

**VIRTUE, HONOUR AND MODERATION:
THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERTY IN MONTESQUIEU'S
POLITICAL THOUGHT**

Andreas Aktoudianakis

**A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews**



2016

**Full metadata for this item is available in
St Andrews Research Repository
at:**

<http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/>

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:


<http://hdl.handle.net/10023/9889>

This item is protected by original copyright

**This item is licensed under a
Creative Commons Licence**

Virtue, Honour and Moderation:
The Foundations of Liberty in Montesquieu's Political
Thought

Andreas Aktoudianakis



University of
St Andrews

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of
PhD at the
University of St Andrews

22 / March / 2016

1. Candidate's declarations:

I, Andreas Aktoudianakis, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 78000 words in length, has been written by me, and that it is the record of work carried out by me, or principally by myself in collaboration with others as acknowledged, and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.

I was admitted as a research student in September 2011, and as a candidate for the degree of PhD in May 2012; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St Andrews between 2011 and 2016.

(If you received assistance in writing from anyone other than your supervisor/s):
I, Andreas Aktoudianakis, received assistance in the writing of this thesis in respect of language, grammar, and syntax, which was provided by Ms. Katherine Palfrey.

Date 22/March/2016 signature of candidate

2. Supervisor's declaration:

I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations appropriate for the degree of PhD in the University of St Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that degree.

Date signature of supervisor

3. Permission for publication:

In submitting this thesis to the University of St Andrews I understand that I am giving permission for it to be made available for use in accordance with the regulations of the University Library for the time being in force, subject to any copyright vested in the work not being affected thereby. I also understand that the title and the abstract will be published, and that a copy of the work may be made and supplied to any bona fide library or research worker, that my thesis will be electronically accessible for personal or research use unless exempt by award of an embargo as requested below, and that the library has the right to migrate my thesis into new electronic forms as required to ensure continued access to the thesis. I have obtained any third-party copyright permissions that may be required in order to allow such access and migration, or have requested the appropriate embargo below.

The following is an agreed request by candidate and supervisor regarding the publication of this thesis:

PRINTED COPY a) No embargo on print copy

ELECTRONIC COPY a) No embargo on electronic copy

Date: 22 / March / 2016 signature of candidate

Date: 22 / March / 2016 signature of supervisor

ABSTRACT

Liberal thinkers have suggested different theories that legitimise the state's various processes, institutions, and use of coercive power. However, their theories cannot account for those motivations that cause men to put their lives in danger when standing against political oppression. The study of Montesquieu's theory of government can aid liberalism's incomplete account of the political motivations that incline men to defend their liberty. Toward this end, this thesis studies Montesquieu's notions of virtue and honour, and challenges the meaning they have been accorded in previous studies. This thesis suggests that Montesquieu combined these notions in order to conceive a type of motivation that inclines individuals to defend their liberty against encroachment. In order to recover this type of motivation, this study will adopt an approach of close textual analysis with attention to the context.

Virtue and honour play a crucial role in Montesquieu's political thought because they foster the preservation of government. Virtue inclines citizens in republics to act with self-sacrifice. However, that virtue does not aim toward the attainment of excellence or of God's grace; rather, Montesquieu conceived virtue in relation to public utility. Honour inclines the subjects of monarchy to pursue their selfish desires in order to derive public benefits. However, Montesquieu did not conceive honour in connection with the liberal motif of the invisible hand; rather, he conceived honour in connection with the pursuit of glory. By combining honour and virtue, Montesquieu conceived a type of motivation that can foster the preservation of liberty in modernity. This motivation enables individuals to enjoy their liberty in times of peace by pursuing their selfish desires; in times of crisis, it inclines them to perform great actions in order to defend that liberty against political oppression. Considering Montesquieu's type can aid liberalism's account of political motivations in the contemporary debate.

EDITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations will be used to refer to Montesquieu's writings, followed by book, chapter, and page numbers. Otherwise this thesis relies on André Masson's edition, which was published in three parts as the *Œuvres Complètes De Montesquieu* in 1950.

<i>EL</i>	<i>The Spirit of the Laws</i> . Translated and edited by Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller & Harold Samuel Stone. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
<i>Pensées</i>	<i>Pensées</i> . Translated, edited, and with an Introduction by Henry C. Clark (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2012).
<i>LP</i>	<i>Persian Letters</i> . Translated, edited, and with an Introduction by J. Davidson. (London: Routledge, 1923).
<i>CR</i>	<i>The Complete Works of M. de Montesquieu</i> (London: T. Evans, 1777), 4 vols. Vol. 3.

The following abbreviations will be used to refer to Aristotle's writings, followed by book and chapter.

<i>Politics</i>	<i>The Politics</i> . Translated by Benjamin Jowet. 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1885).
<i>EE</i>	<i>The Eudemian Ethics</i> . Translated by A. Kenny. (OUP Oxford, 2011).
<i>NE</i>	<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i> . Edited and translated by R. Crisp. (Cambridge University Press, 2000).

The following abbreviations will be used to refer to Cicero's writings, followed by book and chapter.

<i>De Off</i>	<i>De Officiis</i> . Translated by Gardiner, G.B. (Aberdeen University Press; London; 1899).
<i>Rep</i>	<i>The Republic and The Laws</i> . Translated by N. Rudd. (Oxford University Press; New York; 1998).

The following abbreviations will be used to refer to Machiavelli's writings, followed by book and chapter and page number.

<i>Prince</i>	<i>The Prince</i> . N. Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others. Edited and translated by Allan Gilbert. (Duke University Press, 1989).
<i>Disc</i>	<i>Discourses on Livy</i> . N. Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others. Edited and translated by Allan Gilbert. (Duke University Press, 1989).
<i>Hist</i>	<i>History of Florence and of the Affairs of Italy</i> . This text was typed up from a Universal Classics Library edition, published in 1901 by W. Walter Dunne, New York and London. The translator was not named. (Pennsylvania State University, 2007).

The following abbreviations will be used to refer to St Augustine's writings, followed by page number.

<i>DCD</i>	<i>The City of God</i> . Translated by Henry Bettenson. (Penguin Books; London; 2003).
<i>NEG</i>	<i>Grace and the Will According to Augustine</i> , Karfíková, L. (Brill 2012).
<i>DLA</i>	<i>On Free Choice of the Will</i> . Translated by Thomas Williams. (Hackett Publishing Company, 1993).
<i>PHR</i>	<i>Grace and the Will According to Augustine</i> , Karfíková, L. (Brill 2012).

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis would not exist without the exceptional mentorship of my supervisor, Dr. Gabriella Slomp. Gabriella tirelessly read my work and offered me detailed comments that really helped me to improve my writing and critical engagement with the study of political theory. I could not have hoped to work with someone who is more critical, encouraging and professional than Gabriella. Her commitment to perfection and scrutiny will serve from now on as a standard that will guide my future engagements.

In addition, I wish to acknowledge the support from other Faculty members at the School of International Relations in St Andrews, most notably Professor Anthony Lang, Professor Nicholas Rengger and Professor Patrick Hayden. Over the last five years, they have contributed to the development of my ideas and research during my MLitt and PhD. At my alma mater, the American College of Greece, Mr. Daniel McCormac deserves mention. It was he who first helped me realise how exciting and stimulating I found the study of political theory. Also, Dr. Haris Vlavianos, whose class inspired me to consider critically the relevance of the ideas of past thinkers to the present.

In addition to this academic guidance, I also wish to acknowledge the support of my family. The completion of my studies could not have been possible without them on my side. I consider myself very lucky being a son, brother and grandson to Evangelos & Eleni, Nikolas and Jaja. Finally, I particularly wish to express my gratitude to Kate Palfrey, whose encouragement helped me to walk toward the light every time I found the weight on my shoulders restricting.

CONTENTS

Abstract	3
Editions and Abbreviations	4
Acknowledgments	6
Contents	7

Part I: The Character of Politics

Introduction	10
Thesis Statement and Contribution to the Literature	22
Methodological Note	23
The Plan of this Study	27
The Foundations of Liberty	30
I. Montesquieu's Method of Classification	31
II. Human Nature, Law and the Purpose of Politics	36
III. Montesquieu's Original Typology of Regimes	40
IV. The Pursuit of Liberty in Montesquieu's Original Typology	46
V. The Pursuit of Liberty in England	55
VI. Conclusion	61
Reading the Commentary: Virtue, Honour and the Principle of England	63
I. Interpreting England's Principle in Connection with Honour	64
II. Conflating the Principles of England and Monarchy	71
III. Interpreting England's Principle in Connection with Fear	78
IV. Interpreting England's Principle in Connection with Virtue	84
V. Conclusion	94

Part II: Liberal Aspirations

Honour: More than Laissez-Faire	98
I. Gloria in Machiavelli	99
II. Honour and Laissez-Faire in Mandeville	105
III. The Aspect of Power in Montesquieu's Notion of Honour	111

IV. The Psychological Motives of Honour	118
V. Conclusion: The Conceptual Heritage of Montesquieuian Honour	125
Virtue: a Matter of Utility	129
I. A Conceptual Ambiguity in Montesquieu's Notion of Virtue	130
II. Pagan Virtue: the Pursuit of Excellence	133
III. Christian Virtue: Pious Humility and Grace	141
IV. Montesquieuian Virtue: Self-sacrifice as a Means to an End	147
V. Conclusion	156
English Liberty: a Matter of Principle	159
I. The Eighteenth-Century Debate on Luxury	160
II. Montesquieu's Early Response to the Debate on Luxury	172
III. England's Principle and the Englishmen's Psychological Motives	176
IV. Montesquieu's Response to the Debate on Luxury	184
V. Conclusion	189
Conclusion	191
Bibliography	204

Part I: The Character of Politics

INTRODUCTION

“Liberty, that good which makes for the enjoyment of other goods”

(Pensées 1574)

What are the formal foundations of liberty and what motivates men to defend it? Political liberty is present in a state when power is not abused, says Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu (1689-1755).¹ But he adds immediately that “it has eternally been observed that any man who has power is led to abuse it; he continues until he finds limits” (*EL XI*, 4 p.155). For this reason, Montesquieu deemed that to preserve liberty in a state, it is necessary to establish certain barriers in the constitution that prevent the abuse of political power. The best way of attaining this end, he thought, is by formulating the constitution in a way that separates political power into executive, legislative and judiciary functions (*EL XI*, 6 pp.156-66). In this way, ambitious politicians are hampered in their attempts to centralise political power and use it for their own purposes.

Nevertheless, Montesquieu did not believe that the constitution alone could serve as a sufficient measure against encroaching political power. Rather, he thought that the citizens of a state must also do their own part to secure their liberty. As U.S. President Andrew Jackson said, “eternal vigilance by the people is the price of liberty” and “you must pay the price if you wish to secure the blessing” (Jackson, 1850, p.11). In a similar vein, Montesquieu thought that although the constitution limits the abuse of political power on paper, it may still be undermined in practice if the citizens do not check upon its exercise (*EL XIX*, 27 pp.325-33). For this reason, he thought that in order to be free, the citizens must remain vigilant in political affairs to resist the tyranny of a majority or the government’s encroaching power.

¹ This study does not offer a biographical note on Montesquieu. However, for an authoritative account about Montesquieu’s life and thought, see Shackleton, R. *Montesquieu: A Critical Biography*. Oxford University Press, 1961 (Shackleton, 1961).

Therefore, along with formal constitutional guarantees, Montesquieu thought that the survival of liberty also requires the spirited defence of the citizens.

Montesquieu's observation opens the door to another set of questions: What are the individual motivations that foster the preservation of liberty? How do individuals develop these motivations in modern liberal democracies? These questions aim to define the type of motivation that inclines individuals to defend their liberty in the face of danger. Both questions assume that these motivations are linked to a certain trait of character or a social norm that can be instilled equally among men. Though it may be true, this assumption is attended by a great number of variables and its examination lies within the realm of social science. However, insofar as it concerns the contemporary debate in political theory, these questions remain very relevant. Indeed, it has been argued that given the plurality of their societies, modern liberal democracies cannot provide their citizens with a common metaphysical or religious framework to agree on social norms (Hedrick, 2010, pp.1-17). Moreover, according to Krause, these questions have been largely neglected in recent years because political thinkers have devoted their attentions mostly to specifying the meanings of justice and political legitimacy (Krause, 2002a, p.9).

The accounts of political thinkers who have attempted to address the question about the individual motivations that foster the preservation of liberty may be divided in three camps. Firstly, there are the advocates of rational choice theory, who define these motivations in relation to the individual's pursuit of self-interest.² Secondly, there is a larger camp that consists of communitarians and republicans. Despite the differences and problems associated with their approaches, these theorists may be grouped together insofar as they define these

² Despite its more or less common approach in defining the individual motivations that foster liberty, the rational-choice camp is very diverse. Indeed, Friedman suggests that rational choice theorists disagree as to whether all actions should be considered against strictly selfish motives (Friedman, 1996). Moreover, while Friedman focuses on those aspects which set rational-choice theorists apart, others, like Chong, have attempted to locate points of convergence between purely self-interested and charitable actions (Chong, 1991, pp.191-229).

motivations in relation to their respective notions of virtue. In this group, communitarian and republican theorists address the question of motivations in relation to the notion of civic virtue.³ They define virtue as a type of motivation that inclines individuals to prioritise the common good over their private ambition. In order to educate the citizens to lead a life of virtue, this camp deems that the government must play an active role by shaping education and laws. In this manner, they think that the citizens will become rightly motivated to oppose unjust policies and bow to legitimate political authority. Toward this end, they compare the act of statesmanship, or “statecraft” as Digester put it, with the process of “soulcraft” (Digeser, 1995, p.3). However, the benefits of communitarian and republican theories of virtue come at a cost. Despite its seeming benignancy, virtue may require the government to interfere with the citizens’ private lives and repress individual dispositions under its overarching mentality. Moreover, an overarching state mentality can stifle private ambition, which is the driving force behind the apparatus of modern liberal democracies. As a result, the communitarian/republican pursuit of virtue dissipates contemporary liberal aspirations by endangering social heterogeneity and individual freedom.

Thirdly, in an attempt to address the limitations of the communitarian and republican accounts of virtue, liberal thinkers have pronounced their own conceptions of virtue. Their formulations result in a conception of virtue within a liberal framework that aims to reinforce the formal guarantees of liberty in modern liberal democracies. Liberal thinkers aim to nurture a basic concern for the common good while at the same time accommodating individuality; they also aim to avoid the exclusion and oppression that undermine their communitarian and republican counterparts. This is also evident in their descriptions, which define “liberal virtues” as freedom of association, self-restraint, pluralism, diversity,

³ See, for example, *After Virtue* (MacIntyre, 1984); *The Spirit of Community: Rights Responsibilities and the Communitarian Agenda* (Etzioni, 2013); *Liberalism and the Communitarian Challenge* (Ray, 1999); *Our Politics, Our Selves? Liberalism, Identity, and Harm* (Digeser, 1995); *Liberalism, Communitarianism and Education: Reclaiming Liberal Education* (Keeney, 2012); *Statecraft as Soulcraft* (Will, 1984); *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (Sandel, 1998).

tolerance, neutrality, reflective judgment, sympathetic imagination and the ability to cooperate (Macedo, 1990).⁴ However, despite eluding the pitfalls of their communitarian and republican counterparts, liberal virtues cannot account for those motivations that incline an individual to defend spiritedly his liberty. For example, none of the virtues mentioned above can describe the motives of the unknown rebel at the 1989 Tiananmen square protests, or Witold Pilecki's voluntary surrender to Auschwitz as part of Poland's underground resistance against Nazism (Iyer, 1998; Pilecki & Garlinski, 2012). Therefore, although liberal virtues further liberty in liberal democracies, they cannot account for those motivations that cause men to put their lives in danger when standing against political oppression.

As Montesquieu and President Jackson would have said, political legitimacy and political motivations are two sides of the same coin that buys a people its liberty. Contemporary political thinkers have offered various accounts regarding the role of the citizens in upholding or opposing the exercise of political power that interferes with their liberty. However, communitarian and republican thinkers have failed to consider the strong political motivation of private ambition and to secure the individual from state interference. Moreover, liberal thinkers have also failed to account for those political motivations that incline individuals to spiritedly defend their liberty. Hence, despite their various attempts, political theorists have not yet managed to explain successfully the individual motivations that further liberty in modern liberal democracies.

The study of Montesquieu's "system on liberty" can significantly aid contemporary liberalism's account of political motivations (*Pensées* 907 p.232). Indeed, although he has often been considered a conservative thinker, Montesquieu's political aspirations were in fact

⁴ See for example, *The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom* (Kukathas, 2003); *Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State* (Galston, 1991); *The Liberal State & the Politics of Virtue* (Beckman, 2001); *Liberalism and the Moral Life*, (Rosenblum, 1989); *Liberalism and Value Pluralism* (Crowder, 2002); *Constructing Community: Moral Pluralism and Tragic Conflicts* (Moon, 2012); *Cultural Pluralism and Dilemmas of Justice* (Deveaux, 2000); *Civic Liberalism: Reflections on Our Democratic Ideals* (Spragens, 1999); *Modus Vivendi Liberalism: Theory and Practice* (McCabe, 2010); *Virtue and the Making of Modern Liberalism* (Berkowitz, 2000).

liberal (Richter, 1977, p. 63-4). In contrast to his contemporaries Jean de la Bruyère and Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet, who praised the divine right of Kings,⁵ Montesquieu described the relationship between man and nature based on the natural laws (Shackleton, 1961, p. 252).⁶ By choosing this criterion as the foundation of his political thought, he aimed to expose the artificial certainty of “every belief and custom” (Shklar, 1987, p.30).

The exposition of uncertainty became Montesquieu’s purpose in the *Persian Letters* (1721). This work is a novel consisting mainly of letters exchanged between two Persian visitors to Europe, and their friends, servants, and wives at home. In their letters the Persian visitors communicate their impressions of Western societies, religion and culture. By drawing comparisons with the Eastern institutions and cultural norms, the correspondents present a satirical picture of France in the early 18th century (Shackleton, 1961, p. 28). In this regard, Shackleton says that “the principal intellectual aim of Montesquieu in the *Lettres Persannes* was to destroy prejudice” (Shackleton, 1961, p.41). This “device of a many-sided correspondence [...] suited Montesquieu’s sceptical purposes perfectly” says Shklar (Shklar, 1987, pp. 30-31). Montesquieu used this form to express his scepticism with regard to the absolute ideals of monarchy and Roman Catholicism. Through the words of Usbek, Montesquieu criticised legislators who derived laws from indubitable axioms because he considered laws subject to change “like the minds of those who make them” (*LP* 98 p.223). By

⁵ Jean de la Bruyère and Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet authored works on political thought and statesmanship that aimed to consolidate absolute monarchy and Louis’ reign in France. Bruyère wrote *Les Caractères* (1688) under a fixed conception of monarchy and religion which is absolute and Catholic (Shackleton, 1961, p. 36). Although at certain points he criticises Louis’ extravagance, in all his judgments Bruyère is guided by “absolute standards which are never placed in doubt” (Ibid). As a result, his approach to the analysis and exercise of power in monarchy was essentially despotic. On the other hand, Bossuet’s *Politique Tirée de l'Écriture Sainte* (1679) was altogether a work in support of the divine right of absolute monarchy. Bossuet deemed monarchy to be sacred, paternal and absolute. Guided by these principles, he based his work on the scriptures and ascertained Louis’ absolutism by divine right (Bossuet, 1990, p. 245). Despite the differences separating their thought, exponents of absolutism such as de la Bruyère and Bossuet justified Louis’ consolidation of power based on three inviolable axioms. These were: paternal monarchy, Catholic faith and indubitability of reason (Ibid, p. 57).

⁶ For example, he says in *The Spirit of the Laws* that “These rules are a consistently established relation. Between one moving body and another moving body, it is in accord with relations of mass and velocity that all motions are received, increased, diminished, or lost; every diversity is uniformity, every change is consistency” (*EL* I, I p.4).

challenging the validity of truths derived from religious belief, Montesquieu also challenged his contemporaries' assumption that absolute monarchy was the ideal form of government. Instead, he argued (through the words of Usbek) that "the most perfect [government] is that [...] which leads men by following their propensities and inclinations" (*LP* 80 p.195).⁷

The study of these 'propensities and inclinations' became Montesquieu's object in *The Spirit of the Laws* (1748). Montesquieu's principal purpose in *The Spirit of the Laws* was to understand the 'character' of modern politics (Oakeshott, 1993, p. 36). This character, he thought, amounted to the shared experiences among men who live together and follow shared norms regarding the constitution, society and commerce. As Oakeshott put it, the character of a state is "a certain range of dispositions in respect of the pursuit and engagements of government" (Oakeshott, 1993, p. 41). Thus, the character of a state is largely dependent on the type of government that rules over a people. Moreover, it forms certain propensities and inclinations among men that influence their behaviour (Ibid, p.37). Montesquieu thought that the various types of regimes active in eighteenth-century Europe were limiting because their character could not further the pursuit of liberty (Ibid, p.36). Instead of enlarging the scope of liberty, Montesquieu thought that these regimes obstructed their citizens from realising the full range of their individual propensities. As a result, those individuals whose propensities clashed with the character of the state would have to suppress them by conforming to the character of the majority.⁸ Therefore, if the 'most perfect' government enables men to follow their own 'propensities and inclinations,' Montesquieu would opine that none of these regime types could qualify as perfect.

⁷ Montesquieu repeated the same phrase in *The Spirit of the Laws*: "It is better to say that the government most in conformity with nature is the one whose particular arrangement best relates to the disposition of the people for whom it is established" (*EL* I, 3 p.8).

⁸ For example, Montesquieu said that republican citizens should be checked by censors in order to enforce them to act virtuously: "There must be censors in a republic where the principle of government is virtue. It is not only crimes that destroy virtue, but also negligence, mistakes, a certain slackness in the love of the homeland, dangerous examples, the seeds of corruption, that which does not run counter to the laws but eludes them, that which does not destroy them but weakens them: all these should be corrected by censors" (*EL* VI, 19 p.71).

Montesquieu therefore conceived an ideal type of government that corrected the limitations of modern politics in two ways. Firstly, it established formal constitutional guarantees for the protection of individual liberty (*EL XI*, 6 pp.156-66). Secondly, due to its liberal constitution, this type was able to accommodate every individual insofar as his propensities and inclinations did not infringe upon the law (*EL XIX*, 27 pp.325-33). In this regard, Montesquieu's ideal type furthers liberty while addressing both parts of the question at the beginning of this section. It establishes formal guarantees that protect individual liberty, which in turn motivate the citizens to love their liberty "prodigiously" and thus, to defend it spiritedly, "like hands rescuing the body" (*EL XIX*, 27 p.326). Montesquieu thought that his ideal type could meet modern men's expectations of liberty without resorting to oppression (*EL XI*, 6 pp.156-66). Moreover, as Oakeshott put it, Montesquieu's ideal type constituted a free state because its character was, unlike the limiting character of eighteenth-century European states, *capable de tout* (Oakeshott, 1993, p.41).

Montesquieu had an avid interest in investigating the various types of motivations that incline individuals to act in modern politics. His interest in this topic had been developed partly due to his contact with the influential debate on luxury in the 18th century.⁹ This debate consisted of two sides that proposed different ways of managing men's individual motivations in order to address the social effects of luxury. However, Montesquieu deemed that both sides of the debate proposed solutions that could potentially undermine men's pursuit of liberty. In this regard, his conception of an ideal regime type served as a response to this debate: it established formal guarantees of liberty; it enabled men to freely pursue their individual motivations; more crucially, it inclined them to defend that liberty against political oppression. For this reason, the study of Montesquieu's ideal type can significantly aid contemporary liberalism's account of political motivations. Indeed, despite moments of

⁹ This debate, its participants and its influence on Montesquieu is explored in depth in chapter 6 of this study.

conservatism, Montesquieu was one of the thinkers who shaped the liberal tradition in its cradle.¹⁰ And perhaps he understood better than any of his contemporaries that besides formal guarantees, the preservation of liberty requires the necessary political motivations to sustain it.

Montesquieu's contribution to the eighteenth-century discourse on liberty is uncontroversial, but the details and implications of his analysis are greatly contested in the contemporary debate. Indeed, although every past and modern reader agrees that liberty is a central notion in his thought, this claim serves as the start for all controversy in the modern debate. As a result, modern scholarship on Montesquieu has become polarised over the question of whether his ideal of liberty was liberal or republican.

On one hand, Montesquieu is widely recognised as the political philosopher who played a pivotal role in the development of eighteenth-century republicanism in both America and France (Shklar, 1990, p.265; Nelson, 2006, p.176). And many scholars have credited him for setting the terms for the republican debate in the time that followed (Pangle pp.6-7; Shackleton p.276; Linton, 2001, p.13). Montesquieu admired classical republican governments for inspiring their citizens with love for their homeland and uniting their private ambitions into a single will. He said that when this love was in full force, "things were done in those governments that we no longer see and that astonish our small souls" (*EL IV*, 4 p.35). Nevertheless, although he admired ancient republics, Montesquieu was also aware of the difficulties attending their establishment in modernity. For this reason, a great number of scholars argue that Montesquieu was a republican insofar as he wanted to recover some aspects of ancient republicanism in modern states (Hullung, 1976, pp. 212-21; Kelly, 1986, p. 293; Keohane, 1972, p.384; Levy, 2006, p.53; Linton, 2001, p.13, 62; Pettit 1997, p.20; Rahe, 2009, p.55; Thiemann, 2009, p. 275).

¹⁰ For a cogent account regarding Montesquieu's liberalism see *Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas* (Berlin, Hardy & Hausheer, 1980, ch.6)

On the other hand, a great number of scholars disagree with this line of interpretation, arguing that Montesquieu was a liberal (Berlin, 1980, pp.130-62; Krause, 2000, p.257, 264; Dijn, 2008, pp.20-32; Mosher, 2007, pp. 114–5; Mosher, 1994, p.38-40; Pangle, 1973, p.4; Flamenatz, 1963, p.275; Manent, 1998, ch.5; Sonenscher 2009; Spector 2004). Although this intellectual camp agrees that Montesquieu admired the spirit of ancient republics, they argue that he clearly repudiated their relevance to modernity. This is due to the perceived mismatch between the rise of commerce and colonialism in eighteenth-century Europe, and the principles and virtues of classical republics (Douglass, 2012). Montesquieu deemed that modern states must allow men greater room for individual agency by raising restrictions in the economy and capitalising on men's private ambition to procure public benefits (Hirschman, 1997, p.10; Richter, 1977, p.43; Larrère, 2001, pp.335-73). Those who consider Montesquieu a liberal deem that he wanted to perfect the eighteenth-century French monarchy by amending its constitution through the separation of political power. Hence this camp considers Montesquieu to have argued that modern men's expectations of liberty could be met not through virtuous republics but in industrious constitutional monarchies.

Therefore for every commentator reading Montesquieu as a republican, another is ready to argue that his proposed ideal of liberty was liberal.¹¹ Oakeshott says that this controversy stems in part from Montesquieu's often disorderly exposition of his political theory in *The Spirit of the Laws* (Oakeshott, 1993, p.36). Indeed, in *The Spirit of the Laws*, Montesquieu introduced two separate typologies of regimes, but it is uncertain how they are related and whether they should be studied together.

Firstly, in Part 1 of the book, Montesquieu introduced three regime types: republic, monarchy and despotism. In republics, he said, the people enjoy liberty as a collectivity by having possession over the means to control their lives and realise their fundamental

¹¹ For an example of the confusion to which Montesquieu's discussion of liberty has given rise, see *Essays in the Liberal Idea of Freedom* (Spitz, 1974); cf. *An Intellectual History of Liberalism* (Manent & Balinski, 1996, pp.60-63).

purposes (*EL II*, 2 p.10-5). In monarchies, the subjects have no share in government but they enjoy greater liberty in administering their private affairs as they see fit within the sphere of the law (*EL II*, 4 p.17-9). And in despotisms, Montesquieu deemed there can be no liberty, because political power is unregulated and the despot acts of his own accord (*EL II*, 5 p.20). Based on this distinction, men in republics and monarchies enjoy different types of liberty. In republics, they enjoy self-governance at the expense of individual liberty; in monarchies, they enjoy individual liberty at the expense of self-governance.

Secondly, in Part 2 of the book, Montesquieu introduced another type of government, which he abstracted from the constitution of England in the eighteenth-century. Montesquieu's *England* is an ideal type and should not be confused with the actual English regime (Courtney, 2001, p.279; Hirschl, 2008, p.202). Montesquieu's England attains and preserves his ideal of liberty for modernity (*EL XI*, 6 pp.156-66). For this reason, commentators from both sides deem England to be fundamental for understanding his notion of liberty. However, Montesquieu was not systematic in his analysis of England's government; as a result, his descriptions obscure both England's type of government and the type of liberty it promotes.

For example, unlike in his delineation of republics and monarchies, Montesquieu did not define England's type of government (*EL XI*, 11 pp.156-66). Instead, he limited his description to saying that in England "the republic hides under the form of monarchy" (*EL V*, 19 p.70). As a result, commentators debate whether Montesquieu considered England a monarchy or a republic.¹² Montesquieu's description of England's government has also given

¹² The bibliography related to this question is immense and its examination lies outside the scope of this study. However, for further reading on this matter see for example *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government* (Pettit, 1999); *Montesquieu and the Logic of Liberty* (Rahe, 2009); *Beyond Publius: Montesquieu, Liberal Republicanism and the Small-Republic Thesis* (Levy, 2006); *The Politics of Virtue in Enlightenment France* (Linton, 2001); *Liberalism with Honor* (Krause, 2002a); *Before the Deluge: Public Debt, Inequality, and the Intellectual Origins of the French Revolution* (Sonenscher, 2009); *Montesquieu* (Lowenthal, 2012); *The Judgmental Gaze of European Women: Gender, Sexuality, and the Critique of Republican Rule* (Mosher, 1994); *Free Trade, Free Speech and Free Love: Monarchy from the Liberal Prospect in Mid-Eighteenth Century France* (Mosher, 2007); *Honor, Interest, Virtue: The Affective Foundations of the*

rise to a debate about the type of liberty it promotes: commentators defining England as a republic deem that it promotes republican liberty, while commentators defining it as a monarchy deem its ideal of liberty to be liberal. Based on the type of liberty they attribute to England, commentators frame Montesquieu as a liberal or republican thinker.¹³

The implications of this debate extend outside the study of Montesquieu's political thought into the contemporary debate on liberty. Based on their own interpretation of England's type of liberty, various thinkers frame him as part of a greater liberal or republican tradition.¹⁴ On one hand, those labelling him a liberal consider England to be Montesquieu's liberal apogee and regard him as one of the fathers of liberalism (Faguet, 1999; Berlin, 1980, pp.130-61; Aron, 1968, p.54; Manin, 1984, pp.10-24; Jaume, 2000, Ch.2; Krause, 2000, p.257, 264; Dijn, 2008, pp.20-32; Mosher, 2007, pp. 114-5; Mosher, 1994, p.38-40; Sonenscher, 2009; Spector 2004; Spector, 2012, pp.57-72). On the other hand, commentators labelling him as a republican consider England to be Montesquieu's attempt to re-enact republican liberty in modernity (Hullung, 1976, p.46-50; Pettit 1997, p.20, pp. 40-1; Rahe, 2009, p.55; Levy, 2006, p.53; Lowenthal, 1987, pp.513-34).¹⁵

Regardless of the reasons why he did not define England's type of government, Montesquieu's omission has put it at the centre of a controversy in the modern debate. This debate has not so far yielded a solution or improved our understanding about his political thought and its place in the contemporary debate on liberty. Instead, it has increased the

Political in the Spirit of the Laws (Spector, 2008); Democratic and Aristocratic Republics: Ancient and Modern (Carrithers, 2001); Montesquieu and English Liberty (Courtney, 2001); Montesquieu on Economics and Commerce (Larrère, 2001); Montesquieu and the New Republicanism (Shklar, 1993); Montesquieu's Philosophy of Liberalism: A Commentary on the Spirit of the Laws (Pangle, 1989).

¹³ The critical examination of both liberal and republican interpretations will become the object of chapter 3.

¹⁴ Those labelling him as a liberal argue that England shares three central features with the liberal tradition. Firstly, the Englishmen can participate in legislation by electing their representatives (*EL XI, 6 p.159*). Secondly, its constitution separates political power to protect the individual from state interference (*Ibid*). Thirdly, England encourages the development of economic ties with other states to foster economic development and peace (*EL, XX, 2 pp.338-9*).

¹⁵ Those labelling him as a republican argue that England shares three central features with the republican tradition. Firstly, it fosters social and political equality through formal guarantees about the citizens' civic liberties (*EL XIX, 27 p.331*). Secondly, it encourages political awareness and requires the people to participate in legislation by exercising their right to elect their representatives (*EL XI, 6 p.159*). Thirdly, the Englishmen's love for their liberty inclines them to become actively engaged for its defence and guard it from political usurpation (*EL XIX, 27 p.326*).

complexity and ambiguity attending Montesquieu's concepts and categories. In their attempts to define England's type of government, commentators have conflated two analytical levels in the study of his thought: firstly, the types of regimes he identified based on his survey of states in eighteenth-century Europe, and secondly, the ideal type of regime he sought to propose for modernity. Commentators may therefore be mistaken in their tendency to domesticate England based on the types of republic and monarchy; this conjecture becomes more powerful when considering that commentators read England against the types of regimes that Montesquieu considered limiting and defective.

By conflating these analytical levels, commentators run the risk of limiting the breadth of Montesquieu's thought to fit contemporary categories such as liberalism and republicanism. *Liberalism* and *republicanism* are conceptual categories used to organise the thought of various thinkers about government and liberty. However, analysing the thought of a certain political thinker often brings us across junctions where different categories meet. Multiple strands of thought come together to form Montesquieu's political theory. Richter agrees that "Montesquieu's thought turns out to be characterised by complex tensions that cannot be reduced to any one single 'ism,' such as 'liberalism,' or analysed away as the alleged ideology of his class" (Richter, 1977, p.60).¹⁶ Under these conditions, it is a precarious enterprise to weave together ideas that are intended to be separate. This becomes especially relevant when it comes to the analysis of the individual motivations that further liberty: by reading England against the types of monarchy and republic, commentators obstruct the potential of understanding the unique motivations that further Montesquieu's ideal of liberty.

From here this introduction proceeds in three parts. Firstly, the purpose of the thesis and its contribution to the scholarship on Montesquieu will be stated. Following that, the

¹⁶ Alembert argued in his eulogy of Montesquieu that this conjecture could be more reasonable than the careless omission often attributed to him by commentators (Alembert, 1759, p.26). Moreover, the same is argued by Baum (Baum J.A., 2013, p.107).

methodological premises adopted in this thesis to examine the thought of Montesquieu regarding the individual motivations that foster the pursuit of liberty will be laid out. The final part will offer an overview of the following chapters and their respective arguments.

Thesis Statement and Contribution to the Literature

The purpose of this study is to analyse the character, or individual motivations, that foster Montesquieu's ideal of liberty in England. Toward this end, this study challenges commentators' tendencies to interpret England's character based either on the types of monarchy or republic. This is for two reasons. Firstly, to prevent conflating the individual motivations that further liberty in England with those of monarchies or republics; secondly, in order to disentangle Montesquieu's ideal of liberty from a duality that limits its consideration within liberalism or republicanism. Hence, by taking Montesquieu's ideal of liberty separately from a particular interpretative paradigm, this study not only elucidates Montesquieu's concept of liberty, but also remedies liberalism's incomplete account of political motivations.

To attain this end, in Part 1, the argument of this study unfolds in two levels. Firstly, it examines some crucial concepts in Montesquieu's political thought. It analyses his method of regime classification and his descriptions of human nature, natural law and the purpose of politics. It also examines the attainment of liberty in relation Montesquieu's original typology and England's ideal regime type. It is shown that in contrast to Montesquieu's original typology, England is more capable of attaining liberty due to its constitutional separation of powers. However, it is emphasised that Montesquieu's descriptions of England obscure the type of individual motivations that make possible the preservation of that liberty. Secondly, the study turns its focus to the scholarship on Montesquieu's political thought. Specifically, it reviews the commentators' interpretations of the individual motivations that further liberty in England. It is shown that commentators have neglected to notice certain crucial aspects in Montesquieu's descriptions of those motivations; as a result, it is argued that their interpretations are ill-conceived.

In Part 2, the argument of this study unfolds in three levels. Firstly, it invites rethinking of the type of individual motivations that drive men's actions in republics. It is shown that the character of republics should not be viewed merely as a construct that fosters self-renunciation and equality. Rather, it is argued that Montesquieu considered republican self-renunciation largely as a matter of utility. Secondly, it invites rethinking of the type of individual motivations that drive men's actions in monarchies. It is shown that the character of monarchies should not be viewed merely as a construct that embodies the liberal motif of the 'invisible hand'. Rather, it is argued that Montesquieu conceived the character of monarchies in connection to the pursuit of glory. Thirdly, it studies and interprets Montesquieu's description of the type of motivations that drive men's actions in England. It is shown that the character of England merges certain aspects both from the characters of monarchy and republic. In this regard, it is argued that by combining aspects from the two types, England fosters the attainment and preservation of liberty.

Therefore, in contrast to the commentators' interpretations, this study disentangles England's character from its exclusive consideration under the types of monarchy or republic. By widening the available spectrum for consideration of the individual motivations that drive men's actions in England, this study recovers an aspect that has evaded commentators' attention in the modern debate: that Montesquieu's concept of liberty is not simply the product of a constitution. Rather, this study shows that based on his analysis of the general character of England, Montesquieu conceived liberty together with the individual motivations that keep it alive.

Methodological Note

In his *Essai sur l'Absurde*, Camus said that "to understand is, above all, to unify [...] that nostalgia for unity, that appetite for the absolute, illustrates the essential impulse of the human drama" (Camus, 2005, pp.34-5). By 'nostalgia for unity', Camus meant the process of explaining the occurrence of an event or idea by reordering a sequence of previously unrelated events. The relevance of Camus's claim to this section is based on the intention to

offer some brief methodological considerations and acknowledge the premises of this study. Firstly, this section briefly outlines the methodological debate between the two most notable methodological approaches in the study of old texts in Intellectual History. Secondly, it justifies the methodological approach adopted in this study.

The methodological writings of the Cambridge School have been very influential in shaping the study of Intellectual History. Cambridge School intellectual historians (most notably Quentin Skinner and John Pocock) argue that before one engages in the study of an old text, one must study its context to preserve its meaning and depict accurately the intentions of the author (Pocock, 2009; Skinner, 2002).¹⁷ Skinner's justification for his methodology is that any argument in philosophy can only be meaningful so long as it remains local. That is because he considers that the thoughts and aspirations of philosophers have been shaped, though not determined, by the problems and exigencies of their own time. Although contemporary thinkers phrase their questions similarly to their predecessors, their questions still differ because they emanate from different historical moments. Therefore, according to Skinner, separating an argument from its context distorts its intended meaning, because one loses sight of the context that it originally addressed.

The antipode of Skinner's contextualism, the 'great text' tradition (mainly identified with Arthur Lovejoy), is premised on the assumption that an idea can permanently shape the discourse that followed its conception. Lovejoy argued that the ideas of a certain thinker can have trans-historical importance because they address the same philosophical problems with posterity (Lovejoy, 1948). Although this tradition illustrates the impact an idea can have for posterity, it fails to show how posterity's attempts to understand its relevance reshape its original meaning. For this reason, critics argue that Lovejoy underestimated the contextual parameters and structural constraints that language poses to our contemporary reading. This

¹⁷ Closely related to this approach, Reinhart Koselleck's method of conceptual history shares some central assumptions with Skinner's contextualism (Skinner, 2002, p.177; Koselleck, 2002).

is why, against the 'great text' tradition, Skinner argues that it is fruitless to think that one can use the arguments of past thinkers to address contemporary philosophical problems (Skinner, 2002, pp. 5, 79). In the same vein, Iain Hampsher-Monk criticises Lovejoy for treating past thinkers as if they are "alive and well, and working just down the corridor" (Hampsher-Monk, 1998, p.38).

Skinner's historical contextualism has impacted the study of Intellectual History and remains popular among commentators.¹⁸ However his method has also been attacked by various critics who argue that it is not the only valid approach in this field of study. There are three main reasons why commentators debate whether Pocock and Skinner's historical contextualism actually recovers history "as it really was" (Boucher, 1985, p.270). Firstly, historical contextualism has been attacked on the grounds of defining what constitutes the context. Despite the various attempts to define its meaning, to a large extent, the notion of a 'context' remains under-defined (Ibid, p.255; King, 2013, p. 217). Secondly, after having defined the context of their study, contextualists reconstruct its meaning based on historical accounts. Though, as these accounts are based on older texts, it becomes doubtful whether their reproduction of the context is objective or unbiased; for this reason, King says that historical contextualism suffers from circularity (Ibid, 224). Thirdly, as Robert Lamb describes, a similar problem exists from the perspective of the author. Lamb argues that Skinner's contextualism depicts inaccurately the intentions of the author because it relies on certain "ahistorical assumptions about the motivation for political action" (Lamb, 2009, p.22).

Hence, despite its criticism of approaches that pay small attention to the context of an idea (like Lovejoy's 'great text' tradition), historical contextualism also suffers from its own limitations. Contextualists' assertions that their method is the sole basis for determining the value of an exegesis does not stand; moreover, they discourage commentators who have

¹⁸ David Boucher notes that the critique addressed by Skinner and his followers against other practitioners has forced them to reaffirm their approaches to the study of Intellectual History (Boucher, 1985, pp.251-60).

different approaches from voicing their own critiques (LaCapra, 1983, p.37). For this reason, as Bevir says, contextualism (and every other method in the study of Intellectual History) “can perform a useful heuristic value, but it cannot give us a logical guarantee of the objectivity of an understanding of a work” (Bevir, 2002, p. x).

This study is not a piece of work on methodology or philosophy of history. Rather, it aims to disentangle Montesquieu’s concept of liberty from its liberal and republican interpretations in order to elucidate some important features that are silenced in the contemporary discourse. Aiming for unity, as Camus would put it, commentators consider Montesquieu’s concept of liberty as part of a greater tradition. However, this can overshadow the subtle and finer aspects of his thought. It is exactly this complication that this study aims to address. Instead of assuming historical constancies and making incontestable assertions, this thesis acknowledges the merit of the various contemporary interpretations of Montesquieu’s thought; it also acknowledges that contemporary interpretations are contingent on posterity’s active agency toward understanding and reshaping Montesquieu’s ideas, or what Foucault would call the “rules governing the production of truth” (Foucault, 2002, p.116). Therefore, as Camus put it, “in this way I am defining a method. But it is also evident that the method is one of analysis and not of knowledge” (Camus, 2005, p.20).

In order to analyse the individual motivations furthering Montesquieu’s concept of liberty, this study will adopt an approach of close textual analysis with attention to the context. To a certain extent, this approach considers the influence that Montesquieu’s context had on his thought. But it does not make thought a slave to context. Montesquieu was not writing as a mere polemicist. Rather, he considered himself one of the few outstanding minds to have studied the Western tradition and aspired to make themselves memorable through their

teachings.¹⁹ Philosophers of this tradition have vowed to transcend the *ici et maintenant* of their context in order to crystallise an aspect of their age that bears lasting significance in posterity. Perhaps Montesquieu failed to do this, as many others have done and will do in the future. Nevertheless, this study's intellectual commitment to precision requires consideration of Montesquieu's attempt at transcendence as part of his context. The method of this study disagrees with the assumption that the ideas of a thinker are determined by the intellectual debates attending his context; rather, it deems the thinker's ideas are also shaped by the philosophical tradition he embodies and his ambition to shape that tradition for posterity.

The Plan of this Study

This study proceeds in two parts. Part 1 (chapters 2 and 3), "The Character of Politics," introduces the reader to the thesis by analysing the meaning of certain crucial concepts in Montesquieu's political thought. It also examines critically the commentators' interpretations of England's character. Part 2 (chapters 4, 5 and 6), "Liberal Aspirations," invites rethinking of the types of individual motivations that drive men's actions in republics and monarchies. It also examines and interprets Montesquieu's description of England in order to recover the type of individual motivations that further his ideal of liberty.

The purpose of chapter 2, "The Foundations of Liberty," is to explain some crucial concepts in Montesquieu's political thought and to outline his theoretical framework to prepare the reader for the discussion that will follow. Toward this end, the chapter examines Montesquieu's method of regime classification, and his descriptions of human nature, natural law and the purpose of politics. It also examines the attainment of liberty in relation to Montesquieu's original typology and his ideal type of England. In this regard, the chapter

¹⁹ Montesquieu ended the preface of *The Spirit of the Laws* saying that "If this work meets with success, I shall owe much of it to the majesty of my subject; still, I do not believe that I have totally lacked genius. When I have seen what so many great men in France, England, and Germany have written before me, I have been filled with wonder, but I have not lost courage. 'And I too am a painter,' have I said with Correggio" (*EL Preface*, p.xlv).

argues that England is more capable of attaining liberty than the original typology due to its constitutional separation of powers. Nevertheless, it is emphasised that Montesquieu's descriptions of England obscure the type of individual motivations that make possible the preservation of that liberty.

The purpose of chapter 3, "Reading the Commentary: Virtue, Honour and The principle of England," is to illustrate how Montesquieu's description of England's character has been interpreted in the secondary literature. As part of this, it analyses the arguments of those interpreters of Montesquieu that are addressed in chapters 4 and 5. Toward this end, firstly, it analyses two lines of interpretation that consider England's character based on the type of monarchy. Then, it analyses the line of interpretation that considers England's character based on the type of republic. And then, it considers the line of interpretation that considers England's character based on the type of despotism. By examining critically each line of interpretation, this chapter shows that commentators have neglected to notice certain crucial aspects in Montesquieu's descriptions of England's character and thus, it argues that their interpretations are ill conceived.

The purpose of chapter 4, "Honour: More than Laissez-Faire," is to study and interpret the general character of monarchy. The chapter analyses the character of monarchies and distinguishes two themes that link it to Machiavelli's notion of *gloria* and Mandeville's notion of *private vices public benefits*. It is shown that the character of monarchy does not incline individuals toward the mere accumulation of profit; rather, it inclines them to attain social distinction by committing acts that require great ability and courage. Hence, it is argued that insofar as individuals desire distinction, Montesquieu's description of the character of monarchy was influenced by Machiavelli's notion of *gloria*. Therefore, this chapter argues that although Mandeville's liberal theme was influential, it should not be overemphasised in Montesquieu's description of the character of monarchy.

The purpose of chapter 5, “Virtue: Less than Charity,” is to study and interpret the general character of republics. The chapter analyses the character of republics and distinguishes two main themes that link it to pagan and Christian notions of virtue (cardinal and theological virtues). It is suggested that unlike these notions, the character of republics lacks the presence of an ultimate good, a pagan or Christian notion of a *telos*, and that in the absence of a *telos*, the character of republics fosters virtue insofar as it fosters the preservation of the state. In this regard, the character of republics inculcates in the citizens love for the homeland and self-renunciation as a matter of utility – that is, as a means to an end. This description puts the character of republics at odds with the meaning of pagan and Christian notions of virtue. By defining republican virtue in connection with the pursuit of utility in politics, this chapter argues that Montesquieuian virtue should be considered in connection with its Machiavellian counterpart (*virtú*).

The purpose of chapter 6, “Liberty: A Matter of Principle,” is to study and interpret the meaning of England’s general character. In order to capture its full breadth, this chapter considers England’s character in connection with a crucial intellectual debate that took place in the eighteenth century, the debate on luxury. Then, the chapter analyses Montesquieu’s descriptions identifying the individual motivations that drive the Englishmen’s actions. It is suggested that Montesquieu conceived England’s character by merging certain distinctive aspects from the types of monarchy and republic. With regard to the type of monarchy, it is suggested that the Englishmen pursue their private ambition in times of peace. And with regard to the republican type, it is suggested that in times of war, Englishmen unite their wills to defend their common liberty. Thus this chapter argues that by pursuing their private ambition in this fashion, the Englishmen foster the long-term preservation of their liberty. Moreover, this chapter argues that based on his conception of England’s character, Montesquieu addressed the debate on luxury from a middle ground.

The purpose of chapter 7, “Conclusion,” is to provide an overview of what this thesis has managed to achieve.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERTY

“If one wants to seek the design of the author, one can find it only in the design of the work”

(*EL* Preface p.xliii)

This chapter explains the central concepts of Montesquieu’s political theory to prepare the reader for the discussion that follows in the next chapters. Also, it seeks to understand the relation between Montesquieu’s typology of regimes and the attainment of liberty. Toward this end, the first section examines Montesquieu’s concepts of the *nature* and *principle* of government and his method of classifying his typology of regimes. It suggests that Montesquieu departed from Aristotle’s classical model of classification and ordered his typology based on his own criteria. The second section examines Montesquieu’s concepts of natural and positive law and his description of the purpose of politics. It shows that Montesquieu described the purpose of politics in terms of satisfying men’s natural need for security. The third section analyses Montesquieu’s original typology of regimes according to their types of nature and principle of government. The fourth section examines the attainment of the purpose of politics in Montesquieu’s original typology. It is shown that monarchy attains that purpose better than republics, and that this helps monarchy to approximate Montesquieu’s ideal of liberty. This section also argues that despite approximating Montesquieu’s ideal of liberty, monarchy is unstable and so, its subjects do not enjoy liberty consistently. The fifth section examines Montesquieu’s ideal type of England. It shows that England attains the purpose of politics better than any other regime in Montesquieu’s typology. It also argues that England’s complete attainment of that purpose fosters his ideal of liberty. The final section concludes that although England attains Montesquieu’s ideal of liberty, it is uncertain how it fosters its preservation. It argues that to attain this perspective, one must define England’s character by examining Montesquieu’s descriptions of the Englishmen’s individual motivations.

I. Montesquieu's Method of Classification

Aristotle did not formally separate the study of government from the study of its social foundations.²⁰ Instead, his method presupposed the Greek city-state as its basic social unit which, due to its small size, described both a form of a government and a type of society. In this regard, Aristotle's method of classification considered the social foundations of a regime to be dependent on the city-state's particular form of government. As a result, he classified his typology of regimes based entirely on structural aspects of its government such as, the location of power and the number of individuals exercising it (Shackleton, 1961, p.266). Following this approach, Aristotle distinguished three types of city-states: monarchy, aristocracy and republic (*Politics* 1279a-1280 pp.179-81). Moreover, in the case where the regime failed or its institutions became corrupt, he defined the same regimes as tyranny, oligarchy and democracy, respectively (Ibid). Aristotle's method of classification was generally valid insofar as it considered the city-state as its basic social unit for analysis. However, the size of states and societies in the eighteenth-century was significantly larger than those in Aristotle's study of city-states in the 4th century B.C. For this reason, Montesquieu thought that the city-state would be an unfit analytical unit to account for the intricate and complex relations between political superstructures and their social foundations (Shackleton, 1961, pp.266-7).²¹

Moreover, Aristotle explained the emergence and development of politics through a quasi-historical account of natural associations that peaks with the development of the *polis* (*Politics* 1252b-1253a pp.120-3). Starting with the two sexes and the family, Aristotle gradually moved up to more complex stages of association that lead to the *polis*. Insofar as the *polis*

²⁰ Aristotle was aware of the distinction between politics and society. Although he did not separate them formally, he came close to distinguishing them when he studied the causes of political decline (*Politics* 1301a20-21). According to Hulliung, the reason that he did not allow their formal separation was because he was concerned about the lack morality signified by this division (Hulliung, 1976, p.4).

²¹ On the ways in which Montesquieu's classification departed from the classical system, see *Main Currents in Sociological Thought* (Aron, 1968, pp.20-1); *Montesquieu: a critical biography* (Shackleton, 1961, pp.265-83); *Montesquieu and the Old Regime* (Hulliung, 1976, pp.1-14).

emerges from natural associations, Aristotle conceptualised it like a living organism, whose parts cannot exist separately from the whole: “the whole is of necessity prior to the part” (Ibid 1253a2-19 p.122). In this regard, by conceptualising the *polis* holistically and systematically, it follows that Aristotle considered it an irreducible whole (*Politics* 1253a20 p.122; Barker, 2012, pp.221, 276-77; Clark, 1983, pp.102-4; Hulliung, 1976, pp.5-6). However, Montesquieu was not happy with this approach because he thought that it examined the state at one moment in time and could not explain its potential transformation (Arendt, 2011, p.331). For this reason, he deemed that Aristotle’s conception of the *polis* and the classical model at large was “petrified and atemporal” (Hulliung, 1976, p.6).

Aristotle’s method of classification, or its simplification, was the most widely used during Montesquieu’s time (Shackleton, 1961, p.266).²² However, the extent to which he followed Aristotle did not prevent him from developing his own concepts and departing from the classical model. Indeed, as he put it in the subtitle of *The Spirit of the Laws*, Montesquieu’s object was to understand the relation between a government and its social foundations.²³ To study this relationship, Montesquieu analysed his typology of regimes based on two crucial concepts. These concepts were the *nature* and *principle* of government and they focus on different features of a given regime, the government and society, respectively.

Regarding the nature of a government, Montesquieu defined it as the conceptual tool that examines the structure of a government: “That is what I call the nature of each government. One must see what laws follow directly from this nature and are consequently the first fundamental laws” (*EL* II, 1 p.10). In this regard, the *nature* classifies a regime based

²² In his *Pensées* Montesquieu had listed Aristotle’s *Politics* and Plato’s *Laws* among the books he read to inform his typology (*Pensées* 907 p.232). Moreover, Shackleton notes that Aristotle’s method of classification, or its simplification, was the most widely used during Montesquieu’s time (Shackleton, 1961, p.266).

²³ Montesquieu wrote in the subtitle of *The Spirit of the Laws* that its objective is to study the rapport between the laws and the social mores: “De l’esprit des lois ou du rapport que les lois doivent avoir avec la constitution de chaque gouvernement, les moeurs, le climat, la religion, le commerce, etc. A quoi l’auteur a ajouté des recherches nouvelles sur les lois romaines touchant les successions, sur les lois fran, caises et sur les lois féodales which translates as *On the Spirit of Laws or on the Relation which Laws Ought to Bear to the Constitution of each Government, Mores, Climate, Religion, Commerce, etc. to which the Author Has Added New Research on Roman Law relating to Successions, French Laws, and Feudal Laws*” (Goldie, M., and R. Wokler, 2006, p.9).

on the location of sovereign power and the number of individuals exercising it in a state (*EL* II, 1 p.10). Based on this criterion, Montesquieu officially distinguished three possible types of nature: republic (which he distinguished further in aristocracy and democracy), monarchy and despotism (*Ibid*). In republics, sovereign power rests with the people, who exercise it over the state as a whole (*EL* II, 2 pp.10-5). In monarchies, sovereign power rests with the monarch, who consults with a body of nobles and exercises it based on fixed laws (*EL* II, 4 pp.17-9). And in despotisms, sovereign power rests with the despot, who exercises it based on his own accord (*EL* II, 5 p.20). Moreover, due to the different locations of power and number of individuals exercising it, different types of nature foster different social arrangements. In this regard, republics foster equality because political power is shared among the citizens, who participate in decisions regarding the state's affairs (*EL* V, 3 pp.43-4). Monarchies foster social hierarchy because the monarch grants a different share of power to his subjects based on their proximity to the throne (*EL* II, 4 pp.17-9). And despotisms foster equality insofar as everyone is a slave to the despot, who possesses total power over everyone's fortune and life (*EL* III, 8 pp.27-8).

