TERRORISM IN INDONESIA:
AN EXAMINATION OF TEN RADICAL GROUPS

Jolene Jerard

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University of St Andrews

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TERRORISM IN INDONESIA:
An Examination of Ten Radical Groups

Jolene Jerard

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of PhD at the University of St Andrews

13 October 2014
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ABSTRACT

The study is based on the hypothesis that there are forces of influence that push a group from extremism to terrorism. While not all groups make the shift to terrorism, there are inherent forces within the radical group that influence the course of action undertaken by groups. The study examines 10 radical groups in Indonesia and explores the question: How do ideology, leadership and group dynamics play a significant role in the radical groups in Indonesia?

The study explored groups within a broad cross-section of terrorist and extremist groups that have either been in operation or are currently in operation in Indonesia. The groups examined were Lashkar Jihad (LJ), Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Darul Islam (DI), Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Negara Islam Indonesia (NII), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HT), Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI), Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), Al Qaeda Indonesia (AI) and Mujahideen Indonesia Timur (MIT).

The study highlights that groups are able to sustain themselves on the path of terrorism if there is a unique confluence of a politicised ideology, presence of influential leadership and group dynamics. Based on 124 interviews and questionnaires of terrorist and extremist leadership and cadre, the study sheds light on unique dynamics within these groups in Indonesia. In an examination of the 10 radical groups, this study shows that the very factors that often influences the radicalisation of individuals on the pathway of terrorism – ideology, charismatic leadership and community affiliation through group dynamics also in turn influence the course of action of groups as a whole.
DEDICATION

To my family whom I have been dearly blessed with;

my parents, Jerard and Janet and my brother Joshua,

Thank you for allowing me to chase my dreams unencumbered.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

“For God, For Family, For Country”

Author’s Interview with a Member of Al-Qaeda in Iraq,
Erbil, Iraq, 2009

It is indeed a discomforting realisation that in so many ways we are similar and in so many ways infinitely different from the subject of our exploration. For at the heart of some, is so deep a desire for a better tomorrow and world that is at peace, that every waking moment is dedicated to the creation of change. The path of peace and that of violence is but a fork in the road, often a choice with cascading implications undertaken with but a fleeting dream of a better tomorrow.

In November 2009, I had the privilege of meeting with Professor Paul Wilkinson - an inspirational intellectual titan and a true visionary in the field of terrorism studies. After my presentation at a Workshop on Homeland Security Organisation in Defence Against Terrorism organised by NATO Centre of Excellence - Defence Against Terrorism (COED-DAT) Professor Wilkinson pulled me aside and asked me to think about pursuing my post-graduate degree at the University of St. Andrews. I remember telling him then that a post-graduate degree was not something that I had thought about at that time. He reminded me to follow my heart and that things would fall into place. When we parted ways after the course he gently reminded me once again - Don’t forget St. Andrews. I promised him then that I would think about furthering my studies. Unfortunately by the time I eventually got around and enrolled into the University of St. Andrews, Professor Wilkinson had passed on, approximately a month before I matriculated. I will continue to cherish the thought-provoking discussions and the lessons he had briefly shared during those few days. He was an icon in the field and man whose ideas will continue to influence the intellectual pursuit of scholars in this field for generations to come - just as he has (probably unbeknown to him through his gentle and spirited ways) influenced mine and my journey to this University.

This journey has been a process that concomitantly amalgamates intellectual pursuit with a truly personal passage of self-discovery. It has been a journey that has reminded me of the people, who have inspired me and have tirelessly supported me along the way. To the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at the Nanyang Technological University of Singapore and especially Professor Rohan Gunaratna, Head of International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research I am grateful for the continued support in making this journey possible.
Very special thanks to my supervisors Dr. Peter Lehr and Dr. Robert Lambert who gave me clear direction and guidance through the fog of intellectual confusion. To treasured friends like Mr. Salim Mohamed Nasir, thank you for reminding me that the quest for intellectual pursuit must continue unyieldingly even in the depths of self-doubt and uncertainty.

Through this journey, I am privileged and honoured to have met many men and women who have dedicated their lives in tireless sacrifice and service to their countries and to humanity. To Mr. Loh, Inspector General Pol. Dr. Tito Karnavian, Brigadier General Pol. Dr. Mohammad Syafii and General (Purn) Dr. A. M. Hendropriyono, I owe my heartfelt gratitude, utmost respect and sincere appreciation.

In the famous words of Ernest Hemingway, “It is good to have an end to journey toward; but it is the journey that matters, in the end.”
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**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

JI – Jemaah Islamiyah

JAT – Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid

DI – Darul Islam

AQI – Al-Qaeda in Indonesia

FPI – Front Pembela Islam

HT – Hizbut Tahrir

LJ – Laskhar Jihad

MIT – Mujahideen Indonesia Timur

MIB – Mujahideen Indonesia Barat

MMI – Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia

MUI – Majelis Ulama Indonesia

NII – Negara Islam Indonesia

TNI – Tentera Nasional Indonesia

FKASWJ – Forum Komunikasi Alus Sunnah Wal Jamaah

FKPI – Forum Komunikasi Pembangunan Indonesia

NKRI – Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia
CHAPTER ONE

THE INTRODUCTION

“All is a riddle, and the key to a riddle...is another riddle.”
Ralph Waldo Emerson

Fourteen years after the attacks on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001, and the subsequent demise of Osama Bin Laden in May 2011, the threat of terrorism remains unabated as acts of terrorism continue to take place. Academics, officers from law enforcement and the security services grapple with efforts to mitigate the threat of extremism and terrorism internationally. The world remains riddled with insecurity. While the phenomenon of terrorism is not new, the attacks on the World Trade Centre is analogous to a rent in the fabric of the security studies domain, a black swan event.¹ The attack was a game changer, which brought to the foreground and cemented the dawn of a new era of perpetual insecurity.

The threat of terrorism has continued to dominate the security agenda of nations. Innumerable resources have been spent by governments to dismantle the operational infrastructures of terrorist groups through kinetic countermeasures.² In the fiscal year 2013 alone, the intelligence community of the United States set aside USD16.6 billion, more than a third of its annual budget on counter terrorism alone.³ The amount set aside was revealed in what was later known as the ‘black budget’ that was passed to The Washington Post by Edward Snowden, a defence contractor. Aside from the release of sensitive data to the press, the sheer quantum of the ‘black budget’, reiterates the continued importance placed on terrorism vis-à-vis defence two years after the death of the Osama bin Laden.

On the global platform the threat of terrorism, looks poised to continue. The ensuing conflict in Syria, the present spiral downhill for Iraq, the instability in Pakistan, the wavering security of Afghanistan and its ripple effect on Africa and Asia present a sobering backdrop. Against the larger and more enduring threat of radicalisation and terrorism continues to thrive unabated globally.

In exploring the growing heterogeneity of the threat of terrorism, Nesser points to the increase in attacks over the last few years as a ripple effect from “the ‘Arab Spring’,

¹ Nassim Nicholas Taleb used this metaphor to refer to an unforeseen and unprecedented event that will have a large impact on the course of history. See Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, (UK: Penguin, 2008)
² Kinetic Countermeasures in this instance refers to the use of force to apprehend, kill and disrupt terrorists, terrorist cells and terrorist plots.
the death of Osama bin Laden and the weakening of al-Qaida’s Af(ghan)-Pak(istan) networks, and last but not least, the proliferation of jihadism in social media.” The heterogeneity of the threat emphasises the need to rethink establish means of mitigating the threat of terrorism, revisit assumptions and attempt to creatively construct new methods of handling an evolving threat landscape.

As an extension from the time and investment towards the operational vanguard of terrorism, there have been attempts to nip the flourishing problem of terrorism in the bud, where possible. This has resulted in a proliferation of numerous studies on the processes surrounding the journey of individuals who have chosen to embrace violence as a means to an end. In bringing to a halt what is often thought of as a germination process, it is hoped that stemming this process would help prevent the eventuality that these individuals embark on a process of committing acts of terrorism.

Comparatively fewer resources and even lesser effort have been channelled to dismantle the infrastructures that promote and sustain the processes of radicalisation. This study aims to shed light and fill the gap in the understanding of the processes of radicalisation of 10 terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia through exploring the unique roles of ideology, leadership and group behaviour and their subsequent impact on a group. Despite efforts undertaken, the continued and continuous regeneration of ideologues, leaders and fighters for a future generation is almost guaranteed through the sustenance of the fertile wellsprings of a permissive environment. Ironically, the only certainty in the study of terrorism thus far seems to be continued uncertainty. This seems to permeate the discourse as academics and practitioners alike as they attempt to contribute to the understanding of a much-debated field of terrorism studies.

SITUATING THE DEBATE:
TERRORISM AND THE NEW SECURITY PARADIGM

The term security derives it etymological roots from “Latin secures safe, secure, se without + cura care – the quality or state of being secure or as a freedom from danger (freedom or fear or anxiety).”  

5 As a branch of the International Relations, security studies and strategic studies were in the 1990s and early 2000 analogous to siblings fighting to remain relevant in a fast changing world. Buzan opined that the “literature on strategic studies is too vast and so complicated that those wanting to understand it


cannot easily find a place to start”\textsuperscript{6} and that this very expansion of the strategic studies domain was as a result of being “driven by fast-moving developments in technology, conflict and politics.”\textsuperscript{7} The work of realist scholars with a strong emphasis on the state was now giving way to the necessity for an expanded understanding of security.

Buzan and Hansen identified four key themes in the changing dimensions of security studies in the post-World War II period. Drawing insight from the evolution of security studies, Buzan and Hansen identified four themes, first questioning the focus on the state as the sole referent object. Second, the emerging national and transnational nature of the security threat, third the necessity to widen or expand the ambit of security concerns and last but not least questioning the very concept of security in it of itself given that the concept of security studies is dependent on a referent object which keeps shifting \textsuperscript{8} In a growing consensus between the traditionalists such as Baylis, Wirtz, Cohen and Gray; and the proponents of an extended security studies in the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century otherwise known in circles as the wideners such as Buzan, Waver and de Wilde\textsuperscript{9}, today “security studies are viewed in their broader sense as an area focusing on a variety of threats and security aspects, not solely military ones.”\textsuperscript{10}

Stephen Walt in a seminal article in 1991 acknowledged the “resurgence of security studies”\textsuperscript{11} as an “important positive development for the field of International Relations.”\textsuperscript{12} The full thrust of this renaissance as Walt had termed had achieved it fruition in the aftermath of the events on 11 September 2001. While terrorism as a strategy and a tactic had well existed before, the new paradigm of perpetual insecurity has resulted in the explosion of issues that fall under the expanding ambit of security has been on a steady rise. From state security, environmental security, human security, food security, energy security to financial security, the rubric of security today seemingly blankets a whole gamut of issues.\textsuperscript{13} There is no agreed upon universal definition of security. “Security is a contested term, one with multiple

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{7} Ibid
\bibitem{9} Peter Suchy, Role of Security and Strategic Studies within International Relations Studies, p.12; See also, Baylis, J., James J. Wirtz, Eliot Cohen, Colin Gray (Eds.) \textit{Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies}. (New York: Oxford Univeristy Press, 2006)
\bibitem{12} Ibid, p.21
\bibitem{13} Barry Buzan, \textit{People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations}, (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1983)
\end{thebibliography}
meanings, some of which are not all logically linked to conventional understandings.” A generally accepted consensus of the idea or concept of security as one that is contingent on the generic notion of being or feeling safe from threat and danger.

The study of security has been, is and will continue to be a central part of the lexicon, political discourse and analysis in International Relations. It is the crux of discourses of both International Relations and conceptual notions of power and politics. “Security is profoundly political; neorealist assumptions usually elide this basic point; what it is that should be rendered secure is an essential component of any discussion of security.” Security as a concept had its roots in World War 1 and later during the Cold War. It was initially channelled towards studying the causes of war in the hope of achieving an enduring and sustainable peace. Since then, from the bipolar structures of the Cold War to the ultimate ascension of a hegemonic superpower, the nature of security discourse between and amongst states has witnessed an unfathomable inclusiveness to all elements that affect security writ large. Today, the concept of security includes non-state actors and myriad of political, economic, societal and military issues that fall under this general rubric of security. In his recapitulation of security, Wæver notes that

“with the help of language theory, we can regard ‘security’ as a speech act. In this usage security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in better, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering ‘security’ a state representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.”

As a general working definition, security today can be broadly defined as the ability of an actor to be comfortable that its survival is not in question. The expanding ambit of security helms the thrust of discussions in foreign policy. No longer is the notion of security limited to relations between states. The broader question often asked today is: Whose security is of concern? The differentiation lies in the changing referent object. The literary canon of the security discourses is entrenched in the work of a multitude of scholars. The work of Foucault on the interdependence between power and knowledge, post-war realist Hans Morgenthau on the notion of statesmen’s ability to define threats against the state and the Gramscian notion of the extended state in

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17 Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power”, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Summer, 1982), pp. 777-795
reference to non-governmental institutions that further the arm of the state, extended the notion that the referent object of much of the discourse rests with the state. “A constructed object that lies at the centre of much contemporary discourse in security studies is the state. In conventional studies of security, the state is treated as a natural fact, but any particular “state” is in fact a cultural production; it is in effect a set of statist discourse.”

In terrorism studies, the referent object would typically been assumed to be the state. Reiterating the words of Michael Foucault, David Campbell, noted that, “countries go to war, not for the purpose of defending their rulers, but for the purpose of defending ‘the nation’, ensuring that the state’s security, or upholding the interests and values of the people.” The statist nature of securitisation discourse has “thus become and remain dominant in part because of the power relations sustaining them.”

For states, the sovereignty of the land is an area of concern, for non-state actors, terrorist groups and single-issue groups, their ability to survive through sustaining the interest of their target audience who would buy into their cause. In very broad terms, the concept of security today highlights the value placed on the loose and intangible feeling of safety wherein the ultimate survival of an actor (state, organisation or individual) is not put to question.

The ever-increasing ambit of security today propels the need for a reassessment of the security debate. As contemporary political discourse waltzes around security studies and critical security studies, there are overarching narratives that need to be addressed. These fundamental questions include: What does the notion of security comprise? Whose security do actors fight to secure? Today issues that fall under the parameters of security are merely limited by the imagination. The Copenhagen School for instance “defines securitization as an extreme version of politicization” Just as any given issue can be politicised, today any given issue of interest can be securitised.

**HIERARCHY OF SECURITY**

Since any given issue can be an area of security concern, what then do governments and societies aim to secure? Within this already expanded ambit of security, unspoken rules still govern. At the top of the list of key security concerns, security concerns that directly affect the state remain paramount. It is within this realm that not only a disproportionately large amount of funds are still channelled but also a heightened reaction is undertaken. The militaristic posturing undertaken on terrorism is in itself a case in point.

At times, the importance ascribed to terrorism is differentiated through the analogies used to describe the threat and by extension the means to deal with it. The war analogy comes with the assumption that a decisive military victory is possible and the criminal analogy on the other hand assumes that the fight against terrorism is a protracted problem that needs to be contained. Furthermore, it gives the notion that “this approach is a reactive one – criminals are normally caught after they have committed their crimes.”

Terrorism while having been considered a non-traditional security threat in the past has edged its way towards what most states deem as a traditional threat. The police, military and security organisations are being trained to effectively mitigate this threat on the state, the region and the international system as a whole. Ramazan Erdag explores the importance of rethinking the concepts surrounding security with an emphasis on collective security through the use of institutions on a global level.

German military theorist Clausewitz astutely emphasises that “Theory becomes infinitely more difficult as soon as it touches the realm of moral values.” As much as this is reflective of the ability to operationalise military tactics and strategy during war, this is also similar to the inherent hurdle in the terrorism studies literature on the definitions of terrorism. In the case of terrorism, the ascribing of moral norms and values to the individual as opposed to mere consideration of the tactic of terror used has further muddied the waters in this definitional debate. This will be explored in further detail in Chapter 2.

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26 Ibid, p.274
SECURITY: OLD CONCEPT, NEW PARADIGM

The new paradigm of security comprises a synergy between the perceptions of the current threats facing the state amidst an ever-changing world. However, the meaning of security as a fundamental concept has not changed. What has indeed changed instead is the perception of what needs to be included under the ever-expansive umbrella of security. Dalby highlights the dilemma of this extended security wherein “the process of providing various forms of security, insecurities are also produced, often in a way that either actually undermine the initial production of security or that merely perpetuate the problems to which they are supposedly providing solutions.”29

This new paradigm has its foundations in the nature and the manner through which society as a whole has changed and will continue to change through the passage of time. Just as Hobbes wanted to ensure sustainable human security through the Leviathan, it remains that same logic that will guide and govern this new paradigm of security – a collective logic of survival. Terrorism has been considered amongst the foremost threat to state security and a sustained threat to world order. Sageman, a leading terrorism scholar, similarly argues that “a new type of terrorism threatens the world, driven by networks of fanatics determined to inflict maximum civilian and economic damages on distant targets in pursuit of their extremist goals.”30

Attempts to define terrorism have often resulted in an emotive response by scholars and both the religious and political elite alike. Distilling the terms and terminology that would be amenable to all parties concerned remains an uphill battle. Crenshaw astutely notes this uphill battle with the semantics and lexicon of terrorism whereby “the field is probably still plagued by challenges posed by a lack of definition (what terrorism constitutes), the inability to build a cohesive integrated and cumulative theory (built around larger data sets and over longer time periods) and the 'event driven character of much research'.”31 This challenge is further exacerbated by the tendency to ascribe to a moral and social meaning to terrorism. The multiplicity of definitions and the parallel definitional debates that follow has reiterated the necessity to be cognizant of ascribing an amoral definition to the term terrorism. Richard English notes that the while the challenge of multiple definitions will continue, the solution does not lie in a layering of yet another definition but instead to,

Distinguished scholar Bruce Hoffman identified five factors that are characteristic of terrorism thus setting it apart from rudimentary criminal activity. These factors are the political aims and motives, the use of violence, the innate psychological repercussions of the violent act that impact more than the victims, the group has an identifiable hierarchy and chain of command and last but not least, acts of terrorism are typically conducted by sub-national or non-state entities.33

This study will provide a working definition on the use of terrorism. Despite its constant use, there remains no single widely accepted definition for terrorism; there is however three factors in defining terrorism as noted by Boaz Ganor. The factors listed by Ganor echo the early factors provided by Hoffman as the distinguishing characteristics of terrorism. First, Ganor terms, the “essence of the action”34 where violence remains as the distinguishing characteristic of an act of terrorism. Violence is defined as the use of physical force to coerce physically or psychologically.35 The second factor that Ganor asserts is “the goal of underlying terrorism”36 whereby terrorism always has a political objective.37 Finally, he argues that “the target of the damage,”38 is always non-combatants.39 Encompassing these three characteristics of terrorism, this study will define terrorism as the creation and psychological exploitation of fear through the deliberate use or threat of use of violence against non-combatants in the hope of creating political change.40

36 Boaz Ganor, Counter-Terrorism Puzzle, p.17
39 This working definition was also used in my postgraduate research. See, Jolene Jerard, Pact with the Devil: Negotiating with the Non-negotiable, Masters Thesis, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 2007
40
PARADOX OF TERMINOLOGY

The rise of Islamism has thrust the debate on terrorism forward. It has stereotyped the debate and at times, it has aluded to the terms Islamism and terrorism as being synonymous. This is indeed a growing fallacy in a field where discussions on religiously inspired terrorism has encountered a hyperbolic spike. The literary corpus on terrorism has often used the terms fundamentalist, radical, extremist, terrorist and the recently minted term violent extremist almost interchangeably. It is generally assumed that the actors involved often possess a Manichean worldview coupled with strong irredentist ambitions. Islamism is “a religious ideology with a holistic interpretation of Islam whose final aim is the conquest of the world.” At its crux it is a type of terrorism - religiously inspired terrorism. The term Islamist underpins “the political nature of this movement within the Muslim world – as distinct from ‘Islamic’, the culture and religion of Islam.”

All religiously inspired terrorism includes a degree of fundamentalism. ‘Fundamentalist’ was a term initially coined by Curtis Lee Laws in 1920, the term was coined in reference to American protestants who were drawn to the fundamental elements of faith and were prepared to defend their faith against modernity and secularism. Scholars have constantly attempted to amalgamate the varied terms in a generalization that unfortunately provides limited insight with ambiguous language. Ben-Dor and Pedahzur for instance attempts to define fundamentalism “as a movement that is radical in terms of its goals, extremist in terms of its methods, and literalist in terms of its adherence to scripture.” The definition albeit all-encompassing does not delineate between (extremist) thought and (extremist) action. Perhaps more importantly, it erroneously equates fundamentalism with extremist methods. In this study, contrary to Ben-Dor and Pedahzur definition, a fundamentalist would refer to individuals or groups who are merely literalist in interpretation of their respective faith- returning to the fundamentals of the faith, but it would not necessarily entail the manifestation of violence to a point of causing grievous danger to others.

In the process of examining the 10 radical groups, this study will delineate this key difference and attempt to fill the gap in the theoretical understanding between belief system and manifestation of violence. History recognises individuals like Mahatma Ghandi who was a non-violent activist; he had deviated from mainstream political thought but has successfully managed to inspire revolutionary change without the use of violence.

41 Mehdi Mozaffari, “What is Islamism? History and Definition of Concept”, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Vol.8, No. 1, March 2007, p.21
43 Gabriel Ben-Dor and Ami Pedahzur, “The Uniqueness of Islamic Fundamentalism and the Fourth Wave of Terrorism”, in Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Vol.4, Issue 3, 2003, p.73
Just like the term fundamentalism “has been stretched beyond its original meanings the more attenuated it becomes,” as seen in the definition by Ben-Dor and Pedahzur, the terms used to define individuals participating in acts of terrorism have shifted through the course of time as scholars and practitioners alike struggle with labels to define the threat in changing times. For instance, the term ‘countering violent extremism’ was recently minted by the Obama administration to purge the ethnic and religious stereotypes associated with the term ‘terrorist’ in the recent decade. Individuals participating in acts of terrorism are now beginning to be known through more apolitical terminology as violent extremists, a term devoid of ethnic, religious, political and military undertones.

The diagram below shows the definitional lens through which this study will be conducted. A fundamentalist person or group would refer to individuals who are more literalist in their religious interpretations. An extremist would refer to an individual or group that hold fundamentalist values, and sympathise with the cause of terrorism but refrains from engaging in violent acts – extremist ideology. The difference between the fundamentalist, extremist and a terrorist or violent extremist would be the use of violence to further their cause for radical political change. The process from (ideological) extremist to terrorist (violent action) in this case would be referred to as radicalisation. It is this shift that this study aims to examine.

Figure 1: Conceptual Diagram

Each of the concepts listed in the above conceptual diagram (Fundamentalist, Extremist/Ideological Extremist, and Terrorist/Violent Extremist) is rooted in some degree of political radicalism. The term ‘ideological extremist’ used here will refer to

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all forms of ideology that an individual may possess or be partisan to include but not limited to religious, political ideology. While all religiously inspired terrorist/violent extremists are inherently fundamentalist, not all fundamentalist groups are terrorist in nature. At each sub-set, both individuals and the group aim to create the necessary social change to achieve their desired state of political affairs. The key difference would be the manner in which individuals or the group chooses to manifest this political radicalism. At the epicentre of the discourse on political radicalism, is the synergy between the desire for social change and the choice of tool utilised for creating the desired social change. In the case of terrorists, they move beyond just non-violent extremism and choose a pathway of violence to achieve the political end state desired.

There is growing contention to identify the means through which radicalisation occurs within the two different schools - as a (1) process or (2) a conveyor belt. The former assumes that as a process, the radicalisation of individuals occurs gradually but does not necessitate the radicalisation to the extent of terrorism. Zeyno Baran used the metaphor of a ‘conveyor belt’64 to describe the tenuous shift and the danger posed by non-violent extremist who move on to become terrorists. The metaphor of the conveyor belt assumes the movement from one stage to the next is seamless. Scholars who advocate that radicalisation occurs using the metaphor of a conveyor belt emphasize the underlying security concern that would arise from of non-violent extremists as this transition would be inevitable.

Della Porta, Moskalenko and McCauley have argued that this transition is not as fluid and often occurs “as a response to perceived injustice inflicted by security forces.”47 The schools of thought however are not altogether that different. The critical difference being the speed at which transition from non-violent extremist to terrorist takes place. Scholars like Githens-Mazer and Lambert warn against the blind parroting of what they have termed the conventional wisdom on radicalisation.48 Taking into account the mildly reductionist nature of the process and conveyor belt models, this study will hence aim to identify and critically evaluate factors that generate a visible shift in a group’s pathway of radicalisation.

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Drivers of Radicalisation

The quest to identify the key drivers of radicalisation has brought to the foreground a nuanced debate on the definition, nature, process and means of radicalisation of individuals. Radicalisation remains a contentious subject within the scholarly community. The widely accepted working definition used by the European Commission refers to radicalisation as the “phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas that could lead to acts of terrorism.” Effective counter terrorism efforts need to take into account the kinetic efforts aimed at dismantling the threat through identifying, apprehending, neutralising and disrupting terrorists and terrorists’ cells. In addition to that the kinetic efforts, strategic counter terrorism efforts aimed at creating an environment that is hostile to the terrorists need to be undertaken. Understanding the processes of radicalisation is a cornerstone in the current effort to mitigate the terrorist threat. The factors that radicalisation exert significant impact on the internal dynamics of the radical group.

Individuals are motivated to maintain and achieve a positive, more inclusive, self-definition that fulfils several basic psychological needs such as a sense of belonging, distinctiveness, respect, understanding and agency. For members of terrorist groups, there is already an innate sense of achievement that is derived from merely being part of the group that derives legitimacy directly from God. The role that terrorist groups as a unique entity play in the radicalisation process has not been thoroughly explored.

The study will evaluate the terrorist group as the principle agent of change. Reinhold Niebuhr notes that, “with communities, the self interest of the group is inevitably the predominant factor.” In this case, the role and decisions of an individual is tied intimately with the aims and ambitions of the group. The various processes of radicalisation and impact of collective behaviour will be explored later.

Objective

This study endeavours to explore the inherent assumption within existing literature on radicalisation that the factors that drive the radicalisation of individuals and the factors that drive the radicalisation of groups from non-violent ideological extremism to terrorism are one and the same. Exponential emphasis has been given to factors that motivate individuals to join terrorist organisations. In comparison, little effort is

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49 European Commission, Terrorist Recruitment: Commission Communication, MEMO/05/329, 2006; See Also, Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Europe: Typologies of Radicalisation in Europe’s Muslim Communities. Ed. Michael Emmerson, Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels, 2009


invested to understand if the factors that drive and sustain a group on the path of terrorism are similar to factors that motivate individuals on the path of terrorism.

While a group is made out of many individual persons, the social and psychological dynamics within a group could dominate and perhaps even override the factors that motivate individuals. Peer groups form a significant means through which individuals are socialized into norm and mores. A critical understanding of this difference is lacking in much of the current research in security and terrorism studies, which has traditionally focused on militant groups, their capabilities and ideologies and the government responses to threats they pose.

Even most of the so-called ‘lone wolf’ terrorists at very least subscribe to an existing ideology, and/or act on behalf of the interests a larger group. Most terrorists are inadvertently part of a group either real or perceived as being member of a global ummah or community. As such, understanding individual pathways of radicalisation form only one part of equation. The individual pathways of radicalisation would only provide insights into why individuals embark on the path of terrorist activity. Little research has been done to identify key drivers of radicalisation of groups. The heightened radicalisation and violence of groups used in the study here refer to the role of a terrorist group as a collective entity to sustain interest, inspire change and direct the course of action of the group would provide extremely valuable insights on the reasons why some groups espouse radical ideology and why others very quickly move one step further to conducting violent acts of terrorism. The groups continue in engage in what Barkun terms the playing out of Apocalyptic Scripts whereby “the more firmly a group comes to believe that it controls the dynamics of prophetic fulfilment, the more likely that its actions will include or precipitate violence.”

**TERRORIST GROUP AS A COLLECTIVE ENTITY: TO FORM, INFORM AND TRANSFORM**

Terrorist groups are able to not only form an organisation and act as a driver of extremist ideology but it also has a unique transformative quality that can direct the course of action of an individual and the group as a collective entity. The role of the group and consequently the leadership, structure of the group, group dynamics, ideological heritage and even the role of charismatic ideologues within an extremist or terrorist group are factors that will have an impact on the level and process of radicalisation of the group. In particular, the group’s propensity towards violence will depend on the group’s ability to harness the role of drivers from within. Using the Indonesian case, this study will explore the radical pathways of 10 radical groups in Indonesia. The 10 groups that will be examined are, Lashkar Jihad (LJ), Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Darul Islam (DI), Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Negara Islam Indonesia (NII), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HT), Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI), Jamaah

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52 Michael Barkun, “Religious Violence and the Myth of fundamentalism”, p.65
Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), Al Qaeda Indonesia (AI) and Mujahideen Indonesia Timur (MIT). Out of approximately twenty-nine groups espousing terrorism and extremism in Indonesia, 10 groups were chosen, taking into account the constraints of time required in the completion of the study. This study will then aim to “understand the nature of terrorist groups, including similarities and differences among them, terrorist groups and their warfare can be classifies according to general typologies.”

The study will highlight the drivers of radicalisation of groups and explore reasons why some groups have escalated their levels of violence through the course of time whilst others have remained extremists without engaging in acts of violence will be explored. In this new and evolving field of study, there is an acknowledgement that "additional social science research is needed to study how the ideas that shape the objectives of terrorist groups are capable of influencing the thinking and daily activities of new recruits and veteran operatives alike.” As such, while shedding light on this gap in the literature on the process of radicalisation of groups, the study will also extrapolate lessons that would provide a holistic understanding on the processes of radicalisation.

**Research Question**

Given the similar environment from which a burgeoning number of both extremist and terrorist groups thrive in a fertile and permissive environment of Indonesia, the study aims to examine 10 radical groups in Indonesia and explore the question: How do ideology, leadership and group dynamics play a significant role in the radical groups in Indonesia?

To evaluate this phenomenon, the study conducted will build on previous scholarly research on radicalisation. The study will be based on the hypothesis that there are forces of influence that push a group from extremism to terrorism. Not all groups ultimately make that shift to terrorism. The study will explore the premise that amongst the forces that move groups along a path of increased violence is an extreme political ideology, presence of influential leadership and the role of group dynamics.

This study will thereby examine of ten radical groups in Indonesia chosen from groups that were both established in the past to groups that were most recently established. While mapping the presence of radicalism in Indonesia through the course of history and exploring the connection between groups, the key players within the groups and the nature of their inter-group affiliations the study will endeavour to explore:

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54 Ibid; p.41
1. The identifiable factors make terrorist groups in Indonesia different.

2. The unique dynamics within terrorist groups that can influence change from non-violent extremism to terrorism within these 10 radical groups.

Detailed understanding of these variables will add further insight into the paths of radicalisation undertaken by each group and the ability of the group to sustain itself on the path of terrorism. Hoffman points to “knowledge (that) is still lacking concerning reasons why many “fringe” movements or hitherto peaceful religious cults suddenly turn to violence or embark on lethal campaigns of indiscriminate terrorism.”\textsuperscript{55} This study makes an attempt to unravel and shed light on the gap in both the literature and understanding of the processes surrounding group radicalisation.

The lessons learned from the Indonesian case study will provide a foundation that will be able to assist governments in the establishment of the necessary principles to combat radicalisation through a well-rounded strategy. This well-rounded strategy will entail a better understanding of the radicalisation process that will include not only individual motivations but the pertinent aspect of factors that sustain a group on radical pathways that ultimately influence the survival and sustenance of terrorist and extremist groups through the years.

**Navigating Through the Chapters**

In a calibrated attempt to unpack the intricacies of the complex riddle of group radicalisation. This first chapter has set the landscape and provided both the rationale and objective for the study. The next 7 Chapters will address several layers that will help shed light on the key factors behind the radicalization of groups. Chapter 2 will explore the dominant themes in the on-going discourse on radicalisation. Themes of the terrorism and the liberal state and the uniquely permissive environment within which terrorist and extremist groups thrive in Indonesia will be addressed in Chapters 3. Chapter 4 will elaborate on the methodology undertaken in the conduct of the study. Chapter 5, 6 and 7 will expound on the three themes, namely the role of ideology, the role of leadership and the role of group dynamics within the organisation respectively. Thereafter, Chapter 8 will summarise and conclude the study expounding on the confluence of these three key themes against the existing literature on factors that sustain terrorist and extremist groups.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

“Complexity begets ambiguity, which yields in all ways to prejudice and avarice. Complication does not so much defeat Men as arm them with fancy.”

R. Scott Baker

Navigating through the labyrinth of decades of research undertaken by scholars in the field of terrorism studies, one line succinctly encapsulates this undertaking. The literary corpus on terrorism is simply complicated.

It is simple only to the point that in essence there is a resounding agreement of the need for a continued search for answers as scholars and the security community grapple to comprehend and make sense of emerging realities. There has been a dogged attempt by scholars to try to understand terrorists, attempt to demystify their journeys towards terrorism, and at the heart of this literary corpus, struggle to identify both the causes and causal factors in the hope of making sense of the threat of terrorism.

It is complicated, in that years of research and work by academics, policy makers, practitioners and the international community respectively have shed light in more areas of inquiry, surfaced more questions and at best produced no agreed upon definition. The desire to criminalise acts of violence seems simple, but reality as the work of scholars show stems from a deeper and more pronounced need that legislation in it of itself would be insufficient in addressing and mitigating the threat of terrorism and political violence.

Ariel Merari acknowledges a similar difficulty in that “(t)errorism is a study area which is easy to approach but very difficult to copy within a scientific sense. Easy to approach - because it has so many angles, touching on all aspects of human behavior. Difficult to cope with – because it is so diverse.”56 Albeit there is truth in what John Horgan laments in that the field is theoretically underdeveloped and embryonic57 as a sub-discipline. Horgan’s words echoes the earlier work and words of Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman as they critique the discipline of terrorism studies as one that is “impressionistic, superficial and often pretentious, venting far reaching generalizations on the basis of episodic evidence.”58 In spite of these critiques, it is

pertinent to recognise the progress made thus far through the amalgamation of a variety of disciplines in the pursuit of acquiring a deeper understanding of the field, identifying causal relations amongst actors and exploring means to mitigate the threat of terrorism. The attempt to have a greater understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism is one that has its roots in history. Rather than concede defeat, what it warrants instead is continued research in an ever-evolving field of study. This Chapter will comprise two sections. The first section will focus on the complicated labyrinth of terrorism studies. The second section of this chapter will explore and expound on present models and conceptual frameworks of radicalisation that have arisen in the search for answers in the face of a continued threat of terrorism.

**Terrorism Studies: The Complicated and the Complex**

The repertoire of literature on terrorism and radicalisation bears the hallmarks of both the complicated and the complex. “Complex systems theory stands for an approach in the social as well as natural and computational sciences that studies how interactions between parts give rise to collective behaviors of a system, and how the system interacts and forms relationships with its environment.” The difference behind these deceptively similar concepts was well elaborated by Roberto Poli, the UNESCO Chair in Anticipatory Systems. His *golden rule* on distinguishing between complicated and complex systems was aimed at leadership and the ability of leaders to find effective solutions to problems.

Poli defined “Complicated problems (as those that) originate from causes that can be individually distinguished; they can be addressed piece by piece; for each input to the system there is a proportionate output; the relevant systems can be controlled and the problems they present admit permanent solutions.” This differentiation can also be used in the ongoing work in the field of terrorism and studies on radicalisation in general, in the hope that it can illuminate and provide a different perspective of the ongoing debates in the field. Attempts will be made to unpack the epistemologically dense and complicated labyrinth literature through the lens of time. Thus showcasing lessons that can be drawn from a historical and macro-understanding of the threat of terrorism and its roots.

The first section of this chapter will explore the current scholarship on terrorism, through the lens of chronology in what has come to be known in the terrorism studies

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as waves of terrorism. This refers to the periodic spurts of terrorism related activity through time. This section, will additionally highlight the predominant challenges within terrorism studies, explore Jason Frank’s notion of terrorism theory vis-à-vis the manner in which orthodox, radical and moderate terrorism theory address the root causes debate and finally situate the study of radicalisation within the expansive root causes debate in terrorism literature.

The second section of the Chapter will explore the realm of the complex. Poli refers to

“complex problems and systems (as those that) result from networks of multiple interacting causes that cannot be individually distinguished; must be addressed as entire systems, that is they cannot be addressed in a piecemeal way; they are such that small inputs may result in disproportionate effects; the problems they present cannot be solved once and for ever, but require to be systematically managed and typically any intervention merges into new problems as a result of the interventions dealing with them; and the relevant systems cannot be controlled – the best one can do is to influence them, learn to “dance with them”, as Donella Meadows aptly said.”

Even the sentence structure of his definition alludes to a multi-layered process of understanding complexity – where one riddle will almost inevitably lead to another. The section will shed light on the prominent radicalisation models and processes that have gradually surfaced in recent years especially in the aftermath of the attacks of September 2001. Each model time and again is resplendent with unique and individualised complexity.

At no point in the history of the literature of terrorism has there been such a surge of attempts by officers in the security services, law enforcement and academics to understand terrorism and pathways of radicalisation. Understanding this unique and complex dynamic of radicalisation is a layered and multi-pronged process. This chapter will aim to provide a refreshing perspective of several established models and perspectives of radicalisation that have come to dominate the discourses in the field over the course of time.

THE COMPLICATED: TERRORISM STUDIES THROUGH THE YEARS

Key themes, critiques and the general foundation of the root cause debate within terrorism studies will be explored in this first section. It will underscore the foundational search for the root causes of terrorism – an old debate that has once again resurfaced in approximately the mid-2000 amidst the quest to understand the puzzle of radicalisation that has dominated the discourse of terrorism and security in recent history.

Chronological Understanding: The Four Waves of Terrorism Research

Amongst his seminal works, was featured one of the most comprehensive summations of international terrorism through the lens of history, David Rapoport identified four waves of terrorism research. These waves were the anarchist, nationalist, 1960s leftist, and the current religious waves; each wave had its own unique ideological underpinning.\(^6\) Rasler and Thomson attempted to test and later affirmed Rapoport’s notion of the four waves of terrorism. Their work was based on an empirical study of groups from 1968-2004.\(^6\)

On one end of the spectrum were scholars like Rapoport, Rasler and Thomson who iterated the notion of the four waves of terrorism and posited that it aptly presented the discourse over time. On the other end of the spectrum were scholars like Kaplan who saw the four waves of terrorism as a necessary but insufficient means of explaining terrorism as it changed through the ages. Kaplan, while acknowledging the academic and visionary prowess of Rapoport extends his four waves of terrorism theory to include a fifth wave modern terrorism as the earlier exposition did

“not account for groups that begin on an international wave—indeed, some of such groups may even be the creations of foreign patrons or the result of foreign educations or the influence of foreign ideas or religious beliefs on founders of groups—but which for some reason have turned inward, cut ties to their international benefactors or ideological/religious bedfellows and sought to realize a utopian vision of a radically perfected society on the local level”\(^6\)

It is hence the groups that operate on the periphery that Kaplan and later Lizardo and Bergesen\(^6\) highlight were what they felt as being part of this fifth wave.

Sedgick on the other hand brings to the fore an alternative means of categorising the four waves. Contrary to Rapoport, the categorisation of the waves would not be based on ideological underpinnings. Sedgwick sees the categorisation based on ideology as an “optical illusion”\(^6\), whereby it is not so much the role of ideology as noted by Rapoport but instead the importance of what he sees as four waves of groups underpinned by their ability to inspire other groups to take over their strategy. The

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concept of ideology and its role in radicalisation surfaces once again in the models and processes of radicalisation. This concept of ideology as a binding factor will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 4 of this study.

Furthermore, Harrow, in developing a model on the changing effects of terrorism, explores not only “why a wave of terrorism emerges, but most often does not, and what goes on inside a wave of terrorism.” He notes that, “positive feedbacks of terrorism create an emergent identity which facilitates the factors needed for terrorism.” According to Harrow, it is this positive reverberation that eventually results in the creation of a common identity between members of a group. Scholars such as Kumar Ramakrishna has emphasized that the notion of the *echo-chamber effect* in radicalising individuals with a uniform, repetitive and unifying message especially in the cyber realm. In this instance, the notion of the *echo-chamber* would equally extend within the parameters of a group.

**Old Terrorism and New Terrorism**

The present “understanding ‘new terrorism’ are still located in the Cold War state-centric, realist and positivist perception.” The state-centric means of viewing terrorism is seen in not only terrorism literature but even at the policy level wherein law enforcement and security have a strong role in protecting against acts of terrorism.

One thing that has been certain is the need for value neutrality in the field of defining terrorism, the emotive nature of the subject matter, the multiplicity of referent objects from government, terrorist groups to victim continues to plague the field. As a result, “the meaning and usage of the word have changed over time to accommodate the political vernacular and discourse of each successive era, terrorism has proved increasingly elusive in the face of attempts to construct one consistent definition.” As such, despite the fact that “the historical origins of the concepts of ‘terror’ and ‘terrorism’ are relatively uncontroversial, their contemporary moral and substantive load and scope are matters of continuing debate.” The attempts and “trend toward ever more convoluted semantic obfuscations to side-step terrorism’s pejorative overtones has, if anything, become more entrenched in recent decades.”

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68 Ibid: p.15

69 Kumar Ramakrishna, ‘Self-Radicalisation and the Awlaki Connection’, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Commentaries, 7 July 2010


Constant Critique within the Literature on Terrorism and the Birth of a Sub-field

There have been a number of critiques that have surfaced in the literature of terrorism. Amongst these critiques is the inability to have a universal definition, the low barriers to entry and intellectual myopia of the field after many years of work by scholars. In recent times, there has been a birth of a new sub-field of research within terrorism studies that could be touted as the new wave that aspires to herald a new dawn of research in terrorism studies.

No Universal Definition

In an academic discipline that has long been established, the level of uncertainly with basic concepts that continues to thrive has been both a wonder and an impediment. It is a wonder that despite the efforts undertaken by the international academic community and policy makers alike, the problem of definitions continue to be an impediment. The lack of a universally agreed upon definition of terrorism will continue to be a haunting echo and a bitter aftertaste amidst both the academic discourse as well as the policy domain not only in the near future but almost certainly in years to come.

Low Barriers to Entry and Intellectual Myopia

The insufferable reality to terrorism academicians and practitioners alike is that despite the inability to agree upon a definition, terrorism has been a field that has experienced a phenomenal thrust in the volume of work done but curiously enough has managed to stagnate just as quickly. Certainly enough has been done by exploring the intelligence failure in the lead up to September 2011, Hoffman highlighted that while failure in the intelligence community was critiqued, academic failure present in the field of terrorism studies, especially the level of “intellectual myopia that characterised the field.” 74 He notes that while this failure was “patently less consequential, they were no less significant: calling into question the relevance of much of the scholarship on terrorism during the years leading up to 9/11.”75

In 1988, Schmidt and Jongman commented that, “more than 85 percent of all books on the topic have been written since 1968.”76 They strongly critiqued the existing literature, noting that despite the volume in literature increasing after the 1970s, most of the areas of terrorism research was “impressionistic, superficial, and at the same time often also pretentious venturing far-reaching generalisations on the basis of

75 Ibid

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episodal evidence.”"\textsuperscript{77} Despite what Sheperd\textsuperscript{78} in 2007 referred to as a golden age in terrorism literature after September 2001, the dearth of scholarship based on new evidence was observed was later made by Silke in 2008. He drew attention to the fact that “one new book on terrorism is being published every six hours. And this is just English-language titles.”\textsuperscript{79} In 2011, Dolnik goes further to state that only three books evaluating the state of the field and its future directions have been published in the last 10 years.”\textsuperscript{80}

A recurrent theme over the past three decades since then is the simmering frustrations in a field where the low barriers to have meant that writers in a multitude of fields of expertise and journalists alike compete with academics and policy makers on the same playing field. As such, news articles on terrorism by journalist tethering academic and scholarly literature and eventually becoming the pool of primary data acquired. The low barriers to entry have been a critique that scholars in terrorism have long held in the field of terrorism. This never ending cycle has in turn yielded never ending critique on the nature of data acquisition that has influenced both the quality and the type of discourse undertaken by scholars in the field. This aspect will be dealt with in some detail in the next chapter on methodology.

