THE PROBLEMATIC ALLIANCE BETWEEN RECONSTRUCTION AND OBJECTIVITY IN INTERNATIONAL THEORY

Hans Lindenlaub

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews



2016

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

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my primary supervisor Prof Nicholas Rengger for his extremely stimulating and generous intellectual support over the years, which has opened up new horizons for me and which has pushed the thesis into the direction finally taken. I also would like to thank my secondary supervisor Prof Karin Fierke, who has provided productive comments despite her work being subject to extensive criticism in the thesis. Most importantly, I would like thank my parents and Marion for their unfaltering support and trust without which I could not have embarked on this project.

Abstract

This thesis aims to critique three leading advocates of a particular strand of post-positivism, which has become influential in contemporary international theory, and which is characterized by three defining features: the idea that a proper understanding of the world requires taking into account the intrinsically contingent character of that world, which is developed in opposition to the positivist philosophy of science; the attempt to conceptualize the contingent coming about of identities and practices as an ongoing and open process of intersubjective (re-) constitution; and the aim to understand this ongoing intersubjective constitution in a way that excludes normative judgements. The main purpose of the thesis is to point out a tension between these three features. What it argues is that the conceptualization of practices as intersubjectively constituted stands in tension with both the aim to account for the contingent character of these practices and the aim to understand these practices in a way that excludes normative judgements. In particular, the thesis attempts to point out three problems that arise from the combination of these three aims: first, it argues that the notion of intersubjective constitution entails a particular kind of determinism, which undermines the post-positivists' aim to account for the contingent character of practices; second, the thesis argues that this notion inevitably entails a normative stance by the theorist, which undermines the post-positivists' aim to understand intersubjective process of in a way that excludes normative judgements; third, it argues that, in the post-positivist empirical analyses, this normative stance is never defended and, as a result, entails the arbitrary privileging of particular moral attitudes over others. The main implication of this critique suggest the need for a fundamentally different notion of social scientific understanding, which explicitly recognizes and grounds the role of moral judgements. A minor implication is that contemporary cosmopolitan agendas in world politics seem inherently flawed.

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Introduction

The goal of this thesis is to critique a particular strand of constructivist theorizing, which is part of the broader *post-positivist turn* in contemporary international theory. During the last three decades, the opening up of the field of international theory to meta-theoretical, or philosophical, debates has given rise to the emergence of post-positivism, which has provided the foundation for an impressive array of theorizing about world politics. While it would be wrong to say that we are living in a 'post-positivist era', post-positivist theorizing seems to have become a dominant force in European international theory and elsewhere. The post-positivist field includes theories as diverse as post-structuralism, (a certain kind of) constructivism, scientific realism, pragmatism, and, the most recent newcomer, the 'practice turn'. Given this diversity, there is, of course, no coherent theoretical programme that builds a common ground among these different post-positivist approaches. I want to argue, however, that, in this post-positivist field, a distinct strand of arguments has recently gained prominence among many scholars, and perhaps now even constitutes the predominant mode of reasoning among them. The main goal of this thesis is to subject this mode of reasoning to an internal critique by examining the works of three of its leading advocates in international theory.

I argue that this mode of reasoning exhibits three distinctive and common features, which - all taken together - set it apart from other kinds of post-positivist theorizing:[1] (1) the first feature, and point of departure, is a concern with the intrinsic *contingency* of the social world, which is derived from a critique of the positivist philosophy and its manifestations in international and social theory. The bedrock of the positivist philosophy, the post-positivist critics argue, is the correspondence theory truth, which assumes a fundamental dualism between thought and the world - a pre-given mind is confronted with a pre-given reality; the function of language is to represent or mirror the objective features of this world.[2] Among the post-positivist critics, there is a good deal of agreement that the positivist dualism between mind and the world provides the foundation for a large number of IR and social theories, which include rational choice and game theory, rationalist IR theories, conventional constructivist accounts, the English School and Wendtian constructivism. For the post-positivist critics, what renders these theories positivist is their *individualism*, e.g. the assumption of essential, or 'pre-social', agents that exist prior to interaction and that are endowed with given and intrinsic preferences. For instance, as

[1] For instance, the scientific realism advanced by Colin Wight.
[2] For instance, Epstein (2008) 6; Epstein (2010) 332; Fierke (2002) 334-336; Hellmann (2009a) 168; Jackson (2008a) 132-134; Kessler (2008d) 509.

Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Stefano Guzzini, Oliver Kessler and Charlotte Epstein argue, rationalist theories posit essential individuals that act on the basis of a given utility calculus.[1] Likewise, as many of the post-positivist critics have emphasized, 'conventional constructivist accounts' (such as those of Thomas Risse, Margareta Keck or Kathryn Sikkink) assume pre-existing agents that are driven by exogenously given 'normative' or 'ideational' preferences.[2] There is also a rather strong consensus among the post-positivist scholars that the constructivist theory of Alexander Wendt is part of this conventional constructivism because it displays similar individualist and essentialist features; while Wendt conceives of the state partly as socially constituted, he, as Kessler, Epstein, Lene Hansen, Karin Fierke and Xavier Guillaume have pointed out, also ontologizes the state by attributing to this state a physical, or pre-social, essence.[3] Finally, as Kessler argues, much English School theorizing has also been driven by individualist assumptions in that it conceptualizes sovereign states as pre-given actors that make up international society.[4]

For the post-positivist critics, the assumption of pre-existing agents endowed with given preferences has a major implication in that this assumption renders positivist theories fundamentally *static* and *deterministic*. As Jackson argues, positivist agents are bound by exogenously given standards of value or cost-benefit calculations that dictate their actions beyond their control.[5] Likewise, Gunther Hellmann argues that realist, liberal and constructivist theories assume a static view of action in that the agents chose particular means in order to achieve pre-given ends.[6] Epstein makes a similar claim, arguing that conventional constructivist and rationalist theories conceive of ideas, power and interests as discrete essences and, in this way, contribute to the reification of social life. In the constructivist approaches of Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, for instance, change is only conceptualized as passage from one stable state to another along the trajectory of the internalization of a new norm.[7] Kessler makes a related point when he writes that the assumption of pre-existing actors and identities, on which game theory, Wendtian constructivism and the English School are based, implies that change can only occur as a 'linear adaption', e.g. as a better adaption to the objective features

[1] Epstein (2008) 8; Epstein (2013b) 294; Guzzini (2000) 162-163; Jackson (2002a) 737-738; Kessler (2011b) 2164, 2175.
[2] Epstein (2008) 4-5, 8, 9-11, 15; Epstein (2010) 333; Fierke (2001a) 117; Jackson (2003) 227-228; Kessler (2009a) 89-91; Hellmann (2009 b) 266-267.
[3] Epstein (2010) 331-333; Fierke (2001a) 123-124; Guillaume (2009) 73-74; Hansen (2006) 15; Kessler (2009a) 91-92.
[4] Kessler (2009a) 92-93.
[5] Jackson (2003) 232; Jackson (2002a) 749.
[6] Hellmann (2009b) 265, 272.
[7] Epstein (2008) 8, 10-11, 15; Epstein (2010) 333-334.

of the world.[1] In sum, the post-positivist view holds that positivist theories conceive of action and interaction, in which the agents relate to each other in particular ways, as pre-determined and law-like processes. Jackson sums this up quite clearly when he writes that, from a positivist perspective of action, 'the agents had to make the choices they did without being able to act otherwise'.[2]

The post-positivist critics argue that this individualist, essentialist and deterministic view of action entails a methodology that aims at the discovery of universal causal laws through the Popperian strategy of falsification. As Hansen and Jackson argue, positivist analyses attempt to generate constant causal conjunctions between independent variables and behaviour by testing falsifiable hypotheses against the world; positivist explanation involves the bringing of particular events under general patterns of cause and effect. This may well involve, as Hansen points out, the establishment of general causal conjunctions that focus on multiple explanatory variables, measuring the relative causal importance of each of them.[3] Hellmann argues along very similar lines when he writes that the positivist methodology relies on the 'logic of subsumption', which subsumes observed events under pre-given categories and theories in order to generate systematic knowledge about 'if-then' causal relationships.[4] Fierke provides another statement of this argument by characterizing the positivist methodology in terms of Kenneth Waltz's 'logic of pictures', which attempts to discover the objective features and general laws of the world by fixing the meaning of theoretical categories prior to analysis and by testing whether these concepts correspond to this world.[5]

It is precisely this deterministic view of action, and the corresponding strategy to subsume practices under general patterns of cause and effect, which the post-positivist critics uniformly and unequivocally set out to challenge. What the positivist view of action fails to take into account is, according to these critics, the intrinsic and fundamental *contingency* of social life. On this contingency view, the evolution of practices and institutions is not pre-determined by an over-arching regulative ideal but fundamentally dynamic, open and non-teleological. This means that social actions and interactions are not predetermined, necessary or natural outcomes, which had to come about the way they did, but only contingent possibilities, which co-exist with and emerge against the background of equally plausible alternatives and which, as a result, *could have been otherwise*. That is, the coming about of particular practices is to some extent

[1] Kessler (2009a) 94; see also Epstein (2008) 15.
[2] Jackson (2002a) 749.
[3] Jackson (2008a) 136-137; Hansen (2006) 8, 24.
[4] Hellmann (2009a) 163-164; Hellmann (2009b) 270.
[5] Fierke (2002) 336, 338, 341-342; see also Guzzini (2000) 157.

always *novel* and *unpredictable* in that these practices are not pre-determined by, or do not naturally follow from, previous states of affairs. By conceiving of practices as pre-determined outcomes and by subsuming these practices under causal covering laws, positivist theories fail to account for their contingent, novel and unpredictable character and, therefore, to provide an adequate understanding of them. That is, what positivist analyses fail to do, and what social analysis should generally aim at, is to account for practices *as* contingent outcomes that unpredictably emerged against the background of equally plausible alternatives.

This line of reasoning is visible, for instance, in the highly interesting pragmatist writings and analyses offered by Hellmann. Drawing on the works of Geoffrey Hawthorn, John Dewey and others, Hellmann argues that contingency is a fundamental feature of the world. On his view, the overwhelming majority of the practices scholars study are not pre-determined but *novel* outcomes, which result from the *creative* reconfiguration of both means and goals in particular (problematic) situations. In these situations, the space of possibilities for action is not known in advance but has to be established through creative acting in the first place. The novel and contingent character of practices implies that they cannot be understood by being brought under general categories. Rather than employing the logic of subsumption, social analysis has to conceive of reality as 'fundamentally emergent', 'continuously novel' and 'open-ended', and to understand particular practices by locating them *post-hoc* in particular spaces of possibilities.[1] Epstein argues along similar lines when she writes that given identities, interests and practices are not timelessly valid but dynamic, contingent and temporary fixations, which hold currency only in particular historical contexts, which could have been otherwise, and which will be possibly undone by other alternatives. Positivist theories such as conventional constructivism, which conceive of self-other relationships as already fixed and of the formation of identities as a deterministic process of norm internalization, fail to account for the contingent and particular nature of these identities, e.g. how they came about in the first place. For instance, Wendt's notion of a fixed state identity leaves unexplored why a number of countries came to embrace an anti-whaling agenda, given that many of them had once seen whaling as key to their national interest. Rather than searching for universal foundations, social analysis has to theorize particularity, contingency and multiplicity.[2]

In a similar vein, Jackson argues that particular arrangements of practices are never automatic outcomes but only contingent and ongoing accomplishments, which have arisen out

[1] Hellmann (2009a) 162-167; Hellmann (2009b) 267, 270-273, 275.
[2] Epstein (2008) 1-2, 9, 11-12, 15-17; Epstein (2010) 335, 337, 344; Epstein (2013 a) 502.

of *ambiguous* situations that allowed for multiple possibilities and which are merely temporally stable patterns. By conceiving of particular arrangements as determined by exogenously given and unambiguous interests, positivist theories fail to *endogenize* these arrangements as contingent outcomes and to explain 'how and why' they were selected over other alternatives.[1] In her insightful study of Western foreign policy discourses surrounding the Bosnian War, Hansen makes a similar case against positivist analyses by discussing a couple of concrete empirical examples. For instance, Celeste Walander's rationalist account of NATO survival after the Cold War, which argues that this survival was due to the alliance's ability to address not only external threats but also a variety of other instabilities and insecurities, assumes that 'threats' and 'instabilities' have an objective existence and leaves unexplored how these the notions became constituted in the first place, justifying particular outcomes such as the intervention in Bosnia.[2] Kessler strikes a similar cord by stressing the inherent *polycontextuality* of the social world, which implies that there is always a dynamic plurality of possible truths, each possibility constantly excluding and giving rise to other plausible alternatives. By attributing a universal notion of truth to all individuals, positivist theories fail to account for the contingency of particular possibilities, e.g. how particular concepts are formed in order to structure an unstructured reality in the first place.[3] Finally, in his seminal article on the meaning of constructivism, Guzzini offers another statement of this critique by arguing that rational choice theories, which conceive of action in a simple stimulus-reaction chain, cannot explain the fact that apparently similar physical practices acquire very different meanings in different contexts. What these theories lack, and what analysis should aim at, is an understanding of the *specificity* of practices, e.g. why particular practices were chosen and developed in the first place.[4]

(2) The second feature, which characterizes the strand of post-positivism being scrutinized here, is the attempt to come to grips with and account for the intrinsic contingency of social life through the concept of *intersubjectivity*, e.g. by conceiving the contingent coming about of practices as a process of intersubjective constitution. On this view, the social world exhibits genuine contingency to the extent that it is constituted by particular and ever-changing intersubjective contexts. The post-positivist scholars embrace the notion of intersubjectivity by drawing on a huge variety of philosophers and social theorists, including Dewey, Ludwig

[1] Jackson (2003) 230-231; Jackson (2006) 13-14; see also Guillaume (2007) 741-742.
[2] Hansen (2006) 22-23.
[3] Kessler (2008a) 44-49.
[4] Guzzini (2000) 161.

Wittgenstein, Niklas Luhmann, Friedrich von Hayek, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Jacques Lacan, Pierre Bourdieu, Max Weber and Mikhal Bakhtin. Yet, while the post-positivists draw on many different sources, they put forward essentially the same idea of the ongoing and dynamic intersubjective (re-) constitution of the world. What this idea fundamentally implies is, as all of these scholars stress, that actors, identities and practices are not objectively given but only come into existence through particular structures of meaning, which constitute these actors, identities and practices in relation to each other; and that these structures of meaning are expressed, or mediated, through *language*, which, as a result, is no longer only a mirror but always bound up in the constitution of the world - language has a productive, constitutive or performative power.[1] This line of reasoning is visible, for instance, in Fierke's writings, which draw on Wittgenstein's language philosophy and which argue that intersubjective language games constitute the identities and possible moves of the actors by placing them in particular relationships.[2] Coming from a post-structuralist perspective, Hansen makes a similar point by writing that identities and practices are relationally constructed through discursive processes of differentiation, in which particular signs acquire meaning only in opposition to other signs.[3] Drawing on the work of Lacan, Epstein argues that identities are discursively constituted through intersubjective processes of symbolization, in which the meaning of a term depends on other terms and in which the self can only be defined in relation to the other.[4] Guzzini makes a related claim by relying on Bourdieu's concept of the *field*, which generates groups, agents and strategies through systems of social difference.[5] Drawing on the work of Bakhtin, Guillaume makes a similar point when he claims that the other, or 'alterity', is necessary for the self, each self-understanding being dialogically linked to other identities.[6] Hellmann and Kessler argue along similar lines when they write that objects and identities are constituted through intersubjective communication processes, which inscribe them with meaning and signification.[7]

The post-positivist scholars go on to argue that it is precisely the intersubjective constitution of identities, interests and practices which renders them *both* inherently contingent and unstable. On the one hand, intersubjective contexts are always contingent processes, which come about

[1] For instance, Epstein (2008) 5; Fierke (2002) 337-338; Guillaume (2002) 7-8; Guzzini (2000) 164; Hansen (2006) 16.
[2] Fierke (1998) 17, 25-26.
[3] Hansen (2006) 16-17, 21.
[4] Epstein (2008) 6-8; Epstein (2010) 335-338; Epstein (2013b) 303.
[5] Guzzini (2000) 165-167.
[6] Guillaume (2010) 99-101.
[7] Hellmann (2009b) 274; Kessler (2012b) 261-262.

through creative action and whose existence automatically excludes other plausible alternatives. As, for instance, Epstein and Hansen argue, the fixation, or articulation, of meaning is a contingent and 'hegemonic' act that simultaneously rules out other possible articulations.[1] Kessler makes a similar point by arguing that the constitution of 'actual' intersubjective meaning always excludes and refers to other possibilities.[2] Fierke and Jackson argue along similar lines when they write that intersubjective meaning is always *meaning in use*, e.g. meaning that is produced through creative and contingent action, which draws a boundary between what is legitimate and those possibilities which are excluded.[3] In a similar vein, taking a pragmatist perspective, Hellmann puts forward the idea of the *primacy of praxis*, according to which intersubjective rules for action are creative achievements arising out of problematic situations of doubt, in which the agents creatively reconfigure the relationship between means and ends in novel and unpredictable ways.[4] On the other hand, the contingency of intersubjective contexts renders these contexts inherently unstable in that they give constantly way to new and unexpected alternatives, rendering the course of history dynamic and open-ended. For instance, Epstein argues that the attempt by the self to project and constitute itself in the symbolic order gives rise to a fundamental lack in that the process of intersubjective symbolization can never fully capture the singularity of the individual's desire, thus preventing a fully closed self and entailing a dynamic process of symbolization that never reaches an end point.[5] Likewise, Hansen argues that the construction and fixing of identities through discursively articulated systems of differentiation renders these system intrinsically vulnerable to destabilization, giving them only a relative stability that is constantly undermined by alternative articulations.[6] Kessler and Fierke argue along similar lines when they write that the partial and selective nature of intersubjective rules renders them inherently vulnerable to excluded alternatives, contributing to the ongoing and spontaneous transformation of the world.[7] Hellmann makes a related point when he argues that established intersubjective rules for action always carry the possibility of, and give rise to, new doubts and creative reconstruction, and that, as a result, all human practice is characterized by the ongoing interplay between established routines and indeterminate

[1] Epstein (2008) 7-10, 12; Hansen (2006) 16.
[2] Kessler (2010a) 94.
[3] Fierke (2001b) 132-133; Fierke (2009) 159; Jackson (2003) 234, 237; Jackson (2006) 29-31; see also Epstein (2008) 5.
[4] Hellmann (2009a) 147-150.
[5] Epstein (2008) 11-12; Epstein (2010) 334-338.
[6] Hansen (2006) 18-19, 26. For a similar argument see also Jackson, who argues that intersubjective processes of boundary drawing are only patterns of temporary and relative stability. Jackson (2006) 252-253.
[7] Fierke (1996) 427-473; Kessler (2011a) 205.

situations.[1] Guillaume expresses a similar idea by writing that the notion of identity as a relational processes implies that this identity only has a relative and temporary stability, and that it becomes an open, contingent, incomplete and dynamic historical framework, which 'might evolve in one way or another'.[2] Guzzini too is in line with these claims when he argues that intersubjective language rules not only draw stable boundaries but also have a 'generative capacity', which allows for an infinite degree of innovation, creativity and freedom, and which entails a non-teleological and non-cyclical evolution of history.[3]

(3) The third feature, which characterizes the strand of post-positivism being discussed here, is the attempt to account for the ongoing and dynamic intersubjective (re-)constitution of the world from a *non-normative* perspective. For, while presumably none of the post-positivist scholars would presumably deny the (Weberian-inspired) claim that research *interests* and *problems* exist only in virtue of particular value commitments, all of them - implicitly or explicitly - uphold the possibility of empirically *analysing* social phenomena in a way that excludes normative or moral judgements.[4] That is, the proclaimed goal of the post-positivists is to empirically and non-normatively 'explain', 'trace', 'reconstruct', 'understand', 'describe' and 'observe' the contingent, particular and ongoing processes of intersubjective boundary drawing. Jackson, for instance, explicitly favours a *sociological* mode of analysis, which limits itself to empirically tracing how intersubjective boundaries are drawn in particular ways as opposed to others, and which abstains from making any normative evaluations.[5] Likewise, Hellmann argues that social analysis should proceed by the 'logic of reconstruction', which aims to provide an *adequate description* of creative reconfigurations of rules for action that 'happen empirically'.[6] Fierke makes a similar point by arguing that her language game approach aims to *describe* how particular intersubjective contexts unfold over time, and, in so doing, offer an 'explanation of what happened'.[7] Hansen expresses the same idea by writing that she aims to study 'in a systematic, structured and empirically rigorous manner' the complex ways in which identities are intersubjectively made and re-made, adding that a post-structural epistemology does not exclude 'theoretically rigorous frameworks, empirical analyses of real world relevance,

[1] Hellmann (2009a) 147-150, 164; Hellmann (2009b) 271.
[2] Guillaume (2007) 745-746, 748-749; Guillaume (2010) 99-103.
[3] Guzzini (2000) 164-165; Guzzini (2010) 307-308, 311.
[4] While there is a difference between the terms 'moral' and 'normative', I will use both terms interchangeably in relation to the term 'judgement' because this difference is not the focus of this thesis.
[5] Jackson (2006) 18-21.
[6] Hellmann (2009b) 267, 274 -276, 278.
[7] Fierke (1996) 470-471; Fierke (1998) 3-4.

or systematic assessments of data or methodology'.[1] Likewise, Guillaume claims that his dialogical approach is less concerned with the normative problem of how self and other build a relationship of mutual recognition than with the *sociological characterization* of intersubjective transactions, which are at the heart of identity formation.[2]

It is, of course, true that some of the post-positivist scholars emphasise the role of moral judgements in social scientific analyses to the extent that these analyses not simply represent but are also implicated in the intersubjective and performative construction of the world by legitimizing certain practices and delegitimizing others. But even these scholars do usually not mean that their own theories but only that *other*, and in particular positivist, theories are performative and implicated in the intersubjective construction of the world; and, consequently, claim that the purpose of their own analyses is to non-normatively 'observe', 'describe' or 'disclose' how the 'positivist other' is part of the ongoing performative and intersubjective (re-) construction of reality. This line of reasoning is visible, for instance, in Guzzini's seminal article on the meaning of constructivism: while Guzzini argues that a consistent constructivism has to reflexively problematize and theorize how social scientific observers are part of and affect the world they are trying to analyse, by 'reflexive problematization and theorization' he implies less a reflection on the normativity in his own analyses than the 'disclosure' of moral judgements in *other* theories from a non-performative point of view. As his discussion of and reliance on Richard Ashley's critique of realism shows, the contribution of his constructivism is to provide an *explanatory framework* that lays bare the moral judgements, or legitimating routines, in the discourse of realist scholars.[3] Epstein expresses a similar idea by arguing that discourses of truth and knowledge mask particular relations of symbolic power, and that the goal of her own discourse analysis is to 'take a critical step out of what the discourses actually say, in order to *observe* what they do.'[4] Kessler argues along similar lines when he claims that his own approach aims to 'observe the performativity of scientific truth claims', e.g. how these claims intersubjectively shape reality by explaining it.[5]

In this thesis, I will subject this strand of post-positivism, and its three defining features, to an extensive criticism. What I want to argue is that the three features, which I roughly sketched above, stand in tension with each other. I do believe that the post-positivist scholars make an important point against positivist theorizing by arguing that a proper social scientific

[1] Hansen (2006) 1-2, 4, 9-10, 25, 28-29.
[2] Guillaume (2007) 742; Guillaume (2010) 96-98.
[3] Guzzini (2000) 149-150, 162, 169-175.
[4] Epstein (2008) 13.
[5] Kessler (2007c) 114.

understanding requires an account of the particular intersubjective constitution of practices and identities. I want to argue, however, that to conceive of identities as intersubjectively constituted and to attempt to *understand* these intersubjectively constituted identities entails consequences which undermine the two other professed aims of the post-positivist scholars. The main argument of this thesis is that the conceptualization of identities as intersubjectively constituted processes sits uneasily both with the aim to account for these identities as 'fundamentally contingent' outcomes, which unpredictably emerge against the background of equally good alternatives, and with the aim to understand these identities in a way that excludes normative judgements. Furthermore, I want to suggest that this tension points to the need for a notion of social scientific understanding (or explanation) that is fundamentally different from the one prevailing in contemporary post-positivist (and other kinds of) scholarship. In order to reveal the tensions among the three features of the strand of post-positivism discussed here, and to eventually suggest an alternative notion of understanding, this thesis will critically examine the works of three of the leading advocates of this strand, which are Fierke, Kessler and Jackson. While this choice is to some extent arbitrary, and while I certainly do not want to denigrate the value of the works of the other scholars discussed above, I believe that the three features characterizing their strand of post-positivism have been most forcefully, clearly and consistently - over a large number of high profile publications - expressed in the writings of these three constructivist[1] scholars, which, therefore, reveal the tensions among these features more clearly than other writings. There is also a second reason why a focus on the analyses of Kessler, Fierke and Jackson is a plausible choice, which I hope will become evident in the final part of the thesis (last chapter and conclusion). While I will be unable to provide a fully developed argument, I believe that a critical examination of these analyses, as offered in this final part, also identifies - as a 'by-product' - some of the possible reasons for certain crises which have plagued world politics recently, and opens up - albeit vaguely - a space for thinking about possible solutions for coping with these challenges.

The main part of the thesis will attempt to point out *three* common problems in the writings of Fierke, Jackson and Kessler, which I argue arise from the three features that characterize their approaches, e.g. from the aim to account for the contingent character of the world, the aim to conceive this world as intersubjectively (re-) constituted on an ongoing basis, and the aim to

[1] Jackson has opposed the label 'constructivism' and referred to his own approach variously as 'relationalism', 'transactional social constructionism' and, in methodological terms,'analyticism' (Jackson (2003), (2006) 15, (2011)). Given that this thesis proceeds on the assumption that Jackson's writings reveal fundamental similarities to the approaches of Kessler and Fierke, and given that the latter two have characterized their approaches as 'constructivist', I will label Jackson's approach as constructivist too in order to be able to refer to them as a group.

understand this ongoing process of intersubjective constitution from a non-normative point of view. My first claim is that the concept of intersubjectivity implies a particular kind of *determinism*, which undermines Fierke, Kessler and Jackson's proclaimed aim to account for social configurations as contingent outcomes, the need of which they derive from their critique of positivism. This determinism is equally present in their empirical analyses. My second claim is that the concept of intersubjectivity unavoidably entails a *normative* stance by the theorist, which undermines the proclaimed aim of the three constructivists to understand intersubjective process of change from a non-normative point of view. It is this normativity entailed by the notion of intersubjectivity which transforms the empirical analyses of Fierke, Jackson and Kessler into normative rationalizations, which do not simply trace the emergence of certain outcomes but also approve of these outcomes as victories of particular moral attitudes over others. My third claim is that this advocacy and privileging of particular moral attitudes over others in the constructivist real-world investigations is *arbitrary*. The three constructivists arbitrarily elevate particular moral attitudes to the level of generally valid positions without being able to show that these attitudes are actually generalizable, as general modes of moral conduct and in particular contexts. This arbitrary privileging of certain moral attitudes over others leads some of the constructivist analyses to offer an apologetic reading of history and to justify policies that have turned out to have harmful consequences.

Furthermore, I will argue that these three criticisms have two broader implications for social and international theory: the first, and major, implication, which both is in line with and goes beyond recent writings on the notion of *reflexivity* in international theory, is that the social scientific understanding of practices in their particularity is intrinsically bound up with rationalization and moral judgement; and that this interrelation of explanation and rationalization/judgement raises the need for social theorists to explicitly ground their explanatory-normative frameworks in a well-reflected conception of a priori human moral capacities and motivations, as has been done by a particular strand of philosophy, historiography and social theory that goes back at least to the Enlightenment. The second implication, which relates to international theory more narrowly and which speaks to the recent revival of the realist tradition in this field, suggests the need for a political ethics in world politics that is more strongly centred on the idea of the *national interest*, which could serve as a healthy corrective to contemporary cosmopolitan designs that seem inherently flawed.

In the remainder of this thesis, I will develop these claims as follows: (1) the first three chapters will outline the constructivist theories of Jackson, Kessler and Fierke. The structure of

each of these chapters will follow a similar pattern in that it will present the scholar's characterization of positivism in international and social theory, her critique of positivism, and her constructivist theory and analyses that are derived from this critique. (2) The fourth chapter will draw these constructivisms together and reconstruct in more detail the three common features that are present in all of them and that I tried to roughly sketch above. I will reconstruct the first two of these common features by locating the constructivist theories in a particular strand of hermeneutic theory that emerged over the last century: I will argue that the constructivist critique of contemporary positivism mirrors the hermeneutic critique of the Cartesian mind-body dualism, which raises the need to account for the contingent nature of social relations; and that the three constructivisms mirror the hermeneutic solution to this 'Cartesian problem', which is to conceptualize the contingent coming about of these relations as an ongoing intersubjective process. I argue that the third common feature of the three constructivisms is their use of intersubjectivity as a descriptive concept that serves to analyse but not to evaluate social processes of change. The subsequent chapters will emphasise three problems that arise from these three common features. (3) The Fifth chapter will argue that the concept of intersubjectivity implies a particular kind of determinism, which undermines the aim to account for social relations as contingent outcomes. (4) The next chapter will argue that the concept of intersubjectivity necessarily entails a normative stance by theorist, which undermines the claim to descriptively analyse intersubjective processes of change. I will also attempt to make clear how this normative stance translates itself in the advocacy of particular moral attitudes over others in the constructivist empirical analyses. (5) The final chapter will attempt to point out the arbitrariness and unpersuasiveness of this moral advocacy. (6) The conclusion will provide a summary of the main arguments and flesh out the two broader implications for social and international theory.

Social Transactionist Constructionism

Neopositivism

In IR theory, many accounts of constructivism have emerged during the last three decades. Patrick Jackson has developed one of the most original of these accounts. His approach differs from more conventional constructivist accounts in that it does not simply offer a particular *scientific* but also a distinctive *philosophical ontology*. Jackson argues that the contribution of constructivism lies not simply in the emphasis of ideational factors such as norms and ideas but in its rejection and overcoming of the (neo-) positivist philosophy of science.[1] In this section, I will present Jackson's characterization and critique of the positivism in international theory; the next section will outline his constructivist theory and empirical analyses, which build on this critique.

According to Jackson, the key feature of positivism is a *dualist* ontology. From a dualist perspective, there is a radical gap between the world and knowledge of the world; reality exists independently or externally to any thought. This implies that the things and people that make up the world have *essences* or *dispositional qualities*. These qualities give reality a (more or less) determinate character and enable and constrain the particular knowledge claims that can be made about it.[2] In IR, positivism provides a foundation particularly for those theories that build on the assumptions of rational choice and game theory, such as neorealism and liberalism (or neo-utilitarianism). Despite the differences between these theories, both of them share positivist assumptions to the extent that they are *substantialist*, *individualist* and *deterministic*. Rationalist approaches are substantialist because they assume that the actors (the individual, the state, the firm, etc.) already exist prior to their interaction and relations; constitutively independent agents interact in a condition of strategic interdependence. The notion of actors as preformed entities also entails an individualist or reductionist account of explanation inasmuch as it locates the principal causal mechanisms at the individual level. Actors are conceived as "acting under their own powers (…) independently of all other substances;"[3] action is a self-willed and self-generating activity. As a consequence, social outcomes can be reduced to the individual decisions or motives of the component parts of society, whether these parts are individuals, domestic groups or states.[4] Finally, by conceiving of social outcomes as caused by

[1] Jackson (2006) 15-24; Jackson (2008a) 146, 151-152; Jackson (2011) 43, 134, 141-142.
[2] Jackson (2008) 132-134.
[3] Emirbayer (1997) 283.
[4] Jackson and Nexon (1999) 293-294 ; Jackson (2002a) 737-738; Jackson (2003) 225-226; Jackson (2006) 245.

the decisions of preformed actors, rationalist theories adopt a deterministic view of human action. Agents act according to an exogenously given cost-benefit calculus. Outcomes result from the interaction between given preferences and the strategic environment with which the actors are confronted. Thus, actors become mere throughputs for environmental factors that are completely unable to affect the course of events. Acting rationally means that they have to make the choices they make and that they could not do anything other than they do without acting irrationally. Agency, which is understood as the capacity to act otherwise, is *completely* eliminated from rationalist accounts.[1] "(…) Agency and necessity are *irreconcilably opposed* to one another."[2]

Jackson argues that not only rationalist theories but also many of their constructivist critics buy into the positivist ontology. Constructivist approaches that emphasize ideational over material factors seemingly take an anti-individualist position that roots action in social contexts. However, on closer examination it becomes clear that these constructivist accounts are as substantialist, individualist and deterministic as their rationalist rivals. Like their rationalist opponents, conventional constructivists locate the causal mechanisms at the individual level. Norms, ideas and identity are not part of the interpersonal space between actors but *subjective* attributes. Action is again reduced to the decisions of autonomous and essential agents, the only difference being that these agents are not driven by rational cost-benefit calculations but act on the basis of an internalized logic of appropriateness. This logic is as deterministic as the calculus of costs and benefits. The agents are bound by the dictates of an exogenously given standard of value they are unable to control.[3]

In his writings, Jackson particularly discusses two examples of positivist analyses of world politics: first, the 'neo-utilitarian' approaches of John Ikenberry, David Lake and Andrew Moravcsik. Even though there are differences among these scholars, they all have in common that they reduce action to the rational choices of independently existing individuals that interact with their strategic environment. Lake attempts to understand why the US sometimes chooses 'anarchic' security arrangements and sometimes opts for 'hierarchical' security cooperation. He argues that this variation can be explained by the desire to capture join production economies, the likelihood of opportunism on the part of potential allies, and the governance costs linked to any particular arrangement. Ikenberry wants to explain why victorious powers often restrain themselves after major wars. He claims that victorious powers can have incentives to build

[1] Jackson (2003) 229-233, 237, 249; Jackson (2002a) 737, 740, 749-750; Jackson (2006) 35-36, 246.
[2] Jackson (2003) 231 (my emphasis).
[3] Jackson (2003) 227-228, 232; Jackson and Nexon (1999) 293-294; Jackson (2006) 247.

constitutional arrangements that restrain power through binding institutions that tie both the dominant state and the weaker states together and therefore reduce fears of domination. The likelihood of these institutions depends on the power disparities between these states and their democratic character. Moravcsik attempts to explain the punctuated nature of the process or European integration, periods of relative stability being followed by 'grand bargains' that restructure European institutions. He explains this process by the configurations of domestic economic interests that put pressure on European governments.[1]

As a second example, Jackson discusses realist, liberal and constructivist accounts that attempt to explain the formation of NATO. These accounts are individualist in that they reduce the formation of the alliance to the properties and interactions of independently existing individuals. Realists argue that this formation was driven by the timeless logic of the balance of power: the elimination of the Nazi threat had to lead to the break-up of the wartime alliance. As a consequence, the remaining two superpowers were compelled by the pressures of anarchy to balance each other and to form two bipolar blocs. NATO is an outgrowth of this bloc formation. Even though this argument seems to be systemic, it is actually individualist because it focuses on how and why the relevant actors made decisions and translated material interests into actions. Liberals, building on the apparatus of neoclassical economics, likewise ground NATO's formation in individual motivations. From this perspective, NATO resulted from the desire to signal restraint and to exploit gains from the joint production of security. Finally, constructivist explanations see NATO as an example of a security community, which is based on shared norms, values and beliefs. These beliefs are subjective rather than interpersonal properties; certain individuals were committed to certain values and decided that forming an alliance based on these values was the right thing to do.[2]

Realist, liberal and constructivist explanations of NATO do not only locate the relevant causal mechanisms at the individual level but also treat them as general decision making principles which are omnipresent in social life and which *necessarily cause* certain actions. Given certain conditions, actors will necessarily act in a particular way without their being able exercise any agency. Thus, realists claim that anarchy causes balancing and that the Western states had to balance the Soviet threat. Given the circumstances, this was the only thing to do, and any state in the same situation would have acted similarly. Likewise, liberals contend that the desire to show restraint and to exploit common gains compelled Western states to

[1] Jackson (2002a) 739-740, 741-743.
[2] Jackson (2003) 226-228.

institutionalize security cooperation; to do anything else would be to act irrationally. Finally, constructivists argue that the formation of NATO was a necessary consequence of the logic of appropriateness. [1]

Jackson argues that the individualist, substantialist and determinist underpinnings of rationalist and mainstream constructivist approaches lead to a *logical* problem. Positivist approaches seek to explain particular events by subsuming them under general and necessary relations of cause and effect. In other words, they attempt to account for the stability of practices and social arrangements. They do so by imputing to individuals universal, fixed and exogenous motives which serve as an *unambiguous* basis for making decisions; that is, they specify *what actors want* in concrete situations. This enables them to systematically connect motives and outcomes: action flows directly from the preferences of state leaders, who try their best to achieve them under strategic interdependence.[2]

This view entails, however, a logical problem because it cannot explain how particular motives translate into outcomes. This is because social contexts are always ambiguous and contested in the sense the sense that they allow for more than one possible course of action; rather than sharing one particular conception of interest, different individuals may have different preferences that do not necessarily coincide and that stir public debate and controversy. If that is the case, positivist approaches have difficulty explaining why the agents select one particular option among all possible options; that is, *why they choose one course of action rather than another*.[3] The acceptance of a particular course of action is never self-evident but requires an *active* effort to convince the audience of it against possible alternatives. All social arrangements are *contingent* outcomes that have emerged out of the contest with their competitors. Positivist explanations are unable to take into account the contingent nature of these practices and arrangements. They cannot account for the existence of multiple possibilities for action and, consequently, lack any mechanism that explains how the agents reduce the inherent ambiguity of social situations, enabling a particular course of action to succeed against its alternatives.[4]

For example, Lake cannot explain why military involvement in Europe in the early 1950s was the fundamental strategy of the US, given that there was a controversy about this strategy at the same time. Moravcsik argues that de Gaulle's policy towards Europe was mainly driven

[1] Jackson, (2003) 229-232.
[2] Jackson (2002a) 738-740; Jackson (2003) 231; Jackson (2006) 131, 245-246.
[3] Jackson (2002a) 740-741; Jackson (2003) 231; Jackson (2006) 13-14, 47-48, 246.
[4] Jackson (2002a) 743-744, 749-750; Jackson (2003) 231-233, 235, 237; Jackson (2006) 246.

by agricultural interests but does not make clear how these interests actually translated into policy-making, given that they could not be expressed in the public debate. Ikenberry assumes that multilateral institutions formed by democratic states are inherently legitimate, but he does not actually explain why this institutional form is preferable to other possibilities.[1] Finally, positivist accounts focusing on the formation of NATO cannot explain why their preferred motive or variable was the dominant one, given that the early post-war period contains evidence for all of these factors. 'Threats', 'gains' and 'normative consensus' were all part of a highly contested debate the outcome of which was not predetermined.[2]

Relationalism

Jackson argues that the explanatory weakness of positivist theories can only be overcome by adopting fundamentally different philosophical premises. These are offered by what he calls *relationalism* or *social transactionist constructionism*. Jackson develops this approach by drawing heavily on the social theory of Max Weber, and in particular on his concept of l*egitimacy*. According to Weber, the key problem of legitimacy is how the rulers get the ruled to obey. For him, in contrast to the assumptions of conventional constructivism, legitimacy is not rooted in individual minds but a property of the *intersubjective* context.[3] Intersubjective rules and contexts establish the *public boundaries* of action, rendering some actions permissible while de-legitimizing others. This makes legitimacy less an issue of physically forcing action but more a matter of shaping it *indirectly* through the limits of public acceptability: policy makers can only enact those policies which they are able to justify to their audience. By shaping the possibilities of action, boundaries also produce actors as they demarcate a sphere with which these actors are allowed to act; actors do not possess any essential properties but are *social sites* that result from successful practices of boundary drawing.[4]

What is important about this notion of legitimacy is that it shapes action without influencing individual motives or subjective states of mind. Claims to legitimacy and authority exercise their effects even if (or, rather because) true persuasion proves (very often) impossible. Legitimation claims succeed not because they 'really persuade' the audience but because they appeal to their *own effectiveness*; they exercise power 'through their effects.'[5] An argument wins not because it is 'true' or because it "accords with the audience's prior normative

[1] Jackson (2002a) 741-743.
[2] Jackson (2003) 230-231.
[3] Jackson (2002a) 448-449, 451; Jackson (2003) 234; Jackson (2006) xv, 15.
[4] Jackson (2002b) 449, 451-452, 455-456; Jackson (2003) 234-235; Jackson (2006) 24-26.
[5] Jackson (2002b) 450; Jackson (2003) 235-236; Jackson (2006) 24-25, 32.

commitments but because its grounds are *socially* sustainable."[1] All that matters is that legitimation claims are proffered in an *efficacious* way that resonates with the prevailing standards of acceptability and that renders any opposition ineffective. The goal is to rhetorically manoeuvre opponents into a corner where they can no longer maintain their position publicly. It is completely irrelevant whether the speaker and his opponent genuinely believe in the standards to which they appeal. Indeed, the relevant actors may have many different motives and may act for selfish or altruistic reasons. However, what is important is not *why* specific individuals use the potentialities of the social context in a specific way but that they can *only* use *some* potentialities while others are excluded. It is in this way that the social context limits the boundaries of action, ensuring that it remains within a certain range of variation.[2]

As legitimacy shapes action through its own effectiveness rather than through persuasion in a strong sense, it becomes a *contingent* notion that attains its meaning only in *use*. It is through their *practical involvement* that the agents generate 'valid' or legitimate knowledge. This is precisely because the cultural resources, or *rhetorical commonplaces*, that constitute intersubjective contexts and that limit the range of acceptable actions are not strongly shared between the speaker and the audience; they are not fully internalized by every individual. This means that rhetorical commonplaces do not define legitimate action in advance; rather, they are always contested, giving rise to *debate* and requiring the active effort of the agents to lock down their meaning. Particular configurations are always 'unique' and ongoing accomplishments of the contingent interventions of individuals.[3] In this sense, they are only *relatively stable* arrangements that have to be continuously reproduced through the temporary fixing of meaning. Even though the weaving together of cultural resources in a certain way is *sufficient* to produce a particular arrangement, this outcome is by no means *necessary*; a different arrangement could have been always possible. Therefore, rather than determining rhetorical commonplaces in advance, one has to carefully trace their dynamic deployment in practice and explain how the winning position prevailed over its alternatives.[4]

Jackson argues that this conceptualization strips legitimacy of any normative or transcendental content, making it an empirical concept that becomes amenable to sociological and non-evaluative analysis. This de-normativization is in line with Weber's broader aim of separating empirical and ethical argument. Conventional constructivist accounts tend to build

[1] Krebs and Jackson (2007) 47.
[2] Jackson (2002b) pp. 449, 452-453; Jackson (2003) 238; Jackson (2006) 26, 49, 251-252; Krebs and Jackson, (2007) 42, 44.
[3] Jackson (2002b) 451, 453-454; Jackson (2003) 235, 237, 239; Jackson (2006) 28-30, 40; Jackson, (2011) 134.
[4] Jackson (2003) 234, 236; Jackson (2006) 30-31, 39, 46-47, 252.

claims of normative or transcendental validity of a particular policy into the causal mechanisms that explain that policy. In so doing, they move the crucial explanatory factors into an untheorized normative structure without explaining how this structure became legitimate in the first place. As a result, conventional constructivists *presume* rather than demonstrate or explain the transcendental validity of very contested ethical notions. An example of this approach is Margareta Keck and Kathrin Sikkink's boomerang model, according to which oppressed social movements unleash a transnational cycle of normative pressure that finally feeds back on their own countries, assumes a specific conception of human rights as inherently legitimate.[1] A certain kind of civilizational analysis (that of Samuel Huntington and David Gress for instance) falls into a similar trap by treating civilizations as objects that possess essential characteristics. By attempting to define the essence of civilizations, this analysis reifies particular normative contents over others. In this way, it ends up on the same plane with political actors who claim that particular norms constitute a given civilization. It has crossed the 'crucial logical boundary' between science and politics and is no longer only analysing but also complicit in the production of its objects of study. A Weberian perspective represents an advancement over these approaches because it traces the empirical and historical processes of legitimation and boundary construction rather than making any claims about their normative validity; rather than evaluating different conceptions of legitimacy, it simply reconstructs them out of their cultural contexts.[2] Social science, Jackson writes,

> "can and should remain firmly on the analytical side of that gulf and avoid converting its concepts into "political advertisements" and "weapons of war" (…) And it should do this for two reasons: *theoretically*, because there is no way to validly leap from the observation of social action to a judgement about the empirical validity of the concepts that orient that action; and *practically*, because there is no need to make such a leap in order to analyze the dynamics and impacts of social action."[3]

Jackson has used his approach to study two interlinked cases: the formation of NATO, and the reconstruction and the full integration of post-WWII Germany into the Western alliance. He argues that both outcomes resulted from the dissemination and rhetorical deployment of the commonplace of *Western civilization*, according to which the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the European countries were part of a larger cultural community. This occidentalist language served to de-legitimize positions opposed to US involvement in Europe and

[1] Jackson (2006) 18-20.
[2] Jackson (2006) 4-8, 18-21; Jackson (2002b) 449-450.
[3] Jackson (2006) 8-9.

Germany's full integration into the Western military and economic institutions.[1] The success of the occidentalist rhetoric was by no means evident; it prevailed in a contested and dynamic debate that was "an ongoing process of forming and reforming positions" rather than a clash between 'preformed views'. Thus, its victory resulted *endogenously* from the interaction of particular legitimation claims rather than from exogenously given motives or ad hoc environmental factors.[2]

Jackson argues that the immediate post-war period gave rise to a heated debate about the future role of the US and Germany among American and German policy elites. While the American debate gave rise to a variety of policy options, in practice there were only two major contenders. Both of these contenders drew on the rhetorical commonplace of Western civilization, which had become firmly established in intellectual and popular discourses by that time. The first was what Jackson calls the *exemplarist* position. The rhetorical core of the exemplarist position was composed of two ideas: 'exceptionalism,' which denotes the 'ontological distinctiveness' of America from the rest of the world, particularly from Europe; and 'heliotropism,' according to which the progress of civilization follows the direction of the sun, implying that societies located further to the West were more advanced. Both ideas were joined by the commonplaces of 'anticommunism,' which called for the *internal* purification of American Society from all communist elements, and the defence of liberty as the most important good. These notions constituted together the idea that the United States of America was a "city on a hill", the lone defender of the good. The foreign policy implications of this exemplarist position were that the US should stay away from European power politics. It also implied a tendency to act unilaterally, because the US was so different from the rest of the world. In the context of the immediate post-war period, the exemplarist position implied an American withdrawal from Europe.[3]

The exemplarist course of action was, however, decisively undermined by the second major contender, which Jackson labels *occidentalist vindicationism*. The vindicationist position was not so much *opposed* to as a *reconfiguration* of exemplarism. The main rhetorical move of the vindicationist supporters was to sever the link between heliotropism and American exceptionalism: the US was no longer a lone city on the hill but part of a broader community of civilized nations. Even though the US retained its cultural superiority, it could no longer remain in isolation but had to actively defend the cause of civilization in the world. While the

[1] Jackson (2003) 239-247; Jackson (2006) viii-x, 113-114.
[2] Jackson (2006) 31, 46-47, 113.
[3] Jackson (2003) 241-243; Jackson (2004) 177-178; Jackson (2006) 56-60, 147.

vindicationist language that served to justify the American participation in both world wars referred to the US as a member of human civilization as such, in the immediate aftermath of WWII, this language shifted to *Western* Civilization, of which the US was a part and which was under threat. This appeal to a Western civilization enabled the vindicationists to defy the idea that Western values could be defended at the territorial boundaries of the US and to link anticommunism with an active American involvement in Europe. American military and economic involvement was required because Western values in Europe were threatened by a totalitarian and barbarian tyranny. Democracy, freedom and liberty had to be defended against a communist ideology that was portrayed as similar to German National Socialism in the 1930s and 1940s. As Germany was part of the Western civilization, it had to be fully included in the economic aid package as well as in any Western military cooperation.[1] This deployment of occidentalist language effectively de-legitimized the exemplarist position. It provided those who *wanted* global US engagement and German economic recovery with a crucial justification that resonated with the wider American populace and that *actually* enabled them to pursue these goals; and it manoeuvred those who opposed any American engagement into a corner where they were no longer able to maintain their opposition. It is in this way that the use of occidentalist language laid the discursive groundwork for the foundation of NATO and the full integration of Germany into the Western alliance.[2]

Jackson argues that the German debate unfolded in a very similar way. In that debate, two positions confronted each other both of which drew on the commonplace of Western civilization. The first was the *Sonderweg* position of the *Social Democratic Party* (SPD), which resembled the exemplarist position in the US debate. The SPD argued that Germany was part of the Western community but retained an 'ontological distinctiveness' in that community because it represented a unique brand of 'democratic socialism', which was meant to build a bridge between East and West. The party also expressed a strong commitment to German national unity and full sovereignty, which it argued should be achieved before pursuing any far-reaching integration in Western institutions.[3] The *Sonderweg* position was, however, effectively delegitimated by the deployment of occidentalist rhetoric by the *Christian Democratic Party* (CDU), which emphasised the Western cultural foundation of Germany more strongly and which advocated the country's full integration into Western institutions even before achieving national unity. By wholeheartedly embracing the West, the CDU and its leader Konrad

[1] Jackson (2006) 58-62, 131-138, 149-152, 156-157, 162-165, 170-180, 195.
[2] Jackson (2003) 244-249; Jackson (2006) 131-132, 151, 156, 161, 175-181.
[3] Jackson (2006) 63-68, 125-127, 130, 182-184.

Adenauer exposed the contradictions in the Sonderweg position, which accepted Germany's belonging to a Western community but which opposed far-reaching participation in Western institutions and emphasised national independence.[1]

[1] Jackson (2006) 68, 127-130, 141-144, 183-184, 187-191, 203-215.

Radical Constructivism

Ontological Uncertainty

Oliver Kessler has developed one of the most complex and original accounts of constructivism in international theory. Like Jackson, he develops his theory in opposition to positivism. In this section, I will outline Kessler's characterization of this philosophy as well as its manifestation in social and international theory; the next section will outline his critique of positivist theorizing and positivist-inspired analyses of world politics; in the final section, I will present Kessler's constructivist theory and his empirical analyses, which build on this critique.

Kessler argues that, rather than taking the middle ground between post-modernism and positivism, the contribution of constructivism is to go beyond the positivist philosophy of science. The positivist view holds that the world is a closed physical system which consists of things or essences, which is governed by universal laws, and which exists independently of our perceptions. The implication is that this world can be represented through objective knowledge that is independent of any subjective beliefs and spatial and temporal contexts. The positivist view implies the possibility of knowledge that is homogenous, harmonious, timeless and hierarchical.[1] Kessler claims that rationalist theories such as game theory, neorealism and neo-institutionalism are most clearly committed to the positivist philosophy. Rationalist theory is positivist in that it relies on the *aleatory conception of probability*, which defines probability in quantitative terms, e.g. as a numerical fraction or proportion of a finite unity. All future events can be quantified in terms of probability distributions and possible (or known) states of the world. The implication is that probability is an ontological property of reality. The aleatory view implies, in other words, an objective world consisting of fixed concepts and categories, which have intrinsic properties and which are clearly delineated from each other.[2] In game and rational choice theory, this aleatory view is present through what Kessler takes to be the central feature of this theory, which is the expected utility hypothesis. This hypothesis, which was first axiomatized by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, serves to theorize rational decision under conditions of uncertainty without, however, abandoning the central insights of rational choosing under certainty. Given the aleatory assumption of a finite number of exogenously given states of the world whose probabilities can be derived from their physical properties and

[1] Kessler (2007a) 248, 252-253; Kessler (2008a) 14-17, 82-83, 165; Kessler (2008d) 509-510, 519; Kessler: (2010a) 85, 88-89; Kessler (2012b) 255-259.