Regarding the *principle* of government, Montesquieu defined it as the conceptual tool that examines the aspect of agency between rulers and ruled. In this regard, the *principle* classifies a regime based on the type of motivation that guides men's actions in their engagements with the government (*EL* III, 1 p.21). Thus, unlike the nature which makes the government "what it is [the structure of its government]," Montesquieu said that the principle is "that which makes it [the government] act" (*EL* III, 1 p.21). Based on this definition, he conceived *virtue*, *honour* and *fear* as the types of motivations that guide individuals in republics, monarchies and despotisms, respectively. Moreover, by engaging their pursuits in this manner, individuals act in a way that preserves their government's particular nature.²⁴

²⁴ Montesquieu thought that the particular structure of a government is codetermined by the types of motivations that incline individuals to act and so, "any considerable change is bound to affect others" (Plamenatz, 1963, p.256; Aron,

Indeed, he said that *virtue* promotes equality in republics because it inclines the citizens to renunciate their private interests for the common good (*EL III*, 3 pp.22-4). In monarchies, he said that *honour* promotes social hierarchy, because it inclines the subjects to serve the monarch in return for social distinctions and power (*EL III*, 7 p.27). And in despotism, he said that *fear* promotes equality among the subjects because, through punishments and threats, it fosters their complete subordination to the wills of the despot (*EL III*, 9 pp.28-9).

Montesquieu classified his typology of regimes based on a set of questions that addressed a regime's particular nature and principle of government. With regard to the nature, he asked 'what is the location of sovereign power and the number of individuals exercising it in government?'. With regard to the principle, he asked 'how is political power exercised over the society?' In classifying his typology, Montesquieu did not grant these questions equal importance. Rather, as it will be shown, he relied mostly on the question addressing a regime's principle of government.

This can be evinced through the examination of two examples. Firstly, Montesquieu divided the republican type of government into two subtypes, democracy and aristocracy. By considering the two types under the more general type of republic, Montesquieu inclined the reader to assume that they share the same type of nature. However, this is not the case because whereas in democracy "the people as a body have sovereign power," in aristocracy "sovereign power is in the hands of a part of the people" (*EL II*, II p.10). In this regard, the two types differ with regard to their location of sovereign power and number of individuals exercising it. Despite this difference, Montesquieu grouped them together. Secondly, the same methodological inconsistency appears when reviewing Montesquieu's types of monarchy and despotism. Montesquieu defined the two types separately. By distinguishing the two types, he inclined the reader to assume that they differ with regard to their type of

1968, p.21). On Montesquieu's understanding regarding the interrelatedness between social structures and the various political, religious and economic institutions, see *Man and Society: a critical examination of some important social and political theories from Machiavelli to Marx* (Plamenatz, 1963); *Main Currents in Sociological Thought* (Aron, 1968).

nature. However, this is not the case. He said that in both types sovereign power lies in one person (*EL II, 1 p.10*). Hence, insofar as the two types share the same location of power, they ought to be grouped together. Though, as it appears, Montesquieu did not apply consistently the criterion about a government's nature in classifying his typology.

The reason why Montesquieu neglected classifying these types based on their type of nature is because he prioritised the criterion relating to their principle. In the first case, Montesquieu considered democracy and aristocracy under the more general category of republican government due to the similarities in their principles. Indeed, he said that "just as there must be virtue in popular government, there must also be virtue in the aristocratic one" (*EL III, 4 p.24*). Hence, despite the differences in their natures, Montesquieu grouped the two types together on account of their shared requirement for virtue. In the second case, Montesquieu considered monarchy and despotism under separate categories because of the differences in their principles. Indeed, he said that in monarchies "one alone governs, but by fixed and established laws; whereas, in despotic government, one alone, without law and without rule, draws everything along by his will and his caprices" (*EL II, I p.10*). In this regard, Montesquieu suggested that the two regimes differ in the manner in which they exercise political power. This difference signifies that they have different principles. Hence, on account of their different principles, Montesquieu defined the two types separately. Based on the examination of the previous cases, it follows that Montesquieu considered the principle of government as the main criterion for classifying his typology of regimes.

To conclude: Montesquieu classified his typology by considering both Aristotle's structural criterion and the individuals' types of motivations in their engagements with government. Hence, in addition to a type of government, Montesquieu's typology also signified a type of society whose influence on the former could be analysed and explained. Moreover, based on his theory of principles, Montesquieu emphasised the significance of individual agency and its transformative role in the study of politics. In this regard, he suggested that the study of politics should not examine the government at one moment in

time. Rather, unlike Aristotle and the classics, he deemed that the proper study of politics should consider the state as a dynamic entity that should be analysed in relation to history. Finally, this is what Montesquieu had in mind when he wrote that “history must be illuminated by laws, and laws by history” (*EL XXXI*, 2 pp.672-5).

II. Human Nature, Law and the Purpose of Politics

Montesquieu’s description of men in their state of nature played a crucial role in forming his theory about the emergence of societies and the establishment of a central government with laws. By analysing the role of natural law in humanity’s pre-political stage, Montesquieu explained the establishment of societies in relation to men’s natural need for security. Based on the same need, he explained the establishment of government and the rule of positive law in organised societies. In this regard, by examining the role of law in the sequence between men’s pre-political and political stages, this section illustrates Montesquieu’s definition of the purpose of politics.

At the beginning of *The Spirit of the Laws*, Montesquieu drew a distinction between what he called the “physical world” and the “intelligent world” (*EL I*, 1 p.4). In the first case, he referred mainly to the material world on earth and the cosmos at large. In the second case, he referred to the various forms of intelligent life and especially to humanity. Despite their differences, Montesquieu deemed that both worlds operate within laws, or what he calls “primitive” rules (*Ibid*). These rules, he said, are derived from reason and form a “consistently established relation” that is comparable to the “relations of mass and velocity” between two moving bodies (*Ibid*).²⁵ Although the physical world follows these rules invariably so that

²⁵ On this matter, Montesquieu’s reasoning appears to be influenced by Descartes and the more general tendency of his times to rationalise hypotheses of political and legal theory with reference to the laws of physics. In *The Spirit of the Laws*, Montesquieu’s approach of defining the workings of the material universe bears some relevance to Descartes’s concept of external substance (*res extensa*) (Descartes, 1984, § 53, pp.23-4). Like Descartes, Montesquieu attempted to define the relation between natural contending forces, like the opposing relationship between the forces of motion and mass (*inertia*). Though, unlike Descartes, Montesquieu’s purpose did not consist only in explaining the laws governing the material universe. Rather, Montesquieu referred to the relationship between natural contending forces in order to describe the laws governing men before the creation of organised societies and politics. By describing men’s

“every change is consistency,” the intelligent world is “far from being as well governed,” (Ibid). That is because Montesquieu considered men to be “limited” in their nature by “a thousand passions,” which make them subject to “ignorance and error” (Ibid). And as a result, their natural limitations misguide their actions and damage their social relations. Hence, Montesquieu considered men to be limited by their nature in ways that conflict with the preservation of their society.

In order to live sociably and further their species, Montesquieu thought that men should regulate their actions according to laws (Ibid). He separated these laws into two types, natural and positive. Firstly, regarding natural law, he said that it is derived “uniquely from the constitution of our being” and it establishes “possible relations of justice” which predate the establishment of society²⁶ and politics (Ibid; *EL I*, 2 p.4). In his state of nature, Montesquieu said that man felt weak and timid and his main preoccupation was seeking ways to secure

activities with relation to nature, Montesquieu aimed to reduce them to simple principles. Moreover, in the rest of *The Spirit of the Laws*, he took these descriptive principles and treated them normatively, because he deemed that they should constitute the basis of social activity and positive laws (Shackleton, 1961, p.252). On one hand, the derivation of normative statements from descriptive principles was not something new in moral and political philosophy. Nonetheless, Montesquieu’s originality consisted in his attempt to introduce the natural sciences to the realm of legal and political philosophy.

Montesquieu’s Cartesian influences in his conception of the law can also be evinced in the *Persian Letters*. There, Montesquieu placed Usbek - one of his main characters - to criticise ordinary lawgivers for regulating men’s social activity based on laws that are subject to change - “like the minds of those who make them, and of the people who obey them” (*LP* 98 p.223). He said that wise legislators should derive their laws based on two axioms that explain all philosophical problems. Firstly, “that every body tends to describe a straight line, unless it meets with some obstacle which diverts its course; the second, which is but a consequence of the first, is, that every body which moves round a centre, tends to fly from it” (Ibid). In the same regard, Descartes said in his *Principia* that “Every moving body, at any given moment in the course of its movement, is inclined to continue that movement in some direction in a straight line” and “from this follows that any body which is moving in a circle constantly tends to move [directly] away from the centre of the circle which it is describing” (Descartes, 1984, § 39, p.60). Thus, Montesquieu deemed that the laws of physics provide a solid basis for describing men’s social activity and toward this end, he adopted Descartes’s principles. Finally, based on these two accounts, Montesquieu “reveals himself to be Cartesian,” says Shackleton (Shackleton, 1961, p.41).

²⁶ Montesquieu deemed that there are certain principles of justice or laws that predate human society and establish its foundations. On this account, Shackleton says that Montesquieu “is seen to be at once with the theorists of natural law” (Shackleton, 1961, p.248). Though, his description of natural law is in some ways alien to the ordinary conceptions of jurisprudence of Pufendorf, Grotius or Domat, because Montesquieu did not employ the ‘ought to.’ (Ibid, p. 251). For example, unlike Domat, Montesquieu did not say men have an obligation to believe in God. Rather, he said that whether rightly or wrongly, men do in fact believe in God. In this regard, Montesquieu’s description of natural law natural laws is descriptive of man’s condition.

his self-preservation (Ibid).²⁷ As a result, man's senses were permeated by fear which made him flee at the sound of animals and other men (Ibid). Under these conditions, Montesquieu said that "such men would not seek to attack one another" (Ibid).²⁸ Rather, given their mutual vulnerability and fear, men would seek to avoid each other and so, "peace would be the first natural law" (Ibid). Secondly, Montesquieu said that men's weaknesses would incline them to seek nourishment to secure their preservation (Ibid). Thirdly, Montesquieu said that men would soon realise that their fears are mutual and that this would persuade them to become sociable and make natural entreaties to the opposite sex (Ibid). Fourthly, by acting sociably, men would soon start to enjoy the benefit of security among their peers, which would inspire them to live in organised societies (Ibid).²⁹ Hence, based on his description of man's original condition, Montesquieu deemed that men's natural need for security and self-preservation to be the drive behind the establishment of societies.

Montesquieu thought that despite its promise of security, life in society cannot sustain the peacefulness of men's original state. Indeed, he said that upon entering life in society, men engaged in a competition over acquiring possession of the society's principal resources (*EL I, 3 p.7*). By laying claim to these resources, certain individuals secured their long-term self-preservation and so, they began "to feel their strength" (Ibid). At the same time,

²⁷ Montesquieu referred to the state of nature to contrast men's lives before and after the creation of societies. Although he used this device to justify the creation of law and government, he was not interested in speculating on men's pre-social condition, or how politics emerged from that condition. In fact, in the *Persian Letters*, he treated other thinkers' attempts to answer this question with contempt (*LP 95 pp.217-8*). In *The Spirit of the Laws*, he dismissed quickly the subject by showing a very limited interest in social contract theory or the case of a "savage who was found in the forests of Hanover and who lived in England in the reign of George I" (*EL I, 2 p.6*).

²⁸ At this point, Montesquieu's description of human nature departed from its Hobbesian counterpart. Montesquieu criticised Hobbes for assuming that men's first desire is "to subjugate one another" (*EL I, 2 p.6*). Although both thinkers deemed that fear is a widespread passion in the state of nature, they disagreed about its consequences. Like Hobbes, Montesquieu thought that in the state of nature men are independent and equal by nature because they are all equally vulnerable and capable of harming and being harmed. Nevertheless, while Hobbes deemed that man's natural weakness leads him to a state of war which ceases with the establishment of societies, Montesquieu deemed that man's weakness leads to peace. In this regard, Montesquieu thought that man has a natural pre-political inclination which inclines him to live sociably. Moreover, this natural inclination assumes a form of intelligence that leads to the emergence of speech. Nevertheless, Montesquieu did not say anything about the process of acquiring this intelligence (Lowenthal, 2012, pp.513-34). Rather, his descriptions on this matter are limited to saying that "A man in the state of nature would have the faculty of knowing rather than knowledge" (*EL I, 2 p.6*).

²⁹ For an in-depth analysis of Hobbes and Locke's influence on Montesquieu's description of the state of nature and how it was received by Rousseau, see chapter 3 in *Montesquieu's Philosophy of Liberalism* (Pangle, 1989).

individuals with limited access to these resources engaged in continuous struggles in order to acquire a better share. Montesquieu thought that eventually man's struggle to satisfy his need for security and desire for power resulted in a state of war. Moreover, he thought that if that state of war pervaded the particular society, it could lead to "a state of war among nations" (Ibid). In this regard, Montesquieu thought that the same need which inclined man to create societies and live sociably - the pursuit of security - became the cause of war that threatened that society with dissolution. Hence, although natural law vouched for peace in men's natural state, in society, men's natural limitations compromise their need for security and threaten its preservation.

The establishment of positive laws and a central government to enforce them is necessary to avoid a state of war and ensure men's security in societies, said Montesquieu (*EL* I, 3 pp.7-9). Unlike natural laws, positive laws are conceived and established by men to regulate their social activity based on their particular circumstances and needs. Montesquieu separated them into three types: the "right of nations," the "political right" and the "civil right" (Ibid, p.7). Firstly, the right of nations regulates the relations between different states (Ibid). The political right regulates the relations between those who govern and those who are governed in a given society (Ibid). And the civil right regulates the relations among individuals in that society (Ibid).

Out of these types of positive law, Montesquieu deemed the political and civil right to be the most crucial, because they precede and determine the right of nations. In this regard, he deemed that any discussion about the relations between states should be preceded by an analysis of their civil and political right. For Montesquieu, there could be no talk about a right of nations unless one had identified a society that is regulated by a central government and a fixed set of laws. That is because he thought that the political and social organisation

of a society determined its right of nations and its application.³⁰ Moreover, he thought that “a society could not continue to exist without a government” (Ibid; *EL XI*, 5 p.156; *LP 11* pp.55-9).³¹ In this regard, Montesquieu’s priority in *The Spirit of the Laws* was to distinguish the possible types of government that could secure their social structure with laws (*EL I-8* pp.3-128).³² These governments, he said, would consist in “the union of all individual strengths” and would form “what is called the political state” (*EL I*, 3 p.8).

To conclude: Montesquieu explained the necessity of politics to regulate men’s social activity due to their inability to live peacefully with each other in society. Natural law was successful in attaining peace in the state of nature. But following the establishment of societies, it proved itself ineffective in regulating men’s social activity and as a result, natural peace was succeeded by a state of war. For this reason, Montesquieu explained the establishment of central governments and positive law in organised societies due to men’s natural need for security and self-preservation. In this regard, he deemed that the purpose of politics consists in fostering social tranquility and security. His purpose was also to identify the types of regimes that attain this purpose and evaluate them on this basis.

III. Montesquieu’s Original Typology of Regimes

In Part 1 of *The Spirit of the Laws*, Montesquieu analysed his original typology of regimes based on their nature and principle of government. Montesquieu’s original typology

³⁰ The ‘right of nations’ is concerned with the relations between different states and it is derived from two basic premises, said Montesquieu. Firstly, that “the various nations should do to one another in times of peace the most good possible, and in times of war the least ill possible, without harming their true interests” (*EL I*, 3 p.2). And secondly, that “the object of war is victory; of victory, conquest; of conquest, preservation” (Ibid). Although he referred to specific examples at various points in *The Spirit of the Laws*, Montesquieu did not elaborate its formal definition further than this description. That is because he thought that the relations among different nations are largely dependent on their particular social and political organisation. In this regard, he thought that whether a state will frame its right of nations based on these premises depends on its particular constitution and type of government. That is why he said that “even the Iroquois, who eat their prisoners [...] know rights of war and peace: the trouble is that their right of nations is not founded on true principles” (Ibid). Hence, Montesquieu thought that to understand how states behave with each other, one must first study their political and civil right.

³¹ Through the fable of the Troglodytes, Montesquieu illustrated that unless a government is established, men cannot coexist peacefully with each other and their community will perish (*LP 11* pp.55-9).

³² This is what he meant when he said that “I have made no attempt to separate political from civil laws, for, as I do not treat laws but the spirit of the laws, and as this spirit consists in the various relations that laws may have with various things, I have had to follow the natural order of laws less than that of these relations and of these things” (*EL I*, 3 p.9).

numbered mainly three types: republic, monarchy and despotism. This section analyses his original typology by examining each type's nature and principle of government.

Republic

Firstly, Montesquieu was a keen admirer of ancient republics. Moreover, he modelled his republican type of government based on Aristotle's descriptions of the Athenian democracy and especially Cicero's description of Rome (Aron, 1968, p. 23). Regarding its nature, Montesquieu conceived republican government as the type of government where the people as a whole, or a part of people, possess sovereign power (*EL II*, 2 p.10). He thought that when the people exercise sovereign power as a whole, the republic takes the form of a democracy (Ibid). And when sovereign power lies with a part of the people, it takes the form of an aristocracy (Ibid). Montesquieu distinguished the institutions of republican government in the senate, the assembly and the magistracy (*EL II*, 2 pp.10-5). In general, the fundamental laws of republican government established the people's right to vote on matters relating to legislation, justice, elect their representatives and be elected (Ibid). In this regard, both the legislative and judiciary powers were exercised by the citizenry (*EL II*, 2 pp.10-5; *VI*, 2-5 pp.74-80 & 8 pp.81-2). Last but not least, republican laws defined the types of issues that could be decided by the people, the process by which they elect their magistrates and representatives in the assembly, as well as the number of citizens participating in them (*EL II*, 2 pp.10-5).

Regarding its principle, Montesquieu conceived political *virtue* as the type of motivation animating the actions of individuals in republics. In the *Preface* to the *The Spirit of the Laws*, he distinguished his notion of virtue from its moral and Christian counterparts.³³ Instead, he defined it as the citizen's "love of the homeland and of equality" (*EL Preface* p.xli). This love, he said, requires a "continuous preference of the public interest over one's own" which is of

³³ It will be shown in chapter 5 that Montesquieu conceived his notion of virtue separately from the cardinal (prudence, temperance, courage, justice) and theological virtues (faith, hope, charity). This is why he said that "virtue in a republic is love of the homeland, that is, love of equality. It is not a moral virtue or a Christian virtue; it is political virtue" (*EL Author's Foreword* p.xli).

cardinal importance to the preservation of the republic (*EL IV*, 4 p.36). As a result, virtue inclines the citizens of republics to become actively engaged in the administration of government, which acts as an assurance of their popular sovereignty (*EL II*, 2 pp.10-5). For this reason, he thought that republican laws should attend to inspiring virtue by proscribing not only what is illegal but also, what is unrighteous. In this regard, he thought that republican laws should establish equality in criminal law, property, restrain private commerce, reinforce morals in family life and encourage a civic religion that is based on virtue (*EL I*, 3 pp.7-9 & *V*, 3, pp.43-4 & *V*, 5-7 pp.44-51 & *V*, 19 pp.68-71). By influencing the content of republican law, Montesquieu thought that political virtue could foster a noble sentiment of “self-renunciation” and inspire “all those heroic virtues we find in the ancients and know only by hearsay” (*EL II*, 2 pp.10-5; *III*, 5 pp.25-6). That is why he said that in ancient republics, “when that virtue was in full force, things were done in those governments that we no longer see and that astonish our small souls” (*EL IV*, 4 p.35). Finally, Montesquieu lamented the absence of virtue from eighteenth-century politics, where the statesmen “speak to us only of manufacturing, commerce, finance, wealth, and even luxury” (*EL III*, 3 pp.22-4).

Monarchy

Montesquieu conceived his model of monarchy based on his reading of the European monarchies of his day (mainly English and French) (Aron, 1968, p.23). Regarding its nature, Montesquieu conceived monarchy as the type of government where sovereign power lies in the rule of one person, the monarch (*EL II*, 4 pp.17-9). In monarchy, he said, “the prince is the source of all political and civil power” and exercises it based on set of fixed laws (Ibid). Apart from the monarch, its nature also consists in “intermediate, subordinate and dependent powers” that is, the clergy, the nobility and the *parlements* (Ibid). In general, the role of the clergy and the nobility in monarchy is to check the monarch’s exercise of power in order to prevent its abuse (Ibid). Moreover, apart from checking the monarch, the nobility also exercises the judiciary function of government. In order to have an interest in checking the monarch, Montesquieu deemed that these bodies must enjoy certain privileges which they

would feel inclined to defend against the monarch's absolutism (Ibid).³⁴ Hence, by protecting their privileges and fortunes, these bodies promote the preservation of monarchy. And for this reason Montesquieu deemed that their presence in monarchy to be crucial: "no monarch, no nobility: no nobility, no monarch; rather, one has a despot" (Ibid). However, Montesquieu did not think that the clergy and the nobility alone were enough to check the monarch. For this reason, he deemed it necessary that monarchies have the *parlements*, which act as custodian and interpreter of the laws (Ibid). In this regard, although the prince would have absolute authority over the executive and legislative branches of government, he would not have a say in matters relating to justice (*EL VI*, 5 pp.77-80).

Regarding its principle, Montesquieu conceived *honour* as the type of motivation animating the actions of individuals in monarchies. Unlike virtue, which promotes equality in republics, in monarchy, honour fosters the development of "pre-eminences, ranks, and even a hereditary nobility" (*EL III*, 7 p.27). In this regard, honour does not inspire individuals to act with self-renunciation in order to promote equality and the good of the community. Rather, it inclines them to advance their private fortunes by pursuing their self-interest: "in monarchies and despotic states, no one aspires to equality; the idea of equality does not even occur; in these states everyone aims for superiority" (*EL V*, 4 p.44). Montesquieu deemed that the passions animating the nature of monarchy arise from the "desire to distinguish oneself" (Ibid).³⁵ However, he said, there are also cases of individuals in monarchy whose actions are inspired by a type of politeness that resembles virtuous self-renunciation (*EL IV*, 2 pp.31-4). Nevertheless, he added, even in those cases, the action arises from the desire to distinguish oneself (Ibid). Indeed, he said that men in monarchies are polite from "arrogance" because

³⁴ For this reason, Montesquieu was adamant about securing these prerogatives from the influence of the monarch: "if you abolish the prerogatives of the lords, clergy, nobility, and towns in a monarchy, you will soon have a popular state or else, a despotic state" (*EL II*, 4 p.18).

³⁵ As a result, by pursuing their ambition, individuals engage in commerce and industry, which benefits the state by generating wealth. In monarchy, he said, "each person works for the common good, believing he works for his individual interests" (*EL III*, 7 p.27).

they flatter themselves that they are neither common, nor have they “lived with the sort of people who have been neglected through the ages” (Ibid).³⁶ Finally, Montesquieu said that the laws in monarchy are not concerned with regulating private life and reinforcing peoples’ morals; rather, they only proscribe the things that are necessary to foster security in public life. That is why Montesquieu said that “in well-regulated monarchies everyone will be almost a good citizen, and one will rarely find someone who is a good man; for, in order to be a good man, one must [...] love the state less for oneself than for itself” (EL III, 6 p.26).

Despotism

Montesquieu conceived his model of despotism based on his reading of the empires he referred to as Asiatic (Aron, 1968, p.23).³⁷ Montesquieu expressed his deepest aversion when he discussed despotism. He said that “one cannot speak of these monstrous governments without shuddering” (EL III, 9 p.28). Regarding its nature, he conceived despotism as the type of government that operates in the absence of a fixed set of laws and a constitution. Indeed, he said that in despotism, “the laws, the state, and the prince” are all combined in one person (EL V, 14 p.60). In this regard, the government is “uniform throughout” because “not many laws are needed for timid, ignorant, beaten-down people” (Ibid). As a result, in despotism, there is no body that can contain the prince’s arbitrary will. On this account, Montesquieu considered despotism to be wholly bad because it is “corrupt by its nature,” “self-destructive” and its sole purpose is the “delights of the prince” (EL VIII, 10 p.119; *Pensées*, 885 p.228; EL XI, 5 p.156).

Regarding its principle, Montesquieu conceived *fear* as the type of motivation animating the actions of individuals in despotism. Fear inclines individuals to act through threats that

³⁶ Indeed, he said that “politeness does not customarily have its origin in such a pure source” (EL IV, 2 p.32)

³⁷ Montesquieu generally considered the Persian, Chinese, Indian and Japanese empires under the broader category of despotism. Although he had access to material that could have afforded him a more informed understanding about their governments and culture, his knowledge of Asiatic regimes was largely fragmented (Aron, 1968, p.24). Moreover, critics have argued that “in a sense, we can say that Montesquieu was responsible for an attitude toward the history of Asia which has still not completely disappeared - an attitude typical of European thought, whereby Asiatic governments are viewed as being [...] a desert of servitude” (Ibid).

invoke men's natural revulsion toward physical pain and loss of life. Unlike republics and monarchies, where "love of the homeland, shame, and fear of blame are motives" that induce individual action, in despotism, "men's portion, like beasts', is instinct, obedience, and chastisement" (*EL III*, 10 p.29). Through threats and violence, fear fosters unquestionable obedience to the will of the prince, which produces its effect "as infallibly as does one ball thrown against another," said Montesquieu (*Ibid*). Toward this end, fear beats down individual ambition and self-esteem, in order to avoid revolutions and preserve the prince's oppressive rule (*EL III*, 9 p.28). As a result, Montesquieu said that in despotic states man becomes "a creature that obeys a creature that wants" (*EL III*, 10 p.29).

To conclude: Montesquieu formed his typology based on the historical study of the various forms of government and social organisations that had been recorded up to his time. Based on this study, he distinguished mainly three types of regimes: republic, monarchy and despotism. He linked each of these types to a particular motivation that drives the actions of individuals in their engagements with government: *virtue*, *honour* and *fear*.³⁸ However, he did not suggest that men in actual regimes behave exactly like men in his typology. Rather, as Oakeshott put it, he merely thought that "in each of the actual regimes there will be found tendencies which, if pursued, may result in one or other of these regimes [the ideal types]" (Oakeshott, 1993, p.41). In this regard, Montesquieu's typology consists of ideal types that he abstracted based on the study of actual regimes, and can be used for the study of real cases.³⁹

³⁸ However, Montesquieu thought that men living under a particular regime may also engage in action from other motivations. This is why he said that "It should be observed that there is a very great difference between saying that [...] virtue is not the spring that makes a government act and saying that it is not present in that government. If I were to say that a certain wheel, a certain gear, is not the spring that makes this watch move, would one conclude that it is not present in the watch?" (*EL*. Author's Foreword p.xli). Montesquieu thought that regardless of their personal motivations, individuals should act based on the principle of their particular government in order to secure its preservation. Indeed, he said "this does not mean that in a certain republic one is virtuous, but that one ought to be; nor does this prove that in a certain monarchy, there is honour or that in a particular despotic state, there is fear, but that unless it is there, the government is imperfect [italics added]" (*EL III*, 11 p.30).

³⁹ On Montesquieu's understanding of the use of ideal types and their internal contradictions, see generally Montesquieu and the Old Regime (Hullung, 1976, p.8); *The Political Theory of Montesquieu* (Richter, 1977, p.75); *Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers*, (Ville, 1967); *Main Currents in Sociological Thought* (Aron, 1968); *Introduction in The Spirit of the Laws by Montesquieu, a Compendium of the First English Edition* (Carrithers, 1977).

IV. The Pursuit of Liberty in Montesquieu's Original Typology

Montesquieu thought that the attainment of the purpose of politics served as a precursor to the pursuit of liberty. In this regard, he thought that a citizen "feels" he is free once a government has successfully attained that purpose (*EL XIX*, 27 p.326). Montesquieu defined liberty in terms of providing security from other individuals and the state's arbitrary interference. However, this is not to say that the attainment of the purpose of politics also signifies the attainment of liberty. Rather, Montesquieu suggested that the attainment of that purpose is a precondition for the pursuit of liberty: "Political liberty in a citizen is that tranquillity of spirit which comes from the opinion each one has of his security, and in order for him to have this liberty the government must be such that one citizen cannot fear another citizen" (*EL XI*, 6 p.157). Montesquieu thought that in order to be free, an individual must live under laws that protect him, while allowing him to do as much as possible. These conditions inspire an individual with confidence because so long as he obeys the laws, the state will not interfere with his actions. Hence, for Montesquieu, the attainment of liberty signified that feeling of confidence one experiences when he feels safe.

According to Montesquieu, only governments with a constitution and a fixed set of laws can address men's natural need for security and attain the purpose of politics (*EL III*, 8 pp.27-8; *V*, 14, pp.59-63). The laws and the constitution act as obstacles to the sovereign's exercise of power and so prevent its abuse by moderating power "by its very spring" (*EL III*, 3 p.22; *III*, 10 p.30).⁴⁰ For this reason, Montesquieu called these governments "moderate"; based on his typology, these are the types of monarchy and republic (*EL III*, 10 p.30).⁴¹ In monarchies and republics, he said, the legislator "must combine powers, regulate them, temper them" so that

⁴⁰ For example, in a beautiful analogy, Montesquieu explained the function of the nobility and other intermediary powers in checking sovereign power in monarchy: "Just as the sea, which seems to want to cover the whole earth, is checked by the grasses and the smallest bits of gravel on the shore, so monarchs, whose power seems boundless, are checked by the slightest obstacles and submit their natural pride to supplication and prayer" (*EL II*, 4 p.18).

⁴¹ This position had been adopted earlier by Machiavelli, who distinguished republics and monarchies as 'good' governments; and contrasted them to despotism where the prince enjoys arbitrary power (*Disc I*, 10 and 25 pp.220-223, 252-253). Both Machiavelli and Montesquieu differ in their classification to Hobbes, who aimed to disconnect the various forms of government from the moral distinction between good and evil (Hobbes, 1996, pp.129-138).

each power is “in a position to resist another” (*EL V*, 14 p.63). In this regard, these governments prevent the abuse of power by a single body or individual through a system of checks and balances. As a result, Montesquieu said that in moderate states, a man can be sure that “the wrath of one or many will not take away his life or possession of his property” (*Pensées* 884 p.228). However, this condition is not met by despotic government. In contrast to moderate governments, despotic states do not have a fixed set of laws or a constitution that stipulates the limits of the prince’s power over his subjects. Instead, the despot exercises power “according to his wills and caprices,” said Montesquieu (*EL III*, 2 p.21). As a result, he can interfere with the autonomy of his subjects to an extreme degree and rule them like slaves.⁴² Hence, unlike republics and monarchies that foster man’s basic need for security, despotic government fosters coercion and fear. For this reason, Montesquieu deemed that due to its inhumanity, despotism is an outrage against human nature (*EL V*, 14 p.63).

Although they moderate political power using a set of laws, Montesquieu deemed that republics and monarchies still have certain weaknesses that undermine security. This security, he added, is under greater threat when attacked by public or private accusations; and hence, he argued, “the citizen's liberty depends principally on the goodness of the criminal laws” (*Ibid*). In turn, the ‘goodness’ of the criminal laws depends on the government’s particular nature and principle (*EL VI*, 5 pp.74-5). Thus, it follows that any apparent defects of the criminal laws can be traced back and explained by the particular

⁴² Aristotle defined ‘natural slaves’ those men who obey others because they cannot reason for themselves (*Politics* 1254b22-4). Moreover, Aristotle’s natural slaves are not persuaded to follow an order. Rather, their obedience results from the threat of punishment by their master and that is also the degree to which they apprehend reason - in relation to the avoidance of pain (Curzer H.J., 2012, p.376). In the same regard, Montesquieu said that despotic government inspires action through the fear of punishment and that “not many laws are needed for timid, ignorant, beaten-down people” (*EL V*, 14 p.59). Yet, Montesquieu differs from Aristotle in his expectations from the despot. On one hand, Aristotle thought that slaves should be reasoned with by their master rather than simply punished (Curzer H.J., 2012, p.376). Based on this premise, Aristotle assumed that the master possesses the faculty of reason to a greater degree than his slave. On the other hand, Montesquieu deemed that the slavery resulting from despotic rule “assumes ignorance even in the one who commands” and described the despot as “naturally lazy, ignorant and voluptuous” (*EL IV*, 3 p.34 & II, 5 p.20). As a result, Montesquieu’s argument precludes the possibility of reasonable action both from the master and the slave. Considering his view of slavery, the popular eighteenth-century thesis on ‘enlightened despotism’ (advocated by Rousseau and Voltaire) seems like a lost cause.

nature and principle of a regime. For this reason, the proper study of a regime's criminal laws should explain its deficiencies with relation to its nature and principle.

According to Montesquieu, in republics, the nature of government does not separate the executive and judiciary functions of government. As a result, the citizens can act both as prosecutor and judge at the same time (*EL VI*, 8 p.81; *XI*, 6 p.157). However, this procedure attending criminal law can undermine the proceedings of justice because often "political interest forces civil interest," said Montesquieu (*EL VI*, 5 p.77). Indeed, he said that in Rome "whoever had many vices and many talents" would seek out criminals to please the authorities and promote himself in public office (*EL VI*, 8 p.81). In this regard, the non-separate functions of prosecuting and judging threatens the security of individuals in republics (*Ibid*).

Regarding its principle, republican virtue has an entirely different purpose to fostering men's natural need for security. As we saw earlier, Montesquieu deemed that men's natural need for security and self-preservation is the driving force behind the establishment of organised societies and government. However, virtue does not aim at merely regulating men's natural selfishness.⁴³ Rather, through intense education and "singular institutions," virtue aims at a "modification of the soul" that fosters the renunciation of oneself for the common good (*EL IV*, 6 p.36; *EL Preface* p.xli). In this regard, virtue places much higher demands on human nature compared to those that justified the institution of government.⁴⁴ For example, virtue requires the citizens to obey the state's general will at all times. As a

⁴³ Montesquieu suggested that men are selfish by nature on various occasions. In the *Persian Letters*, through the words of Usbek, he said that "interest is the greatest monarch in the world" (*LP* 107 p.241). Montesquieu's fable of the Troglodytes serves as another evidence in support of this claim. He said that in the Troglodyte society "every man determined to do what was right in his own eyes; and in attending to his own interests, the general welfare was forgotten" (*LP* 11 p.56). Also, Montesquieu's description of men upon the creation of societies explains the entrance into a state of war due to their desire "to turn their favour the principal advantages of this society" (*EL I*, 3 p.7). Moreover, at a later point in *The Spirit of the Laws*, he said that "it has eternally been observed that any man who has power is led to abuse it; he continues until he finds limits" (*EL XI*, 4 p.155).

⁴⁴ As a result, virtue inclines men to act with self-renunciation. Montesquieu said that "virtue is a renunciation of oneself, which is always a very painful thing" (*EL IV* p.35).

result, if the state cannot foster their natural needs, the citizens will not be able to seek alternative means of procuring their self-preservation.⁴⁵ In this regard, virtue's intended spirit of self-renunciation can force an individual to prioritise the common good over his self-preservation. Nevertheless, this undermines man's natural need for security. In such cases, Montesquieu said that the republican citizens' 'love of the homeland' degenerates into oppression and fear for one's self-preservation (*Pensées* 1269 pp.300-1 & *EL VI*, 14 p.88; *Ibid* 15 p.88-90, *Ibid* 17 p.92-3, *Ibid* 19 p.93-4). Finally, for this reason Montesquieu thought that "democracy and aristocracy are not free states by their nature" (*EL XI*, 4 p.155).

On the other hand, in monarchies, the sovereign combines the executive and legislative functions of government in his person. In this regard, the judiciary function is exercised by the nobility and so it remains separate. However, if the monarch centralised his power by subsuming the judiciary function, Montesquieu said that "the constitution would be destroyed and the intermediate dependent powers reduced to nothing" (*EL VI*, 5 p.78). Nevertheless, the judiciary function is not an easy prey in monarchy because the nobility has a vested interest in defending it against the monarch's absolutism. As a result, insofar as the nobility fulfils its purpose, the monarch cannot act as a judge and a prosecutor at the same time (*Ibid*). In monarchy, "the prince is the party who pursues those who are accused and has them punished or acquitted" (*Ibid*). For this reason, Montesquieu said it would be "senseless" for the prince to act as a judge because "he would lose the finest attribute of his sovereignty, which is that of pardoning" (*Ibid*). Moreover, he said that in monarchy, the procedure of criminal law is complex and so the individual's "honour and goods are removed from him only after a long examination" (*EL VI*, 2 p.75). Thus Montesquieu concluded that

⁴⁵ On this point, this thesis concurs with the interpretations offered by Thomas Pangle and Pierre Manent (Pangle, 1989, pp.5, 54, 81; Manent, 1994, p.24).

in monarchy, “even the lowest citizen is esteemed” and so the individual feels secure from potential abuses.⁴⁶

Due to its principle, monarchy does not require the virtues that are necessary in republics. Instead, Montesquieu said that in monarchy, republican self-renunciation is replaced with honour, which encourages individual “ambition” and the “desire to enrich oneself” (*EL III*, 5 pp.25-6). As a result, the laws in monarchy do not need to interfere with the private lives of the subjects to the extent they do in republics. Indeed, Montesquieu said that in monarchy “the laws replace all these virtues, for which there is no need” (*Ibid*). Moreover, honour inclines the nobility to defend its prerogatives and to resist the monarch’s despotic inclinations. However, the nobility’s spirited defence of its prerogatives does not spring from its ‘love of the homeland’ or interest in the common good. Rather, it springs from its self-interested desire to preserve its position in the social hierarchy. Nevertheless, although the nobility’s motives are selfish, the state continues to be governed according to a fixed set of laws, and thus the interests of the nobility coincide with those of the people. Honour prevents the usurpation of the laws through its appeal to men’s natural selfishness, and as a result it inspires the individual with “the opinion one has of one’s security” (*EL III*, 7 p.27). Therefore Montesquieu said that although individuals in monarchy act selfishly, this can result in a “spirit of liberty” which can produce great things and “contribute as much to happiness as liberty itself” (*EL XI*, 7 p.166).⁴⁷

Although monarchy fosters the ‘spirit of liberty,’ its subjects do not enjoy their liberty in its own right but rather, as a simulacrum. Montesquieu said that although monarchy

⁴⁶ Monarchy’s protection of the individual through a complex procedure of criminal law led Montesquieu to say that “one can see that [in justice] there must be at least as many formalities in republics as in monarchies” (*EL VI*, 2 p.75).

⁴⁷ Regarding honour’s promotion of individual liberty and the public benefit, Montesquieu referred to the example of the Viscount of Orte, who disobeyed the order of Charles IX to massacre the Huguenots (*EL IV*, 2 p.33). Orte decided to disobey the lawful political authority of the king to avoid committing such a brutality. However, although Orte’s reverence for his code of honour urged him to commit a magnanimous action, this does not mean that his motives were influenced by virtue or self-sacrifice. Rather, Orte’s action was inspired by personal ‘ambition’ and the desire to appear “daring and free” (*Ibid* p.32). Nevertheless, Orte’s reverence for his code of honour enlarges his sphere of individually motivated action, which in turn favours the attainment of individual liberty in monarchy.

“approximates” his definition of liberty, it cannot attain its full meaning (*EL XI*, 7 p.166). That is because, although monarchy fosters greater security than republics, its principle encourages the monarch and his subjects to pursue their desire for power at the expense of law and liberty.

Honour and the abuse of liberty in the *Persian Letters*

This aspect of honour can be evinced by a reading of letters 37 and 91 from the *Persian Letters*. With regard to the abuse of law by the monarch, Usbek (in the words of Montesquieu) describes in his correspondence Louis XIV's autocratic administration of government. Through analysis of Usbek's description, it is shown that Louis' desire for power inclines him to rule like a despot. Usbek says:

“It is said that he [Louis XIV] possesses in a very high degree the faculty of making himself obeyed; he governs with equal ability his family, his court, and his kingdom: he has often been heard to say, that, of all existing governments, that of the Turks, or that of our august Sultan, pleased him best: such is his high opinion of Oriental statecraft” (*LP*, 37 p.105).

In this description, Usbek suggests that although Louis is not a despot, his style of administration bears a great similarity with that of the Sultan (Montesquieu considered the Ottoman Empire to be a despotism). In this regard, he suggests that Louis' manner of exercising political power fosters absolute obedience among his subjects. By demanding their absolute obedience, Louis prevents his subjects from engaging freely in individually motivated action. Instead, the subjects' actions proceed from fear of punishment, which stifles their critical engagement with political authority.⁴⁸ Hence, by demanding absolute obedience, Louis inspires his subjects with fear and threatens their liberty.

Later in the same letter, Usbek (in the words of Montesquieu) offers a description that illustrates Louis' partiality in distributing favours without regard for the actual merit of the

⁴⁸ Given Louis' requirement of absolute obedience, his subjects cannot exhibit Orte's magnanimity (see previous footnote) and resist the monarch's unreasonable demands.

recipient's actions. The following excerpt shows that Louis' arbitrary distribution of favours corrupts the established rules for social distinction in monarchy. Usbek writes to Ibben that,

“He [Louis XIV] delights to reward those who serve him; [...] he does not believe that the greatness of a monarch is compatible with restriction in the distribution of favours; and, without examining into the merit of a man, he will heap benefits upon him, believing that his selection makes the recipient worthy; accordingly, he has been known to bestow a small pension upon a man who had run off two leagues from the enemy, and a good government on another who had gone four” (Ibid p.106).

In this instance, Usbek observes that Louis distributes favours without inquiring into the merit of a man's actions. That is because the power of judging the beneficence of an action for the monarchy depends wholly on Louis' opinion, who considers himself infallible. In this regard, the worth of a man's actions does not serve as a sufficient criterion for determining the distribution of honorary distinctions. Through his conduct, Louis shows no regard for the established channels for social distinction and the attainment of honour in monarchy. However, in *The Spirit of the Laws*, Montesquieu emphasised that individual action in monarchy must be rewarded based on its contribution to the state's *raison d'état*. Otherwise, he says, “the slow and natural means for distinguishing oneself no longer have an effect, and the principle of the government is stricken” (*EL XIII*, 20 p.227). Therefore, it follows that the Louis' arbitrary power of judging the beneficence of an action in monarchy violates the established channels for social distinction and social mobility. As a result, the monarch undermines the individuals' pursuit of liberty.

With regard to the abuse of the law by individuals, in letter 91, Usbek (in the words of Montesquieu) describes the political consequences that stem from the nobility's uncritical attachment to the rules of honour. Usbek says that individuals in monarchy and especially the aristocracy,

“obeyed no other laws than those of this point of honour, and by them they regulated the whole conduct of their lives. [...] When they had occasion to arrange their differences, almost the only method of decision prescribed was the duel, which resolved all difficulties. [...] This method of decision was badly enough conceived; for although a man might be more dexterous and

stronger than another, it did not follow that he had more right on his side (*LP* 91 pp.212-3).

Usbek observes that in monarchy, the nobility resolves its conflicts outside the realm of the law by replacing the proceedings of justice with the practice of duelling. This practice is illegitimate because its outcome is not based on the justice of an individual's claim but on his martial dexterity and physical strength. Moreover, this practice conditions a judgment about justice according to one's position in the social hierarchy. Indeed, suppose that a noble who wronged an individual from a lower class challenged him to resolve their conflict through a duel: if the noble wins the combat, his injustice is legitimised. Aside from injuring the security of the individual from the lower class, this injustice also strengthens the nobility's dominance over the lower classes. In this regard, Usbek draws a picture of a society where judgments relating to justice are decided on inegalitarian criteria. It follows that inequality in monarchy is not limited to the private circumstances of a person, such as his fortune, estate, profession, etc. Rather, it extends to the realm of criminal law by prescribing different routes to justice based on social status, thus undermining the spirit of liberty.

Later in the same letter Usbek (in the words of Montesquieu) suggested that, depending on his preferred method for resolving his conflicts, an individual may suffer different consequences:

“the kings prohibited it [the practice of duelling] under very severe penalties, but in vain; honour which wishes always to reign, revolts, and regards not the laws. On this account violence prevails amongst the French: for these laws of honour require a gentleman to avenge himself when he has been insulted; but, on the other hand, justice punishes him unmercifully when he does so. If one follows the laws of honour, one dies upon the scaffold; if one follows those of justice, one is banished for ever from the society of men: this, then, is the barbarous alternative, either to die, or to be unworthy to live” (*Ibid* p.213).

Although the practice of duelling became penalised by the law, Usbek says that the subjects of monarchy were not discouraged from its practice.⁴⁹ In this regard, Usbek suggests that in monarchy, the code of honour receives priority over the established set of laws. In the same regard, in *The Spirit of the Laws*, Montesquieu said that honour demands more strongly the performance of an action if it is prohibited by law: “what honour requires is more strongly required when the laws do not require it” (*EL IV*, 2 p.34). Hence, if the law prohibits the conduct of duels, the code of honour will be more insistent on their performance. This highlights a further aspect of honour: it shows that men’s desire for social distinction and honour in monarchy inclines them to disobey the law, thus undermining the state's preservation and the spirit of liberty.

To conclude: Montesquieu did not consider the purpose of politics equally attainable among all types of regimes. Rather, he thought that only regimes with a fixed set of laws and a constitution were capable of attaining it. However, its attainment does not also determine a regime’s capacity to foster liberty. Rather, Montesquieu deemed that a state’s ability to foster liberty depends on the degree to which it protects the individual from abuses in the proceedings of justice. Montesquieu thought that only monarchy makes steps toward attaining this end. Though, despite the protection it offers, monarchy only ‘approximates’ Montesquieu’s definition of liberty. That is because its principle, honour, inclines the individual to pursue his desire for power even if it conflicts with the law. By encouraging the violation of the established laws and abuse of power, honour exacerbates political inequality and corrupts established justice. As a result, it damages “the opinion one has of one's security” (*EL XII*, 2 p.188). Hence, despite attaining greater security than republics, Montesquieu did

⁴⁹ Honneur was an idea and a guiding principle deeply embedded in the aristocratic notion of justice of the French society in the 18th century. As a practice, it was related to private war by ‘drawing the sword’ and its social implications were especially targeted by Louis XIV, who issued anti-duelling legislation in 1679 that punished by death any individual caught duelling (Kelly, 1986, p. 112). Moreover, according to the *Encyclopedie*, a person’s honour could suffer injure through verbal, written, or physical offence (Boucher d’Argis, 2013, p. 752a). In these cases, one was permitted to take vengeance which consisted in “de venger les offenses où les lois n’ont point porté de remede;” and “ainsi la vengeance est une sorte de justice” (Jaucourt, 2012, p.4a). This translates as “to avenge the affronts for which law offers no remedy;” and “therefore revenge is a kind of justice.”

not think that monarchy could be effective in fostering liberty (*EL XI*, 7 pp.166-7). That is why Montesquieu said that “the monarchies we know do not have liberty for their direct purpose [...] they aim only for the glory of the citizens, the state, and the prince” (*Ibid*, p.166).

V. The Pursuit of Liberty in England

Montesquieu conceived an ideal type of regime to address the deficient security in republics and monarchies. He defined this in Part 2 of *The Spirit of the Laws*.⁵⁰ This is the famous case of England, which Montesquieu praised so much, because its “constitution has political liberty for its direct purpose” (*EL XI*, 5 p.156). Apart from promoting liberty, Montesquieu deemed that England also addressed the needs of modernity by facilitating the rise of commerce in the eighteenth-century. Indeed, he said that England “has always made its political interests give way to the interests of its commerce” (*EL XX*, 7 p.343). In this regard, England, more than any other type of regime in *The Spirit of the Laws*, embodies his ideal of liberty and constitutes his proposal for modernity.

Despite the importance he ascribed to England, Montesquieu’s analysis of its government falls short of the expectations he inspired in his readers. Indeed, Montesquieu’s definition of England’s nature and principle of government are cryptic and open to interpretation.⁵¹ Regarding its nature of government, although he thoroughly analysed its constitution, he did not specify whether it qualified as a monarchy or a republic.⁵² Rather, he said that England is the nation “where the republic hides under the form of monarchy” (*EL V*, 19 p.70). Regarding its principle, he did not specify the type of motivation that inclines

⁵⁰ Montesquieu’s interpreters have widely considered England as the ideal regime type that he abstracted from England’s constitution in the 18th century (Courtney, 2001, p.279; Hirschl, 2008, p.202).

⁵¹ The most central chapters for the study and interpretation of England’s nature and principle of government are in *The Spirit of the Laws*. Regarding England’s nature, commentators study Montesquieu’s analysis in the chapter On the Constitution of England in book XI (*EL XI*, 6). Regarding its principle, they study Montesquieu’s analysis of the English mores in the chapter How the Laws Contribute to Form the Manners, Customs, and Character, of a Nation, in book XIX (*EL XIX*, 27 pp.325-33). Alongside these chapters, interpreters often refer to excerpts from the Persian Letters, the Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and their Decline and the Notes sur L’Angleterre. Though, in all of Montesquieu’s work, the two chapters from *The Spirit of the Laws* are central to every interpretation of England’s nature and principle of government.

⁵² Montesquieu’s analysis of England’s constitution is the largest chapter in *The Spirit of the Laws*. Every commentator interpreting England’s nature of government considers this chapter.

individuals to action. Rather, he said vaguely that in England “all the passions are free” (*EL* XIX, 27 p.325). England’s nature and principle of government act as a medium through which liberty may be attained (*EL* XI, 5 p.156). In this regard, although Montesquieu considered England as the type of government whose purpose is liberty, it is unclear how that liberty becomes realised. For this reason, the study of its nature and principle of government is of cardinal importance for understanding Montesquieu’s “system on liberty” (*Pensées* 907 p.232).

Firstly, this section examines Montesquieu’s description of England’s nature of government to illustrate how the separation of powers takes place in its constitution. Secondly, it suggests that by combining aspects from the types of monarchy and republic, England corrects their defects and furthers the pursuit of liberty. Thirdly, it suggests that Montesquieu’s cryptic definition of England’s principle obfuscates our understanding of the type of individual motivations that foster the pursuit of liberty.

Based on Montesquieu's definition, England identifies with neither republican nor monarchical types of regimes. In this regard, Montesquieu conceived England separately from his original typology and so, it is *sui generis* (Shackleton, 1961, p.287). Montesquieu began his chapter on the English constitution with an analysis of its nature of government. In contrast to his original typology in Part 1 of *The Spirit of the Laws*, he said that England fosters greater security through the complete separation of the executive, judiciary and legislative powers.

Montesquieu thought that the judiciary power should not be exercised by permanent bodies of magistrates, because that would make the magisterial function identifiable with a particular social class (*EL* XI, 6 p.158). In that case, said Montesquieu, the people would not fear the magistrate’s person but rather, his office and social class (Ibid). Moreover, he said, this would encourage the accused to frame his punishment as an act of oppression that ascertains the dominance of the nobility over the people (Ibid). To avoid this feeling of

insecurity, Montesquieu wrote that the formation of tribunals should last for only “as long as necessity requires” (Ibid). Moreover, he said that “the judges must be of the same condition as the accused” (Ibid). In important cases, the accused “must be able to challenge so many of them [the judges] that those who remain are considered to be his choice” (Ibid). In this regard, Montesquieu said that the judiciary power would become “invisible and null” because it could not be identified with a fixed body or a particular class (Ibid).⁵³ As a result, the individual would feel greater security about his prospect for a fair trial, and not fear the abuse of his life and fortune.

Unlike the judiciary function, Montesquieu deemed that there was no danger in giving the legislative and executive branches of government to permanent bodies. That is because these branches of government are not vested in certain individuals but rather, they represent the general will of the people (Ibid). Regarding the legislative branch, Montesquieu said that it should be shared between a body of nobles and a body from the people: the upper and lower chambers of parliament, respectively. These two bodies have the capacity to check upon each other through the “faculty of vetoing” and correct what has been ordered by another through the “faculty of enacting” (Ibid).⁵⁴ Regarding the upper chamber, Montesquieu deemed that, although these privileges are “odious in themselves,” the nobility should be allowed to preserve its distinctions and remain “hereditary” (Ibid). This arrangement would benefit the pursuit of liberty because the nobles would have an “interest in defending it” (Ibid). In this regard, Montesquieu said that the nobility’s part in legislation “should be in proportion to the other advantages they have in the state” (Ibid). Regarding the lower chamber, Montesquieu said that “one of the great drawbacks of democracy” is that the people are ineffective in discussions of public matters (Ibid). Indeed, due to the large size of modern states, it is impossible to expect that the whole body of the people can participate

⁵³ According to Shklar and Pangle, this aspect of the English constitution has been considered the most important indication in favour of Montesquieu’s liberalism (Pangle, 1973, p.140; Shklar, 1987, p.89).

⁵⁴ However, the nobility should not exercise the faculty of enacting in the things that it would have an interest in corrupting, such as the laws about levying silver coin, says Montesquieu (*EL XI*, 6 p.161).

in legislation. For this reason, Montesquieu said that the people should elect a body of officials to act as their representatives in legislation. These representatives, he said, would be “able to discuss public business” and do for the people “all that they themselves cannot” (Ibid). Through this arrangement, Montesquieu deemed that the laws in England would be formed by taking into consideration the interests of every social class. As a result, the noble class would not have the capacity to dominate the people, and the people would not have the capacity to act with vengeance against them. Rather, through a system of mutual checks and balances, the upper chamber would have the “right to check the enterprises of the people [the lower chamber], as the people have the right to check theirs” (Ibid).

