced by the Bush administration had a significant effect on shaping this new construction – while also reflecting it – and played a direct role in shaping and prioritizing U.S. responses at all levels of implementation. While each of these changes was based in partial truths supported by observable realities, in combination they exaggerated biases that undermine understanding of the phenomenon and encourage counterproductive efforts. These biases influence individual analysis and action by framing and filtering understanding of the problem, triggering specific associations while making others seem inappropriate, and encouraging the pursuit of harder and more judgmental perspectives. At a national level the cumulative effect of the opinion climate created by the social construction constrains and guides political decision making as well as the focus and implementation of bureaucratic agencies. The resulting cognitive dissonance for understanding terrorism from a population-centric perspective and shifts in presumption to an enemy-centric approach led to an overall war on terror that repeatedly involves action and rhetoric negatively affecting popular support in the Muslim world with counterproductive long term results. The post-9/11 social construction of terrorism in the United States, and the biases it reinforces, as well as the related strategic narrative advanced by the Bush administration significantly help to explain why hearts and minds strategies too often lacked top level support and
prioritization, leaving them discounted, underfunded, and relatively unincorporated in overall war on terror efforts and thinking.

The American approach to counterterrorism in general, and hearts and minds efforts specifically, was based on a flawed model of the conflict. This model exaggerates American centrality and agency with the result of encouraging counterproductive actions when analyzed from a counterinsurgency and social movement informed perspective. The central problem of the U.S. model is seeing the conflict as principally involving the United States and its terrorist enemy with other actors playing secondary roles. Consistent with this approach U.S. policy makers and political leaders assume that America has much greater potential to change attitudes and control other actors. A social movement and counterinsurgency approach highlights the much more complicated dynamics shaping attitudes, including assumptions about the causes and best solutions for real grievances, the stronger influences of local social networks, associations based upon the actions of local governments and elites, and the filtering effect of established framing processes. By failing to appreciate these challenges the United States often takes ineffective steps to engage attitudes while continuing other counterproductive actions and rhetoric. The American approach to dealing with local governments similarly overestimates U.S. agency, while failing to fully appreciate the negative effect of associations with these governments on popular attitudes as shaped by movement dynamics. Even when the United States recognizes that local partners in the war on terror have problematic histories, and attempts to influence positive changes consistent with a hearts and minds strategy, the U.S. often fails to recognize that local governments have neither the capacity nor the will to pursue such initiatives. In many cases, the increased resources and political space created by aligning with the U.S. war on terror gives these governments the ability to increase repression of local movements with the effect of increasing the violent potential of mobilization dynamics as well as the association of blame attributed to the United States.

Analyzing the contested framing processes important to the evolution of movement dynamics illustrates how U.S. rhetoric and actions following the attacks of 9/11 undermined U.S. hearts and minds goals. American political leaders frequently insist that U.S. policies are unrelated to the threat of militant violence, instead arguing
that it is opposition to American values. While this may help maintain domestic support for the war on terror, a social movement informed analysis supports the repeated and emphatic explanations of experts and surveys that it is opposition to American policies. As a result the U.S. war on terror reinforced long established anger and grievances with specific American policies and strengthened framing arguments that the United States is really motivated by supporting Israeli dominance, maintaining regional hegemony, and exploiting cheap oil. American rhetoric and especially the invasion of Iraq contributed to growing acceptance of the militant Islamist frame that the war on terror is a really a war on Islam. At the same time widely criticized U.S. rhetoric and action with respect to issues such as detainee policy as well as perceived hypocrisy on democracy promotion undermined America’s intended counter framing. The mistakes and misperceptions underlying each of these cases are driven in large part by the biases of an overly enemy-centric approach and highly normative moral judgments.

Prospects Going Forward

The starting assumption of this thesis was that a hearts and minds strategy should be a core component of U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the war on terror, based upon the persuasive logic for population-centric strategies outlined in Chapter One as well as a majority view of the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism literatures.

Although much of the research conducted for this thesis provides further support to this reasoning, at the same time it raises concerns about the limits and challenges of actually pursuing such efforts. To examine the prospects for U.S. hearts and minds strategies this section briefly reviews the constraints raised, evidence that the U.S. may be learning from its experiences, and the potential success for precautionary and incremental efforts over the long term building upon America’s current structural strengths.

