Creating Languages in Central Europe: A Longue Durée Perspective

Tomasz Kamusella
University of St Andrews, Scotland, UK

Abstract
Languages are made into discrete entities, as we know them nowadays, from the ‘mass of the continuous linguistic’ by the technology of writing in the service of power centers, usually state capitals. All the choices made on the way – planned or not – amount to standardization (homogenization, or doing away with territorial and social particularities and inconsistences), which intensifies the bigger a percentage of population are literate. Long lasting extant states and religion decidedly shaped the constellation of written languages across (Central) Europe. This constellation, having emerged in the 10th-11th centuries was dramatically remade during the religious wars with the emergence of printing, from the 15th-17th centuries, heralding a growing correlation between vernaculars and written languages, first in Catholic and Protestant Europe, during the 18th-19th centuries in Orthodox Europe, and only in the 20th century in Islamic Europe. The last century also saw the implementation of the political principle of ethnolinguistic nationalism – especially in Central Europe – which claims that the nation-state is legitimate only if it is monolingual and monoscriptural, and does not share its official language with another polity.

Keywords: Central Europe, ethnolinguistic nationalism, Europe, language politics, language standardization, literacy, script, writing

Introduction
In the text I aspire to give a bird’s view of how languages have been created in Europe, with a clear focus on the multiethnic and
polyconfessional center of the continent, during the last millennium. Originally, I was requested to survey all of Europe, but then, in order to dig deeper into the subject matter (as I believe, a simplistic outline would not do), I would need much more space. In view of this predicament, I decided to focus on Central Europe (without neglecting other parts of the continent, when relevant to the story), roughly defined as the vertical middle section of the continent (cf Magocsi 2002). Of course, it is an arbitrary decision, but it should permit me to cover a good degree of diversity – as numerous cultural and political influences from all over the continent have crisscrossed with one another in the region.

As a reminder, I wish to stress that Europe to be seen as a continent requires suspense of disbelief (cf Grataloup 2009). Out of all the world’s continents, Europe fits least well the geographical definition of continent, namely, a large landmass almost entirely encircled by bodies of water, that is, a huge ‘island.’ From this purely definitional vantage, Europe is just another large peninsula or subcontinent of Eurasia, like India. This peninsula was cast in the role of a continent by generations of Western thinkers and politicians, who, in the medieval and early modern times, chose to see the place as ‘special’ and somewhat ‘separate and better’ than the rest of the world. On no account they would agree to even a conceptual union with ‘barbaric Asia’ (cf Calvert 1856: 85). It was believed then that (Christian) Europeans were destined to colonize and ‘civilize through Christianization’ Asians and other parts of the world, as they had already done so in the Americas (cf Sardar, Nandy and Davies 1993).

Before diving into the history and mechanics of language creation in Central Europe, I present a theoretical model and terminology that underpin my analysis. The analysis itself runs the well-trodden path with the following events as its stepping stones, namely, the introduction of writing, the spread of printing in conjunction with the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation,
the implementation of compulsory universal elementary education, the formulation of the normative idea of the ethnolinguistically homogenous nation-state, and the recent rise of the intensively literate society with numerous mass media that through the medium of internet coalesce into the novel dimension of ‘cyberspace.’

The events constitute a shifting and changing stage on which political, social and economic forces led to the emergence of numerous standard languages through which all formal actions, contacts and administration are channelled on the territory of a polity. Given the puny territorial and demographic size of (Central) Europe and its polities in comparison to the rest of today’s world, it is quite surprising that the continent (and especially its central part) should enjoy (or suffer?) the highest number of standard languages in official state use per the unit of population (cf Breton 2003: 22-23).

On the one hand, this unique development is an indirect product of European (Western) colonialism and imperialism that wiped out entire societies and their cultures (including languages), forcing the remaining populations into the mold of Western-style ‘modernization’ (Crosby 1986; Phillipson 1992). That is why, not a single non-European or indigenous language is in official use nowadays in the Americas. The situation is only a bit different in Africa. The Western maritime colonial empires divided the continent among themselves in the late 19th century, but in their vast majority the local ethnic groups and their specific cultures survived this onslaught. However, in the wake of the decolonization of Africa during the latter half of the 20th century, the colonies were mechanically overhauled into nation-states complete with the colonial languages rebranded as the newly independent polities’ official (national) languages.

Pre-colonial non-European and indigenous written languages connected to Islam- or Christianity-related literacy were reintroduced only in Northern Africa (that is, Arabic), Ethiopia
(mainly, Amharic) and Madagascar (Malgasy) (Levtzion and Pouwels 2000; Randrianja and Ellis 2009: 217-219; Ullendorff 1988). The sole cases of inventing and elevating local ethnic languages of no firmly established precolonial tradition of official or religious (or other) literacy to the status of official state languages are afforded by Swahili in Tanzania and Somali in Somalia (Laitin 1977; Mazrui and Mazrui 1998: 123-190). The status of Swahili as a second or third official language is observable in Kenya and Uganda, while that of Kinyarwanda and Kirundi in Rwanda and Burundi, respectively (Mazrui and Mazrui 1998: 123-158; Obeng and Hartford 2002: 88-89). Atypically, in 1994, post-apartheid South Africa announced nine of its non-European indigenous languages as official, alongside Afrikaans and English. But the nine had already begun as official and national languages in the apartheid regime’s unrecognized ‘Black’ nation-states, disparagingly referred to as ‘bantustans’ (Orman 2008).

From all the non-European areas, in Asia indigenous languages weathered best the frequently lethal cultural and demographic impact of European (Western) colonialism and imperialism. Unlike in Africa or the Americas, many areas of Asia were characterized by widely developed religion- and state administration-related literacies, often of much longer standing than any European counterparts. Therefore, despite the shattering influence and often the still elevated role of the former colonial languages, Asia is similar to Europe in that its indigenous languages generally serve there in the capacity of the media of administration and education (Breton 2003: 23; Errington 2008).

**Preliminaries**

*Language or Languages?*

Nowadays, we live in the world that is flamboyantly described with the ubiquitous and vague enough adjective ‘modern.’
Scholars and people at large, when queried, tend to come up with varying definitions or rather less rigorous ad hoc statements of what such a ‘modernity’ is about. I do not wish to enter the fray, but propose that the modern world – or rather the stage on which it unfolds – is constructed from elements belonging to the three categories that nowadays people, quite unreflectively, take for granted, namely, of nations, states and languages. They (including scholars, of course) construe of these elements as discreet, long-lasting (or even ‘eternal,’ at least, from the standpoint of a person’s lifetime), and obvious to such a degree that these entities do not require wasting any deeper thought on them. The elements so ‘normal,’ the popular belief claims that they (though in changing configurations) ‘have always been with us.’

On the other hand, during the last half a century, curious and enterprising scholars have shown that nations and states are invented (imagined) into being by groups of humans (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Hroch 1985). These two types of artifacts are part and parcel of today’s human social reality. We, as members of the species of *Homo sapiens sapiens*, spin this reality with words, constantly interacting with one another through talking (Austin 1962, Searle 1995). Speech makes humans and their groups what they are. In English this foundational activity and its wide-ranging ramifications are referred to with the general term ‘language,’ preceded by no article. The human world, spun through and with language, is construed as ‘culture’ in opposition to ‘nature’ (or material reality) that existed before the humankind, continues to exist irrespective of people’s wishes and acts, and will remain unperturbed after the human species has finally gone extinct.

This language-generated social reality is essentially invisible to the camera lens. It is impossible to capture on film or detect otherwise such artifacts of culture (social reality) as nations or states. They are real and part and parcel of the human social world only to humans partaking in this social world and knowing
of the aforementioned artifacts through interaction with other humans. These artifacts reside in the humans’ minds, as collectively agreed upon ideas, encoded in the brain through specific arrangements of neurons and their states. In this way humans remember and ‘know’ about nations, states and other artifacts of culture of which the human social world is made, and which humans need to live and interact with one another, organized in groups. This close intertwining of the largely invisible (and unknowable to non-humans) human social reality with the material reality of Earth’s surface where people reside is a reflection of the dual biological (genetic) and cultural (language-based) evolution of the modern human (cf Cavalli-Sforza 1981; Shennan 2009).

Languages in plural, as actualizations of the foundational (biological, evolutionary) human capacity for speech or ‘language’ in general (always in singular and with no article in front of it), are as much invented and imagined into being as nations or states (cf Kamusella 2004; Pennycook 2010; Preston 1989). Importantly, language-in-general (or Sprache in German) is part of nature (biological reality), while languages (or Einzelsprachen in German) of culture (social reality). In English the use of the same word ‘language’ for both does not allow for a clear distinction between the two, unlike the German terms, which I introduced above especially for the sake of conceptual clarity.

Humans being a social species par excellence, they invariably live in groups. Distance – be it spatial or social – between groups produces isolation that results – among others – in linguistic differentiation. At the basic level human groups (that is, biologically and culturally self-reproducing communities) speak different – the popular term is – languages. (cf Nettle 1999) I prefer to speak of ‘lects,’ as this neologism appears (for now) to

---

1 I coined the term ‘lect’ from the Greek in its origin morpheme lect in the term ‘dialect.’ (Interestingly, though the Greek word diálektos literally means ‘that may be spoken,’ the aforementioned morpheme alone, lektós, stands for ‘chosen.’) Since the mid-1960s, in technical linguistic vocabulary this morpheme has functioned as a suffix for
be free of any ideological and other value-laden connotations that hinder and muddle dispassionate analysis.

The term ‘a language’ (my lame attempt at rendering German Einzelsprache into English) comes in an ideological package with that of ‘dialect.’ Often, the latter is perceived as something ‘worse’ or ‘lower’ than a ‘proper language.’ In this perspective dialect is seen to be a trait typical of ‘uncultured’ human groups (for instance, ‘tribes’) that ‘stand on a lower rank of civilizational development’ than the invariably ‘Western (European) learned commentator.’ The reader can immediately sense, how this dichotomy of a language and dialect creates this pernicious divide between ‘us and them.’ The former are imagined to be the ‘harbingers of progress and cultivation’ and the latter (from the former’s perspective) are seen as characterized by ‘backwardness and ignorance.’ This kind of rationalization about the human world, as typical of European thought, can be traced back to ancient Greek writings in which Greek-speakers are opposed to ‘barbarians.’ Unable to converse in the Greek language, barbarians spoke what appeared to a typical Greek ‘gibberish,’ subsequently recorded in Greek as bar-bar, and aptly rendered as ‘blah blah blah’ in the English lect (Kramer 1998: 86-87).

During the age of European (Western) colonialism and imperialism, this pseudo-linguistic differentiation of peoples (human groups) allowed for drawing an ideologically ‘justified’ line between colonizers and the colonized. ‘Back home’ in Europe (or the West) this dichotomy also obtained, and to a degree still does, between the educated and empowered who speak ‘properly in the language’ of a state capital and the ‘riff-raff’ talking in ‘a broken language,’ ‘kitchen language’ in the same capital, or worst of all, in a ‘dialect’ (‘jargon,’ ‘idiom,’ ‘patois,’ ‘argot’ and so on), when the subaltern group’s speech is spatially farther removed from that of the elite’s. With the term ‘dialect’ the speech is

\[\text{denoting any language form in such compounds as ‘sociolect,’ ‘acrolect, or ‘basilect,’ formed in emulation of the term ‘dialect’ (Dialect 2014; -lect 2014).}\]
branded of the population residing in the state’s far-flung provinces (cf Cameron 1995; Smith 1984; Tollefson 1991).

Writing and Ideology

The perceived lack of education and refinement as typical of ‘dialect-speakers’ in colonies or at home was identified with the ‘lack of writing,’ or illiteracy. Peoples who did not write were ‘savages,’ like those dialect-speakers ‘at home,’ the latter nevertheless ‘a rank higher,’ due to sharing the same religion of Christianity with the literate elite. But some ‘heathens’ and ‘savages’ did write copiously and, especially in Asia, developed their own sophisticated literacies. Faced with this dilemma, ideologues of Western civilizational supremacy developed the ranking of scripts. Predictably, the top place was reserved for the West’s epitomic Latin script, followed by a ‘bit worse’ Greek and Cyrillic alphabets, ‘less developed’ Arabic and Hebrew scripts (on the account that they do not represent vowels), even ‘more backward’ syllabic writing systems of India, with the Chinese morphemic script at the bottom of the pile, ridiculed as ‘picture writing’ (Kaske 2006: 223, 242).

Hence, in this Eurocentric terminology on the linguistic, ‘a language’ is a lect of an elite, who uses it in speech and for extensive written purposes. On the contrary, dialects are lects of the disempowered and subaltern, who lost or have had no tradition of writing in these lects. Unhelpfully, this belief persists in the seemingly ‘scientific definition,’ which claims that languages are mutually incomprehensible lects, while dialects mutually comprehensible ones that, in turn, ‘belong’ to ‘their’ language (Bloomfield 1926: 162).