[2] Kessler (2007c) 115; Kessler (2008a) 81-85, 88, 93, 98, 101, 103, 135, 158; Kessler (2008c) 5-7; Kessler (2011b) 2175; Kessler and Daase (2008) 218-219.

are known to all individuals, the expected utilities for all outcomes can be rationally calculated by multiplying the preference order for a particular group of outcomes with their probabilities. In this way, rationality is conceived in terms of the *internal consistency of individual choice:* the assignment of numerical probabilities to all outcomes allows for the comparability and ordering of particular actions into a hierarchical, transitive and clearly defined preference order according to their expected utility. That is, rational action refers to the consistent choosing among objectively given alternatives.[1]

Kessler goes on to claim that the conceptualization of probability in aleatoric terms and of rationality as the consistent choice among given alternatives depends on the assumption that the game and its basic categories are *ontologically prior* to interaction; the interests, identities and payoff functions of the rational agents are exogenously given before playing the game.[2] This renders the individual the fundamental unit of analysis. In game theoretical settings, essential and ontologically given individuals become the sole carriers of knowledge. Knowing or 'transcendental' agents face objectively given decision problems. This implies that social facts are conceptualized in terms of an individualist epistemology: intersubjective phenomena such as institutions and collective expectations are reduced to individual motives or cost-benefit calculations; 'the whole' is defined by its pre-existing parts.[3] This means that expectations, observations and institutions only exert effects on an exogenously given and priorly constituted situation. That is, they *regulate* but do not *constitute* the interaction of pre-existing agents. Institutions are conceived as allocation devices that enable equilibrium outcomes by reducing the agents' transaction costs. Their role is reduced to incentive setters that causally influence the motives of ontologically given actors. Likewise, the scientific observer's questions and expectations do not constitute but only help *reveal* the exogenously given preferences of individuals.[4]

For Kessler, the assumption of exogenously given actors acting on the basis of fixed and consistent preferences finally implies that rationalist theory relies on an *ontological* concept of uncertainty, which reduces uncertainty to *risk*. In game theoretical settings, the uncertainty resulting from the mutual interdependence of strategies is overcome through the attribution of

[1] Kessler (2008a) 101-108, 118-119, 122, 126, 131-132, 162, 168, 170; Kessler (2008c) 6 ; Kessler (2008d) 505, 511-512, 518; Kessler (2011b) 2174-2175.
[2] Kessler (2008a) 85, 126, 133, 164, 170, 172; Kessler (2008c) 7-8; Kessler (2008d) 505, 512; Kessler (2011b) 2164, 2175; Kessler (2013a) 68; Kessler/Daase (2008) 220, 222-223.
[3] Kessler (2007a) 252-253; Kessler (2008a) 19, 99, 119, 131, 171; Kessler (2008c) 1, 3-4, 8; Kessler (2008d) 503, 506-507, 511-512, 514, 519; Kessler (2012b) 262; Kessler and Kratochwil (2010) 29-33;
[4] Kessler (2008a) 82, 84-85, 130, 131, 141-142, 144, 166-168; Kessler (2008d) 506, 514-515, 516; Kessler (2013a) 68.

common knowledge, which translates into fixed payoff structures, identities and interests. That is, the cooperation problem is solved through an equilibrium concept that is conceived as a *fixed state* or a *stable situation*. As a result, the expectations and strategies of the actors can only change within an ontologically given situation of fixed preferences and identities. Change is understood as the rational and linear adaption of expectations to the 'true probabilities' due to better information and the overcoming of misperceptions, errors and miscalculations.[1] This means that non-knowledge (as the expression of uncertainty) is always already structured and 'known;' it is always transformed into knowledge and manageable risk by means of probability distributions and possible states of the world. Individuals are able to calculate their future and evolution because 'they already know what they do not know.' In this way, praxis is reduced to a simple management or coordination problem.[2] As non-knowledge is always transformed into or subsumed by a stable state, it becomes logically *subordinate* to the concepts of equilibrium and stability. That is, non-knowledge is conceived as the opposite of knowledge about stable phenomena and probability relations; the existence and accumulation of knowledge automatically reduces the amount of non-knowledge. Uncertainty does not have an *autonomous standing* vis-à-vis the notions of stability and equilibrium. Non-knowledge can only be conceptualized in terms of misperceptions or errors that can be overcome through rational adaption. *Genuine* uncertainty beyond numbers is excluded.[3]

Kessler finally claims that not only rationalist theory but also much what goes under the constructivist or (sociological) turn in international theory is grounded in the positivist philosophy. Constructivist and English School scholars such as Martha Finnemore, Kathryn Sikkink, Alexander Wendt, Hedley Bull and Barry Buzan seem to move beyond the methodological individualism of rationalist theory by emphasizing the social and intersubjective nature of world politics. However, like their rationalist opponents, these scholars end up reducing intersubjective norms to the individual motives or interests of pre-existing states. For, in their accounts, intersubjective norms only integrate and regulate the space between pre-given states, or 'rump individuals' that possess a private stock of ideas prior to interaction. The constructivist turn embraces the positivist semantic of 'parts and whole' in that it conceives of intersubjectivity as a 'thing' or a 'parcel' that is exchanged between pre-

[1] Kessler (2008a) 19, 36, 96-97, 141-142, 159, 164 170, 185, 206; Kessler (2008c) 15-16; Kessler (2009c) 168-169; Kessler (2013a) 68.
[2] Kessler (2008a) 167, 173, 175-176; Kessler (2008c) 14; Kessler (2011b) 2174-2176; Kessler (2013a) 68-70; Kessler/Daase (2008) 222.
[3] Kessler (2008c) 2-3, 14, 17-18; Kessler (2011b) 2175-2177; Kessler (2013a) 68-69, 73.

constituted actors.[1] As a result, and similar to game and rational choice theory, change can only be conceived by taking these pre-constituted state actors as the baseline. That is, global change can only be framed in terms of either a growth or a loss of state sovereignty, or as an increase or decrease of international law. Radical uncertainty, which involves a transformation of statehood itself, is ruled out.[2]

The Limits of Ontological Uncertainty

Kessler claims that positivist theories run into a fundamental problem when analysing social phenomena. Positivism conceives of meaning as a property of things and individuals; notions such as truth, reason, consistency and rationality are located in the agents' minds and thus objectively given. The problem, however, is that social life is *fundamentally uncertain* or *polycontextual* in sense that there always exists a plurality of notions of truth which are mutually contradicting but equally plausible. Truth is not a universal property of human beings but emerges only against the background of and stands in permanent competition with other alternatives; impossible alternatives are transformed into viable options and become naturalized, giving rise to new unrealized possibilities. By attributing a fixed notion of truth to all individuals, positivist research precisely fails to locate the actual in the space of the possible.[3] It is unable, that is, to account for the processes in which concepts and categories are formed and transformed in order to structure an unstructured reality in the first place. It cannot explain the emergence of certain notions of truth as *contingent outcomes* that have silenced other alternatives and given rise to new possibilities which will ultimately threaten their foundations. In other words, positivist research fails to account for the specificity of outcomes, which renders them *qualitatively* different from other possibilities that have been abandoned or not (yet) been actualized. What it misses are the radical changes, uncertainties, ruptures and the evolutionary dynamics of social life which cannot be captured by the paradigm of linear adaption.[4]

Kessler shows how radical uncertainty poses a problem for rationalist and (mainstream) constructivist theory by discussing various examples. Against rationalist theory, he discusses empirical studies and hypothetical examples in order to bring to the fore the multiplicity of notions of rationality and to make clear the implausibility of rationality conceived as internal consistency. For instance, studies have shown that the questions asked by a scientific observer

[1] Kessler (2008a) 26-33; Kessler (2009a) 90-94, 96-97.
[2] Kessler (2009a) 94, 99-100, 104-105.
[3] Kessler (2008a) 44-49, 79, 93; Kessler 2009a) 97; Kessler (2012c) 80-81.
[4] Kessler (2008a) 96-97, 133-134, 139-140, 142-145, 166, 206-207; Kessler (2008d) 507-509; Kessler (2009b)186; Kessler (2009c) 170; Kessler (2013a) 68, 70-71.

to a participant do not simply reveal the latter's objective preferences but have a decisive influence on how these preferences are formulated. Many different and mutually exclusive preference orders can be made acceptable on the condition that they are framed in the right way by the investigator.[1] The impossibility of an objective hierarchy of preferences is further confirmed by the fact that people make contradictory choices in different contexts, none of which can be, however, irrational (such as a person picking as much of a desired brunch item as possible if there is a large quantity, and not doing so if the quantity is low). For Kessler, these examples show that rationality does not a have a fixed universal meaning but is intrinsically contextual and particular. There is no internally consistent preference order but only a plurality of mutually exclusive notions of rationality, none of which is superior to the others.[2]

In his writings, Kessler also discusses an empirical case in order to show how the intrinsic uncertainty of social life undermines the foundations of rationalist and economic theory, which I want to discuss in more detail. This is the global financial crisis. The dominant economic models and policy reform proposals conceptualize this crisis as a problem of *asymmetric information*. The crash came about because the respective financial institutions were no longer able to comprehend and disclose the risk associated with complex instruments such as Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO). These information gaps and distortions led to a confidence problem because no unambiguous values could be attributed to the individual actors and their actions. This undermined the efficient allocation of funds and caused the collapse of the financial markets. As the crisis was caused by information asymmetries, the implication is that financial markets have to be reformed by increasing their *transparency*. Politics has to impose tighter disclosure requirements on the financial system, which will provide *more data* and hence close the information gaps. If all actors have access to the same amount of data, the confidence problem will be solved, resulting in stable financial markets.[3]

By conceiving the financial crisis as a problem of asymmetric information, the economic models assume the validity of the efficient market hypothesis, which states that financial markets *can be stable* on the condition that politics provides the necessary infrastructure and incentives. Under normal circumstances, markets obey their own laws and tend towards equilibrium conditions. As long as all actors have access to the same economic data, they will interpret this data in the same way. This means that the meaning of data is *ultimately fixed*; knowledge is intrinsic to statistical information. The implication is a *negative* notion of crisis

[1] Kessler (2008a) 129-131.
[2] Kessler (2008a) 131-135; Kessler (2008d) 512-513.
[3] Kessler (2008a) 203-305; Kessler (2009c) 164-165; Kessler (2012a) 276, 281-282; Kessler (2013a) 61-64.

that is logically subordinate to the concept of stability: the financial downturn is not *endogenous* but *exogenous* to financial practices. It did not result from these practices themselves but from miscalculations and adaption errors that were due to insufficient data. The task of regulatory bodies is reduced to the technical role of providing enhanced data through new legislation, which will help financial actors adjust rationally to a new equilibrium.[1]

Kessler argues that the essentialism underpinning the economic explanations fails to account for the *newness* of the financial downturn. The crisis can only be understood as the result of the *radical changes* that have taken place in global finance over the last two decades.[2] It is important to note that this is not simply an empirical critique. Kessler is not merely arguing that the models fail to explain the *current* crisis, e.g. that they are able to shed light on the past and that they fail to account for the transition from the past to the current system that produced the crisis. His point is that the economic models are not just empirically but *intrinsically* flawed: they fail explain the current crisis inasmuch they are unable to account for *any* financial crisis and order.[3] This inability arises from the uneven distribution of knowledge among financial actors. Economic data does not have any intrinsic meaning but is constantly subject to multiple interpretations which are equally possible but radically different from each other. A specific financial order and its tensions are always produced by particular practices which are internal to that order and which render it fundamentally different from alternative possibilities. That is, the formation of a financial order is not a rational adaption but a genuine re-evaluation of existing data that *changes* its meaning vis-à-vis alternative interpretations. Any creation implies a transformation that fundamentally breaks with other alternatives.[4] This is as valid for the sublime crisis and the financial system to which it refers as it is for the Gold Standard and the Bretton Woods system. All of these orders have developed internal practices and *new* forms of knowledge that broke with previously valid expectations.[5]

The existence of a plurality of mutually contradicting possibilities implies that there is no universal equilibrium on which all actors converge. Rather, every institutional setting is a contingent event that automatically generates new possibilities, uncertainties and paradoxes,

[1] Kessler (2007c) 119; Kessler (2008a) 181, 203-204, 206, 220; Kessler (2009c) 166, 170; Kessler (2012a) 276, 278, 280-282; Kessler (2013a) 62-64, 68-69.
[2] Kessler (2009c) 164; Kessler (2012a) 282.
[3] "The primary objective of this contribution is thus *conceptual*. The crisis is taken as a vantage point to explore how Hayek's thought provides us with an alternative *vocabulary* with which we can develop a different understanding of *financial systems and their crises*." Kessler (2012a) 277.
[4] Kessler (2006) 215-216; Kessler (2007c) 121; Kessler (2007b) 360; Kessler (2008a) 77, 182, 206-207; Kessler (2008c) 3; Kessler (2009c) 169-170; Kessler (2012a) 282, 295-296; Kessler (2013a) 62-62, 72-73.
[5] Kessler (2012a) 296-297; Kessler (2013a) 73.

which will ultimately challenge its foundations. This means that global finance is subject to *continuous* change and instability. Rather than being opposed to each other, institutional stability and crisis are in a co-constitutive relationship that renders the global financial system dynamic and complex.[1] The implication is that financial practices and orders cannot be explained by subsuming them under models that posit universal preferences or attribute apriori values to all economic data. Given the permanent uncertainty that results from the plurality of plausible interpretations, essentialist theories are *generally* unable to account for the processes in which knowledge about finance is created as knowledge in the first place. Financial knowledge structures cannot be understood by subsuming them under ahistorical truths but only through a *reconstructive* analysis that situates them in space and time.[2] The focus has to be on those processes of change that establish the specificity of financial orders, e.g. which enable certain practices of finance at the expense of others:

"Das heißt es eröffnet sich der Blick auf Prozesse, in denen neue Signale an Bedeutung gewinnen und alte Signale als irrelevant anerkannt werden (…)"

and which determine

"(…) unter welcher Bedingung und *in welchem sich wandelnden Kontext* etwas als Signal gelten kann."[3]

In other words, given the condition of permanent uncertainty, it is always imperative to reconstruct how particular financial practices are selected and delimited from other possible alternatives: how economic phenomena are made economic and delineated from non-economic fields, how knowledge is communicated in financial as opposed to economic markets, and how only certain issues cause financial instabilities and crises at the expense of other possibilities.[4]

It is the newness of the subprime crisis understood in *this* sense that the economic models fail to explain. They fail to conceive of the current downturn as a distinct event that necessarily differs from other financial systems and their crises. Contemporary global finance has moved beyond the boundaries of the state system and developed into an autonomous and transnational

[1] Kessler (2007c) 120-121; Kessler (2008a) 220; Kessler (2009c) 167, 169-170; Kessler (2012a) 276, 292, 296-297; Kessler (2013a) 73.
[2] Kessler (2008a) 206-207; Kessler (2009c) 172; Kessler (2012a) 291-292; Kessler (2013a) 70-71.
[3] Kessler (2008a) 207, my emphasis ("The focus must be on those processes, in which new signals acquire meaning and old signals lose relevance, and which determine under what changing context signals are constituted as signals in the first place").
[4] Kessler (2009c) 167; Kessler (2012a) 291-293, 298; Kessler (2013a) 71-73.

space with distinct rules and rationalities.[1] One of the most striking features of this trend is the invention of derivatives, which have significantly changed the function of prices. Derivatives de-couple the financial markets from the real economy: while prices refer to material goods and objects in real markets, it is prices themselves which are the products of finance; prices are the very goods that are generated in financial markets. This renders the temporality of finance different from the temporality of the real economy in that financial transactions become much more future-oriented. Investment decisions are not driven by the expectation over actual but possible profits. Financial actors do not make money from the efficient allocation of capital but from the future revenues on which they can bet or hedge. They do not generate profits by avoiding future risks but by *making them tradable*. Through derivatives, the present loses its importance at the expense of the future, which itself becomes the object of trade.[2]

In addition to the detachment from the real economy and cash flows, the financial system has also witnessed the emergence of new players which no longer operate within the confines of the state system and which the challenge the established distinction between the private and the public. Rating agencies, investment banks and hedge funds are no longer merely private actors but have become part of a public discourse that raises issues of responsibility, authority and legitimacy. In particular, given that that the value of financial products is not determined by a material base but by the identity of those who make the value estimations, rating agencies have become an authoritative source of judgement that shapes the expectations of investors.[3]

Kessler argues that these changes and innovations in global finance were crucial in bringing about the subprime crisis. Derivatives enabled the specific kind of speculative attacks that occurred during the European currency crisis in 1992 and the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and were crucial for the securitization of debt into CDO's, which contributed to the financial collapse. The securitization of debt and the privatization of mortgage made the crisis truly global, allowing banks to sell outstanding claims on a global scale and thus linking markets, actors and assets in arbitrary ways with unpredictable consequences. In addition, not only derivatives but also rating Agencies and hedge funds contributed to the creation and diffusion of CDO's, the former providing first class ratings and the latter generating the demand for those assets.[4] In sum, the crisis was produced by factors that were *internal* or *peculiar* to the fabric of modern finance. The causes of the downturn were not exogenous but *endogenous* to the

[1] Kessler (2011a) 210; Kessler (2012a) 282; Kessler (2012c) 88-89; Kessler (2013a) 59-61.
[2] Kessler (2008a) 207-208; Kessler (2011a) 207-210; Kessler (2012a) 294-295; Kessler (2012c) 88-89.
[3] Kessler (2008a) 209-214; (2012a) 295; Kessler (2011a) 207; Kessler (2013a) 60-61.
[4] Kessler (2009c) 173; Kessler (2012a) 278-280, 296; Kessler (2012c) 88; Kessler (2013a) 60, 63.

contemporary financial system.[1]

It is finally worth mentioning hat Kessler applies a similar critique to some constructivist analyses of world politics. By taking pre-existing states as ontologically given, these analyses assume a universally fixed notion of statehood and hence fail to account for current transformation (or distinctiveness) of international law and sovereignty from a segmented to a functionally differentiated order. Both sovereignty and international law do not have a fixed essences but acquire different meanings in different historical contexts, which makes it necessary to reconstruct each legal order in its particularity, e.g. those processes that transformed it from an impossible to a realistic option. What positivist constructivist analyses fail to grasp is that the current transformation does not simply stand for an increase of legal norms that constrain pre-existing states but for a change of the notion of statehood *itself*. While the state used to provide the basic reference point for international law in that the main purpose of this law was to tame state power, the state-centric order is now being challenged by an increasing constitutionalization of world politics, which has created a new hierarchy of norms that trumps sovereign will, and a growing fragmentation of international law, which refers to the emergence of a multiplicity of public and private legal orders that conflict with each other.[2]

Theorizing Genuine Uncertainty

For Kessler, the problems of positivist theorizing imply that a fundamentally different approach is needed in order to account for the radical polycontextuality or uncertainty of social life. This alternative is provided by what he calls *radical constructivism*, which he mainly develops by drawing on the work of Niklas Luhmann, John Maynard Keynes, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Friedrich von Hayek. By contrast to positivism, radical constructivism acknowledges the polycontextuality or uncertainty of social life as a basic fact. Reality is unstructured in the sense that knowledge never exists in a concentrated or integrated form but is always heterodox and dispersed unevenly in society. All individuals have their own subjective experiences which cannot be apprehended from an objective viewpoint.[3] Given the plurality of possible interpretations, the question arises of what it is that makes for a particular order, practice or outcome at the expense of all others possibilities. That is, explaining a particular order requires disrupting the free flow of potential orders and distinguishing this order from its alternatives; it requires establishing its specificity, distinctiveness or qualitative difference from other

[1] Kessler (2009c) 167; Kessler (2012a) 276, 82-283, 295-296; Kessler (2013a) 63.
[2] Kessler (2009a) 87-88, 90, 94, 96-102, 103-105.
[3] Kessler (2008a) 147-148; Kessler (2012a) 284-286, 288.

possibilities. This is only possible by conceiving of truth and knowledge as socially or contextually determined. Truth and knowledge are only valid within or dependent on specific *intersubjective* contexts. If these context changes, the modes of knowing and perceiving will change too.[1]

Intersubjective contexts are *constitutive* of reality. Intersubjective knowledge manifests itself in *rules*, the purpose of which is to reduce the uncertainty arising from the plurality of possible interpretations. Rules and the semantic distinctions underlying them are generated through *language* or *communication*. By contrast to positivism, intersubjective rules are neither rooted in conscious reflection nor reducible to individual minds. Humans cannot step outside the conditions of their cultural and take an objective position. Rules do not simply regulate the interaction between pre-existing individuals. Rather, they constitute identities, roles and subjectivities in the first place; they are the implicit or unconscious conditions of possibility that precede the formulation of interests and preferences.[2] As such, rules are intrinsically *self-referential* in that they do not arise from pure data or individual minds but from *mutual expectations* or *observations*. Coming back to the economic studies discussed above, rationality and consistency are not private but contextual properties that only emerge in the course of the interaction between the investigator and the interviewee.[3]

As intersubjective contexts are constitutive of reality, they are always contingent events which are distinct from other possibilities. This is because the notion of constitution *implies* difference. By constituting a particular order and its truth conditions, contextual or qualitative judgements not only structure reality but also necessarily *change* it in relation to other possibilities. The key idea behind the claim that a certain rule is constitutive of a specific practice is precisely that without this rule this practice would not exist and that there would be a different reality. The act of establishing meaning or of identifying 'something as something' always presupposes the drawing of a boundary between this something and that what it is not.[4]

The upshot of this argument is that intersubjective contexts are inherently fragile. If the creation and maintenance of any order *depends* on the exclusion of all other alternatives, these

[1] Albert et al. (2008) 57-59, 66; Kessler (2008a) 36, 242-245; Kessler (2008c) 10-11, 13; Kessler (2008d) 510-512; Kessler (2011b) 2172; Kessler (2013a) 70-71.
[2] Kessler (2007a) 262-264; Kessler (2008a) 35, 132, 150-153, 170; Kessler (2008c) 16-17; Kessler (2008d) 510-511, 513, 515-516; Kessler (2009a) 96-98; Kessler (2012a) 286-288; Kessler (2012b) 261-262; Kessler and Kratochwil (2010) 32-33.
[3] Kessler (2007a) 263-264; Kessler (2008a) 19, 68, 76, 130-131, 133-134, 152-153 169-170, 181 203; Kessler (2008c) 13; Kessler (2008d) 513, 516-518; Kessler (2012a) 289-290.
[4] Kessler (2007c) 112; Kessler (2008a) 133-134, 142, 169; Kessler (2008c) 2-3; Kessler (2008d) 511, 518; Kessler (2009a) 95-97; Kessler (2012b) 262.

alternatives are constitutive of the actualized option.[1] That is, actualized meaning can only be understood in relation to or is defined by non-actualized alternatives:

"□Both Husserl and Heidegger□ redefine the concept of meaning from the set of truth conditions to the boundary of actuality and potentiality. All that exists can only be understood within the context of the alternatives and what does not exist. "Practices" exist only in a wider set of alternatives and within the horizon of the possible. With the actualization of potentiality, new possibilities emerge and, over time, the horizon of possibility shifts."[2]

As every actualization constantly carries new possibilities, it becomes inherently unstable; it is continuously threatened by other alternatives that construct reality differently. This implies that uncertainty is not subordinate to but has an autonomous standing vis-à-vis the concept stability. As all attempts to create stable meaning produce new non-knowledge that eventually undermines their foundations, the defining feature social life is a notion of stability that is not static but *dynamic* and that allows for the qualitative transformation and re-interpretation of phenomena in different contexts.[3] Social order evolves *spontaneously*, e.g. in such a way that escapes deliberate planning. Evolution does not occur through rational adaption but 'indirectly' through the continuous selection of those rules and practices that have proven most successful.[4] The methodological implication is that social practices cannot be understood through simple observation but only through a reconstructive methodology, which traces the different and varying ways of how boundaries are drawn *in use*. That is, social research needs to accept the primacy of *praxis*.[5]

Kessler has used his radical constructivist approach to reconstruct, capture or trace the current transformation (or distinctiveness) of contemporary world society. Drawing on the works of Ulrich Beck, Michel Foucault and Luhmann, he argues that the constitutive rules of world society are undergoing two interrelated changes: from a *segmented* to a *functional* mode of differentiation, and from a semantic of *threats* to semantic of *risk*. In order to conceptualize or characterize these two transformations, Kessler makes a particular (and presumably confusing) theoretical move. His conceptual strategy for characterizing the transformations

[1] Albert et al. (2008) 58-61; Kessler (2008a) 34-35; Kessler (2009a) 97; Kessler (2010a) 94, 96; Kessler and Kratochwil (2010) 34.
[2] Kessler (2010a) 94.
[3] Albert et al. (2008) 58-59, 61; Kessler (2006) 215, 217-218; Kessler (2007b) 358-359, 367-368; Kessler (2008a) 76-77, 159, 166, 220; Kessler (2008c) 17-19; Kessler (2009c) 167, 169-170; Kessler (2011a) 205; Kessler (2012a) 296-297.
[4] Kessler (2008a) 153-157; Kessler (2012a) 289-290.
[5] Kessler (2007a) 264-265; Kessler (2008a) 86-87, 98, 148, 151, 153, 166; Kessler (2008c) 17-18; Kessler (2008d) 517-518; Kessler (2010a) 99-100; Kessler (2011a) 205.

from segmented to functional differentiation and from threats to risk is to resort to the distinction between the positivist and the post-positivist philosophy of social science. Kessler transforms the distinction between two philosophical views, which make mutually exclusive assumptions about how the individual can know and engage with the world in the first place, into a distinction between two *political world views*, which imply two different modes of interaction and which have shaped empirical security practices at different points in time.

The transition from segmented to functional differentiation is conceptualized in terms of the distinction between Cartesian individualism, which assumes individuals or states to exist priorly to interaction ('the idea of pre-existing parts that make up the whole'), and the intersubjective or -societal concept of world society. The segmented order was 'individualist' in that the sovereign state was the main reference point of international law. Law fulfilled a peace-providing function in that it integrated the independent parts into the whole; it only existed 'in-between' sovereign and pre-existing states.[1] The emergence of functional differentiation, by contrast, gives rise to a 'more societal or intersubjective' perspective that challenges the state-centeredness of the segmented order. Kessler, of course, often refers to the concept of intersubjectivity as a social theoretical or philosophical category, arguing that *both* the segmented and the functional order are two intersubjective modes of internal differentiation in world society that result from the drawing of particular boundaries.[2] This is in line with his constructivism, which attempts provide an alternative to the positivist philosophy, as I have outlined above. However, at the same time, he uses the concept of intersubjectivity, or intersociality, as a means to *demarcate* the emerging functional order from the state-centric mode of interaction. Functional differentiation, he argues, gives rise to a 'genuinely inter-societal vocabulary' that leaves traditional national categories behind.[3] On the one hand, it signifies a growing constitutionalization and hierarchization of legal norms which trump sovereign will. On the other hand, and here Kessler comes close to adopting the standard globalization narrative, it entails an increasing fragmentation of international law that results from a new plurality of actors, systems and sectors which develop their own legal rationalities and temporalities. World politics witnesses the emergence of hybrid forms of governance, private authority and 'post-national constellations', which undermine the traditional state-centred distinctions between civil and military, public and private, and inside and outside. This

[1] Kessler (2009a) 98-99, 101-103; Kessler (2011b) 2178-2179; Kessler (2012c) 82, 85-86.
[2] Kessler (2008a) 37-38; Kessler (2009a) 94, 98; Kessler (2012c) 80-81.
[3] Kessler (2008a) 23, 26; Kessler (2009a) 88-90, 92, 98-99, 104; Kessler (2011a) 206; Kessler (2011b) 2165, 2182; Kessler (2012c) 77-79, 85, 90-91.

plurality of functional systems that generate their own legitimate knowledge structures 'tears apart the dream of a hierarchical world order', in which the nation state possesses the monopoly of knowledge production.[1]

This transposition of philosophical or social theoretical distinctions into different political orders that occur at different points in time is even more evident in Kessler's argument about the move from a vocabulary of threats to a vocabulary of risk. In order to conceptualize this transition, he resorts to the distinction between ontological and genuine uncertainty, which I have outlined above. In this use, ontological and genuine uncertainty stand for two different kinds of security policies.[2] Security policies that are informed by the logic of threats rely on the positivist notion of ontological uncertainty, which aims to quantify and calculate uncertainty as manageable risk trough instrumental rationalist reasoning. As the uncertain future can be subsumed under universal laws and general models, it is structured and 'known'. This means that possible threats are already known to exist; they are *actual*. Security practices relying on the notion of ontological uncertainty are concerned with actual dangers. This presupposes a pre-defined ontology in which the interests, identities and expectations are given and known to everyone.[3] Kessler argues that structured or calculable security generally was a feature of the segmented Westphalian system. This system was dominated by the sovereign state, which determined the primary principles inclusion and exclusion and which provided the dominant temporality for world politics. Practices of inclusion and exclusion centred on the control of borders and space, and the temporality of diplomatic relation controlled all other temporalities. How global problems should be solved and the world economy reformed was determined by the internal rules of diplomacy.[4] As a more concrete empirical instance of structured uncertainty, Kessler (in two articles co-authored with Christopher Daase) discusses the Cold War. The security problematique of the Cold War was framed in terms of the *security dilemma*. The motives, payoff functions and military capabilities of both adversaries were common knowledge. Both knew the potential military and political benefits as well as the possible ways of effective punishment. Threat assessment was relatively easy since the enemy was given and known. This made *deterrence* a rational strategy.[5] The logic of ontological uncertainty also underpinned what Kessler calls traditional state-centred international law. This is because

[1] Kessler (2008a) 17-18, 25-26, 29, 41-43; Kessler (2009a) 87-88, 98-101, 103-104; Kessler (2011a) 206; Kessler (2012c) 78-79, 84, 86.
[2] Daase and Kessler (2007) 412-414, 419; Kessler and Daase (2008) 214-215, 222.
[3] Daase and Kessler (2007) 418-420; Kessler (2008b) 866-867; Kessler and Daase (2008) 218-219, 222; Kessler and Werner (2008) 294.
[4] Kessler (2012c) 78-79, 85-86.
[5] Daase and Kessler (2007) 414-415, 421-423; Kessler and Daase (2008) 211-212, 214-216, 222-223.

traditional international law was governed by the vocabulary of *norms*. The function of norms is to serve as a yardstick to evaluate actions that have already happened or are immediately happening; they respond to the past or present. That is, norms address 'structured' uncertainties. They work within and presuppose a well-defined ontology that has fixed the basic legal categories and distinctions.[1]

Kessler argues that the rise of a plurality of new actors, sectors and systems, which develop their distinct orders of knowledge, rationalities and temporalities, has undermined the possibility for structured uncertainty and given rise to the logic of risk in security practices, which relies on the post-positivist concept of genuine uncertainty.[2] The risk approach to security is based on the assumption that probability assessments about 'what is the case' are not an ontological property of the world but dependent on qualitative or intersubjective judgements. As the categories and judgements structuring our world can change, there is a genuine uncertainty that cannot be brought under universal models by formal reasoning. That is, uncertainty arises from the absence of probability relations; it refers to an unstructured realm in which common standards of rationality have broken down or do not apply. It is this fundamental uncertainty which renders one's own position inherently contingent and particular: each reduction of uncertainty depends on particular judgements that always generate and compete with "other perspectives, other worlds and other models that could frame the issue-area differently."[3] This shifts the focus of security policy from a predictable to a genuinely uncertain future. Threats no longer belong to the existing realm of structured and 'known' uncertainty but arise from the radical unpredictability resulting from the non-existence of common standards and expectations. Security becomes an empty concept, or an unachievable ideal, because each security measure is just a contingent perspective that not only reduces but also generates and competes with new uncertainties, insecurities and other possible worlds that are equally plausible. Given this fundamental contingency and particularity of its own perspective, security policy can no longer reduce uncertain threats to secure knowledge by means of calculation and instrumental reasoning. Rather than applying universal models to an 'enemy', or an 'other', who escapes these models because he is so different, risk policy has to become self-reflexively aware of its own contingency vis-a-vis this enemy. Rather than assimilating the other to technical and abstract models, a genuine risk approach has to understand and engage with the particular,

[1] Kessler (2008b) 869-871; Kessler (2011b) 2180-2181; Kessler (2012c) 89-90; Kessler and Werner (2008) 294.
[2] Kessler (2011a) 197-198, 206, 209-210; Kessler (2011b) 2182; Kessler (2012c) 79, 87, 91; Kessler and Werner (2008) 294.
[3] Daase and Kessler (2007) 418-419; Kessler and Daase (2008) 212, 220-222; Kessler and Werner (2008) 293-294.

implicit, practical and contextual knowledge that constitutes this other's identity and actions.[1] Kessler makes this point more generally by arguing that the purpose of state politics is no longer the hierarchical provision of collective decisions for other sectors but the *navigation* between multiple realities or visions of politics, each of which is equally legitimate. Rather than producing universal knowledge that subsumes other sectors under its laws, the state becomes a 'manager of heterogeneity or multiplicity'.[2]

For Kessler, the turn to risk is evident in contemporary global finance, as outlined above. During the last three decades, financial markets have not only transformed into an autonomous realm that has emancipated itself from the real economy but they have also developed a distinct temporality that is no longer geared towards the present. While old finance was driven by the avoidance of risks and the efficient allocation of capital based on the actual profits of companies, new finance generates profits by making risks tradable. It is no longer the present but the future which is the object of trade. This is why states and international organizations have failed to reform the financial markets in the wake of the current financial crisis. The present-oriented temporality of diplomatic reform efforts cannot keep pace with the future-oriented temporality of global finance.[3] By framing the financial downturn as a problem of asymmetric information and by attempting to reform financial markets through more transparency and standardization, politics applies a universal method that ignores the distinct rationality and temporality of global finance, e.g. the implicit, practical and contextual knowledge constituting it, which has emerged with the rise of functional differentiation of world society. The universal models that shape reform efforts fail to grasp the particularity and complexity of contemporary finance.[4]

Kessler argues that the War on Terror is another example of how the logic of risk has challenged traditional security strategies, and in particular deterrence framework of the Cold War. In the fight of terrorism, a 'common currency' that serves to evaluate threats does not exist. Terrorists carry out their attacks with any warning, they do not seek rational gains, and they cut across the logic of the nation state in that they are neither private nor public actors. For all these reasons, the deterrence of terrorists through physical punishment is hard to achieve.[5] This is precisely what is problematic about states' responses to terrorism. States have increasingly

[1] Daase and Kessler (2007) 423-428; Kessler and Daase (2008) 212, 214, 220, 223, 227; Kessler (2008a) 176-180; Kessler (2008b) 864; Kessler (2011b) 2167-2168, 2171; Kessler and Werner (2008) 290-291, 294, 300.
[2] Kessler (2008a) 43-44; Kessler (2009a) 104.
[3] Kessler (2008a) 207-208; Kessler (2011a) 198, 207-210; Kessler (2012c) 79, 88-89, 91.
[4] Kessler (2007c) 120-121; Kessler (2008a) 19, 49, 203-205; Kessler (2009c) 164; Kessler (2013a) 61-62.
[5] Daase and Kessler (2007) 421-422; Kessler and Daase (2008) 211-213, 214, 216-217, 224-226.

employed measures such as targeted killings, indefinite detentions, camera surveillance, data storage and online screening in their fight against terrorism. Kessler and Daase argue that these 'illiberal policies' are rooted in the old deterrence paradigm. Counter-terrorism relies on an 'individualist ontology' in that it attempts to reduce terrorism to an objective threat which can be deterred. By applying general models associated with deterrence and the balance of power to terrorism, states attempt to fight a contextual problem with a universal method. Rather than trying to reduce uncertainty to secure knowledge, counter-terrorism policies should self-reflexively become aware of their own contingency and pursue a dialogue with the terrorist other.[1] Daase and Kessler argue that the Iraq war provides a similar example of how the logic of risk has undermined traditional security strategies. The mistake of the Bush administration was precisely that it did not self-reflexively observe the particularity of its own point of view and engage with its own non-knowledge. Rather than trying to understand the particularity of the Iraqi context, Bush, Rumsfeld and co. systematically disregarded or hid - through 'group think' or 'cognitive bias' - any practical or contextual knowledge from the public that did not fit their preconceived models and operative concepts.[2]

The logic of risk has also altered the boundaries of traditional international law, which was underpinned by the logic of norms. While the logic of norms was focused on the present, the war on terror has introduced a logic of precaution into legal reasoning that has shifted its focus towards the future. Given the unpredictability of terrorist attacks, legal reasoning is less concerned with the evaluation of past risks than with the evaluation of *potential* dangers that have not happened yet. For instance, human rights, which are evaluated in spatial terms - e.g. on the basis of whether human rights violations have already taken place -, have been increasingly challenged by precautionary measures such as terror lists, which introduce a temporal dimension by overriding human rights if there is a potential danger. The key question no longer is whether a violation has occurred but whether and to what extent it is legal to deprive a potential terrorist of basic human rights in order to save lives.[3] In his writings on international law, Kessler also argues that counter-terrorism policies such as targeted killings, which rely on the logic of risk and precaution, have undermined international law. These killings are not justified with proven guilt but with the threat an individual is believed to constitute in the future. This signifies a readjustment or a collapse of traditional legal categories in that states use the old language of law enforcement against terrorists but do not accept the system of accountability

[1] Daase and Kessler (2007) 429-431; Kessler and Daase (2008) 226-228; Kessler (2008b) 864.
[2] Daase and Kessler (207) 428-431.
[3] Kessler (2008b) 865, 870, 881-884; Kessler (2012c) 89-90; Kessler and Werner (2008) 290-291, 294-295.

that goes with it. With this shift, law is no longer only a means for conflict resolution but also a manager of uncertainty that justifies the use of violence.[1] As Kessler also claims that states' responses to terrorism are not part of the evolving vocabulary of risk, there seems to be a tension running through his writings. I believe that this tension can be, to some extent, made sense of when considering Kessler's broader point about the transformation of international law through risk. His point seems to be that the ambiguous status of counter-terrorism (that is both part and not part of risk) precisely illustrates how traditional legal reasoning is being challenged and transformed by risk: one the one hand, terrorism has in fact moved security politics towards a logic of risk and precaution; on the other hand, precautionary counter-terrorism policies are still rooted in the old legal paradigm in that they use the language of law enforcement without accepting its system of accountability. The resolution of this tension cannot mean going back to traditional international law and denying 'the newly emerging reality of risk' but rather creating new legal rules that both take this reality into account and regulate the use of force:

"It might indeed be true that terrorism itself already disrupts the very distinctions upon which the laws of war are built. Fighting such a phenomenon might indeed require 'new rules'. Such rules, however, should aim at the preservation of a system where the use of lethal force is regulated and subject to mechanisms of responsibility - not just at the facilitation of killing individuals as a deformalized form of risk management."[2]

[1] Kessler (2008b) 870, 848; Kessler (2011b) 2165, 2181-2182; Kessler (2012c) 90; Kessler and Werner (2008) 290, 294-295, 300-306.
[2] Kessler and Werner (2008) 305.

Wittgensteinian Constructivism

The Logic of Pictures

Karin Fierke has made a powerful contribution to constructivist theorizing by relying on the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Fierke's approach differs from more conventional constructivism in that it does not simply emphasize the importance of ideational over material factors in world politics. Rather, and similar to Jackson and Kessler, the defining feature of Wittgensteinian constructivism is that it is distinctively anti-positivist. In this section, I will outline Fierke's characterization of the positivism and its manifestations in international theory; the next will present her critique of positivist theory, which she makes on a conceptual level and through a discussion of various empirical cases; the final sections will outline her own constructivist theory and real-world investigations, which build on this critique.

According to Fierke, positivism assumes the correspondence view of language and the world. This view holds that the reality has an essence; it is divided into discrete and atomistic units that stand in a logical relationship to each other. The purpose of language is to *picture* or *mirror* these objectively existing entities; propositions describe the internal properties of the essential elements making up the world. This means that propositions, terms and concepts have a fixed meaning.[1] Fierke argues that positivism informs a variety of IR theories, such as rationalist approaches, some constructivist approaches and - surprisingly - poststructuralism. All of these theories express two basic features: first, in one way or another, they reduce outcomes to the motives or capabilities of individuals that exist prior to interaction, context or language. Waltz's realism, for instance, conceptualizes the international system as made up of atomistic state units that exist independently of national characteristics and interaction. These units are arranged according to the distribution of material capabilities.[2] Likewise, game theorists locate preferences inside people's minds and conceive of rational action in terms of individual moves. Rational actors exist prior to and are disconnected from any social and moral structures.[3] Many constructivist or hermeneutic approaches are equally grounded in an individualist ontology. By relying on the Weberian notion of *verstehen*, scholars such as Martin Hollis, Steve Smith, Emmanuel Adler and Alexander Wendt locate the motives or reasons for action inside the mind. In his article 'Anarchy is What the States Make of It', for example,

[1] Fierke (2001a) 118; Fierke (2001c) 135; Fierke (2002) 332-333, 335-336, 344; Fierke (2007) 3; Fierke (2010) 92; Fierke and Nicholson (2001) 11.
[2] Fierke (1996) 489; Fierke (2001a) 123; Fierke (2002) 336-337; Fierke (2007) 25.
[3] Fierke (1999a) 406; Fierke (2001a) 123; Fierke (2012) 322; Fierke (2013) 61; Fierke and Nicholson (2001) 18.

Wendt starts from the theoretical argument that interests and identities are constituted relationally but then goes on to focus on the (re-)thinking processes inside Gorbachev's mind in his empirical analysis of the end of the Cold War.[1] Finally, even poststructuralist IR reproduces individualist assumptions. By emphasizing the dependence of the world on discursive interpretations which vary according to different subjective perspectives, poststructuralism reduces reality to mental processes or individual properties.[2]

The individualism of positivist IR theories renders the relationship between action and outcomes *mono-causal* in that individual preferences, motives or capabilities become decisive or effective for bringing about outcomes. One subject consciously impacts on another and generates a certain constellation. Moral language has a regulative function at best in that it is manipulated to realize or disguise pre-given interests and intentions.[3] For instance, realists argue that Western material power was crucial for bringing about the end of the Cold War. By deliberately pressuring the Soviet Union to back down, the West 'won' the contest between the two blocs. Liberals make similar claims, arguing that Western ideals such as human rights put pressure on the Soviet Union to open up.[4] In the same way, game theorists such as Thomas Schelling have focused on how rational leaders manipulate language to produce effective and credible threats or incentives. Conventional constructivists have emphasized how norm entrepreneurs put normative pressure on states to comply with human rights, thereby unilaterally imposing the conditions of socialization. Likewise, Wendt presents the change in Soviet policy as a matter of Gorbachev's cost-benefit calculation that exists prior to any meaning or interaction. Gorbachev as a single leader initiated change and constructed a new game. Finally, mono-causality is also present in poststructuralist analyses, which highlight how specific actors impose and objectify particular interpretations on others. For example, in his analysis of the Gulf War, David Campbell, argues that the US single-handedly imposed the dominant narrative of Saddam Hussein as a leader like Hitler who invades sovereign countries.[5]

The second feature of positivist IR is the assumption that social life is intrinsically *static*. By conceptualizing identities and interests as existing prior to interaction, positivist theories attribute universal, abstract and apriori categories to their objects of research. Interests, identities and practices have a fixed meaning that exists priorly to and independently of the investigation. This implies that world politics becomes subject to laws and recurrent patterns of

[1] Fierke (2001a) 117; Fierke (2010) 85; Fierke and Nicholson (2001) 19.
[2] Fierke (2001) 338, 346.
[3] Fierke (1998) 111; Fierke (1999b) 30; Fierke (2001a) 117; Fierke (2005) 9; Fierke (2010) 86-87.
[4] Fierke (2001a) 127, 133.
[5] Fierke (1998) 62-63; Fierke (2001a) 124; Fierke (2002) 347-350.

behaviour. It is driven by a single logic that ensures continuity and repetition throughout history.[1] For example, Waltz's neorealism is built on the assumption that world politics is eternally driven by the competitive logic of anarchy, which forces states into the balance of power and zero-sum games. That is why realists see continuity rather than change in the post-cold war era: the end of the cold war and the backing down of the Soviet Union were a case of successful deterrence and confirm the law that military and economic power are the most effective means for achieving ends. In addition, the existence of rogue states and nuclear weapons attest to the fact that the logic of force remains the dominant feature of the post-cold war era.[2] Likewise, conventional constructivists such as Adler reproduce the assumption of an objective reality by replacing the materialist causal logic of realism by a causal logic that focuses on the power of 'ideas'. Moreover, Wendt's analysis of the end of the Cold War perpetuates the state system by conceiving of states as rational actors that exist prior to interaction.[3] Finally, poststructuralist IR also ends up reifying practices, even though it does so in a slightly different way from rationalist theories. In some parts of her work, Fierke seems to suggest that poststructuralism and rationalism are two opposing extremes in that the former emphasizes pure arbitrariness and the latter complete stasis.[4] However, a closer look reveals that, for her, the main problem with poststructuralism is that it exclusively focuses on how the dominant actors impose their narratives and marginalize alternatives, hence contributing to the perpetuation of the current state of affairs. The only difference from the realist view is that it is discursive power rather than material capabilities that is crucial for achieving a certain outcome.[5]

The Limits of the Logic of Pictures

Fierke argues that the individualism and essentialism of positivist theories are *inherently* flawed. By fixing the meaning of identities and concepts, positivism assumes that world politics is driven by a single logic that transcends time and space. What this view ignores is that there exist never just one but always *multiple* possibilities for action. This opens up the possibility of *change* from one context to another. It is precisely these moments of transition which positivist theories cannot account for.[6] At first sight, this criticism seems to imply that change is an

[1] Fierke (2001c) 133; Fierke and Nicholson (2001) 14, 20; Fierke (2002) 332, 342-343; Fierke (2010) 83-84.
[2] Fierke (1996) 468; Fierke (2001c) 133; Fierke (2002) 339-341; Fierke (2005) 6, 16; Fierke (2007) 13, 17-18, 25.
[3] Fierke (1998) 59-62; Fierke (2001a) 117-118, 121, 125.
[4] Fierke (2002) 338, 346.
[5] Fierke (1998) 6, 12; Fierke (2001a) 119-121, 128-129, 131-132.
[6] Fierke (2001c) 133; Fierke (2002) 339-442; Fierke (2007) 3; Fierke and Nicholson (2001) 20-21.

empirical phenomenon that may or may not occur. On this view, positivist theories could account for particular practices *as long as* these practices remain stable and encounter problems *only if* they change.[1] A closer look suggests, however, that Fierke's criticism is more fundamental: change is not just an empirical but an *intrinsic* feature of world politics. The existence of multiple possibilities implies that actors and identities do not have an essence but can acquire various meanings and identities across space and time. Certain practices and identities are *never* obvious or necessary but always contingent outcomes that could have been otherwise. This makes it necessary to focus on those processes during which specific possibilities are chosen in the first place.[2] What needs to be explained is how certain outcomes are enacted rather than others. This means that social analysis has to conceive of outcomes *in their particularity*, which emphasizes those of their features that set them apart from other possibilities. It is precisely these processes of selection and particularization that Fierke calls 'moments of transition'. In this way, the analysis of change becomes tantamount to the analysis of practice *as such*: as each selection of a certain set of practices constitutes a qualitative shift that breaks with previously valid alternatives, social analysis always has to enquire into how the actors could transform these practices *at the expense* of those alternatives which were plausible in the past and which made this transformation neither obvious nor predictable. By subsuming particular outcomes under universal logics of action, positivist theories fall short of doing this.[3]

In her writings, Fierke illustrates this problem for positivist theories and analyses by discussing various empirical examples. Rationalist theories, for instance, encounter this problem when attempting to explain the transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War order. Realists argue that the post-Cold War period is marked by continuity rather than change. The end of the Cold War confirmed the timeless wisdom that material power is the most effective means to achieve outcomes. By building up its military, NATO forced the Soviet Union into submission and could claim a zero-sum victory. This logic of zero-sum competition has also been present in the post-Cold War era: as the various military interventions and the War on Terrorism show, the threat and the use of force by states are still the defining feature of contemporary world politics. Likewise, the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe in the 1990s confirms the realist view as it was driven by the US desire to establish hegemony in the

[1] There are indeed passages in Fierke's work which are susceptible to this interpretation. See Fierke (2002) 341; Fierke and Nicholson (2001) 24.
[2] Fierke (2001a) 130; Fierke (2002) 345-346; Fierke (2005) 7-9, 13, 16; Fierke (2010) 88-90.
[3] Fierke (1996) 470-473, 490; Fierke (2001a) 126-127; Fierke (2002) 343, 345-346, 349; Fierke (2007) 3, 27-28, 35, 68; Fierke (2005) 16.

region. By incorporating the post-communist countries in its orbit, the alliance attempted to project power to Eastern Europe and to create another exclusionary structure with clear boundaries between inside and outside.[1]

Fierke argues that this view fails to account for important differences between the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods. Realism cannot explain the fundamental *change* of the meaning of security after the end of the superpower confrontation. The Cold War was structured by a zero-sum competition between two nuclear families which defined their security in contrast to each other. Each family saw the other as threat that undermined its own security and cohesion. The solution to this condition of mutual insecurity was, paradoxically, nuclear deterrence. As each family saw itself confronted with the threat of nuclear war, both became locked in a balance of terror which they considered to be inescapable and necessary for their own survival. In this context of mutual insecurity, communication between the two families took the form of a *negotiation*: each side did not take the other into account but merely attempted to realise its interest vis-à-vis the other.[2]

The breakdown of the Cold War led to a fundamental change of the meaning of security. The steps undertaken by the two superpowers in the late 1980s meant the abandonment of those practices that had characterized their confrontation. Reagan's SDI programme, Gorbachev's unilateral disarmament initiatives and the Reykjavik summit challenged deterrence and the balance of power as a foundation of international relations. Deterrence was no longer a source of security but of insecurity that had to be escaped. Both sides no longer negotiated with each other but entered into a *dialogue*, in which they came to see each other as 'humans'. Each party no longer defined itself in opposition to but in relation with the other. Rather than imposing one's point of view on the other, the US and the Soviet Union started to listen to each other and to accept that their positions could change in the course of their interaction. While both had previously been separated by enmity and distrust, they now aimed to create openness, transparency and mutual trust.[3]

As security practices took on a different meaning with the end of the Cold War and in its aftermath, it follows that these practices could not have been predicted. This is to say that these practices were *surprising* outcomes that did *not obviously* follow from or that were not to be expected given the existence of the Cold War security structure. The implication is that any

[1] Fierke (1998) 9-10, 154-155, 163-164; Fierke (1999b) 28-30, 49; Fierke (2001c) 136; Fierke (2001a) 127-128, 133; Fierke (2005) 6, 16; Fierke (2007) 30, 60, 70-73.
[2] Fierke (1997) 230-231; Fierke (1998) 9, 35-41, 102-105, 122-123, 133-137, 168; Fierke (2001c) 128-129.
[3] Fierke (1997) 236, 238-239; Fierke (1998) 129-138, 147-151, 154-155, 164-169, 222; Fierke (2001c) 139.

analysis attempting to understand these events has to account for their newness or non-obviousness; it has to 'make post-Cold War security strange' and show how it became possible in the first place. By subsuming Cold War and post-Cold War security under a single concept of security and by conceiving the latter as fundamentally continuous with the former, rationalist theories fail to do this.[1] They fail to show how the two superpowers could successfully engage in practices that had previously been considered unrealistic. What they cannot account for is how Gorbachev and Reagan became agents of peaceful change and disarmament, given that they had been locked in a structure of conflict which made armament and balancing rational strategies. In particular, it is unclear how Gorbachev could successfully introduce reforms, given that earlier Soviet leaders with the same motives had been unable to escape the constraints of the Cold War.[2]

Fierke offers a similar critique of rationalist explanations of changing security practices in the post-Cold War world. For example, NATO expanded into Eastern Europe indeed to survive and to re-affirm its relevance, but this interest in survival was very different from the Cold War. While the alliance had previously survived by organizing collective defence and by deterring an external threat, enlargement in the 1990s was designed to promote its image as an anchor of stability that would overcome the divisions of Europe and the spheres of influence of the Cold War. NATO drew its power from acting as a 'catalyst of change' that diffused political ideals and crisis management rather than from being an agent of aggression that spread military hardware. The incremental nature of the enlargement process and NATO's renunciation to deploy nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe confirmed its new role as an organiser or a catalyst of dialogue, in which there would no winners or losers. By positing a universal logic of security, realism fails to grasp the distinctiveness and newness of NATO's post-Cold War strategy of survival: given that military deterrence had been NATO's core function, it fails to show the alliance could expand into Eastern Europe without balancing a perceived threat.[3]

Realist accounts of Russia's response to NATO enlargement in the 1990s encounter a similar problem. These accounts tend to see Russian opposition to enlargement and the Russia-NATO Founding Act in 1997 as two further instances of the universal logic of zero-sum competition. Russia tried to halt expansion by taking a confrontational stance but could finally not avoid it

[1] Fierke (1998) 53-54, 154-155; Fierke (2001a) 122, 128-129, 132-133; Fierke (2001b) 142-143; Fierke (2001c) 138-139; Fierke and Nicholson (2001) 20-21, 23-24.
[2] Fierke (1998) 4-5, 155-157; Fierke (2000) 338; Fierke (2001a) 124-125, 127-128, 132; Fierke (2005) 12-13; Fierke (2007) 60-61, 65; Fierke and Nicholson (2001) 20.
[3] Fierke (1998) 173, 187-189; Fierke and Wiener (1999) 722-723, 734; Fierke (1999b) 50-51; Fierke (2007) 70-74.

due to its military and economic weakness. Its defeat was cemented in the Founding Act, which it had no choice but to agree to.[1] The problem with this view is that it fails to address two puzzles: first, it cannot account for the *evolution* of Russian opposition during the 1990s. In the course of its interaction with NATO, Russia increasingly and surprisingly adopted a position that no longer only involved firmness but also flexibility and softness. While it still threatened a counterreaction to enlargement, this threat was increasingly coupled with the offer of cooperation and the acceptance of enlargement. This 'mixed strategy' expressed the need to become a recognized and major player without creating new divisions in Europe.[2] It is this distinctiveness of the Russian drive for self-assertion from traditional zero-sum strategies that poses a problem for realism. What the realist view cannot explain is why Russia moved to a mode of self-assertion that appealed to the logic of dialogue at the expense of more traditional strategies of power seeking that had been valid in the past.[3]

The second puzzle realism fails to address is the *outcome* of the NATO-Russian interaction. While the Founding Act cemented eastern enlargement, it also made some important concessions to Russia which weakened NATO's traditional function as military organisation at the expense of a stronger political role. NATO managed to expand, but only at the price of rethinking its commitment to collective defence. Overall, the agreement looked more like a special relationship in which Russian interests were taken into account than a relation of inequality in which Russia was dependent on NATO. Given Russia's economic and military weakness, this was a rather surprising outcome; it was by no means that obvious that it could realize its interests to the extent it did. By subsuming the Founding Act under a universal zero-sum logic, the realist view fails to explain why this agreement was realized in a way that acknowledged Russian interests to some extent rather than in a manner that was a complete defeat for Russia, as would have been rational in a traditional zero-sum competition.[4]

In another article, Fierke applies the same critique to realist analyses of the UNSCOM crisis that involved Iraq and the UN in late 1997 and early 1998. The crisis erupted after a series of moves by Iraq to impede the work of the weapons inspectors in the country and was solved through the Agreement on Mutual Understanding between Saddam Hussein and Kofi Annan in 1998. The agreement was reached against the background of US and British threats to use force and supported by a large number of Arab States as well as France, China and Russia. The

[1] Fierke (1998) 190; Fierke (1999a) 422.
[2] Fierke (1998) 190-191, 205, 207; Fierke (1999a) 414, 417-421.
[3] Fierke (1998) 10, 216-217; Fierke (1999a) 423.
[4] Fierke (1998) 206; Fierke (1999a) 404, 421-423.