A repeated criticism raised in this thesis is that U.S. efforts have been based on exaggerated assumptions of centrality and agency. This equally applies to many prescriptions for hearts and minds efforts as well as criticisms of the war on terror. Tactics of terrorism rarely arise without a long history of festering grievances built upon the failure of previous efforts and aggravated by the actual and perceived misdeeds of other actors. Reviews of American and British counterinsurgencies stress these lessons, noting especially that the influence of an external government supporting a local state is
significantly limited. International actors are dependent not only on the successful and consistent follow through of strategy by their own forces, but on the capacity to pursue and will to follow through of the local counterinsurgent in addressing problems where the solution may threaten their own self-interests. Applied to international counterterrorism in a globalized world of virtual connections, where the number of conflicts involved dramatically increases along with the number of actors who can potentially undermine or drown out U.S. action, a global hearts and minds strategy faces even more challenges.

However, while there is a long list of limitations, the research of this thesis also indicates that U.S. actions and rhetoric have significant effects. To the degree that increases in anti-American attitudes are in part traceable to the approach and specific rhetorical and policy choices of the United States, reciprocally this is evidence for the potential of positive changes over time. An important lesson of the hearts and minds logic discussed throughout this thesis is that marginal changes in the climate of opinion are important to security goals as they relatively increase or decrease the chances of radicalization, fund raising, social sanction, and other factors directly related to the potential threat posed by militant groups.

While proactive hearts and minds efforts may only make incremental differences, a related lesson is in the benefits of a pervasive unity of understanding of the importance of popular support at a precautionary level. Similar to the efforts of the U.S. military to retrain and refocus its forces on a doctrine of winning the population over as the centre of gravity instead of focusing on defeating the enemy, widespread understanding of the importance of popular attitudes to counterterrorism goals would help avoid many of the mistakes discussed in this thesis that resulted in unnecessary increases in resentment. In adopting this advice policy actors and political leaders should insure that a population-centric approach is a part of the overall strategic narrative, and that consideration of popular attitudes are part of initial policy and strategy formation, instead of only being a concern when increasing anti-Americanism contributes to national security threats. Attention to hearts and minds must be part of the take-offs and not just the crash landings of U.S. policy.

Although this thesis focuses on a wide range of policy decisions and official rhetoric that have negatively affected U.S. hearts and minds goals, there are a number of
indications the U.S. may be learning. Towards the end of the Bush administration
various elements of the government made initiatives to move away from more extreme
language for framing the war on terror while newer appointees and senior level advisors
espoused more sophisticated and population-centric views of the conflict. Experts have
praised the long-term potential of programs designed to build civil society structures to
encourage democratization and address root level grievances, while Foreign Service
personnel began integrating more successfully with the U.S. military in Afghanistan and
Iraq on Provincial Reconstruction Teams and other assignments where they are
conducting face to face public diplomacy while making substantive improvements to
base level grievances that may incrementally contributed to long-term goals. Perhaps
the most impressive indication of related learning came from within the U.S. military
where a senior level leadership led initiative to develop a new U.S. counterinsurgency
doctrine combined with complimentary bottom up efforts by a wide range of military
personnel in response to concerns that the original enemy-centric approach to the wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan was failing and probably making things worse. Widespread
adoption of the new doctrine appears to have contributed to a considerable turn in
prospects for Iraq and holds out promise for Afghanistan. Significant policies critiqued
in the previous chapters were criticized consistent with population-centric

3 The last Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy of the Bush administration for example
promisingly defended the need for American broadcasting to focus on its credibility as
an objective provider of the news, resisting calls for increased propaganda efforts, and
has explained that American goals should be considerably reduced in recognition of
complexity and limits to agency. Glassman and Moran, 2008, "Public Diplomacy in the
Twenty-First Century - Moran Interviewing Glassman," Council on Foreign Relations:
Event Transcript (June 30),
http://www.cfr.org/publication/16698/public_diplomacy_in_the_twentyfirst_century_ru
sh_transcript_federal_news_service.html. Robinson, 2008a, "US Public Diplomacy
Nominee to Counter Extremist Islamic Views," Voice of America (January 31),
http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2008-01/2008-01-31-
voa2.cfm?CFID=57205537&CFTOKEN=70698749. See also the statements of
Ambassador Dell Dailey. Dailey, "An 'All Elements of Power' Strategy for Combating
Terrorism: Remarks at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy."