The definition has been time and again falsified in real life. For instance, dialects of Chinese and Arabic are often mutually incomprehensible (Künstler 2000; Muhawi 2013: 165). On the other hand, Moldovan and Romanian are exactly the same, while the post-Serbo-Croatian languages of Bosnian, Croatian,
Montenegrin and Serbian are almost the same (Greenberg 2004). On top of that, mutual comprehensibility is often asymmetric, meaning that speakers of one lect can understand speakers of another lect better than the other way around (Haugen 1966).

The conflating of the technology of writing with the concept of a language is so pervasive that general public tends to believe that writing is part of language. It is not, as a photograph of a person is not part of the person in any material way. (Obviously, a person may imagine that the photograph is part of herself and act accordingly, but then this fact, like nations or languages, belongs to the realm of a social reality, not that of the material reality.) Of course, lects were never reduced to writing until the invention of the very technology of writing five millennia ago. (Rogers 2005: 5) Yet, the vast majority of the extant 7000 odd lects remain unwritten to this day, relatively stable literacies were developed only in conjunction with less than 600 of them (Ethnologue 2014).

Furthermore, as in the past, also nowadays the process of recognizing a lect as a language remains purely political, and as such is arbitrary (Ferguson 1996: 62). Even securing a system of writing for a lect with millions of users is not enough to make the lect in question into a language (Kamusella 2012a). It happens so, because there is not and cannot be a linguistic definition of a language (Einzelsprache), independent of human agency, hinging exclusively on the inner workings of the linguistic, or language-in-general as humans’ evolutionary capacity for speech. Languages are products of extralinguistic – mostly political – decisions.

**Standard Languages and Nations**

The aforementioned technologization of lects into languages through writing and entailed political decisions have taken place since the invention of writing. The process took place time and again with an elite’s approval and overseeing at a power center (capital) in a polity, which explains the process’s deeply political
character (cf Bourdieu 1991: 43-65; Ferguson 1996: 269-270). The process of fitting a script to a lect by inventing norms of writing (for instance, spelling, grammar, punctuation) and applying it for the regular (and later, mass) production of texts is referred to as ‘codification,’ from Latin codex for ‘book.’ The process that also alters and transforms a lect into a language intensified in Europe after the invention of printing in the 15th century. Mechanical reproduction of texts ushered the age of Andersonian print capitalism² that entails increasingly deepened homogenization of printing, writing and usage conventions (cf Bieńkowska and Maruszak 2005; Pettegree 2010).

In this way standard languages began to be fashioned, incongruences and variety (seen from an elite’s perspective as unwanted ‘eccentricities’ that hamper seamless communication across the territory of a polity) weeded out from them, increasingly under the state’s pressure and with its approval (to the disadvantage of the subaltern, their lects marginalized, their cosy home-bound comprehensibility replaced by the incomprehensibility of the official language to be mastered at school) (cf Pogorelec 2011; Szulc 1999: 57-86). Initially, the authorities’ interest in book production was limited to censorship. But with the rise of universal literacy in Europe, between the 18th and mid-20th centuries (cf Simon 1960), specialized institutions and governmental agencies began to ‘regulate’ closely and ‘reform’ languages. Language politics became part and parcel of state politics, its product – a standard language – being as much a standardized channel of communication as a message in itself, a potent and versatile tool of politics wielded as needed by the powers that be (cf Kačala and Krajčovič 2006: 62-181).

² The concept of ‘print capitalism’ was proposed in 1983 by Benedict Anderson in his seminal work Imagined Communities. It maintains that the sudden multifold increase in the production of texts, triggered off by printing presses in conjunction with capitalist-style investment for profit into this new branch of economy, swiftly led to the uniformization of languages in which books were published. In turn, these languages began to appear as well-defined entities, which, in the age of compulsory elementary education for all, were successfully deployed for various projects of nation- and nation-state-building.
The United States sociolinguist of Norwegian origin, Einar Haugen, theoretically described the process of language creation and standardization (1966a), as an afterthought in the wake of his ground-breaking monograph on the building and codification of the Norwegian language (1966b). A similar schema, however formulated from the vantage of the rise of ethnolinguistic national movements and nations, was given by the Czechoslovak marxian historian, Miroslav Hroch (1985: 25). A decade later, Hroch explicitly included languages in his schema (1994), bringing it closer to Haugen’s model. It shows what (mostly wide and sweeping) social and political changes are necessary when an ideological (symbolic) and spatial overlapping of a language, nation and state is to be achieved, as the basis of national peoplehood and statehood creation and legitimization (Kamusella 2006).

The resultant ethnolinguistic type of nationalism has become the norm in modern Central Europe. In the 20th century the region’s political order, which initially was neither national nor ethnolinguistic, was destroyed and overhauled time and again in order to bring about a tight overlapping (isomorphism) of languages with nations and their polities (or nation-states) (Biondich 2011; Prusin 2010). Practical methods of how to achieve this ideal of ethnolinguistic homogeneity within a state’s borders had been earlier devised and implemented in revolutionary France between the late 18th and the mid-20th centuries (cf Weber 1976). These were duly adopted in Central Europe, centralization and homogenization forcing tens of millions from their homes and massacres reaching the scale of planned genocides several times over (Akçam 2006; Magocsi 2002: 189-193; Mojzes 2011; Snyder 2010).

**Setting the Stage in Europe**
In the first millennium CE, or in late Antiquity and the first half of the Middle Ages, the use of writing in Europe was limited to the territory of the Roman Empire and some areas adjacent to the polity (for instance, Ireland). In the case of Central Europe, this meant the southernmost periphery of the region. In this area the empire’s two traditions of literacy met, one in Latin language and script, and the other in Greek language and script. The rough divide between both ran westward from the Black Sea, across what today is Bulgaria, along the Greek-Macedonian frontier, and across northern Albania to the Adriatic. It closely – though not fully – corresponded to the formal West-East division of the empire, this North-South line doubling nowadays as the frontier between Croatia and Bosnia in the west, and Serbia and Montenegro in the east (Magocsi 2002: 6). Likewise, the Latin-Greek linguistic divide continued on the southern shores of the Mediterranean, following the division of the empire, from the north to the south, across today’s Libya (Wright 2012: 46, 51-52).

By the eighth century, the empire’s classical Latin-Greek bilingualism of the elites had unravelled. Latin became the official language of state administration and religion in the post-Roman polities of the West (including also the Vandal Kingdom in Africa) and Greek in the East Roman Empire (or Romania in Greek, but today, anachronistically dubbed as ‘Byzantine Empire;’ this name coined only after the fall of Constantinople, in the 16th century by a historian in the Holy Roman Empire [Wolf 1568]). The differing linguistic and script bases of the two literacies were additionally steeped in two gradually diverging strains of Christianity, which had been adopted as the official religion of the Roman Empire in the fourth century. While the official Greek literacy drew on the religious and ideological prestige of the New Testament originally composed in Greek and on the second-century BCE translation of the Old Testament into this language (Septuagint) (Caragounis 2004), Latin was elevated to a similar distinction only in the late fourth century (when the division of the Roman Empire became
permanent) with the officially approved translation of the Bible into this language (Vulgate) (Beger 1893).

As a result, Latin became the holy and administrative language of the West (European) Christian world (including all the western Mediterranean shores) and Greek of the East (that is, southeastern Europe, Asia Minor and along the eastern Mediterranean littoral) (Kassis 2006: 22-23). Across both areas, another religiously underscored literacy continued as a language and script, namely the Hebrew script and language of the Jews. This minority literacy gained prestige from the Hebrew original of the Old Testament, its initial part (Pentateuch) known as the Torah in Judaism. But Hebrew as the language of everyday communication among Jews creased in the second century BCE. The command of Hebrew as mainly a written medium of religious scholarship and commerce continued to be imparted in yeshivas (religious schools) from one generation of males to another until the modern times (Glinert 1993).

In the eighth century the political-cum-cultural project of evangelization (that is, Christianization) was decisively joined by another. Islam, a new monotheist religion of universalistic aspirations founded in the seventh century, successfully contested Christianity’s hold on the populations around the Mediterranean. (Judaism, as the religion of the Jews, did not enter the fray; proselytizing was rare, the sole known important case of it being the probable acceptance of Judaism as the religion of state’s elite in Khazaria – located between the Black and Caspian seas – at the close of the eighth century [Stampfer 2013].) Like Christianity, Islam came complete with its own holy book, the Quran written in the Arabic language with the use of the Arabic script. By the turn of the ninth century, the Islamic Caliphate extended from Central Asia, through Arabia and North Africa to Iberia. The official and religious use of Arabic gradually extinguished Latin and Greek there, especially in North Africa (or confined both languages to tolerated minority Christian communities), thus creating a linguistic-cum-religious divide that
shattered the former Roman cultural and institutional (already weakened) commonality of the Mediterranean world (Ruthven and Nanji 2004: 36-39).

This divide survives to this day transformed into the pernicious belief in ‘essential difference’ between Europe (West) and Africa (Islam). With both Christianity and Islam aspiring to convert all of humankind to ‘the only true and correct faith,’ respective groups of the faithful found themselves at loggerheads in Iberia and Asia Minor. By 1492, after eight centuries of coexistence (Dodds, Menocal and Balbale 2008; Lévi-Provençal 1938), Islam, and alongside this religion Arabic and its script, had been expelled (together with Jews) southward from Iberia, while the Ottoman seizure of Constantinople (Istanbul) in 1453 meant the gradual replacement of Christianity with Islam in Asia Minor (Anatolia), the Middle East and in many areas of the Balkan Peninsula (but importantly, with the retaining of tolerated Christian and Jewish minorities, as previously in Islamic Iberia). The religiously-driven concept of the periodization of European (and Western) history is clearly visible in the choice of these two symbolic dates as the beginning of the ‘modern times.’ The religious character of the caesura of 1492 is sometimes concealed when it is posed as the date of the (European) ‘discovery of the New World’ (or present-day Americas).

The division of the Mediterranean between Islam and Christianity completed the process of shaping the political structure of Europe that remains recognizable in its main contours to this day. But the beginning of the changes dates back to the fifth century. The second half of the first millennium CE was characterized by invasions (or rather migrations) and relatively rapid processes of state making and destruction (especially in the West), which by the turn of the second millennium produced political entities that are in one way or another identifiable (sometimes stretching credulity quite a bit) with most present-day polities in Europe (Zientara 1996).
When in the south Christian armies clashed with their Islamic counterparts, Christianization proceeded northward at a pace, to the areas with no or scant literacy that had not (or only briefly) been included in the Roman Empire. Latin-based Christianization stemmed from Rome, and its Greek-language counterpart from Constantinople. The expansion of the former type of Christianity, to the British Isles, Scandinavia and across the old Roman limes into Germania (Strzelczyk 1987) meant the replacement of any rudimentary writing systems (Ogham script in Ireland or Germanic Runes) with the Latin alphabet, the former branded as ‘pagan’ (Düwel 1994; McManus 1991; Reszkiewicz 1973: 11-12). However, after Christianization, the previous existence of non-Latin alphabet-based literacies helped spawn a limited amount of texts in Celtic (Irish, Welsh), Germanic (Anglo-Saxon, German) and Norse written in Christian (that is, Latin) letters between the eighth and 12th centuries (Bergman 1947: 23-24; Huallacháin 1994: 10-14; Reszkiewicz 1973).

Soon the dominance of Latin as the sole language of administration and intellectual (mainly theological or religion-based) discourse across the Western Christian world was reasserted, especially thanks to the so-called Carolingian renaissance in Charlemagne’s Empire from the late eighth century through the following century. Meanwhile, the distance between the classical Latin, codified in the first and second CE centuries (into this ‘standard’ Latin the Vulgate was translated), and the popular speech in the Romancephone areas had become so pronounced that the latter was referred to as the ‘Rustic Roman language’ (later more disparagingly dubbed as ‘Vulgar Latin’). The tension between Romance vernacular lects of everyday life and the increasingly less comprehensible official Latin, in the context of burgeoning state administrations, necessitated a production of texts in Rustic Roman. The trend grew in the ninth and tenth centuries, and was paralleled by the simultaneous rise of writing in Germanic. This new tradition of vernacular literacy (not literacy in holy or prestigious languages of the past) commenced in Charlemagne’s Empire that contained fragments of
both the West Romance and West Germanic dialect continua, and soon the novel technology was transferred to other Germanic and Romance areas across the Western Christian world (Banniard 1995: 159-190; Schlösser 2005: 39-40; Wolff 2003: 104-148).