UNSCOM crisis was preceded by a series of Western military interventions in Iraq, the most significant of which was the operation 'Desert Storm' in 1991. This operation was intended to punish Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait and taking of Western hostages. Realist explanations tend to see Desert Storm and the Agreement as two examples of the timeless realist wisdom that rouge states only understand the language of force. While the threat of force had to be actualized in order to expel Iraq from Kuwait, it was sufficient to make it sign the Agreement. On this view, Saddam was an outlaw who had not changed since Desert Storm and who simply signed the Agreement in order to hide his weapons.[1]

The problem with the realist view is that the UNSCOM crisis and its resolution significantly *differed* from the Gulf War episode. While the first episode was governed by the assumption that Iraq only understood the language of force, the Agreement followed the logic of dialogue and treated Iraq as a recognized state that could be listened to. In the second episode, Iraq and many other states had abandoned the logic of force and begun to act on a different logic, according to which Iraq had to honour its commitments but was no longer subject to the all-intrusive regime of sanctions and surveillance. While the first context established a hierarchical relationship, the second was based on reciprocity and driven by the assumption that Iraq is not only capable of lying but also of speaking meaningfully and hearing reasoned argument. As the UNSCOM crisis was fundamentally different from the Gulf War, it can only be understood by accounting for its newness in the first place. What needs to explained is how the transition to an agreement based on the logic of dialogue became possible, given that the past interaction had been defined by the logic of force. By subsuming both episodes under a universal logic of security, realism fails to answer this question.[2]

Language Games

Fierke argues that the individualism and essentialism of positivist theories make it impossible to account for the changing and contingent nature of outcomes. By reducing outcomes to the preferences or capabilities of pre-existing individuals, these theories fail to explain how these outcomes were possible in the first place, given that they always constitute transformations that break with previously valid alternatives. What positivist research cannot account for is the newness, uniqueness or particularity of events, which set them qualitatively apart from past possibilities and which make their occurrence neither obvious nor predictable. It is not the

[1] Fierke (2000) 336, 339, 342, 344, 355, 356.
[2] Fierke (2000) 336-338, 345-346, 352, 357-360.

subsumption of outcomes under universal laws but an account of how these outcomes unfold in a particular way as opposed to others that is needed. According to Fierke, this is only possible by adopting an approach that is based on radically different philosophical premises. These are provided by Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*, and in particular by his concept of *language game*.[1]

The notion of language game does away with an objective world that is mirrored in our language. Words do not serve as labels that are attached to pre-given things but constitute these things in the first place. Actors, interests and identities are not essences but only acquire meaning in particular language games or contexts; they only come into being through particular uses of language that are governed by *intersubjective rules*. Intersubjective rules do not originate in individual minds but emerge out of a dialogical process of interaction, in which each actor 'tends to the other' in a way that resonates with or takes into account of how the other is going to respond.[2] Rules constitute the identities and interests of the agents by relating them to each other in a particular way and by ruling out other alternatives at the same time. In so doing, they create expectations about what is and what is not *legitimate*. That is, on the one hand, intersubjective rules are intrinsically particular, selective and partial in that they emphasize and legitimize certain responses at the expense of others. On the other hand, they are not mere interpretations that can be applied differently by different individuals but imply a *clear distinction* between correct and incorrect behaviour. It is in this way that rules seem to belong to an objective order that is not consciously chosen but followed *blindly* or as a *matter of course*.[3]

Fierke argues that it is the intersubjective nature of language games which renders them inherently fragile and open to the criticism from alternative possibilities, which entails their transformation. As identities are fundamentally social and, thus, dependent on the recognition of others, they constantly face the danger of *contradictions* or *inconsistencies*, which arise if the agents fail to live up to previously stated justifications and which reveal the underlying illegitimacy of a given language game. The act of criticism exposes these discrepancies between

[1] Fierke (1998) 4, 54; Fierke (2001c) 133, 135; Fierke (2002) 339-341, 345-346; Fierke (2005) 16; Fierke (2007) 64-66, 68-69; Fierke and Nicholson (2001) 20-22.
[2] Fierke (1996) 469, 477, 480, 489; Fierke (1997) 225; Fierke (2000) 340-344, 360; Fierke (2001a) 117-118, 130-131; Fierke (2001c) 134-135, 138; Fierke (2002) 337-338, 346, 349-350; Fierke (2010) 88-89, 92; Fierke and Nicholson (2001) 11, 19.
[3] Fierke (1996) 469-470, 472-473, 477, 481, 486-487, 490; Fierke (1997) 229; Fierke (1998) 17, 25-26, 29-30, 51; Fierke (1999a) 405; Fierke (2000) 340-341, 347-348, 360; Fierke (2001a) 123, 131; Fierke (2002) 338-339, 349; Fierke (2005) 7-8, 17; Fierke (2007) 56; Fierke (2010) 88-89, 91; Fierke (2013) 64; Fierke and Nicholson (2001) 12, 15.

the agents' professed ideals and their practices by contesting these practices 'from the outside', e.g. by contrasting the given and unjust language game with an alternative context that is marginalized but that already has meaning *within* the existing game. Fierke refers to this act of criticism as 'acting as if': rather than playing by the dominant rules, the opponents step outside by flaunting these rules and by acting as if an alternative game was already in place.[1] By acting 'as if' "(…) you begin to construct a different world and, at the same time, defy the power of the old over you."[2]

As intersubjective contexts are constantly open to the challenge of alternative possibilities, social life becomes fundamentally *dynamic*. Rather than unfolding according to a rational blueprint, human interactions are an ongoing and unpredictable process in which there is no final shape or end point. As language games unfold, their meaning is transformed in that initially unrealistic alternatives become realistic options at a later stage. Through a never-ending process of public reasoning and contestation, the agents constantly project rules into new contexts, thus continuously remaking the world.[3] This fundamental instability makes it impossible to account for outcomes by subsuming them under abstract categories. Rather, social analysis has to move closer to detail and *look and see* how intersubjective meaning is constructed in particular contexts of interaction. What is needed is an understanding of *meaning in use,* which focuses on how particular distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate behaviour are established over others and which traces the evolution of these distinctions over time. It is this situating of practices in a larger context of evolving rules that makes it possible to give a *better description* of change and particularity in social life.[4]

Fierke argues that the language game approach helps to shed light on the conceptual puzzles positivist theories are unable to solve. From a Wittgensteinian perspective, the change of security practices that occurred with the end of Cold War came about through a transformation of the intersubjective context in which the main actors were embedded. The collapse of the Cold War structure did not result from a Western victory over the Soviet Union but from the tension between two different language games of security, one which was based on zero-sum

[1] Fierke (1998) 6-7, 21-23, 94-95, 99, 113-115, 137, 156-157, 217-218; Fierke (1999a) 409-413; Fierke (1999b) 30-31; Fierke (2000) 339-340, 342-343, 347; Fierke (2001b) 135-136; Fierke (2010) 91-93; Fierke (2012) 326-327; Fierke (2013) 64-66.
[2] Fierke (2001b) 136.
[3] Fierke (1996) 471-473, 478-479, 481; Fierke (1997) 225-226; Fierke (1999b) 28-29, 32; Fierke (2002) 338, 351; Fierke (2005) 16; Fierke (2007) 56, 64, 68; Fierke (2010) 94; Fierke and Nicholson (2001) 12, 14, 20-21.
[4] Fierke (1996) 468, 471-472, 480-481, 490; Fierke (1997) 225-226; Fierke (1998) 3-4, 7, 44-45, 53, 94, 164, 210, 213; Fierke (2001a) 122, 128-130, 132-133; Fierke (2001b) 143; Fierke (2001c) 135-136; Fierke (2002) 342-343, 345-346, 351-352; Fierke (2005) 12-13, 15; Fierke (2007) 27-28; Fierke (2010) 83, 93; Fierke and Nicholson (2001) 12, 23-24.

competition and one which relied on the logic of dialogue. The Cold War game was built on a shared set of rules which constituted East and West in a relationship of mutual enmity. The heterogeneous space of Europe was homogenized through the *family metaphor*, which constructed each European state as a member of a single family whose values were defined in opposition to the other.[1] In the 1980s, this language game gave rise to contradictions through its exposure to an alternative context. During that time, peace movements in East and West started to expose and exploit the underlying illegitimacy of the context of mutual enmity by acting as if an alternative logic of dialogue existed, which emphasized a common European security. This logic exposed the contradiction between the superpowers' claims to provide security through nuclear weapons and the insecurity that was generated through the arms race between them. What the Soviet Union and the US named as a source of security was renamed by the peace movements as the source of threat and insecurity. It was not one side or the other but the Cold War *as such* that had to be escaped. Rather than maintaining the distinction between self and other, the peace movements started a dialogue that cut across the divisions of Europe and that re-established both sides as human beings.[2] Civil society groups in Eastern Europe relied on a similar logic to challenge the dictatorships in their countries. By drawing on the idea of a pluralist and democratic society, these movements exposed the contradiction between the dictatorships' claims that socialism served to protect the workers and the threat that arose from the protectors through their oppressive policies.[3]

This moral challenge 'from the outside' proved successful in destabilising the Cold War context. The exposure and exacerbation of the tensions of this context led Gorbachev and Reagan gradually to adopt the language game of dialogue, ending the ideological division of Europe. The peace movements' strategy to step outside and act as if an alternative game existed was required as it effectively unmasked the arbitrary and conventional nature of the Cold War game.[4] Fierke refers to this strategy in general terms as a 'Machiavella' or 'besting' strategy. Besting is employed in hierarchical contexts or zero-sum games in which a weak player - Machiavella - confronts the Machiavellian Prince. While the Prince inspires fear through his superior material power and manipulation, he also needs to maintain the appearance of being good and just. It is precisely this appearance that Machiavella *must* draw into question. As she

[1] Fierke (1997) 248; Fierke (1998) 9, 35-42, 45-49, 102-110; Fierke (2001a) 129, 132-133; Fierke (2001b) 133, 143; Fierke (2007) 62-64.
[2] Fierke (1997) 232-233, 235-236; (1998) 75-76, 78-81, 115-117, 121-124; Fierke (2001b) 136-137; Fierke (2007) 63-64.
[3] Fierke (1997) 232-233; Fierke (1998) 72-73, 99-101, 117-121; Fierke (2007) 64.
[4] Fierke (1997) 237; Fierke (1998) 82-92, 125-129, 147-151; Fierke (2001b) 135-138; Fierke (2007) 62.

is playing from a position of weakness, she cannot defeat the Prince with force; she cannot get caught up in a war with her enemy. Rather than fighting back, Machiavella has to 'win the Prince over' and make him respond on her own terms. Her only choice is to expose the gap between the Prince's appearance and his ruthless actions in order to transform the zero-sum game into a context where her interests are taken into account. By refusing to 'hit back' and by acting as if the principles of equality, integrity and dignity informed her actions, the Prince will be thrown off balance and eventually fall into line. It is in this way that Machiavella succeeds in making the 'unthinkable thinkable' and changes the game.[1]

Fierke offers a similar analysis of NATO enlargement in Eastern Europe in the 1990s. It was a changing intersubjective context of dialogue that transformed NATO's identity and that made possible an expansion that was driven by the diffusion of political values and crisis management rather than by traditional deterrence. In the immediate post-Cold War period, NATO had been reluctant to expand. However, in the early 1990s, contradictions emerged, which forced it to rethink its position. During that time, questions about its continuing relevance in the absence of a clear threat resurfaced in public debates.[2] This contradiction was aggravated by the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), which began to pose a moral challenge to NATO and the West by drawing on the newly emerged logic of dialogue. Given that the alliance had encouraged the Soviet bloc to adopt liberal values and promised to promote their implementation throughout the 1980s, the CEECs argued that post-Cold War NATO fell short of realising its promise. Like the dissident movements in Eastern Europe who had emphasized the discrepancy between their regimes' claims to respect human rights and their oppressive practices, the CEECs held a mirror up to Western governments, arguing that they did not live up to their responsibility of actively facilitating the realization of their own values in Eastern Europe. While the West had once pushed Eastern societies to tear down their walls and to build a united and democratic Europe, NATO's reluctance to open itself up to the East seemed to create new divisions and spheres of influence on the continent. For the CEECs, NATO expansion served to realize the Western vision of a united and free Europe that would overcome Cold War thinking.[3]

As a state or alliance's identity and capacity to act are fundamentally social and, therefore, dependent on the recognition of others, the exposure of NATO's violation of normative

[1] Fierke (1998) 95-100, 216-219; Fierke (1999a) 409-414; Fierke (2012) 326.
[2] Fierke (1999b) 29-30, 32-36, 49-51; Fierke (2007) 73; Fierke and Wiener (1999) 723, 734, 736-737.
[3] Fierke (1998) 177, 180, 184-185; Fierke (1999b) 37-40, 42, 45-46, 49; Fierke (2007) 73; Fierke and Wiener (1999) 729-731, 737.

expectations provoked a feeling of disrespect and turned into a threat to its identity. The desire of the CEECs to join NATO became a decisive test for its continuing relevance and survival, thereby *transforming* its institutional interest in enlargement. In order to remain relevant, NATO had to act in a way that was consistent with its previously stated ideals and expand into Eastern Europe. Expansion became *essential* to realize its interest in survival.[1] The need for recognition by CEECs'

"(...) required a consistency between words and actions, which eventually dictated enlargement to the East."[2]

Despite the absence of a military threat, NATO had to expand in order to cement its new identity as a catalyst of dialogue, democracy and stability in Europe. This civilizing role was reinforced by Russia's position, which designed its opposition to enlargement in a manner that abstained from an aggressive counterreaction, thereby putting normative pressure on NATO and forcing it to expand in a way that emphasized cooperation and partnership with those countries not to join in the near future. The evolving language game of dialogue meant that NATO had to and could only expand as Europe's new anchor of peace and stability.[3]

In another analysis, Fierke argues that Russia's identity also changed in the course of its interaction with NATO and the CEECs. It was the newly emerging game of dialogue that led Russia to oppose enlargement in a way distinct from traditional power-seeking and that made possible the realization of its interests to a high rather than a low extent.[4] In the early 1990s, the identities of NATO and Russia were relationally constituted in a hierarchical gender game. While Russia was given meaning by feminized categories which represented it as docile, emotional, unpredictable, weak and dependent on the West, NATO was represented through masculine terms which constructed it as an autonomous actor that manages the reconstruction of European security. This relationship soon generated contradictions: while Russia wanted a partnership, NATO did not 'reciprocate Russia's love' and treat it as an equal partner; it did not take Russian interests into account and keep its promise made earlier that it would not expand eastwards. The betrayal and humiliation inflicted by NATO soon provoked strong domestic criticism, requiring Russia to transform the game and move out of the position of the victim.[5]

[1] Fierke (1998) 181, 185, 188-189; Fierke (1999b) 30-32, 44, 50-51; Fierke (2007) 72-73; Fierke and Wiener (1999) 729, 731, 736-737.
[2] Fierke (2007) 73.
[3] Fierke (1998) 182-183, 186-189; Fierke (1999b) 32, 43-45, 48-52; Fierke (2007) 71, 73-74.
[4] Fierke (1999b) 50-51; Fierke (1999a) 414, 420; Fierke (2007) 71.
[5] Fierke (1999a) 405, 407-409, 414-415.

This could only be achieved by 'besting the West,' which implied exploiting the normative contradictions of NATO's power politics in order to move to a positive-sum game that was based on equality. When, in the early stages, Russia showed an overly aggressive counterreaction that relied on the zero-sum logic, this failed - and indeed had to fail - because it only aroused suspicions abroad that Russia wanted to create new divisions in Europe.[1] 'Knitting angrily its brows and banging its shoes on the table, as was done in the Cold War,'

"would have been an empty gesture that would only have contributed to the further isolation of the country. It wouldn't have been politically effective because it only gave NATO an excuse to ignore Russia and proceed unhindered."[2]

It was only by adopting a besting strategy, which included both opposition to enlargement and conciliatory moves, that Russia was able to change the zero-sum game into a context where its interests would be taken into account. By firmly objecting to expansion as another Cold War move and by 'softly' offering cooperation, Russia acted as if it was an independent actor who had legitimate interests. In so doing, it managed to effectively exploit the moral tensions in NATO's stance and succeeded in transforming the game. Even though enlargement had become inevitable by that time, NATO had to take Russian interests seriously because it needed to avoid the impression of creating a new Cold War in Europe. The resulting agreement looked more like a special partnership between equals rather than a relationship of dependence and, in line with Russia's interest, emphasized the political nature of expansion to the detriment of collective defence.[3] Thus, besting was the strategy that proved most successful:

"[Machiavella], viewing her ends through the prism of the long term, recognises that her acts of cooperation will only further the weakening of NATO's defences against her. In acting, rather than reacting, she disarms the alliance."[4]

Fierke offers a similar analysis to understand the UNSCOM crisis, arguing that the transition from interaction relying on force to an agreement based on dialogue came about through a changing intersubjective context. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait gave rise to contradictions, which generated uncertainty in US-Iraqi relations. The invasion posed a puzzle to the US as Iraq had been in an ally in the 1980s. While several responses would have been possible, US foreign

[1] Fierke (1999a) 409, 414, 415-417, 422.
[2] Fierke (1998) 205.
[3] Fierke (1998) 204-206; Fierke (1999a) 414, 417-423.
[4] Fierke (1998) 207.

policy makers made sense of it by treating Saddam as if he was a criminal like Hitler who only understood the language of force, generating specific expectations regarding his identity and future actions. For Saddam, the situation was equally unclear as he had received mixed signals from the US prior to and believed to have legitimate reasons for invading Kuwait. While he could have responded differently to the threat of force, Saddam reinforced the typification of this criminal identity by taking hostages. Through an intersubjective process of 'tending towards the other', Iraq and the US constructed a common game which constituted the US as a legitimate authority in relation to a criminal Hussein. While the mutual taking of perspectives in this way was not necessary, it generated a *possible* world of interaction in that the threat to use force created a space for a criminal to take hostages, which enabled his subsequent punishment through Desert Storm.[1]

By late 1997, new contradictions occurred, which disrupted this 'cop and criminal-game'. During that time, Iraq began to exercise agency by acting as if an alternative structure of meaning was in place, according to which it was a sovereign state that deserved respect and that had a right to be heard. By changing his intransigent stance and by accepting weapons inspections in principle, Saddam provided reasoned arguments that exposed the illegitimacy of the American threats to use force, which expressed a growing hegemonic tendency of the US to impose its will on others. Saddam's Machiavella strategy drove the US into a corner where it could no longer maintain an image of him as an evil other which had to be punished.[2] By acting as if he was a recognized state leader that deserved respect, Saddam created a space for the UN, Russia, China, France and many Arab states to listen to what he had to say. While these actors could have responded differently, Saddam's acts were persuasive enough to show that he had changed; while the threat and use of force had been legitimate in the earlier Gulf War episode, they were no longer justified. Through an intersubjective process of 'tending towards the other', Iraq and these other agents constructed a common game of dialogue that made possible the Agreement on Mutual Understanding. While the process of mutual perspective taking did not have to unfold in this particular way, it was a possible outcome in that Iraq's agency created certain expectations for the others to respond in kind and conclude a negotiated settlement.[3]

[1] Fierke (2000) 342-345, 347-348, 360; Fierke (2002) 349.
[2] Fierke (2000) 345, 352, 358.
[3] Fierke (2000) 345-349, 355, 358, 360-361.

Contingency, Intersubjectivity and Non-normativity

In the previous chapter I have outlined the constructivist theories of Fierke, Kessler and Jackson. In this chapter, I want to draw these three different approaches together and establish the common ground among them. In order to do so, I will make three arguments. The first two of these arguments locate the three constructivisms in a common and well-established body of ideas that have emerged within hermeneutic philosophy over the last century. (1) I will argue that the constructivist critique of the failure of contemporary positivist theorizing to account for contingency mirrors the hermeneutic critique of the Cartesian mind-body dualism, which argues that this dualism fails to account for the contingent and processual nature of knowledge. I will reconstruct this 'Cartesian problem' in the writings of a variety of hermeneutic thinkers and then argue that it is mirrored in the constructivist critique of contemporary positivism. In a second step (2), I will argue that the three constructivisms also mirror the hermeneutic solution to this Cartesian problem, which is a concept of contingency that conceives of *contingency as an intersubjective process*. I will reconstruct this concept in the writings of three hermeneutic scholars - George Herbert Mead, Charles Taylor and Quentin Skinner - and then argue that it is also manifest in the three constructivist theories. Finally (3), I will argue that there is a third point of convergence among the three constructivisms, which relates to the conceptual status of the notion of contingency conceived as an intersubjective process. Fierke, Kessler and Jackson treat this notion as a non-normative methodological concept that serves to descriptively analyze intersubjective processes of change. This puts them in one camp with Skinner but opposes them to Taylor and Mead, both of whom conceive of intersubjectivity as a concept that is both descriptive and normative and that not only allows for explaining but also for transforming the world. As for the conceptual status of intersubjectivity, there is, therefore, a dividing line cutting across the constructivist/hermeneutic camp.

The Cartesian Problem

I argue that the constructivist concern with contingency can be better understood against the broader background of hermeneutic philosophy. It is precisely the need to account for the particular and contingent nature of knowledge about the world that has been one of the guiding themes in hermeneutic writing since the early 20th century. This need arose out of the rejection of the Cartesian dualism between mind and body. The core idea which underlies this dualism and which the hermeneutic attack centres on is the notion of an *autonomous* and *disengaged*

individual facing an objective world. Charles Taylor and Norbert Elias locate the origins of this notion in the empiricist and rationalist tradition of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, including Descartes himself, Bacon, Condillac, Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Leibniz. This tradition emerged in opposition to the cosmic-platonic view, which had dominated philosophical discourses until the late Middle Ages. The cosmic-platonic philosophy conceived the universe as a meaningful and rational order, in which the different domains of the world were all linked because they expressed the same set of divine ideas. On this view, understanding the world was inseparable from being in attunement with that world, e.g. from seeing its goodness and loving it. All of our everyday experience was unreflectively and spontaneously understood on its own terms, that is, through its place in the cosmic order.[1] Rationalism pulverized this view by re-conceptualizing the concepts of *reason* and *rationality*. The rationalist thinkers were at pains to stress how our everyday experience could mislead humans in truly apprehending the world. Their solution was a rational method that helped to scrutinize the world properly and that freed the mind of all prejudices in order to grasp the essential features of that world. Rationality required a *distancing* or *disengaging* from all impressions, appearances and ordinary experiences in order to reach an understanding of the underlying constitution of things. The crucial move of Descartes and his successors was to conceive of this rational method in terms of a *mental* process. The disengaging procedure was *ontologized* in the very constitution of the mind. Thought became reduced to an incorporeal substance that delineated the individual as an 'inner' and self-enclosed space from his outer environment. The reflexive examination of and distancing from everyday experience transformed into a *natural* distance between a thinking, autonomous subject and his external objects of contemplation. Through a correct ordering of his thoughts and careful scrutiny of his ideas and impressions, an individual could generate certainty and knowledge by himself.[2]

The ontologization of reflexive rationality in the constitution of the mind has fundamental implications for the relation between the individual and his outer environment, e.g. between subject and object ('object' and 'environment' can refer to both other individuals and physical things[3]). As thought is conceived as an incorporeal medium, the adjustment of the individual to the outer world is reduced to an act of what Taylor calls *corresponding to* or *representing* that world. It is through the rational method that we examine our own ideas in abstraction from what

[1] Elias (1980) LVII-LVIII; Taylor (1985a) 222-223; Taylor (1985b) 127-128, 141-142; Taylor (1995) 3, 44-45.
[2] Elias (1980) XLVI-L, LII-LIV, LVIII, LX-LXIII; Taylor (1985a) 224-225, 241, 248-250; Taylor (1995) 4-5, 7, 61, 64-66, 72, 76, 169.
[3] Norbert Elias (1980) LIII, LXII-LXIII; Mead (1912) 403; Taylor (1995) 169.

they stand for. That is, we are able to operate a 'canonical split' between the intrinsic properties of things and our experiences of or reactions to these properties. Reflexive rationality allows us to distinguish subjective impressions from objective reality.[1] It is this very operation of a split between the subjective and the objective that establishes a correlation or a relation of representation between the two spheres. The separation allows for the delineation of an objective order of things from a subjective realm of experience which adequately represents this order. Affective reactions of or beliefs held by individuals come to be correlated with the objective world of material things, institutions and behaviour. As thinking reveals those subjective states that correspond to reality, language too acquires a *designative* function. It becomes an instrument that allows us to re-arrange our ideas according to the way the world is assembled. Words clearly designate or represent objects and behaviours.[2]

The relation between subject and object conceived in terms of correspondence or representation entails an important implication, which has been especially made clear by George Herbert Mead, in an essay called *The Definition of the Psychical*. In this essay, Mead scrutinizes various attempts to define the 'psychical' or 'subjectivity' as the subject matter of psychology. While his discussion includes a variety of thinkers, throughout the essay it becomes quite clear that Mead groups the majority of them into one camp, which he labels the 'psychological parallelist school'. It emerges also clearly that Mead takes the German psychologist Wilhelm Wundt to be the main representative of this group. That is, 'The Definition of the Psychical' is essentially a critical engagement with and a response to Wundt's psychological parallelism. The parallelist view holds that the psychical arises out of a process of logical criticism, reflection or analysis, which attempts to deal with contradictions that occur in our immediate presentation or experience of objects. In order to explain these contradictions, the procedure of criticism withdraws the immediate sensuous experience or presentation (Vorstellung) of the object into the subjective realm of feelings and volitions. That is, the operation of logical criticism purges or abstracts all that is subjective from the object under scrutiny. The result is a mediate, conceptual or abstract object and a psychical realm of subjectivity that contains the withdrawn sensuous presentation which now functions as a *symbol* of this conceptual object. The psychical serves the purpose of symbolizing or providing the necessary sensory content for the object of mediate or abstract knowledge, which after all no abstract thinking can completely dispense with.[3] What it does is “to offer a refuge for former

[1] Taylor (1980) 31-35; Taylor (1985a) 224-225, 249; Taylor (1995) 4-5, 8, 65-66.
[2] Taylor (1971)19-22, 36; Taylor (1980) 34-36; Taylor (1985) 220, 223, 225-226, 250-255; Taylor (1995) 3, 9.
[3] Mead (1903) 78-80, 83, 86, 92, 94, 100.

real objects which are now but ghostly symbols of the reality which they once constituted."[1] This means that the psychical is essentially *representational* in that it provides those subjective elements which answer or correspond to the outer environment. It is the subjective statement of the physical universe which makes this universe more comprehensible.[2] This correlation of the psychical with the object through logical criticism is similar to Taylor's canonical split which establishes a correspondence between subject and reality.

For Mead, the crucial implication is that this parallelist view transforms an individual's act of relating to the outer world into a *self-evident* and *linear* process of adaption. As reflection simply reveals those psychical states that symbolize or correspond to the conceptual object, the psychical is made up of contents that are already analysed or treated *in terms of* this object. That is, as the psychical is that which has been abstracted from and which does not constitute the object, it becomes a 'residue' or 'reject' that can only be stated *in relation to* the objective reality sought. In other words, the psychical is nothing but the *result* of a reflection that has already established an adequate relation between subject and object.[3] This means that an individual's act of relating to the world becomes a rather automatic process in that the individual *already knows* how to relate the outer environment; she already has an idea of how to appropriately respond to an object or stimulus. Communication with the outer world amounts to nothing more than the *correct* subjective adaption to a pre-given object, which loses its validity (to the subjective realm) through this adaption but retains its organized content or objective character.[4] To put it in slightly different terms, the Cartesian view implies an already existing relationship between subject and object which thereby becomes universal, normal and self-evident. The process of communication between the individual and the environment comes about easily and naturally. Elias expresses this taken-for-grantedness well when he writes:

"But the "closed personality" of *homo philosophicus* perceives this mechanical and regular causal chain as an adult simply by opening his eyes, without needing to learn anything about it from others, and quite independently of the stage of knowledge reached by society. (…) The individual opens his eyes as an adult and not only recognizes autonomously here and now, without learning from others, what all these objects are that he perceives; he not only knows what he is to classify as animate and inanimate, as mineral, vegetable or animal; but he also knows directly here and now that they are linked causally in accordance with natural laws."[5]

[1] Mead (1903) 80.
[2] Mead (1903) 82-84, 90, 94-98, 101, 103.
[3] Mead (1903) 88, 93-98, 102-103, 104-105.
[4] Mead (1903) 100-101; Mead (1934) 107.
[5] Elias (1994) 470-471.

As the subjective sphere is already stated in terms of or adequately related to the objective world, communication processes or forms of social cohesion that diverge from this adequate relation can only be accounted for as *deviations*, *errors* or *disruptions*. These disruptions will be overcome by distinguishing more strongly our illusions from actual reality. The normal state of affairs will be restored or achieved through a process of *perfection,* which purges the object more fully of ideology and thus reveals its true nature.[1] Taylor finds instances of this 'developmental view' in the fields of comparative political and transcultural science as well as analytic philosophy. Comparativists such as Gabriel Almond, Seymor Lipset and Robert Dahl understand the cohesion of political society in terms of correlations between evaluative beliefs about the legitimacy and the actual performance of a political system. Politics in all societies is assumed to be a variation of a bargaining process, in which outputs are produced on the basis of group or individual interests. The fullest realization of this secularized and individualized bargaining model in Western societies is seen to be an increase of the correct perception of reality, which has succeeded in getting rid of the ideological culture of traditional societies.[2] Likewise, philosophers such as William Quine and Donald Davidson assume the theoretical stance towards the world to be normal, which represents reality from an objective point of view as opposed to simply understanding it through putting ourselves in tune with it by means of symbolic or expressive activities. Therefore, tribal and High Renaissance societies which did not separate between representative and symbolic activities are regarded as examples of a mistaken and early 'proto-technology', as anthropologists like James Frazer have argued.[3]

It is precisely the assumption of a self-evident relationship between subject and object, e.g. the assumption that the subject is already stated in terms of the object and thus nothing more than the result of reflection, which so many hermeneutic thinkers have rebelled against. The problem with this view is, as Taylor argues, that a given subject-object relationship is never a natural outcome but only one possibility among other alternatives. A certain relationship does not come about naturally but only through a *particular context* or *background*, which is inherently partial in that it always emphasizes a particular point of view at the expense of others.[4] By treating certain subject-object relations as natural and inescapable frameworks, the Cartesian view loses sight of the contingent and particular nature of these relations. What it fails to do is to account for the specificity or *detail* of social orders, e.g., to answer "why there is this

[1] Taylor (1971) 23, 33; Taylor (1985b) 92, 102; Elias (1980) X, XX-XXI; Mead (1930b) 702, 705; Luhmann (1987) 162-165.
[2] Taylor (1971) 34, 35-37, 39-40; Taylor (1985b) 126.
[3] Taylor (1985a) 281, 284-285, 289, 291; Taylor (1985b) 34, 105-106, 123-125, 127-128.
[4] Taylor (1971) 23, 32-33, 35, 39, 44; Taylor (1985a) 27; Taylor (1985b) 102-104; Taylor (1995) 62-63, 67-75.

kind of ritual, that form of hierarchy, that type of fervour, those modes of blessedness, and so on."[1] The assumption of an already existing system of communication in which words or signs stand for objects begs the decisive question of how *this* system came about rather than other possibilities. What remains unexplained is a community's *sensitivity* to or *reflective awareness* of *linguistic rightness*, which prescribes the use of certain words in a specific way and not in others. By building the correct meaning into words from the very start, this view treats as unproblematic which has to be problematized and explained.[2]

Taylor argues that this failure has led Cartesian-inspired approaches to fall into ethnocentric assumptions. By positing the bargaining model as the normal way political society is organized, comparative political science fails to see that this model owes its existence to a *distinct* Western context which is grounded in a *particular vision* of society. This vision treats individuals as autonomous and rational parties which enter into willed negotiations and which all partake in the common endeavour of the 'civilization of work' in order to produce happiness and well-being. It is a specific way of organizing society which is far from shared in non-western societies, many of which lack notions of instrumental rationality and contractualism. The specificity of this model becomes even more visible when considering the fact it has come under increasing strain in Western societies, which is not to be interpreted as a 'pathology' but as a *change* towards a new social order. Rather than being an inescapable background, the 'civilization of work' is a particular way of organizing society among others.[3] Likewise, the scientific representation of reality from an objective position is not the natural way of relating to the world, as much analytic philosophy implies, but a distinct practice that has developed within the Western context and that has no meaning in societies where words and concepts are not used to represent reality but to connect the individuals with the cosmic or religious universe. By forgetting the norm of representation as a norm and by transforming it into a natural fact, Anglo-Saxon theories of meaning fail to grasp scientific and symbolic cultures as two distinct and contingent possibilities of relating to the world.[4]

Quentin Skinner has provided another statement of this critique through his attack on positivism in the history of political ideas and political history, which he argues fails to account for *conceptual change* or *innovation*. Positivist approaches studying the history of ideas assume the existence of essential and perennial concepts (liberty, reason, justice, ect.) that have a *fixed*

[1] Taylor (1980) 34, 36-37; Taylor (1985b) 122-123.
[2] Taylor (1985a) 227-228, 230-231; Taylor (1985b) 103-104, 276-277; Taylor (1995) 80-83, 86, 88-89, 92, 94-95.
[3] Taylor (1985b) 126; Taylor (1971) 22-23, 26-27, 35, 37-45.
[4] Taylor (1985a) 285-292.

meaning across time and space. The implication is that the writings of past thinkers have to be understood *in relation to* these perennial concepts. Historical texts are to be interpreted as either contributions or failures to contribute to certain 'unit ideas' that make up the field. As each text *already* and *naturally* stands in a relationship with the canonical concepts, its meaning or significance can be discovered by merely focusing on what it *says* about these concepts. That is, the meaning of a text is entirely derived from its linguistic utterances.[1] Skinner argues that this view fails to see that there are no perennial concepts, doctrines or ideas. Concepts only acquire meaning in and through particular *uses*, which are *radically contingent* in that they fundamentally vary across different historical contexts. The positivist view that posits universal doctrines is only a localized understanding that reflects particular preconceptions and expectations of our time which were absent in other periods. There is no history of canonical ideas but only a history of the various and changing uses of ideas, in which the agents come to define concepts in specific ways which would have been *unthinkable* in other contexts.[2] By assuming the existence of perennial doctrines to which all past texts can be assimilated, the positivist view fails to grasp the contingent nature and thus to adequately understand the meaning of these texts. That is, by exclusively focusing on what a certain thinker said, it cannot understand what he was actually *doing in* or may have *meant* by saying what he said. This view fails to conceive of linguistic utterances as *arguments* that were made in a specific way in order to contribute to particular debates. The positivist approach to history cannot answer why a "text is organized in a certain way, why a certain vocabulary is deployed, why certain arguments are particularly singled out and emphasised, why in general the text possesses its distinctive identity and shape" at the expense of other possibilities.[3]

Mead's critique of psychological parallelism essentially mirrors the critiques above. The parallelist theory defines the psychical as that phase of consciousness which deals with contradictions in our immediate perception or sensuous experience by withdrawing this perception from the object into the realm of subjectivity through a process of logical criticism. Parallelism distinguishes between the subjective or individual experience of the world and the world as it exists objectively and freed from all individual error, and puts both in relation to each other. This means that the psychical and the logical criticism through which it arises have a representational or mediate function in that they reveal the subjective counterpart to the pre-

[1] Skinner (2002) 57-67, 72-73, 76-77, 86.
[2] Skinner (1999) 61-63, 71; Skinner (2002) 85-86, 88-89, 125-127, 175-176.
[3] Skinner (2002) 79, 82-82, 85-87, 100-101, 104-105, 113-115, 117, 124-125.

given object.[1] Mead argues that the parallelist view fails to grasp the psychical. The distinct feature of the psychical or subjective situation is that it is *immediately* (or directly) experienced. As an immediate experience, it implies a *coincidence of presence and meaning* which cannot represent anything beyond itself. The psychical is peculiar to the particular moment in complete distinction from the past and the future, and as such it cannot symbolise a mediate object that transcends it.[2] As the psychical is immediate, it implies a condition of 'pure subjectivity' where subject and object can no longer be distinguished from each other. That is, in a problematic situation that gives rise to contradictions in our sensuous experience, the procedure of criticism does not simply purge all subjective elements from a pre-given object but robs this object of its character as an object-stimulus *as such*. The object not only loses its validity but also its objective character and thus disappears. The psychical phase signifies a complete breakdown of the stimulus-response relation, a situation in which action is inhibited by the existence of conflicting but equally possible responses that make it impossible to determine the meaning of the object-stimulus.[3] It is this phase of disintegration that leads to the *reconstruction* of the relationship between subject and object, or stimulus and response. But this reconstruction does not simply *re-establish* the object-stimulus, for it is precisely this object-stimulus which has been lost or proven inadequate. What emerges from the psychical phase is essentially *novel*, a new world that completely invalidates the old world and that could not have been foretold. The psychical gives rise to a spontaneous and creative re-ordering - the "I" - that puts forward 'undreamt hypotheses' which bring into existence a new self and a new object.[4]

By reducing the psychical to the subjective correlate to the physical object - the empirical self or the "me" -, the parallelist theory loses sight of it as a creative phase of disintegration and reconstruction. Parallelism objectifies the psychical as a permanent state and thus deprives it of the very elements that have rendered it psychical.[5] As a result, this view fails to recognize its necessary role in the production of representational knowledge. A relation of correspondence between response and stimulus does not exist naturally but only results from a creative act that has successfully reconstructed a problematic state of disintegration. That is, the setting up of a parallelism between subjective experience and the environment lies *within the act* of the individual, who selectively picks out and recombines certain characters of this environment that answer to his responses. The individual does not face a pre-given environment to which he has

[1] Mead (1900) 10-11; Mead (1903) 78-80, 83, 86, 92, 94, 100.
[2] Mead (1903) 80, 87, 93-98, 103-104.
[3] Mead (1900) 12; Mead (1903) 100-102, 105-107.
[4] Mead (1900) 3-9, 13, 15; Mead (1903) 99, 101-102, 105-110, 111-112.
[5] Mead (1900) 10-12; Mead (1903) 96-98, 103-104.

to adapt correctly but determines this environment through his responses to it, which he organizes through a selective and reconstructive process of *attention* or *conscious reflection* in a particular way as opposed to others. Each 'adaption' brings about a new self and a new environment that did not exist before.[1] By assuming that the responses to certain objects occur automatically or require only simple conditioning (e.g. such as the child, whose fear of the white rat is conditioned by loud sounds and then continues to persist even when these sounds are absent, or the soldier, who can simply be trained to execute orders), the parallelist view fails to problematize the contingent origin of these response-stimulus relationships. While this view can account for *having* an idea of certain responses, it cannot account for the reflective thinking process of *getting* this idea. Parallelism fails to explain why the individuals come to associate particular reflexes with particular stimuli at the expense of other possibilities.[2]

I argue that it is the hermeneutic critique of the Cartesian mind-body dualism, and the need to account for the contingency of action derived from it, which Kessler, Fierke and Jackson take as a point of departure for developing their own approaches. The three constructivists perceive this dualism to be present in rationalist theory, conventional constructivism and other theories in contemporary IR. All three of them argue that these theories presuppose an external world that exists independently of thought and that possesses intrinsic qualities. As Kessler puts it, probability is an ontological property of reality, which implies that this reality is made up of a finite number of exogenously given and quantifiable states. The constructivist critics also emphasise that these theories share the correlate of the notion of an external world, which is the assumption that the individual can discover or relate to that world through a reasoning process which is located in his mind. That is, they are built on the assumption that essential agents exist prior to interaction, which makes it possible to trace outcomes directly to individual motives or decisions. Fierke, Kessler and Jackson draw the same implication from this assumption of an autonomous agent who single-handedly adjusts to the world as their hermeneutic predecessors: the act of adjustment becomes a *self-evident* and *deterministic* process. This is what Fierke has in mind when she argues that positivist theories render the relationship between action and outcomes mono-causal and static. If an individual agent merely has to *manipulate* a pre-given environment in order to obtain a successful outcome, this individual *already knows* how to act towards others in the most efficient way. It is in this way that action becomes subject to laws of cause-effect sequences. The notion of rationality conceived as internal consistency, which

[1] Mead (1900) 6, 8; Mead (1903) 98-99, 108-109, 111-112; Mead (1908) 312, 319; Mead (1925) 255-257, 259, 261; Mead (1934) 25, 76, 78-79, 90-91, 94-95, 97-100, 117-118, 124-125, 129-131, 182, 242-243, 245-247.
[2] Mead (1934) 25-27, 48-51, 56-57, 100-103, 105-107; Mead (1930b) 703, 705.

Kessler attributes to game theory, points to a similar conclusion: as the individual agent is capable of calculating or knowing all possible states of the world, she is able to develop a *clearly ordered* preference ranking and take a *definite* stance towards that world. The act of choosing rationally is nothing more than the *correct* adjustment according to a utility function that reveals the true probabilities of all states of reality. Jackson makes a similar point by saying that the agents become 'throughputs' for environmental factors to which they adapt on the basis of exogenous interests. Like their hermeneutic counterparts, the constructivists argue that this deterministic view of action leaves little room for contingency. According to Jackson, it 'completely eliminates' agency. Kessler argues along similar lines when he writes that positivism always transforms non-knowledge and uncertainty into manageable knowledge. Like Taylor, Elias and Mead, he claims that the positivist view understands change either as progress, which is due to the discovery of the true probabilities, or as an irrational deviation resulting from errors and misperception.

Jackson, Fierke and Kessler subject the determinism that is entailed by the Cartesian view to the same critique as the hermeneutic thinkers. The essence of this critique is to question and problematize the taken-for-grantedness of social action and relationships. Jackson makes this clear when he argues that the existence of multiple possibilities for action undermines any unambiguous and systematic tracing of outcomes to individual motives. Certain arrangements do not occur naturally through a single-handed adaption by the individual, but are always contingent outcomes which have succeeded in a *contested* and *open* debate against other alternatives. Kessler and Fierke make similar claims by emphasising the transformative potential of practices. Kessler argues that social orders cannot be subsumed under universal categories, concepts and interests, but are contingent events that *qualitatively differ* from or constitute a *transformation* vis-à-vis other possibilities. The current financial crisis did not simply result from a misinterpretation of economic data, which could be overcome through the provision of better information, but from specific practices that came about through *radical* changes in global finance over the last two decades. Likewise, the growing salience of legal norms is not merely an increase of international law, e.g. an improved adaption of pre-given states to their environment, but reflects a *genuine* transformation to a functionally differentiated order which has changed the very meaning of sovereignty. Fierke too argues that the positivist assumption of a universal logic of action fails to grasp outcomes as particular and transformed events that came about through a rupture with previously valid practices. For instance, by subsuming the end of the Cold War and its aftermath under a single mode of behaviour, realism

fails to explain this event as a new and distinct outcome that fundamentally transformed the European security order from a zero-sum into a positive-sum game.

The three constructivist critics mirror the hermeneutic line of reasoning when they argue that social analysis has to make this contingent character of social life its central concern. Jackson puts this clearly by saying that an analysis of social action has to grasp outcomes in their singularity, e.g. it has to explain why a particular course of action succeeded rather than another. Fierke makes a very similar point when she argues that we have to 'make outcomes strange' and ask how these outcomes could occur in the first place, given the existence of past alternatives which made them neither obvious nor predictable. That is, we always have to conceive them as new and distinct events that fundamentally break with alternatives which were previously valid. Kessler puts this slightly differently by arguing that social analysis has to situate given social orders in 'space and time' and to focus on those processes of transformation during which these orders are formed in a specific way and delineated from other possibilities.

As it is emphasised in hermeneutic and constructivist writing, an event is contingent if it could have been otherwise. That is, it does not necessarily or logically follow from a previous state of affairs – a contingent outcome is unpredictable. This is what expressions such as 'genuine rupture', 'qualitative shift', 'radical contingency', 'the perfect freedom of forming undreamt hypotheses', 'making the unthinkable thinkable' and 'the openness of public debate' refer to. Another way this idea of contingency is expressed in hermeneutic and constructivist writing is through the concept of *undecidability*: as each event is just a particular possibility among others, each is just as good as the others; there is no hierarchy or final end point. Each event only represents a partial instance that constantly competes with and gives rise to other alternatives. What is important to point out is that this idea of 'could have been otherwise' does not simply refer to the possibility of 'chance' or 'accident', but rather to the existence of multiple courses of action, each of which is equally appropriate or compelling. And 'appropriate' (or 'compelling') can only mean *morally* appropriate. That is, what underlies the idea of 'could have been otherwise' in the hermeneutic and constructivist writings is a *moral pluralism*. When the hermeneutic and constructivists theorists argue that truth and knowledge are contextually determined, that there are multiple visions of society, or that social analysis has to account for the contingency of outcomes by tracing the contested character of public debates, they all conceptualize contingency as the possibility of a plurality of moral points of view or arguments, each of which is plausible and acceptable. A particular act or set of practices is contingent in that other possibilities for action would have been equally *legitimate*.

Contingency as an Intersubjective Process

In the preceding part, I have argued that the constructivist critique of contemporary international theories mirrors the hermeneutic critique of Cartesian philosophy and social theory. This critique emphasises the failure of Cartesianism to grasp an individual's act of relating to the world, or interaction among groups and individuals, as a *contingent achievement* that could have been otherwise. The building of an appropriate relation with the environment is never a natural adaption but has to be problematized and accounted for as one particular possibility among other alternatives. In this part, I will argue that the constructivist theories of Jackson, Kessler and Fierke attempt to solve the 'Cartesian problem' and to account for contingency in a way that also reflects earlier hermeneutic conceptualizations of contingency. This solution is a concept of contingency that conceives of contingency as an *intersubjective process*. In a first step, I will recover this concept of intersubjective contingency in the writings of Mead, Taylor and Skinner. I focus on these three hermeneutic thinkers for two reasons: first, because the concept of intersubjectivity and its relation to novelty, change and contingency play - despite the differences among them[1] - a key role in their philosophies and social theories; and second because I believe that their conceptualization of contingency as an intersubjective process provides an approach to contingency which is manifest in *all* of the three constructivist theories, and which, therefore, serves to reconstruct the common ground among them; the three constructivisms essentially mirror the hermeneutic approach to contingency developed by Mead, Taylor and Skinner. In a second step, I will make this link between the constructivist and hermeneutic thinkers explicit.

Mead locates contingency in the dialectic between the breakdown of adjustment or coordination and its reconstruction through communication in terms of significant symbols or gestures. The adjustment of the individual to the other is a contingent event in that it results from an intersubjective process in which the individual takes the attitude of the other into his own conduct in order to reconstruct a problematic state of disintegration. It is this relation between breakdown and intersubjective reconstruction that Mead conceives in terms of the relation between “me” and “I”. The “me” is that individual which has successfully established a relation with the other. The individual enters into this relation by becoming an *object* to herself and by taking the role of the other into her own conduct. That is, she uses a stimulus, gesture or symbol in such a way that it calls out the *same* response in herself which it calls out in the other; she assumes the gesture which affects the other individual in the same manner as it affects

[1] Indeed, in the last part of this chapter, I will emphasise one of these differences.

herself; in using a certain symbol, she not only arouses a particular tendency to respond in the other but also arouses that tendency in herself.[1] It is this ability of the symbol to call out the same reaction in the individual making it and the hearer that renders this symbol *significant* or *meaningful*. This ability is made possible by the existence of *language*, which - through the vocal gesture - provides the medium for the individual to put herself in the other's shoes. Under normal conditions, this 'other' does not just refer to the role of a particular individual but to the attitudes that make up the community as a whole, which is what Mead famously called the *generalized other*.[2] The taking of the attitude of the community enables the individual to *control* her action with reference to that community. It is this control of her conduct in terms of common attitudes that gives her a *self*, *mind* or *self-consciousness*. In other words, the self does not exist in isolation from but emerges only in relation to the other selves that make up the group. We cannot be ourselves and have rights unless we take the moral values and responses of the community into our conduct. The individual experiences herself not directly but only indirectly from the standpoint of society, which functions as an *impartial censor* that criticizes and approves of her immediate expressions.[3] It is this self which only arises in response to and through the taking of the organized attitude of the community that is the "me". Thought, reflection rationality, reason or intelligence do not connote self-enclosed mental processes that develop ideas and convey them subsequently to an external audience; rather they stand for an inner conversation which thinks its final expressions *already* in terms of or as answering to an audience. "The "me" is a man's reply to his own talk."[4]

By taking the attitude of the community through the use of significant symbols, the individual directs his own stance vis-à-vis others. By making a particular gesture, he calls out a *universal* or *common* response in himself and the community which serves to control his further action with reference to that community. In this way, his conduct acquires such universality which allows him to become a member of and participate in the *cooperative* process that constitutes the community (Mead also uses other terms than cooperation to designate this process, such as 'harmony', 'coordination', 'integration', 'unity', 'organization', 'understanding', 'social object' and 'common end').[5] This cooperative activity which the "me" stands for could be (and in fact has been) interpreted as an *assimilation* of the individual to a universal consensus

[1] Mead (1912) 405-406; Mead (1922) 160-161; Mead (1934) 54, 65-71, 96-97, 100, 108-109, 136-139.
[2] Mead (1925) 269, 270, 272; Mead (1934) 65-66, 71-74, 77-78, 90, 97, 123, 133, 146, 149, 162.
[3] Mead (1925) 262, 272; Mead (1934) 70-74, 82, 94-95, 97, 109, 112, 120, 124-125, 131-133, 138, 140-142, 149, 154-155,161-164, 166, 171, 178, 189, 190-191, 210.
[4] Mead (1912) 405; Mead (1922) 162-163; Mead (1925) 272; Mead (1934) 92-94, 100, 114-115, 117-122, 124, 138, 140-142, 155-156, 167, 173, 175-176, 192, 196, 199, 270.
[5] Mead (1922) 161-162; Mead (1925) 263; Mead (1934) 87, 155, 159-164, 167, 190, 200-201, 254-255, 260-261.

which excludes those of his particular characteristics that he does not share with others. On this view, membership of the community implies the abstraction of all individual particularities and differences - what is common to all cannot be particular. And Mead does indeed make statements that could lead to this conclusion. For instance, he argues that the universal or significant character of a symbol or stimulus arises from the *recognition* of certain features in it that calls out a universal response, notwithstanding the particular characteristics of that stimulus. Universal is that which transcends and answers to an infinite number of stimuli, no matter what the individual differences and variations among them may be. If one has a nail to drive, one can use a hammer, a brick, a stone or any other object that possesses those universal features which are necessary to perform the task. Likewise, it does not matter whether it is Tom, Dick or Harry who steals my property; for the response of the community which I take over will be identical in all three cases. It is in this sense that something is universal *as over against* various particular perspectives. Inasmuch as the universal response is called out by different and varying particulars, these particulars 'are brought under' the universal.[1] In an excellent essay, Patchen Markell has provided another statement of this interpretation by arguing that Mead partly defines the "me" as the agency of society which speaks through the individual. The "me" is that individual which simply complies and acts in accordance with societal norms. In *Mind Self, and Society*, Mead does make statements that could give credibility to this view. For instance, he writes that the "me" represents that group of attitudes which stands for others in the community (…)." He also says that "[T]he "me" is a conventional, habitual individual," who has exactly the same ideas as his neighbour. The "me" belongs to the values of society as opposed to the values of the individual.[2]

Notwithstanding these statements, I argue that the interpretation of the "me" as an assimilation of the individual to societal norms is not accurate. A closer look at Mead's works suggest that the "me" does not refer to the assimilation of the individual to a universal consensus that abstracts form her particularity, but to the integration of that particularity into a relational system of individual differences. It is this organization of a plurality of individual differences and particularities into a coherent whole that gives rise to universality. I think this point becomes clear by looking more closely at the individual's act of taking the attitude of the community in order to control her own conduct vis-à-vis that community. For Mead, the taking over of the communal attitude does not crush out individuality but, on the contrary, serves to individualize

[1] Mead (1934) 82-85, 89, 125-126, 167.
[2] Mead, quoted in Markell (2007) 125-126.

the member in relation to the community. This individualization is a *functional* superiority, self-assertion, self-realization or distinction that is based on the *capacity* of the individual to perform certain tasks better than others. By putting herself in the others' shoes, the individual is able to see what the others *cannot do* and realize her superiority over them through building up an activity that answers to or fills this gap. It is in this way that she obtains a 'triumph', 'esteem' or 'recognition'. At the same time, as this superiority is based on the individual's competence - that which she makes use of -, it requires or depends on the existence of the community, which has to *recognize* her achievements as *legitimate.* Functional superiority is not a crude form of domination, such as violent destruction or exploitation, but grounded in that what she can do better in relation to others. The individual can only assert herself by recognizing and maintaining the community in its relationship to her.[1] This means that her self-realization through the taking over of the communal attitude is essentially about building up a distinct activity that *must correlate* with or *complement* her environment. It is through the "me" that the individual enters into a relationship with the community in which both simultaneously exclude and depend on each other. The "me" is that which opposes or is distinct from the other and at the same time complements and requires this other. (…) [O]ne is doing something different from the others, even though what the others do determines what he is to do."[2] Mead provides examples of the "me" as a correlative activity. For instance, an economic exchange between two persons occurs through a mutual process of role taking in which both organize their distinct capacities in relation to each other. By putting herself in the other's shoes, each individual sees what the other needs (e.g. does *not* possess or is *unable* to do) and builds up that activity which is superior to and distinct from the other's incapacities*,* but which complements, requires and depends on these incapacities nevertheless:

"In the economic field the individual is taking the attitude of the other in so far as he is offering something to the other and calling out in reply a response of giving in the individual who has a surplus. There must be a situation in which the individual brings forward his own object as something that is valuable. Now, from his own point of view it is not valuable, but he is putting himself in the attitude of the other individual who will give something in return because he can find some use for it. He is calling in himself out the attitude of the other in offering something in return for what he offers; and although the object has for the individual no direct value, it becomes valuable from the point of view of the other individual into whose place the first individual is able to put himself."[3]

[1] Mead (1913) 379; Mead (1918) 581, 593, 597; Mead (1929) 394-395; Mead (1934) 161-162, 189, 193-194, 196, 204-205, 208-209, 211, 222, 225-226, 255, 262, 284-285, 287-288, 324-326.
[2] Mead (1918) 581, 593; Mead (1925) 267-268, 274; Mead (1934) 151, 160-161, 167, 190, 270, 273.
[3] Mead (1934) 300-301.

As a result, an individual can assert himself in the economic sphere only to the extent that he takes account of the act of the other to which his own act must correspond:

"Property can appear as an object only in so far as the individual stimulates himself to buy by a prospective offer to sell. Buying and selling are involved in each other. Something that can be exchanged can exist in the experience of the individual only in so far as he has in his own make-up the tendency to sell when he has the tendency to buy. And he becomes a self in his experience only in so far as one attitude on his own part calls out the corresponding attitude in the social undertaking."[1]

The organization of individual differences into a system of complementary (and thus necessary or definite) relations of difference - what Mead calls a system of functional differentiation - gives rise to a certain kind of universality, cooperation, organization, harmony or unity. If one particular act always answers to, complements or calls out a whole group of related acts, e.g. if all acts stand in a definite relationship to each other, they all become involved in the working toward and maintenance of a common social end. All particular functions are interrelated in an organic or unitary fashion so that they refer to a universal group of attitudes and responses which all members of the community adopt in specific situations. It is a unity that arises *out of* diversity.[2] Mead's discussions of property illuminate this notion of universality rather well: a case of theft calls out a set of responses by different individuals such as the victim, the police officer, the attorney general, the jurors and the judge. While each of these responses is distinct, they are all interrelated and complimentary in that each fulfils a particular function vis-à-vis the others. It is precisely this functional interrelation which gives unity to the variety of responses. Even though each activity is distinct, the assistance by the police officer, the prosecutive action by the general attorney and the pronouncement of judgement by the judge all contribute to *maintenance* of property and the *recognition* of property rights.[3] Likewise, the individual who affirms his property rights against a thief does so by recognizing the respect for the property of others. He is able to appeal to his right because he takes the attitude which everyone else has with reference to property. In asserting his own right, the individual also recognizes that of all other members of the community. Both the individual and the community are expressed in a common end.[4] I believe that this is the kind of unity or commonality which Mead has in mind when he writes that the universal transcends an infinite number of particulars:

[1] Mead (1925) 268.
[2] Mead (1925) 263-268, 274; Mead (1929) 396; Mead (1934) 98, 123, 151, 158-160, 263-264, 270, 276, 287, 300, 322.
[3] Mead (1934) 260-261.
[4] Mead (1915) 150; Mead (1925) 267-268.Mead (1934) 161-162.

any individual act reflects this universal in that each of them calls out or refers to a larger group of acts with which it stands in 'harmonious contrasts or relationships' and which together constitute the common social purpose.[1]

The “me” is the individual which integrates her individuality into a system of complementary and definite relations of difference by taking the role of the others. It is in this way that she contributes to the maintenance of and reflects the community and its common purpose. Mead argues that this “me” and the community it represents are subject to constant change and reconstruction. It is this phase of creative reconstruction which he refers to as the “I”. There has been a great deal of debate about how the “I” precisely relates to the “me”. In what follows, I argue that Mead conceives the creative phase of reconstruction as an intersubjective process that responds to the ever-persisting *failure* of the actual “me” and the community it represents to integrate all individual particularities into a system of definite relations of difference. The response of the “I” to this failure is to build a new “me” which takes over the attitude of a larger community and thus succeeds in organizing individual differences more fully than the existing universal. That is, contingency is located in that process or phase of activity which answers to the inherent contradictions in a universal by reconstructing this universal in such a way that it incorporates relations of difference in a more adequate manner.