4 Abramowitz, "Bush Nudges Mideast on Democracy: Dissidents Skeptical, Saying U.S.
Has Overlooked Abuses.". Chu Miniter, "Why George Bush's 'Freedom Agenda' Is Here
to Stay.". Cofman Wittes and Yerkes, "The Middle East Freedom Agenda," 32.

5 DeHart, 2008, "Suited for the new Diplomacy?," Washington Post, June 15,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/06/13/AR2008061303222.html.

6 Betz, "Redesigning Land Forces," 225. Ucko, "Innovation or Inertia."
recommendations by both major party nominees running for President in 2008 when this thesis was initially completed.

During the Cold War it took the United States time to develop expertise with a more sophisticated and nuanced understanding of the challenges faced. It appears a similar evolution may be occurring with respect to the war on terror, although how far such changes will go, whether they will be sufficient to make pervasive changes to the current American approach, and whether they will be able to overcome or slowly change the biases inherent in the current social construction of terrorism remain to be seen. Optimism based upon the promising signs mentioned above should be tempered by the observation that many problems with the current approach of America’s war on terror are rooted in similar mistakes and biases that persisted throughout the duration of the Cold War.

Another promising prospect for American hearts and minds efforts stems from what might be called the passive or inherent benefits of being an established, economically successful, liberal democracy. As Chapter Seven highlighted, there is a long history of research and expert opinion indicating that Muslim populations generally admire these aspects of America and other Western countries. To the degree that these features act as weak but continuous attractions, over time they may help to offset the damages done by short term but strongly negative reactions to specific policy choices and rhetoric. This potential benefit may be heightened to the degree that contentious policies that are negatively viewed in the Muslim world are addressed by the U.S. political system. For example, the United States Supreme Court’s decision granting habeas corpus rights to Guantanamo Bay detainees along with continuing international coverage of the resulting judicial cases offers potential to emphasize the self-correcting protection of individual rights for which the American system has been admired as well as a new opportunity for the government’s evidence of the threat posed by some detainees to be made public. Global polls leading into the 2008 U.S. presidential elections, although highlighting some international cynicism about the prospects for change, found improving attitudes towards the United States based on the reinforcement of classic American ideals, perceived rejection of Bush administration policies, and the intense international coverage of Barack Obama’s success and rise in
American politics. The United States then elected an African American with a Muslim name whose father was from Kenya and who as a boy had “spent several years in Indonesia and heard the call of the azaan at the break of dawn and at the fall of dusk.” An event which probably at least caused many in the Muslim world to be a bit more open to change and possible persuasion from future U.S. actions.

The indications of American learning offer some promise the United States will increasingly pursue a more sophisticated approach to terrorism. One possibility is adoption of Kilcullen’s suggestions to treat militant Islamists as part of a global counterinsurgency emphasizing disaggregation instead of aggregation of terrorist groups. By working through official rhetoric and policy to localize conflicts, and avoiding actions that create connections between them, American counterterrorism efforts could benefit from more degrees of freedom for calibrating individualized responses based upon unique local contexts. While the U.S. war on terror is not the only aggregating influence encouraging connections between militant Islamist groups it is an important one. Further, the natural dynamics of many of these conflicts, as a social movement perspective emphasizes, is to focus inward and localize as it is often local grievances driving popular attitudes. Thus Hizballah and Hamas, for example, even though they share a common primary enemy and a broadly similar religious ideology, have often avoided close interconnections, treated each other with suspicion, and over time become increasingly focused on nationalist political demands. These tendencies are amplified as each becomes more involved in the needs of delivering to broader local political constituencies, creating opportunities for nuanced diplomatic approaches to isolate extremists while providing non-violent paths for potential moderates and the larger potentially sympathetic population.

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8 Obama, "Remarks by the President on a New Beginning.

To the degree that the rise of a more sophisticated view of the challenges faced from militant Islamists leads to higher-level support for more fundamental policy changes it is possible that more significant progress may be made. For example, while U.S. support for Israel’s right to self-defence and existence will not and should not change, it is not hard to imagine that the new U.S. administration will give very high priority to efforts to find a long term peaceful settlement to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Motivated internally by an understanding of the potential benefits for U.S. security and a fear of possible catastrophic terrorist attacks, coupled with growing belief that Israel’s long term security depends upon finding a peaceful permanent solution sooner rather than later. While many administrations have tried and failed before, the success of such efforts could dramatically change the mobilizing environment. No one should expect increased American efforts to broker Middle East peace to dramatically or quickly change negative Muslim attitudes or suspicions of U.S. intentions, especially given the long antagonistic history underscored by recent policy and rhetoric as discussed in this thesis, but even marginal improvements will be beneficial to U.S. security. And if successful many experts believe that the prospects for the entire region would significantly improve.