Vernaculars into Languages in the West

The tentative rise of vernaculars (or new written lects) in the shadow of dominant Latin correlated with the most permanent and politically dominant power centers (capitals) in their respective polities. The Romance lect of Paris, or future French, began to be employed for administrative purposes at the turn of the 13th century (Wolff 2003: 112). The equally – or even more – impressive rise of literacy in the Romance lect of southern France (Provençal) was extinguished in the early 13th century by the near-genocidal suppression of Cathar communities, branded as ‘heretics’ (Kienzle 2001; Niel 1995; Wolff 2003: 109-111). The role of power and brute force in the rise of languages is clearly seen in the case of Castilian (Spanish), which was made in the 13th century into the leading language of administration by the crusading King Alfonso X of Castile, León and Galicia. Its rapid rise was connected to the confessional homogenization of Iberia (through forced conversions and expulsions) and the ban on Arabic language and script (Schlösser 2005: 40-41; Yasumura 2009: 368-369). The emergence of the Catalonian language is directly connected to the establishment of the now largely forgotten Crown of Aragon as a dominant Mediterranean power at the turn of the 15th century. Its union with Castile and subsequent political decline led to the 1716 dissolution of the Crown of Aragon, which was combined with the ban on the use of Catalan in administration (Dorel-Ferré 2010: 5, 24-33; Schlösser 2005: 62).

The rise of Florentine or Tuscan (lingua Toscana, or today’s Italian) as a written lect followed a different path, for its emergence in the 14th century was connected to the lasting popularity of Dante’s and Petrarch’s vernacular poetry. Both poets
happened to write in Florence (the capital of Tuscany) and in the
city’s Romance lect, though they invariably stuck to high prestige
Latin in their ‘more serious’ works. The absence of a strong and
territorially extensive polity that would claim Tuscan as its own
allowed for the founding of literacies in other Romance lects
connected to a plethora of polities across the Apennine Peninsula,
especially in Venice (Venetian) and Naples (Neapolitan). In the
context of France and Spain with their respective single
vernacular languages employed (alongside Latin) across both
states’ territories, this Apennine multiplicity of written lects and
literacies triggered off the original ‘language question’ (questione
della lingua) in the 16th century and spawned the seminal model
of ‘language academy,’ epitomized by Florence’s Accademia della
Crusca established in 1583 (Parodi 1983). The discussion in the
Apennine world on which language to use and how to standardize
it continued till the founding of the Italian nation-state in 1861
(Schlösser 2005: 41). However, standard Italian became the
medium of everyday communication of half of Italy’s inhabitants
only in the mid-20th century (Mauro 2005: 71).

Interestingly, the 1066 invasion of England by Romancephone
Normans (from Normandy in present-day France) replaced
English (Anglo-Saxon, Old English) with Norman (Anglo-) French
to be used in administration side by side with Latin, though two
centuries later the French of Paris began to replace this Norman
French, too (Lambley 1920: 26-34). The tendency was fortified
by the English monarch’s extensive possessions in France, the
last ones of which were lost in the mid-15th century. Only with
this development the highly Latinate English of London began to
be employed gradually in administration on an official footing
between 1362 and 1503. The process of superseding French and
Latin with English was largely complete after Henry VIII’s break
with Rome in the 1530s; but it was formally sealed quite late,
only with George II’s statute of 1733\(^3\) (Berndt 1984: 30; Cable 1984: 78-85; Lambey 1920: 21-22).

As in the cases of Spain and France, the process of making English into official language of the kingdom was connected to the expansion of the English monarch’s rule all over the British Isles (or today’s Britain and Ireland), meaning the replacement of other lects with English for official purposes. For instance, in 1537 Irish was banned in England’s Ireland (Crowley 2005: 13). In 1707 the union of Scotland and England concluded the adoption of English in Scotland at the expense of the local Germanic lect of Scots (that had functioned as the country’s official language between 1424 and the early 17\(^{th}\) century). The turning point in this process was the acceptance of the 1611 translation of the (King James’s) Bible into the English of London as official in Scotland, as no successful and complete translation of the Holy Scripture into Scots had been made (Kay 2006: 49-50, 73-74, 87-92).

In the symbolic year of 1492 the first Castilian-language grammar of Castilian (Spanish) was published. (It was also the first-ever printed grammar of any European vernacular lect [Burke 2004: x].) Its author, Antonio Nebrija famously opined that ‘Language has always been the perfect instrument of empire’ (in Rosa 1995/1996). This view was readily accepted by Spanish monarchs, which meant a gradual replacement of Latin and Spain’s other written languages and lects with Castilian (Resnick 1981: 7). The French king concurred, and in his efforts to centralize the realm, in 1539 he issued the famous Ordinance of Villers-Cotterêts. It was intended to diminish the influence of the Catholic Church on the state, but the document’s articles 110 and 111 attempted to make French into the kingdom’s sole official language. However, this became a reality only at the turn of the

---

\(^3\) The act was composed in 1730 and entered into force three years later, obliging all law courts in Britain to employ exclusively English in proceedings (Use of English 1733). Interestingly, a similar provision for the exclusive employment of English in the law courts of Britain’s Ireland followed only four years later (That All 1737).
17th century when decisively more books began to be published in French than in Latin (Nadeau and Barlow 2008: 45-46, 53).

Latin was more firmly entrenched as the language of administration and writing in the vast Holy Roman Empire that was the largest and most stable polity in (West Christian) Europe, having survived from the tenth century till 1806. It overlapped with the southern and central parts of the West Germanic dialect continuum, though in the west and south also contained fragments of the West Romance dialect continuum, while in the east fragments of the North and South Slavic dialect continua. The idea that spoken lects of everyday communication (vernaculars) may be used for writing and other formal purposes arrived in the empire between the 12th and 14th centuries, when Provençal- and French-language chivalric poetry began to be copied and developed independently in local Germanic lects. These lects were known under the same name of variously spelled Duitsch / Teutsch (meaning ‘of the people’ [Wermke et al 2007: 142-143]) that is the origin of the self-linguonyms of the present-day languages of Dutch and German. These lects began to be employed – rather tentatively – for administrative purposes in the late 13th century (Wolff 2003: 128-130).

A similar dawn of written lects in Scandinavia, unfolded much later, in the 16th century, when first texts in Danish and Swedish appeared, mainly under the vernacularizing influence of the Lutheran Reformation. Paradoxically, in distant Iceland the local Norse (Icelandic) literacy continued from the mid-12th century through the 16th and 17th centuries, when the growing domination of Danish marginalized it, following the centralization of the Kingdom of Denmark and its overseas possessions (Haugen 1976: 32, 39-40). Between Scandinavia and the Holy Roman Empire, or along the Baltic littoral and the southern shores of the Northern Sea, the Hanseatic League of merchant towns and fleets thrived between the 14th and 17th centuries. The need for an easily comprehensible vernacular for business purposes elevated ‘Low German’ (then another of the Duitsches) to the rank of this
league’s main written language of administration. Besides being the everyday lect of the Hanseatic cities of Lübeck, Hamburg or Danzig (Gdańsk), Low German was in wide (elite) use across the State of the Teutonic Order (later Prussia), extending from present-day Estonia to Poland. (The local peasantry spoke a variety of Baltic, Finno-Ugric and Slavic lects) At that time speakers of this language did not perceive any difference between it and the Duïtsch (Dutch) of the Low Countries (Dollinger 1970: 260-262).

Low German fell out of (official) written use by the late 17th century. At that time the Holy Roman Empire formally recognized the Netherlands as independent (1648), and the republic’s Duïtsch-speakers codified their own language of Dutch, in which the translation of the Bible was published in 1637 (Vandenputte, Vincent and Hermans 1986: 21). (However, side by side, Latin remained the second most important language of the Low Countries – French was a close third – through the 18th century [Burke 2005: 15-16].) Their Duïtsch-speaking counterparts in Prussia eventually settled for the Martin Luther’s 1534 translation of the Bible into the lect of Meißen (or what dialectologists classify as ‘East Central German’), despite the fact that the Prussians’ lect was as different from standard German (stemming from Luther’s language) as today’s Dutch from German. While the rise of Dutch was a result of the Low Countries’ efforts to leave the Holy Roman Empire, Prussia’s abandonment of its Low German was caused by the polity’s intensifying political and economic links with this empire.

But prior to the emergence of a cross-confessional agreement that the Teutsch of Luther’s translation of the Bible should become the German language of all the Germanic-speakers in the Holy Roman Empire, many other Teutsches (or Germanic lects) competed with one another. After the mid-15th century that heralded printing in Western Europe, printers effectively reduced the number of these lects to around seven Druckersprachen (‘languages of printing presses’). Luther’s Bible solidified the
division of the empire between the Protestant north and the Catholic south, but the emperor’s Catholic court, seeking to reunify the empire, adopted this widely popular ‘Protestant German.’ As a result, the imperial language of Gemeines Deutsch (‘Common German,’ based on the ‘East Upper German’ lect of today’s Austria) was abandoned (Szulc 1999: 63-69). However, unlike in the lands west of its borders, the Holy Roman Empire retained Latin as the leading language of administration and intellectual discourse until 1784. In this year, Joseph II decreed that all state official business must be conducted in German across the Habsburg lands, meaning in the southern half of this empire and in the Kingdom of Hungary (Kann 1974: 185). (In the case of Hungary, this decree was nullified six years later in 1790, allowing for the swift reintroduction of Latin [Kósa 1999: 67].)

Holy Languages in the East

Before the influence of printing, the Reformation and the subsequent religious wars – already alluded to above – on the linguistic shape of Europe is analyzed, it is necessary to probe into the development of literacies in the East. In 1054 the Great Schism drove a hard ideological divide between the two branches of Christianity, but earlier they had already been aggressively competing with each other. Spreading Christianity to a new territory either from Rome or Constantinople meant to which of the two spheres of influence this territory would fall. In the process, the territory’s new Christians were obliged to adopt the political, cultural and ideological package either of Western or Eastern Christianity.

Unlike in the West, Constantinople did not insist on the monopoly of a single language and its unique script. (However, in the first millennium BCE, prior to the establishment of Rome’s predominance over the Apennine Peninsula, a tendency existed there to develop different scripts for separate lects [cf Urbanová and Blažek 2008].) In an effort to spread Christianity as wide as possible translating the Greek Bible into other languages was
allowed. This entailed the creation of new written languages, alongside their own specific scripts. The practice is similar to that in today’s India or Southeast Asia, where the normative belief is that a lect in order to become a full-fledged language in its own right, it must be endowed with a specific script not shared by any other languages (cf Campbell 1997: 18-24, 90-91, 122-126; Coulmas 1989: 179-201).

In the first half of the first millennium, in the East Roman Empire and its sphere of influence the Bible was translated into the Semitic lects of Syriac in Syria and of Coptic in Egypt, into the East Germanic lect of (Ostro-) Gothic in Moesia (today’s northern Bulgaria), the Indo-European isolate lect of Armenian and into the Caucasian lect of Georgain. The eponymous script of Syriac stems from the Arameic writing system (close to Hebrew), the Coptic and Gothic are modelled on the Greek alphabet, while the Armenian and Georgian writing systems appear to have been developed with elements from the Greek, Syriac, and possibly Hebrew writing systems (Campbell 1997: 6-7, 59-62, 114-115; Rogers 2005: 123, 161-167).

The most important development in this tradition, from the perspective of Europe, came during the 860s Christianizing mission to Greater Moravia (or today’s Czech Republic, Slovakia, southern Poland and Hungary). It resulted in the making of the South Slavic lect of Salonica (Thessaloniki) into a written language, for the sake of which a new script, Glagolitic, was developed, drawing at various writing systems employed across the (East) Roman Empire (Miklas 2000). But the flowering of Glagolitic-based (Church) Slavonic literacy was brief. In 880, despite the developments, the Western Latin-based literacy was adopted as coofficial in Greater Moravia, before its suppression five years later (Tornow 2005: 34-35, 105-106; Třeštík 2010). The Slavophone literati writing in Glagolitic letters were either

4 In English the term ‘Slavonic’ is reserved for referring to the Glagolitic- and Cyrillic-based liturgical language, while its cognate ‘Slavic’ is applied to all other languages of the Slavs.
expelled or had to look for employment elsewhere. An appropriate opportunity came when Bulgaria reasserted its political independence from Constantinople also by ideological means. In 893 Slavonic replaced Greek as the polity’s official language. However, Glagolitic appeared too strange to the Bulgarian elite acquainted with Greek letters, and accordingly was replaced by a brand-new script closely modelled on Greek, namely, Cyrillic (Crampton 2005: 15-17; Dzurova 2007).

Subsequently, both Greek and Cyrillic-based Slavonic were used for written purposes among the Orthodox faithful in the Balkans and across Central and Eastern Europe. In 988, the North Slavic polity of (Kyivan) Rus’, extending from the White Sea to the Black Sea adopted Christianity from Constantinople, alongside the Cyrillic-based Slavonic language. But the competition with Rome continued. At the turn of the tenth century, Magyars (Hungarians) destroyed Greater Moravia and ravaged much of Central and even Western Europe. The western one-third of Greater Moravia (that is, the regions of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia) was incorporated into the Holy Roman Empire, and the Glagolitic-based Slavonic literacy was preserved there. However, increasingly marginalized, it survived through the 19th century on Croatia’s north Adriatic littoral (Nazor 2008: 14-19; Trunte 2012: 84-104).

