Introduction: understanding the consequences of the Arab Uprisings--structural variations and divergent trajectories

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This introduction sets the context for the following articles by first conceptualizing the divergent post-Uprising trajectories taken by varying states: these are distinguished first by whether state capacity collapses or persists, and if it persists, whether the outcome is a hybrid regime or polyarchy. It then assesses how far starting points—the features of the regime and of the uprising—explain these pathways. Specifically, the varying levels of anti-regime mobilization, explained by factors such as levels of grievances, patterns of cleavages and opportunity structure, determines whether rulers are quickly removed or stalemate sets in. Additionally, the ability of regime and opposition soft-liners to reach a transition pact greatly shapes democratic prospects. But, also important is the capacity—coercive and co-optative—of the authoritarian rulers to resist, itself a function of factors such as the balance between the patrimonial and bureaucratic features of in neo-patrimonial regimes.

Keywords: Arab Uprising, mobilization, democratization, neo-patrimonialism, state capacity

What are the consequences of the Arab Uprisings for democratization in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) area? The Arab Uprisings that began in 2010 had, as of the end of 2014, removed four presidents and seemingly made more mobilized mass publics an increased factor in the politics of regional states. It is, however, one thing to remove a leader and quite another to create stable and inclusive “democratic” institutions. The main initial problematic of the Arab Uprising was how to translate mass protest into democratization and ultimately democratic consolidation. Yet, despite the fact that democracy was the main shared demand of the protestors who spearheaded the uprisings, there was, four years later, little evidence of democratization; what explains this “modest harvest,” as Brownlee et.al.¹ put it?

Neither of the rival paradigms, democratization theory (DT) and “post-democratization approaches (PDT), that have been used to understand the Middle East have come out of the Uprising looking vindicated. The PDT theme of authoritarian resilience, in its focus on elite strategies for managing participatory demands, had clearly overestimated their efficacy, neglected their negative side effects and underestimated the agency of populations. Yet, the democratization paradigm has also since suffered from the failure of revolt to lead to democracy.² Rather than either a uniform authoritarian restoration or democratization, the Uprising has set different states on a great variety of different trajectories. As Morten Valbjorn argues in his contribution, grasping this complexity requires moving beyond both DT and PDT.

This introductory article first conceptualizes the variations in post-Uprising trajectories. It then seeks to explain how far the starting point—the features of both regimes and oppositions in the uprisings--explain these post-Uprising variations, specifically looking at: 1) anti-regime mobilization, both its varying scale and capacity to leverage a peaceful

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transition from incumbent rulers and 2) variations in authoritarian resistance to the Uprising, a function of their vulnerabilities, resources and “fightback” strategies.” This will provide the context for the following contributions which focus on post-Uprising agency, that is, the struggle of rival social forces—the military, civil society, Islamists and workers—to shape outcomes. These contributions give special attention to three states that are iconic of the main outcomes, namely state failure and civil war (Syria); “restoration” of a hybrid regime (Egypt); and democratic transition (Tunisia). In the conclusion of the special issue, the evidence is summarized regarding how the power balance among post-Uprising social forces and the political cultural and political economy contexts in which they operated explain variations in emergent regime outcomes.

**Alternative post-uprising trajectories**

The quite various outcomes or trajectories of the Arab uprisings appear best conceptualized in terms of movement along two separate continuums, level of state consolidation and regime type. Moreover variations in the states’ starting points on these dimensions at the time of the Uprising will arguably affect trajectories.

As regards state consolidation, if the Uprising leads to democratization this ought to strengthen states in that it would accord them greater popular consent, hence capacity to carry out their functions. However, the initial impact of the Uprising was state weakening, with the extreme being state collapse or near collapse (Libya, Syria), where democratization prospects appear to be foreclosed for the immediate future. Yet, even amidst such state failure, new efforts at state remaking can be discerned. Such competitive state making in MENA was first conceptualized by the North African “father” of historical sociology, Ibn Khaldun, and adopted by Max Weber, who identified the “successful” pathways to authority building dominant in MENA, notably the charismatic movement which tended to be institutionalized in patrimonial rule, perhaps mixed with bureaucratic authority. Ibn Khaldoun’s “cycles” of rise and decline in state building appear better suited to MENA than the idea of a progressive increase in state consolidation; indeed the history of state making in MENA has, described a bell-shaped curve of rise and decline, with the current state failure merely a nadir in this decline.