Mead conceives the “I” as a creative power which constantly challenges and reconstructs the “me” and the society it belongs to. As Markell points out, this creative power has often been understood as a psychic seat or locus within the individual that exists independently of and that acts *against* the “me” and the society it represents. The “I” is seen to belong to a mysterious domain within the person which is irreducible to the community and which demands this community to transform its existing conventions. Creativity denotes the progressive realization of the values of a self-possessed individual which the present society has failed to fully embrace yet. This means that the potentiality of the “I” is fundamentally *separate* from the actuality represented by the “me”. A realm of pure potentiality that is given *in advance* serves to correct the moral flaws of actual conduct.[2] Markell agrees that some of Mead's statements could support this interpretation of the “I” as a prior potential which is divorced from the actual. For instance, he occasionally characterizes the “I” as an 'ego' which asserts himself against the organized attitude of the community. Markell also argues that the social progressivism and activism which penetrate Mead's academic writings gives credibility to this view. Much of this work clearly

[1] Mead (1900) 5-6; Mead (1925) 263-268; Mead (1934) 75, 85, 87, 98-100, 117-118, 263-264.
[2] Markell (2007) 104-106, 110-112, 126-127, 129.

expresses the belief that the individual could harmoniously realize himself in the community through the elimination of barriers to mutual perspective-taking.[1]

Markell argues, however, that this is not the only plausible interpretation of the "I". A closer reading suggests that Mead does not conceive the creative power of "I" as a prior potentiality external to actual conduct, but as something that is located *within* this conduct itself. It is not an inner seat of potentiality that gradually imposes itself on present practices but is rather *immanent* to these practices. The "I" is an *activity* or *actuality*, which refers to that which is *actually* going on or taking place. "It is that (…) which we may be said to be continually trying to realize, and to realize through the actual conduct itself."[2] This association of the "I" with the present and ongoing activity implies that this activity is intrinsically incomplete, open and uncertain.[3] While the "me" calls on the individual to respond in an expected way, the *actual* response of the individual is not given in the "me" but will always be novel and different from what was anticipated; it cannot be calculated in advance. This is why Mead says that it is because of the "I" that we are never fully aware of what we are doing, and that it is only *after* we have done something that we become aware of it. We are aware of what the situation is, but exactly how we are going to respond awaits the completion of the act itself. The "I" can never be presented directly as an "I" but only in memory, when it has become a "me".[4]

While Markell argues that Mead's work is ridden by the tension between these two understandings of the "I", I think that Mead rather consistently espouses the second interpretation, which locates the potential of the "I" within the actual and which emphasises the indeterminacy of activity. As I will try to show below, this interpretation is not necessarily in conflict with the progressivist and deterministic overtones in Mead's writings. The grounding of the potential within actual conduct implies that the conditions for change lie within the present situation, e.g. the existing "me" and the society it belongs to. For Mead, the "me" gives constantly rise to problematic situations, which involve the break-down of the system of organized differences and which call for the "I" to reconstruct the broken-down situation in a new and more adequate way. As he repeatedly puts it, 'the "me" presents the problem', to which the "I" responds.[5] What is important is that Mead conceives this problem essentially as a *moral problem*, which involves a struggle in which the "me" faces the *criticism* from the standpoint of conflicting moral values and interests. The "me" and the society it stands for are constantly

[1] Markell (2007) 114, 124-125; Mead (1934) 177, 200, 203.
[2] Markell (2007) 115-116, 118-121, 124, 129-130; Mead (1934) 203.
[3] Markell (2007) 122, 129-132.
[4] Markell (2007) 123; Mead (1934) 174-178, 196-198, 202-204, 214.
[5] Markell (2007) 131; Mead (1934) 97-100, 119, 124, 177-178, 182-183, 186, 196-197, 210, 214, 277, 279.

exposed to moral criticism, which maintains the ever-present risk of their failure. The source of this exposure is the continual presence of what Mead calls the *outsider* or *stranger*.[1]

The encounter with the outsider exposes the limitations of the community and the universal end expressed by it. The stranger prevents the community from proceeding harmoniously because he cannot integrate himself into its system of organized differences and realize his individuality in a way that makes a distinct contribution recognized by all members. The result is a state of social disintegration in which the existing response of the self to the community (and the relation between them) loses its universal validity and comes into conflict with those responses and interests represented by the outsider. In relation to the stranger, the community can only adopt an attitude of *hostility* that opposes his values and interests.[2] This encounter turns the community into a clan or mob-like structure which is united in its fight against the common enemy and whose values become *cults*. These cult values are considered as inviolable and take on a mystical and emotional character that escapes rational deliberation. They are narrow, exclusive and partial in that they stand in antagonistic opposition to the outsider. Cult values can only be realized through the stranger's physical, economic or political destruction. As such, they make it impossible for the community members to take over the role of the outsider and to correlate their activities with his capacities in a relationship of functional complementarity. Cult values are the source of the broken-down situation.[3]

For Mead, it is precisely the exposure of the community's values as cults in a state of disintegration that gives rise to a new and more universal society which reconfigures the relationship between self and other so as to integrate the stranger's individuality. The failure of the community to integrate the outsider into its system of organized differences reveals the partiality and one-sidedness of this community and its values. The conflict with the stranger discloses the *moral incompleteness* or *lack of universality* of its common ends. It is the recognition of this incompleteness that imposes the need to reconstruct the “me” in such a way that it brings *all* opposing responses and interests in relationship with each other. The 'immorality' or 'selfishness' of the old universal calls out a *rational*, *objective* or *impartial* reflection that gives expression to all conflicting tendencies to act so as to create an enlarged

[1] Mead (1913) 378-379; Mead (1923) 235; Mead (1929) 396-397; Mead (1930b) 705-706; Mead (1934) 168, 199, 212, 217, 320.
[2] Mead (1900) 6, 14-16; Mead (1908) 318-320; Mead (1913) 378-379; Mead (1918) 588-590, 592; Mead (1929) 407; Mead (1934) 220, 306-307, 308, 320, 322-323.
[3] Mead (1908) 318-319; Mead (1918) 580, 584-592, 594-595, 598-600; Mead (1923) 235-237, 242-243; Mead (1929) 388, 392-394, 397-400; Mead (1930a) 145-147; Mead (1934) 147-149, 218-221, 296.

and more adequate "me".[1] That is, the attempt to deal with the problem and to re-establish the normal state of affairs require the taking of the attitude of a broader community that includes the stranger and that organizes individual differences *more fully* into a new universal whole. The hostile interests that characterize the broken-down situation already contain a larger social whole in which they pass over into functional activities that compete with and recognize each other at the same time. The paralysed state of disintegration carries with it the functional standpoint, which adjusts the conflicting values in terms of their different uses or functions to each other.[2]

The implication is that contingency is understood as an intersubjective phase of reconstruction that answers to the ever-persistent incompleteness of the actual "me". The intrinsic failure of the "me" to integrate all individual differences exposes its narrowness and gives constantly rise to its reconstruction, which involves the taking over of the role of a larger community and the building of a more universal system of functional differentiation. The underlying mechanism which renders this 'natural tendency' towards functional development possible is the community which is represented by the *logical universe of discourse*.[3] This community is the most universal order in that it constitutes rational thought as such. The universe of discourse is simply the ability to converse in significant symbols and to take the role of the other in order to control one's action. As such, it is *not* a substantive ideal but a *rational procedure*, *medium* or *method*.[4] It does not impose a particular notion of the common good but formulates the conditions for defining this good. The moral necessity that follows from it is simply *that* the individual must use the rational method and converse in significant symbols. That is, the only obligation it imposes is that the individual has to take the attitude of all as fully as possible, without excluding anyone. The self must identify with and harmonize all interests and values that make up the situation.[5] It is this rational medium which allows individuals to constantly step outside and criticize the narrowness of their actual societies from the perspective of larger communities. Interests and values which were previously regarded as

[1] Mead (1900) 5-9, 12-16; Mead (1908) 316-317, 318-319; Mead (1913) 378-380; Mead (1918) 580, 595-597, 600-601; Mead (1923) 241; Mead (1930a) 137-141, 144-148; Mead (1934)169-170, 214-216, 302, 309-310.
[2] Mead MSS pp. 285-286, 288-289, 302, 310, 318; Mead (1923) 240-241; Mead (1918) 581, 588-590, 592-597.
[3] Mead (1900) 15; Mead (1918) 593-594; Mead (1930a) 146, 148; Mead (1934) 156, 161, 167-168, 180-181, 188, 199, 202, 216-218, 256-257, 266-268, 270-273, 284-286, 288-289, 297, 303, 308-310.
[4] Mead (1908) 317, 320-321; Mead (1930a) Mead (1934) 195, 201-202, 256, 259-260, 269. This is why Mead says that thinking cannot be taken outside of possible social uses, and that the categories and political institutions in which our individual rights are formulated are 'abstract' and 'empty' and get their content only through concrete struggles. See Mead (1934) 259; Mead (1915)151-152.
[5] Mead (1900) 5-6, 13, 15; Mead (1908) 314-318; Mead (1915) 149-150; Mead (1923) 236-238, 241; Mead (1930a) 146; Mead (1934) 155, 158, 164, 167, 259, 266-269, 277, 281-283, 327.

private, exceptional or irrelevant turn into public goods in that they become part of the system of organized differences, contributing thus to a fuller, more concrete and more perfect realization of society.[1]

It is precisely this idea of procedural rationality, e.g. the taking of the attitude of a larger community in response to the inadequacies of the present situation, which provides the foundation for Mead's political activism. Mead attempted to relate this idea to concrete political and social issues. This involved, on the one hand, a *descriptive* analysis of political and social phenomena in terms of the dialectic between social disintegration and intersubjective reconstruction. For instance, Mead characterizes the historical development of political and economic society as a continuous movement from relations of hostility to greater functional differentiation: the Roman Empire was initially built on relations of brute strength and then developed gradually an administrative capacity which was based on functional superiority. Monarchs emerged in the Middle Ages because they could set up functional relationships among people that had been separated by social barriers, distances and hostility. The democratic form of government arose against the backdrop of autocratic or personal types of government, which were exclusive in that they could not integrate all groups and deal with conflicts of interests. And the development of global trade has 'undistanced' groups which would have otherwise been hostile to each other.[2] On the other hand, however, Mead treats the rational method not just as a descriptive concept but also as a *normative ideal*, which serves him to promote a political agenda. He is able to do so because the taking of the role of the other so as to achieve greater control is a moral process in which the individual is forced to respond to his own ethical narrowness by taking a more universal, rational, or impartial perspective. As the rational method serves to remedy the moral flaws of present conduct, it becomes an instrument for social reform that is worth striving for. The rational control of moral problems is "(...) recognized as the most absorbing, most interesting, most fascinating intellectually with which the mind of man can occupy itself, and this interest belongs legitimately to the solution of every moral problem (...)".[3] As a consequence, it is incumbent to promote the use of this intelligent procedure in social affairs and subject present institutions and practices to the critique from the superior standpoint of function. Mead did this in the fields of interstate relations, philanthropy

[1] Mead (1908) 319; Mead (1915) 147, 150-152; Mead (1918) 596; Mead (1923) 247; Mead (1930a) 146, 148; Mead (1934) 271-273, 281-284, 290-291, 293, 298, 326-328.
[2] Mead (1915) 141-142, 153-154; Mead (1923) 236, 239; Mead (1925) 272; Mead (1934) 285-287, 291-296, 311-318.
[3] Mead (1908) 321-323; Mead (1923) 236; Mead (1934) 138, 179, 271-272, 276-277, 282-284, 293-294, 297, 316-317.

and punitive justice, advocating the building of larger communities that integrate criminals, the poor and enemy countries into more inclusive systems of functional differentiation.[1]

Taylor conceives contingency in a way that is similar to Mead. From Taylor's perspective, contingency is located in an intersubjective process of understanding during which particular modes of engaging with the world emerge as new and more adequate reformulations of past activities. The central idea underlying this view is the notion that reality is constituted by intersubjective structures of meaning. Taylor argues that practices and social orders are not natural outcomes but only come into existence and acquire meaning through specific intersubjective contexts, which constitute the agents and their practices by *articulating* evaluative or qualitative *distinctions*. The constitution of the world involves the delineation of *perspicuous contrasts*, which relate the agents to each other in a particular way and which rule out other possibilities at the same time. A boundary is drawn or articulated between forms of interaction which are legitimate, right or appropriate and those which are illegitimate, wrong or inappropriate. Language is the medium through which we articulate or express constitutive distinctions. It is in this sense that language becomes constitutive of reality. Words do not simply describe pre-existing practices but are rather essential for the existence of these practices.[2]

Taylor argues that it is precisely the intersubjective and constitutive nature of practices that renders them constantly open to the challenge or criticism from alternative possibilities, which eventually undermine their existence. This argument closely resembles Mead's account of evolution. Taylor argues that this constant challenge does not result from independent moral standards which are universally shared and which serve to prove certain practices as inferior, entailing their transformation. History does not unfold deterministically according to a universal principle. Rather, the conditions for evolution lie *within* those practices which are under challenge. As intersubjective contexts articulate a perspicuous contrast between right and wrong conduct, the question constantly arises as to whether that contrast is properly articulated and if there are not better ways to do so.[3] Any set of practices constantly faces phenomena which it fails to account for but which *demand* an explanation, not from the standpoint of an independent moral yardstick but from the point of view of these practices themselves. That is, the process of criticism involves the pointing out of those elements which are already implicit but unrecognised in a given set of practices, and which can no longer be ignored. The criticism

[1] Mead (1915) 152-152; Mead (1918); Mead (1923) 243-246; Mead (1925) 276-277; Mead (1929) 386, 400, 402-403, 406-407; Mead (1930a); Mead (1934) 272, 326-328.
[2] Taylor (1971) 11-13, 15, 22-29, 32, 37, 39; Taylor (1985a) 19-26, 34-35, 62-65, 228, 256-258; Taylor (1985b) 93, 229, 234-235, 261-262, 270-273.
[3] Taylor (1971) 29, 32-33, 40, 44-45; Taylor (1985a) 64-65; Taylor (1985b) 149.

is such that the proponent of a certain activity cannot but consent to its flawed nature given what is already contained or implied in that activity. It is this *self-defeating* character which gives rise to an intersubjective process of change which *explicitly* articulates that which was only implicit and which had been given marginal importance. In the course of this process, the activity that was initially 'confusing', 'badly formulated', 'distorted', or 'inadequate' is transformed into a fuller mode of engagement that is more 'clairvoyant', 'understandable' or 'adequate'. The inadequacies of present conduct give rise to its re-articulation into a *more perspicuous* and hence *rational* order.[1] This re-articulation is radical in that it involves a fundamental re-organisation of concepts which cannot be brought under a common vocabulary with the past and predicted in advance. It is only after the change has happened that we can grasp and identify it. Understanding in the human sciences is largely *ex post* understanding.[2]

The implication is that contingency is located in an intersubjective process which re-articulates the concepts that constitute reality so as to render them more adequate. The articulation of constitutive boundaries is contingent in that it changes its object in a way that is incommensurable with past activities, e.g. in that both cannot be brought under a common meta-language. And it is intersubjective because it transforms the past practices so as to make them more understandable.[3] In other words, a new articulation does not deterministically impose itself on the past activity, but only emerges in recognition of this activity as a plausible alternative that articulates a perspicuous order in a different but less adequate way. The new activity is not an eternal mode of thought but only an historical achievement in relation to the past. The superiority of the new over the old arises through a relationship of incommensurability between them, in which the new comes to be a *better alternative* (or variation) than the past with respect to a human constant.[4] This constant is not a substantial ideal but a 'feel for contrasts', which precedes the devising of any concrete language. It is a prior concern or sense for drawing perspicuous contrasts and for making discriminations between right and wrong. It is this primary sense for distinctions which allows for a plurality of social forms in that distinctions can be drawn in different and incommensurable ways; and which, at the same time, provides the possibility for transcultural judgements of superiority and for transitions from one form to another. The *fact* that all social forms articulate perspicuous contrasts allows for identifying those which "lay claim to a higher, or fuller, or more effective rationality, if [they

[1] Taylor (1985a) 70, 237, 257-258, 270-271; Taylor (1985b) 109-110, 129, 137, 149-150; Taylor (1995) 42, 53, 55-56, 60.
[2] Taylor (1971) 47-51; Taylor (1985a) 38, 40, 258, 276-278.
[3] Taylor (1985a) 36-42, 237, 257-258, 270-272.
[4] Taylor (1985a) 26-27; Taylor (1985b) 125-126, 129-130, 144-146, 148, 150-151. Taylor (1995) 54-56.

are] in a position to achieve a more perspicuous order than [others]."[1]

This view of social life fundamentally redefines the purpose of social theory in that articulation becomes central to adequately explaining or understanding social practices. This transforms social theorizing into an activity that is explanatory *and* normative at the same time. The constitution of practices by particular articulations means that a social theory attempting to give an adequate account of these practices cannot simply impose itself on and subsume them under a universal framework. For social theory is itself constituted by particular articulations and thus dependent on a specific cultural background. As such, it cannot claim to be culture-transcendental, or "wertfrei", and to account for practices that are shaped by different cultural contexts. In fact, positivist theories which apply a neutral scientific language to cross-cultural differences unconsciously end up being partisan and norm-setting because they impose particular values on a context where these values do not exist.[2] Rather than assimilating all practices to a culturally-specific model, a proper interpretation has to grasp their particular nature. A valid account requires that the theorist understand those specific articulations or self-definitions that constitute particular practices. It is essential that she give an account of the agents *as agents* and grasp their self-definitions as a plausible alternative which is different from ours. However, a proper explanation does not stop at the self-definitions of the agents under study. An understanding of the agents does not simply mean adopting but also *challenging* their point of view. That is, it involves a critique of the inadequacies and contradictions in their conduct so as to articulate this conduct more clairvoyantly. An explanation of certain practices always *changes* these practices in order to make them more perspicuous. This is why social theory never just explains an independently existing reality but shapes and constitutes this reality. As a result, the social sciences cannot be "wertfrei" but have to be understood as *moral* sciences that have an explicit normative dimension.[3]

The transition from pre-scientific to scientific cultures figures as a prominent example of articulation in Taylor's work. His claim is that, while pre-scientific cultures are not simply inferior to or wrong with respect to theoretical societies, the latter transform the former in a way that articulates a superior and more perspicuous understanding of the world. This is why there is a *rational justification* for the passage from pre-scientific to scientific society, and this is why this transition has happened in so many places of the world.[4] Taylor makes this argument by

[1] Taylor (1985a) 228, 230, 237, 261-263, 268; Taylor (1985b) 93, 137, 150-151; Taylor (1995) 152.
[2] Taylor (1985b) 103, 113-114, 116-118, 123-124, 131-132.
[3] Taylor (1971) 3-5, 14-17, 45; Taylor (1985a) 276-278; Taylor (1985b) 93-94, 97-102, 104-105, 107-111, 117-118, 123-126, 129-130, 140; Taylor (1995) 154-155.
[4] Taylor (1985b) 129; Taylor (1995) 42, 46, 49.

giving an account of how modern science emerged as victorious against the pre-scientific Renaissance view of understanding the world. The modern notion did not develop through a linear process. Renaissance science did not simply get it wrong and become subject to a correction process which eliminated its factual errors. This view, which also underlies the writings of Western anthropology on pre-scientific tribal societies, is ethnocentric because it judges the past by the standards of the present.[1] Rather, the seeds of the Renaissance's failure lay *within* its particular practices. Renaissance science was constituted by a distinct perspicuous order which fused symbolic and cognitive or manipulative activities into one single activity; understanding the world was inseparable from being in tune with it. This was incommensurable with the modern separation between symbolism and manipulation.[2] It was precisely this distinct fusion of symbolism and practical control which gave rise to contradictions and enabled the victory of the modern view. For even this particular fusion relied on a human constant, which was the inner connection between understanding the world and achieving technological control, e.g. the ability to manipulate the things in it. As a result, the technological advance in manipulating and predicting the physical world, which emerged through the dissociation of manipulation and symbolism, *had to* command the attention of those opposed to it. As the increase in scientific knowledge *could not fail* to offer recipes for more effective practice, the supporters of modern science had an argument the Renaissance sages *must* listen to, despite the absence of a universal criterion. The connection between scientific advance and technological payoff, which was already implicit in Renaissance science, could no longer be ignored once a high degree of technological control was achieved in practice.[3]

Skinner has given another statement of contingency as an intersubjective process through the concept of *rhetorical redescription*, which he seems to derive from Weber's work and which serves to account for conceptual innovation in the history of political ideas and political history. For Skinner, rhetorical redescription refers to an intersubjective legitimation process in which particular agents - which he calls *innovating ideologists* - exploit or manipulate contradictions in a given political order so as to render new and *untoward* practices publicly acceptable.[4] The starting point for this account of change is his contention that the social world is constituted by intersubjective vocabularies or ideologies, which both describe and evaluate actions or states of affairs. Vocabularies establish the *standard* or *correct* uses of terms for certain states of affairs

[1] Taylor (1985b) 124, 139.
[2] Taylor (1985b) 127-130, 140-144.
[3] Taylor (1985b) 129, 145-150; Taylor (1995) 44-49.
[4] Skinner (1974a) 292; Skinner (1999) 62, 64, 66; Skinner (2002) 148.

and delineate them from incorrect applications. And by applying standard uses to certain actions, they also evaluate them: they are standardly used to *commend* and *condemn* the actions which they are employed to describe. This implies that vocabularies constitute societies by legitimating particular classes of actions while disapproving of others. Political orders are constituted by particular evaluative terms that can only be applied to justify a limited range of practices.[1] Skinner argues that these intersubjective vocabularies are constantly subject to the criticism from innovating ideologists, who redescribe them so as to legitimate and introduce new practices which are regarded as illegitimate from the standpoint of the prevailing moral order. The possibilities for making and legitimating untoward claims lie *within the existing situation*: the innovating ideologist cannot justify his actions by whatever evaluative concept he prefers but only by appealing to those moral principles that his opponents already use for describing actions of which they approve. That is, the innovating ideologist legitimates change by persuading an audience that an already recognized and favourable evaluation can be applied to an action that would normally not be given this description. He has to show that some of the existing moral principles can be used - in virtue of their ordinary meaning - to describe an action that has been regarded as illegitimate. By arguing that the ordinary criteria for applying a favourable evaluative-descriptive term are actually present, the innovating ideologist manages to extend the range of commendable actions. It is this 'rhetorical trick', as Skinner calls it, that alters the moral identity of a society.[2]

Skinner argues that it is the constant use of the technique of rhetorical redescription that has rendered the history of ideas a dynamic series of ever-changing and particular perspectives. Political history has not been not driven by the mere application of political traditions to practice but by the particular and creative *uses* that have been made of these traditions *in practice*. Vocabularies are contingent outcomes that have emerged out of practical struggles in which specific ideologies were creatively reconfigured so as to legitimate and introduce new kinds of action.[3] For Skinner, the purpose of the historian is to *trace* these changing configurations. And in this use, the term 'trace' has a purely *descriptive* meaning. The historian recovers the beliefs which counted as rationally acceptable in particular historical contexts, but she does not judge the truth value or rightness of these beliefs. She does not take, that is, a critical stance on the ideas she is examining.[4] As Skinner puts it:

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[1] Skinner (1974a) 293-294; Skinner (1999) 61; Skinner (2002) 148-149, 161-162, 173-174; Tully (1988) 13.
[2] Palonen (2003) 52-53; Skinner (1974a) 294-295, 298-301; Skinner (1999) 66-68; Skinner (2002) 153, 155-156.
[3] Skinner (1974a) 287-290, 298; Skinner (1988b) 87-88; Skinner (1999) 61-64; Skinner (2002) 153; Tully (1988) 18-19, 22-25.
[4] Skinner (1974a) 287; Skinner (1999) 61; Skinner (2002) 51-53; Taylor (1988) 219-220.

"I am not in general talking about truth; I am talking about what different people at different times may have had good reasons by their lights for holding true, regardless if we ourselves believe that what they held true was in fact true. (…) I am merely insisting (…) that our task as historians is to try to recover Machiavelli's point of view; and that, in order to discharge this task, what we need to employ is solely the concept of rational acceptability, not that of truth."[1]

The explanation of certain beliefs as rationally acceptable in particular circumstances does not fall into the trap of judging their truth or falsity because the concept of rationality does not imply a particular criterion or good. All that it involves is a basic concern for consistency, which includes the need to avoid contradictory statements and, most importantly, an interest in the *justification* of beliefs, involving a concern for the kind of coherence and evidence that are needed for concluding that affirmations are justified. As this basic notion of rationality is present in all cultures (past and present) at least to some extent, the historian can access and recover the content of foreign beliefs without imposing her own perspective on them.[2] This bracketing of the issues of truth, normativity and judgement from social analysis is precisely what separates Skinner from Taylor (and, I believe, also Mead), as Taylor himself has emphasized.[3]

Skinner has analysed cases of rhetorical redescription in the history of ideas and political history throughout his work. Here, I want to outline one of these analyses, which he provides in an essay entitled 'The Principles and Practice of Opposition: The Case of Bolingbroke and Walpole'. In this essay, Skinner attempts to explain the political opposition campaign of Bolingbroke and his followers against Walpole's Ministry in the 1720s and early 1730s. His starting point is to claim that the two prevailing explanations of Bolingbroke's behaviour are flawed because they misconceive the relationship between political ideals and action. The 'Namierite' view argues that Bolingbroke's opposition was entirely driven by self-interest and his desire for power. The political principles with which he justified his opposition were ad-hoc rationalisations that had no importance for explaining his behaviour.[4] Skinner claims that this Namierite view is incomplete because fails to explain the *specificity* of Bolingbroke's campaign. For Bolingbroke and his followers did not - as would have been expected if power had been the

[1] Skinner (2002) 52-53.
[2] Skinner (1988b) 239-240, 257-258.
[3] Taylor (1988) 220, 224, 226; I will return to this difference between Skinner, on the one hand, and Taylor and Mead, on the other, below and in chapter 6.
[4] Skinner (1974b) 94, 100-102.

main driving force - use any issue or appeal to every possible principle in order to attack the Ministry. Rather, the campaign followed a particular pattern that included only certain issues and that became consistent and predictable over the years. Bolingbroke and his party consistently attacked the Ministry's position to keep a standing army in times of peace, and the award of government places and pensions by the Ministry to its supporters in parliament. They claimed that these two policies were *unpatriotic*, by which they meant that they undermined political liberties.[1] The inability of the Namierite view to explain this specificity has given rise to the 'revisionist' explanation of Bolingbroke's opposition, which argues that he was sincerely attached to the protection of political liberties and genuinely motivated by the fear that these liberties be undermined. Skinner dismisses this explanation, which takes Bolingbroke's own professed justifications at face value, as naïve and unfalsifiable. Contra the revisionists, he argues that the motives of Bolingbroke were indeed largely self-interested. Yet this does not mean that the principle of patriotism served Bolingbroke only as an ad-hoc rationalisation which did not have any causal weight, as the Namierites claim. Both the Namierite and the revisionist view commit the logical error of assuming that a political principle matters causally only if it genuinely acted as a *motive* for pursuing a certain course of action.[2]

Skinner argues that, rather than being 'directly driven' by the principle of patriotism, Bolingbroke was redescribing this principle in a particular way so as to respond to the necessity of rendering his interest-driven and prima facie dubious opposition publicly acceptable. While Bolingbroke was motivated by political ambition rather than the ideal of patriotism, this ideal shaped his actions in that he had to appeal to it and match it to his political practice in order to pursue his campaign.[3] This necessity arose from the fact that, according to the constitutional conventions of the time, a formed opposition against the King's ministers was seen as illegal, treacherous and unpatriotic. This made it *rational* and *essential* for Bolingbroke to justify and redescribe his campaign in a new way that defeated its initial description as unpatriotic and that showed that the principle of patriotism - which both Bolingbroke and his opponents agreed was about the protection of political liberties - actually applied to it. And this in turn made it rational for him to focus on the issues of standing armies and the House of Commons; for in the political thought of Bolingbroke's Whig opponents, standing mercenary armies and the encroachment of the citizen body's independence were seen as the major causes of dictatorship.[4] By focusing on

[1] Skinner (1974b) 96-100, 102-103.
[2] Skinner (1974a) 290-292; Skinner (1974b) 104-108; Skinner (2002) 145-146.
[3] Skinner (1974b) 108, 110-111, 127-128; Skinner (2002) 155-156.
[4] Skinner (1974b) 99, 108-112, 116-124.

these issues, it became possible to make the Whig ministry's policies appear as unpatriotic and illiberal in the light of the Whig's *own* principles and, correspondingly, to present the opposition campaign as motivated by the spirit of patriotism and concerned with the preservation of political liberties. In other words, Bolingbroke's 'great coup' lay in his ability to exploit or lay bare the contradictions in the Ministry's policies with *maximum plausibility*. He realized that, by *reminding* the Whigs of their own principles and by presenting himself and his followers as 'true' or 'better patriots' than his opponents, he would have the *best chances* to effectively continue an opposition that would have been normally regarded as unconstitutional. Bolingbroke's achievement was to recognize that the appeal to patriotism was essential for the successful pursuit of his campaign.[1] Skinner expresses this clearly when writes:

"What I have tried to argue is that until we put ourselves in a position to explain why Bolingbroke and his party evidently *believed it was rational* to concentrate on certain specific courses of political action, we cannot hope to explain why they chose to concentrate on just those courses of action. And what I have tried to show is that the reason they believed it was rational to act in just the way they did was that it *was rational* in the circumstances to act in just that way."[2]

Mead, Taylor and Skinner attempt to solve the Cartesian problem in a similar way in that they conceptualize contingency as an intersubjective process. Intersubjective contexts constitute the individuals in relation to each other in a certain way, thereby drawing a boundary between legitimate and illegitimate behaviour. Mead expresses this idea most clearly: by becoming an object to himself and by arousing the same response in himself that he calls out in the other, the individual acquires self-consciousness and controls his conduct vis-à-vis this other. By taking the role of the other, the individual and this other enter into a relationship in which both simultaneously exclude and depend on each other. The individual comes into existence by building a correlative activity that is distinct from and that complements his environment at the same time. In this way, he realizes his individuality in a way that is recognized as *legitimate* by the community. The organization of individual differences into a system of definite and complementary oppositions gives the rise to a common or universal end to which all of the varying activities contribute. At the same time, it implies the drawing of a boundary between those activities which maintain and those which negate or do not come under the universal purpose. For instance, the various practices that recognize and maintain the

[1] Skinner (1974a) 289; Skinner (1974b) 112-113, 125-128.
[2] Skinner (1974b) 127.

institution of property are all hostile towards the thief. I believe that Taylor expresses a similar idea when he argues that intersubjective contexts constitute the agents by articulating perspicuous contrasts, which relate the agents in a certain way while ruling out other possibilities at the same time. That is, perspicuous contrast delineate a boundary between legitimate and illegitimate modes of interaction. This line of reasoning also closely resembles Skinner's argument that intersubjective vocabularies constitute practices in their descriptive-evaluative function: by establishing the standard uses of actions and state of affairs, they legitimate particular classes of actions while excluding others. Another implication, which each hermeneutic thinker emphasises, is that language does not simply describe or represent but rather constitute reality in that it is a medium through which constitutive boundaries are expressed.

For Mead, Taylor and Skinner, intersubjective vocabularies not only constitute practices but are constantly exposed to the criticism from excluded perspectives, which reveal the intrinsic contradiction of these vocabularies and which radically transform them. This is what Mead's notion of the stranger, Taylor's new phenomena that demand an explanation, and Skinner's concept of untoward practices refer to. It is important to note that the marginalized perspective does not simply impose itself on the existing order according to an external or substantial ideal that comes to be progressively realized. The act of critique does not challenge the actual from the standpoint of an independent moral yardstick that is universally shared, but from the very standpoint of the actual itself. As Mead puts it, the creative and critical power of the “I” is not located in a prior and separate realm of potentiality that merely corrects the moral flaws of actual conduct but rather immanent to actual conduct itself. In his essay on Mead, Markell captures this clearly when he writes that the injustice resulting from the failure to give recognition is not a failure to recognize certain qualities of others but “a failure to see and to respond to the conditions of one's own action”.[1] The outsider exposes the immanent partiality or incompleteness of a universal and thus imposes the need to take the role of a larger community that radically transforms both self and other. Taylor expresses a similar idea when argues that the act of critique proceeds on the assumption that there is no common ideal that unites both the present and the new activity. Rather than imposing itself on actual conduct, a new articulation recognizes this conduct as a legitimate possibility that has to be challenged on its own terms. The act of critique discloses the self-defeating nature of the present by making explicit those features which are already implicit in it and which can no longer be ignored once

[1] Markell (2007) 132.

pointed out. In this way, a new articulation transforms the present practices into a more perspicuous order that exhibits a higher degree of adequacy, rationality, or comprehensiveness. I believe that it is precisely this act of pointing out the contradictions within present conduct, of 'making the implicit explicit', that underlies Skinner's concept of rhetorical redescription: the innovating ideologist redescribes the moral resources that are already present within the situation in a new way so as to legitimize his untoward practices. By emphasising his opponents' failure to acknowledge that existing moral principles can applied to his practices, he discloses the immanent flaws of and manages to transform the present state of affairs.

The upshot is that intersubjectivity and contingency are intrinsically linked. As intersubjective rules constitute the individuals by relating them to each other and by drawing boundaries between right and wrong conduct, they give constantly rise to the criticism that some interests are excluded from the universal system of differences or that there are more adequate ways to articulate perspicuous contrasts, entailing their constant transformation. The act of criticism gives rise to a process of change which fundamentally transforms its object. Taylor puts this most clearly by arguing that the (re-) articulation of constitutive boundaries changes its object in a way that it cannot be brought under a universal meta-language with that which preceded it. Mead makes a similar point when he argues that the phase of reconstruction gives rise to a creative re-ordering that brings into existence a new self and a new environment. At the same time, this re-ordering transforms the present society in a way that makes it more complete, understandable or rational. Creative reconstruction involves the taking of the attitude of a broader community, e.g. the taking of the role of the other more fully than in present conduct. Likewise, articulation and rhetorical redescription transform present practices so as to make them less contradictory or to create more perspicuous boundaries between right and wrong.

This implies that contingency as an intersubjective process relies on a *procedural rule* as a universal human trait that is *empty*. Mead calls this the 'logical universe of discourse', Taylor refers to it as the 'universal feel for perspicuous contrasts', and Skinner labels it the 'basic requirement for consistency and justification'. This rule is empty in the sense that it is not a substantial ideal; it does not have any particular content. Rather than imposing a particular content or common good, this rule stipulates the conditions which the agents have to meet in order to proffer an acceptable definition of the common good. What it requires is that the individual take the role of the other rather than exclude him (Mead), that she articulate a perspicuous rather than an irrational order (Taylor), or that she justify her actions consistently

rather than inconsistently (Skinner). As this rule is empty, it implies a dynamic view of social life in that the number of particular interests which can be included in the universal system of differences and the number of ways in which perspicuous boundaries can be drawn are limitless. At the same time, it provides for the possibility of judgements of superiority between social forms and thus enables a specific mechanism of transition from one form to another. Any given set of practices inevitably gives rise to new possibilities which take the attitude of the other *more* fully, which draw *more* perspicuous contrasts, or which are justified *more* consistently. I think that this procedural principle essentially locates contingency *in the ever-persisting tension between the failure in and success of maintaining the distance between legitimate and illegitimate conduct*. That is, contingency conceived as an intersubjective process is grounded in the ever-recurring dialectic between the *lack* and the *presence* of the conversation in significant symbols, perspicuous boundaries and consistent justifications.

I argue that it is this hermeneutic notion of contingency as an intersubjective process which is present in the constructivist theories of Fierke, Kessler and Jackson. The three constructivists conceive of reality as intersubjectively constituted. Intersubjective vocabularies or rules do not regulate the conduct of pre-given agents but produce and constitute these agents in the first place. By constituting the actors in relation to each other, they establish the public boundaries of action, rendering some actions permissible while de-legitimizing others. Kessler, Jackson and Fierke mirror the hermeneutic line of reasoning by arguing that intersubjective vocabularies are constantly exposed to the criticism from marginalized perspectives, which entail their constant transformation. And they concur with the hermeneutic scholars that this critique does not impose itself from the standpoint of a linear notion of progress or a universal ideal, but rather points out the contradictions *within* existing conduct. As Kessler puts it, the actualization of a given intersubjective order already carries with it or refers to other possibilities, which will ultimately threaten its foundations. Any actualization is intrinsically unstable in that it constantly produces new crises, contradictions and failures, which give continuously rise to its reconstruction. Social orders are subject to a 'self-sustaining or -governing' (as opposed to externally determined) process of 'evolutionary selection', in which they constantly call out new alternatives that prove more successful in practice.[1] Jackson and Fierke make a similar point by focusing more closely on the process of reasoning in which a given set of practices faces opponents challenging it. Jackson argues that the transformation of a social arrangement is not a natural or linear outcome but comes about through a contested and open debate in which

[1] Kessler (2008a) 154-157; Kessler (2012a) 196-197; see also ch 2, 30-31.

different and equally plausible positions confront each other. Rather than appealing to an external standard or universal consensus, the speaker renders any opposition ineffective by beating the opponents on their own terms, e.g. by disclosing the flaws within their own conduct.[1] Fierke's notion of 'acting as if' expresses a very similar idea: the act of criticism discloses the gap between justifications and practices within actual practices by acting as if an alternative game was in place which is marginalized but already implicit in these practices.[2] The common ground between Jackson's concept of legitimation that works through 'its own effectiveness' and Fierke's notion of 'acting as if' becomes particularly clear when comparing them with the concepts of articulation and rhetorical redescription: rather than criticising a given set of practices from the perspective of an external standard, a new articulation or redescription recognizes these practices as a legitimate possibility that has to be challenged by making explicit those features which are already implicit in it and which its proponents can no longer ignore once pointed out to them, or, alternatively, by redescribing it in way that gives it a more consistent justification than in the present.

The implication is again that contingency is grounded in a procedural principle, which is empty in the sense that it can be filled with an infinite number of contents, but which stipulates the conditions for defining what a valid content is in the first place. It is this emptiness which entails a dynamic view of social life. As Jackson puts it, particular arrangements are unique and ongoing accomplishments that are only relatively stable and that change over time. Fierke strikes a similar cord by arguing that the world does not unfold according to a rational blueprint but is constantly made and remade through a never-ending process process of public reasoning and contestation.[3] This is also in line with Kessler's argument that social order does not evolve through a process of logical deduction - e.g. a final ground - but spontaneously and without rational planning, each stabilization of meaning producing new non-knowledge that eventually undermines its foundations.[4] At the same time, social configurations, political orders and language games always call out and give way to alternatives which articulate the prevailing standard of acceptability *more effectively* (Jackson), which ensure the well-being of society *more successfully* (Kessler), or which reduce the discrepancy between justifications and practices *more consistently* (Fierke) than their predecessors.[5] Contingency is firmly located in the ever-lasting tension between the failure of and success in maintaining the boundary between

[1] See ch 1, 15-16.
[2] See ch 3, 46-47.
[3] See ch 1, 16; ch 3, 47.
[4] See ch 2, 31.
[5] Kessler (2008a) 157; See also ch 1, 15-16; ch 2, 31; ch 3, 46-47.

legitimate and illegitimate conduct.

The Conceptual Status of Intersubjectivity

While the three constructivist approaches to contingency mirror the hermeneutic conceptualization of contingency as an intersubjective process, they employ the concept of intersubjectivity in a way which not all of the hermeneutic thinkers discussed above would approve of. Kessler, Fierke, and Jackson treat this concept as a non-normative methodological concept that serves to *analyse* and not to *evaluate* empirical processes of change. The three constructivist critics subscribe to the positivist distinction between factual analysis and moral judgements, the difference from positivism being that their analyses focus on phenomena that are socially constructed and that keep evolving through intersubjective processes of change. This is, of course, not to imply that Kessler, Jackson and Fierke would deny that social analysis can proceed without any normative commitments. All of them would probably agree with the argument that certain values are constitutive for research *problems* and *interests* in social science. What they - implicitly or explicitly - endorse, however, is the possibility of (causally or constitutively) *analysing* social phenomena in a way that excludes normative or moral judgements. As I have outlined in chapter 1, Jackson is the most outspoken on this separation of ethical and empirical arguments. He clearly believes in the possibility and the desirability of an empirical and non-normative analysis for social science. The purpose of social analysis is to 'trace' and 'reconstruct' empirical processes of legitimation rather than making claims about the normative validity of these processes.[1] Fierke makes a similar argument when she writes that the goal of social analysis is to 'look and see' in order to 'describe' intersubjective change in world politics. The value-added of the language game approach is explanatory. By looking and seeing how language is put to use in different contexts, we provide a 'better explanation of what happened'.[2] Rather than taking a normative stance on its subject of study, the analysis of games simply reconstructs given events in their particularity. This is precisely what distinguishes it from critical and post-structural theory:

"Given the desire to bridge the critical and the empirical, it is not self-evident that we should return to Wittgenstein. (…) [A]nd critical theorists of other traditions have argued that post-Wittgensteinian scholarship, given the emphasis on meaning in use, takes the world as it is, failing to deal with issues of power, history, and social change. (…) While it is true that Wittgenstein's philosophy of language is not particularly useful for *theorizing* about power

[1] See ch 1, 16-17.
[2] Fierke (1996) 471; Fierke (1998) 53.

or change, I would argue that it does provide a point of departure for rethinking how we *describe* an historical context of power and change. Description, while not inherently critical, becomes so if it makes us look again, in a fresh way, at that which we assume about the world because it has become overly familiar. Taking seriously the criteria for describing contexts, such as the end of the Cold War, or the conflict in Bosnia, opens up the prospect of challenging realist accounts of these changes."[1]

In her analysis of the end of the Cold War, Fierke provides another statement of this descriptive kind of analysis:

"By looking at the weakness of various existing approaches, I rethink the criteria for a 'better' description of a process of change. A better description describes a 'reality', but this reality is explicitly social; the focus is on the *actions* of a *range* of players, actions which are dependent on rules for their meaning. The analysis identifies the parameters of a dominant game and moves, over time, by which it was transformed."[2]

This emphasis on descriptive as opposed to normative analysis is also evident in her most recent work on political self-sacrifice:

"This book does not pose the normative question regarding the right of communities that have lost their sovereignty to resist, particularly with violence. Instead, my focus is on the empirical observation that communities in this position often do resist, and that political self-sacrifice can be an important component of this resistance. The theoretical objective is to analyse the dynamics of political self-sacrifice, particularly as they relate to different violent or non-violent expressions."[3]

While Kessler does not explicitly discuss the distinction between descriptive and normative analysis, it becomes quite obvious that he accepts this distinction, locating his approach firmly on the descriptive side. The value-added of his post-positivist approach is explanatory in that it makes it possible to 'reconstruct', 'capture' or 'analyse' the evolution of intersubjective meanings over time.[4] The purpose is to reconstruct how the present became naturalized and stabilized from within a wider set of alternatives. Kessler's unconcern for normative issues and his preference for descriptive analysis is also confirmed by the fact that he draws on scholars as diverse as Beck, Luhmann and Foucault in order to argue that world society is undergoing a transformation from a vocabulary of threats to a vocabulary of risk. He is able to draw on these

[1] Fierke (2001a) 122. See also Fierke (2000) 361; Fierke (2005) 162-163.
[2] Fierke (1998) 4.
[3] Fierke (2013) 14.
[4] For instance, Kessler (2007b) 357-358; Kessler (2008c) 17; Kessler (2011a) 209; Kessler (2012a) 292; Kessler (2012c) 77-78.

very different bodies of literature, which have different normative implications, because he only uses them to 'empirically highlight' and 'reconstruct' the contemporary changes in world politics.[1]

The conceptualization of intersubjectivity as a purely descriptive category renders the three constructivist approaches similar to that of Skinner and opposes them to the social philosophies of Taylor and Mead. As I have already indicated above, for Taylor, the constitution of reality through the constant (re-) articulation of qualitative boundaries implies that social theory never only explains or describes but also partly shapes, alters or reforms this reality. Social analysis provides an understanding of particular practices by grasping these practices in their self-definitions and by challenging and articulating them more clearly. And while Mead does not explicitly discuss the distinction between descriptive and normative analysis, the fact that he not just combines but *fuses* the descriptive and the normative lets one to believe that such a distinction would have been quite alien to his thinking. For Mead, the social theory of the intersubjective origin and evolution of the self already contains the foundations of an ethical theory, and both support each other in a way that it is difficult to really separate them.[2] I will come back to this dividing line between Fierke, Jackson, Kessler and Skinner, on the one hand, and Mead and Taylor, on the other, in chapters 5 and 6.

[1] Kessler and Daase (2008) 212-214; Kessler (2011a) 209; Kessler (2011b) 2166-2167.
[2] Mead (1934) 379.

Determinism

In the last chapter, I have attempted to establish three defining and common features of the constructivist theories of Fierke, Kessler and Jackson. In this chapter I want to critically take issue with the first two features, which refer to the hermeneutic foundations of constructivism. By subjecting contemporary positivist theorizing to the hermeneutic critique of the Cartesian mind-body dualism, Kessler, Fierke and Jackson raise the need to account for the fundamentally contingent nature of social relationships as a key problem for social scientific analysis. Their solution to this Cartesian problem, which also mirrors earlier hermeneutic attempts, is to conceive the contingent coming about of these relationships in terms of an intersubjective process, in which the individuals draw the boundary between legitimate and illegitimate conduct or take the attitude of the others more fully than in the past. In this chapter, I want to point out a tension between the raising of this Cartesian problem and the solution to it - between the claim to account for genuine contingency and the actual attempt to do so through the concept of intersubjectivity. I argue that the conceptualization of contingency as an intersubjective process implies a *determinism* which transforms social practices into natural or necessary outcomes. What it implies is that human acts are not contingent and unpredictable events, which could have been otherwise, but rather pre-determined outcomes, which are the logical responses to particular situations. Decision-making becomes reduced to a simplistic and deterministic logic of choice. This determinism decisively undermines the constructivist and hermeneutic claim to account for genuine contingency, which is derived from the critique of the Cartesian dualism of mind and body. I will attempt to make clear this tension between the claim to account for contingency and the actual failure to do so through two steps: first, through a conceptual discussion, which aims to show that the notion of intersubjectivity implies a certain determinism; second, I will attempt to show how this determinism penetrates the empirical investigations of the hermeneutic and constructivist scholars discussed above. As the main purpose of this thesis is a critique of the constructivist theories of Kessler, Fierke and Jackson, I will, however, particularly focus on their analyses.

Intersubjectivity and Necessity

By positing a universal procedural principle which locates contingency in the tension between the failure of and success in maintaining the boundary between legitimate and illegitimate conduct, the constructivist and hermeneutic theorists seemingly eschew any determinism and

substantialism. This principle is not a pre-existing 'ground' or 'essence' that deterministically imposes itself on human conduct. Rather, it resembles what Judith Butler calls, in her discussion of Ernesto Laclau's concept of the universal, an *absence*: an 'empty placeholder' which, by only providing the formal conditions which all legitimate claims have to meet, is constantly filled and refilled with new contents.[1] While there is no doubt that this proceduralism (or formalism) eschews any simple essentialism, I argue that it nevertheless allows for a certain determinism to creep in through the back door, which undermines the radical contingency that the hermeneutic and constructivist theorists claim to account for. The main problem with the formalist view is precisely that it presupposes a prior consensus on the criteria for formulating acceptable and unacceptable arguments. This fixing of the formal conditions for rhetorical success and failure in advance implies that, as I have argued above, contingency can only be located in the tension between the failure of and success in formulating arguments that meet the formal criteria, e.g. in a tension that is embedded in a common standard which allows for evaluating *the extent* to which these arguments meet the criteria or not. Transformation comes about through the formulation of justifications that are *more* effective, *more* consistent or *more* coherent, or alternatively, through the taking of the attitude of the other *more fully* than the opponents. Creativity basically consists in rendering a novel position more representative of or resonate with the formal criteria than the rival views. If, however, a novel articulation is that which makes the present *objectively* (that is, universally) more acceptable, e.g. if, as Taylor and Jackson put it, it manoeuvres the opponent into a corner from where he *must* consent even if he did not want to, this novel articulation becomes the *best* or *logical* response to present conduct. If we can unanimously identify a 'contradiction', it follows that we can also identify a best or logical strategy that solves this contradiction. The recognition of a contradiction already implies or requires a corresponding solution that logically and successfully answers to this contradiction. An argument that is 'less consistent' already implies a correlative argument that is 'more consistent' than the rival. And a 'best', 'required' or 'logical' response is a response which is necessary, or that which has to be done. The conceptualization of novelty as a successful response to present contradictions is deterministic in that it reduces this novelty to a predetermined, or logically required, choice. What it does is to transform novel points of view into logical consequences that arise out of the flaws of present conduct.

The overall implication is that the intersubjective solution to the Cartesian problem somehow begs the whole question. The conceptualization of contingency as an intersubjective

[1] Butler (2000) 31-34.

process seriously undermines the claim to account for the fundamentally contingent character of social life, which the hermeneutic and constructivist scholars derive from their critique of the Cartesian mind-body dualism. The positing of a prior formal framework to a significant extent eliminates the contingency or uncertainty which this framework was supposed to account for in the first place. If the novel is always conceived as the logically required solution to an objective contradiction, other courses of action would in fact not have been plausible or acceptable. Taking seriously the possibility of alternative courses of action would precisely require abandoning the assumption of a formal consensus that fixes the conditions for rhetorical success and failure. For genuine contingency can only arise out of a situation where such a consensus does *not* exist. The possibility that another course of action could have actually come about has to be grounded not in the presence but in the *absence* of a consensus on what constitutes a less and a more consistent justification, an incoherent and a coherent articulation, a failure in and a success of building a complementary activity with the other, or an ineffective and an effective argument. It is only when the actors do not agree on what constitutes a contradiction and a consistent justification that there is a *genuine* and *undecidable* clash among multiple courses of action and thus the possibility that each of them could in fact have come about. Genuine contingency cannot arise out of the tension, to use Mead's language, between the failure of and success in building a complementary activity with the other but only out of the disagreement about *what complementarity means* in a given situation.

Bolingbroke's Coup and the Rise of Modern Science

In the remainder of this chapter, I will argue that this tension between the claim to account for contingency and the elimination of contingency through the concept of intersubjectivity penetrates the real-world investigations of the hermeneutic and constructivist scholars, which I have outlined in the two previous chapters. It is precisely through the positing of a prior formal consensus, which constitutes the boundaries within which legitimate positions evolve, that these investigations transform certain empirical outcomes from novel events into predetermined or logically required choices. As a result, these analyses do away with the contingency they were designed to account for in the first place. In his analysis of Bolingbroke's opposition campaign, Skinner very clearly argues that the way Bolingbroke designed his campaign was the *best* thing he could do to in order to pursue an effective opposition policy. As there was a fundamental agreement among all parties that general opposition was regarded as unpatriotic and that patriotism meant the preservation of liberty, e.g. as the distinction between the defence and

violation of liberty was constitutive of the discursive space in which legitimate arguments could be made, it became 'essential' and 'rational' to justify his campaign in a way that depicted him as a 'better' or 'truer' patriot than his opponents. By framing the opposition as a patriotic defence of liberty, he was able to exploit the contradiction in the Whigs ministry's policies with 'maximum plausibility'. Creative action (in Skinner's terms ideological redescription) is reduced to the simple matter of 'making explicit', or 'reminding' the opponent of the objective flaws that are already contained in his position. What Skinner is essentially arguing is that Bolingbroke *had to do* what he did. As the quote above indicates[1], what Bolingbroke did *was in fact* rational, essential and necessary, and his 'coup' *only* lay in recognizing that it was rational, essential or necessary to act in this way. If that is the case, however, it remains unclear how Bolingbroke's rhetorical redescription can be understood as a process of *genuine innovation*, which persuaded people to apply a given evaluative term "in circumstances in which they may have never thought of applying it,"[2] or in which a concept was defined in a specific way that would have been 'unthinkable' in other contexts. If Bolingbroke's redescription was the best or most rational response to the situation, how can it be a contingent and unpredictable outcome at the same time (leaving aside the possibility of error and miscalculation because for Skinner, as well as for the other hermeneutic and constructivist scholars, contingency does not arise from 'erroneous practices' that deviate from a common standard of acceptable behaviour, but rather from the plurality of visions and moral viewpoints)? I believe that Michael Oakeshott, in his review of Skinner's *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, makes a similar criticism on a more general level. Oakeshott argues that there is a dissonance between Skinner's claim that the late medieval and early modern political writings were only concerned with circumstantial problems that fundamentally differed across time and pulled into different directions, and his claim that all of these writings contributed to laying the foundation of a single modern concept of the state. That is, there is a contradiction between Skinner's claim that these writings were part of purely contingent, particular or localized struggles and his claim that they all pulled deterministically in the single direction of a homogenous conception of statehood.[3]

I think that the same contradiction is present in Taylor's account of the transition from pre-scientific to scientific cultures. While he emphasises that the modern notion of science did not develop in a linear or deterministic way, his account nevertheless implies that the emergence of

[1] See ch 4, 79.
[2] Skinner (1999) 71.
[3] Michael Oakeshott (1980) 450-453.

this notion was a logical, natural or necessary response to the pre-scientific view. Given that both notions shared the idea of an inner connection between understanding the world and the ability to manipulate things in it, the separation of symbolism and manipulation represented a *logical* step because it allowed for a higher degree of technological control than the fusion of both activities. As Taylor puts it very clearly, the technological advance that came about through the dissociation of symbolic and manipulative activities gave the supporters of modern science an argument that the Renaissance sages *had no choice but to* listen to. Taylor acknowledges, of course, that the notion of articulation implies the possibility of transcultural judgements of superiority and transitions from one culture to another.[1] However, the question still remains as to how this possibility is compatible with his claim that articulation also involves a 'fundamental re-organisation of concepts' which cannot be brought under a common vocabulary with the past and predicted in advance.[2] The claim that articulation creates something radically new and unpredictable (and renders understanding in the human sciences largely 'ex post understanding') sits uneasily with the claim that it is a logical response to the inadequacies of present conduct.

The Inevitability of German Reconstruction

I argue that a similar contradiction haunts Jackson's empirical investigation of the formation of NATO and Germany's reconstruction as well as its full integration into the Western alliance after WWII. Jackson is at pains to emphasise how his analysis of public legitimation processes accounts for the contingency of this outcome. The formation of NATO and Germany's reconstruction arose out of a 'contested' and 'open' debate in the US and Germany, the outcome of which "was by no means inevitable."[3] Even in the later stages of this debate, "there were still moments during which the [occidentalist] trajectory could have been derailed," and each of these moments "could have worked out differently, leading to a very different outcome."[4] The possible contenders that could have derailed the occidentalist trajectory were, according to Jackson, exemplarism in the United States and the *Sonderweg* or more nationalist stance of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in Germany. It was only the creative and contingent deployment of occidentalist rhetoric that effectively delegitimized both exemplarism and the SPD position and that paved the way for the formation of NATO and German reconstruction.[5] It is precisely this ability to account for the contingency of the outcome that renders the social constructionist

[1] Taylor (1985b) 149-151.
[2] Taylor (1971) 47-51.
[3] Jackson (2006) 113.
[4] Jackson (2006) 196, 199.
[5] Jackson (2006) 30-31, 50 -51, 112-113, 119, 148, 222.

approach superior to conventional explanations of NATO and German reconstruction. By reading stable preferences into the indeterminate environment of the immediate post-war period, conventional approaches cannot explain why their preferred causal variables could exercise their causal powers in an environment where all of these variables were highly contested. Conventional explanations begin at the end of the story and treat the formation of NATO as an *end product* that resulted from a stable background consensus or a debate with already fixed positions, without asking how these positions were formed in the first place.[1] The analysis of public legitimation processes in the United States and Germany avoids this kind of reification. Rather than focusing on finished products or fully formed positions, this analysis emphasises the *process* of claims making, e.g. the dynamic drawing of boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable policy options. Its focus is not on the simple application of unambiguous representations or rhetorical commonplaces but on their creative deployment in order to shape the public space in one way or another.[2] This mapping out of

"the pattern of arguments actually deployed in a given policy debate does not constitute reification, inasmuch as no claim is made that these arguments were the *only* arguments that could have been deployed."[3]

I now wish to draw attention to what I believe is a fundamental flaw in Jackson's analysis. Jackson claims that the occidentalist position, which justified American military and economic involvement in Europe as a defence of Western civilization, was a contingent outcome that succeeded against the exemplarist stance in an open and contested debate. This implies that there must have been other policy options that would have been as plausible and legitimate as this occidentalist position. As stated above, Jackson argues that, in practice the only alternatives to the occidentalist strategy were the exemplarist stance in the United States and the SPD *Sonderweg* position in the German context. Occasionally, he seems to give the impression that these two alternatives were indeed as acceptable as their occidentalist opponent:

"Not all possible combinations of these commonplaces made their appearance during the period preceding and following German surrender in May 1945 (…) and in practice there were only four major contender: exemplarism and occidentalist vindicationism in the United States, and the SPD and CDU positions in Germany. Each of these combinations of commonplaces pointed into different policy directions, rendering particular options acceptable ruling others out of bonds."[4]

[1] Jackson (2006) xii, 14-15, 47-48, 197.
[2] Jackson (2006) viii-ix, 13, 15-16, 25, 27-29, 46-47, 49, 51, 55.
[3] Jackson (2006) 31.
[4] Jackson (2006) 112.