At the same time it is worth recognizing that terrorism has rarely proven to be a successful strategy and often undermines the long-term goals of those who employ it despite short-term tactical successes. Groups employing tactics of sub-state terrorism generally face significant asymmetric disadvantages and low probabilities of strategic success whatever approach they choose. Although the United States may have made many mistakes and failed to achieve desired progress with hearts and minds goals over the past seven years, the same body of research on attitudes and opinions in the Muslim world also finds a failure for many militant Islamist groups to make appreciable progress with larger Muslim populations. Al-Qaeda and Usama bin Ladin may be admired and respected for standing up to the United States, but that has not generated a noticeable increase in support for goals such as the pursuit of a transnational caliphate or adoption of the fundamentalist Islamist version of sharia governance al-Qaeda promotes. More troubling for militant Islamists, research has repeatedly found attitudes turning against them and their long-term goals in Muslim countries that experience increases in terrorist violence on civilian populations.
The wide range of grievances underlying mobilization in many countries across the Muslim world are good reasons to believe that contentious and violent action will not easily or quickly disappear regardless of what the United States does. The long history of conflict between the West and these countries, with the United States now perceived as the leader of the West and having reinforced these frames through the first seven years of the war on terror, also makes it unlikely that attitudes will quickly return to 1990s levels. As many critics of hearts and minds strategies are quick to point out, Usama bin Ladin and al-Qaeda planned and carried out a series of increasingly deadly transnational mass casualty plots under those conditions. However, the fallacy of this thinking is to see hearts and minds strategies as a mutually exclusive choice with other efforts, as well as to forget that the agency of other actors including Muslim populations can also work with Western actors in a manner they did not in the past. By adjusting the balance of how larger publics, political leaders, and those implementing policy think about terrorism to include significant population-centric approaches with other more targeted but still very aggressive counterterrorism efforts a more optimal overall strategy is possible. It is not only possible to both carry out aggressive capture/kill missions targeting terrorist leaders while also engaging the aspirations and grievances of larger Muslim populations, the two are complimentary with the increased intelligence and support of the second improving the chances for success of the first. The choice is not between returning to a September 10 worldview, with a “make nice” version of hearts and minds, versus pursuing an enemy-centric and aggressive war on terror. The fallacy of that framing is reinforced by the enemy-centric biases of the current social construction of terrorism, and is part of why the United States performed so poorly over the first seven years after 9/11.

**Evaluating a Social Movement Theory of Terrorism**

This thesis incorporated concepts and tools from the social movement literature to aid the analysis of dynamics related to popular support and the war on terror. As noted in Chapter Two, the social movement and terrorism research traditions have much in common in terms of foundational literature, common research questions, and evolution of theoretical focuses. In many ways the study of social movements has enjoyed deeper and more rigorous academic treatment while the study of terrorism and
political violence has enjoyed more integration with questions of public policy. While both research traditions should benefit from the cross-fertilization of more integrated research, this section focuses on benefits for the study of terrorism looking specifically at advantages over the current rational actor approach dominant in terrorism studies and the value of a social movement perspective as a reorienting tool to overcome normative biases.

The current rational actor approach to the study of terrorism and political violence is beneficial in its direct rejection of previous psychological approaches that similar to popular stereotypes sought to explain terrorists as presumptively abnormal, and thus reinforced a series of counterproductive and limiting misconceptions. However, the current approach in terrorism research still reinforces elements of the enemy-centric bias discussed in this thesis. These obscure important larger population level phenomenon. Current social movement research similarly is built upon a rational actor foundation rejecting the biases of earlier mob-based psychological theories of mass action, but has further developed a number of productive research traditions on top of this while also emphasizing a population level focus. Application of a social movement theory approach to terrorism therefore serves to bring population level dynamics into focus, while also providing a series of “orienting devices” in terms of the conceptual tools developed in that tradition.10 The focus on grievances, mobilizing networks, political opportunity structures, and framing processes in this thesis is an example of the potential benefit of these conceptual tools for exploring the complex dynamics of popular mobilization related to the war on terror. This thesis used those tools broadly to examine a wider range of issues, where future research may choose to take advantage of the deeper development of specific social movement concepts to enhance a more focused examination of specific research questions of interest. Future application of this research tradition to the study of terrorism and political violence thus promises the potential for specific richer conceptual exploration of issues such as framing processes, while also potentially providing back to the social movement literature specific case studies that may help develop the understanding of those concepts with respect to forms of mobilization that have often been understudied or even ignored.