The empire had the problem of distinguishing between one Slavia within its own borders (Bohemia) and another Slavia between this empire and Rus’ (that is, the future Poland). The latter adopted Latin-style Christianity from the former Slavia in 966. In 1000 the imperial chancery proposed to rename the ‘external’ Slavia as ‘Poland’ to do away with this onomastic confusion (Urbańczyk 2008). In the same year or a year later, Hungary (extending then from today’s Slovakia to Croatia and Bosnia) also adopted Christianity from Rome (Kontler 1999: 53). The development consigned to gradual disuse the ‘pagan’ Turkic rune-like script (used exclusively for carving brief inscriptions), though its remnants survived in Hungary’s Transylvania until the 17th
century. Its counterparts had been also employed in Bulgaria and Rus’ (also alongside Scandinavian Runes) before Christianization, and among Turkic peoples between the Black and Caspian seas prior to the adoption of Islam (Franklin 2002: 110-111; Hosszú 2013: 7-19). Since the turn of the 2010s, an alternative Hungarian-language literacy in this script (written from right to left) has been rapidly developing, strongly connected to the burgeoning right wing of the political spectrum in Hungary. The leadership of the rightist parties see it as a useful graphic sign (or ‘extended logo’) for sharp differentiation of their electorate from these segments of population that may be of another political persuasion (Leanyfalu 2014; News 2014).

The rise of the Danubian principalities of Walachia and Moldavia (or forerunners of present-day Romania and Moldova⁵) in the 14th century again raised the question from where these East Romancephones would accept Christianity. Squeezed between Catholic Hungary and the Orthodox Rus’ principalities, the polities opted for Orthodox Christianity in order to emphasize their separateness vis-à-vis Hungary to which Walachia had been previously subjected. But unlike in the case of Bulgaria’s and Rus’s Slavophones, the two principalities’ population adopted Cyrillic-based literacy not in their own (or other Romance) lect, but in Slavonic. In the first half of the 16th century, both principalities became vassals of the Ottoman Empire (alongside Hungary’s Transylvania where a substantial population of Romance-speakers, or Walachians, resided), and in the following century a new parallel Cyrillic-based Orthodox literacy in the Romance lect (then known as Walachian and Moldavian, today it is Romanian and Moldovan) developed. Its crowning came with the Cyrillic-based Walachian (Romanian) translation of the Bible in 1688. In this feat, Walachian, as earlier Slavonic, joined the

⁵ Present-day Moldova (also known as ‘Moldavia’ when it was part of the Soviet Union before 1991) corresponds to the eastern half of historic Moldavia, or Bessarabia. In the wake of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1806-1812, Bessarabia was detached from the Ottomans’ Moldavia and incorporated into the Russian Empire.
growing group of the Orthodox holy-cum-liturgical languages (Tornow 2005: 166-168, 382-392).

The religious literacies in Church Slavonic and the New Testament Greek were comprehensible (though not perfectly) to the Slavic- and Greek-speaking Orthodox faithful, like the Latin Vulgate and liturgy of the Catholic Church to Romancephones in Western Europe. Celtic-, Germanic-, Slavic- and Finno-Ugric-speakers had to study Latin in order to access the Latin-based Catholic literacy. A similar predicament was the experience of Walachia and Moldavia’s East Romancephones who had to study Church Slavonic in order to achieve even a basic understanding of this language.

These limited kinds of religiously-based literacy steeped in languages not employed by any extant speech community required specialized transmission. As in the Jewish case, it proceeded in religious schools, imparted mainly from one generation of males to another. The same method was employed in the Ottoman Empire (its inhabitants knew it under the name of Devlet-i Aliyye-i, or ‘Sublime State’), where the elite who ran administration needed to master three radically different languages, namely the Semitic lect of Classical Arabic for religious and judiciary purposes, the Turkic one of Osmanlıca (Ottoman Turkish) for administration, and the Indo-European one of (court) Persian for literary pursuits. Boys eager to join the Ottoman elite studied all the three languages in madrasahs. They could not be acquired at home as all the three were far removed from the Arabic, Turkic or Persian vernaculars of day-to-day communication in villages and at city markets. Unlike in the case of the aforementioned Orthodox written (holy) languages, all three languages of Ottoman intellectual life were, however, united by the shared Arabic script and numerous Arabic and Persian loans in the empire’s leading language of Osmanlıca that the more distanced it from the Turkic lect(s) of everyday life speech (Woodhead 2012).
A similar development, resulting in diglossia or polyglossia (meaning the use of different lects in different spheres of life [Ferguson 1996: 25-39]) in the case of Greek was masked by the language’s unitary name. The classical Greek, or the Attic koine of the fifth century BCE was half a millennium removed from the Christian liturgical Greek of the New Testament. In turn, the (‘Byzantine’) Greek of the East Roman Empire (Romania) was removed from the latter by an entire millennium, while on the other hand, this administrative language was scantly comprehensible to speakers of local lects within the Greek dialectal area extending from the Black Sea to Sicily. Prior to the founding of the modern Greek polity in the 1820s, in the Greek language Greeks referred to themselves and their language as ‘Roman.’ Nowadays the official adjective is ‘Hellenic,’ but in the 19th century an intra-Greek tradition developed, referring to the Greeks and their language as ‘Hellenic’ in the Greek national polity, and to their counterparts in the Ottoman Empire as ‘Roman’ (Mackridge 2009).

What united all the Greek-speakers, irrespective of the variety and name of the lect that they chose to employ, was the same Greek script. Its religiously-conditioned normative hold was so strong that the Orthodox faithful in the Ottoman Empire often employed this script to write their Albanian, Slavic or Turkic lects. In this role, the Greek script reminded the Latin alphabet in the West and the Arabic script in the Ottoman Empire and the wider Muslim world. Likewise, Slavic-, Greek- or Albanian-speaking Muslims wrote their lects in Arabic letters, as well. The same practice was widespread among Jews or Armenians (in other words, members of the Armenian Apostolic [monophysitic] Church) who jotted down their variegated vernaculars in the Hebrew and Armenian scripts, respectively (cf Dedes 2000; Galustian 1981: 83; Huković 1986; Sitarz 1992: 7-16).

In the premodern times, a given monotheistic religion, as epitomized by its holy book symbolically reduced to a particular script, trumped any linguistic difference among its faithful. The
shared (holy) script constituted a cultural-cum-linguistic area in which circulation of ideas was facilitated by this very writing system and the mediating bridge of the holy book’s language that linked speech communities who were speaking radically different lects. But despite religious conflicts and the rise of entailed cultural differences, trade and communication were a necessity in the Mediterranean leading to the emergence of the unwritten pidgin (or no one’s first language) of Lingua Franca (‘Frankish language’). From the 11th to 19th centuries seamen of various confessional and ethnolinguistic backgrounds conversed in this Romance-based lect, which contained a lot of elements taken from Turkic, Arabic and Greek (Dakhlia 2008). Likewise, religions and scripts separated different groups of the faithful from the very same speech community. Indeed, they managed (interconfessional) small talk in the street or at the market without any problem, but at the level of written communication they expressed ideas in the very same lect (or its more official register) with the use of different scripts, customarily not accessible to those who professed other religions (cf Paić-Vukić 2007).

The link between script and religion is normatively so strong in the European context that after the ninth century no new scripts were developed. What is more, vernacular lects stick to the script of this religion founded before the second millennium, to which its original speech community paid (and usually still does) allegiance. In Europe only two cases of wholesale script change (not imposed from outside) were observed. In the Danubian principalities of Walachia and Moldavia, the elites wished to sever their historical and cultural links with the Orthodox world, perceived then as ‘backward,’ and in their drive at modernization staked hopes on the purely linguistic Romancephone commonality with the then highly successful nation-state of France. In order to reinvent their postulated ‘Romanian’ nation as the ‘French of the East,’ in the early 1860s the principalities’ leadership replaced Cyrillic with the Latin alphabet for writing Romanian, and in 1866
adopted the very name ‘Romania’ for their nation-state just created in a merger of the two principalities.

The name Romania sounds quite ‘Romance’ to the Western ear, though on the other hand it was a bow to anti-Western traditionalists, who saw it as an adoption of the Greek name of the Orthodox East Roman Empire, or *Romania* in Greek.6 Frenchification and de-Slavicization of the Walachian/Moldavian language, renamed as ‘Romanian’ followed in order to recover the lect’s ‘true’ Latinate character (Close 1974; Drace-Francis 2005; Mârza 2008). These changes did not apply to Russia’s Bessarabia (or the eastern part of historical Moldavia) that became Moldova after 1991. The Moldovan language was written in Cyrillic with some Soviet-style Slavicisms until 1990, and retained its name till 2013 when it was changed to ‘Romanian’ (Moldovan 2013). Cyrillic-based Moldovan continues in official use, side by side with Russian and Ukrainian, in the de facto polity of Transnistria that broke away from Moldova in 1990 (Moldova 2012: 1708).

Perhaps, uniquely and early, the idea budded in the Danubian principalities that the script of a language may be changed, thanks to the context of intensive multiscripturality (parallel use of many scripts) in the official languages. The principalities’ long-established Slavonic and Walachian (Romanian) were written in Cyrillic, the administration had to correspond with Istanbul in Arabic script-based Osmanlıca, and between 1711 and 1821 Greek with its own specific alphabet was the official language of administration in both polities (Close 1974: 14).

---

6 As Ágoston Berecz rightly points out, my interpretation of the coining of the name of the state of Romania is a conjecture. The history of this name may make for a fascinating read when a scholar decides to face the challenge. At present, the obtaining consensus is that the name ‘Romania’ stems from the self-ethnonym *român* of East Romancephones, especially, in Walachia. However, another form of this ethnonym was *rumân*, yielding *Rumânia* as the original Romanian-language name of Romania. Only as an afterthought it was altered to today’s *România*. In communist Romania, a spelling reform that was to follow pronunciation more closely, resulted in yet another form of the country’s name, *Romînă*. But quickly, as an ideologically motivated exception, the previous form, *România*, was reinstated.
The script change (or rather fixing) as an instrument of modernization is associated with the emergence of Albanian as a written language. In 1908 it was decided that the language should be written in the ‘progressive’ Latin alphabet, after half a century of nascent literary culture in whose framework Muslim Albanian-speakers had written their lect in Arabic letters, while their Orthodox and Catholic counterparts, variously in Greek, Latin and even Cyrillic characters. Those believing that a single language must be written in a single script had also proposed mixed scripts (earlier Romanian writers had followed a similar course in the first half of the 19th century [Boia 2001: 31]) (Hradečný, Hladký, Monari, Šistek and Hradečná 2008: 275-279; Mojdl 2005: 24-27).

The change in Albanian’s script that breached the scriptural homogeneity of the Ottoman Empire’s Muslims took place in the midst of the Young Turk Revolution that rocked the Sublime State. The revolutionaries demanded ‘modernization’ and saw the Latin alphabet as part and parcel of it. When, in the wake of World War I, Turkey emerged as an ethnolinguistically defined nation-states from the dismembered Ottoman Empire, the Young Turk modernizers focused on the state’s language, too. Arabic and Persian were cast away as a legacy of the ‘backward’ Ottoman times. Osmanlıca, quite removed from the everyday speech of Turkic-speakers in Anatolia, was radically purged of Arabic and Persian elements, vernacularized and imbued with numerous neologisms and loans from Western languages during the 1920s and 1930s. A new Turkish language was constructed overnight, rendering Osmanlıca publications incomprehensible to new generations. At the early stage of this wholesale overhauling, in 1928, the Arabic script was replaced with the Latin alphabet (Lewis 1999).

Nowhere else in Europe did speech communities (or rather their elites, as they shape the rules and frameworks of the political and cultural projects) decide of their own volition to change scripts for writing their lects in such a radical manner. The scriptural
traditions correlated with respective religions (the links between them founded in the first millennium CE) continue unabated to this day, despite the Reformation, the immensely destructive religious wars in the early modern period, and the overall loss of religiosity in the West during the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. In the European Union, few frequent church or mosque but all write their lects in the ‘holy’ letters of the Cyrillic, Greek or Latin alphabet.