As for regime type, if one measures variations in regimes along Dahl’s two separate dimensions by which power is distributed, level of elite contestation and level of mass inclusion, a greater variety of regime types is possible than the simple authoritarian-democratic dichotomy and this variation may explain both vulnerabilities to the Uprising and likely outcomes. Patrimonial regimes low in both proved quite viable in the face of the Uprising, as did the persistence of absolute monarchy in the tribal oil-rich Arab Gulf. Polyarchy, high on elite contestation and mass inclusion, has been rare in MENA. The region has, however, experienced various “hybrids” in which some social forces were included in regimes in order to exclude others: thus, the populist authoritarian regimes of the 1960s expanding popular inclusion within single party/corporatist systems, in order to exclude the oligarchies against which they had revolted; when populism was exhausted in the 1980s, they turned “post-populist,” marginally increased elite contestation (e.g. by co-opting new elements into the regime and allowing some party pluralism and electoral competition) in order to co-opt the support needed to exclude the masses. Given that the Uprising initially precipitated both increased elite contestation and mass inclusion, movement toward polyarchy, i.e. democratization, appeared possible. However, rather than linear “progress” toward increased contestation and inclusion, hybrid regimes with different combinations of opening and closing at elite and mass levels are more likely.

Figure 1 adumbrates the alternative trajectories the uprising has so far taken. Where the state fails, the outcome is an authority vacuum, with extreme levels of elite contestation
propelling mass mobilization along identity lines, with rivals competing violently to reconstruct state authority, often pitting the most coercive remnants of state establishments with charismatic Islamist insurgencies (Syria, Libya, Yemen). The rival regimes are likely to be hybrids constructed around patrimonial or charismatic leadership and remnants of bureaucratic state institutions, with very limited elite contestation within such regimes-information and with identity groups mobilized around included victors, with the losers coercively excluded.

Where the state does not collapse, two outcomes are possible: the establishment persists and restores its authority or it is taken over by new democratic leadership. In the first case, the new post-Uprising regimes are likely to be hybrids, mixing elements of co-optation, coercion and pluralism—electoral authoritarianism—with middle levels of inclusion. Equally, the state establishment may take advantages of widening identity cleavages within society, such as that between secularists and Islamists, to divide and rule, including one segment in order to exclude the other, as in Egypt. Only Tunisia approximates the second case of democratic transition.

Figure 1: Pathways of the Post-Uprising Arab States

Path Dependency: Uprising Starting Points and Subsequent Trajectories
To understand the starting point from which Uprising trajectories departed, we need to assess its drivers—the vulnerabilities of authoritarian regimes and the dimensions of anti-regime mobilization.

Roots of crisis, authoritarian vulnerability
Two theoretical approaches give us insight into the roots of the crisis that exploded in the Arab Uprisings. In modernization theory (MT), the challenge authoritarian regimes face is that once societies reach a certain level of social mobilization (education, literacy, urbanization, size of the middle class) regimes that do not accommodate demands for political participation risk that they will take revolutionary forms unless otherwise contained by exceptional means such as “totalitarianism.” MENA states were in a middle range of modernization where democratization pressures were significant but could still seemingly be
contained and indeed had been in the republics for decades, first by a generation of populist more inclusive forms of authoritarianism (diluted imitations of Soviet “totalitarianism”), later by post-populist “Upgrading.” MT would locate the roots of the Uprising in a growing imbalance between social mobilization and political incorporation. There were some levels of imbalance in all the republics but the depth of the imbalance arguably affected regime trajectories. Thus, levels of social mobilization as measured by indicators such as literacy and urbanization were lowest in Yemen and highest in Tunisia; yet political incorporation was sharply limited in Tunisia; yet co-optation via controlled political liberalization was much more developed in Yemen. The very strong incongruence in Tunisia may help explain the rapid, thorough mobilization and quick departure of the President, as well as the more thorough transition from the old regime; conversely, the stalemated outcome in Yemen may be related to the lower levels of social mobilization combined with still viable traditional practices of co-optation.