And in another passage he states that:

"There were other socially plausible ways that the Berlin Airlift, and the Soviet Union's actions in the eastern zone of occupation, could have been understood; the continued presence of opponents to the occidentalist strategy illustrates the point. What remains to be shown is how the occidentalist strategy achieved a position of dominance in the public debate (…)."[1]

Both quotes give the impression that the occidentalist stance was just one policy option among others. A closer look, however, very clearly reveals that this is not the case. If one is to look for an answer *why* the occidentalist strategy achieved dominance, Jackson's reply becomes tautological or circular: because it is that which 'effectively', 'decisively' and 'importantly' delegitimated exemplarism and SPD nationalism. Its deployment made the 'decisive difference' and, in this way, paved the way for an American involvement in Europe and German reconstruction on civilizational grounds. Occidentalist rhetoric played a 'key role' in producing this outcome rather than another.[2] This implies that the occidentalist stance is not just one possible course of action that competed with its rivals on an equal footing. It was not just different from but *intrinsically superior* to the exemplarist and SPD positions because it is precisely that rhetorical strategy which 'effectively drove these positions into a corner'. Jackson already makes this clear when he topographically delineates the occidentalist course of action and its two rivals. This topographical delineation is not just a 'delineation' but, at the same time, an argument for why the occidentalist rhetoric was more legitimate than the rival positions. Recall that, in the US debate, exemplarism was composed of American exceptionalism, which denoted the ontological distinctiveness of the United States from the rest of the world (and in particular from Europe), and of the heliotropist idea that societies located further in the West were more advanced; both ideas were joined by 'anticommunism', which called for the purification of American Society from all communist elements and the domestic defence of liberty as the most important goods. Occidentalist vindicationism

"(...) is not so much opposed to [the exemplarist stance] as it is reconfiguration [of it] (…). This reconfiguration is accomplished through a tempering of American exceptionalism, such that the United States is thought to be part of a larger community of states and people. This alternative was first simply referred to as "civilization" (…); its replacement by the more restricted "Western civilization" is an important part of the formation of the postwar

[1] Jackson (2006) 196.
[2] Jackson (2003) 245-246; Jackson (2004) 181; Jackson (2006) viii-ix, xii, 58-62, 113-114, 132, 147-148, 150, 156, 161, 175, 177, 198, 202, 206, 216, 220, 223-224.

world. This occidentalist rhetorical commonplace made it possible to firmly link anticommunism with an active involvement in Europe, so as to save Western Civilization from the threat of communism. In vindicationist discourse, America is still exceptional *within* Western Civilization, and Western Civilization is exceptional when compared to the rest of the world, but (in effect) the firm connection between the physical borders of the United Sates and the boundaries of America are severed. *This de-legitimates the positions associated with exemplarist logic, and legitimates a more active America involvement overseas, to defend the civilization of which it is part.*"[1]

This intrinsic normative superiority of the occidentalist stance is also clearly visible in Jackson's account of the actual debates. It was the deployment of occidentalist rhetoric that delegitimated the rival positions. Take, for instance, Jackson's account of Marshall's response to the question of why the US should be concerned about what happened in Europe:

"Marshall's answer is that we are part of a common civilization (….) and that therefore "we" have a responsibility to aid European recovery. The occidentalist position helps to "interpellate" the audience (…) into a particular subject-position (…), a position of being responsible for what transpires in European affairs. *Marshall's argument thus delegitimizes a potential exemplarist response that would point in a very different policy direction*."[2]

Occidentalist rhetoric proved decisive in paving the way for Germany's integration into the Western Community of states in a similar way:

"U.S. representatives and their German allies successfully deployed occidentalist arguments in support of an independent West German state, noting (...) that such a state would be a trustworthy partner inasmuch as it shared the basic cultural and civilizational presuppositions of its neighbours to the west. *As a part of 'Western Civilization'*, a separate West German state could be legitimately constructed; as a wayward power returning to its proper civilizational fold, a separate West German state could be accepted (grudgingly) by its neighbours; as a member of a larger community, the new state's westward orientation could be solidified and institutionalized. Occidentalism served as the condition of possibility for its acceptance by its opponents both within and without."[3]

This intrinsic superiority of the occidentalist strategy becomes even clearer when Jackson explains how opposition to this strategy was overcome. He is keen to point out that the *mere presence* of the occidentalist commonplace was not sufficient and that it had to be used in a creative and particular way in order to produce the outcome.[4] When, however, one asks what else was needed to drive the opponents into a corner, Jackson's response is that the specific

[1] Jackson (2003) 243-244 (the last emphasis is mine).
[2] Jackson (2006) 62 (my emphasis).
[3] Jackson (2006) 201.
[4] Jackson (2006) 30-31, 50, 207.

actions undertaken by certain individuals 'to deploy occidentalist language' were crucial in bringing about their defeat.[1] At best, all the proponents of the occidentalist course of action had to do was to simply *reaffirm* or *reassert* the goals of their occidentalist program in case of strong resistance.[2] The overall implication is that there is a crucial contradiction or circularity in Jackson's reasoning: he claims that the occidentalist stance prevailed in a contingent and open debate, which implies that the SPD and exemplarist positions would have been equal contenders. In fact, however, it turns out that it was precisely the occidentalist stance which effectively delegitimated these positions. That is, *the alternative possibilities to the actual course of action lose their plausibility or legitimacy precisely in relation to this actual course of action*. This means that these 'alternatives' were not real alternatives and that the actual course of action was in fact the *only* plausible option. The following quote illustrates this contradiction:

"In the remainder of this chapter, I will discuss the three *significant* moments of contingency during which the occidentalist trajectory was secured. Each of these three moments features a socially plausible alternate trajectory. In each of these three moments the alternate trajectory was defeated through a sequence of events that depended, at least in part, on the deployment of occidentalist commonplaces so as to render that alternate course of action unacceptable."[3]

While the first two sentences imply that the occidentalist strategy was not the only plausible course of action and that it could have been actually derailed by other possibilities, the third undoes this contingency by arguing that this strategy decisively delegitimated these other possibilities.

What this contradiction shows is that, in Jackson's analysis, the deployment of the occidentalist strategy was the *best* or *most rational thing* the supporters of an American involvement and German reconstruction could do because this strategy 'effectively' revealed the inadequacies of both the exemplarist and SPD positions, leading to their eventual 'defeat.' This essentially means that the success of the occidentalist course of action *had to* come about because it was that strategy which proved 'decisively' superior to its two rivals. And this superiority arises from Jackson's assumption of a fundamental consensus among all parties to the debate on the criteria for formulating acceptable and unacceptable (or, in his language, effective and ineffective) claims. In fact, Jackson posits a fundamental moral distinction that constitutes the boundaries within which all actors deploy their arguments. I believe that this

[1] Jackson (2006) 207.
[2] Jackson (2006) 178-180.
[3] Jackson (2006) 200.

distinction can be best characterized as one between *selfish* and *value-driven* behaviour. That is, in Jackson's account, all parties to the debate have to make arguments in a way that resonates with the maxim of value-driven conduct and that rules out selfishness and egoism. It is this constitutive distinction which renders possible a judgement or an evaluation of competing positions in terms of whether these positions draw this distinction *less* or *more* effectively, and which allows for judging exemplarism and SPD nationalism as two 'ineffective' or 'contradictory' views to which the occidentalist strategy became the logical and necessary answer.

I think that this can be clearly seen by looking more closely at the way Jackson characterizes the conflict between the occidentalist strategy and its two rivals. As I have already indicated above, and as Jackson is quite keen to emphasise, the competing views were not completely different from each other but shared a common ground. For debate would not be possible without some common ground which is shared by the opponents. This common ground was their commitment to the idea of Western civilization.[1] And at the heart of this idea is a fundamental distinction between self-interested and value-driven, or other-regarding, behaviour. Jackson makes this clear already on the first page of *Civilizing the Enemy*, where he contrasts the notion of Western civilization with the realist logic of anarchy, according to which only states can claim the monopoly of force and the right to make final decisions, and neo-liberalism, which argues that world consists of markets and consumers. The language of Western civilization is different from both the logic of self-help and economic interests.[2] Even exemplarism and the SPD *Sonderweg* position subscribe to this distinction between value-driven and self-regarding behaviour implied by the concept of Western civilization. On the exemplarist view, the United States is exceptional because it is the vanguard of Western civilization; and this means being *more moral* than the rest of the world. The United States is a 'city on a hill', which has realized the values of liberty and freedom more completely than any other country. This moral superiority is also visible in its foreign policy in that it opposes and keeps out of traditional European power politics.[3] In the same way, the *Sonderweg* position of the SPD did not imply a simple return to old-fashioned realpolitik but was fundamentally committed to the idea of a larger community of Western states. While the SPD advocated a kind of traditional nationalism that envisioned a unified Germany playing a distinct or separate role, this role did not refer to a complete aloofness but rather to an independent bridge-building

[1] Jackson (2003) 239; Jackson (2006) 46-47, 60, 147, 175, 181-182, 208, 238.
[2] Jackson (2006) vii, 113, 158-160, 167-168, 171.
[3] Jackson (2006) 53-54, 57-58.

position between East and West. On the SPD view, Germany was culturally attached to the West but should pursue a unique brand of 'democratic socialism', which was meant to become a model for Europe and to represent a mediating position between American capitalism and communism. The SPD was not in principle opposed to Germany's integration into the larger Western community but only to the idea of pursuing far-reaching cooperation with the West without having attained its former unity and formal sovereignty in the first place.[1]

I argue that it is Jackson's positing of the commonplace of Western civilization, and the distinction between self-interested and value-based action implied by it, as a common framework for the debate that renders the success of the occidentalist strategy a natural outcome. The acceptance of this distinction as common ground for making legitimate and illegitimate claims implies a normative hierarchy, in which the exceptionalist positions - be it the idea of a 'city on the hill' or of *Sonderweg*[2] - become 'contradictory' views when confronted with, or from the perspective of, their occidentalist rival. Given the commitment of the supporters of exceptionalism to the idea of a larger community that goes beyond national self-interest, their simultaneous advocacy of exceptionalist notions, which imply a rather nationalist or self-centred view, makes them *obviously* vulnerable to the challenge from rhetorical strategies that appeal to the values of this community *more fully* than they do. In other words, the exceptionalist advocates' commitment to the distinction between value-driven and self-regarding conduct implies that their self-regarding exceptionalism will *most naturally* call out an occidentalist strategy that is more consistently value-oriented and less tainted with self-interest. Jackson's account of how the particular debates play out shows this clearly: in the American debate, the advocates of occidentalism succeed because they draw the line between the moral obligation of United States to the larger Western community and self-interest more strongly than their exemplarist rivals. What makes the occidentalist strategy so effective is its appeal to get involved in Europe not because of narrow interests but because of the cultural or civilizational similarity that exists between United States and the European countries. By framing the American involvement as a defence of *Western values* - according to Jackson's textual interpretation those of freedom, democracy and liberty - rather than of geopolitical or economic interests, the advocates of the occidentalist course of action delegitimate exemplarism, which now becomes a self-interested stance because it advocates that the United

[1] Jackson (2006) 63-64, 66-68, 181-182.
[2] Jackson emphasises the similarity of both positions. Jackson (2006) ix, 67-68.

States should 'go it alone' and not care about what happens in Europe.[1] In a similar way, Konrad Adenauer 'outflanks' the *Sonderweg* position of SPD leader Kurt Schumacher by taking a line that is more value-oriented and less centred on the national interest than Schumacher's. By firmly and wholeheartedly nesting Germany in the broader Western community, Adenauer's occidentalism constructs a powerful critique which 'effectively' exposes and delegitimates what Jackson calls the more 'narrow', 'nationalist', or 'parochial' conception of political community of Schumacher.[2]

I believe that Jackson's way of characterizing the debate clearly shows why the victory of occidentalist rhetoric was not a contingent but a predetermined outcome. His prior assumption of a constitutive boundary between normative action and self-interest, e.g. that arguments framed in terms of values are more acceptable (or effective) than arguments advocating self-interest, implies that 'more narrow' conceptions of political community which include notions of national interest, self-determination or exceptionalism will *inevitably* give rise to broader conceptions which more strongly emphasise values and communal obligations. The exceptionalist position *had to* give way to an occidentalist strategy which drew the line between value-driven and selfish behaviour more clearly (or effectively) than they did. The success of the occidentalist course of action was not a contingent outcome but the *logical consequence* that arose out of the normative contradictions of its rivals. In Jackson's analysis, the occidentalist victory did not come about through an open *process*, as he claims, but was precisely a predetermined *end product*, a result of a moral deliberation which had already been done. Paradoxically, Jackson ends up supporting a type of determinist explanation that resembles the conventional accounts of the formation of NATO which he himself criticises in the first place.

The Inevitability of Dialogue

I argue that Fierke's empirical analyses suffer from the same problem as that of Jackson. All of her analyses aim to show how fundamental changes of intersubjective meanings have come about in world politics, which cannot be subsumed under a single universal logic of action. In particular, these investigations aim to show how language games constituted by what she calls the logic of zero-sum conflict 'unexpectedly' gave way to games constituted by the logic of dialogue. Fierke's focus is on the moments of *contestation*, in which the logic of dialogue,

[1] Jackson (2003) 244-247; Jackson (2006) 58-62, 113, 133-134, 138, 151-152, 154-164, 168, 170-172, 176-177, 219-220-228.
[2] Jackson (2006) 68, 125-127, 183-184, 188, 191, 203-204, 209-215, 229-230, 232.

having initially been considered 'unrealistic' or 'unthinkable', arose as a plausible alternative to zero-sum contexts in various settings.[1] A closer look at her empirical investigations reveals quite clearly, however, that the emergence of dialogue out of zero-sum games was less a radical rupture which made the 'unthinkable thinkable' than an inevitable, natural or necessary consequence. Rather than being equal contenders in a *genuine* contest, dialogue is intrinsically superior to zero-sum conflict in that it is the best or logical response to the latter's normative contradictions. On Fierke's view, zero-sum games are inherently contradictory, a kind of 'fake', 'bluff' or 'false consciousness': while they induce self-regarding behaviour which does not take the other into account but only uses him as means to its ends, which does not listen to the other but only tries impose its own truth on him, and which draws a clear division between the self and the enemy (and non-human) other, this behaviour has to be cloaked in moral language in order to maintain the appearance of being good and just. This makes, as she clearly argues, the 'besting' (or 'Machiavella') strategy the *necessary* choice for weak actors because it *effectively* exposes the gap between the powerful's ruthless practices and their moral justifications through the acting as if a game of dialogue and equality was possible. If Machiavella begins to act as if the principles of dialogue, equality and integrity informed her actions, the powerful prince 'will be thrown of balance' and 'forced' to rethink the rules of the game.[2] For her, "[T]he *best strategy* is, therefore, to transform the game so that others want to play by different rules. A combination of disrupting the dominant game, by flaunting the rules and acting as if alternatives were possible, transforms the conflict."[3]

In Fierke's analysis of the end of the Cold War, this deterministic drive towards dialogue is evident in her argument that the peace movements' besting strategy was 'required' because it provided the most effective means to destabilise the 'ideological and artificial' division between East and West. By renaming the apparent source of security (nuclear deterrence) as a source of insecurity and by naming the Cold War as such (rather than blaming one side or the other) as a prison that had to be escaped, the peace movements were not just formulating a contested position in an open debate; rather they were effectively exposing the gap between the superpowers' claims to provide security and their actual practices and thus decisively delegitimating the relationship of mutual enmity.[4] The same kind of deterministic reasoning is present in Fierke's analyses of NATO enlargement, the Russian response to this enlargement,

[1] Fierke (1998) 94, 99, 115; Fierke (1999a) 414; Fierke (2001a) 133; Fierke (2012) 322.
[2] Fierke (1998) 95-97, 100; Fierke (2012) 323, 326; Fierke (1999a) 410-412; see also ch 3, 48-49.
[3] Fierke (1998) 95 (my emphasis).
[4] Fierke (1998) 100, 108, 115-117, 121, 128, 212, 214-215; Fierke (2001b) 136-137.

and the UNSCOM crisis. In her study of NATO expansion into eastern Europe, she clearly argues that the transformation of its institutional interest in enlargement was 'essential' or, as the quote indicates,[1] 'required' in order to maintain a consistency between its previously stated justifications and practices and to avoid the impression of creating new divisions and spheres of influence in Europe. Fierke is essentially arguing that NATO 'had to transform' and expand the way it did at the expense of other forms of expansion and not expanding at all. Given both the normative pressure from the eastern European countries and the 'civilized' Russian opposition that abstained from any aggressive counterreaction, NATO 'was forced to change' and expand as an anchor of dialogue, peace and stability rather than as a military alliance spreading material hardware. The evolution of the Russian response to NATO enlargement and the outcome of the interaction between both actors were predetermined in a similar way. Fierke makes it very clear that Russia could *only* move out of the hierarchical zero-sum game with NATO, which did not 'reciprocate Russia's love', by adopting a besting strategy which combined firmness and flexibility and which effectively exploited the normative contradictions in NATO's stance. Her point is essentially that Russia 'had to change' its opposition policy because this was the most rational thing to do in order to achieve an agreement that took her interests into account. As the quotes from her study clearly indicate[2], alternative policy options, such as an aggressive counterreaction, would not have been politically effective. Finally, deterministic reasoning also haunts Fierke's analysis of the weapon inspector crisis. Her account of the transition from a context of force to a context of dialogue does not resemble an account of genuine change but rather a game of logical choice, in which a move by one player already determines how the others are going to respond. Fierke makes it quite clear that Saddam's besting strategy was the most rational thing to do in order to move out of the zero-sum context of force and hierarchy, which constructed him as a criminal and the U.S. as a legitimate authority. For, "[a] strategy of this kind makes it difficult for the enemy to maintain an image of you as evil and threatening other, which is necessary for constructing the use of force."[3] Once Saddam started acting as if he was a recognized state leader that had the right to be listened to, the move to a context of dialogue happened almost automatically in that the other state leaders (even the U.S. and the UK)[4] simply fell into line; there was not any kind of deliberation, persuasion or contestation, in which Saddam's arguments were confronted and competed with

[1] See ch 3, 50.
[2] See ch 3, 51.
[3] Fierke (2000) 352.
[4] Fierke (2000) 352.

other plausible alternatives. The overall implication is that, in Fierke's empirical investigations, the move from contexts of zero-sum conflict to contexts of dialogue is not an instance of the unthinkable becoming thinkable, as she likes to emphasise,[1] but the necessary response to the normative contradictions of zero-sum conflict. Her analyses conceive of contexts of conflict in a way that already predetermines or implies the solution of these conflicts through contexts of dialogue and equality.

I argue that this deterministic drive towards dialogue arises from Fierke's positing of a fundamental consensus among human beings, which constitutes the moral boundaries of political debate and which allows for evaluating zero-sum conflict and hierarchy as modes of interaction that are normatively inferior to dialogue. Fierke derives this consensus from the constructivist argument about the intersubjective constitution of the world, which she develops in opposition to rationalist IR theories. Rationalist theories, she argues, discount moral language and discourse in that they assume states to be purely self-interested actors which do not care about others. If the role of moral language is recognized at all, it is taken be a disguise for other interests. If, however, human beings are not self-regarding egoists which only maximise their own interests but fundamentally social in that they depend on the recognition of others, as the constructivist view assumes, it follows that they become vulnerable when others confront them with a discrepancy between their moral justifications and their selfish practices, leaving them unable to continue with their actions. If the gap between practices and moral arguments becomes too big, the agents will have to realign their practices and take the community into account.[2] This essentially means that Fierke posits a prior universal consensus among humans which delimits the space within which acceptable arguments can be made and which draws a constitutive boundary between illegitimate self-regarding conduct, which shows no concern for others, attempts to impose its own definition of truth on them, and seeks hierarchy; and legitimate other-regarding conduct, which takes all sides equally into consideration, treats the other not as a means but as a 'human end', and displays a willingness to revise its own presuppositions when engaging with and listening to the other.[3] This constitutive boundary implies that the agents have to advance policy positions in such a way that they can be plausibly represented as instances of other-regarding conduct and that those lacking this moral dimension will lose because they expose themselves to the accusation of pretending to act in line with the norms of the community but actually failing to do so.

[1] Fierke (1998) 99; Fierke (2000) 338-339, 347; Fierke (2012) 322.
[2] Fierke (1998) 111-115; Fierke (199b) 30-31; Fierke (2001b) 130-132; Fierke and Wiener (1999) 731.
[3] Fierke (1998) 133-137, 150, 167-169, 214, 222, 216-217; Fierke (2000) 346; Fierke (2001b) 136-137, 140-141.

The fundamental implication of this constitutive boundary is that arguments justifying realist practices such as self-help, balancing, deterrence and in fact most other kinds of conflictual behaviour, do not fare very well and will necessarily be succeeded by arguments advocating dialogue, equality and cooperation. If human beings are capable of collectively agreeing that there *is* illegitimate conduct that fails to recognize the others and legitimate conduct that recognizes the interests of all equally, conflictual or uncooperative behaviour can only be a normative contradiction or failure, e.g. an instance of not recognizing or listening to the others, and will, therefore, inevitably call out practices of dialogue which do recognize or listen to them. In other words, the move from conflict to cooperation becomes pretty *easy* because the actors only need to start recognizing, listening to and engaging with each other in order to discover the common good which acknowledges the legitimate interests and equal rights of each of them. In this way, Fierke essentially transforms the transition to cooperation into a process of *perfecting knowledge* in that the actors simply have to know each other more fully in order to arrive at a common understanding. This idea of a natural harmony of interests, which automatically comes about once the agents listen and talk to each other, clearly underlies, for instance, her analysis of the end of the Cold War. The move from the Cold War to a context of dialogue was a transition from a set of practices, which treated the other as a non-human enemy that would only respond to the threat of force, to a 'process of meeting', which involved - for the first time ever! - sitting down together, talking face to face, and recognizing each other as 'real human beings.'[1] And it was precisely and simply *by* talking and listening to each other that both sides were able to overcome their mutual hostility and reach an agreement based on tolerance and pluralism:

"Dialogue is a reciprocal exchange through which parties grow and change. While weapons are subject and object of speech at the negotiator's table, *it is the meaning of words, knowledge of another's position and the stakes of the relationship itself that constitutes dialogue*. Negotiating and entering into a dialogue, in this context, represented the juxtaposition of two contrasting forms of self/other relationships: the one secured two mutually exclusive spaces of secrecy and militarism; the other involved an engagement with the other in a process of making public and opening spaces." (…) "Bitter arguments and divisions have constructed barbed wire in people's minds and hearts. This barbed wire, which relates fundamentally to human beings and not only to ideology, *can only be dismantled by meeting one another face to face, coming to know one another as human beings who communicate and tolerate difference, rather than enemies*." (…) "A cross-bloc exchange requires making the Cold War an enemy rather than human beings on the other side. *Once meeting face to face and the 'other' can no longer be a beast,*

[1] Fierke (1998) 131-132, 136, 140, 148-151, 167-168; Fierke (2001b) 138; Fierke (2005) 176-177.

can no longer be killed, because one does not fight friends; one enters into dialogue with friends."[1]

In a similar way, Fierke characterizes other post-Cold War conflicts and their (possible) solutions in terms of the simplistic dichotomy between listening and not listening to the other. In the first decade after the end of the Cold War era, the U.S. and the UK, which Fierke's analyses tend to turn into evil princes who seek empire and who pursue military campaigns in order to distract from their own sex scandals,[2] used force against and imposed their own points of view on state leaders like Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic without bothering what these leaders had to say. Fierke argues that the simple setting up of a 'face-to-face relationship' with Milosevic and Hussein, which recognizes them as sovereign leaders with legitimate grievances, would have and has in fact contributed to achieving more peaceful modes of interaction. In her analysis of the UNSCOM crisis, it is *the mere fact* that Saddam and other state leaders started recognizing, engaging with and listening to each other that allowed them to reach a common understanding which recognized the legitimate interests of each of them.[3]

Fierke's assumption of a constitutive consensus on the boundary between immoral conduct that ignores the others and moral conduct that takes them into account reduces the problem of conflict to a simple problem of ignorance. As the actors are collectively capable of drawing the line between conduct that ignores the others and conduct that takes them into account, e.g. as they all agree that there is a common good which recognizes all interests equally, conflict becomes a normative contradiction, an instance of selfishly ignoring or failing to take into account the others, which can be naturally resolved through conduct that does take them into account. As conflict is an instance of not engaging with, listening to or recognizing the others, it is sufficient that the agents do engage with, listen to or recognize each other in order to conclude a just peace; by starting to talk and listen to each other, they will come to know each other and reach an understanding which recognizes the rights of all of them. This reduction of conflict to a state of selfish ignorance, distorted knowledge or 'false consciousness', which can be simply and easily overcome through engaging with and knowing the enemy other, implies that the move from conflictual to cooperative behaviour is not an unexpected or surprising outcome that was previously unthinkable, as Fierke claims, but rather a natural consequence. In fact, one could argue that she conceptualizes conflict in a way that the actors who take an uncooperative stance in the first place have already decided that cooperation is going to come

[1] Fierke (1998) 137, 140, 142 (my emphasis).
[2] For example, Fierke (2000) 355, 358; Fierke (2001b) 141.
[3] Fierke (2000) 346-347, 358, 361; Fierke (2001b) 135, 138-141.

about. Metaphorically put, Fierke is setting up a conflict-advocating straw man who is so thin and weak that he will be blown away even by the slightest breeze of air; and when he is blown away, she represents this as an unusual or surprising outcome that was previously unthinkable.

The Inevitability of Functional Differentiation and Risk

I finally argue that Kessler's empirical investigations eliminate the radical uncertainty he claims to account for in the same way as Fierke's and Jackson's analyses. Kessler, in line with much hermeneutic writing, emphasises that the purpose of social (or constructivist) analysis is to account for the contingent and uncertain character of social processes, which opposes it to the static view of the positivist philosophy. The positivist view conceives of probability as an ontological property of the objectively given world. This means that uncertain non-knowledge can only stand for erroneous assumptions about objective probability relations, which can be easily corrected through a rational or linear adaption to the true state of affairs. That is, change turns into a hierarchical or teleological process in that new knowledge comes to be an *increase*, or a *better grasp,* of the objective probability relations of the world, which results from the overcoming of misperceptions, errors and miscalculations.[1] A constructivist analysis, by contrast, focuses on the intrinsic polycontextuality of social life. It recognizes that there is no ultimate truth or ground on the basis of which claims can be decided and which ensures a teleological evolution. From a constructivist perspective, knowledge does not have a true core but always depends on particular qualitative judgements. A constructivist understanding of political processes takes into account the existence of a plurality of worlds or models, which stand in conflict with each other and which all possess *equal plausibility* ("eine Pluralität gleichberechtigter Modelle"). Its aim is to reconstruct the particular and always changing processes of boundary drawing, in which particular notions of truth are established at the expense of others.[2]

I argue, however, that Kessler's analyses of the contemporary transformation of world society rely on a particular kind of teleological reasoning, which undermines the radical contingency he claims to account for. His empirical investigations reveal that the transformation from segmented to functional differentiation and from 'threats' to 'risk' is not a radical and an unpredictable shift between two equally plausible alternatives but rather a 'process of

[1] Kessler (2008c) 3-8; Kessler (2008d) 504-506, 510; Kessler (2011b) 2174-2176; Kessler (2013a) 68-69; see also ch 2, 22-23.
[2] Kessler (2008a) 44-49, 166; Kessler (2008c) 8, 13, 16-17; Kessler (2008d) 504, 507-508, 518-519; Kessler (2012b) 260-262, 264-265.

correction', in which the functionally differentiated risk society emerges as the most rational response to the normative contradictions of the segmented state system. Kessler implicitly posits a prior constitutive consensus among the actors on the boundary between legitimate and illegitimate conduct, which allows for evaluating the segmented state system as a normative contradiction to which the functionally differentiated risk society is the superior solution. By conceiving the relationship between segmented differentiation/threats and functional differentiation/risk as a relationship between 'normative contradiction' and 'solution', Kessler, paradoxically, comes close to supporting the positivist view that he criticises in the first place.

I will develop this argument through a closer discussion and examination of Kessler's characterization of the transformation from one vocabulary or mode of differentiation to another, which will proceed in four steps. The first point I want to draw attention to is the *apodicticity* in which this characterization is couched. By apodicticity I mean Kessler's tendency to frame the contemporary transformation to functional differentiation and risk as an *inescapable fact*. Recall that Kessler links the rise of both concepts to a version of what other scholars have referred to as the 'globalization thesis', which emphasises the emergence of a 'post-westphalian' or 'post-national constellation' in world politics.[1] While the state is not going to disappear, the rise of new and multiple types of agency such as NGO's, terrorists, warlords, multinational companies and financial actors (i.e. banks, hedge fonds, ect.) has undermined the state-centric and territorial character of international relations; security threats have been decoupled from the nation state, privatized and transnationalized; in particular, the rise of terrorism, as exemplified by the attacks on the World Trade Centre, constitute 'the beginning of a new security paradigm'; hybrid forms of governance and private authority have emerged which make traditional state-centred distinctions such as private/public, inside/outside or civil/military irrelevant.[2]

The problem with this characterization of the contemporary global transformation is that it is simply *posited,* as a fact or an outcome beyond doubt. Kessler does not take issue with any alternative views and 'make a case' that this transformation has actually come about. This is what one would expect, however, given that the idea of a post-westphalian constellation (in whatever version) has been highly contested in the IR literature. For instance, Marxists like Justin Rosenberg, whom Kessler ironically tends to cite in support for his argument that there is need for a new sociology of the international, have provided plausible critiques of

[1] Kessler (2011a) 197-199, 106; Kessler (2012c) 79, 85-86.
[2] Kessler (2009a) 87-88, 98; Kessler (2011a) 197-199, 210; Kessler (2011b) 2164-2165; Kessler (2012c) 77-78.

globalisation theory.[1] For realists like John Mearsheimer, Kenneth Waltz or William Wohlforth, the state is still the primary actor in a globalized world; contemporary realist debates do not focus on an (alleged) transformation to risk and functional differentiation but tend to centre on the question of whether the current international system has become unipolar.[2] Coming from a completely different direction, Jean-Francois Bayart has made a related point by arguing that, historically speaking, the nation state is not opposed to but rather a product of globalisation and that the current international order still is and will most likely remain organized as a territorialized state system.[3] In addition, there are rival views which could challenge Kessler's interpretation of terrorism. By arguing that terrorism has undermined the state-based security vocabulary of the Cold War, Kessler and Daase seem to seriously suggest that terrorism is a new feature of the post-Cold War era which did not exist before.[4] Yet terrorism is actually a very old phenomenon, and the question of whether the 'new terrorism' differs from older forms and whether and to what extent it has changed the nature of the state system and security is hotly debated.[5] On a more general level, on might argue that Kessler's argument about the contemporary transformation of world society implies a very distorted view of history in that it assumes the 'old' Westphalian nation state to be an omnipotent actor which was completely autonomous and in absolute control of everything. This is what he suggests when he writes that the nation state has lost its monopoly of knowledge production, that it is no longer able to control threats on its own and that formerly stable distinctions such as 'private/public' or 'inside/outside' have collapsed - "[R]isk shows that threats are increasingly transnationalized and privatized, embedded in global finance structures and answered by illiberal practices challenging the private-public and national-international distinction. Of course that does not mean that states are to vanish or are about to become unimportant, but that the stories one could tell with sovereignty alone become increasingly limited."[6] To this one could easily reply with Kalevi Holsti or Stephen Krasner that sovereignty has never been the only story to be told and that the idea of absolute autonomy, a sort of 'golden age of the Westphalian state', has been a myth rather than a reality. There have always been constraints on and violations of sovereignty,

[1] Rosenberg (2002); Rosenberg (2005).
[2] Ikenberry et al. (2011); Layne (2009); Mearsheimer (2014c); Waltz (1999); Waltz (200b).
[3] Bayart (2004).
[4] Kessler and Daase (2008) 213. In another essay, Kessler acknowledges that terrorism has a very long history but then goes on claim that "the meaning transnational terrorism and 'the war on terror' acquired does challenges some 'traditional' convictions." However, he does not explain how and why the new transnational terrorism differs from older forms. Kessler (2010b) 24.
[5] Mearsheimer, for instance, argues that transnational terrorism poses only a minor threat to the US, implying that it has not really been a 'game-changer'. Mearsheimer (2014d) 12.
[6] Kessler (2010b) 17.

distinctions such as private/public or domestic/international have always been contested, and private actors have been part of the Westphalian system since its inception.[1]

Kessler does not deem it necessary to discuss these or any other critiques of the idea of a post-westphalian constellation (and there are quite a few of them). Rather than showing *that* this transformation has *actually* occurred against alternative interpretations which emphasise the persisting importance of the state in the age of globalization, he simply takes it for granted, as a fact on which all can agree. He simply assumes that the notion of a state-centred system 'no longer fits' in the contemporary period.[2] For Kessler, the main problem is not to show that there has actually been a transformation to a post-westphalian world but only to find a new conceptual vocabulary to describe this transformation, the existence of which he takes to be beyond doubt (and this problem is then solved through the concepts of functional differentiation and risk):

"[W]hile IR focused on a limited set of core concepts (such as rational actions, states, anarchy and bipolarity), to make sense of political practice, a plethora of new actors and institutions makes it increasingly difficult to stabilize the semantic underpinning of traditional state-based approaches. (…) To capture today's complexity of world politics *requires* from IR nothing less than the construction of a new vocabulary."[3]

Occasionally, Kessler also refers to an alleged consensus among IR scholars in support of his argument that global change has occurred:

"Given the *widely observed systemic changes today* which are altering the constitutive rules of world politics, such a notion of uncertainty [e.g. ontological uncertainty] does not get us very far indeed. *We have witnessed* a move to privatise, transnationalise, and depoliticise security threats that are answered by illiberal practices. *We have witnessed* the advent of new actors, new political spaces that hardly fits in the traditional conceptual framework of national vs. international politics or public vs. private actors. Additionally, *it is meanwhile somewhat of a consensus* that an understanding of systemic changes requires abandoning established dogmas rooted in an individualistic philosophy of science and thereby calling for a different understanding in IR of how the world is (made) known."[4]

The second point I want to make concerns the condition of possibility which enables Kessler to treat the transition to a post-westphalian logic of functional differentiation and risk as a fact beyond doubt. I argue that he can posit this transition as an already achieved outcome because

[1] Holsti (2004); Krasner (1996).
[2] Kessler (2009a); see also Kessler (2011a) 198-199; and Kessler (2011b) 2182.
[3] Kessler (2012c) 77 (my emphasis).
[4] Kessler (2011b) 2164-2165 (my emphasis). See also Kessler (2011a) 210; and Kessler (2012c) 87-88.

he conceptualizes functional differentiation and risk as *inherently superior* to the anarchic and state-centric system. That is, Kessler conceives of the global turn to functional differentiation and risk not as a contingent outcome that succeeded in an open contest against the equally plausible notion of the anarchic state system, but rather as the natural response to the flaws of this system. I believe this becomes clear when looking more closely at the language Kessler uses to characterize the relationship between the logics of functional differentiation/risk and state-centrism. From his language use, it emerges quite clearly that both notions are not just two equally plausible and contested alternatives - which would be the case if there was genuine or radical uncertainty - but that the former is somehow intrinsically superior to the latter. The logic of functional differentiation and risk not only *differs* from but also and automatically 'alters', 'threatens', 'undermines', 'challenges', 'replaces', 'reconfigures', 'renames' or 'redefines' the constitutive rules of the state-centric security dilemma.[1] For instance, with the rise of functional differentiation and the resulting conflicts between functional and territorial boundaries, international law - without resistance - "*alters* its constitutive boundaries, the role of the state for the autopoesis of legal communication, and thus the form of its internal complexity."[2] Likewise, the logic of risk "*redefines* basic legal distinctions like private/public, war/crime, inside/outside or here/there. As a consequence, traditional confines of international law that are based on the temporality of norms are either *circumvented*, they *collapse* or *readjust*."[3] In the field of security, risk policies 'are increasingly replacing' traditional security doctrines such as deterrence, détente and mutually assured destruction.[4] Terrorism has introduced new and unpredictable uncertainties which have 'fundamentally altered' or 'challenged' the Cold War logic of the security dilemma.[5] The complete contingency and "unpredictability of future attacks, together with the ambiguous nature of the adversaries, *change[s]* the temporality of both security and international law."[6] I think these quotes show rather clearly that the logics of functional differentiation/risk and state-centrism/security dilemma are not just two equal contenders that compete in an open contest but that the former somehow 'beats' or 'trumps' the latter. That is, in Kessler's writings, the global turn to functional differentiation and risk appears less as a radical and unpredictable shift than as the 'best' or 'natural' response to the inadequacies of the 'old' Westphalian state system.

[1] Kessler (2008b) 863-865, 870; Kessler (2009a) 103; Kessler (2011a) 197-198; Kessler (2011b) 2165-2166, 2181-2182; Kessler (2012c) 85-86, 89-90; Kessler and Werner (2008) 294-295.
[2] Kessler (2009a) 103.
[3] Kessler (2011b) 2181.
[4] Kessler (2011a) 197-198.
[5] Kessler and Daase (2008) 212-214, 217, 226.
[6] Kessler and Werner (2008) 295.

Thirdly, I want to argue that this intrinsic superiority of functional differentiation/risk is a *normative* superiority. I think that this normative superiority of functional differentiation/risk to state-centrism/threats becomes clear when we come back to Kessler's conceptual move to characterize the difference between both. In chapter 1, I have argued that he resorts to the positivism - post-positivism divide between individualism/ontological uncertainty and intersubjectivity/genuine uncertainty in order to do this. Kessler transforms two philosophical or social theoretical bodies of thought into two political vocabularies that constitute global political practices at different points in time. While the Westphalian state-system relied on the logic of individualism/ontological uncertainty, the functionally differentiated risk society that is currently emerging signifies a move to the logic of intersubjectivity/genuine uncertainty. A security policy based on the logic of individualism/ontological uncertainty calculates and quantifies uncertainty through universal models and instrumental reasoning; it is rendered possible by a well-defined ontology in which expectations, identities and interests have been fixed. Security policy shifts towards intersubjectivity/genuine uncertainty when this well-defined ontology breaks down. In this case, a fundamental uncertainty arises because each perspective is just a particular point of view that constantly competes with other plausible worlds and perspectives. Security becomes an empty concept because each security policy, e.g. each reduction of uncertainty, is only a contingent perspective that always generates new uncertainties and insecurities. As a result, rather than reducing uncertainty to quantifiable knowledge and subsuming the other under abstract models, security politics has to become aware of its own contingency and engage with the particular knowledge that constitutes this other's identity.[1]

I think that this conceptualization of the difference between state-centrism/threats and functional differentiation/risk in terms of the divide between positivism - post-positivism reveals the moral superiority of the functionally differentiated risk society, rendering it a natural or obvious outcome. If the distinction between individualism/ontological uncertainty and intersubjectivity/genuine uncertainty is read in political terms, it signifies a normative conflict between and a move from a *self-centred* to a more strongly *other-regarding* mode of behaviour. Security politics relying on the logic of individualism/ontological uncertainty stands for self-centred or selfish conduct in that it advocates an autonomous and sovereign individual, or, as Kessler is keen to emphasise, *state*, which acts toward a given environment on the basis of its

[1] Daase and Kessler (2007) 418-419; Kessler and Daase (2008) 212, 214, 220-222; Kessler (2008a) 43-44; Kessler (2008b) 863-864; Kessler (2009a) 98-99, 103-104; Kessler (2012c) 79, 85-87, 91; Kessler (2011a) 206; Kessler and Werner (2008) 291-292; see also ch 2, 32-35.

own models, biases and presuppositions. The sovereign individual/state subsumes other actors under abstract models without taking into account their particularity and diversity. As the autonomous individual/state controls its environment through universal models and instrumental reasoning, it stands on the top of the hierarchy of knowledge production.

Yet this mode of selfish behaviour is relatively fragile because it requires, as Kessler emphasises, a well-defined ontology, in which expectations, interests and identities have been fixed and in which the actors are to some extent 'alike'. While the Cold War and the old Westphalian state-system in general provided such well-defined ontologies, he argues that the post-Cold War era and globalization have given rise to new heterodoxy of actors and systems that have led to the break-down of common standards, interests and identities. In this heterodox setting, where multiple types of agency such as terrorists, companies, NGO's and states co-exist and conflict with each other, self-centred behaviour that disregards the other actors is no longer an option. The new plurality of systems implies that the state is no longer the hierarchical centre of knowledge production, which simply imposes its universal models on others without taking into account their particularity and diversity, but represents only one particular perspective among others. The possibilities for self-centred conduct vanish because each security policy constantly faces and generates new uncertainties and insecurities. In other words, Kessler is putting forward one of Beck's core arguments about the contemporary risk society, which seems to have become quite popular in academic debates on globalization. On this view, contemporary world politics has become so complex, interconnected, heterodox and multifaceted that the link between individual action and its consequences has broken down; as each individual act generates new radical and unpredictable uncertainties, the consequences of this act can no longer be properly calculated or attributed to it; as 'cause' and 'effect' can no longer be distinguished from each other, the attribution of responsibility to individual acts becomes impossible.[1] This implies that self-centred and national interest-driven behaviour has to give way to other-regarding conduct that more fully takes the others into account. The state can no longer instrumentally calculate the consequences of its actions towards a given and unproblematic environment but has to apply a *contextual method*, or *practical reasoning*, which engages with the particularity and diversity of this environment. It needs to become aware of its own contingency and take seriously the particular knowledge that constitutes the others' identities.

[1] Beck (2008) 4-7; Maus (2007) 33; Kessler and Werner (2008) 291-292; Müller (2004)127-128; Zizek (1998) 148-153.

While Kessler never spells this out, I argue, fourthly, that this intrinsic normative superiority of the functionally differentiated risk society, which relies on other-regarding behaviour, over the anarchic state-system, which is driven by the national interest and instrumental rationality, both requires and presupposes a prior formal consensus among all actors that draws a boundary between actions that recognize, engage with and produce valid knowledge about all particular identities, on the one hand, and self-centred actions that ignore these identities, on the other. That is, by conceiving the transition from the state-centric system/threats to functional differentiation/risk as a move from self-centred behaviour, which exclusively acts on the basis of its own assumptions towards an external environment, to other-regarding conduct, which relies on practical reasoning that takes into account this environment in its diversity - e.g. which gains valid knowledge about the others that recognizes them in their particularity -, Kessler implies that all can agree on the criteria that determine what counts as a valid act of recognition or knowledge production and what doesn't.

I think this becomes particularly clear when looking at how Kessler conceives of crises, conflicts and violence in contemporary world politics. For him, these conflicts and crises result mainly from the *mistaken beliefs* and *ignorance* held by national governments and international institutions, which still cling to the old Westphalian model and the logic of ontological uncertainty, and which have failed to realize that world society has moved to functional differentiation and risk. For instance, as Kessler and Daase argue, the problem with many (illiberal) counterterrorism policies is that they are still rooted in the traditional security paradigm, *ignoring* the categorial shift to risk and genuine uncertainty in the field of security. By reducing terrorism to an objective threat that can be deterred, states attempt to apply abstract models to a contextual problem. Rather than imposing universal models on the terrorist other, states should abandon their self-centred stance, become aware of their own contingency and seriously engage with this other in his particularity.[1] Daase and Kessler employ a similar line of reasoning with regard to the Iraq war, arguing that the Bush-administration failed to take into account the local knowledge of the Iraqi situation and thus implying that a better outcome could have been achieved if this knowledge had been taken into account.[2] Likewise, the IWF's failure precisely results precisely from a lack of particular knowledge of the conditions of the countries which it tries to assist.[3] Finally, the failure of governments to reform global finance stems from their inability to recognize that this realm has decoupled itself from the real economy and

[1] Kessler and Daase (2008) 226-228.
[2] Daase and Kessler (2007) 429-431.
[3] Kessler (2008a) 176-180.

developed a distinct rationality and temporality which can no longer be controlled through the regulatory provision of standardized macroeconomic data (as is argued by mainstream economics). Reform policy can no longer rely on the 'top-down regulation' through 'static laws' but has to be based on a 'dynamic notion of stability' and include a 'learning mechanism', through which it constantly revises its own presuppositions and which takes account of the continuous change and innovation in financial markets.[1] I think that all these examples show that Kessler reduces conflicts, crises and violence to a self-centred stance of ignorance which attempts to impose universal models of knowledge on the others and which in turn can be overcome through the mutual recognition of and gaining knowledge about each others' particularities. In so doing, he has to presuppose a prior agreement on what counts as a valid act of recognition, which takes into account the common good that acknowledges the others' particularities, and what doesn't.

It is this prior formal consensus, which draws a line between valid acts of knowledge production that recognize the particular other and invalid acts of selfish ignorance, that allows for evaluating the anarchical state-system as a normative contradiction, to which the functionally differentiated risk society is the natural solution. While the new complexity of world politics and the break-down of the link between individual action and its consequences underline the need for functional differentiation/risk, it is this prior constitutive consensus that renders it a natural and superior outcome. If the agents are collectively capable of drawing a line between acts that do and those that don't recognize the others' particularities, self-centred conduct that acts on the basis of a means-ends rationality and without regard for others will most likely give rise to 'cosmopolitan' behaviour that recognizes the particular interests of all; for once the agents start taking each others' particularities into account, they will reach a common understanding or valid knowledge about each other. This deterministic conceptualization of the transition from the state-centric system to a functionally differentiated risk society renders Kessler's analysis similar to the positivist view which he criticises in the first place. By conceiving this transition as a move from a self-centred stance of ignorance that disregards its environment to a cosmopolitanism that takes seriously the particular knowledge of this environment, he seems to come close to adopting the positivist model that conceives of change as a deterministic process or rational adaption, in which the present notion of truth is replaced by better knowledge of the objective probability relations of the world.

[1] Kessler (2007c) 120-121; Kessler (2009c) 164, 169, 170-171, 173; Kessler (2011b) 298; Kessler (2012a) 294-295; Kessler (2012c) 89, 91; Kessler (2013a) 57-58, 60-62.

Normativity

In the last chapter, I argue that there is a tension between the first two common features of the constructivist theories discussed in chapter 2. The conceptualization of contingency as an intersubjective process implies a certain determinism, which undermines the contingency this conceptualization was supposed to account for in the first place. In the next two chapters, I will attempt to point out two problems that arise from the third common feature discussed in chapter 2, which is the use of the hermeneutic concept of intersubjectivity as a non-normative methodological tool that serves to objectively analyse social change. I will argue that the use of intersubjectivity as a methodological concept unavoidably implies a *normative* stance by the theorist, and that this eliminates the possibility of non-normative empirical analysis upheld by Fierke, Jackson, Kessler (and Skinner). I will develop this argument in three steps: (1) drawing on Taylor's critique of Skinner, I will point out a contradiction in the methodologies of Jackson, Kessler and Fierke, which emphasise the intersubjective constitution of the world but insist on the possibility of analysing this social world from an objective or outside perspective. I argue that this contradiction already suggests or hints at the implausibility of a purely empirical analysis distinct from ethical argument. (2) I will develop this suggestion further. Drawing on Taylor and Mead's philosophy outlined in chapter 2 as well as the argument from chapter 3, I will argue that the conceptualization of contingency as an intersubjective process does indeed imply a normative stance. This also undermines the claims of those constructivists and hermeneutic theorists who explicitly uphold the possibility of treating intersubjectivity as a depoliticised or non-normative concept. Finally (3), I will make this normative stance in the constructivist analyses of Fierke, Kessler and Jackson explicit. In their analyses, the three constructivists do not just 'trace' empirical processes of change or empirically account for the emergence of certain outcomes, as they claim to do, but rather rationalize these outcomes as victories of certain moral attitudes or purposes over others.

The Contradictory Notion of 'Observing Performativity'

In order to make clear that the concept of intersubjectivity implies a normative stance that eliminates the possibility of non-normative empirical analysis, I wish, as a first step, to draw attention to a problem in (some of) the hermeneutic and constructivist writings discussed here. As I have tried to show above, Skinner, Fierke, Jackson (explicitly) and Kessler (implicitly) subscribe to the distinction between normative and empirical argument, locating their analyses

on the empirical side.[1] I argue that this, however, reveals another contradiction in their methodologies. This is because Fierke, Jackson, Kessler and Skinner at the same time espouse the notion of the intersubjective constitution of the world, which ascribes a performative function to language: language not just describes but also constitutes the world by legitimizing particular practices and delegitimizing others. In his critique of Skinner, Taylor makes brilliantly clear the contradiction that arises from the acceptance of both assumptions:

> "Now this doctrine [i.e. the positivist belief that facts and values can be separated] has fewer friends today, and certainly Quentin Skinner is not one of them. He has rather helped to show how inextricably entwined the explanatory and the evaluative are in all languages of politics. My point in evoking it is simply to show what follows from negating it. Once you drop positivism, you lose any *a priori* grounds for situating your own explanatory language on a different level from the language you are trying to study and explain. The language in which I explain the politics of the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the French Revolution, is not of an utterly different kind from the language of Aquinas, Machiavelli, Hobbes or Hegel. These are all conceptual schemes which serve inseparably to classify political realities, to describe them, explain them and evaluate them. To the extent that they are different and uncombinable, they are rivals."[2]

The point that Taylor makes against Skinner is that, if the latter accepts the intersubjective construction of the world, the question arises as to why he is able to exclude his analysis from that socially constructed world. If Skinner argues that language is not only descriptive but also always performative, i.e. that it not just describes or explains but also constitutes reality, it remains unclear why and illogical that he can situate his own explanatory language on 'another level' from which non-performative explanation, description or reconstruction are possible.

It is precisely this contradiction that haunts the methodologies of Jackson, Kessler and Fierke. Jackson emphasises the social constructedness of the world, which comes into being through intersubjective and contingent processes of boundary drawing. As a result, social scientific knowledge about the world can never be objective but always reflects partial perspectives and is thus continuous with or productive of the world. He argues that this poses a fundamental problem for positivist theories and methodologies, which aspire to universally valid knowledge about the world but actually represent specific moral commitments; by reifying particular normative contents over others, these methodologies become complicit in the constitution of their objects of study.[3] In that regard, it is interesting that Jackson, when

[1] See ch 4, 86-88.
[2] Taylor (1988) 220.
[3] Jackson (2006) 6-8; Jackson (2008a) 130-131, 137-138.

emphasising the performative power of positivist theories, makes a criticism that mirrors Taylor's critique of Skinner. Conventional constructivists, he argues, claim that the knowledge practices of the actors are productive of the world but exempt their own scholarly practices from these processes of knowledge production. As a result, even though they hope to establish objective accounts of the situation, they end up imposing their particular definitions of truth on their subjects of study.[1]

Jackson argues that his Weberian-inspired monist ontology avoids these pitfalls because it acknowledges the continuity of knowledge practices, *including those of scholars*, with the world.[2] Yet a closer look at his monism shows that this is clearly not the case. For acknowledging the continuity of scientific knowledge production with the world would imply admitting the normativity and performativity of one's own explanatory framework; and Jackson is simply not willing to go down that route. Even though his ideal-typical specifications of rhetorical commonplaces are rooted in partial values, they can be systematically *applied* to the study of empirical reality, regardless of the specific differences of the particular values involved. Their application is "a more less technical question in Weber's conception, and it is on *this* basis - and *not* on the specific content or character of the value-orientations thus applied - that the 'scientific' character of an investigation can and should be evaluated."[3] Jackson, as I have also tried to make clear above, firmly and explicitly upholds the idea of a non-normative empirical analysis, which descriptively traces the contingent deployment of rhetorical commonplaces.[4] He accepts the social construction of the world and the embeddedness of scientific inquiry in particular cultural contexts, and he is quite keen to deny the possibility of non-normative explanatory knowledge to positivist analyses and to accuse them of being complicit in the performative constitution of their objects of study; his own methodology, however, is somehow exempted from the performative constitution of reality, moving on a different plane from which it reconstructs this reality and its changing contours through a non-performative lens.

Fierke's approach falls prey to the same contradiction as Jackson's. In every piece of her work, she emphasises the social construction of the world and advances the argument that language is not just descriptive but constitutive of this world. Fierke argues that this poses "a challenge to the methodological underpinnings of much IR theory," which is based on the assumption that theory mirrors the world.[5] The post-positivist turn has revealed "the extent to

[1] Jackson (2008) 150-151.
[2] Jackson (2008a) 150.
[3] Jackson (2008a) 148.
[4] See ch 1, 16-17.
[5] Fierke (2010) 88.

which mainstream theories are bound up in the world and power relations within it."[1] Theory is less a mirror than constitutive of reality.[2] By attempting to represent the timeless and objective laws of international relations through priorly fixed concepts from an outside perspective, positivist theories such as Waltz's neorealism end up reinforcing and justifying particular interests, practices and power structures.[3] As a consequence, Fierke suggests that "theorists need to be more reflexive about what they are doing when they claim to explain,"[4] and that we should "view analysts, like actors, as a product of their social context, rather than objective observers who stand outside the world."[5] However, as for her own analyses, there is no need for more self-reflexivity. Fierke emphasises that her critical reconstructions and descriptions of changing intersubjective contexts are, unlike post-structural analyses, empirical endeavours that do not engage in normative critique.[6] While the explanatory languages of her subjects of study and of rival theories are constitutive of the world they describe, her own conceptual language remains on another level from which non-performative description is possible; while she calls on other theorists to become more reflexive and admit that scientific observation from outside is impossible, it is no problem for her to step 'outside' and descriptively trace the contours of intersubjective change. Even though I have already given a few quotes which clearly indicate Fierke's espousal of the idea of a non-performative empirical analysis,[7] I would like to add one more quote which confirms this view and which reveals the contrast between her own research practice and her demands on other scholars:

"This project [her book] shifts away from an emphasis on theory to the construction of an overview of how existing practices have emerged over time, how human actors have responded to the historical contexts of war they have found themselves in and how these responses have set the stage for new constellations of practice, in part arising from the unintended consequences of earlier decisions. It seeks greater clarity, and an ability to look again from a new angle at the maze of intersecting social constructs. *Rather than providing an interpretation, from either the position of the powerful or the weak, it is an attempt to stand outside and present an overview of the assumptions that have defined a world of mutual practice and interaction that is continuously being remade*. The hope is to open space for greater reflexivity and choice."[8]

[1] Fierke (2010) 88.
[2] Fierke (2010) 93.
[3] Fierke (2001a) 115-116; Fierke (2005) 161-162.
[4] Fierke (2010) 93.
[5] Fierke (2002) 342.
[6] Fierke (1998) 4, 53; Fierke (2000) 361; Fierke (2001a) 122; Fierke (2012) 322; see ch 4, 86-87.
[7] Ch 4, 87.
[8] Fierke (2005) 163 (my emphasis).