**The Question of the Middle**

The two traditions – Eastern and Western – of how to think about the linguistic and how to create languages from lects overlapped in Central Europe, namely in Poland-Lithuania and the Kingdom of Hungary. In both polities Catholic and Orthodox subjects lived side by side, with a small but militarily and socially significant admixture of Muslims. Hungary (prior to its seizure by the Ottoman Empire in the 16\textsuperscript{th} century), but especially Poland-Lithuania established non-territorial religious-cum-political autonomies for Jews at that time mostly expelled from Western Europe beginning in the 14\textsuperscript{th} century. Therefore, in the 18\textsuperscript{th} century most of Europe’s Jews lived in Poland-Lithuania. A similar religious-based non-territorial autonomy was established in the country for Armenians, while a way-of-life defined one for Roma (‘Gypsies’) (Kopanski 1995: 1-44; Mróz 2000; Polonsky 2010).

The use of non-territorial autonomies for religiously different groups in Poland-Lithuania is strikingly similar to the social organization of the Islamic Iberia before the Christian Reconquista and to the millet system in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman millets for the Orthodox, Jewish, Armenian or Catholic faithful functioned exactly as the aforementioned non-territorial autonomies in Poland-Lithuania. Apparently, it was Poland-Lithuania that emulated the model, borrowing it from the Islamic world, alongside the Ottoman garb for its nobility, not the other way around (Hupchick 1994; Kłoczkowski 1998: 164-175).
This acceptance, or sometimes grudging tolerance, of ethnoreligious and confessional difference sets Central Europe and the Ottoman Empire apart from the West and the East with the latter two’s insistence on ethnoreligious and confessional homogeneity. Here, talking of East and West, I mean the present-day highly ideologized categories of thinking about Europe (and the world) that began emerging in the 18th century (Wolff 1994). While the Reformation added Protestant communities (lords, burghers and peasants alike) to the variety of different communities enjoying non-territorial autonomies in Poland-Lithuania, Hungary and the Ottoman Empire; in Western Europe (especially, in the Holy Roman Empire) the subsequent religious wars, that culminated in the near-genocidal Thirty Years’ War (Wilson 2009), spawned the paramount principle of territorially construed political homogeneity, succinctly summarized as *eius regio cuius religio* (‘whose realm, his religion’). The religious wars finished in a bloody stalemate, which was resolved with the introduction of confessional homogeneity within each polity, with no place there for people professing other religious creeds. In this process, the model of the territorial (‘Westphalian’) state was ironed out, whose main (though often ideal or idealized) features are absolute sovereignty and a compact territory coming in a single piece (Meyn 1992).

A reflection of this development in the East was the coalescing imperial ideology of the Russian Empire, mainly in its European half. Muscovy, as one of the Rus’ principalities (though located in the distant northeastern borderland of the then already defunct medieval Rus’), claimed for itself the distinction of a ‘Third Rome,’ following the fall of the ‘Second Rome,’ or Constantinople. The polity’s heady success at ‘gathering the lands of Holy Rus’” led to the founding of the Russian Empire in 1721, which was the sole independent and sizeable Orthodox polity at that time. Since the beginning of Peter the Great’s rule at the turn of the 18th century, the nascent empire embarked on the program of ‘modernizing’ (or rather ‘Westernizing’) reforms, striving to emulate Protestant Western and Northern Europe, or the Netherlands and Sweden at
that time. Part and parcel of the Russian policies was the concept of political-cum-cultural homogeneity and centralization (Lazari 1996).

When Poland-Lithuania was partitioned at the close of the 18th century, Russia cordoned off its share of territorial spoils by making its partition zone into a Jewish Pale of Settlement, so that non-Christians would not ‘pollute’ Holy Rus’. In the 19th century this drive at homogeneity was reflected in the policy of striving to make all the empire’s population homogenously Orthodox (cf Khodarkovsky 2002: 189-201). When it did not work quick and swiftly enough, from the 1860s to 1905 a big attempt at linguistic Russification of the non-Russian speakers was made. Both policies worked, but never fully, while in the empire’s non-Rus’ east Muslims and speakers of various languages were gradually accommodated and left to their own (though tightly supervised) cultural-cum-religious devices (Kappeler 2001; Rodkiewicz 1998; Thaden 1981; Zajączkowski 2009).

In the wake of then popular Panslavism, some proposed a more modest program of introducing Cyrillic for all the Slavic languages in the empire and outside it, before extending this policy to non-Slavic languages in Russia (Gil’ferding 1871). But the program was met with resistance, because neither Catholic, nor Protestant subjects were ready to accept ‘Orthodox letters’ (cf Zinkevičius 1996: 259-296). In the interwar period the Soviet Union succeeded the Russian Empire, importantly, less the latter’s least Russian and Orthodox western borderlands. Hence, with the use of totalitarian methods it proved possible to impose Cyrillic for writing almost all the languages in the communist polity and in the neighboring polities of Mongolia and Tannu-Tuva by the turn of the 1940s (Martin 2001: 414-422). In the 1950s, Soviet advisors insisted that China adopt Cyrillic instead of the Latin alphabet, when Mao’s communist regime still toyed with the replacement of the Chinese script (Zhou 2003: 63, 156).
The breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 resulted in an ethnolinguistically and religiously much more homogenous Russia than in the past. After the federation’s autonomous Republic of Tatarstan decided to switch from Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet for writing the Tatar language beginning in 2000, two years later the Duma replied with a law providing that all languages native to the territory of Russia must be written in Cyrillic. In this way, the two-century-long quest for an ethnocultural homogeneity in Russia was at long last fulfilled at the level of script. In this success, Russia became an aspiring linguistic area in its own right, linguistic loans filtering to the country’s languages solely through the prism of the Russian language that is also Cyrillic’s normative prime gate keeper across the country (cf Faller 2011: 131-134).

After this digression let us return to the question how lects were transformed into written languages in this in-between Europe, or the middle between the West of Latin letters and the East of Cyrillic. As in the case of the Germanic lects sharing the same name (Deutsch / Teutsch), initially all the Slavic lects were known as ‘Slavic,’ that is, lingua S(c)lavonica in Latin or Slovenski in Slavonic (Dulichenko 2011: 209; Holzer in Okuka 2002: 186). In many ways the tradition has survived to this day as attested by the confusingly similar names of the languages of Slovak (Slovenčina) and Slovenian (Slovenščina). In the early 19th century, its persistence gave rise to the idea that all the Slavic lects are just ‘dialects’ that should be united in a single Slavic language, like earlier the Holy Roman Empire’s Germanic-speakers had done with their lects ‘amalgamated’ into the (standard) German language, or abandoned for its sake (Kollar 1837; Šafařjk 1837).

However, in the late medieval and early modern period, when lects were made into languages across Western and Central Europe there was not a single polity encompassing most of the Slavic dialect continua, which the role for the Germanic dialect continuum was served by the Holy Roman Empire. The first Slavic
vernacular lect to emerge as a written language was the Slavic of Bohemia. This development took place during the 12th and 13th centuries, under the influence of the example of the coalescing Germanic and Romance vernacular languages within the Holy Roman Empire of which Bohemia was a part, too. Another influence was that of Greater Moravia’s ninth-century Slavonic literacy in Glagolitic that survived in Bohemia until the late 11th century (Trunte 2012: 88-89). Not surprisingly, Bohemia’s Slavic-speakers selected Latin letters for writing their lect, which beginning in the 15th century, they dubbed as ‘Czech,’ deriving it from the Slavic form of the name of Bohemia (Dulichenko 2011: 209).

The early reformation of the Hussites and the subsequent Hussite Wars in the early 15th century were triggered off, among others, also by the Holy Roman Empire’s insistence on the use of Latin in liturgy, instead of Czech. Jan Hus, who gave name to this movement, also proposed a new kind of spelling for Czech, borrowing from Hebrew the use of diacritics for achieving this end. It did away with digraphs (or two letter combinations) for representing a single sound (phoneme), opting for one-to-one correspondence between letters and sounds. As Hussitism was decried to be a ‘heresy,’ their spelling was also deemed ‘heretical,’ and Catholic Slavophones in neighboring Moravia (or the eastern half of today’s Czech Republic) stuck to the old ‘Catholic’ spelling, giving rise to their – now forgotten – Moravian language that survived till 1918. However, with time, elements of Hussite spelling were adopted for writing Moravian, too (Kamusella 2009: 423; Řepa 2001).

A similar, and even wider, disagreement which Slavic lect should become a written language and what name should be given to it unfolded between the 15th and 20th centuries in the South Slavic dialect continuum, for a long time, cut across by the mobile military frontier separating the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg lands (or, after 1867, Austria-Hungary). Not a single Slavophone medieval polity there survived to the modern epoch,
which otherwise could have spawned a stable Slavic language with a clear-cut name and a solid tradition of literacy in it. To add insult to injury the medieval in its origins division between Catholics and Orthodox Christians, became progressively more multidimensional with the appearance of Slavic-speaking Muslims and Protestants. Likewise the number of scripts and related to them systems of spellings proliferated accordingly.

Between the 16th and 19th centuries, language projects and names became quite numerous in the South Slavic area, especially under the influence of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation. The conflicting influences of both were fuelled by printing presses that kept churning out vernacular translations of the catechism and the Bible for Protestants and Catholics. Previously, the act of translating a holy book had been thought an unspeakable desecration of its holy language, ergo, God’s language (Fine 2006; Peti-Stantić 2008).

Translating the Bible into this or that lect had the power of making and codifying languages, many of which survive to the present day. In the 16th century Polish took the place of Czech as a lingua franca in the Slavophone areas of Central Europe, the latter language vilified as ‘heretic,’ and the power in the lands of the Czech Crown permanently seized by the Catholic Habsburgs. That is why the Old Czech (or Catholic) diagraphic spelling was adopted for writing Polish rather than its Hussite variant. The Polish language – apart from achieving a co-official status, vis-à-vis Latin, in Poland-Lithuania during the 1540s – was written and spoken from today’s Estonia to Romania. Interestingly, instead of being grafted on any regional lect, the language sprang up from the deterritorialized sociolect of Poland-Lithuania’s nobility who had coalesced between the 11th and 14th centuries. Marrying among themselves, and being spatially mobile across the state’s entire territory, the nobility – though of varying regional and ethnic origin – their speech had become uniform. It set them apart from the majority of the population – peasantry – who were
tied to land through the system of serfdom well into the 19th century (Dulichenko 2011: 224-228).

Printeries brought the innovation of two different kinds of fonts (types) for writing and printing in the Latin script font, namely Gothic (Black Letter, Fraktur, Bastarda, Swabian hand etc.) based on the hands of late medieval manuscripts and Antiqua (literally ‘Old Letter’) that emulates the letter forms of classical Rome, as they had developed during the 1st and 2nd centuries. At the turn of the 16th century a division of labor between these two types developed, Antiqua employed for printing books in Latin and Gothic for publications in the newly codified vernacular lects. The Reformation shattered this new norm, meaning that books for Protestants, in whatever language they happened to be, were printed in Gothic, while for Catholics in Antiqua.

The new tendency was limited mainly to the Protestants of the Lutheran creed and never held fast in the Holy Roman Empire where Catholic emperors endeavored to reach out to the Protestant half of the polity by adopting the Lutheran form of German and the Gothic type, as well. In the age of nationalism, during the 19th century Gothic was increasingly associated with German as the national language of the German nation, which caused Lutherans of other ethnolinguistic backgrounds to drop this variety of the Latin alphabet in favour of Antiqua. Finally, Gothic disappeared from use after 1941, vilified as ‘Jewish’ and banned in the Third Reich. The German legislation of that time announced Antiqua to be the ‘normal script’ (Normal-Schrift) (Borman 1941; Kapr 1993; Morison 1972).

Differentiation in types of scripts is closely associated with the rise of the Russian language. In the Orthodox and Muslim worlds, and also among Jews, translating their holy books into vernaculars remained a taboo. Literati kept to their respective ‘holy languages’ when engaging in administration or intellectual pursuits. Religion remained the sole legitimate mold for organizing social, intellectual and political life. Orthodox
Christians and Muslims alike saw printing as an anathema, due to its mechanical (‘unthinking’) character. The holy language was to enjoy an intimate connection to every scribe’s heart through his hand that held the pen. Under the West’s growing modernizing impact, views on that matter began to change. At its fastest the change progressed in Poland-Lithuania’s eastern – and mainly Orthodox – half, which in 1596 was coaxed into a union with the Catholic Church that preserved the liturgical use of Cyrillic-based Slavonic for the ‘Uniates’ (they found this name offensive and in the mid-18th century it was replaced by the sobriquet ‘Greek Catholics’). Until 1696, when it was banned and replaced with Polish, (Martel 1938: 65; Tornow 2005: 347) the main official language in the eastern half of Poland-Lithuania (or in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania) was the local Slavic lect written in Cyrillic, known as Ruthenian (that is, Ruski), its name derived from Rus’, and in continuous employment since the 13th century (Grynchyshyn, Gumets’ka and Kernyts’kyii 1977: 5; Niendorf 2011: 25-48).