10 Tilly, "Islamic Activism."
One specific problem in terrorism research, for which the application of social movement approaches is especially promising, is in addressing the debate about the root causes of terrorism. On one side of this debate researchers and policy experts cite the existence of a wide range of grievances as contributing to the rise of terrorism. The other side dismisses the role of root causes given the much larger number of similar cases that do not give rise to terrorism and the fact that many individuals involved in terrorism are better off than others around them. This dismissal often is in part shaped by and reinforces the biases of the current social construction of terrorism especially as it applies to larger potentially sympathetic populations, and is thus also an impediment to hearts and minds efforts. Most terrorism researchers recognize a more complicated relationship between underlying conditions and the emergence of tactics of terrorism, with root causes playing an important but not determinative role. Unfortunately, dismissing these grievances, as popular conceptions and political leaders are inclined to do, devalues consideration of the role played by larger potentially sympathetic populations. The result increases the likelihood that more coercive or less focused hard counterterrorism policies are used and decreases the motivation to pursue the difficult and often long-term efforts needed to make marginal improvements in underlying conditions.

The same root causes debate has long been at the heart of the study of social movements in answering the questions of movement emergence and how the “free rider” problem is overcome for individual participation. Original strain and root cause theories of social movement emergence have been replaced or refined by research responding to the challenge of these questions in examining especially the effects of changes to mobilizing networks, political opportunity structures, and framing processes for explaining why movements surface at particular times and not others, as well as why they take different forms under similar conditions. Application of a social movement theory approach to studying terrorism promises to improve understanding of when such grievances are important to radicalization and the emergence of violence, how they are exploited by terrorist groups, as well as how changes in these conditions and the perception of them influence larger popular attitudes with respect to terrorism.

Integration of a social movement tradition into terrorism and political violence research also promises to serve a beneficial effect as a reorienting tool to overcome...
normative biases in both traditions.\textsuperscript{11} Terrorism researchers, usually more closely aligned with public policy and governments, have tended to study groups of which society (and frequently the researcher) disapproves. Conversely social movement researchers, often associated more closely with critical academic traditions, have tended to study movements of which they (and those around them) often approve. In the same manner that the social construction of terrorism biases understanding at an often unconscious level, the positive associations often associated with social movements for researchers in that tradition (or suspicious attitudes towards established power structures) bring some level of potential bias. Integrating these research traditions is likely to have disruptive effects on both biases, bringing them more clearly into conscious consideration.

The normative reorienting effect of this integration is also likely to occur at a simpler level, with the application of social movement theories to terrorism increasing exploration of the perceptions of potentially sympathetic populations, and with the application of terrorism cases to social movement research motivating closer examination of the potentially violent and destructive side of mobilization.\textsuperscript{12} A similar reorienting effect is likely to occur by encouraging terrorism research to focus more on countermovement actors, and social movement researchers to consider the potential desirable or positive effects of state action on movements instead of the dominant focus of current research on state repression.

\textit{Rescuing a Normative Conception of Terrorism}

A central explanation of this thesis is that biases in how we talk and think about terrorism undermine our understanding of the phenomenon and lead to counterproductive efforts in the war on terror. Discourse about terrorism has long been criticized for its prejudicial effects and many academics, including prominent social movement figures, have argued that the term should be rejected both for academic

\textsuperscript{11} Where as Tilly talks about social movement concepts as orienting tools to help identify and examine descriptive elements of a mobilization dynamic, my suggestion is that this approach may help to expose and explore normative elements generating biases and thus label these as “reorienting tools.” Ibid.