\textit{Birth of a Sub-Field of Critical Terrorism Studies}

This revivalist search of answers founded on the aspiration to almost whip into shape a discipline whom in the eyes of prominent Critical Terrorism Studies scholars such as Franks, Jackson, Gunning and Smith amongst others as having bordered on becoming undisciplined in the search for knowledge within the domain of terrorism studies. This has therein led to the birth of Critical Terrorism Studies. As a field of study, “(f)rom its earliest inception, the critical theory of the Frankfurt School rejected the notion that it is possible to circumscribe the particular, socially and historically situated responsibility of each individual discipline independently of the other – thus the need for rigorously \textit{interdisciplinary} perspective.”\textsuperscript{81} It is with this same desire for an interdisciplinary platform that this study aims to rest its foundations upon. Paul Wilkinson posited that one of the fundamental reasons Terrorism Studies did not emerge as a field of study was in part due not only because of the level of conviction amongst scholars that Terrorism was of little strategic consequence amidst the dominant discourse of the Cold War but also due to “the


\textsuperscript{79} Andrew Silke, “Research on Terrorism”, \textit{A Review of the Impact of 9/11 and the Global War on Terrorism} in Terrorism Informatics Knowledge Management and Data Mining for Homeland Security, (Eds.) Chen,H; Reid, E.;Sinai, J.; Silke, A; Ganor, B Springer 2008, p.28


hostility of many established university departments to multi-disciplinary studies of any kind.”

“that the present historical juncture presents an extraordinary opportunity to develop a critically-oriented approach to the study of political terrorism, in large part because disillusionment with the existing field of knowledge and practice has opened up the intellectual, political and discursive space that is necessary for the articulation of new ideas, questions, approaches, and paradigms.”

For what better time is there than the present to reassess what has now come to be assumed as infallible truths within terrorism discourse amongst generations of scholars in the field of terrorism studies. The strongest critique of this sub-field is the feared moral repugnance when embarking on a critical evaluation of terrorism wherein the referent would not be the state but which could also include terrorist groups as well, is that it will appear morally repugnant to take the side of the terrorists, or that research might point to their claims being justified. A justified claim, does not in turn justify the violence in order to achieve it.

As opposed to being derided, as a sub-field that questions for the sake of questioning, this study hopes to embrace these very differences within the field, while exploring a few themes in the discourse of terrorism that has been often spoken as accepted truths about but remain unexplored through either quantitative or qualitative research. The bridge between orthodox and traditional terrorism research and critical terrorism studies lies in the ability to form a middle way between these sub-fields, acknowledging the limitations and embracing the differences. For it remains only in highlighting these differences can true progress be made in contributing a small drop to a vast ocean of research amidst years of work done in the field of terrorism studies.

**Root Causes of Terrorism Debate**

Central to the terrorism discourse is the role of human interaction vis-à-vis a group and vis-à-vis the society as a whole. Thomas Mockaitis highlights the sense of alienation from communities, the frustration and the humiliation that these individuals experience as being the principal driving forces toward joining a terrorist group. “The answer to that question lies not in the disciplines of history and politics but in the field of human psychology.” The human element and its interaction with the community has been, is and will continue to be a fundamental thread in the terrorism studies discourse.

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At the core of this study is the intricate weave of the historical attempts of the root causes debate and the revival of the key theme that has dominate terrorism discourse over the past few years on radicalisation. Sarah Marsden and Alex Schmid iterate that this very

“debate on ‘root causes’ and terrorist group justifications is one, and it necessitates multiple levels of analysis, implicating historical, social, political, ideology and group psychology. What would be most helpful is a layered approach allowing the exploration of different levels of analysis within a framework of hypothesised causes and justifications of terrorism. The difficulties in this endeavor are numerous and implicate a plethora of variables, making parsimonious aetiological typology particularly challenging. However, the explanatory weight, and the possibility or theory generation makes it an aspiration worth pursuing in future typological efforts.”

Despite the initial difficulties faced in gleaning empirical data necessary for this study, the next Chapter will elaborate on the empirical data and interviews that form the foundations of this study. While acknowledging the work of past scholarship, through an exploration of the core themes of this root causes debate, themes of poverty, liberal democracy, nation-centrist views of the policies through the course of the chapters to come; this study will move away from the theoretical generalisations of evolution of terrorism as a field of study, and explore the phenomenon of terrorism through the lens of a single country case study of Indonesia.

As part of the root causes debate, this study aims not to look at the question - why terrorism occurs per se. The focus will be how escalation to violence occurs within the context of a group. The hope would be to identify the factors that lead to the escalation of violence within the realm of a group. This would translate to a better understanding of the nature of the threat and thereby help to influence policy making to better mitigate the threat in the future.

3 Types of Terrorism Theory and the Root Causes Debate

In contrast with the historical lens use by scholars such as Rapoport and Kaplan, Jason Franks draws attention to what he posits as three types of Terrorism Theory. He differentiates his three theories based on the manner in which they address the root causes debate through the course of time. As a collective while the three types of theories agree with the general challenges that underscore the terrorism as a field of study, the manner in which scholars engage with the debate on the specific area of root causes provides a refreshing perspective and lens to look at the type of

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scholarship that have therein dominated the field amidst the waves of terrorism and the “approaches to explaining the root of terrorism.”

Differentiating between these three theories, Franks notes that the first Orthodox Terrorism Theory, attempt to view acts of terrorism through the perspective of the law and legality surrounding acts of violence. In this instance, theories within the Orthodox band, “does not engage in a roots debate as it favours the illegal and illegitimate approach to explaining terrorism that mirrors the realist, state-centric understanding.” Here, the legal instruments of the states would look upon terrorism not only acts of violence that harms life and property but also as an activity that is in opposition to state governance tantamount to treason. The Internal Security Act in Singapore and even the Patriots Act in the United States is an example of this.

In comparison with the legal lens used in Orthodox Terrorism Theory, Radical Terrorism Theories on the other hand, “explains and understands terrorism largely from the perspective of the terrorist” as such the tendency for the authors to use the root causes debate a means for the “justification of violence.” The authors of these would include the literature from prolific authors who are usually part of the terrorist or extremist movements who write in support of terrorism and empathise with the necessity to fight for a cause that they perceive to be just.

In Indonesia, the ideologues from terrorist and extremist groups have taken to writing books and spreading their ideology through writings and publications. Approximately three years ago in Indonesia, at its height, there were dedicated publishing houses for extremist literature that began surfacing to feed this industry. Until today, terrorist in Indonesian prisons continue to write books that are then published for mass consumption and sold in bookstores in Indonesia. Several of these books will be used as part of this study to understand their justifications for the path of violence that they have undertaken.

Last but not least, in Moderate Terrorism Theory, “attempts are made to explain and understand the roots of terrorism in relation to socio-economic and structural as well as political causes.” In this case, theories within this moderate bracket attempt to highlight the root causes and explore means through which terrorism can be mitigated. The underlying assumption here is that these root causes can be addressed to some degree and as such the rationalising of the causes of terrorism.

87 Ibid
88 Ibid
89 Ibid
90 Ibid
In this first section, the “Complicated” refers to a system having many parts, making it somewhat harder to understand, whereas “complex” refers to a system being not fully predictable."\(^9\) The overarching historical perspective provides an overview with a sufficient degree of clarity through the broad brushstrokes of history. As such, in spite of the critiques and the challenges in even defining terrorism the “weight of the literature is focused upon terrorism rather than radicalisation”\(^9\)

The process of radicalisation on the other hand is complex. The unpredictability of the process of radicalisation is especially telling in the fact that to date, there is no means to definitively identify if the journey of an individual will ultimately lead to an act of terrorism. This complexity is increased by the sheer subjectivity surrounding what is seen to be the insidious nature of radicalisation and the unpredictable nature of human behavior.

**THE COMPLEX: RADICALISATION THE PUZZLE OF OUR TIME**

In studying the process of radicalisation, sensitisation to the complexity of the human person and the socio-political interaction within and amongst groups of actors are pertinent.

“We can understand simple and complicated systems by taking them apart and analyzing the details. However, we cannot understand complex systems by applying the same strategy of reductionism. But we can achieve some understanding by watching and studying how the whole system operates.”\(^9\)

This section will highlight the attempts to identify models that aim to draw lessons from larger social systems and explore its impact on the process of radicalisation.

**Radicalisation and the Root Causes Debate**

While there have been attempts at a meta-analysis on the subject of radicalisation, little effort has been made through the years to identify a definitive process through which radicalisation occurs. The beacon of hope in policy circles has been that by understanding radicalisation, it will help guide not only preventive efforts prior to individuals being radicalised but will also influence efforts to counter violent radicalisation. One of the initial assumptions and perhaps more simplistic definitions on radicalisation have referred to radicalisation as a process preceeding violent


extremism. This definition propagates a “systematic bias in the literature”\textsuperscript{94} as it is premised on the assumption is that the process of radicalisation should inadvertently lead to violence. The definition of radicalisation needs to be nuanced and include the understanding that radicalisation does not necessarily equate to or result in violence.

In a paper released by the European Commission to the European Parliament, noted that the “trends, means and patterns of radicalisation have evolved and broadened.”\textsuperscript{95} Broadly, the study of radicalisation aims to understand the process of how persons that get involved in terrorism, stay involved in terrorism and thereafter potentially leave terrorism is unique to individuals, groups and the context within which this occurs.\textsuperscript{96}

Eminent scholars such as Alex Schmid and Peter Neumann iterated that while the literature on radicalisation has begun to surface increasingly in approximately 2004, the fact was the radicalisation debate has its beginnings in what was the waning debate on root causes. It is the resurrection of an old undercurrent that has meandered its path through history and the multiple waves of terrorism that was explored in the section above.

The radicalisation debate sprung from a growing consciousness that through understanding as Charles Tilly aptly noted the reasons “why” and the processes “how” terrorism occurs, the solutions created to mitigate the threat can be better shaped to affect a greater impact in a shorter time. This growing consciousness additionally stemmed from the acknowledgement that efforts other than kinetic means against terrorism needed to be sought and put to into action. The understanding of the processes of radicalisation would thereby help not only to mitigate acts of terrorism but would simultaneously influence the counter terrorism policies. In short, the impact of earnestly understanding radicalisation was a tall order. It was hoped that this understanding would affect multiple ends of the spectrum - enable the critical evaluation of current measures in place, create new and effective measures to counter radicalisation and ultimately also influence the efforts at de-radicalisation.

This study will highlight the unique factors within groups in Indonesia that move the group from radical thought to violent action. This study will aim to explore the


\textsuperscript{96} Randy Borum, Psychology of Terrorism, \textit{Mental Health Law and Policy Faculty Publications}, Paper 571, January 2004, pp.1 - 76
various journeys and pathways undertaken by individuals and possibility that the push and the pull factors are only important when individual join the group. Heightened violence on the other hand may depend on other factors within the group. For instance, the role of group dynamics, wherein the strength of influencers within the group can not only dominated the discourse within a group but could ultimately alter the pathways of a given group or organisation towards violence.

**Building on the Work of Scholars**

Clara Volintiru’s work in 2010 explored the necessity to build what she referred to as a *dynamic model* of terrorist radicalisation. In essence it would be a model that “accounts for the interaction between an individual’s motivation and the determining factors surrounding context.”\(^97\) Her work while applied to the case studies of Kosovo and Chechnya, put forth a case extolling the benefits of creating a synthesis between and amongst models that have often been used in the field. The idea of amalgamating theories that support the process of radicalisation is not new. As with most cases of radicalisation the answer is almost never mono-causal. In an early evaluation of Jemaah Islamiyah a prominent terrorist group in Indonesia, it was noted that, “the transnational, networked and non-state threat of Jemaah Islamiyah arises from the specific conjunction of localized contextual factors, social psychological variables, and specific ideological impulses.”\(^98\)

In a collection of articles in 2011, Randy Borum was the first to put together one of the more comprehensive compilation of theories and concepts on radicalisation by scholars in a single series to date. In 2012, Kris Christmann building on Borum’s work, compiled “scholarly literature on the process(es) of radicalisation, particularly among young people, and the availability of interventions to prevent extremism.”\(^99\) Certainly while the models that were highlighted in Christmann’s was not altogether new, the aspect that he focussed was on radicalisation as a process.

This section will build on the work of Borum and Christmann and showcase the models and conceptual frameworks of radicalisation that have over time come to dominate discussions in this field. Borum and Christmann’s excellent work have laid the foundation having thematically dealt with the various models and conceptual frameworks of radicalisation respectively.

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\(^{97}\) Clara Volintiru, “Towards a Dynamic Model of Terrorist Radicalisation,” *European Institute of Romania*, EIR Working Paper Series, No. 27, October 2010, p.3


In this review, not only will these radicalisation models be addressed and expanded upon, they will additionally be chronology arranged in accordance to the years that they surface. Chronology in this instance, will offer what is hoped to be a refreshing perspective to the manner in which these models of radicalisation have surfaced over time. These models and conceptual frameworks appeared against a backdrop of ongoing terrorist threat and attacks. The models appeared not in a time space vacuum but against a dynamic environment, where globalisation and technology appears to have led to the increased speed of radicalisation. The earlier work by Borum and Christmann while thematically arranged, does not account for the dynamic environment where there was a surge in models within a short span of 2 years. What they have managed to highlight is that at the core, there are commonalities between and amongst models and conceptual frameworks of radicalisation over the years.

**A Crucible of Explanations: Models and Conceptual Frameworks of Radicalisation**

The efforts made towards understanding the processes and models of radicalisation thus far have been rightfully derived from an amalgamation of multiple disciplines. Embroiled in a layered complexity, attempts to demystify radicalisation have resulted in the depiction of this journey as stages, processes, phases, pathways, mechanisms and even metaphorically as a staircase and a conveyor belt. These conceptual frameworks, diagrams and metaphors aimed not only to explain the radicalisation through organising thought, providing possible action plans but also to some extent wanting aspiring to be predictive in nature. This struggle to make sense of the threat is especially seen in the proliferation of models and concepts.

These models and conceptual frameworks have grown amidst almost entrenched problems in the discipline. These have included amongst others differing definitions and terminology, debates on definition, the lack of empirical data and resulting rehashing of old data and last but not least the intrinsic challenge of access to interviewees amongst others. The dominant models and conceptual frameworks of radicalisation that have surfaced over the past few years have focused the threat of Islamist radicalisation. As a result, amidst a growing homegrown threat of terrorism, governments in the west in particular were accused of using the notion of radicalisation as a “master signifier of the late ‘war on terror’ and (that it) provided a new lens through which to view Muslim minorities.”\(^{100}\) This was amongst the critiques raised of the impact that these models and conceptual frameworks of radicalisation played on operational counter-terrorism measures.

In the attempt to reduce abstraction, conceptual models aim to identify key concepts, showcase inter-connectivity between concepts and map the application of these

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concepts within the parameters of given scenarios and contexts. A conceptual framework by extension is “the system of concepts, assumptions, expectations, beliefs, and theories that supports and informs your research.” Like the notion of the paradigm addressed later in Chapter 3, a conceptual framework forms “the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community.”


For ease of understanding, these models on radicalisation surfaced gradually over a period of time against the backdrop of an evolving threat landscape over close to 35 years. The various models of radicalisation have been divided into 4 phases mirroring the backdrop against and nature of the models and conceptual frameworks and the speed in which they had surfaced. The Phases are as follows, Phase 1: *The Enquiry* (before 2000), Phase 2: *The Struggle to Understand* (2001-2005), Phase 3: *The Proliferation of Models and Conceptual Frameworks* (2006-2009) and finally Phase 4: *The Quest* (2010 – 2014). While not every radicalisation model and conceptual framework that has surfaced will be discussed given constraints of space, the table below provides a relatively expansive list of the models and conceptual frameworks that have gained much prominence in the discipline. These models and conceptual frameworks will be discussed in this Chapter are listed for ease of reference in the table below.

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103 Ibid
Table 1: Radicalisation Models and Conceptual Frameworks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Models and Conceptual Frameworks</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Process of Terrorism</td>
<td>Martha Crenshaw</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>4-stages in ideological development</td>
<td>Randy Borum</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Al-Muhajiroun Model of Radicalisation</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>Phases of Islamic Radicalisation</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Conveyer Belt</td>
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<td>‘Continuum’ of Salafi-Jihadi radicalization</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>4-Stage Process of Radicalisation of Al Qaeda influenced radicalisation</td>
<td>Mark Sageman</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>NYPD Model</td>
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<td>2007</td>
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<td>4-Stage Pathway Model for suicide bombers</td>
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<td>12 Mechanisms of Political Radicalisation</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>U.S. NCTC Dynamic Framework</td>
<td>NCTC</td>
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The 17 models and conceptual framework on radicalisation begin with the foundations that were laid by prominent scholars in the field. Central to this is the underlying current that all the models collectively aim to develop and enhance the understanding of the process of radicalisation. After the NCTC model in 2011, there were fewer models that gained prominence in recent years.

**Phase 1: The Enquiry (Before 2000)**

The first phase looks at the inquiry into the processes of radicalisation prior to the surge in radicalisation models in the aftermath of the attack of the World Trade

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104 Michael Taarnby, “Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe. Trends and Perspectives,” Research report funded by the Danish Ministry of Justice, 14 January 2005
Centre on 11 September 2001. One of the early articles on the processes of radicalisation that was put together was in 1981 by eminent scholar Martha Crenshaw. Her work on the Process of Terrorism focused on the psychological variables that influenced an individual to participate in acts of terrorism. The process as Crenshaw referred to was analysed on three levels, “first on situational variables, then on the strategy of the terrorist organization, and last on the problem of individual participation.”105 Central to her work is the notion of rational choice wherein a “terrorist group reasons that there is no alternative”106 and as a result will pursue a process that will ultimately involve them conducting acts of terrorism in order to achieve their goal. The process would be triggered by a sense that violence in the only means possible.

While Crenshaw’s work did not explicitly use the word radicalisation, her use of the word process of terrorism ties in to the same conceptual understanding of this very process of radicalisation that has come to dominate contemporary terrorism studies literature as a whole. Her work highlighted one of the key themes on causes the influence role of individual choice and the group mechanisms that influence and ultimately sustain the choice of an individual.

Crenshaw posits that “(t)here are two fundamental questions about the psychological basis of terrorism. The first is why the individual takes the first step and chooses to engage in terrorism: why join?”107 The second question she emphasizes “is more appropriate: Why does involvement continue? What are the psychological mechanisms of group interaction?”108 Both the questions form the foundations of the discourse even in the literature on terrorism close to three decades on. This study will hope to explore what Crenshaw raises early on – why do individuals continue within the group? What factors in the group’s interactions inspires sustainability of the terrorist or extremist group in the face counter terrorism efforts by governments globally.

Central to the early discourse on processes was the notion of rational choice. This was an aspect that Crenshaw has also emphasised. It was also a theme that criminologists have explored at approximately the same time. Clarke and Cornish’s Rational Choice Theory argue that individuals are always seeking to be rational. They iterate that not only are there choice-structuring properties at play with the array of cost benefits analysis, however there is a need to explore mitigating factors at play that will affect the choice undertaken by an individual. Applied to radicalization, one of the strongest mitigating or sustaining an individual’s involvement could be that of the group.

**Phase 2: The Struggle to Understand (2001 – 2006)**

In the immediate aftermath of September 2001 there were 6 dominant models of radicalisation that had surfaced over the span of approximately 5 years. These models had a strong ideological and social network slant within the discourse. The work of

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106 Ibid
107 Ibid
109 Ibid
the scholars behind these initial models of radicalisation were focussed on Salafi-Jihadi ideology, the role of the global threat landscape with an emphasis on the Soviet-Afghan War in 1979 and the on-going strife in Bosnia and Chechnya amongst others.

Amidst the strong struggle to understand and rationalise the attacks of terrorism that were devastating the world, these models highlighted a paradigm of recruitment and alluded to the role of the grassroots and a bottom-up strategy of recruitment by terrorist groups. A subtle current that underscored these models was the emphasis on the role of minority groups were being recruited from Europe. These early studies on radicalisation were based on the recruitment and radicalisation strategies of Al-Muhajiroun and the Hamburg Cell.

In 2003, Randy Borum highlighted the 4-stages in ideological development, in an FBI bulletin. These stages were aimed to be a heuristic tool that would aid law enforcement and investigators. The 4 stages are as follows: It’s not right, It’s not fair, It’s your fault, You’re evil. The first stage would be to have an issue at hand, perhaps a sense of disenfranchisement, the second stage “begins by framing some unsatisfying event or condition as being unjust, (the third stage) blaming the injustice on a target policy, person or nation, and then (finally stage four) vilifying it, often demonizing, he responsible party to facilitate justification for aggression.”

Based on insights gleaned from a study of Al-Muhajiroun, Quintan Wictorowitz highlights the role of social influence in radicalisation. Wictorowitz refers to a four stage process of (a) cognitive opening where a person is open to new ideas, (b) religious seeking, where the individual uses a religion to justify actions, (c) frame alignment where the frame of religion and current state of world affairs are enmeshed to produce a common narrative and (d) socialization wherein indoctrination and change in identity and values occur.

Taarnby’s model was based on lessons learned from the Hamburg cell. It comprised 8 stages beginning with individual alienation and thereafter leading onto a string of stages such as the need for a spiritual quest, a process of radicalisation, meeting with individuals who are of the similar disposition, formation of cells, accepting violence as the only means to an end, connecting with someone from within an established

110 Ibid
112 Quintan Wictorowitz, “Joining the Cause: al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam, presented at the Roots of Islamic Radicalism Conference, Yale University, 8-9 May 2004, See also, Alejandro J. Beutel, Radicalisation and Homegrown Terrorism in Western Muslim Communities: Lessons Learned for America, Minaret of Freedom Institute, 30 August 2007, (Accessed on 6 June 2014 at http://www.minaret.org/MPAC%20Backgrounder.pdf)
terrorist organization and culminating in a terrorist operation. At its core, these 8 stages, highlighted the “existence of a strong social affiliation between a group of Islamists. Often this affiliation is shaped by close friendships, kinship or discipleship.” The emphasis in Taarnby’s study was the role of social networks and ideology.

Moghaddam’s model conceptualised the process of radicalisation as synonymous to that of a staircase. He highlights “an urgent need for greater attention to the social and psychological processes that lead to terrorist acts.” Using the metaphor of a staircase with a ground floor and five higher floors, Moghaddam explores the psychological processes that surround the movement to each “floor.” In this instance, terrorism is constructed within the frame of a “moral problem with psychological underpinnings;” (Moghaddam notes that) the challenge is to prevent disaffected youth and others from becoming engaged in the morality of terrorist organizations. At the ground floor were the vast majority of people occupy what he terms as the “foundational” ground floor, where what matters most are perceptions of fairness and just treatment. Here the focus of the individual would be on material conditions and a generic sense of the need for justice in what is perceived to be an unjust society.

At the first floor, individuals then explore their perceived options to mitigate unfair treatment. After a period of explorations the second floor, looks at the individual’s readiness to engage in acts of aggression and as such seek to move higher on the metaphorical staircase. In the search to do more, the individual morally engages with terrorist organisations that ideologically justify their struggle to achieve an ideal society, in this instance through any means possible. The fourth floor, refers to the stage when an individual joins and is part of a terrorist organization and due to the secrecy surrounding the group, exiting the group would no longer be an option. At the fifth and final level would be the individual crossing the threshold of inhibition and conducting acts of terrorism.

Another metaphor that has gained prominence is that of the conveyor belt. In 2005, Zeyno Baran’s Seminal work on Hizbut Tahrir presented this metaphor. He noted that while “HT is not itself a terrorist organization, but it can usefully be thought of as a conveyor belt for terrorists. It indoctrinates individuals with radical ideology, priming them for recruitment by more extreme organizations where they can take part in

114 Ibid; p.24
117 Ibid,163-166
actual operations.” Glees and Pope concur and following the metaphor note that “their research found that there is a parallel between the activities of the extremist Islamist group Hizbut-Tahrir and Islamic student societies at London university campuses (and else-where in the UK) and the recruitment of British Muslim students into terrorism.”

In 2006, Cozzens’ aimed “to generalize and expand Taarnby’s phases of radicalisation to more explicitly highlight the function of ideology while adding a further layer of analysis to capture its ability to shape jihadi violence and legitimize it after the fact.” Following in the earlier work of Wictorowitz and Sageman on the role of salafi-ideology, Cozzens acknowledged that “Ideology is not the only element critical to address through development initiatives designed to counter the Salafi-Jihadi world-view.” The “continuum of Salafi-Jihadi radicalization – a system spanning from an individual’s initial embrace of the Salafi-Jihadi worldview to the commission of violence and its sub-sequent legitimization. This model provides a more structured approach to discerning the multiple roles that Salafi-Jihadi ideology plays within the radicalization process.”

The models of radicalisation proposed by Wictorowitz, Taarnby and Cozzens would inadvertently influence much of the discourse that would follow in the years to come. Despite the assumed strong emphasis on the European experience that lubricated the general understanding of radicalisation, the general lessons that were expounded by all three scholars, were especially pertinent in the radicalisation processes of terrorists in Indonesia. This was especially seen in the radicalisation processes during the Christmas Day bombings in 2000, Bali Bombings in 2002 and 2005, the attack on the Australian Embassy in 2003 and the attack on the JW Marriott hotel in 2005. The initial assessments by scholars and security community on the attacks in Indonesia was the role of ideology and the strength of the social networks that influences recruitment strategies of the operatives in Southeast Asia.


Between 2007 and 2008 there was a proliferation of radicalisation models that aimed to understand this unique process of movement from violent ideas to violent action, with 8 models within the course of 2 years. The dominant discourse at this phase was

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121 Ibid

the discussions on the need to tease the intricate difference between individuals that possess violent thoughts and the necessity to stop potential acts of terrorism. In this phase, the proliferation of models of radicalisation could be seen to stem from the desire to nip the problem of terrorism in the bud.

It could be posited that this proliferation could have arisen from the frustration that kinetic measures in itself would have limitations. The desire to understand and showcase process and journey towards activism formed the underlying focus of these models. Substantial resources were poured by governments into research that would help identify patterns of radicalisation, in part due to assumption that the models of radicalisation could facilitate better understanding and facilitate action from the legal dimension. Furthermore, the surge of models of radicalisation could be seen in rise in the focus of governments, founding of research centres dedicated to radicalisation. The proliferation of research centres and the proliferation of terminology by international institutions such as UN’s violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (VERLT), even Obama’s change in rhetoric to violent extremism and not terrorism, highlight the need for a more nuanced understanding of the process of radicalization – for not all who follow on the path of radicalization become terrorists, while motivated, they may not engage in acts of terrorism.

In 2007, in the aftermath of the London Bombings an area that has gained much importance is the emergence of what Aidan Kirby calls indigenous radicalisation of self-starter cells where the role of globalisation and the Internet plays a pertinent role in the creation of networks. It was against this backdrop of an urgent need for answers that there was a surge in models of radicalisation.

The Marc Sageman 4-Stage Process of Radicalisation

In the aftermath of the failed plot in Fort Dix in May 2007 to kill U.S. military personnel, was Marc Sageman’s June 2007 testimony to the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Sageman drew attention to the “process of radicalization as consisting of four prongs: a sense of moral outrage (to perceived major violations); a specific interpretation of the world (typically seen as a War Against Islam); resonance with personal experiences (especially how they perceive themselves to be treated in their daily lives); and mobilization through networks (either through real world activity or through the online realm).”

Like scholars before him albeit showcasing the idea through the concept of phases or stages, he added that the “four factors are not stages in a process, nor do they occur sequentially. They are simply four recurrent phases in this process.”

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124 Marc Sageman, “Radicalisation of Global Islamist Terrorists”, United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 27 June 2007, p.2
125 Ibid
New York Police Department (NYPD) 4-Stages of Radicalisation

Silber and Bhatt’s NYPD model that was published in 2007, drew inspiration from Sageman’s earlier work on terrorist networks. The model that the NYPD created was based on their analysis of “three U.S. homegrown terrorism cases and two New York City based cases namely, Lackawana, New York; Portland, Oregon; Northern Virginia; New York City - Herald Square Subway and New York City – The Al Muhajiroun Two.” The model was tested against case studies of attacks in Madrid 2004, Amsterdam 2004, London 2005, Sydney and Melbourne 2005 and Toronto 2006. At the heart of this model was the aim to develop strategies for law enforcement to mitigate the terrorist threat in both an efficient and effective manner. “Understanding this trend and the radicalization process in the West that drives “unremarkable” people to become terrorists is vital for developing effective counter-strategies and has special importance for the NYPD and the City of New York.”

The model comprised four distinct stages, Stage 1 - Pre-Radicalisation wherein individuals who are susceptible to terrorist and extremist ideology are vulnerable, Stage 2 - Self-Identification whereby the individual identifies with not only a new identity but new groups of individuals who reflect this change in themselves, Stage 3- Indoctrination where the individual embraces salafi-jihadi ideology more often than not through a person who is a religious leader and finally culminating in Stage 4 – Jihadisation where the individual acting often though not always as part of a group to carry out acts of violence.

Silber and Bhatt identified several catalysts that could propel individual through the stages, including political, economic and social factors. 3 factors were emphasised as essential to the incremental movement through the stages was the first, (a) Group Think that was deemed “as a force-multiplier for radical thought while creating a competitive environment amongst the group members for being the most radical.” The second factor, (b) was a spiritual sanctioner “who provides the justification for jihad—a justification that is especially essential for the suicide terrorist. In some cases the sanctioner was the nucleus around which the cluster formed.” Finally, (c) an operational leader “who is essential as the group decides to conduct a terrorist act—organizing, controlling and keeping the group focused and its motivation high.”

Silber and Bhatt’s model of radicalisation was the only one thus far that provided and estimate on the duration through which the radicalisation process would take.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

In December 2007, the FBI published their 2-pronged approach that they had developed. The approach sought to “(1) identify early indicators of those who

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127 Ibid
129 Ibid, p.9
130 Ibid
131 Ibid
demonstrate the potential for violence and (2) engage in extensive outreach to Muslim communities to dispel misconceptions that may foster extremism.”

Similar to the NYPD Model, the FBI’s model also had four stages. “pre-radicalisation (wherein there are patterns of behavior that make the individual vulnerable), identification (where the person accepts the cause), indoctrination (the individual is filled with conviction and engages in training), and action (where the individual conducts acts of terrorism). Each one is distinct, and a radicalized individual may never reach the final stage.” This was very much in line with the call for a more nuanced understanding of radicalisation towards violence.

**Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Prevent Strategy and Delivery Plan**

Published in 2008, The ACPO Prevent Strategy and Delivery Plan stems from a law enforcement based approach that was created as part of UK’s four-pronged Contest Strategy. This model was an outcome of the UK experience of the London Bombings in 2005. Initiated in 2007, this model work alongside the four prongs of the UK’s CONTEST Strategy namely, **Pursue** to halt attacks, **Prepare** to have sufficient measure in place to mitigate the effects of an attack, **Protect** to intensify the levels of protection against attacks and **Prevent** to help bring to a halt individuals from becoming terrorists and providing support to terrorist and extremists groups. While all four prongs were to function simultaneously, this last prong was aimed at nipping the problem of terrorism in the bud. It “contains a four-tiered delivery framework for the police, and their partners.” The four-tiered pyramid assumed that at base of the pyramid is Tier 1, representing the base of the pyramid is the community. Moving up, Tier 2 were the vulnerable group, those who were easily inspired and influence by the ideology and actions of terrorist groups, moving upwards at Tier 3 were individuals who were deemed to be sympathetic to the course of terrorists but who may not belong directly to a group but were willing to offer some support. At the apex of the pyramid at Tier 4 were the smallest group but those who are active terrorists, conducting acts of violence.

The ACPO model is based on Prevent, the aim of the strategy was to follow the underscoring rationale behind the understanding of radicalisation proposed by radicalisation models that dominated Phase 2 between 2001-2006. It is an interventionist approached based on notion that ideology and social networks are key.

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133 Ibid
135 Ibid; p.12
The focus was to challenge extremist ideology and disrupt those that promote violent extremism. Moreover, to simultaneously strengthen and support the institutions and infrastructure that could help prevent future acts of terrorism.

**The Paul Gill 4-Stage Pathway Model for Suicide Bombers**

Paul Gill initially “proposed a theoretical prism to view suicide bombing by incorporating the interactions between the suicide bomber, the terrorist organisation and the surrounding society from which suicide bombing emerges.”\(^{137}\) The interaction between the individual, the organisation and the society would influence the manner through which suicide bombers eventually undertake their journeys to violence eventually.

Later building on his multi-dimensional theoretical prism, Gill developed the 4-Stage Pathway Model for Suicide Bombers in 2008. The “pathway model proposes that certain socialisation processes predispose audiences towards participating in violence.”\(^{138}\) Furthermore, his “model proposes that individuals experience four key stages on their path to a suicide bombing: broad socialization processes and exposure to propaganda, experience of catalysts, pre-existing familial or friendship ties and finally in-group radicalization. These four stages are pre-requisites that all suicide bombers experience. The order with which differing suicide bombers experience these stages changes from bomber to bomber.”\(^{139}\)

**The McCauley and Moskalenko 12 Mechanisms of Political Radicalisation**

In 2008, McCauley and Moskalenko identified that thus far the “focus (was) on the common usage in which radicalization refers to increasing extremity of non-state challenges to state authority. (They) aim to show, however, how state action can contribute to radicalization of non-state group.”\(^{140}\) As opposed to the idea of stages or phases, their 12 mechanisms refer to the “the means or manner in which something is accomplished. Thus, the mechanism of vision includes the physical stimulus and the physiological and neural processes involved.”\(^{141}\)

McCauley and Moskalenko metaphorically used a pyramid to explain their 12-stages. “From base to apex, higher levels of the pyramid are associated with decreased numbers but increased radicalization of beliefs, feelings, and behaviors. Thus one way of thinking about radicalization is that it is the gradient that distinguishes terrorists from their base of sympathisers.”\(^{142}\)

According to McCauley and Moskalenko, at the Individual Level, the means toward the radicalisation could have surface from a number of facets, (1) a sense of personal

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\(^{139}\) *Ibid*; p.415


\(^{141}\) *Ibid*; p. 415

\(^{142}\) *Ibid*; p. 417
victimization that is either real or perceived, (2) political grievance against the state resulting from political trends or events, (3) the joining of an established radical group that would lead the individual down a slippery slope of radicalisation by moving from sympathiser to activist, (4) joining a radical group because of the power of love wherein to prevent dissension and ensure loyalty, family members, friends and lover are recruited and finally, (5) the force multiplier of the extremity shift in like-minded groups where similarities in opinion of the group results in decisions made without consideration of alternative scenarios.  

Following from the Individual level, at the Group Level, McCauley and Moskalenko’s model are 4 mechanisms or means that could result in increased radicalisation at the Group Level. These were, (6) an extreme cohesion and solidarity that groups build amongst its members when they come under isolation and threat (7) an increase in level of violence to gain more sympathisers given competition for the same base of support, (8) an increase in level of violence when the group competes with state power resulting in what is known as condensation. This play on the sympathies of the masses when the state uses what is seen to indiscriminate use of force. Finally (9) fissioning amongst members given in-group competition especially when differences in opinion amongst members surface.

Moreover the third level of mechanisms of radicalisation occurs at the level of the masses. (10) Jujiitsu politics refers to the act of using the enemy’s strength against him. In this instance, in the face of an external threat, the effect would be increased cohesion and solidarity amongst group members. In addition, (11) hate in this instance would refer to the dehumanisation of the out-group especially in the face of prolonged violence. Last but not least, (12) Martyrdom as the act that would create mass support for an assumed worthwhile cause that is seen to be important enough to sacrifice one’s life.

143 Ibid: pp. 418-423
145 Ibid, pp. 426-428
Unlike McCauley and Moskalenko’s all-encompassing model on 12 mechanisms, Sara Savage and John Liht’s intergrated model of radicalisation in 2008 ends abruptly with the acceptance of radical ideology. Moving through the 6 stages, of self-uncertainty, absence of cultural worldview, joining a fringe group, heightened inter-group comparisons, demonizing and deligitimising the out-group and finally, the acceptance of radical ideology. Savage and Liht’s model of radicalization stops at the acceptance of radical ideology, perhaps with the assumption that acceptance of radical ideology would implicitly assume the individual’s engagement in violent extremism.

With a similar focus on the role of radical ideology is the Recognising Radicalisation (RECORA) Model, otherwise also known as the Amsterdam Radicalisation Model by Meah Yousif and Collun Millis in 2008, focused on what they called the “supply and demand scheme,” wherein, the “demand of the seekers, the supply of radical ideology and the breeding ground of frustration and injustice.” They posit that radicalization occurs because of the steady interest in extremist ideology.

**Phase 4: The Quest (2009 – 2014)**

The models that dominate the years after 2009 have a broader focus on the processes of radicalisation. These models broadly show an understanding the complexity of the process of radicalisation, have attempted to incorporate numerous trigger causes for the process of radicalisation in their respective models.

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146 *Ibid*: pp. 415-433
148 Yousiff Meah and Colin Mellis, “Recognising and Responding to Radicalisation: Considerations for policy and practice through the eyes of street level workers,” *The RecoRa Institute, Municipalities of Amsterdam, Birmingham, Essen, the Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht*, 2008, p.27
149 *Ibid*: pp.30
Tinka Veldhuis and Jørgen Staun’s 2009 Root Cause Model of Radicalisation, almost harks back to the initial discussion on root causes. Veldhuis and Staun focus on the notion of the *embedded individual*. While the focus is on the individual, the close societal and group level interactions are emphasised. This model “distinguishes causal factors at the macro-level and the micro-level, and argues that macro-level factors are preconditions for radicalisation, but that in order to explain why some people do radicalise, and other people do not do so, a scrutiny of micro-level variables is essential.”

At the macro–level were larger geopolitical issues including International Relations, poor levels of integration amongst migrants and the diaspora community and globalisation and modernisation. The micro-level causes are divided into two segments. The first segment, entails the social realm which would include social identity, social interactions and group processes and relative deprivation amongst communities. The second segment, is the individual level wherein personal characteristics and experience play a fundamental role in an individual’s sustenance within the organisation.

The United States National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) released a Radicalisation and Mobilisation Dynamics Framework in 2011. The framework “represents how individuals radicalise, mobilise, and in some cases, commit violence and describes radicalisation as a dynamic and multi-layered process involving several factors that interact with one another to influence an individual. There is no single factor that explains radicalisation and mobilisation.” This framework identifies several factors that radicalise and mobilise individuals to conduct acts of violence. These factors include amongst others, personal factors, community factors, group factors, socio-political factors and ideological factors.

This notion of ideation mobilised into action has dominated discourse in the US in particular, with the emphasis of trying to identify early warning signs and indicators that could preceed action. The NCTC mobilisation to action diagramme aimed to identify the means through which individuals could be mobilised to action.

**KEY THEMES FROM RADICALISATION MODELS AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS**

Essential to the body of literature on terrorism thus far, are the attempts to shed light on the intentions of terrorists, what terrorists want; the capability of terrorists, the means that terrorists undertake to achieve their desired ends and the opportunity that terrorists are able to capitalise onto achieve their tasks. Over the course of the past few decades, the prominent radicalisation models and conceptual frameworks

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150 Tinka Veldhuis and Jørgen Staun, “Islamist Radicalisation: A Root Cause Model”, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, October 2009, p.22
151 Ibid; p.24
explored and noted above have focused predominantly on the role of the individual’s pathway of radicalisation.

What has evolved instead is the pace and speed of radicalisation given the ease of transference of ideas in an increasingly permissive cyber milieu against a backdrop of continued acts of terrorism. While “the style du jour is to point to ‘permissive’ factors that help establish an environment in which terrorism is more likely to occur,”153 collectively, several themes have remained congruent with the dominant discourse on radicalisation.

**Identify Trends**

In the absence of meta-models or meta-conceptual frameworks of radicalisation, is the need to identify trends in radicalisation. It is only in identifying these trends, is there hope of influencing possible and probable scenarios in the hope of mitigating the threat in the future. Ultimately any success that can be achieved can only be done by “identifying patterns and trends of extremist behavior in its early stages.”154 Through the course of the four phases identified, the multiplicity of models and frameworks all aimed to identify trends using past experiences. The challenge lies in the fact that it is done against the backdrop of an evolving terrorist threat.

As a collective the models and conceptual frameworks have ranged from the simplistic to the complex. The dangers that arise from reductionist models were evident in light of the manner in which the surge of models in 2007 when they were rapidly presented by law enforcement agencies grappling with the issue of radicalization, each with the notion of a staged and sequential process. These models included amongst others the NYPD model, the FBI model and the ACPO model. It is possibly in recognition of these very dangers of a reductionist understanding of radicalization model, that Silber and Bhatt forewarned that “although this (the NYPD) model is sequential, individuals do not always follow a perfectly linear progression. However, individuals who do pass through this entire process are quite likely to be involved in a terrorist act.”155

This fear of reductionism later made way for presence of more complex models in 2008 with the work of McCauley and Moskalenko of the12 mechanisms, Veldhuis and Staun’s Root Cause Model and NCTC’s dynamic framework of radicalisation. Either way the contribution to the field in general has been immense. The presence of key trends highlighted by scholars far through the course of the four phases listed explored above reiterate the fact that these catalysts play an essential role.

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The radicalisation models and frameworks over time have highlighted the role of ideology, the social environment, and factors within a terrorist or extremist group that sustain participation of the individual. It is arise from the initial work of scholars and practitioners that the conceptual model was envisioned and created to assess group radicalisation in Indonesia. This will be explored in greater detail in the next Chapter.

**Transformational Process**

Radicalisation is a process and not an event. Broadly, radicalisation can perhaps be summed best as a process of “change and transformation that involves different stages. However, it is not a linear process and the stages are not clear-cut, nor necessarily sequential. The acceleration, slowing down, or even abandonment of the process depends on internal and external variables.”\(^{156}\) It is a transformational process that sets individuals and groups on a pathway of increased violence. Despite the presence of an event that can catalyse an activities very much like the notion of *cognitive opening* by John Horgan or McCauley and Moskalenko notion of *unfreezing* that sometimes leads may lead to an escalation of violence. The seminal work done by Randy Borum, highlight the need to separate radicalisation as a process that could potentially lead to non-violent action as well. As such, the need for the differentiated terminology for radicalisation to violent extremism.

Almost 14 years after the attack on the World Trade Towers on September 2001, The U.S. based Asymmetric Warfare group released a tactical reference guide in August 2011. The reference guide titled Radicalisation into Violent Extremism was an indicator chart that provided a “step-by-step process for identifying, evaluating, and responding to possible indicators”\(^{157}\) of radicalisation. In this instance, Radicalisation was defined as “the process by which an individual, group or mass of people undergoes a transformation from participating in the political process via legal means to the use or support of violence for political purposes.”\(^{158}\) Borrowing from McCauley and Moskalenko’s earlier work, this guide highlighted the various mechanisms of radicalisation from the individual, group and mass radicalisation.\(^{159}\)

A majority of the models cited thus far have focused on the study of radicalisation of individuals as opposed to that of a group. While undoubtedly a transformational process, increasing levels of violence of an individual does not necessarily translate to increasing violence of a group as a collective. Building on the work on radicalization


\(^{158}\) Ibid, p. 2

of individuals by scholars thus far, this study will identify factors that result in the transformation of groups on a pathway of violence as a collective.
CHAPTER THREE
CASE STUDY OF INDONESIA

“This country, the Republic of Indonesia, does not belong to any group, nor to any religion, not to any ethnic group, nor to any groups with customs and traditions, but the property of all of us from Sabang to Merauke!”

Sukarno

Indonesia’s case study is unique. It epitomises intrepid nationalism and showcases valiant efforts at religious plurality through a uniquely indigenous blend of democracy. However, Indonesia remains plagued by a continued cycle of extremism and terrorism since its independence. Asia has the highest concentration of Muslims in the world with Indonesia having the largest Muslim population within a country globally. Since 2008, opinion surveys have indicated that Indonesians were concerned about the rise on extremism in Indonesia. In 2008 it was reported that 60% of Indonesians were concerned about extremism. This was a sharp increase from 2006 where only 43% were concerned about extremism in their country. The 2010 opinion poll indicated that 59% on Indonesians were concerned about extremism.