Ruthenian was employed in administration and printing, for writing about secular and religious matters, in a way that was easily comprehensible to Slavophones, unlike in the western Catholic half of Poland-Lithuania (or the Kingdom of Poland), where Latin was given more prominence than Polish. The attraction of Ruthenian was also noticed farther east, in Muscovy (where it was referred to as Litevskii or ‘Lithuanian’), because Ruthenian-language writers drawing simultaneously at Polish and Church Slavonic opened a bridge for a transfer of ideas from West to East and the other way round, as well. Furthermore, Ruthenian was much closer to Muscovy’s Slavic lects than official Church Slavonic of a South Slavic origin, then already removed over seven centuries from living speech (Bumblauskas 2013: 26-27; Kravetskii and Pletneva 2001; Stang 1932).

At the turn of the 18th century, Peter the Great imposed a program of modernization (or rather Westernization) on Muscovy, which he transformed into a Russian Empire. Part and parcel of
this process was script invention (‘modernization’). He commissioned in the Netherlands a new type of Cyrillic, closely modelled on Antiqua. (Kjellberg 1958: 90) Known as Grazhdanka (‘civil script’), Peter decreed that all non-religious (that is, initially mainly military) books in Slavic (or slightly vernacularized Church Slavonic, sometimes known as ‘Slavo-Russian’) must be printed with its use. (cf Sidorov 1964: 112-132; The traditional Cyrillic became the preserve of religious manuscripts and publications, hence now it is often dubbed as ‘Church Cyrillic,’ or ‘Old Cyrillic’ (Shitsgal 1959).

Tsar Peter also founded an Academy of Sciences emulating the French Academy of Sciences, established half a century earlier. One of the tasks of this academy at St Petersburg, like its Parisian model, was to compile a dictionary of the realm’s language. Unfortunately for the project, until the 1830s the majority of the empire’s educated elite were literate either in Polish or German, not in what eventually became Russian. The prestige of Church Slavonic was so strong that only by the turn of the 19th century a compromise emerged proposing a Russian language should be composed in an equal measure from the Slavic lect of Moscow and Church Slavonic. At the same time the aforementioned academy delivered the promised dictionary (Vinokur 1947). However, this reference failed to give a single name to the language, variously referred to as ‘Slaveno-Russian’ or Rossiiskii, with different conflicting definitions of what the linguonyms should refer to. Afterward, in Russian this language became known as Rossiiskii through the 1830s, when it officially became Russkii. The latter name, which emulates the Ruthenian-language name of Ruthenian (Ruskii), remains unchanged to this day (Kamusella 2012b).

The story of Ruthenian that went defunct in Poland-Lithuania at the very close of the 17th century still continues in another important development. During the second half of the 19th century publications began to appear in Cyrillic-based languages of Little Ruthenian and Little Russian, respectively, in Austria-
Hungary’s eastern Galicia and in Russia from Rovno (Rivne) to Kiev (Kyiv). Between 1863 and 1905 it was prohibited to produce books or periodicals in Little Russian in Russia or to import their Little Ruthenian counterparts from Austria-Hungary (Rodkiewicz 1998). At the same time, in the latter country the Little Ruthenian lect became a medium of education and a co-official language in local administration across eastern Galicia. At the turn of the 20th centuries, proponents of Little Ruthenian and Little Russian, seeing these two lects as an essentially single language of a single nation, decided on the single name ‘Ukrainian’ for both.

Meanwhile, the folding back of the tentative policy of Russification in the wake of political liberalization brought about the 1905 Revolution also allowed for the rise of modern-style printing in White Russian (Belarusian). Publications for Belarusian Uniates (Greek Catholics) were produced in Latin letters, and for their Orthodox counterparts in Cyrillic. This bichristurality survived until the incorporation of all the Belarusian and Ukrainian territories into the Soviet Union during World War II. Earlier, in the interwar period, both, Ukrainian and Belarusian, were standardized as the ideological basis of the Ukrainian and Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republics in the Soviet Union. It meant a tentative break with the 19th-century official Russian stance that Little Russian and White Russian are ‘rural dialects’ (narechiia) of Russian. (Hruchevsky 1965) Speakers of these narechiia were then expected to forget them when becoming educated, which first of all, meant achieving native-level fluency in Russian (McMillin 1980; Rudnyc’kyj 1967; Shevelov 1980).

This process of standardizing the two dialects-turned-languages brought to the head the question about the history of Belarusian and Ukrainian. None was used before the mid-19th century in a written form that would continue in any of the two standard languages. However, in the Soviet Union it was felt that each union republic, as defined in ethnolinguistic terms, it should enjoy cultural and political history going back at least to the Middle
Ages. A solution to this dilemma was reached when the corpus of Ruthenian-language writings, produced between the 14th and 17th centuries, was declared as ‘rightfully’ belonging to ‘Old Belarusian’ and ‘Old Ukrainian.’ This apportioning of the single corpus among the two modern languages followed the purely geographical principle. All the Ruthenian-language texts produced in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the ducal chancery at Kyiv are classified ‘Old Ukrainian,’ and those written in the chancery at Vil’na (nowadays, Vilnius in Lithuania) as ‘Old Belarusian’ (cf Anichenka 1969; Grynchyshyn, Gumets’ka and Kernyts’kyii 1977: 5). Another instance of language-engineering and rearranging elements of culture from the past in an anachronistic manner that serves the needs of the present moment.

From Nationalism to the Internet

The prestige of Latin-based education across Western and Central Europe hinged on the vast educational system designed and run for the sake of nobles’ and burghers’ sons by the Society of Jesus. This model was often emulated in Protestant states, too, especially in Scandinavia, the Netherlands and the northern half of the Holy Roman Empire. The Jesuit system of education ceased abruptly, when in 1773 the pope suppressed the Society of Jesus. Its assets in the form of school buildings, libraries and dormitories were sometimes lost, but in most cases continued to serve the same educational purpose, though under a different leadership. In Poland-Lithuania this change in leadership was combined with the radical replacement of Latin with Polish as the medium of education. In reality Latin lasted as a language of instruction in secondary and university education until the early 19th century, when Poland-Lithuania had already been already partitioned out from the political map of Europe (Bobková-Valentová 2006; Klemensiewicz 1999: 496-516).

The phasing out of Latin from education and administration in Western Europe was not as momentous as in Central Europe,
because in the former region, such state languages as English, French, Spanish, Dutch, German or Tuscan (Italian) had earlier pushed Latin to the margins. In the 18th century, French became a new lingua franca of all-European literacy and social distinction, decisively replacing Latin in this function. At first, French spread as a new shared sociolect of nobility and aristocracy in Western and Central Europe, but soon it began to fulfill this function also in Russia, and since the mid-19th century in the Ottoman Empire, as well. Between the mid-19th and the mid-20th centuries French was the global language of diplomacy and scholarship, though in Central and Eastern Europe German strongly competed with it in this role. The tragedy of World War II changed the political and economic balance in favour of English as a new vehicular language of technology and politics across Europe and the world. The Kremlin’s push to make Russian into a lingua franca of at least the Soviet bloc failed, mainly due to the impossibility of unsupervised, free and mass travel between the Soviet bloc countries and the Soviet Union (cf Crystal 1997; Fumaroli 2011).

The unexpected success of the French Revolution strongly contributed to the aforementioned rise of French as a global lingua franca. The Kingdom of France was overhauled into a centralistic French nation-state. All males were granted the same citizenship of equal rank, and in turn were conscripted into the revolutionary armies. Linguistic centralization and homogenization followed swiftly. In 1793 the use of other languages than French was banned in administration, education and public life. And five years later, the French Academy of Sciences produced the fifth – revolutionary – edition of its epitome normative dictionary that had been published for the first time in 1694 (Nadeau and Barlow 2008: 145).

In this manner, nationalism as a novel ideology of statehood and power legitimation was married fast with language policy. The nation-state’s linguistic package provided for the use of the state official language (preferably in singular) across the polity’s entire territory in state offices and schools. The norms of this language
were ironed out by the polity’s academy of sciences that expounded them in authoritative dictionaries and grammars approved by the state. (This is the source of the radical difference in approach to language management between the ‘Continent’ where prescriptivism rules and the Anglophone world given to descriptivism.) The references were employed for writing textbooks that spread the knowledge of the standard national language among the state’s entire population (or ‘nation’) through compulsory elementary education. Universities that had dropped Latin in favour of the state (national) language as the medium of instruction supplied elementary schools with teachers fluent in the written form of this national language, both in speech and writing. The military service, compulsory for all males (irrespective of their social status), solidified their facility in the national language, as it was the language of commands and fraternization between soldiers from far-flung provinces and the capital. These self-reinforcing social-engineering instruments of school, army, academy and university generated an increasing amount of ethnolinguistic homogeneity, helped on the way by the burgeoning press and cheap books in the national language. The decisive levellers of any remaining linguistic difference (that the state still wished to obliterate) came in the 20th century in the form of the genuinely ubiquitous mass media of cinema, radio, and most importantly, television.

The Napoleonic wars brought about the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806. In this way, German nationalism that budded in reaction to the apparently unstoppable French military onslaught, was deprived of a polity that could have overhauled its mainly Germanicphone population into a German nation, and the empire into the nation’s own nation-state. Faced with this unseemly predicament, German national activists settled on the German language as the basis for building a German nation, hoping that later the nation, its construction completed, would win an appropriate state for its home. In this way, a new, ethnolinguistic type of nationalism was born. This novel kind of the national ideology yielded the first crop of its fruit when Italy
and Germany were founded as ethnolinguistic nation-states in 1861 and 1871, respectively (Abizadeh 2005).

Under the great impression made by the unprecedented economic, political, military and social successes, especially of France and Germany, the idea of ethnolinguistic nationalism and centralized statehood ignited many other national movements across Central Europe. They began codifying and standardizing their languages, settling on an agreed language name, its script and type of spelling, and through authoritative dictionaries and grammars. In due course, literature and press appeared in the newly minted standard national languages. Alongside scholarly and educational institutions, economic and agricultural clubs and societies, and political parties sprang up with the aim of supporting the national language and using it as the sole medium of conversation and business (Sundhaußen 1973).

Demands for ethnolinguistically defined ‘autonomy and national rights’ were met with widespread suppression (assisted by Russian troops) in 1848-1849 across Central Europe. But it was impossible to reverse this trend after liquidating the remains of the serfdom system in the Austrian Empire and Prussia, which eventually necessitated the introduction of all male suffrage in 1871 in the German Empire and in 1907 in the Austrian half (Cisleithania) of Austria-Hungary. These changes were replicated in a less evolutionary manner in the Russian Empire in a much shorter span of time between the 1860s and 1905. The highly multiethnic empires of the Habsburgs, the Romanovs and the Ottomans found themselves at the receiving end of the socio-political pressure exerted by multiplying ethnolinguistic national movements. Unwisely, following Prussia’s proposal that all ‘civilized’ polities should include in censuses the question about language as the ‘sure’ measure of nationality, subsequent censuses’ results armed national leaders with ‘objective data’ on the demographic size of their postulated nations. The data also indicated where national polities for these nations should be
carved out from the non-national empires (Böckh 1866; Kertzer and Arel 2002; Leuschner 2004; Silver 1986).

Russia, as mentioned above, set out on the homogenizing policy of Russification that lasted unabated from the 1860s until the 1905 Revolution, when demands for democracy and the freedom of publication in various languages and scripts had to be conceded, at least temporarily. Meanwhile, since the 18th century St Petersburg had also cast itself in the role of the champion of the rights of (Orthodox) Christians in the Ottoman Empire. After gaining lands from the Sublime State along the northern shores of the Black Sea and expelling Muslims form there in the 18th century, Russia hoped to get a foothold in the Balkans. The tsar set his eyes on seizing Constantinople (vel the ‘Second Rome’) intending to make it into a Tsarigrad (‘Tsar’s or imperial capital city’).

The Balkan nation-states of Montenegro, Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria or Romania initially emerged during the first half of the 19th century as ethnoreligious national projects, in emulation of France and numerous nation-states that sprang up in the Americas at the turn of the 19th century. These national polities in the Balkans had not much interest in any language policy. Religion was the priority, meaning expulsion of remaining Muslims in an endeavor to achieve religious homogeneity within a given polity’s boundaries. In Bulgaria, Montenegro and Serbia, initially the increasingly Russian-style Church Slavonic was employed for official purposes, though it was gradually vernacularized, resulting in hybrid forms (similar to Russian’s vernacular-cum-Church Slavonic character), referred to as ‘Slaveno-Bulgarian’ or ‘Slaveno-Serbian.’ In the case of Greece it was Kataharevousa (‘purifying language’) that, like the aforementioned ‘Slaveno-style’ Slavic languages combined written Greek (or rather written Greek languages, that is, Classical, liturgical and ‘Byzantine’) with elements of the everyday speech of Athens (or Demotic) (Albijanić 1985; Mackridge 2009; Rusinov 1999: 504).
Bulgarian emerged as a language in its own right, shaped in line with the European model of language standardization, by the turn of the 20th century. Disagreements about what the Greek language should be continued well into the second half of the 20th century. In 1976 Demotic was made official in Greece, but the compromise entails that elements of classical Greek and Katharevousa continue to be taught at school, while the Greek of the New Testament continues to function as the liturgical language in the Greek Orthodox Church. The publication of the Demotic translation of the New Testament triggered off riots in Athens in 1901 and 1903. The Greek original of the New Testament and the Septuagint are still used in liturgy, though an Orthodox Church-approved translation of the Bible into Demotic came off the press in 1997. But it is only for non-liturgical private perusal among the faithful (Mackridge 2009: 247-252).