Executive power in England should be exercised by a monarch, said Montesquieu (Ibid). Unlike the other bodies that exercise power as collectivities, the executive branch must be exercised with immediate action. For this reason, he thought, it would be more effective if it rested in the hands of one person. The office of the executive would have the responsibility of preventing the legislature from enacting laws that centralised its own power or annulled the prerogatives of the executive. In order to do this, the monarch would have the right to check the legislative body by intervening in its decisions through the faculty of vetoing. On the other hand, the legislative body would not have the ‘reciprocal’ right to check the executive. That is because executive power, he said, “has the limits of its own nature” and so, “it is useless to restrict it” (Ibid). However, it would be able to “examine the manner in which the laws it has made have been executed” (Ibid).⁵⁵ As part of that, the legislative body would not have the capacity to accuse the monarch of breach of duty because his “person should be sacred” (Ibid). Rather, if it deemed that its laws had been executed ineffectively, it would be able to seek out and punish the ministers responsible for the monarch’s errors, who are treated by the law as common men.

⁵⁵ An example of such mediation would be the legislative power denying the executive having the right to imprison citizens who can post bail for their conduct (EL XI, 6 p.159).

According to Montesquieu's classification, England is a moderate state because its constitution imposes restraints on the executive, legislative and judiciary powers. In contrast to republics and monarchies in Montesquieu's original typology, England features a complete separation of powers. This arrangement protects the individual from arbitrary interference and inspires in him a feeling of security. For example, in contrast to England, criminal law in republican government can abuse the individual's life and fortune because the people are the judge and the prosecutor at the same time. Also, in monarchy, the nobility's code of honour clashes with the established legal procedures of criminal law and as a result, undermines individual security. The English constitution corrects these defects in two steps. Firstly, the judiciary body is separated from the executive power and it is composed of temporary officials who are chosen by the people. Secondly, unlike monarchies, where the legislative branch represents the interests of the upper classes, in England, the people can influence the legislation through their representatives. Through these arrangements, the individual enjoys greater security with regard to the procedure followed by the criminal law. Also, by influencing the law through his choice of representatives, the individual feels more confident that the law will protect his life and fortune from abuse.

In addition to addressing the deficiencies of republics and monarchies, England also adopts certain aspects from their natures. From republics, it adopts a set of laws that establish equality in political participation.⁵⁶ From monarchies, it adopts a system of social hierarchy that is based on the accumulation of wealth and the purchase of titles of nobility.⁵⁷ In this regard, Montesquieu does not conceive England's nature based on the modification of a particular type of government. Rather, he formulates it by combining the opposing patterns

⁵⁶ By adopting these features, republican commentators argue that England's nature of government resembles a modern republic that is based on commerce (Rahe, 2009, p.230; Lowenthal, 1987, p.525; Hulliung, 1976, p.47; Levy, 2006, p.53).

⁵⁷ Montesquieu was "enthusiastic about the constant renewal of the nobility from below," says Mosher (Mosher, 2001, p.208). Indeed, Montesquieu said that "traders are not nobles, but they may become [...] When nobility can be acquired with silver, it greatly encourages traders to put themselves in a position to attain it" (EL XX, 22 p.351). Based on these features, liberal commentators argue that Montesquieu considered England to be a modern monarchy (Carrithers, 2001, pp.134-8, 148-9; Carrithers & Coleman, 2002, pp.21, 24-5; Dijn, 2008, pp.20-32; Larrère, 2001, pp.349-50; Mosher, 2007, pp.114-5; Mosher, 1994, pp.30, 38; Sonenscher, 2007, p.42).

of social organisation that are found in the types of monarchy and republic: Firstly, England fosters equality by granting all men the right to participate in government through representatives. Secondly, England fosters social hierarchy by encouraging its citizens to pursue their private ambition within the sphere of law and acquire wealth. Therefore, though England fosters equality with regard to the citizens' political and civil rights, it also fosters hierarchy with regard to their ownership of wealth, goods and titles of nobility. Finally, through this arrangement, Montesquieu was right to claim that in England the "republic hides under the form of monarchy" (*EL V*, 19 p.70).

This particular arrangement of England's nature has implications for its principle of government. Montesquieu did not link England's principle to his original typology. However, its principle may be deduced through scrutiny of its nature. Indeed, by combining aspects of republican and monarchical governments in its nature, Montesquieu leads us to assume that England's principle consists in the combination of virtue and honour. Combining honour with virtue is crucial for the preservation of liberty in England. That is because, aside from its formal constitutional guarantees, the pursuit of liberty in England also depends on encouraging the individual motivations that foster its preservation. Thus, along with pursuing their private ambition in times of peace, in times of crisis, the Englishmen should unite their wills to defend their common liberty. However, virtue and honour foster opposing types of individual motivations and different types of social organisation. At an individual level, while virtue fosters self-sacrifice and love of the homeland, honour fosters private ambition. And at a social level, while virtue fosters equality in republics, honour fosters hierarchy and aggrandisement in monarchy. Therefore, both at an individual and a social level, the differences between the two principles are profound. As a result, although the assumption that England's principle combines virtue and honour might seem plausible, it is difficult to ascertain its validity at this stage.

To conclude: this section has suggested that Montesquieu addressed the deficient security of monarchies and republics by conceiving the ideal regime type of England. Unlike

monarchy and republic, England secures the individual from the government's arbitrary interference and furthers the pursuit of liberty. To attain these ends, England allows the lower classes to participate in legislation through representatives and protects the individual from abuses in criminal law by instituting temporary magistrates chosen by the people. And apart from correcting their defects, England adopts in its nature certain features from the two types. In relation to republics, it fosters equality by enabling the people to participate in government through elected representatives. In relation to monarchy, it fosters social hierarchy by enabling the people to pursue their private ambition and acquire wealth and titles of nobility. However, although Montesquieu thoroughly analysed England's nature of government, that was not the case with its principle. Although he leads us to assume that England's principle consists in the combination of virtue and honour, this hypothesis requires further evidence to be proven.

VI. Conclusion

Montesquieu did not think that the study of modern politics could be successful using the traditional concepts and categories of Aristotle. Modern states were significantly more complex than ancient city-states. For this reason, he thought that the proper study of eighteenth-century politics must be conducted by also taking into account those dynamics that foster the state's transformation. To study these dynamics, Montesquieu conceived the concepts of the *nature* and *principle* of government. In this regard, Montesquieu diverted from Aristotle's widely adopted typology in the 18th century by considering a criterion that extended beyond the location and number of individuals exercising power in a state. Montesquieu classified his typology according to the types of individual motivations that incline men in their engagements with government.

Montesquieu defined the purpose of politics with relation to addressing men's natural need for security. He thought that traditional republics and monarchies could attain the security missing from men's original state through the institution of a central government and the rule of law. But although traditional republics attained the purpose of politics by

fostering the preservation of society, they were not capable of enlarging the individual's feeling of security from the state's arbitrary interference. Montesquieu deemed individual security to be a need that follows the attainment of other, more basic needs. In this regard, he conceived the establishment of eighteenth-century monarchies as a progressive step toward remedying the oppression that ancient republics imposed upon the individual. However, although monarchy was more resilient in remedying oppression and fostering individualism, it still had defects which threatened the individual's security and ultimately hindered his desire to pursue his liberty. Hence, Montesquieu deemed that although monarchies could address the defects of ancient republics, they could not foster the type of security that suits individual needs in the age of the Enlightenment.

For this reason, Montesquieu conceived an ideal type that he abstracted from the constitution of eighteenth-century England. England attained greater security than republics and monarchies by separating the branches of government and instituting a system of checks and balances. This system protected the individual from the state's arbitrary interference. Moreover, it offered the individual greater security by enabling him to participate in legislation through representatives, and by guarding the criminal law procedure against potential abuses. As a result, Montesquieu deemed that apart from security, England's government was also capable of fostering the individual's pursuit of liberty. However, although he explained that England can foster liberty in modernity, it is ambiguous how that liberty could be realised. This ambiguity stemmed from his cryptic analysis of the individual motivations determining the dynamics between England's rulers and ruled. Hence, to understand Montesquieu's concept of liberty and its significance in the contemporary debate, it is necessary to investigate further these types of individual motivations.

READING THE COMMENTARY: VIRTUE, HONOUR
AND THE PRINCIPLE OF ENGLAND

“The more one reflects on the details, the more one will feel the certainty of the principles. As for the details, I have not given them all, for who could say everything without being tedious?”

(*EL* Preface p.xliv)

This chapter examines the secondary literature on the interpretation of England’s principle of government. The first section analyses the line of interpretation that identifies England’s principle with honour, based on the assumption that England is a monarchy. It is shown that following further examination of the textual evidence, this camp’s interpretation cannot withstand the critique levelled against its claims. The second section analyses the line of interpretation that conflates England and monarchy’s principles, based on the assumption that they both advance the liberal motif of the ‘invisible hand’. It is suggested that this camp’s interpretation is problematic because it suppresses the subtleties of monarchy’s principle by linking it to Mandeville’s famous notion of *private vices public benefits*. The third section examines the line of interpretation that suggests England’s principle is fear. It is suggested that this camp’s choice of concept is inappropriate and that instead of fear, it should use the term ‘vigilance’. The fourth section examines the line of interpretation that considers England’s principle as part of a narrative that originates in Montesquieu’s notion of virtue. It is shown that this camp’s interpretation is limited because it does not consider honour’s role in the formation of England’s principle.

I. Interpreting England's Principle in Connection with Honour

This camp suggests that England's government is a monarchy and on this account, it assumes that England and monarchy have the same principle, that is, honour (Carrithers, 2001, pp. 134-8, 148-9; Carrithers, 2002, pp.21, 24-5; Dijn, 2011, pp.20-32; Larrère, 2001, pp.349-50; Mosher, 2001, pp. 207-14; Mosher, 2007, pp.114-5; Sonenscher, 2007, p.42).⁵⁸ However, this section suggests that this camp's assumption that England's principle is honour is ill-conceived. To prove this claim, firstly, this section examines Krause, Mosher and Spector's central claims about honour's relationship with the pursuit of liberty in monarchy (Krause, 2002, pp.113-4; Mosher, 1994, pp.30, 38-40; Spector, 2009, pp.56-62).⁵⁹ Secondly, this section examines whether these claims can be cross-verified in relation to England's principle. It is shown that those aspects of honour that undermine the pursuit of liberty in monarchy are not present in Montesquieu's description of England's principle. On the contrary, using textual evidence, this section shows that England's principle resolves honour's problematic relationship with the pursuit of liberty and so, it follows that this camp's assumption that England's principle should be interpreted in connection to honour is ill-conceived.

Krause considers honour a "mixed motive" (Krause, 2002, p.471). In some cases, she says that honour inclines an individual to pursue his selfish desire for social distinction. As part of that, an individual may engage in actions that are magnanimous and serve the common good.⁶⁰ Though, she adds that an individual's pursuit of honour is not based on a reasoned

⁵⁸ Mosher, insofar as he refers to England's government in conjunction with the French monarchy, regards its principle as a more "democratised version of honour," thus signifying that it has a more egalitarian character than honour (Mosher, 2001, p.163). Nonetheless, he still considers England's government and its principle under the type of monarchy; and apart from his reference to its principle's slight deviation from honour, there is no other reference in the monarchical reading of England suggesting an alternative interpretation of its principle.

⁵⁹ These authors have offered very cogent accounts of Montesquieu's conception of honour and its relationship with the pursuit of liberty in monarchy.

⁶⁰ The example of Orte may remind the reader of Oakeshott's notion of the proud man in the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes (Oakeshott, 2000, pp.79-81). According to Oakeshott, the proud man does not break his word for peace because of personal pride (courage): "What he achieves for himself and what he contributes to a common life is a complete alternative to what others may achieve by means of agreement inspired by fear and dictated by reason; for, if the unavoidable endeavour of every man is for self-preservation, and if self-preservation is interpreted (as Hobbes interprets it), not as immunity from death but from the fear of shameful death, then this man achieves in one manner (by courage) what others may achieve in another (by rational calculation)" (Ibid, pp.78-9).

plan of action but on caprice and impulse. In this regard, it is uncertain whether honour can always procure the common good. Rather, she says that the probability that honour can be a catalyst of magnanimous action is a matter of coincidence, which depends on the individual's psychological motives (Ibid, p.472). Hence, she says that while honour sometimes leads to "magnanimous actions," some "other times it is nothing more than having someone to look down on" (Ibid, pp.471, 489).

Regarding honour's promotion of liberty and the common good, Krause refers to Montesquieu's example of the Viscount of Orte. According to Montesquieu, Orte was a nobleman who disobeyed the orders of Charles IX to massacre the Huguenots (*EL IV, 2 p.33*). Orte, says Krause, "thought too much of himself to undertake such brutality" (Krause, 2002, p.476). As a result, he acted impulsively and disobeyed the lawful political authority of his king because he had greater esteem for his code of honour (Ibid). The fact that honour urged Orte to commit a magnanimous action does not mean it fosters self-sacrifice. Rather, Krause says that "even when honour involves personal sacrifice, it does not aim directly for the common good" (Ibid, p.471). In this regard, Orte's decision to disobey the commands of his king was based on self-interest. Nevertheless, Orte's pursuit of honour fostered the pursuit of liberty because he engaged critically with political authority and thus, saved innocent lives. Hence, Krause deems that despite its selfish character, honour can sometimes foster the pursuit of liberty in monarchy.

Nevertheless, Krause says that the attachment one feels toward one's code of honour can often lead to actions that undermine the security and liberty of others. That is because an agent acting out of reverence for his code of honour acts out of "an attachment to them, rather than a reasoned assessment" (Ibid, p.488). Hence, although Orte pursues his ambition by engaging in a just cause, that same pursuit may threaten the security of others due its 'partiality.' Indeed, an individual who acts out of an attachment to his code of honour prioritises his self-interest, or that of the group. In this regard, fostering the common good depends entirely on the likelihood that the object of one's selfish desire (honour) will

coincide with the other individuals' natural need for security. Hence, although honour sometimes fosters the pursuit of liberty in monarchy, some other times it undermines that liberty in order to satisfy the individual's selfish desires. Finally, based on this observation, Krause says that this feature "helps explain why Montesquieu calls honour the 'prejudice' of each person and each condition" (Ibid).

Spector argues that the commonly-held impression among commentators that monarchy is a liberal government that allows every individual to freely pursue his ambition is false. Spector notes that agency in monarchy is motivated by personal ambition that acts like "a duty toward oneself" and inspires "an unconditional obligation to uphold one's code" (Spector, 2009, p.60). In this regard, individuals' attachment to the code of honour "tends to distance them from the requirements of citizenship" (Ibid, p.57). As a result, liberty in monarchy depends on "the concurrence of the hope of rewards and the fear of punishment in case of transgression of the law," says Spector (Ibid, p.56). However, this conditioning decreases the likelihood that an individual's pursuit of his self-interest will coincide with the rule of law. On this account, Spector says that due to its deviance and partiality, honour inclines individuals to pursue self-interest - that is, the self-interest of "individuals or bodies, not of the state" (Ibid, p.53). In this regard, an individual's obedience to the rules of honour fosters the liberty of that individual's social class, or the particular professional-military body to which he belongs. It follows that the liberty of those individuals who are alien to these groups will be threatened. Therefore, despite its liberal appearance, Spector says that honour is bereft of "universal criteria of the just or the good", which makes it the "object of moral condemnation" (Ibid, p. 57).

In order to understand Montesquieu's notion of honour, Mosher studied its meaning in French society of the eighteenth-century. In his study, he observes that honour's influence on individuals drove the French monarchy in two separate directions. The first direction fostered liberty and the common good. The second encouraged the protection of social privileges that were exclusive to the nobility. Regarding the first direction, Mosher develops

his analysis of honour by locating it within a greater process that he calls the “democratisation of honour” (Mosher, 2001, pp.207-14). Mosher explains this process using a historical approach that examines a particular social dynamic among the French nobility in the eighteenth century. Mosher observes that in this dynamic, the nobility’s code of honour slowly became assimilated by lower social classes and inclined them to attain honour and distinctions. Moreover, the means toward the attainment of honour were not always dependent on heredity. Indeed, Mosher says that “money earned in commerce, and particularly in finance, seems to have exercised [...] immediate influence on social and official status” (Ibid, p.209). As a result, Mosher says, the nobility did not have “an exclusive lock on honour” and “as the culture of honour spreads, it legitimises social differentiation” and individual liberty (Ibid, p.208).

Regarding the second direction, Mosher argues that although Montesquieu was tolerant of the social mobility of ambitious bourgeois, he wanted “the boundaries to be crossed, but not erased” (Ibid, p.210). Indeed, in his analysis of monarchy Montesquieu says that “noble lands [...] will be peculiar to the nobility and will not transfer to the people, unless one wants to run counter to the principle of the government” (*EL V*, 9 p.55). Hence, despite honour’s dissemination across the lower classes, and the individuals’ ambition to acquire titles of nobility, Mosher says that “Montesquieu requires its legal entrenchment” (Ibid, p.211). Therefore, in contrast to the opinion that honour enlarges the sphere of individual liberty in monarchy, Mosher argues that honour has another tendency which aims at the pursuit of exclusivity and social aggrandisement (Ibid, p.210). This is what Mosher defines as ‘monarchy’s paradox’: although individuals from lower classes aspire to pursue their ambition for wealth and distinction, the nobility seeks to restrict access in order to defend its code of honour and social hierarchy. Hence, despite the fact that the nobility has no exclusivity of honour, the pursuit of private ambition and individual liberty would still be enjoyed by the few.

Based on the above, commentators ascertain honour's contribution toward the attainment of liberty in monarchy according to three claims. Firstly, according to Krause, an individual's reverence for his code of honour enlarges the sphere of individually motivated actions. Secondly, according to Spector, obedience to the code of honour advocates the liberty of the members of a particular social class or professional-military body. Thirdly, according to Mosher, the open-access nature of the code of honour enables individuals from lower social classes to acquire distinctions through means that are not limited to heredity.

Nevertheless, for every reason why honour advances the pursuit of liberty, commentators identify a reason why it hinders its attainment. Firstly, instead of a reasoned assessment, honour inclines individuals to act out of an emotional attachment to its code.⁶¹ As a result, through the uncritical prioritisation of honour over civil law, an individual may commit actions that undermine the security of others and the preservation of the state. Secondly, by encouraging an emotional attachment, honour inclines individuals to prioritise its own rules at the expense of the law. In this regard, there is a very small chance that an individual will satisfy the rules of honour without infringing the law.⁶² As a result, it is unlikely that an individual's selfish pursuit of honour will foster the common good or liberty in monarchy. Thirdly, in monarchy, the code of honour is disseminated by the nobility to individuals from lower classes. In turn, honour inclines those individuals to pursue their selfish desires for wealth and distinction. However, the satisfaction of those desires can be hampered by the nobility's vigilant attempts to protect its exclusive privileges.⁶³

If this camp's assumption that England's principle is honour is correct, then the aforementioned aspects of honour should be present in Montesquieu's analysis of England's

⁶¹ Montesquieu said that in monarchy, honour acts as the "prejudice of each person and each condition" (*EL* III, 6 p.26).

⁶² Indeed, Montesquieu said that in monarchy, "what honour forbids is more rigorously forbidden when the laws do not agree in proscribing it, and that what honour requires is more strongly required when the laws do not require it" (*EL* IV, 2 p.34).

⁶³ Montesquieu said that "all these prerogatives will be peculiar to the nobility and will not transfer to the people" (*EL* V, 9 p.55).

principle. In order to test the cogency of this camp's assumption, these aspects are now traced and cross-verified with the textual evidence in *The Spirit of the Laws*.

Attention is first given to those traits of honour which, according to the commentators, further the attainment of liberty. Montesquieu said that in England "each individual, always independent, would largely follow his own caprices and his fantasies" (*EL XIX*, 27). From this excerpt we may infer that the Englishmen are free to engage in individually motivated action. In this regard, Krause's claim that honour enlarges the pursuit of individually-motivated action in monarchy can be traced in Montesquieu's description of England's principle. Montesquieu said that men in England are judged by "real qualities, and of these there are only two, wealth and personal merit" (*Ibid*). From this excerpt we may infer that the Englishmen can pursue their ambition and acquire distinction on the basis of wealth or personal merit. In this regard, Mosher's claim that individuals in monarchy can acquire distinctions through non-hereditary means can be traced in Montesquieu's description of England's principle. Hence, based on the textual evidence, the commentators' first and third claims about honour can be traced in Montesquieu's description of England's principle.

However, there is substantial evidence that proves that the commentators' second claim about honour's pursuit of liberty cannot be traced in England's principle. Specifically, Spector claims that the individual's obedience to the code of honour advocates the liberty of a particular social class or professional-military body. In contrast, Montesquieu said that an individual in England "would often change parties; he would abandon one and leave all his friends in order to bind himself to another in which he would find all his enemies" (*EL XIX*, 27 p.326). In this regard, Montesquieu deemed that the Englishmen override their emotional attachment toward sets of rules that define the conduct of their social class. Moreover, the previous quote signifies that he deemed that not only are the Englishmen free to defy these rules, but they are also willing to join their enemies to further their ambition. Under this light, Spector's claim that the individuals' obedience to honour fosters liberty cannot be traced in Montesquieu's description of England's principle. Therefore, although the

commentators' first and third claims about honour overlap with England's principle, further examination proves that this assumption is not entirely true.

Attention is now given to those traits of honour which, according to the commentators, hinder the pursuit of liberty. Firstly, in contrast to the tendency of honour to encourage social prejudices, Montesquieu said that in England "men would scarcely be judged there by frivolous talents or attributes, but by real qualities, and of these there are only two, wealth and personal merit" (*EL* III, 7-8 pp.21-8; *Ibid* XIX, 27 p.331). Secondly, in contrast to the priority that honour receives over the law in monarchy, Montesquieu said that in England "the laws would not be made for one individual more than another" (*EL* XIX, 27 p.332). Hence, due to England's egalitarianism, the laws act as the single denominator of everyone's actions. Thirdly, regarding honour's encouragement of social exclusion in monarchy, Montesquieu said that in England, "each [citizen] would regard himself as the monarch" (*Ibid*). In this regard, Montesquieu deemed that the Englishman's ambitions are not hindered by the nobles' exclusive, legally entrenched, privileges. Rather, unlike the subjects of monarchy, whose ambitions are dependent on the caprices of the nobility, the Englishmen feel like monarchs, which means they are independent to pursue their ambition on account of their personal merit and wealth. Therefore, based on the textual evidence, honour's complications toward the attainment of liberty in monarchy cannot occur in England.

To conclude this section, the commentators' indirect suggestion that England's principle should be identified with honour is invalid. Due to honour's influence in monarchy, the pursuit of individual ambition often receives priority at the expense of the law and civil liberty. Moreover, social mobility is hindered by the nobility, which retains important positions for a small elite that enjoys privileged treatment by the law. However, it may be argued that this is not the case in England. Indeed, unlike monarchy, individuals in England do not feel reverence for any set of rules that inclines them to show loyalty to a particular group or social class. Instead, the Englishmen are willing to change parties and join their enemies in order to further their interests. As a result, the complications that commentators

have identified regarding honour's interference with the law are absent from Montesquieu's description of England's principle. Therefore, we may conclude that the similarities between England and monarchy's principles do not suffice to support the commentators' indirect suggestion that England's principle is honour.

II. Conflating the Principles of England and Monarchy

Catherine Larrère, Melvin Richter and Michael Sonenscher interpret England's principle based on a narrative that traces its origins in Montesquieu's notion of honour. This camp's line of interpretation is divided into two stages. Firstly, this camp reads Montesquieu's notion of honour in conjunction with Bernard de Mandeville's famous notion of *private vices public benefits*. Secondly, insofar as England's principle inclines individuals to freely pursue their ambition, this camp traces its origins in Montesquieu's notion of honour (Larrère, 2001, p.339; Richter, 1977, p.43; Sonenscher, 2007, p.167). In this regard, this camp conflates the principles of England and monarchy based on the assumption that they both advance Mandeville's liberal motif. This section suggests that this camp's assumptions about England's principle are ill-conceived. This is because the object of individual ambition in monarchy differs significantly from its English counterpart, which means that their conceptual affinity should not be overemphasised. In order to prove this claim, firstly, this section analyses the commentators' assumptions about the link between Mandeville and Montesquieu's notion of honour. Secondly, this section analyses the commentators' line of interpretation in tracing England's principle in the notion of honour. Also, based on the relevant textual evidence, it identifies the weaknesses in their interpretations.

Larrère deems that Montesquieu justified social inequality in monarchy based on Mandeville's theory of the circulation of wealth through commerce. Larrère deems that Montesquieu studied the type of monarchy on two analytical levels: the factual and the moral (Larrère, 2001, p.339). On the factual level, Larrère deems that Montesquieu's description of monarchy fosters unequal distribution of wealth that leads to inequality and social resentment. With regard to the moral level, she observes that Montesquieu amended

the effects of inequality by conforming monarchy to a “pattern of justice” (Ibid). However, she says, this endeavour was problematic because the concepts of inequality and justice are mutually exclusive (Ibid). Indeed, Montesquieu’s type of monarchy harbours inequality by its very nature. Hence, by eradicating inequality in monarchy, its government would begin to resemble a republican regime. Therefore, instead of eradicating inequality, Larrère claims that Montesquieu justified it on account of its economic and social benefits. Indeed, she says that according to Montesquieu, “inequalities require justification” (Ibid). Toward this end, Larrère claims that Montesquieu adopted Mandeville’s line of argument in the *Fable of the Bees* (Ibid). She says that Mandeville’s theme of ‘*private vices, public benefits*’ suggests a “circular process” of wealth where “the expenses of the rich make up the wages of the poor” (Ibid). Hence, by adopting Mandeville’s argument, Montesquieu suggested that inequality in monarchy can be beneficent insofar as it encourages the constant flow of wealth among the social strata, says Larrère (Ibid). In this regard, Montesquieu addressed the social resentment of the lower classes while preserving monarchy’s particular nature.

Likewise, Richter supports the notion that “Montesquieu’s concept of monarchy, and its principle, honour, was in part adapted from Mandeville’s *The Fable of the Bees*” (Richter, 1977, p.43). To reach this conclusion, Richter analyses the unpublished sequel of *The Troglodytes* and illustrates how Mandeville’s influence led Montesquieu to revise it before its final publication in *The Persian Letters*. According to Montesquieu, the Troglodytes were a tribe that recognised no central government whose members were wholly engaged in the pursuit of their self-interest (*LP* 11 p.56). For this reason, in the absence of civic spirit, Montesquieu depicted the Troglodytes perishing due to famine and disease.

After their tribe perished, Montesquieu noted that two virtuous Troglodyte survivors founded a benevolent anarchic state that was based on virtue. Due to its increasing size, the community could not meet its basic needs in the absence of a central government. For this reason, Montesquieu said that the Troglodytes decided to yield their liberty to a philosopher-king who would rule their community in accordance with virtue. After a while, the

Troglodytes found virtue too demanding and decided to moderate it by enabling the free pursuit of individual ambition and the accumulation of wealth. At the same time, they introduced certain restrictions that moderated the social inequality stemming from the unequal distribution of wealth. In this regard, Montesquieu deemed that a monarchy could pursue virtue “in conjunction with wealth,” by allowing “self-interest as much scope as was consistent with the laws,” says Richter (Richter, 1977, p.42).

Richter argues that Montesquieu revised the fable before its final publication because its moral was inconsistent with his definition of monarchy in *The Spirit of the Laws*. Indeed, in the fable of the Troglodytes, Montesquieu suggested that in monarchy, “the arts and sciences and the accumulation of wealth were compatible with the maintenance of virtue” (Ibid, p.44). On the other hand, in *The Spirit of the Laws*, Montesquieu said that in monarchy, “politics accomplishes great things with as little virtue as it can” (EL III, 5 p.25). Richter attributes this inconsistency to the fact that Montesquieu had not fully developed his notion of honour at the time he wrote the sequel of the Troglodytes (Richter, 1977, p.43). He deems that Montesquieu finalised his definition of monarchy and honour following his acquaintance with Mandeville’s notion that “satisfactory outcomes resulting from morally indifferent or contemptible motives” (Ibid).⁶⁴ In this regard, Richter says that Montesquieu combined “ancient aristocratic French theory of monarchy” with Mandeville’s “bourgeois account of how private vices produce public benefits” (Ibid, p.43). Hence, instead of combining virtue and honour in monarchy, Montesquieu made “the first the principle of republics, and the second, that of monarchies” (Ibid, p.44).

Sonenscher deems that insofar as honour inclines individuals to pursue their *private vices* in order to foster *public benefits*, Montesquieu’s notion of honour was influenced by Mandeville. Sonenscher justifies this claim in relation to the development of commerce in monarchy. He says that the combination of a monarch with subordinate powers allowed

⁶⁴ For this reason, he only included a limited edition of the sequel in the final version of the Persian Letters.

monarchy to acquire “a range of financial instruments that had come to shield it from political interference” (Sonenscher, 2007, p.166). Hence, he observes that by protecting commerce with laws, monarchy enabled the free circulation of wealth and the development of industry. Moreover, by capitalising on the individual’s selfish passions, monarchy inclined individuals to pursue their ambition in commerce and ensure the state’s preservation. Sonenscher says that although Montesquieu thought men’s passions incline them to be “wicked,” honour inclines them to be “humane and virtuous” out of self-interest (Ibid, p.166). Therefore, instead of engaging in conflict with each other, individuals in monarchy compete in commerce and the accumulation of wealth. Thus Sonenscher links Montesquieu’s notion of honour to Mandeville’s teaching that men’s ‘private vices’ can be ultimately transformed into ‘public benefits’ (Ibid, p.167).

Based on these observations, Larrère, Richter and Sonenscher claim that in defining the principle of monarchy, Montesquieu adopted Mandeville’s famous notion that socially satisfactory outcomes can result from self-interested motives. Now it is shown that according to this camp, Montesquieu formulated England’s principle based on the same notion (Larrère, 2001, p.339; Richter, 1977, p.43; Sonenscher, 2007, p.167).

In order to justify the conceptual resemblance between the two principles, this camp projects central aspects of England’s principle onto Montesquieu’s notion of honour. With regard to England’s principle, this camp identifies its main trait with the liberal motif of the ‘invisible hand’. Indeed, Montesquieu claimed that “England has always made its political interests give way to the interests of its commerce” (*EL XX*, 7 p.343). On account of this claim, this camp deems that England’s principle fosters a free labour market where individuals procure public benefits by pursuing freely their ambition in commerce. This reading traces the seeds of the same motif in Montesquieu’s conception of honour. It confirms its presence based on Montesquieu’s claim that in monarchies “each person works for the common good, believing he works for his individual interests” (*EL III*, 5, 7 p.27). In this regard, this camp deems that both principles capitalise on men’s selfish passions to generate public benefits.

Based on this conceptual resemblance, this camp traces the conceptual origins of England's principle within a narrative that originates in Montesquieu's notion of honour. Moreover, it deems that this narrative is united under the authority of Bernard de Mandeville (Spector, 2012, pp.65-9; Douglass, 2012, pp.711-5).

However, despite their attempts to interpret England's principle, this camp's assumptions may be ill-conceived. Indeed, by overemphasising the conceptual resemblances between the two principles, this camp confounds Montesquieu's thought in two ways. Firstly, by projecting England's *laissez-faire* economy on monarchy, this camp links monarchy's honorific individualism to the liberal motif of the 'invisible hand.' In this regard, by linking honour to acquisitiveness, this camp considers the bourgeois Englishmen and the chivalrous subjects of monarchy under the same light. As a result, this narrative suppresses honour's subtleties by linking the object of its ambition to the desire for wealth. Secondly, this camp explains the formation of England's principle only with relation to Montesquieu's notion of honour. In this regard, it neglects considering the possibility that Montesquieu may have conceived England's principle also in connection to his notion of virtue. However, by neglecting to consider the role of virtue toward the conception of England's principle, this camp exaggerates Englishmen's individualism.

With regard to this camp's first misconception, in *The Spirit of the Laws*, Montesquieu defined the object of honour with relation to the pursuit of individual distinction and glory. For example, he said that in monarchy "one judges men's actions here not as good but as fine, not as just but as great; not as reasonable but as extraordinary" (*EL IV*, 2 p.32). Hence, although honour prompts individuals to pursue their self-interest in monarchy, it inclines them toward nobler ends than the mere accumulation of monetary wealth. This is why Montesquieu said that "glory and honour are for that nobility which knows, sees, and feels no real good" (*EL XIV*, 19 p.227).

In this regard, although honour inclines individuals to pursue their selfish passions in order to procure public benefits, their motives are substantially different from Mandeville's bourgeois desire for monetary wealth. In his analysis of *On Education in Monarchies*, Montesquieu referred to the examples of Crillon and the Viscount of Orte. According to Montesquieu, both men had received orders from their kings to assassinate their political opponents. However, Montesquieu said that the two men disobeyed their kings' orders because their "great and generous courage regarded a cowardly action as an impossible thing" (*EL IV, 2 p.33*). Through their act of disobedience, the two men rejected the king's favour and a generous bounty. Hence, instead of aiming for monetary wealth, their selfish motives inclined them to protect the opinion they had about themselves. Their actions also procured certain public benefits. By disobeying their kings' orders, the two men prevented the king's abuse of power and enlarged the pursuit of liberty and security in monarchy. Using this example, Montesquieu illustrated that the pursuit of honour is not coterminous with the accumulation of monetary wealth. Although both principles converge insofar as they prompt individuals to pursue their self-interest, there are important differences with regard to the object of the ambition they inspire. Finally, as Hirschman put it, the idea of an 'invisible hand' in Montesquieu's thought "was formulated in connection with the search for glory, rather than with the desire for money" (Hirschman, 1997, p.10).

With regard to its second misconception, this camp explains the formation of England's principle only in relation to Montesquieu's notion of honour. As a result, it neglects the possibility that Montesquieu may also have conceived England's principle in connection to virtue. By neglecting to consider the influence of virtue, this camp cannot account for Montesquieu's claim that in times of crisis, the Englishmen forgo their private pursuits in order to secure the preservation of the state. On one hand, Montesquieu deemed that to a great extent, the Englishmen are led by their selfish passions and ambition to increase their wealth. Indeed, he said that in England "all the passions are free" and so, "the ardor for enriching and distinguishing oneself would appear to their full extent" (*EL XIX, 27 p.325*). On

the other hand, Montesquieu also pronounced certain aspects that testify against this camp's emphasis on the Englishmen's extreme individualism. Indeed, Montesquieu added later that "this nation would love its liberty prodigiously" and that "in order to defend that liberty, the nation might sacrifice its goods, its ease, and its interests, and might burden itself with harsher imposts than even the most absolute prince would dare make his subjects bear" (Ibid p.327). In this regard, the textual evidence suggests that despite their individualism, in times of crisis the Englishmen act out of "love of the homeland" (*EL* Author's Foreword p.xli). Finally, this evidence suggests that by considering honour as the sole progenitor of England's principle, this camp suppresses the aspects that signify virtue's influence.

To conclude this section, this camp interprets England's principle based on a narrative that originates in Montesquieu's notion of honour. This narrative suggests that both principles capitalise on men's selfish passions in order to procure public benefits. On this account, this camp links both the principles of monarchy and England to the liberal motif of the 'invisible hand' and Mandeville's *private vices public benefits*. However, by overemphasising Mandeville's influence on honour, this camp misreads its intended meaning. Examination of the relevant textual evidence has shown that Montesquieu's notion of honour inclines individuals toward the attainment of nobler ends than the mere accumulation of wealth. Hence, although both principles foster public benefits by capitalising on men's selfish passions, this section has suggested that the object of their ambition differs significantly. Moreover, this section has used textual evidence to suggest that honour should not be considered as the sole conceptual progenitor of England's principle. Indeed, through its emphasis on honour, this camp suppresses certain aspects about England's principle that signify a conceptual affinity with Montesquieu's notion of virtue. As a result, this camp's assumption that England's principle originates solely in honour is ill-conceived.

III. Interpreting England's Principle in Connection with Fear

Rahe and Courtney suggest that England's principle should be considered in connection with Montesquieu's notion of *fear* or, as it appears in the original, *crainte*⁶⁵ (Rahe, 2009, p.99; Courtney, 2001, p.284; Courtney, 2008, p.41). In this regard, this camp interprets England's principle by referring to the term Montesquieu used to define the principle of despotism. Fear in despotism hampers security by subjecting men to unquestionable obedience and slavery.⁶⁶ In this regard, given England's unremitting pursuit of liberty, this camp's interpretation is especially controversial and may be ill-conceived. In order to prove this claim, firstly, this section examines the arguments of the two thinkers to identify the reasons behind their interpretations. Secondly, based on the examination of the relevant sources, this section argues that there is substantial textual evidence that refutes this camp's line of argument.

Rahe argues that England has "an undeniable kinship with despotism" (Rahe, 2009, p.99).⁶⁷ He says that England's object of government is to inspire its citizens with security and "tranquility of mind" (Ibid). In the same regard, Rahe says that despotism's object of government is the pursuit of "public tranquility" (Ibid). On this account, Rahe suggests that England's principle is "something very much like fear" (Ibid). However, although despotic states in general often attain their object, England fails to do so, says Rahe (Ibid). That is because the separation of powers in its constitution forms a condition where England's government is "rarely, if ever, at rest" (Ibid, pp.99-100). Indeed, England's branches of government are always in conflict because they aim to increase their influence over one another (Ibid, p.100). As a result, political turbulence in parliament influences society and

⁶⁵ Montesquieu's reference to fear in the original was through the concept *crainte*. See Montesquieu's analysis of "Du principe du gouvernement despotique" in Book III, chapter 9 (Masson, 1950(a)).

⁶⁶ See Ch.2, section III.

⁶⁷ On this matter, Rahe says that "the government of England is not a despotism comparable to the oriental states that Montesquieu so vehemently despised, but it has an undeniable kinship with despotism. It has its object "political liberty," not the "delights of the prince." But it comprehends this political liberty in terms of the citizen's "opinion of his security." Where the "despotic state" in China takes as its object "public tranquility" and other despotisms pursue "tranquility" as their "aim [but]," if not their "object," England's government pursues the individual citizen's "tranquility of mind" (Rahe, 2009, p.99).

creates social unrest. Rahe explains England's state of unrest in relation to the Englishmen's psychological motives. Indeed, he says that rather than acting from reason, the Englishmen are guided by their ambition and desire for power (Ibid). In this regard, he argues that in the minds of the Englishmen, "reason is the slave of passions" and their actions are guided by fear about their self-preservation (Ibid). For this reason, Rahe argues that Montesquieu's understanding of the Englishmen's psychology corresponds to Machiavelli, Hobbes and Hume's descriptions of human nature (Ibid). Finally, Rahe concludes that "human passions [...] alone are necessary to sustain" England and "the ruling passion that does so [fear] is closely akin to the very passion that is responsible for the establishment of despotism" (Ibid).

Courtney argues that based on Montesquieu's description, England's principle can be linked neither to virtue nor to honour. On one hand, he says, Montesquieu described the English as being "motivated by caprice, fancy, and various forms of self-interest" (Courtney, 2008, p.38). This is especially true considering his description of England's parliamentary debate. Indeed, Montesquieu said that in England, "each individual, always independent, would largely follow his own caprices and his fantasies, he would often change parties; he would abandon one and leave all his friends in order to bind himself to another in which he would find all his enemies" (*EL XIX*, 27 p.326). On the other hand, Courtney says that "to complete the equation one must take account of the 'citizens' who, when necessary, will intervene to preserve the balance of the constitution" (Courtney, 2008, p.39).⁶⁸ Indeed, Montesquieu wrote that if a party encroaches on political power "the citizens would come and raise the other party like hands rescuing the body" (*EL XIX*, 27 p.326). Thus Courtney argues that Montesquieu illustrated both the Englishmen's pursuit of self-interest and their eagerness to protect the constitution for the common good (Courtney, 2008, p.38). Therefore,

⁶⁸ Based on this line of argument, Courtney aims to confute Krause and Pangle who argue that instead of fear, the English are moved by "unbridled self-interest," thus alluding to the principle of honour in monarchy (Courtney, 2008, p.37).

he deems it problematic to identify England's principle with either virtue or honour (Ibid, p. 41).

Instead, Courtney suggests that England's principle of government should be defined as a variant form of *fear* (Ibid, p.41). That is because the liberation of the passions in England has given way to "a bitter struggle for power between rival parties" in parliament (Ibid, p.36). As a result, these factions challenge the people's opinions about their security and so, the "English live in constant fear of losing their freedom" (Ibid, p.41). However, Courtney says that Montesquieu deemed this fear could have a positive effect for the preservation of liberty (Ibid). Indeed, Montesquieu thought that fear would incline the people to be alert about their security and "help them [the people] avoid the real perils to which they might sometimes be exposed" (*EL XIX*, 27 p.326). On this account, Courtney says that Montesquieu followed a "negative approach" in describing English liberty, because he portrayed it emerging from selfish psychological motives (Courtney, 2008, p.41). Finally, Courtney concludes that although England's principle should be defined as fear, it is "not the same as that dumb fear that is the principle of despotism" (Ibid, p.41).

Although both Rahe and Courtney conclude that England's principle resembles 'fear,' there are important differences in their arguments. Unlike Rahe, who writes that England bears "an undeniable kinship with despotism," Courtney says that "it would be a mistake [...] to seek a link between the English system and despotism" (Rahe, 2009, p.99; Courtney, 2001, p.284). Hence, the two thinkers do not advance their opinions with equal pertinacity. This difference in their attitudes can be explained with relation to the particular points they emphasise in their analyses. On one hand, Rahe explains the affinity between England's principle and fear based on Montesquieu's description of human nature (Rahe, 2009, p.102). In this regard, Rahe's observation that the Englishmen are animated by fear does not apply only to specific occasions such as the parliamentary debate or times of crisis. Rather, by referring to the Englishmen's human nature as a whole, Rahe suggests that the Englishmen are animated by fear on a constant basis. As a result, he concludes that fear is the

Englishmen's "normal state of mind" (Ibid). On the other hand, Courtney explains the affinity between England's principle and fear based on the political factions and struggle for power in the parliamentary debate. Thus Courtney's conception of fear is limited to the occasions when rival parties struggle for power. Hence, although these struggles were often becoming the centre of parliamentary debate, they could not have been constant. Indeed, Courtney says that the government "will [eventually] be able to remove the bad impressions which have been given them [the people], and to calm their movements" (Courtney, 2008, p.41). It follows that, according to Courtney, after balancing the constitution, the Englishmen's "opinion each one has of his security" would be restored (*EL XI*, 6 p.157). Therefore, unlike Rahe, who considers fear to be the Englishman's standard *modus operandi*, Courtney portrays it as a transitory phase.

Moreover, the two commentators differ with regard to the effect they think 'fear' has on English liberty. On one hand, apart from its negative aspects, Courtney's reference to 'fear' also suggests a positive aspect of the Englishmen's disposition that can favour the preservation of political liberty (Courtney, 2009, p.41). Courtney says that the Englishmen are "motivated by something that transcends the narrow self-interest of party and may involve sacrifice" (Courtney, 2008, p.42). On the other hand, by suggesting an affinity between Montesquieu and Hobbes's (also Machiavelli and Hume) descriptions of human nature, Rahe deems that the Englishmen act only from unbridled self-interest (Rahe, 2009, p.99).

It is surprising that Rahe came to consider 'fear' as the most appropriate way of describing England's principle of government. On one hand, Rahe may be right in saying that insofar as English politics is turbulent, the Englishmen feel fearful about the preservation of their liberty. However, following the study of additional textual evidence, his definition of fear as the Englishmen's "normal state of mind" may be ill-conceived (Rahe, 2009, p.102). Indeed, in his chapter on the English mores, Montesquieu wrote that despite their selfishness, the Englishmen are willing to renounce their ambition in order to protect their liberty: "in order to defend that liberty, the nation might sacrifice its goods, its ease, and

its interests” (*EL XIX*, 27 p.327). It follows that the Englishmen would act with self-renunciation in order to defend their liberty from usurpation. In this regard, the Englishmen’s love for their liberty resembles the republican citizens’ love for their homeland.⁶⁹ Indeed, Montesquieu said that “this nation would love its liberty prodigiously because this liberty would be true” (*Ibid*). As a result, the Englishmen’s willingness to sacrifice their private interests for the common good serves as an assurance for the preservation of liberty. This evidence also challenges Rahe’s claim that the Englishmen feel constantly fearful. Indeed, at least during the occasions where the Englishmen act from their love for liberty, their actions must be driven by a more vivid motivation than dampening fear.

Montesquieu’s use of the notion fear in his chapter on the English mores appears to show that he considers it unsuitable to describe the Englishmen’s individual motivations. Indeed, Montesquieu said that “as no citizen would fear another citizen, this nation [England] would be proud, for the pride of kings is founded only on their independence” (*EL XIX*, 27 p.332). This quote shows that Montesquieu suggested that the Englishmen do not feel fearful of one another. On the contrary, he suggested that the Englishmen are proud like kings and enjoy independence. In this regard, Montesquieu regarded the Englishmen’s independence as the effect of the eradication of fear among them. In this regard, Montesquieu framed the notions of ‘fear’ and ‘independence’ as being mutually exclusive. On the whole, Montesquieu offered sufficient textual evidence to prove that apart from being selfish, the Englishmen can also show care for the common good. In turn, this instils in them a sense of solidarity that eradicates fear and inclines them to feel independent. Therefore, based on further textual evidence, it follows that Rahe’s suggestion that fear is the Englishmen’s normal state of mind is ill-conceived.

⁶⁹ See Ch.2, section III.

Courtney deems that England's principle should be defined as fear, at least during the occasions when rival parties struggle for power in parliament. In his analysis, Courtney distinguishes between what Montesquieu calls "empty clamors" and real fears (*EL XIX*, 27 p.326; Courtney, 2008, pp.41-2). Regarding the former, Courtney says that although the parliamentary debate would often incite terrors among the people, those terrors would be based on "empty clamors and insults" (*Ibid*). Moreover, he notes that these terrors could potentially have "the good effect of stretching all the springs of the government and making all the citizens attentive" (*Ibid*). Regarding the latter, he says that if these 'terrors' were real, the people would "unite together against the power that violated the laws" (*Ibid*). In this regard, Courtney considers the Englishmen's feeling of fear as an intermittent state that would last until the balance of powers was restored in parliament. Therefore, Courtney's reading does justice to Montesquieu because it takes into consideration his claims about the Englishmen's willingness to defend their liberty.

Nevertheless, his choice of concept conflicts with Montesquieu's conceptual vocabulary. By referring to fear, Courtney aims to convey the Englishmen's alertness to political affairs. However, Montesquieu used the term 'fear' only in cases where he discussed the corruption of a republic and its degeneration into a despotic state. Indeed, in *The Spirit of the Laws*, Montesquieu said that when republics become corrupt, "what was a maxim is now called severity; what was a rule is now called constraint; what was vigilance [or, as it appears in the original, *attention*] is now called fear" (*EL III*, 3 p.23).⁷⁰ Montesquieu deemed that insofar as factions are conditioned by the laws, they can benefit republican government because they incite the people's *vigilance* and prevent the government from usurpation.⁷¹ However, when

⁷⁰ In his own words, Montesquieu referred to vigilance under the term attention. He writes in the original that "Ce qui étoit maxime, on l'appelle rigueur; ce qui étoit règle, on l'appelle gêne; ce qui étoit attention, on l'appelle crainte. C'est la frugalité qui y est l'avarice, & non pas le desir d'avoir" (Masson, 1950(a), Book III, Ch.3).

⁷¹ Montesquieu wrote that "Authors enlarge very copiously on the divisions which proved the destruction of Rome; but their readers seldom discover those divisions to have been always necessary and inevitable [...] Those who expect in a free state, to see the people undaunted in war and pusillanimous in peace, are certainly desirous of impossibilities; and it may be advanced as a general rule, that whenever a perfect calm is visible, in a state that calls itself a republic, the spirit of liberty no longer subsists." (*Considerations IX* p.58).

republican government has already become corrupt, Montesquieu deemed that “what was vigilance is now called fear”(Ibid). In this regard, by describing the Englishmen’s state of vigilance with reference to fear, Courtney assumes that England’s government has degenerated into a despotic state, which is wrong. In order to communicate his intended meaning without confounding Montesquieu’s account of England, Courtney’s interpretation could benefit by referring to the Englishmen’s state of alertness under the term “vigilance” (Ibid).

To conclude, this camp has attempted to define England’s principle of government with reference to the notion of fear. However, based on the examination of textual evidence, it has been proved that this camp’s choice of concept is ill-conceived. In both cases, this section has proved that fear is not a suitable notion to describe the factious debate in the English parliament. That is because, apart from fear, Montesquieu suggested that the Englishmen also engage in action from other motivations, such as love for liberty and the common good. Moreover, this section has suggested that instead of referring to fear, this camp’s interpretation would benefit by considering Montesquieu’s notion of ‘vigilance’. This section has suggested that ‘vigilance’ is a more appropriate concept to describe the Englishmen’s reaction to the factious parliamentary debate.

IV. Interpreting England’s Principle in Connection with Virtue

Pangle and Manent interpret the formation of England’s principle of government based on a narrative that traces its origins in Montesquieu’s notion of virtue. This camp’s line of interpretation is divided into two stages. Firstly, this camp analyses Montesquieu’s notion of virtue and claims that its excessive demands undermine men’s natural need for security. Secondly, in order to address its defects, this camp deems that Montesquieu reworked virtue’s character and derived from it England’s principle. However, by illustrating the formation of England’s principle based on a reworking of virtue, this camp neglects considering honour’s role toward the same end. For this reason, this section suggests that this camp’s interpretation of England’s principle is ill-conceived. In order to prove this claim, firstly, this section

analyses the reasons why commentators deem virtue undermined men's natural need for security. Secondly, it illustrates the commentators' interpretations of the formation of England's principle. Thirdly, this section identifies the weaknesses in their interpretations by illustrating their failure to consider honour's influence. Fourthly, based on textual evidence, this section suggests that a proper analysis of England's principle should also consider honour's potential role in its formation.

Virtue's threat to security

This camp deems that virtue is incapable of furnishing men's natural need for security. This camp justifies this claim on three reasons. Firstly, Pangle says that virtue inspires in republican citizens the "desire for glory and national pre-eminence," which "leads naturally to the desire for superiority and victory in war" (Pangle 1973, p.83). However, virtue's warlike character threatens the individual's natural need for security, says Pangle (Ibid). Secondly, republican citizens "wish to be always in control of the means to their preservation," says Pangle (Ibid, p.54). Though, he adds, a reclusive republic will find it hard to be autonomous and to cater for its needs without external assistance (Ibid). Thirdly, virtue demands that the citizens obey the state's general will at all times. In this regard, if the state can no longer foster their needs, the citizens will not be able to seek alternative means of procuring their self-preservation (Ibid, p.82; Manent, 1994, p.24). As a result, virtue challenges the original need it aimed to address because "the citizens must be poor" and "without the comforts of commerce" (Pangle, 1973, p.80). Based on these reasons, this camp concludes that republican virtue enforces "a rule that oppresses and even afflicts" (Manent, 1994, p.24). As a result, this camp deems that Montesquieu could not "endorse these institutions because of their ugly consequences, as well as the tremendous sacrifices they require" (Pangle, 1973, p.76). In view of virtue's excessive demands on human nature, this camp deems that Montesquieu had to identify alternative ways of procuring security. Toward this end, this camp deems that

Montesquieu reworked virtue's character and derived England's principle (Manent, 1994, p.40; Pangle, 1973, pp.114, 208).⁷²

The commentators' interpretations

Attention is now given to the commentators' interpretations of the formation of England's principle. Pangle considers England's government to be "republican" (Pangle, 1973, pp.115-6). However, he adds that virtue is absent from its political life (Ibid).⁷³ In this regard, instead of self-renunciation, Pangle deems that England's principle fosters security while allowing the citizens to pursue their "natural selfishness" (Ibid, p.117). Although England's principle promotes the collective selfishness of its citizens, "it still requires a minimal devotion to the whole on the part of each citizen," says Pangle (Ibid, p.115). That devotion, he says, amounts to "law-abidingness" and the obligation to serve in the army during times of war (Ibid). In this regard, Pangle says that "the English constitution does not have 'a principle' in the same way that the other forms of government do" (Ibid, p.116). Indeed, although the other regimes' principles emerge from a 'modification of the soul,' in England "all the passions are free," said Montesquieu (*EL* Author's foreword p.xli; Ibid XIX, 27 p.325). Hence, Pangle deems that instead of suppressing the competition emerging from men's natural selfishness, England's principle transforms it into a "guarantee for personal security and the rule of law" (Ibid, p.117).

⁷² Although the two commentators share a common starting point by acknowledging virtue's incompatibility with modernity, they highlight different aspects of the Straussian reading when they leap to England's modern republic. On one hand, Pangle regards England as the "government which represents the rational solution to the problem of human nature" (Ibid, p.114). On the other hand, Manent frames England as "the new regime of political life" (Manent, 1994, p.40). The difference between the two analyses lies in their emphasis: while Pangle focuses on England's 'government,' Manent considers the individual motivations inclining individuals to action, that is its 'political life'. This difference makes Manent's analysis more relevant to our study of England's principle. That is because Manent aims to analyse how Montesquieu rejected the political life advanced by republican virtue and derived the principle of the 'new regime'.

⁷³ Pangle says that "The English government is characterised by almost complete abandonment of reliance on virtue. Montesquieu never mentions virtue or education when discussing England in Books XI and XIX; it was ridiculous, a "spectacle," to see England try to establish a democracy founded on virtue because "those who took part in affairs had no virtue at all" (III 3). Nor does "honor" play any more than a secondary role. England is a "republic" and even a "democracy" (V 19; XII 19; XIV 13), but it does not rely on the principle which seemed essential to a republic. England is a new kind of republic which "hides under the form of a monarchy" in order to achieve the end of freedom (V 19; XI 5; XIX 27, p. 580)" (Pangle, 1973, p.114).