Second, Marxist theory locates the crisis in a contradiction between the productive forces and the political superstructure. Gilbert Ashcar argues that the uprisings were stimulated by the contradiction between the imported capitalist mode of production and the blockage of growth by crony capitalist rent seeking patrimonial regimes that failed to invest in productive enterprise, resulting in massive numbers of educated unemployed. Indeed, the Arab Uprising was a product of the republics’ evolution from a formerly inclusionary populist form of authoritarianism to post-populist exclusionary versions under the impact of global neo-liberalism; this move was particularly damaging in the republics, compared to monarchies, because they had founded their legitimacy on nationalism and a populist social contract, both of which they abandoned in the transition to post-populism. The cocktail of grievances that exploded in the Uprising was produced by the growing economic inequality produced the region’s distinct combination of International Monetary Fund-driven “structural adjustment” and crony capitalism. This was driven by region-wide policies of privatization, hollowing out of public services, reduction of labour protections, tax cuts and incentives for investors. Yet economic growth remained anaemic principally because, while public investment plummeted, private investment did not fill the gap and indeed MENA was the region with the highest rate of capital export, in good part because capital was concentrated in a handful of small population rentier monarchies that recycled their petrodollar earnings to the West. This was reinforced by the loss of nationalist legitimacy as regimes aligned with the West. Protests against this evolution had been endemic, beginning with the spread of food riots across the region in the 1980s—but, at the same time the regime’s strategies of “authoritarian upgrading” meant to make up for the exclusion of their popular constituencies, such as divide and rule through limited political liberalization; co-optation of the crony capitalist beneficiaries of neo-liberalism, and offloading of welfare responsibilities to Islamic charities, had appeared sufficient to keep protests episodic or localized enough to be contained by the security forces, preventing a sustained mass movement.

Bringing the modernization and Marxist approaches together, we can hypothesize that in the short term authoritarian upgrading had reached its limits and had begun to produce negative side effects. Thus, the wealth concentration and conspicuous consumption of crony capitalists was paralleled by growth of unemployment among middle class university graduates—the force that spearheaded the uprising; the excessively long tenure of presidents, their attempts to engineer dynastic succession and an over-concentration of wealth and opportunities in presidential families alienated elites as well. On the other hand, political liberalization had stalled or been reversed in the years just preceding the Uprising, with, for example, manipulated elections becoming more a source of grievance than of co-optation.

In addition, the republics suffered leadership de-legitimation from the very long tenures of many presidents.
Ultimately, the particular depth of the crises in each country was a function of the relative degree of economic blockage and the imbalance between social mobilization and political incorporation. However, states were set on varying trajectories by the specific initial features of the uprising in each, shaped by the interaction between varying levels of anti-regime mobilization and varying levels of regime resilience in the face of this mobilization.

Variations in mobilization across cases
While the literature on the Uprising has noted the apparently greater immunity of the monarchies to anti-regime mobilization, as compared to the republics, much less appreciated are the variations in levels of mobilization among the uprising states: while in Egypt and Tunisia widespread bandwagoning against the regime led to the relatively rapid departure of presidents. Large cross-class coalitions, involving revolutionary youth, union activists, Islamists and the urban poor joined to overwhelm by sheer numbers the very substantial security forces and to converged on the centre of power while no social forces—even the constituents of the large ruling parties—seemed prepared to defend the regime. By contrast in Syria, Libya, Yemen and Bahrain there was enough mobilization to destabilize the state but regimes had core constituencies prepared to defend them and wider groups unwilling to bandwagon with the opposition, obstructing the irresistible mobilization needed to sweep away incumbent rulers. What explains these variations?

Social movement theory (SMT) identifies two factors—the framing of grievances via a vision of change and the political opportunity structure. Arguably levels of grievances had reached a tipping point and opportunity structure had become more favourable for challenges to regimes, albeit not uniformly across different states. Although grievances were ubiquitous, variations in their intensity affected the ability of movements to mobilize discontent. Given that the Uprising was a reaction to post-populism, a working hypothesis would be that, other things being equal, the earlier post-populism began, hence the more advanced it likely was, the deeper the class inequalities, the more intense the accumulation of grievances and the more widespread mobilization was likely to be. In MENA the move to post-populism, a main root of grievances, was most advanced in Tunisia and Egypt which had pioneered it in the 1970s, while in Syria, where it came three decades later, its impact would likely have been lesser. Similarly, the extent of regime nationalist de-legitimation—from alignment with the US, separate peace with Israel—varied, with notably Syria enjoying a certain nationalist legitimacy as the one regime that had eschewed this foreign policy submission to the West.