To a large degree, it was a repeat of the story of translating the Bible into Russian. The first attempts in the 1810s were seen as a blasphemy and desecration of the holy language of the Church Slavonic Bible. The translation approved by the Orthodox Church came off the press in 1876, ironically, four years after the publication of the Russian translation of the first volume of Karl Marx’s Das Kapital (Pervyi 2014; Rizhskii 2007: 160-192). Obviously, like in Greece, the ‘holy’ Church Slavonic translation of the Bible continues to be used in liturgy in Orthodox churches across Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Macedonia or Serbia.

Likewise, although translations of the Quran into European languages (first, into Latin) began to be published already in the 16th century, Muslims themselves – irrespective of their everyday lects – stuck to the Arabic original. And this original, believed to have been dictated by God (Allah in Arabic) to Muhammad, remains the staple of Islamic liturgy. Yet under the influence of the huge 19th- and 20th-century projects of translating the Bible into ‘all the world’s languages’ (The Bible 2014), in the second half of the 20th century similar efforts have been regularly
undertaken in the Islamic states. Interwar Turkey was a precursor in this field (About Al-Quran 2014; Wilson, M Brett 2009).

This opposition to translations from a holy language and to reproducing a holy book in a mechanical fashion stopped the spread of printing to the Orthodox and Islamic worlds in an equal measure. The culture of manuscripts written and copied by hand continued, and in places prevailed, there well into the 20th century. Printing developed in Russia during the 18th century. From there the idea and technology spread to Serbia in the 1830s, while the first Bulgarian-language printing houses opened in the Ottoman Empire during the 1840s. Russian-style Grazhdanka swiftly replaced Church Cyrillic in print (apart from liturgical books) during the subsequent decades (Crampton 2005: 60; Dubovac 1975; Gorshkov 2009). The setting up of printing presses for Christians and Jews was allowed in the Ottoman Empire since the 16th century. But the printeries were permitted to operate on the condition that they would not produce books in the holy Arabic script (that is, in the languages of Arabic, Osmanlıca or Persian), which would constitute sacrilege. Although the first-ever Osmanlıca-language printing house opened in 1727, it did not last. Printing in this language and in the Arabic script took off in earnest only during the Tanzimat reform period; a governmental Ottoman press was founded in 1835 (Shaw and Shaw 1977: 128; Somel 2003: 236).

The spread of printing, educational systems, state offices and conscription brought to the Balkans the ideas and means of shaping lects into languages. During the first half of the 19th century proponents of Illyrian (Croatian) and Serbian were working hard on dictionaries and grammars of the two proposed languages. But in the second half of that century, most of the linguistic entrepreneurs decided to develop a common language, or Serbo-Croatian, hopefully for all the South Slavs, written in Cyrillic for Orthodox Serbs (mainly in Serbia, as Bulgaria never joined the project) and in Latin letters for Catholic Croats (in
Austria-Hungary). In the latter case, a version of the Hussite Czech spelling was employed. The old religious conflict connected to this orthography was brushed aside, as amply attested by making the Czech (and Moravian) language cooficial (alongside German) in Austria-Hungary’s crownlands of Bohemia and Moravia during the 1880s (Hlavačka 2005).

The appearance of the Bosnian language in Austria-Hungary’s Bosnia was short-lived. In the wake of the Great War, the founding of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (or Yugoslavia, since 1929) was based on the postulated ethnolinguistic, Serbo-Croatian, national commonality, to which the Slovenes were added, resulting in the state’s official language of Serbo-Croato-Slovenian. The solution was modelled on interwar Czechoslovakia’s official and national language of Czechoslovak that came in its two territorially delimited varieties of Czech and Slovak. After 1938, following the breakup of interwar Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovak split into the two separate languages of Czech and Slovak not to be melded together ever again. A similar fate met Serbo-Croato-Slovenian that during World War II broke up, and after several permutations, yielded the three separate languages of Serbo-Croatian, Macedonian and Slovenian. The subsequent fracturing of the first language at the turn of the 21st century reflected the slow-motion breakup of Yugoslavia. It resulted in the rise of the four post-Serbo-Croatian languages of Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian (Greenberg 2004).

In this manner, each post-Yugoslav successor nation-state (except Kosovo), in line with the logic of ethnolinguistic nationalism that equates language with nation, received its own national language not shared with any other nation. Some opine that Serbo-Croatian composed from two varieties separated by script ‘had to split.’ But, what is largely forgotten, this composite language, like Czechoslovak, originally drew at the influential model of the Norwegian language. Since 1885, Norwegian has been composed from two varieties, namely, the Norwegianized
Danish (Bokmål) and Nynorsk (New-Norwegian), posed as a revived Norse. Despite various political and social conflicts aimed at or caused by this composite language during the intervening period, the Norwegian language continues undivided (Haugen 1976: 35-36).

In official use Latin survived longest in the Habsburgs’ Kingdom of Hungary (extending from present-day Slovakia to Croatia), when it was replaced with Hungarian in 1844. (Of course, in Catholic liturgy Latin continued until the turn of the 1970s, and remains a co-official language in the Vatican City State.) The suppression of revolutionary national movements in the wake of the 1848-1849 insurrections brought Latin and German back to the realm at the expense of Hungarian. Also some official uses and education in Croatian, Romanian, and in the nascent languages of Slovak and Slovenian were permitted briefly. During the 1850s and 1860s German was the leading language of education and official business across the Austrian Empire, including the Kingdom of Hungary. In 1866 Austria suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of Prussia pushing on with its political plan of overhauling the northern half of the German Confederation (a pale reflection of the Holy Roman Empire created in 1815) into a German nation-state (Wandruszka and Urbanitsch 1980: Vol 1).

Three years later Berlin created a German Empire, but meanwhile Vienna in order to regain a modicum of legitimacy overhauled its empire into a dual Austria-Hungary in 1867. It was a bow to the growing force of the Hungarian ethnolinguistic national movement. Czech and Croatian national leaders disliked this development, hoping that a tripartite monarchy is on the cards for the Slavs. The Czech leaders would not be mollified, so in order to attract to the dualist project Polish-Lithuanian nobles, Polish was made the official language in the Crownland of Galicia in 1869. In this way the opposition of the disgruntled Czechs in Bohemia were balanced by the Polish camp in Galicia. A year earlier, in 1868, the Hungarian government granted official status
to the Croatian language in the Hungarian provinces of Croatia and Slavonia.

While, in Italy, Germany and the Russian Empire the policy of ethnolinguistic homogenization was implemented, Vienna decided to keep the empire together by allowing a degree of ethnolinguistic territorial autonomy where necessary and advisable. Switzerland was the obvious model to follow, its cantons officially monolingual in one of the confederation’s four official languages (Müller 1987). The thinking was that demands and interests of various ethnolinguistic national movements could be met in their respective regions, thus preserving the political and territorial unity of the multi-ethnic empire. But the Hungarian government at Budapest, in breach of the legislation on that matter, decided to embark on a policy of unyielding Magyarization (Hungarianization) of non-Magyars (or non-Hungarian-speakers) in the Hungarian half (Transleithania) of the Dual Monarchy. This fuelled resentment and translated into the growth of national movements, soon joined by non-Magyars who previously had been staunchly loyal to Hungary (Berecz 2013; Wandruszka and Urbanitsch 1980: Vol 2).

Increasingly bigger losses of territory suffered by the Ottomans at the hands of Christian neighbors and brand-new Christian nation-states from the 18th century through the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and the First World War caused a similar resentment among the ruling Turkicphone elite of the Ottoman Empire. This resentment was deepened by successive waves of expulsions of Muslims from the lost areas, and by persecution of Muslims remaining there (Toumarkine 1995). The confluence of Islam as the political basis of the empire with Turkish ethnolinguistic nationalism underpinned the dramatic social and political changes that destroyed the Sublime State and spawned Turkey that follows the Central European model of ethnolinguistic nation-state. The changes that championed Turkish ethnolinguistic nationalism alienated the Albanians who had even earlier founded their own ethnolinguistic nation-state in 1912/13. This quickening
ethnicization of the rump Sublime State in the quest for the holy grail of ethnolinguistic-cum-religious homogeneity also made possible the 1915 genocide of Armenians and Assyrians (Akçam 2006).

After 1918, the rubble of the collapsed multiethnic empires in Central Europe was distributed among the newly founded nation-states, almost all of them based on the ethnolinguistic principle (the striking exception was the Free City of Danzig, which the Allies were reluctant grant either to Germany or Poland that demanded this city port). It provides that states with a population that speaks and writes in more than one language are illegitimate. The early modern principle of the ethnoreligious homogeneity within the boundaries of a state (eius regio cuius religio) was replaced with its modern variation, namely, eius regio cuius lingua (‘whose realm, his language’). However, it soon turned out that apart from the nation speaking its own national language in Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, or Poland, speakers of other languages – dubbed ‘minorities’ in the new vocabulary of the post-1918 times – still remained. Bigger empires were replaced by their miniature versions; the ideal of ethnolinguistic homogeneity ultimately unattainable.

Among Central Europe’s national polities only Finland instituted Swedish as another co-official language, alongside the national language of Finnish. But this decision was preceded by a civil war in which the language issue had been of much import (Hamalinen 1979). In its official bilingualism, Finland joined the trilingual (until 1938) Switzerland and the then bilingual Belgium. Language conflicts have periodically rocked Belgium since the late 19th century, but lately the state appears to have found a solution to the dilemma and emulates the Swiss model of instituting official monolingualism in its different provinces. Not that the Swiss model is set in stone, as exemplified by making Romansh the fourth official language in Switzerland in 1938, its speakers enjoying the use of this language in the administration of the

Full monoglotism (the normative use of a single national language by a state’s entire population in all spheres of life), as prescribed by ethnolinguistic nationalism, remained elusive. Diglossia or polyglossia in several lects (or the use of different lects in different spheres of life by individuals) remained the standard. Tasked so by the state, school and army attempted to uproot dialects and other languages than the national one, but it was a slow process. Unfortunately, national leaders were helped in their quest for ethnolinguistic homogeneity by Soviet (communist) and German (national socialist) totalitarianisms and the tragedy of World War II. Genocidal policies culminating in the Holocaust of Jews and Roma killed millions, while tens of millions were forced out of their homes that happened to be located in ‘nationally wrong’ countries (Prusin 2010; Snyder 2010).

In this way, a near perfect correspondence of nation-states with their respective ethnolinguistically defined nations was achieved by the mid-20th century. Nowadays, this outcome appears to be the ‘natural’ or ‘normal’ state of things, though from the longue durée perspective it is highly unusual. Ironically, the founding of the European Union (EU) in 1992 and its successive eastward enlargements of 1995, 2004, 2007 and 2013 have brought multilingualism back to Central Europe. Unhindered by borders or any legal hurdles, courtesy to common EU citizenship, millions have moved from one country to another. The EU’s 24 official languages are increasingly employed in the Union’s institutions and across all the member states. To their status of national languages these lects added the distinction of being EU official languages.

Not that the process is without its ironies, some quite poignant. The Maltese numbering slightly over 400,000 and 70,000 Irish who speak their Irish language on everyday basis can peruse all the EU legislation readily translated into their languages. But the
same facility is not available to over seven million Catalan-
speakers, because the Autonomous Community of Catalonia is a
region within the nation-state of Spain. Ergo, Catalonian is not a
national or state-wide official language, and as a result the status
of EU official language was never extended to it. This is also true
of other regionallects, recognized as languages, but not claimed
by any nation-state as official or national, as in the case of Welsh
in Britain or of Latgalian in Latvia.

During the interwar period the Soviet Union, which was Central
Europe’s sole large non-national polity (whose legitimacy hinged
on the ideology of communism), also embarked on the policy of
accepting various languages in official use, in stark contrast to
the late Russian Empire’s policy of Russification. The time
between the two world wars was characterized in the Soviet
Union by unprecedented language engineering that created or
‘modernized’ (that is, supplied with authoritative grammars and
dictionaries) over a hundred languages into which state
propaganda and Stalin’s works were speedily translated, followed
by ‘progressive’ (that is, ‘ideologically correct’) works of world
and Russian literature. But since the late 1930s, Russification
came back and the official use of non-Russian languages was de
facto limited to the then sixteen union republics. The about
10,000 ethnolinguistically defined autonomous territories of
various ranks that had existed previously were largely liquidated
(Martin 2001; Smith 1998).