Manent deems that Montesquieu's plan was not simply to illustrate virtue's defective relation with attaining men's natural need for security (Manent, 1994, p.29-30).⁷⁴ Rather, his plan was to modify its oppressive character and derive from it a principle that would foster the pursuit of liberty in England (Ibid, p.29-30).⁷⁵ Manent says that in view of modern men's need to freely pursue their private ambition, Montesquieu silenced virtue's excessive demands for self-renunciation (Ibid, p.30). In this regard, Montesquieu adapted virtue's meaning to modernity by transvaluing its self-renunciation to obedience to the rule of law (Ibid, p.28). Indeed, Manent says, the permanent critique between the "dying stars" of Christian and pagan virtue opened up "a third possibility" (Ibid, p.28). That possibility, he says, is summarised in the "Form of law, as the locus and consequence of their discord but also as their common achievement" (Ibid, p.34). Finally, Manent concludes that "Montesquieu sees this new law, which is purely instrumental, appearing and at work first in Protestant, commercial, and liberal England" (Ibid, p.35).⁷⁶

A contradiction: neglecting consideration of honour

By suggesting that Montesquieu derived England's principle based on the reworking of virtue, this camp neglects to consider the role of honour toward the same end. Indeed, this

⁷⁴ According to Manent, Montesquieu's notion of virtue consists in the synthesis of Christian and pagan notions of virtue (Manent, 1994, p.23-4). However, these notions are incompatible with each other because while Christian virtue aims at other-worldly grace, pagan virtue aims to attain excellence in the polis. As a result, Manent says the synthesis of the two concepts seems implausible on first thought because, due to their different notions of a telos, the two concepts antagonise each other (Ibid, p.25). For this reason, he says that Montesquieu synthesised the two concepts by focusing on the means they employ to attain their ends. Both Christian and pagan conceptions of virtue concur in their emphasis on educating men to suppress their selfish desires in order to attain grace or the good life (Ibid, p.18). In this regard, Manent says that Montesquieu identified this similarity as a "common denominator" between the two notions (Ibid, p.29). Based on this 'denominator', he says, Montesquieu silenced the teloi of the two notions and focused on the means they employ toward their attainment (Ibid). In this regard, in the absence of a telos, Montesquieuan virtue is an "artifice," says Manent, that consists in "the preference for the general over the particular," which is nothing more than an "unnatural obedience to a repressive rule" (Ibid, p.23; Ibid, pp.15, 29).

⁷⁵ In this regard, Manent deems that Montesquieu conceived England's principle based on a reformulation of virtue. Indeed, he says that "by depriving virtue of its specific motive [...] Virtue is now no more than an unnatural obedience to a repressive rule [...] But at the same time this "democratised" virtue that joins the equality and austerity of Christianity to the austerity and activity of the Greek city opens or appears to open a hitherto unforeseen possibility" (Manent, 1994, p.30).

⁷⁶ Manent says that "The harsh law that makes this planet go round, is on the one hand what modern man wants to flee: it is what is common to both pagan and Christian virtue, the form and fatality of the past that leaves behind it in the progress of modern, English touted by Montesquieu. But this harsh law is also what modern man wants in the end to realise the virgin birth of oneself by oneself proclaimed by Kant, reason emancipated from nature as from God; this law that man gives himself is the instrument itself of his new liberty" (Manent, 1994, p.199).

camp considers honour as a mere passing point in a narrative about the reworking of virtue in modernity (Ibid, p.199). Nevertheless, although it neglects the study of honour, this camp acknowledges its superior ability in fostering men's natural need for security in comparison to virtue. Under this light, this camp's omission to take into consideration the role of honour in the formation of England's principle poses a contradiction (Pangle, pp.98-9, 102-4).

Pangle suggests that republican government and its principle are less capable of fostering security than monarchy. For this reason, Pangle deems that monarchy's constitution is superior to its republican counterpart (Ibid, pp.98-9, 102-4). Before making this claim, Pangle analyses the pursuit of security in republics in relation to the constitution and the citizen. Regarding the security of the constitution, he says that republics can be more easily corrupted than monarchies because of their limited separation of powers (Ibid, pp.70, 74-6). Regarding the security of the citizen, he says that "Montesquieu has made perfectly clear the inadequacy of the republic's protection of the individual, his life, his comfort, his property, his family, and his natural inclinations" (Ibid, p.102). As a result, Pangle concludes that "insofar as the status of republican government and its participatory freedom is called into doubt, the status of monarchy rises" (Ibid, p.102). Therefore, Pangle clearly suggests that monarchy is more capable of fostering security than republican government.

Despite his claims about monarchy's relative superiority, Pangle does not devote equal attention to the study of its nature and principle. Indeed, his analysis of monarchy is subordinated to the chapters 'Participatory Republicanism' and 'Liberal Republicanism,' which mainly discuss the republican and English regimes, respectively (Ibid pp.48-106, 107-60). In this regard, Pangle reads Montesquieu's theory of government as a sequence that begins with the study of ancient republics and ends with England's modern republic. Based on this narrative, Pangle undervalues the significance of monarchy and its principle because he depicts them as a mere gateway to England's happy isle. Moreover, the fact that he acknowledges the superiority of monarchy in catering to men's natural need for security makes this omission contradictory.

The same critique can be levelled against Manent. Manent deems that honour, “the hallmark of the French monarchy,” is more capable of fostering security than virtue, due to its “moderate” character (Manent, 1994, p.47). However, though he deems honour is superior to virtue in fostering security, Manent omits considering its influence in the formation of England’s principle. Manent illustrates the formation of England’s principle based on a narrative that begins with virtue’s failure to foster men’s need for security and ends with virtue’s adaptation to modernity. In this narrative, Manent omits consideration of honour’s potential role in the formation of England’s principle. As a result, his study frames honour as a mere passing point in a narrative about the reworking of virtue in modernity. Indeed, he says that “the primary intent of *The Spirit of the Laws* is thus to weaken decisively the authority of the Ancients, of the idea of the “best regime,” the idea of virtue, in order to replace it with the authority of the present moment, of the modern experience, summed up in the notions of “commerce” and “liberty”” (Manent, 1994, p.15). Nevertheless, if Montesquieu conceived England’s principle based solely on virtue, there would be no obvious reason why he should devote equal attention to the study of honour.

Considering honour's role toward the formation of England's principle

This section now uses textual evidence to suggest that a proper analysis of England’s principle should also consider honour’s role in its formation. Specifically, it shows that Montesquieu formulated England’s principle in order to address both the defects of virtue and honour. Attention is now given to the defects of virtue. The focus of the section then turns to the defects of honour.

Montesquieu observed that virtue’s deficiency in fostering security hampers the development of commerce in modernity:

“When the philosophy of Aristotle was brought to the West, the shrewd minds, who are the great minds in times of ignorance, found it very agreeable. The schoolmen were infatuated with it and took from this philosopher many explanations on lending at interest, whereas its very natural source was the gospel; they condemned it without distinction and in every case. Thus, commerce, which was the profession only of mean people,

also became that of dishonest people; for, whenever one prohibits a thing that is naturally permitted or necessary, one only makes dishonest the people who do it. Commerce passed to a nation [the Jews] then covered with infamy, and soon it was no longer distinguished from the most horrible usuries, from monopolies, from the levy of subsidies, and from all the dishonest means of acquiring silver.” (*EL XX*, 20 p.388).

In this instance, Montesquieu referred to the philosophy of Aristotle after its return to the West and its interpretation by the theologians in the twelfth century (Haskins, 1957, p.98).⁷⁷ Montesquieu thought that the theologians’ adoption of Aristotle’s teachings on virtue hampered the development of commerce. That is because virtue was in conflict with basic financial practices such as lending at interest, which came to be considered a vice. As a result, the identification of commerce with vice led to the abuse of individuals who engaged in its practice and ultimately, it undermined their natural need for security. For this reason, Montesquieu criticised the theologians’ interpretation of Aristotelian virtue and rejected its relevance to modernity. Indeed, he said later that “to the speculations of the schoolmen we owe all the misfortunes that accompanied the destruction of commerce” (*EL XX*, 20 p.389).

In addition to virtue, Montesquieu deemed that the pursuit of honour in monarchies was equally detrimental for security and the development of commerce. Indeed, Montesquieu thought that honour-seeking individuals in monarchy would often violate the laws in order to advance their personal ambition.⁷⁸ In the same regard, he observed that, driven by their ambition, the kings in Europe often abused their power by confiscating the wealth of traders:

“The Jews, who were made wealthy by their exactions, were pillaged with the same tyranny by the princes, a thing that consoled the people and did not relieve them. What happened in England will give an idea of what was done in other countries. When King John imprisoned the Jews in order to have their goods, there were few who did not have at least an eye put out; thus did this king conduct his chamber of justice. A Jew who had had seven teeth pulled out, one each day, gave ten thousand silver marks on the eighth. From Aaron, a Jew of York, Henry III got fourteen thousand silver marks and ten thousand for the queen. In those times, one did violently what is done in

⁷⁷ This excerpt confirms Manent’s narrative about Montesquieu’s notion of virtue (see footnote 81). Manent suggests that Montesquieuian virtue consists of the amalgamation of its Christian and pagan counterparts. This excerpt acts as a proof that through its interpretation by theologians in the twelfth century, Montesquieu merged Aristotelian virtue with its Christian counterpart.

⁷⁸ See Ch.2, section IV.

Poland today with some measure. As the kings were not able to search into the pockets of their subjects because of their privileges, they tortured the Jews, who were not regarded as citizens. Finally, the custom was introduced of confiscating the goods of the Jews who embraced Christianity. We know of this outlandish custom from the law abrogating it. The reasons given for it have been very empty; it has been said that one wanted to test them and make nothing remain of their enslavement to the devil. But, it is clear that this confiscation was a kind of right of amortisation of the taxes which the prince or the lords levied on the Jews and which they were denied when the latter embraced Christianity. In those times, men were regarded as lands. And, I shall note in passing how much one has toyed with that nation from one century to another. Their goods were confiscated when they wanted to be Christians, and soon afterwards they were burned when they did not want to be Christians” (*EL XX*, 20 p.388).

In this instance, Montesquieu referred to the various kings whose avarice for power often directed their political motivations at the expense of individuals or minorities, like the Jews. Due to their profession, Montesquieu said that the Jews became ‘wealthy’ and powerful. In turn, their power was perceived as a threat ‘by the princes’ of Europe. Indeed, being emotionally attached to their position in social hierarchy, the princes had an active interest in preserving their supremacy at any cost.⁷⁹ As a result, Montesquieu said that the princes abused the Jewish traders under the precept of religion. Indeed, based on the teachings of the theologians, the practice of commerce conflicted with the Christian faith. As a result, commerce was permitted and practiced only by non-Christian individuals and particularly the Jews (Cave & Coulson, 1965, p.169-82). Hence, the princes found an opportunity to abuse the Jews and confiscate their property for the sake of morality and social integrity.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ See Ch.2, section IV; Ch.3, section I.

⁸⁰ Montesquieu said that in response to the princes’ abuse of commerce, the Jews invented the ‘letters of exchange’. He said that “The Jews, proscribed by each country in turn, found the means for saving their effects. In that way, they managed to fix their refuges forever; a prince who wanted very much to be rid of them would not, for all that, be in a humour to rid himself of their silver. They invented letters of exchange, and in this way commerce was able to avoid violence and maintain itself everywhere, for the richest trader had only invisible goods, which could be sent everywhere and leave no trace anywhere” (*EL XX*, 20 p.389).

According to medieval historians, the ‘bills [or letters] of exchange’ was a process of making payments by binding one to pay a sum of money in exchange of goods or services at a predetermined future date (Cave & Coulson, 1965, pp.113, 169). After the Norman Conquest of England, such laws were written to protect the Jews from assault (*ibid*, p.170-3). As a result, the Jews came to be considered “royal property,” and “their loans were protected by the Crown, a fact which emboldened them in their attitude toward their debtors” (*ibid*). Moreover, “usury prohibitions were not applicable to Jews and were not efficiently enforced among Christians” (*ibid*). This is the law of Edward the Confessor concerning Jews: “It should be noted that all Jews, wherever they may be in the kingdom, should be under the protection and defines of the lord king. And no Jew may place himself under any rich man without the king’s permission because

Moreover, the laws in monarchy were not effective in guarding the individual from the state's arbitrary interference.⁸¹ As a result, the Jews were not sufficiently protected from the princes' avarice because, having no respect for the law, they could abuse their security at their own caprice. Hence, Montesquieu deemed that the pursuit of honour in monarchy was detrimental to the security of individuals and the development of commerce.

Having identified virtue and honour's weaknesses in fostering security and the development of commerce, Montesquieu amended these issues in his conception of England's principle. Unlike the traditional types of regimes, Montesquieu deemed that modern states like England enlarged the individual's pursuit of liberty by protecting commerce through treaties and laws.⁸² In turn, he thought that England's laws and treaties for the protection of commerce influenced its principle. Indeed, he said that "it is an almost general rule that [...] everywhere there is commerce, there are gentle mores" (*EL XX*, 1 p.338). This 'gentleness' in mores is crucial for the development of commercial ties among nations and the preservation of peace. Indeed, Montesquieu noted that "the natural effect of commerce is to lead to peace. Two nations that trade with each other become reciprocally dependent; if one has an interest in buying, the other has an interest in selling, and all unions are founded on mutual needs" (*EL XX*, 2 p.338). Also, at a national level, England's principle inculcates men with an interest to show obedience to and respect for the laws. Indeed, he

the Jews themselves and all their property are the king's. But if any one refuse them or their money, let the king require as much of his property as he wishes and is able" (*Ibid*).

⁸¹ See at Ch.2, section IV; Ch.3, section I.

⁸² Indeed, he said that ever since commerce became protected by law, the "princes have had to govern themselves more wisely than they themselves would have thought, for it turned out that great acts of authority were so clumsy that experience itself has made known that only goodness of government brings prosperity" (*EL XX*, 20 p.389). Through its protection by law, commerce brought economic and social prosperity to the states securing its practice. As a result, the various heads of state changed their attitude toward traders, because their abuse not only destroyed commerce but also its social and economic benefits. Moreover, the legal protection of commerce strengthened peace among states because their mutual profits fostered their mutual interest in preserving its practice. Indeed, Montesquieu noted that "the natural effect of commerce is to lead to peace. Two nations that trade with each other become reciprocally dependent; if one has an interest in buying, the other has an interest in selling, and all unions are founded on mutual needs" (*EL XX*, 2 p.338). Hence, unlike republics and monarchies, England avoids entering into conflict with other states by inclining them to have an interest in preserving peace and commerce: "Other nations have made commercial interests give way to political interests: England has always made its political interests give way to the interests of its commerce" (*EL XX*, 7 p.343).

observed that in England, “men are in a situation such that, though their passions inspire in them the thought of being wicked, they nevertheless have an interest in not being so” (*EL* XX, 20 p.390). Hence, unlike virtue’s extreme demands of self-renunciation and honour’s ruthless ambition, England’s principle is able to foster security among individuals without resorting to oppression or abuses.

In this regard, the textual evidence suggests that Montesquieu conceived England’s principle in order to address both virtue and honour’s problematic relation with security and the development of commerce. Therefore, it follows that in order to understand the meaning of England’s principle, Montesquieu’s readers should not emphasise their reading of virtue at the expense of honour and *vice versa*.

To conclude this section, Pangle and Manent interpret England’s principle based on a narrative that originates in Montesquieu’s notion of virtue. As a result, although they acknowledge honour’s liberal character, their accounts tend to silence its significance in shaping England’s principle.⁸³ However, by silencing honour’s role toward this end, Pangle and Manent cast a shadow over a significant part of Montesquieu’s political thought and purposes. Indeed, based on the analysis of the relevant sources, this section has suggested that Montesquieu did not conceive England’s principle merely to address virtue’s defective relation with the attainment of security. Rather, the examination of textual evidence suggests that Montesquieu’s conception of England’s principle serves as an attempt to amend the deficiencies of both virtue and honour. This section has shown that Montesquieu identified those issues that needed to be amended in the two concepts and addressed them through England’s principle. Hence, instead of a mere passing point in a narrative about the reworking of virtue, honour should be considered as an equally significant concept from which Montesquieu drew the conceptual resources to form England’s principle.

⁸³ According to Spector, this camp’s omission may be explained in relation to the broader thesis of the Straussian tradition, which they form in the study of Montesquieu (Spector, 2012, p.58).

V. Conclusion

England's principle plays a very crucial role in the attainment of Montesquieu's ideal of liberty. However, due to Montesquieu's cryptic analysis, commentators have problems understanding the causality of this relation. As a result, England's principle has invited a variety of interpretations by commentators with varying approaches to the study of Montesquieu's notion of liberty.

To restore unity in the study of Montesquieu's thought, commentators have interpreted England's principle by domesticating it to his original typology. In this regard, they have offered interpretations that link it to the notions of *fear*, *virtue* and *honour*. By interpreting England's principle with reference to these notions, commentators emphasised different types of motivations from Montesquieu's original typology. Specifically, Courtney and Rahe deemed that political turbulence makes the Englishmen feel insecure about the preservation of their liberty. In this regard, this camp defined England's principle with reference to *fear*. With reference to *virtue*, Manent and Pangle claim that Montesquieu considered virtue's demands for self-renunciation to be incompatible with men's natural need for security. For this reason, this camp suggested that Montesquieu reworked the meaning of virtue and adapted it to modern men's needs by emphasising the individual's obedience to the law. There are two camps interpreting England's principle with reference to *honour*. Some thinkers among the two camps (Larrère and Sonenscher) have been seen to embrace both lines of interpretation. In the first camp, Carrithers, Dijn, Larrère, Mosher and Sonenscher link England's principle to honour based on the assumption that England is a monarchy. In the second camp, Larrère, Richter and Sonenscher suggest that Montesquieu conceived honour under the influence of Mandeville's famous notion of *private vices public benefits*. This camp trace Mandeville's influence in England's principle and on this account, it identified it with honour.

Based on their different lines of interpretation, each camp links England's principle to a different tradition of liberty. By identifying England's principle with honour, commentators

emphasise liberal motifs such as, the free pursuit of private ambition and the state's capitalisation on men's selfish passions. On the other hand, based on republican motifs such as civic spirit, political awareness and reverence for the law, commentators identify England's principle with *fear* and *virtue*. However, the commentators' attempts to define England's principle have often been problematic. Indeed, in order to link England's principle with a specific tradition of liberty, commentators often suppress those aspects that challenge their line of interpretation.

Specifically, with regard to republican interpreters, Manent and Pangle have neglected to consider honour's role in the formation of England's principle. Rather, this camp illustrates the formation of England's principle based solely on the reworking of virtue in modernity. As a result, this camp suppresses the fact that Montesquieu considered honour a liberal construct that improved on virtue's deficient security. Moreover, Courtney and Rahe have complicated Montesquieu's conceptual vocabulary by reading republican citizens' vigilance in terms of *fear*. As a result, this camp interprets England's principle with reference to a notion that signifies subordination and oppression. In this regard, this camp mistakes republican citizens' *vigilance* with despotic subjects' *fear* about their self-preservation.

With regard to liberal interpreters, in the first camp, Carrithers, Dijn, Larrère, Mosher and Sonenscher regard England's principle in connection with monarchy's honorific individualism. Indeed, by assuming that England's principle is honour, this camp projects certain traits of honour on England's principle. However, following this line of interpretation, this camp silences the Englishmen's spirit of independence and social mobility. Moreover, in the second camp, by suggesting that Montesquieu conceived honour under the influence of Mandeville, Larrère, Richter and Sonenscher link it to the Englishmen's bourgeois desire to accumulate wealth. However, this line of interpretation suppresses honour's subtleties by diluting its chivalric code with the liberal motif of the 'invisible hand'.

Finally, by defining England's principle with relation to Montesquieu's original typology, commentators have attempted to explain its causal relation to the pursuit of liberty. However, their interpretations often suppress certain crucial aspects in Montesquieu's original typology. As a result, before engaging in the interpretation of England's principle, it is crucial to offer a reading of these notions that have been silenced in the secondary literature. Therefore, these issues will be addressed in the chapters that follow.

Part II: Liberal Aspirations

HONOUR: MORE THAN LAISSEZ-FAIRE

“The lot of those who levy taxes is wealth, and the reward for this wealth is wealth itself. Glory and honour are for that nobility which knows, sees, and feels no real good except honour and glory”

(*EL XIII*, 20 p.227).

This chapter considers the meaning of Montesquieu’s notion of honour. In order to understand its meaning, it is necessary to consider it in comparison to the work of two thinkers whose ideas were particularly influential for Montesquieu: Niccolò Machiavelli and Bernard de Mandeville. The first section of this chapter examines Machiavelli’s concept of *gloria*. It suggests that according to Machiavelli, the attainment of *gloria* becomes possible when individuals pursue their self-interest in conjunction with the good of the state. The second section studies Mandeville’s famous theme of *private vices public benefits* and also his notion of *honour*. It suggests that Mandeville considered honour as a construct devised by politicians to foster social utility and obedience to the law. The third and fourth sections consider Montesquieu’s notion of honour by analysing its constituent elements. The third section considers Montesquieu’s conception of *power*. It suggests that the individual’s ability to transform his personal qualities into power is crucial for the attainment of honour. The fourth section examines the psychological motives of honour in order to understand its utility in monarchy, and the rules determining its attainment. The section suggests that according to Montesquieu, the individual’s ambitious pursuit of honour is beneficial to monarchy when guided by obedience to the monarch. It also suggests that Montesquieu encouraged individuals to show resistance to the monarch when his orders undermine the good of the state. The fifth section concludes the chapter. It suggests that despite the influence he received from Mandeville, Montesquieu conceived his notion of honour in connection with Machiavelli’s notion of *gloria*. This section also considers the ways in which Montesquieu’s notion of honour departed from its Mandevillian and Machiavellian counterparts.

I. Gloria in Machiavelli

Commentators have long established that there are important conceptual convergences between Montesquieu's notion of honour and Machiavelli's notion of *gloria* (Krause, 2002a, p.48; Shackleton, 1964, pp.1-13; Duconseil, 1943; Joly, 1864; Bertière, 1956, pp.141-58; Drei, 1998, pp.45-54). This claim is evinced in Montesquieu's explicit references to Machiavelli in *The Spirit of the Laws* (EL VI, 5 p.77; XXI, 20 p.389; XXVIII, 6 p.541; XXIX, 19 p.618). Among others, the reference that is most indicative of Machiavelli's influence on Montesquieu's notion of honour, is located in the passage where Montesquieu criticises honorific individualism in monarchies. In that passage, Montesquieu criticises the princes' reckless pursuit of honour in monarchical government under the broader term 'Machiavellianism': "One has begun to be cured of Machiavellianism, and one will continue to be cured of it. There must be more moderation in councils. What were formerly called *coups d'État* would at present, apart from their horror, be only imprudences" (EL XXI, 20 p.389). He adds that "Since that time princes have had to govern themselves more wisely [...] for it turned out that great acts of authority were so clumsy that experience itself has made known that only goodness of government brings prosperity" (Ibid). In this regard, Montesquieu suggested that his description of the monarch's pursuit of honour is analogous to Machiavelli's description of the prince's pursuit of *gloria*. In order to determine the ways in which the two notions overlap, as well as the ways in which they differ, it is crucial to engage in the study of Machiavelli.

Analysing excerpts from *The Prince*, *Discourses on Livy* and *History of Florence*, this section studies the meaning of *gloria* in Machiavelli and its related concepts *virtù* and *fortuna*. The purpose of this section is to identify the individual qualities and type of conduct requisite for the attainment of *gloria*. Toward this end, this section studies the meaning of Machiavelli's notion of *gloria*. It will suggest that the attainment of *gloria* is linked to pursuing one's self-interest in conjunction with the good of the state. This section also analyses the role of *virtù* and *fortuna* in the individual's pursuit of *gloria*. It will suggest that

while Machiavelli considered *virtù* as a requisite quality for the attainment of gloria, its attainment also depends on the arbitrary force of *fortuna*.

Gloria in Machiavelli's writings appears under various names, and depending on their use in the text, they can be considered synonymous. According to Price, synonyms of gloria are *fama*, *onore*, *laude*, *stima* and *reputazione* (Price, 1977, p.589). Machiavelli conceived various types of glory. Indeed, he said it could be true and false, individual and common, religious and worldly, and glory in the arts (Ibid, p.590). Moreover, from all types of glory, he said that the most celebrated are those acquired by "heads and organisers of religions," "those who have founded either republics or kingdoms" and "after these, they are famous who, when set over armies, have enlarged their own dominion or that of their native land" (*Disc I*, 10 p.220).⁸⁴ From all these types of glory, this study focuses particularly on "worldly glory" (*Disc II*, 2 p.331). This is because, according to Machiavelli, the attainment of worldly glory is linked with the practice of politics, or as he put it, "the lives and habits of men" (*Disc II*, Preface p.321).

Worldly glory, said Machiavelli, is the type of glory acquired by men whose actions will be "memorable" after death, because they achieved "great things" either through "great campaigns" or "unusual deeds" in war, politics and diplomacy (*Hist VII*, 5 p.360; *Prince*, XVI

⁸⁴ For Machiavelli, men who are active in politics and warfare are consciously engaged in the pursuit of glory. Indeed, Price says that "the individuals to whom Machiavelli ascribes glory are all mythical heroes, rulers, or generals" (Price, 1977, p.592). In this regard, only a few men strive toward its attainment. Indeed, Machiavelli said: "For in all republics, in whatever way organised, positions of authority cannot be reached by even forty or fifty citizens. And because this is a small number, it is an easy thing to secure oneself against them, either by getting rid of them or by bestowing on them so many honours that according to their stations they are for the most part contented" (*Disc I*, 16 p.237).

Machiavelli thought that the rest of the people in a state seek to attain security by preserving their property and avoiding shame - which is irrelevant to the individual's pursuit of glory. In *The Prince*, he said that "So long as the great majority of men are not deprived of either property or honour, they are satisfied; thus the prince finds nothing to contend with except the ambition of the few, which in many ways and easily can be controlled" (*Prince*, XIX p.67-8). Moreover, in the *Discourses*, he said that "Those others, for whom it is enough to live secure, are easily satisfied by the making of ordinances and laws which provide for the general security and at the same time for the prince's own power. When a prince does this and when the people see that under no circumstances will he break those laws, in a short time they feel secure and contented" (*Disc I*, 16 p.237).

& XXI pp.62-5, 87-91). Focusing specifically on the area of politics, Machiavelli deemed that while the founders of tyrannies are detested, founders of states and reformers are praised.⁸⁵ In this regard, Machiavelli thought that the attainment of worldly glory becomes possible through the successful establishment of states or the reformation of corrupt states. Indeed, he said that “Truly if a prince is seeking glory in the world, he should wish to possess a corrupt city, not to ruin it wholly like Caesar but to reform it like Romulus. Truly the heavens cannot give a greater opportunity for glory, nor can men desire a greater” (*Disc I*, 10 p.223). Moreover, in defining the founding or reformation of a state as the prime source of glory, Machiavelli did not limit his consideration to the period in which the ruler was alive. Rather, he regarded as glorious the statesman whose laws and institutions possess surpassing goodness that outlive him. He said that: “It is not, then, the salvation of a republic or a kingdom to have a prince who will rule prudently while he lives, but to have one who will so organise it that even after he dies it can be maintained” (*Disc I*, 11 p.226). Thus Machiavelli deemed that by establishing or reforming corrupt states, great rulers further the common good for posterity and attain glory for doing ‘memorable’ and ‘great things’.

Apart from achieving ‘great things’, one’s attainment of gloria depends also on the means he employed in its pursuit. In this regard, to attain gloria, Machiavelli said that a ruler should not employ dishonourable methods:

“I do not believe fraud deserves fame when it makes you break promises you have given and pacts you have made, because such fraud, though it sometimes wins for you position and kingly power, as was explained above will never win you glory” (*Disc*, III, 40 p.518).

Machiavelli illustrated this claim with the example of Agathocles from *The Prince*. He said that “For, if one considers the virtue of Agathocles in entering into and escaping from

⁸⁵ Indeed, he said that while the “founder of a kingdom or commonwealth merits praise,” those whose actions lead to the corruption and dissolution of states or founded tyrannies deserve blame and condemnation: “those men are infamous and detestable who have been destroyers of religions, squanderers of kingdoms and republics, enemies of virtue, of letters, and of every other art that brings gain and honour to the human race, such as the impious, the violent, the ignorant, the no-account, the lazy, the cowardly” (*Disc I*, 10 p.220).

dangers, and the greatness of his spirit in enduring and overcoming adversities, one does not see why he has to be judged inferior to any most excellent captain. Nonetheless, his savage cruelty and inhumanity, together with his infinite crimes, do not permit him to be celebrated among the most excellent men” (*Prince* VIII p.35). Thus Machiavelli deemed that a prince who preserves his hold on power through violence and deceit cannot attain glory. That is because despite his success and power, the means he engaged for their attainment will overshadow his achievements in men’s opinions and posterity.

However, Machiavelli said that sometimes, deceit and violence are necessary to establish a new state or to maintain one. To make his pursuit compatible with glory, the prince should encourage the people to think he is “merciful, faithful, humane, honest, and religious” (*Prince* XVIII p.70). Regarding such occasions, he said that

“a prince, and especially a new prince, cannot observe all those things for which men are held good, since he is often under a necessity, to maintain his state, of acting against faith, against charity, against humanity, against religion” (*Prince* XVIII p.70).

Machiavelli continues, “it is not necessary for a prince to have all the above-mentioned qualities in fact, but it is indeed necessary to appear to have them” (*Ibid*). Thus, if a prince cannot attain glory through honourable means, then he may attain it through cunning. For this reason, Machiavelli advised the prince not to hesitate to “enter into evil when forced by necessity” (*Ibid*).⁸⁶ Nonetheless, to procure one’s attainment of glory, it is crucial that one’s actions do not become known to the public. Machiavelli deemed that by applying these tenets a ruler could pave his way to *gloria* and enjoy the good opinion of other men.⁸⁷

Machiavelli identified two crucial factors that influence a man’s attainment of glory, *virtù* and *fortuna*. Machiavelli referred to *virtù* in various contexts and as a result, its

⁸⁶ Even so, although he allowed that a prince may engage in evil acts, Machiavelli specified that these acts should be “done at one stroke, out of the necessity to secure oneself, and then are not persisted in but are turned for as much utility to the subjects as one can” (*Prince* VIII, p.37-8).

⁸⁷ Machiavelli said that the founders and reformers of states who attain these objectives enjoy perpetual honour, security, peace and tranquility of mind (*Disc* I, 10 p.220).

meaning can often seem ambiguous. Nevertheless, leaving aside its traditionally moral meaning, “in the vast majority of cases,” Price says, “virtù, virtuoso, and virtuosamente” signify a “‘drive,’ ‘determination,’ ‘courage,’ ‘skill,’ or ‘ability,’ in political or military affairs” (Price, 1973, p. 319). Hence, in Machiavelli, virtù means “not moral virtues but talents: ‘political’ ability, the determination and capacity to rise in the Church, a talent for influencing and managing men” (Ibid, p.326). In this regard, virtù is a crucial concept because depending on a prince’s ability to practice it well, it influences his pursuit of gloria.⁸⁸ Moreover, apart from the virtù of the prince, Machiavelli also considered virtù as a “quality” that “should be possessed by the people as a whole,” says Skinner (Skinner, 1992, p.62). In this case, the purpose of virtù focuses not on the exercise of great political leadership but on the social and political utility derived from the citizens’ concern for the common good (Ibid p.71).⁸⁹ Indeed, Machiavelli said that “this idea deserves to be noted and acted upon by any citizen”: that “one must follow to the utmost any plan that will save her [the state’s] life and keep her liberty” (*Disc III*, 41 p.519). Hence, Machiavelli thought that the collective exercise of virtù is crucial because, unless hampered by a “persistent and excessive force,” it furthers the prince’s and the state’s attainment of glory (Ibid I, 19 p.245).

Machiavelli defined that ‘persistent and excessive force’ as fortuna. Although the presence of virtù generally aids the prince’s pursuit of glory, fortuna may act as a hindrance.

⁸⁸ Moreover, Machiavelli deemed that the presence of virtù signifies a state’s passing from decline to progress in pursuit of gloria:

“It may be observed, that provinces amid the vicissitudes to which they are subject, pass from order into confusion, and afterward recur to a state of order again; [...] when they have arrived at their greatest perfection, they soon begin to decline. In the same manner, having been reduced by disorder, and sunk to their utmost state of depression, unable to descend lower, they, of necessity, reascend; [...] The reason is, that valour produces peace; peace, repose; repose, disorder; disorder, ruin; so from disorder order springs; from order virtue, and from this, glory and good fortune” (*Hist V*, I p.218).

Machiavelli said that the ‘life’ of states could be analysed in consecutive stages of decline and progress. During this process, he said, ‘valour’ and men’s practice of virtue (virtù) are crucial for the attainment of peace, order and glory. Indeed, by ‘necessity’, he said, the effect of virtù inclines states to ‘reascend’ from decline to progress, leading men to ‘glory and good fortune’. In this regard, Machiavelli deemed that insofar as men and states acquire glory, this becomes possible on account of their virtù.

⁸⁹ This aspect of virtù is emphasised by Skinner and it will be explored further in chapter 5.

That is because unlike virtù, fortuna is not a personal characteristic of the prince. Rather, fortuna is nature's blind force that influences human life arbitrarily:

“And I liken her to one of these violent rivers which, when they become enraged, flood the plains, ruin the trees and the buildings, lift earth from this part, drop in another; each person flees before them, everyone yields to their impetus without being able to hinder them in any regard” (*Prince XXV p.98*).

In this regard, fortuna signifies the aspect of chance in human affairs: despite one's preparedness, one's efforts may still prove inadequate in the face of contingencies. Nevertheless, Machiavelli deemed that a prince should do his best to master *fortuna* and turn it to his favour. And the way to make this possible is by demonstrating one's virtù:

“I judge this indeed, that it is better to be impetuous than cautious, because fortune is a woman; and it is necessary, if one wants to hold her down, to beat her and strike her down. And one sees that she lets herself won more by the impetuous than by those who proceed coldly. And so always, like a woman, she is the friend of the young, because they are less cautious, more ferocious, and command her with more audacity” (*Prince XXV p.101*).

Hence, rather than acting with prudence and moderation, Machiavelli thought that a prince should exhibit tenacious virtù and be ready to engage violence, deceit and murder in order to master fortuna's whims.⁹⁰

To conclude: Machiavelli defined gloria as the esteem a prince can enjoy in the opinion of other men. That esteem is derived from doing 'great things' which are 'memorable', such as founding a religion, acquiring dominion, the successful establishment of a state, or the reformation of a corrupt state. Machiavelli deemed that in order to attain gloria as a reward for his political activity, the successful ruler must further the good of the state in posterity.

⁹⁰ However, fortuna is whimsical. Machiavelli deemed that Cesare Borgia possessed extraordinary virtù and did all he could to master his fortuna. Nevertheless, he said, the death of Borgia's father and his own bad health put a stop to his pursuits of dominion and gloria: “if his orders did not bring profit to him, it was not his fault, because this arose from an extraordinary and extreme malignity of fortune” (*Prince VII p.27*).

On the other hand, a prince who possesses inferior virtù may be aided by the positive, though arbitrary, strokes of fortuna in his attempts to remain in power. Machiavelli noted that Numa, lacked virtù in military affairs and hence, the glory of Rome would have been endangered if he resorted to war. Nonetheless, Machiavelli deemed that Numa's fortuna aided him in preserving his kingdom: “Romulus was great enough to give Numa Pompilius opportunity to rule Rome many years with the arts of peace” (*Disc I, XIX p.245*).

To attain that end, Machiavelli deemed it important that a prince should not rely only on honourable means. Rather, he advised him that if necessary, he should not hesitate to employ violence, deceit and murder insofar as his actions are covert and unacknowledged by the general public. The attainment of gloria is dependent on the degree to which a prince possesses sufficient virtù and fortuna. Machiavelli defined virtù as the set of personal skills that enable a prince to manoeuvre his political environment by transforming threats into opportunities in order to secure his hold on power. Moreover, he deemed that in order to attain gloria it is crucial that virtù is also shared by the citizens. In this case, virtù focuses not on the exercise of great leadership but on the political utility derived by the citizens' prioritisation of the good of the state over their self-interest. Fortuna signifies the arbitrary force of luck that influences men's lives in positive or negative ways. Machiavelli advises the prince that he should exhibit tenacious virtù in order to master fortuna. Finally, the fact that Machiavelli described the attainment of gloria as the result of committing 'great' and 'memorable' things which foster the good of the state is a crucial tenet that appears later in Montesquieu's notion of honour.

II. Honour and Laissez-Faire in Mandeville

Bernard de Mandeville argued that instead of teaching men to be virtuous, a state should capitalise on their vices in order to foster social welfare. This argument was very influential to Montesquieu and other political thinkers in the French Enlightenment (Berg, 2007, p.32; Berg & Eger, 2007, p.28; Hont, 2008, pp.388, 406; Douglass, 2012, pp.713-4). Indeed, Montesquieu refers explicitly to Mandeville, as "the author of *The Fable of the Bees*", at various parts in *The Spirit of the Laws* when he discusses his ideas on commerce, fashion and luxury (EL VII, 1 p.97). For example, Montesquieu reinforces his argument that men's preoccupation with fashion can have a positive effect on commerce by citing Mandeville: "Fashions are an important subject; as one allows one's spirit to become frivolous, one constantly increases the branches of commerce" (EL XIX, 8 p.312). Following Mandeville's reasoning, he concludes that by encouraging individuals to pursue their frivolous desires, like an interest in fashion,

the state can derive public utility: “One has only to imagine to oneself [...] the innumerable goods resulting from vanity: luxury, industry, the arts, fashions, politeness, and taste” (*EL* XIX, 9 p.312). Hence, it appears that Montesquieu adopted in his political thought Mandeville’s famous argument that men’s *private vices* may be transformed into *public benefits*.

The influence of Mandeville’s theory on Montesquieu may also be evinced in his conception of honour. In his discussion about the role of honour in fostering individual action in monarchy, Montesquieu said: “Honour makes all the parts of the body politic move; its very action binds them, and each person works for the common good, believing he works for his individual interests” (*EL* III, 7 p.27). Clearly, Montesquieu deemed that honour inclines men to pursue their selfish passions in order to foster public utility. Hence, insofar as he suggested that honour inclines men to pursue their selfish passions - that is, the “desire to distinguish oneself” - it may be said that Montesquieu adapted his conception of honour to Mandeville’s notion that *private vices* may be transformed into *public benefits* (*EL* II, 4 p.32). However, this is not to say that Montesquieu’s and Mandeville’s notions should be conflated on account of this similarity. As Hirschman has suggested, although the two notions may overlap in certain ways, Montesquieuan honour is a complex idea that amalgamates various meanings and should be carefully disentangled (Hirschman, 1997, p.10). In order to determine the ways in which the two notions overlap, as well as the ways in which they differ, it is crucial to engage in the study of Mandeville’s theme, *private vices public benefits*, as well as his understanding of the meaning of *honour*.

Mandeville expounded his theme in his work *The Fable of the Bees*, published in 1714. Due to this work, Mandeville has often been considered as a precursor of the *laissez-faire* and the liberal motif of the ‘invisible hand’ (Goldsmith, 1977, pp.63-81; Kaye, 1988, p.58; Chalk,

1951, p.347).⁹¹ Broadly speaking, this motif signifies the force inclining individuals to pursue their self-interest while contributing unknowingly to the common good. Mandeville admired the force lying in men's selfish passions. He thought that despite the conflict they produce, men's selfish passions could be counteracted through the creation of an appropriate legal and institutional framework. As a result, he thought that "by the dextrous Management of a skilful Politician," men's selfish passions "may be turned into public benefits" (Mandeville, 1988, p.231; Hirschman, 1997, p.18). Moreover, he thought that men's selfish passions could surpass virtue in their ability to procure social welfare. Indeed, against traditional notions of morality, Mandeville suggested in his fable that capitalising on men's vices is more efficient in procuring social welfare:

"THEN leave Complaints: Fools only strive
To make a Great an Honest Hive
bT' enjoy the World's Conveniences,
Be fam'd in War, yet live in Ease,
Without great Vices, is a vain
Eutopia seated in the Brain.
Fraud, Luxury and Pride must live,
While we the Benefits receive [...]
So Vice is beneficial found,
When it's by Justice lopt and bound" (Mandeville, 1988, p.74-5)

⁹¹ Kaye notes that "In the Fable Mandeville maintains, and maintains explicitly, the theory at present known as the laissez-faire theory, which dominated modern economic thought for a hundred years and is still a potent force. This is the theory that commercial affairs are happiest when least regulated by the government; that things tend by themselves to find their own proper level; and that unregulated self-seeking on the part of individuals will in society so interact with and check itself that the result will be for the benefit of the community. But unnecessary interference on the part of the state will tend to pervert that delicate adjustment" (Kaye, 1988, p.58). Moreover, Chalk concurs that "there is much justification for F. B. Kaye's assertion that Mandeville's Fable of the Bees is the first systematic presentation of the laissez faire philosophy. Be this as it may, the economic liberals of eighteenth century England" (Chalk, 1951, p.347). For more interpretations of Mandeville as a precursor of the laissez-faire, see *An Inquiry into Physiocracy* (Beer, 2014); *The Physiocrats: A Study in Economic Rationalisation* (Ware, 1931).

In contrast to Kaye's mainstream interpretation of Mandeville, Nathan Rosenberg suggests that Mandeville's economic liberalism has often been overemphasised (Rosenberg, 1963, pp.183-196; Viner, 1958, p.332-4). Rosenberg suggests that "Mandeville, when he is not dealing specifically with matters pertaining to foreign trade, presents a fairly well-articulated conception of the role of government in economic and social affairs which is not adequately encompassed by such terms as "mercantilism," "interventionism," or "laissez-faire" at least in their more generally-accepted connotations" (Rosenberg, 1963, pp.183-196). Also, Viner says that "Many scholars, including economists who should know better, regard Mandeville as a pioneer laissez-faire individualism in the economic field and as such an anticipator of Adam Smith [...] It is a common misinterpretation of Mandeville [...] to read his motto, 'Private Vices, Publick Benefits,' as a laissez-faire motto, postulating the natural or spontaneous harmony between individual interests and the public good" (Viner, 1958, p. 332-4).

Mandeville suggested that in order to foster social welfare, politics should prioritise utility over ethics. Thus Mandeville reversed the traditional relation between politics and ethics. According to traditional moral theories, politics fosters social welfare by educating men to be virtuous. For example, Aristotle described the polis as the framework where men act collectively in the pursuit of moral excellence: “this is the same to the individual and to the community,” that is, “to be most excellent” (*NE* 1094b8-9). Aristotle deemed that in order to foster the common good, the state must take an active role in teaching individuals to suppress their vices. On the other hand, Mandeville suggested that in order to foster social welfare, politics should encourage individuals to pursue their vices: ‘so vice is beneficial found, when it’s by justice lopt and bound’ (Primer, 2012, p.191). Nevertheless, Mandeville did not suggest that all private vices could potentially foster public benefits. Indeed, he deemed that allowing men to pursue all types of vices was essentially to court disaster (Kaye, 1988. p.64). In other words, as Kaye put it, “the real thesis of the book is not that all evil is a public benefit, but that a certain useful proportion of it (called vice) is such a benefit” (Ibid, p.31). Mandeville deemed that the conversion of private vices into public benefits could become possible only in relation to a specific vice, that is, men’s extreme greed for wealth, material goods and luxury (Kaye, 1988, pp.104-5; Hirschman, 1997, p.18).

Later, in 1732, Mandeville elaborated on his thesis that men’s private vices may be turned into public benefits, in *An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour and the Usefulness of Christianity in War* (Hont, 2008, p.395). In this work, Mandeville suggested that the individual’s pursuit of social distinction such as honour has social utility because it fosters obedience to the law. However, Mandeville did not attribute men’s pursuit of honour to their desire for material goods and wealth. Rather, he suggested that individuals pursue honour and social distinction in order to satisfy a different passion: that is, ‘self-liking’ or their desire for praise.

To begin with, Mandeville expressed his disagreement with the claim that moral philosophy can inculcate obedience in men and foster social welfare. The moral philosophers

and especially the Greeks, he said, put a great effort into teaching men that the practice of self-denial would help them realise “the truth” (Mandeville, 1732, p.4). In spite of their teachings that virtue is good for its own sake, Mandeville deemed that the moral philosophers’ “great aim was the publick Peace, and the Welfare of the Civil Society; to make Men governable, and unite Multitudes in one common interest” (Ibid). In this regard, he suggested that apart from its moral character, virtue also fosters social utility because it supports the attainment of the purpose of politics.⁹² Nevertheless, Mandeville thought that it was more efficient to procure the common good by capitalising on men’s selfish passions; he said that the moralists’ teaching about suppressing men’s passions in order to foster social welfare was “very superficial and defective” (Ibid, p.4).⁹³

Mandeville thought that there was usefulness in the study of men’s selfish passions. So, rather than negating their study, as happens under the precept of virtue, he suggested that exploring them could enhance our understanding about human nature.⁹⁴ Mandeville argued that there was a passion in human nature “for which there is no word coined yet” and that “all men” are “born with” and “act from that and no other principle” (Ibid, p.3). Mandeville called that passion “self-liking” and defined it as the “value, which all individuals set upon their own persons” (Ibid). Due to this passion, he deemed that all men are “desirous of praise, and love to be applauded by others” (Ibid). Indeed, he said that the desire to be esteemed by others is “a palpable consequence of that self-liking which reigns in Human Nature, and is felt in every one’s breast before we have time or capacity to reflect and think of any body

⁹² Indeed, he said that “To love virtue for the beauty of it, and curb one’s appetites because it is most reasonable so to do, are very good things in theory; but whoever understands our nature, and consults the practice of human creatures, would sooner expect from the, that they should abstain from vice, for fear of punishment, and do good, in hopes of being rewarded for it” (Mandeville, 1732, p.31).

⁹³ Indeed, Mandeville said that “but as all their [the Moralists] labours were only tending to those purposes, they neglected all the rest; and if they could but make useful to each other and easy to themselves, they had no scruple about the means they did it by, nor any regard to truth or the reality of things; as is evident from the great absurdities they have made Men swallow concerning their own nature, in spite of what all felt within” (Ibid, p.4).

⁹⁴ “So most of the passions are counted to be weaknesses, and commonly called frailties, whereas they are the very powers that govern the whole machine; and, whether they are perceived or not, determine or rather create the Will that immediately precedes every deliberate action” (Mandeville, 1732, p.5-6).

else” (Ibid, p.4). Therefore, Mandeville thought that insofar as men are born with the desire to satisfy that passion, the moralists’ attempts to suppress it were to no avail.

Mandeville deemed that instead of suppressing men’s self-liking, the state should capitalise on it in order to foster social utility. To attain this end, he thought that politics should inspire individuals with fear about failing to satisfy their desire for praise. He thought that through education and by example, the state should incline individuals to avoid ignominy. Moreover, Mandeville thought that by wanting to avoid shame, men may act sociably and foster social utility from self-interested motives:

“as soon as it was found out, that many vicious, quarrelsome, and undaunted men, that fear’d neither God nor Devil, were yet often curb’d and visibly withheld by the fear of shame; and likewise that this fear of shame might be greatly encreas’d by an artful education, and be made superior even to that of Death, they had made a discovery of a real tie, that would serve many noble purposes in the society” (Ibid, p.40).

Hence, rather than invoking men’s fear of God’s punishment, Mandeville thought that social welfare was better served by capitalising on their fear of shame.⁹⁵ To inspire that fear, he suggested that politicians invented a specific term: that is, the notion of honour, which could be used by politicians as a motive to regulate men’s actions.⁹⁶ Indeed, Mandeville stated clearly that “My conjecture concerning honour, as it signifies a principle from which men act, is, that it is an invention of politicians, to keep men close to their promises and engagements” (Ibid, p.29).

To conclude: Mandeville thought that due to its preoccupation with ethics, politics could not efficiently foster social welfare. In contrast to traditional moral theories, Mandeville suggested that the social welfare or happiness of a state is not dependent on its morality. He

⁹⁵ Regarding religion’s influence on men’s behaviour, Mandeville said that men’s fear of an “invisible cause” proves a helpful means to secure “promises of allegiance and loyalty” from the people (Mandeville, 1732, p.22). However, he said that despite its utility, “the Christian Religion itself was often found insufficient for that purpose” (Ibid, p.30).

⁹⁶ Mandeville explained how ‘self-liking’ is linked to honour by looking at honour’s opposite, that is dishonour: “this could have had no existence any more than honour, if there had not been such a passion in our nature as self-liking” (Ibid, p.10).

argued that instead of teaching men to suppress their vices, politics should capitalise on them in order to foster social utility. Mandeville captured the meaning of this argument in his famous notion that *private vices* may be transformed into *public benefits*. Specifically, Mandeville thought that deriving social utility by capitalising on men's vices was possible only with regard to a specific type of vice: that is, men's extreme desire for material wealth and luxury. He reversed the traditional relation between politics and ethics by prioritising the pursuit of utility. In *An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour and the Usefulness of Christianity in War*, Mandeville elaborated his earlier thesis in connection to the individual's desire for social distinction and praise. Here Mandeville suggested that the individual's pursuit of social distinctions such as honour has social utility because it fosters obedience to the law. However, he did not attribute men's pursuit of honour to their desire for material goods. Rather, he suggested that individuals pursue honour and social distinctions out of their fear of ignominy. In this regard, Mandeville deemed honour to be a construct devised by politicians as a means of manipulating men's actions. Finally, Mandeville's argument that the individuals' pursuit of honour may foster obedience to the law and social utility is a crucial tenet that appears later in Montesquieu's notion of honour.

III. The Aspect of Power in Montesquieu's Notion of Honour

Analysing excerpts from *The Spirit of the Laws* and the *Persian Letters*, this section studies the notion of power in Montesquieu's concept of honour. Firstly, at a macro-level, this section studies Montesquieu's analogy between honour's role in monarchy and the role of gravity in the solar system. It is suggested that Montesquieu deemed power to be a crucial concept for the understanding of monarchy and his notion of honour. Secondly, by analysing Montesquieu's description of two characters in the *Persian Letters*, this section studies the meaning of power at a micro-level. It is suggested that Montesquieu deemed that the individual's personal qualities signify a form of power that is crucial for the attainment of honour. Thirdly, this section suggests that despite the lack of explicit textual references, Montesquieu's notion of power resembles the meaning of power according to Hobbes.

Newton's law of universal gravitation proved that "every body attracts every other with a force directly proportional to the product of their masses and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them" (Russell, 1999, p. 521). The application of Newton's law to the study of our solar system shows that the sun exercises a strong gravitational force over the planets that causes them to orbit within its gravitational field. That is because the mass of the sun is much greater than that of the planets orbiting around it. The planets orbit around the sun because in each case, the product of their masses is greater than the square of the distance separating them. Based on this premise, Newton stated that in a solar system, "every planet, at every moment, has an acceleration towards the sun which varies inversely as the square of the distance from the sun" (Ibid, p. 520).⁹⁷

Newton's law of universal gravitation was very influential for Montesquieu and other political thinkers in the Enlightenment (Shackleton, 1961, pp.247-53; Carrithers, 2001, pp.205-6). Newton's influence on Montesquieu may be evinced by the study of a comparison that he used in order to describe the role of honour in monarchical government: "You could say that it [honour] is like the system of the universe, where there is a force constantly repelling all bodies from the centre and a force of gravitation attracting them to it" (*EL III*, 7 p.27). Using this analogy, Montesquieu suggested that honour keeps the various branches of government together and in orbit around the monarch. Montesquieu made a similar point when he described the role of the monarch as equivalent to that of the sun - *le Roi-Soleil*. Indeed, he said that "the prince is the source of all political and civil power" that sets monarchy's structure in motion (*EL II*, 4 p.17). In this regard, just as the sun is the greatest source of gravitational force in the solar system, the monarch is the greatest source of civil and political power in monarchy. Referring to the inverse relationship between the sun's gravitational force and the distance separating him from other planets, Montesquieu said

⁹⁷ $f_{grav} = (M_1 * M_2) / D^2$. In this equation, f_{grav} represents the force of gravity between the two objects. M_1 and M_2 represent the mass of the sun and the mass of a potential planet. D^2 represents the square of the distance separating the objects' centres.

that honour in monarchy “diminishes imperceptibly in proportion to its distance from the source [the monarch]” (*EL IV*, 2 p.33). Using a similar analogy, Montesquieu compares the monarch’s position and role in the sovereign court to that of the sun in the solar system: “In monarchies one sees the subjects around the prince receive his light” (*EL V*, 12 p.58).

In this regard, Montesquieu adapted the effects of the sun’s exercise of gravitational force to the study of politics and especially, to monarchical government. By comparing honour’s role in monarchy to that of the gravitational force in the solar system, Montesquieu set out honour’s underlying notion of power. Indeed, he said that “In monarchical and moderate states, power is limited by that which is its spring; I mean honour, which reigns like a monarch over the prince and the people” (*EL III*, 10 p.30). The metaphor of a monarchical solar system invokes subtler ideas: like concentric orbits around the sun, the effect of the exercise of power between individuals and institutions in monarchy fosters social hierarchy: just as the sun’s gravitational force inclines the planets to adopt certain orbits, the prince’s exercise of political power places individuals into social ranks. Also, just as the sun’s exercise of gravitational force over a planet depends on the distance between them, in monarchy, an individual’s share of power depends on his proximity to the monarch. By making this analogy between honour’s role in monarchy and the role of gravity in the solar system, Montesquieu enables the reader to understand better the premises of his study. Montesquieu’s study of government appears to have been influenced by the broader tendency of the Enlightenment to rationalise hypotheses about the workings of politics and society using natural laws (Shackleton, 1961, pp.251-2). This observation was also made by Montesquieu’s contemporaries like Charles Bonnet, who wrote to him: “Newton a découvert les lois du monde matériel: vous avez découvert, Monsieur, les lois du monde intellectuel” (Ibid, p.252).⁹⁸ By considering honour’s role in monarchy through the law of gravity,

⁹⁸ Translation: “Newton discovered the laws of the material world: you have discovered, Sir, the laws of the intellectual world.”

Montesquieu suggested that honour's behaviour is conditioned by mechanistic aspects like the property of power.