Finally, Kessler reasons along very similar lines and ends up in the same contradiction as Jackson and Fierke. Like the latter, he is at pains to emphasise the constitutive function of language. The vocabularies we use to classify and categorize do not just represent but also constitute and perform the world in a particular way as opposed to others.[1] And, of course, he does not miss any opportunity to emphasise that positivist theorizing, and in particular mainstream economics, is complicit in the production of the reality which it attempts to objectively model, explain or represent. Economic models do not just passively describe but constitute economic facts and phenomena. Its vocabulary does not provide superior and objective expertise about an external world but is deeply *political* in that it constitutes and legitimises particular practices as opposed to others. What is more, economic theory lacks the self-reflexivity to become aware of its own performativity and political character.[2] While Kessler denies the possibility of non-performative knowledge to mainstream economics, he is ready, however, to grant it to his own radical constructivist alternative. Constructivist analysis 'traces', 'reconstructs' or 'describes' the constitutive processes of boundary drawing by the actors and (economic) theorists that construct the world in a certain way and thus exposes the contingency and particularity of this world.[3] While other theories that attempt explain the world are performative, Kessler's constructivism manages to take a non-performative perspective from which it *observes* how these theories perform the world by explaining it.[4] If one grants that 'laying bare' is not much different from 'describing', I think the following quote rather clearly shows this contradiction:

"It [Kessler's article] therefore engages with the recent discussion on the concept of 'performativity' as one possible avenue for treating language as constitutive for economic institutions. The simple fact that we cannot describe or explain also means that by introducing a new vocabulary, we see different things. Social change is thus always the result of a clash of several vocabularies and definitions and the task of economic sociologists is to lay bare these clashes."[5]

This contradiction becomes even more visible when Kessler discusses the performative dimension of the economic explanations of the financial crisis in more detail. For he makes the - contradictory - argument that this performativity of the economic models is precisely what

[1] Kessler (2007c) 113-114; Kessler (2007a) 263-265; Kessler (2012b) 262-263.
[2] Kessler (2007b) 363-364; Kessler (2007c) 112-113, 121; Kessler (2008a) 18, 20-21, 161; Kessler (2013a) 57-58.
[3] Kessler (2007b) 357-358; Kessler (2011a) 209; Kessler (2012a) 292; Kessler (2012c) 77-78.
[4] Kessler (2007c) 114.
[5] Kessler (2007c) 112.

renders them *unable* to account for the contemporary empirical changes which have produced the financial downturn. Kessler claims that the causal reasoning of the economic mainstream, which argues that the financial crisis was caused by the lack of transparency and asymmetric information, is *not* based on the empirical subject matter but has its origins in the identity of economics as a discipline and the internal debates structuring it.[1] The economic models fail to empirically grasp the realm of contemporary global finance *because* they are shot through with political, subjective and ideological assumptions. This is also why Kessler repeatedly refers to the focus of mainstream economics on asymmetrical information and transparency as a *distorted view* ('Verzerrung').[2] The following quote illustrates this criticism quite clearly:

"It seems almost trivial that the legitimacy of AIM [models of asymmetric information] as the primary explanation of financial stability results not from the 'world out there' but from internal debates within economics. We can see how this internal debate in economics as discussed in the second section shapes the meaning of financial stability and thereby the entire machinery of standardization, good governance and even recent institutional decisions like the creation of the FSF. These are processes by which AIM create their own reality and implicit assumptions are *made* true. A static definition of stability is imposed on a dynamic world and now assumptions of AIM are validated by processes of standardization and surveillance. AIM reproduce the image of an economy which obeys some economic laws despite empirical counter-evidence. In other words, AIM helps to silence the self-referential questions which financial crises raised thereby reproducing claims of better knowledge by economists."[3]

By linking the failure of the models of asymmetric information to empirically account for the contemporary financial crisis to their performative dimension, Kessler implies that this crisis can be empirically accounted for from a non-performative point of view. And this 'better empirical picture' is, of course, provided by his reconstructive analysis of the changing constitutive rules of global finance, which emphasises the emergence of a distinct realm with its own rationality and temporality. For instance, emphasising the importance of new financial actors, he writes that he does 'not want to judge the moral quality of a particular behaviour' but only show that "eine adequäte Beschreibung der Finanzmärkte, und daher auch eine adequäte Konzeption von Finanzstabilität, diese Akteure berücksichtigen muss."[4] Thus, by arguing that the performativity of the economic models prevents these models from accounting for the new reality of global finance, Kessler is caught in a blatant contradiction because he denies what he

[1] Kessler (2007c) 112-113, 118, 120; Kessler (2009b) 186-187, 205-207; Kessler (2013a) 59; Kessler (2013b) 46-47.
[2] Kessler (2013b) 45, 47.
[3] Kessler (2007c) 120.
[4] Kessler (2008a) 76.

affirms at the same time: while he wages a crusade against the the possibility of non-normative analysis in economic science, whose attempts to model reality make it complicit in the constitution of this reality and the legitimisation of particular practices as opposed to others, his reconstructive analysis simply describes the changing reality of global finance without having any performative or legitimizing effects; while he denies the possibility of non-performative expertise to economics, his constructivist analysis of global finance aims at nothing but the provision of such expertise.

In sum, Taylor's critique of Skinner convincingly reveals a fundamental contradiction in the methodologies of Kessler, Jackson and Fierke. These scholars advance the thesis of the social construction of the world but do not include themselves and their own explanatory (or reconstructive) analyses in that socially constructed world. They all argue that the explanatory languages of their subjects of study and/or of their scientific rivals (positivist theories) not just mirror but constitute and perform the world; yet their own scientific languages are situated on a different plane from which non-performative description, explanation and reconstruction are possible. The social construction of the world does not imply an engagement with and acknowledgement of the moral judgements in their own explanatory analyses but only a 'move closer to this world', i.e. a better empirical reconstruction of its details, ruptures and particularities. While the embeddedness of all human beings (including scholars) in particular social contexts is acknowledged, the notion of an (social) reality whose changing and particular contours can be reconstructed from 'outside' is still upheld. I think what this contradiction already suggests or points to is the implausibility of a non-normative empirical analysis from a hermeneutic and constructivist point of view. For, as Taylor puts it, if one argues that language not just describes, or explains, but also performs the world, there is no a priori reason to exclude one's own language of scientific explanation from this performative construction of the world. The assumption of the constitutive power of language suggest or implies, as a logical consequence, that the explanatory language of the historian and the language of her subjects of study are normative rivals on the plane.[1]

Normative Formalism

I now want to make this implication explicit and argue that the concept of intersubjectivity does entail a normative stance vis-à-vis the world which the theorist cannot escape; and I want to do so by going back to chapters 2 and 3. In both chapters, I have argued that the concept of

[1] Taylor (1988) 220.

intersubjectivity, as it is used in the hermeneutic and constructivist writings, presupposes a prior consensus which determines the procedural or formal boundaries within which legitimate points of view have to evolve. It is this formal framework which establishes a common standard that allows for evaluating, judging or deciding among different positions as to whether and what extent they meet the formal criteria. This turns novelty into a predetermined choice in that it becomes a logical response to the objective flaws of present conduct. The existence of a prior formal consensus allows for conceptualizing the relationship between the old and the new in terms of 'contradiction' and 'rational solution', whereby a less consistent argument already predetermines, implies or calls out that particular response which is more consistently in line with or representative of the formal criteria.

I think this argument already reveals the normative dimension of intersubjectivity. For the consensus on the formal boundaries within which debate and social evolution occur can only be a *normative* consensus. The 'formal' criteria are actually normative criteria that determine what counts as an *acceptable* or a *legitimate* position and what doesn't; the formal consensus delineates the space for debate by drawing a constitutive moral boundary between legitimate and illegitimate conduct. This means that the determinism implied by this formal consensus is actually a moral determinism: the process of deterministic hierarchization is properly speaking a process of *normative hierarchization*, in which more coherent justifications decisively or effectively 'defeat', 'beat' or 'trump' less coherent moral arguments. And this means that the theorist, by positing a normative formal consensus that determines the criteria which legitimate arguments have to meet, also approves or endorses the normative validity of these criteria and the hierarchizations following from them.

I think it is precisely this normative dimension of intersubjectivity which is emphasised by Taylor and Mead and which I have discussed in chapter 2. Taylor argues that, by conceiving the world as constituted by ever-changing intersubjective articulations which draw perspicuous boundaries between right and wrong conduct, articulation becomes central to social theorizing itself. By conceptualizing the transformation of practices as an articulation that renders them more adequate, the theorist inevitably accepts and 'articulates herself' this moral superiority of the new over the old. Put differently, a social scientific understanding of certain practices never only involves an empirical reconstruction of these practices in their particularity but also a moral critique of their inadequacies, which transforms these practices so as to make them more coherent or adequate.[1] In a similar way, Mead's location of contingency in an intersubjective

[1] Taylor (1985b) 93-94, 97-102, 104-105, 107-111, 117-118, 123-126, 129-130, 140; ch 4, 76-78.

phase of reconstruction implies moral judgement. While Mead locates the creative power of the "I" within actual conduct that continuously reconfigures the relationship between individual and environment in unforeseen ways, e.g. while he locates contingency in the ever-lasting tension between problematic situation and intersubjective reconstruction, this does not imply for him that moral truth is a purely contextual notion which depends on particular and changing intersubjective practices of world-making and which renders moral judgement impossible. For what underlies the concept of intersubjectivity is a *procedural obligation* that represents the most universal order common to all humanity, e.g. rational thought as such. The moral dictum of this procedural obligation is that the individual take the role of all whose interests are at stake as fully as possible, or, alternatively, that all the different values belonging to a particular situation be given adequate expression and related to each other in a system of functional differentiation. It this procedural obligation which transforms the ongoing process of intersubjective reconstruction into an evolving *moral process*, in which the intrinsic moral incompleteness of the actual community gives constantly rise to the taking of the role of broader communities, reconfiguring the relationship between self and other in new and more adequate ways; and it is this obligation which enabled Mead himself 'to step outside' and criticize the ethical narrowness of actual conduct from the standpoint of more inclusive and adequate communities.[1]

This raises a problem in the first place for those hermeneutic and constructivist scholars who explicitly deny the normative nature of the proceduralism underling the concept of intersubjectivity, and who treat this proceduralism as a 'depoliticized' notion that allows for bracketing moral judgement from the empirical analysis of intersubjective legitimation contests and victories. Skinner, as I have outlined above, insists that he only recovers the intersubjective reasons that 'counted as politically right' or as 'rationally acceptable' in certain periods without judging the normative truth value of these reasons.[2] Jackson's line of reasoning mirrors that of Skinner. Jackson attempts to preserve the possibility of a value-free analysis of intersubjective processes of legitimation by distinguishing between the analysis of 'true persuasion' (which he attributes to Habermas's theory of communicative action and orthodox constructivism) and the analysis of rhetorical efficacy. Analyses of persuasion focus on processes in which the agents become convinced by the correctness certain ethical positions. In so doing, they willingly (Habermas) or unwillingly (orthodox constructivism) affirm the transcendental validity of these

[1] Mead (1930a) 146; Mead (1908) 314-318; Mead (1923) 236-238, 241; see also ch 4, 71-74.
[2] See ch 4, 79.

positions. Jackson argues that his analysis, by contrast, is not concerned with the rightness, correctness or validity of ethical arguments but only with their *effects*. What it does is to empirically trace the creative deployment of ethical arguments that effectively renders any opposition impossible, regardless of whether speaker and audience believe in their validity.[1] Fierke resorts, occasionally, to a similar distinction between the judgement of the truth of moral arguments and the empirical analysis of the contests between them, in which some arguments prevail because they are somehow less contradictory than others. In her analysis of the end of the Cold War, for instance, she writes that, as an analyst, she is not judging the greater truth of one position or the other but only exploring the contest between them; and that one could argue endlessly about who was right (the peace movement or NATO), but that the point is simply that the argument of the peace movement revealed a contradiction between the justification for and the practice of deterrence.[2]

In the light of the discussion above, this distinction between the judgement of the truth of ethical arguments and the empirical analysis of the victories of ethical arguments, to which Skinner, Fierke and Jackson subscribe, cannot be upheld. By positing normative procedural criteria that allow for assessing the adequacy, rational acceptability, effectiveness or consistency of particular justifications, Skinner, Jackson and Fierke themselves accept the normative validity of these criteria and the hierarchizations that follow from them. That is, by claiming that some arguments are more rationally acceptable, more effective, more adequate or more consistent than others, these scholars *do* eventually imply that these arguments possesses greater normative validity, correctness or truth than their rivals. Taylor puts this very clearly in his critique of Skinner, where he argues that it is impossible to reconstruct what 'counts as politically true and right' without, at least implicitly and to some extent, having an idea of what *is* politically true and right.[3] Habermas echoes this point when he writes that the reasons, which the agents proffer in order to make their claims legitimate and rational, can only be recovered by the scholar if the latter takes a positive or negative stance towards them. The scholar can only *understand* reasons she has empirically observed by *evaluating* them as valid or invalid reasons.[4]

[1] Jackson (2003) 235-236, 238; Jackson (2006) 18-21; Krebs and Jackson (2007) 36-37, 39-42; see also ch 1, 15-16.
[2] Fierke (1998) 115, 164, 212-213.
[3] Taylor (1988) 221-222.
[4] Habermas (1990) 29-31.

In the two previous sections, I have argued that there is an intrinsic normative dimension to the concept of intersubjectivity which Skinner, Fierke, Jackson and Kessler - despite their claims to the contrary - cannot avoid. In this final section, I want to push this argument a step further and make this normative dimension explicit in the empirical investigations of Fierke, Kessler and Jackson. I will do so by bringing together the arguments developed in the two previous sections and in the last chapter. In the last chapter, I have argued that the constructivist empirical analyses posit particular moral boundaries, which delimit the space within which legitimate positions unfold and which transform certain 'novel' empirical phenomena into predetermined outcomes. Building on the argument developed in the previous two sections, I now argue that the constructivist scholars, by *positing* these particular moral boundaries that entail particular hierarchizations, also *endorse* or *accept* the validity of both. That is, by conceiving of social change as an intersubjective process in which new outcomes emerge in response to the normative contradictions of the past, the three constructivists not only provide empirical accounts of the emergence of these outcomes but also rationalize them as victories of certain moral purposes over others. The three constructivist analyses do not just 'describe' or 'trace' transformations in world politics but also offer, or, to use Taylor's language, 'articulate', defences of certain moral purposes against others. These normative defences, I argue, are similar in that they all share a common enemy and advocate similar notions of morally appropriate behaviour: all of the constructivist analyses articulate - in one way or another - the normative superiority of 'other-regarding' over 'self-interested conduct', which they largely attribute to rationalist IR theories as well as game theory in general.

(1) This normative critique is clearly visible in Jackson's analysis of German reconstruction and integration into NATO. As I have argued in chapter 3, Jackson posits a prior moral consensus among all actors which constitutes the space within which legitimate arguments can be made and which draws a line between selfish and value-driven behaviour, e.g. between the narrow pursuit of the national interest and action in line with the norms of the broader Western community. It is this positing of a prior constitutive moral boundary which allows him to argue that the occidentalist position, which emphasised the broader community of Western states over national self-interest, effectively delegitimated exemplarist arguments in the sense that the advocates of exemplarism had to give way to or, at least publicly, *accept* or *consent* to the arguments of their occidentalist opponents. Building on the argument developed in the two previous sections, I argue that the logical upshot of this is that Jackson himself endorses or

articulates this normative superiority of value-driven over selfish behaviour and, therefore, of the occidentalist over the exemplarist position. To put it more simply, Jackson essentially argues that Germany's economic reconstruction and integration into NATO was a *good thing* because it was a victory of community-oriented conduct over the national interest.

I think that this moral approval of the occidentalist victory comes clearly to the fore in Jackson's reconstruction of the political debate that led to this victory. For, as should also become clear from the discussion of his empirical analysis above,[1] his detailed tracing of this debate is essentially an account of how the legitimate occidentalist position 'rightly prevailed' over the less legitimate exemplarist stance. In fact, one of the stunning features of Jackson's analysis is the absolute *ease* with which he determines which arguments 'win' and which arguments 'lose' the debate. While the quotes from and the discussion of his analysis in chapter 5 should reveal Jackson's moral decisonism already, I want to provide a few more examples which render it fully visible. Jackson's account of the US debate, in which the reference to the larger cultural community of Western States decisively delegitimated the self-interested (or exceptionalist) notion that the US could turn its back on the world and go it alone, indicate quite clearly, I believe, his endorsement of the rightfulness of the occidentalist victory as well as of the exemplarist defeat. Discussing the 'occidentalist activism' of Henry L. Stimson, the former Secretary of War and head of the 'Citizens Committee for the Marshall Plan', Jackson argues that

> "Stimson's argument was thus an occidentalist deployment against an American exceptionalism' and the policies that it traditionally supported. His concern with breaking down the notion of "foreign" illustrates one of the central rhetorical capacities of the occidentalist commonplace: its ability to serve as the larger community within which particular nations and states can be effectively "nested." By this logic, the ERP is the logical outgrowth of a civilizational commonality - provoked perhaps by Soviet power, but rooted in something other than short-term interest."[2]

A speech given by Secretary of State Dean Acheson is attributed with a similar normative power:

> "What is important to note is that by deploying the occidentalist commonplace in this manner he [Acheson] is contributing to an active and ongoing constitution of U.S. Policy as dealing with the conceptual object of 'the West' rather than with a more parochial or narrow community."[3]

[1] See ch 5.
[2] Jackson (2006) 164.
[3] Jackson (2006) 228.

In the same way, Jackson's discussion of a speech by the former representative Hamilton Fish, who had been 'converted' to the occidentalist position, quite clearly suggest his endorsement of the normative superiority of the larger Western community over narrow self-interest:

"Here we see what amounts to a textbook use of occidentalism to erode the support for the exemplarist position: 'American exceptionalism' is replaced by American membership in a wider civilizational community, and policy implications are drawn from this altered rhetorical configuration."[1]

Jackson's moral disapproval of the exemplarist position becomes also visible when he, repeatedly, emphasises that the opponents of an extensive American involvement in Europe 'had no good answers', 'opened themselves up to rhetorical counter-attacks', or were 'unable to make a compelling reply'.[2] A particularly striking example of this 'exemplarist failure' is Senator Robert Taft, who sought the Republican Party's presidential nomination in 1952. Taft accepted that the US was part of the broader community of Western states but was opposed to committing ground troops to Europe. As the threat to Western Civilization in Europe 'could only' be countered by ground troops and as the renouncement of the commitment to Western Civilization was an 'unappealing prospect in a time when anticommunism prospered', Taft was 'rhetorically trapped' or 'unable to oppose the Government's policy'. He was not able to garner support for his proposal because 'the rhetorical ground had stacked against him'.[3] The following quote summarizes Jackson's moral verdict on Taft quite clearly:

"Taft's failure to secure a compelling legitimation for his position - and in particular his failure to explain how one could be simultaneously committed to 'the West' and opposed to policies constituted as measures undertaken to defend 'the West' - contributed to his loss of the Republican Party's presidential nomination at the convention in July 1952. (…) *[H]ence Taft was not electable*."[4]

In Jackson's analysis of the German debate, this moral decisonism is rendered fully visible. What this analysis brings to light is that Adenauer's occidentalism legitimately prevailed against Schumacher's position because it advocated the norms of community more consistently than the latter. And this meant in particular a stronger recognition of the *equal* interests of all members of this community: by fully nesting West German institutions in the larger cultural

[1] Jackson (2006) 177.
[2] Jackson (2006) 171-172, 175, 179.
[3] Jackson (2006) 222-223.
[4] Jackson (2006) 225 (my emphasis).

community of Western states and by appealing to the common cultural bond between his country and the other members, Adenauer managed, on the one hand, to allay their fears (in particular those of the French) of a new German nationalism; on the other hand, it allowed him to claim a more or less equal and independent status for West Germany, which would make an economic and military contribution to the defence of Western ideals against Communism.[1] As Jackson is very keen to point out, this community-centred stance of Adenauer provided a powerful rhetorical tool to 'delegitimize', 'outflank' or 'exploit the tensions' in Schumacher's position. Schumacher was caught in a clear contradiction because he supported Germany's cultural alignment with the West but opposed its political and military integration before achieving full independence. Jackson is strikingly clear that this made Schumacher guilty of the charge of nationalism because he was not fully committed to the Western community of states. Schumacher's 'explicitly nationalist' or 'parochial stance' made him 'vulnerable to rhetorical Adenauer's attacks' and 'contributed to his delegitimation'.[2] The following quote illustrates Jackson's moral verdict quite well:

"This justification exemplified the political problem generated by a prominent commonplace concerning community membership: the SPD could not credibly refuse to participate in European institutions without thereby opening itself up to accusations of abandoning the community to its opponents. By playing the nationalist card, Schumacher made himself and his party unacceptable to the Allies, especially by contrast to Adenauer's enthusiastic embrace of 'western' integration (...)."[3]

I believe that these examples clearly indicate that Jackson not only reconstructs but at the same time endorses the victory of occidentalist value-driven conduct over the narrow self-interest advocated by exceptionalism. When he argues that occidentalist notion of a wider community 'breaks down' or 'erodes' exceptionalist, parochial or narrow conceptions of community, he does affirm the normative superiority of the former over the latter. Likewise, when Jackson writes that the advocates of exceptionalism 'had no good answers' or 'compelling replies'; and that Taft 'failed to secure a compelling legitimation', that 'the rhetorical grounded hard turned against him' and that he was 'not electable' (which seems to be a rather harsh judgement, given that the race between Taft and Eisenhower for the presidential nomination was a very close one); and that Schumacher 'made himself unacceptable' through his nationalist stance, he quite clearly judges these positions to be less legitimate. Generally speaking, his

[1] Jackson (2006) 187-189, 191, 210-211, 230.
[2] Jackson (2006) 68, 204, 211-215, 229, 232.
[3] Jackson (2006) 215.

blunt tendency to delimit the space of available legitimation strategies for the actors - which is manifest when he argues, for instance, that there 'were no rhetorical strategies available' for the advocates of an American involvement in Europe after WWI,[1] or that there 'were no kinds of reasons which the German Communist Party could have given' for rejecting American economic aid for Germany in the immediate aftermath of WWII[2] - does not simply reflect empirical observation but brings to the fore a pretty straightforward moral decisionism. I fail to understand how Jackson can have such a good sense of which arguments prevail and which don't as well as what kind of legitimation strategies are available in particular contexts and at the same time avoid moral judgements, as he claims to do.

Jackson would, of course, deny all this by arguing that he does not claim that the occidentalist arguments were 'truly' or 'really persuasive', which would amount to affirming their normative validity, but only that they served to 'effectively outmanoeuvre the opponents and engender the consent of a broader audience', or to 'do the discursive work required for making occidentalist course of action acceptable and even inescapable'. In the previous section, I have already argued that even the analysis of rhetorical efficacy cannot dispense with a notion of what is normatively right, valid or persuasive. Now I want to point out another example in Jackson's analysis, which brings the sloppiness of this distinction between true persuasion and rhetorical efficacy, or legitimation, even more to the fore. Discussing the successful legitimation of an American military commitment to Europe, Jackson writes that

> "[A]lthough the defense of Europe had been legitimated, and had been legitimated in occidentalist terms, this does not necessarily translate into enthusiastic acceptance (…). But this should not be surprising, as legitimation and subjective acceptance are different phenomena. A police officer may *legitimately* pull me over for speeding or for cutting across a double yellow line to reach a left-turn lane that I have not reached the proper entry point for yet, but this does *not* mean that I have necessarily to be enthused or even happy about it. It *does*, however, deprive me of being able to legitimately refuse to pay the fine. The American commitment to the defense of Europe should be thought in this way: as a feature of the intersubjective political environment rather than as a subjectively internalized belief or persuasive concept."[3]

I think that this quote is quite remarkable because it shows what the difference between true persuasion and rhetorical efficacy finally boils down to: a difference between the 'enthusiastic acceptance', on the one hand, and the 'grudging acceptance' of the occidentalist argument, on

[1] Jackson (2004) 180.
[2] Jackson (2006) 181.
[3] Jackson (2006) 225.

the other.[1] I have to admit that this difference strikes me as rather unimportant. What difference does it make whether someone accepts the occidentalist argument that emphasises the wider Western community over narrow self-interest with enthusiasm or only with reluctance? For what matters is that in both cases he *accepts* or *consents to it*. Rhetorical efficacy would only be different from persuasion if it referred not to making the exemplarist opponent 'grudgingly accept the occidentalist argument' but only to compelling him to make a response in the first place. In that case, all that the exemplarist opponent accepts or recognizes is that the occidentalist argument has such a normative appeal that he has to respond to it. But the fact that this opponent is forced to make a compelling reply does not imply that he accepts or succumbs - whether grudgingly, enthusiastically, wholeheartedly or reluctantly - to the occidentalist course of action. Jackson, however, defines the rhetorical efficacy of the occidentalist position as a normative power that not only elicits a response by the exemplarist opponents but also engenders their consent to *this position itself*, thereby rendering rhetorical efficacy similar to persuasion. As a result, he eventually does argue that this position was morally superior to the exemplarist rival.

(2) Fierke's various empirical analyses express a normative project that is similar to that of Jackson. The essence of this project is to articulate the moral superiority of other-regarding conduct, which she calls 'the logic of dialogue', over self-interested conduct, which she terms 'the logic of zero-sum contexts' and which she explicitly associates with the neorealist theory of international relations. In Fierke's analyses, the articulation of this superiority is accomplished through the rationalization and idealization of certain events (the end of the Cold War, NATO enlargement and the Agreement of Mutual Understanding) as normative victories of dialogue over zero-sum conduct. The articulation of her normative stance is so blunt, aggressive and explicit that it is difficult to understand how she how she can uphold the distinction between empirical and normative analysis and claim that she is 'only describing' intersubjective processes of change in world politics.

In the previous chapter, I have argued that Fierke posits a prior consensus among humans, which constitutes the moral boundary within which political debate unfolds, by building on the constructivist argument about the social construction of the world and by opposing the neorealist view of international politics. This constitutive consensus draws a boundary between other-regarding and self-interested conduct: if the agents are not purely self-regarding egoists, as neo-realism (and rationalist IR theory as a whole) assumes, but social beings that depend on

[1] See also Krebs and Jackson (2007) 39.

the recognition of others, they have to act and advocate policy positions in a way that takes the others into account; agents advocating positions which fail to live up to the recognition of the others will be open to charge of a egoism and of creating a discrepancy between their moral justifications and their practices, which will eventually force them to adopt a course of action that takes the others more consistently into account.[1] Throughout her work, Fierke gives a very clear idea of what this distinction between other- and self-regarding conduct amounts to: self-regarding, or zero-sum, conduct shows no concern for others, seeks hierarchy, attempts to impose its own definition on others without listening to them, relies on coercion and force as the primary means to achieve its ends, treats the other not as an end but only as a means, and creates dividing lines between self and other.[2] These are practices, as Fierke makes very clear, which are advocated by the neorealist view of international politics:

"Realist strategy and theory are part of a game within which military objects are brought to bear for purposes of coercion. Both validate the role of instrumental reason in international politics. The use of force is the only game in town. The necessity of choices is publicly presented in terms of no choice. Any right thinking individual, it is argued, will recognise that power needs to be countered with power in kind."[3]

By contrast to this immoral neorealist view of political conduct, other-regarding conduct takes all sides equally into consideration, treats the other as a 'human end', listens to him and treats him with dignity, and displays a willingness to revise its own presuppositions when listening to him.[4] Given Fierke's positing of this constitutive boundary which draws a dichotomy between immoral neorealist egoism and moral other-regarding conduct, and given the sharpness and starkness with which she draws this dichotomy, I find it very difficult to understand how she cannot at the same endorse the validity of this dichotomy; by positing a constitutive boundary that draws a line between the moral and the immoral attitude, she simply cannot avoid accepting this moral boundary and the hierarchizations that follow from it herself. As this moral boundary provides the foundation on which all of Fierke's analyses are built, the implication is that her theoretical framework is profoundly moralized from the very start.

I argue that it is precisely Fierke's assumption of this constitutive moral boundary which transforms her empirical investigations into normative rationalizations, which not simply

[1] Fierke (1998) 111-115; Fierke (1999b) 30-31; Fierke (2001b) 130-132; Fierke and Wiener (1999) 731.
[2] Fierke (1998) 133-137, 150, 167-169, 214; Fierke (2000) 346; Fierke (2001b) 136-137, 140-141; Fierke (2012) 322-324; Fierke (2013) 56.
[3] Fierke (1998) 222.
[4] Fierke (1998) 133-137, 150, 167-169, 214; Fierke (2000) 346; Fierke (2001b) 137, 140-141; Fierke (2012) 322-324.

describe but also and at the same time *morally approve* of the emergence of certain outcomes as victories of dialogue over immoral selfish practices. I think that this normativity becomes already apparent when going back to the struggle between 'Machiavella' and the 'Machiavellian Prince', which Fierke uses as an overarching frame to conceptualize the transformation from zero-sum contexts into contexts of dialogue, and which I have outlined above.[1] Fierke conceptualizes this struggle as one between the 'weak', 'oppressed', 'powerless', 'excluded', or 'victims', on the one hand, and the 'strong or 'powerful', on the other. The powerful 'deceive', 'dominate', 'exploit' or 'bully' the weak. And the reasons, which they give to justify their rule, are characterized by Fierke's merely as attempts to 'maintain the appearance of being good and just', as opposed to genuine moral justifications.[2] The Machiavella or besting strategy, which is employed by the weak, exposes the 'hidden violence', 'injustice' and 'ruthlessness' of the dominant game. By refusing to hit back and by acting as if the rules of 'dignity', 'equality' and 'integrity' were in place, Machiavella manages to throw the prince off balance and establish a 'win-win context', in which both actors become 'equals'.[3]

It is this deeply moralized conception of the transition from zero-sum contexts of hierarchy, exclusion and exploitation to contexts of dialogue, equality and dignity which provides the overarching frame for Fierke's various empirical analyses of change in world politics. Take, for instance, her analysis of the transformation from the Cold War to post-Cold War security. In this analysis, the Cold War itself is characterized as a zero-sum conflict that 'imprisoned' or 'trapped' both parties in a relationship of mutual enmity. The actions of both sides were 'partial', 'partisan', 'ideological' or 'selective' in that each side adopted a 'fixed position' and blamed the other for rejecting that position. The representatives of the East and West were not communicating to each other as 'human beings' but only by 'negotiating through threats and weapons', building up military hardware in order to 'coerce' the other to stay at the bargaining table.[4] While Fierke concedes that the practice of deterrence, which characterized Cold War security, was constituted and justified by a particular moral discourse,[5] she makes it clear that this moral discourse has less legitimacy than those justifications constituting the post-Cold War context of dialogue. While she takes a constructivist view, which implies that both the Cold war and the post-Cold War game are social constructions, this does not prevent her from conceiving the former as somehow more constructed, artificial or conventional than the latter. From her

[1] See ch 3, 46-52; ch 5, 100-101.
[2] Fierke (1998) 96-98; Fierke (1999a) 410-412; Fierke (2013) 66.
[3] Fierke (1998) 97-100, 216; Fierke (1999a) 411-414; Fierke (2001b) 135-136; Fierke (2013) 68-75.
[4] Fierke (1998) 40, 79, 85, 90-91, 99, 117, 133-134; Fierke (2001b) 136-138.
[5] Fierke (1998) 122-123.

discussion of the moral arguments justifying deterrence, it becomes clear that the sole purpose of these arguments was to maintain the *appearance* that deterrence was able to provide for security, thereby *disguising* its dangerous nature. For Fierke, the justification for deterrence was not a genuine moral argument but only a *pretext*, which served to present the need for nuclear weapons as an objective necessity and which had to be exposed as a pretext or a convention.[1] In line with this reasoning is her claim (which is built on an argument by E.P. Thompson) that the Cold War was an 'artificial and unnatural chasm' that had to be dismantled and be brought back to its 'natural state of health', which was a united and peaceful Europe.[2] This dismantling was mainly carried out by what Fierke calls 'critical actors or peace movements', which were able to step outside the dominant game and 'enlighten the trapped superpowers'. By pointing out the gap between the claim to provide security and the creation of insecurity through deterrence, i.e. by renaming the Cold War itself as the source of insecurity rather than one side or the other, the peace movements managed to break down 'the prison' and to pave the way for a 'peaceful', 'pluralistic', 'democratic' and 'united Europe'.[3] The post-Cold War security game was constituted by the logic of dialogue, which implied the 'ability not to separate one's own security from the security of others', the ability 'to listen as opposed to negotiating with weapons', and the 'humanisation of international relations'.[4] Dealing with each other as human beings

"(...) is part of the language game of dialogue, as opposed to negotiation. The emphasis is less the formal contract than the stakes of one's relations to other people. Dialogue does not fit with the means-ends logic of being forced to do what one otherwise would not do."[5]

A normative stance that combines the same kind of moral approval and disapproval is running through Fierke's analyses of NATO enlargement into Eastern Europe. Her point of departure is to subject the position of NATO in the early 1990s to a moral critique. While she seems to argue that this critique is not hers but that of the representatives of the Eastern European governments and other analysts, it becomes very clear that she wholeheartedly endorses their points of view. The moral problem diagnosed by Fierke was that NATO, and the West in general, 'appeared to be isolating itself behind a new cordon sanitaire and constructing

[1] Fierke (1998) 71, 79, 85, 99-100, 102, 106, 109-110.
[2] Fierke (1998) 140-141.
[3] Fierke (1998) 79-81, 85, 100-101, 107-108, 144, 147-148; Fierke (2001b) 137-138.
[4] Fierke (1998) 76, 84-85, 131-132, 148-151; Fierke (2001b) 138.
[5] Fierke (1998) 150.

new barriers, divisions and spheres of influence in order to keep the Central and Eastern Europeans out'.[1] This, however, stood, as she is extremely keen to emphasise, in contrast to the *promise* of the West to help the Eastern European countries implement and uphold Western values. Building on a few essays published in the *NATO Review*, she and Antje Wiener derive this promise from the Helsinki Final Act, signed in 1975 ('the promise of Helsinki'), which, in their view, clearly 'committed and morally obliged' the West to ensure the full implementation of its ideals in Eastern Europe. Fierke and Wiener also claim that this promise was further reified by the representation of the end of the Cold War as a victory of Western values: the Cold War victor, who had encouraged Eastern Europeans to adopt to its ideals during the Cold war, 'could not leave them to their own' after its end.[2] The Eastern European states contrasted this promise by NATO (and the West) with its 'divisive actions', compelling NATO to open up and creating 'a more inclusive Europe without dividing lines or spheres of influence'. It was 'the promise of dialogue that forced NATO to listen to the concerns of its partners'.[3]

Fierke's analysis of the evolution of the interaction between NATO and Russia in the course of the 1990s exhibits the same pattern of moral judgement. This becomes already apparent when looking at her characterization of the initial context of interaction in the early 1990s: this context was a 'hierarchical gender game', in which 'a weak and feminized Russia' was facing a 'strong and successful NATO that did not treat her as an equal partner' and 'bother to take her opinions into account' when taking the decision to expand into Eastern Europe. Russia 'felt humiliated', 'in pain', 'confused' and 'a loss of dignity', 'identifying her predicament with the broken promises' by NATO.[4] While Fierke takes some of these criticisms from other (mainly Russian) sources, it is again evident that she fully endorses them, blurring the boundary between her own moral point of view and that of others. Her final judgement on the initial context is clear: Russia was in the position of a 'victim', which it 'had to leave'.[5] And Russia did so by besting the West, e.g. by 'combining toughness and softness' and by 'acting as if her dignity and equality were assumed'. 'Russia's goal was not to try to intimidate the West' but to move out of the hierarchical game and 'to compel NATO to take into account her legitimate demands'.[6] The resulting NATO-Russia Founding Act is praised as a 'dialogue of equals', within which 'Russia's legitimate concerns were recognized'. Fierke's open dismissal of a tougher Russian response to NATO

[1] Fierke (1999b) 37, 45-47; Fierke and Wiener (1999) 730-731, 735-73.
[2] Fierke (1999b) 38-39; Fierke and Wiener (1999) 727-731.
[3] Fierke (1999b) 29, 45-47, 49-51; Fierke and Wiener (1999) 734-736.
[4] Fierke (1999a) 405-409.
[5] Fierke (1999a) 409.
[6] Fierke (1999a) 414, 417-421; Fierke (1999b) 44, 48.

expansion as 'ineffective' point even more to the conclusion that she thinks that Russia did the right thing and that this agreement was the best outcome.[1]

Given Fierke's moral stance on the evolution of the interaction between both NATO and the Eastern European Governments and NATO and Russia, her overall evaluation of NATO enlargement into Eastern Europe should not come as a great surprise: in her analyses, this enlargement is idealized and praised as a victory of the logic of dialogue, as 'a positive-sum or win-win game with no winners and losers' that is the first step towards a new, inclusive and peaceful European security order. NATO enlargement involved a parallelism of integration and cooperation, integrating new members but also taking into account the interests of those not ready or willing to join. It was less a military endeavour, which aimed at collective defence or deterrence, than a political project, which aimed to 'heal the divisions of Europe' and to create a 'more equal or genuine dialogue', and which provided the possibility for the Eastern European countries and Russia "to hold NATO accountable for its words." With the end of the Cold War, NATO had transformed its identity from an 'agent of aggression' into 'an organiser of dialogue' and 'Europe's anchor of peace and stability'.[2] In an essay entitled *Changing Worlds of Security*, this idealization of NATO enlargement reaches an unprecedented level. In this essay, Fierke argues that this enlargement contributes to the emergence of a new European security order that is qualitatively different from the 'traditional and dangerous' notion of security of the Cold War context, which drew 'lines and walls between self and other'.[3] While NATO is still projecting military power (e.g. in Bosnia), it

> "(…) makes a decision for the time being to avoid drawing new lines around Europe. Instead of fixed spaces connected by bridges, relationships are conceived, among others, in terms of overlapping rings of love. The rings of love denote a form quite different from that of either the courtship games of the classical European balance of power or the Cold War families. (…) With the rings of love, Europe (or at least several countries of Europe) remains at the centre, but is woven in a range of different partnerships that overlap, making it difficult to distinguish its boundaries. (…) As competition over the naming of the European space emerges, the relationships become less intimate - clubs rather than families - accompanied by the emergence of different degrees of intimacy, as characterized by the rings of love and the absence of clear boundaries between inmates and others."[4]

I believe that Fierke's moral progressivism could not be rendered more visible than by this characterization of the emerging post-Cold War European order in terms of 'rings of love'.

[1] Fierke (1999a) 422-423; Fierke (1999b) 49.
[2] Fierke (1998) 220; Fierke (1999b) 44-45, 48-51; Fierke and Wiener (1999) 735.
[3] Fierke (1997) 249.
[4] Fierke (1997) 246-247, 249.

The same moral progressivism is, finally, running through Fierke's analysis of the UN weapons inspector crisis. While Fierke concedes that the hierarchical context, in which the criminal Iraq faces the US as a legitimate authority and in which communication occurs only through force, may have initially been a legitimate option, she argues that this typification, which enabled the US and the UK to continue to threaten the use of force against Iraq, became illegitimate in the subsequent years. The US and the UK 'remained trapped in the logic of force', imposing a disproportional punishment on Iraq 'without bothering to listen to its legitimate demands'.[1] The treatment of Iraq by the US 'was an expression of American hegemony in the world and the region, which desired to impose its will on others, and an attempt to distract domestic attention from the Lewinsky sex affair'.[2] While Fierke occasionally argues that these accusations were not made by her but by a large majority of the international community, she clearly endorses these views. This becomes evident, for instance, when she writes that Iraq was offering resistance because "the USA had become increasingly arrogant in believing it could call the shots within the UN and the global community as a whole, regardless of the wishes of others."[3] In another paragraph, she endorses a statement given by the then French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin by openly stating 'that the use of force was justified in the first episode but not in the second'.[4] It is then no surprise that Fierke presents Iraq's actions during the second episode in an overly positive light: 'by acting like a sovereign state that deserved respect and that had a right to be heard', Iraq managed to transform the game; by promising to honour its obligations and by asking for its legitimate concerns to be heard at the same time, Iraq 'provided a reasoned justification', convincing many other states and rendering a negotiated agreement possible.[5] Fierke's moral approval of Iraq's actions and her disapproval of the US and UK policies becomes even more visible when she dismisses the justifications, which were given by both countries for their continuation of the bombing campaign after the conclusion of the agreement, as mere 'pretexts' (as opposed to 'reasoned justifications').[6] The final paragraph of her analysis summarizes her overall verdict on both governments clearly:

"The use of force is necessary in some situations; but it is perhaps prudent to be sceptical of claims by the powerful that only they speak the language of truth and that they determine who should be listened to. At stake in this conflict of logics, is the possibility of realizing the promise of the end of the Cold War - an international community of

[1] Fierke (2000) 336, 346-348, 352.
[2] Fierke (2000) 336, 349, 355, 358.
[3] Fierke (2000) 358.
[4] Fierke (2000) 349.
[5] Fierke (2000) 352, 358.
[6] Fierke (2000) 361.

states who speak and listen in a public space, using force only as a means of collective security, not for unilateral advantage."[1]

I think that this discussion brings the fundamental normativity in Fierke's empirical analyses to the fore. Fierke offers a profoundly moralized conception of the transitions from certain empirical states of affairs to others by idealizing and rationalizing these transitions as moral victories of other-regarding conduct over immoral self-interest. In her analyses, contexts of 'hierarchy', 'exclusion', 'dehumanisation', 'exploitation', 'oppression', 'partisanship', 'partiality', 'ideology', 'spheres of influence', 'broken promises', 'humiliation' and 'arrogance' give way to contexts of 'equality', 'dignity', 'respect', 'integrity', 'impartiality', 'humanisation', 'kept promises', 'peace', 'inclusion', 'tolerance' and 'pluralism'. What is particularly striking is the sharpness and crassness with which Fierke draws this dichotomy between immoral zero-sum contexts and moral contexts of dialogue. Her analyses leave absolutely no doubt about who are the 'bad guys' and the 'good guys', as well as what constitutes a reasoned justification, on the one hand, and a mere pretext, appearance or disguise, on the other. To this is added her characterization of the dichotomy between the moral and the immoral attitude in terms of pairs of opposites which seem a bit extreme: for instance, the two quotes above[2] suggest that what distinguishes a neorealist policy from her notion of dialogue is the treatment of others as human beings - neorealist/rationalist notions such as bargaining and instrumental rationality 'dehumanize' social relationships. While neorealists emphasise the prevalence of conflict and self-interest, I think none of them would be happy with the accusation that they are advocating strategies that treat people as animals. In Fierke's writings, policy makers are not spared from these oppositions either. While US President Clinton is accused of being an empire-seeking president that bombs other countries in order to cover up his sex scandals, terrorists and mass murderers (Hussein and Milosevic) are credited with legitimate interests as well as the right for respect and dignity.[3] In one of her books, she draws an equally violent contrast between the French President Jacques Chirac and the Eastern European countries. During the debate preceding the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Chirac 'reprimanded' the Eastern European States, who were going to become members of the European Union, 'as if they were children' because they had supported the US position. These countries, however, did not respond as if they were children and 'backed down or whined'. Rather, they acted "as mature statespeople who had a right to their own views, even if this

[1] Fierke (2000) 361.
[2] See 132, 134.
[3] Fierke (2000) 336, 352, 355; Fierke (2001b) 139-141.

differed from one of the most powerful states in Europe." In so doing, they were "raising questions about Chirac's authoritarian tactics toward potential members of the European Union."[1] While Fierke mentions this interaction only as a minor example to illustrate a broader argument about the difference between cause and constitution, I think, however, that this example precisely points to the general feature of her work: the absolute ease and levity with which she - sometimes just 'in passing' and without any serious engagement with the opposing views[2] - openly dismisses the actions of certain actors while praising those of others.

Given Fierke's blunt moralization and idealization of certain empirical transitions as moral victories of dialogue over selfishness, it remains difficult to understand how she can plausibly claim that she is 'only or primarily describing' change in world politics. In some parts of her work, this contradiction between her claim to do empirical analysis and her own normativity is so striking that it is hard not to realize it. At the end of chapter 4, I have provided a quote from Fierke's most recent book on political self-sacrifice, which states that 'this book does not pose the normative question regarding the right of communities that have lost their sovereignty to resist; rather its focus is on the empirical observation that communities in this position often do resist and on the analysis of these dynamics of resistance'.[3] In her analysis of the weapons inspector crisis, she makes a similar claim. Criticizing the exclusive focus of post-structuralism on the normative critique of dominant representations, she writes:

> "The accompanying claim that marginal voices should be allowed to speak could be given more substance and more critical edge if the detailed analysis of disruptions and inconsistencies were taken more seriously. The close examination of even brief moments when alternatives became possible is essential for the beginning to better understand and act on (or as if) more lasting alternatives were possible. The detailed examination of disruptions and inconsistencies, including the voices of the marginalized, provides a more powerful challenge to realist arguments than normative claims that the marginalized should have been allowed to speak."[4]

The contradiction in these two quotes, which I have been trying to emphasise on the previous pages, is that the characterization of an 'empirical situation' in terms of the 'marginalized who have lost their sovereignty or autonomy', and the 'powerful who oppress the marginalized', is intrinsically normative. The statement that someone's interests are marginalized or that he has lost his autonomy is not just a descriptive statement but also implies a moral evaluation.

[1] Fierke (2005) 14.
[2] I want to come back to this problem in the next chapter.
[3] Ch 4, 87.
[4] Fierke (2000) 361.

'Sovereignty', 'autonomy' and 'marginalization' are normative terms, the meaning of which has been bitterly contested in scholarly and political debates. By conceiving empirical transitions in terms of struggles between the 'oppressed' and the 'powerful', Fierke leaves the terrain of pure empirical analysis and imposes a particular moral stance on reality, which approves of the rightful resistance by the former and condemns the illegitimate practices of exclusion by the latter.

(3) I finally argue that a normative stance is running through Kessler's empirical analyses which is similar to that of Jackson and Fierke. While his normative agenda may be the least visible, I argue that it is as present as in the other constructivist analyses discussed here. In fact, the apparent absence of this agenda in Kessler's writings is mainly due to his skilful obscuration of it through a rather dubious rhetorical strategy. In the previous chapter, I have argued that, by characterizing the transition from the state-centric system to the functionally differentiated risk society in terms of the positivism - post-positivism divide between Cartesian individualism/ontological uncertainty and intersubjectivity/genuine uncertainty, Kessler turns this transition into a normative victory of self-reflexive other-regarding conduct, which recognizes the others' particularities, over self-centred conduct, which imposes abstract models on the others; I have also argued that this normative victory of the other-regarding mode of action, in which the actors succeed in mutually recognizing and taking into account their particularities, implicitly presupposes a prior formal consensus on what counts as a valid act of recognizing the particular others and what doesn't. In what follows, I want to argue that this implicit positing of this consensus and the resulting evaluation of the transformation from state-centrism to the functionally differentiated risk society as a normative victory of self-reflexive other-regarding conduct over self-centred behaviour reveal Kessler's own normative stance. For they show that he is not simply 'describing', or 'tracing', but also endorsing this normative victory himself. That is, Kessler's empirical analyses also articulate a normative preference for a community-oriented mode of action, which becomes aware of its own contingency, which relies on practical knowledge, and which recognizes the others' particularities, over selfish and in particular *state-centred* conduct, which proceeds on the basis of abstract models and in disregard of others. Kessler essentially makes a normative case for self-reflective practical reasoning and against self-centred abstract and instrumental reasoning.

I believe this normative stance comes especially to the fore in his strong and recurring criticism of the expertise that is provided by contemporary economic science to reform society and of current state practices in world politics. Kessler criticises economic expertise for its

reliance on the aleatory conception of probability, which conceives of uncertainty as ontological or structured. This implies a conception of knowledge that is 'hierarchical' and 'harmonious'. As a result, political reform becomes reduced to a 'technical problem' that can be solved through instrumental rationalist calculation. Universal laws derived from theory are applied to particular policy problems. Kessler argues that this hierarchical conception of knowledge which advocates the primacy of theoretical knowledge and universal laws neglects the inherent complexity of social life. Knowledge exists never in an integrated form, which can be apprehended from an objective point of view, but is always dispersed and 'heterarchically organized'; there are always 'multiple and different skills, talents, forms of expertise and ways of knowing reality'. By subsuming practical problems under abstract propositions, laws and theories, economic expertise 'excludes' these different forms of knowledge. Rather than applying universal laws to particular cases, both social analysis and political reform have to give primacy to 'practical knowledge', which reconstructs the 'local and tacit knowledge structures' that constitute contexts of action 'in a particular time and space'.[1] While Kessler's critique of economic expertise seems to be primarily methodological, I believe that it also reveals a rather clear normative stance that is lurking in background: a moral critique of self-centred instrumental rationality, which 'hierarchically' imposes its universal models on the others and which 'excludes' the particular knowledge that constitutes these others in a specific time and space, and a moral approval of self-reflexive other-regarding conduct, which recognizes the 'plurality and heterarchy' of forms of knowledge and which understands or engages with these forms in their particularity rather than imposing preconceived models; that is, which leads to the 'recognition of one's own subjectivity through the recognition of the other in his particularity and difference'.[2]

I argue that the same normative stance is lurking behind Kessler's critique of contemporary state practices in world politics. Contra the views of some governments and positivist theories that emphasise the primacy of the state (in particular neorealism), Kessler argues that the 'hierarchical order', in which the nation state had the monopoly of knowledge production and regulation and in which the temporality diplomacy determined the temporalities of other fields, has gone. The state 'has lost its ultimate right to interpret data', has stopped being the 'court of last resort for the production of knowledge' and is now only one actor in a 'heterodox' array of

[1] Kessler and Daase (2008) 220; Kessler (2008a) 19, 44-45, 48-49, 166,-167, 175-180, 220; Kessler (2012a) 284-289; Kessler (2013a) 70-71.

[2] Kessler (2008a) 156; In his book, Kessler uses this critique of economic theory and expertise in order to attack the policy of the IMF. I think that this shows one more his blurring of the line between methodological and normative critique. See Kessler (2008a) 175-180.

actors that have developed their own temporalities, rationalities and criteria of legitimacy. As a result, the state can no longer impose knowledge claims and regulation measures on others but has to take into account the 'heterogeneity of knowledge institutions and ideas of politics' by 'managing or navigating between these multiple realities', by which Kessler primarily seems to mean some form of 'private-public partnerships'.[1] The futility of hierarchical state-based regulation and the necessity for heterodox governance have become particularly apparent in the global economic and financial systems. Both fields have moved from a hierarchical system, which was based on the clear separation between the national and the international and which attributed to the state 'the final authority of risk definitions', to a functionally differentiated system, in which knowledge is increasingly constituted in globally constituted communities of practices and in which the 'top-down regulation of financial and economic actors has become impossible'. Rather than sticking to the 'utopian ideal' of hierarchically regulating global finance, both states and financial actors such as hedge funds have to move to 'hybrid private-public modes of regulation', which rely on a 'heterogeneous net of risk management' and practical knowledge.[2] This normative critique of the state is also evident (and probably most visible) in the two articles co-authored with Daase, which critically discuss contemporary counter-terrorism policies. Kessler and Daase argue that states have to abandon their national interest- or instrumental rationality-driven stance, which imposes or applies universal models on the terrorist other, in favour of a self-reflexive position, which becomes aware of its own contingency and engages in a dialogue with this other.[3]

I believe that all these examples rather clearly reveal a normative project in Kessler's analyses. When he argues that the state-centred system was based on a 'hierarchical mode of regulation', which gave it the 'monopoly of' or made it the 'court of last resort' for the production of knowledge, which endowed it with the 'ultimate right to interpret data', which made it the 'final authority of risk definitions', and which enabled it to control the temporalities of other systems; and when he argues that this hierarchical mode of regulation has been made obsolete by a 'heterodox setting', in which the state has to recognize that there is a plurality of knowledge institutions and political actors and that governments have to navigate between these actors by engaging with their particular identities through some form of public-private partnerships, he is not simply making a descriptive argument but also a moral judgement. Kessler's critique of current state practice and state-centric theories brings to the fore a moral disapproval of the

[1] Kessler (2006) 219-221; Kessler (2008a) 17, 29, 42-44; Kessler (2012c) 78-79, 85-86.
[2] Kessler (2006) 224-226; Kessler (2008a) 218; Kessler (2009c) 173.
[3] Daase and Kessler (2007) 430-431; Kessler and Daase (2008) 227-228.

national interest-driven and autonomous state, which hierarchically and ignorantly imposes pre-conceived models on the others without taking them into account, and a moral approval of a heterodox mode of regulation, in which the state is just one actors among others and in which it has to engage with, recognize and obtain knowledge about their particular identities and interests. While Kessler would not go so far to declare the nation state completely dead, while he is certainly not supportive of terrorism, and while he is (partly) critical of financial actors such as hedge funds, he is making a moral case for a mode of interaction, in which the various public and private actors, and in particular the state, abandon their self-centred stance of ignorance, start acquiring knowledge about each others' particular identities and reach a mutual understanding based on some form of hybrid private-public partnerships. In other words, there is a certain kind of cosmopolitanism lurking in Kessler's analyses, which advocates a deeper community-oriented mode of conduct over the national interest.

While I believe that Kessler's criticism of economic expertise and contemporary state practices bring his normative stance clearly to the fore, some, and even Kessler himself, may still argue that this normativity is more a misattribution on my part than a real feature of his work. For Kessler never makes his moral stance explicit and, instead, derives the need for self-reflexive practical reasoning and knowledge, throughout his work, from the new and distinct *empirical* characteristics of contemporary world politics. On this view, practical reasoning is simply the best option because it is most in line with the *changing reality* of world politics, which has moved to a functionally differentiated risk society; it imposes itself as an 'empirical necessity'. In the remainder of this section, I want to reveal the implausibility of this argument that contemporary world politics exhibits certain new features which impose the priority of practical reasoning over hierarchical regulation and control. A closer look reveals that the 'new features' which Kessler attributes to the contemporary system and which allegedly undermine the possibility for state control have largely been present across history. The 'new problems and challenges' which Kessler emphasises are not really new but have been more or less part of the conditions which state regulators have always faced and within which the nation state has managed to thrive. By showing that the preference for self-reflexive practical reasoning over hierarchical regulation does not simply arise out of 'new empirical necessities', I intend to render the normative character of his articulation of this preference further visible.