\textsuperscript{12} For example, Wiktorowicz argues that applying a social movement perspective to the study of Hamas has a “de-orientalizing” effect. Wiktorowicz, Ibid. "Introduction: Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory," Bloomington, 22.
After 9/11 the American social construction of terrorism became even more normatively charged, emotional, and enemy-centric. However, as discussed at the beginning of this thesis, I believe that a normative construction of terrorism serves a positive role. This final section examines whether a normative construction of terrorism can be saved at the same time as overcoming the problematic enemy-centric and overly moral judgmental biases by looking specifically at the dangers of these biases as self-fulfilling prophecies, why we are unlikely to and should not get rid of a normative construction of terrorism, and finally raising warnings for counterterrorism if we fail.

The preceding chapters of this thesis have raised a wide range of problems with the biases inherent in how we talk and think about terrorism especially after 9/11 in the United States. An especially problematic effect of these biases is that they tend to create self-fulfilling prophecies that in turn make them self-reinforcing. Terrorism researchers and insurgent theorists have long observed that overly repressive state responses often alienate the larger population building sympathy with militant groups. With respect to the U.S. war on terror a range of tactics associated with harder and more coercive approaches to counterterrorism, stemming from an enemy-centric and highly normative approach, have demonstrated these effects including military strikes with a higher tolerance for collateral damage, alignment with authoritarian regimes creating space for their repressive actions, and inflammatory rhetoric seen as targeting larger Muslim populations. When these actions have triggered increasing anti-Americanism and protests from larger Muslim populations, they have in turn served to reinforce perspectives consistent with the original biases that these general populations are part of the problem anyway. Similar self-fulfilling effects occur through a number of other mechanisms, including: undermining moderates as when the United States reacted very adversely to the success of Islamists in Lebanese, Palestinian, and Egyptian elections; the bolstering of transnational extremists caused by engaging in clash of civilizations rhetoric consistent with the framing of militants; and, the aggravation of base level grievances generated by a range of American policies pursued without considering the implications of population level effects.

Tilly, "Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists."
Despite the dangers inherent in a normative terrorism discourse there is little reason to expect the general construction or language to dramatically change anytime soon.\textsuperscript{14} Nor should we strive for an entirely non-normative discourse. Many of the fundamental problems with how we discuss terrorism emerge from the aspects of the discourse that are also essential to our shared social desire to prohibit, denounce, and deter the use of terrorist violence. As long as we hold to this desirable goal, which we should, the realities of an imperfect world will be that the language of terrorism will cause problems. The associated moral condemnation exercises a public sanctioning and shunning influence and helps to motivate and legitimate government action, which in turn help to raise the cost for groups considering such tactics deterring future use. The normative condemnation is similarly part of the desired effect of a hearts and minds goal in gaining the popular support of a population to discourage recruitment, fundraising, concealment, and operations. Actors seeking legitimacy, whether as individuals and groups wishing to participate within normal political structures or as states participating in the international system, seek to avoid the condemnation of being connected with the use of terrorism because of the associated sanctions. From a social movement perspective successfully convincing a target population to label actions as terrorism or a group as a terrorist, and having those labels perceived as legitimate, is part of important contested framing processes that may shape the evolution of a movement by discouraging the use of certain repertoires of contention or turning larger parts of a movement against violent elements.

Our desire to overcome the biases yet retain a normative construct of terrorism creates competing pressures that leave no perfect resolution. As long as the construct carries a powerful normative connotation it will be susceptible to politicized abuse. However, while these forces push in opposite directions, they do not entirely trade off. In the same manner as errors of false positives and false negatives in quantitative research it may be impossible to eliminate both, but it is possible to decrease both by refined and more careful usage. The dangers of the enemy-centric and highly normative biases discussed in this thesis can be muted while still condemning the tactic of terrorism. The reorienting effects of adopting the perspective of the larger population

\textsuperscript{14} Boyle explains that once a phrase such as the “war on terror” has become a core part of political discourse and framing it becomes resistant to change and tends to persist. Boyle, "The War on Terror in American Grand Strategy."
and examining social movement dynamics assist in overcoming these biases. A consistent problem with American discussions of terrorism is the failure to recognize that local populations make moral judgments by including consideration and balancing against other normatively prescribed actions. Ignoring these only exaggerates the alienation between populations and decreases understanding. Another step may involve learning to embrace some level of ambiguity and the morally unsatisfying reality that there are no pure good actors and pure bad actors. The flexibility of such ambiguity for being able to label something as terrorism while stepping back to adopt the perspective of that actor, or more importantly others potentially sympathetic, is key to successful analysis as well as public policy and diplomacy. The ultimate measure of counterterrorism is saving the most lives balanced with not sacrificing important priorities. This may require the type of shrewd and hard hitting diplomacy and approach to the war on terror that both condemns a group for using terrorism, but also creates space for the that group or more importantly the larger movement around them to evolve into non-violent processes as part of a inclusive system. Such a change requires top-level support whether from respected academic work or those senior political leaders and other influential individuals who may be able to contribute to a change in the general social construction over time.