While the survey does not indicate the nature of the sample group, the numbers provide a glimpse into the increasing concerns of heightened extremism in Indonesia. Foiled terrorists plots including the spate of book bombs in March 2011 targeting key personalities and the Good Friday attempted attack on a Church in April 2011 continue to dominate the terrorist threat landscape. To date, in Indonesia attacks still continue with increased vigour and has recently culminated in the call by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria also known as the Islamic State (IS) to support the on-going conflict.

In Indonesia where approximately 90% of the electorate are Muslim, the growing religious conservativeness that has been observed has not been translated in the polls. Despite the Muslim majority of the voters, an Islamic Party has never won at the polls. What the polls fail to take into consideration is that most “Southeast Asian groups would renounce violence and focus on political means as long as the end result

160 Sukarno, First President of Indonesia, Speech in Surabaya, 24 September 1955
is the establishment of an Islamic state or the implementation of Islamic jurisprudence. There is no explicit aversion (at least historically) on their part to achieve these objectives through the existing political framework.” 164 The penetration of the Indonesian extremist groups in the political sphere is testament to this. For example, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, the Spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), established a new organization, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), after resigning from Majlis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI) in July 2008 citing that leadership in MMI was chosen on the basis of democracy. Acharya and Acharya astutely highlight that “Southeast Asia’s terrorist presence is far from monolithic and does not directly correlate to the Middle Eastern version, as groups vary in their purpose, targets, and geographic reach.” 165 Thus while some groups maybe willing to use peaceful democratic means of achieving their end, others pursue a much more violent means instead.

Terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia fall on a spectrum ranging from non-violent extremists to those who engage in violence and have conducted vicious acts of terrorism. As such not every group advocates the conduct of terrorist activities to achieve their goals. The JI faction led by the late Noordin Mohamed Top for instance believed in targeting the west and western interests. He masterminded several of the most devastating terrorist operations, which included Bali Bombings in 2002 and 2005, the Australian Embassy attacks in 2004 and even the attack on the JW Marriott in 2003 and later both the JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton in 2009.

A terrorist groups’ willingness to engage in the political process acknowledges the plausibility that they are able to employ various means to achieve their end goal – the formation of an Islamic Country or a Caliphate. Whilst the JI faction that was led by Noordin Mohamed Top conducted attacks against western targets, there are groups in Indonesia such as Majlis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI) and Hizb-ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HT) that do not overtly advocate the use of violence to achieve their ends.

**Political Islam and the Indonesian State**

Indonesian history is rife with tensions amongst the political elite as they attempt to negotiate the place of religion as well as religious values within the parameters of the constitution. Like the work of Benedict Anderson on nations as an imagined community, he defined “a nation an imagined political community – and imagined both as inherently limited and sovereign.”166 Based on Anderson’s definition of a

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165 Ibid

nation, Indonesia as a nation has existed long before they received Independence\textsuperscript{167} from the Dutch. This notion of the community or the ummah was entrenched because of the strong religious bond of Islam. Thus, “despite the acknowledged hegemony of the secularist ideal, religion continues to provide a framework”\textsuperscript{168} for action even prior to the establishment of an independent state.

\textit{Pancasila: Foundations of the Indonesian State}

It was against a backdrop of War and fighting for independence from the Dutch that Indonesia’s first President, Sukarno who was in office from 1945-1967, shared the conceptualised the ideal of \textit{Pancasila} (five principles) on 1 June 1945 during a public speech known as \textit{The Birth of Pancasila} delivered to the Independence Preparatory Committee. \textit{Pancasila} refers to the five tenets that underpin the Indonesian constitution namely, God, justice, state unity, democracy and social justice. These tenets were based upon common values that were shared across the board by all Indonesians. Sukarno is believed to have included the notion of belief in God, (which definitively includes religion into the foundations of the state) due to the strongly entrenched religious nature of the populous. The concept of \textit{Pancasila} was and still is a creative, indigenous idea that remains distinctively Indonesian.

As \textit{Pancasila} was initially envisioned on 1 June 1945, the notion of religion was added to feature religious plurality based on common and shared principles. The idea of \textit{Pancasila} cemented almost three weeks later through the Jakarta Charter on 22 June 1945, however whilst keeping with the other four tenets included with particular specificity the role of religion. The first tenet now read, \textit{belief in the one and only Almighty God with the obligation for Muslims to adhere to Islamic Law}. After petitions and discussion with several non-Muslim and moderate Muslim leaders, the final version that eventually made it to the constitution of Indonesia on 18 August 1945 while retaining belief in God, had removed the inclusion of shari’a in order to respect citizens from other faith backgrounds. Hence, “the removal of seven words stipulating that all Muslims should observe Islamic law, was significantly to reduce the proposed formal role of Islam in Indonesian political and social life.”\textsuperscript{169} As much as the hold of both the Dutch and the Japanese influenced its past, the delicate role of religion and democracy continues to affect the plethora of events of that were to follow from its inception to date.

Managing Islam Through the Years

Since its very inception, Indonesia, the world’s third largest democracy had to negotiate its way through the role of religion and politics quickly. The strength of the Indonesian case study lies in a Muslim dominant country embracing a religiously pluralist system upon which Indonesia is governed through *Pancasila*. Despite the fact that the Indonesian state embraces religious plurality, ideological extremism and terrorism have crept into society.

Through the course of Indonesia’s history, religion and politics meandered like parallel streams through the course of time. Islam as a religion in Indonesia is far from monolithic and from its very beginning, merged with the local culture and traditions of the Indonesian people. In the colonial era, during the time of the Dutch, religious leadership was marginalized. Religious leadership whose position was rooted in much of daily living of people was given little importance as the Dutch took over key positions in the governance of Indonesia. Muslim leaders especially the ulama “displaced that elite (who handled administration in government circles) in exercising political authority over the peasantry.”170 In the attempt to secularise the administration they had “destroyed imperial Islam, undermined the authority of native rulers, and unwittingly reinvigorated popular Islam.”171 Islam survived and grew from strength to strength unchecked in the private realm through *madrasahs* and *pesantrens* within villages. Within these circle Muslim religious elite survived autonomously untouched for many years.

During the time of the Japanese, they were wise to include religion in support of what was framed to be a national cause in a carefully calibrated manner. Thus “while Indonesia was under Dutch rule, Islam had been excluded from politics. However the Japanese recognised the importance of religion in society and were careful to accommodate, rather than marginalize, Islam.”172 This calibrated manner of using established Islamic local, social and institutional networks helped to ensure Japanese control of Indonesia. The informal religious networks were used by the Japanese to spread propaganda and influence against possible Dutch reclaiming rule over Indonesia. This unique balance was achieved by capitalising on the angst felt by the Muslims for having been sidelined in positions of administration and military by the Dutch thus far.

Indonesia’s first President Sukarno (1945-1967) initiated a process of what he called *guided democracy* between 1956-1959. Democratisation in Indonesia has proven to

be a challenge as the Islamic Constituency had great political clout and hence the inability of the Indonesian government to deal with hard line Muslims. Muslim religious elite was once again relegated to the sidelines. The presence of “weak central governments, poor local governance, massive numbers of internally displaced communities and continuing poor economic conditions in the region, including up to 40 million people unemployed in Indonesia, these radicals are assured a receptive audience.”

One of the first extremist groups that arose was that of Darul Islam (DI). “In West Java the Darul Islam movement was more a product Kartosuwirjo’s disagreement with the leaders of the Republic than his theological-political consciousness.” Kartosuwirjo led the Darul Islam (DI) movement from 1948-1962. A foremost lesson from DI and its subsequent offshoots including Jemaah Indonesia (JI), and Ring Banten was that “perceived inattention by the center to discontent in the periphery can be a potent driver of rebellion.”

The continued tension between religion, politics and nationalism was evident, for even “Kartosuwirjo’s own writings from the late 1920s-1930s highlight both this tension and the gradual transformation of pan-Islamism from a goal of the anti-colonial struggle to a tool with which to achieve national freedom.” It was only the Darul Islam movement that was “waged under the banner of Islam.” However, this was short-lived when Indonesia was declared independent three days after Kartosuwirjo had declared West Java an Islamic State on 14 August 1945. With Indonesia declared Independent on 17 August 1945, Kartosuwirjo sided with the republic of Indonesia and channeled grievances politically through the Masyumi Party.

Suharto’s New Order between 1967-1998 saw another attempt to suppress political Islam. From Suharto’s brazen and calculated arresting of power from Sukarno, to his strong grasp of the reins of power thereafter, Suharto was shrewd at quelling potential

173 Brek Batley, The complexities of dealing with Radical Islam in Southeast Asia: A case study of Jemaah Islamiyah, ” (Canberra: The Australian National University, 2003), p.11
174 Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003) p.35
178 Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003) p.35
179 Ibid
dissent that may arise. Suharto realised the underlying ability of Islam to mobilise the population and as such in a carefully calculated manner, “Islam continued to be marginalized and limited to the private religious sphere, as Suharto was determined to prevent it from becoming a powerful political force.”

Suharto fearing the strength of mobilization under the banner of religion used Pancasila as a tool to manage the rise of political Islam. “Suharto’s use of Pancasila for political purposes culminated in the formulation of Pancasila as the only basis. At this point, indeed Pancasila could be easily manipulated. With the government as the sole interpreter of Pancasila, any perceived opponents could simply be labeled as “anti-Pancasila,” and thus be banned.”

Through the years the failure of Islam to gain national power has enhanced the tacit sense of society under siege and as a result the necessity to fight back to achieve its ends. Expounding on the concept of Talibanisation, by Kouser Azzam, Bilveer Singh highlights that “(i)n essence, Talibanisation encompasses aspects from symbolic group politics and communal definitions through “authenticity” – that is, a specific reading of Islam and reconstructing Islamic tradition to actual practices such as the institution of an Islamic state.” The underlying quest for an Islamic State and the years of struggling to manage religion coupled with a global climate of unrest, resulted in a unique development and birth of extremist and terrorist movements in Indonesia. “What distinguished the new movements were their intense militancy, extremism, and increasing popularity to resort to or condone violence to achieve their political goals.” This was especially seen in the most recent split in the groups with the formation of Jamaah Anshorul Shari’a in 2014, a splinter group formed in support of and pledging allegiance to IS.

The Call to Jihad

In Indonesian history, there were several separate instances during its contemporary history when there was a distinctive call to jihad. At each of these instances, the aspiration to have Islam play a larger role in politics and governance of the state, led to a revitalisation within the terrorist and extremist movement in Indonesia. Often enough this led to the proliferation of terrorist and extremist activities with vigour. Inspired by radical utopianism, they felt that the problems that arose in Indonesia could be solved by the one means of governance that Indonesia as a state had not seen to fruition – the formation of an Islamic State.


183 Ibid: pp.43-44
Nationalism and the Call to Jihad

In the 1940s, S. M. Kartosuwirjo saw the on-going developments in Indonesia as the start of was he referred to in his writings as the seeds of World War Three. In 1926 Sukarno identifies Islam, nationalism and Marxism as the three streams of the Indonesian anti-colonial movement. Kartosuwirjo on the other hand, considered it a fight between the three great ideals of the time namely, *Islamism, Nationalism* and *Communism*. In his eyes, the only way forward as such was to establish a system of governance under the rule of God.\(^{184}\) There was no other conceivable option. In an article written in March 1949, Kartosuwirjo further emphasised that the journey towards the establishment of what he called *Negara Islam Indonesia* (Islamic State of Indonesia) was through revolution and martyrdom where the “enemies of Allah, enemies of Islam, the enemies of the establishment of an Islamic State in Indonesia should be destroyed in order to fulfil the destiny of a nation governed by the rule of law.”\(^{185}\) Kartosuwirjo’s envisioned ideal of an Islamic State was especially seen in a collection of documents on DI.

“The military publication *Penumpasan pemberontakan D.I/T.I.I.*, S.M. Kartosuwiryo di Jawa Barat, itself a collection of Darul Islam documents’ reproductions, as well as accounts produced after Kartosuwiryo’s capture, report that in the 1950s Kartosuwiryo’s intention was to first consolidate his authority on the archipelago, and then to build relations on the international level with Malaysia, Pakistan and Egypt. Once linked with movements like the Muslim Brotherhood, the Indonesian Islamic state would have been able to establish a pan-Islamic dewan Khalifatullah fil’ardi (Council of God’s Caliphs on Earth), which would assume a federal structure with a rotating leadership of two-year terms.”\(^{186}\)

The Darul Islam came about in response to the first call to Jihad in Indonesia in August 1949 by S. M. Kartosuwirjo when he had declared West Java an independent Islamic State.\(^{187}\) The *Negara Islam Indonesia* (NII) as a movement began its first phase when Kartosuwirjo aspired for an Islamic State in West Java and his announcement that West Java was Darul Islam or land of Islam.

The second phase of the establishment of NII arose out of the rejection of Indonesian nationalists to entrench *shari’a* law as a law of the land in the 1970s. It was in the 1970s that the earlier and nascent struggle for what was envisioned as an Islamic State was at its embryonic stage. Influence by global developments - Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt arose fervour for change. The second phase of the NII movement was based on the precedent of the earlier DI movement. Coupled with global developments, the

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\(^{184}\) Holk H. Gengel, *Darul Islam dan Kartosuwiryo: Angan-angan yang Gagal*, (Sh Publications: No date provided), p.127


initial faith of channeling their grievance through the Masyumi Party remained unsatisfactory. As such, there was a revival within NII to alleviate dissatisfaction with governance under Suharto and for the instating of Shari’a in Indonesia. The rule of law and especially that of the Shari’a continues to be a point of contention through the years. The etymological meaning of the word Shari’a is track or road.  

“The Islamic law is based, as we shall see, on unqualified submission to the will of God. This is a fundamental tenet of the Islamic religion, and since Islamic law is based upon Islamic religion, it proceeds on the same fundamental assumption. The will of God embraces all aspects of life and the law hence covered them all. It is a path or way guiding the Muslim and the revealed law governing all these matters is known as the Shari’a”188

In Islam the notion of the social contract is contrary to that which was initially espoused by Western philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes and then expounded upon in greater detail by Jean Jacques Rousseau and John Locke. Central to the Western concept of a social contract is in essence the notion of a contract between men. In Islam every person is “in individual contract, reflecting the Covenant his soul has sealed with God; for the Covenant is in reality made for each and every individual soul”189 This forms the foundations of what is envisioned to be the utopian ideal of a nation under God’s law. “Shari’a is not strictly speaking, a legal system for it reaches much deeper into thought, life and conduct than a purely legal system can aspire to do.”190

Global Developments and the Call to Jihad

The Iranian revolution and later the Soviet-Afghan War provided necessary inspiration and acted as a catalyst. They showcased the possible merits of rule under the laws of Islam, and were icons of both a new liberating force as well as a symbol of resistance191 against the West.

In the early 1970s and 1980s, there were two key personalities in NII Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. They were arrested in 1978 for their role in the propagation of violence and radical extremist ideology and later escaped to Malaysia in 1985. While fleeing from Suharto’s measures in Indonesia they sought refuge in Malaysia where on 1 January 1993; they co-founded and formed a new group, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). They remained in Malaysia until 1998 building an intricate network of resources and personnel, several of whom after being recruited were later sent to Afghanistan for training during the Soviet Afghan War between 1979-1989. When the Suharto regime had collapse, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir then moved

the JI headquarters back to Indonesia in 1998. To a large extent, through the use of “a combination of radical religious ideology, clandestine recruitment, extensive networking and professional transnational operations, JI has created a formidable challenge for any security or intelligence authority.”  

It was the effect of global influences that were exacerbated by already weak governance that further enable JI to flourish from its beginning in Malaysia and later in Indonesia.

“While for many Muslims, radicalism was learned from the textbooks of scholars such as al-Banna, Maududi, and Qutb, many Southeast Asian radicals personally saw and heard what modern radicals such as Faraj, Sayyaf, and Azzam had to say.” The initial wave of extremists that fought in the Soviet Afghan War from 1979-1989 were not only influenced by their ideas but several had even met these key ideologues inspiring the global jihadist narrative whilst they were in Afghanistan. These global developments presented the necessary inspiration and key ideologues provided the religious justification for violent extremism.

**Inter-religious and Communal Tensions and the Call to Jihad**

In the late 1990s, there were tensions and perceived fear of Christianisation of Indonesia. The Conflict in Ambon resulted in more than 2000 deaths. According to United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), more than 700,000 people were displaced by violence in Ambon and Maluku from 1999-2002, and some 30,000 had yet to be resettled by early 2011. The effects of which were staggering.


Framed within a construct of a Muslim-Christian conflict, the fatwas provided moral and religious justification and legitimacy to what was intrinsically a domestic nationalist struggle. At its peak, LJ had a growing membership that was estimated to be approximately 10,000-13,000 members with approximately between 4000-6000 volunteer in Maluku.  

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194 Noorhaidi Hassan, “Between Transnational Interest and Domestic Politics: Understanding Middle Eastern Fatwās on Jihad in the Moluccas.” *Islamic Law and Society* 12, No.1, February 2005, pp. 73-92
In the late 1980s after the post-Suharto era and the rise of extremist groups within the Indonesia. Between 1985-2000, toward the end of the Suharto era and the political uncertainty that followed with three Presidents in the span of two years, the “jihadi movement was free to expand with relative impunity.”

Groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) was founded in Malaysia on 1 January 1993 and moved its headquarters to Indonesia in 1998. In addition to the flourishing of groups that were entrenched in radical thought with the aim of subverting the government in power, there were also independent paramilitary and vigilante groups that had begun to form. Extremist paramilitary organisations such as the Front Pembela Islam (FPI) and vigilante groups such as Laskar Jihad (LJ) that were formed in response to the ongoing conflict in Poso and Maluku in 2000.

LJ’s call to jihad ended in February 2002 with the signing of the Malino II Declaration. LJ posed “an internal threat to the mainstream interpretation of Islam in Indonesia and, crucially the Indonesian state’s monopoly of force.” Jafaar Umar Thalib “gave a number of reasons for disbanding the organization, including Laskar Jihad’s failure consistently to follow the doctrinal positions outlines on the fatwas of the Middle East ‘ulama’.”

Throughout the course of Indonesia’s contemporary history, the aspiration for religion to play a more dominant role can be seen in the call to jihad as a result of nationalism, global developments and even religious and communal tensions. This almost guttural call for jihad that began in 1945 by Kartosuwirjo, gained traction with global events especially the Iranian revolution and the Soviet-Afghan War and thereafter thrust forward with ensuing tensions nationally has resulted in a growing momentum. Unique to Indonesia is the burgeoning number of terrorist and extremist groups.

Despite the increased number of terrorist and extremist groups, each group has articulated its own means to achieve almost the same end. Each group varies in their capability and targets, the general intention of these terrorist and extremist groups fall into two streams either the establishment of an Islamic State in Indonesia or the establishment of a regional caliphate in Southeast Asia, the formation of what is known as Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara which would encompass Indonesia and the neighbouring countries including Singapore, Brunei and Australia. It was the

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199 The 2004 organisational chart of Jemaah Islamiyah was in accordance to a mantiqi system or a regionally based system comprising of countries responsible for training, recruitment and the raising of funds.
aspiration for a state governed by *Shari’a*, that would present a panacea to national problems could not be solved through the establishment of a new order. To achieve this end, any means would be justified, even violence.

**BOURGEONING TERRORIST GROUPS IN INDONESIA**

Whilst they do not comprise all the groups in Indonesia, the list shown in the table below highlights the sheer number of terrorist and extremist groups that have gained considerable prominence in Indonesia over the past seven decades.

*Table 3: Terrorist Groups in Indonesia*

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<th>No.</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Formation</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Darul Islam (DI)</td>
<td>1945</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Negara Islam Indonesia (NII)</td>
<td>1945 (revival 1970s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM)</td>
<td>1960s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Dewan Da’wah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII)</td>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Gerakan Aceh Movement (GAM)</td>
<td>1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HT)</td>
<td>1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Komite Aksi Penanggulanan Akibat Krisis</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(KOMPAK)</td>
<td><em>(Crisis Prevention Committee)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Wahdah Islamiyah (WI) aka Fathul Muin</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foundation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Islamic Community</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Negara Islam Indonesia Komandmen Wilayah</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 (NII KW9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Khilafatul Muslimin (KM)</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Front Pembela Islam (FPI)</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Islamic Defenders Front</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Forum Antisipasi Kegiatan Pemurtadan</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(FAKTA)</td>
<td><em>(Anti-Apostasy Movement Forum)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Rabitatul Mujahideen (RM)</td>
<td>Late 1990s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Cross SEA Organisation Network</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Laskhar Jihad (LJ)</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Warriors of Jihad</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI)</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Indonesian Mujahideen Congress</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Laskhar Jundullah (LJ), security arm of</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KPPSI until 2005</td>
<td>as part of KPPSI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>God’s Militia</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Forum Kommunikasi Ahllus Sunna Wal Jamaah</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(FKAWJ, <em>Forum of the Followers of</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The groups listed above gained considerable prominence in the aftermath of major terrorist attacks in Indonesia. Unique to the developments in Indonesia is the vestiges of the history that have underpinned their rise and the unique permissive environment that groups are able to thrive. During the course of this study the most prominent of the groups responsible for conducting attacks the majority of the attacks will be explored.

The ten groups that will be explored further in this study as noted earlier will be, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Lashkar Jihad (LJ), Darul Islam (DI), Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Negara Islam Indonesia (NII), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HT), Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI), Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), Al Qaeda Indonesia (AI) and Mujahideen Indonesia Timur (MIT). These have been the groups that have been involved in the conducting of major attacks throughout Indonesia, and attacks on government, security and law enforcement officers.

**GRAVITY OF THE THREAT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA**

The reasons behind the sustenance of the movement in Indonesia is not merely because of jingoistic nationalism but it entails a complex vignette of multifarious reasons which are unique to the interests of groups and (individuals) hence the continued popularity of the movement for Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara and the aspiration to from an Islamic State. Amongst the reasons given for supporting the
Caliphate - is the need to ensure that their civil rights and liberties will be kept, a country that is built on moral legitimacy under the banner of Islam.

Based on findings from their study of forty JI and Komite Penanggulangan Krisis (Crisis Prevention Committee, KOMPAK) members, Idhamsyah Eka Putra and Zora A. Sukabdi, posit that terrorism in Indonesia is could be explained by three social conditions, first the ensuing conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims globally, the perception that systems that are in place at present have not brought economic prosperity and perhaps enacting the Law of God would bring prosperity and finally also the perceived notion that the government is taking the side of non-Muslims and the West especially on matters of economic and political importance.

**Asia as the New Front of Terrorism**

Ajai Sahni warns that the notion of the locus of terrorism is amongst the “conceptual barriers to an effective understanding of, and response to, the unstructured threat of contemporary terrorism” which ultimately will “distort the character and direction of the global war on terrorism.” It is not so much that Southeast Asia has become the second front or that the threat has moved from the Afghan-Pakistan areas to Southeast for the notion of a “shift is contrafactual.” This gives the idea that the threat moved but contrary to that violent extremism has been a steady feature within the Southeast Asian region.

The groups highlighted in this study come from across the historical spectrum of the last seven decades. They span nearly two to three generations of fighters who have grown up amidst separate historical backdrop of Indonesia. The understandings gleaned could provide insights of the future with the new call for jihad issued by the Islamic State (IS) as it calls for fighters in Asia to join them in Iraq and Syria. Several key ideologues in Asia and in particular Indonesia have already pledged their allegiance to IS. They implications of this to reinvigorate the journey of some groups towards violent extremism would have implications not only to Indonesia but have significant ripple effects both regionally and globally.

In recent times, the ubiquity of the Internet, the presence of extremist publishing houses and extremist websites has created an environment that is not only permissive, but one that ensures the sustenance of both extremist and terrorist groups. The

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202 Ibid, p.7
inability of the state to proscribe terrorist groups due to political pressure and limitations in the Association of Southeast Asian’s (ASEAN) efforts to effectively counter terrorism has aided in the creation of a permissive environment.

In exploring ways to improve on counter terrorism efforts in Indonesia thus far, Norhaidi Hasan argues that that ‘enemy-centric’ strategy that Indonesia has emphasised thus far resonates with the historical dominance of the military in Indonesia. Noting that the best strategy in the long run was for a population-centric strategy that would amalgamate both hard and soft approaches in dealing with the threat of terrorism in Indonesia. These soft approaches of engagement and building an integrated, cohesive and well-coordinated security framework within ASEAN would increase effectiveness in the long term.

Contrary to the realist analogy of states as billiard balls acting independently of each other, the growing threat of terrorism presents a cogent security threat to the Southeast Asian region. This as such has created a traditionally uncomfortable yet necessary contemporary marriage of joint security frameworks between the Southeast Asian nations as a collective.

Indonesia as the heart of the terrorist and extremist movements in Southeast Asia presents an interesting case study. Over the course of the next few Chapters, the role of ideology, leadership and group dynamics will be explored in greater detail. These multifarious groups have flourished in an environment with tightened security measures and yet they have managed to regenerate and thrive with considerable success and with an increasingly better avatar over time. It is this unenviable continuous cycle of violence that lays the groundwork for this study.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

“Let every man be his own methodologist;
let every man be his own theorist;
let theory and method again be part of the practice of a craft”

C. Wright Mills

The field of terrorism studies is no longer a domain of esoteric debates amongst select scholars of the security studies community alone. As expounded in Chapter 1, the widening ambit of security and the confluence of ideas from multiple disciplines provide a nuanced understanding of the threat of terrorism. The influence of multiple-disciplines is especially reflected in the variety of discourses that this study will draw lessons from in the process of exploring the factors that influence the behaviour of groups as they embark on a path of violent extremism. Central to the hypothesis is the latent understanding that both terrorist and extremist groups continually aspire for and attempt to enact a political change within society.

This Chapter will detail the research design and methods chosen to unpack the complex vignette of terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia. The study will explore the forces of influence that push a group from extremism to terrorism. These forces include the strain from an extreme political ideology, presence of influential leadership and group dynamics. As a whole, the research design and methodology undertaken in this study will build on previous scholarly research on radicalisation, some of which was highlighted and expounded upon in the earlier chapters. In the absence of easy explanations to the research questions and to avoid methodological reductionism, this research design comprises a three-tier data collection process followed by a three-phase data analyses process.

MIXED METHODS RESEARCH DESIGN

There are three research paradigms that are ontologically and epistemologically different. Each of these paradigms - the positivist paradigm, constructivist paradigm and the pragmatist paradigm, are based on very different research philosophies. In Thomas Kuhn’s seminal work on paradigms, he defines paradigms as “universally recognised scientific achievements that, for a time, provide model problems and solutions for a community of researchers.” This held true for a large volume of research that surfaced prior to the early 1990s that were dominated by both the quantitative and qualitative research paradigm. The quantitative research method, it

assumes that in the process of conducting analyses, researchers “eliminate their biases, remain emotionally detached and uninvolved with the objects of study and test or empirically justify their stated hypotheses”\(^{208}\). On the other hand, proponents of the qualitative research method “contend that multiple-constructed realities abound, that time- and context- free generalisations are neither desirable nor possible, that research is value-bound, that it is impossible to differentiate fully causes and effects, that logic flows from specific to general and that knower and known cannot be separated because the subjective knower is not the only source of reality.”\(^{209}\)

In comparison, the pragmatist paradigm that was born out of a search for a middle ground amidst the two contesting paradigms of quantitative and qualitative research methods in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Kuhn notes that in general, “paradigms gain their status because they are more successful than their competitors in solving a few problems that the group of practitioners has come to recognise as acute.”\(^{210}\). The pragmatist paradigm was born out of what researchers have begun to see as distinct challenges that were posed by the qualitative and quantitative research paradigms.

The pragmatist paradigm “rejects the either/or choices associated with the paradigm wars, advocates for the use of mixed methods in research, and acknowledges that the values of the researcher play a large role in the interpretation of results.”\(^{211}\). The mixed methods approach combines both deductive and inductive means of questioning and seeking knowledge. Mixed methods research is defined as a mixture of “elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches (e.g. use of qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis and inference techniques) for the purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration.”\(^{212}\). Johnson and Turner iterate that “methods should be mixed in a way that has complementary strengths and non-overlapping weaknesses.”\(^{213}\). They add that “The fundamental principle is followed for at least three reasons: (a) to obtain convergence or corroboration of findings, (b) to eliminate or minimize key plausible alternative explanations for conclusions drawn from the research data, and (c) to elucidate the


\(^{210}\) Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p.26


divergent aspects of a phenomenon. The fundamental principle can be applied to all stages or components of the research process.\textsuperscript{214}

The mixed methods research design chosen for this study is congruent with the eclectic multi-disciplinary approach that is conducted through an examination of three key areas of ideology, leadership and group dynamics. Using the nested or embedded mixed methods framework, this study will draw it research philosophy from the pragmatist paradigm and will mesh together both qualitative and quantitative approaches at various phases of the process of unpacking this complex vignette of themes and ideas.\textsuperscript{215} As a whole the study will aim to amalgamate both discursive strategies of Foucault’s top-down approach through the exploration of data in report and court documents and Goffman’s bottom-up approach through the face-to-face interviews and through the questionnaires conducted.

Introduced by Wertheimer in 1923, the Gestalt principle has its roots in visual design. It is based on the notion that that the \textit{whole is bigger than the sum of its parts}. The mixed methods research design draws inspiration from this very principle. In this instance, the “combine quantitative and qualitative research tools can support stronger scientific inferences than when either is employed in isolation.”\textsuperscript{216} The strength in the mixed methods approach as such lies in the collective strength of the design that goes beyond the individualised strengths of both the quantitative and qualitative research methods alone. The amalgamation of both research paradigms provides for complementarity\textsuperscript{217} and completeness\textsuperscript{218} of the research design.

\textbf{DATA COLLECTION: A THREE - PRONGED STRATEGY}

A constant critique within terrorism studies has been the lack of original data that is gleaned from the field by researchers and analysts working on areas within the terrorism studies domain. This study aims to gently steer away from predominant research methods of social science research on terrorism wherein “there is a


\textsuperscript{216} Janette K. Klinger and Alison G. Boardman, “Addressing the “Research Gap” in Special Education Through Mixed Methods”, \textit{Learning Disability Quarterly}, Vol.34, No. 3, 2011, p.208; See also, (Feuer, Towne and Shavelson, 2002)


continuous lack of individual-level, data driven evident to test hypotheses, build case studies, and support the emergence of new theories about the psychological process in the development of the terrorist.”

To ensure an overall rigour in research design this study will explore a variety of means to obtain both qualitative and quantitative data. A three-prong approach is used in the process of data collection from the field namely – Interviews, Questionnaires, Court Documents and Extremist Literature. Harris and Brown iterate the need to “collect the two types of data with a minimal time gap.” Furthermore they add that “researchers must create tightly aligned and structured instruments; present the construct in a simple, concrete, and highly contextualised manner; collect the two types of data with a minimal time gap; and estimate agreement between methods.”

While “mixed methods researchers deny that the paradigmatic differences between the ways of viewing the world make qualitative and quantitative method incompatible,” Harris and Brown’s work on compatibility between questionnaires and semi-structured interviews, raised several factors that the authors suggest are needed to mitigate potential differences that may arise in attempting to align data between these two methods in particular. Their suggestions include, ensuring that the both the questionnaire and the interview questions are similar, the importance of reducing the time lag between data collection, presentation of findings in a specific way, ensuring that the responses have a common context, encouraging simplicity in psychological objects explored and having an estimate of agreement between methods given varied data distributions.

The sampling strategy undertaken in this study was to gather a sample size that would scalable and would provide balanced insight. Other factors that influenced the sample size were the necessity for the respondents to agree to participate in the study (given that they all either presently belonged to a terrorist or extremist group or we doing time for terrorism related activities), time constraints for the study as a whole and the security parameters and permissions needed in order to conduct these interviews. Glaser and Strauss’ concept of theoretical saturation refers to the point wherein “no additional data are being found.” In principle, although the idea of theoretical saturation is attractive and definitive at a conceptual level, “it provides little practical

221 Ibid
222 Ibid; See also Day Simmons and Gu, 2008; Ryan and Bernard, 2000; Smith, 2006.
guidance for estimating sample sizes, prior to data collection, necessary for conducting quality research."^{225} On the criterion of theoretical saturation, there is not a published guideline across the social sciences discipline that indicates that the point of theoretical saturation has been reached. Often enough these are dependent on the discretion of the researchers based on the findings gleaned in the process of the study. At a conceptual level, the sample size in his study meets the criterion of theoretical saturation within the parameters set.

At the start of this study 10 groups were selected from a broad cross section of terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia. These groups were chosen because of their prominence and pertinence in the threat landscape in Indonesia. They range from groups that have existed in the past and are presently in existence and fall on the spectrum from extremist to terrorist. The unique dynamics in Indonesia and the 10 groups selected - Lashkar Jihad (LJ), Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Darul Islam (DI), Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Negara Islam Indonesia (NII), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HT), Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI), Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), Al Qaeda Indonesia (AI) and Mujahideen Indonesia Timur (MIT) were explored in Chapter 3 of this study.

Based on the research methodology drafted, permission was thereafter sought from Indonesian government agencies to conduct both the semi-structured interviews and questionnaires for this study. Both the interviews and questionnaires were conducted in Indonesia in the Indonesian language over the course of approximately 2 and a half months. In total there were 124 respondents from both terrorist and extremist groups. Of the 124 respondents, one-on-one semi-structured interviews were conducted with a select group of 30 respondents or approximately 24% of the total sample size, who formed the upper echelons and were in positions of leadership within their respective terrorist and extremist organisations in Indonesia. These included prominent emirs, co-founders, ideologues, trainers, bomb makers and individuals who had trained in Afghanistan and were responsible for the initial waves of terrorist and extremist activities in Indonesia.

In addition to permission that was sought from the authorities to conduct interviews and questionnaires within the corrections facility, additional permission was sought from the detainees prior to the semi-structured interviews that were conducted with them. Each interview lasted approximately two hours on average. The interviews were conducted in rooms within the prison and custodial setting. The rooms that the interviews were conducted in were relatively casual over tea and soft drinks. The interviewees were informed of the purpose of the research prior to the start of the interview and were at liberty to stop the interview at any time. The interview questions mirrored the questions that were asked in the questionnaires in order to

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enable effective analysis across the three themes of ideology, leadership and group dynamics.

The remaining 94 respondents responded to the survey questions. Of the 94 respondents for the questionnaires, 16 respondents were from extremist groups; they comprised approximately 17% of total number of questionnaires conducted. 83% of the questionnaire respondents were either from terrorist groups or arrested on terrorism related charges. Despite the varied data distribution, the similarity in focus of the questions asked anchors the data collection via both these methods. Both the interviews and the questionnaires were conducted with the aim of understanding pathways of radicalisation of the selected groups.

As with the semi-structured interviews, after permission was sought, the questionnaires were distributed to those who volunteered to do the questionnaire. They were advised of the purpose of the questionnaire and to answer them in candidly. The questionnaires were anonymous with the exception of respondents annotating the (terrorist or extremist) organisation they were part of. I was present to answer queries that the respondents might have had through duration. As with the semi-structured interviews, the respondents were free to leave at any point of time.

To minimise the time gap in the collection of data for the interviews of terrorist and extremist group leaders (within prison and those that were released), the interviews with law enforcement and security personnel were conducted within the same span of approximately three months. This was done while taking into consideration the time frame required need to visit several category one/high value detention facilities in Indonesia after permission was granted. The interviews were conducted in Jakarta, Medan, Palu, Semarang, Cilacap and Yogyakarta. The interviews were conducted in the following facilities over the duration of approximately 2 and a half months – Class 1 Penitentiary in Cipinang; Class 1 Penitentiary in Tangerang; Class 1 Penitentiary in Nusa Kambangan; Jakarta Provincial Police Prison where terrorists and criminals are held as they await trial; Jakarta Police Mobile Brigade Prison in Depok where Indonesia’s elite police unit is located and prisons that are under the auspices of the District Police around the country.

The use of a three phase analytical framework based on Alexander George’s notion of structured focused comparison between the groups, couple with the special attention paid to the primary themes of political ideology, presence of influential leadership and a sense of collective consciousness will help ensure that the data will be presented in a directed and succinct manner. The findings from both the Interviews and

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226 In Indonesia, the Class 1 Penitentiaries are known as the Super Maximum Security (SMS) facility. They are located across the country; the highest security amongst them is the Nusa Kambangan facility in Cilacap, where the prison facility is located on an island. This facility comprises a large number of high value detainees including several terrorist detainees.
Questionnaires were triangulated against the court documents, extremist literature, and additional interviews with experts and scholarly work in the field.

**Data Collection (1) - Interviews with Leadership**

The first prong of data collection in this study comprised four types of one-on-one interviews that were conducted with leadership. The first was with *terrorist suspects and convicted terrorists* held in detention centers and prisons who have held or still hold positions of leadership within the terrorist organisation so as to understand what the impact of group dynamics on their path to terrorism. Second, interviews were conducted with *former members of terrorist organisations* who have held positions of leadership in their organisations and have since been released after serving time in Indonesia. Third, *leaders of (Non-Violent) Extremist groups* who are currently leading the two main extremist groups in Indonesia. Last but not least, *individuals from the Indonesian government and academia* who are not only thought leaders within the field in Indonesia but they are additionally able to offer unique insights into the unique threat landscape in Indonesia.

Of the interviews conducted, the 30 interviews with the terrorist detainees, former terrorist and leaders of extremist groups in Indonesia form an integral part of the primary research data that has been collected as part of this study. Their unique insight into the nature of group dynamics as well as their impressions on that held the reins of power in their respective organisations proved to be candid yet poignant reminders that pathways of radicalisation. The insights gleaned provided insight into the reasons behind the movement of groups to heightened trajectories of violence.

The choice of interview subjects were based on their positions of seniority and leadership with their respective organisations and ultimately their availability and willingness to participate in this interview. As noted earlier, in the instance that the leadership were imprisoned, permission was sought from Indonesian agencies to interview the leadership of the 10 groups that were selected as part of this study. Please refer to the list below for terrorist/extremist leaders that were interviewed.

**List of Interviews with Leadership**

Table 4: List of Interviews with Terrorist Leadership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO.</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>TERRORIST/EXTREMIST ORGANISATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ustadz Jaffar Umar Thalib</td>
<td>Head, <em>Laskhar Jihad</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ismail Yusanto</td>
<td>Spokesperson, <em>Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ustadz Kiyahin</td>
<td>Co-Chairperson, <em>Front Pembela Islam</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Role and Summary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Badri Hartono</td>
<td>Head, <em>Al Qaeda in Indonesia</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Umar Patek</td>
<td>Instructor, linked with Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Bali Bombing and arrested in Abbotabad Pakistan, <em>Ring Banten, Jemaah Islamiyah</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Nassir Abbas</td>
<td>Head of Mantiqi 3 and military training division, <em>Jemaah Islamiyah</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Abu Dujana</td>
<td>Head of Askari Sariyah, Military Wing, Jemaah Islamiyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Saptso</td>
<td>Arrested for involvement in the Aceh Training Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ustaz Ambrori</td>
<td>Radical Cleric, <em>Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Mobarok</td>
<td>Involvement in the Bali Bombing 2002, <em>Jemaah Islamiyah</em> Few survivors from the original group involved. Most have been executed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Jibril</td>
<td>Military Training in Afghanistan, 2nd Batch, <em>Darul Islam</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Ustadz Kohar</td>
<td>Military Training in Afghanistan, 3rd Batch, <em>Darul Islam</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Hidayat</td>
<td>Military Training in Afghanistan, 3rd Batch, <em>Darul Islam</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Suhairi</td>
<td>Military Training in Afghanistan, 7th Batch, <em>Negara Islam Indoneisa and Jemaah Islamiyah</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Jubair</td>
<td>Military Training in Afghanistan, 7th Batch, <em>Negara Islam Indoneisa and Jemaah Islamiyah</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Ghozali</td>
<td>Ideologue, involved in CIMB Bank Robberies <em>Tanzim Al Qaeda Serambi Mekkah and Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Abu Tholud</td>
<td>Head of JI’s Mantiqi III, a member of JI’s central command and Special Forces <em>Jemaah Islamiyah, Tandzim Al Qaeda Serambi Mekkah, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As a female analyst conducting the interviews, the paradoxical power asymmetry of interviews needs to be taken into consideration, “due to the interpersonal nature of the interview context, participants may be more likely to respond in ways they deem socially desirable.” Any “successful field research depends on the investigator’s trained abilities to look at people, listen to them, think and feel with them, talk with them rather than at them.” The ability to build rapport with the subject was

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227 Lois R. Harris and Gavin T.L. Brown, “Mixing interview and questionnaire methods: Practical Problems in aligning data”, Practical Assessment, Research and Evaluation, Volume 15, Number 1, January 2010, p.1; See also, Richman, Keisler, Weisband and Drasgow, 1999

pertinent towards the success of each interview. Managing social expectations, religious and gender difference meant that special effort was taken to ensure that the respondents were at ease. In order to ensure that the subjects were as comfortable in the social setting as possible, the interviews were conducted in Indonesian and minimally a hijab worn throughout the interviews with the first three categories of interviews conducted.

The questions during the semi-structured interviews did not focus on operations that they conducted but instead focussed on what inspired them as individuals and as a group fighting for a cause. The interview sought to understand their sentiments, experience and role within the organisation and at the core, what inspired them to start and continue into with their journey as an individual and thereafter within a group. A factor that constantly stood out from the face-to-face interviews was that each one of them had acted with clear intent and with an aspiration for change as part of their respective groups.

Data Collection (2) – Questionnaires

The questionnaire draws inspiration and is modified from an earlier work conducted by the two esteemed psychologists in the field, Arie Kruglanski and Michelle Gelfand.229 Their creation of the index by Kruglanski and Gelfand was initially aimed to understand the process and the indicators that can identify factor that would lead to a successful rehabilitation programme. Their pioneering work focuses on factors “such as personal history, organisational embeddedness, current conditions, family situation, and personality variables (such as need for social dominace or tolerance for ambiguity) may all affect resilience to change.”230

The questions from their earlier work were reframed to suit the core themes explored at the heart of this study - the correlation between violence in terrorist and extremist groups through the exploration of the role of ideology, leadership and group dynamics in the 10 selected groups. The questionnaires aimed to explore and understand the unique ways through which ideology, leadership and group dynamics played a role in terrorist groups in Indonesia. For scalability, a five-point Lickert Scale was used. The Likert scale is a psychometric scale will enable a quantitative assessment of the opinions provided by the respondents. The questionnaires were conducted in Indonesian. These structured questionnaires provided reliability between the


qualitative and quantitative methods used in this study and were translated into Indonesian and thereafter back-translated in order to ensure accuracy in the translations.

Within the prison system in Indonesia, there are a mixture of detainees who are indicted and those awaiting trial within the prison facility. In the process to conducting the interviews and questionnaires, it was important to be cognizant of the subtle difference in the outcome and the manner in which detainees would choose to approach the questions with regards to their group affiliation and activities in Indonesia. The questionnaires that were distributed in the prison facilities were distributed with the understanding of anonymity, given that several respondents were still undergoing trial.

As opposed to the one-on-one interviews with the leadership that the respondents and their organisations are named, these questionnaires were classified according to groups that the individual noted they belonged to. Respondents to the questionnaires were members from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI), Darul Islam (DI), Negara Islam Indonesia (NII), Splinter groups and cells in Aceh and Poso, Hizbut-Tahrir (HT) and Front Pembela Islam (FPI). The questionnaires have been coded accordingly. Some respondents had claimed that they did not respond to any group and omitted answering a few sections of the questionnaire.

The questionnaire respondents were informed that they would be asked a series of questions on the role that they have played in their respective organisations. The questions raised were divided into the following themes, (a) what they were doing prior to joining the organization, (b) sentiments that they had felt when they had joined the organization, (c) personal experiences within the organization, (d) attitudes towards the Indonesian government, (e) the sense of belonging to the organisation, (f) the level of fundamentalism and last but not least (g) what the respondents aimed to change in Indonesia if they were given an opportunity. The questionnaire aimed to understand the level of group ‘embeddedness’ and belonging, level of extremist thought and their unique journeys into the terrorist or extremist organisation. Please refer to Annex 1 for the list of questions that were asked.