However, complicating matters is that populations are divided not just by class inequalities but also by communal (sectarian, ethnic) cleavages. Where class cleavages are not cross cut by communal cleavages or where there is a substantial overlap between them, especially where identity separated the ruling group from deprived societal majorities, as in Bahrain, mobilization would be expected to be more intense; indeed, perhaps 40% of the population was estimated to participate in demonstrations at the core of power, Pearl Square, and it evidently took external intervention (by Saudi Arabia) to put an end to it, although the mobilization by the regime of its sectarian minority constituency precluded the sort of total anti-regime mobilization approximated in Egypt and Tunisia. Where communal cleavages cross-cut class, with, e.g. a cross-communal upper class benefiting from post-populism while retaining clients in the lower classes, as in Lebanon, mobilization against the regime would be limited or divided into pro and anti-regime movements. A middle case would be Syria, where a substantial portion of the Sunni urban upper and middle strata, particularly beneficiaries of post-populism, aligned with the minority dominated regime or at least did not join the opposition, while a substantial anti-regime coalition joining middle class activists and
the rural poor who had been victimized by post-populism, mobilized large enough numbers to de-stabilize the regime but not to overthrow it, resulting in stalemate.

As SMT argues, mobilization requires not just grievances, but also a permissive opportunity structure in which societal opposition can overcome atomization and combine for collective action. Compared to homogeneous societies, where society is fragmented along identity lines, mass mobilization is obstructed as compared to homogeneous society where shared identity facilitates it. Also important is the extent of civil society organization—whether it has enough density and autonomy to give people associative experience beyond primordial solidarities and without which people remain atomized. In this regard, why the revolt began in 2010 and not before may be down to the improving opportunity structure owing to the pre-Uprising region-wide growth of civil society. But civil society was much more advanced in Egypt and Tunisia because the early onset of neo-liberalism had both necessitated greater tolerance for it and had also led to years of protest experience by activists that generated organizational skills and networks that would be crucial in the uprising. Finally, autonomous communications technology is crucial to overcoming atomization: the new electronic communications had made the public more politically conscious, interconnected and mobilizable than hitherto, although more so where it was well established than where it was relatively new or IT penetration limited (Syria, Yemen). The social media were sources of networking and mobilization for activists. The pre-existing single Arab public space created by exposure to Arab satellite TV created a powerful demonstration effect: the early success of the Uprising in Tunisia led to a re-calculation by alienated individuals elsewhere that they could actually bring down a dictator; similarly the wide media depiction of the outside intervention against the Libyan regime changed the calculations of actors elsewhere, notably in Syria, where many believed they would be protected by the “international community” yet, similarly, as further into the uprising, the consequences—chaos, civil war—became widely disseminated, calculations would change, with some reverting to political passivity, and others committed to armed struggle—each antithetic to democratic transition.

In summary, higher levels of mobilization against regimes were more likely in homogeneous societies with social mobilization levels far exceeding institutional incorporation, with developed civil society and protest experience, considerable IT penetration, and accumulating grievances generating dominant class cleavages, such as Egypt and Tunisia; where mobilization is more rapid, massive, unified, and peaceful, chances increase that presidents quickly go and a democratic transition is possible. Where class and communal (identity) cleavages crosscut each other mobilization and mobilization is diluted or rival mobilizations checkmate each other, leaders can hang on, resulting in a failed state or authoritarian restoration. However, level of mobilization is only one variable shaping outcomes; another is the dynamics of bargaining between regime and opposition.

Explaining the mobilization—democratization disconnect
The Arab Uprising produced substantial pro-democracy mobilization across many states but the outcome was very different. According to the mass protest paradigm, as delineated notably by Stephan and Chenoweth, mass protest can readily destabilize authoritarian regimes; even if the regime refuses protestors’ demands and uses violence against them, this is likely to backfire, stimulating wider anti-regime mobilization, precipitating international sanctions and support for the opposition, and, most importantly, causing defections in the security forces, which will be reluctant to use violence against fellow citizens who are not themselves using violence. All of these phenomena were observable in the Arab Uprisings. How regimes responded to protests mattered; indeed one commonality was that the brutal overreaction of
security forces against protesters spread rebellion to much wider sections of the population. Videos of beatings and shootings escalated demands for reform into demands for the “fall of the regime.” Why then did mass protest not translate into democratization in MENA? The mass resistance literature cannot explain variations in outcome because it ignores differences in the scale of mass mobilization (hence pressure on regimes) and the capacity of opposition leaders to split the regime, a requisite of translating mobilization into peaceful transition. The transition paradigm identifies the pre-condition that allows protest to initiate a democratic transition, namely a pact between moderates in the ruling elite and among the opposition wherein the latter refrain from threatening the vital interests of incumbents who, in return, concede a pluralisation of the political system, enabling a transition coalition composed of both insiders and outsiders to preside over democratization. Where protests remain peaceful the chances of such a democratic transition increases since it encourages moderates within the regime to push for reform and/or withdraw their support from hard-line authoritarians; democratic transition is less likely when rebels make maximalist demands or resort to violence, thereby empowering regime hardliners against the moderates. In Egypt and Tunisia insider-outsider coalitions (e.g. the army and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt) came together to engineer a peaceful exit of the president, ushering in a possible transition from authoritarianism. However, it is very difficult for the sort of unorganized mass protests, lacking leadership or organization that characterized the Arab Uprising, to bargain with regimes and exploit hardliner-soft-liner cleavages; as such, they tended to fall back on maximalist all or nothing demands which empowered regime hardliners, leading to either regime collapse, or civil wars in Syria and Libya where no mediators could engineer a transition coalition. When revolts turn violent the chances of democratization sharply decline.