At a micro-level, Montesquieu illustrated the notion of power in terms of the personal qualities of individuals. In letter 48 from the *Persian Letters*, Usbek (in the words of Montesquieu) presents to Rhedi the discussion he had with an acquaintance at a social gathering, about a man whose appearance and manners he finds intriguing:

“Who is that man,” said I, “who has told us so much about the banquets at which he has entertained the great, who is so familiar with your dukes, and who talks so often to your ministers, who, they tell me, are so difficult of access? He ought surely to be a man of quality; but his aspect is so mean that he is hardly an honour to the aristocracy; and, besides, I find him deficient in education. I am a stranger; but it seems to me that there is, generally speaking, a certain tone of good-breeding common to all nations, and I do not find it in him. Can it be that your upper classes are not so well trained as those of other nations?” “That man,” answered he, laughing, “is a farmer-general; he is as much above others in wealth, as he is inferior to us all by birth. He might have the best people in Paris at his table, if he could make up his mind never to eat in his own house. He is very impertinent, as you see; but he excels in his cook, and is not ungrateful, for you heard how he praised him to-day” (*LP* 48 p.60)

Asking a gentleman's opinion about another man, Usbek says: ‘He ought surely to be a man of quality; but his aspect [*la physionomie*] is so mean that he is hardly an honour [*il ne fait guère honneur*] to the aristocracy’. With this comment, Montesquieu denoted the physiognomy of a person to be indicative of a person's nobility, and might even be considered an index to his character.⁹⁹ The importance of Usbek's remark lies in how a delicate, refined appearance predisposes the beholder to assume further qualities of a noble nature. In spite of its triviality, the importance of one's physiognomy is that it is perceived first. Usbek adds: ‘besides, I find him deficient in education’. Thus, Montesquieu tells us that the educational level of an individual is also an index to his nobility. Usbek makes this remark without justification. Surely, one could protest that forming an opinion about the educational level of another man requires proper observation. But the ease of manner with which Usbek makes

⁹⁹ To be fair, Usbek says that the man ‘ought surely to be a man of quality’. This implies that maybe, by way of being among people of high social status, this person enjoys a good reputation in spite of his rough features.

this observation implies that educational level may be evidenced by appearance and manners. Later, Usbek's interlocutor says that the man in question 'is a farmer-general; he is as much above others in wealth, as he is inferior to us all by birth'.¹⁰⁰ By this it is understood that a person's noble birth is linked to their social hierarchy and honour. Despite his humble origins, Montesquieu suggested the tax collector is familiar with the nobility. Thus it appears that an individual's ambition for honour can also be satisfied by the accumulation of wealth.

Later in the same correspondence, Usbek notices another man, whose appearance and manners he finds equally intriguing:

"And that old man, I whispered, who looks so morose? [...] He is an old soldier," said he, "who makes himself memorable to all his hearers by the tedious story of his exploits. He cannot endure the thought that France has gained any battles without him, nor hear a siege bragged of at which he did not mount the breach. He believes himself so essential to our history that he imagines it came to an end when he retired; [...] "But why," I asked, "has he quitted the service?" "He has not quitted it, but it has quitted him. He has been employed in a small post, where he will retail his adventures for the rest of his days; but he will never get any further; the path of honour is closed to him." "And why?" asked I. "It is a maxim in France," replied he, "never to advance officers whose patience has been worn out as subalterns; we look upon them as men whose minds have been narrowed by detail; and who, through a constant application to small things, become incapable of great ones. We believe that a man who, at thirty, has not the qualities of a general, will never have them [...] Therefore we employ in brilliant services those great, those sublime men, on whom Heaven has bestowed not only the courage, but the genius of the hero; and in inferior services those whose talents are inferior" (*LP* 48 p.61).

Probing into the character of this man, Usbek learns that he is a soldier who was degraded to a smaller post because of his inferior qualities. As a result, his interlocutor says, 'the path of honour is closed to him'. Thus Montesquieu suggested that despite his ambition to distinguish himself in the military, the soldier lacked the necessary personal qualities and as a result, his ambition had to be repressed. In this example, Montesquieu evokes the individual quality of heroic genius [*génie héroïque*] and frames it as an ingredient of glory and a prerequisite for a distinguished military career. The interlocutor explains that courage

¹⁰⁰ A 'farmer-general' is a person whose profession is the collection of taxes.

alone is not enough and for this reason the soldier was not promoted to a higher post. Thus Montesquieu suggested that courage and heroic genius are necessary qualities for a distinguished military career. It may also be inferred that the soldier lacks the individual quality of modesty. Indeed, despite his degradation, the soldier demonstrates an attitude of self-importance which arouses the contempt of his peers.

Montesquieu used these examples to suggest that both characters were motivated to distinguish themselves and capitalised on their personal qualities to attain honour. These qualities are noble birth, physiognomy, education, wealth, heroic genius, courage, and modesty. The presence of these qualities in an individual indicates that individual's advantage with relation to another. The presence of these qualities is perceived in the form of power because they determine one's ability to attain honour and social distinction. Although these qualities may equally account for power, they differ in character. In this regard, noble birth and good physiognomy are ascribed qualities, and wealth, education, courage, modesty and heroic genius are attainable. One is born with ascribed qualities; attainable qualities require ambition that inclines the individual to transform them into some perceptible form of power.

The centrality of power in Montesquieu's notion of honour resembles its meaning according to Hobbes. In chapters 10 & 11 of the *Leviathan*, Hobbes examines the notion of power and its attendant notions of worth, dignity and honour (Hobbes, 1996, pp.62-9). "In the first place," said Hobbes, "I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restlesse desire for power after power that ceaseth onely in Death" (Ibid, p.70). Hobbes deemed that the desire for power is a natural inclination of man and he defined it as a man's "present means, to obtain some future apparent Good" (Ibid, p.62). For Hobbes, what men perceive as 'power' is not the ability itself but its external manifestation and consequent result - that is, an 'apparent good'. In this regard, the kind of power that Hobbes has in mind should be understood as 'power to' that is, "an effective ability to [...] produce another thing

hereafter” (Rudolph, 1986, p.78).¹⁰¹ At an individual level, that power is the external manifestation of one’s own ability. However, at a social level, an individual’s estimation of his power is determined by comparison. In that case, Hobbes said that power consists in the perceptible acknowledgement that a “man hath the odds or excess of power above him that contendeth or compareth himself” (Hobbes, 1999, p.48). Therefore, at a social level, an individual’s quotient of power depends on comparison: that is, the degree to which that same power is shared by other individuals.

Moreover, Hobbes said that “the acknowledgement” of an individual’s power by others “is called honour” (Ibid). Hobbes listed a number of forms of power that may be considered honourable by others. He categorised these forms of power as natural and acquired (Ibid). Among others, he mentioned “beauty of person”, “adventure upon great exploits and danger”, “riches” and “nobility”, as qualities that signify one’s power and are deemed by others to be ‘honourable’ (Ibid, pp.48-9). These qualities, said Hobbes, signify a man’s “value” or else, “his Price” (Hobbes,1996, p.63). However, that value is contextual. Indeed, Hobbes said that a man’s worth, or his honour, is “a thing dependant on the need and judgment of another” (Ibid, p.63). This means that a man’s honour depends on a variety of factors, such as the usefulness of a quality at the time and place that it is acknowledged: “A learned and uncorrupt Judge, is much Worth in time of Peace; but not so much in War” (Ibid). Hence, Hobbes conceived power as the perceptible natural or acquired qualities in an individual; depending on their usefulness toward the attainment of an ‘apparent Good’ in a given context, these qualities determine one’s worth, or honour.

There are no explicit textual references that suggest that Montesquieu considered his conception of honour and its attendant notion of power in connection to Hobbes’s. Nevertheless, analysis of the previous excerpts allows one to argue that the two thinkers’

¹⁰¹ For the distinction between ‘power to’ and ‘power over’, see *The Terms of Political Discourse* (Connolly, 1993, Ch.3).

notions share some common features. Both thinkers considered various forms of power, whose exercise may confer on an individual some apparent good. Both thinkers deemed that the estimate of one's power is determined by comparison with other individuals. Moreover, both thinkers suggested that others' acknowledgment of the 'power to' constitutes an individual's honour, or its absence (for example, the old soldier and the tax collector). In contrast to Hobbes, Montesquieu did not engage in a systematic study of the notion of power and its relation to honour. Although he implies that it is present in monarchical government and among individuals, he distinguishes neither its particular forms nor the rules governing its behaviour. However, Montesquieu's analogy of monarchical government and the solar system, and the examples of the tax collector and the old soldier, suggest that the presence of power is a defining element for the attainment of honour. Thus, this section has illustrated that both at macro and micro levels, honour and its attainment is dependent on the underlying aspect of power.

IV. The Psychological Motives of Honour

In order to understand the meaning of Montesquieu's notion of honour, it is crucial to analyse the psychological motives that incline the individual toward its attainment: *ambition*, *obedience* and *resistance*. The examples of the tax collector and the old soldier, showed earlier that individuals experience a drive that inclines them to attain power. That drive is the psychological motive of *ambition*, which inspires an individual to increase his quotient of power in relation to others in order to attain honour. In this regard, Montesquieu defined ambition as the individual's desire to attain power that leads to honour. Depending on the manner of its exercise, it is possible that an individual's pursuit of ambition benefits the state. Indeed, Montesquieu said that "ambition [...] has good effects in monarchy; it gives life to that government" (*EL III*, 7 p.27). Ambition prompts an individual to attain power and to engage in actions that will distinguish him among others. While the individual aims to satisfy his desire for power and honour, his selfish actions serve the preservation of the state. Montesquieu said that "honour makes all the parts of the body politic move; its very action

binds them, and each person works for the common good, believing he works for his individual interests” (*EL III*, 7 p.27). Moreover, Montesquieu noted that it is not a problem for the state if an individual does not have the requisite personal qualities to provide services to the state. In this case, he said, that individual’s ambition can be “repressed” - which was the case in the example of the old soldier (*Ibid*).

Thus ambition is essential to the preservation of monarchy because the individual’s ambitious pursuit of honour advances the good of the state. For this reason, Montesquieu said that “unless [honour] it is there [in monarchy], the government is imperfect” (*EL III*, 11 p.30). It follows that for the proper functioning of monarchy, its subjects must be motivated by ambition; unambitious and modest individuals will be inefficient in preserving the monarchy because honour will not be capable of procuring the common good by capitalising on their selfish desires. This is why, alluding to the words of Cardinal Richelieu, Montesquieu argued that “If there is some unfortunate honest man among the people [...] a monarch should be careful not to employ him. So true is it that virtue is not the spring of this government!” (*EL III*, 5 p.26). Thus, Montesquieu deemed that individuals acting on the principle of virtue would hinder the welfare of a society that operates based on “the prejudice of each person and each condition” (*EL III*, 6 p.26).

Although deficient ambition is injurious to monarchy, the other extreme can prove equally harmful for its preservation. Montesquieu deemed that excessive ambition corrupts the laws and institutions of monarchy. That is because by aiming for intemperate accretion of power, the individual’s unbridled ambition inclines them to override the state’s designated channels for attaining honour. This means that in order to satisfy their desire for honour, overambitious individuals threaten to infringe the law. Montesquieu warned that when the subjects of a monarchy pursue their ambition at the expense of the laws and the constitution, “the slow and natural means for distinguishing oneself no longer have an effect, and the principle of the government is stricken” (*EL XIII*, 20 p.227). Thus,

Montesquieu warned against the individual's excessive ambition due to its detrimental effect on the preservation of monarchy.

Besides warning against the ambition of the common man, Montesquieu also called attention to those men with political power. He noted that “the passions and weaknesses of those who govern” often become corrupted by their “imaginary needs,” such as “the charm of an extraordinary project” (*EL XIII*, 1 p.213). Due to their “sick envy of vainglory” and their “impotence of spirit in the face of their fancies” these men, instigate social unrest because they consider that “the needs of their small souls” are on a par with “the needs of the state” (*EL XIII*, 1 p.213).¹⁰² Moreover, he thought that apart from corrupting the laws, ambitious men with power also corrupt other individuals. Indeed, Montesquieu thought that these men require the support of others in order to accomplish their selfish designs.¹⁰³ To garner the peoples' support, Montesquieu said that ambitious political men attempt to capitalise on the common man's ambition for superiority in order to manipulate him.¹⁰⁴ Therefore, he warned that overambitious politicians pose a threat to the preservation of monarchy because they instigate social unrest in order to satisfy their private ends.

¹⁰² Montesquieu illustrated the dangers stemming from the excessive ambition of powerful men in monarchy with an example of the English Civil War:

“It was a fine spectacle in the last century to see the impotent attempts of the English to establish democracy among themselves. As those who took part in public affairs had no virtue at all, as their ambition was excited by the success of the most audacious one [Cromwell] and the spirit of one faction was repressed only by the spirit of another, the government was constantly changing; the people, stunned, sought democracy and found it nowhere” (*EL III*, 3 p.22).

Montesquieu suggested that through his ambition for glory, Cromwell appealed to the selfish desires of his followers, whose help enabled him to complete his plans. In this regard, like Hobbes, Montesquieu considered ambition to be the main cause behind the breakout of the English Civil War.

¹⁰³ This point resembles Hobbes' warning to prevent men with political ambitions from seizing power. Hobbes argued that the people should be made aware of the “substantial doctrines” and rhetorical forms of speech that ambitious men use to manipulate the public opinion. Indeed, in the *Behemoth* he warned that “ambition can do little without hands, and few hands it would have, if the common people were [...] diligently instructed in the true principles of their duty” (Hobbes, 2014, §2 p.70).

¹⁰⁴ Montesquieu said that the ambitious politicians' attempts to manipulate the people could be successful in monarchy because the desire for superiority is shared by everyone: “in monarchies and despotic states, no one aspires to equality; the idea of equality does not even occur; in these states everyone aims for superiority” (*EL V*, 4 p.44).

In order to address the political factions instigated by politically ambitious men, Montesquieu advised the prince to inculcate *obedience* among his subjects. That is why he said that “there is nothing in monarchy that laws, religion, and honour prescribe so much as obedience to the wills of the prince” (*EL IV*, 2 p.33). To attain the obedience of the people, he said that the monarch must have predominant power in the state. This is why he advised that the monarch “distributes his authority in such a way that he never gives a part without retaining a greater part” (*EL VI*,16 p.66). Moreover, he advised the monarch to share his power with the nobility who, by being part of the sovereign government, develop a vested interest in defending it from subversion. Indeed, he said that “these orders [the nobility] have longed only for the laws and their duty and have slowed the ardour and impetuosity of factious men more than they were able to serve them” (*EL V*, 11 p.58). Thus, in order to avoid the state’s subversion and civil unrest, Montesquieu advised that the prince should share his power with the nobility in order to attain obedience.

However, the nobility’s obedience to the wills of the prince can prove injurious to the state when that obedience becomes uncritical. Indeed, given the human soul’s “delight in dominating other souls,” Montesquieu deemed the monarch to be equally susceptible to excessive ambition (*EL*, XXVIII, 41 p.595). As a result, by “referring everything to himself exclusively,” the monarch’s overwhelming power can become a direct affront to the security of the state (*EL VIII*, 6 p.117). To avoid this, Montesquieu counts on the nobility’s ability to shield the state from the monarch’s centralising tendencies. That is why he warned against the monarch’s councils and the nobility being overcome by the monarch’s ambition. Instead, he said that they should advise him to act based on “necessity and from a strict justice” (*EL X*, 2 p.139). Otherwise, “If those who direct the conscience or the councils of princes do not hold to these, all is lost; and, when that right is based on arbitrary principles of glory, of propriety, of utility, tides of blood will inundate the earth” (*EL X*, 2 p.139). In this regard, although Montesquieu advised the nobles to show obedience to the prince, at the same time

he advised them to make their obedience conditional when that obedience becomes a risk to the security of the state.

Montesquieu advised the nobility to show *resistance* to the monarch's absolutist tendencies in order to protect their honour and the security of the state. He illustrated this aspect of honour with the examples of Crillon and the Viscount of Orte. Crillon and Orte chose to defy their kings' orders because they considered them dishonourable. Montesquieu said that Crillon was ordered by Henry III to assassinate the Duke of Guise; although this order was issued by the sovereign, Crillon thought it was a cowardly action to kill a man without allowing him to defend himself. For this reason, Crillon proposed instead to engage the Duke in battle (*EL IV, 2 p.33*). Montesquieu said that the Viscount of Orte was ordered by Charles IX to have the Huguenots massacred after Saint Bartholomew's day; however, he said that upon his arrival at Bayonne, Orte deemed that performing this duty would result in a great injustice. Hence, Orte replied to the king:

“Sire, I have found among the inhabitants and the warriors only good citizens, brave soldiers, and not one executioner; thus, they and I together beg Your Majesty to use our arms and our lives for things that can be done” (*EL IV, 2 p.33*).

Crillon and Orte's acts of resistance suggest that their obedience to the king is in fact questionable. The two men critically engaged their kings' orders and concluded that they were unjust and dishonourable. Their chosen course of action also suggests that they have an increased sense of self-esteem: Crillon and Orte do not consider themselves minors who, having no opinion about what constitutes right and wrong, follow blindly the orders of a paternal figure in return for protection and spiritual guidance.¹⁰⁵ Montesquieu described the

¹⁰⁵ This is a characteristic dominating the relationship between the individual and political authority that belongs to an earlier period. In the Middle Ages, subjects did not have rights in the public sphere. Rather, “whatever they had, they had as a matter of royal grace, or royal concession” (Ullmann, 1966, p.19). For this reason, the King's grace was vitally important for the subjects because without it they could have no public standing. In this regard, the show of absolute obedience was crucial for attaining the King's grace. Walter Ullmann suggests that unquestionable obedience to the wills of the king was “the outward sign of faith” and that “the eulogies which the virtue of obedience received in the Middle Ages are therefore easily understandable, for obedience was the external sign of faith in the institution, the yardstick that offered a ready measurement for the degree of the individual's subjection” (Ibid, p.32).

two men as having an extraordinary level of courage and self-confidence that enabled them to deny the validity of the king's judgment. By following different courses of action to those prescribed by the king, the two men protected themselves from dishonour: honour "dictates to us that the prince should never prescribe an action that dishonours us because it would make us incapable of serving him" (*EL V*, 11 p.33). By employing these examples, Montesquieu suggested that the individual's selfish pursuit of honour can be the cause of great actions that protect the state from the monarch's abuse of power.¹⁰⁶

Montesquieu suggested that honour inclines individuals to pursue much nobler ends for its attainment, which extend beyond the accumulation of wealth and even other men's esteem. Through their act of disobedience, Crillon and Orte rejected the king's favour and a generous bounty. Montesquieu thought that although the pursuit of honour advances one's self-interest, its object extends beyond the acquisition of money and material goods: "glory and honour are for that nobility which knows, sees, and feels no real good" (*EL XIV*, 19 p.227).¹⁰⁷ The cases of Crillon and Orte show that acting honourably even inclines one to scorn the opinions of other men. The reasons behind the two men's disobedience extended beyond seeking other men's approval: Montesquieu said that the two men disobeyed because their "great and generous courage regarded a cowardly action as an impossible thing" (*EL IV*, 2 p.33). Thus he suggested that the king's orders offended their pride: the two men were preoccupied with preserving the good opinion they had about themselves, which differs from acting with an aim to impress others. Rather than merely aiming for material goods or other

¹⁰⁶ On this point, this study concurs with the interpretations of Céline Spector and Sharon Krause. Spector agrees that based on the examples of the two men, "Montesquieu highlights the political courage necessary for a state governed by the rule of law, whatever the existing formal guaranties may be" (Spector, 2008, p.60). Moreover, Krause says that "Somewhat paradoxically, then, a measure of reverence fuels honour as a source of resistance to violations of political right" (Krause, 2002a, p.48).

¹⁰⁷ This can also be evinced based on the example of the tax collector in section III. Montesquieu said that the tax collector, despite his wealth, "he is as much above others in wealth, as he is inferior to us all by birth" (*LP 48* p.60). Moreover, in *The Spirit of the Laws*, Montesquieu criticised the profession of the tax collector because he considered the accumulation of wealth as an end in itself: "all is lost when the lucrative profession of tax collectors, by its wealth, comes to be an honoured profession [...] the slow and natural means for distinguishing oneself no longer have an effect, and the principle of the government is stricken" (*EL XIII*, 20 p.227).

men's good opinion, Montesquieu suggested that the pursuit of honour also ascertains self-determination: he said that "[honour] wants one to be able indifferently to aspire to posts or to refuse them; it regards this liberty as greater than fortune itself" (*EL IV*, 2 p.34). Therefore, according to Montesquieu, honour in monarchy inclines the individual to attain nobler ends than the mere accumulation of material goods or other men's esteem.

Montesquieu suggested that actions in pursuit of honour require excellence and self-sacrifice. With regard to excellence, he said that in monarchy "one judges men's actions here not as good but as fine, not as just but as great; not as reasonable but as extraordinary" (*EL IV*, 2 p.32). With regard to self-sacrifice, he said that by the rules of honour "we are sovereignly forbidden to give any [importance] to our life" (*EL IV*, 2 p.34). These noble aspects of honour recall the magnanimous virtue found in Aristotle and Cicero.¹⁰⁸ However, although honour may possess certain attributes of magnanimity, Montesquieu suggested that individuals do not pursue honour from altruistic motives. Rather, he said that individuals in monarchy engage in fine actions that require self-sacrifice in order to satisfy their pride: in monarchy, "the virtues we are shown here are always less what one owes others than what one owes oneself; they are not so much what calls us to our fellow citizens as what distinguishes us from them" (*EL IV*, 2 p.31). Despite engaging in actions that may require self-sacrifice, the individual's pursuit of honour is animated by selfish motives. Still, Montesquieu deemed that the pursuit of honour inclined individuals to perform extraordinary actions that foster the good of the state.

¹⁰⁸ See Ch.4, section II. The same position has been adopted by Sharon Krause. Indeed, she says: "Aristotle defined magnanimity as complete virtue directed toward oneself, and distinguished it from complete virtue in relation to another person,' which he called justice. Like Aristotelian magnanimity, honour is concerned with what one owes to oneself. Yet Aristotle emphasised that a magnanimous man should be a "good" man, for honour was the prize of virtue, and it was "bestowed only on good men." Magnanimity without both nobility and goodness, was impossible. As we have seen, however, for Montesquieu those with honour are not necessarily good, for one judges honourable actions not as good but as fine. While the magnanimous man must do the right thing for the right reason, for Montesquieu it is enough that those with honour do the right thing, even if their reasons are not, morally speaking, the right ones (Krause, 1999, pp.471, 482).

To conclude: Montesquieu considered the individual's ambitious pursuit of honour instrumental in the preservation of monarchical government. That is because despite its selfish motives, ambition indirectly promotes the preservation of the state. However, the honour-seeking pursuits of individuals become dangerous when their ambition becomes excessive. Hence, in order to benefit the state, Montesquieu deemed that ambition must be neither insufficient nor excessive, and should be regulated by the individual's sense of *obedience* to the laws. That obedience may also prove harmful when it is unquestioned, because it allows the monarch to assume more power and become despotic. For this reason, Montesquieu suggested that the subjects and the nobility must also exhibit *resistance* toward the monarch's overambitious pursuit of power. In this regard, Montesquieu deemed individual ambition to be beneficial to monarchy when guided by obedience to the laws and the monarch; at the same time he considered that obedience provisional, encouraging individuals to constantly question the honourableness of an action ordered by the sovereign authority.¹⁰⁹

V. Conclusion: The Conceptual Heritage of Montesquieuian Honour

The study of the relevant textual evidence suggests that Montesquieu became very influenced in his views on public administration by the teachings of Mandeville. Indeed, in his description of honour in monarchy, Montesquieu adopted Mandeville's reversal between ethics and politics. Montesquieu said that "in monarchies, politics accomplishes great things with as little virtue as it can" (*EL III*, 5 p.25 & *Ibid III*, 6 p.26). In this regard, Montesquieu rejected virtue's relevance to monarchical government and replaced it with a selfish passion, honour.¹¹⁰ He said that when honour is "joined with the force of the laws, it can lead to the goal of government as does virtue itself" (*EL III*, 6 p.26). Moreover, he said that honour drives

¹⁰⁹ On this point, this study concurs with Mosher, who argues that Montesquieu considered obedience "provisional by requiring every subject to draw a prior conclusion about the continuing worth or honourableness of the higher authority in question" (Blom, et al, 2007, p. 106).

¹¹⁰ Montesquieu defined the purpose of politics as the attainment of security. This is explained in detail in Ch.2, section II.

men's actions so that "each person works for the common good, believing he works for his individual interests" (*EL III*, 5, 7 p.27). Based on these claims, Montesquieu suggested that men's pursuit of honour, founded on a selfish passion, can foster social utility and the common good with the same efficacy as virtue. Hence, insofar as Montesquieu compromised ethical considerations and encouraged individuals to pursue their selfish passions for the sake of social utility, it may be argued that he conceived his notion of honour under the influence of Mandeville.

However, there are still significant differences between Montesquieu's notion of honour and its Mandevillian counterpart. Indeed, although both notions derive social utility by capitalising on men's selfish passions, textual evidence suggests that Montesquieu's honour generates significantly more complex behavioural patterns. Unlike Mandeville, Montesquieu suggested that honour inclines the individual to do much more than merely obeying the sovereign authorities. Montesquieuian honour inclines men to defy political authority when obedience would dishonour them. As a result, by inclining individuals to engage critically with political authority, Montesquieu suggested that honour fosters security by protecting the state against the monarch's centralising tendencies. Moreover, unlike Mandeville, Montesquieu did not define honour merely as the individual's desire to be esteemed by others (self-liking). Rather, he deemed that honour also inclines one to preserve the good opinion he has of himself. In this regard, Montesquieuian honour inclines individuals to pursue ends that extend beyond the accumulation of wealth and even the good opinions of other men.

The fact that Montesquieu did not link his notion of honour to the pursuit of wealth or material gain invites analogy to Machiavelli's notion of *gloria*. It was shown earlier that neither Machiavelli's prince nor Montesquieu's man of honour is interested in the attainment of monetary wealth. Rather, the two men seek to attain glory by doing things that are 'great' and 'extraordinary'. Moreover, both thinkers conceived the individual's pursuit of glory in connection with advancing the good of the state. For example, Machiavelli extolled Romulus

for restoring Rome to its glory and Montesquieu admired Crillon and Orte for resisting the King's absolutism. Therefore, both thinkers deemed glory or honour to be attainable only by individuals whose self-interest inclines them to perform extraordinary actions that are not guided by principles of revenue-maximisation.

However, there is a crucial difference between Montesquieu's notion of honour and its Machiavellian counterpart. Machiavelli deemed that the prince's main preoccupation should be the preservation of his dominion over the state. To attain that end, he thought that the prince must be ready to employ violence and cunning (*virtù*). He also thought that the prince must be proactive and treat the vicissitudes (*fortuna*) of power in politics with determination: he said that 'it is better to be impetuous than cautious'. Although Montesquieu agreed with Machiavelli that the preservation of the state is the supreme law, he was sceptical about the means that Machiavelli endorsed toward this end. Montesquieu thought that the prince's determination to gain power inclined him to engage "great acts of authority" that were often "clumsy" (*EL XX*, 20 p.389). In contrast to Machiavelli and his example of Cesare Borgia, Montesquieu rejected the use of brute force in modern politics.¹¹¹ Brute force and cunning, he thought, could not procure the state's long-term preservation. That is why Montesquieu's Viscount of Orte did not engage in the killing of innocents; there is nothing, at least in principle, that would prevent Machiavelli's prince from doing so. Hence, unlike Machiavellian glory, Montesquieuan honour inclines one to pursue his desire for honour while adhering to a certain code of conduct.

Despite this difference, the pursuit of honour in Montesquieu has much more in common with Machiavelli's notion of glory than with Mandeville's liberal motif of *private*

¹¹¹ Montesquieu wrote in his *Pensées* that "As for conquerors, I will tell them that it is a common trait to love war; that there are many bellicose princes, just as there are many private individuals who have a violent passion for acquisition; that it is moderation, as the rarest virtue, that ought to constitute heroism; that it is not surprising that so many princes have sought to make themselves famous by their aggression against their neighbours, since nothing is so easy for them as to let themselves be led by their passions, whereas the role of a moderate and just prince is all the more laborious for being merely reasonable; that these sorts of virtues cost a great deal to princes because they are real" (*Pensées* 1987 p.514).

vices public benefits. That is because both Montesquieu and Machiavelli conceived their notions in relation to committing great actions that surpassed the ambitions and expectations of the common people and furthered the security of the state. For this reason, one should not overemphasise the conceptual affinity between Montesquieu's notion of honour and Mandeville's liberalism. Indeed, for all its similarity with Mandeville's liberal motif, as Hirschman put it, the idea of an 'invisible hand' in Montesquieu's thought "was formulated in connection with the search for glory, rather than with the desire for money" (Hirschman, 1997, p.10).

VIRTUE: A MATTER OF UTILITY

“For people who have to have nothing but the necessities, there is left to desire only the glory of the homeland and one's own glory”

(*EL VII, 2 p.98*).

This chapter examines the meaning of Montesquieu's notion of virtue. The first section illustrates that the lack of conceptual clarity in Montesquieu's notion obfuscates its meaning and its relation to the cardinal and theological virtues in the Western canon.¹¹² This section suggests that due to its lack of conceptual precision, Montesquieuan virtue requires further examination. The second section analyses the meaning of pagan virtue, its assumptions about human nature and its role in the *polis/civitas* according to Aristotle and Cicero. It is suggested that both thinkers deemed that virtue fostered self-sacrifice and guided men toward the attainment of excellence. The third section analyses the meaning of Christian virtue, its assumptions about human nature, and its role in politics, according to St Augustine. It is shown that Christian virtue fostered self-sacrifice by urging men to show humility and to have faith in God's divine plan for salvation. The fourth section examines Montesquieu's notion of virtue. It suggests that Montesquieuan virtue is not a moral construct and so should be distinguished from its pagan and Christian counterparts. By drawing a comparison with its Machiavellian counterpart (*virtú*), this section illustrates that Montesquieu defined virtue in connection with the pursuit of utility in politics.

¹¹² An elaborate account of the cardinal and theological virtues lies outside the scope of this study. Insofar as it concerns the cardinal virtues, this study informs its argument by considering Aristotle and Cicero's accounts of virtue. Insofar as it concerns the theological virtues, this study informs its argument by considering the meaning of virtue according to St Augustine. The author of this study is aware that a solid understanding of the theological virtues should also lie in the accounts of other thinkers, such as St Ambrose and St Thomas Aquinas. However, this study aims to understand the theological virtues' general assumptions about human nature, and their role in politics. In order to attain this perspective, this study considers the meaning of virtue according to St Augustine. Broadly speaking, Augustine's understanding of virtue suffices for this purpose. Moreover, from now on, any reference to the cardinal and theological virtues will be made through the concepts of pagan and Christian virtue.

I. A Conceptual Ambiguity in Montesquieu's Notion of Virtue

By defining the principle of republican government as virtue, Montesquieu invites his reader to consider the concept in connection to the Western canon. However, Montesquieu's notion often creates conceptual ambiguities that obfuscate the canon's traditional categories. To resolve these ambiguities, this section suggests that - at least insofar as it concerns the pagan and Christian notions of virtue - Montesquieuan virtue should be considered separately from that tradition. To prove this claim, firstly, this section illustrates some basic conceptual traits in the canon's category of virtues. Secondly, this section illustrates certain similarities between the canonical and Montesquieuan notions of virtue. Thirdly, by examining the textual evidence, this section suggests that Montesquieu urged his readers to avoid considering his notion of virtue in connection to its pagan and Christian meanings.

At a basic level, the meaning of virtue can be explained through consideration of its moral economy and notion of a *telos*.¹¹³ Broadly speaking, regarding their moral economy, both pagan and Christian types of virtue have been defined in connection to altruistic action. Both types inculcate in men the desire to suppress their selfish desires in order to prioritise the good of the community. As Manent observes, "this notion [their moral economy] sums up the practical universal principle of both Greek philosophy and the Christian religion: all men, from one end of the world to the other, are equally called to live according to virtue, that is, to perfect and fulfil their nature as much as they can, despite great inequalities in their capacities, be they natural qualities or supernatural graces" (Manent, 1998, p.18). Regarding *telos*, in its pagan conception, virtue inclines individuals to act with self-renunciation as part of attaining moral excellence and the best political order (Cochrane,

¹¹³ This concept (moral economy) is borrowed from Pierre Manent, who uses it in order to describe the qualitative ratio between an individual's pursuit of his self-interest and the common good. Specifically, Manent coins this concept in his analysis of virtue of Montesquieu's republican type of regime. Manent says that "it can be demonstrated that when Montesquieu speaks of virtue he means virtue in general, including even the virtues we call moral or Christian" (Manent, 1998, p.22). In this regard, by referring to the moral economy of republics, Manent refers to the state in which an individual sacrifices his self-interest for the common good (ibid pp.21-2). This concept is used here in the same manner as it is coined by Manent; it aims to emphasise a crucial similarity between the cardinal and theological virtues, that is, the individual's sacrifice of his self-interest for the common good.

1940, pp.380, 385, 420; Markus, 1988, pp.74, 86; Fortin, 2012, p.164). However, in its Christian conception, virtue does not aim toward excellence. Rather, Christian virtue inclines individuals to act with self-renunciation as part of attaining God's divine grace (Wetzel, 1992, p.108; Markus, 1989, p.4; Liebeschuetz, 2001, p.223). In this regard, Christian and pagan virtue share different notions of a *telos*. Though, leaving other differences aside, both types incline men to act with self-sacrifice as part attaining moral goodness.¹¹⁴

At first glance, it appears that Montesquieu conceived his notion of virtue in line with that of the Western canon.¹¹⁵ Indeed, Montesquieuan virtue adopts the same moral economy as its Christian and pagan counterparts. For example, Montesquieu said that “one can define this virtue as love of the laws and the homeland. This love, requiring a continuous preference of the public interest over one’s own, produces all the individual virtues; they are only that preference” (*EL IV*, 5 p.36). Montesquieu admired republican virtue for its moral economy because it inclined individuals to participate in government and exercise power from disinterested motives. He said: “The political men of Greece who lived under popular government recognised no other force to sustain it than virtue. Those of today speak to us only of manufacturing, commerce, finance, wealth, and even luxury” (*EL IV*, 3 p.23). Moreover, he deemed that virtue’s influence inspired individuals to commit great actions. He added later that “when that virtue was in full force, things were done in those governments that we no longer see and that astonish our small souls” (*EL IV*, 4 p.35). Thus, Montesquieu deemed that virtue inspired individuals to commit great actions with personal sacrifice. Insofar as he suggested that virtue fosters the moral economy of self-sacrifice,

¹¹⁴ Indeed, as Manent observes, “The two traditions differed in what they considered the virtues to be and how they ranked them, but they at least held in common that human life is called to find its fulfilment and happiness in the exercise of the virtues” (Manent, 1998, p.18).

¹¹⁵ Virtue as a concept had found a very fertile ground in the works of Montesquieu and other Enlightenment thinkers, who professed its superiority and lamented its decline compared to the honorific individualism that was prevalent in modern monarchies (Linton, 2001, pp.62-7). Thinkers like Montesquieu understood virtue as the exalted ideal that was characteristic in the language of authors like Livy, Tacitus and Cicero and whose works were part of the curriculum of education in France until the Revolution (*Ibid*, pp.38-9).

Montesquieu's reader may assume that his notion of virtue should be considered in conjunction with its pagan and Christian counterparts.

However, one would be wrong to draw this conclusion. Textual evidence suggests that Montesquieu urged his readers to dissociate his notion of virtue from its Christian and pagan counterparts. Early in *The Spirit of the Laws*, Montesquieu said that,

“In order to understand the first four books of this work, one must note that what I call virtue in a republic is love of the homeland, that is, love of equality. It is not a moral virtue or a Christian virtue; it is political virtue, and this is the spring that makes republican government move [...] Therefore, I have called love of the homeland and of equality, political virtue. I have had new ideas; new words have had to be found or new meanings given to old ones. Those who have not understood this have made me say absurdities that would be outrageous in every country in the world, because in every country in the world morality is desired” (*EL* Author's Foreword p.xli).

In this excerpt, it appears that Montesquieu was aware of the possibility that his readers might consider his notion as a successor to the Western canon. However, by stating that ‘new words have had to be found or new meanings given to old ones’, Montesquieu suggested that his notion of virtue deviates from the various meanings it has received under different authors and contexts in that tradition. Moreover, by saying that ‘it is not a moral virtue or a Christian virtue’, he explicitly distinguished his notion of virtue from its Christian and pagan counterparts. Therefore, despite adopting the same moral economy as pagan and Christian virtue, Montesquieu exhorted his readers to consider his notion as a distinct and independent concept - ‘political virtue’.

Montesquieu suggested that his notion of virtue is political, and so should be considered separately from its Christian and pagan conceptions. Nevertheless, his distinction leaves many questions unanswered. What is the meaning of political virtue? In what way does it differ from its Christian and pagan counterparts? What is its relation with attaining the purpose of politics in republics? And more importantly, did Montesquieu indeed present in *The Spirit of the Laws* a new idea of virtue? Surely, the skilled reader would object that Montesquieu's notion of political virtue could be traced in Machiavelli's famous notion of

virtù. However, at this point, this study has not yet examined the relevant textual evidence in order to understand Montesquieu's notion and address these questions in depth.

To conclude this section: on one hand, the moral economy of Montesquieu's notion of virtue invites his readers to consider it in connection with the Western canon's long-standing tradition of virtue. On the other hand, Montesquieu suggested that his notion should be considered separately from its pagan and Christian counterparts. But Montesquieu's definition of virtue in *The Spirit of the Laws* lacks conceptual precision. As a result, although he suggests that his notion should be considered as separate and distinct, it is unclear in what way exactly it differs from its pagan and Christian counterparts.

II. Pagan Virtue: the Pursuit of Excellence

Commentators have long established that there are important links between Montesquieu's conception of virtue and the pagan description made by Aristotle. That is not to say that Montesquieuian virtue has its origins in Aristotelian virtue. Although there are certain common aspects in their conceptions, commentators have mostly suggested that Montesquieu treated Aristotelian virtue as a point of departure (Manent, 1994, pp.17-24, 42; Pangle, 1989, pp.56-65; Shackleton, 1961, p.266; Krause, 2002a, p.194). Moreover, the same can be said (though to a smaller extent) about Cicero (Pangle, 1989, p. 24). Commentators have acknowledged Montesquieu's admiration for the Roman, for whom he wrote a eulogy in 1717 that praised his attack on superstition and support of liberty (Shackleton, 1961, p.20).¹¹⁶ Moreover, in his biography of Montesquieu, Shackleton says that he intended to write a work on duties that would be based on Cicero's *De Officiis* (Ibid, pp.70, 265).¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶ Montesquieu noted in his *Discours sur Cicéron* that "Cicéron est, de tous les anciens, celui qui a eu le plus de mérite personnel, et à qui j'aimerais mieux ressembler" (Kingston, 1996, p.149).

¹¹⁷ However, Shackleton says that Montesquieu eventually abandoned this plan because he became aware that a rival treatise had treated the same theme.

In order to understand the ways in which Montesquieu's notion of virtue departed from its pagan counterparts, this section studies the meaning of pagan virtue, its underlying assumptions about human nature, and its role in politics, based on the works of Aristotle and Cicero. It suggests that, broadly speaking, pagan virtue required individuals to suppress their selfish passions as part of attaining moral excellence.¹¹⁸ Of course, there are multiple passages and an enormous secondary literature that is devoted to the study of these concepts. Therefore, it is impossible to engage a detailed analysis of pagan virtue in this study. However, for the purpose of this engagement, it will suffice to analyse some of its basic features as they appear in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, *Eudemian Ethics*, *Politics* and Cicero's *Republic* and *De Officiis*.

In his *Eudemian Ethics*, Aristotle put forward his theory of the *golden mean*. Through this theory Aristotle aimed to offer a conceptual framework that defines how men should live in order to attain happiness. Happiness is by nature everyman's supreme good, said Aristotle (*EE* 1214a; *NE* 1099a24-25). For its attainment, he said that men should live their lives with virtue (*EE* 1226b10; *Ibid*, 1227a15-20). Hence, Aristotle thought that the systematic pursuit of virtue in *one's* actions or thought shapes his state of character and leads one to happiness.

A man's state of character is shaped by the habitual exercise of a certain action in response to his feelings, said Aristotle (*Ibid*, 1214a15-25). In various instances in their lives, men experience feelings which induce "pleasure or pain" and hinder their pursuit of virtue (*Ibid* 1220b5-10). For example, Aristotle said that like every feeling, fear impacts men in different ways. While some men would respond in a cowardly manner because they feel pain, others would respond rashly because they feel pleasure. In this regard, one's response to fear shapes his state of character accordingly: "a man that is not afraid of things of which he ought to [...] is rash" and "he that is afraid of things of which he ought not to be afraid [...] is cowardly"

¹¹⁸ These are also the two central features that Manent distinguishes about pagan virtue. See Ch.3, Section III.

(Ibid, 1221a15-20). Nevertheless, pursuing or avoiding fear due to one's fixation with pleasure or pain does not signify the presence of virtue in one's state of character.

Instead of allowing himself to act in pursuit of pain or pleasure, a man who deliberates goodness should always guide his actions by virtue, said Aristotle (Ibid, 1220b25-30). Virtue in one's character "causes men to be capable of doing the *best* actions and gives them the *best* disposition in regard to the greatest good [happiness]" (Ibid, 1222a5-10).¹¹⁹ Thus, a man who deliberates goodness will learn to ignore pain or pleasure and in every case his actions will aim at virtue, which is located between the two. In this regard, Aristotle located virtue on a "continuum that is divisible" into excess, deficiency and a mean: "in all cases" he says, "it is the mean relative to us that is best, for that is as knowledge and reason ordains" (Ibid, 1220b20-25, 30-35). Therefore, Aristotle deemed that in each case, moral virtue is a middle state between two opposing ends; by choosing always the mean, a man's "actions and workings of the soul constitute Happiness" (*NE* 1098a23-24).

Aristotle deemed that the purpose of the *polis* is the life of contemplation of virtue (*Politics* 1325b 17-33). However, he thought that for a number of reasons, men who are capable of devoting themselves to a life of contemplation of virtue "are exceedingly rare" (*NE* 1156b-1157a, 1158a-1158b; Pangle, 1989, p.62). The most important reason for this, he thought, was the fact that the citizens were usually occupied with the administration of the *polis*, or other engagements that did not allow them to contemplate virtue undisturbed. For this reason, Aristotle thought that virtue could be attained mainly by philosophers because they live a life of leisure (*scholê*) (Ibid).¹²⁰ On this account, Aristotle linked the attainment of virtue

¹¹⁹ Italics added.

¹²⁰ According to Aristotle, *scholê* was crucial both to human flourishing and to preservation of the polis. On empirical grounds, Aristotle suggested that the decline of glorious city-states, like Sparta, often happened in the occasion of success in war and economic growth. For this reason, he suggests the legislator should consider ways in which to educate the citizens about how to engage in leisure during times of peace: "the statesman should keep in view when he frames his laws; he should consider the parts of the soul and their functions, and above all the better and the end; he should also remember the diversities of human lives and actions. For men must engage in business and go to war, but leisure and peace are better; [...] In such principles children and persons of every age which requires education should

more closely with the philosopher's βίος θεωρητικός (bios theoretikos or life of contemplation):

“So, among actions performed in accordance with virtue, those in politics and war are distinguished by their nobility and extent, but they involve exertion, aim at some end, and are not worthy of choice for their own sake. The activity of intellect, on the other hand, in so far as it involves contemplation, seems superior in its seriousness, to aim at no end beyond itself, and to have its own proper pleasure, which augments the activity; it seems also to possess self-sufficiency, time for leisure, and freedom from fatigue, as far as these are humanly possible” (NE 1177b15-22).

In this regard, Aristotle examined the attainment of virtue in the areas of philosophy and politics and suggested that the former is more closely associated with its attainment. Nevertheless, this aspect of virtue complicates the pursuit and attainment of the purpose of politics in the *polis*. Indeed, given the fact that men of virtue are very rare and that philosophers prefer to withdraw from political life for the sake of a superior private life, for all its moral worth and sublimity, it becomes increasingly difficult to foster virtue in politics (Pangle, 1989, p.62).¹²¹

For this reason, Pangle argues that Aristotle's *polis* “must therefore settle for the goal of fostering the development of a type of human being who is halfway between the good citizen and the philosopher: the gentleman” (Ibid). Moreover, he deems that the “culmination” of the type of virtue that fits the life of the gentleman is summarised in what Aristotle called “greatness of soul” (Ibid). As described in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, ‘greatness of soul,’ magnanimity or μεγαλοψυχία, is “a kind of ornament of all other virtues, in that it makes them better and cannot be without them” (NE 1123b54-56). That virtue, says Pangle, “gives

be trained” (Pol 1334a22-30). On theoretical grounds, Aristotle suggested that leisure is conducive to the good life: “nature herself, as has been often said, requires that we should be able, not only to work well, but to use leisure well; for, as I must repeat once and again, the first principle of all action is leisure. Both are required, but leisure is better than occupation” (Pol 1338a1-4).

¹²¹ Pangle notes that “The aim of the city is the life of thought and contemplation of the truth (*Politics* 1325b 17-33). Unfortunately, this goal is all but impossible for a number of reasons. The most massive is the fact that men capable of devoting themselves to the contemplative or philosophic life are exceedingly rare - rarer than the rarest gem” (Pangle, 1989, p.62).

one an opportunity to exercise the higher capacities of one's soul" in pursuit of "public honour and office - the greatest political goods" (Ibid). Nevertheless, although these goods "are distinguished by their nobility and extent" Aristotle said that "they involve exertion, aim at some end, and are not worthy of choice for their own sake" (NE 1177b15-22). In this regard, the gentleman runs the risk of undermining his virtue if he pursues these goods as ends in themselves. To avoid that, he must be aware that these goods are inferior to philosophical life and the contemplation of truth which, "in so far as it involves contemplation, seems superior in its seriousness" (NE 1177b15-22). Therefore, Aristotle deemed that gentlemanly virtue did not equal the sublimity of the philosopher's βίος θεωρητικός and so, he distinguished one from another.¹²²

The examination of the differences between Aristotle's concepts of virtue and magnanimity lies beyond the scope of this study. Without conflating the two notions, this study is particularly concerned with illustrating the aspects of self-sacrifice, *telos*, and underlying assumptions about human nature in these notions. Now, to illustrate these aspects, this section focuses on virtue's relation to the individual and the pursuit of the common good in the *polis*.

At an individual level, Aristotle analysed the nature of the human soul by distinguishing its parts and describing how they should interact to fulfil their purpose, that is the pursuit of

¹²² Due to the complexity of its nature, commentators debate about whether 'greatness of soul' or magnanimity is a type of virtue exhibited by statesmen or philosophers. On this issue, among others, Hardie says that "to say of someone that he has this virtue [magnanimity] is to say that his practice of the virtues generally is on a grand scale or grand manner" (Hardie, 1978, p. 64). On this account, Hardie deems that Aristotle did not deny that a philosopher, a man of theoretical wisdom, could become a man of political rule or that a statesman, a man of practical wisdom, will be capable of understanding and appreciating the theoretical life (Ibid, p.75). On the contrary, he says, it is involved in the function of statesmanship that the statesman should have a just estimate of the comparative attraction and intrinsic worth of the "two lives," the political and the theoretical (Ibid, p.75). Similarly, Gauthier says that Aristotle's magnanimous statesman might not be successful in achieving the happiness of all the citizens without having a decent understanding of contemplative wisdom; nevertheless, he concedes that it is not valid to say that Aristotle's magnanimous man is a philosopher (Gauthier, 1958, pp. 17-39, 114-116). Moreover, in favour of linking magnanimity to philosophy, Jaffa argues that the philosopher may as well achieve magnanimity insofar he is equally capable for great actions; nevertheless, his intent in achieving magnanimity is not at all the same with that of the magnanimous statesman (Jaffa, 1952, p. 141). Finally, Arnhart says that there is good textual evidence in favour of for both interpretations of the magnanimous man and that Aristotle probably wanted to leave this question open (Arnhart, 1983, p.66).

happiness. He said that in the soul of rational creatures “there are two parts denominated Rational, the one being obedient to Reason, the other as having and exerting it” (*NE* 1098a 4-6). In this regard, through the “working of the soul and actions with reason,” a man sacrifices his passions and engages in a life of virtue (*NE* 1098a 18-19). Moreover, Aristotle deemed that by guiding his thoughts and actions by reason that leads to virtue, an individual lives his life “in the way of Excellence” (*NE* 1098a23-24).

Proceeding to the societal level, Aristotle described how the virtuous man’s pursuit of excellence should take place within a community in order to facilitate the happiness of its members. Premised on his claim that man is by nature a political animal, Aristotle regarded the pursuit of happiness as taking place within the greater sphere of the *polis* (*Politics*, 1253a). In similar terms to his analysis of the human soul, Aristotle described the *polis* as the framework where men act as a collectivity and their actions aim toward excellence: he says that “this is the same to the individual and to the community,” that is, “to be most excellent” (*NE* 1094b8-9). In this regard, insofar as they share the same end, the study of the *polis* comes to represent a macrography of the workings of the soul. Aristotle emphasised that the good of the community should be given priority over the individual: “for even if the good is the same for an individual as for a city, that of the city is obviously a greater and more complete thing to obtain and preserve” (*NE* 1094b5-7). Toward this end, he said that it is crucial to inculcate the citizens with the requisite spirit of self-renunciation: the *polis* must bestow “most care on making the members of the community of a certain character; good that is and apt to do what is honourable” (*NE* 1099b51-54).

Now, the focus of this section turns to the examination of virtue according to Cicero. Contrary to Aristotle, Cicero deemed that lectures on philosophy are not sufficient to induce the attainment of virtue and excellence by the citizens. Hence he considered theoretical wisdom to be inferior. Cicero deemed that the practical wisdom acquired in politics - “the most important field of practice” - is necessary and foremost for the complete attainment of

moral excellence (*Rep I, 2*).¹²³ Indeed, he said that “the statesman who, by official authority and legal sanctions obliges everyone [...] must take precedence over the teachers who theorise about such matters” (*Rep I, 3*).¹²⁴ In this regard, Cicero deemed that theoretical wisdom cannot account for moral excellence unless it becomes engaged with practice in politics.

At an individual level, Cicero acknowledged that men’s selfish passions hinder their attainment of virtue. As a result, to attain virtue and preserve the wellbeing of the *civitas*, he deemed it crucial that the statesman acts with moderation. In his description of the human soul, Cicero identified two forces that contend with each other in the process of moderating one’s passions. The first, he coined as appetite or ορμή (*hormé*). The appetitive part of the soul, he said, appeals to men’s selfish passions and inclines them to act selfishly. As a result, this part hinders men from reflecting rationally toward the attainment of virtue. The second, he called reason and its role is to hold in check the appetitive part. In this regard, for the attainment of virtue, it is crucial that this part of the soul becomes preeminent. Moreover, Cicero described the state where reason is in control of men’s appetites “as nearly as possible the definition of duty” (*De Off XXIX, 101*).¹²⁵

¹²³ Cicero criticised Greek philosophers and especially the Epicureans, for adopting a philosophical attitude that fosters political abstinence. According to Cicero, the Epicurean philosopher believes “it is no business for a wise man to take over the reins, since he cannot check the mad, uncontrollable rush of the crowd; nor does it befit a free man to struggle with corrupt and uncivilised opponents, lashed with foul abuse and submitting to outrages which would be intolerable to a person of good sense” (*Rep I, 9*). On this account, he criticises the Epicureans because they deem that the hardships apparent in the life of the statesman are an obstacle to the need for leisure, which is necessary for theoretical life and the achievement of excellence. Against the Epicureans, he says that men should become involved in political affairs from boyhood in order to advance in experience, practical ability and office. That is because, he says, one “ought to have everything at his fingertips, for he never knows when he may have to use it” (*Rep I, 11*).

¹²⁴ In similar manner, though with a different purpose in mind, Cicero identified the magnanimous man with the kind of human excellence that brings men closer to divine power by being committed to the ‘perfect duty’ - the practice of politics. In this regard, Cicero promoted the mere καθήκον of the statesman, as described by the Greeks, that is, “doing that for which an adequate reason can be given,” to a κατόρθωμα, that is, “doing that which is right” (*De Off III, 8*). Hence, by commending the office of the statesman as the foremost gateway to moral excellence, Cicero signified an important change of priorities between the Greek and Roman political thinkers. That is, the comparative hierarchy of laws and customs or civic religion over the schools of moral philosophy. Indeed, he said “For what philosophy lecture is so fine that it deserves to be set above the public law and customs of a well ordered state?” (*Rep I, 3*).

¹²⁵ In this instance, Cicero’s definition resembles Socrates’ argument in his apology. Socrates suggested that a man of virtue must remain steadfast in his duty despite his fear of death. On this account he argued that as he obeyed his commander in the battles at Potidaea, Amphipolis and Delium, in the same way he had to obey the Gods and teach

In order to fulfil his duty in politics, the magnanimous statesman must shun his selfish desires and pursue his ambition toward noble ends that foster excellence in the *civitas*.¹²⁶ As a result, the state becomes strong and the statesman comes to enjoy “the independence of the kings, who suffer no want, bow to no authority, and enjoy liberty, or the privilege of living as you please” (*De Off* XX, 70). However, to attain this end, Cicero deemed that the statesman must be indifferent toward good and bad fortune and willing to sacrifice his private interests and even his life. Hence, by pursuing virtue with self-sacrifice, Cicero said the statesman attains supreme virtue, that is magnanimity or *magnanimitas*. Indeed, he said (through the words of Scipio) that “nor, indeed, is there any occupation which brings human excellence closer to divine power than founding states and preserving those already founded” (*Rep* I, 12).¹²⁷

Therefore, we can see that there are two unifying characteristics across the two thinkers’ conceptions of magnanimity. Firstly, the magnanimous man is indifferent toward petty human things and devotes his attention unreservedly to the attainment of moral excellence in the *polis* or the *civitas*.¹²⁸ Secondly, in pursuit of this end, the magnanimous man engages great and useful actions at the expense of his self-interest and even his life.¹²⁹ Therefore, the

philosophy to the youths of Athens: “wherever a man has taken up a position because he considers it best, or has been posted there by his commander, that is where I believe he should remain, steadfast in danger, taking no account at all of death or of anything else rather than dishonour” (Plato, 1997, p.42).

¹²⁶ On the contrary, Cicero deemed it is anything but virtue when the statesman’s rational part of the soul succumbs to the passions and becomes divorced from virtue. Those statesmen who cannot moderate their appetites aim their ambition toward selfish ends and pursue it with arrogance and intemperance: “it happens that men of ambition neither listen to reason nor bow to public and legitimate authority, but chiefly resort to corruption and intrigue” (*De Off* XIX, 64). As a result, instead of being “equals by law,” they aim to become “masters by force” (*Ibid*). And that, he said, constitutes “a brutal vice, repulsive to all our finer feelings” (*De Off* XIX, 62).

¹²⁷ Based on this claim, Cicero’s magnanimity resembles Aristotle’s description of the magnanimous man’s estimate about the worth of his actions. Aristotle said that the ‘great-souled’ man is at the summit of greatness and justly estimates himself at the highest possible rate. He added later that “this term ‘rate’ has reference of course to external goods: and of these we should assume that to be the greatest which we attribute to the gods” (*NE* 1123b17-19 & 1123b21-25).