Throughout the course of the survey, the word ‘terrorist group’ or ‘extremist group’ was not used given the pejorative nature of the term and the subsequent impact that it would have on the results. The value-neutral terminology of ‘organisation’ was used in questionnaire. The respondents were not provided full disclosure on what the constructs that the questions were aimed at assessing. The aim was to prevent instances wherein the respondents chose to play up or play down the role that they have had with their respective organisations. The respondents were told that this survey was aimed at understanding their personal journeys, struggles and what essentially inspiration to the cause.
Data Collection (3) – Court Documents and Extremist Literature

A third-prong of data collection was to source for court documents and extremist literature from Indonesia. These additional insights will be triangulated and amalgamated with the insights gleaned from both the semi-structured qualitative interviews and quantitative questionnaires. Extremist literature in this instance would include literature that was authored by the terrorist leadership and court documents and records of the activities of the detainees within the correctional facilities.

Analyses of the court documents and indictments would provide insight on the nature of the network and in-group dynamics between members of the groups. It would help to corroborate data and identify narratives and the level towards which the strength of ideology acts as a socially binding mechanism that can not only transcend territorial boundaries through narratives but also additionally strengthen the in-group dynamics and its impact on the ideological resolve of individuals within the groups.

Due diligence was taken to ensure safety and security during the course of the interviews. All data collected including original questionnaires, notes from the interviews, court documents and extremist literature are kept securely.

DATA ANALYSES: THREE PHASES OF SYNTHESIS

Mixed methods design used in this study is known as the embedded or concurrent nested strategy. This would embed both the quantitative as well as the qualitative element at the data acquisition stage as well as the data interpretation stage. This would help to enhance the findings while working off the strengths from both the quantitative and qualitative approaches. This study will utilise three phases of data synthesis – the influencers, the sustenance of terrorist groups and the threat matrix. These are illustrated in the diagram below.
**Phase One: The Influencers**

The first phase will analyse 10 terrorist and extremist groups across the three key factors that are hypothesised to influence the movement of groups from radical extremist thought to violent action. These key factors are ideology, leadership and group dynamics. For each key factor, data collection using both the quantitative and qualitative methods would be included.

The diagram shown below will form the conceptual framework within which the six variables of the group’s escalation to violence will be explored vis-à-vis the role that ideology, leadership and group dynamics may play in the group’s shift towards violence. The additional variables will be the intent of the group, the opportunities and the capabilities of the group to conduct an act of terrorism.

The analysis using the Alexander George’s method of inquiry in Phase Two will bring together this unique confluence of theories and assess the pathways of groups as they make the shift from ideological extremism to terrorism in a methodical manner that will rigorously draw from three varied disciplines of International Relations, Organisation theory and Collaborative Networks.

**Figure 2: Confluence of Disciplines**

![Confluence of Disciplines Diagram](image)
Phase Two: The Sustenance of Terrorist Groups

The framework used to analyse each of the 10 case studies of terrorist and extremists groups in Indonesia will be done using a method developed by Alexander George to conduct structured and focused comparison of each of the case studies. George’s method is aimed at developing typological theories. “In contrast to earlier discussions that focus on coarse comparisons, we emphasise that qualitative research usually involves a combination of cross-case comparisons and within-case analysis using methods of congruence testing and process-tracing. Within-case methods of analysis can greatly reduce the well-known risks of inferential errors that can arise from using comparative methods alone.”

A typology helps to partition events through the use of a specified combination of factors. “Typological theories treat cases as a configuration of variables that may involve complex interactions among all the variable values in the case.” In this instance, the assumption would be that “typological theories involving several variables can better capture the complexity of social life than the two-variable typological theories that are common in the social sciences.” This would add to the rigour of the research design and thereby provide a better understanding of the threat.

The method’s openness to equifinality is especially attractive in recognition of the fluid interaction between variables in the process of radicalisation. There are five steps within this framework, (1) identifying the nature and class of problems to be studied; (2) to define the independent, dependent and intervening variables; (3) to select cases to be studies and compared; (4) decide the characterisation of independent and dependent variable and lastly; (5) to formulate a detailed set of questions to be applied to each case. The use of one country – Indonesia thereby provides a contextualised comparison, thereby achieving a “high level of construct validity.”

The formulation of the detailed set of questions to analyse each case study will draw on the earlier work by Jones and Libincki. They identified five factors that contribute towards in the demise of terrorist groups. In analysing the factors that propelled a group to their demise they argued that the key factors were policing, military force,

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231 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, (Unites States of America: MIT Press, 2004), p. viii or ix


234 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, (Unites States of America: MIT Press, 2004), p. viii or ix

the splintering of the group, politics, or (the eventual) victory of a terrorist group. Separately, they had identified five variables that influenced the sustenance of a terrorist organisation. These five variables were ideological motivation, economic conditions, regime type, the size of groups, and the breadth of terrorist goals. This study will build on the work by Jones and Libincki and will posit that in addition to the five variables identified, the role of group dynamics is an integral variable that continues to sustain groups.

**Phase Three: The Threat Matrix**

The threat matrix as reflected above draws its influence from criminology. A successful act of terrorism arises from the convergence of three factors namely, the individual or groups intention or motive for attack, the capability of individuals and groups to carry out attacks and lastly, the opportunity for attack. The factors that push groups on the path of violence and terrorism are caused by a convergence of - Intention, Capability and Opportunity for attack. This third and last phase in the analyses adds to the earlier hypothesis wherein the external push factors or strains of influence are necessary but not sufficient. The factors that influence a group’s future tell only one side of the story. It is ultimately a group’s ability to successfully carry out an act of terrorism or threaten to carry out an attack would point to the precise moment that the shift from extremism to terrorism takes place.

This third and last phase in the analyses will conclude the study and provide a summation of the underlying threat of the group’s progressive thrust towards violence in Indonesia.

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CHAPTER FIVE

INFLUENCER A:

IDEOLOGY AND THE IMPACT ON
RADICAL GROUPS IN INDONESIA

“A belief is not merely an idea the mind possesses.
It is an idea that possesses the mind”

Robert Oxton Bolt

Long wars are won or lost on the battlefield of ideas. In Indonesia, despite the relative successes that have been achieved in the kinetic efforts against terrorism, the ideological scaffoldings that form the very foundation of terrorist and extremist movements has not been dismantled. “In the widest possible sense an ideology thus offers answers to the question of what type of society should be desirable.” The vast ineffectiveness at countering the radical ideologies that incite violence that are promulgated by terrorist and extremists has created a permissive environment for the sustenance of these groups.

Over the course of the past three decades, several prominent models and conceptual frameworks on radicalisation have placed substantial emphasis on the role of ideology in radicalisation. These radicalisation models and conceptual frameworks included amongst others, The Al-Muhajiroun Model by Quintan Wictorowitz, Phases of Islamic Radicalisation by Micheal Taarnby, the Continuum of Salafi-Jihadi Radicalisation by Jeffery Cozzens, the NYPD model, FBI model, 6-Stage Radicalisation Model by Savage and Liht, NCTC Model and Velhuis and Staun’s Root Cause Model. These models and conceptual frameworks were explored in greater detail in Chapter 2 of this study.

This Chapter will examine the role of ideology as one of three key influencers in sustaining and pushing the groups in Indonesia on a pathway of violence. The other key influencers, the role of leadership and group psychology will be dealt with in greater detail in the next two Chapters of this study. This chapter will explore the factors within the group’s ideology that (1) incites violence, (2) sustains the terrorist and extremist movement in Indonesia.

The Chapter will not embark on the refutation of these extremist narratives as expounded by terrorist and extremist groups. What is pertinent for this study is not how true or false these ideological statements are but instead the type of meaning these beliefs have acquired vis-à-vis society over time and ultimately its relation to power. In particular, its hold over the group and thereby the impact on the operational injunctions of the group. Power can be accrued when thoughts and ideas are politicised through the language of religion and channelled in order to have an impact on the escalation of violence within groups.


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**IDEOLOGY: DIFFERENTIATING FORM AND SUBSTANCE**

The word *ideology* is more often than not, one of the most controversial terms used within the social sciences discipline. Just like terrorism, the term when used loosely can be looked upon as pejorative. Much of the discourse on terrorism (thus far) has placed the role of ideology at the heart of the causes of terrorism. In short, ideology is seen to provide a motive and framework for action, provide a justification for acts of violence, provide a language for mass mobilisation through the call for jihad, generates public support and radicalises communities through a culture of violence and a radical interpretation of Islam. The danger lies in the often tenuous and flawed correlation between Islam the religion and violence.

In *form*, ideology merely refers to the collation of ideas or very loosely put a ‘belief system’ per se. A collection of ideas without the process of politicisation of the very ideas in question will remain but an aggregation of ways of thinking about the world and proving a loose explanation for ensuing world events. This functionalist approach of broad categorisation of the terms has resulted in the problem where the term *ideology* has been used loosely within the discourse. In this instance, “nearly every ideological system or set of practices can be a religion, then calling something religious does not distinguish it from anything else.” As such, merely stating that ideology has justified violent action or resulted in mobilisation or caused conflict negates a quintessential factor that links thought (a belief system) and activism (an action).

In *substance*, what most scholars often failed to highlight is the crucial and missing link in the puzzle. It is the means and the methods used to politicise the idea. The substance lies in the politicisation of the idea(s) that both accelerates and charts the course for action and potentially violent action. The securitization of the ‘belief system’ has rendered it a key factor in influencing the increased level of violence. The missing link between the idea and the means undertaken to politicise a belief system and can be moved a step further, to explore the transference of the now politicised belief system to a community of people.

The term ideology as used by scholars has amalgamated both these aspects over time. As such, it is not only ‘what’ the ideas are but perhaps more importantly, ‘how’ these ideas have been politicised that has created a lasting impact. Ideology as the term is originally meant – as a system of beliefs as such, is a necessary but insufficient means of explaining the pathways of violence of groups in Indonesia. This Chapter will explore the role and subsequent impact of manifestos of JI and JAT on the ideology of the group. In addition to the formal means of influence through manifestos, this Chapter will also explore the use of books, music and chants to reach out to the masses. These varied means undertaken by the groups aim to reiterate the core message propagated by these groups on the necessity and viability for the establishment of an Islamic State – a seemingly incorruptible ideal that they all share.

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239 Mohamed Bin Ali, Ideological Response to Terrorism and Extremism,
This study will argue, that the role of particular individuals or a group in providing a permissive environment needs to be highlighted in order to provide the necessary depth and understanding on the traditional assumptions of the role of ideology. It is important to note that ultimately “belonging to a group and remaining isolated from society at large reinforces the terrorists’ ideology and strengthens their motivations”\textsuperscript{241} through the constant politicisation of these ideas through the lens of religion. The repetitive reinforcement of ideas and group-pressure as explored further in Chapter 7 are pertinent in sustaining interest of the members and cadres of terrorist and extremist groups.

Religion is a familiar and potent force when harnessed effectively. It channels an almost primordial reaction amongst believers to enact change for the sake of what is perceived to be the greater good. A set of ideas and values in it of itself is not political. It is ultimately the politicisation of these ideas and values that renders the ideology political. The group becomes the catalyst through which ideas are politicised, sustained and put into a course of action, thereby rendering the ideology problematic to contend with thereafter.

\textit{Ideology Creates a Framework for Interaction}

Stuart Hall defines ideology as “mental frameworks – the languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and systems of representation – which different classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense of, figure out and render intelligible the way society works.”\textsuperscript{242} The role of ideology is to facilitate making sense of governing realities amongst communities. Ideology is often widely seen in the literature as a “set of consensually shared beliefs and doctrines that provide the moral and intellectual basis for a political, economic, or social system, imbues human existence with meaning and inspiration, but it also fosters illusion and threatens individual freedom.”\textsuperscript{243}

Teun A Van Dijk’s work on ideology aptly notes “that discourse and ideology are social phenomena and as long as one embeds cognition in social contexts and society.”\textsuperscript{244} The social context of ideology and the manner in which meaning is created will inadvertently act as the means through which societies and groups are formed, informed and ultimately transformed over time. The ideology is both the message and the identity marker of the group. The leadership a potent messenger and the collective aggregation of individuals through group dynamics reinforce this message. The social context through which an ideology is propagated and reinforced cannot be dismissed.

Political Islam has been rendered to an uncomfortable position since Indonesia’s Independence. This has been explored in greater detail in Chapter 3. It has directly influenced the manner in which radical thought has taken root in society over time. The social role of ideologies to impact the norms and mores of groups and society would have implications on not only the identity of members within the group, it

\textsuperscript{241} Franco Ferracuti, Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, p. 61
\textsuperscript{242} (Hall, 1996:26)
\textsuperscript{243} The Ideological Animal, p.265
would additionally have implications on the identity of the group vis-à-vis the community at large. It is pertinent to understand that,

“ideologies are also socially shared and related to societal structures, an obvious insight which, however needs a different theoretical analysis. Similarly, beliefs are not only personal, nor do they always spontaneously ‘emerge’ as products of the individual mind. Rather, many of them are socially acquired, constructed and changed - for example, through social practices and interaction in general, and through discourse and communication in particular. This means that besides their mental dimensions, they have social dimension, neither of which should be reduced to the other.”

The ideology in this case forms the framework for interaction both within and outside of a given group. “As ideological animals, humans suffuse the world with socially constructed meaning.” An ideology that is rooted in any given religion has the ability to influence existing social and political structures, impact groups and their respective interests, and inspire power and create a sense of dominance through the acquisition and reproduction of divine inspiration.

Idea of Ideology Defines the Parameters and Sets the Future Direction of Group

An aggregation of individuals who possess the same idea has the propensity to facilitate the process through which these ideas are mutually reinforce over the course of time. The function of “(t)he group, as selector and interpreter of ideology, is central.” In JI for instance, the Qoidah Sholbah (Core Group) comprised selected members such as Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Abdullah Sungkar, Abu Jibriel and Hambali whose task was to identify others that had potential to carry forth the ideology of JI. As the arbiter of knowledge the parameters of action and the activities that the group eventually engage in were defined. As such,

“group ideology plays an important role in supporting this conformity-inducing group environment. When questions are raised the absolutist ideology becomes the intellectual justification. Indeed the ideology becomes, in effect, the scripture for the groups morality.”

Ideology as such is seen to “break the bonds of the existing social order” An important aspect is the presence of an in-group and out-group. While not conforming to one group – the mainstream, the terrorist or extremist group thereby creates and defines the parameters for its own existence through its ideology. Setting the tone of the debate, the politicisation of the terrorist ideology has not only outlined the activities undertaken within the group, but it would define how members of the group interact in the public domain and see themselves in relation to society. The parameters of the group as dictated by its ideology vis-à-vis the use of violence to achieve their aims will have a considerable impact on the trajectory of security of the state.

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246 The Ideological Animal. p.277
248 Jerrold Post, Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, p.34
Setting the group on the course of action to achieve their objections, Qutb felt that only religion could rid “humanity from the barbarity of technocratic culture.” Ideology thereby imbues in the group not only a common identity and a cause to identify with, but also a goal to move towards. This creates a group identity with strength harnessed through the narrative of religion. This transformational character of ideology sets out the rules of engagement. It sets the group on a course of action. It presents a ‘cognitive map’ for future action that can then be undertaken by the group.

When religious texts are used to politicise, the effects can be devastating. Religion weaves into the picture and underscores the notion that if God is with you, then Man would not be able to stand in the path of a Divine Plan. It bolsters the movement as a collective both terrorist and extremist groups alike with the aspiration to move towards a utopian ideal.

**Religiously Motivated Terrorists: Create, Define and Transform**

The challenge of dealing with the threat of religiously inspired terrorism has and in many ways still continues to be a daunting enterprise. Ensnched in a misinterpretation of religious texts, while holding the cards for a zero sum game, the current wave of religiously motivated terrorism bears the hallmarks of all the dangers raised by scholars that will be evident in this complex discourse. Hoffman notes that two challenges are prevalent in religiously inspired terrorism. The first would be the inability to identify the adversary, and thereby reduce the opportunity to conduct any predictive analysis to assess their capabilities accurately. Second, the unpredictability of religiously inspired terrorists in their pursuit of violence as means to an end. Ultimately “the intention to kill and maim for political purpose is chosen, and the choice itself is strongly informed by moral arguments and reasons, however misconceived or hallucinatory.” The dominant discourse in terrorist and extremist literature “speak of one another as evil.” They ascribe notions of evil and the idea that the enemy that they are facing albeit a secular state is equivalent to the warring factions in the dichotomy of good and evil. David Rapoport emphasises that the “special justification and precedents” differentiate the religious and the secular terrorists.

Central to the role of religion is Durkheim’s work on the distinction between the sacred and the profane. As such religion “functions to promote social unity and to

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251 Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, p. .128

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create moral and intellectual consensus.”\textsuperscript{256} Stark and Bainbridge take the idea of further and see religion through the lens of deductive reasoning as one that provides believers with things that they desire and have not yet received in life thus far.\textsuperscript{257} The allure of the divine sanction and aspiration of a better future remains a central theme for religiously motivated terrorists. Broadly, “religion focuses on maximizing individual benefit through group participation, while ideology is intent on maximizing group benefit through individual participation.”\textsuperscript{258}

**Salafi-Jihadi**

Jihad can be defined as *striving in the path of God* with the aim of defending Islam against any attack.\textsuperscript{259} In particular, it would be to defend Islam against the non-believers who are seen to be the “very epitome of evil.”\textsuperscript{260} Radical leader and Bali Bomber Imam Samudra for instance, was of the opinion that there is a “jihad di fai (defence)”\textsuperscript{261} and “jihad hujumi (offence)”\textsuperscript{262} The Bali bombings of 2002 was looked upon as a conflation of both a defensive and offensive attack against the perceived enemy. Explaining that jihad is a continuous process until the aspiration of an Islamic State is achieved, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir identified the various weapons that can be used in the path of Jihad,

> “there are three types of weapons: (1) weapons made of iron (guns)  
> (2) weapon of written word (dakwah) (3) weapon of prayer. Now that I am in jail, I utilise the weapon of the written word.”\textsuperscript{263}

He emphasized that one’s call to jihad should continue as it is a divine calling and a gift to strive for the establishment of God’s rule on earth.

The term salafi-jihadi has been used in much of the discourse to describe the underlying religious doctrine that underscored much of terrorist ideology today. Wiktorowicz identified an apt manner of understanding the Salafi Movement. He divides the Salafi movement into three categories, namely, *purists, politicos* and *jihadists*. The common denominator within the Salafi movement is the religious creed or *aqida* based on the Qu’ran and Sunnah. The creed is based on Islamic principles such as the belief in the, *tauhid* or the oneness of God, the supremacy of divine governance. The division amongst the three categories arise from the manner in which the *aqida* is applied to contemporary issues and the hold that they have on religious authority. The purists implement the *aqida* by using politically neutral and peaceful

\textsuperscript{258} Bruce B. Lawrence, *Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt against the Modern Age* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1995), p.79  
\textsuperscript{261} Imam Samudra, *Aku Melawan Teroris*, (Solo: Azeria, 2004) p.178  
\textsuperscript{262} Imam Samudra, *Aku Melawan Teroris*, (Solo: Azeria, 2004) p.178  
\textsuperscript{263} Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Interview with Author, Nusa Kambangan, Indonesia, 22 October 2013
means through dakwhah, tazkiyya and tarbiya. They see themselves as protectors of the tauhid and the purity of Islam. The politicos claim to have a better understanding of contemporary issues, and undertake a more activist approach short of a rebellion against the current order to uphold the aqida.

The jihadists emerged during the Soviet-Afghan War and unlike the politicos they would not hesitate to use violence to uphold the aqida. The necessity to take up arms in this instance was seen to be a necessary progression due to the perceived dereliction of duty of the religious leadership of both the purists and the politicos who were seen to have not performed their duty to uphold the aqida to the fullest of their abilities.

Over time the salafi-jihadists gained considerable clout amongst radical teachers, preachers and scholars in scholars even in Indonesian Islamic boarding schools or pesantrens. In a recent report exploring the evolution of Al Qaeda and the persistent threat of the salafi-jihadist, Seth Jones, notes that there is a “58-percent increase in the number of Salafi-jihadist groups from 2010 to 2013.” In addition to that the “number of Salafi-jihadists more than doubled from 2010 to 2013.” It is the prevalence of the salafi-jihadi discourse that continued to alarm governments and exacts pressure in order to find new ways of dealing with this threat. Salafi-jihadi ideology confers “the believer with a strong sense of identity and existential certainty; it also, more importantly, enables them to rationalize personal failings and justify violent retaliation against those who are perceived to be responsible for them.”

In a now infamous interview in 1998, Osama bin Laden even after his death, continues to be a prominent icon of the salafi-jihadi movement even after his death. He iterated then that violence was the only way in which to achieve an ideal state. Violence through acts of terrorism would act as justified punishment and would be a warning and bring about order and justice. Osama bin Laden emphasised that,

“Every state and every civilization and culture has to resort to terrorism under certain circumstances for the purpose of abolishing tyranny and corruption. Every country in the world has its own security system and its own security forces, its own police and its own army. They are all designed to terrorise whoever even contemplates to attack that country or its citizens. The terrorism we practice is of the commendable kind for it is directed at the tyrants and the aggressors and the enemies of Allah, tyrants and the traitors who commit acts of treason against their own countries and their own faith and their own prophet and their own nation. Terrorising those and punishing them are necessary measures to straighten things and to make them right.”

266 Ibid
It was indeed a strong statement of justifying violence in order to achieve a political end, for like Clausewitz, who saw “war as politics by other means.” For Osama bin Laden, terrorism was a natural progression of force in order to purge evil – an extension of other methods that have been used in order to make things right. The bold use of force is thus seen as a necessary means to an end. “Clausewitzian war, in short, is rational and instrumental. It is the attempt to bring about a new state of affairs through the artful combination of violence and the promise to cease violence if certain political objectives are met.”\textsuperscript{269} This was similar to what the salafi-jihadists proposed, as means in order to achieve their desired objective that of a state governed by Islamic Law.

“Salafis are totalist, in that they believe that Islam is a complete code of life, and envisage no sphere of human activity independent from this scope. They are fundamentalist, in that they believe that Islam is the literal word of God and cannot therefore be questioned or revised in any way.”\textsuperscript{270}

It is this quest to return to fundamentals of Islam that stands as the core of their activities. In Indonesia, as much as their actions could be undeniably defined as salafi-jihadi by many scholars, several of the leaders interviewed attempted to steer clear of the term when using to describe themselves or the work of their organisation. When asked if he considered his group ‘radical’, spokesperson of HTI, Ismail Yusanto noted that it would depend on whose definition of radical. For HTI,

“if it is about going back to the roots, it means going back to the Quran and the Sunnah, then its alright.”\textsuperscript{271}

Ismail Yusanto went on to highlight that the term

“radical has a political bias especially since radical is a pejorative term.”\textsuperscript{272}

Ustaz Jaafar Umar Thalib the former leader of LJ noted that the

“salafi-jihadi is a label, I am salafi.”\textsuperscript{273}

The discomfort with the terminology might just stem from the entrenched association of salafi-jihadism with acts of terrorism. Semantics aside, most would wear the badge of salafism proudly and see violent jihad as a means to establishing Islamic Law in Indonesia.

Explaining the foundations of Islamic Law, Dr. Irfan Idris, Director of Indonesia’s Deradicalisation Programme a scholar in Islamic Law noted that most of the terrorists and extremists have missed the 5 factors that were the reasons behind why Islamic Law of Shari’ah was created in the first instance. These factors were, to look after

\textsuperscript{269} Lee Harris, ‘Al Qaeda’s Fantasy Ideology: War without Clausewitz,’ Policy Review, August and September 2002, p.21
\textsuperscript{270} Simon Cottee, Mind Slaughter: Neutralizations of Jihadi Salafism, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 33, No. 4, 09 March 2010, p.334
\textsuperscript{271} Ismail Yusanto, Interview with Author
\textsuperscript{272} Ismail Yusanto, Interview with Author
\textsuperscript{273} Ustaz Jaafar Umar Thalib, Interview with Author
life, to look after the religion, to look after the intellect, to look after the family and last but not least to look after one’s possessions. He noted that all the above would be important in order to establish Islamic law, and not merely a misguided understanding on establishing Islam in Indonesia. Salafi-Jihadi or radical, the groups as a collective aimed to return back to the core teachings of Islam with a the objective of establishing Islamic Law however, it is done in a selective and misguided manner, that does not embrace the true spirit of the law.

Survey Findings – Fundamentalism

As part of this study a survey was conducted exploring the notion of fundamentalism in terrorist and extremist groups. The 94 respondents comprised members of both terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia. The notion of fundamentalism was examined with the aim of identifying the importance placed on the role of religion namely Islam and the perception of members after they had joined the group.

Of the 94 respondents, the results reiterated the entrenched notion of religion amongst members of the groups. 77% believed that God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which must be totally followed. 66% believed that the basic cause of evil in this world is Satan, who is still constantly and ferociously fighting against God, in this instance this would include governments and agencies who impede the establishment of an Islamic State. 56% believed that there are basically only two kinds of people in the world: the Righteous, who will be rewarded by God, and the rest who will not. 66% felt that to lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one, fundamentally true religion. True to the salafi teachings underpinning terrorist and extremists groups in Indonesia, 70% agreed that the fundamentals of God’s religion should never be tampered with, or compromised with others’ beliefs. For abandoning the true religion, 68% agreed that God would punish those who walked away from the faith.

The centrality of religion amongst the respondents was especially strong with the survey results that showed an overwhelming majority of those who reiterated the role of religion. 80% of the respondents agreed that Islam is the only acceptable religion. 78% agreed that Islam teaches without error God’s truth. 76% believed that only Muslims would be allowed to go to heaven regardless if the individual was good. And finally, 67% believed that non-Muslims had a lot of pagan ways. The construct of fundamentalism to some extent showcased the inherent in-group and out-group dynamics that were rooted in their belief system.

Differentiating the Nuanced Impact of Ideology on: Individual vs Group

In exploring the influence of ideology in radicalisation, Jonathan Githens-Mazer and Robert Lambert’s work on conventional wisdom, adeptly warns about the fallacy surrounding the often focused upon conventional wisdom of the assuming that solely ideology caused the radicalisation of individuals. Their work based on case studies of brothers involved in Operation Crevice and the Brixon Salafi Community’s work

274 Irfan Idris, Interview with Author, National Counter Terrorism Agency Head Quarters, Jakarta, 1 July 2013.
highlighted that even if the ideology is “one of ‘Islam under threat’ or more specifically as a ‘Salafi-jihadi’ orientation, is present in a variety of cases where individuals don’t become terrorists. It is therefore illogical and dangerous to assume that identity issues and/or ideology in and of themselves are causing terrorism.”

A nuance understanding of the role of ideology is pertinent to provide an accurate and balanced understanding of the role of ideology in both individual and group radicalisation respectively. This study explores factors that could lead to increased levels of violence within groups. Ideology in this instance, is seen from the vantage point of the collective. Ideology is seen as an outward manifestation that reinforces the identity of what the collective unit stands for. It is taken to be one of three key influencers that will shape the group’s course of action.

The survey conducted of terrorist and extremist group members on the construct of the individual’s purpose of joining the organisation was examined. Of the 94 respondents, 60% respondents noted that they felt it was their religious duty to join the organisation. 75% felt that they were doing something for the good of the community. 69% felt that joining the organisation would bring honour to themselves and finally, 67% felt that that joining the organisation would bring honour to their families.

Figure 3: Purpose of Joining

Hence while at an individual level, there may be instances where ideology plays a limited role in radicalisation, the role of ideology for the group provides a varied

function on the path towards violence. For the group, ideology acts as an identity marker, a binding mechanism for group solidarity and even as a framework for action. At an individual level, where ideology does not play a pertinent role, the individual may perhaps be attracted to other aspects within a group that would pull them on a path of radicalisation. The individual can either be drawn by the role of leadership or intra-group relations that would facilitate the individual’s pathway of radicalisation. In the case of Indonesia, the pre-existing perception of religious duty, greater good and concept of honour were reflected in the responses in the survey. In an extension of the work by Mark Juergensmeyer on religious violence, the case study of the threat landscape in Indonesia is influenced by “religious language and ideas.” Even in the event that ideology were not the initial influence, it is an enduring facet that has entrenched itself within the terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia for it is the image of a “cosmic war, which adds further complications to a conflict that has become baptized with religious authority” spiraling it into a vortex and a continues cycle that is sometime hard to break out of.

**Many Groups… One Movement**

Former Chief of Indonesia’s Intelligence Agency, General Hendropriyono, explained the proliferation of many groups in Indonesia using the analogy of a fruit tree. He opined that the terrorist threat in Indonesia was analogous to a tree with radical ideology as its roots and the fertilisers are the on-going conflicts especially the Israeli-Palestinian issues. The sunrays were akin to the poverty and economic strife in Indonesia, shining its warmth on all but just like sunshine, not everyone gets burnt and just as poverty would not necessarily result in an increased vulnerability of individuals to be radicalised. The strong trunk of the tree was the steady growth of the terrorist and movement in Indonesia and its many fruit the terrorist organisations. The numerous terrorist organisations were borne from the same tree – many groups one movement. He added that while a majority of the terrorist groups were problematic to Indonesia, a considerable number such as JI, MMI and JAT had one person in common, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir.

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276 Mark Juergensmeyer, ‘Religion as a Cause of Terrorism,’ in Louise Richardson (Eds.) The Roots of Terrorism, (New York: Routledge, 2016), p.139
277 Mark Juergensmeyer, ‘Religion as a Cause of Terrorism,’ in Louise Richardson (Eds.) The Roots of Terrorism, (New York: Routledge, 2016), p.142
278 General Hendropriyono, Interview with Author, Jakarta, 2 July 2013
279 General Hendropriyono, Interview with Author, Jakarta, 2 July 2013
Figure 4: Attitude of Countries

The strong disdain for Israel and the US was evident where of the 94 respondents, 63% held both negative and very negative views of Israel and 67% held both negative and very negative views of the US.

The table below highlights the core aims of the ten groups that are being examined in this study. With the exception of FPI, all the groups call for the establishment of an Islamic State as its ultimate political end game. FPI calls for the establishment of Islamic Law within the parameters of the state – while maintaining the state’s doctrine of Pancasila. Ghozali explained that in his opinion, there were two types of ideologies as seen in behaviour of the terrorist movement in Indonesia, (1) The first what he referred to as the ‘Radical’ comprised groups that wanted to change the laws in Indonesia and wanted to change what is known as Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI), the Republic of Indonesia. These groups are JI, JAT, MMI, HTI, NII, DI and several of the more radical smaller splinter groups. (2) The second was what he referred to as the ‘Moderates’ these comprised groups that did not want to change status quo too much, however they wanted to see implemented Islamic Law. These groups include groups such as FPI who were comfortable with Indonesia’s use of Pancasila however saw the necessity to include the implementation of Islamic Law.  

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280 Ghozali, Interview by Author, Medan, 30 September 2013
Table 3: Ideology in Action - Beliefs and Aims of the Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Aims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Darul Islam (DI)*</td>
<td>Established in 1948 with the aim of challenging Dutch rule through independence and the establishment of an Islamic State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Negara Islam* Indonesia (NII)</td>
<td>NII was established by Kartosuwiryo with the proclamation of Independence in West Java in 1949, the area that was controlled by NII was called DI. The movement in general aims to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. Both DI that was formed in 1948 and the NII are intrinsically linked and often referred to as the DI/NII movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lashkar Jihad (LJ)</td>
<td>As the paramilitary wing of FKA JW, LJ has a primarily local agenda. Targeting Christians in conflict areas of Maluku and Poso. LJ deployed fighters to Ambon. FKA JW, its parent organisation was formed as part of Salafi movement in Indonesia that had aimed to spread the Salafi teachings in Indonesia namely the Sunnah of the Prophet, to be a positive example to society and accept and believe in ta'hu d (the oneness of God).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI)</td>
<td>Aimed to establish Islamic law in Indonesia and the world. This would be done through <em>dakwah</em> (outreach), educating Muslim community, gain consensus for the establishment of Islamic Law, create positive environment for non-Muslims and to mobilise the masses towards the creation of Islamic Law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)</td>
<td>They aimed to establish an Islamic Archipelago (Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara) that includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the southern Philippines, Singapore and Brunei.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT)</td>
<td>JAT ultimately aims to establish a true Islamic state/khilafah based on the teachings of the Quran and Prophet - Khilafah rasydah ala minhajin Nubuwwah. The state will be achieved through outreach (<em>dakwah</em>) and jihad, through encouraging people to do good deeds and fight evil deeds (<em>amar ma’ruf and nahi mungkar</em>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Al Qaeda Indonesia (AI)</td>
<td>The group’s objective is to establish a pan-Islamic state, or an Islamic state in Indonesia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Mujahideen Indonesia Timur (MIT)</td>
<td>Its short-term objective is to establish an Islamic state in Poso. Its long-term goal for the establishment of an Islamic state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Front Pembela Islam (FPI)</td>
<td>FPI’s goal is the implementation of Shariah law in Indonesia. Unlike other groups, (on paper) FPI does not call for an Islamic state. Instead, it demands the change in Indonesia’s constitution to include adherence to Islamic law. FPI’s primary objective objective is to implement the <em>amar ma’ruf nahi munkar</em> (to do good deeds and avoid the evil deeds) principles in all aspects of life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)</td>
<td>Hizbut Tahrir’s goal is to establish a global Islamic state or Daulah Khilafah Islamiyah. HTI calls for the Indonesian nation-state (NKRI) to be abolished and replaced by an Islamic Caliphate.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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281 Group Profiles, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Global Pathfinder Database.
The terrorist and extremist movements in Indonesia were not without its internal schism and fissures. When asked in the survey the aspects that they would like to see changed in Indonesia the highest recurrent theme was that of wanting to see a change instituted in Indonesia, Islamic state and governance at 24% and the to change the laws and legislation at 16%. Approximately one quarter of the respondents or 28% have aspects that they wanted changed that were not reflected in the dominant themes shown below.

To a large extent, what remains unique with the Indonesia case study is the fact that numerous groups have surfaced under a multitude of banners, but almost always with the same aim. This chapter will highlight two of the major splits that had taken place in Indonesia vis-à-vis belief systems.

**Split from DI/NII to JI**

Although there were distinct similarities in the aims articulated by the groups, the terrorist movement in Indonesia was prone to schisms and fissures from within. These schisms occurred at the level of ideology and as a result of leadership. The split between DI and JI for instance occurred “over the conduct of the struggle with the kaffir unbelievers and the scope of the fundamentalist vision.” At one level, some assume that Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, senior leaders of NII had a more global vision for NII, by sending mujahideen to participate in the Soviet Afghan War. Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir were tasked to expand NII’s networks

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283 Mahkamah Agung Republik Indonesia, *High Court of the Republic of Indonesia*, Court Verdict for Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Case Nombror : 29 K/Pid/2004, See also Appeal Verdict, Case Number 332/PID/2011/PT.DKI
while in exile in Malaysia,\textsuperscript{284} capitalised on the opportunity accorded by Abdullah Azzam through the Makhtab al-Khadamat al-Arab. It is likely that their sending of mujahideen to Afghanistan “was less to wage jihad against the Soviet in Afghanistan than to take advantage of the military training that was made available on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border.”\textsuperscript{285} Hence, the concerted effort by Abdullah Sungkar to send batches of fighters to Afghanistan was as a result of his aspiration to steer JI may have not entirely be because of a totally global aspiration but a viable space to train in order to conduct activities in Southeast Asia. There were reports that Adjegan Masduki a senior and rival NII member opposed the regional and global stance that he felt Abdullah Sungkar was shaping the group towards.\textsuperscript{286} However if this was the case, Hambali’s plan to initiate a change in targets from domestic to a western targets might not have been met by opposition by Abdullah Sungkar as described by several individuals that were interviewed including Nassir Abbas.

Muhammad Tito Karnavian, identified two distinct narratives for the split. At one level there was the ideological split as noted by those that were pro-JI. According to this narrative, Abdullah Sungkar accused senior NII member, Adjegan Masduki “of having Shi’ite and sufı tendencies and therefore of having strayed from salafi teaching.”\textsuperscript{287} DI and later NII were founded on the basis of salafi doctrine where as Ghozali pointed out, they desired to change the laws in Indonesia through the establishment of Islamic Law.

At a second level was the narrative that was predominant from pro-NII forces and supporters of Adjegan Masduki who indicated that there was a dispute over funding and the control of funds that Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir had accrued while they were in Indonesia. “Adjegan Masduki suspected that (Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir) were getting funds from the International Network that was sending the Mujahideen to Pakistan and Afghanistan.”\textsuperscript{288} This was in addition to the funds that they were already collecting from the communities in Malaysia and Singapore. The dispute arose over the autonomy of the use of funds by NII through Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir.

Either because of the split over funding or ideology or perhaps owing to both these reasons, the DI/NII group split with the formation of JI in 1993. The ideology of JI was enshrined in the document Pedoman Umum Perjuangan al Jemaah al Islamiyah (General Guide for the Struggle of Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah) (PUPIJ) a document that they had consolidated in May 1996. Since its establishment in 1993, JI had over the course of a few years, “evolved into an ideological hybrid deriving its political ideology and strategy in part from Qutb and the Egyptian Islamic jihadi groups Gamaa al Islamiyah al Masri (Al Masri Islamic Group) and al Islamiyah al Jihad al Masri (Al Masri Islamic Jihad), as well as from its own indigenous

\textsuperscript{286} Rohaiyah, RSIS Commentary
\textsuperscript{287} Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous ICG Asia Report N°63, 26 August 2003, p.6
resources.⁹²⁸ JI aimed to mirror the work of its namesake the Gamaa al Islamiyyah al Masri and to some extent saw itself as an extension to the group in its aim to establish an Islamic state and caliphate. This time as opposed to DI/NII, JI’s aim was not merely the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia but the aspiration of Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara – a Caliphate in the Southeast Asian Archipelago.

Defection from MMI to JAT

The Majelis Muhjahideen Indonesia (MMI) was formed in 2000 with the aim of bringing various terrorist and extremist groups together under the umbrella of one council. As a collective, the aim of MMI was the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate.⁹²⁹ Tensions between MMI and Ba’asyir escalated in 2006 after Ba’asyir’s release from prison and over the question of who should be in charge of facilitating the return of Ba’asyir return to Ngruki. Ba’asyir’s sons Abdul Rochim and Rashid Ridho were of the opinion that MMI was misusing their father’s popularity for the benefit of MMI decided to manage Ba’asyir return after his release from prison. His dakwah or outreach activities were later managed by Abdul Rochim under the newly form Abu Bakar Ba’asyir Centre in 2008.

At the core the split was a result of the dispute over the dogma on the manner through which leadership was selected in MMI. Ba’asyir noted that while “The amir could consult with others in an executive council, or majelis syuro, but ultimately, he made the decisions, popular or not, and every member of the organisation had to fall in line.”⁹³⁰ Ba’asyir felt that in MMI the leader possessed “only a symbolic role.”⁹³¹ Abu Bakar Ba’asyir refused to condone the selection of the leader of MMI through election as he deemed choice of leader by democratic elections as un-Islamic. The split result in the more radical sections of MMI joining JAT, several of whom later were part of the JAT Executive Council.

On more than one occasion, Ba’asyir continued to make attempts to unite terrorist groups under one common banner. The formation of JAT almost mirrored the idea of a multitude of groups operating under one banner. 10 days after Ba’asyir’s resignation from MMI on 28 July 2008, Ba’asyir founded a new organisation – JAT. JAT was inaugurated on 17 September 2008 on “the (Islamic Calendar’s) anniversary of the Battle of Badr in 624, Islam’s first major victory, when the Prophet’s outnumbered forces in Medina (and) defeated attackers from Mecca”⁹³² with Ba’asyir as its Emir.

JAT possessed members from a variety of backgrounds as a majority used to be members of terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia. Within its ranks, JAT comprised members who were from various terrorist and extremist groups. An enduring problem that JAT faced was that “JAT has never really had an identity apart

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²⁹⁰ Terence Chong, Globalization and Its Counter-forces in Southeast Asia, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008) p.267
²⁹¹ ICG, Indonesia: The Dark Side of Jama’ah Ansharut Daulah (JAT) Crisis Group Asia Briefing No.107, 6 July 2010 p.2
²⁹² Ibid
²⁹³ Ibid, p.3
from Ba’asyir, and he is too weak for many JI members, too political for the (orthodox) salafis, and too compromising for the takfiris.”294 JAT’s formation was as a direct result of Ba’asyir’s almost cult leadership status. JAT later proved to have enduring rift with several groups. With JI’s Abu Rusydan there were tensions on dual membership. Abu Rusydan who held tight reigns on membership and insisted the individuals could not be a member of both JI and JAT at the same time. With DI’s Tahmid Rahmat Basuki who felt that Ba’asyir was capitalising on internal dissent to poach its members.

**Continued Proliferation of Groups in Indonesia**

After 2010 with the founding of a military training capability in Aceh, many of the key leadership from JI and JAT were either neutralised or apprehended. It was within this vacuum and in the absence of hierarchical leadership that several smaller splinter groups began to surface in Indonesia. While engaging in violence as a means to an end and aspiring for the inclusion of Islamic law and the establishment of an Islamic State, these groups did not have the technical skillsets that were prevalent amongst terrorist leadership in the past. These skillset included experiences of training in Afghanistan or within regional training facilities for instance in the Philippines. Despite the lack of training as compared to the operatives of the past, the intention and aspiration has not wavered altogether that much. Groups such as MIT and AQI aimed to target the near enemy and as Imam Samudra, highlighted the establishment religion needs to be continually worked until such a time when the “abode of sin becomes the abode of Islam.”295 This was in reference in to Indonesian state that was still governed under secular law.

**Impact of Ideology On A Group’s Identity**

In Indonesia, the ideology of the terrorist or extremist group had an enduring impact on the group’s identity not only vis-à-vis the inter-group interactions but it additionally has an enduring impact on intra-group relations, amongst its members. Most of the group leadership when asked what their ideology was, almost always responded ‘My ideology is Islam.’ Religion was a strong identifying marker of both the individual within the group and the group as a collective. Even the few that went into details about establishing an Islamic state, they unfailingly reference their beliefs directly with Islam. While in no way was it in reference to the fact that Islam was violent, what it did emphasise was the deep-rooted association that was placed connecting faith and ideology. By and large, despite the subtle differences on how the groups were run, they almost always saw group as an extension of the requirements of Islam and the necessity to be take on the uphill task to sow the seeds and establish an Islamic State.

**Impact 1: Building Solidarity Using Religious Ideology as a Collective Identity**

The religious narrative has provided the necessary justification and has facilitated the politicisation of the ideologies that underpin the non-violent and violent extremist

294 Ibid, p.6
groups in Indonesia. The strength of the religious narrative is compounded by several factors (1) religion in the public domain has always held a contested position in Indonesia that has a predominantly Muslim population, (2) religion remains a strong marker of identity in Indonesia and (3) religion as an entity on its own already provides a natural sense of solidarity. An ideology politicise by religious doctrine capitalises on a strong under current of primordial sentiments associated with tenuous religious sentiments amongst the majority of the population.

According to the PUPJI, which embodies JI’s ideology, it was crucial not to separate life and worldly affairs from worship (ibadah) and the quest for Allah’s pleasure. Separating religion from governance of the country would prove detrimental to all.

“This firstly, man lives only to worship and obey Him. Consequently, all worldly possessions, time, energy, and thoughts must be dedicated for the purpose of ibadah to Allah. Secondly, man is the vicegerent of Allah in this world. His duty is to administer and prosper the earth according to the syariah, prevent, destroy and overcome evil practices that destroy the earth as a result of not complying the syariah. Thirdly, life on earth for man is like a test to sieve out whom, amongst men has the best deeds. Those who have the best deeds are those who fulfil two conditions; sincere to Allah and to follow the Sunnah (the way of the Prophet). Fourth, the Prophets were sent to uphold the religion. According to the ulama, the religion is Islam in a comprehensive meaning.”

As a whole, the ideology and work of JI was seen as a continuation of efforts entrenched in history since the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1972, and as such numerous groups had since emerged throughout the course of history. “The Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah, which is a Jemaah (group) among Muslims, was born and established for dakwah and jihad fi sabillah together with other Jamaah in order to preserve the righteous path based on Islamic principles.”