Authoritarian resilience
The other side of the coin of opportunity structure, regime capacity to resist, is also important to understanding the great variation in outcomes. Authoritarian regimes had two options for dealing with the Uprisings: co-optation or repression and their resilience was a function their ability to effectively mix the two. But what explains these capacities?

Variation in regime type is said to explain the reliability of the coercive apparatus. For Stephan and Linz, Weber’s “Sultanism,” a regime type in which the leader enjoys the absolute loyalty of a personally dependent “staff” explains the inability of protests to separate regimes from their leaders in Libya and Syria; however unlike the household slaves of Sultans in modern states elites are not personal dependents of rulers and, indeed, preside over institutional domains. Brownlee, et. al. argue that dynasticism—the transfer of power from father to son—denotes the exceptional intra-elite loyalty to the leader needed to ensure reliable coercive capacity; yet many monarchies suffered coups by their militaries in the 1950s-60s; nor does hereditary succession in a republic enjoy even the putative legitimacy it has in actual monarchies. Several of the republican leaders were preparing such a transition but only in Syria had it come about and Syria’s Asad never enjoyed undisputed authority, having to share power with other elites who presided over institutional “centres of power.”

More useful for understanding MENA is the neo-Weberian concept of neopatrimonialism, a hybrid of personal and bureaucratic authority in which there can be considerable variation in the relative balance between the two sources of authority. Such variations may go some way to explaining how the regimes reacted to the Uprising and the resulting differences in trajectories. Stephan and Linz argued that the more patrimonial the regime the less likely a peaceful transition in the face of protests since there would less likely be soft-liners in the regime with enough independence of the leader to ally with soft-liners in the opposition to remove the president; thus, in Syria the security forces were colonized by
the presidential clan’s clientele network, elites remained cohesive behind the president; conversely, where the state bureaucratic apparatus enjoyed relative autonomy of the leader and was not colonized by a particular identity group, as in Egypt and Tunisia, it was able to sacrifice the presidential family to save the state via agreement between regime soft liners and peaceful protestors. Stacher 19 agrees on the outcome but explains it is almost opposite terms: the relative centralization of power in Egypt allowed the decision to be taken on a swift presidential removal without imperilling the whole regime and allowing, too, its restoration of control over society; in Syria’s more decentralized regime, nobody had the power to decide on a swift transition.

The capability of neo-patrimonial regimes to resist the uprising over the longer term probably depends on some balance between personal authority and bureaucratic capability. While the personal authority of the president helps contain elite factionalism and his clientalization of the state apparatus helps minimize defections when it is called upon to use force against protestors, regimes’ ability to resist longer term insurgencies and to stabilize post-Uprising regimes requires that the state apparatus enjoy institutional capability such as infrastructural penetration of society via the bureaucracy and ruling political party. Thus, the Egyptian state had the bureaucratic capacity to reconstitute its authority over the whole of the country’s territory, except for some contestation by Islamist insurgents in Sinai.

Thus, we can hypothesize that the patrimonial-bureaucratic balance determines regime resistance capacities. Where the bureaucratic capacity is high relative to the patrimonial authority, loyalty to the leader is low but its capacity to sustain the state establishment is high (Tunisia and Egypt); where the patrimonial side is high and the bureaucratic low, the state apparatus stays loyal but the state collapses, as in Libya, where the leader’s clientele networks were far stronger than state institutions. Stalemate is more likely where there is an even patrimonial-bureaucratic balance. In Yemen, splits in the ruling elite core plus weak bureaucratic institutions led to increasing fragmentation of power over state territory. In Syria, state institutions, in spite of colonization by regime in-group assabıyya, were too strong to be overthrown by the opposition but too weak to retain control of the whole territory of the state.