¹²⁸ However, his scorn for petty human things does not suggest that he is arrogant. Rather, his indifference is “founded on the conviction that nothing is worthy of the admiration, the desire, or the effort of man except what is honourable and decorous and that he must surrender neither to his fellow-men, to passion, nor to fortune” (*De Off* XIX, 66).

¹²⁹ However, the magnanimous man’s readiness for self-sacrifice does not suggest an actualisation of excessive impulse like rushing into the battle blindfold, or an outburst of the thymos, as Aristotle would term it. Rather, it is an outcome

attainment of moral excellence through self-sacrifice is a unifying characteristic in the pagan notions of virtue, as described by Aristotle and Cicero.

Moreover, based on their descriptions of magnanimity, it is possible to deduce the two thinkers' conceptions about the purpose of politics and their assumptions about human nature. Regarding the former, both thinkers deemed that the purpose of the *polis* or the *civitas* is the attainment of excellence. Regarding the latter, Aristotle and Cicero's descriptions of virtue suggest that they share a common understanding about human nature. Both thinkers suggested that despite the challenges it faces, 'excellence' is within the reach of human action. In this regard, both thinkers deemed that through reason, man can theorise perfection and pursue it in life through the creation of the best political regime (Liebeschuetz, 2001, p.223). According to some interpreters, this is a distinguishing characteristic across the entire pagan tradition of political philosophy: "whatever they thought [Plato, Aristotle] about the origins of the metaphysical status of the right social order, the theme of the polis as the means of directing men towards the achieving of good life runs through the whole Greek tradition of political thought" (Markus, 1988, p.74). Moreover, as it will be shown next, this common aspect of the Greek and Roman schools of political thought was perceived later as a 'sin' by St Augustine and the Christian thinkers, who urged the statesman to strive for a new ἀρχή (arché or beginning) by lowering the purpose of politics.

III. Christian Virtue: Pious Humility and Grace

Due to the exigencies of his historical context, Augustine formulated his notion of virtue in order to put its pagan counterpart at rest.¹³⁰ In this regard, his description of Christian

proceeding from his moral temperament and suggests a preference for choosing a dignified death over shameful slavery. With reference to Aristotle, this term slavery refers to the magnanimous man's slavery of reason to his passions. Though, with reference to Cicero, it refers mainly to the magnanimous statesman's subordination to a tyrant.

¹³⁰ Born in 354 A.D., "Augustine came into a world the perplexities of which have probably never been exceeded by any period, before or since in human history," says Cochrane (Cochrane, 1940, p.380). In the 4th century, the Roman

virtue constitutes the antipode of pagan virtue, and so serves as a great example in identifying the differences between the two.¹³¹ Moreover, examining the meaning of virtue according to St Augustine is crucial in understanding the ways in which Montesquieu's notion of virtue departed from its Christian counterpart. For these reasons, this section examines the meaning of virtue in the political theology of St Augustine. Toward this end, based on a selection of excerpts from *The City of God*, *On Nature and Grace*, the *Perfection of Human Righteousness* and *On Free Choice of the Will*, this section studies Augustine's description of Christian virtue, its assumptions about human nature, and its role in politics.

Empire underwent great political, economic and social changes, that signalled its decline. According to historians, these were the main changes in a series of events that climaxed with the sack of Rome in 410 A.D (Noble, T. F. X., 2004, p.210-17). During the first half of the 4th century, the Toleration Edict of Milan in 313 A.D. (which gave Christianity an equal standing with other pagan religions); the transfer of the imperial seat from Rome to Constantinople in 324 A.D. and the accession of Christianity to the empire's official religion in 380 A.D. were a trauma to Rome's pagan values and its civic conscience. During the second half, these social changes were attended by significant changes in military, economic and foreign policy. After the death of Emperor Theodosius in 395 A.D., Rome became intensely militarised to address the threat posed by the Visigoths and the barbarian break-through on the Rhine (406-7 A.D.). The military threat raised the army's role in public life and overshadowed civilian concerns. Moreover, it led to heavier taxation for the development of larger military structures. In turn, the heavier taxation led to the economic stagnation of the Empire's rural populations. As a result, the rural populations became disenchanted toward the central administration and turned their hopes for security to provincial elites and town councils. This attitude increased the role of local authorities and provincial elites in politics and led to the gradual disempowerment of central government and its dependence on the army. Finally, the rising economic stagnation and political instability put the empire in a state of decline that made it vulnerable to external threats and led to the sack of Rome in 410 A.D. by Alaric and the Visigoths.

¹³¹ Signalling the derailment of an entire tradition, the sack of Rome tarnished the glory of the Roman Empire determinately and incontestably (Cochrane, 1940, p.380). Indeed, speculating upon the sack of Rome in 1921, Figgis suggested that its effect on men matched the crying shame of the First World War: "only in our own time can the shock of that world-catastrophe be paralleled in its effect on the imagination and thoughts of men" (Figgis, 1921, p.6). Following Rome's pillaging, the far-flung Roman aristocracy interpreted this event as a punishment that was inflicted by the gods due to their disloyalty to Rome's pagan tradition. Indeed, the changes implemented in the first half of the 4th century led to social transformations that made Rome depart from its traditional pagan heritage (Coleman, 2000, p.305-7). As a result, the Roman aristocracy found a convenient scapegoat in the newly-founded Christian Church and asked for a return to Rome's pagan αρχή (arché or beginning). The pagan argument called for an answer. Thus, in an attempt to ameliorate the Roman consciousness and defend the case of Christianity, Augustine composed his magnum opus, *The City of God* between 412-427 A.D. In his Christian apologetic, Augustine's main argument is that Rome was bound to collapse due to its pagan virtues that inclined it toward conquest and domination. According to Augustine, Rome's traditional values were sinful because they were driven by man's cardinal sin against God, pride. On one hand, according to Virgil's epic, the *Aeneid*, Roman pagan virtues aimed at martial prowess and the glory of the civitas: "Roman, be sure to rule the world (be these your arts), to crown peace with justice, to spare the vanquished, and to crush the proud" (Virgil, 1999, p.92). On the other hand, in a stark contrast with the pagan world view, Augustine said that "God resists the proud but he gives grace to the humble" (*DCD* Preface, p.5). Thus, through his formulation of virtue based on the opposition with its pagan counterpart, Augustine called for a radical revision of first principles.

It suggests that its central aspects consisted of lowering men's expectations about politics, and the showing of pious humility for the love of God.

Firstly, according to the gospel, in his original state, man was made perfect and he lived harmoniously in the Garden of Eden based on God's Eternal Law. Indeed, Augustine said that "human nature was in the beginning created blameless and without any defect" (*NEG* p.226). However, man was tempted by the Devil to disobey God and eat from the forbidden tree of knowledge of good and evil: "[...] when you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil" (Genesis, 3:5). Blinded by his ambition to become equal with God, man followed the Devil's advice and disobeyed God. Augustine said that man sinned because his action to eat from the forbidden tree was guided by self-love and not love for his creator. Indeed, he said that "the fault is in the soul which perversely loves its own power and has no thought for the justice of the Omnipotent" (*DCD* p.481). In turn, God punished man for his sinful disobedience by expelling him from the Garden of Eden, forcing him to live his life in the *saeculum*.¹³² As a result, Augustine deemed that in its current state, man's soul has fallen from *grace* and so, human nature is "wounded, injured, beaten" and "ruined" (*NEG* p.253).

Based on Augustine's assumption that God is perfect, one might raise the question 'why did God, who is perfect, create an imperfect being like man?' Augustine deemed that a perfect God could only create a perfect creation (Rombs, 1991, pp.110-134). However, he said that although man was made perfect, he wilfully became perverted.¹³³ Indeed, according to Augustine, man's fall from grace was the result of free will: "the soul, we note, was not first forsaken by God, so that it forsook him as a result; it first forsook, and as a result it was

¹³² The notion *saeculum* signifies the life of man's soul in the temporary world: the intermediate stage after the fall and the subsequent salvation through the working of the Spirit in human history (Markus, 1989, p.71).

¹³³ According to Augustine, God gave man free will because human beings could not live rightly without it. He said that "the very fact that anyone who uses free will to sin is divinely punished shows that free will was given to enable human beings to live rightly, for such punishment would be unjust if free will had been given both for living rightly and for sinning" (*DLA* pp.29-30).

forsaken” (*DCD* p.523). During the act of disobedience, Augustine said that man was faced with two possible courses of action. These were either acting with goodness by obeying God’s Eternal Law, or doing that which pleases oneself. From the two, he said that man chose “this wicked desire” which prompts him “to please himself as if he were himself light, and which thus turns him away from that light by which, had he followed it, he would himself have become light” (*DCD* p.571). Based on man’s wilfulness to do evil, Augustine suggested that man’s soul had become perverted even before committing the evil act: “[...] they would not have arrived at the evil act if an evil will had not preceded it” (*DCD* p.571). Hence, he concluded, “the evil act, the transgression of eating the forbidden fruit, was committed only when those who did it were already evil” (*DCD* pp.572-3).

Due to men’s wilful perversion and the punishment they received for their original sin of pride, Augustine deemed that men are incapable of acting with goodness: “willing the good is in their power, but doing it is not” (*NEG* p.254). That is because, firstly, his actions are limited by material nature (nourishment, shelter, carnal desires); secondly, man’s fall from grace had a tremendous impact on his ability to engage in reasoned action (*DCD* p.522; Wetzell, 1992, p.108). As a result, he said, man became a “slave to his desires” and his actions are selfish (*DCD* p.502). Indeed, Augustine said that men are so selfish that “even brute beasts, deprived of rational will, would live in greater security and peace among their own kind [...] for not even lions or serpents have ever carried on among themselves the kind of warfare in which men engage” (*DCD* p.503). Moreover, from Augustine’s contention that human reason is utterly compromised by man’s passions emerges his doctrine of involuntary sin: “This then was the time when the flesh began to ‘lust in opposition to the spirit’, which is the conflict that attends us from our birth” (*Ibid*). Therefore, according to Augustine, human nature’s ability to act with goodness has been utterly compromised due to the original sin of pride.

With regard to Augustine’s notion of virtue: although man cannot act with goodness, Augustine deemed that he can still hope to avoid sin through his faith in God’s omnipotent justice. Indeed, through the words of St Paul in his epistle to the Romans, Augustine said:

“especially for injured nature, the choice of the will is of little use for avoiding sin, unless it is helped and healed ‘by the Grace of God through Jesus Christ, our Lord’” (Rom 7:25; *PHR* p.290). According to the Gospel, to avoid sin men must engage in actions that stem from two commandments. The first and foremost is that “You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind” (*Matthew XXII*, 37). The second is “You shall love your neighbour as yourself” (*Matthew XXII*, 39). These two statements from the gospel summarise the essence of Christian virtue: a man’s love for his fellows is rooted in his love for God, which prompts him to sacrifice his private interests for the common good.

However, virtue does not consist merely in the act of sacrificing one’s self. Rather, it also depends on the motive that inclined one to act in this way. For example, in the case of pagan virtue, the magnanimous man’s self-sacrifice for the common good was rewarded with goods such as honour and praise. Though for Augustine, such an action would constitute a sin because it is motivated by pride. Indeed, he said:

“For although the virtues are reckoned by some people to be genuine and honourable when they are related only to themselves and are sought for no other end, even then they are puffed up and proud, and so are to be accounted vices rather than virtues. For just as it is not something derived from the physical body itself that gives life to that body, but something above it, so it is not something that comes from man, but something above man, that makes his life blessed; and this is true not only of man but of every heavenly dominion and power whatsoever” (*DCD* p.891).

Thus, according to Augustine, the magnanimous man’s actions constitute a vice because they are motivated by love for honour and directed toward ‘heavenly dominion’ (the *polis* or the *civitas*). Augustine transvalued the meaning of pagan virtue by suggesting that its self-sacrifice merely constitutes a lesser vice because it is directed toward a false *telos*.¹³⁴

¹³⁴ Indeed, Augustine writes that “nevertheless, they who restrain baser lusts, not by the power of the Holy Spirit obtained by the faith of piety, or by the love of intelligible beauty, but by desire of human praise, or at all events restrain them better by the love of such praise, are not indeed yet holy, but only less base” (*DCD* p.202).

Therefore, for Augustine, true virtue is attainable only when a man suppresses his vain desires for earthly glory and guides his actions with humility and love for God.

Given men's inability to act with goodness, Augustine did not suggest that politics should aim at excellence. Rather, the purpose of Augustinian politics consists in "simply doing one's best" (Murray, 1997, p.53). Based on Augustine's dualistic formation of the concepts *Fall - Redemption, City of Man - City of God*, man is trapped in a temporary stage of existence that is called the *saeculum*. Within this map of concepts, any question about the role of politics in attaining the good life should be discarded for another: 'what is the purpose of politics with relation to God's divine plan of salvation?' Given Augustine's view of human nature, the avoidance of disorder and sinfulness is impossible and consequently, there is no room for magnanimity for the statesman or the people. Indeed, in one of his letters, Augustine wrote that "the might of the emperor, the judge's power of the sword, the executioner's hooks, the soldier's weapons [...] they inspire fear and thus put a check on the bad, so that the good may live peacefully among the bad" (Atkins, 2001, p.80). Hence, instead of pursuing excellence in politics, Augustine preached for security, modesty, humble toleration and obedience to the earthly sovereign authorities, because "a state cannot stand or be governed except by injustice" (*DCD* p.882).¹³⁵

To conclude this section: according to Augustine, Christian virtue differs significantly from its pagan counterpart with regard to its meaning, its assumptions about human nature and its role in politics. Regarding its meaning, Christian virtue inclines men to suppress their

¹³⁵ In this regard, Augustine opposed Plato's argument in the *Republic*, that political authority is derived and represented based on the comparative superiority of the ruler and the best men to guide the less excellent (Plato, 1994, pp.70-114). Instead, in Augustinian politics not even statesmen are immune to the endemic nature of sinfulness (Deane, 1963, p.150). Hence, unlike the Socratic and Roman thinkers, Augustine neither considered that politics should aim at excellence, nor does he think that men can apprehend nature's perfection through rational reflection. On the contrary, he deemed that any attempt to imitate God's perfect plan of creation in politics is a sin that stems from man's pride (Dihle, 1982, p.15). In this regard, Augustine was reaching back to an old Judaeo-Christian tradition, in which "the purpose of the state and of its coercive machinery was to deal with the disorganisation and the conflict resulting from the fall," says Markus (Markus, 1989, p.84; Liebeschuetz, 2001, p.223). Indeed, he said that, "the earthly city [...] limits the harmonious agreement of citizens concerning the giving and obeying of orders to the establishment of a kind of compromise between human wills about the things relevant to mortal life" (*DCD*, p.877).

vain desires for earthly glory and perfection. Instead, it prompts them to be humble and pious to avoid sinfulness by showing faith in God's divine plan for salvation. Regarding its assumptions about human nature, it considers men incapable of acting with goodness because they are trapped in a vicious circle of sinfulness that begun with Adam's original sin of pride. Regarding its role in politics, Christian virtue consists in 'simply doing one's best'. In this regard, instead of aiming at perfection, Christian virtue aims at fostering security so that 'the good may live peacefully among the bad'. Nevertheless, as it was suggested in the first section, it may be said that Christian and pagan virtue overlap insofar as they share the same moral economy - that is, inclining the individual to suppress his selfish desires in order to attain a greater moral purpose.

IV. Montesquieuian Virtue: Self-sacrifice as a Means to an End

This section studies the meaning of Montesquieuian virtue. It suggests that unlike its pagan and Christian counterparts, Montesquieuian virtue does not inspire individually motivated action toward the attainment of a moral end. In order to elucidate the understanding of Montesquieu's notion of virtue, this section draws a comparison with Machiavelli's famous notion of *virtú*. It suggests that Montesquieuian virtue coincides with its Machiavellian counterpart insofar as their role in politics is instrumental to the preservation of the state. Lastly, this section examines the dire effects that stem from the individuals' preoccupation with the pursuit of virtue in republics. It suggests that although Montesquieu praised virtue for its utility in politics, he thought that its uncompromising character endangers the preservation of republican government and liberty.

Firstly, textual evidence suggests that Montesquieu's description of virtue conflicts with central traits of its pagan and Christian counterparts. Montesquieu dissociated his notion of virtue from pagan virtue's emphasis about guiding one's actions with reason toward the attainment of excellence. Rather, he considered virtue to be nothing more than a 'feeling' that can be experienced by the 'lowest' and the 'first' citizens of a state:

“Virtue, in a republic, is a very simple thing: it is love of the republic; it is a feeling and not a result of knowledge; the lowest man in the state, like the first, can have this feeling” (*EL V*, 2 p.42).

In contrast with pagan virtue’s emphasis on reason, Montesquieu suggested that the citizen’s pursuit of virtue is not conscious or deliberate. Rather, he described it as a ‘feeling’. According to pagan virtue, guiding one’s actions based on feelings does not signify a reasoned assessment of the pursuit of excellence.¹³⁶ In his *Eudemian Ethics*, Aristotle deemed that experiencing an emotional state does not involve the act of choosing, and so is not a virtue (*EE* 1234a20-25).¹³⁷ Moreover, insofar as virtue is a ‘feeling’, Montesquieu said it can be experienced equally by the ‘first’ and ‘lowest’ man in a state. This claim conflicts with the pagan conception of virtue.¹³⁸ As it was shown earlier, Aristotle deemed that virtue is a quality exhibited only by a few men with “exceptional capacities for heroism and self-sacrifice” (Smith, 1986, p.8). Therefore, in contrast to pagan virtue, Montesquieu dissociated his notion of virtue from excellence and popularises its attainment.

Montesquieu dissociated his notion from Christian virtue’s emphasis on guiding one’s actions with pious humility and love for God. Indeed, based on the following description, Montesquieu suggested that virtue does not stem from action motivated by faith in God’s divine providence. Rather, he deemed that men act virtuously from a passion to satisfy the general order:

“The less we can satisfy our particular passions, the more we give ourselves up to passions for the general order. Why do monks so love their order? Their

¹³⁶ To attain virtue, Aristotle deemed that men’s actions should be the result of a reasoned assessment and knowledge. Indeed, he said that “But actions done in accordance with virtues are done in a just or temperate way not merely by having some quality of their own, but rather if the agent acts in a certain state, namely, first, with knowledge, secondly, from rational choice, and rational choice of the actions for their own sake” (*NE* 1105a28-34).

¹³⁷ According to Aristotle, actions or feelings that stem from ignorance are involuntary and so, they are not indicative of virtue. Indeed, he said that “Since virtue is to do with feelings and actions, and since voluntary feelings and actions are praised and blamed, while the involuntary ones are pardoned and occasionally even pitied, presumably anyone considering virtue must determine the limits of the voluntary and the involuntary. [...] Things that happen by force or through ignorance are thought to be involuntary. What is forced is what has an external first principle, such that the agent or the person acted upon contributes nothing to it - if a wind, for example, or people with power over him carry him somewhere” (*NE* 1110a). Hence, according to Aristotle, virtue can be attributed only for voluntary actions that proceed from a reasoned assessment and knowledge.

¹³⁸ See section II.

love comes from the same thing that makes their order intolerable to them. Their rule deprives them of everything upon which ordinary passions rest; what remains, therefore, is the passion for the very rule that afflicts them. The more austere it is, that is, the more it curtails their inclinations, the more force it gives to those that remain” (*EL V*, 2 p.43).

In this instance, Montesquieu suggested that the monks’ show of humility and obedience to their order does not stem from their faith in God’s hidden plan for salvation. Rather, he said that it stems from a ‘passion’ for ‘the very rule that afflicts them’. In this regard, Montesquieu suggested that self-sacrifice alone is sufficient for the attainment of virtue. However, as it was shown earlier, Augustine deemed that virtue consists in the show of self-sacrifice for the love of God.¹³⁹ Indeed, he said that “it is not up to our power to live rightly, unless while we believe and pray we receive help from him who has given us the faith to believe that we must be helped by him” (*DCD* p.852). In contrast to Augustine, Montesquieu attributed the citizens’ self-sacrifice to a ‘passion’. Therefore, it follows that Montesquieuan virtue differs from its pagan and Christian counterparts because it does not inspire self-sacrifice toward the attainment of a moral end. Rather than fostering action toward the attainment of excellence or love of God, Montesquieu suggested that republican citizens act with self-sacrifice in order to satisfy their ‘passion’ for the general order.

In order to understand Montesquieu’s break with the consideration of virtue as a moral end, it is crucial to examine the role of *virtú* as described by Machiavelli in the *Discourses on Livy*. Commentators have often emphasised the Florentine’s influence on Montesquieu’s notion of virtue (Shackleton, 1964, p.6; Rahe, 2009 pp.70-1; Pangle, 1989, pp.47). However, as Shackleton observes, Montesquieu was very self-conscious about allowing his reader to perceive Machiavelli’s influence on his discussion of republican virtue: “The general attitude of the French Enlightenment to Machiavelli was hostile,” says Shackleton “and as the

¹³⁹ See section III, pp.18-19.

Enlightenment was to condemn him, so did Montesquieu” (Shackleton, 1964, p.5).¹⁴⁰ Examining the attitude of French thinkers toward Machiavelli, one can explain why Montesquieu was careful not to refer explicitly to his theory, in fear that he might be considered one of his followers. Shackleton adds that “this was not, however, his final attitude. In 1728 Montesquieu departed on travels which took him to Italy and to England, and he returned to France in 1731. He then proceeded to write, first the *Considerations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence*, and then the first books of *L'Esprit des lois*; and these are impregnated with the influence of the Florentine Secretary” (Ibid).

Now, in order to study Machiavelli’s influence in Montesquieu’s notion of republican virtue, this section will turn its focus to the examination of *virtú*. As it was shown earlier, Price says that generally speaking, Machiavelli’s notion of *virtú* signifies a “drive, determination, courage, skill, or ability, in political or military affairs” (Price, 1973, p. 319). However, Skinner argues that Machiavelli’s use of *virtú* in the *Discourses* suggests one “important addition to his previous account [in *The Prince*]” (Skinner, 1992, p.62). While in *The Prince* Machiavelli associates *virtú* with great political leaders and military commanders, in the *Discourses* he “insists that, if a city is to attain greatness, it is essential that the quality should be possessed by the citizen body as a whole” (Ibid). Thus Machiavelli’s advice that the prince should overcome his moral scruples and do whatever is necessary to foster the preservation of the state should be held equally essential by the citizens. Indeed, he said that “this idea deserves to be noted and acted upon by any citizen”: that “there must be no consideration of just or unjust, of merciful or cruel, of praiseworthy or disgraceful; instead, setting aside every scruple, one must follow to the utmost any plan that will save her [the state’s] life and keep her liberty” (*Disc III*, 41 p.519). Therefore, Machiavelli concluded that in order to attain greatness in a state, *virtú* should be in princes and citizens alike so that

¹⁴⁰ Shackleton says that “In this opposition and in the consequent opposition to the author of *Il Principe*, Montesquieu was in harmony with his friends and contemporaries in France. The role in French thought of *Télémaque* was completely opposed to Machiavellianism, and the influence of Fénelon was strong in the salon of Madame de Lambert, of which Montesquieu was an habitué” (Shackleton, 1964, p.5)

everyone is prepared “to advance not his own interests but the general good, not his own posterity but the common fatherland” (*Disc I*, 9 p.218).

However, Machiavelli admitted that although it may be possible to find statesmen of extraordinary *virtú* like Romulus or King David, one cannot expect to find *virtú* occurring naturally among the masses (*Disc I*, 19 p.244). Machiavelli did not expect that ordinary citizens will voluntarily sacrifice their own interests for the good of the state: indeed, “men never do anything good except by necessity” (*Disc II*, 3 p.201). Moreover, he argued that “the nature of men is ambitious and suspicious and does not know how to set a limit to its own fortune” (*Disc I*, XXIX p.257). As a result, he deemed that due to their very nature, there is a very small likelihood that ordinary citizens will guide their actions by self-imposed *virtú* (Butters, 1986, p.414). Under these circumstances, Machiavelli deemed that a state will never manage to preserve its liberty and attain greatness if it relies on naturally occurring *virtú*. The citizens’ selfish nature and desire to promote their individual ambitions would drive the state toward corruption and dissolution (Skinner, 1992, p.64).

To avoid this, Machiavelli suggested two methods of effectively instilling *virtú* among the citizenry through institutional and constitutional arrangements. Firstly, he deemed that *virtú* can be instilled among the citizenry by ensuring that the institutions associated with the “observance of religious teaching” are “well used” (*Disc I*, 11 p.225; *Ibid I*, 15 p.234). By emphasising the role of religious institutions, Machiavelli aimed to bring back to the modern world “the secret known to the ancient Romans” says Skinner (Skinner, 1992, p.70). That is the ability “to inspire - and if necessary to terrorise - the ordinary populace in such a way as to induce them to prefer the good of their community to all other goods” (*Ibid*). Secondly, he deemed that *virtú* can also be instilled among the citizenry through the state’s use of coercive power of the law. He said that the greatest examples of *virtú* “have their origin in good education,” the efficacy of which is dependent on “good laws” (*Disc I*, 3 p.203). Moreover, he said that the “good effect” of fostering the preservation of the state and the attainment of glory, may be attained in republics “either by [the] virtue [*virtú*] of a man or by [the] virtue

[*virtú*] of a law” (*Disc III, 1 p.420*). Therefore, in order to effectively instil *virtú* among the citizenry, Machiavelli deemed that the state must efficiently use its religious and political institutions.

As Skinner has aptly observed, Machiavelli deemed that in order to cater for the preservation of the state, it is necessary that *virtú* is exhibited by rulers and citizens alike. However, human nature is selfish and as a result it is a very rare occurrence that men of extraordinary *virtú* will come to power. Hence, in order to effectively protect the state from self-seeking citizens and politicians, Machiavelli suggested that *virtú* should be instilled through artificial means. Political and religious institutions should play an active role in this: that is, to inculcate the citizens with a vested interest for the common good and the desire to protect it with self-sacrifice. In this regard, Machiavelli did not consider the development of *virtú* in politics as an end that is worth pursuing for its own sake. Unlike its pagan and Christian counterparts, Machiavellian *virtú* is not a moral construct. Rather, *virtú* is a political construct whose aim is to foster the preservation of the state and lead it to greatness. Skinner says that Machiavelli “is not in the least interested in the question of religious truth [...] he is solely interested in the role played by religious sentiment [...] to promote these useful effects” (*Ibid p.71*).

Now, having examined the purpose of Machiavellian *virtú* in politics, this section identifies certain commonalities shared also by Montesquieu’s notion of virtue. Like Machiavelli, Montesquieu considered human nature too selfish to pursue virtue in politics.¹⁴¹ He said that due to “a misfortune attached to the human condition [...] it is always easier to follow one’s strength than to check it” (*EL XXVIII, 41 p.595*). Moreover, Montesquieu deemed that there is something immoderate and intrinsically perverse at the heart of the human soul that engulfs human nature as a whole: indeed, he said that “the soul takes such delight in dominating other souls; even those who love the good love themselves so much that no

¹⁴¹ See at Ch.2, sections II & IV.

one is so unfortunate as to distrust his good intentions” (Ibid). In this regard, Montesquieu deemed that men’s selfishness is so pervasive that one should not even trust the intentions of those who behave virtuously. This pessimistic description of human nature bears resemblance to Machiavelli’s and especially, St Augustine’s. Indeed, as it was shown earlier, due to men’s inherent selfishness, Augustine rejected the possibility that they can act with goodness. In the same regard, though not premised on the authority of the gospel, Machiavelli and Montesquieu deemed that ‘men love themselves’ more than they ‘love the good’. Therefore, like Machiavelli, Montesquieu rejected the possibility for altruistic self-determination in politics.

Montesquieu deemed that although they act virtuously, republican citizens do not engage in action out of virtuous motives: indeed, he said that “what I call virtue in a republic is love of the homeland, that is, love of equality. It is not a moral virtue or a Christian virtue; it is political virtue” (*EL* Author’s Foreword). Rather, republican citizens act virtuously to satisfy their passions: “Nothing is so powerful as a commonwealth, in which the laws are exactly observed; and this not from fear nor from reason, but from a passionate impulse, as in Rome and Lacedaemon” (*CR* IV, 45 p.27). Instead of fostering excellence or grace, Montesquieuian virtue merely aims to foster the preservation of the republican government.¹⁴² Montesquieu said that “the Lacedaemonians and the Cretans [...] opened those famous academies that gave them such a distinguished rank in the world. At first modesty was alarmed, but it yielded to public usefulness” (*EL* VIII, 11 p.120). In this regard, Montesquieuian virtue is essentially an answer to the question ‘what is virtue good for?’ and inevitably, it assumes that “the Utilitarian answer is the only one which can possibly be given” (Bradley, 1951, pp.3-24; Stephen, 1991, p.276). Therefore, as in Machiavelli, rather than

¹⁴² See Ch.2, section III.

fostering self-renunciation as part of attaining a moral end, the role of Montesquieuvian virtue in politics is instrumental.¹⁴³

Although it is evident that Montesquieu followed Machiavelli in his definition of the role of virtue in politics, he was not oblivious to the dire effects that virtue can have on security and the pursuit of liberty.¹⁴⁴ He deemed that men's virtuous pursuits, driven by their passions, can often develop into immoderate zeal. Indeed, he said that the citizens often become so impassioned that they are "always correcting or being corrected, always instructing or being instructed" (*EL XXIX*, 16 p.318). As a result, political virtue can lapse into a severe civic mentality (*EL IV*, 8 pp.39-41). That mentality, he said, encourages individuals to acquire benefits and social praise by feigning their virtuous motives. Indeed, he said that "in Rome citizens were permitted to accuse one another" and "whoever had many vices and many talents, a common soul and an ambitious spirit, would seek out a criminal whose condemnation might please the prince" (*EL VI*, 8 p.81). As a result, he said that what once was a common preoccupation with equality grows into an ugly fanaticism and citizens become "grave, serious, dry, taciturn" (*EL XXIX*, 7 p.311). This mentality, he said, corrupts the government and leads to injustices against the citizenry. In turn, it undermines the people's opinion about their security, which grows into resentment and threatens republican unity with divisions and rebellions (*EL III*, 3 pp.22-4).

¹⁴³ On this point, this study's line of interpretation concurs with Rahe's. Rahe argues that "like Machiavelli, he [Montesquieu] has next to nothing concerning public deliberation. When he speaks of virtue, he is not interested in those qualities of character and intellect that enable the very best citizens (and perhaps even the ordinary citizens at their very best) to transcend petty, private concerns and engage in public deliberation concerning the dictates of justice and the common good. Nor is he concerned with the liberation of reason from passion" (Rahe, 2009, pp.70-1).

¹⁴⁴ On this account, Rahe observes that "Montesquieu may accept in its broad outlines Machiavelli's account of ancient citizenship and of the aggrandisement that he regarded as its *raison d'être* - but this does not make him an unabashed admirer of the severity, the cruelty, and ferocity to which, both agree, it inevitably give rise. In *The Spirit of the Laws*, as in his *Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and their Decline* and his *Reflections on Universal Monarchy in Europe*, Montesquieu's aim is Machiavelli's defeat, and the critique that he directs at ancient republicanism is a crucial part of 'the cure' that he has designed for the despotic temptations promoted by what he terms 'Machiavellianism'" (Rahe, 2009, p.74). On this matter, see also *Against the Despotism of a Republic: Montesquieu's Correction of Machiavelli in the Name of the Security of the Individual* (Vickie, 2006): 263-89.

To address disunity and social tumult, Montesquieu said that republics divert the citizens' attention from their problems and strengthen their national identity by creating enemies. This makes them warlike and expansionistic: "a republic must dread something. Fear of the Persians maintained the laws among the Greeks" (*EL VIII*, 5 p.116).¹⁴⁵ Moreover, to sustain the demands of their foreign policy, Montesquieu said that war and athletic exercises are the only means available to the citizens for satisfying their natural selfishness.¹⁴⁶ As a result, he observed that "for people who have to have nothing but the necessities, there is left to desire only the glory of the homeland and one's own glory" (*EL VII*, 2 p.98). Nevertheless, due to the necessity of fostering security through expansion and war, Montesquieu observed that there is something paradoxical about republics. By fostering their preservation through the inculcation of virtue among the citizenry, republican regimes sow the seeds of their destruction. Indeed, the more a republic grows in territory through conquest and war, the more its government and principle become corrupt.¹⁴⁷ Based on this observation, Montesquieu is led to say that "The more secure these states are, the more, as with tranquil waters, they are subject to corruption" (*EL VIII*, 5 p.116).

Therefore, for all his admiration of ancient republics and virtue, Montesquieu deemed that inculcating men with virtue does not succeed in fostering the purpose of politics. Rather, it establishes an authoritarian social framework that fosters corruption and oppression, and

¹⁴⁵ Montesquieu said at a later passage that "Although all states have the same purpose in general, which is to maintain themselves, yet each state has a purpose that is peculiar to it. Expansion was the purpose of Rome; war that of Lacedaemonia" (*EL XI*, 5 p.156).

¹⁴⁶ Indeed, he said that having no other way of counteracting men's selfish passions, republican regimes incline the citizens to be constantly preoccupied with war: the citizens, he says, "found an occupation in the exercises derived from gymnastics and those related to war. The institutions gave them no others. One must regard the Greeks as a society of athletes and fighters" and "these exercises [...] appropriate for making people harsh and savage" (*EL IV*, 8 pp.40-1).

¹⁴⁷ Montesquieu suggested that the expansionistic tendencies of republics such as Rome led to their corruption: "It is in the nature of a republic to have only a small territory; otherwise, it can scarcely continue to exist. In a large republic, there are large fortunes, and consequently little moderation in spirits: the depositories are too large to put in the hands of a citizen; interests become particularised; at first a man feels he can be happy, great, and glorious without his homeland; and soon, that he can be great only on the ruins of his homeland. In a large republic, the common good is sacrificed to a thousand considerations; it is subordinated to exceptions; it depends upon accidents. In a small one, the public good is better felt, better known, lies nearer to each citizen; abuses are less extensive there and consequently less protected" (*EL VIII*, 16 p.124).

undermines the individuals' natural need for self-preservation. Indeed, by feeding on men's passions, Montesquieu deemed that republican virtue often leads them to extremes that threaten the republic's security. As a result, his distaste for republican virtue and its dire effect on liberty led him to exclaim "Who would think it! Even virtue has need of limits" (*EL* XI, 4 p.155).

To conclude this section: Montesquieu's notion of virtue conflicts with the *teloi* of its Christian and pagan counterparts because it does not foster action that leads to excellence or love of God. Montesquieu suggested that virtue is a 'feeling' that can be experienced equally by everyone. As a result, although he defined the principle of republican government as 'virtue,' further examination shows that its content is irrelevant to the traditional meaning of virtue that is related to morality. Rather, it appears that Montesquieu defined the role of virtue in politics in similar terms to Machiavelli. Indeed, according to Montesquieu, instilling virtue and self-sacrifice among the citizens is desirable insofar as it fosters the preservation of the state. In this regard, virtue has instrumental value in politics because it is framed as a means to an end. Despite virtue's political and social utility, Montesquieu deemed that its pursuit can often undermine the state's security and the pursuit of liberty.

V. Conclusion

By defining the principle of republican government as virtue, Montesquieu invites his reader to consider the concept in connection to the Western canon's tradition of virtue. However, the analysis of relevant textual evidence suggests that there are important differences separating Montesquieu's notion from the long-standing tradition.

As it was shown earlier, the traditional meaning of virtue in its Christian and pagan conceptions is the pursuit of a greater moral end or *telos*. That end is virtuous insofar as it subsumes the individual's private interest and is pursuable for its own sake. In this regard, pagan virtue fosters self-renunciation as part of attaining excellence and Christian virtue

does the same as part of attaining grace. Both notions employ the same moral economy toward attaining their respective notions of goodness. This means that to attain goodness, individuals must learn to suppress their selfish passions through proper education. Despite their different *teloi*, both Christian and pagan virtue prioritise the good of the community over the individual's pursuit of his private welfare.

Pagan and Christian virtue differ significantly with regard to their assumptions about human nature and the role of virtue in politics. Indeed, as it was shown earlier, the accounts of Aristotle and Cicero on virtue suggest that men are capable of apprehending nature's perfect laws through reason. Moreover, they thought that men could strive for that kind of perfection in politics by aiming to create the best political regime. On the other hand, St Augustine's description of Christian virtue rejects the pagan philosopher's pursuit of perfection in the *polis* or the *civitas*. Rather, as it was shown earlier, Augustine deemed that human nature is incapable of perceiving God's divine plan of creation. As a result, he deemed that any attempt to strive for perfection in politics is sinful. For this reason, given human nature's depraved condition, Augustine lowered the aim of politics and transvalued pagan virtue to pious humility and obedience to the earthly authorities.

In contrast to both Christian and pagan conceptions of virtue, Montesquieu suggested that virtue amounts to nothing more than a 'feeling' that may be experienced equally by everyone. Rather than fostering individual action for the love of God or as part of attaining excellence, Montesquieu defined his notion as a political construct. Although it adopts the same moral economy, Montesquieuan virtue does not incline individuals to attain a moral purpose. Rather, Montesquieu's notion of virtue employs self-renunciation in order to foster the preservation of republican government. As it was shown, the value of Montesquieu's notion amounts to its social and political utility. Indeed, through strict education and laws, virtue aims to counteract men's selfish passions by directing their pursuit through channels that foster the state's survival. Thus, for Montesquieu, republican virtue is a vehicle for the preservation of the state.

Although Montesquieu thought that his notion of virtue was new, it has been shown that it shares some crucial aspects with Machiavelli's notion of *virtú*. However, for all its social and political utility, Montesquieu observed that the citizens' pursuit of virtue can often lead to social oppression and the corruption of the state. This observation may also explain why Montesquieu preferred to silence the conceptual kinship between the two notions - republican virtue and Machiavellian *virtú*. Montesquieu did not want to be identified as a Machiavellian. Moreover, he did not want to be identified as a moralist. Hence, in defining his notion, Montesquieu had to avoid relating it to two mutually exclusive theories of virtue. Firstly, he aimed to describe his notion in such a way as to steer away from the idealism of pagan and Christian thinkers. Secondly, he aimed to emphasise virtue's practical value in politics without being identified as a Machiavellian. As a result, his attempt to conceive political virtue while honouring these provisos did not allow him room to provide much conceptual clarity. Despite his lack of conceptual precision, Montesquieu's readers should not discredit his account of virtue. Rather, they should consider it a point of reference within his greater work from which he departed in order to offer a solution to modern men's requirements for liberty.

ENGLISH LIBERTY: A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE

“I say it, and it seems to me that I have written this work only to prove it: [...] the political good, like the moral good, is always found between two limits”

(*EL XXIX*, 1 p.602).

This chapter will examine Montesquieu’s definition of England’s principle of government. However, in order to understand the meaning of England’s principle, one also needs to recover the problems Montesquieu aimed to address in his historical context. To attain this perspective, the first section of the chapter will examine the eighteenth-century debate on luxury. It will distinguish the debate’s anti- and pro-luxury camps and illustrate their claims with the arguments of François Fénelon and Bernard de Mandeville, respectively. It will also examine how these arguments were received and recast by the third Earl of Shaftesbury and Jean-François Melon. The second section will seek to determine Montesquieu’s position in the debate on luxury based on the study of the *Persian Letters* and his preparatory writings for *The Spirit of the Laws*. It will be shown that during his early years (1721-1738), Montesquieu vacillated in his support for the anti- and pro-luxury camps. In order to determine accurately Montesquieu’s response to the debate, a proper study should also examine his mature writings of the years 1746-7 (before the publication of *The Spirit of the Laws* in 1748). In this regard, the third section will examine and interpret Montesquieu’s description of England’s principle. It will suggest that England’s principle merges aspects of the principles of monarchy and republic. Moreover, it will argue that insofar as it merges aspects from the two principles, England’s principle constitutes a middle state in relation to Montesquieu’s original typology. The fourth section will suggest that Montesquieu had developed a third, alternative view of luxury by the time he completed *The Spirit of the Laws*. Taking into account his description of England’s principle as a middle state, this section will argue that Montesquieu chose to address the debate on luxury from a middle ground. Finally, this chapter will conclude that, by understanding the Englishmen’s motives in their

pursuit of luxury, one may determine the individual motivations that preserve Montesquieu's ideal of liberty.

I. The Eighteenth-Century Debate on Luxury

In order to understand Montesquieu's conception of England's principle, one needs to recover the problems that he aimed to address in his historical context. To attain this perspective, this section will reconstruct the crucial debate on luxury in the eighteenth-century.¹⁴⁸ Once England's principle is understood in relation to this debate, this study will be able to appreciate Montesquieu's extraordinary originality against the prevailing assumptions of his time. This study will then be able to grasp the reason Montesquieu's name is so often invoked in the discourse on liberty.

In the early Enlightenment, thinkers of differing contentions composed pamphlets and treatises addressing the question: 'can modern commercial societies benefit from commerce and luxury without compromising their moral principles?' This question captures one of the most prominent and controversial debates in the eighteenth-century European thought, the debate on luxury (Berg, 2007 (b), pp.7-27; Hirschman, 1997, pp.56-63; Hont, 2006, pp.379-418).¹⁴⁹ This debate consisted in two sides which can be broadly defined by their support of or

¹⁴⁸ The choice of thinkers in this section is justified by the significance of their contributions in forming the debate and the degree to which their arguments were adapted and recast by Montesquieu. Of course, this section could go in greater lengths and expand the scope of its study by also considering the work of other thinkers, in England or France, whose thought influenced the debate in one or the other way. However, expanding the scope of this study would increase significantly the complexity of the argument that is advanced. Moreover, it would burden the reader with details which, though interesting for some, would be irrelevant to the study of Montesquieu and his conception of England's principle of government.

¹⁴⁹ According to Hont, the broader debate on luxury can be divided in two (Hont, 2006, pp.380-1). The first of the debates took place between 'ancients' and 'moderns' insofar as the critics' line of argument originated in ancient Greece, republican Rome and early Christianity (Ibid). The critics of luxury argued that it fosters extreme inequality, depopulation and corrupts ideals such as love for one's country, honour, courage, pious humility and love for God (Ibid, p.380). Opposed to modern economic growth, luxury's critics argued in favour of radical anti-luxury reforms and a return to the cult of ancient military states. On the other hand, the supporters of luxury argued that it advances growth in population, living standards, arts and sciences, national prestige and the state's overall happiness (Ibid). The second debate took place among the moderns themselves. The issue at stake was not whether or not to accept modern economic growth; rather, it focused on how to make modern economic growth morally benign. Therefore, the argument was between partisans of "unregulated" and "well-ordered" luxury (Ibid, p.380). From these two debates, this study focuses on the latter.

opposition to the social effects of luxury and commerce.¹⁵⁰ Those in support came to be known as the *doux commerce* theorists. The most influential thinkers in this camp were Bernard de Mandeville and Jean-François Melon, who led the debate in England and France, respectively (Hont, 2006, pp.382-3). Mandeville and Melon deemed that men's selfish passions could be socially beneficial when pursued in commerce, in the attainment of wealth, and in luxury. They thought that despite their selfish motivations, men's passions could perfectly imitate the social effects of charity or virtue. Their critics in the anti-luxury camp disagreed fervently with this thesis. The most influential thinkers in this camp were François Fénelon and the third Earl of Shaftesbury, who led the anti-luxury camp in France and England, respectively (Ibid). Their main argument was that commerce and luxury infest a society, because they rely on selfishness and limit people's concern for the common good. Nevertheless, these critics of luxury did not argue for a return to an agrarian economy, or the abolishment of commerce and industry. Rather, for them, the key issue of the debate was about how modern economic growth could be made morally benign.

François Fénelon

Fénelon (1651-1715) was a French Roman Catholic Archbishop who enjoyed the favour of Louis XIV and was entrusted with the education of his grandson, the young Dauphin, from 1689 (Riley, 1994, pp.xiii-xiv). As a man of devout faith, Fenelon was inspired by the quietistic notion of disinterested love, or 'pure love' for God (Ibid, p.xiv). The exposition of this notion in theology and politics became, respectively, the objects of his *Explication des Maximes des Saints* (1697) and *Les Aventures de Télémaque* (1699). These two works were extremely influential in his time (Ibid, p.xvii). Through analysis of these works, this section examines Fénelon's views on the disastrous effect of luxury in modern society and his proposal for its

¹⁵⁰ According to Hont, the two poles of the debate on luxury were represented by Fénelon and Mandeville. These two thinkers, he says, voiced "the purest and ablest formulations of the fundamental alternatives on offer" (Hont, 2006, p.382). Although Mandeville was the first major critic of the assumption that modern economic growth can coincide with moral virtue, he did not initiate the argument of the debate. Rather, the eighteenth-century debate began with Fénelon's description of a comprehensive plan for the replacement of luxury in Europe with a principled and morally benign economic system (Ibid).

reformation. It will also seek to understand the meaning of his proposal in relation to the notion of virtue and its wider implications for eighteenth-century politics.

Fénelon intended his epic *Telemachus* to be a continuation of the fourth book of Homer's *Odyssey* (Riley, 1994, p.xxvii). In it, Fénelon described Telemachus' search for his father, accompanied by a mentor who instructs him in the art of virtuous statesmanship. Within the book, Fénelon described the reform of the corrupt and warlike state of Salentum. Thus Fénelon's critique of luxury in Salentum and its reform is a central theme of *Telemachus*.

Luxury and arbitrary power are the two reasons why states become corrupt, said Fénelon (Ibid, p.296). From these two evils, he said, luxury is the worst because although arbitrary power is "the bane of kings," "luxury poisons a whole nation" (Ibid, p.297). For Fénelon, luxury is a contagious vice that can make a whole nation consider superfluities as necessary to life (Ibid, p.297). That is also the case in Salentum, he said, where the nobles try to imitate the king's magnificence and the poor try to "pass for people of fashion" (Ibid). Under these conditions, even wise men "do not have resolution [...] to set an example of a different conduct" (Ibid). As a result, in Salentum, "all ranks are confounded" and wealth has become the people's "sole pursuit" (Ibid).

To correct these evils, Fénelon deemed that the people of Salentum needed a philosopher-king who would reform "the taste and manners of a whole nation" by enacting new laws (Ibid, p.298). He distinguished three phases of this reformation: the suppression of luxury, the conversion to frugality, and the introduction of "virtue and public spirit" (Ibid, p.160-71, 295-302). Following its reform, Fénelon suggested that Salentum grew its economy and industry without invoking self-love and luxury. Indeed, he said that the Salentians acted with virtue and an increased concern for the common good (Ibid). However, this did not mean that the Salentians acted with self-renunciation. Despite being "firm and steady," "candid," "loyal," "trusty," and "kind" to strangers, Fénelon deemed that the Salentians still

pursued their private ambition (Ibid). In this regard, the Salentians' concern for the common good did not interfere with their self-interested desire to remain "industrious, patient, laborious" and "constantly employed" (Ibid, p.37). As a result, Fénelon said, they increased their material wealth and fostered their "empire of the sea, and such a flourishing commerce in their ports" (Ibid). Hence, Fénelon suggested that commerce and modern economic growth could coincide with the pursuit of moral virtue.

In his *Explication des Maximes des Saints*, or *Maxims of the Saints*, Fénelon conceived moral virtue in relation to the quietistic notion of 'pure love' (Ibid, p.xiv; Fénelon, 1698). Fénelon attributed 'pure love' to saints and angels, because it is unconditional in its expression and aspires to no other end than self-sacrifice for the love of God. He said that pure love is to "love God with a love of pure charity, and without any mixture of the motive of self-interest" (Fénelon, 1698, p. 5).¹⁵¹ However, the Salentians' motives for action combined love for God with the pursuit of their private ambition (Riley, 1994, p.37). Thus, the Salentians acted from what appears as a diluted, "attenuated version of pure love" (Ibid, p.xxiv). Fénelon described this type in the *Maxims* as 'mixed love' (Fénelon, 1698, p.2). In this case, he said, one's actions are guided by self-interest, which becomes "the chief and predominant motive" (Ibid, p.2); nevertheless, that self-interest "is mixt with a beginning of love to God for himself" (Ibid, p.3). Hence, although this type does not foster his ideal of 'pure love,' Fénelon thought that at least it was not directed purely toward the self and the pursuit of luxury.

¹⁵¹ In addition, Fénelon distinguished four more types, which represent different types of love as they intermingle with self-interest. In the fourth grade, pure love for God gradually mingles with self-interest, yet Fénelon said it is still truly justifying because "the disinterested motive is over-ruling in it" (Fénelon, 1698, p. 3). This ratio changes in the third grade, where self-love overrules charity. In this state, one's love vacillates about its object: on one hand, one's actions are guided by self-interest, which becomes "the chief and predominant motive" (Ibid, p.2); on the other hand, one's love "is mixt with a beginning of love to God for himself," because it does not succumb entirely to egotism (Ibid, p.3). The last two gradations of love are "neither chaste nor filial," said Fénelon (Ibid, p. 1). The second grade considers love for God as a means to an end: an "instrument to be made use of for to work our happiness" (Ibid, p. 2). Finally, the first grade of love is "meerly servile" and "one who loveth so, does not love God" but only "what comes from him" (Ibid, p.1).

Fénelon's description of the Salentians' moral concern to pursue their self-interest served as an example for statesmen in modern European states. His purpose was to encourage them to instil in their people a care for the common good, in order to protect their societies against depravity and destruction. The type of love he prescribes to the Salentians shows that Fénelon did not consider politics as capable of rendering human society morally impeccable. Rather, he deemed politics to be a necessity whose purpose is affording a morally tolerable, austere refuge "while one waits for eternal felicity that one scarcely dares hope for" (Riley, 1994, p.xxxi).¹⁵² In this regard, Fénelon did not take politics 'for more than it is' - it is a necessity, not a place for perfection (Oakeshott, 1939, pp.146-50). Insofar as Fénelon deemed that politics could not become wholly good, he may be considered a "neo-Augustinian," says Riley (Riley, 1994, p.xxxi): he deemed that acting from 'mixed love' could make politics less evil by recognising the effects of luxury and fettering its causes.

Bernard de Mandeville

Fénelon's counterpart on the opposite side of the argument was Bernard de Mandeville (1670-1733) (Hont, 2006, p.382). Mandeville ridiculed Fénelon's example of virtuous and frugal Salentum (Ibid, p.387). Instead, he deemed that the pursuit of luxury was the best way to sustain economic growth and promote social welfare. He explained this in his response to Fénelon's *Telemachus* in the *The Grumbling Hive, or Knaves Turn'd Honest*, a satirical pamphlet he published in London in 1705 (Ibid, pp.387, 395). In 1714, he republished the same piece with a commentary under the title *The Fable of the Bees* (Ibid). This section illustrates how Mandeville's line of argument in *The Fable of the Bess* served as a response to Fénelon's attack on the pursuit of luxury.¹⁵³

¹⁵² According to the quietistic notion of 'pure love,' hoping for salvation is a sin because it means one loves God as a means to an end.

¹⁵³ Mandeville's ideas have been examined already in Chapters 3 and 4. For this reason, this section does not engage an exhaustive analysis of his ideas, but focuses on the main principles of his thought and their relation to the debate on luxury.

At the beginning of his fable, Mandeville stated his intention to “shew the Impossibility of enjoying all the most elegant Comforts of Life that are to be met with in an industrious, wealthy and powerful Nation, and at the same time be bless’d with all the Virtue and Innocence that can be wish’d for in a Golden Age” (Kaye, 1988, p. 63). With these words, Mandeville claimed that the purpose of his fable was to refute the moralists’ assumptions (especially those of Fénelon) that the prosperity and happiness of a society depends on its moral integrity (Richter, 1977, p.43). Mandeville did not think that men’s selfish passions should be suppressed, but rather that men should be encouraged to act upon them. In his *Inquiry into the Origin of Honour* (published in 1732) he said that:

“most of the passions are counted to be weaknesses [...] whereas they are the very powers that govern the whole machine; and, whether they are perceived or not, determine or rather create the Will that immediately precedes every deliberate action” (Mandeville, 1732, p.6).¹⁵⁴

Moreover, he thought that men’s passions could even imitate the effects of virtue. Indeed, he said that men are “ashamed of the many Frailties they feel within” and “endeavour to hide themselves” by “wrapping up the true Motives of their Hearts in the Specious Cloke of Sociableness, and their Concern for the publick Good” (Kaye, 1988, p.166). Hence, unlike Fénelon’s *Salentum*, Mandeville deemed it is a “vain eutopia” to assume “t’ enjoy the world’s conveniences” without the help of men’s selfish passions (Ibid, p.24).

Although Mandeville argued that men act in ways that appear virtuous because it is socially esteemed and elicits praise, he did not think that men’s selfish passions alone could procure happiness and social utility. Rather, he thought that unless they are managed, men’s vices can grow into crimes and become destructive (Ibid, p.31). Thus, in order to benefit from men’s selfish passions, Mandeville thought that the state must create mechanisms for their manipulation and conversion into social utility. Indeed, he thought that “by the dextrous Management of a skilful Politician,” the “very Vices of every particular Person” could be

¹⁵⁴ According to Hont, Mandeville’s position regarding the usefulness of men’s selfish passions did not change between the *Inquiry into the Origin of Honour* and *The Fable of the Bees* (Hont, 2006, p.395).

made “subservient to the Grandeur and worldly Happiness of the whole” (Ibid, p.63, 231). He thought that the industry of luxury and commerce was ideal for this purpose because the social benefits they procure outweigh their moral imperfections (Ibid, p.69). This idea summarises Mandeville’s famous notion of *private vices* being converted into *public benefits*. This notion was diametrically opposed to the ideas of Fénelon and the moralists because it signified a “definite application of the utilitarian standard” (Ibid, p.31). In opposition to Fénelon, Mandeville thought that “all the Cardinal Virtues together won’t so much as procure a tolerable Coat or a Porridge-Pot among them [men]” (Kaye, 1988, p.142). For this reason, he argued that teaching modern men to suppress their desires for luxury and wealth was essentially to court disaster (Hont, 2006, p.395).