This echoed a message by Ayman Al-Zawahiri, that was translated into Indonesian and published in an extremist website, arrahmah.com. In his Special Instructions for the Conducting of Jihad, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, emphasised that jihad comprised two aspects – military and proselytization. The global impact of messages by terrorist and extremist leadership outside of Indonesia continue to have a considerable impact on the terrorist and extremist groups in Southeast Asia writ large and Indonesia in particular, through an active network of extremist materials. These principles are reiterated once again in Chapter 2, Article 4 and Article 5, of the JI Constitution that highlights the foundation, targets and the method of the struggle. The JI Constitution explicitly states in Article 4, that:

“(1) This jamaah is based on the Holy Quran and Sunnah in accordance to the understanding of the Salaf. (2) The aim of the struggle is to establish the daulah as a step towards the restoration of the Caliphate”

296 Pedoman Umum Perjuangan al Jemaah al Islamiyah (General Guide for the Struggle of Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah) (PUPJI), p.1
297 Ibid, p.2
298 Pedoman Umum Perjuangan al Jemaah al Islamiyah (General Guide for the Struggle of Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah) (PUPJI), p.2
299 Ibid, p.13
As extension, it goes further to note in Article 5 of the JI Constitution, as it moves one step further to craft a general way forward identifying the religious tenets that can be used to support their work. Hence,

“In order to achieve the aim, the jamaah will take the path of dakwah tarbiyah (education), amar ma 'rif nahi munkar (enjoining good and forbidding evil), hijrah (emigration) and jihad.”

As stipulated in the PUPJI, the main aim is for the establishment of the “caliphate in accordance to the way of the Prophet, free people from the enslavement to people to the enslavement to Allah alone.”

JAT’s ideology as embodied in its own ideological document that was inaugurated during the official inauguration of JAT in September was known as Manhaj dan Aqidah, the Identity and Agreement of JAT, called for a move to target the ‘near enemy.’ It emphasised, “We distance ourselves, bear hatred against, are hostile to and will combat the thoglut (those who profess that they are Muslim but are resisting the laws of God) We oppose those between us and they will remain enemies until they abide by and serve only one God forever.”

JAT’s notion of the importance of Islamic law is entrenched and extends to the fact that even if the ruler of the state is Muslim and Islamic Law is not the law of the land, then the country would be regarded as pagan and as such the necessity to continue to struggle until Islamic law is achieved. Once again the centrality of religion underscores JAT’s collective identity, aim, vision and aspiration.

In a position that often plays too close to the edge between extremism and violent extremism, FPI on the other hand notes that their group would stand against social ills and cautions that “if there were an armed movement similar to that as was seen in Papua or Maluku or any others in the area devoted to justice and against injustice, and make better the Homeland, these would have to be supported and defended, as long as the movement is not symbiotic widened movement that would morph into terrorist or separatist movements.”

There are religious undertones to the statements made and despite the overt statements that FPI are not terrorists and do not engage in violence, however the statements that are issued by FPI seem to imply that violence would be a means to an end if the cause of justified. In this instance, if the cause is justified then by extension of the same argument, acts of violence would not be seen as acts of terrorism but violence in defence of a community of people who are unable to defend themselves.

For FPI, the terms and conditions justifying acts of violence to achieve their ends would be dependent on attacks on the Muslim Community. To a large extent, “(i)deological and structural factors – including political socialization, mass media influences, and the institutional control that dominant groups have over rewards and punishments in society – also affect system justification theories.” It is within this

300 Ibid, p.13
301 Ibid, p.25
302 Manhaj dan Aqidah Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid, pp.6-7
303 Ibid, p.23
304 Habib Rizieq Syihab, “Wawasan Kebangsaan: Menuju NKRI Bersyariah,” p.32
305 The Ideological Animal, p.267
convoluted and cyclical justification that sometime moves extremist groups in Indonesia too close to the edge. The hymn shown below was sung with much gusto at FPI's Third Congress by the approximately 2000 people in attendance at its Opening Ceremony in Bekasi in August 2013. The words of the Hymn while initially praising God, have been peppered with a Call to Jihad in defence of Muslims and that the price of defending Muslim might be death - a sacrifice that they would be willing to undertake for the cause of God.

**FPI Hymn: Come Let us Conduct Jihad**

Allah is Great, Allah is Great, Allah is Great, Allah is Great! (x2)
Allah is our God,
He is our purpose
Muhammad is the Prophet,
He our Exemplary
Al-Quran is our guide

*The way of Jihad is our fight*
*Martyrdom is our desire*

Allah is Great, Allah is Great, Allah is Great, Allah is Great! (x2)

**Come let us do jihad, Come let us do jihad**

**Defending Islam and Muslims**

**Lead a noble life or die a martyr** (x4)

Allah is Great, Allah is Great, Allah is Great, Allah is Great! (x2)

The fact that Indonesia is a predominantly Muslim country is constantly emphasized in the manifestos and ideological documents of the various groups listed above. This is also applicable to the ideological materials of FPI and HTI. The examples above provided above highlight the solidarity of purpose by JI, JAT and FPI respectively. Like most of the groups in this study, this sense of solidarity is built on the foundations of religion. This provides a cornerstone of moving thought to action. By using the language of religion, the solidarity of the group is almost automatically strengthened as a result of not only the naturally emotive power of religion but also the sense of morality that underpins the identity marker of religion within these groups. This inadvertently acts as a justification of the paths chosen by the groups in order to achieve their respective aims. The use of hymns as described above provide a strong identifying marker not only for the group as one entity, but the religious undertones creates a sense of solidarity with the plight of the Muslim *Ummah* global community. It is this sense of solidarity that is capitalised on in order to achieve their goal.

**Impact 2: Aspiration of Radical Utopianism**

Karl Mannheim’s work on ideology and utopia echoes the respite that is often sought by terrorists and extremists as they engage in an aspiration of a future while harking back to the golden age of Islam. According to Mannheim “When the imagination finds no satisfaction in existing reality, it seeks refuge in wishfully constructed places

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306 Hymne Sung at FPI Conference
and periods. Terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia are unsatisfied with the current means and methods of governance of the Indonesia. The aspiration of the utopian ideal is assumed to be achievable. It is an aspiration, an ideal that will take time to achieve fruition, but nonetheless one that would ultimately reap success over an extended period of time.

Capitalising on the doctrinal underpinning of religion, the accusation by terrorist and extremist groups alike is that the non-Islamic countries have deliberately targeted, attempted to divide and made bold and calculated attempts to control resources of the Islamic Countries. The only solution to the problem is the establishment of an Islamic State one that will adhere strongly to the laws of Islam. To achieve this end, the use of violence is sanctioned. Lyman Sargent notes that, “every ideology contains a utopia, and the problem with utopia arises when it becomes a system of beliefs rather than what it is in almost all cases, a critique of the actual through imagining a better alternative.”

In envisioning this better alternative, at no point did any of the manifestos or ideological documents provide a blueprint of the manner through which the country will be governed thereafter. For FPI, the perceived deficits of the democratic system lies the notion that “in a democratic system, there is one person, one vote and majority vote is decisive, so much so that the voice of the scholar is given the same importance as the voice of a prostitute, the voice of the intellectual is given the same importance as the voice of the fool, and the voice of a fighter is treated the same as that of the voice of the loser.” In qualifying the necessity of Islamic Law, Habib Rizieq highlights that the sense of equality accorded to all through a democratic system of governance, surpasses the base moral inequality that underlies each person. As such Islamic law is seen to provide a better sense of justice.

The ideological documents written by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir for instance as noted in the PUPJI, aims “to adhere to a collection of honourable steps, support and develop strength for the glory of Islam and Muslims, to restore the Islamic Caliphate, and the sovereignty of the syariah all over the world.” In this quest for a utopian ideal, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, authored 6 part series of books titled Tadzikiroh while in prison. These books were a collection of letters, documents and Islamic religious rulings (fatwas) by clerics in Saudi Arabia. These books provide a compilation of articles of faith and a call to action for different sectors of the community to rise and achieve this ideal.

In a brazen call for change, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir wrote,

“I urge Muslims to preach and let us rise up Daulah Islamiyah jihad enforce with determination to win or die by the help of God’s way of Allah, do not bow and surrender to the taghout. Daulah Islamiyah / Khilafah is the demands of

310 PUPJI, p.2
The 6-part series were written for his followers with a specific group that he reached out to in several of the editions. They were as follows:

(1) Tadzikiroh 1: Dedicated to the People in Power and Presently Ruling Indonesia, a Country with a Predominantly Muslim Population
(2) Tadzikiroh 2: Dedicated to All who Claim to be Muslim and the Officials in the Legal, Justice and Corrections Facility in Indonesia
(3) Tadzikiroh 3: An Explanation of the Concept of Monotheism and Worship
(4) Tadzikiroh 4: Treatise on Monotheism and Faith
(5) Tadzikiroh 5: Democracy is the Devil’s Whisper and is Instrumental in Destroying Monotheism and Faith
(6) Tadzikiroh 6: How to Practice and Fight for Islam Under the Guidance of Qur’an and Sunnah

Written in a mixture of Indonesian and Arabic, each book justifies the quest for an Islamic State. It identifies government bodies that need to ammend their ways and espoused the core concepts often identified by Salafis namely, the role of faith (iman), Monotheism (Taufhid) and the necessity to reject democracy and to surrender to the demands of the Quran and Sunnah.

On the other hand, FPI’s leader Habib Rizieq notes the presence of what he refers to as the “Khilafah Phobia.”313 This refers to a phobia by the International community of what a Caliphate would entail due to lack of understanding of the workings of a Caliphate. The manner through which FPI envisions the Caliphate differs from the Caliphate as envisioned by HTI. HTI calls for the establishment of a Caliphate through abolishing the present system of government, FPI on the contrary seeks the implementation of Islamic Law with the confines of an Islamic Republic. Albeit seemingly more palatable in nature, their forays into vigilantism in support of their objectives, places them in a problematic contest of aspiration towards the idea of a utopia.

**Impact 3: Envisioning a Cognitive Map for Future Action**

*The Call to Action: On the International Stage*

The fatwa issued by the World Islamic Front Against the Jews and the Crusaders was faxed to Al-Quds al-‘Arabi on 23 February 1998 and signed by Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu-Yasir Rifa’i Ahmad Taha, Shaykh Mir Hamzah, secretary of the Jamat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan; and Fazlul Rahnna, Amir of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh. The fatwa underscored the highlighted three areas that were deemed to be “crimes and sins committed by the Americans.”314 Justifying the fatwa were the occupation of Muslim lands, oppression of the Iraqi People and economic and

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312 Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Tadzikiroh Buku 1: Nasehat dan Peringatan Kerana Alloh, 2012, p.vii
313 Habib Rizieq, Hancurkan Liberalisme Tegakkan Syariat Islam, (Jakarta: Islam Press, 2013), pp.201-201
religious incentive of the Americans to support Israel and destroy the Arab world. As such their actions are tantamount “a clear declaration of war on God, his messenger, and Muslims.”  

As such in response to this declaration of war,“Nothing is more sacred than belief except repulsing an enemy who is attacking religion and life.”

“On that basis, and in compliance with God’s order, we issue the following fatwa to all Muslims: The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and military -- is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God, “and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together,” and “fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in God.”

Osama Bin Laden’s message, to groups all over the world was to embark on a collective effort to fulfil their obligation as Muslims and to engage in is jihad liberate the Arab world from the grip of the enemy of God, namely the United States and its allies. The language was strong and framed the message in a rigid dialectic of good versus evil.

In Southeast Asia and in particular in Indonesia, Osama Bin Laden's message provided the cognitive map for future action. Hence in addition to the articulated goal of wanting to establish Islamic Law in Indonesia, for (some factions within) the leadership of JI there was a move to push for jihad on a global stage, beyond the principal aspiration of JI that was initially domestic and regional in nature – Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara (Land of Islam in the Archipelago). At the global level this meant a shift in the trajectory of violence to include and to focus on attack on the Westerners and Western Target with a more concerted effort.

As much as Osama Bin Laden remained generally widely respected amongst the Southeast Asian Afghan alumni, there might have been a more deep-seated reason behind the resonance of Osama Bin Laden’s Call for war against the Crusaders and the Jews with the Indonesian violent extremists. By the time Osama Bin Laden had issued his fatwa in 1998, several batches of Indonesians and Southeast Asian members of DI/NII and JI had already gone and returned from fighting the Soviet Afghan War in Afghanistan. The influence of the Afghan alumni provided a significant thrust to the movement. The research team at the Ministry of Religious Affairs highlighted the role of the alumni from conflicts in Afghanistan, Poso, Ambon and Moro (in the Philippines) as bringing to Indonesia a predominantly Wahabi-Salafi influence coupled with increased levels of intolerance. The religious zeal coupled with the perception that by coming together the Mujahideen could be victorious. Riding on the successes of their time in Afghanistan, it increased their confidence in a clear and present victory over the enemies of Allah. The call to action against the far

315 Ibid
316 Ibid
317 Ibid
319 Interview with Kasuslitbang, Kementerian Agama Indonesia, Interview, 23 October 2013
enemy thereafter led to a string of high profile bombings that had killed and injured many in Indonesia.

The Call to Action: On the Regional Stage

On the regional stage, the more prominent group associated with a large number of high profiled attacks in Indonesia was JI. The general guide for JI comprises four distinct sections, (1) the principles for the methodology to establish the religion, [ideology] (2) the methodology to establish the religion [group] (3) the operational methodology [group] and (4) the constitution. [ which delved into the leadership structure of the group]. The first of which, entailed ten principles for the ‘establishment of the religion’ form the foundation upon which would become JI’s general ideological guide for the role of the group and the constitution and by extension the role of the leader and that of the members of JI. The section of JI’s guide will be explored in this Chapter. The remaining three will be discussed in the Chapters ahead.

The ten principles as listed in the PUPJI were are follows:

“(1) Our aim is only to seek Allah’s pleasure through the means that has been determined by Allah and His Prophet. (2) Our faith is based on the faith of the Sunni according to the way of the Salaf. (3) Our understanding about Islam is comprehensive and follow the understanding of the Salaf. (4) Our aim in the struggle is to guide mankind to submission to Allah only by the restoration of the caliphate on earth. (5) Our way is faith, hijrah (emigration) and jihad in the way of Allah. (6) Our provisions are: Knowledge and the Taqwa (Consciousness of God), Yaqin (Confidence) and tawakkal (reliance to Allah) and syukur (gratefulness) and patience. Zuhud and making eternity (eternal things) your priority and the Love for jihad in the path of Allah and matrydom. (7) Our loyalty to Allah, the Prophet and the believers (8) Our enemy is the unseen Satan and human Satan. (9) Our jamaah ties are based on the shared aims, beliefs and understanding of the religion and (10) Our Islamic practices are pure and comprehensive with the jamaah system, then the state, then the Caliphate.”

The 10 principles as listed by JI in the PUPJI to a large extent became the “normative template from which the institutional entity of Jemaah Islamiyah emerged and subsequently developed.” As much as the PUPJI identified a future call for action, many of the attacks that were conducted by JI there after were a result of a handful of members from the organisation who either through the power of influence or personal ambition defected from this core document in order to achieve its objective. The role of leadership and influence will be explored in greater detail in the Chapter 6.

Impact 4: Centrality of Violence

At the heart of the exploring the poignant role of ideology as an influencer is the means through which ideology translates to an increased level of violence within the group. As Hoffman notes “The religious imperative for terrorism is the most

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320 PUPJI, p.2
321 PUPJI, p.2
322 Elena Pavlova, “From Counter-Society to Counter-State: Jemaah Islamiyah According to the PUPJI,” Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, 14 November 2006, p.35
important defining characteristic of terrorist activity today.”

He further added that the increased number of deaths rests in “the radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimisation and justification, concepts of morality, and world-view embraced by the religious terrorist, compared with his secular counterpart.”

The modern day construct of the Mujahideen, gained momentum during the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-1989). It was a battle of resistance that brought together fighters from all over the world. Individuals who were came together, to fight under a common banner, a common ideology, a common faith, for a common community of believers and a common cause. In an almost (seemingly) selfless sacrifice in defense of religious belief and ideals, the underscoring drive was that only victory would prevail even in death. As such, there would be victory for the cause and victory for themselves, as they would be guaranteed a place in paradise. The often referred to and romanticised benefits from Jihad that were “awaiting them in paradise are rivers of milk and honey, and beautiful young women. Those entering paradise are eventually reunited with their families and as martyrs stand in front of God as innocent as a newborn baby.”

The increased levels of violence seen in religiously motivated terrorists in part lies in the varied perception that they have of themselves.

“Where secular terrorists regard violence either as a way of instigating correction of a flaw in the system that is basically good or as a means to foment the creation of a new system, religious terrorists see themselves not as components of a system worth preserving but as ‘outsiders’, seeking fundamental changes in the existing world order. This sense of alienation also enables the religious terrorists to contemplate far more destructive and deadly types of terrorist operations than secular terrorists, and indeed a far more open ended category of enemies for attack.”

For FPI, its slogan “Reformation, Yes! Terrorism No! Revolution Yes! Separation No! God is Great!” perhaps to some extent emphasizes the fact that the group abhors terrorism. However this tension between the justification of the use of violence, with their tendency for vigilantism has created doubts on their ability to pursue a path of non-violence while aspiring to achieve its agenda. While the FPI calls for an the establishment of a state under Islamic Law, their tendency for clamp down on what it sees as non-Islamic values and ideals through violence remain a cause for concern.

Survey Findings

In exploring the centrality of violence in the group three measures were used in the survey to explore the impact after an individual joins the organisation. These were namely the level of approval of violence of US and Israeli civilians and troop, the
perception of armed jihad and the level towards which there was identification with other Muslims.

On the approval of violence as show in the table below, of the 94 respondents, 40% approve of the attacks on US military troops in Muslim countries and 13% approve of the attacks on US civilians in Muslim countries. 17% approve of attacks of US civilians on US soil. By contrast the approval of attacks on Israeli civilians were almost double at 31% and 61% approved the attack on Israeli military troops.

Figure 6: Approval of Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approval of Violence</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I approve of attacks on US military troops in Muslim countries.</td>
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<tr>
<td>I approve of attacks on US civilians in Muslim countries.</td>
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<tr>
<td>I approve of attacks on US civilians in the US.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I approve of attacks on Israeli civilians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I approve of attacks on Israeli military troops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree nor Disagree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the perception of armed jihad as shown in the table below, of the 94 respondents, 27% agreed that the concept of jihad in Islam approves the killing of civilians in some circumstances. 37% agreed that armed jihad is a personal obligation of Muslims today and while only 19% agreed that suicide bombers would be rewarded by God for their deeds, a relatively high proportion of respondents - 38%, chose to remain on the fence.
On identifying with other Muslims shown below, of the 94 respondents 73% of Muslims of Indonesia should help their oppressed brothers. 67% identified closely with other Muslims and 51% think of themselves largely in terms of religious beliefs.
Tore Bjorgo notes that extremist ideologies in general can be looked upon as an *intermediate cause* of terrorism even if the individual adopts the ideology for reasons other than religion. Ultimately when the “worldviews are adopted and applied in order to interpret situations and guide action, they tend to take on a dynamic of their own, and may serve to dehumanize the enemy and justify atrocities.”

The construct exploring the centrality of violence amongst members of terrorist and extremist groups showed relatively mixed results on approval of violence. While the approval of violence against Israeli troops and civilians factored highly, the muted response with the high number of respondents on the fence on perception of armed jihad may have been a result of the majority of respondents being incarcerated at the time they responded in the survey. While perhaps it was a result of a renewed perspective while incarcerated or perhaps being wary the survey result would highlight their true opinion albeit the surveys were done anonymously. The differentiated response by the members who were incarcerated with the opinions of the terrorist leadership who were interviewed separately showed the hardened ideological stand of the leadership.

**CONCLUSION**

This Chapter examined the role of ideology as one of three key influencers. Just as terrorism is a by-product of ideological extremism, there have also been instances where even in the face of ideological extremism, there have been a limited pursuit of violent extremism by members of terrorist groups. As such the need to be weary of sweeping generations and the presence of a multiplicity of paths towards radicalisation.

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This Chapter addressed the role that religious ideology plays in both maintaining the ideological cohesion of the group and propelling the shift from non-violent extremism to terrorism. The Chapter highlighted the manner through which thoughts and ideas are politicised through the language of religion and channelled in order to have an impact on the escalation of violence within groups.

To a large extent the “transcendental dimension”\(^{329}\) of religiously motivated terrorist not only reinforces the ideology but to a large extent additionally presents the aspiration for and Islamic State through the lens of a dichotomy between a group of people that are either for or against an Islamic state and in the process demonising the other. Lee Harris explores the notion that, “political and ideological symbols and tropes used not for political purposes, but entirely for the benefit of furthering a specific personal or collective fantasy.”\(^{330}\) In this instant, the other is dehumanised into the role of an object and not a subject with innate views and aspirations. Echoing Mannheim’s work on utopian and ideology Harris also asserts that the need for the fantasy, “comes from a conflict between a set of collective aspirations and desires, on one hand and the stern dictates of brutality, on the other – a conflict in which a lack of realism is gradually transformed into a penchant for fantasy.”\(^{331}\) It is this complex dialectic of using ideology to channel aspiration into that plays a critical role in understanding the impact of religiously motivated ideology on the group. The next Chapter will explore the second key influencer, namely the unique role of leadership and its impact on group influence.

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\(^{329}\) Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p.94


\(^{331}\) Lee Harris, ‘Al Qaeda’s Fantasy Ideology: War without Clausewitz,’ Policy Review, August and September 2002, p.25
CHAPTER SIX

INFLUENCER B:

LEADERSHIP AND IMPACT ON GROUP INFLUENCE

“Leadership is influence. Nothing more, nothing less. The true measure of leadership is influence.”

John Maxwell

Leadership has been heralded as the boon and bane of organisations globally. From the international conglomerates, government sectors, security services to the infamous gangs and terrorist groups, leadership has unmistakably in many ways chartered the path for the success or decline of a multitude of organisations. Broadly, leadership can be taken to be a process, personal quality, behavior, a trait, cognitive or emotional orientation, self or collective interest and even a role in a group.\footnote{Philip Sadler, Leadership, (London: Kogan Page Publishers, 2003) p.5} Underscoring the notion of leadership is the unspoken assumption that given the presence of a leader, there are either followers or there exists an entity to be led.

The importance of leadership in terrorist and extremist organisations has been one of great debate within the literature. These discussions on leadership often centre around (a) the importance of dismantling terrorist leadership and thereafter its impact on the demise of terrorist organisations (b) the sustained presence of charismatic leadership as seen in the radicalization models and conceptual frameworks and (c) the existence of a top-down hierarchical organization versus that of the grassroots organisation as terrorism moves into a new phase with the continuous use of the Internet and in particular social networking sites to reach out and connect with possible recruits.

Foremost in the agenda of security agencies is the task to clamp down on terrorist groups. As such, the role of a leader and its impact on the sustainability of a group is pertinent. These concerns are based on the assumption that stems from a primarily kinetic vantage point whereby the death of the leadership would herald the demise if not, mitigate the threat emanating from the given terrorist or extremist group. The killing of terrorist leadership would cause not only chaos but could result in a possible dissension in the ranks of the members through schisms from within. Perhaps more importantly the demise of terrorist leadership provide for a strategic window to allow security and law enforcement to enact a targeted approach at dismantling the group.

Within the parameters of the discussion of the demise of a terrorist group were the initial work of scholars such as Martha Crenshaw, Seth Jones and Martin Libicki and later Audrey Cronin. Of particular interest was their explorative work on factors that would lead to the demise of a terrorist group. This would be explored later in Chapter 8.

The impact of charismatic leadership has often been cited as potent force for the recruitment and radicalization of terrorist and extremists. The role of charismatic leadership was prevalent in the radicalization models and conceptual frameworks that
were present in what this study has referred to as Phase 2: The Struggle to Understand (2001-2006) and in Phase 3: The Proliferation of Models of Radicalisation (2007-2009). The presence of an authority figure who was able to translate vision into action was in essence what Silber and Bhatt in the NYPD radicalization Model referred to as individuals who were catalysts in specificity, they called them the operational leader or an spiritual sanctioner. The other models implicitly refer to them in passing as ideologues, in essence individuals that are able to inspire with a certain je ne sais quoi that motivates groups and thrusts them into action.

The most prominent of these debates that arose in 2008 were between terrorism scholars Marc Sageman and Bruce Hoffman. Essentially was ‘new terrorism’ terrorism bottom-up or top-down? The Sageman-Hoffman debate, as with the earlier RAND report by Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, the discussion predominantly surrounded the work of Al Qaeda – a group that posed a more dominant threat internationally at that point in time. In Sageman’s first book, Understanding Terrorist Networks and later expounded on in greater detail in his second book ‘Leaderless Jihad’ he argued that the predominant threat of the future would not be from hierarchical organizations. Hoffman on the other hand, abhorred Sageman’s notion of the bunch of guys concept and was steadfast with his emphasis that organizations still do matter. Hoffman notes that in order to defeat a group like Al Qaeda “destroying the organization's leadership and disrupting the continued resonance of its radical message”333 that seduce individuals from the grassroots.

In a hierarchical organization undoubtedly the role of leadership is key. Most of the groups operating in Indonesia are predominantly hierarchical. Leaders articulate the vision, mobilise the group to action whilst working towards the ideal of the group. In a nutshell, they provide the strategic direction, motivate and coach, enforce and interpret the organisation’s policies and last but not least obtain the necessary resources for the group.334 Leaders help to provide and sustain a visceral impact on an individual’s sense of belonging by harnessing the power of a politised ideology while emphasising group identity in the process of achieving their aspired objectives. It is this unique power of leadership in terrorist groups and its impact on group influence will be explored in this chapter.

LEADERSHIP AND POWER

Leadership as a core concept is inextricably connected with the concept of power. In short, this intimate correlation between leadership and power is best described by the impact that effective leadership has in engineering change.

“Leadership over (a) human being is exercised when persons with certain motives and purposes mobilize, in competition or conflict with others, institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers.”

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334 Steve M. Jex, Organisational Psychology: A Scientist-Practitioner Approach, (Canada: John Wiley & Sons, 2002), pp.269-270
To some extent, it can be argued that the leadership of terrorist and extremist organisations can be seen to be a type of revolutionary leadership, wherein a non-state actor, wanting to alter the manner through which the state is governed ultimately harnesses the power of religion to create change. This intricate notion of power is central to the role of leadership for “an individual may exert power without being a leader, an individual cannot be a leader without having power.” While assuming the presence of a hierarchy in this instance, the position of an individual in an organisation would determine the level of power (in most instances).

Niccolò Machiavelli in The Prince, his classic 16th-century treatise advocates manipulation and occasional cruelty as the best means to power emphasises that - *It is much safer to be feared than loved*. The wielding of power through position and the wielding power through coercion is just one of a few means through which leadership can exercise their strength within the organisation. However this is not the predominant means through which leadership in terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia have exercised their power.

**A Position of Power versus A Position of Influence**

An important distinction that needs to be made is the fact that an individual’s position of power within an organisation need not directly translate to their level of influence. In Indonesia, while leaders at the apex of terrorist and extremist organisations wield substantial power and are undoubtedly influential, there are a few select individuals whose level of influence far exceeded their position within the organisation. Organizational psychologists sometimes refer to this as the ability to lead without possessing a title. As such, influence is derived not from position within organizations but from qualities relationship and personal excellence and effectiveness. Later in this Chapter, this study will explore several individuals who led without a title. Ambitious and well-connected, they climbed through the ranks, gained prominence, and additionally, thrust their group onto a path of increased violence.

Alan Bryman identifies three components in leadership namely *group, influence, and goal*. Leadership is taken to be the social influence by the leader over the group. Gary Yukl and Van Fleet defined leadership as “a process that includes influencing task objectives and strategies, influencing commitment and compliance in task behavior to achieve these objectives, influencing group maintenance and identification and influencing the culture of an organization.” Yukl and Van Fleet’s emphasis on the role of influence is a pertinent facet that will be explored in greater detail in this Chapter – “influencing others to behave in a ways that is consistent with the goals of the organization.”

John French and Bertam Raven identified bases of social power. These were namely:

337 Gary Yukle Definition, p.149
reward power, coercive power, legitimate power, referent power, and expert power. Reward as a basis of social power refers to power that is derived from the transactional ability reward or pay the other person. Coercive stance as a basis of social power, refers to the ability of the leader to manipulate the subordinate party, in this instance, the degree of threat and punishment would influence the degree of power. Legitimacy as a basis of social power refers to individuals who wield power as a result of social norms and mores, and they are in positions that are socially acceptable whilst at the same time enabling the person in position to garner respect through traditional means. As a referent and basis of social power it is a little more ambiguous. In this instance, “the individual seeks some sort of "social reality" and may adopt the cognitive structure of the individual or group with which he identifies.” As such, “the lack of clear structure may be threatening to the individual and the agreement of his beliefs with those of a reference group will both satisfy his need for structure and give him added security through increased identification with his group.” Expertise as a basis of social power would refer to power that is wielded by the strength of the individual’s expertise. The assumption here would be that the individual’s strength in expertise over a particular domain provides an indisputable edge over the other members of the group, rendering the leader as the individual who would set the parameters for debate and control.

HARNESSING THE POWER OF INFLUENCE

(1) The Influence of Moral Authority

A predominant and powerful factor that has considerable influence over the activities of terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia is the sword of moral authority that is wielded by leadership within these groups. The sword of moral authority slices both ways. It has the power to influence the activities within the group by reinforcing the role of the individual leader as preeminent holder of moral authority. It additionally becomes intertwined with the identity of the group as a collective whereby they are seen as soldiers upholding the faith through their association with both the leader as the figure of moral authority and hence by extension the group.

Moral authority is “seen as being rooted in fundamental moral truths that are not a subject to human interpretation of revision.” In this case, it is through the lens of religion that the moral authority of the leader in derived and sustained for the followers. A leader of an organisation based on an (albeit misguided version of) Islam through radical and extremist ideology would nonetheless retain this very sense of moral authority while in his position of leadership. The moral authority that is exercised by the terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia are far reaching. The impact could be felt not only for activities within the group but also vis-à-vis the group’s activities when it interacts with the public. As seen in the case of hard-line extremist group FPI, whose behavior as the sheriff of moral values in Indonesia had

340 Ibid; p.266
341 Ibid
resulted in them being labeled as thugs and vigilantes in Indonesia. They “are known to vocally oppose and target “immoral” businesses, such as those associated with drugs, prostitution, gambling and bars.”

The centrality of Islam in daily living coupled with the aspiration to create an Islamic state is especially prevalent in the ideology of the terrorist and extremist groups explored in this study. As an ideal to be aspired towards, all ten groups would be able to agree on the aspiration of state under the Laws of Islam. This is in part tied to the dominant position of Islam within daily life in Indonesia despite Indonesia being a secular state. At the core, Islamic leadership is premised on the role of religion. “For Muslims, the first and original leader is God and all are bound by their faith to obey God’s law. Thus any leader of any organization – business, political or religious – is also first and foremost a follower of God.” Hence, the responsibility of leading people of the faith, by the faith could only be done through the faith.

As explored in greater detail in Chapter 4, the contested role of political Islam had resulted in the relegation of Islam to the peripheries of society, where religion and religious leadership flourished over the years. With the aspiration of many terrorist and extremist groups to establish Islamic Law, religion is a nodal factor in order to not only glean support but would be at the foundation of its establishment. The already entrenched, role of religious leadership in Indonesian history is reiterated further by the authority that religious leadership had amongst the Indonesian masses through the course of history. Their ability to function within the villages away from institutions that were run by government administration meant that over time, religious leadership shielded albeit unwilling and untouched by administrative powers and duties of running Indonesia, grew from strength to strength within the villages in Indonesia. Villages act as arterial veins connecting communities. The presence of numerous madrasahs within the community reinforce the moral authority of religious leadership is sacrosanct.

The influence of moral authority will be expounded upon through highlighting the varied means through which the leadership terrorist and extremist groups’ exercise their moral authority.

**Capitalising on Carrying the Mantle of the Prophet**

While it is certainly not the case that most religious leadership by and large participate in acts of terrorism. The leaders in terrorist and extremist organisations in Indonesia, continue to see themselves as carrying the mantle of religious leadership. They do so in order to fulfil a gap that they have continued to emphasise exists. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir former Emir of JI, MMI and JAT candidly shared how he saw himself vis-à-vis the on-going threats that he has faced even in light the current sentence he is serving for participation in formation of a military training camp in Aceh. With fervour and pride in his voice he brushed off the fact that he was placed on the Most Wanted Lists noting that the

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“US and Australia said that they wanted to kill me, but I am like the Prophet Mohamed, I aim to spread the truth about Islam.”

The sense of pride that brimmed in his voice and the air of conviction that he was carrying the mantle of God could be seen in the paternal yet commanding demeanour he possessed.

It is this very mantle of leadership that continuously resonates, even with the leadership of FPI. Head of hard-line extremist group FPI, Ustaz Habib Riziq’s aura of spirituality and use of religious parlance during the conduct of its Third National Deliberation from 22-25 August 2013 was testament to that. The inauguration on 22 August was conducted in an officious and orderly nature of the annual event brought together more than 5,000 people including participants from all over Indonesia and even the Middle East. The arrival of chief guests, a majority of whom were extremist leadership including MMI amongst others was with an air of dignity and calm as Ustaz Habib Riziq in a white turban, white traditional clothes and a walking stick mirroring the attire of the Prophet Mohamed entered with close to 10 paramilitary dressed in white. Carrying the mantle through trying to emulate the Prophet through both thought and action. The colour white is the colour traditionally worn by all the members of FPI. For a group aiming to rid society of what they perceive to be social ills and sin, the colour white become a symbol of the purity that they are fighting for.

Moral authority in this instance is seen through the actions of the leadership, either through both thought and action. The outward manifestation of which can be seen to in dressing like Prophet Mohamed and the association that they are doing the work of the Prophet – the establishment of Islamic Law.

**Capitalising on the Use of Fatwa**

The use of *fatwa* or legal pronouncements by religious scholars has often been used a means through which leadership has shown and maintained their moral authority. Present at the inauguration ceremony of FPI were leaders from Majelis Ulama Islam (MUI) *The Organisation of Islamic Clerics*. MUI is a conglomeration of approximately 40 Islamic organisations that aim to come together with the hope of providing a unified front for religious affairs. MUI in a show of support by publicly backed Ustaz Habib Riziq the leader of FPI for the upcoming presidential election in 2014. FPI and MUI have always had a long-standing connection. FPI provided MUI with a political platform for them to exert pressure on government.

“Through a fatwa issued in 2005 condemning everything from liberalism, secularism and pluralism to pornography and mixed marriage, MUI provided an external source of theological legitimisation for FPI’s *nahi mungkar* campaign; through its financial backing, it provided the access to funds to make the campaign happen.”

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345 Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Interview by Author, Nusa Kambangan, Indonesia, 22 October 2013
In additional to the financial backing, the FPI also uses the *fatwas* issued in 2005 to “legitimise violent vigilantism,” and in a strange cyclical dynamic MUI used the increased violence as a resulting from the vigilantism as a justification that the *fatwas* issued in 2005 should stand. The role of religious leadership in this instance has had influence both within the terrorist and extremist groups as well as within society writ large through the enactment of the *fatwas* in 2005 by MUI. This seemingly discomforting aggregation of strange bedfellows was made perhaps even stranger when “Indonesia’s then-religious affairs minister, Suryadharma Ali, opted to make the keynote speech at the FPI’s annual congress in Jakarta at which he praised the group as a national asset.” During the course of his speech at the event, he commented on the atmosphere adding with gusto “I am one of you!”

The moral authority of religious leadership in this instance has become one of that is driven in a calculated manner that would benefit the religious leadership from within terrorist or extremist groups, the religious leadership outside these groups through the aggregation of the association of groups such as MUI and by the then rather controversial Minister of Religious Affairs. The extensive nature of influence by a moral authority under the umbrella of religion was especially prevalent. The closing address was delivered by Mr. Salim Segaf Al Jufri, Minister of Social Affairs, Indonesia. The presence of political leadership as guests of honour highlights the influence that FPI has not only in terms of strength of position within Indonesia but is reinforced by the presence of religious leadership in Indonesia adding credence to the FPI and the influence of FPI’s leadership.

*Capitalising on Divine Sanction*

In addition to the convoluted relationship between the various groups involved as highlighted above, there is a sense of divine sanction that underscores most of the activities undertaken. In the case of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir the overt candour with which he compared himself to the Prophet, sheds light on the idea and the ideal that he as a leader aspires towards. Hoffman notes that in religious motivated terrorist groups, the role of divine approval for acts of terrorism conducted is an important facet.

> “Religion- conveyed by sacred text and imparted via clerical authorities claiming to speak for the divine – therefore serves as a legitimising force. This explains why clerical sanction is so important to religious terrorists and why religious figures are often required to ‘bless’ (i.e. approve or sanction) terrorist operations before they are executed.”

Much of this notion of divine sanction is sometimes rooted in subtlety. Ustaz Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s sense of duty and obligation to create and enact change in his position of leadership is one that needs to be revisited. He emphasised,

> “I have never killed people, but it is my responsibility to change Indonesia so that it comes under Islamic Law.”

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347 Ibid
349 Mr. Suryadharma Ali, Guest of Honour, FPI Monas III, 22 August 2014
As an extension of the sense of responsibility and obligation, the leader feels that he has been given divine sanction.

A strong manifestation of this is divine sanction is seen in the use of the *bai’ah* or oath of allegiance between the leadership and members of the group. A case in point was when members of NII/JI were asked to take their oath of allegiance to the leadership. The oath of allegiance is a concept that is intrinsically tied to religion. According to the Quran,

“Verily those who pledge their loyalty (bai’ah) to you, do no less than pledge their loyalty to Allah: the Hand of Allah is over their hands: then anyone who violates his oath does so to the harm of his soul, and anyone who fulfils what he has covenanted with Allah, Allah will soon grant him a great Reward.” (The Quran, 48:10)

This lays the foundation for the unique relationship between the leader and the group members. Certainly, the member of the group had a different memory of how they had pledged their allegiance. Nassir Abbas, former Head of Mantiqi 3 and military training division, JI who has been released and is assisting law enforcement with investigations noted that the bai’ah was quick it was more like a handshake. Prior to leaving for Afghanistan, the small group gathered in a room before they left for Afghanistan and after a prayer and the bai’ah, they left the next day on their journey to Afghanistan. Fajar Taslim, from JI’s overseas cell in Singapore noted that his bai’ah was taken in a sea. They entered the waters and when they had come out of the waters bai’ah was taken.

Certainly while the method of taking the bai’ah differed from even within the same terrorist group JI, the act of pledging one’s allegiance and obedience to a leader through vehicle prayer reinforces the influence and authority of the leadership through the veil of religion and the moral authority conferred upon an individual seen to be a figure of authority of the faith.

*Capitalising on the Role of the Vicegerent*

The idea of a vicegerent of often thought to be a papal concept whereby the Pope is seen to be the representative of Christ on Earth. Although not often spoken about, a vicegerent is a concept that is quite often used in Islam in as well. The word *khalifa* or Caliph a term that is often used synonymously at times and taken to mean vicegerent. Jaafar Idris examines the Qur’anic verses and Prophetic traditions against the scholarly work of classical scholar of Islamic texts such as al-Tabarl, al-Zamakhsharl, al-RazT, al- Qurtubl, and Ibn Kathlr vis-à-vis more modern scholarship. The more modern views of Sayyid Abu Ala’ al-Mawdudl and Sayyid Qutb, greatly influenced the terrorist and extremist ideological landscape not only in movement in the Middle East but in Southeast Asia as well.

The concept of vicegerent refers to the presence of a leader as the representative of God on earth. The task of the vicegerent would be ensure that the will of God flourishes on earth. In this instance, it is assumed that with the formation of the theocracy of the Islamic state, the “de jure sovereignty” would belong to Allah and

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351 Nassir Abbas, Interview by Author, Jakarta, Indonesia, 12 July 2013  
352 Fajar Taslim, Interview by Author, Nusa Kambangan, Indonesia, 22 October 2013
“de facto sovereignty” would be at the hands of the vicegerent who would need to ultimately be subservient to the will of Allah. In his writings, Qutb emphasizes that the role of man would always be subservient to that of God despite the presence of a vicegerent that has been appointed by God.

According to Qutb,

“The supreme will intending to give to this new being the reins of the earth, and a free hand in it; and entrusting him with the task of revealing the will of the Creator in innovation and formation, in analysis and synthesis, in alteration and transformation; and of discovering the powers and potentialities, and treasures and resources of this earth, and make all this—God willing—subservient to the great task with which God entrusted him. This new being has thus been given latent powers and potentialities commensurate with the powers and potentialities and treasures and resources of this earth. He has also been given enough of the latent powers which enable him to realize the Divine will.”

Mawdudi on the other hand underscores almost a similar message. Where the sole task of the vicegerent would be to work towards the fulfillment of God’s Law.

“Khalifa, vicegerent, is one who exercises the delegated powers on behalf of the supreme authority. Man is thus, not the master; he is only His deputy and does not possess any powers of his own except those which are delegated to him by the real Master. He therefore has no moral right to have his own will but his duty is to fulfill the will of the delegating Authority.”

The ideological document of JI, the PUPJI follows from a similar thread of how Qutb and Mawdudi had explained the role of the vicegerent.

“man is the vicegerent of Allah in this world. His duty is to administer and prosper the earth according to the syariah, prevent, destroy and overcome evil practices that destroy the earth as a result of not complying with the syariah.”

The aim as outlined by the PUPJI was the establishment of an Islamic State. The role of the leader would be “to lead the community towards understanding the obligation of being the vicegerent of Allah on earth.” A core function of the Vicegerent as spelled out in the PUPJI was the development of personnel. The development of personnel would prepare and lay the foundations and systems necessary to establish and sustain the Islamic State. The individuals will be selected, they would be instilled with Islamic leadership methods and will work towards the creation of the the Core Group – *Qo’idah Sholabah*. The PUPJI adds that the Core Group can be identified by their fervour, solidarity and sense of responsibility towards the establishment of the Islamic Law. The Core Group would be made of individuals who are selected to not

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355 *Pedoman Umum Perjuangan al Jemaah al Islamiyah* (General Guide for the Struggle of Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah) (PUPJI), p.1

only be leaders, they will act as the vanguard for the community, they would be set the benchmark and would be a model of other member and finally the core group would be guard and carryout the mission of JI until its fruition.

While still conceptually vague, “One cannot but conclude that the concept of man as khalifatu Allah is a very vague and inconsistent one. Any attempt to make it clearer and more consistent renders it either banal or un-Islamic.”\(^{357}\) In the attempts to make sense of numerous religious sanctions and fatwas issued and the role of leadership, Tariq Ramadan highlights that generally even in diversity that is at times hard to explain the aspect that remain central is that “Islam is one, the fatawa, with all their diversity, and sometimes contradictions, still remain Islamic and authoritative.”\(^{358}\)

The Caliphate is to be “formed from the consolidation or federation of a number of united Islamic States that are in agreement under one leader.”\(^{359}\) Neither Qutb, Mawdudi or the PUPJI assists in identifying the process through which the one leader of Khalifa would be chosen. What is noted however is that the state would be a political entity that would be ruled under the laws of Allah and that the leader will be impeccable models of religiosity, possess leadership qualities and will have to be Muslim.

**Capitalising on the Role of Enforcer of Religious Norms and Mores**

The role of an enforcer of religious norms and mores implicitly assumes the fact that the leader in the position to enforce these values is not only superior in hierarchy but additionally morally as well.

In JI, the Emir is the highest leader and would be assisted by four councils. The first Majlis Shura or the Executive Council that is established in the office of the Emir and assist to evaluate JI’s management globally. The Fatwa Council to ensure that decisions made are aligned to the Quran and Sunnah. The Hisbah Council, a disciplinary committee for members of the group that have committed violations. Last but not least the Qiyyadah Markaziyyah Council, the centre of management for all activities of the group.\(^{360}\) In JI, the role of the Emir as the sole decision maker and arbiter is key. Of particular interest is the role of the Hisbah or the disciplinary committee whose role was to enforce on the basis of religious norms and mores.