I want to make this point by returning to the two new features which, in Kessler's view, constitute the evolving functionally differentiated risk society. The first feature is that new types of private agency and practices have undermined state-centred distinctions such as

'public/private' and 'national/international', thereby challenging the power of the state to exercise control. Contemporary transnational terrorism, for instance, cuts across the logic of the state system in that it is neither a crime nor an act of war and in that it relies on means which make it completely unpredictable. Given that terrorists are neither public nor private actors, that their motives are hard to know, that they do not seek 'rational gains', and that they strike without any warning, they cannot be fought by states through traditional deterrence methods, which relies on instrumentalist rationality and universal models.[1] Terrorists "(…) alter the very contours of world politics", and point to "(…) a qualitative change that redefines the very game and reality shat states face."[2] The problem with this argument is that it completely ignores that the nation state has faced terrorism for a very long time. If, in the past, the state managed to fight terrorism by deterrence methods more or less successfully, why should it not be capable of sufficiently deterring contemporary terrorism? While, in the last decade, states have failed to prevent terrorist attacks such as 9/11, they have managed to prevent others, and they have done so by using 'deterrence measures' such as data storage, online screening and electronic surveillance. Kessler's argument that contemporary terrorism has 'changed the game of world politics' would only be plausible if he could show that this terrorism is more unpredictable and produces more uncertainties than older forms - which he never does. He even hardly seems to recognize that terrorism has a very long history, and in the rare instances where he recognizes it, he simply posits - without any further explanation or justification - that contemporary transnational terrorism challenges traditional convictions.[3]

Kessler's argument that the emergence of global finance as a distinct realm has undermined the ability of the state to control is equally dubious. He argues that contemporary global finance possesses three new features, which render it distinct from the state-regulated real economy and traditional banking, and which render it insusceptible to traditional state regulation: first, global finance constitutes a 'genuinely global or transnational space' which has left the confines of the state. Financial products are 'global fragments', which are traded no longer in a national framework but in globally constituted networks. This renders global finance different from the traditional banking system, which depends on and is stabilized through public funding (i.e. central banks), and which is subject to national regulation and scrutiny. Given the global character of the realm of finance, the regulation of this realm through the stabilisation of national banking systems and the demand on countries to provide better information about their

[1] Kessler and Daase (2008) 212-214, 216-217.
[2] Kessler and Daase (2008) 226.
[3] Kessler (2010b) 24.

financial systems is doomed to failure. By trying to control global finance through 'country-specific' or national regulation, governments reduce a global and complex phenomenon to its parts and thereby pursue a *utopian* project.[1] Second, global finance differs from the traditional state-based real economy in that it has acquired a new autonomy. The prices of financial products do not refer to physical goods, as in real markets, but are formed through a distinct social structure of actors, practices and mutual expectations, which possesses its own sources of legitimacy, expertise and epistemic authority that escape the rationality of the state. Questions of authority and legitimacy can be referred no longer to the state but only to this network of rating agencies, investment banks and hedge funds, which has challenged the traditional public/private boundary and become part of a public discourse.[2] In particular, the emergence of rating agencies points not simply to the provision of certain 'technical functions' but to the formation of an internal source of *political* authority that is not delegated from the state; by providing authoritative ratings, rating agencies structure the expectations of financial actors and bring communication in financial markets about.[3] The third feature that distinguishes global finance from the state-regulated real economy is its focus on the future. While real markets are driven by actual or generated profits, investment decisions in financial markets are driven by the expectations of future revenues. Financial products such as derivatives make the future tradable by quantifying the potential default risk in prices. This future-oriented temporality of financial markets cannot be controlled through the hierarchical provision of a 'static' and present-focused regulatory framework by governments.[4]

The first feature suggests that nation states, which exercise control over particular territories through various and different jurisdictional means, cannot - through cooperation with each other - regulate transnational or global processes that transcend their borders, such as financial trade. The following quote brings this point clearly to the fore:

"The complexities of cross-country relations and monetary flows cannot be tracked and measured adequately because of a lack of information. The collection of more comprehensive and accurate data would require the establishment of new structures to exchange information about the global shadow banking system and its evolution. This turns the problem of data collection into a utopian project. As long as there are regulatory borders and jurisdictional differences, the quest for information leads to global coordination problems that imply a global regulatory framework into which

[1] Kessler (2006) 220-221; Kessler and Wilhelm (2014) 100-102, 104-105.
[2] Kessler (2009c) 167-168, 170-171; Kessler (2011a) 207-208; Kessler (2012a) 294-295; Kessler (2013a) 59-62; Kessler and Wilhelm (2013)257-260; Kessler and Wilhelm (2014) 109-110.
[3] Kessler (2007b) 361; Kessler (2009c) 168; Kessler (2011a) 207; Kessler (2012a) 295; Kessler and Wilhelm (2013) 259-260; Kessler and Wilhelm (2014)109-110.
[4] Kessler (2012a) 294-295; Kessler (2012c) 88-89; Kessler and Wilhelm (2014) 105-106.

national, regional and transnational regulatory measures could be inserted. Therefore as long as there are different jurisdictions, information gathering will necessarily be insufficient and financial actors will suffer from information asymmetries."[1]

The question that this quote raises is this: why does the fact that states rely on different jurisdictions and regulatory borders rule out the possibility of developing an international structure of financial data sharing and information exchange? Different jurisdictions have not prevented states from developing quite far-reaching modes of cooperation and data sharing in fields such as economic trade, arms control or health. While no one would deny that the development of a global financial architecture based on information sharing will be difficult, it simply does not follow that the existence of regulatory borders renders this endeavour 'utopian'.

It is equally unclear how the second and third 'new features' of global finance undermine the possibilities for state control and regulation. As for the second, the existence of private forms of agency that develop their own sources of authority, legitimacy and expertise is neither new nor peculiar to global finance. In the 19th century, for instance, an autonomous network of financial investors, among which the Rothschild family was the most powerful, developed and quite strongly influenced European politics.[2] Kessler's representation of rating agencies as 'new actors' also omits the slightly significant fact that these agencies have existed since the very early 20th century. Moreover, it can be plausibly argued that not only global finance but also the real economy is built on internal sources of authority, expertise and legitimacy that are essential for constituting economic exchange.[3] Kessler himself recognises this when he argues that prices *in general* are not simply neutral or apolitical arbiters that reflect the scarcity of economic goods but always political in that they result from a specific network of actors, institutions and calculative practices, which constitutes economic exchange by producing a particular kind of knowledge while excluding others.[4] Finally, as for the third new feature, it is common knowledge that decision making not only in finance but also in the real economy is oriented towards the future. In the real economy, decisions are never driven by 'actual or generated profits', as Kessler claims, but *always* by expectations about future profits. The overall implication is that configurations of private actors, which have developed distinct rationalities, temporalities and sources of legitimacy, have existed below and above the state level for a very

[1] Kessler and Wilhelm (2013) 253.
[2] Ferguson (1998) 4-7, 9-10.
[3] An example of this are credit bureaus, which assess the creditworthiness of economic actors in the domestic economy.
[4] Kessler (2012a) 290-292, 295; Kessler and Wilhelm (2013) 258; Kessler and Wilhelm (2014) 109.

long time, and that this has not prevented the state from becoming the main source of regulation and control. In fact, one could argue in a Weberian fashion that the differentiation into different value spheres that possess their own distinct rationalities is one of the defining features of the modern state. If that is the case, it remains unclear why the emergence of global finance as a distinct transnational realm, which has developed its own rationality, temporality and sources of authority, poses such a dramatic challenge to state regulation.

Kessler's failure to show that the changing reality of contemporary world politics undermines the possibility for state regulation becomes most strikingly visible in his discussion of the second feature of this transformation, which refers to the growing evolutionary complexity. Kessler regards global finance as a field where this new complexity is particularly manifest. Global finance differs from traditional state-based banking in that it is subject to constant change and evolution. In financial markets, new agency positions and financial practices emerge on a constant basis, rendering the definite attribution of certain functions to certain actors impossible. Kessler argues that this constant evolution of global finance cannot be eliminated through tighter state regulation but is, on the contrary, rendered possible by it: traditional regulation is based on the assumption that the actors and their relationships are 'static', 'all-encompassing' and 'steady'. Yet it is precisely this attempt to impose homogeneity through legal rules that has constantly created new forms of heterogeneous and deviant behaviour in the financial markets. State regulation and global finance are in a 'dialectical relationship' in that each regulation gives rise to new loopholes, practices, actors and uncertainties in the field of finance.[1] For Kessler (and Benjamin Wilhelm), this means that the attempt by the state to hierarchically regulate global finance is utopian:

"Regulation without any loopholes and dynamic evolution of the actors, ever-lasting stability and clear boundaries: the underlying utopia becomes fully visible."[2]

I think that this argument, which claims that traditional state regulation cannot cope with the growing evolutionary complexity of global finance, and in particular as it is made in this quote, clearly reveals the faultiness of Kessler's attempt to ground his critique of state practice in the changing reality of contemporary world politics. Kessler seems to assume that traditional fields of state control, such as conventional banking (as opposed to the new shadow banking), were

[1] Kessler (2009c) 164, 167-170, 173; Kessler (2012a) 296-297; Kessler (2013a) 72-73; Kessler (2013b) 44; Kessler and Wilhelm (2013) 255-265; Kessler and Wilhelm (2014) 106-108.
[2] Kessler and Wilhelm (2014) 107 (my translation).

completely static, did not allow for any loopholes, always had clear boundaries, and contained fixed actors; and, conversely, that dynamic evolution is a rather recent phenomenon which manifests itself in new fields such as global finance. I find this assumption highly implausible: was there ever a time when state-governed fields were absolutely steady, contained static actors, had no loopholes and did not give rise to evolutionary dynamics, and when the state was able to 'conclusively (!) fix the meaning of all actors and practices'?[1] The answer is clearly no. It can be plausibly argued that evolutionary complexity, according to which political regulation never succeeds completely but always gives rise to new contingencies, uncertainties, heterodoxies and deviant practices, is not specific to the contemporary period but has rather been a common feature of human history. Particularly with respect to secular modernity, it is safe to say that state regulators have acted under conditions of complexity and evolution, that they have been - more or less - aware of this, and that they (even in autocratic states) have rather seldomly attempted to achieve absolute control, if absolute control is understood as the 'conclusive fixing of all signs, actors and practices'. In fact, one could go even further and argue, as Mead does, that dynamic evolution and complexity are defining features of the modern democratic state, which emerged in the 18th century. On Mead's view, the democratic form of government has incorporated revolution in its own operation to the extent that it allows for the continuous reconstruction and change of political institutions *without* leaving the confines of legality or overthrowing the constituted authority.[2] Kessler, occasionally, seems to recognize this when he talks about about complexity as feature of social and political evolution in general.[3] Yet this all the more raises the question of what his problem with contemporary state practice is: if the modern nation state has managed to impose itself as the main source of authority, regulation and control despite, or rather *because,* of the persistent presence of dynamic evolution and complexity, it remains unclear why contemporary financial practices, which undoubtedly keep changing and evolving, pose such a dramatic challenge to state regulation.

In sum, Kessler argues that the capacity of the contemporary state to regulate and control has been undermined in comparison to a context when the state did not face private violence entrepreneurs that acted in unpredictable ways, when it did not have to cope with transnational processes that cut across national borders, when it completely dominated the different spheres of social life, and when it could definitely fix the meaning of actors and practices that were completely static and did not evolve. I cannot think of a historical context where this omnipotent

[1] Kessler and Wilhelm (2014) 105.
[2] Mead (1915) 141-142.
[3] Kessler (2012a) 297.

state existed. Rather, it is fair to argue that the complexity, confusion and dynamic evolution, which Kessler ascribes to contemporary world politics, have generally been part of the conditions under which the nation state has operated, and that this state has become the main source of regulation, presumably because it has managed to cope with this complexity, confusion and evolution in a better way than other forms of political order. The overall implication is that Kessler cannot justify the preference for self-reflexive practical reasoning over self-centred and hierarchical state regulation as an empirical necessity that arises from the changing reality of international relations. This lacking empirical foundation brings - I believe - once more to the fore the normative character of the articulation of this preference.

Arbitrariness

In the previous chapter I argued that the use of the concept of intersubjectivity entails a normative stance by the constructivist theorist which she cannot avoid. I also argued that this normative stance is manifest in the constructivist analyses, which do not simply 'trace' the emergence of certain empirical events but also rationalize these events as victories of particular moral attitudes over others; in one way or another, all of these analyses articulate a normative defense of other-regarding conduct against self-interest. In this final chapter, I want to question the persuasiveness of these moral judgements by pointing out a common problem that afflicts all of them. What emerges from the discussion in chapters 3 and 4 is that, in the constructivist analyses, the normative superiority of dialogue, self-reflexive practical reasoning and the logic of occidentalism over self-interest depends on the universal acceptance of certain formal criteria, which all moral attitudes have to meet and which render other-regarding conduct morally superior to self-interest. That is, what makes dialogue, practical reasoning and occidentalist arguments morally superior is their *generalizability* or *universalizability,* e.g. their appeal to formal criteria of acceptability which are universally recognized. In what follows, I will argue that Kessler, Fierke and Jackson fail to show that these formal conditions or criteria, which allow for the generalizability of other-regarding claims, do indeed exist, and that this renders the normative case for dialogue, practical reasoning and occidentalist arguments unpersuasive. The constructivists' failure to show the generalizability of their preferred moral attitudes renders these attitudes *particular* perspectives which, at best, co-exist with rival moral perspectives that are equally compelling, and, at worst, seem to be inferior to these rival perspectives. In other words, by positing their preferred moral attitudes as morally superior without inquiring into the preconditions for this superiority, Kessler, Fierke and Jackson end up *arbitrarily* privileging these attitudes over other moral perspectives. In the remainder of this chapter, I will attempt to expose the lacking generalizability of dialogue, practical reasoning and the logic of occidentalism, as well as the arbitrariness that is involved in privileging these moral attitudes over others, by discussing three examples: (1) by discussing dialogue and practical reasoning as general modes of moral conduct, and by confronting them with the moral defense of self-interest given by Kenneth Waltz in his book *Man, the State and War*, which is built on the impossibility of generalizing cosmopolitan attitudes; (2) by exposing the non-generalizability of the logic of dialogue in the case of NATO enlargement, which renders Fierke's evaluation of this enlargement as an instance where this logic was universally accepted

not only unpersuasive but also politically problematic; (3) and by exposing the non-generalizability of the occidentalist position, which undermines Jackson's evaluation of this position as a morally superior argument commanding universal consent.

The Limits of Human Reason

What emerges from the numerous analyses of Fierke and Kessler is a general normative preference for other-regarding conduct, which is called 'the logic of dialogue' and 'practical reasoning' respectively, over self-interest. This is, in addition, shown by the fact that both have openly advocated dialogue and practical reasoning as modes of conduct that should be adopted in international relations at the expense of traditional realpolitik.[1] In the remainder of this section, I will argue that the normative compellingness for dialogue and practical reasoning as general modes of action over against self-interest is unpersuasive. This compellingness depends on a particular view of *human reason*, which emphasises the possibility of mutual understanding and harmony in social life. The problem with this view of human reason is not so much that it is wrong but that, in the analyses of Fierke and Kessler, it is either *assumed* or *posited*. This raises a major problem since this view has been subject to extensive criticism in philosophy, political theory and political science. In what follows, I will contrast Fierke and Kessler's normative advocacy of dialogue and practical reasoning with one of these criticisms, which is Kenneth Waltz's analysis of the causes of war and peace in his influential *Man, the State and War*. In this book, Waltz not only provides plausible arguments for the limits of human reason but also draws from these limits the opposing conclusion of the moral desirability of the national interest, realpolitik and the balance of power. I argue that, when confronted with Waltz's moral position, the logics of dialogue and practical reasoning lose their normative superiority or persuasive appeal. These logics are morally less persuasive than Waltz's position not simply because they are 'wrong' and the latter is 'right'; rather, the difference between both is that, while Fierke and Kessler derive the moral compellingness for dialogue and practical reasoning from a view of human reason which they simply take for granted, Waltz builds his moral argument precisely on his *deliberate refutation* of this view of human reason. Dialogue and practical reasoning fail as morally superior positions because Fierke and Kessler only posit or assume the conditions on which their moral superiority depends, rather than *defending* their existence against critics like Waltz.

[1] For example, Kessler and Daase (2008) 226-228; Kessler (2009c) 169, 173; Fierke (1999a) 423-424; Fierke (2000) 361.

Before showing how dialogue and practical reasoning lose their normative power when confronted with the Waltzian argument, I want to make fully clear why Fierke and Kessler conceive of both logics as normatively superior to self-interest. Both scholars conceive of self-interest as a morally inferior mode of action because it reflects a stance of *ignorance* or *distorted knowledge*, which can be overcome through a superior other-regarding stance that acquires knowledge of the others' particular interests and identities. Selfishness as a *failure* to recognize the others is subordinated to other-regarding conduct that *does* recognize the others and that gives rise to a harmony of interests, acknowledging the legitimate demands and particular identities of each. This normative hierarchy between the selfish ignorance and other-regarding conduct, which is manifest in Kessler and Fierke's analyses, depends on a crucial precondition: it requires that human agents be universally capable of agreeing on the existence of a boundary between arguments, positions and acts that fail to recognize the others and those that take the others into account. That is, they have to collectively agree on what counts as a failure to recognize the others and on what counts as an act of successful recognition that acknowledges the particular interests of each. While Kessler never makes this assumption explicit, Fierke does so by deriving it from the constructivist notion of the social constitution of the world: if human beings are not self-regarding egoists, as realism assumes, but social beings that depend on the recognition of others, they have to constantly ensure that their practices are in line with their moral justifications that purport to recognize the common good.[1] The notion of the social constitution of the world enables Fierke to posit the *universal capacity of human agents* to distinguish between selfish acts that fail to live up to the moral claims to recognize the others and genuine other-regarding acts that are in line with these claims. It is the assumption of this universal human capacity which as allows for evaluating self-interested conduct as a mistaken stance of ignorance in relation to the morally superior logic of dialogue.

I now want to suggest that, even though there are certainly differences, this articulation of the normative superiority of dialogue and practical reasoning over self-interest shares some crucial similarities with those proposals for global peace which Waltz, in his book, terms 'first and second images' and against which he develops the 'third image'. Waltz argues that first and second image theories identify particular causes of war in international relations and make particular prescriptions for overcoming it. The first image regards war as caused by human nature, resulting either from the ignorance or mental unfitness of those holding political power.[2]

[1] See ch 5, 103-106, 111-115; ch 6, 131-138, 140-143.
[2] Waltz (2001) 16-18.

Second image theories attribute the roots of war to particular types of government, which are defectuous in that they do not give rise to the expression of the 'real interest' of the people as a whole but only reflect the interests of a small ruling elite. For example, early liberal theorists argued that monarchies were inherently war-prone in that they allowed their selfish rulers to pursue their own interests through conquest and that, if the real or general interest of all peoples was given full play, an objective harmony of interests would arise among nations in which war would have no place. Likewise, Marxist theorists argue that capitalist democracy reflects the domination of a minority of financial and industrial interests which favour imperialism and war. If these particular class interests were eliminated and the real voice of the community was heard in every state, a perfect harmony among nations would ensue in which each would acknowledge the rights of the others.[1] The first and second image theorists proscribe different 'cures' for how the general interests of all peoples can be realized: behavioural psychologists advocate an increase of knowledge through the education of political leaders and a deeper engagement among peoples, liberal theorists see the solution in the democratization of nations, and Marxists favour the adoption of socialist governments in each country.[2]

Waltz argues that what unites both images is that they conceive of war, conquest and the balance of power as *defects* or *irrationalities*, which will easily or naturally give way to global harmony through a process of *individual perfection*. Given that there exists an attitude which is intrinsically good, rational or peaceful in that it realizes the common interest of all peoples and an attitude which is intrinsically bad in that it reflects the aggressive stance of a selfish or ignorant minority, it is sufficient that the each of the agents or the political units *separately* or *individually* adopt or strive towards the peaceful attitude in order to achieve international harmony; the separate adoption of the rational attitude by one or a few actors will be identically understood and reciprocated by all others.[3] Waltz makes it clear that this conceptualization of war as a defect, which can be simply overcome through the individual improvement of all units, requires or presupposes a common human capacity for rational action and judgement. That is, it depends on the assumption that all actors share a common reason which 'leads them to an identical definition of interest, which makes them draw the same conclusions as to the methods for coping with particular situations, which makes them agree on the action required in case any chance incidents arise, and which ensures that each can rely completely on the steadfastness

[1] Waltz (2001) 82, 97-103, 143-147, 149-153, 155-156.
[2] Waltz (2001) 44-52, 83-84, 101-103, 120-122, 146-147.
[3] Waltz (2001) 82-84, 119-120, 122, 149-150, 152, 155-156, 161, 164, 233.

of purpose of all the others'.[1] If 'perfect rationality' prevailed among all human beings, "[E]ach could rely on the behaviour of all others and all decisions would be made on principles that would preserve a true harmony of interests."[2] To put it in my own language, if acts or qualities are to exist which are intrinsically good or peaceful to the extent that each actor can simply adopt these acts individually without having to fear that the others interpret them differently, this presupposes that human agents have the same capacity to agree on what counts as a good or peaceful act that recognizes the interests of all and on what counts as a defective act of aggression that fails to take the others into account.

I believe that this discussion reveals the similarities between Fierke and Kessler's stance, on the one hand, and the first and second image theories, on the other. Both views regard practices like war, self-help and egoistic policies as mistakes or defects, which result from the *failure* to know or recognize the interests of all others and which can be easily overcome through an other-regarding stance that *does* recognize these interests. That is, war, self-help and the balance of power can be overcome if the agents simply adopt that stance which is intrinsically or universally recognized to be peaceful in that it acknowledges all interests. International harmony is easy to achieve because the adoption of the peaceful attitude by one or a few actors is identically understood and reciprocated by all others. I think this is precisely what Kessler's notion of practical reasoning refers to: if the actors only take the self-reflexive attitude and start acquiring particular knowledge about each other, it is assumed that they will naturally arrive at an harmonious understanding. Fierke's notion of dialogue brings this logic even more to the fore: if Machiavella starts acting according to the logic of dialogue, which demands respect and dignity but also recognizes the interests of the others, the Prince will - albeit grudgingly - reciprocate Machiavella's attitude and treat her with respect and dignity; when Saddam starts acting like a state leader who fulfils his obligations but who has a right to be heard, the other states reciprocate this stance and recognize Saddam's legitimate interests; once the West and the Soviet Union take the attitude of dialogue and start engaging with and listening to each other, they reach a mutual agreement based on tolerance and pluralism. In sum, there *is* an intrinsically good or peaceful stance of dialogue that acknowledges the interests of everyone, and all the agents have to do is, either simultaneously or sequentially, adopt this stance. In the cases of both the constructivist and the first and second image theories, this normative hierarchy between the national interest, self-help and war, and dialogue, practical reasoning and harmonious

[1] Waltz (2001) 150, 152-154, 168-170, 227.
[2] Waltz (2001) 168.

conduct depends on the assumption of a universal human capacity to distinguish between 'right and wrong conduct', e.g. to agree on what constitutes an act that recognizes all interests and what constitutes a violation of the common good.

It is precisely this optimistic belief in the possibility of completely eliminating war, realpolitik and self-help and of achieving a harmony of interests, which is manifest in the writings of Kessler, Fierke and the first and second image theorists, that *Man, State and War* seeks to undermine. As outlined above, Waltz argues that first and second image theories advocate global peace through individual perfection, e.g. through a process of internal reform in which each actor adopts that attitude which is recognized to be intrinsically good in that it realizes the common aspirations of all peoples. This possibility of individual perfection depends on the assumption of a universal human capacity to agree on what counts as 'good' behaviour, which recognizes the interests of all and which each actor can separately adopt without being concerned about the others, and as 'bad' behaviour that fails to recognize the others. It is precisely the existence of this capacity, which is the condition for the moral superiority and achievability of the global harmony of interests, that Waltz draws into question. Building on the political philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Waltz argues that the defining feature of the human condition is not the collective capacity but the *collective incapacity* of individuals to agree on a common standard for evaluating what counts as right and wrong conduct. For Rousseau and Waltz, this incapacity is an inescapable condition of *social situations*, e.g. once human beings come to interact with and depend on each other. The interdependence and juxtaposition of individuals expose their fundamental inability to generalize their particular wills, aims and interests to such an extent as to make them compatible with all others. For, even though a particular aim may be 'perfect' or legitimate from the standpoint of the individual having it, it remains one specific aim among many that may be unjust from the perspective of the others.[1] The same applies to the relations among nation states:

"The will of the state, which in its perfection is general for each of the citizens, is only a particular will when considered in relation to the rest of the world. Just as the will of an association within the state, while general for itself, maybe wrong when considered from the standpoint of the welfare of the state; so the will of a state, though equitable for itself, maybe wrong in relation to the world. (...) The nation may proclaim, and mean, that its aspirations are legitimate from the point of view of all states; but despite the intent, each country's formulation of its goals will be of particular rather than of general validity."[2]

[1] Waltz (2001) 199-120, 155-156, 168-171, 181-182, 194, 196.
[2] Waltz (2001) 181.

The intrinsic diversity of aims, interests and ideas of the moral good, which is revealed through the close juxtaposition of the states to each other, implies that there are *no good acts in themselves*, which recognize the interests of all and which each state can separately adopt. An act which one state considers to be good or peaceful may incite the others to go to war. Given the interdependent plurality of aims and wills, it is unrealistic to expect an automatic harmony of interests and agreement on rights and duties.[1] In sum, Waltz emphasises the intrinsic incapacity of interdependent individuals or states to collectively agree on 'good' interests, conduct or attitudes, which recognize the rights of all, and those which don't - there are no 'just' and 'unjust' interests but 'only interests, and hence conflicts of interests.'[2] In domestic politics, this incapacity is merely obscured by the fact that there is an effective state authority which makes *arbitrary* decisions to settle the undecidable conflicts of interest, which necessarily arise among particular groups; the purpose of the state is not to make the *correct* decision but to make *a* decision at all, which is preferable to the settlement of rights and wrongs by force.[3]

In his book, Waltz provides plenty of examples and draws on a variety of intellectual sources to underpin the argument that the collective incapacity to agree on what counts as right and wrong behaviour becomes a defining feature each time humans start interacting with and depending on each other. For instance, in his discussion of those first image theorists who claim that better knowledge through a real engagement with each other will promote global peace, he argues that a deeper mutual engagement and more knowledge about the other have often exposed the mutual failure to agree on a shared notion of the common good. Close cultural affinity and interdependence among European countries have not prevent the occurrence of destructive wars and violence among them. Moreover, building on the records of travel writers such as Friedrich von Schlegel and Alfred Milner as well as on the work of Karl Deutsch, Waltz argues that more knowledge about other peoples has often not increased our sympathetic understanding and tolerance but our hatred, disgust and stronger assertion of our own nationalism.[4] Waltz further underscores the problematic nature of the notion of 'better knowledge' by raising two crucial questions about the Cold War: "(…) does understanding always promote peace, or do nations sometimes remain at peace because they do not understand each other very well? Are we in a cold war with the Soviet Union because we do not understand

[1] Waltz (2001) 183-184, 188, 228-231.
[2] Waltz (2001) 190.
[3] Waltz (2001) 190.
[4] Waltz (2001) 49-50.

Communist societies well enough, or because the more clearly we come to understand them the less we like them (…)?"[1] In raising these questions, Waltz, of course, implies that better knowledge about the other is not the solution but precisely the problem in this conflict.

Another example provided by Waltz is Rousseau's famous stag hunt parable: five hungry men agree to cooperate to trap a stag, one fifth of which will satisfy each of them. But the hunger of any of them will also be satisfied by a hare. When a hare comes within reach, one of the men catches it, but in so doing he allows the stag to escape and leaves the others hungry.[2] From one point of view, the man has failed to recognize the interest of the group: "[r]eason would have told him that his long-run interest depends on establishing, through experience, the conviction that cooperative action will benefit the participants." However, "(…) reason also tells him that if he forgoes the hare, the next man might leave his post to chase it, leaving the first man with nothing but food for thought on the folly of being loyal."[3] In other words, the essence of the stag-hunt situation is that there is no common agreement on what counts as right and as wrong conduct, e.g. on what constitutes a failure to recognize and a successful recognition of the others. While the man's action is wrong from the standpoint of the others in that he fails to recognize their interests, it is right from his own standpoint because everyone else would have acted the way he did. What is line with the general interest from one point view is a violation of it from another.

A final example, which I wish to draw attention to, is Waltz's insightful account of the failure of the various European socialist parties to preserve their unity and harmony at the outbreak of WWI, despite their expressed commitment to a unified proletarian interest and the preservation of international peace in the years preceding the war. Waltz argues that the breakdown of socialist harmony, which led each socialist party to support the war effort of its respective country, was due to two reasons: first, given the prior agreement among the socialist parties to support their own countries in a defensive war and given the impossibility of determining aggressor and victim when the war broke out, each party clearly and quickly decided that the war was defensive for its own country and not for the enemy. The war was defensive for everybody!'[4] Second, the proclaimed unity broke down because the military victory of its own country turned out to be in interest of each socialist party. For the French socialists, who followed Jean Jaurès' argument that socialism could only develop within the nation state, the

[1] Waltz (2001) 48.
[2] Waltz (2001) 167-168.
[3] Waltz (2001) 169.
[4] Waltz (2001) 128-133.

defense of the their nation was imperative; for the German socialists, the support of their country's war effort and the latter's military victory were crucial for their own political survival and their broader European aspiration of realizing socialism in Europe; and for the English socialists, a German defeat was essential because it meant the preservation of democracy in Europe.[1] It is important to point out that neither of these particular interests were more 'just' or 'unjust' than the others. Waltz refutes the explanation by some Marxists theorists that the German socialists had been bought off by the German autocratic state and that this caused the disunity and the failure to perceive the common proletarian interest. Taken separately, each of these particular interests were perfectly legitimate. Taken together, however, they did not allow for the expression of unified proletarian interest in peace.[2]

Waltz argues that the morally undecidable clash of particular interests and wills, to which the condition of interdependent states without an effective authority gives inevitably rise, implies that war and conflict cannot be simply overcome through individual perfection but remain a constant possibility. Given that there is no neutral process for reconciling the conflicts of interest that necessarily arise in a condition of anarchy, each state becomes the final judge of its cause and may use force at any time to implement its policies - "[T]that among particularities accidents will occur is not accidental but necessary."[3] This is the implication of what Waltz calls the *third image*. As a result, each state has to rely on its own devices for assuring its security, the *relative efficiency* of which becomes of crucial importance. This means that each country has to make sure that it possesses sufficient strength to counter its adversaries. The guiding principle of foreign policy must be to consider the effects of each particular policy on the relative strength of the other states - 'everyone's strategy depends on everyone else.' While balancing strategies may include a peaceful attitude such as appeasement, they may well involve aggressive, inhumane or cruel policies such as the use force.[4] Waltz emphasises that, in a condition of anarchy where mutual fear and suspicion persist and particular wills inevitably clash, this self-help stance is the *best* or *preferable* option.[5] A foreign policy guided by "(...) the third image of international relations is neither moral nor immoral, but embodies merely a reasoned response to the world about us."[6]

I argue that Waltz's argument reveals the unpersuasiveness of Fierke and Kessler's

[1] Waltz (2001) 134-137.
[2] Waltz (2001) 147-149, 156.
[3] Waltz (2001) 159-160, 182, 188, 210-211, 227.
[4] Waltz (2001) 159-160, 197, 201, 204-206, 211-216, 220-223, 226, 238.
[5] Waltz (2001) 207-208, 212-216.
[6] Waltz (2001) 238.

articulation of the normative superiority of dialogue and practical reasoning over self-interest, self-help and realpolitik. Fierke and Kessler are unable to show that dialogue and practical reasoning are morally superior to self-interest because they fail to *respond to* or *take into account of* Waltz's argument that the condition, on which this superiority rests, does not exist and that this non-existence renders self-interest, realpolitik and the balance of power the most compelling stance. The problem is that both simply take for granted the view of human reason on which this superiority depends, rather than *self-reflexively problematizing* and *defending* this view against Waltz's moral defense of self-interest, which is explicitly built on the refutation of it. Such a self-reflexive problematization would imply the raising and discussion of the question as to whether there actually exists a collective human capacity to distinguish between behaviour that does and that does not recognize the particular others. For Kessler's advocacy of practical reasoning, for instance, it would raise the question as to whether a self-reflective engagement with and practical knowledge about the particular other always lead to mutual recognition, a view that becomes most visible in his (and Daase's) call on states to reflexively engage with the terrorist other rather than trying to fight this other through traditional deterrence. Would it be possible to reach a mutual understanding with the Islamic State if we only started to seriously engage with and attempted to understand the particular aims of this organization, or would such a deeper engagement not rather increase our disgust, repudiation and intolerance? Do Islamist terrorists, many of which grew up in Western countries, hate us because they don't know or because they know our culture? Would it have been possible to reach an agreement with Saïd Kouachi, Chérif Kouachi and Amedy Coulibaly if we had attempted to truly understand them before they slaughtered 18 people, or would such an attempt not have revealed the fundamental incompatibility between their moral views and the foundations on which our democratic societies depend? Generally speaking, how can we be so sure that practical knowledge about the other will always enable us to successfully recognize ourselves through the recognition of this other's particularity and difference? And, finally, if we cannot be sure, does that not make a self-centred stance that attempts to hierarchically regulate, deter and control the other the most preferable policy option?

Fierke's moral advocacy of dialogue would face similar kinds of questions. For her, the social constitution of the world and the dependence of individuals on each other simply imply that these individuals are collectively capable of distinguishing between acts, positions or course of actions that do and that do not live up to the moral claims to recognize the others. It is the assumption of this common human capacity which, in her analyses, transforms conflict,

hierarchy, violence and war into some kind of 'defect', 'false consciousness' or 'mistaken stance of ignorance', which can be easily overcome through an attitude of dialogue that implies the mutual engagement with and recognition of each other; the justifications given by the Princes to sustain their conflictual practices are nothing but 'appearances', 'pretexts' or 'disguises', which can be naturally exposed as such through dialogical conduct that advocates mutual respect and dignity; the Prince's conflictual stance that is cloaked in moral language is based on a 'discrepancy between justifications and deeds', which will be exposed and overcome through conduct that lives up to its justifications and recognizes the other. While Fierke only *derives* this common human capacity from the social constitution of the world, Waltz's analysis provides *plausible reasons* why the sociality and interdependence of individuals do not imply their collective capacity but rather their collective incapacity to agree on the boundary between conduct that does and that does not recognize the others. His analysis raises questions such as: while there have been peace and cooperation (the possibility of which Waltz does not deny), does the persistence of conflict, violence and war in world politics not make it much more plausible to assume that human agents are generally incapable of agreeing on what constitutes a failure to recognize and a successful recognition of the other? Given the prevalence of bitter conflicts and debates about political issues which do not allow for clear and final judgements, should we not rather assume that the normal condition of social interaction is that individuals fail to agree on what counts as a 'pretext', an 'appearance', a 'disguise' or a 'discrepancy between justification and practice', on the one hand, and a 'consistent position' that lives up to its justifications and that recognizes the other, on the other? Does the dependence of human agents on each other and the need for justification render moral conflicts decidable in that critical actors only have to press the 'discrepancy between words and deeds-button' in order to make the opponent fall into line, or do they do not rather reveal the fundamentally undecidability of these conflicts because of the existence of a plurality of justifiable notions of what is morally good and desirable? Is the conflict between the Prince and Machiavella one between selfish disregard and genuine recognition of the other, or is it not rather a conflict between two different moral ideas of what 'listening to', 'recognizing' and 'engaging with the other' mean? And, finally, if human agents are generally unable to agree on what counts as a failure to recognize and as a successful recognition of the other, is it not better if we focus on our own narrow interests and security without attempting to pursue dialogue or establish universally accepted standards of right and wrong?

Kessler and Fierke may answer all of these questions not in the affirmative and argue that

Waltz's view of the limits of human reason is unfounded. This would be legitimate - after all, his provocative claim that, in a condition of anarchical interdependence, morally undecidable conflicts of interests inevitably arise may indeed invite criticism. However, the problem is that Kessler and Fierke never *discuss* and *respond* to such questions at all. While both advocate the normative superiority of dialogue and practical reasoning over self-interest, they simply assume rather than problematize and defend the view of human reason on which this superiority is based. In other words, they never raise the question as to whether moral claims that are framed in terms of dialogue or practical reasoning *are actually generalizable or universalizable in the sense that all actors can consent to or recognize them as claims of dialogue or practical reasoning.* This is necessary, however, because, as Waltz's argument shows, there are scholars who have attempted to refute the existence of a universal human capacity to agree on what counts as acceptable and unacceptable conduct, who have emphasised the non-generalizability of behaviour that attempts to establish universal standards of justice, and who have argued that this non-generalizability makes self-interested conduct desirable. It is this failure to problematize and defend the generalizability of the attitudes of dialogue and practical reasoning against arguments that deny this generalizability and that advocate self-interest which renders Kessler and Fierke's moral advocacy unpersuasive.

NATO Expansion and the Particularity of Dialogue

I now want to argue that is the same failure to inquire into the generalizability of the moral attitude of dialogue or practical reasoning which makes the advocacy of this attitude over self-interest in relation to concrete political events both unpersuasive and politically problematic. I will do so by discussing Fierke's evaluation of NATO enlargement. I argue, first (1), that Fierke's positive evaluation of NATO expansion as a successful instance of dialogue, which prevailed over the zero-sum context of the early 1990s and in which the actors succeeded in mutually recognizing each other, is unpersuasive because it fails to show that the attitude of dialogue was generalizable in the sense that all actors could consent to it. While enlargement was indeed predicated on and justified with what one could term a 'logic of dialogue', this logic remained unacceptable to some of key participants to the debate. Fierke wrongly and arbitrarily represents a particular and contested attitude of dialogue as a universally valid attitude which was recognized by all actors. NATO expansion was a 'win-win outcome' of dialogue not because the actors did actually agree but because she makes them agree to recognize each other. I argue, second (2), that this tension between the assumption of the universal validity of dialogue and

its actual particularity, which is evident in Fierke's work, also underlied the West's decision to enlarge NATO into Eastern Europe, and it is precisely this tension which has rendered this enlargement politically harmful. NATO enlargement was not a win-win game based on mutual recognition but an attempt to organize the European security order according to a logic of dialogue that claimed to be cosmopolitan but turned out to be deeply particularistic and divisive, thereby laying one of the foundations for the current conflict in Ukraine. Finally (3), I argue that this suggests that the logic of dialogue, as a political ethic, is profoundly problematic. The advocate of dialogue resembles what Max Weber has called the *ethicist of conviction*, whose belief in the rationality of the world renders him unable to consider and take responsibility for the consequences of his actions.

(1) As I have argued above, Fierke provides an evaluation of NATO enlargement that is overly positive. On her view, this enlargement was a victory of dialogue of over selfish zero-sum behaviour, a positive-sum game with no winners and losers that laid the foundation for an inclusive European security order. Enlargement involved the parallelism of integrating new members and deepening cooperation with those not ready to join. In this way, NATO expansion did away with the former dividing lines and the old game of competing spheres of influence, constructing instead a web of different partnerships that was characterized in terms of 'rings of love'. The alliance became an organizer of dialogue that 'healed the divisions of Europe'. Fierke's positive evaluation of NATO enlargement is based on her argument that this enlargement signified a shift from a zero-sum context of exclusion and misrecognition to a context of dialogue, in which the actors mutually recognized each other. In particular, the expansion was driven by and designed to respond to *two* conflicting normative claims for recognition. In what follows, I argue that this evaluation of NATO enlargement as a shift from a context of exclusion and misrecognition to a context of mutual recognition is problematic. While this enlargement was justified with reasons which, broadly, correspond to Fierke's notion of dialogue, these reasons were far from being recognized as universally valid. Rather than signifying a move from a zero-sum context of exclusion to a dialogical context of recognition, NATO expansion was predicated on a particular notion of dialogue and recognition that turned out to clash with other notions of recognition. Fierke papers over these rifts by singling out a particular attitude of dialogue and recognition and by imposing it on all actors, and in particular on those who did not accept it. I will make this argument by discussing the two claims for recognition which, according to her, drove NATO expansion in more detail.

While NATO expanded in order to survive, Fierke argues that this expansion was primarily

driven by the need to fulfil a normative claim for recognition, which was made the by Central and Easter European states (CEECs). As I have outlined above, she claims that these states confronted the West and NATO with the discrepancy between its past *promises* of dialogue and its actions. Given the promise of the signatories of the Helsinki Final Act to ensure its full implementation in Europe and given that West had encouraged the East to adopt liberal ideals during the Cold War, the CEECs argued that NATO failed to live up to these claims because it was not doing enough to help them uphold these ideals and appeared to hide itself behind a new cordon sanitaire or dividing line. After the initial wave of expansion had been decided, the Baltic states were making a similar claim, arguing that their exclusion from the alliance would create a new 'buffer zone' or 'sphere of influence' which was contrary to the West's promise of dialogue and overcoming the divisions of Europe.[1] It is absolutely crucial to emphasise that Fierke argues that these *particular* moral claims were *generally valid* in the sense that they 'effectively caught NATO in a normative contradiction' and 'forced' it to expand. That is, she appropriates a particular moral claim by the CEECs (or writers supporting this claim) and elevates it to the level of general validity. This blurring of the line between particular and generally valid moral arguments becomes clear, for instance, when she quotes from a speech by Vaclav Havel, in which he emphasises the responsibility of the West to assist and include Eastern Europe in its institutions, and then approvingly writes:

"The West, and its institutions, then represented a normative ideal. The CEECs were encouraged to act in accordance with these ideals in resisting totalitarianism. Now that 'containment' of the Soviet Union was no longer necessary, the West had a responsibility to assist the CEECs in the 'recovery', to assist them in upholding these values."[2]

Fierke's tendency to generalize particular moral claims becomes even clearer in her account of how Polish officials put normative pressure on the West:

"The CEECs (…) highlighted the promise of the partnership to prepare candidates for future NATO membership. For instance, the Polish Minister of Defence Piotr Kolodziejcyk drew on the proclamation of the Partnership to further the countries interest in NATO membership: 'We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East;' Poland undertook the partnership as 'the best route towards its goal of full integration into the alliance.' In addition, Kolodziejcyk, referring to Clinton's June speech in Warsaw (it was no longer a question of whether the alliance would expand but when and how) stated 'that most of the doubts about

[1] See ch 1, 49.
[2] Fierke (199b) 38.

the necessity of that step have disappeared'. The Partnership thus relied on a language of manoeuvre to mollify two conflicting tendencies, represented by Russia and the CEECs. *NATO became entangled in this language, however, as the latter drew on the promise of the Partnership to further its goal of eventual membership*."[1]

Fierke follows a similar reasoning when she accounts how the (Baltic and other) countries, which were excluded from the first wave of expansion, put normative pressure on NATO. Fearing that a selective expansion would divide Europe through a security vacuum and spheres of influence, these countries started 'to hold the West accountable for its words'. In order to show how they did this, she quotes from a speech by Ambassador Stankevicius of Lithuania, in which he emphasises statements by Clinton and Secretary of State Christopher that there would be no room for spheres of influence of great powers in Europe.[2] Then she adds:

"NATO had once again become entangled in its words. The argument that NATO expansion would render the division of Europe obsolete, that it would end the Cold War game based on a politics of 'spheres of influence', was being used by states outside the initial wave of expansion; they too should be included under NATO's security guarantee."[3]

I believe all these quotes clearly show how Fierke transforms a particular moral claim made by the CEECs into a claim that is universally valid. From the argument made by the *some* states that NATO was caught in a normative contradiction, that it had become entangled in its words and that it had to expand, she infers that *NATO was* caught in a normative contradiction, that *it had become* entangled in its words and that *it had to* expand.[4] This transformation of a particular moral claim into a valid position that commands universal consent reflects Fierke's broader theoretical and moral framework outlined above, which attributes to human agents the collective capacity to distinguish between practices that do and that do not live up to the moral claims to recognize the other. As a result, there *are* discrepancies between practices and justifications, and there *are* consistent moral positions that successfully respond to them. It is because *NATO was* caught in a normative contradiction, because *it had* failed to deliver on its promise and because expansion *was* a *necessary* response to this broken promise that Fierke is able to provide a positive evaluation of this expansion.

I now argue that this leap from a particular moral claim that was made by the some states and observers to a generally valid claim that 'NATO was caught in a normative contradiction

[1] Fierke (1999b) 42-43 (my emphasis).
[2] Fierke (1998) 185.
[3] Fierke (1998) 18; see also Fierke (1999b) 46-47.
[4] Fierke (1999b) 50-52; Fierke and Wiener (1999)736; see also ch 1, 50.

from which it could not escape' is profoundly problematic. A look at political debates at the time suggests that the particular claim made by the CEECs did not have general validity in the sense that it 'decisively drove the alliance in a corner'. Rather, this claim only has general validity because Fierke makes it have this validity, and she does by employing *two* strategies: first, she makes the moral claim by the CEECs and their supporters look stronger than it actually was. This applies in particular to her use of the notion of 'promise'. Fierke is at pains to emphasise the gap between the 'promise' of the West and its failure to live up to it, and how the CEECs confronted Western leaders with their failure to deliver this 'promise'. In her article co-authored with Wiener alone, she uses the word 'promise' 60 (!) times. Treaties such as the Helsinki Final Act and even the NATO Partnership for Peace Programme (!) are interpreted to contain a 'promise' to integrate the CEECs into Western institutions.[1] A closer look at the political debates suggests, however, that this notion did not figure prominently in the claims by the supporters of NATO expansion. While these supporters, like Vaclav Havel, were emphasising the *historical responsibility* of the West, they did not argue that the West 'had broken its promise'. And they were not talking about the 'promise of Helsinki'.[2] It is indeed questionable to attribute such a promise to the Helsinki Final Act. And it is even more questionable to argue that the Partnership for Peace contained a 'promise to prepare candidates for future NATO membership' - in fact it did not promise any such thing (for how else would it have been possible to include countries such as Belarus, Turkmenistan or Azerbaijan in mid-1990s?). In general, it seems slightly puzzling that Fierke repeatedly emphasises a promise which did not figure prominently in the discourse of the enlargement supporters but pays relatively minor attention to a promise which has in fact been extensively debated since the early 1990s, which is the West's putative promise to Russia not to expand NATO into Eastern Europe.[3]

Fierke's second strategy is to largely ignore arguments opposing enlargement at the time, the *existence* of which implies that the moral claims by enlargement supporters can't have been universally valid claims which NATO had no choice to meet except by expanding. While she is right to argue that the CEECs put normative pressure on the West by emphasising its historical responsibility and by claiming that NATO expansion was necessary in order to ensure stability, democracy and the overcoming of divisions and spheres of influence in Europe, and while she is equally right to argue that NATO expansion was broadly justified with these ideas of dialogue,

[1] Fierke and Wiener (1999) 727-729; Fierke (1999b) 42-43.
[2] Havel (2002).
[3] Fierke (1999a) 409.

she neglects that these ideas were far from universally accepted in the Western world. In fact, there was a rather strong opposition to enlargement in Western countries (as, for example, the letter by 50 foreign policy experts to Clinton in 1997 shows), and this opposition persisted after the decision to enlarge had been taken. One observer suggested, for instance, that the insistent demands of the CEECs reflected the stance of 'traumatized peoples that felt betrayed by a patronizing West and that over-suspiciously questioned the latter's intention to do away with the old divisions of Europe'.[1] Apart from the argument that an eastward expansion would antagonize Russia, concerns were raised which questioned the whole rationale of the enlargement project: while it was acknowledged that the extension of European Union membership to the CEECs could address some of their demands, it remained unclear to many observers how a military alliance, the goal of which had been the territorial defence of its members, could promote democratic and economic reforms and prevent social unrest and inter-ethnic tensions.[2] As Waltz remarked, "(…) the task of building democracy is not a military one."[3] The idea of NATO promoting democracy seemed to be even odder given the fact that three of its members had been non-democratic for long periods.[4] In addition, those countries who were considered as potential candidates in the early 1990s did not experience high degrees of political and economic instability, and those countries who did experience instability, such as some of the ex-Yugoslavian republics, were not seriously considered for NATO membership. Finally, there was no military threat to Eastern Europe.[5]

A part from the argument that NATO expansion would exacerbate tensions with Russia (to which I will come below), Fierke never explains how the claims made by the CEECs managed to prevail over these arguments opposing expansion, which were frequently voiced at the time. All she has to say is that the CEECs did not make a clear distinction between NATO and the EU, claiming that Western institutions as such had a responsibility for ensuring economic and political reform.[6] But for an opponent of enlargement, this claim would have been hardly convincing. Therefore, it is plausible to argue that, in the political debates in the 1990s, there were arguments against enlargement which were *as compelling as* the CEECs' claims for enlargement (if not even more compelling). If, however, this is the case, it is wrong to argue that 'NATO became entangled in its words', or that 'it was caught in a normative contradiction'

[1] Eyal (1997) 697-698.
[2] Braithwaite (1997); Brown (1995) 37-38; Hanson (1998) 18-20; Waltz (2000a) 34; Zelikow (1996) 14-15.
[3] Waltz (2000a) 34.
[4] Braithwaite (1997).
[5] Brown (1995) 37; see also George Kennan's criticisms in the New York Times (1998).
[6] Fierke (1999b) 39.

by the CEECs' claims in the sense that 'it had to expand'. While *some* (albeit key) policy makers such as Clinton, Christopher, Madeline Albright, Helmut Kohl and Volker Rühe may have been susceptible to the claim that NATO had a responsibility to assist the CEECs, *others* argued that it had no such responsibility or that, if there was such a responsibility, it was not upon NATO to act. In particular, the existence of plausible arguments against expansion suggests that Fierke's apodictic claim that 'NATO had to expand in order to survive' and 'to maintain some semblance of consistency with its normative ideals'[1] is exaggerated (and sits uneasily with her key constructivist tenet that an actor could have acted otherwise[2]).

Fierke's imposition of a common notion of dialogue on actors who did in fact not consent to this notion becomes even more visible when considering the second claim for recognition, which was made by Russia and which she says drove NATO expansion in a particular way. Fierke can praise NATO expansion as a complete success of dialogue only because, in her view, this expansion took into account not only the moral claims by the CEECs but also Russian concerns about and opposition to enlargement. The crucial condition on which this evaluation depends is that NATO and, in particular, Russia were actually playing a game of dialogue, and that the outcome of this interaction, which was the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, was actually a 'win-win' outcome that recognized Russian interests. Fierke argues that this is the case. While Russia adopted a 'tough stance' initially, after Primakov became foreign minister, she "(…) increasingly demanded to be treated more as an equal and independent entity. She wanted a dialogue of equals within a special relationship."[3] Primakov employed a besting strategy, the core concern of which "(...) was a dialogue that focused on building a new relationship to NATO."[4] Both Russia and NATO "(…) now express a concern that the other remains trapped in the old Cold War game, which involves 'spheres of influence' and re-creating the 'division'. Both claim to be more interested in dialogue, cooperation and overcoming the division of Europe."[5] It was through a besting strategy, which exploited the moral tensions in NATO's stance and held it accountable for its stated intent to overcome the divisions in Europe, that Russia managed to move to a positive-sum game of equal partnership, culminating in the Founding Act. Fierke is very clear that this Founding Act recognized Russian interests: Russia "(…) moved in five years from 'unrequited love' to signing a contract for a special relationship within which her legitimate concerns are acknowledged and within which the West made

[1] Fierke and Wiener (1999) 736.
[2] Fierke (2000) 361.
[3] Fierke (1998) 206.
[4] Fierke (1998) 204; see also Fierke (1999a) 414, 417-418.
[5] Fierke (1998) 170-171.

important concessions."[1] On some occasions, she even gives the impression that the Russians actually welcomed NATO expansion:

"Russia was attempting to 'best' the West, or to put NATO in a position where it would have to live up to its stated intent of dialogue in true partnership or be exposed as the agent in creating new divisions of Europe. The defence elite in Russia recognized that expansion would weaken NATO's Article Five guarantee. In this respect the Russian response can be understood as part of a longer-term strategy by which her interest in the transformation of NATO into a more political pan-European organisation might be realised."[2]

Fierke makes a similar claim by relying on a single (!) article written by a Russian journalist: "*Russia* realises that this aspect [NATO's Article 5] will be weakened by its expansion plans."[3] This is because "(...) NATO's functions are likely to evolve towards the more political role desired by Russia."[4] Given that Russia's legitimate interests were recognized by the Founding Act, it is then no surprise that Fierke openly dismisses a tougher Russian stance that would have asked for more concessions. While she is not fully clear about this, she seems associate such a tough stance with the ultra-nationalist and communist parties in Russian domestic politics, which stood opposed to pragmatists and liberals like Primakov and Boris Yeltsin who sought accommodation with the West.[5] Notwithstanding the win-win outcome of the Founding Act, Fierke, whose analysis stops in 1999, is, of course, aware that the relation between Russia and the West may deteriorate in the future, in particular when the Baltic states would join the alliance in a second wave of enlargement. She remains, however, fairly optimistic regarding the future because NATO's stated intent of dialogue and overcoming the divisions of Europe has given Russia leverage to hold the alliance accountable for its words and demand it to pursue the subsequent wave of enlargement in a way that takes her interests into account. This is why she is able to call the Founding Act a 'historical opportunity that would be lost'.[6]

I now want to argue that this characterization of the Russian opposition to NATO enlargement, which locates it in a logic of dialogue, is misleading. While Fierke is right to argue that Russian policy aimed at establishing a relationship of 'equality' with NATO, in which Russia would maintain an 'independent' position, she overlooks the particular meaning which the terms 'equality' and 'independence' had in the Russian context. As the accounts of many

[1] Fierke (1999a) 422-423.
[2] Fierke (1998) 220.
[3] Fierke (1998) 206 (my emphasis).
[4] Fierke (1998) 207; see also Fierke (1998) 186, 189, and the quote in ch 1, 51.
[5] Fierke (1998) 178-179, 196, 208.
[6] Fierke (1998) 208-209, 221-222.

observers and statements by Russian policy makers, military officials and analysts at the time suggest, both terms referred to Russia's status as an independent *great power* that is on an equal par with NATO, and in particular with the US.[1] And, as an Economist article from 1994 on the Russian policy towards NATO makes clear with a brilliant simplicity, there is one particular thing a great power needs: *a sphere of influence*.[2] Observers like Anatol Lieven emphasised that, already in the early 1990s, Russian foreign policy discourse was marked by a consensus across the political spectrum that Russia had a right to exercise some kind of influence in adjacent territories with Russian-speaking populations or where it had had a large cultural presence, which in particular included the Baltic states and (even more importantly) Ukraine. This idea of a sphere of influence did not imply that the Russians wanted to go back to the Cold War or pursue an imperialist policy. A sphere of influence was seen more as a legitimate defense of Russian interests. Therefore, it was entirely compatible with the idea of a 'pan-European security order'. What it ruled out, however, was the military presence of other superpowers or alliances in its orbit.[3] Russian opposition to NATO enlargement was predicated precisely on this idea of defending a limited sphere of influence. And this idea was visible in Russian foreign policy discourse to an extent that it could not have escaped careful observers. There are countless statements by Russian officials, analysts and journalists from the 1990s which articulate the view that NATO enlargement into Eastern Europe was an intrusion into the Russian sphere of influence that had to be resisted.[4] One of the most prominent of these articulations was probably Primakov's defense of a 'multipolar world order' against a US hegemony, which consisted of a few great power poles that should manage international affairs. Likewise, the Russian proposals to make the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe the leading body for resolving conflicts and to endow it with a security council that includes a few permanent seats with a veto right aimed at establishing a concert of great powers that manages European affairs.[5] What also fitted in this great power pattern was, as Jonathan Eyal noted, the striking tendency of Russian officials to refuse to directly negotiate with the CEECs and to deal with Western governments instead.[6] It is finally worthy to note that this

[1] Blank (1998) 116-117, 119; Blank (1999) 703-704; Hanson (1998) 21; Kozyrev (1994) 62-63; see also the Russian National Security Blueprint (1997).
[2] Economist (1994).
[3] Black (1999) 249; Blank (1999) 303-307; Greene (2002) 3; Hanson (1998) 23-25; Lieven (1995) 197-198; Lieven (1996); Lieven (1998) 144-146; see also the Russian National Security Blueprint (1997), which repeatedly emphasise Russian security interests in adjacent territories and territories comprising Russian populations.
[4] Blank (1998) 116-121; Blank (1999) 303-307; Lieven (1995) 196-198; Lieven (1996); Lieven (1998) 143-146.
[5] Economist (1994).
[6] Eyal (1997) 716-717.

opposition to NATO expansion as a defense of the Russian sphere of influence had unanimous domestic support. According to Lieven, this support was already universal in 1995.[1] In an article published in 1999, Joseph Black writes that the leaders of all political parties and a clear majority of Duma deputies are hostile to expansion, and that their stance has the support of all mainstream newspapers. NATO expansion "(…) is a subject on which there is a very rare consensus in the extremely diverse and often mutually incompatible landscape."[2]

The implication is that the Russians did not oppose NATO expansion because they aimed to gain recognition within a game of dialogue but because they rejected the logic of dialogue, on which this expansion was predicated. While NATO expansion was, as Fierke argues, grounded in a logic of dialogue that aimed to overcome the divisions of Europe through the promotion of liberal values and the abandoning of spheres of influence, the Russian idea of a European peace was predicated on the existence of two limited spheres of influence or 'buffer zones' belonging to Russia and NATO (or the US). The problem that the expansion gave rise to was not, as she suggests, a simple 'coordination problem', which presumes that there is an objective attitude of dialogue that recognizes the interests of all actors equally and which Russia and NATO only have to switch to in order to make expansion work for both sides, but rather a conflict between two incompatible notions of the meaning of 'recognition' (and 'European peace'). And this conflict could not be and in fact was not resolved as a 'win-win outcome'. While Western policy makers attempted to reassure the Russians by presenting expansion as a contribution to European peace that was not directed against Russia, the Russians continued seeing it as intrusion into their sphere of influence. The Russian elite did not see the demise of the Soviet Empire as liberating experience and expressed an 'instinctive refusal to see international relations in any other terms but those of the balance of power and spheres of influence', the result being that 'no amount of persuasion from the West succeeded in convincing the Kremlin that enlargement was not against its interests'.[3] The Founding Act did very little to change this. In the run-up to the signing of the Act, the general public mood in Russia was suspicious about and often even hostile to any potential settlement that did not block expansion. While there was some cautious support immediately after the signing of the Act, this support faded very quickly (within days) and gave way to negative and unfavourable commentary in a large number of newspapers.[4] In addition, while the Russian signature of the Founding Act expressed a certain

[1] Lieven (1995) 196-197.
[2] Black (1999) 250.
[3] Eyal (1997) 716.
[4] Black (2000) 38-59.

willingness for accommodation, Russian officials were also publicly tying its success to one particular condition: that NATO not admit any former USSR republics, such as the Baltic states and Ukraine. From February 1997 onwards, Russian officials made it very clear that they would reconsider their relationship with NATO if one of these countries were to join the alliance. They kept saying this in the run-up to the signing of the Act in May, and after it had been signed, Yeltsin, Primakov, Vladimir Lukin and others stated repeatedly that the admission of the Baltic countries would abrogate the Founding Act. In 1998, this warning was given official status in Russian foreign policy through the concept of the 'red line', a demarcation line which coincided with the borders of the former USSR and which NATO must not cross.[1]

This implies that the Founding Act could not be interpreted, as Fierke and so many other Western supporters of NATO enlargement argued, as a win-win game, in which Russia acquiesced to NATO expansion in exchange for concessions. As Lieven (and others) cautioned at the time:

"The widespread impression in the West now seems to be that, with the signing of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, the question of relations with Russia has been solved and Russia's objections to NATO expansion dealt with. Nothing of the sort is the case. Although it is understandable that Western governments wish to give that impression, it is worrisome that so many Western journalists, and even Western diplomats, seem genuinely convinced that relations have somehow been raised to a new and better level. The celebration of the accord is another sign of a disturbing trend in contemporary Western diplomacy: the obscuring of real and dangerous issues by the empty rhetoric of goodwill and, still worse, by the apparently genuine self-deception that such talk really can substitute for agreements on substantive issues."[2]

By arguing that the Founding Act made NATO expansion into Eastern Europe, and in particular to the Baltic countries, acceptable to Russia or that it designed this expansion in a way that recognized legitimate Russian interests[3], Fierke does not give an account of how the Russians actually defined their legitimate interests but of what she thinks these interests should be. For this expansion, and in particular a second wave that included the Baltic countries and that could possibly stretch to Ukraine, was simply unacceptable to the Russian government. Given the unanimous domestic support for the opposition to NATO enlargement, given the largely negative reactions to the Founding Act, and given the Kremlin's persistent demand that NATO not expand into the former USSR, I believe it is implausible to argue that Russia's signature of

[1] Black (1999) 250-251, 252, 256-258, 264-265; Black (2000) 54, 81; Lieven (1998) 144.
[2] Lieven (1998) 143; see also Hanson (1998) 21-22.
[3] See in particular Fierke (1998) 206-207; Fierke (1999a) 422-423; and Fierke (1999b) 47-49.

the Founding Act was part of 'Russia's long-term strategy, which realized that expansion will weaken the military dimension of the alliance and eventually transform it into a political pan-European security organization'. The Russians clearly continued seeing (and have done so until today) NATO as a military alliance.[1] I also find it implausible to sell NATO expansion as a non-military expansion that would probably transform NATO into a political organization or to argue that, in the 1990s, NATO had transformed from 'an agent of aggression to an organiser of dialogue that was healing the divisions of Europe'. There was no sign whatsoever that the alliance was going to evolve into a purely political organization. The Founding Act was a legally non-binding document in which NATO merely declared that it 'had no intention' to station nuclear forces on the territories of the new members. Moreover, in the 1990s, NATO conducted the first two military operations in its history, one of which was not sanctioned by the UN Security Council. The picture that emerges from these events is not that of an 'organizer of dialogue, peace and stability in Europe' but rather that of a powerful *military* alliance which retained its full operational capacities while taking on the new task of promoting liberal values, either through expanding or the (illegal) use of force. I presume it is a picture like this that many Russians had at the end of the decade.