The Third Earl of Shaftesbury

Mandeville’s ideas in *The Fable of the Bees* and the *Inquiry into the Origin of Honour* were very influential in England and France (Hundert, 2005, p.225). His resultant reputation invited the criticism of various thinkers of that period. The most important of these was an English politician and philosopher, the third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713) (Gonthier, 2010, p.24; Hont, 2006, p.395-99). With the arrival of Shaftesbury, the critique of luxury left Fénelon’s realm of theology and entered the domain of ethics. This section examines the ways in which Shaftesbury rejected some aspects of Mandeville’s thesis.¹⁵⁵ It also examines Shaftesbury’s critique of the manner in which modern men pursue their passions and its

¹⁵⁵ Although Shaftesbury rejected Mandeville’s assumption that sociability proceeds from self-interest, he did not challenge his thesis about the usefulness of passions in attaining social utility. Indeed, he thought that the “different Tunings of the Passions” make men differ from one another, and they are accountable both for “the highest Improvements” and “the greatest Corruptions” of their species (Shaftesbury, 2001, p.55). In this regard, Shaftesbury’s theory differed from Fénelon’s distinction between ‘pure love’ and self-love. He did not think that self-love was the main drive behind men’s actions. Unlike Fénelon, Shaftesbury thought that there were many human passions animating “the movements of this machine,” like “Humour, Caprice, Zeal, Faction, and a thousand other Springs” (Ibid, 2001a, p.72). Moreover, he thought that these passions could even counterpoint men’s self-love, which is significantly worse for the wellbeing of society (Ibid).

detrimental effect to their natural sociability. Then, using Shaftesbury's critique of modern men, it will deduce his response to the debate on luxury.

Shaftesbury's major work the *Inquiry into Virtue, or Merit* (1708) rejected Mandeville's assumption about human nature in the *Fable of the Bees*.¹⁵⁶ On one hand, Mandeville argued that men are individualists by nature, but they become sociable by artifice in order to satisfy their selfish desires. Indeed, he said that "the Sociableness of Man arises only from these Two things, viz. The multiplicity of his Desires, and the continual Opposition he meets with in his Endeavours to gratify them" (Kaye, 1988, p.218). On the other hand, Shaftesbury argued that men are sociable by nature but they become individualists due to modern society's shortcomings (i.e. luxury). Indeed, he thought that commerce and luxury have unnaturally increased men's privateness in modern societies: "this real Estrangement from human Commerce," is in "Opposition to the Order and Government of the Universe" (Shaftesbury, 2001, p.98). Hence, while Mandeville argued that naturally conflicting individuals become sociable for gain, Shaftesbury argued that naturally sociable individuals become individualists due to modern society's defects.

Shaftesbury thought that before the advent of industry and commerce, the "sole End" of man was "the Advantage and Promotion of the Species" (Ibid, p.87). Though in modernity, he thought, commerce and industry have paved the way for the easy attainment of these needs. As a result, in addition to their original needs, men created others which are artificial because they extend beyond the scope of necessity. Under these conditions, Shaftesbury said, men no longer pursue their passions as part of promoting the 'Advantage and Promotion of the Species'; instead, they pursue their passions for their own sake. In this regard, men do not engage the company of others and become alienated by diminishing the natural

¹⁵⁶ Shaftesbury's opposition to Mandeville took place posthumously. Indeed, Shaftesbury's true purpose was to attack Hobbes's assumption in *De Cive*, that men become sociable by pursuit of gain (Hont, 2006, p.395-6; Hobbes, 1998, p.22). Though, the same assumption was taken up later by Mandeville in *The Fable of the Bees* in 1714. Hence, by refuting Hobbes's assumption, Shaftesbury also opposed Mandeville's theory of luxury in *The Fable of the Bees*.

pleasures and affections of these interactions (Ibid, p.86). Shaftesbury thought that by satisfying his needs with greater ease than nature intended, “[man] is [therefore] made to pay dear for ’em in another way, by losing his natural good Disposition, and the Orderliness of his Kind or Species” (Ibid, p.76).

Thus Shaftesbury deemed the artificial needs of modern men to be unsustainable because they deprive them of their natural sociability. He thought that by pursuing their passions in this manner, men feel desolate, both at an individual and social level. However, Shaftesbury did not think that the technological advancements which made modern commerce possible should be held responsible for this problem: he did not call for a return to agrarian-based economies. Moreover, he did not think that remedying the effects of luxury lay in fettering human activity and suppressing men’s selfish passions. Indeed, unlike Fénelon, Shaftesbury thought that men could fend off luxury’s social effects without practising self-denial. Hence, instead of disinterestedness and ‘pure love,’ Shaftesbury built his ethics on the concept of “OEconomy” (Ibid, 2001, p.11). He defined *oeconomy* as the concept which signifies a state of equilibrium between man and his natural environment, and leads to happiness (Ibid, pp.11-14). In order to attain happiness, he thought, men should increase their sociability and physical activity. Thus their natural “oeconomy” would spring back to an equilibrium (Ibid, 2001a, p.46, 72; Klein, 1994, p.195-210). Hence, Shaftesbury sided with the anti-luxury camp by transforming Fénelon’s theological critique of luxury into a socialising process that aimed to eradicate individualism.

Jean-Francois Melon

Mandeville criticised Shaftesbury’s thesis because he thought that its socialising process opened a “vast Inlet to Hypocrisy” and “politeness” (Kaye, 1988, p.212).¹⁵⁷ His critique was adopted later by the supporters of luxury in France. The most important adaptation was

¹⁵⁷ Mandeville expounded his critique of Shaftesbury in the second volume of *The Fable of the Bees*, in 1723 (Kaye, 1988, p.209-45). In that volume, Mandeville criticised Shaftesbury’s thesis that “Men may be Virtuous without Self-denial” (Ibid, p.212).

expounded in 1735 by Jean-Francois Melon (1675-1738), who was secretary to John Law and a friend of Montesquieu (Hont, 2006, p.409-10; Jennings, 2007, pp.86, 104). Through his commentary and praise, Melon communicated Mandeville's ideas in France even before the *Fable's* translation into French in 1740 (Jennings, 2007, p.80; Hundert, 2005, p.205). Like Mandeville, Melon rejected the relevance of virtue in modern societies and deemed that luxury was necessary to foster economic growth and social welfare (Jennings, 2007, p.80; Hundert, 2005, p. 103). Moreover, in 1714, he published *A Political Essay Upon Commerce*, in which he formally encouraged the adoption of Mandeville's ideas in France. This section examines Melon's argument that modern states should capitalise on men's selfish passions in order to foster economic growth and social utility. It is shown that Melon followed Mandeville's lead by adopting his famous notion that under politicians' careful management, men's *private vices* may be turned into *public benefits*. It then examines Melon's views on commerce and luxury in order to locate his position in the debate.

According to Melon, sloth and idleness are modern society's greatest vices because they incite "seditions" and "civil Wars" (Melon, 1738, p.157). Sloth and idleness, he thought, were the reasons behind the downfall of the Roman republic: politicians, led by their ambition, offered the people free corn and "publick employment" (Ibid, p.156). As a result, the citizenry became slothful and "sold" their votes to politicians who promised them benefits at public expense (Ibid, p.167). For this reason, said Melon, the maxim that the common people are happy "to have Bread, and publick Shews" should not be understood separately from that of employment (Ibid, p.156). Otherwise, ambitious politicians will act upon the people's idleness to pursue their private ends, which can lead to "domeftick Troubles" and "the most cruel civil Wars" (Ibid, p.157). Indeed, Melon wrote: "The wifet and beft eftablifhed Monarchy, would find it very difficult to fupport it felf, if one Part of the Inhabitants of the capital City, were fed, and amufed in the Idlenefs of Peace, and had nothing to lofe in the Troubles of a civil War" (Ibid).

To avoid this, Melon deemed that the state should promote commerce and luxury. The development of these areas, he thought, leads to the development of new needs and desires. As a result, to satisfy their new needs, individuals strive to increase their wealth. Thus the pursuit of luxury keeps both the merchants and the people active and industrious. Indeed, Melon said that “Luxury is, in some sort, the Destroyer of Sloth and Idleness. The sumptuous Man would soon see the End of his Riches, if he did not endeavour to preserve them, or to acquire more; and he is, by so much the more engaged, to perform the Duties of Society, as he is exposed to the Eyes of Envy” (Ibid, p.177). Melon therefore argued that a harmful passion such as sloth could be replaced by another, ambition, which can prove useful for the welfare of society. Thus he argued that a state should investigate how to “turn them [the passions] to the best Advantage of the Community” (Ibid, p.174). Insofar as Melon deemed that men’s selfish passions could serve as a fertile ground for reaping public benefits, it may be said that he followed Mandeville’s lead.

Melon thought that the development of free commerce and luxury was the optimal policy to attain self-sufficiency among modern European states. According to Melon, all states aim at self-sufficiency (Ibid, p.2). But self-sufficiency cannot always be attained through conquest, because a state cannot preserve its rule over a continuously expanding territory (Ibid, pp. 136-140). For this reason, he thought that modern European states should substitute the spirit of commerce for the spirit of conquest (Ibid, p.129). Although commerce promoted economic competition that could potentially spark disputes among states, Melon thought that at least it prevented the rise of monopolies and war. For this reason, he deemed that in order to attain its long-term self-sufficiency, a modern state should engage in commerce with its “neighbour” (Ibid). Moreover, he thought that after securing its basic needs, a state should promote its industry of luxury to prevent its population from lapsing into sloth and idleness (Ibid, pp.105-29). Thus Melon deemed that the promotion of luxury signified a state’s highest stage of economic development (Ibid, p.188). In this way, he addressed the debate on luxury by siding with Mandeville and the *doux commerce* theorists.

To conclude: the opponents in the eighteenth-century debate on luxury can be delineated by their support of or opposition to the pursuit of luxury. As it was shown earlier, the anti-luxury camp criticised luxury because it limited men's concern for the common good of society. As a proponent of this camp, Fénelon suggested that modern states should check men's selfish passions because they are injurious to their long-term preservation. Fénelon justified his opposition to luxury using an argument that invoked religious piety and the avoidance of sin. His critique of luxury was later adapted to the realm of ethics through the words of Shaftesbury, who argued that men's pursuit of luxury inclines them to satisfy artificial needs that alienate them from each other and undermine their pursuit of happiness. However, instead of suppressing modern commerce and luxury, Shaftesbury suggested that men should engage in social activities in order to fend off social alienation.

On the other hand, in the *doux commerce* camp, Mandeville and Melon encouraged the pursuit of luxury because of its economic and social utility. As it was shown earlier, Mandeville deemed that teaching men to practise self-restraint is a painful and arduous process with unreliable results. Instead of suppressing men's selfish passions, Mandeville suggested that the state should capitalise on them in order to derive social utility. Mandeville's lead was taken up later in France by Melon, who deemed that men's selfish passions are less damaging to society than idleness, which promotes sedition and civil war. To avoid this, Melon recommended that a state should encourage individuals to be industrious by pursuing their self-interest in the areas of commerce and luxury. He also deemed that mutual economic interests among states would foster peace and political stability.

Finally, the debate on luxury can also be regarded as an opposition between two approaches to managing men's selfish passions (Hirschman, 1997, p.14-30). On one hand, the *doux commerce* theorists encouraged the individual to pursue his selfish passions for their social utility; on the other hand, the critics of luxury suggested that men should curb their selfish passions in order to promote virtue and concern for the common good. Hence, while

the *doux commerce* theorists capitalised on men's selfish passions, the critics of luxury aimed to suppress them. Having examined both sides of the debate on luxury, this study now seeks to determine Montesquieu's early response to it.

II. Montesquieu's Early Response to the Debate on Luxury

It is often argued in the secondary literature that Montesquieu was greatly influenced by the eighteenth-century debate on luxury (Berg, 2007 (a), p.32; Berg, 2007 (b), p.11; Hirschman, 1997, p.60; Hont, 2006, pp.379-418; Hundert, 2005, pp.204-5; Jennings, 2007, p.83).¹⁵⁸ Textual evidence shows that Montesquieu was acquainted with both sides of the debate on luxury and had read the works of its most prominent exponents, Fénelon, Shaftesbury, Mandeville and Melon.¹⁵⁹ The influence that Montesquieu received from these thinkers can be evinced especially in his early writings in the *Persian Letters* (published in 1721), and in various parts of *The Spirit of the Laws* that were composed long before its final publication in 1748.¹⁶⁰ Nonetheless, the two works differ in terms of conceptual affinity with regard to the side of the debate that he supported: Montesquieu's outlook regarding the pursuit of luxury in the *Persian Letters* is different from the view he puts across in *The Spirit of the Laws*.

¹⁵⁸ The secondary literature examines Montesquieu's contribution to the debate based on his views on luxury in the relevant chapters from *The Spirit of the Laws* (EL V, 6; X, 13; XX, 1; XX, 4; XX, 9; XX, 10; XXI, 15; XXI, 20; XXII, 2; XXII, 7; XXII, 10). Generally speaking, in these chapters Montesquieu expounds his views on issues relating to commerce, taxation, luxury and social mores.

¹⁵⁹ Montesquieu refers explicitly to Fénelon in his *Pensées*, *Correspondance* and *Extraits de Lecture Annotés* (*Pensées* 115, 1054, 1335; Masson, 1950(c), p.707, 826, 1324-6). He refers explicitly to Mandeville as the "the author of *The Fable of the Bees*" in *The Spirit of the Laws*, in order to support his ideas on commerce, fashion, and luxury (EL II, 4 p.32; VII, 1 p.97; XIX, 8 p.312; XIX, 9 p.312). Shaftesbury's influence on Montesquieu has been documented by Thomas Pangle, Robert Shackleton Sheila Mason and Ursula Gonthier (Pangle, 1989, p.222-3, 318; Shackleton, 1961, pp.37-9, 58, 133; Mason, 2012, pp.68-70, 78-9, 87; Gonthier, 2010, p.7, 23-6). Melon's influence on Montesquieu has been documented by Shackleton and Hont (Shackleton, 1961, pp.39,104; Hont, 2006, p.409-11, 414); Montesquieu explicitly refers to Melon's theory in his *Pensées* (*Pensées* 1440).

¹⁶⁰ Montesquieu composed his magnum opus within a period of twenty years (EL Preface, p.xliii). For this reason, it is important to distinguish between his early ideas and those he added in 1747, a year before its final publication. According to Shackleton, Montesquieu's analysis of his original typology was "largely written during the years 1734-8, and not either before or (in any important measure) after those years" (Shackleton, 1961, p.265). In this regard, the composition of Montesquieu's original typology predates his study of England's principle, which was composed and added in *The Spirit of the Laws* in book XIX, chapter 27 as late as 1746-7 (ibid, p.295). Thus, by focusing on Montesquieu's early writings in *The Spirit of the Laws*, attention will be given to his original typology - that is, the ideas he expounded in the years between 1734 and 1738. The examination of Montesquieu's mature ideas, i.e. England's principle, will be the object of the next section.

Montesquieu used the fable of the *Troglodytes* in the *Persian Letters* to expound two different arguments that contribute to the debate on luxury. Firstly, he refuted Hobbes's thesis on human nature. This also acted as a refutation of Hobbes's followers, including Mandeville (Gonthier, 2010, p.24; Hont, 2006, p.404-5). Montesquieu argued that if men acted based on the principles laid down by Hobbes, they would be incapable of forming and sustaining societies (*LP* 11, p.55-9). By making this critique, Montesquieu essentially chose between the two most influential descriptions of human nature that were available in his time, of those of Hobbes and Shaftesbury (Hont, 2006, p.405). To make his point, Montesquieu tested their theories of human nature by inviting them into a confrontation (Crisafulli, 1943, pp.372-92). In letter 10, Montesquieu's characters, Mirza and Usbek, discuss whether it is more natural to be ruled by one's passions or to practice virtue (*LP* 10 p.54-55). In letter 11 Usbek uses a parable to explain his views to Mirza: the fable of the *Troglodytes*. The *Troglodytes* were members of a small Arabian tribe who were extremely selfish and unjust toward each other (*LP* 11 p.55-9). Montesquieu said that their conflicting selfish desires were the reason why the *Troglodytes* "perished in their sins, the victims of their own unrighteousness" (Ibid, 59). Through this fable, Montesquieu aimed to show that if Hobbes's description of human nature was valid, men would come together in pursuit of gain but eventually their societies would break down, due to the irreconcilability of their selfishness. Thus, Montesquieu positioned himself in opposition to Hobbes's description of natural selfishness and sided with Shaftesbury's theory of natural sociability.

In the sequel to this fable, Montesquieu proposed an ending that recalls Fénelon's utopia in *Salentum* (Richter, 1990, pp.62-64).¹⁶¹ Montesquieu said that after the *Troglodyte* tribe perished, two virtuous survivors created a small utopian society based on the values of

¹⁶¹ The first edition of the *Persian Letters* was published anonymously in 1721 in Amsterdam and included the fable of the *Troglodytes* with a sequel. Montesquieu decided to exclude the sequel from the subsequent editions of the *Persian Letters*. Commentators have argued that Montesquieu decided to exclude the sequel because the fable's moral was inconsistent with his theory of monarchy in *The Spirit of the Laws*. In this thesis, reference to the sequel is made based on the copy offered by Richter in his "Montesquieu: Selected Political Writings" (Hackett, 1990), pp. 62-64.

humanity, justice and love for virtue (*LP* 12 & 13, p.59-64). This society became firmly established and the *Troglodytes* were prosperous and happy. However, their increased social welfare soon led to a population increase which complicated their needs. Eventually, the *Troglodytes* realised that they needed a different political organisation in order to meet the requirements of a greater population. Instead of self-enforced virtue, the *Troglodytes* now wanted to be ruled by a king and a set of laws. The *Troglodytes* asked a man who everyone respected to become their king (Richter, 1990, p.62-64). After a few unsuccessful candidates a man accepted the offer, thinking that his reign could serve as an example for his people and teach them to pursue virtue in conjunction with their private ambition (Ibid, p.63). The king thought that by teaching his subjects that “avarice” and “prodigality” are “disgraceful,” virtue could co-exist with commerce (Ibid). Hence, Montesquieu ended the fable’s sequel by allowing the possibility of establishing a ‘virtuous’ monarchy like Fénelon’s Salentum. This shows that in his earlier works, Montesquieu sympathised with the views expressed by the anti-luxury camp and especially Shaftesbury and Fénelon.¹⁶²

In *The Spirit of the Laws* Montesquieu adopted a different outlook to the ideas he had at the time he published the *Persian Letters* (1721). By the time he started working on *The Spirit of the Laws* in 1734, Montesquieu seemed to doubt the moral drawn from the fable of the *Troglodytes*. On one hand, he still disagreed with Hobbes’s description of human nature.¹⁶³ On the other hand, he no longer thought it was possible for a monarchical government to promote both virtue and commerce. In contrast with Fénelon’s virtuous monarchy, Montesquieu said that “in a monarchy it is very difficult for the people to be virtuous” (*EL* III, 5 p.25). Instead, he deemed that in monarchy, honour “takes the place of the political

¹⁶² This line of interpretation concurs with Gonthier and Hont (Gonthier, 2010, p.24; Hont, 2006, p.404-5).

¹⁶³ In *The Spirit of the Laws*, in his chapter On the laws of nature, Montesquieu writes, “Hobbes gives men first the desire to subjugate one another, but this is not reasonable” (*EL* I, 2). Instead, Montesquieu posited that in the state of nature, “each feels himself inferior” and so, he concludes, “such men would not seek to attack one another, and peace would be the first natural law” (Ibid).

virtue” and “each person works for the common good, believing he works for his individual interests” (*EL* III, 6, p.26; *Ibid*, 7, p.27). Montesquieu deemed that individuals in monarchy procure social utility through their selfish pursuit of honour. Thus it may be said that Montesquieu’s analysis of monarchical government was partly influenced by Mandeville’s doctrine of *private vices* and *public benefits*.¹⁶⁴ It follows that at the time he developed his theory of monarchy, Montesquieu had renounced his support for the ideas of Fénelon and the anti-luxury camp, and had transferred his support to the *doux commerce* camp.¹⁶⁵

To conclude: Montesquieu’s outlook regarding the pursuit of luxury in the *Persian Letters* is different from the view he puts across in *The Spirit of the Laws*. Through study of the *Persian Letters*, it follows that in his earlier works (dating before their publication in 1721), Montesquieu sympathised with the views expressed by the anti-luxury camp and especially Shaftesbury and Fénelon. However, through study of *The Spirit of the Laws*, it follows that by the time he developed his theory of monarchy (in the years between 1734-38), Montesquieu had renounced his support for the anti-luxury camp, and had transferred his support to the *doux commerce*. Therefore, commentators have justly identified Montesquieu’s position in the debate on luxury with the *doux commerce* camp (Hont, 2006, pp. 404-9; Larrère, 2001, pp. 337-40; Rahe, 2009, pp. 108-13). At same time, while not denying his support for the *doux commerce*, Larrère expresses some reservations: she argues that Montesquieu was not concerned specifically with the study of the economic benefits of commerce and luxury in the eighteenth century (Larrère, 2001, p.335-373). Rather, she deems that Montesquieu supported the *doux commerce* camp and the pursuit of luxury only insofar as it furthered the pursuit of liberty “for its own sake” (*Ibid*, p.336).¹⁶⁶ Therefore, insofar as

¹⁶⁴ See Ch.4, section II.

¹⁶⁵ Indeed, he says that “M. de Cambrai [Fénelon], who knew a great deal did not know everything [...] Most of the arrangements he proposed for Salentum are appropriate only for a small Greek city” (Masson, 1950(c), p.707).

¹⁶⁶ Specifically, Larrère says that “Having studied political liberty for its own sake, Montesquieu well knew that it was too fragile to be entrusted to the guardianship of nature, that is, to self-regulating, untrammelled processes alone. He was aware that if liberty was to flourish, or even exist, a certain arrangement of political institutions was required. Hence, Montesquieu never treated commerce as completely autonomous and never stopped studying its relationships with politics as well as with other more global social processes” (Larrère, 2001, p.336).

Montesquieu supported the pursuit of luxury and commerce for the sake of liberty, it becomes all the more crucial to consider his views on luxury in connection with his exemplary type of England. In order to advance this perspective, the next section will examine Montesquieu's description of England's principle.

III. England's Principle and the Englishmen's Psychological Motives

There is a broad consensus among Montesquieu's readers about the significance of his celebrated chapter *On the Constitution of England* (EL XI, 6 pp.156-166). Among Montesquieu's readers, contemporary and past, this chapter is normally interpreted as a statement of the classical theory of the separation of powers and a eulogy for English liberty.¹⁶⁷ England's liberty does not depend only on constitutional guarantees. Without underestimating the importance of the laws and the constitution, Montesquieu deemed that English liberty depended mainly on its underlying principle of government. In England, said Montesquieu, the members of the Parliament and the laws may be effective guards against the corruption of liberty: "The Parliament [...] does not lack illumination, so the corruption does not cease to be encumbered" (*Pensées* 1960 p.502). However, he adds that unless the principle of government remains intact and the people retain their love for liberty, there can be no solid guarantee that the Parliament will not abuse its power: "I am saying, then, that as long as the middling people preserve their principles, it will be difficult for your constitution to be overthrown" (Ibid). Therefore, regardless of England's constitutional guarantees, Montesquieu deemed that its principle of government to be ultimately responsible for the preservation of liberty.

Under this light, England's principle of government manifests a causal relationship with the preservation of liberty. In order to understand this relationship, one should study Montesquieu's chapter on *How laws can contribute to forming the mores, manners, and*

¹⁶⁷ This chapter also contains Montesquieu's definition of liberty (EL XI, 6 p.157).

character of a nation (EL XIX, 27 pp.325-332). In this chapter, Montesquieu studied the relationship between England's government and its social mores.¹⁶⁸ He also defined the Englishmen's psychological motives in their engagements with government. These motivations are inextricably linked to England's principle of government. Despite its centrality, this chapter suffers from a lack of conceptual clarity. Montesquieu did not link England's principle with a particular passion, as he did with monarchy and republic - the individual's desire for distinction in monarchy and the republican citizen's asceticism. Rather, he said that in England "all the passions are free" (EL XIX, 27 p.325). This definition is ambiguous. As a result, Montesquieu's description of England's principle is cryptic and that makes its study particularly difficult. This is probably the reason why Montesquieu's readers have often neglected the study of this chapter, says Courtney (Kingston, 2008, p.31). However, for all the difficulties attending the study of this chapter, it would be limiting to consider English liberty only in relation to its formal guarantees (as it appears in chapter 6 of Book XI).

Prima facie, according to the relevant textual evidence, Montesquieu's exposition of the Englishmen inclines us to assume that they are pure individualists. He said that in England "each citizen would have his own will and would value his independence according to his taste" (EL XIX, 27 p.325). This assumption becomes entrenched later in the chapter, when Montesquieu described the psychological motives, or passions, animating the Englishmen's actions:

"As all the passions are free there, hatred, envy, jealousy, and the ardor for enriching and distinguishing oneself would appear to their full extent, and if this were otherwise, the state would be like a man who, laid low by disease, has no passions because he has no strength" (EL XIX, 27 p.325).

¹⁶⁸ Indeed, he said at the beginning of the chapter that "I have spoken in Book II of a free people, and I have given the principles of their constitution; let us see the effects that had to follow, the character that was formed from it, and the manners that result from it" (EL XIX, 27 p.325).

Montesquieu tells us that in England 'all the passions are free'. As a result, even selfish passions like 'hatred, envy jealousy, and the ardor for enriching and distinguishing oneself' appear to their full extent. Of all the passions, Montesquieu deemed that the pursuit of one's private ambition to be the main drive behind the Englishmen's actions:

"As each individual, always independent, would largely follow his own caprices and his fantasies, he would often change parties; he would abandon one and leave all his friends in order to bind himself to another in which he would find all his enemies; and often, in this nation, he could forget both the laws of friendship and those of hatred" (*EL XIX*, 27 p.326).

This description shows that Montesquieu deemed that Englishmen do not act out of loyalty to a particular party or group. Rather, they act independently, following their own 'caprices' and 'fantasies', without being hindered by any feelings of attachment. Montesquieu said that as a result, the Englishmen are not moved by what he calls the 'laws of friendship' and 'hatred.' Instead, in order to pursue their ambition, they are willing to renounce their loyalty to friends and join their enemies.

Because they are aware of each other's selfish motivations, the Englishmen's unbridled ambition fosters a feeling of great distrust among them, said Montesquieu. He stated that "the people would be uneasy about their situation and would believe themselves in danger even at the safest moments" (*EL XIX*, 27 p.326). The Englishmen fear being harmed by getting in the way of other ambitious individuals. Thus Montesquieu suggested that Englishmen treat one another as a means to attain their private ends. Moreover, he said that their fears about their personal security would be further magnified due to the heated debate in parliament:

"As those who would most sharply oppose executive power would be unable to admit the interested motives of their opposition, they would increase even more the terrors of the people, who would never know precisely whether or not they were in danger" (*Ibid*).

Guided by private ambition, the parties in parliament would contrive rumours about the incumbent government in order to increase their popularity among the people, said Montesquieu. Being aware of the politicians' self-interested motives, the people 'would never

know precisely whether or not they were in danger'. As a result, Montesquieu said, this feeling of uncertainty about one's security 'would increase even more the terrors' of the people. Montesquieu's description of the Englishmen therefore excludes the possibility for individual action arising from concern for the common good.

Nevertheless, further analysis of the Englishmen's passions may prove otherwise. Montesquieu deemed that the prevalent political uncertainty inspired the Englishmen with a high esteem for their common liberty: the Englishmen have learned to "love their liberty prodigiously" - like a "good which makes for the enjoyment of other goods" (*EL XIX*, 27 p.327; *Pensées*, 1574 p.387). As a result, they are afraid of losing it: "One is afraid of seeing the escape of a good [liberty] that one feels, that one scarcely knows, and that can be hidden from us" (*EL XIX*, 27 p.326). In order to preserve their liberty, Montesquieu said that the Englishmen become actively engaged in protecting it from abuse. He suggests that the Englishmen have developed an increased concern about public policy, government and the politicians' private agendas: they check constantly whether the proceedings of government are observed, in order to prevent prospective usurpers from fulfilling their plans. In this regard, Montesquieu said that even when the Englishmen's fears about their security are unfounded, they still "have the good effect of stretching all the springs of the government and making all the citizens attentive" (*EL XIX*, 27 p.326).

Moreover, in the case where their fears were substantiated, Montesquieu deemed that the Englishmen would forgo their private ambition in order to protect their liberty:

"But, if those terrors arose on the occasion of the overthrow of fundamental laws, they would be insidious, lamentable, and heinous, and would produce catastrophes. One would soon see an awful calm, during which everything would unite together against the power that violated the laws. If, in the case where uneasiness has no certain object, some foreign power threatened the state and put its fortune or glory in danger, at that time everything would unite in favour of executive power, as small interests would cede to greater ones" (*EL XIX*, 27 pp.326-7).

Thus Montesquieu deemed that the Englishmen act collectively when an ambitious politician, party or foreign power threatens the proceedings of government or the

constitution. He distinguished two types of threats, internal and external. Regarding internal threats, he said that if the incumbent political party gained too much power, “the effect of liberty would be to lower it while the citizens would come and raise the other party like hands rescuing the body” (*EL XIX*, 27 p.326). Regarding external threats, he said that in the case where ‘some foreign power’ threatened the state, the Englishmen would put aside their differences and unite in the cause of national defence.

Furthermore, Montesquieu suggested that the Englishmen would go to much greater lengths to preserve their liberty than merely forgoing their private ambitions. He said that they would even be willing to undergo great austerity and hardship to protect their liberty from abuse:

“it could happen that, in order to defend that liberty, the nation might sacrifice its goods, its ease, and its interests, and might burden itself with harsher imposts than even the most absolute prince would dare make his subjects bear” (*EL XIX*, 27 p.327).

In this regard, it would be inaccurate to consider the Englishmen merely as selfish individuals who, tossed by their desires, are incapable of engaging in action in the common interest. Rather, Montesquieu deemed that despite their aggressive individualism during times of peace, in times of crisis the Englishmen condition their self-interest based on the common good.

The psychological motives inclining the Englishmen to action show that England’s principle shares some common features with the principles of virtue and honour.¹⁶⁹ In relation to honour, Montesquieu deemed pursuing one’s private ambition to be crucial for the preservation of both the types of monarchy and of England. In monarchy, he said, ambition “gives life to that government” (*EL III*, 7 p.27). In the same regard, in England, “the ardor for enriching and distinguishing oneself would appear to their full extent, and if this

¹⁶⁹ So far, the pursuit of one’s private ambition has been linked to the principle of monarchy. According to his description of England’s principle, Montesquieu deemed that the Englishmen act in ways that resemble the subjects of monarchy. See Chapter 4, section IV.

were otherwise, the state would be like a man who, laid low by disease, has no passions because he has no strength” (*EL XIX*, 27 p.325). Hence, insofar as ambition is present and benefits the government, it follows that England’s principle resembles the principle of monarchy.

However, it is crucial to underline that although ambition is present in both types of government, the object of its pursuit is different: while ambition in monarchy is geared toward the pursuit of glory, in England it aims for revenue maximisation. Montesquieu said that the Englishmen’s ambition yields neither to friendship or hatred. In this regard, he suggested that in England it is of little importance whether one’s actions appease a friend or provoke an enemy. Unlike the subjects of monarchy, the Englishmen do not regulate their actions by a set of rules of engagement, like the code of honour (*EL IV*, 2 pp.31-4). Rather, their conceptions of friendship and enmity are subjective and their loyalty, either at an individual level or the level of the state, is valued by the yardstick of cost and benefit. This is why Montesquieu said that “England has always made its political interests give way to the interests of its commerce” (*EL XX*, 7 p.343). Hence, unlike the subjects of monarchy who engage in action in pursuit of glory, Montesquieu deemed that the Englishmen engage in action based on the prospect of maximising revenue. Thus Montesquieu’s description of the Englishman brings to mind Mandeville’s economic liberalism. According to Mandeville, the state benefits by setting free men’s selfish passions because, under “the dextrous Management of a skilful Politician” they “may be turned into public benefits” (Kaye, 1988, p.231). In similar manner, Montesquieu said that in England “all the passions are free,” adding that if this was otherwise the state would be like a man laid down by disease (*EL XIX*, 27 p.325). Therefore, although England’s principle resembles honour through its emphasis on private ambition, the two principles differ with regard to that ambition’s object.

In relation to virtue, Montesquieu suggested that the Englishmen’s love of liberty inclines them to develop a concern in protecting it against ambitious usurpers. This is also the case in republics, where political alertness is crucial for sustaining the demands of

participatory government. Montesquieu said that “the misfortune of a republic is to be without intrigues, and this happens when the people [...] are no longer fond of public affairs” (*EL II*, 2 p.14). Montesquieu said that in times of crisis the Englishmen forgo their selfish interests and act collectively to defend their liberty. In a similar manner, he said that in republics, the citizens’ “love of the laws and the homeland” leads to the “renunciation of oneself” (*EL IV*, 5 p.35). It follows that political concern and collective action for the common good are present both among the Englishmen and the citizens of republics. However, it is crucial to underline that the Englishmen’s concerns and actions for the common good are not triggered by the same factors as those that trigger republican citizens: while republican citizens fear losing their equality, the Englishmen fear losing their freedom to pursue their private ambition. In this regard, the Englishmen do not act in self-renunciation. Rather, they act selfishly, because their willingness to forgo their short-term ambition stems from their desire to secure its pursuit in the long-term. Nevertheless, insofar as it concerns the Englishmen’s collectivism in times of crisis, it is safe to say that England’s principle shares some common aspects with republican virtue.

Through the study of England’s principle, Montesquieu’s reader may infer further aspects of the Englishmen. Based on the resemblance between England’s principle and republican virtue, it may be inferred that Montesquieu was critical of the Englishmen’s unbridled pursuit of their ambition. Although he had liberal aspirations, Montesquieu thought that pursuing one’s ambition at all costs undermined the security of the state and the individual.¹⁷⁰ Moreover, he deemed that security to be a prerequisite for the attainment of liberty.¹⁷¹ Montesquieu defined liberty as that “tranquillity of spirit which comes from the opinion each one has of his security, and in order for him [the citizen] to have this liberty the government must be such that one citizen cannot fear another” (*EL XI*, 6 p.157). Thus, in order to preserve that liberty, Montesquieu deemed it necessary to moderate the

¹⁷⁰ See Ch.4, Section IV.

¹⁷¹ See Ch.2, section IV.

Englishmen's unbridled ambition by inculcating in them obedience to the law. He thought that insofar as they show obedience to the law, the Englishmen should be free to pursue their ambitions as they see fit. Indeed, he said that the Englishmen "are free because they are subject only to the power of the law" (*EL XI, 6 p.159*). Therefore, in order to foster security and the pursuit of liberty, Montesquieu deemed that the Englishmen's ambitious pursuits must be conditioned by the law.

The reader may also infer that the Englishmen are capable of engaging in action both in pursuit of their private ambition and the common good. During times of peace, their motivations resemble those of the subjects of monarchy. Although Englishmen do not pursue glory, both the principles of monarchy and England incline individuals to pursue their private ambition. Also, although Englishmen certainly do not act with self-renunciation, their obedience to the laws and concern for their liberty in times of crisis resembles republican citizens' public-spiritedness. On one hand, Montesquieu's metaphor that the Englishmen's love for liberty inclines them to 'raise the other party like hands rescuing the body' may suggest nothing more than calculated self-interest. However, what is to be maintained is the Englishmen's set of values associated with the ideal of liberty, and their willingness to make sacrifices in order to protect it.

Despite certain similarities, it is impossible to identify the Englishmen's motivations exclusively with either the principles of monarchy or those of republic. Moreover, the fact that their motivations fluctuate between times of peace and times of crisis makes this enterprise even more complex. However, it is safe to say that the motivations animating the Englishmen operate within the conceptual space left open between honour and virtue. Though England's principle cannot be identified exclusively with honour or virtue, textual evidence has shown that the Englishmen's motivations share some common aspects with both. Thus it may be suggested that Montesquieu framed England's principle as the middle ground between the principles of virtue and honour. Moreover, by framing England's principle as a middle state, Montesquieu emphasised its suitability for attaining the purpose

of politics. He said “I say it, and it seems to me that I have written this work only to prove it: the spirit of moderation should be that of the legislator; the political good, like the moral good, is always found between two limits” (*EL*, XXIX, 1 p.602). Because he framed it as a *golden mean*, Montesquieu suggested that England's principle moderates the potential threats that virtue and honour pose to security.¹⁷² Therefore, by addressing their defects, England's principle is conducive to preserving the Englishmen's ultimate good, liberty.

To conclude: England's principle inclines the Englishmen to pursue their ambition freely in order to accommodate the growing needs of a modern, commercial, individualistic society. Moreover, it inclines them to avoid harming each other or the constitution by inculcating in them a care for the common good. As a result, the Englishmen obey the laws and prevent others from transgressing them in order to protect their vested interest in freely pursuing their ambition. In this regard, England's principle combines the motivations of virtue and honour because it fosters both a concern for the common good and pursuit of individual ambition. Moreover, by combining aspects of the two principles, Montesquieu's conception of England's principle represents a middle state or a *golden mean* in his theory of government. Finally, Montesquieu emphasised the suitability of England's principle for eighteenth-century politics because it embodied his modern ideal of liberty. This study will now seek to understand Montesquieu's position in the debate on luxury based on his conceptualisation of England's principle.

IV. Montesquieu's Response to the Debate on Luxury

Previous studies have offered cogent analyses of Montesquieu's earlier positions on luxury in *The Spirit of the Laws* and the *Persian Letters* (Hont, 2006, pp.404-9; Larrère, 2001, pp. 337-40; Rahe, 2009, pp. 108-13). However, to the author's knowledge, this is the first study on Montesquieu that considers his description of England's principle as an index to his views on commerce and luxury. In order to make this link, this section will explore Montesquieu's

¹⁷² See Ch.2, section IV.

views on luxury and his position in the relevant debate through the individual motivations that incline the Englishmen to action. This section therefore interprets Montesquieu's position in the debate on luxury based on his mature views in his study of England's principle, which was composed and added in *The Spirit of the Laws* in book XIX, chapter 27 as late as 1746-7 (Shackleton, 1961, p.295).

It was shown earlier that Montesquieu conceived England's principle as a middle state between virtue and honour. This framing suggests that in Montesquieu's typology of regimes, England's principle signifies a state between defect and excess. In this regard, the states of defect and excess are assigned to the principles of virtue and honour, respectively. The middle-state approach can also be applied to interpret Montesquieu's position in the debate on luxury. Indeed, by linking his typology of regimes to the categories of the debate, one can illustrate Montesquieu's solution to the problem of luxury in the 18th century. On one hand, Montesquieu's republican government resembles Fénelon's utopia, *Salentum*. Like in Fénelon's *Salentum*, republican citizens renunciate their individual desires in order to foster civic virtue and equality; toward this end, the republic banishes luxury and encourages frugality through sumptuary laws. On the other hand, Montesquieu's monarchical government resembles Mandeville's *Grumbling Hive*. Like Mandeville's *Hive*, Montesquieu's monarchy enlarges the scope of ambition by capitalising on the individuals' selfish passions in order to produce public benefits.¹⁷³ Nevertheless, it has been shown that Montesquieu rejected the relevance of these types, monarchy and republic, in addressing the needs of modernity.¹⁷⁴ Thus, along with the two types and their principles, Montesquieu also rejected the authorities of Fénelon and Mandeville.

Montesquieu did not think that Fénelon's teachings about the negation of luxury could serve as a viable solution to the problem of modernity. Instead, he thought that luxury and

¹⁷³ However, the object of ambition is not the same in Mandeville's *Hive* and Montesquieu's monarchy (See Ch. 4).

¹⁷⁴ See Ch.2.

commerce should not be abolished altogether because they address modern man's needs for ease and security. Moreover, he thought there to be significant value in fostering commerce between different nations, because their economic interests prevent them from engaging in violent conflict. He said that "the natural effect of commerce is to lead to peace. Two nations that trade with each other become reciprocally dependent; if one has an interest in buying, the other has an interest in selling, and all unions are founded on mutual needs" (*EL XX*, 2 p.338). Therefore, Montesquieu considered that mutual dependence among nations for the exchange of goods makes their relations more peaceful. For this reason, he thought that the benefits derived from the development of commerce and luxury outweigh the benefits arising from eradicating it. Therefore, it may be said that Montesquieu embraced certain aspects that Mandeville and Melon highlighted about the benefits of luxury and commerce.

Nevertheless, Montesquieu also had certain reservations about the unregulated pursuit of commerce and luxury. Although he agreed with Mandeville and Melon in certain points, he thought that there was some truth in the critiques of Fénelon and Shaftesbury. Indeed, he considered that although commerce may benefit the relationships between nations, this is not the case when it comes to the relationships between individuals. At an individual level, Montesquieu thought that commerce and luxury could prove harmful because they damage the social ties that bind private interests to the common good. Indeed, he thought that men become alienated when commerce and luxury become their sole preoccupation: "in countries where one is affected only by the spirit of commerce, there is traffic in all human activities and all moral virtues; the smallest things, those required by humanity, are done or given for money" (*Ibid*). In this regard, like Shaftesbury, Montesquieu deemed that although commerce and luxury procure social utility, their pursuit as an end in itself alienates men and corrupts their natural sociability.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁵ Like Shaftesbury, Montesquieu deemed men to be sociable by nature. See at Ch.2

Although Montesquieu acknowledged that both of these approaches contained certain valid points, he did not take their solutions at face value. Despite their potential benefits, he thought that each approach contained the seeds that could potentially exacerbate problems like social inequality or individual oppression. In this regard, Montesquieu considered that the *doux commerce* camp's support for deregulating the pursuit of commerce and luxury might undermine the rule of law and the security of the state. Indeed, he said that allowing the price of necessity goods to be determined by the market's 'invisible hand,' could potentially place at risk the security of the state and that of individuals (*EL I*, 2 p.6). In a similar manner, he thought that enforcing strict laws to regulate the individuals' self-interested pursuits could potentially act as an affront to liberty (*EL IV*, 5 p.35). Moreover, the danger attending each approach mirrored the defects that he illustrated in his description of the principles of monarchy and republic. The code of honour in monarchy inclined individuals to enact seigniorial justice and override the established laws at the expense of national security.¹⁷⁶ The pursuit of virtue in republics also required individuals to curtail their private ambition at the expense of individual liberty.¹⁷⁷ Hence, for Montesquieu, neither of the two approaches was to be allowed room for full implementation.

Instead, to address the problem of luxury, Montesquieu proposed a solution based on his conceptualisation of England's principle. He thought that England's principle was the most appropriate individual disposition to address the growing needs of modern, commercial, individualistic societies in the 18th century. Montesquieu framed his conceptualisation as a middle ground between the debate's opposing intellectual camps. In order to do this, he merged the different approaches employed by the debate's main authorities, Fénelon and Mandeville, and their followers Shaftesbury and Melon. He assimilated from the *doux commerce* theorists their advocacy for the social utility stemming from men's selfish passions. This is why Montesquieu said that in England "all the passions are free," adding

¹⁷⁶ See Ch.2. section IV.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

that if this was otherwise the state would be like a man laid down by disease (*EL XIX*, 27 p.325). From the critics of luxury, he assimilated ideas about the importance of self-regulating one's selfish passions in order to preserve the fragile existence of liberty. Indeed, as it was shown earlier, Montesquieu described how the Englishmen moderate their private ambitions in times of crisis in order to ensure for its long-term pursuit. Therefore, instead of republican virtue or honour, anti-luxury or *doux commerce*, Montesquieu thought that the solution most favourable to the pursuit of liberty, like the "moral good," must be located in the middle (*EL XIX*, 27 p.602).¹⁷⁸

In addition to merging the two approaches, Montesquieu fortified England's principle against the critiques advanced by the two camps. Firstly, Montesquieu secured England's principle against Shaftesbury's critique of luxury. Although he said that the Englishmen are free to pursue their desire for luxury, they are not wholly preoccupied with its pursuit. In England, he said, "there would be a solid luxury, founded not on the refinement of vanity, but on that of real needs" (*EL XIX*, 27 p.331). In this regard, Montesquieu suggested that the Englishmen would pursue their desire for luxury insofar as it fulfilled their 'real needs.' He added later that in England "frivolous things would be proscribed" (*Ibid*). As a result, the Englishmen would not alienate themselves from other individuals while seeking to satisfy their artificial needs, as Shaftesbury would put it. Instead, they would seek to satisfy those needs that require engaging the company of others and would thus preserve their natural sociability (*EL I*, 2 p.6). Therefore, although in England 'all the passions are free,' the Englishmen engage in selfish pursuits without destabilising their 'oeconomy.'

On the other hand, Montesquieu also fortified England's principle to withstand the critique of Mandeville and Melon. He said that in England "one would not have the

¹⁷⁸ As it was shown earlier, he says "I say it, and it seems to me that I have written this work only to prove it: the spirit of moderation should be that of the legislator; the political good, like the moral good, is always found between two limits" (*EL*, XXIX, 1 p.602).

politeness that is founded on idleness” (Ibid). ‘Politeness’ and ‘idleness’ are the key concepts that Mandeville and Melon used in their critiques of Fénelon and Shaftesbury.¹⁷⁹ Montesquieu said that the Englishmen would not suffer from these vices because being busy with their affairs, they would have no time for pleasantries. Montesquieu said that the Englishmen, instead of being hypocritical, would treat each other with the civility that marks a people that loves its liberty. Indeed, he said that while “politeness flatters the vices of others [...] civility keeps us from displaying our own” (EL XIX, 16 p.317). In this regard, the Englishmen would respect each other’s freedom and their actions would not spring from ulterior motives. Although this does not mean that they would act from - as Fénelon would put it - ‘pure love’, at least they would not pretend to be virtuous.

V. Conclusion

Montesquieu’s theory of government was a child of its time, but some of his ideas broke new ground with relation to the contemporary debates. On one hand, the debate on luxury was influential for Montesquieu. He was influenced by the concepts and categories of its main exponents and their different approaches to managing men’s selfish passions. In this regard, Montesquieu admired Fénelon’s doctrine of ‘mixed love’ for its promotion of the common good. At the same time, he also recognised the social utility of Mandeville’s doctrine of *private vices public benefits*. On the other hand, he conceded neither Fénelon’s nor Mandeville’s approach to be fit to address the needs of modern men. Indeed, Montesquieu considered Fénelon’s self-renunciation to be insufficient to produce economic growth in modernity; he thought that Mandeville’s emphasis on the free pursuit of private ambition alienated individuals and threatened the security of the state.

For this reason, Montesquieu responded to the debate on luxury by conceiving a new approach, which consisted of his conceptualisation of England’s principle. In a manner that

¹⁷⁹ Mandeville criticised Shaftesbury’s theory of natural sociability for promoting ‘politeness’ that is founded on hypocrisy (footnote - see page). Melon criticised the critics of luxury for demoralising the people from developing industry that leads to ‘idleness,’ ‘sloth.’

resembles Aristotle's theory of the *golden mean*, Montesquieu conceived England's principle to address the debate on luxury from a middle ground. He merged the debate's different approaches by combining their psychological motives in England's principle. Thus, as it was shown earlier, Montesquieu encouraged men to pursue their private ambition. Though, at the same time, he taught them to regulate their actions in order to ensure its pursuit in the long term. In addition to addressing the debate on luxury from a middle ground, England's principle also promotes an ideal of liberty that addresses the needs of modernity. This ideal consists of the synthesis of honour and virtue's distinguishing characteristics, private ambition and self-restraint. Of course, that notion of self-restraint bears no resemblance to republican citizens' self-renunciation. Rather, it serves as a euphemism for one's calculated pursuit of self-interest. By merging these two aspects in England's principle, Montesquieu suggested that their mutual presence is crucial for the preservation of liberty in modernity. Now, having understood the meaning of England's principle and its causal relation with the pursuit of liberty, this study will turn to consider the significance of Montesquieu's ideal of liberty.

CONCLUSION

“Political liberty in a citizen is that tranquillity of spirit which comes from the opinion each one has of his security, and in order for him to have this liberty the government must be such that one citizen cannot fear another citizen.”

(*EL XI, 6 p.157*)

This chapter concludes the thesis. It offers a summary of the issues raised in chapters 2-6 and addresses the thesis research question. This chapter also identifies the theoretical implications of the thesis with respect to the wider study of Montesquieu’s political thought.

Montesquieu conceived political liberty as “that tranquillity of spirit which comes from the opinion each one has of his security” (Ibid). The attainment of that liberty, he thought, could not be realised in the types of regimes that had existed up to his time and which he outlined in his original typology: republics, monarchies, and despotisms. Regarding despotic government, Montesquieu thought that the complete absence of laws makes the pursuit of liberty impossible. Regarding republics and monarchies, he thought that these types could offer men some protection from the government's arbitrary interference with their person, privacy, home, and family. Nevertheless, Montesquieu thought that these types of government could not foster the attainment of liberty.

As it was shown earlier in chapter 2, Montesquieu suggested that the public and private realms are not effectively separated in republican regimes.¹⁸⁰ He thought that the government can legislate on matters that pertained to the individual’s personal and family life such as religious beliefs, sexual orientation etc. Montesquieu also thought that republican regimes cannot guarantee that individuals face a fair trial, because the people act as judge and prosecutor at the same time. Moreover, Montesquieu thought that republics

¹⁸⁰ See Chapter 2, section IV.

must impose restrictions on the property and wealth of the citizens through sumptuary laws. Montesquieu thought that regulating the individual liberties of the citizens is necessary in order to preserve the size of republican regimes and their institutions. In this regard, Montesquieu deemed that republican government stands or falls by strict subordination of each to the whole. In order to foster this degree of subordination, Montesquieu thought that the state should inculcate in the citizens a disposition that inspires them with “love of the homeland and of equality” that is, “political virtue” (*EL* Author’s Foreword, p.xli). However, he thought that virtue often inclines men to adopt an austere civic mentality that leads to fanaticism and abuses against minorities. In this regard, the cultivation of virtue and the preservation of republican institutions restrains men’s free engagement in individually-motivated action and often undermines, as Montesquieu put it, their spirit of “tranquility” (*EL* XI, 6 p.156). Therefore, Montesquieu deemed that republican institutions and virtue cannot furnish men's pursuit of liberty in modernity.

As it was shown earlier in chapter 2, Montesquieu thought that in monarchies, the sovereign combines the executive and legislative functions of government in his person.¹⁸¹ As a result, the judiciary function is exercised by the nobility and so it remains separate. In this regard, Montesquieu deemed that the system of justice in monarchy cannot be easily abused by the monarch and so, an individual can feel assured that his “goods” may be “removed from him only after a long examination” (*EL* VI, 2 p.75). Thus Montesquieu observed that in monarchy “even the lowest citizen is esteemed” (*Ibid*). Montesquieu thought that monarchical government does not need to instil in men a virtuous disposition in order to sustain its institutions. Rather, he thought that monarchy replaces virtue with honour, which encourages individuals to pursue their private ambition insofar as it furthers the state's preservation: “Ambition [...] has good effects in monarchy; it gives life to that government” (*EL* III, 7 p.27). In this regard, monarchy offers individuals a greater space for individually

¹⁸¹ See Chapter 2, section IV.

motivated action and a fair trial. As a result, Montesquieu thought that monarchy can inspire in men a tranquility of spirit that amounts to the “spirit of liberty” (*EL XI*, 7 p.166). Nevertheless, Montesquieu thought that honour often inclines the monarch and his subjects to infringe upon the law in order to satisfy their ambition.¹⁸² In this regard, he thought that honour encourages the development of nepotism, which leads to social resentment. Hence, although monarchy fosters the spirit of liberty, Montesquieu thought that men cannot enjoy that liberty consistently.

Unlike republics and monarchies, Montesquieu thought “there is also one nation in the world whose constitution has political liberty for its direct purpose” (*EL XI*, 7 p.166). As it was shown earlier in chapter 2, Montesquieu addressed the abuses on liberty in republics and monarchies by conceiving an ideal type of regime that he abstracted from the constitution of eighteenth-century England.¹⁸³ He did this by combining certain aspects of republican and monarchical types of government. From republics, England adopts a set of laws that establish equality in political participation; from monarchies, it adopts a system of social organisation that allows men substantial space to freely pursue their ambition without interference. England attains greater liberty than republics and monarchies because its constitution effectively separates the branches of government and institutes an efficient system of checks and balances. In this regard, it efficiently protects the individual from the government's arbitrary interference. Moreover, the separation of powers protects the procedure of criminal law from abuses. Montesquieu thought that the “goodness” of England's criminal law is of paramount importance (*EL XII*, 2 p.188). Indeed, he said that “The knowledge [...] concerning the surest rules one can observe in criminal judgments, is of more concern to mankind than anything else in the world” (*Ibid*). Moreover, he thought that the successful application of that ‘knowledge’ could inspire men with a tranquility of spirit that would enable them to feel free. Indeed, he said that “the citizen's liberty depends principally on the goodness of the

¹⁸² See Chapter 2, section IV.

¹⁸³ See Chapter 2, section V.

criminal laws [...] Liberty can be founded only on the practice of this knowledge” (Ibid). Thus, Montesquieu deemed that the attainment of liberty is principally dependent on the goodness of criminal law, which, through its constitutional separation of powers, England was able to achieve.

Nevertheless, Montesquieu thought that England’s formal guarantees alone could not suffice to preserve that liberty. In order to foster liberty in England, he thought that the citizens’ actions should be driven by a type of motivation that fosters the preservation of its institutions. However, as it was shown earlier, Montesquieu's description of the Englishmen's political motivations is cryptic.¹⁸⁴ Although Montesquieu analysed in depth how England’s institutions foster the attainment of liberty, he did not devote equal attention to analysing the type of motivation that inclines individuals in their engagements with government. As a result, it is uncertain what type of motivation inclines Englishmen to defend the formal guarantees of their liberty in times of crisis. More crucially, a limited understanding of the Englishmen’s motivations prevents the reader from fully grasping the meaning of Montesquieu's notion of liberty.

In order to explore the full breadth of Montesquieu’s understanding of liberty, this study attempted to elucidate his cryptic account of the Englishmen’s political motivations. As it was shown earlier, insofar as Montesquieu conceived England’s government by combining aspects from monarchy and republic, he inclines the reader to assume that this type of motivation consists in combining virtue with honour.¹⁸⁵ However, it is difficult to perceive the way in which Montesquieu made possible their combination because the two concepts promote opposing types of motivations: while virtue fosters self-sacrifice, honour inclines men to pursue their private ambition.¹⁸⁶ In order to understand how Montesquieu made possible the combination of virtue and honour, it is crucial to identify a common

¹⁸⁴ See Chapter 2, section V.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

denominator between the two notions. Toward this end, this study engaged in an in-depth analysis of honour and virtue.