Specific to the current context of the U.S. war on terror researchers, analysts, policy makers, and others conscious of the danger inherent in these biases face a significant practical problem in that key elements of the current social construction of terrorism are based on more than a grain of truth. The primary groups threatening the United States with terrorist attacks are all militant Islamists who at least broadly are interconnected through larger Islamist movements and share important commonalities. Some of these groups are willing to, capable of, and in important cases intent on carrying out mass casualty attacks against U.S. and Western targets. Key movement figures do espouse very long-term goals involving the establishment of at least regional control governed by an extreme version of fundamentalist theocratic rule. It is easy for critics of the type of hearts and minds strategy advocated in this thesis to point to

15 Booth does this well acknowledging that he can imagine situations in which he may have supported terrorism while also arguing that terrorism is “a powerful word, and one with almost wholly negative connotations (and long may it remain so!)” Booth, "The Human Faces of Terror," 65,72.
examples of each of these realities in making their arguments. It takes a deeper understanding of the specific dynamics and histories of various conflicts and groups to appreciate the significant differences within Islamist movements, to realize that while connected most of these actors and especially the larger populations around them are locally focused and not intent on transnational violence, and that the driving motivations for most individuals are not related to nor supportive of the long term militant Islamist goals used to justify the extreme threat to U.S. and Western interests. While the nuanced response in advocating the need for a population-centric approach may be more difficult to make, a conclusion of this thesis is that it is necessary to improve our understanding of terrorism as well as the counterterrorism efforts governments pursue.

Writing about the Bush administration’s legal setbacks and the value of judicial review, a Texas law professor noted of the sentiments that drove the Iraq war and justifications for torture, “we tend to be at our worst when we’re mad and scared.” The normative construction may perform a valuable role in deterring groups from adopting tactics of terrorism and motivating government action. However, the emotions of individuals and the larger public after the 9/11 attacks, which continue to be reflected in the now unconscious associations and filters of how we talk and think about terrorism, are central to the enemy-centric and normative biases discussed throughout this thesis. In order to preserve the benefits of a normative construction of terrorism, while striving for an unbiased understanding, individual researchers, analysts, and policy makers as well as the larger public must strive to be aware of and compensate for these influences.

A final and problematic danger of the self-fulfilling sort is that despite the overly enemy-centric and highly normative biases the United States and the West will prevail in the current war on terror with militant Islamists. While this is good news from a security perspective, the problem is that these governments can prevail without addressing the biases inherent in the current construction. In the process actions and rhetoric may then continue to contribute to mobilizing grievances across large parts of the world, increasing the damage of violent conflict in the interim, without giving sufficient attention to addressing the underlying problems over the long term. As in the past, notably for the current crisis as the United States did when the Soviets were driven

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from Afghanistan, because the motivation to engage was based on an enemy-centric bias political actors will forget about the problem until those grievances rise up again under a new movement. Given the mobilizing dynamics and history of larger parts of the Muslim world there is a good chance that the next movement will also include violent elements, who blame the United States and the West, and will be willing to carry out mass casualty attacks further magnified by newer technology.

Because of the difficulties discussed in this thesis and limits to agency there is no guarantee that addressing the biases now by taking a more population-centric view will either guarantee that the solutions pursued will solve the problems contributing to mobilization or that government attention will persist after this wave of mobilization passes. There is always the possibility that the next mobilization will for whatever chances of fate take a completely non-violent path in attempting to address grievances and integrate into the international system peacefully. But it seems to me that we are better off trying to avoid the risk by raising awareness of the problems and striving through individual academic and policy work to address these biases.

As Laura Bush explains, the attacks of September 11 have left a mark on our emotions and our thinking. Whether our goal is to improve the quality of academic research and understanding of the dynamics surrounding the use of political violence, or to improve a government’s efforts in the race for hearts and minds striving to insure that another similar attack does not occur on our watch, the conclusion of this thesis is that we need to change how we approach the study and analysis of terrorism.


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