The brunt of this Soviet policy of Russifying was most painfully
felt in Belarus and Ukraine, because of the persisting view at
Moscow that Belarusian and Ukrainian were ‘just dialects’ of
Russian, and as such slated by the ‘laws of history’ for extinction
(Hrushevsky 1965; Rudnyc'kyj 1967). In independent Ukraine,
the existence of the official Ukrainian language, though shaky and
in divisive competition with unofficial (at the state level) Russian,
appears to be assured. On the other hand, Belarusian is losing
ground rapidly to Russian in Belarus that has been officially
bilingual since 1995. Unlike Ukrainians, most Belarusians see no
problem with the loss of the Belarusian language. In this their attitude is more similar to postcolonial countries where the colonial power’s language was adopted as official in preference to any indigenous lects. But from another perspective, present-day Belarus is a unique Central European polity where language is not used for nation-building and statehood legitimation. A mix of assorted Soviet symbols and customs successfully fulfills this function (Bekus 2010: 151-155; Moser 2013).

On a par with the institutionalization of official multilingualism in the EU, the rise of the internet appears to be a wild card in the return of multilingualism and polyglossia to all of Europe. In cyberspace which, since its inception over a decade ago, has not been effectively controlled by states until recently, proponents and speakers of neglected or unrecognized lects may meet and embark on collaborative projects. They appeal for official recognition as languages for their lects and also work along the standard route by providing these lects with dictionaries, grammars and literature so that others would see them as full-fledged languages. New internet-based devices were developed during the first decade of the 21st century, which every language now needs to don in order to be worthy of this distinction, among others, its own Wikipedia and computer keyboard layout.

Developments in this department are quite unpredictable, depending on a group of dedicated enthusiasts who manage to attract attention and support of this or that target speech community. Some linguistic (or more aptly, language-building) projects fail, while others of which nothing was heard a couple of years ago, unexpectedly shoot out to prominence. Let us only mention as examples such newly codified (or revived, thanks to ‘internet codification’) non-state languages that enjoy their Wikipedias as the following ones: Võro in Estonia, Low German in Germany, Latgalian in Latvia, Samogitian in Lithuania, Silesian in Poland, or Rusyn in Ukraine and Serbia. Also Serbo-Croatian survives in the internet with a Wikipedia under its belt, while Belarusian uniquely sports two Wikipedias, one in the pre-Soviet
national spelling and the other in Soviet (Russifying) orthography (cf Klimaǔ 2006).

Although without own Wikipedias to their name, web and paper publications are produced in the Slavic lects of Bunjevac in Serbia, Burgenland Croatian in Austria, Goranian in Kosovo, Paulician (Banat Bulgarian) in Romania and Serbia, or Pomakian in Bulgaria and Greece (Dulichenko 2003/2004). Strangely, Europe’s largest stateless ethnolinguistic group, or the ten to 12 million Roma (‘Gypsies’ is a largely derogative exonym, nowadays best avoided) have not managed to codify (let alone standardize) their language of Romani. The Romani Wikipedia is a makeshift affair, much smaller, less coherent and less dynamic than the aforementioned Wikipedias produced by and catering to speech communities that amount to a mere several tens or few hundreds of thousands of members (Vikipidiya 2014).

**Conclusion: European Ethnolinguistic Commonality?**

This profound disability suffered by the Roma in Europe, where their vast majority are illiterate in their native lects or state languages, is a reflection of their continuing subaltern status. In its socio-political and economic dimensions it is similar to that that was the fate of Afro-Americans in the south of the United States before the Civil Rights Movement in the mid-20th century. Most projects of literacy creation in Romani have been run by non-Roma activists and the states where Roma happen to reside, which entailed the use of various Romani varieties for written purposes, jotted down in a myriad of ad hoc inconsistent spelling systems in Latin, Cyrillic, Greek and even Devanagari letters. A standard language of Romani is still a thing of the future, though in the 1990s there was a concentrated attempt to elevate Vlax Romani to this status (cf Hancock 1995).

I alluded above (cf Ferguson 1996: 269-270) that nation-states by increasing homogenized communication in the national
language within their territories and by separating their populations from outside influences create national linguistic areas. As a result, tolerated or not, unofficial lects (variously referred to as ‘minority languages’ or ‘dialects’) emerging or surviving on the territory of a given national polity, willy-nilly, in many ways become increasingly similar to the overbearing national (state) language. These similarities include, among others, adopting the state language’s script, spelling system, or grammar description conventions, and following the dominant lect’s idioms, grammatical constructions or word formation and pronunciation patterns. It happens so, due to an unprecedented concentration of administrative and legal means that enforce the near-exclusive use of the national language in most of the public and private spheres of life.

But looking at the phenomenon from the suprastate perspective of the European Union or Europe itself (or Eurasia’s westernmost peninsula imagined to be a separate continent in its own right), the existence of a European linguistic area may be also postulated (cf Jakobson 1931). What underlies this linguistic area is the memory of the Latin-Greek cultural and linguistic symbiosis that lasted most of the first millennium, first, across the Roman Empire. The division of this empire led to the unravelling of the symbiosis, and the resultant cleavage was deepened by the subsequent split of Christianity into its two separate Western (Catholic and Protestant) and Eastern (Orthodox and Greek Catholic) branches. However, the Renaissance and the Enlightenment revived this waning symbiosis in the model of the classical gymnasium. This kind of gymnasium survived until the interwar period, and its students were expected to become fluent, both, in classical Latin and classical Greek (Fuhrmann 2001).

Indeed, it was an uphill battle and few did. Meanwhile vernacular lects of the Protestant and Catholic West, codified and standardized into languages, drew extensively at classical Latin and its grammar as the model to be followed in the process. Their Eastern (Orthodox) counterparts emulated classical and New
Testament Greek in this respect, though beginning in the 19th century, the influence of the West coaxed them more into the adoption of the Latin-style model for building languages. This Western model won hands down in the 20th century, when Turkey and the Soviet Union threw their weight behind it.

The Latin language itself survives in medical language, a corpus of ossified legal terms and phrases, and in the Linnaean taxonomy of species. These are quite specialized fields, but in one way or another brush off onto everyone’s life in modern Europe. Furthermore, in science and technology, since the 18th century, it has become the standard to coin names for new devices and discovered phenomena by drawing at classical Greek and Latin roots. For instance, the neologism ‘television’ is composed from the classical Greek word tèle for ‘far’ and Latin visio for ‘sight.’

The Graeco-Latinate coinages constitute the basis of so-called ‘internationalisms’ shared by almost all Europe’s languages and widely adopted into other languages across the world. (cf Liu 1995) In the former case, this phenomenon is the present-day continuation of the classical Greek-Latin cultural and linguistic symbiosis, while in the latter it is a symptom of globalization and of the West’s continuing cultural, scientific and economic imperialism (Calvet 1974). This underlying Greek-Latin terminological, conceptual and grammatical basis of modernity, as defined, shaped and dominated by the West, evokes reactions that range between acceptance and rejection.

In Europe, at the level of language construction and maintenance, the former approach can be illustrated by the wholesale adoption of internationalisms and other Latinate words, idioms and phrases in Russian, only thinly masked by their rendering (usually simple transliteration) in Cyrillic letters (Smith 2006). On the other hand, linguistic purism exemplifies the opposite tendency of rejecting Western-style modernity, in search of a nationally specific version of it, usually combined with the deepening of ethnolinguistically defined national identity. The German or Czech
language illustrate this tendency. (Langer and Davies 2005) Returning to the aforementioned example of the term ‘television,’ it is immediately recognizable in Russian *televidenie*, but its German counterpart *Fernsehen* appears to be starkly ‘un-European,’ like the Czech *počítač* for ‘computer.’

The Graeco-Latinate foundation of the proposed European linguistic area is graphically expressed by script choices. After the Second World War, the multiplicity of European writing systems (complete with Arabic, Armenian and Hebrew scripts) was limited – through genocide, expulsions, border changes and forced assimilation – to three alphabets only, namely, Cyrillic, Greek and the dominant one of Latin. Historically speaking, the Latin writing system developed from the Greek one, like Cyrillic (Rogers 2005: 167, 170-173). But the latter attained its contemporary shape by having been made similar to the Antiqua type of Latin letters. Hence, Cyrillic (or more precisely, Grazhdanka) is of both Greek and Latin origin. At present, the European Union’s official scripts are three, namely, Cyrillic, Greek and Latin. Although in alphabetical order accorded the last place in this enumeration, the Latin script is known to all Europeans, including those who write their (national) languages in Cyrillic and Greek letters. It is not true the other way round of Europeans writing their (national) languages in Latin letters, the vast majority of them have not even a basic command of Cyrillic or Greek alphabet.

After the First World War, the skill and readiness to use multiple scripts for writing and reading different languages (for instance Ukrainian in Cyrillic or Italian in Latin letters) and the same ones (for example Belarusian texts in Cyrillic and Latin scripts or Yiddish ones in Hebrew and Latin letters) largely disappeared. Ethnolinguistic nationalism encouraged normative ‘monoscripturalism’ (the use of one script only) by all the members of a single nation, alongside enforcing similarly normative monolingualism on the territory of the nation’s nation-state. The pragmatic (that is, largely apolitical and unideologized) diglossia (and even poliglossia), as a matter of course prior to
World War I, was replaced by the nationally construed and ethnolinguistically defined normative monoglossia, additionally underscored by monoscripturalism.

European integration seems to be changing this trend by promoting ‘serial monoglossia and monoscripturalism.’ The majority of Europe’s polities remain monoglossic and monoscriptural, but EU citizens are increasingly expected to develop the skill of switching between several languages (and sometimes different scripts, too) when interacting with their counterparts in and from different member states. Europe’s truly multilingual states are few and apart, among them Switzerland, Luxembourg, Moldova, or Belgium. Genuinely multiscriptural polities are even fewer, only Montenegro and Serbia. The former polity enshrined biscripturalism in its constitution, while the same phenomenon is a de facto development of unofficial nature in Serbia. The Serbian constitution recognizes only Cyrillic as the country’s single official script.

Esperanto, though nowadays unduly consigned to oblivion across the West, is another example of the Graeco-Latinate commonality of modern Europe. What is not widely known, L L Zamenhof (originally, Eliezer Levi Samenhof) designed this language in the late 19th century, first of all, as a common lingua franca for Europe’s Jews, namely the Germanicphone Ashkenazim speaking Yiddish and the Romancephone Sephardim speaking Spanyol (Ladino). However, the movement to employ Esperanto as a neutral language of international communication became soon dominant, and the Jewish roots of this language are largely forgotten, because Europe’s Jews never used it in line with Zamenhof’s intentions in this respect. After the Great War Esperanto stood a good chance of becoming one of the official languages of the League of Nations, but for the French veto. In Europe the Esperanto movement was nearly wiped out during the 1930s through imprisonment and executions of the leading Esperantists in Nazi Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union. After
World War II, Esperanto revived, especially in Japan and the Far East (Żelazny 2012).

Most of Esperanto’s vocabulary is derived from Romance (Latinate) roots. The second most important source of its semantic borrowings are Germanic languages, while the rest is composed from a sprinkling of Slavic and Greek roots. In this Esperanto is mostly a descendant of Latin, but its full employment of internationalisms underscores this language as a significant product and expression of Europe’s Latin-Greek cultural-cum-linguistic symbiosis (Jagodzińska and Geller 2009; Trunte 2012: 711-742).

When Zamenhof was busy translating the canon of world literature (as agreed upon in the West at the turn of the 20th century) into Esperanto in order to endow it with a literature of scope and quality as enjoyed at that time by Europe’s most important national languages, another Jewish visionary and Zamenhof’s namesake, Eliezer Perlman (later, Ben-Yehuda), set out on the Zionist project of overhauling the then restricted male-only language of Hebrew into a full-fledged Jewish national language. This new Hebrew, or Ivrit, became the language of everyday communication among British Palestine’s Jews (Yishuv), and after the founding of Israel in 1948, was made into the national language of the first-ever Jewish nation-state (although Israel’s legislation pays lip service to Arabic as the country’s another official language). In this manner, Israel as an ethnolinguistic national polity constitutes a direct export of the Central European ideology of ethnolinguistic nationalism to the Middle East.

In the world where writing and literacy are the norm, of the making of languages (and scripts) there is no end,⁷ as long as human groups exist.

---

⁷ As an inspiration for this sententious parting word, I gladly acknowledge the title of Paul Robert Magocsi’s book (1999).
References


from the Czech and German by Ben Fawkes]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


Wolf, Hieronymus. 1568. Corpus Historiæ Byzantinæ. Frankfurt am Main.