It was shown in chapter 4 that honour in monarchy inclines individuals to pursue their selfish passions insofar as their pursuit fosters the preservation of monarchy. With regard to this aspect of honour, it was argued that Montesquieu followed the line of argument that was advanced by Mandeville in *The Fable of the Bees*. Despite the similarities between the ideas of the two thinkers, it is crucial to emphasise certain aspects of Montesquieu's notion that separate it from Mandeville's liberal doctrine of *private vices public benefits*. As it was shown earlier, Mandeville thought that honour was a construct of politicians who wanted to direct men's obedience toward ends that are beneficial for the state.¹⁸⁷ In contrast to Mandeville, Montesquieu's notion of honour fosters more complex patterns of individual behaviour. Rather than merely aiming to foster obedience, Montesquieu thought that honour inclines individuals to engage critically with political authority, and so protects the monarchy from lapsing into despotism.¹⁸⁸ Thus Montesquieu thought that honour inclines individuals to perform actions that are "fine," "great" and "extraordinary" (*EL IV*, 2 p.32).

In this regard, Montesquieu did not conceive his notion of honour in connection with the pursuit of wealth or, more generally, the liberal motif of the 'invisible hand'. Rather than aiming for the mere accumulation of wealth, Montesquieu thought that honour inclines men to perform great actions in order to attain glory and social distinction. Therefore, although Montesquieu adopted Mandeville's liberal doctrine, their teachings should not be conflated; rather, as it was argued earlier, Montesquieu's notion of honour should be considered in connection with Machiavelli's notion of *gloria*. Both Montesquieu and Machiavelli described the successful pursuit of the *raison d'État* in connection with the

¹⁸⁷ See Chapter 4, section II.

¹⁸⁸ See Chapter 4, section IV.

pursuit of *gloria* and the prince's determination to preserve his dominion by engaging in *virtù* or, as Montesquieu put it, "great acts of authority" (*EL XXI*, 20 p.389).¹⁸⁹

However, Montesquieu deemed that the monarch's practice of *virtù* was often "clumsy" and that what were formerly great acts of authority "would at present, apart from their horror, be only imprudences" (*Ibid*). In order to address modern men's desire for liberty, Montesquieu thought that the state's use of brute force and readiness to engage in war should be replaced by moderation. That moderation, he thought, depends principally on a state's "goodness of government" and its ability to make "its political interests give way to the interests of its commerce" (*EL XX*, 7 p.343). Moreover, Montesquieu deemed that the pursuit of commerce could foster peace among nations - "The natural effect of commerce is to lead to peace" (*EL XX*, 2 p.338). In this regard, Montesquieu thought that Machiavellian politics no longer had a place in modernity, where the preservation of the state depends on its commercial ability. Moreover, by discarding the relevance of Machiavellian politics and the pursuit of glory, Montesquieu also renounced monarchical government's relevance to modernity.

Chapter 5 suggested that Montesquieu's notion of virtue should not be considered in conjunction with its pagan and Christian counterparts or, as they have been broadly defined, the cardinal and theological virtues.¹⁹⁰ On one hand, Montesquieu considered self-renunciation to be a central aspect of his notion of virtue, and so his notion bears some similarity with the moral economy of its pagan and Christian counterparts. However, as it was shown earlier, there are many more differences between these notions than similarities.¹⁹¹ Pagan and Christian virtue inclined men to act with self-sacrifice in order to

¹⁸⁹ See Chapter 4, section V.

¹⁹⁰ See Chapter 5, section I.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid*.

attain a greater moral end, that is, the pursuit of excellence or God's grace, respectively.¹⁹² Montesquieu's notion of virtue does not incline individuals toward the attainment of such noble ends.¹⁹³ Montesquieu described virtue as a 'feeling', and that feeling, he thought, could be experienced equally by everyone. Montesquieu did not consider virtue to be good for its own sake; rather, he thought that virtue was worth pursuing insofar as it was useful to the preservation of the state's laws and institutions. In this regard, Montesquieu's notion of virtue serves as a response to the question 'what is virtue good for?' and as it was argued earlier, this question forces a utilitarian answer.¹⁹⁴

It was also argued that insofar as Montesquieu's notion of virtue fosters self-renunciation as a matter of utility, it should be considered in connection with Machiavelli's notion of *virtù*.¹⁹⁵ Although the two notions bear important similarities, Montesquieu did not explicitly identify virtue's conceptual affinity with its Machiavellian counterpart. The reasons behind Montesquieu's taciturnity on this matter may be attributed to his fear of being framed as a pupil of Machiavelli, who was considered a teacher of evil in the intellectual circles of France during the Enlightenment. Borrowing aspects from Machiavelli's description of virtue as *virtù*, Montesquieu thought that virtue could derive utility from all men in the state. In this regard, unlike its pagan counterpart, Montesquieu's notion of virtue was egalitarian. As it was shown earlier, pagan virtue placed demands on men which not all were capable of meeting.¹⁹⁶ Indeed, Aristotle deemed that only the most excellent men could attain virtue, which is why he considered aristocracy to be the ideal form of government. On the other hand, Montesquieu's notion of virtue placed demands on men that could be pursued equally by everyone.¹⁹⁷ One must immediately add that Montesquieu's study of republican government also illustrated the conflict between virtue's demands and its inability to

¹⁹² See Chapter 5, sections II and III.

¹⁹³ See Chapter 5, section IV.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ See Chapter 5, section II.

¹⁹⁷ See Chapter 5, section IV.

effectively address modern men's natural need for security and desire for liberty. Hence, while giving credit to republican virtue and its admirable spirit of self-renunciation, Montesquieu also showed in an impartial manner its inherent contradictions.

Thus Montesquieu did not conceive the principles of monarchy and republic in conjunction with the pursuit of a moral standard for individual action. Rather than inclining men to attain a greater moral end, Montesquieu suggested that the purpose of virtue and honour is invariably the procurement of social utility. This is also the common denominator that made possible their combination in Montesquieu's description of England's principle.

As it was shown in chapter 6, through scrutiny of its nature, England's principle consists of the combination of virtue and honour.¹⁹⁸ Combining honour with virtue is crucial for the preservation of liberty in England. Montesquieu suggested that in times of peace, the Englishmen are free to pursue their private ambition within the area specified by the law without interference by the government. In this regard, during times of peace, the Englishmen act like the subjects of monarchy. However, it is crucial to underline that the object of the Englishmen's ambition differs from the subjects of monarchy: while ambition in monarchy is geared toward the pursuit of glory, in England it aims at revenue maximisation. Montesquieu suggested that in times of crisis the Englishmen forgo their selfish interests and act collectively to defend the political foundations of their liberty from abuse. It follows that political concern and collective action for the common good are present both among the Englishmen and the citizens of republics. However, as it was shown earlier, the Englishmen do not act in self-renunciation; rather, they act selfishly, because their willingness to forgo their short-term ambition stems from their desire to secure its pursuit in the long-term.¹⁹⁹ Hence, by combining the individual motivations present in republics and monarchies, Montesquieu thought that England could accommodate the need for liberty in

¹⁹⁸ See Chapter 6, section III.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

a modern, commercial, individualistic society while fostering the necessary degree of civic spirit.

As it was shown earlier, Montesquieu did not conceive England's principle in a vacuum; he conceived it as a response to the problem of luxury and commercialisation that prevailed in the eighteenth century.²⁰⁰ This problem became the object of a debate which proved very influential for Montesquieu, that is, the debate on luxury. Montesquieu was influenced by the debate's main approaches in addressing the problem of luxury, the anti-luxury and *doux commerce*, which were led by Fénelon and Mandeville, respectively.

However, he didn't think that either of these two approaches could offer a viable solution to politics in the eighteenth-century. In contrast to the anti-luxury camp, he thought that the pursuit of liberty would be undermined if the state interfered with man's desire to pursue his ambition in commerce and luxury. He also thought that restricting commercial activity to the kinds of items that are of absolute necessity would potentially decrease social welfare. At the same time, Montesquieu did not wholly agree with the *doux commerce* camp's suggestions. On one hand, he thought that allowing men to pursue their self-interest in commerce unhindered by law was crucial in order to foster social welfare, economic development and national defence. On the other hand, he thought that the *doux commerce* camp's unconditional emphasis on the free pursuit of private ambition could corrupt society by alienating individuals, and undermine the pursuit of liberty. So, in a manner that resembles Aristotle's theory of the *golden mean*, Montesquieu conceived England's principle to address the debate on luxury from a middle ground: he merged the debate's two approaches. In connection with Mandeville's approach, Montesquieu encouraged Englishmen to pursue their private ambition. In connection with Fénelon, he taught them to act with care for the common good in order to ensure pursuit of ambition in the long

²⁰⁰ See Chapter 6, section I.

term. Thus, by merging these motivations in England's principle, Montesquieu suggested that their mutual presence can foster the preservation of liberty in modernity.

As it was shown earlier in chapters 1 and 3, depending on their interpretation of England's nature and principle of government, commentators link Montesquieu to different traditions of liberty.²⁰¹ Commentators defining England as a republic deem that Montesquieu was a proponent of republican liberty, while commentators defining it as a monarchy deem that he was a liberal. By illustrating Montesquieu's views about the relevance of republican and monarchical governments to modernity, this thesis invites reconsideration of his categorisation by commentators as a liberal or republican thinker. Insofar as Montesquieu rejected the relevance of republican and monarchical regimes in modernity, this thesis suggests that the commentators are mistaken in their attempts to domesticate the type of England based on these types. Moreover, one may draw two further conclusions from this evidence. Firstly, to the extent that classical republicanism involves an eagerness to learn from the political institutions of ancient republics and an admiration for civic virtue, this thesis has shown that Montesquieu should be considered one of its opponents. Secondly, to the extent that classical liberalism favours the deregulation of economic activity and limitation of the government's ability to interfere with one's person, property, and fortune, this thesis has shown that Montesquieu should be considered as one of its proponents.

Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise that Montesquieu did not give his support without reservation. Montesquieu was afraid that modern men's preoccupation with their private affairs would enable the government to ratify laws that could undermine the constitution. For Montesquieu, the loss of interest in politics signalled the corruption of the state and its degeneration into despotism. He did not think that liberty could survive in a state where individuals are solely interested in the pursuit of their private affairs; or where individuals cannot perceive that their mutual interest consists of making sacrifices for the

²⁰¹ See Ch. I section Introduction and Chapter 3, sections I-V.

common good in times of crisis; or where individuals are unsuspecting of political authority and the motives of their representatives. This is also the reason why Montesquieu chose not to openly endorse Mandeville's liberal doctrine of *private vices public benefits*: he thought that it encouraged individuals to lose concern for the common good and become self-absorbed.

Montesquieu thought that this danger could be addressed effectively through his conception of England's principle. By conceiving England's principle as the combination of virtue and honour, Montesquieu suggested that modern men should pursue their private ambition with a basic concern for the common good. This type of motivation was evinced in Montesquieu's description of the Englishmen during times of peace. As it was shown earlier, the laws limit Englishmen's actions only insofar as it is necessary in order to protect one citizen from the selfish desires of another.²⁰² In this regard, Montesquieu's description of England's principle meets his requirement for the attainment of liberty: "the government must be such that one citizen cannot fear another citizen" (*EL XI*, 6 p.157). Montesquieu considered this the minimum requirement that a state can impose on its citizens in order to be free.

However, meeting this requirement does not serve as sufficient proof that individuals will be able to enjoy that liberty consistently. Montesquieu was very sceptical about the motives of men with power: he said that "Political liberty is found only in moderate governments. But it is not always in moderate states. It is present only when power is not abused, but it has eternally been observed that any man who has power is led to abuse it; he continues until he finds limits" (*EL XI*, 4 p.155). Montesquieu doubted the integrity of the motives behind the actions of politicians. For this reason, he suggested that the citizens should be ready to spiritedly defend their liberty against usurpation. These were the

²⁰² See Chapter 6, section III.

examples of Crillon and the Viscount of Orte. As it was shown earlier, the two men engaged critically with political authority and decided to disobey it because they thought that it abused their liberty.²⁰³ Likewise, Montesquieu thought that in times of crisis the Englishmen would disobey the political authority that threatened their liberty; they would forgo their private affairs and unite in order to save the constitution. In this regard, Montesquieu suggested that the Englishmen's obedience to political authority is conditioned by that authority's respect for the constitution and for their liberty. As a result, the Englishmen's willingness to defend their liberty in times of crisis makes the abuse of political power difficult to effect.

Through his description of the Englishmen, Montesquieu identified a type of motivation that bridges the gap between the minimum requirements of liberty and the performance of great feats to foster its preservation. In this regard, the motives of the Englishmen are mixed. At the very least, the Englishmen pursue their self-interest while showing minimal concern for the common good through obedience to the law. At the very most, they forgo their private ambition and engage critically with political authority in order to defend the laws that establish their liberty. It is obvious that the Englishmen's motivations recall some aspects of the defiance and glory illustrated by the actions of Crillon and the Viscount of Orte. It is also obvious that Englishmen's respect for the laws and institutions that establish their liberty bears some relevance to the political virtue that drives men's actions in republics.

Montesquieu's account of the Englishmen's political motivations may benefit the citizens of modern liberal democracies. By arguing in favour of moderation in modernity, Montesquieu did not define the purpose of politics in relation to an ultimate good - a *summum bonum* - toward which all citizens should strive. Rather, he thought that the purpose of politics is to avoid at any cost the ultimate evil, that is, the lapse into despotism

²⁰³ See chapter 4, section IV.

and the loss of liberty. Finally, until politics is freed from men who are tempted to abuse their power, Montesquieu's notion of moderation can inspire modern citizens of liberal democracies to enjoy their individual liberties while being ready to endanger their lives in defence against political oppression.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary:

- de Secondat baron de Montesquieu, C. (1777). *The Complete Works of M. de Montesquieu*. London, Liberty Fund.
- de Secondat baron de Montesquieu, C. (1976). "An Essay on the Causes That May Affect Men's Minds and Characters." *Political Theory* 4(2): 139-162.
- de Secondat baron de Montesquieu, C., D.W. (1977). *The Spirit of the Laws: A Compendium of the First English Ed., Edited with an Introd., Notes, and Appendixes, by David Wallace Carrithers, Together with an English Translation of An Essay on Causes Affecting Minds and Characters (1736-1743)*. Berkeley, University of California Press.
- de Secondat baron de Montesquieu, C. (1989). *Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws*, Cambridge University Press.
- de Secondat baron de Montesquieu, C. (2002). "Discourse on Cicero." *Political Theory* 30(5): 733-737.
- de Secondat baron de Montesquieu, C. (2012). *Pensées*. Indianapolis, Liberty Fund.
- de Secondat baron de Montesquieu, C. and J. Davidson (1923). *Persian Letters*. Translated by J. Davidson, Etc.
- de Secondat baron de Montesquieu, C. and D. Lowenthal (1999). *Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and Their Decline*, Hackett Publishing Company, Incorporated.
- Masson, A. M. (1950a). *Œuvres complètes de Montesquieu: Esprit des lois, Lettres persanes, Considérations.*, Editions Nagel.
- Masson, A. M. (1950b). *Œuvres complètes de Montesquieu: Pensées, Spicilege, Geographica, Voyages.*, Editions Nagel.
- Masson, A. M. (1950c). *Œuvres complètes de Montesquieu: Oeuvres diverses, Morceaux rejetés de l'esprit des lois et des lettres persanes, Extraits de lecture annotés, Correspondance, appendices et tables.*, Editions Nagel.

Secondary:

- Alejandro, R. (2001). *The Limits of Rawlsian Justice*, Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Alembert, J. L. R. (1759). *Miscellaneous Pieces of M. de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu*, D. Wilson and T. Durham.
- Althusser, L. (1982). *Louis Althusser: Montesquieu-Rousseau-Marx; Politics and History*, NLB.
- Andersen, N. Å. (2003). *Discursive Analytical Strategies: Understanding Foucault, Koselleck, Laclau, Luhmann*, Policy Press.
- Anthony, T. E. o. S. (2001). *Characteristics of men, manners, opinions, times*, Liberty Fund.
- Anthony, T. E. o. S. (2001a). *Characteristics of men, manners, opinions, times*, Liberty Fund.
- Arendt, H. (2009). *The Promise of Politics*, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group.
- Arendt, H. (2011). *Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954: Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism*, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group.

- Aristotle (1885). *The Politics of Aristotle*. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Aristotle (2011). *The Eudemian Ethics*, OUP Oxford.
- Aristotle and R. Crisp (2000). *Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics*, Cambridge University Press.
- Arnhart, L. (1983). "Statesmanship as Magnanimity: Classical, Christian & Modern." *Polity* 16(2): 263-283.
- Aron, R. (1968). *Main Currents in Sociological Thought: Montesquieu, Comte, Marx, Tocqueville, and the Sociologists and the Revolution of 1848*. Harmondsworth Penguin Books.
- Augustine, S. (1872). *The Works of Aurelius Augustine: A New Translation*, T. & T. Clark.
- Augustine, S. (1887). *Anti-Pelagian Treatises of S. Augustine viz. de Spiritu et Littera, de Natura et Gratia and de Gestis Pelagii*. London, David Nutt.
- Augustine, S. (2001). *Augustine: Political Writings*, Cambridge University Press.
- Augustine, S. (2010). *Augustine: On the Free Choice of the Will, On Grace and Free Choice, and Other Writings*, Cambridge University Press.
- Baker, K. M. (1990). *Inventing the French Revolution `: Essays on French Political Culture in the Eighteenth Century*, Cambridge University Press.
- Barker, E. (2012). *The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle*, Dover Publications.
- Baum, J. A. (2013). *Montesquieu and Social Theory*, Elsevier Science.
- Beckman, L. (2001). *The Liberal State & the Politics of Virtue*, Transaction Publishers.
- Beer, M. (2014). *An Inquiry Into Physiocracy (Routledge Revivals)*, Taylor & Francis.
- Bell, D. (2014). "What Is Liberalism?" *Political Theory* 42(6): 682-715.
- Berg, M. (2007). *Luxury and Pleasure in Eighteenth-century Britain*, Oxford University Press.
- Berg, M. and E. Eger (2007). *Luxury in the Eighteenth-Century: Debates, Desires and Delectable Goods*, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Berkowitz, P. (2000). *Virtue and the Making of Modern Liberalism*, Princeton University Press.
- Berlin, I. (2012). *Concepts and Categories: Philosophical Essays*, Random House.
- Berlin, I., et al. (2002). *Liberty: Incorporating Four Essays on Liberty*, Oxford University Press.
- Berlin, I., et al. (1980). *Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas*. New York, The Viking Press.
- Berlin, I., et al. (2000). *The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays*, Chatto & Windus London.
- Bertière, A. (1956). *Montesquieu, lecteur de Machiavel*. Bordeaux, Imprimeries Delmas.
- Bettenson, H. and G. R. Evans (2003). *City of God*, Penguin Books Limited.
- Bevir, M. (2002). *The Logic of the History of Ideas*, Cambridge University Press.

- Blom H., L. C., Simonutti C. (2007). *Monarchisms in the Age of Enlightenment: Liberty, Patriotism and the Common Good*, University of Toronto Press.
- Bock, G., et al. (1993). *Machiavelli and Republicanism*, Cambridge University Press.
- Boesche, R. (1990). "Fearing Monarchs and Merchants: Montesquieu's Two Theories of Despotism." *The Western Political Quarterly* 43(4): 741-761.
- Bohman, J. and W. Rehg (1997). *Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics*, MIT Press.
- Bossuet, J. B. and P. Riley (1999). *Bossuet: Politics Drawn from the Very Words of Holy Scripture*, Cambridge University Press.
- Boucher, D. (1985). *Texts in Context*, Springer Netherlands.
- Boucher d'Argis, A.-G. *Injure*. *L'Encyclopédie*. Volume 8.
- Bradley, F. H. (1951). *Ethical Studies, Selected Essays*. Indianapolis - New York, Bobbs-Merrill.
- Burke, E. (1761). *Dodsley's Annual Register*, J. Dodsley.
- Camus, A. (2005). *Le Mythe de Sisyphe, Essai sur l'absurde*. Athens, Kastaniotis Publications.
- Carrese, P. (2004). "Montesquieu's Complex Natural Right and Moderate Liberalism: The Roots of American Moderation." *Polity* 36(2): 227-250.
- Carrese, P. (2010). *The Cloaking of Power: Montesquieu, Blackstone, and the Rise of Judicial Activism*, University of Chicago Press.
- Carrithers, D. W. (1986). "Montesquieu's Philosophy of History." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 47(1): 61-80.
- Carrithers, D. W. (1991). "Not so Virtuous Republics: Montesquieu, Venice, and the Theory of Aristocratic Republicanism." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 52(2): 245-268.
- Carrithers, D. W. (1998). "Montesquieu's Philosophy of Punishment." *History of Political Thought* 19(2): 213-240.
- Carrithers, D. W. (2001). *Democratic and Aristocratic Republics: Ancient and Modern. Montesquieu's Science of Politics: Essays on the Spirit of Laws*. D. W. Carrithers, M. A. Mosher and P. A. Rahe, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Carrithers, D. W., et al. (2002). *Montesquieu and the Spirit of Modernity - SVEC 2002:09*, Voltaire Foundation.
- Carrithers, D. W., et al. (2001). *Montesquieu's Science of Politics: Essays on the Spirit of Laws*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Cave, R. C. and H. H. Coulson (1965). *A Source Book for Medieval Economic History*, Biblo and Tannen.
- Chalk, A. F. (1951). "Natural Law and the Rise of Economic Individualism in England." *Journal of Political Economy* 59(4): 332-347.
- Charvet, J. (1978). "About Possession: The Self as Private Property." *Political Theory* 6(4): 564-567.
- Chase, D. P. and G. H. Lewes (1890). *The Ethics of Aristotle: (the Nicomachean Ethics)*, Walter Scott.
- Chong, D. (2014). *Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement*, University of Chicago Press.

- Cicero (1899). *De Officiis*. London, Aberdeen University Press.
- Cicero (1998). *The Republic and The Laws*, OUP Oxford.
- Clark, S. R. L. (1983). *Aristotle's man: speculations upon Aristotelian anthropology*, Clarendon Press.
- Cochrane, C. N. (1940). *Christianity and Classical Culture, Etc*, New York.
- Cohen, G. A. (1992). *Incentives, inequality, and community. The Tanner lectures on human values*. G. Peterson. Salt Lake City, University of Utah Press. 13: 263-329.
- Cohen, M. R. (1964). *Reason and Nature*, Free Press of Glencoe.
- Cohler, A. M. (1988). *Montesquieu's Comparative Politics and the Spirit of American Constitutionalism*, University Press of Kansas.
- Coleman, J. (2000). *A History of Political Thought: From Ancient Greece to Early Christianity*, Wiley.
- Connolly, W. E. (1993). *The Terms of Political Discourse*, Princeton University Press.
- Conroy, P. V. (1992). *Montesquieu revisited*, Twayne Publishers.
- Constant, B. and B. Fontana (1988). *Constant: Political Writings*, Cambridge University Press.
- Cooper, J. E. (2010). "Vainglory, Modesty, and Political Agency in the Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes." *The Review of Politics* 72(2): 241-269.
- Courtney, C. P. (2001). *Montesquieu and English Liberty. Montesquieu's Science of Politics: Essays on the Spirit of Laws*. D. W. Carrithers, M. A. Mosher and P. A. Rahe, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: 273-290.
- Courtney, C. P. (2008). *Morals and Manners in Montesquieu's Analysis of the British System of Liberty. Montesquieu and His Legacy*, State University of New York Press: 31-49.
- Cox, I. (1983). *Montesquieu and the History of French Laws*. Oxford, Voltaire Foundation at the Taylor Institution.
- Crisafulli, A. S. (1943). "Montesquieu's Story of the Troglodytes: Its Background, Meaning, and Significance." *PMLA* 58(2): 372-392.
- Crowder, G. (2002). *Liberalism and Value Pluralism*, Bloomsbury Academic.
- Curzer, H. J. (2012). *Aristotle and the Virtues*, OUP Oxford.
- Deane, H. A. and R. A. Munkelt (2013). *The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine*, Angelico Press.
- Dent, N. J. H. and T. O. Hagan (1998). "Rousseau on *Amour-Propre*." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes* 72: 57-75.
- Descartes, R., et al. (1984). *Principles of Philosophy*, Springer Netherlands.
- Desserud, D. (1991). "Virtue, Commerce and Moderation in the 'tale of the troglodytes': Montesquieu's *Persian Letters*." *History of Political Thought* 12(4): 605-626.
- Deveaux, M. (2000). *Cultural Pluralism and Dilemmas of Justice*, Cornell University Press.

- Digeser, P. (1995). *Our Politics, Our Selves? Liberalism, Identity, and Harm*, Princeton University Press.
- Dihle, A. (1982). *The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity*, University of California Press.
- Dijn, A. (2005). "Aristocratic Liberalism in Post-Revolutionary France." *Historical Journal* 48: 661-681.
- Dijn, A. (2008). *French Political Thought from Montesquieu to Tocqueville*, Cambridge University Press.
- Dijn, A. (2011). "On Political Liberty: Montesquieu's Missing Manuscript." *Political Theory* 39(2): 181-204.
- Dijn, A. (2014). "Was Montesquieu a Liberal Republican?" *The Review of Politics* 76(01): 21-41.
- Douglass, R. (2012). "Montesquieu and Modern Republicanism." *Political Studies* 60(3): 703-719.
- Doyle, W. (2001). *The French Revolution: A Very Short Introduction*, OUP Oxford.
- Drei, H. (1998). "Le mot et le concept de vertu chez Machiavel et Montesquieu." *Revue Montesquieu* (2): 45-54.
- Driver, J. (2001). *Uneasy Virtue*, Cambridge University Press.
- Dryzek, J. S. (2000). *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations*, Oxford University Press.
- Duconseil, M. (1943). *Machiavel Et Montesquieu Recherche Sur Un Principe D'Autorité*, Éditions Denoël.
- Durkheim, É. (1965). *Montesquieu and Rousseau: forerunners of sociology*, University of Michigan Press.
- Eldar, D. (1986). "Glory and the Boundaries of Public Morality in Machiavelli's Thought." *History of Political Thought* 7(3): 419.
- Elshtain, J. B. (1997). *Augustine and the Limits of Politics*, University of Notre Dame Press.
- Etzioni, A. (2013). *The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities, and the Communitarian Agenda*, Crown/Archetype.
- Faguet, É. (1999). *La Politique Comparée de Montesquieu, Rousseau et Voltaire*, Adegri Graphics LLC.
- Fénelon, F. (1698). "The maxims of the saints explained, concerning the interior life." 134.
- Fénelon, F. and P. Riley (1994). *Telemachus, Son of Ulysses*, Cambridge University Press.
- Figgis, J. N. (1921). *The Political Aspects of St. Augustine's City of God*. London, Longmans.
- Finlayson, J. G. and F. Freyenhagen (2012). *Habermas and Rawls: Disputing the Political*, Taylor & Francis.
- Force, P. (2003). *Self-Interest before Adam Smith: A Genealogy of Economic Science*, Cambridge University Press.
- Ford, F. L. (1953). *Robe and sword: the regrouping of the French aristocracy after Louis XIV*, Harvard University Press.

- Fortin, L. E. (1987). *St Augustine. History of Political Philosophy*. L. Strauss and J. Cropsey. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Fott, D. (2002). "Preface to Translation of Montesquieu's "Discourse on Cicero"." *Political Theory* 30(5): 728-732.
- Foucault, M. and J. D. Faubion (2002). *Power*, Allen Lane.
- Free, L. R. and S. M. Mason (1975). *Montesquieu's idea of justice*, Martinus Nijhoff.
- Friedman, J. (1996). *The Rational Choice Controversy: Economic Models of Politics Reconsidered*, Yale University Press.
- Galston, W. A. (1991). *Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State*, Cambridge University Press.
- Garsten, B. (2010). "Religion and the Case Against Ancient Liberty: Benjamin Constant's Other Lectures." *Political Theory* 38(1): 4-33.
- Gauthier, R. A. (1951). *Magnanimité*, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin.
- Geenens, R. and H. Rosenblatt (2012). *French Liberalism from Montesquieu to the Present Day*, Cambridge University Press.
- George, W. H. (1922). "Montesquieu and de Tocqueville and Corporative Individualism." *The American Political Science Review* 16(1): 10-21.
- Giddens, A. and F. R. Dallmayr (1982). *Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory*, University of California Press.
- Gilbert, A. (1994). "'Internal Restlessness': Individuality and Community in Montesquieu." *Political Theory* 22(1): 45-70.
- Goldie, M. and R. Wokler (2006). *The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought*, Cambridge University Press.
- Goldsmith, M. (1976). "Public Virtue and Private Vices: Bernard Mandeville and English Political Ideologies in the Early Eighteenth Century." *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 9(4): 477-510.
- Goldsmith, M. (1977). "Mandeville and the Spirit of Capitalism." *Journal of British Studies* 17(1): 63-81.
- Goldsmith, M. (1988). "Regulating Anew the Moral and Political Sentiments of Mankind: Bernard Mandeville and the Scottish Enlightenment." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 49(4): 587-606.
- Goldsmith, M. (2002). *Private Vices, Public Benefits: Bernard Mandeville's Social and Political Thought*, Cybereditions.
- Gonthier, U. H. (2010). *Montesquieu and England: Enlightened Exchanges, 1689-1755*, Pickering & Chatto.
- Gregory, M. E. (2010). *Freedom in French Enlightenment Thought*, Peter Lang.
- H., B. (1986). "Good Government and the Limitations of Power in the Writings of Niccolò Machiavelli." *History of Political Thought* VII(3): 411-417.
- Haakonssen, K. (2006). *The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-century Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press.
- Habermas, J. (1992). *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, Polity Press.

- Hamilton, A. (2004). *The Federalist Papers*, Digireads.com.
- Hammer, D. (2002). "Hannah Arendt and Roman Political Thought: The Practice of Theory." *Political Theory* 30(1): 124-149.
- Hampsher-Monk, I., et al. (1998). *History of Concepts: Comparative Perspectives*, Amsterdam University Press.
- Hampson, N. (1963). *A Social History of the French Revolution*, Routledge.
- Hampson, N. (1983). *Will & circumstance: Montesquieu, Rousseau, and the French Revolution*, Duckworth.
- Hardie, W. F. R. (1978). "'Magnanimity' in Aristotle's Ethics." *Phronesis* 23(1): 63-79.
- Haskins, C. H. (1957). *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century*, Harvard University Press.
- Hayek, F. A. (2012). *Individualism and Economic Order*, University of Chicago Press.
- Hedrick, T. (2010). *Rawls and Habermas: Reason, Pluralism, and the Claims of Political Philosophy*, Stanford University Press.
- Helvétius (1758). *De L'esprit: Or, Essays on the Mind, and Its Several Faculties*, J.M. Richardson and Sherwood, Neely, and Jones.
- Hendrickson, R. R. (2013). "Montesquieu's (Anti-)Machiavellianism: Ordinary Acquisitiveness in The Spirit of Laws." *The Journal of Politics* 75(02): 385-396.
- Hirschl, R. (2008). *Montesquieu and the Renaissance of Comparative Public Law. Montesquieu and His Legacy*. R. Kingston, State University of New York Press: 199-219.
- Hirschman, A. O. (1997). *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph (Twentieth Anniversary Edition)*, Princeton University Press.
- Hobbes, T. (2014). *Behemoth or The Long Parliament*, University of Chicago Press.
- Hobbes, T. and J. C. A. Gaskin (1999). *The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic: Part I, Human Nature, Part II, De Corpore Politico; with Three Lives*, Oxford University Press.
- Hobbes, T. and R. Tuck (1996). *Hobbes: Leviathan: Revised Student Edition*, Cambridge University Press.
- Hobbes, T., et al. (1998). *Hobbes: On the Citizen*, Cambridge University Press.
- Hont, I. (2006). *The early Enlightenment debate on commerce and luxury The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought*, Cambridge University Press.
- Howse R. (2006). "Montesquieu on Commerce, Conquest, War and Peace." *Brook. J. Int'l L.*: 693-708.
- Hulliung, M. (1974). "Patriarchalism and Its Early Enemies." *Political Theory* 2(4): 410-419.
- Hulliung, M. (1976). *Montesquieu and the Old Regime*, University of California Press.
- Hundert, E. J. (2005). *The Enlightenment's Fable: Bernard Mandeville and the Discovery of Society*, Cambridge University Press.
- Hundert, E. J. and P. Nelles (1989). "Liberty and Theatrical Space in Montesquieu's Political Theory: The Poetics of Public Life in the Persian Letters." *Political Theory* 17(2): 223-246.

- Hurt, J. J. (2004). *Louis XIV and the Parlements: The Assertion of Royal Authority*, Manchester University Press.
- Iyer, P. (1998). *The Unknown Rebel*. *The Time Magazine*.
- Jackson, A. (1850). Gen. Jackson's farewell address to the people of the United States, together with his proclamation to South Carolina.
- Jaffa, H. V. (1952). *Thomism and Aristotelianism: A Study of the Commentary by Thomas Aquinas on the Nicomachean Ethics*, Literary Licensing, LLC.
- Janet, P. and V. Leuliette (1914). *Fénelon, His Life and His Works, I*. Pitman & Sons.
- Jaucourt, L. d. Vengeance. *L'Encyclopédie*. Volume 17.
- Jaume, L. (2000). *La liberté et la loi*, Fayard.
- Jennings, J. (2007). "The Debate about Luxury in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century French Political Thought." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 68(1): 79-105.
- Joly, M., et al. (1864). *Dialogue aux enfers entre Machiavel et Montesquieu: ou, La politique de Machiavel au XIXe siècle*, A. Mertens.
- Kalyvas, A. and I. Katznelson (2006). "The Republic of the Moderns: Paine's and Madison's Novel Liberalism." *Polity* 38(4): 447-477.
- Karříková, L. (2012). *Grace and the Will According to Augustine*, Brill.
- Keeney, P. P. (2012). *Liberalism, Communitarianism and Education: Reclaiming Liberal Education*, Ashgate Publishing Limited.
- Kelly, G. A. (1986). *Mortal politics in eighteenth-century France*, University of Waterloo Press.
- Keohane, N. O. (1972). "Virtuous Republics and Glorious Monarchies: Two Models in Montesquieu's Political Thought." *Political Studies* 20(4): 383-396.
- Keohane, N. O. (1980). *Philosophy and the State in France: The Renaissance to the Enlightenment*, Princeton University Press.
- Kettler, D. (1964). "Montesquieu on Love: Notes on the Persian Letters." *The American Political Science Review* 58(3): 658-661.
- King, L. A. (2005). "The Federal Structure of a Republic of Reasons." *Political Theory* 33(5): 629-653.
- King, P. (2013). *Thinking Past a Problem: Essays on the History of Ideas*, Taylor & Francis.
- Kingston, R. (1996). *Montesquieu and the Parlement of Bordeaux*, Librairie Droz.
- Kingston, R. (2008). *Montesquieu and His Legacy*, State University of New York Press.
- Klein, L. E. (1994). *Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness: Moral Discourse and Cultural Politics in Early Eighteenth-Century England*, Cambridge University Press.
- Korsgaard, C. M. (December 2012). *The Unity of the Right and the Good in John Rawls's Thought*. American Philosophical Association in December.
- Koselleck, R. and T. S. Presner (2002). *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts*, Stanford University Press.

- Krause, S. (1999). "The Politics of Distinction and Disobedience: Honor and the Defense of Liberty in Montesquieu." *Polity* 31(3): 469-499.
- Krause, S. (2000). "The Spirit of Separate Powers in Montesquieu." *The Review of Politics* 62(2): 231-265.
- Krause, S. (2002a). *Liberalism with honor*. Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press.
- Krause, S. (2002b). "The Uncertain Inevitability of Decline in Montesquieu." *Political Theory* 30(5): 702-727.
- Krause, S. (2003). "History and the Human Soul in Montesquieu." *History of Political Thought* 24(2): 235-261.
- Krause, S. (2011). "Bodies in Action: Corporeal Agency and Democratic Politics." *Political Theory* 39(3): 299-324.
- Kukathas, C. (2003). *The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom*, OUP Oxford.
- LaCapra, D. (1983). *Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, Contexts, Language*, Cornell University Press.
- Lamb, R. (2009). "Quentin Skinner's revised historical contextualism: a critique." *History of the Human Sciences* 22(3): 51-73.
- Larrère, C. (2001). *Montesquieu on Economics and Commerce. Montesquieu's Science of Politics: Essays on the Spirit of the Laws*. D. W. Carrithers, M. A. Mosher and P. A. Rahe, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- LaVaque-Manty, M. (2006). "Dueling for Equality: Masculine Honor and the Modern Politics of Dignity." *Political Theory* 34(6): 715-740.
- Lee Auspitz, J. (1976). "Individuality, Civility, and Theory: The Philosophical Imagination of Michael Oakeshott." *Political Theory* 4(3): 261-294.
- Levy, J. T. (2006). "Beyond Publius: Montesquieu, Liberal Republicanism and the Small-Republic Thesis." *History of Political Thought* 27(1): 50-90.
- Levy, J. T. (2009). "Not So Novus an Ordo: Constitutions Without Social Contracts." *Political Theory* 37(2): 191-217.
- Liebeschuetz, J. H. W. G. (2001). *The Decline and Fall of the Roman City*, Oxford University Press.
- Linton, M. (2001). *The Politics of Virtue in Enlightenment France*, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Loriaux, M. (1992). "The Realists and Saint Augustine: Skepticism, Psychology, and Moral Action in International Relations Thought." *International Studies Quarterly* 36(4): 401-420.
- Lovejoy, A. O. (1948). *The great chain of being: a study of the history of an idea* Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
- Lowenthal, D. (2012). *Montesquieu. History of Political Philosophy*, University of Chicago Press: 513-534.
- Lutz, D. S. (1984). "The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought." *The American Political Science Review* 78(1): 189-197.
- Lutz, M. J. (1997). "Civic Virtue and Socratic Virtue." *Polity* 29(4): 565-592.

- Lynn, J. A. (1999). *The wars of Louis XIV, 1667-1714*, Longman.
- Lyons, D. (1965). *Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism*, Clarendon Press.
- MacDonald, S. (2003). "Problems with Principles: Montesquieu's Theory of Natural Justice." *History of Political Thought* XXIV(No.1): 109-130.
- Macedo, S. (1990). *Liberal virtues: citizenship, virtue, and community in liberal constitutionalism*, Clarendon Press.
- Macfarlane, A. (2002). *The Riddle of the Modern World: Of Liberty, Wealth and Equality*, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Machiavelli, N. (2007). *History of Florence and of the Affairs of Italy*.
- Machiavelli, N. and A. Gilbert (1989). *Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others*, Duke University Press.
- MacIntyre, A. (2013). *After Virtue*, Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Mackie, J. L. (2003). *Hume's Moral Theory*, Taylor & Francis.
- Mandeville, B. (1732). *An enquiry into the origin of honour and the usefulness of Christianity in war, by the author of the fable of the bees*.
- Mandeville, B. (1988). *The Fable of the Bees or Private Vices, Publick Benefits*. Indianapolis, Liberty Fund.
- Manent, P. (1994). *The city of man*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
- Manent, P. (1994). "Montesquieu and the Modern Experience." *Government and Opposition* 29(03): 378-391.
- Manent, P. and R. Balinski (1996). *An Intellectual History of Liberalism*, Princeton University Press.
- Manin, B. (1984). "Les deux libéralismes: marché ou contre-pouvoirs." *Intervention mai-juillet*(9): 10-24.
- Manin, B. (1987). "On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation." *Political Theory* 15(13): 338-368.
- Manin, B. (2001). "Montesquieu, la république et le commerce." *European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 42(03): 573-602.
- Mansfield, H. C. (1995). "Self-Interest Rightly Understood." *Political Theory* 23(1): 48-66.
- Markus, R. A. (1988). *Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St Augustine*, Cambridge University Press.
- Marso, L. J. (1998). "The Stories of Citizens: Rousseau, Montesquieu, and de Staël Challenge Enlightenment Reason." *Polity* 30(3): 435-463.
- Mason, S. M. (2012). *Montesquieu's Idea of Justice*, Springer Netherlands.
- Masterson, M. P. (1972). "Montesquieu's Grand Design: The Political Sociology of 'Esprit des Lois'." *British Journal of Political Science* 2(03): 283-318.
- Maxwell, L. (2006). "Liberalism and Fear." *Political Theory* 34(4): 506-509.
- McCabe, D. (2010). *Modus Vivendi Liberalism: Theory and Practice*, Cambridge University Press.

- McMahon, D. M. and S. Moyn (2014). *Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History*, OUP USA.
- McMylor, P. (1994). *Alasdair MacIntyre: Critic of Modernity*, Routledge.
- Meloni, J.-F. (1738). *A Political Essay upon Commerce*. Dublin, Philip Crampton.
- Meloni, J. F., et al. (1983). *Opere: 1,2, Lib. Testi Universitari*.
- Miller, D. (1992). "Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice." *Political Studies XL(Special Issue)*: 54-67.
- Moon, J. D. (2012). *Constructing Community: Moral Pluralism and Tragic Conflicts*, Princeton University Press.
- Morgenthau, H., et al. (2005). *Politics Among Nations*, McGraw-Hill Education.
- Mosher, M. A. (1984). "The Particulars of a Universal Politics: Hegel's Adaptation of Montesquieu's Typology." *The American Political Science Review* 78(1): 179-188.
- Mosher, M. A. (1994). "The Judgmental Gaze of European Women: Gender, Sexuality, and the Critique of Republican Rule." *Political Theory* 22(1): 25-44.
- Mosher, M. A. (2001). *Monarchy's Paradox. Montesquieu's Science of Politics: Essays on the Spirit of Laws*. D. W. Carrithers, M. A. Mosher and P. A. Rahe, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Mosher, M. A. (2007). *Free Trade, Free Speech and Free Love: Monarchy from the Liberal Prospect in Mid-eighteenth Century France. Monarchisms in the Age of Enlightenment: Liberty, Patriotism and the Common Good*. L. C. Blom H., Simonutti C., University of Toronto Press.
- Murray, J. H. (1997). *Reconstructing Realism*. Edinburgh, Keele University Press.
- Nagel, T. (1995). *Equality and Partiality*, Oxford University Press, USA.
- Näsström, S. (2014). "The Right to Have Rights: Democratic, Not Political." *Political Theory* 42(5): 543-568.
- Nelson, E. (2006). *The Greek Tradition in Republican Thought*, Cambridge University Press.
- Nicole, P. and C. Jourdain (1845). *Œuvres philosophiques et morales de Nicole: comprenant un choix de ses essais*, L. Hachette.
- Noble, T. F. X. (2004). *Noble-Western Civilization: The Continuing Experiment*, Houghton Mifflin.
- Oakeshott, M. (1939). "The Claims of Politics." *Scrutiny*(September): 146-150.
- Oakeshott, M. (2000). *Hobbes on Civil Association*. Indianapolis, Liberty Fund.
- Oakeshott, M. and S. R. Letwin (1993). *Morality and Politics in Modern Europe: The Harvard Lectures*, Yale University Press.
- Outhwaite, W. (2013). *Habermas: A Critical Introduction*, Wiley.
- Pangle, T. L. (1989). *Montesquieu's Philosophy of Liberalism: A Commentary on The Spirit of the Laws*, University of Chicago Press.
- Pettit, P. (1999). *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government*, Oxford University Press.
- Pettit, P. (2002). "Keeping Republican Freedom Simple: On a Difference with Quentin Skinner." *Political Theory* 30(3): 339-356.

- Pilecki, W. and J. Garlinski (2012). *The Auschwitz Volunteer: Beyond Bravery*, National Book Network.
- Plamenatz, J. (1963). *Man and Society: a critical examination of some important social and political theories from Machiavelli to Marx*. London, Longmans.
- Plato and D. Gallop (1997). *Defence of Socrates; Euthyphro; Crito*, Oxford University Press.
- Plato and R. Waterfield (1994). *Republic*, Oxford University Press.
- Pocock, J. G. A. (1981). "Virtues, Rights, and Manners: A Model for Historians of Political Thought." *Political Theory* 9(3): 353-368.
- Pocock, J. G. A. (2009). *Political Thought and History: Essays on Theory and Method*, Cambridge University Press.
- Primer, I. (2012). *Mandeville Studies: New Explorations in the Art and Thought of Dr. Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733)*, Springer Netherlands.
- Radasanu, A. (2010). "Montesquieu on Moderation, Monarchy and Reform." *History of Political Thought* 31(2): 283-308.
- Rahe, P. A. (2009). *Montesquieu and the Logic of Liberty: War, Religion, Commerce, Climate, Terrain, Technology, Uneasiness of Mind, the Spirit of Political Vigilance, and the Foundations of the Modern Republic*, Yale University Press.
- Rahe, P. A. (2011). "Montesquieu's anti-Machiavellian Machiavellianism." *History of European Ideas* 37(2): 128-136.
- Rawls, J. (2009). *A Theory of Justice*, Harvard University Press.
- Ray, B. N. (1999). *Liberalism and the Communitarian Challenge*, Kanishka Publishers.
- Richter, M. (1976). "An Introduction to Montesquieu's 'An Essay on the Causes That May Affect Men's Minds and Characters'." *Political Theory* 4(2): 132-138.
- Richter, M. (1977). *The Political Theory of Montesquieu*, Cambridge University Press.
- Richter, M. (1990). *Selected Political Writings*, Hackett Publishing Company.
- Riley, P. (1978). "The General Will Before Rousseau." *Political Theory* 6(4): 485-516.
- Robin, C. (2000). "Reflections on Fear: Montesquieu in Retrieval." *The American Political Science Review* 94(2): 347-360.
- Rombs, R. J. (2006). *Saint Augustine and the Fall of the Soul: Beyond O'Connell & His Critics*, Catholic University of America Press.
- Rorty, R., et al. (1984). *Philosophy in History: Essays in the Historiography of Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press.
- Rosenberg, N. (1963). "Mandeville and Laissez-Faire." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 24(2): 183-196.
- Rosenblum, N. L. (1989). *Liberalism and the Moral Life*, Harvard University Press.
- Rosow, S. J. (1984). "Commerce, Power and Justice: Montesquieu on International Politics." *The Review of Politics* 46(3): 346-366.
- Rousseau, J. J. and M. Cranston (2003). *A Discourse on Inequality*, Penguin Books Limited.

- Rousseau, J. J., et al. (2012). *The Basic Political Writings (Second Edition)*, Hackett Publishing Company.
- Rousseau, J. J., et al. (2002). *The Social Contract: And, The First and Second Discourses*, Yale University Press.
- Rousseau, J. J., et al. (1964). *The First and Second Discourses: By Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, Bedford/St. Martin's.
- Rudolph, R. (1986). "Conflict, Egoism and Power in Hobbes." *History of Political Thought* VII(1): 73-88.
- Samuel, A. J. (2009). "The Design of Montesquieu's 'The Spirit of the Laws': The Triumph of Freedom over Determinism." *The American Political Science Review* 103(2): 305-321.
- Sandel, M. J. (1998). *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, Cambridge University Press.
- Schaub, D. J. (1995). *Erotic liberalism: women and revolution in Montesquieu's Persian letters*, Rowman & Littlefield.
- Schaub, D. J. (1995). *Erotic liberalism: women and revolution in Montesquieu's Persian letters*, Rowman & Littlefield.
- Scheffler, S. (1994). *The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions*, Clarendon Press.
- Schmitt-Maaß, C., et al. (2014). *Fénelon in the Enlightenment: Traditions, Adaptations, and Variations: With a preface by Jacques Le Brun*, Editions Rodopi.
- Shackleton, R. (1961). *Montesquieu: a critical biography*, Oxford University Press.
- Shackleton, R. (1964). "Montesquieu and Machiavelli: A Reappraisal." *Comparative Literature Studies* 1(1): 1-13.
- Shackleton, R., et al. (1949). *Essays on Montesquieu and on the Enlightenment*, Voltaire Foundation at the Taylor Institution.
- Shapiro, I. (2009). "Reflections on Skinner and Pettit." *Hobbes Studies* 22(2): 185-191.
- Sharon, K. (1998). *The Politics of Distinction and Disobedience: Honor and the Defense of Liberty in Montesquieu*. The Department of Government. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University. Doctor of Philosophy in the subject of Political Thought.
- Sharpe, M. (2015). 13 Cicero, Voltaire, and the Philosophes in the French Enlightenment. *Brills Companion to the Reception of Cicero*, Brill: 327-356.
- Shklar, J. N. (1984). *Ordinary Vices*, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Shklar, J. N. (1987). *Montesquieu*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Shklar, J. N. (1989). *The Liberalism of Fear*. *Liberalism and the Moral Life*. N. L. Rosenblum, Harvard University Press.
- Shklar, J. N. (1990). *Montesquieu and the New Republicanism*. *Machiavelli and Republicanism*. G. Bock, Q. Skinner and M. Viroli, Cambridge University Press. 13.
- Shklar, J. N. (1990a). *The Faces of Injustice*, Yale University Press.
- Shklar, J. N. and S. Hoffmann (1998). *Political Thought and Political Thinkers*, University of Chicago Press.

- Shklar, J. N. and S. Hoffmann (1998). *Political Thought and Political Thinkers*, University of Chicago Press.
- Shklar, J. N. and B. Yack (1996). *Liberalism Without Illusions: Essays on Liberal Theory and the Political Vision of Judith N. Shklar*, University of Chicago Press.
- Shovlin, J. (2000). "The Cultural Politics of Luxury in Eighteenth-Century France." *French Historical Studies* 23(4).
- Skinner, Q. (1992). *Great Political Thinkers*, Oxford University Press.
- Skinner, Q. (1998). *Liberty Before Liberalism*, Cambridge University Press.
- Skinner, Q. (2002). *Visions of Politics*, Cambridge University Press.
- Skinner, Q. (2003). *A Third Concept of Liberty: ISAIAH BERLIN LECTURE*. Proceedings of the British Academy, Volume 117. Oxford, British Academy.
- Skinner, Q. (2008). *Hobbes and Republican Liberty*, Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, A. and K. Haakonssen (2002). *Adam Smith: The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, S. B. (1986). "Goodness, Nobility & Virtue in Aristotle's Political Science." *Polity* 19(1): 5-26.
- Sonenscher, M. (2009). *Before the Deluge: Public Debt, Inequality, and the Intellectual Origins of the French Revolution*, Princeton University Press.
- Spector, C. (2003). "Montesquieu: Critique of republicanism?" *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 6(1): 38-53.
- Spector, C. (2004). *Montesquieu: Pouvoirs, richesses et sociétés*, Presses Universitaires de France - PUF.
- Spector, C. (2008). *Honor, Interest, Virtue: The Affective Foundations of the Political in The Spirit of the Laws. Montesquieu and His Legacy*. R. Kingston, State University of New York Press.
- Spector, C. (2010). *Montesquieu: liberté, droit et histoire*, Michalon.
- Spector, C. (2012). *Was Montesquieu liberal? The Spirit of the Laws in the history of liberalism French Liberalism from Montesquieu to the Present Day*, Cambridge University Press.
- Spector, C. and T. Hoquet (2004). *Lectures de l'Esprit des lois*, Presses universitaires de Bordeaux.
- Spector, H. (2010). "Four Conceptions of Freedom." *Political Theory* 38(6): 780-808.
- Speier, H. (1977). "The Truth in Hell: Maurice Joly on Modern Despotism." *Polity* 10(1): 18-32.
- Spitz, D. (1974). *Essays in the Liberal Idea of Freedom*, Arizona U.P.
- Spragens, T. A. (1999). *Civic Liberalism: Reflections on Our Democratic Ideals*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Stead, G. C., et al. (1993). *Christian Faith and Greek Philosophy in Late Antiquity: Essays in Tribute to George Christopher Stead, Ely Professor of Divinity, University of Cambridge (1971-1980)*, in *Celebration of His Eightieth Birthday*, 9th April 1993, E.J. Brill.
- Steinberger, P. J. (2009). "Analysis and History of Political Thought." *The American Political Science Review* 103(1): 135-146.

- Stephen, J. F. (1991). *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity: And Three Brief Essays*, University of Chicago Press.
- Strauss, L. (1959). *What is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies*, University of Chicago Press.
- Strauss, L. and J. Cropsey (1987). *History of Political Philosophy*, University of Chicago Press.
- Sullivan, V. (2006). "Against the Despotism of a Republic: Montesquieu's Correction of Machiavelli in the Name of the Security of the Individual." *History of Political Thought* 27(2): 263-289.
- Swain, L. A. (2001). "The Secret Chain: Justice and Self-interest in Montesquieu's Persian Letters." *History of Political Thought* 22(1): 84-105.
- Tenenbaum, S. (1973). "Montesquieu and Mme. De Stael: The Woman as a Factor in Political Analysis." *Political Theory* 1(1): 92-103.
- TeSelle, E. (1988). "Toward an Augustinian politics." *Journal of Religious Ethics* 16(1): 87-108.
- Teske, R. J. and J. E. Rotelle (1997). *Answer to the Pelagians*, New City Press.
- Thiemann, R. F. (2009). *Montesquieu and the Future of Liberalism. Montesquieu and His Legacy*. R. E. Kingston. Albany NY, State University of New York Press.
- Titelbaum, M. G. (2008). "What Would a Rawlsian Ethos of Justice Look Like?" *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 36(3): 289-322.
- Turner, B. P. (2016). "Mandeville against Luxury." *Political Theory* 44(1): 26-52.
- Ullmann, W. (1966). *The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages: Walter Ullman*, Johns Hopkins Press.
- Vile, J. C. (1967). *Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers*, By M.J.C. Vile. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Viner, J. (1958). *The Long View and the Short: Studies in Economic Theory and Policy*. London, Allen and Unwin.
- Virgil, F., H.R. (1999). *VIRGIL, V.1: ECLOGUES / GEORGICS /: AENEID*, HARVARD UNIVERSITY P.
- Voltaire (1843). *Mélanges historiques. Politique et législation. Physique*, Chez Firmin-Didot Frères.
- Vyverberg, H. (1958). *Historical Pessimism in the French Enlightenment*, by Henry Vyverberg, Massachusetts.
- Ware, N. J. (1931). "The Physiocrats: a study in economic rationalisation." *American Economic Review* 21(4): 607.
- Wetzel, J. (1992). *Augustine and the Limits of Virtue*, Cambridge University Press.
- Whiteside, K. H. (1999). "Justice Uncertain: Judith Shklar on Liberalism, Skepticism, and Equality." *Polity* 31(3): 501-524.
- Will, G. F. (1984). *Statecraft as Soulcraft*, Touchstone.
- Williams, T. (1993). *On Free Choice of the Will*, Hackett Publishing Company.
- Wolfe, C. (1977). "The Confederate Republic in Montesquieu." *Polity* 9(4): 427-445.

Young, D. (1978). "Montesquieu's View of Despotism and His Use of Travel Literature." *The Review of Politics* 40(03): 392-405.

Zuckert, M. (2001). "Natural Law, Natural Rights, and Classical Liberalism: On Montesquieu's Critique of Hobbes." *Social Philosophy and Policy* 18(01): 227-251.