The role of the Hisbah Council or the Hisbah Team is prevalent across both terrorist and extremist groups. The disciplinary committee in this instance acts as the judge and jury when it comes to crimes on the basis of morality in society. The impact in this case can be two fold within the group and in the case of FPI as highlighted earlier outside the group as well. Amongst the core aims of FPI is amar ma’ruf nahi munkar (commanding right, preventing ill deeds), and implementing dakwah (religious outreach) and hisbah.


\(^{359}\)Nassir Abbas, *Inside Jemaah Islamiyah: A Former Member’s True Story*, (Jakarta: Grafindo, 2011) p.123

\(^{360}\)Ibid; pp.127-130
“Terrorists usually show acute concern for morality, especially for sexual purity, and believe that they act in terms of a higher good. Justifications usually focus on past suffering, on the glorious future to be created, and on the regime's illegitimacy and violence, to which terrorism is the only available response. Shared guilt and anxiety increase the group's interdependence and mutual commitment and may also make followers more dependent on leaders and on the common ideology as sources of moral authority.”

FPI uses its paramilitary wing *Laskhar Pembela Islam* (LPI), Army for the Defense of Islam in its strategy to curtail on immoral activity. Emphasizing the strength and commitment of the Hisbah Committee within FPI, Ustaz Kiyahin, the Co-Chairperson of FPI provided an example of how a young member who had used violence inappropriately was disciplined, noted that the individual’s membership to the group was suspended. He added that disciplinary issue would be taken seriously. This is especially since the members are the public face of the organization. Influence is further cemented by the interdependence not only of leadership with the group, but between and amongst groups as well. The strange bedfellows of FPI and MUI through their 2005 fatwa provides this very notion of policing morality between and amongst these groups and the policing of morality in the public domain.

The quest for the manifestation of a supra-morality could be tied to the quest for a radically utopian society as discussed in the previous chapter. The overarching sense of perfection is entrenched in the mental construct of many members. In the society that is led by God’s rules where legislation comes under the purview of religion, the role of moral values as stipulated by the faith is quintessential. As such the entities and individuals that govern the domain of morals, norms and mores form an influential and pertinent duty of keeping the group in line with the core vision of group and their collective aspirations.

**(2) The Influence of Ties of Family and Brotherhood**

While LJ in the early 2000s provided a taste of what it was like to fight on for the Muslim community in Ambon, DI/NII and later JI formed the cornerstone of the sustenance of many groups that were to surface after 2009. In a carefully crafted strategy by the core members in the upper echelons of leadership in JI, the effects of their leadership cemented several of the key influencers that are still felt in many of groups that have since metastasized from these larger terrorist groups that had dominated the scene up until the mid-2000s. Many of these groups capitalized not only on the familial networks but the intricate ties of family that sometime blind members into participation and reinforce their loyalties to both the leader and to the organisation.

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362 Ustaz Kiyahin, Interview by Author, Jakarta, 18 July 2013
Marriage, kinship, brotherhood and family ties are especially entrenched in cultures in Asia. The close knit family ties within the group translate to not only a sense of belonging to the group, but it helps with mitigating the possibility of defection from the Tandzhim Sirri or secret organisation. Sidney Jones aptly highlights the important and to a large extent probably strategic decision that that senior members of JI often makes within the group. "Oftentimes senior members of the organisation will offer their sisters or sisters-in-law to new and promising recruits, so that not only is someone drawn into the organisation, but they're drawn into the family at the same time."363

Marriage is thus not only a tie that binds however the extent towards which it was prevalent, could underscore a wider strategy within the group. This would ensure that the group would maintain it ties from within. Strategic effort to recruit from family could be an out of the extremely selective criteria for recruitment that comprised three phases. Zachary Abuza notes that Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Abdullah Sungkar, Abu Jibriel and Hambali carried out an active recruitment strategy in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. In part due to the high levels of anxiety and fearing for the safety of their children in light of their own activities to attempt to overthrow the state, senior JI members sent their children to Karachi, Pakistan. In Karachi they formed a group known as the al-Ghuraba Cell. The al-Ghuraba cell had a dual strategy, the first to ensure safety of the children of senior members and the second, to further the regeneration of the group.364

The safety and security of self, was tied to the safety and security of the family unit and by extension ultimately the safety and security of the group. Even “quasi-kinship ties include bonds between extremist religious teachers and their students, which should not be underestimated because they are not unlike a familial bond.”365

**Capitalise on the Bonds of Family and Brotherhood**

In one of the most prominent attacks of terrorism in Southeast Asia the Bali Bombings in 2002, three brothers, Mukhlas also known as Ali Gufron, Ambrozi and Ali Imron were implicated. The attacks were conducted by JI. Inspired by their Emir Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, funded by Hambali (through US30,000 funding received from Al Qaeda) and conducted by the three brothers in addition to Dulmatin, Umar Patek, Abdul Ghoni, Imam Samudra – the smiling bomber, the Bali Bombings shook the Southeast Asia into awareness of the threat of terrorism in the region. While “all three (brothers) have admitted their roles in the attack; none have shown any remorse, indeed all have shown a stoic face of defiance in the face of the death penalty”366 Ali Imron noted that he did not have much of a say in the bombings as the decisions were made by senior JI leadership and saying no was difficult.367 This was although amongst those in senior leadership included his brother. Umar Patek the Indonesian

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363 Kelly McEvers, The women of Jemaah Islamiah, *BBC East Asia*, 10 January 2004
367 Ali Imron, Interview by Author, Polda Metro Jaya Prison, 25 September 2014
who was arrested in Abottabad in the same area the Osama Bin Laden was staying just before Operation Geronimo killed the Al Qaeda leader acknowledged that he was not really privy to the discussion and that he was just asked to mix the bombs together.\(^{368}\) In this case, senior leadership could possibly have refrained from sharing details of the attacks even amongst family members.

The role of brothers involved in terrorist attacks was prevalent also with the Nasir Abas, Mantiqi 3 leader and Afghan veteran was involved in JI along with his brother Hashim Abbas. Hashim Abbas was involved in one of JI’s first large scale attacks the Christmas Day Bombings in 2000 alongside others prominent members such as Ali Imron. He was arrested for possible attacks in Singapore. His sister Paridah was married to Mukhlas, who was part of the Al Ghuraba cell in Pakistan and involved in the Bali Bombings.

Ali Gufron married Farida daughter of Edy Setiono who had trained with Hambali in Afghanistan\(^ {369}\) Hambali met his wife Noraliza at religious class. Both Noraliza and her sister Noral Falidah attended a madrassah that they were invited to attend in Malaysia. They were invited by visiting clerics in the hometown in Borneo Malaysia. Noral Falidah went on to marry Abu Yusuf a JI operative. Hambali in turn ran the religious classes that Sejahrahtul Dursina and Yazid Shufaat attended when they returned from the US. Yazid Shufaat who would later through Hambali be selected to Head Al Qaeda’s anthrax programme in Kandahar Afghanistan. Taking over from Pakistani Scientist Abdul Rauf.

For Fajar Taslim, certainly the lessons and aspiration that he had when he had initially joined the group had not changed. The leaders whom he noted that he was close to were Ustaz Ibrahim Maideen, the Head of the JI cell in Singapore whose granddaughter he married. The late Dr. Azahari Hussein whom he affectionately called ‘bro’ whom he used to meet on weekends in Johor. Dr. Azahari Hussein was JI’s preeminent and lead bomb maker who had ingeniously put together the idea of Tupperware bombs. Bombs were kept in Tupperwares to ensure that the explosives remained dry amidst the humid conditions in Southeast Asia to ensure maximum lethality. He reminisced of the times he spent in Dr. Azahari’s sports car when he visited with him. Fajar Taslim was close to influential members within the JI network in Singapore and Indonesia. He lamented that with he had now been

“separated by my family and (second) wife”\(^ {370}\)

for the sake of the pathway he had chosen.

*Capitalise on the Strategic Imprint: Relationships that Bind*

The relationships highlighted above showcase a mere sampling of the ties by blood, by marriage and by history that connects many of these groups more prominent members. The important message would be use of ties of family to bind the

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368 Umar Patek, Interview by Author, Kelapa Dua, Indonesia, 22 September 2013
370 Fajar Taslim, Interview by Author, Nusa Kambangan, Indonesia, 22 October 2013
organization together. These ties were most commonly seen in the example of JI in part due to the documents and findings that surfaced over more than two decades of the organisation’s existence. Ties of sibling relationships, connections by marriage through in-laws, father and sons told a tale of brotherhood and trust.

A strategic imprint that was to influence not JI but additionally the formation of many of the groups that had metastasized in light of ongoing counter terrorism operations against terrorist groups in Indonesia. This trend of marriage within the ‘brotherhood’ and ties soldered by marriage often by senior leadership should not be seen to be a transaction of amongst men in the hope of merely finding a spouse. Many of them continued to remain loyal to their spouses. That would take away from what was the careful building of strategic ties amongst a community that would weave familial ties and relationships in the creation of a social fabric that would form the cornerstone of the Islamic State that they had envisioned – Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara.

In the aftermath of the large numbers of arrested including core leadership of JI, JAT, AQI amongst others, the ability to regroup has been limited. In a court testimony, Separiano who was indicted for his participation in the Myanmar Embassy bombings in 2013 highlighted four ways through which terrorists regroup. These were through Internet forums and social networks, marriage, religious teaching sessions and visits to prisons to meet with incarcerated terrorists. 371 Today in prisons, marriages take place between widows of those that were killed and members of terrorist groups across prisons in Indonesia. More than just a means of ensuring that the women are taken care of, the marriages lay the foundations of what could be the next generation of children who are brought up and weaned on a culture violence and extremism. The wife of one of the detainees in the Prison in Palu lamented and shared her concerns with the prevalence of what she termed, nikah bawah tangan or secret marriages between detainees and other women while the first wife had no knowledge of the marriage. 372

Capitalise on Predisposed Feelings of Resentment in Interpersonal Relations

The next figure examines the social construct of rejection prior to joining the organisation: 63% of respondents acknowledge that to some degree prior to joining the organisation they felt angry, 40% experienced loneliness, 44% felt ashamed with themselves and only one third or 33% acknowledged a sense of rejection and 45% noted that to some extent they felt different from those around them. A staggering 62% noted that they never felt isolated. The profile of the members in general point to individuals who were felt a mixed sense of social rejection but strongest was a feeling of anger and feeling different. Certainly while what their anger was targeted against was not highlighted in detail in this construct, the general state of emotions could translate not only to the type of group they joined eventually but the desire to enact change through violence and speed.

372 Aminah, Interview by Author, Palu Prison, 25 October 2013
The figure below highlights the high level of anger that respondents shared they felt prior to joining the organization. The table aims to attempt to identify the sentiments of anger felt. Prior to joining the organization, 63% felt personally upset with the Indonesian government, 80% were upset with the treatment of Muslims by non-Muslims in Indonesia and 82% were upset with the treatment of Muslims by non-Muslims globally. 80% were upset with the specifically the Western World’s treatment of Muslims. 54% felt a sense of discrimination merely because they were Muslim. This was strange given the fact the Indonesia albeit secular has a Muslim majority.

The high levels of anger and resentment prior to joining the organisation alludes to the already entrenched level of dissatisfaction and anger with regards to their treatment as Muslims. The sense of solidarity that is felt with the greater Muslim community worldwide. This sense of resentment existed were not a result of indoctrination by the groups or by the leadership but an entrenched sense of anger that was already present before they embarked on their pathways into the group. It provides insight into the predisposition of members of the groups.
The psychological well-being of the group after spending sometime in the organisation however showed individuals where almost half, 43.4% of the respondents agree that they are generally happy while in the group with only 18% acknowledging that they were upset while in the group and with only 20% agreeing that they feel lonely after being with the organization. The vast majority seemed more at ease in the company of likeminded individuals and in a group that worked towards perhaps the initial sense of collective anger felt as a result of the treatment of Muslims. The reduce sense of loneliness could certainly be associated with the new ties and relationships created with the induction into the organization. The sense of belonging either through familial ties or the bond of brotherhood towards a common objective could have inspired the general sense of well-being while in the organization.
These pre-existing sentiments of anger and resentment, and a perceived sense of injustice could increase the speed of radicalisation of not only the individual but thereafter increase the level of aggression and violence of the group as a collective. They provide the necessary justification and rationalisation for extreme violence as the only way forward. The presence of like-minded individuals add to the

In a meeting with the research team at the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Rudi Subianto, a member of the research team noted that Terrorism in Indonesia flourished not because of religion and ideology per se but in part because there was a rising sentiment that justice was absent a sense of injustice that religion could not bridge. He however acknowledged that to some extent, there was a sense that the members of terrorist groups were “brainwashed by their leaders.” Abdul Jamil yet another member of the research team at the Ministry of Religious Affairs emphasised the strong role that leadership had played through indoctrination. He opined that there was a conflation of factors that included “ideology, social political (stressors), external factors and leadership of terrorist groups.” From the survey conducted the deep-rooted sense of resentment and the perceived sense of injustice is vital.

Despite the general consensus that seemed to form on the importance of leadership, the research team emphasised that the existing preconditions. These preconditions could have laid the foundations for a more permissive environment for radicalisation

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373 Rudi Subianto, Kasuslitbang, Kementerian Agama Indonesia, Interview by Author, 23 October 2013
374 Rudi Subianto, Kasuslitbang, Kementerian Agama Indonesia, Interview by Author, 23 October 2013
375 Abdul Jamil, Kasuslitbang, Kementerian Agama Indonesia, Interview by Author, 23 October 2013
by leadership, citing the violence Ambon in 2000, Hussein HB noted that the fighters generally had “low levels of education, low levels of understanding of religion and low economic prospects. The idea was that if they wanted to enter heaven quickly, then go to Ambon.”

The leadership would them be able to capitalises on the vulnerability and emotional frailty of individuals and would be able to radicalise them to the cause.

(3) The Influence of Hierarchical Leadership

The notion of a clear hand of leadership directing terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia is an aspiration that the groups explored in this study aspire towards. The clearly articulated hierarchy and structure (at least on paper) in most groups provide clarity in the manner through which decisions are made by the leadership of the groups. The presence of Manifestos and Constitutional documents underscore perhaps the latent aspiration of order in the creation of an Islamic State.

The table below provides a brief outline of the type of hierarchical leadership that the groups in Indonesia have envisioned for themselves respectively.

Table 6: Leadership in Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO.</th>
<th>GROUP</th>
<th>LEADERSHIP HIERARCHY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Darul Islam (DI)</td>
<td>DI today is not longer a united movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Negara Islam Indonesia (NII)</td>
<td>NII Constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. All powers rested in the hand of the Imam</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. The second highest function in the NII was the General Chairman of the Supreme Command (KUKT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lashkar Jihad (LJ)</td>
<td>No Information Available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI)</td>
<td>MMI Three levels of Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Mujahidin Congress (held every 3 to 5 years)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Dewan Pempinan Majelis or Legislative Council</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Pimpinan Pelaksana Majelis or Executive Leadership Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)</td>
<td>PUPJI</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>At the apex is the Emir</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Beneath him are four councils:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. A governing council (majelis qiyadah)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. A religious council (majelis syuro)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. A fatwa council</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. A disciplinary council (majelis hisbah).</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT)</td>
<td>JAT Manifesto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>At the apex is the Emir (elected by ulamas and Islamic public figures/leaders)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

376 Hussein HB, Kasuslitbang, Kementerian Agama Indonesia, Interview by Author, 23 October 2013

377 International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Singapore, Global Pathfinder Database
Below the Emir two councils:

1. Majelis syuro (executive council),
2. Tanfidziyah (administrative office).
   [The administrative office manages five departments, namely finance, hisbah (morality enforcement); religious propagation/outreach and media/publication; tarbiyah (education); and katib (a secretariat)]

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Al Qaeda Indonesia (AI)</td>
<td>No Information Available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Mujahideen Indonesia Timur (MIT)</td>
<td>No Information Available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Front Pembela Islam (FPI)</td>
<td><strong>FPI Organisational Structure</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>At the apex is the Grand Imam</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The organizational structure is divided into:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|   |   | 1. Majelis Syura (Consultative Committee)  
|   |   | 2. Majelis Tanfidzi (Executive Committee). |
|   |   | The Consultative Committee is led by Head of Supreme Advisory Council of Consultative Committee and made up of five components: |
|   |   | a. The Shariah Council  
|   |   | b. The Honorary Council  
|   |   | c. The Supervisory Council  
|   |   | d. The Advisory Council  
|   |   | e. The Monitoring Council |
| 10 | Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) | No Information Available |

The table shown above begs yet another question. If indeed the groups have envisioned a structure, then where do these groups stand on the debate raised in 2008 by Sageman and Hoffman on the possible evolution of groups towards that of a leaderless Jihad. *Are the groups in Indonesia all hierarchical and top-down? How do the narratives espoused by the group and their leaders impact the groups in Indonesia?*

With the increase counter terrorism operations many of the operatives of terrorist groups with a clearly defined hierarchy and leadership in the past such as DI, NII, LJ, JI, MMI and JAT, have either been disbanded like in the case of LJ or they have developed a multiplicity of splinter organisations. Smaller groups that have arisen out of the splintering of the predominant larger terrorist groups that had dominated Indonesia’s terrorism threat landscape. Although having definitive leader many of these splintered groups have not articulated a clear structure as seen in the past. AI and MIT for instance have leadership that was either apprehended or on the run.

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378 The Emir stays in his position and cannot be removed from it as long as he is still alive and he does not violate any Islamic law. Thus, an Emir should not be elected periodically through organisational congresses as practised by many mass organisations.
respectively. The groups that have splintered from groups such as DI for instance such as Ring Banten and DI-Akram, which evolved further to become the Abu Omar Group, do not articulate a clear hierarchical structure but are more violent than their predecessors.

Even though most if not all the members in JI cell that he belonged to were caught, Fajar Taslim, the only foreigner currently in an Indonesian prison on terrorism charges still finds a sense of solidarity towards a nebulous notion of a group and a deep conviction for the narratives that he continues to hold dear. His operational injunction is based on a sense of solidarity that he perceives exists amongst others like himself who in his mind are fighting for a common cause – an Islamic State.

Fajar Taslim challenged,

“If you want me to stop, bring me a verse from the Quran and Haddith.”

He later added with much conviction, that

“to get Islamic Law … we will try until we die, for matters and is important.”

Fajar Taslim was part of the JI Cell in Singapore. At the time of his joining, JI possessed a top down hierarchical structure with regionally based units known as *mantiqis* in operation in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and even Australia. Ustaz Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s who was the Emir of JI iterated that

“Islam needs to be at the top and this is important for Islam. It is important that Islam is pure and strong.”

Fajar Taslim’s commitment to what JI had stood for has not changed during his time in prison. In broad brushstrokes, neither has what Ustaz Abu Bakar Ba’asyir stood for changed through the years. In fact, when Fajar Taslim was asked of what his intentions were after his release, without hesitation and an almost cheerfully he answered with much conviction,

“God-willing, I will go and fight in Syria, they can try and catch me if they can, I will die trying.”

For the members of MIT, the YouTube videos by the group’s leader Santoso even while he is on the run aim to provide inspiration for the members in (what is assumed to be) rather unstructured group. Santoso was formerly JAT’s operations field commander. The Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium identified “four different groups acting in tandem as broader network.” These groups were the (1) The Abu Omar Group whose leader Abu Omar is currently serving time (2) MIT led by Santoso, who is now Indonesia’s most wanted Terrorist (3) The Abu Autat Group

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379 Fajar Taslim, Interview by Author, Nusa Kambangan, Indonesia, 22 October 2013
380 Fajar Taslim, Interview by Author, Nusa Kambangan, Indonesia, 22 October 2013
381 Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Interview by Author, Nusa Kambangan, Indonesia, 22 October 2013
382 Fajar Taslim, Interview by Author, Nusa Kambangan, Indonesia, 22 October 2013
383 Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/poso-indonesia-terrorist-operations-also-see-mit
now believed to be allied with MIT and (4) The William Maksum Network. Abu Omar for instance emphasised that his group aimed to

“establish Islamic Law and if there is a need for war then there is a need for war.”384

He believed that at the most basic level there are

“two things that can be done…dakwah (religious outreach) and war.”385

His was a group that had undergone considerable evolutions and has become the one of the most violent groups in operation in Indonesia today. Albeit there is no longer the presence of a clear and distinctive structure amongst group, what they have managed to sustain through the years is the deference to leaders and Emirs across these organisations. Looking at the table shown above, even on paper, then when the Manifestos and Constitutions were drawn up, the role of the Emir was central. His authority was untouched, as he sat at the pinnacle of power. This was tied in very much to the framework of leadership as was envisioned by the notion of the Kalifah or Vicegerent.

Ghozali, currently serving time, was the leader of the cell that spearheaded the robberies in order to fund terrorist operations. He was part of Tanzim Al Qaeda Serambi Mekkah and JAT. He added,

“My cell was small, and had two suicide bombers”386

ultimately it was the leader of the cell who would decide on the operation.

“As a leader and an Emir of the cell, I looked for individuals who are loyal to me, were prayerful and conducted worship, had faith, were sincere in their desire for death… the job of the cell was to make them like that.”387

Today, although possessing a fractured group with a multiplicity of splinters Abu Bakar Ba’asyir still commands the respect and authority amongst followers who visit with him regularly. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s formed JI, MMI and JAT. He left MMI on account that the role of leadership was about to be chosen democratically, a process that he felt was illegitimate. In founding his new group JAT, the importance of the Emir and the almost undefiled power that the leader should hold was emphasised and iterated through the JAT Manifesto which bore strong resemblance to JI’s PUPJI.

In Indonesia, not only does the leader naturally possess a multiplicity of basis for accruing social power. In the perceived absence of justice, law and order and simmering resentment amongst group members, the manner through which the leader conducts himself and the issuance of guidelines provides the perception of order amidst chaos. Just as Santoso does while on the run from security and law

384 Abu Omar, Interview by Author, Nusa Kambangan, Indonesia, 22 October 2013
385 Ibid
386 Ghozali, Interview by Author, Medan, 30 September 2013
387 Ibid
enforcement and just like prominent cleric and ideologue Abu Bakar Ba’asyir continues to do while his is in prison. The power of influence extends beyond the confines of a life on the run and prison wall. They have not stopped acts of violence from continuing.

Indonesia as such presents a unique case in point. The power of the leader at the apex bolstered by the hierarchy of a group presupposes the existence of a structured group. In Indonesia the presence of the leader of a group with a nebulous and unstructured group would still garner support. In addition to the narratives used, as explored in Chapter 5, the overwhelming level of influence that the leaders possess will be able to directly influence the group as a collective. Leadership is as such inextricably linked to collective purpose and collective action. Power through influence is key.

Splits and Fissures

The multiplicity of splinter groups and fissures in the terrorist movement in Indonesia has proven a challenge for security and law enforcement alike. The presence of a clear leader seems to be the predominant means of identifying the group as a collective in the presence of an amoeba-like cadre. The split in this instance is a result of leadership and by extension the organizations that they coordinate and lead. The narratives that sustain the movement remain unchanged.

Cyber-Domain and Leadership

Perhaps an uncalculated consequence, the metastasized threat has been made possible by the influence of Globalisation. In this instance, “information technology, combined with cheaper international travel, has enabled terrorist leaderships to establish their bases in less developed countries with weak or near absent law enforcement or judicial structures.” The ability to leadership to reach out directly to members and inspire a following of possible new recruits through social networking sites, videos and forums have presented a new means of recruitment, radicalization and sustenance of an orthodox concept of an organization. In addition to the role of terrorist leadership is an organization whose foundations are piled in using a strong layer of middlemen who could manage the day to day running of the organisation. The cyber sphere had reduced the dependence of the middleman, albeit to assume that they have been cut out all together, would be myopic.

The current calls for assistance with in the ingoing war in Iraq and Syria for instance showcased a range of methods used. They were conducted using both by a flurry of videos calling for assistance, updates provided by social network site and roadshows conducted all over Indonesia in order to glean the necessary support through funding and assistance rendered to head to Syria to fight.

Terrorist Leaders - Making Sense of a Multiplicity of Groups

Abu Bakar Ba’asyir tried to make sense of the current fissures of groups and multiplicity of small groups that have surfaced on the lack of leadership. It is due to a

“lacking of a strong leadership, if there was these splits won’t happen”\textsuperscript{389}

where under a strong leader all groups would come under one umbrella. In fact JAT when it first was established saw itself as an umbrella group that brought together former members of JI, NII, MMI amongst others. Perhaps JAT envisioned itself an umbrella organization that could lead and streamline efforts.

Abu Tholud, JI Mantiqi 3 Commander suggested that perhaps the

“aspiration of the members were not achieved”\textsuperscript{390}

hence the constant search and creation of new groups. He posits that individuals are unsatisfied by the lack of progress made by existing groups and attempt to create new groups in the hope of achieving the goal of establishing Islamic Law. Badri Hartono Head of Al Qaeda in Indonesia noted,

“we were being attacked so all I did was to start one.”\textsuperscript{391}

Nassir Abbas on the other hand was of the opinion that it is not that the groups are leaderless,

“sometimes it is just because of the size of the group.”\textsuperscript{392}

The really small splinter groups could well operate on consensus and the larger groups try to create a typical leadership hierarchy with the Emir or Leader at the apex. In this case to each group it own method and means to further their cause.

Certainly, the increased pressure by security and law enforcement could have mitigated the rise of large of strong terrorists groups like that of the DI/NII movement and JI of the past. Ghozali notes that for him, these splits and fissures, were analogous to

“one body with many changes of clothes.”\textsuperscript{393}

Ustaz Jaafar concurred when he shared his opinion of JI and JAT adding that,

“ideology is the same, the concept is the same and the leader is the same.”\textsuperscript{394}

As such although there were numerous groups at the core the narratives espoused by the groups as a collective were very similar. They represent a common aspiration for the establishment of an Islamic state with many paths and attempts made by a multiplicity of groups in order to achieve the same goal.

\textsuperscript{389} Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Interview by Author, Nusa Kambangan, Indonesia, 22 October 2013
\textsuperscript{390} Abu Tholud, Interview by Author, Semarang, Indonesia, 3 October 2013
\textsuperscript{391} Badri Hartono, Interview by Author, Semarang, Indonesia, 21 September 2013
\textsuperscript{392} Nassir Abbas, Interview by Author, Jakarta, Indonesia, 12 July 2013
\textsuperscript{393} Ghozali, Interview by Author, Jakarta, 30 September 2013
\textsuperscript{394} Ustaz Jaafar Umar Thalib, Interview by Author, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 27 May 2013
(4) The Influence of Charisma and Personal Ambition

The final factor that propels leadership as a key influencer in radicalisation is the influence of charisma and personal ambition. This is perhaps one of the most intangible qualities of an individual. However their influence is transformational in more ways than one. The influence of charisma and personal ambition embodies transformational characteristics that could change the direction of not only the individual embodying these traits but its resulting effects cascade through the decisions undertaken by the group.

“Charisma gets people to like you, trust you and want to be led by you. It can determine whether you are seen as a follower or a leader, whether your ideas can get adopted and how effectively your projects as implemented. Like it or not, charisma can make the world go round – it makes people want to do what you want them to do.”

At the crux, charisma embodies the fundamentals of power – unbridled influence.

*Nuanced Understanding of Charisma*

While most certainly leaders at the apex of terrorist and extremist organisations are assumed to be charismatic. It is a quality that to some extent may have enabled many to amass a large following. However it would be difficult to differentiate the impact of influence as a direct result of charisma as opposed to influence gleaned from other aspects explored in this study such as moral authority, familial ties and hierarchy within the organisation. The prevalent discourse on charisma in terrorism studies and in particular the study of radicalisation underscores a limited understanding and awareness of the ongoing research on charisma. The tautological use of the term has give rise to a problematic lacuna in understanding the impact of charisma within a terrorist and extremist groups. The fact that people listen intently when a leader speaks for instance does not automatically mean that the leader is charismatic. Charisma is not synonymous with the gift of the gab. While the influence rendered by charisma is important, charisma is much more nuanced. It extends beyond that of traditional respect for religious figures and authorities in positions of power.

This study will not explore the gaps in the terrorism discourse in greater detail. However it is pertinent to be sensitised to a more nuanced understanding of the term.

*Charisma and the Importance of Social Conditions*

Several radicalisation models and conceptual frameworks explored in Chapter 2 for instance, highlight the role of a charismatic leader as a powerful means of radicalising an individual. Weber defines it as individuals who are “holders of specific gifts of the body and spirit; and these gifts have been believed to be supernatural, not accessible

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Behavioural psychologists have debated the notion if charisma is innate or if can be learned. Charisma is an emotive influencer that can function beyond the realm of traditional basis of influence and ignites a sense of admiration and awe amongst their followers. It is a characteristic that has often been spoken about, however seldom examined in greater detail.

In a study exploring the social conditions that give rise to charismatic leadership, Douglas Barnes notes that,

“charisma is not an individualistic phenomena hinging only on the extraordinary quality of a leader's personality. Rather, charisma stems from a complex of factors meeting in and around the same individual. For instance, the leader is likely to live during a period of radical social change in which the values of the society have changed leaving an opening for a new formulation of religious beliefs.”

In many ways the social conditions that have given rise to charismatic leadership can be seen in the traditional leadership within the terrorist and extremist movement in Indonesia. In Chapter 3, this study explored the unique dynamics and role of political Islam in Indonesia. It highlighted the social conditions that led to the formation of terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia and the bourgeoning number of groups over a few decades. The formulation of a radical narrative against a backdrop of change was explored in detail in Chapter 5 in the role of ideology as a key influencer of a group on the its pathway to radicalisation towards violence.

Ustaz Kiyahin and Habib Rizieq developed the idea to form FPI whilst they were both caught in a jam, travelling by car. It was a decision that they had made in light of deteriorating social conditions in Indonesia. In this case, the more social and engaging mannerisms of Habib Rizieq contrasted with the more reserved and thoughtful demeanour of Ustaz Kiyahin, the co-founder of FPI.

In the interviews conducted with the terrorist leadership of JI for instance, a common theme that surfaced was the sense that while Abu Bakar Ba’asyir was seen to be a charismatic figure, Abdullah Sungkar with whom JI was founded in 1993, was a man who was strict. A no-nonsense figure who prior to his death maintained a tight hold over the organisation.

Ustadz Jaafar Umar Thalib another religious teacher whose was head of LJ and had recruited fighters for Ambon. His rational for conducting jihad was as a direct result of the on-going conflict between the Christians and the Muslim. After the Malindo Accords and the disbanding of the group, many of the former members of LJ inspired by conflict in Ambon, were ready recruits and joined other terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia.

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399 Ustaz Kiyahin, Interview by Author, Jakarta, 18 July 2013
Ismail Yusanto, spokesperson of HTI, noted that he was inspired by the solution that HT offered to solve the social ills of society. Struck by a society that was corrupt, he saw a need for change. HT offered a holistic solution that focused on all aspects, social, political and economic.

Each one of these leaders arose against a backdrop of social change and at the same time, saw religion as a solution and their respective groups as a vehicle for the solution. The extraordinary quality of charisma coupled with the ensuing social crises as they had envisioned it gave rise to a powerful transformational course in either the creation of a new terrorist or extremist group like in the case of JI and FPI, the rendering of assistance to fellow brothers in Ambon through the creation of a new group as with the work of LJ or coming on board an established group such as HT. The actual and perceived social conditions had breathed life into these groups and set them on a course of change.

Personal Ambition

Personal ambition is a theme that is somewhat seldom explored in great detail especially within the terrorism discourse writ large and in Indonesia in particular. The tendency is for leadership to play down their role at times in part due to social norms and second, the expectation of humility amongst leaders who are religious. Survey respondent 84HTI, a HTI member noted,

“I am not anyone great, but to carry out preaching, I am well versed and understand the pathways to bring my HT friends and brothers together as I am born in this area. Because of HT, I feel very privileged, as I have come to understand about the ideology of Islam and hope to always start new cells that do religious studies… I am very central.”

Respondent 84HTI’s perhaps was a key member in charge of recruitment in his area, begins by highlighting that was not very great but ended by noting that he was central to the organisation. Just like charisma, personal ambition of an individual in the position of leadership in particular can set not only themselves but the group as a collective on a course of either heightened violence or on a path of de-escalation of violence.

Brimming with Ambition: Hambali

A case in point is the role of Hambali. Hambali was the operational chief and military strategist of JI. Not only was he part of team of four who was tasked to go and recruit individuals when JI was at its embryonic stage, he was additionally in control of a central governing council that intelligence sources assert acts as the main coordinating body for four operational terrorist wings, the Mantiqis, in Southeast Asia.\(^\text{400}\) As such he was seen and very much believed to be Al-Qaeda's chief operative in Southeast Asia. He had personal access to Mohamed Atef alias Abu Hafs, the military commander of Al Qaeda. In 1996, Al Qaeda's chief operational planner Khalid Sheikh Mohammed invited Hambali to Afghanistan. Zachary Abuza quotes Khalid Sheikh

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\(^{400}\) Hambali alias Riduan Issamuddin, Personality Profile, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Singapore, Global Pathfinder Database.
Mohamad’s testimony to the CIA noting that Hambali is charismatic and had a good following amongst the new recruits.\textsuperscript{401}

Nassir Abbas noted that

“ambition of individuals can be controlled by strong leadership.”\textsuperscript{402}

Sharing insight into the dynamics of the group vis-à-vis one of its key leaders Hambali Nassir Abbas noted that Hambali’s ambitions were initially curtailed to a large extent by the strong leadership of Abdullah Sungkar.

\textit{Hambali: Meeting with Osama Bin Laden}

Indonesians were being sent to Afghanistan to assist in fighting against the Russians. The training camps were moved to two areas over the course of a decade. In 1985 - 1992, Camp Sadah was in operation and from 1992-1995 Camp Torkham was in operation. From November 1994 onwards Southeast Asians were moving to train in Southern Philippines. In 1997, Hambali was tasked to go to Afghanistan as JI leadership was keen to understand the developments there as it had come to the knowledge of JI leadership that Osama Bin Laden had set up a training camp in Afghanistan between 1996-1997. Hambali had brought a statement by Osama Bin Laden in 1999 to the JI leaders, however both Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir did not respond to the letter. It is believed that the letter comprise a fatwa that was spoke of partnership and collaboration between the groups through the conducting of attacks. He noted that while several individuals including Noordin Mohamed Top was of the opinion that a more violent stance was needed, as spelled out by the fatwa by Osama Bin Laden. Noordin Mohamed Top later masterminded and launched a string of attacks in Indonesia.

In October 1999, Abdullah Sungkar passed away in Bogor Indonesia. Nassir Abbas added that with Abu Bakar Basyir coming into power after Abdullah Sungkar’s demise, Hambali was happy as he had many ideas on how to further the movement within the region. Hambali was head of \textit{Mantiqi 1}. A \textit{mantiqi} is a regionally based system that JI had used to divide its spheres of operations. As the head of a \textit{mantiqi} substantial authority came under Hambali. Nassir Abbas noted that Hambali was also keen to move the regional conflict of Ambon to a National level.

In 2000 Hambali financed and provided the inspiration for the Christmas Eve bombings, a simultaneous attacks across 24 churches in Indonesia. Nassir Abbas emphasized that many JI leaders were not keen proceed with the Christmas Eve Bombings, but this fell on deaf ears. The \textit{mantiqi} system allowed for the middle management leaders in charge to operate with considerable autonomy. Nasir Abbas admitted that there were a lot of things that he did to report to Abu Bakar Ba’syir as well.

\textsuperscript{401} Zachary Abuza, \textit{Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror}, (United States of America: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003) p.171
\textsuperscript{402} Nassir Abbas, Interview by Author, Jakarta, Indonesia, 12 July 2013
Nassir Abbas explained that the more violent means undertaken by JI was as a result of not a splinter cell but a difference in policy from within JI. He noted that until now, there are individuals who continue to follow the fatwa as written in the 1997 document that Hambali couriered from Afghanistan.

Abu Tholud also a former mantiqi leader noted that the activities of Dr. Azahari and Noordin Mohamed Top in particular

“their heightened violence was a result of them interpreting Jihad differently, a different means of applying jihad.”

Abdurrahman Ayub, leader of mantiqi 4 noted that in approximately

“2000-2001 there were two leaderships in Australia, one was pro-Hambali and operated underground and the other that was loyal to Abdul Rohim and I (the mantiqi 4 leadership).”

The danger continues to be present with those who were enamored with Noordin Mohammad Top’s work as

“Noordin’s group is still around, they were a large group” of operatives. The strength lies in the influence of leadership that is the supported by a common ideology that members on their own accord find hard to refute if not for a cognitive awakening. The leadership reiterates and reinforces not only the ideology but additionally provides justification that membership within this select group benefits the individual.

The personal ambition of Hambali, his aspiration to connect JI with international networks and a permissive environment that accommodated and encouraged autonomous leadership of, thrust JI onto the path of violence that it is has come to be known for today. Hambali was arrested in 2004 in Ayodha, Thailand and is presently serving time in Guantanamo Bay. His ambition had a marked impact on the course of terrorism in Southeast Asia as a whole.

Subdued Ambition: Ustaz Jaafar Umar Thalib

Almost as a counterfoil to Hambali who was brimming ambition is the subdued ambition of the Ustaz Jaafar Umar Thalib, who was head of Laskar Jihad and Head of The Supreme Advisory Board of FKAJ. LJ was established in January 2000 and disbanded in October 2002. A strict Salafi, whose beliefs were root in dialectic of justice and injustice, he had felt that it was,

“The individual duty (fardhu ain) for Indonesian Muslims and a collective duty (fardhu kifayah) for Muslims outside Indonesia to take

403 Nassir Abbas, Interview by Author, Jakarta, Indonesia, 12 July 2013
404 Abu Tholud, Interview by Author, Semarang, Indonesia, 3 October 2013
405 Abdurrahman Ayub, Interview by Author, Jakarta, Indonesia, 11 December 2013
406 Ghozali, Interview by Author, Medan, 30 September 2013
part in the jihad in the Maluku to assists Muslims facing their Christian enemies”.

Ustaz Jaafar Umar Thalib: Meeting with Osama Bin Laden

Having fought in Afghanistan for approximately 10 years, Ustaz Jaafar met with Osama Bin Laden in 1987. He noted later on that Osama Bin Laden was misguided as his notion of an Islamic state is imagined an utopian and a revival of the days of Caliph Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman and Ali. As such although he was in contact with Osama Bin Laden, Ustaz Jafar rejected the idea of cooperating with Osama Bin Laden as

“He was in doubt about Usama’s piety.”

Ustaz Jafar’s success with LJ was contingent on his strong religious credentials. As such with his “exclusive knowledge of Salafi-Wahhabi ideas and exclusive experiences of being in the battlefield provides him with power in the eyes of his followers. With this power, he could easily disseminate and implement his ideas without resistance.”

When compared to Hambali who lacked religious clout, Ustaz Jaafar’s background placed him in a prime position to play and influential role in the terrorism threat landscape in Indonesia. The moral authority from being a religious teacher, an Afghan alumni, access to a large number of young recruits, Arab lineage through his Hadrami family background provided him with considerable influence on many levels.

In 1999 in response to the on-going violence in Ambon and Maluku, Ustaz Jaafar wrote an open letter to President Habibie asking him to intervene. He sent a second letter to President Gusdur. However as little progress was made in quelling the conflict, in 2000 the decision was undertaken to engage in Jihad in order to restore order and protect the Muslim community. Thereafter Ustaz Jaafar’s sent fighters to assist the Muslim groups there “with the backing of several mainstream politicians, to battle a separatist Christian group.”

Ustaz Jaafar noted that with the Malino I Accords (19-20 December 2001) and Malino II Accords (12 February 2002) signed, peace was restored and the task that he had set out to do had come to an end.

407 Hambali alias Riduan Issamudin, Personality Profile. International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Singapore, Global Pathfinder Database
410 Muhammad Sirozi, The Intellectual Roots of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: Ja’far Umar Thalib of Laskar Jihad (Jihad Fighters) and His Educational Background, The Muslim World, Vol. 95, January 2005, p.90
411 Muhammad Sirozi, The Intellectual Roots of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: Ja’far Umar Thalib of Laskar Jihad (Jihad Fighters) and His Educational Background, The Muslim World, Vol. 95, January 2005, p.99
412 Ustaz Jaafar Umar Thalib, Interview by Author, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 27 May 2013
Two factors that mitigated Ustaz Jaafar’s journey on a path of jihad were two men that he had deeply respected. They were his father and Sheikh Muqbil whom Ustaz Jaafar had sought guidance from when Ustaz Jaafar visited with him in Yemen.\(^{414}\)

In both instances both Hambali and Ustaz Jafaar pursued a course that set their groups JI and LJ respectively on a path of increased violence. The difference perhaps lies in the ability of Ustaz Jafaar to reign in on the levels of violence and in the case of JI the group continued to engage on a path of violence even after Hambali’s arrest. Hambali’s ability to influence others such as Noordin Mohamed Top and Dr. Azahari Hussein had set them on the course for heightened violence of the group.

**CONCLUSION**

Transformational leadership often chart paths through unchartered territory. Leadership qualities are important traits in the management of a group’s activities in general. When asked to identify essential qualities that they were keen to see in a leader, members of the terrorist leadership interviewed identified several key traits that they felt were essential for someone in the position of leadership. Some alluded to traits that they saw as essential to furthering the group’s agenda, Ghozali for instance noted that

“In addition to ideology, the leadership needs to possess knowledge, linkages with international counterparts and strong commitment.”\(^{415}\)

Others saw qualities that the individual possessed as being necessary. Ariffin a lone wolf operative who had no affiliation to a group noted that inspirational leaders he looked up to were individuals such as

“Kartosuwiryo (NII) whose ideas attract followers to Islam and Ustaz Abu Bakar Ba’asyir for his attempts to establish Islamic Law (he added that he looked up to) Osama Bin Laden for his charisma and simplicity.”\(^{416}\)

Ghozali added that for all inspirational leadership, terrorist groups in his opinion looked up to was Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri as

“he was a symbol of global jihad as he has not be imprisoned.”\(^{417}\)

The ability to successfully avoid detection is certainly seen as an asset, almost as a ticket to continue with their struggle.

The notion social justice and fairness is an intrinsic part of the values of Islam. Annonymously coded survey respondent, 88HTI who belonged to HTI added that ideally the leader needs to become “a person that is devoted, become welfare centric

\(^{414}\) Ustaz Jaafar Umar Thalib, Interview by Author, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 27 May 2013

\(^{415}\) Ghozali, Interview by Author, Jakarta, 30 September 2013

\(^{416}\) Ariffin, Interview by Author, Nusa Kambangan, Indonesia, 22 October 2013

\(^{417}\) Ghozali, Interview by Author, Jakarta, 30 September 2013
and hold on to the values of Islam and become the capital or one of the provinces in the caliphate.”

The precedence of moral authority and religion was another theme that surfaced. Abu Umar iterated that in addition to being an example to others,

“the best religious leaders are individuals like Ustaz Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Ustaz Aman Abdurrahman for they teach about Islamic law to Muslims.”

Ustaz Kiyahin noted that courage and ownership in the face of challenges is important. Ustaz Kiyahin in candor highlighted the courage of FPI noting that if

“We (FPI) set the bomb, we don't run away like other groups, we will stand there at the spot until the police arrives and say, this bomb… I did it.”

This would reflect the integrity of the leadership to stand by the decisions undertaken. Leadership acts as the glue that makes messages stick. The ideological narratives stick to individuals through messages that are ‘sticky.’ They need to be simple, unexpected, concrete, credible, emotional and story-filled. Perhaps more importantly, the need for these messages to be delivered by effected messengers. Leaders within groups are in a prime position to act as a critical influencer and bridge between two other pertinent influencers in a group. These are namely the Ideology that was expounded on in Chapter 5 and the role of Group Behaviour that will be explored in greater detail in the next Chapter.

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418 Abu Omar, Interview by Author, Nusa Kambangan, Indonesia, 22 October 2013
419 Ustaz Kiyahin, Interview by Author, Jakarta, 18 July 2013
CHAPTER SEVEN

INFLUENCER C:
COMMUNITY AFFILIATION AND IMPACT ON GROUP BEHAVIOUR

We must remember that one determined person can make a significant difference, and that a small group of determined people can change the course of history.