Conclusion
Put together, these variables shaped two polar opposite starting points: 1) quick relatively peaceful leadership change that does not jeopardize the state or 2) protracted violent conflict that puts the state at risk.

1) Where grievances and social mobilization were high, political incorporation low, and the opportunity structure had shifted in favour of society, mass mobilization produced a bandwagoning effect; where state institutions had sufficient capacity and autonomy presidents were rapidly and peacefully removed but state institutions remained intact. This pathway required some minimum form of insider-outsider transition coalition, issuing from negotiations between soft-liners in the army and bureaucracy and a moderate Islamist-democratic opposition coalition. It requires a broadly mobilized (cross-class, cross-sectarian) opposition coalition to force the regime into negotiations and a sufficiency of bureaucratic over patrimonial authority within the regime to empower regime soft-liners.

2) Where social mobilization exceeded political incorporation, and there were enough grievances for anti-regime rebellion to be sustained but insufficient to rapidly remove the patrimonial leader (without external help) owing to the dilution of mobilization by cross-cutting cleavages and insufficient opportunity structure (civil society experience); but where, also, institutions lacked autonomy to turn against the leader and pursue a transition coalition without endangering the whole regime, had sufficient bureaucratic capacity to stand against rebellion yet insufficient to sustain control over the whole territory against rebels, the
outcome was *protracted conflict*, with extended *stalemates* between regime and opposition, leading to varying degrees of state failure, as in Syria, Libya and Yemen. In the Libyan case, external intervention overcame the stalemate but without sufficient conditions for state reconstruction.

These variant starting points generate a path dependency that narrows the chances for some trajectories and enables others. The probabilities are stacked against democratization where the Uprising turns into violent revolt and state failure, with fragments authority among rival leaderships. Peaceful removal of the leader allows *either* moves toward democratic transition *or* restoration of a hybrid regime when, despite removal of the leader, a new exclusionary inside-outsider coalition reverses transitions: thus in Egypt a hardliner coalition of regime and secular opposition re-formed to exclude the Muslim Brotherhood. Nevertheless, such variant outcomes are not predetermined by the starting point and are continually re-shaped by the balance of agency among contending social forces, including external powers, and the political economy and political cultural context in which their competition takes place. These variables are examined in the following articles and summarized in the conclusion.

In the next article, Morten Valjborn, surveys the theoretical debates over democratization in the Middle East, considers the consequences of the Arab Urisings for the credibility of rival democratization and post-democratization paradigms and asks how re-conceptualizations can throw light on the actually existing politics in the post-Uprising Arab world. Vincent Durac then examines anti-regime movements in the light of social movement theory, assessing how it enables us to understand their relative efficacy in challenging regimes but their inability to steer a democratic transition. Joshua Stacher examines the increased violence deployed by regimes to prevent such a transition, arguing that the outcome, the re-making of more coercive authoritarian regimes denotes neither transition or restoration to the pre-Uprising period. Next, Frédéric Volpi and Ewan Stein examine the third major category of players, variegated Islamists, assessing consequences of the relative balance between them for post-Uprising politics. James Allison then examines the positive effect of a class balance, notably the relative efficacy and autonomy of workers’ movements, on democratic potentials. Adham Saouli assesses the oppositive, negative scenario, the mobilization of communal identities by ruling elites and counterelites. Raymond Hinnebusch focuses on the also negative impact of competitive external interference inside the Uprising states on democratization. In the conclusion, the combined effects of the agency of these forces and the political cultural and economic contexts in which they operate are summarized to understand three main divergent trajectories taken by the post-Uprising states.

**Notes**

1 Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, “Why the Modest Harvest?”
2 Pace and Cavatorta, “The Arab Uprisings in Theoretical Perspective.”
3 Hinnebusch, “Historical Sociology and the Arab Uprising.”
4 Sorenson, *Democracy and Democratization*
5 Hinnebusch, “Authoritarian Persistence,” 374-75
7 Brynen, et.al. *Beyond the Arab Spring*, 213-32
8 Idem, 147-72
9 Tripp, *The Power and the People*, 95; Ghobashy, “The Praxis”
10 Lynch, *The Arab Uprising*, 43-65, 165; Brynen, et.al., *Beyond the Arab Spring*, 233-56;
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