Sonia Johnson

The use of terrorist or extremist groups as a referent of analysis in the study of radicalisation processes is an under explored means through which to understand the puzzling process of radicalisation. Broadly, the role of the group has almost been relegated to a secondary tier of analysis and as such, by extention the role of group dynamics and community affiliation in the process of radicalisation. It is an endeavour that is often embarked on in a limited manner after understanding the way through which individuals are radicalised. It is this gap that the Chapter will aim to shed light on. The Chapter will especially focus on the ability of the group as a collective to form, inform and transform not only the individual members within terrorist and extremist groups but in particular the direction of the group as a collective entity that is often influence by the community within which it thrives. The intra-community affiliation through group dynamics plays a pertinent role in sustaining a group on a course of increased violence as seen in the case of Indonesia.

Social theorists such as Emile Durkheim and later Louis Althusser and Carl Jung refer to the concept of collective consciousness as the process through which an individual person identifies with the collective or the group through a multiplicity of facets that dominate social structures. Carl Jung goes one step further through his coining of the term ‘collective unconscious’ which refers to the part of an individual which even he or she is unaware of but which inadvertently influences the group.

Karl Marx once noted that “It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness”[421] Marx’s reference was that of the material condition that placed pressure onto the decisions that are thereby undertaken in order to proceed and live one’s life as they are or in manner that they aspire towards. Explaining the work of Marx, Weinstein notes that when collective consciousness develops, “participants come to share a definition of themselves as members of a larger whole, to understand that this whole has its own interests beyond those of any particular member, and to understand that it

421 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Selected Works, London: Laurence and Wishart, p. 182
has the ability to define and achieve goals in collective action. It is this facet of the intra-group dynamics that has proven pertinent in the sustenance of groups in Indonesia.

As part of an international effort to identify and clamp down on terrorist and extremist groups, countries and international agencies have created and identified a list of terrorist groups that have been proscribed. The aim of these sanctions against terrorist groups is primarily so that it “brings legal clarity to efforts to identify and prosecute members of terrorist organizations and those who support them.” The most prominent of these sanctions against terrorist groups can be seen in the lists of proscribed terrorist groups that have been issued by the United States, United Kingdom, United Nations and European Union respectively.

Despite the legal clarity that sanctioning terrorist groups may have brought to the operational and legal measures undertaken by states, the scholarly discourse on the understanding of the processes of radicalisation engaged in a limited manner with notion of the organisation as a collective. Most of the research on the processes of radicalisation using the models and conceptual frameworks as highlighted in Chapter 2 of this study, even through the years, research has focused predominantly on the role of individual pathways of radicalisation. Hence while belonging to an organisation renders it dangerous, the impact of the processes of radicalisation of the group and in particular the processes through which terrorist and extremist groups as a collective entity have escalated in their use of violence has not been explored in much of the literature on radicalisation.

Just like the definition of terrorism and ideology explored in the earlier chapters, social theorists too are not of one mind on the definition of a group. A group can perhaps be simply defined as “two or more individuals who are connected by and within social relationships.” Broadly, several factors contribute towards the intricate makeup of a group, namely communication between members, mutual dependence, a shared purpose and goal. Ideology and role of leadership as explored in Chapters 5 and 6 have a social element, not only in the means through which ideology is politicised in the former but also in the manner through which leadership and influence of particular individuals affects the direction of the group, in the case of the latter. In the case study of Indonesia, this change in direction additionally involves a path of heightened violence undertaken by these groups in order to meet their stipulated objectives. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 iterated several of these factors raised above as constituting the intricate make up of a group. In Chapter 5, this study

424 Donelson Forsyth, Group Dynamics, (United States of America: Cengage Learning, 2009) p.3
425 Donelson Forsyth, Group Dynamics, (United States of America: Cengage Learning, 2009) p.2
explored the shared aims and objectives of the 10 groups in an attempt to understand the common thread of ideology that weaves through each of these groups. Chapter 6 subsequently highlighted the unique position of leadership and positions of influence within the organisation and its concomitant impact on the 10 groups were explored.

It is a natural problematic that is at the heart of research within the social sciences domain involving a human subject and by extension human behaviour. The unpredictability that underscores much of the research involving human behaviour is natural. It is human behaviour that ultimately defines us not only who we are but will inadvertently chart the direction of both terrorist and extremist groups as a collective even in their interaction between one another. The impact on group behaviour through group dynamics, group influence and group motivation especially in the manner through which decisions that are undertaken by the group will prove to be a lacuna in the understanding of the processes involving the radicalisation of a group. It is very gap that this study aims to shed some light on.

The role of the organisation in radicalisation processes and conceptual frameworks has been explored to some extent by Martha Crenshaw in the first phase and expanded upon in greater detail in the third phase of radicalisation models and conceptual frameworks as explored in this study. In particular is the work by McCauley and Moskalenko on the 12 Mechanisms of radicalisation where amongst which the role of the group has been highlighted. For McCauley and Moskalenko, group radicalisation influenced not only the nature of the group and thereby its membership, but eventually, the ability of the group to survive. Andrzej Nowak and Robin Vallacher emphasise that in a social group, “it is the interaction among individuals over time that produces change and evolution of group-level properties.” Jerold Post similarly adds that the “subordination to the cause, in turn, gives leaders of these terrorist groups who frame the cause a major role in creating a dominant terrorist psychology.”

Even as this study aims to look as the workings of group level factors in radicalisation, it would be myopic to dismiss the complex interplay between and amongst the individuals within the group altogether. It is a symbiotic and synergistic relationship where one cannot survive without the other. The individuals make up the group and the accrued strength of the collective aggregation of individuals charts the direction of the group. At times as this chapter will show, this ends up drowning out the voices of individual actors in favour of the assumed harmonic crescendo of the collective voice of the group as a cohesive entity. A unified voice then governs the objectives stipulated by the group to ensure its survival and the fruition of its goals.

PART 1 THE SURVEY FINDINGS:
THE INDIVIDUAL PERSON WITHIN THE GROUP

A group is more than merely the aggregation of individuals and as noted earlier it is the complex interplay between individuals that ultimately makes up the unique dynamics of a group. The first part of this chapter will explore the findings of the questionnaire that was conducted as part of this study. The 94 respondents were members from both terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia. Specifically this first part will explore in greater detail their sentiments prior to joining the organisation and while in either the terrorist or extremist organisation. While several of the themes from this questionnaire were explored in some detail in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, this Chapter focuses on the role of the group, the central focus of which will be how the individual sees himself and his activities vis-à-vis the organisation. The figure below highlights the sentiments that were felt by the respondents on their life circumstances prior to joining the group.

Figure 12: Life Circumstance Prior to Joining

This section of the survey aimed to explore the unique pressures of everyday life on the individual. Of the 94 respondents, 70% felt satisfied with the job that they held prior to joining the organisation. While 45% felt that joining the organisation helped them financially, 37% were felt exactly the opposite, wherein joining the organisation never helped them financially. 52% noted that their families supported their decision to join the organisation. On the importance of religion in their life prior to joining the organisation, only 4% admitted that religion was Never important. An overwhelming majority of 51% in comparison noted that religion was Always important in their life, bringing those who felt that religion played a significant role in their life to grand total
of 81%. Hence in general a clear majority felt satisfied with their jobs and had the support of their families to join the terrorist or extremist organisation while admitted religion played a significant role in their lives.

The findings might explain the collective identity marker of religion as it continues to helm a significant role in their personal journeys of radicalisation as well as a central role in the ideology and aims of the group. The impact on their finances was certainly helpful as even from the survey, it had split the respondents. For the majority of the respondents, joining the organisation had provided them with some financial benefit, in this instance, while ideology and an overwhelming sense of religiosity may have influenced their decision to enter if not stay within a terrorist or extremist group, the majority’s admittance of financial gain does cast a shadow on the subsidiary benefit of joining and remaining with the organisation. While money may not have an immediate bearing on their decision to join the organisation, the members were able to consciously identify the benefit that it had brought them in general.

A case in point is the *Gerakan Sehari Seribu* (Gashibu), One Thousand Rupiah A Day Movement, that is run by the *Infaq Dakwah Centre* (Centre for Donations and Outreach) and the *Yayasan Rumah Putih* (White House Foundation) - two extremist organisations in Indonesia. These extremist organisations provide financial assistance to terrorist inmates and families of inmates. The movement however has received some critique for its tendency to select high-profiled inmates to render their assistance. Nonetheless, the fact that additional funds are availed to the family either through the *Gashibu* project or from donations from the community might influence the individual’s commitment to the group.

Assistance rendered might have been a result of the fact that a majority of the respondents were from Category One detention facilities in Indonesia. As a result there might have been a number of high-profiled inmates who were recipients of financial incentives while others were not. The financial incentive provides the group with a dependable cadre who are willing to sacrifice for the group with the knowledge that their families will be taken care of by the community in the event that they are killed or incarcerated.

*Recruiting from Within the Community*

On their recruitment into the organisation, while 28 of the 94 respondents noted that they had joined the group on their own accord, 29 respondents were recruited by a social or familial grouping of some kind. The social and familial grouping included friends, family member, secular and religious teachers. The 9 respondents who were recruited through multiple means meant that the felt that they recruited by more than

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one factor listed above. 17 respondents refrained from responding and 11 noted that they were recruited from other channels.

At first glance, what seemed odd was that none were recruited by solely members of the organisation, however the words of Ariffin the lone wolf operative that was interviewed helps to provide a somewhat reasonable explanation to the findings of the survey. When asked why he did not join a group like JI or JAT since he looked up to Abu Bakar Ba’asyir as a source of his inspiration, Ariffin candidly lamented that

“Groups like JI and JAT, only recruit people that they know. They choose us it’s not like we sign up with them.”

Hence the significant numbers that were recruited by a person that they knew were more likely members of the organisation as well. The role of the group in recruitment of others within close proximity to their inner circle would not only help to maintain the secrecy surrounding the group and additionally help prevent defection within the ranks. It is poignant to note that while teachers, religious leaders or family members had recruited them none had indicated that these individuals were members of the organisation, albeit it is a likely that they were, failing which they would not have recruited them in the first place. They link ascribe to them was through a relationship that they knew as opposed to a member of an organisation which seems distant by comparison.

Figure 13: Recruitment into Organisation

The close relationships explored in the Chapter 6 on the influence derived from brotherhood, kinship and marriage reiterate this trend of recruitment of members within an enclosed circuit of known individuals. Recruitment from within can be purely seen to be functional element within the group. This enforces and reproduces the sense of security felt by not only members of the group, but also by the group leader as well.

429 Ariffin, Interview with Author, Nusa Kambangan, Indonesia, 22 October 2013
“The group can provide the members (or the dominant leader) with the security and comfort they seek. These typically derive from the individuals’ knowledge that there is a group of trusted and liked associates who share his worldview, his values and concerns, and who have first have first hand understanding of the predicaments he is facing. Any inner doubts he may have about certain issues or parts of his performance can be held at bay by the confidence and approbation of one’s peers.”

It is the sense of security and trust that is derived from being with the likeminded that continues to resonate with an echo-chamber effect and bears the subtle notes of conformity and pressure of decisions undertaken by the collective.

**Community Connectedness and Embeddedness**

Building on the notion of community is the level of connectedness felt by the respondents to the Muslim and the Indonesian community in general. Their level of connectedness with the community could provide a salient factor in the manner towards which they view themselves and the community as a whole.

**Figure 14: Community Connectedness**

![Community Connectedness Prior to Joining](chart)

Of the 94 respondents, 70% felt connected to the Muslim community prior to them joining the organisation. 70% also felt that they felt connected to the Indonesian community. Exploring the level of community connectedness aims to understand the sentiment felt vis-à-vis a global Muslim identity as opposed to a more nationalist grouping such as the Indonesian community, devoid of indication of religion and ethnicity. On connectedness to the Indonesian community despite the similarities in

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general outcome, a close examination indicates that there was a 7% increase in people who sat in the fence and said that he question did not apply to them and a 10% increase of those who Always felt connected to Indonesian community. Certainly while the survey does not indicate what the respondent envisaged when they imagined the notion of an Indonesian community, it is possible that the initial sense of connectedness to the Indonesian community influenced the reasons behind the individuals joining the organisation, in order to create a better life for themselves in Indonesia.

*Embeddedness of Individual within the Organisation*

The figure below aimed to examine the degree towards which

**Figure 15: Embeddedness within Organisation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Embeddedness within Organisation</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Not applicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>My beliefs fit well with the organisation's goal(s)</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I had prestige within the organisation</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I was fearful about potential punishment if I left the organisation</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The organisation valued my contribution to its goal(s)</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The organisation cared about my well being</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The organisation cared about my opinions</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The organisation would help me if I had difficulties</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It would have been difficult for me to leave the organisation</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I felt a strong sense of belonging to the organisation</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When I was in the organisation, my life served a higher purpose</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the individual felt a sense of belonging and purpose within the group. 42% of the respondents felt that their lives served a higher purpose. 28% felt a strong sense of belonging to the group, 28% also felt that it would be difficult for them to leave the group. 32% had faith that the organisation would assist them in time of difficulty.
27% felt that their opinions were heard and 37% felt that the organisation cared about their well-being. 37% felt that the organisation cared valued their contribution and 53% felt that they did not fear leaving the organisation. Only 20% felt that they had prestige within the organisation and 55% felt that their beliefs fit with the organisation’s goal.

As an extension of the individual’s embeddedness into the organisation was the role of the family embeddedness vis-à-vis the organisation. This was to examine the degree of closeness between the organisation and the familial unit. The figure below showcases the results from the respondents.

In the figure shown below, of the 94 respondents, 43% felt that their families would not be proud that they had joined the organisation and only 22% felt that their families would be proud. 55% disagreed that joining the group would affect their families reputation and 64% disagreed that the organisation would provide benefits for the family and 68% disagreed that their families would be harmed if they left the organisation. Finally 59% disagreed that the organisation spent time with their family members. On the provision of benefits, while the earlier construct indicated that joining the organisation might have provided them with financial benefit *this benefit* might not directly extend to the family.

*Embeddedness of Individual’s Family within the Organisation*

**Figure 16: Family Embeddedness**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Embeddedness</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Not applicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>My family was proud that I worked for this organisation.</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I felt that it would harm my family's reputation if I left this organisation.</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The organisation provided benefits to my family.</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My family would have suffered had I left the organisation.</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of the organisation often spent time with my family members.</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The findings from this section of the questionnaire were quite stark given the strong delineation between the embeddedness of the individual within the group and the family embeddedness vis-à-vis the organisation. Hence while research thus far seems to indicate that the terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia are typically recruited from within the familial and friendship circles of members of the group, the organisation in it of itself kept its distance from the family unit after the individual was recruited.

*Secret Organisation – Tandzim Sirri*

The earlier batches of JI recruits for instance, while recruited by family members, had gradually distanced themselves from their families. Sawad a member of JI whose wife was a student of Ali Imron, who was incarcerated for his role in the Bali Bombing explained that

“joining JI was a process that changes one’s character.”\(^\text{431}\)

He added that his wife did not know that he had joined JI and in a reflective tone admitted that today his brothers and relatives have distanced themselves from him and no longer want to meet with him. He added that

“this is the truth for the prisoners, not all the families are supportive.”\(^\text{432}\)

JI operated under the strict parameters that it was a secret organisation. Many like Sawad had distanced themselves from their families during the time that they were with JI. The ideological document of JI for instance explained the notion of it being a secret organisation through a section dedicated to the “Implementation of Tandzim Sirri”\(^\text{433}\) or secret organisation where it specifies that “it is a set of rules and organised (nature of the) group that is secret in nature.”\(^\text{434}\) The rationale behind the secrecy of the group was to ensure that both the personnel and the group were to be protected.

*Trust and Confidence in Organisation*

Within the confines of a secret organisation, the foundations of trust and confidence of the members while being part of the groups are assumed to be quintessential. This trust and confidence is built not only on the foundations of ideology and confidence in

\(^{431}\) Sawad, Interview with Author, Semarang, 3 October 2013
\(^{432}\) Sawad, Interview with Author, Semarang, 3 October 2013

\(^{433}\) PUPJI, p.29
\(^{434}\) PUPJI, p.29
the leadership of the group, but additionally the sense of dependability the individual had of other members of the group. The figure below explores the construct of trust and confidence by members of the group.
Individual’s Trust and Confidence in Organisation

Figure 17: Trust and Confidence in Organisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust and Confidence</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Not applicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I was confident in the organisation's ability to fulfill its goal(s).</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I trusted the other members in the organisation.</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the 94 respondents, surprisingly only 36% were confident of the organisation’s ability to fulfil its goal. 31% of the respondents were neutral while 17% admitted that they were not confident of their organisation’s ability to achieve their goals. 35% admitted that they had trust other members within the organisation while once again almost 30% were neutral with 19% noting that they did not trust other members in the organisation. While trust and confidence in an organisation is key in the sustenance of any group, what was unique with this construct was that most of the respondents were muted in their responses of their levels of trust of not only of the organisation’s ability to succeed but additionally the other members from within the organisation.

The results of this section of the questionnaire could be a result of the knowledge that even within the confines of a secret organisation, there might be a tendency for members who are caught to turn on other members within the organisation and as a result compromising current members within the organisation. A second plausible explanation might be that the individuals while believing in the cause writ large for the establishment of an Islamic state, might have been comforted with the knowledge that organisations in it of its self is just one part of the equation, it is the movement in general that counts. The permissive environment in the Indonesia has resulted in the proliferation of a large number of groups and the ability to switch membership between and amongst groups might have provided a possible reasoning to muted levels of trust felt. As a counterfoil to examining the trust and confidence of members in organisations, is the construct of individualism. The figure below highlights the relatively strong sentiments of individualism reflected by the respondents.
Individual’s Trust and Confidence in Self

Figure 18: Individualism

Of the 94 respondents, 58% felt that it was important to do a better job than others. 46% admitted that they rarely relied on others. 48% would rather depend on themselves than others. 46% felt that they it was important that decisions of the group are respected and 33% saw it as a duty to take care of group members that were ill at their own expense. 42% noted that the welfare of fellow group members was important to them and similarly 48% noted that they would be proud of the success of members of their group.

Trust after Joining the Organisation

The figure below explores the construct of trust after joining the organisation. Of the 94 respondents, only 15% questioned the intentions of the giver when someone did something nice for them. Only 11% were of the opinion that no one should be trusted.
What was surprising was the number of individuals who chose to remain neutral. The notion of trust in his case was not reflective on the sentiments of the members vis-à-vis trusting another member of the group but a heightened sense of mistrust of others in general arising out of an increase sense of mistrust of their surroundings while being part of a secret organisation.

**Figure 19: Trust after Joining the Organisation**

![Trust Chart]

**Conformity**

In the figure below, of the 94 respondents, only 6% agreed that they would often rely on and act upon the advice of others. Yet another 6% noted that their friends decided what they would do together. 10% admitted that they were influenced by the opinions of others and 32% noted that they were more independent than conforming in many ways. Finally 40% believed that they do not give in to other easily. Once again with the examination of level of conformity they tension is seen through the sheer large percentage that chose to remain neutral with their answers. At a personal level, most individuals saw themselves as people who were non-conformists, namely as independent individuals who did were not influence by the opinion of others and possessing the grit to remain resolute in the decisions undertaken. This is also reflected in an earlier construct where more than 25 of the 94 respondents or close to 30% noted that they had joined the organisation on their own accord.
In the attempt to see if individuals in a group conform, Alexander George additionally warns that individual within a group while not showing characteristics of conformity might show characteristics of concurrence seeking instead. This distinction between concurrence seeking and conformity pressure is explained by George as follows.

“Concurrence-seeking is a distinctive type of group dynamics, not to be confused with the more familiar type of group dynamic that takes the form of conformity pressure on dissident or wavering members of the group to bring them into line with the decision that is being taken. It should be noted that the evidence of conformity pressure within the group is more easily obtained by researchers than evidence that concurrence-seeking has taken place. Concurrence-seeking is at the core of groupthink, but it is generally not accessible to direct observation. Whether or not it occurs within a group has to be inferred.”  

He notes that concurrence seeking although harder to identify is at the heart of groupthink. This might explain the findings as listed above wherein the individuals did not seem to exhibit characteristics that they were conformists from the survey conducted. Their concurrence seeking nature might hence explain the dependence on the group

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and deference to the group’s leadership especially through the language of religion used in many of the group’s ideological discourses.

Social Dominance

In the final construct examined on social dominance, as reflected in the figure below, 26% disagreed and noted that a single group should dominate society, 27% were of the opinion that not one group should dominate society. Of those who had definitively decided, respondents were split almost in half. 22% agreed that attempts should be made to equalise incomes. 39% admitted that fewer problems would arise if people were treated equally. 38% believed that they should do what they can to equalise the living condition for other groups. An overwhelming majority of 54% agree that all groups should be given an equal chance in life. Only 27% disagreed that sometimes other groups ought to be kept in their place. 39% noted that group equality should be the ideal.

While a significant with the social dominance construct is that while majority noted that groups should have an equal chance in life and that equality was should be the ideal, there was a dissonance with the believes that the groups possessed ideologically in terms of the need to the dominance of one group of people over others. It might be this dissonance created that resulted in a large number of individuals who once again chose to remain neutral on general questions surrounding social construct but were willing to take on more pointed question on religion and the faith.

28% disagreed that groups remained in their place fewer problems would surface. Yet another 57% disagreed that to get ahead in life, there was the need to step on other groups. While 21% believed that it was alright if some groups received more of a chance of life than other groups, by contrast 23% disagreed that some deserved more of a chance in life than others. Surprisingly, a majority of 48% disagreed that using force was necessary to get what they wanted from other groups. The majority of 23% felt that some groups are simply inferior to other groups. While a majority of 32% noted that quality between groups would be ideal. A majority of 43% disagreed that groups of a lower status should stay in their place and a further 33% disagreed that it is a good thing for some groups to remain at the top and others at the bottom.
This section on social dominance raised several lines of contention between notions of equality and the striving for social dominance. Most of the terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia believed in the need to establish an Islamic state and Islamic rule of law. Hence while a majority noted that group equality was the ideal and agreed that it was ideal to give all groups an equal chance at life, the reality was with the establishment of an Islamic state through violence would be placing sections of the
Indonesian community at risk of being targets of violence. What was not evident in this case was that what the individual respondents thought of as groups were not expounded upon. Their notion of an in-group and an out-group could range from groups with differences along religious, racial lines or even stratification of grouping along groupings vis-à-vis levels of economic prosperity. It is this very tension that will be highlighted in greater detail in the second part of this Chapter.

**PART 2: COLLECTIVISM AND ITS IMPACT**

Sociologist Robert Bellah ascribes the emergence of an increased collective consciousness within the global Islamic community to the “resurgence of Qur’anic Islam in the last century.”\(^{436}\) This sense of revival is especially pervasive in the discourse by extremists and terrorists who aspire towards the renaissance and resurgence of what they perceive as the golden age of Islam and Islamic civilisation.

The case study of Indonesia is challenging on two levels. First, as described earlier in Chapter 1 and Chapter 3, Indonesia presents a unique threat landscape coupled with a permissive environment that has seen the proliferation of a large number of terrorist and extremist groups. The proliferation of these groups has had an impact on not only the threat landscape in Indonesia, but it also has had a ripple effect on the threat environment of the Southeast Asian region as a whole.

The second challenge is posed by the role of cross-cultural perspectives. Marilyn Brewer and Wendi Gardner, posit that cross-cultural perspectives “have brought a renewed interest in the social aspects of the self and the extent to which individuals define themselves in terms of their relationships to others and to social groups.”\(^{437}\) It is this very unique cross-cultural perspective within the groups in Indonesia or lack thereof that inadvertently presents a second challenge. Within the groups in Indonesia, there is limited cultural difference between and amongst members of the terrorist and extremist group per se. This unique nature of the terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia has meant that more than the cultural identity between and amongst members of the group, what tends to dominate as a common denominator in term of a marker of group identity is religion. In part, this closely ties in with the broad aims of the multiplicity of groups in Indonesia to form an Islamic State.

Even as the groups aspire for the creation of *Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara*, an Islamic Caliphate that will span the Southeast Asian region and include Borneo and even parts of Australia, the identifying marker of the members of the group of religion transcends the traditional borders of the nation state. Transnational groups such as JI


for instance had spread its wings to regional countries such as Singapore and Malaysia. The Mantiqi System or the regionally based system that JI had meant that there were cells operating in neighbouring Malaysia, Singapore and as far as Australia. Fajar Taslim, the sole foreign national incarcerated on acts of terrorism in Indonesia when asked what the similarities were between members of the cell he was with noted rather candidly, “birds of a feather flock together.”

Despite the cultural and at times ethnic differences amongst members, religion has been the overarching binding identity. Religion hence acts as a socially binding mechanism as well as an identity marker. It has bounded the members through membership to a larger community or ummah. It has additionally been the cornerstone of the ties that have bound many of the members within the group through ties of kinship, marriage and even through educational institutions such madrassah and pesantrens. Moreover, as highlighted in the earlier chapters, the language of religion politicises the ideology or system of beliefs as laid out by the organisation and additionally tends to be used by leadership and members in positions of influence to further the aspiration and the stated objectives of the groups.

Muzafer Sherif notes that “Whenever individuals belonging to one group interact, collectively or individually, with another group or its members in terms of their group identifications we have an instance of intergroup behaviour.” In the case of Indonesia, the similarities based on culture and religious values between and amongst the ten groups explored in this study present a unique case in point. It is not so much that the intergroup behaviour ceases to exist, but that the intergroup behaviours are demarcated along the means and methods undertaken by each group to achieve the collective aspiration of an Islamic State. The impact of collectivism through group behaviour, group dynamic and group influence can especially be seen through an increased trajectory of violence and a building of group cohesion.

**Trajectory of Violence**

In a recently published article, James Khalil iterated the need for the studies in political violence to “apply the logic of correlation and causality.” Khalil’s work highlights the notion that radical belief and violent action are not synonymous. This differentiation was briefly highlighted in greater detail in Chapter 1 and can be seen in the non-violent pathways that extremist groups had undertaken in Indonesia. In this instance, even though groups such as FPI push the envelope towards the edge with

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438 Fajar Taslim, Interview with Author, Nusa Kambangan, 22 October 2013
440 James Khalil, “Radical Beliefs and Violence Actions Are Not Synonymous: How to Place the Key Disjuncture Between Attitudes and Behaviours at the Heart of Our Research into Political Violence,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,* Vol. 37, No. 2, 2014, p.198
moments of vigilantism amongst individual actors, the group as a collective minimally holds the position that it steers away from acts of terrorism.

The motivation and beliefs of the groups were explored in greater in Chapter 5 on the ideology of the group. The complex position of political Islam in Indonesia as highlighted in Chapter 3 showcases the manner through which terrorist and extremist groups have positioned themselves throughout the course of Indonesia’s history.

In the case study of Indonesia explored in this study, it is this very unique group and societal level influences that it posits that has a direct impact trajectories of violence undertaken by many of the groups in Indonesia. This is especially seen in the manner that religion plays a dominant role in what is a secular state, the politicisation of ideology and the role of influential leaders that move the group as a collective on the path of increased aggression and violence.

**Quest for Significance as Motivation: Escalation or Mitigation of Violence**

At the crux of the increased levels of violence is the role of identity and a quest for significance of not only the individual who aims to make a difference in the world, but additionally a quest for significance of the group who see their work as part of a larger plan to establish the rule of God in earth. Often enough the “relationships within the terrorist group - the interplay of commitment, risk, solidarity, loyalty, guilt, revenge, and isolation-discourage terrorists from changing the direction they have taken.”

Kruglanski and Orehek emphasize that “a perceived loss of significance to the groups to which a person belongs may motivate a similar quest for significance restoration.” As such they posit that “individuals who define themselves according to their group memberships would be more supportive of aggression against out-groups, including the use of terrorism.”

The perceived notion of the in-group and the out-group in this instance plays a crucial role in the manner through which the groups not only see themselves but also members of the out-group as well. In this instance,

“collectivism is associated with greater support for terrorism. There does not seem to be any difference between the collective of a nation and the collective of a religion in supporting violence. Both groups represent potential sources of social identity. When individuals view themselves according to such group memberships, it increases the likelihood that they will be supportive of the use of violence, including when the violence is aimed at civilian targets.”

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441 Martha Crenshaw, p. 396-397
444 Kruglanski, A. W., and Orehek, E. (2011). The role of the quest for personal significance in
The support of a ‘group tent’ as Kumar Ramakrishna notes is an essential element in the manner through which groups embark on a quest to defend their own through violence in support what he calls an existential identity anxiety. Using Moghaddam’s framework, Ramakrishna notes that there are three factors that underscore the notion of identity – the individual identity, the group identity and the collective identity.

An almost primordial sentiment wherein,

“personal goals and group identities are perceived as relatively deprived, efforts to restore personal significance should be enacted. When the deprivation is perceived to be unjust, a culprit can be identified, and violence can be justified; only then are we likely to see terrorism pursued as a means of restoring significance.”

It will hence restore significance to the group and explore means through which the significance of the group as a collective is brought to greater heights through the achieving its stated objectives, in particular the heralding of a new era of Islamic civilisation.

**Parameters of Action: Subtleties of Jihad and I’dad**

Throughout this discourse to a large extent the choices undertaken by terrorist and extremist groups revolves around the use of or potential use of violence in order to achieve their stated objectives. “Most members of these organizations have revealed that they all agree that militant jihad means justified use of violence against the enemies of Islam, but there is no solid agreement among themselves over when and how to use it.”

Mohamed Achwan, the head of JAT now that Ustaz Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in imprisoned for his role in the Aceh Training Facility in 2010, attempts to draw a subtle distinction between groups who engage in violent extremism through Jihad and those whom he notes are performing i’dad, or preparation for war. These parameters of action albeit subtle have had an impact on not only how the groups are perceived by cadre on the ground, but perhaps more importantly they chart the future direction of the group as a collective.

“We (the community) have actually been under physical attack from the police’s anti-terror squad Detachment 88. Those who can fight back are permitted to use violence as long as they have the necessary resources and capabilities. For those who do not yet have the necessary resources to wage violent confrontation, they should wait and remain patient as their time will come. The battle still has a long


Ibid

Kumar Ramakrishna, Radical Pathways, p.33


Mohamed Achwan’s statement above in 2010 came at time where there was much discussion amongst the terrorist and extremist community on what constituted fighting in the way of God in order to achieve the aspiration of an Islamic State. These subtle distinctions have been at times the defining factor between groups. For terrorist groups in Indonesia, who might have decided to take a step back in the exercising violence in order to meet the stated objectives through i’dad or preparation for war are presented with a conundrum. These groups face the tension of wanting to be seen simultaneously as strong and decisive in the manner in which they are furthering the aim of their respective groups as a collective. The use of violence in this instance can be seen as a proactive step undertaken by a group in order to achieve what they would have envisaged as a decisive victory at the end. Certainly while the use of violence in it of itself is seen to be a decisive, by comparison i’dad to members of other groups such as JI after 2007, in the aftermath of many of their key leadership being caught was seen as a milder approach that may not deliver results with the desired speed. It provided an avenue through which the groups could recuperate from their losses and re-establish themselves through recruitment and preparation for a time that they envisage will arise.

GROUP CONNECTION: INFLUENCING THE LEVEL OF GROUP VIOLENCE

In the earlier section to a large extent the leadership of the groups such as JI and JAT determined the path of Jihad or i’dad undertaken by their respective groups based on their assessment of whether they thought if the groups possessed the necessary resources to attain victory. Whether the path of Jihad or i’dad was chosen, it ultimately influenced the level of violence and the direction of the group as a collective. This section highlights individuals who held positions of influence who through their connections with their group inadvertently influenced the intensity of violence that was eventually undertaken by the group.

Umar Patek and the Group Connection: Contribution of Skills

Umar Patek reminisced that he was initial introduced to the movement through a friend from his village Dulmatin. In 1991, both Umar Patek and Dulmatin left their village in Indonesia in search of work in Malaysia. In Malaysia they had met with a friend of Dulmatin’s - Mukhlas. Mukhlas otherwise also known by his alias Ali Gufron was a senior member of JI and was sentenced to death on 2 October 2003 for his role in the Bali Bombings. Umar Patek noted that he merely followed his friend Dulmatin on the journey to Afghanistan; both their tickets and visas were arranged by

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Mukhlás. Dulmatin later would go on to become a senior member of JI. Dulmatin was killed on 9 March 2010 in a raid in Pamulang after his role in the organisation of a military training facility in Aceh.

Umar Patek noted that when he was in Afghanistan in approximately 1991, JI had not even existed. Aburrahman Ayub, former Head of JI’s Mantiqi 4, which was tasked to oversee operations in Australia noted that while in Afghanistan, Dulmatin and Umar Patek specialised in chemical and biological agents under Zulkarnaen. Zulkarnaen who is still on the run was from the first batch of Indonesians to be sent to Afghanistan was known to be a linguist. Ayub noted that whilst in Afghanistan for Southeast Asians, Zulkarnaen was Number 2 in the hierarchy right after Osama Bin Laden and his skillset outweighs key operatives that have been caught including that of Hambali. Scott Atran credits Zulkarnaen as the individual that who shifted the trajectory of violence not only through his position of influence within JI but additionally as the person who had convened the meetings in the lead up to the Bali Bombings.

On his role in the Bali Bombing, Umar Patek added that he was not privy to the discussions that had taken place and his role in the bombings was to assist in the mixing of the bombs that were to be used. Ayub separately notes that with Dulmatin's demise and the arrest of Umar Patek, the operational ability of JI was reduced drastically. Just as Umar Patek followed Dulmatin and his path converged with that of JI operatives, Umar Patek admitted that after his return from Afghanistan, he went on to join the conflict in the Philippines later in 2002. He went to assist in the Philippines after was invited by Filipinos whom he had met at the training camps in Afghanistan. His Filipino friends had told him about the dire straits of the Moros and asked him to assist in them in the Philippines. In Umar Patek’s opinion, the conflict in the Philippines was similar to that of the situation in Palestine and as such he felt an obligation to assist in the struggle. Umar Patek cemented his relationship with the movements in the Philippines through his marriage with a Filipino woman.

Umar Patek’s unique skillsets contributed to the use and sustenance of violence by groups both in Indonesia and the Philippines in part because of the friendship he shared with Dulmatin and Filipino operatives he had met in Afghanistan. In the Philippines, operatives such as Umar Patek reinvigorated the threats posed by terrorist groups there through their ability to pass on their skills in bomb making and ammunition amongst others that they had acquired from their own background and

449 Umar Patek, Interview with Author, Indonesia, 21 September 2013; See also Court Indictment, High Court of the Republic of Indonesia, Umar Patek, Case Number: NO.REG.PERK: PDM-1953/KTBRT/Ep.2/12/2011
450 Umar Patek, Interview with Author, Indonesia, 21 September 2013
451 Aburrahman Ayub, Interview with Author, Indonesia, 20 September 2014
453 Umar Patek, Interview with Author, Indonesia, 21 September 2013
454 Aburrahman Ayub, Interview with Author, Indonesia, 20 September 2014
455 Umar Patek, Interview with Author, Indonesia, 21 September 2013
experiences. This had resulted in the increased level of violence of the groups even in the Philippines in due course. Back in Indonesia, there were only a select few who were able to put together the bombs. Even is he was not closely tied to other members of JI or DI/NII, his skillsets enabled the group to put together some of the worst attacks of terrorism in the history of Indonesia and even Southeast Asia such as the Bali Bombings.

**Hambali and the Group Connection: Contribution through Networks**

The earlier Chapters explored Hambali’s considerable influence within JI and the manner in which Hambali capitalised on the 1998 Fatwa by Osama Bin Laden. This Chapter explores Hambali’s unique connection with the group. Hambali’s position in JI granted him unobstructed access to the networks that he needed in order to achieve his goal. It placed him in prime position to influence the direction of terrorist and extremist groups operating in Indonesia.

In 1999, the Rabitatul Mujahideen or the League of Holy Warriors was established as a “focal point for coordinating activities between Al Qaida, JI/MMI, and Al Qaida cells in Myanmar, Aceh and Thailand.” In JI played a crucial role in setting up and coordinating meetings amongst the secret alliance that was made up of the senior most members from the various organisations. As Head of Mantiqi 1, as noted in the earlier Chapters, Hambali had considerable autonomy. However as secretary-general of Rabitatul Mujahideen, Hambali was in prime position as a nodal point connecting networks not only in Indonesia, but the Southeast Asia region as a whole. Slowly but surely, Hambali began to build a reputation as a field commander that people began to trust and could depend on.

**McCauley and Moskalenko’s Group Radicalisation in Indonesia**

Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko’s 12 Mechanisms Radicalisation specifically draw attention to the role of group radicalisation. At different levels, all 10 groups in Indonesia have experienced each stage of McCauley and Moskalenko’s Group Radicalisation.

**Solidarity and Cohesion through Isolation**

The group firstly already has present a heightened sense of cohesion and solidarity that groups naturally build amongst its members when they come under isolation and threat. This sense of isolation and threat was a consistent message that was reinforced not only amongst members of JI but it could be seen across all the ten groups explored in this study in general. Groups such as JI for instance built this sense of cohesion through the perception that the reinforced message to the members as it

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was stated in the PUPJI that they it was a secret organisation – *Tandzim Sirri*. MIT for instance, is presently on the run with its leader Santoso issuing calls for solidarity amongst members through YouTube videos. The secrecy that shrouded many of these groups helped promote a sense of group cohesion and emphasis of a community of believers who had come together to protect not only the group but also the religion. It was a double calling, one that was to protect the brotherhood of the group but simultaneously laced with a higher calling to protect the faithful believers.

*Same Bases of Support*

The competition for the same base of support\(^\text{459}\) meant that was prevalent on three levels. At the first level was the competition for support amongst members of the community in general. In this instance, since terrorists and extremists come from the same population, government agencies continue to try to win the hearts and minds of the masses against terrorist and extremist discourse. There is an intrinsic competition amongst both the non-state actor and the state as a result.

At a second level is the competition amongst terrorist and extremist groups themselves. In Indonesia where the aims and ideologies of the groups are so similar as explored in Chapter 5 the tendency would be sometime the ability of members to be convince by leadership on reasons for staying within a group due to it entrenched ideology. The fluidity of membership between and amongst groups reiterated this challenge that the groups face in maintaining members. This tension is exacerbated by the fact that often enough the groups splinter to form new groups, with the sole difference being the manner in which the groups aim to achieve the end game. The group linkages diagram below presents a table indicating the connections between and amongst the groups. The linkages diagramme below presents in a table the connection between the 10 groups explored in this study. The red dots represent strong connections between groups. The blue dots represent the inherent connection between DI and NII. The clear dots represent the connections that are void because the groups are compared against the same organisation. Most of the groups have members who have connections with the groups that were formed earlier in history of terrorist and extremist movements in Indonesian such as LJ, DI, NII, JI and MMI.

At the third level is the competition for the same base of support from within the group. In this case, more established groups such as JI through the autonomy granted to the leadership of a mantiqi, each regionally based division meant competition amongst them. In this instance the leader of mantiqi 1, Hambali possessed much clout through his linkages and position not only within the organisation but also as a nodal point within the region. He had the ability to draw members from the other mantiqis who would want to assist in the operations that he had planned.

At all three levels the competition for same bases of support meant that the group attempted overt measures as a means to draw support from the same community. In this instance the increased levels of violence was a means through which the groups were able to showcase the difference means through which they attempted to achieve their stated objectives in as short a time frame as possible. While extremist groups such as HTI and FPI in particular pushed this envelope to the edge, the terrorist groups in Indonesia tended to escalate their levels of violence with the assumption that this would translate to their objectives being met quickly. Given that the general objectives of the groups were to establish Islamic law and an Islamic state, the objectives have not been met as of yet.

**Gaining Sympathy When State Uses Force**

As a direct response to the violence used by the terrorist and extremist groups, states embark on policies to use increased levels of force in their response mechanisms against terrorist and extremist groups. Indonesia was no different. The formation of the Detachment 88, Indonesia’s elite counter terrorism taskforce was formed in the aftermath of the Bali Bombings in 2002. McCauley and Moskalenko refer to the third stage of group radicalisation as *condensation*. In this instance, as a result of the increased level of force used by the state apparatus to counter terrorist groups, the groups thereafter capitalised on this very increased use of force to gain sympathy from the community.

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460 The group linkages diagramme is based on group profiles from the ICPVTR Global Pathfinder Database.

In Indonesia, this is perhaps seen most evidently in the rational provided by the terrorist movement in Indonesia to shift their target spectrum. Prior to 2009, the terrorist groups in particular targeted what they often referred to as the far enemy. In this instance the target of the groups were the an extended notion of the West, iconic representations of the West include amongst others the attack on the Bali Bombings, Australian Embassy and the JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton Hotel. After the capture of key operatives and the strong clamp down on the groups in 2009 in the aftermath of last major attack of the JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton Hotel in 2009, the groups began to expand their targets to include what they had referred to as the near enemy namely, government officials in particular police and law enforcement that they referred to as thought. The group began to propagate that the shift in target from the far enemy to that of the near enemy was as a result of the attack by law enforcement who were seen to be acting both in collusion and on behalf of the West in order to attack the holy warriors who were attempting to further the course of Islam.

A group with a strong disdain for law enforcement who overtly attempted to gain sympathy from the masses is the MIT. For instance in a 2013 YouTube video, the group issued an open challenge to Detachment 88, Indonesia’s elite counter terrorism taskforce. The message below was shown in the video and translated by the Terrorism Analysis and Research Consortium (TRAC).

"Let Indonesian People know, who is the real Detachment 88 Anti-Terror...!!! They are just money eater people with the Combating Terrorism reason, they themselves who made the Terror, to be seen of it is true there are terrorists, and that all their cunning sense that gets rank and position, at the expense of the Nation People who don’t know the issues and be fooled by them. In fact we were the Mujahideen should they have to resist, but it turns out they only dare to fight unarmed. Therefore, we are open to CHALLENGING Detachment 88 Anti Terror to Fight. Don’t you capture weak people again, resist us...!!! WE WAIT YOUR ARRIVAL...!!! Challenges such letter was made in good faith. In the Name Commander of Mujahideen in Eastren Indonesia Abu Mus’ab Al-Zarqawi Al-Indunesi ABU WARDAH aka SANTOSO aka ABU YAHYA Allahu Akbar."

On 22 April 2014, in a call to Muslims to defend Poso, Santoso in yet another speech on YouTube urged Indonesians to take to the streets and demonstrate against the Indonesian government. Referring to the situation in Indonesia, he noted that Muslims should stay away from Detachment 88 whom he deemed as enemies of the community. Subsequently in a message released on 30 June 2014 MIT has pledged allegiance to Abu Bakar Al Baghdadi and to the Islamic State. In the message, they pledged to, “hear and to obey both in happy and difficult circumstances, in a state of likes and dislikes, in all cases except to do wrong to Allah Ta’ala.” The video by the MIT Press goes on to definitively state MIT’s support for Abu Bakar Al Baghdadi.

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463 2014 Youtube

“O our noble Shaiykh, know that every mujahidin here with you, loves you, supports you, and makes you as a leader and role model in jihad fi sabiililaah in our area. And we all here in East Indonesia are soldiers of yours, your pivot man, and stone cantilever of the Daulah Islamiyah that you lead, that the Daulah full of blessings that it influenced into every soul, whom Allah Ta’ala opened their heart to accept al haq with sincerity at every place and every time”.

MIT went from disdain for the state and the overt attempts by the group to gain the sympathy of the masses and progressing onto a path where the group pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The use of the mass media and in particular YouTube as a means to put forth their messages reiterates their underlying intention to reach out to as many people as possible. The attempts to gain sympathy from the masses is further reinforced by images of the leadership in MIT on the run and in jungles whilst delivering the messages of their aspiration for an Islamic State in Indonesia. It is an emotive picture that highlights the sacrifice that is allegedly made by the group on behalf of the larger Muslim community.

Fissures Amongst Group Members

The last stage in McCauley and Moskalenko’s group radicalisation refers to the fissures amongst group members arising from competition from within the group. The fissures amongst groups can be explored on three levels. At the first level is the in-group competition that resulted in the splintering of the groups. In this instance the split amongst group members is seen in a more tangible fashion through the formation of a new group with a distinct division from the older group. This was explored in greater detail in Chapter 5 of this study through the (ideological) split of DI/NII and JI and later of the split from MMI to JAT. At this level the in-group competition and problems that subsequently arose from this resulted in the formation of newer groups that were considerably more violent than its predecessors.

At a second level is fissure amongst group members without a tangible split in the groups in it of itself. In the case of JI for instance, this was most noticeable in the fissures amongst members of the various mantiqis or regionally based subdivisions as a result of the power imbalance between the regional subdivisions. Mantiqi 1 possessed a disproportionate amount of power by comparison with many of its members opting to follow in a path of escalated violence. As noted in the Chapter 6, the raw ambition of several members who were in positions of power steered the group on a pathway of escalated violence. In this case, while JI as a group did not split, there was an intangible split in manner though which the various regional subdivisions engaged with the larger ideology of the group.

At a third level, perhaps on the scale of a movement, the fissures and in-group competition can be seen in the formation of the newer terrorist groups over the past five years. These include AQI and MIT. The larger movement as a whole possess a similar aim to establish Islamic Law and an Islamic State in Indonesia. The newer groups can be see to have surfaced broadly as a result of in-group competition in the

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movement fuelled by a desire to achieve the end game with considerable speed. The new groups such as AQI and MIT in particular were particularly violent in the methods undertaken by the group as a collective.

**BUILT TO LAST: THE VALUE OF GROUP COHESION**

*Cohesion based on Group Loyalty*

Group loyalty is the cornerstone of any group. It is rooted in not only a sense of belonging to the group and renders those within the group with a sense of identity that they would need to support and defend as part of their agreed upon loyalty to the group. This is not an exception for terrorist and extremist groups. Group loyalty is a treasured commodity that terrorist groups especially prize. As explored in greater detail in Chapter 1 of the study, terrorist groups at its crux aim to create political change. Group loyalty as such will not only ensure that the plan of the group *(typically a non-state actor)* to create political change *(against a state-actor)* is kept secret but it also mitigates potential defection from within the ranks of the group. The group’s sense of loyalty thus bolsters its future course of action as it moves towards its aims and objectives. Group loyalty can be a force that propels and thrusts the group to action without sparing any expense.

“(O)ne important psychological and behavioral force contributing to group stability and integrity is a member’s *group loyalty*, the desire to forgo attractive alternatives for group membership. Loyalty is a complex, multifaceted construct, consisting of emotive, cognitive, as well as behavioral elements. For example, loyalty may be manifested through the experience of strong, positive emotions (happiness, joy, empathy) associated with group membership.”

**Role of the Bai’ah**

In Chapter 6, the role of the *Bai’ah* as used by leadership as a form of divine sanction was explored. While the religious undertones convey a sense of the divine, the role of the *bai’ah* as a social binder of the group renders it altogether a more important facet when one focuses on group dynamics. It reiterates the bonds and cements the sense of affiliation that members have with the group. For members of JI for instance the group loyalty is sealed with an oath of allegiance or *bai’ah* to the leader of the group. In essence the Bai’ah is “an oath of loyalty. Whoever makes bai’ah agrees to submit his entire life to the leader and the ummah. He will not act against the leader in agreed matters, and will be loyal to him in every action, regardless of his personal likes or dislikes.” At the heart, the *bai’ah* would inspire loyalty amongst the group. The religious language of the *bai’ah* would to an extent affect an individual where defecting from the leadership brings along with it such guilt as it is looked upon as turning away from the individual’s affiliation to religion as well. One oath that envelopes a sense of belonging to both the terrorist or extremist group and the faith.

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In JI where the oath of allegiance was very much documented, some members as noted in Chapter 6 embraced the oath as almost a baptism into the group’s code of conduct. As much as the bai‘ah is steeped in a sense of religiosity, other JI members such as Ghoni had downplayed its importance within the realm of the group. For Ghoni, he noted that his joining JI,

“was nothing formal”\(^{468}\)

for others they recalled it as merely being just a handshake and a promise.

The community affiliation can be seen in the manner in which “people form groups and behave towards one another as members of groups which find themselves, or perceived to be in a great variety of relationships.”\(^{469}\) The oath of allegiance presently acts not only as a binding force and additionally as a lens through which members would be able to see themselves and others around them.

**Cohesion Based on Established Structures: PUPJI and the Group**

The sense of group loyalty and through social identification and social cohesion was additionally seen through the criteria of *Al Qoidah Al-Sholbah* – core group that would form the basis of the organisation as stipulated in the PUPJI. At an organisational level, “(1) There is solidarity and bonding among personnel (2) There is a high concern towards collective work (3) There is high endurance in collective work (4) (Members) Possess high organisational discipline (5) A prime social group”\(^{470}\) At the heart of the what JI saw as its core group was strength in the collective. This cohesion was cemented in the ideological and operational manual of JI. John Turner notes that,

> “Individuals assigned to groups on a random basis probably tend to assume that they must have something in common or automatically invent or infer common group characteristics from the available information. At the very least they would have information about one exemplary group member, themselves, from which to derive inferences about the characteristics of the group as a whole.”\(^{471}\)

If one considers most of these terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia for example, for most of them, there were not assigned to these groups on a random basis. However in the course of building ties, they have found commonalities within the group that has continued to inspire their activities and propelled many of them to identify with the collective vision of the group, to establish an Islamic State.

\(^{468}\) Ghoni, Interview with Author, Semarang, 3 October 2013


\(^{470}\) PUPJI, p.28

Martha Crenshaw’s early work aptly deduces the key facets that she sees is essential for group radicalisation when she adds, “We are not dealing with a situation in which certain types of personalities suddenly turn to terrorism in answer to some inner call. Terrorism is the result of a gradual growth of commitment and opposition, a group development that furthermore depends on government action.”

472 It is very much a reaction by an in-group that sees it’s self as chosen against an out-group that it sees as epitomising in this instance everything that is evil. Groups present not only a sense of affiliation, but perhaps at a more human level it provides comfort and the company of other like-minded individuals who are out to change the current status quo.

**Cohesion Based on a Common Cause: One Identity but Many Groups**

Despite the groups in Indonesia having many splinter organisations in recent years, the flattening out of hierarchies of the older groups and the development of newer splinter organisations in a short span of time such at AQI and MIT for instance emphasises the role of group even further. It is this very irony of the manifestation of one collective identity but the presence of a multiplicity of groups that Stuart Albert, Blake Ashforth and Jane Dutton allude to when they conclude that “as the environment becomes more ever more dynamic and complex, organisations become ever more organic.”

473 For the purposes of this study, rather than dismiss the importance of a group, what it does emphasize instead is that the presence of a multiplicity of groups has resulted in not only the sustenance of one group, but the movement as a collective. Although,

> “collective identities can be understood as (potentially) encompassing shared interests, ideologies, subcultures, goals, rituals, practices, values, worldview, commitment, solidarity, tactics, strategies, definitions of the ‘enemy’ or the opposition and framing of issues, it is not synonymous with and cannot be reduced to any of these things.”

As a whole, “collective identity scholarship has also shed light on why groups that on the surface seem to be compatible in terms of goals can nevertheless have problems building alliances.”

475 This aptly describes the threat landscape in Indonesia, in Chapter 3, the presence of a litany of terrorist and extremist groups were highlighted. Chapter 5 drew the attention to the marked similarities in the ideologies of the 10 groups explored in this study. A vast majority of these groups underscored the need for the establishment of an Islamic State. Even then, the presence of groups working together was not without its tensions as seen in the creation of the new group JAT and the presence of a multiplicity of splinter groups that have flourished since then.

472 Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” p. 396
Cohesion Based on Common Experiences

In building effective group cohesion, common experiences between members of the group contribute towards the creation of a cultural worldview that is then shared by the group. Cultural worldview “is defined as a set of beliefs about the nature of reality shared by groups of individuals that provides meaning, order, permanence, stability, and the promise of literal and/or symbolic immortality to those who live up to the standards of value set by the worldview.”  

In attempting to build a collective experience, many of the groups in Indonesia look towards the Middle East to draw inspiration and wisdom. Providing an example of how Tandzim Al-Qaeda Serambi Mekkah attempted to so draw inspiration from the Middle East, Ghozali noted that the group,

“aimed to have programmes all worldwide, while they were targeting Americans, they held in high esteem the Arab language and attempted to establish links with countries outside Indonesia either through visits or online via the Internet, they made attempts to sustain links with Afghanistan.”

A more tangible experience amongst many of the terrorist leadership in particular, and senior leadership in general were their experience in fighting in the Soviet-Afghan war. Their experiences in Afghanistan formed an indelible mark in the manner in which they would therein perceive the world. The experience they had in Afghanistan built a sense of solidarity and cohesion that many of them reminisce and share amongst themselves even until today. Today, while the members of the Afghan Alumni who have since completed their sentences, engage terrorist inmates and try to steer them away from a path of violence. Several members of the Afghan Alumni interviewed such as Jibril, Ustaz Kohar, Hidayat, Suahair and Jubair saw it as a personal undertaking due to the inherent assumption that their level of seniority in the organisation typically vis-à-vis their experiences in Afghanistan underscores their credibility. Hence while those interviewed came from different batches of those who were trained militarily in Afghanistan, collectively in brotherhood they almost fondly remember their journeys to and experiences in Afghanistan. Hence, their experiences in Afghanistan not only provided them with a common experience but a common identity under the banner of an expanded notion of a Southeast Asian Afghan Alumni, a network that spans beyond that of Indonesia alone. Like many of


477 Ghozali, Interview with Author

478 Jibril, Ustaz Kohar, Hidayat, Suahair and Jubair Interview with Author, Indonesia, 25 September 2013
those who had been sent to Afghanistan to train, their experiences were central in the formative process of both their own sense of identity as a person and perhaps more importantly their identity as part of a group as a collective. Their experiences Afghanistan provided the necessary credibility through their experiences of battling the enemy whilst being a *mujahideen* – a Holy Warrior. This experience in particular had set them apart from members of many of the newer groups that have surfaced in recent years. It is a distinction that many interviews shared with pride and nostalgia for both the interviews that were conducted in prison and for the interviews that were conducted with members who had since served their time and were released. The Afghan experience was an indelible mark on the personal journey of the individual and the collective combat experience of the group.

**CONCLUSION**

This Chapter explored the community affiliation of a group and its impact on group behavior through exploring the role of the individual within a group and second through the role of collectivism and its impact within and between groups. Highlighting the unique dynamics within terrorist groups that can influence change from non-violent extremism to terrorism through McCauley and Moskalenko’s factors in Group Radicalisation, the impact of group connections and the factors that facilitated the building of group cohesion amongst groups in Indonesia, the chapter traced the unique factors within a group that contributed to the unique pathways undertaken by them as they attempted to fulfill the stated objectives of the group.

The next and final chapter in this study will explore these the three key factors of ideology, leadership and group dynamics vis-à-vis community affiliation against the sustainability of the group in general and the impact of this study on future research in the field.
CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

“The difficulty lies not so much in developing new ideas
as in escaping old ones.”

John Maynard Keynes

The field of terrorism studies is fraught with complexity. The complex study of radicalisation is indeed both a fascinating yet vexing area of study. At the centre of this complexity is the Holy Grail - the quest to understand the processes of radicalisation and the factors that move and sustain a radical group along this course. This study builds on the work of scholars in the field who had worked on identifying the root causes of radicalisation. The process of radicalisation has a cascading impact on not only the individual and the group, but also the activities of the radical groups whose actions would eventually and inevitably affect the community as a whole. In the process of examining the 10 radical groups in Indonesia, the common denominators of ideology, leadership and group dynamics were identified based on the processes of radicalisation that have dominated the terrorism studies discourse.

Within the domain of terrorism studies, the human terrain remains a fundamental element in the process of radicalisation both within for the radicalisation of individuals as well as the radical pathways of groups. The difficulty in understanding the process of radicalisation lies buried amidst a synergy of factors that bring together several disciplines that can contribute towards the understanding of an on-going and topical area of research that has gain much attention in recent years. The challenge sometimes lies in the ability to connect the dots and to shed light on the areas that have just assumed to be conventional wisdom.

The study of radicalisation has at times been plagued with critique given that solutions are difficult to ascertain. As explored in Chapter 2, just as through the years, scholars have not been able to find a universal definition of terrorism and that has not prevented the field from growing in understanding of the threat of terrorism. Similarly this should not stop scholars from exploring and adding to the understanding of the process of radicalisation. All the more, there is a need to peel through the layers of a complex process that continues to puzzle scholars and practitioners alike. The study of radicalisation is entrenched in the root causes debate. This debate has been a steady undercurrent in the literary corpus of terrorism studies through the years.

In this study, examining 10 radical groups in Indonesia presents a varied vantage point by using the groups as a referent point in examining the process of radicalisation
and the sustenance of the group. The study shed light on common factors that provided the needed perspective whilst taking one step closer towards unearthing a synergy of factors that have influenced the radicalisation and subsequent courses of action – violent or otherwise undertaken by the diverse spectrum of groups in Indonesia selected in this study.

Exploring factors that initially contributed in the radicalisation of individuals on their journey of radicalisation towards violence has in turn shed light on the influence these very factors of ideology, leadership and group dynamics amongst the 10 groups examined. The exploring of 10 groups spanning across more than two decades provide added perspective on the unique threat landscape of terrorism and extremism in Indonesia. It additionally reinforces that in spite of the difference over the course of time and levels of radicalisation of the groups, the three factors of ideology, leadership and group dynamics were a common denominator between the groups. Bearing in mind the unique threat landscape in Indonesia as explored in Chapter 3 and coupled with the genesis and sustenance of the 10 groups selected. This study has contributed towards the understanding of driving factors behind the 10 groups explored.

The study began with a hypothesis that there are several forces of influence that nudge a radical group along the pathway of heightened radicalisation leading to terrorism. Extreme political ideology, the inspirational and dominant presence of influential leadership and a deep-seated group dynamics that influence the general developments of the group are amongst the factors are form the thrust that the group receives. These three nodal factors were explored in greater detail in the earlier chapters where the crucial role they played and the impact on the pathways of increased violence within the groups were explored. It is a paradox that the very factors of ideology, leadership and group dynamic that could have escalated the levels of violence of the 10 groups such as JI, JAT and MIT for instance through the course of time were the very reason why the levels of violence in groups were at times mitigated and event reduced instances such as LJ and HT to some extent.

When focusing on the individual as a referent, the study of radicalisation is typically seen as an exploration into the precursors of acts of terrorism of the individual. The aim therein is to explore and understand factors that would shed light on the way in which an individual can perhaps be stopped from joining a terrorist group or if the individual independently refrains from joining a terrorist group on their own accord. The hope was that through understanding the process of radicalisation, this would help nip the problem in the bud thereby reducing the propensity through which an individual would pursue activities that would lead them onto a path of terrorism.

In this study, the referent is the group. Hence with the group as a referent in the examination of the 10 radical groups as a collective, by extension, this would contribute towards the understanding of the journeys within radical groups and hence
shed light on the ways through which the group as a collective entity sustains itself through the very factors that herald the groups journey towards violence, back from violence or even in this case sustains the groups over the course of time. Understanding the manner through which terrorist groups sustain themselves through the years would shed light on the factors that can thereby be exploited within the parameters of the group that could ultimately cause the demise of the groups as a collective entity. Understanding the factors that contribute towards the escalation of violence in groups is pertinent not just to prevent one person on the path of violence but that of numerous individuals within groups.

**A JOURNEY FRAUGHT WITH TRIBULATION: OVERCOMING CHALLENGES**

Just as individuals made a considerable impact within the parameters of a groups and impacted the journeys of the group towards violence. The journey towards surfacing factors that have had a critical influence within the domain of groups is not without its own trials and tribulations. These challenges stem from the inherent obstacles within the literary corpus on terrorism research, the varying development of groups that were explored in this study and the necessity to embrace the existing puzzles within the process of radicalisation. The tribulation therein lies to acknowledge these obstacles and embrace these challenges as part of the subject matter explored amidst the search for a better understanding of the processes of group radicalisation.

*Limitations and Delimitations of the Study*

Beyond the time and spatial limitations of the study, there is an enduring limitation despite the best efforts in crafting the methodology. There remains an inherent difficulty in the ability to quantifying data when human respondents are central to the study, given the unpredictability of human behavior. In addition, the number of respondents who belonged to extremist groups that were non-violent was significantly fewer in numbers when compared to the interviews and questionnaires that members and former members of terrorist groups responded to. The imbalance albeit challenging was in part a result of the security climate wherein there is a deepseated fear that when documented, that they wn turn would be monitored.

Several of the groups that are being examined are not static and as a result there is need to be cognizant of the fluidity of the group’s dynamics vis-à-vis the outcome of the study. The dynamic nature of the threat of terrorism stemming from emerging patterns globally will have a ripple effect on the developments in Indonesia. Most recent is the ongoing developments in conflict in Iraq and Syria with the Islamic State (IS) and the problem of foreign fighters from Asia, in particular Indonesia. There is a need as such to embrace the limitations resulting from the evolving and fluid nature of the group as a necessary evil of a subject that is to be analysed.
Perception of Stagnation in Terrorism Research

The meandering course of terrorism research has been an area of great contestation and grave debate. The principal discussions and dominant themes in the field of terrorism studies were explored in greater detail in Chapter 1. Marc Sageman issued a rather scathing critique on what he perceived as a stagnation of terrorism research was based on the premise that there was a lack of research using primary source data and that the Intelligence Community dominated access on primary data. As such the inability of academia to come up with a definitive answer to the question ‘What leads a person to turn to political violence?’

The notion of increased level of violence is central to the discussions of this study. Alex Schmid defending the current state of terrorism research acknowledged that “the quality of research on terrorism has greatly improved in the last decade compared to the three decades before 9/11.” As such he opined that he did not see the stagnation that Marc Sageman had alleged was present. Max Taylor in defense of the current state of terrorism research asserted that “academic knowledge must always be privileged over practical intervention, because innovation and effective intervention if evidenced based depends upon knowledge generation, not the other way round.” Hence albeit Sageman was critical that no solution was found Taylor’s argument was anchored in the notion that academia’s primary function is as a generator of knowledge. As David H. Schanzer noted, while the success of the field in terrorism studies as a field of study should not be based on the ability to respond to one question, it is hoped that just like scholars before, this study will in its own way also “illuminate our understanding and guide our decision making in the perilous years to come.”

This study hope that in its own way, through its mixed methods of both quantitative and qualitative research based on interviews with terrorist and extremists provides insights through using primary source data. This study can contribute towards the understanding of an underexplored milieu of the group within the larger study of radicalisation and factors that sustain and influence the group’s dynamics.

Varying Levels of Development of the Terrorist and Extremist Groups in Indonesia

Chapter 3 explored the challenging role of political Islam in Indonesia and the burgeoning number of terrorist groups in Indonesia. In the process of conducting the study, the challenges that arose was two-fold. First there was the disproportionate level of literature that was present on the larger more developed groups such as LJ, DI, NII, JI, MMI and JAT. In comparison groups such as AQI and MIT that are

smaller and newer groups have arisen from the now metastasised threat of terrorism in Indonesia. The newer and smaller groups that have surfaced in recent years show a more violent face of terrorism in Indonesia with these groups espousing and threatening increasing levels of violence in order to achieve their stated objectives and aspirations. Second, as many of the groups in Indonesia that are explored in the course of this study are still operational and continue to evolve, the challenge therein lies in the ability to reflect as accurately as possible the current position of the group vis-à-vis the group radicalisation.

The varying development of groups and the disproportionate literature, present an understandable challenge. With the exception of LJ, the other groups are still operational and have members who form part of the intricate web of terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia. In an ever evolving terrorism threat landscape, this is a necessary challenge not only experience in this study but it also remains a challenge that has to be embraced in the field of terrorism studies writ large.

*Mysterious Puzzle of Radicalisation*

As explored in greater detail in Chapter 2, broadly the subject of radicalisation is situated within the larger root cause debate in terrorism studies. The factors identified under the root causes debate are more pronounced in radicalisation pathways of individuals. The radicalisation pathway of groups on the other hand, operates under the premise that the group is already established. It can almost be loosely considered the second tier of the radicalisation debate. The fact that individual have been pulled towards joining groups presupposes the presence of pull and push factors that influence the individuals journey towards the group. Once they are part of the group, the individual is subject to the push factors of the group’s political ideology, the group’s strength of dominant and influential leadership and the group’s community affiliations and its subsequent impact on the group’s dynamics. These were expounded upon in greater detail in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 respectively.

Chapter 2 explored in detail both the root causes debate that dominate the field and the puzzle of radicalisation based on radicalisation models from the 1980s until 2014. This study identified four phases through which the numerous radicalisation models and conceptual frameworks explored set an individual on a path of terrorism. This study was not aimed at finding the silver bullet and decoding the puzzle of radicalisation of the individual. Whilst the process of radicalisation of an individual still remains a puzzle, the processes of what sustained and inspired a group as a collective entity on the other hand has been an area that has not been explored in greater detail, in part due to the difficulty in accessing the subjects who would be able to provide insight into the dynamics and the experience of the members of terrorist and extremist groups. This study’s provides a foray into an area that has been challenging but has provided insights based on primary resource - the very subjects of study that would be able to provide the experiences from within the group, both the leadership and members of both terrorist and extremist groups. What this study aimed to do from the start was to identify factors that would influence the dynamics within
the group that results in increased radicalisation or even leading up to heightened violence in a group.

Based on the core themes that dominated the processes of radicalisation over approximately the last three decades, as showcased in the numerous radicalisation models and conceptual frameworks in Chapter 2, three factors whose presence greatly influence the journey of radicalisation in Indonesia were identified. The three factors namely, the role of ideology, role of influential leadership and role of community affiliation within the group were explored against the increased violence of the groups in Indonesia. As the study has shown, these factors have in the past and will in the future continue to influence groups in Indonesia, moving them on a trajectory of increased violence over time.

**A Journey through Time: Indonesia’s Unique Threat Landscape**

Indonesia’s permissive environment and the unique and tenuous role of political Islam has been dominated the field since the 1940s. The complexity in managing Political Islam through the years has been challenging. In Chapter 2 these complexities were shown in greater detail. “Ultimately, it is the combined impact of a number of factors that pushes and pulls someone into becoming a terrorist, and these factors will vary depending on the culture, the social context, the terrorist group and the individual involved.”483

The case study of Indonesia is no different. The difficulties that were entrenched in history, the evolving global threat of terrorism and a permissive security environment at present have kept the radical groups alive. The journey through Indonesia’s history coupled with the factors that helps in the sustenance of the 10 radical groups is a pertinent area of study in order to understand how to mitigate the threat of terrorism especially in Indonesia in the long term.

**A Journey through Cobbled Lanes: Survival and Success of Terrorist Groups**

For terrorist and extremist groups in general, the ability of the group to survive and succeed is the two most important goals that the group possesses. The aims and ideology of the group was discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. The sustenance of the group and the ability of the groups to survive in Indonesia are testament to the resilience of the group and its desire to survive. Counter terrorism operations against the groups coupled with the strong security parameters that have been built by an intricate network of agencies working in cooperation international community has increased the pressures faced by terrorist and extremist groups on their ability to

survive. For most terrorist groups this would involve escaping the state apparatus. Similarly for most extremist groups the challenges would be to avoid being caught in the security net that has been put in place to prevent acts of terrorism.

In seminal study by RAND on How Terrorist Groups End, Jones and Libicki examined 648 terrorist groups that existed between 1968 and 2006. They identified “five major ways in which terrorist groups end: policing, military force, splintering, politics, or victory.”484 Their study found that based on the terrorist groups studied, there were two primary ways in which terrorist groups ended dominated. These principal reasons were that the groups either “decide to adopt nonviolent tactics and join the political process, or local law-enforcement agencies arrest or kill key members of the group.”485 In the course of explaining the manner through which terrorist groups usually ended, Jones and Libicki identified five explanatory variables that could influence ultimately either the sustenance or demise of the group. The five factors were “ideological motivation, economic conditions, regime type, the size of groups, and the breadth of terrorist goals.”486 This study expands on the five factors that were raised by Jones and Libicki as factors that would influence how long a group lasts and adds to the list of factors the role of group dynamics. The unique confluence of a politicised ideology, presence of influential leadership and group dynamics have ensured that groups survived over the test of time.

In Indonesia, as shown in Chapter 5, the similarity in the ideological motivation and the similarity in the goals between and amongst the groups in instituting Islamic Law and an Islamic state is shared amongst almost all the groups in Indonesia. The economic conditions of the country and the presence of Pancasila as the core tenet of the regime has influenced to some extent the reasons why individuals joined the groups. These were explored in greater detail in Chapter 7. The size of the groups varies with the more established groups, as noted earlier having a more elaborate hierarchy but with the smaller groups threatening a greater intensity of violence in order to achieve their stated objectives.

Jerold Post aptly highlights the importance of group identity within the workings of a terrorist organisation as it emphasises the social context within which groups exists within society.

“The importance of collective identity and the processes of forming and transforming collective identities cannot be overemphasized. This fact in turn emphasizes the socio-cultural context, which determines the balance between collective identity and individual identity. Terrorists have subordinated their individual identity to the collective identity, so that what serves the group, organization, or network is of primary importance.”487

484 Jones and Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qaeda, RAND Cooperation, 2008, p. 9
485 Ibid, p. 9
486 Ibid, p. 15
The group dynamics in this instance could explain the sustenance of the groups through the sense of camaraderie built from training in Afghanistan, an intricate network of family, brotherhood and kinship and strength of leadership to provide the necessary direction for the groups. In the absence of these factors that move the group towards violence. The economic and other social factors including existing regime type will remain but factors that affect all walks of Indonesian society and not terrorist and extremist groups alone. The confluence of the three factors provide the foundations upon which group dynamics is built and the group sustain themselves through the course of time.

Sustenance of terrorist groups

In a separate but influential study, the Global Transnational Terrorist Project in as early as 2006 studied the rise of the militant minority in JI and admittedly this “militant minority study is important because it demonstrates empirically that terrorist organizations are not always unified, hierarchical organizations that remain static over time.” 488 Benjamin Acosta highlights that the survival and sustenance of a group over time does not necessarily translate to the group succeeding and achieving its stated objectives.

“Although many militant organizations survive for long periods of time, carry out numerous attacks, or even accomplish various tactical and symbolic feats, only a few organizations succeed in achieving the goals that spawned and justify their existence.” 489

Acosta identifies four general pathways that militant groups take in order to achieve success, the first is to remain be active against the state actor until a political solution is met, second is the achievement of a decisive military victory, third the militants attempt a quick victory against a weaker opponent and finally by just waiting for the current state of affairs to change. 490 Ultimately the “differences in the operating conditions of adversary type, external support structure, and receptiveness to tradeoff explain why many militant organizations survive for long periods of time yet only a few achieve the goals that justify their existence.” 491 Martha Crenshaw noted that while a,

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“group might splinter into two new groups or merge with another group; the original group would formally “end” but terrorism would not. In other words, the collapse of a group and the end of terrorism are not necessarily the same thing.”

Crenshaw’s assessment has held true over the course of time. In the case study of Indonesia, this could not have been truer. In Chapter 3, the number of terrorist and extremist groups that have gained considerable prominence in Indonesia over the last seven decades. Chapter 5 showcased the ideology of the groups in Indonesia over time. The metastases of the groups in Indonesia reiterate the fact that although several groups may have come and gone, and faded into the background, the threat of terrorism in Indonesia continues unabated. Louise Richardson similar explores a similar theme on the difficulty on winning the war on terrorism. Indonesia has seen the demise of groups such as LJ the group, however, former members then today are part of groups that present a more virulent threat in Indonesia.

**JOURNEY TOWARDS THE THREAT MATRIX: NON-VIOLENT EXTREMISM TO TERRORISM**

The factors that influence a group’s movement from extremism to terrorism form but one part of the whole equation. The threat matrix looks as shown in the methodology diagramme and Figure 2 in Chapter 3 show three factors that need to converge in order for a terrorist attack to occur. Whilst the groups all by and large possess the necessary intention, their training within the group or in the case of the Afghan alumni and perhaps the alumni at present from Syria and Iraq would equip them with the necessary skills and capability, but the third factor needs to be present – the opportunity. The opportunity in this instance refers to the chance that can be capitalised and a gap in the security framework that the group can exploit in order to conduct an act of terrorism.

While the journey is fraught with challenges of sustenance and survival, the ability to conduct an act of terrorism is dependent on an opportune moment that they can then capitalise on. If there is a final moment that the group can be stopped from making that leap – it is the moment when these three factors converge. However more often than not, by this point it would be too late.

**CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIELD OF COUNTER TERRORISM**

This study aims to question the inherent assumption within existing literature on radicalisation that the factors that drive the radicalisation of individuals and the factors that drive the radicalisation of groups from non-violent ideological extremism to terrorism are one and the same. In an examination of the 10 radical groups, this study has shown that the very factors that often influences the radicalisation of

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individuals on the pathway of terrorism – ideology, charismatic leadership and community affiliation through group dynamics also in turn influence the course of action of groups as a whole.

The strength of this study lies in its use of primary source research through interviews of terrorist and extremist leaderships and an extensive survey that terrorist and extremist members responded to in order to substantiate its findings and shed light on the unique processes of group radicalisation. Interviews with the detainees in Indonesia form an integral part of the primary research data. The detainees offered unique insights into the nature of group dynamics as well as their impressions on persons that they felt held the reins of power in their respective organisations. The insights from the detainees have proven crucial in the ability to glean insight into the reasons behind the movement of groups to heightened trajectories of violence. The findings are sound and add value to a topical area in the field of terrorism studies.

The findings will help the terrorism practitioners better understand the nuanced nature of the threat landscape in Indonesia. This will enable a more enlightened understanding of terrorist groups not only in Asia but in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa as well. The broad similarities of terrorist groups, including the presence of alienated margins, charismatic leaders, nature of recruitment and sustained ideological infrastructures will enable the findings of the study to resonate deeply with efforts to understand the radical pathways of groups. As a corollary to that, this study will add to the understanding of the process of radicalisation vis-à-vis the ongoing work in the International Relations sub-field of security studies.

Future research can be undertaken to explore other factors in the group that would sustain the group and inspire action from within. Separately, a larger cross section of respondents could be sought not only to provide balance to the opinions of member from terrorist groups, but a study could be done to tease the finding from existing surveys further wherein the discussion on the themes raised would be explored in a more detailed manner.

As a whole, this study will additionally enable the policy community to formulate new and better policies to enhance strategies to counter terrorism and extremism through a better understanding of the factors from within that lead and inspire radical groups into violent extremism.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A

INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED

Academia

1. Munir Mulkhan, University of Indonesia, School of Social and Religious Studies, Interview with Author, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 26 May 2013

2. Zuly Qodir, Faculty of Social Studies, Gadjah Madah University, Interview with Author, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 30 May 2013

3. Sugeng, Muhammadiyah University, Political Science, Interview with Author, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 29 May 2013

4. Sarlito Wirawan, Senior Psychologist, University of Indonesia, Interview with Author, Jakarta, Indonesia, 1 July 2013

5. Hamdi Muluk, Professor, Department of Psychology, University of Indonesia, Interview with Author, Jakarta, Indonesia, 1 July 2013

6. Irfan Idris, Professor, Head of Deradicalisation, National Counter Terrorism Agency, Interview with Author, Jakarta, Indonesia, 27 June 2013 and 1 July 2013

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7. Maj. Gen. Agus Surya Bakti, Deputy Head, Prevention Affairs, National Counter Terrorism Agency, Interview with Author, Jakarta, Indonesia, 1 July 2013

8. General (Purn) A.M. Hendropriyono, Former Head of National Intelligence Agency, Interview with Author, Jakarta, Indonesia, 1 July 2013

9. Irjen Pol Drs. Tito Karnavian, Interview with Author, Jakarta, Indonesia, 20 September 2014

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10. Ustadz Jaffar Umar Thalib, Head, Laskhar Jihad

11. Ismail Yusanto, Spokesperson, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia

12. Ustadz Kiyahin, Co-Chairperson, Front Pembela Islam

13. Badri Hartono, Head, Al Qaeda in Indonesia

14. Umar Patek, Instructor, linked with Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Bali Bombing and arrested in Abbotabad Pakistan, Ring Banten, Jemaah Islamiyah
15. Nassir Abbas, Head of Mantiqi 3 and military training division, Jemaah Islamiyah
16. Zarkasih, Caretaker Head, Jemaah Islamiyah
17. Abu Dujana, Head of Askari Sariyah, Military Wing, Jemaah Islamiyah
18. Sapto, Arrested for involvement in the Aceh Training Facility
19. Ustaz Ambrori, Radical Cleric, Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid
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25. Suhairi, Military Training in Afghanistan, 7th Batch, Negara Islam Indonesia and Jemaah Islamiyah
26. Jubair, Military Training in Afghanistan, 7th Batch, Negara Islam Indonesia and Jemaah Islamiyah
27. Ghozali, Ideologue, involved in CIMB Bank Robberies Tanzim Al Qaeda Serambi Mekkah and Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid
28. Abu Tholud, Head of JI’s Mantiqi III, a member of JI’s central command and Special Forces Jemaah Islamiyah, Tandzim Al Qaeda Serambi Mekkah, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid
29. Sawad, Recruitment, Jemaah Islamiyah
30. Ghoni, Jemaah Islamiyah operative who played a central role in the Bali Bombings
31. Abu Bakar Basyir, Emir, Jemaah Islamiyah, Rabitatul Mujahiddin, Majelis Mujahiddin Indonesia, Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid,
32. Abu Husna, Education Division of the Central Board in Jemaah Islamiyah, Senior member of the Jemaah Islamiyah Command,
33. Tony Togar, Bombmaker, Christmas Eve Bombing in 2000 in Medan and the JW Marriott Bombing in Jakarta on 5 August 2003, Jemaah Islamiyah, worked alongside Hambali (Al Qaeda - Jemaah Islamiyah)
APPENDIX B

QUESTIONNAIRE

TERRORISM IN INDONESIA:
AN EXAMINATION OF 10 RADICAL GROUPS

QUESTIONS FOR PARTICIPANTS

History of Joining the Organisation

PART 1

A. Please think back to the period of time BEFORE you joined the organisation and answer each of the following questions.

1. Please describe, in detail, how you came to join the organisation.

___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________

2. Who recruited you to the organisation? Please tick [✓] the most appropriate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Person</th>
<th>[✓]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Family Member</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Member of Organisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Joined on my own</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Ustaz (Religious Cleric)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Other (Please Elaborate)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. How many people in the organisation did you know before you joined?

___________________
4. Of these people, how many were your close friends? _________________________

5. How many people did you introduce to the organisation? _________________________

6. What age were you when you joined? _________________________


8. Did you have children when you joined? If yes, how many? [Yes/No] _________________________

9. What is your birth order in your family? _________________________

10. Did your family know that you were going to join the organisation? If yes, who? [Yes/No] __________

11. At the time of joining, were you employed? If so, what was your occupation? _________________________

12. What was your level of education at the time you joined? __________________________________

B. Please think back to the period of time BEFORE you joined the organisation and answer each of the following questions.

**Anger/resentment**

Using the following scale, circle the most appropriate answer:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Never (about 20% of the time)</td>
<td>Occasionally (about 50% of the time)</td>
<td>Usually (about 70% of the time)</td>
<td>Always</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Before you joined, to what extent did you feel personally upset with the Indonesian government?

2. Before you joined, to what extent did you feel personally upset with the way that Muslims were treated by non-Muslims in Indonesia?

3. Before you joined, to what extent did you feel personally upset with the way that Muslims communities in the world were treated by non-Muslims?
3. Before you joined, to what extent did you feel personally upset with the Western world's attitudes toward Muslims?

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

4. Before you joined, to what extent did you feel discriminated against because you were a Muslim?

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

**Social rejection**

6. Before you joined, to what extent did you feel ANGRY?

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

7. Before you joined, to what extent did you feel LONELY?

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

8. Before you joined, to what extent did you feel ISOLATED?

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

9. Before you joined, to what extent did you feel ASHAMED?

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

10. Before you joined, to what extent did you feel REJECTED?

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
11. Before you joined, to what extent did you feel DIFFERENT from others around you?

1  2  3  4  5

Community connectedness

12. Before you joined, how connected did you feel to the Muslim community? Please elaborate.

1  2  3  4  5

___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________

13. Before you joined, how connected did you feel to the general Indonesian community? Please elaborate.

1  2  3  4  5

___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________

Joining as purpose/honor seeking

14. Before you joined, to what extent did you feel it was your religious duty to join?

1  2  3  4  5

15. By joining the organisation, to what extent did you feel that you were doing something for the greater good of the community?

1  2  3  4  5
16. By joining the organisation, to what extent did you feel that you were bringing honor on yourself?

1 2 3 4 5

17. By joining the organisation, to what extent did you feel that you were bringing honor to your family?

1 2 3 4 5

Life circumstances influencing joining

18. To what extent were you satisfied with the job you held before you joined the organisation?

1 2 3 4 5

19. To what extent did joining the organisation help you financially?

1 2 3 4 5

20. To what extent did your family support your decision to join the organisation?

1 2 3 4 5

21. How important was religion in your life prior to joining?

1 2 3 4 5

PART 2
C. Please think back to the period of time DURING which you were part of the organisation and answer each of the following questions

Experiences in the Organisation

Centrality within the organization
1. How powerful/influential were you within the organisation? Why?
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________

2. How central were/are you in the organisation? Why?
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________

3. How active are you in the organisation? Describe.
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________

Using the scale provided, please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. (Scale 1 - 5)

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<th>1</th>
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<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Neither Agree or Disagree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Job Embeddedness

4. My beliefs fit well with the organisation’s goal(s)

1 2 3 4 5

5. I had prestige within the organisation.

1 2 3 4 5
6. I was fearful about potential punishment if I left the organisation.

7. The organisation valued my contribution to its goal(s).

8. The organisation cared about my well being.

9. The organisation cared about my opinions.

10. The organisation would help me if I had difficulties.

11. It would have been difficult for me to leave the organisation.

12. I felt a strong sense of belonging to the organisation.

13. When I was in the organisation, my life served a higher purpose.

### Family’s embeddedness

14. My family was proud that I worked for this organisation.
15. I felt that it would harm my family’s reputation if I left this organisation.

1 2 3 4 5

16. The organisation provided benefits to my family.

1 2 3 4 5

17. My family would have suffered had I left the organisation.

1 2 3 4 5

18. Members of the organisation often spent time with my family members.

1 2 3 4 5

**Trust/confidence in organisation**

19. I was confident in the organisation’s ability to fulfill its goal(s).

1 2 3 4 5

20. I trusted the other members in the organisation.

1 2 3 4 5

**PART 3.1**

D. Please think back to the period of after you joined the organisation and answer each of the following questions.

**Organisation links**

1. How many people in the organisation were highly dependent on you? ____________

2. How many close friends did you have in the organisation? ____________
Using the scale provided, please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. (Scale 1 - 5)

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Neither Agree or Disagree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
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### Approval of violence

3. I approve of attacks on US military troops in Muslim countries.

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4. I approve of attacks on US civilians in Muslim countries.

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5. I approve of attacks on US civilians in the US.

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6. I approve of attacks on Israeli civilians.

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7. I approve of attacks on Israeli military troops.

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### Perceptions of armed Jihad

8. The concept of Jihad in Islam justifies the killing of civilians in some circumstances.

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9. Armed Jihad is a personal obligation of all Muslims today.

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</table>
10. Suicide bombers will be rewarded for their deeds by God.

11. Muslims of Indonesia should help their oppressed brothers.

12. I closely identify with other Muslims.

13. I think of myself largely in terms of my religious beliefs.

14. In general, I am happy these days.

15. I often feel lonely these days.

Please indicate your general attitudes toward each of the following. Tick [%] the attitude that best describes your opinion of the country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Very Negative</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Not Positive or Negative</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Very Positive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

217
Identify you the country/countries you least favour. Why do you dislike the country/countries?

Country/Countries: ____________________________

Reason:
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________

PART 3.2

Using the scale provided, please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. (Scale 1 - 5)

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<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Neither Agree or Disagree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Individualism/collectivism**

1. If a member of my group succeeded, I would feel proud.
2. The well being of my fellow group members is important to me.

3. It is my duty to take care of my fellow group members, even when I have to sacrifice what I want.

4. It is important to me that I respect the decisions made by my groups.

5. I’d rather depend on myself than on others.

6. I rely on myself most of the time; I rarely rely on others.

7. It is important that I do my job better than others.

---

**Trust**

8. I often wonder what hidden reason another person may have for doing something nice for me.

9. It is safer to trust no one.

---

**Conformity**

10. I often rely on, and act upon, the advice of others.
11. Basically, my friends are the ones who decide what we do together.

12. I’m influenced by other people’s opinions.

13. I am more independent than conforming in many ways.

14. I don’t give in to others easily.

15. It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.

16. Lower status groups should stay in their place.

17. It would be good if groups could be equal.

18. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.
19. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.

   1 2 3 4 5

20. It’s okay if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.

   1 2 3 4 5

21. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.

   1 2 3 4 5

22. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.

   1 2 3 4 5

23. Group equality should be our ideal.

   1 2 3 4 5

24. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.

   1 2 3 4 5

25. All groups should be given an equal chance in life.

   1 2 3 4 5

26. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.

   1 2 3 4 5

27. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.

   1 2 3 4 5
28. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible.

1 2 3 4 5

29. No one group should dominate in society.

1 2 3 4 5

**Fundamentalism**

30. God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which must be totally followed.

1 2 3 4 5

31. The basic cause of evil in this world is Satan, who is still constantly and ferociously fighting against God.

1 2 3 4 5

32. There is a particular set of religious teachings in this world that are so true, you can’t go any “deeper” because they are the basic, bedrock message that God has given humanity.

1 2 3 4 5

33. When you get right down to it, there are basically only two kinds of people in the world: the Righteous, who will be rewarded by God, and the rest who will not.

1 2 3 4 5

34. To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one, fundamentally true religion.

1 2 3 4 5
35. The fundamentals of God’s religion should never be tampered with, or compromised with others’ beliefs.

36. God will punish most severely those who abandon his true religion.

37. The only acceptable religion to God is Islam.

38. Islam is the only religion on this earth that teaches, without error, God’s truth.

39. Only good Muslims will go to heaven; people of other religions will not no matter how good they are.

40. Non-Muslim religions have a lot of weird beliefs and pagan ways.

PART 4
List the top 3 things you would like to change in Indonesia?

(1)______________________________________________________

(2) ______________________________________________________

(3) ______________________________________________________

Thank you for your participation!
03/04/2012
Jolene Jerard
International Relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethics Reference No:</th>
<th>IR9717</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Please quote this ref on all correspondence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project Title:</strong></td>
<td>Group Radicalisation: Understanding the Changing Landscape of Terrorism in Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Researchers Name(s):</strong></td>
<td>Jolene Jerard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Supervisor(s):</strong></td>
<td>Dr Peter Lehr</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thank you for submitting your application which was considered at the International Relations School Ethics Committee meeting on the 20/02/2013. The following documents were reviewed:

1. Ethical Application Form 13/04/2012
2. Participant Information Sheet 13/04/2012
3. Consent Form 13/04/2012

The University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee (UTREC) approves this study from an ethical point of view. Please note that where approval is given by a School Ethics Committee that committee is part of UTREC and is delegated to act for UTREC.

Approval is given for three years. Projects, which have not commenced within two years of original approval, must be re-submitted to your School Ethics Committee.

You must inform your School Ethics Committee when the research has been completed. If you are unable to complete your research within the 3 three year validation period, you will be required to write to your School Ethics Committee and to UTREC (where approval was given by UTREC) to request an extension or you will need to re-apply.

Any serious adverse events or significant change which occurs in connection with this study and/or which may alter its ethical consideration, must be reported immediately to the School Ethics Committee, and an Ethical Amendment Form submitted where appropriate.

Approval is given on the understanding that the ‘Guidelines for Ethical Research Practice’ [https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/utrec/guidelines/](https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/utrec/guidelines/) are adhered to.

Yours sincerely
Dr Jeffrey Murer
Convenor of the School Ethics Committee