(2) I now want to suggest that this tension between the assumed universality of the logic of dialogue and its actual particularity, which is evident in Fierke's analyses of NATO expansion and which she only manages to solve by imposing this logic on those who did not accept it, also underlied the project of NATO expansion and, as a result, has produced adverse political consequences. John Mearsheimer has recently argued that NATO expansion is one of the factors which, in combination with the EU's expansion and the West's strategy of promoting democracy in Eastern Europe, has brought about the current and ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Mearsheimer argues that the expansion was underpinned by what he calls the 'liberal world view', which emphasises the possibility of progress and for overcoming power politics in international relations. NATO expansion was part of a liberal project that aimed to promote democracy and economic interdependence in Eastern Europe and to embed the countries of the region in international institutions. This liberal belief in progress was so strong that NATO adopted an open-door policy, which led it to successively include more and more states and to finally reach out for Ukraine and Georgia in the mid-2000s.[2] Mearsheimer argues that the problem with this liberal expansion project was not that its advocates had dishonest intentions; they did indeed

[1] Hanson (1998) 19-20.
[2] Mearsheimer (2014a) 77-78, 80, 83-84.

hold the view that the promotion of democracy and stability through enlargement was benign and would also benefit Russia. The problem was that the Russians did not see it this way. While the Western advocates saw enlargement as a step towards the creation of a liberal all-inclusive order that was beneficial to everyone, the Russians, worrying about the balance of power in their neighbourhoods and the intrusion of another great power, feared the presence of NATO at their borders, which became more realistic after the formation of a pro-Western government in Ukraine in February 2014. While the West's approach was rooted in the promotion of economic interdependence, liberal values and democracy, the Russians adhered to a realist logic of balance of power and spheres of influence.[1]

While not directly writing about Ukraine, Waltz made, in the early 2000s, a criticism of NATO expansion that is similar to Mearsheimer's. He too argues that expansion is embedded in a liberal project that is pushed by US, which is the sole remaining superpower. And like Mearsheimer, Waltz argues that this US-led expansion project was 'genuine'. The motivations of the artificers of expansion such as Clinton and Anthony Lake were indeed to promote democracy in the Eastern European Countries.[2] "The powerful state may, and the United States does, think of itself as acting for the sake of peace, justice and well-being in the world."[3] The problem, however, is that justice, peace and well-being 'are defined to the liking of the powerful, which may conflict with the preferences of the others.' That is, in the absence of international checks, the liberal internal impulses of the US come to dominate its foreign policy at the expense of the narrow national interest, and it is precisely these 'benign internal impulses' which frighten others.[4]

I think that both Mearsheimer and Waltz both point to the main problem of NATO expansion, and the logic of dialogue in which this expansion has been embedded. The expansion has been grounded in the cosmopolitan idea of organizing European security through a community of democratic states that pursues peaceful relations with neighbouring countries and that leaves behind notions such as realpolitik, the balance of power and spheres of influence. This idea presupposes the rationality of the world, e.g. the existence of a behaviour, a set of practices or an attitude that recognizes the interests of all or that enables the harmonious reconciliation of all interests to an equal extent. This, however, has turned out to be an illusion. For what the Western advocates of enlargement have considered to be inclusive behaviour that recognizes

[1] Mearsheimer (2014a) 82-85; Mearsheimer (2014b) 178.
[2] Waltz (2000a) 34.
[3] Waltz (2000a) 24.
[4] Waltz (2000a) 24, 34.

all interests has been seen by many Russians as an act of exclusion that threatens their security. The problem which NATO expansion has exposed is not the problem of making Russia and the West switch to that objective attitude which recognizes all interests within a game of dialogue, but rather the failure to agree on the meaning of recognition and, consequently, of a durable European peace. In other words, the logic of dialogue, which claimed to be universal and inclusive, has turned out to be particularistic and non-generalizable, and this non-generalizability has produced adverse political consequences, as is shown by the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. And these consequences were, to some extent, predictable. In an article published *in 1995*, Lieven quotes a Russian senior foreign policy adviser, whom he describes as 'sober, centrist and pragmatic',[1] on the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO:

"We would have to consider using their dependence on our oil and gas to do the greatest possible damage to the Ukrainian economy, causing destabilisation by stirring up the Russians in Ukraine, and especially the Crimeans, and greatly increasing military pressure over Sevastopol. This would lead to an international crisis of the first order."[2]

(3) I finally want to suggest that the case of NATO expansion casts general doubt on the logic of dialogue as a political ethic. I believe that this doubt has been expressed most powerfully by Max Weber in his lecture entitled *Politics as a Vocation*. At the end of this lecture, Weber distinguishes between two different kinds of political ethic, which he calls the *ethics of conviction* and the *ethics of responsibility*. Political action that is guided by the ethics of conviction attempts to realize absolute standards of morality. It reduces politics to a means for pursuing 'what is right' or for 'being in the right' (Rechthaben). In so doing, the ethicist of conviction presupposes a rational world that is susceptible and responsive to his acts of justice. He acts on the maxim that 'from good only follows good and from evil only follows evil'. Weber argues that this ethic fails to take account of the intrinsic irrationality of the world and the fact that acts which are considered good can have evil consequences (and vice versa). That is, it fails to consider and take responsibility for the consequences of the actions advocated by it. If the ethicist of conviction's actions entail adverse consequences in that the world does not favourably respond to these actions, it is the world which is to blame for being irrational rather than himself. And this passing over of the blame can easily translate into a belligerent crusader stance that attempts to make the world rational through a 'final act of force'. The ethicist of

[1] Lieven (1996).
[2] Lieven (1995) 198.

conviction simply 'cannot bear the ethical irrationality of the world'. Weber opposes this ethics of conviction with the ethics of responsibility, whose follower assumes that the world is essentially irrational and, as a result, does not pass the blame for the consequences of his actions on that world but takes responsibility for these consequences himself. The ethicist of responsibility knows that, by engaging in politics - which relies on violence as its distinct means -, he is playing with 'diabolical powers' and that his acts can have adverse consequences for which *he* will be accountable. Rather than simply doing what is 'right' or 'just', he will act in a way that guarantees him the highest chance of success, given the probable consequences of his actions. Weber is clear that this may well involve the recourse to immoral means to achieve certain ends, the use of violence, or the putting of one's country above higher aims such as international peace. It also requires moving from the sterile question of 'past injustices' to a consideration of the *sober interests* at stake in a situation and of the responsibility for the *future*.[1]

I argue that the ethics of dialogue resembles and faces a similar problem as the ethics of conviction. Like the latter, the ethics of dialogue presumes the intrinsic rationality of the world. That is, it is based on the belief that human beings are collectively capable of agreeing on the boundary between behaviour that fails to recognize and that does recognize the other; between pretexts or 'discrepancies between words and deeds', and consistent moral arguments; or, more simply, between 'right and wrong'. Given that there exists a stance of dialogue which is intrinsically or universally good in that it recognizes all interests equally, the activist can simply advocate the adoption of, and each politician simply has to individually adopt, this stance *without* being concerned with the effects or consequences this will have on the others. For the adoption of the good attitude of dialogue by one actor will be reciprocated and identically understood by all others - if Machiavella starts acting as if she had respect and dignity, the Prince will, albeit grudgingly, reciprocate her stance and treat her as an equal partner.

The problem is, as the the case of NATO expansion shows, that the world is often irrational and resists our attempts to make it more just. What is considered as a consistent position that lives up its moral justifications by one party can have adverse consequences because it is seen as a contradiction or an act of exclusion by another. Like the ethicist of conviction, the advocate or practitioner of dialogue cannot cope with this irrationality of the world. His response is to blame the world for being irrational and to impose his stance on it. The academic advocate does so by imposing dialogue on those who do not consent to it on paper. The activist or the politician takes a more belligerent stance and pushes for a policy of dialogue against the resistance of the

[1] Weber (1988) 435-450.

other. For, given that this policy stands for a rational stance that objectively recognizes the interests of all, the resisting other must be making a mistake or a victim of ignorance. This belligerent version of dialogue has been frequently articulated in relation to the current conflict in Ukraine, and in particular by those who pushed for NATO expansion in the 1990s. I believe that the Polish intellectual Adam Michnik, who is one of the main advocates of dialogue that challenge the Communist dictatorship in Fierke's *Changing Games*, is representative of this group of hawks. In recent interviews and articles, Michnik has argued that the Ukraine conflict was caused by the actions of an authoritarian Russian leader who lies, deceives, only understands the language of force and who pursues an expansionist foreign policy in order to re-establish the Russian Empire. Michnik, of course, also does not miss the nowadays obligatory reference to 'Munich 1938' and urges the West to resist Putin: weapons and military advisers for Ukraine![1] Michnik's argument relies on second-image reasoning in its purest form: war results from the actions of authoritarian rulers who do not represent the general democratic will, and democracies pursue peaceful policies; war is reduced to a defect that is brought about by an autocratic and manipulative ruling elite. In a talk given in 2009, Michnik made it very clear how and by whom these autocrats should be generally dealt with:

> "While history is the permanent struggle of the spirit of freedom against the world of enslavement, the world of enslavement is made up of systems, ideologies and totalitarian methods; it is dictatorship, fundamentalism, chauvinism, populism as an article of faith and terrorism as a method of action. These threats should be faced head-on. This is the reason for the military presence of NATO in Afghanistan. NATO is needed today because there are still many enemies of freedom."[2]

I believe this quote fully reveals the problem with the logic of dialogue as a political ethic. Given their belief in the possibility of rational improvement of the world, the adherents of dialogue adopt and promote those policies which they think will bring this improvement about without being concerned about the actual effects of these policies on others. And if these others resist or do not want to be made rational, the temptation easily arises to enlighten them by force, as Michnik's views make clear. I wish to emphasise that I do not approve of Putin's recent actions; the Russian president pursues an autocratic course of action at home, he is at least indirectly responsible for the murders of many of his political opponents, and he has broken international law by taking Crimea and supporting the separatists in Ukraine. However, I

[1] Michnik (2014); Michnik (2015).
[2] Michnik (2009).

believe it is highly dangerous to advocate a cosmopolitan political project whose universalizability rests on questionable grounds and to enshrine this project in the raison d'etre of the most powerful military alliance in the world. I find it deeply frightening that this military alliance, starting with the expansion in the 1990s, has now reached a stage where it defines itself as 'based on the common values of liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law', which 'are universal and perpetual' and which it is 'determined to defend through unity, solidarity, strength and resolve'.[1] This kind of cosmopolitan crusader spirit backed up by military force will most certainly call out resistance and entail consequences most of us wish to avoid.

The Particularity of Occidentalist Rhetoric

In the remainder of this chapter, I want argue that Jackson's evaluation of German reconstruction suffers from a similar problem as Fierke's analysis of NATO expansion. In the previous chapter, I have argued that Jackson not simply traces the rhetorical victory of the occidentalist position over the exemplarist and *Sonderweg* rivals but also endorses or approves of this victory himself. What he essentially argues is that the occidentalist position was more legitimate than the exemplarist course of action and, consequently, that German reconstruction and integration into Western institutions was the 'right thing to do'. Jackson employs a strategy that is similar to that of Fierke's in order to justify this evaluation. He argues that the deployment of occidentalist arguments, which emphasised a value-based community of Western states that had to be defended, was *universally effective* in that even the opponents *had no choice* but to consent to it.[2] Jackson argues that this universal effectiveness resulted from the fact that all participants to the debate, and even those opposed the occidentalist course of action, shared a *common ground*, which was the idea of Western civilization. What this idea implied was, as I have outlined above, a commitment to the broader Western community that is based on democracy, liberty and freedom, and a rejection of power politics, self-help and the narrow national interest.[3] It is this shared common ground that made the adoption of the occidentalist stance, which embraced the values of the Western community more fully than the more nationalist exemplarist rivals, the obvious winner of the debate.

In what follows, I will argue that Jackson's evaluation of the occidentalist stance as a morally superior position to which even the opponents had to consent, which follows from his

[1] NATO (2010) 35.
[2] Jackson (2003) 238; Jackson (2006) 47, 49, 113, 175, 179-180, 188, 201, 209, 210-211, 215, 223.
[3] Jackson (2006) 53-54, 57, 59-60, 63-68; see also ch 1, 15-16.

assumption of a shared commitment to the idea of Western civilization by all actors, is unpersuasive. What he overlooks is that the idea of Western civilization was not shared by all participants and that, consequently, occidentalist arguments which emphasised the need to defend this civilization did not engender universal consent. While American involvement in Europe, the formation of NATO, and Germany's integration into Western institutions may have been justified with occidentalist ideas or predicated on the logic of occidentalism, these ideas were deeply contested and continued to be so after the occidentalist course of action had become the dominant policy in the mid-1950s. Jackson misrepresents a particular and non-generalizable occidentalist stance as a generally valid claim to which everyone had to consent. In what follows, I will attempt to expose this non-generalizability by discussing the political interventions of George Kennan, who was one of the key participants in the debate and who is interpreted by Jackson as an advocate of the occidentalist cause. I will argue that Jackson misinterprets Kennan in that the latter was not committed to the idea of a Western civilization and, as a result, did not consent to the occidentalist position which conceived of the conflict between the Soviet Union and the West along civilizational lines. I will do so by proceeding in three steps.

In order to see how Kennan's views are in stark opposition to the occidentalist course of action, I want to recall, first (1), what is essentially implied by the the idea of Western civilization, which Jackson assumes to be commonly shared, and the occidentalist stance, whose universal effectiveness flows from this assumption. As I outlined above, Jackson argues that the idea of Western civilization implied a shared commitment to a broader community of states that was based on the values of democracy, liberty and freedom as well as a rejection of self-help, narrow self-interest and power politics. In the American context, it also implied the commonly shared belief in the vanguard role of the US, which had realized Western values more fully than any other country and which took a distinct moral stance in its foreign policy that was different from traditional European power politics. Given this fundamental distinction between strategic and value-based action, the deployment of occidentalist rhetoric to justify an American involvement in Europe and German reconstruction could only mean a mobilization of the West as a community of *liberal values* against Russian totalitarianism. And this becomes clear in Jackson's analysis of the evolution of the debate. Jackson makes it clear that what made the occidentalist position prevail was the appeal to the common liberal values of Western civilization *as opposed to* mere geostrategic or economic interests. As the quotes from speeches and statements in his analysis clearly indicate, the advocates of the occidentalist course of action

emphasise the need to defend the democratic way of life of the West, which is part of its common heritage and based on individual liberty, against Soviet terror, tyranny and oppression. Likewise, the deployment of occidentalist rhetoric implied that the US has a responsibility to get involved in Europe not for narrow geostrategic reasons but because it was part of a lager community of Western values. In the same way, Jackson argues that the occidentalist logic implied that Germany had to be reconstructed not simply for economic reasons but because it was a member of the larger cultural community of the West that could be trusted and that had to be saved from Soviet oppression.[1] While Jackson is keen to emphasise that this defense of liberal values in occidentalist discourse was limited to the West and Europe (as opposed to the whole world), it remains nevertheless that the deployment of occidentalist rhetoric transformed the conflict between the West and the Soviet Union into a conflict of different political values and ways of life.

I now (2) want to draw attention to Jackson's location of Kennan's political views in the occidentalist discourse just outlined. On Jackson's interpretation, Kennan was committed to the ideas of Western civilization and of the US as the leader of this civilizational community, and his political interventions were important for articulating the new occidentalist strategy. Jackson interprets Kennan's opposition to the Soviet Union, which he voiced through the idea of *containment*, as resulting from "(…) a fundamental diagnosis of the Soviet Union as the chief opponent of 'Western Civilization'."[2] From a quote from the *Long Telegram*, in which Kennan describes the traditional sense of insecurity and fear that has afflicted Russian rulers when coming into contact with a more advanced West, Jackson infers that Kennan explains Soviet actions in terms of a non-Western Russian essence which Western statesmen have to deal with.[3] When Kennan talks about 'Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western World', and when he writes that the success of the Soviets will depend on the 'cohesion and firmness which the Western world can muster', Jackson interprets this as a conceptualization of a conflict along civilizational lines.[4] Kennan's critique of the universalism of the Truman Doctrine is interpreted by Jackson as resulting from Kennan's occidentalism, which led him to advocate the preservation of Europe on civilizational grounds and to neglect other non-European regions;[5] in order to prove this point, Jackson adds a quote from Kennan's National War College lectures:

[1] Jackson (2006) 154-156, 158-164, 167-168, 170-172, 176-177.
[2] Jackson (2006) 135.
[3] Jackson (2006) 136.
[4] Jackson (2006) 136, 153.
[5] Jackson (2006) 153.

"Remember that in abandoning Europe we would be abandoning not only the fountainheads of most of our own culture and tradition; we would also be abandoning all other areas in the world where progressive representative government is a working proposition."[1]

Finally, when Kennan calls on the US to provide 'guidance to European societies', Jackson argues that this is a call on the US to assume the 'active leadership of the West'.[2]

I now (3) want to argue that this location of Kennan's political interventions, which he made in the aftermath of WWII, in the occidentalist discourse is implausible. I argue, first (i), that Kennan's *general view* of the role of the US in international politics stood opposed to the idea of it as a 'city on a hill' leading a Western civilization. I believe this becomes particularly clear when examining a series of lectures given by Kennan in 1951, which is entitled *American Diplomacy 1900-1951* and which develops a general idea of a 'good foreign policy' through a critique of US foreign policy in the first half of the 20th century. In his lectures, Kennan attacks what he calls the 'legalistic-moralistic approach', which came to dominate US foreign policy in this period. This approach is based on the idea that the US is more progressive than the rest of the world and that this imposes the mission on it to make international relations peaceful and orderly. This 'Rotarian idealism' involves the transposition of the Anglo-Saxon concept of individual law on the international field and the establishment of a system of legal rules which eliminates the possibility for aggression; it implies making the world safe for democracy; and it implies the possibility of punishing violations of the international juridical regime.[3] While Kennan sympathises with this idealism, and while he believes that it *someday* may make its imprint on the world, he argues that it is out of touch with the time in which he is writing. The idealist approach wrongly assumes that other peoples are like the US, that they react in the same way in given circumstances and that they do not have aspirations which they regard to be more legitimate than international peace. This approach fails to see that, by advocating general moral principles, it entails more harmful consequences than the attempt to deal with the 'awkward conflicts of national interest' in order to ensure international stability. And, by subjecting the behaviour and political institutions of states to moral and legal judgement, this approach gives rise to a feeling of moral superiority on the part of the judge, which easily spills over into a *total war*, e.g. a war that aims to bring about the unconditional surrender of the law-breaker and the change of his political institutions; while being rooted in a desire to do away with conflicts,

[1] Jackson (2006) 153.
[2] Jackson (2006) 137.
[3] Kennan (1951) 95-100; Kennan (1991) 297.

wars fought in the name of higher moral principles make violence more enduring and more destructive than those fought for the national interest.[1] As a result, Kennan argues, it is imperative for US foreign policy to adopt a new attitude of *soberness* and *detachment*, which 'admits that our own national interest, unsullied by arrogance toward other people or delusions of superiority, is all we are really capable of knowing and understanding'.[2]

In his lectures, Kennan illustrates and develops this critique through a discussion of various events in the first half of the 20th century. For instance, he criticises the US annexation of Puerto Rico following the war with Spain as a dangerous attempt to exercise paternalistic responsibility for other people.[3] Likewise, he is critical of the persistent insistence of US officials on the territorial integrity of China. The principle of territorial integrity was too ambiguous to offer any practical alternative to the special interests, positions and power struggles of the various actors operating in China, and the fact that US officials continuously upheld this principle without suggesting or taking responsibility for any practical alternatives particularly antagonized the Japanese, whose interests would have been seriously affected by its implementation.[4] It is a similar kind of universalist-moralist thinking in US foreign policy that Kennan attacks in his discussion of the two world wars. He argues that the US intervention in WWI came too late and, when it did eventually happen, was predicated on the faulty idea of fighting a total war against Germany because it was antidemocratic and because it had violated international law as well as of 'making the world safe for democracy'. For Kennan, this faulty idea is partly grounded in the characteristics of democracies, which tend to fight wars in anger and in order to *punish* the aggressor, aiming at his total destruction and unconditional surrender. Kennan argues that, rather than engaging in a total war fought for moralistic slogans and the overthrow of the enemy's political system, the US should have intervened as soon as possible in order to end the hostilities with a view to maintaining the balance of power in Europe and ensuring a minimum prejudice to the future stability of the continent. For, as he makes already clear on the first pages, the security of the US has always depended on the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe.[5] As for WWII, Kennan argues that it is precisely this security imperative which has been poorly understood. While many have seen the Western war effort against Germany as a war for democracy, the geopolitical situation in Europe implied from the beginning that, for the Western democracies, any war could only be a war of defense which

[1] Kennan (1951) 95-102; Kennan (1991) 297-298.
[2] Kennan (1951) 102-103.
[3] Kennan (1951) 19-20.
[4] Kennan (1951) 40-48, 53-54.
[5] Kennan (1951) 3-6, 63-72.

would ensure their survival but would not realize any higher purposes. Germany and Japan could only be defeated with the help of another totalitarian power, Russia, and this implied that Russia would become a claimant at the peace table.[1]

I believe that the picture which emerges from these lectures is that Kennan does not see the idea of a Western civilization based on democracy and liberty as a guiding principle for US foreign policy. While he certainly has some sympathy for the cause of Western democracy, his lectures express a deep suspicion about a foreign policy that attempts to realize any higher values such as democracy or an international juridical regime, be it on a global or European scale. For Kennan, it is not the allegiance to a community of Western democracies but the narrow national interest that should drive US conduct. The interest which the US has in Europe is not the defense of Western democracy but the maintenance of the balance of power - the relationship between the US and Europe is primarily strategic! This does not exclude that the US takes a leadership role and intervenes in Europe or elsewhere. The goal, however, must always be to maintain the balance of power. I think this is why he usually refers to the US not as a 'city on a hill' but simply as a *great power* (in his X-article, he uses the term *world power*).[2]

I now (ii) want to argue that Kennan's specific opposition to the Soviet Union and his advocacy of containment did equally not stem from his commitment to a Western civilization whose democratic values were threatened by an evil Soviet empire. Kennan did not see Soviet expansionism as a civilizational threat, his idea of opposing this expansionism was grounded in a non-civilizational logic, and, moreover, he actively opposed the framing of the conflict as a struggle of civilizations in American political discourse. In order to make this clear, it is useful to start with Kennan's explanation of Soviet expansionism. His key argument is that the Soviet regime's expansionism is primarily driven by the need to assure the security of its *internal* political power. When the Bolsheviks came to power, they realized that socialism could only be established through dictatorship. Kennan emphasises that this dictatorship was *absolute*: Stalin and his followers were so fanatic, and their sense of insecurity was so great, that they could not tolerate any rival opposition. As long as there was a capitalist opposition within Russia, the maintenance of an excessive apparatus of repression could be justified with reference to this opposition. When this internal danger was eliminated, the retention of dictatorship could only be justified with the existence of a *hostile capitalist world* threatening Russia. For the adoption of the Marxist ideology implied that there was an intrinsic antagonism between socialism and

[1] Kennan (1951) 75-77, 83-84, 88-90.
[2] Kennan (1987 [1947]) 867; Kennan (1991) 67, 173, 213.

capitalism, that the aims of the capitalist world and the Soviet regime were incompatible, and that capitalism bore within itself the creeds of its own destruction.[1] This idea of a hostile world was reinforced by a 'neurotic' or 'xenophobic' sense of insecurity, which has traditionally afflicted Russian rulers - rather than the people - who have always feared that contact with the outside world would expose the backward character of their rule (this distinction between rulers and people also shows that Kennan does not ascribe an 'anti-Western essence' to Russia, as is argued by Jackson).[2] Kennan makes it very clear that this notion of a hostile world is a *fiction*: it is not rooted in an objective analysis of the outside world and it has little to do with the conditions outside Russia's borders. It arises purely from the inner necessity to justify domestic repression. This is why it does not matter whether foreign hostility really exists or not. While there has been a foreign menace to Russia in some periods and not in others, this has never had any effect on the constant representation of that menace in Russian propaganda. Moreover, the foreign enemy represented as a threat can vary - i.e. while the French and British appeared as threats to Soviet security in the early 1930s, it was the Nazis who were depicted as a menace a few years later.[3] While the fiction of a hostile capitalist encirclement is not a direct motive of the Soviet leaders but rather a prism through which they see world, it has become so deeply ingrained in their thought by the excesses already committed in its name that they can no longer dispense with it. This is why this fiction must be preserved and underlie all manifestations of Soviet foreign policy.[4]

For Kennan, this analysis of Soviet expansionism implies, on the one hand, that the Soviet Union will pursue an expansionist foreign policy which cannot be changed through persuasion or the appeal to common purposes; given the regime's adherence to the fiction of a hostile capitalist encirclement, appeals to the peaceful co-existence of the capitalist and socialist worlds will fall on deaf ears - the Soviet leadership is 'impervious to the logic of reason'.[5] Yet, on the other hand, it implies that the nature of Soviet expansionism is such that it does not correspond to a civilizational threat which puts all its efforts in the complete destruction of the Western democratic way of life. This is because, first (a), this expansionism is not exclusively directed against Western democracy, or civilization, but largely *indiscriminate*. Kennan makes this clear when he describes the basic objective of Soviet policy:

[1] Kennan (1987 [1947]) 853-856; Kennan (1991) 59, 71, 73, 117-119, 121-122, 127.
[2] Kennan (1946); Kennan (1991) 115-117.
[3] Kennan (1946); Kennan (1987 [1947]) 856-857; Kennan (1991) 120-121.
[4] Kennan (1987 [1947]) 857-858; Kennan (1991) 112-115, 121, 127.
[5] Kennan (1946); Kennan (1991) 8, 63-66, 127, 252, 257.

"What is this objective? It is the relative increase in the power of the Soviet Union as compared with the power of states abroad not under Soviet influence. (…) [I]t must work toward the reduction of the total potential - military, economic, political, and moral - of all other nuclei of power abroad, whether in the form of individual states or of associations of states."[1]

Soviet expansionism does not particularly aim to undermine Western democracy but *any* country not under Soviet influence. I believe that this general focus of Soviet expansionism is confirmed by Kennan's lucid observation that it does not really matter whether the world is really hostile to Russia or not, and that the nature of the country that is represented as an enemy can vary, ranging from democratic to totalitarian systems. It is of course true, as Jackson points out, that Kennan occasionally uses the 'West' as a category, that he talks about the Soviet threat to the 'free institutions of the Western world', and that he emphasises the 'need for the Western world to stand firm'.[2] However, this reference to the notion of the West requires two qualifications. First, Kennan also frequently refers to the Soviet threat as a threat to the 'capitalist world' or the 'world as such';[3] this is completely overlooked by Jackson. Second, when Kennan talks about Soviet pressure on the 'free institutions of the Western world', he does not seem to say that *Western* freedom is under threat. While he is not fully clear about this, his National War College lectures reveal that he uses the term 'freedom' in a very *broad* sense: as the freedom of all peoples 'to live in a manner consistent with their independence and their indigenous and traditional forms of government, even if these forms do not entirely correspond to democratic standards'. That is, what is threatened by Soviet expansionism is not the 'Western democratic way of life' but the 'freedom of people everywhere to lead an independent national existence'.[4] The only reason why this freedom is particularly under threat in Europe is that this region offers a huge economic and military potential, and thus a 'greater prize' for the Soviets.[5] Second (b), Soviet expansionism does not engage in ideological crusades but is highly flexible, pragmatic and capable of showing restraint. This is partly because, for Kennan, Marxist ideology is not a direct motive of Soviet policy but rather a 'prism', 'form' or 'method' through which this policy is executed and through which Soviet leaders see the world. This implies a certain flexibility and pragmatism in that the Soviet leadership is at liberty to put forward any thesis it finds useful at a particular moment. This is reinforced by the fact that the Marxist theory

[1] Kennan (1991) 57-58; see also Kennan (1991) 59, 299.
[2] For example, Kennan (1946); Kennan (1991) 75, 83.
[3] Kennan (1946); Kennan (1987 [1947]) 867; Kennan (1991) 60, 72, 84, 127-128, 256.
[4] Kennan (1991) 66-67, 76, 160, 179, 302.
[5] Kennan (1991) 299.

of the inevitable fall of capitalism does not specify when this fall will come about. As a result, Soviet leaders do not expect the complete destruction of all rival power over night and they do not engage in adventuristic revolutionary projects abroad that could embarrass Soviet power. When the Kremlin sees itself confronted with superior force, it accommodates itself to this situation and pursues a retreat.[1]

I believe what emerges from this is that, while Kennan sees Soviet expansionism indeed as a threat, he does not conceive of it as a *civilizational* threat that is primarily bent on the crusaderish destruction of Western democracy. Rather, this expansionism arises from an ideology which is not the basic driving force of Soviet policy but nevertheless essential for the justification of internal dictatorship, and which, as a result, renders this expansionism both indiscriminate and capable of restraint. I think this is precisely why Kennan refers to this expansionism as an 'irritating by-product of an ideology indispensable to the Soviet regime for internal reasons'.[2]

Given this characterization of the Soviet threat, it is then no surprise that Kennan's prescription for opposing this threat - containment - does not correspond to a response to a civilizational threat. The idea of containment, which Kennan defines as the 'application of counter-pressures at constantly shifting geographical and political points that correspond to the manoeuvres of Soviet policy',[3] is grounded in a logic of *strategic rationality*, which aims to balance Soviet expansionism but which refrains from pursuing any deeper Western integration or taking extreme measures of defense. This becomes particularly clear in the National War College lectures, where he argues that the containment of the Kremlin's expansionism through the marshalling of all forces and build-up of counter-pressures aims at making it evident to the Soviet leadership that attempts to break through this containment would be detrimental to Soviet interests. That is, the deployment of counterforce amounts to 'setting rational incentives', which induces the Russians to see that expansionism is not in their interest and which will be effective given the Soviet leadership's pragmatism and sensitivity to power.[4]

It is precisely because of this need to change Soviet behaviour through incentives, and not because of the defense of Western values, that Kennan advocates an economic recovery programme for Western Europe. In his National War College lectures, he is very clear that the purpose of this programme, which will ensure economic recovery and political stability, is to

[1] Gaddis (1977) 875-876; Kennan (1991) 55, 58-59, 61-62, 112-113, 127-128, 250-251; Kennan (1987 [1947]) 859-861.
[2] Kennan (1991) 128.
[3] Kennan (1987 [1947]) 862.
[4] Kennan (1991) 128, 258-259.

check Soviet expansionism and to maintain the balance of power on the continent. For the US, the importance of Western Europe, and in particular Germany, lies not in the region's belonging to a community of Western democracies but in its *strategic value*, e.g. in the fact that it has the highest economic-military potential in the world and that this potential could fall under Soviet control.[1] This means that Kennan's line of reasoning stands in opposition to the logic of occidentalism outlined by Jackson, which advocates American aid for Western Europe on the basis of a common community of values as opposed to geostrategic or short-term interests. The quote provided by Jackson from the National War College lectures, which emphasises the common cultural and political heritage of the West and which Jackson takes as a proof of Kennan's occidentalism, does not change this picture.[2] For if one considers this quote in relation to the whole paragraph and the two paragraphs directly following it, it becomes clear that Kennan does not expresses empathy for his fellow Europeans who are part of the same cultural community but rather gives a warning that a communist-totalitarian Europe would matter to US security even if one left aside the loss of the region's military-economic potential. This is because if the US were the only country in the world with democratic institutions, this would strengthen the totalitarian forces within American society, which are already operating and preparing its overthrow ('there is a bit of a totalitarian in each of us').[3] In sum, Kennan expresses concern for the survival not of a higher Western community of values but of American society.

Kennan not only conceives of the containment of the Soviet Union as a response to a non-civilizational threat but also, and this seems to have completely escaped Jackson's analysis, *openly opposes* any far-reaching defense measures that perceive Soviet expansionism as a civilizational threat and that respond to this threat through a deeper political and military integration of Western countries. On the one hand, Kennan does not regard the cultural and political similarities among these countries to be strong enough to pursue such an integration. For instance, he is not only critical of the prioritization of the democratization of Germany over its economic recovery but goes even so far to claim that this democratization goes into the wrong direction:

"There is another point and that is the democratization of Germany. That is a very dubious point, and I am not sure the Germans can ever be democratized within our time. They lack the instinct for it, and it is going to have to be built up slowly, and we may be doing much more damage to any thought of democratization by the continuance

[1] Kennan (1991) 161, 167, 184, 185, 198, 200, 301, 307, 316.
[2] See 80.
[3] Kennan (1991) 167-168.

of the economic misery and the idleness of German youth than we could do good to it by the Länder government."[1]

I find it implausible to interpret someone making such comments as an advocate of a Western community of liberal values. Kennan's scepticism about more far-reaching integration measures is also evident in his opposition to the formation of NATO. While he accepts that the US and the Western European countries are *great friends* and that the latter may require unilateral security guarantees by the former, he rejects the formation of a formal military alliance among them which is based on the principle of reciprocal and unconditional aid.[2] Apart from the fact that there are no strategic reasons, Kennan expresses the view that alliances among democracies are generally unreliable because of the frequent change of leadership.[3]

Kennan argues, on the other hand, that a deeper political and military integration of the West, which follows from the perception of Soviet expansionism as a threat to a Western civilization, will render the conflict with the Soviet Union more destructive. Recall from above that the deployment of occidentalist rhetoric essentially transforms the conflict between the West and the Soviet Union into a conflict of opposing political constitutions and ways of life. For Kennan, it is precisely this transformation which is so dangerous because it renders this conflict *absolute* and implies the possibility of *total war*. In the X-article and the *Long Telegram,* he already cautions against emotional and hysterical reactions to Soviet expansionism, which entail 'tactless threats' and 'superfluous gestures of toughness' and which make it impossible for the Soviet leadership to comply with the demands of US policy in a way not too detrimental to Russian prestige.[4] In one of his final National War College lectures, this criticism becomes more explicit. There, he criticizes the growing tendency in American public discourse to equate the objective of US foreign policy toward Russia with turning Russia into a liberal state. This objective implies that a war with Russia can only be total, e.g. that it can only aim at the country's unconditional surrender, the total subjugation of its people and the change of its political constitution. Kennan argues that this attempt to change the political constitution of the Soviet Union through either public criticism or war is foolish. By attempting to impose democratization on Russia and by telling the Russians how badly they are governed, the US will only drive the people and the rulers closer together and make their resistance stronger.[5] In a Foreign Affairs article published in 1951, he makes a similar criticism, condemning the

[1] Kennan (1991) 195.
[2] Kennan (1967) 406-409.
[3] Kennan (1991) 310.
[4] Kennan (1946) 861-862.
[5] Kennan (1991) 283-284, 286-292.

tendency to judge other societies by the extent to which they correspond to American standards and ridiculing the expectation to make Russia a democracy.[1] Rather than changing Russia's *political constitution*, the objective should be, and this is precisely what containment is there for, to change Russia's *behaviour*. A constant frustration of the expansive tendencies of Soviet policy through containment will force the Soviet leadership to accept the peaceful co-existence of all peoples and could increase the wedge between the leadership and the people, which Kennan believes to already exist in Russian society.[2]

What emerges from this discussion on the last pages is that Jackson offers a gross misreading of Kennan's political interventions. Kennan was not committed to the idea of a Western civilization that was based on liberal values and led by the 'indispensable American nation', he did not see Soviet expansionism as a threat to this Western civilization of liberal values, his idea of containment was a non-civilizational response to Soviet expansionism, and he strongly opposed any policies that responded to this expansionism as a threat to a Western civilization of liberal values because of their potential to render this conflict even more protracted and dangerous. While I am not in a position to discuss this any further, I wish to add that Kennan was not the only one to disagree with the occidentalist course of action. Hans Morgenthau, who had already gained prominence through *Politics Among Nations*, made a similar criticism of the universalistic moralism of US post-war policy in his 1951 book entitled *American Foreign Policy: A Critical Examination*. In that book, he argues that any universalistic-moralistic project is inherently particular and that the US mission of defending democracy against communism - be that globally or only in Western Europe - transforms the conflict into an absolute struggle between an American crusader and an evil Soviet other, thereby rendering a negotiated settlement based on compromise and accommodation impossible.[3]

The main implication is that the deployment of occidentalist arguments was not, as Jackson argues, universally effective in that even the opponents had to consent to them. As the examples of Kennan and Morgenthau show, the occidentalist line of reasoning was non-generalizable in that it 'did not have effects on' (or was not accepted as valid by) some of the participants to the debate. And this line of reasoning was not universally effective because the formal criteria for effectiveness in terms of which it was framed - the preference for value-driven over self-interested conduct - were not shared by all participants to the debate. In other words, Jackson wrongly and arbitrarily represents a contested and non-generalizable occidentalist claim as a

[1] Kennan (1951) 131-132, 135-136, 152-153.
[2] Kennan (1991) 67, 83-85, 284-285, 290, 292; Kennan (1987 [1947]) 867-868.
[3] Morgenthau (1952) 23-39, 92-98, 113-121, 129-138, 139-158.

universally effective (or valid) argument. As a result, he provides an apologetic reading of history, which justifies the occidentalist course of action pursued at the time without seriously considering alternative moral arguments that were opposed to perceiving the conflict as a struggle of different civilizational values or ideologies. Jackson is able to disguise this non-generalizability of the occidentalist stance only by employing questionable strategies. On the one hand, while he is willing to include figures such as Talcott Parsons, Walter Lippman and T.S. Elliot as participants to the debate, he simply ignores Morgenthau, who had made a key intervention in the debate and who had gained acclaim as a scholar and public intellectual. In the case of Kennan, on the other hand, Jackson resorts to a questionable re-interpretation of textual evidence that does not fit with his argument. While he partly seems to recognize that Kennan's political interventions and the occidentalist stance do not really cohere with each other, this does not prevent him from claiming that Kennan's 'articulations were key moments in the formulation of the occidentalist project'.[1] Jackson can do so because:

"Indeed, the fact that they [Kennan and Churchill] do not draw out that [occidentalist] implication at this point serves to reinforce my argument that occidentalist language was not simply a way for political elites to justify a policy that they had already decided upon on (although it was sometimes used in this manner); instead, the unforeseen combination of discursive commonplaces makes possible the reconstruction of Germany, which actively begins at a later time."[2]

In this sentence, Jackson seems to basically adopt the principle according to which 'the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence'. The absence of occidentalist rhetoric in Kennan's interventions is transformed into a proof of the (gradual coming into) existence of that rhetoric.

[1] Jackson (2006) 135.
[2] Jackson (2006) 135 (footnote).

Conclusions

In this thesis, I have attempted to offer a critique of three constructivist theories. After having outlined these theories, and after having reconstructed three of their common features by relating them to an influential strand of hermeneutic philosophy, I have pointed out three problems, all of which arise from the use of the hermeneutic concept of intersubjectivity. First, I argued that the conceptualization of contingency as an intersubjective process implies a particular kind of determinism, which undermines the contingency this conceptualization was supposed to account for in the first place. The concept of intersubjectivity implies a prior universal consensus that fixes the formal or procedural conditions for the success and failure of positions and arguments, e.g. which determines what counts as an acceptable and an unacceptable position in the first place. This prior consensus transforms novelty into a predetermined choice in that novel arguments, claims and positions become 'logical' or 'best' responses to universally recognized contradictions. This in turn undermines the claim to account for particular choices as contingent outcomes. For the notion of a 'best' or 'most compelling response', to which even the opponent *must* consent, is incompatible with the argument that a particular choice or response was a contingent outcome that could have been otherwise, e.g. that it was just one possibility among other and *equally compelling* alternatives.

Second, I argued that the concept of intersubjectivity unavoidably entails a normative stance by the theorist, which eliminates the possibility of a value-free analysis of social change upheld by Fierke, Kessler and Jackson (as well as Skinner). The prior consensus which fixes the formal conditions for the success and failure of arguments is actually normative consensus in that it determines what counts as acceptable and unacceptable conduct. The determinism, which is entailed by this consensus, is properly speaking a normative hierarchization, in which superior moral attitudes 'decisively' or 'effectively' prevail over morally contradictory attitudes. By positing or assuming a prior consensus that determines the formal criteria which acceptable or successful positions have to meet, the theorist also *approves of* or *endorses* the normative validity of these criteria and the hierarchization of concrete moral attitudes following from them. I finally tried to show how the assumption of such a prior formal consensus leads to the advocacy of particular moral attitudes in the empirical analyses of Fierke, Kessler and Jackson. In their analyses, the three constructivists do not simply 'trace' or 'reconstruct' the emergence of certain empirical outcomes but also rationalize these outcomes as victories of certain moral attitudes over others.

Third, I attempted to point out the arbitrariness and persuasiveness of this privileging of particular moral attitudes over others, which is manifest in the constructivist real-world investigations. I did so by critically examining the link between these moral attitudes and the formal criteria of acceptability, on whose universal recognition the superiority of these moral attitudes depends. I argued that Fierke, Kessler and Jackson fail to show that the formal criteria, which allow for the generalizability of their preferred moral attitudes are in fact generally recognized, both in general and in particular empirical contexts. The failure of the three constructivists to show and inquire into the generalizability of their preferred moral attitudes makes the advocacy and privileging of them over others essentially arbitrary. Particular moral attitudes are arbitrarily elevated to the level of universally or generally valid positions.

In concluding, I want to flesh out two broader implications which I believe follow from this critique. The first (1) is that the activity of social theorizing, and in particular of theorizing particularity, not only mirrors but also both *rationalizes* and *performs* the world it seeks to explain, and that this rationalizing and performative dimension changes the nature of this activity. I do believe that Fierke, Kessler and Jackson, and the other 'like-minded' post-positivists whom I discussed in the introduction, make a very valuable point by arguing that social scientific understanding (or explanation, reconstruction, ect.) requires an account of the intersubjective self-understandings of the agents, e.g. of why intersubjective boundaries are drawn in practice in certain ways rather than in others. I want to suggest, however, that this transforms the notion of 'understanding' in a way that runs counter to the professed aims of these scholars. For what this thesis suggests is that an understanding of intersubjective practices in their particularity always involves some kind of rationalization, which puts these practices in a determinate relationship with alternative possibilities and which implies that these practices are not 'radically contingent' outcomes that unpredictably emerge against the background of equally plausible alternatives, and always performs the world to the extent that it is intrinsically bound up with moral judgements; and that, as a further implication, this changes the nature of social theory in that it raises the need to ground these judgements. While this notion of social theory gives further support to recent writings on the concept of *reflexivity* in international theory, which have a focused on similar issues, it also goes beyond these writings.

I believe that the rationalizing and performative function of social scientific explanation becomes clear through the discussion in chapters 4, 5 and 6. For what emerges from this discussion is that the understanding of particular intersubjective contexts, which proceeds by locating them in the wider space of intersubjective alternatives, is not a disinterested, or

unproblematic, process but rather implies an evaluative contrast and a rationalization of the relationship between actuality and possibility. I believe that Taylor's writings on ethnocentricity and the relationship between scientific and non-scientific cultures, which I discussed in chapter 4, make the relationship between rationalization/evaluation and social scientific understanding even more clear. Taylor argues that we cannot understand distant societies (past or actual) 'purely on their own terms', in their 'absolute uniqueness', or 'in their radical difference'. For such an endeavour would be completely unintelligible in that we would be unable to explain 'what is really going'. While we cannot bypass the intersubjective self-understandings of distant societies, we can *only* understand these self-understandings by putting them in a language of *perspicuous contrast* with our self-understandings, in which both become incommensurable alternatives in relation to some human constant. And it is precisely *because* they are in a relationship of incommensurability that assessment, evaluation and judgements of superiority become possible; a *proper understanding* of the agents, which aims to make them more comprehensible in their particularity, does not simply imply adopting or descriptively tracing their point of view but also challenging, criticizing and transforming the flaws, confusions and contradictions in their conduct.[1] What Taylor's argument suggests is that a social scientific explanation, which explains the particular coming about of certain intersubjective self-understandings by contrasting them with the other alternatives, at the same time rationalizes and evaluates the actual and the possible in relation to each other from the perspective of certain moral ends. In other words, explaining why or how a particular event occurred at the expense of other possibilities always implies giving an account of why the agents did the 'right thing' at the expense of less desirable possibilities, or, alternatively, why they made a mistake which could have been avoided given the existence of preferable alternatives. By contrast, a social scientific explanation that non-normatively 'traces' intersubjective practices as 'radically contingent' outcomes, which unpredictably emerge against the background of morally equally valid alternatives, seems to be an impossibility.

I think the argument that social scientific understanding is always bound up with rationalization and moral judgement, and, therefore, with the constitution of the world, is in line with a growing literature that emphasises the need for greater *(self-) reflexivity* in IR scholarship. Inanna Hamati-Ataya has forcefully emphasised the interrelationship between scientific knowledge and social praxis. She argues that, rather than being produced from an objective point of nowhere, scientific knowledge is always rooted in a particular historical

[1] Taylor (1985b) 92-94, 116-118, 123-126, 128-129, 144-150.

context which is constituted by particular values and 'socio-ideological' concerns. This mutual embeddedness of scientific facts and values implies that science and praxis are mutually constitutive. Knowledge and judgement/praxis are intrinsically connected.[1] Hamati-Ataya argues that a variety of philosophical and theoretical approaches in IR have failed to become more self-reflexive and take into account this interconnectedness and their own partisan role in legitimizing particular values as opposed to others. For instance, the positivist dualism between facts and values and its emphasis on objectivity, rationality and scientific rigour reflects particular bourgeois values, which have effectively marginalized critical approaches.[2] Yet Hamati-Ataya claims that these critical approaches too have failed to fully embrace self-reflexive scholarship. Critical theory embraces self-reflexivity by emphasising the historicity of knowledge that constitutes the world as well as its inscription in particular social interests. However, she argues, given that critical theory's own discourse is equally inscribed in particular social interests, it can only justify its own existence by presenting these interests in terms of the universally shared end of emancipation that applies to humanity as whole. The problem with this is that critical theory is a 'Western intellectual construct' and that the content of its emancipatory project is rooted in a particular view that marginalizes non-Western perspectives. On Hamati-Ataya's view, constructivist scholarship runs into a similar problem. Constructivists embrace self-reflexivity to the extent that they problematize the reification of reality by revealing its social constructedness. Yet, while the agents under study are socially constructed, the constructivist observer is somehow exempted from this social construction. In this way, reflexivity becomes a purely ontological problem rather than an epistemic principle of constructivist research.[3]

In order to overcome these problems, Hamati-Ataya makes the case for a 'maximalist commitment to reflexivity' in IR scholarship. While she is not clear what this exactly entails, such a commitment seems to primarily imply a *sociological* perspective which responds to and embraces the historicity and contextuality of all scientific knowledge. It acknowledges the historicity and value-ladenness of knowledge that is produced by IR scholarship and inscribes particular manifestations of knowledge, judgement and praxis in an open temporality that considers these manifestations "as historical potentialities whose meaning/value evolve through time, depending on both context and purpose."[4] A 'reflexivist ethos' helps to understand how

[1] Hamati-Ataya (2011) 262, 264, 273, 275-277.

[2] Hamati-Ataya (2011) 264, 266-267, 269-272, 276, 278-279.
[3] Hamati-Ataya (2012) 674-680.
[4] Hamati-Ataya (2011) 260, 273-274, 277-282.

the scientific accounts of IR scholars are dependent on and located in particular social, moral and ideological settings and how this makes them complicit in the production of social order.[1] By offering an understanding of the historicity of knowledge, reflexivism provides scholars with the possibility to produce a *plurality* of scientific approaches that pursue the reflectivity of knowledge and reality. Scientific knowledge no longer represents an eternal truth but a 'historical manifestation of responsible, meaningful action'.[2]

In his thought-provoking and eloquently-written book called *Recovering International Relations: The Promise of Sustainable Critique*, Daniel Levine has made an argument that is similar to that of Hamati-Ataya. Drawing on Theodor Adorno, Marx Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse's critique of enlightenment reason, he argues that IR has failed to fully come to grips with the problem of *reification*. On Levine's view, the abstract concepts on which all scientific thinking relies originate in particular interests and values. This applies to IR theories, which combine particular fact-value-traditions with particular methodological approaches. From this combination results the reification, or naturalization, of particular ontological, epistemological and normative assumptions: the contingent and constructed origin of particular fact-value-traditions is forgotten, and these traditions take on an objective quality; theoretical concepts become conflated with real world things.[3] This reification of particular fact-value traditions has political consequences in that it ignores the intrinsic complexity and indeterminacy of the world, which can never be subsumed under, or which is never identical with, particular concepts and understandings. By reifying particular fact-value traditions as natural givens, IR theories undermines the creation of *thinking spaces*, which open up the possibility of *choice* and other ways to see the world. Given that all scientific theory smuggles in and reifies certain values, interests and identities, it is in some sense ideological and political.[4]

Levine argues that the discipline of IR has been *partly* aware of the problem of reification. Many scholars have emphasised the need for critical self-reflexivity, which exposes reifications and orthodoxies in theoretical approaches and which goes together with positive knowledge-building. He claims, however, that this critical self-reflexivity has been only directed against *particular* reifications and not against reification *as such*. That is, self-reflexive critique has only been used instrumentally, e.g. in order to expose the political and ideological content of particular theories and to replace them with other political commitments. While a space for self-

[1] Hamati-Ataya (2012) 682, 686.
[2] Hamati-Ataya (2011) 281-283.
[3] Levine (2012) 11, 14-17, 24-26, 38, 41-42, 46-47, 64, 68, 92-93.
[4] Levine (2012) 11, 47-49, 52-53, 58, 61, 92.

reflexive critique has often been posited, this critique could never be *sustained*.[1] Levine's book discusses plenty of examples of this failure, such as critical security studies and critical IR theory. While critical theorists and security scholars have effectively exposed the normative and ideological agendas of realism, they have only done this to substitute and reify other highly contingent values - those of emancipation - as universal givens.[2]

In order to overcome these problems, Levine advocates a particular kind of self-reflexivity, which he calls *sustainable critique*. While sustainable critique acknowledges that a certain degree of reification is inevitable for all theorizing, it attempts to continuously check or manage its effects. Its point of departure is the assumption of fundamental non-identity between theoretical concepts and the world: each theory captures only a particular slice of that world, which reifies particular clusters of normative-political sensibility. While each offers a useful representation of the world, each equally distorts it in potentially dangerous ways. Each considers the world from its own distinct position, smuggling in particular interests, identities and parties. This normative-partisan character of all theory implies that neither is inherently more valid or useful than the other - 'any is as good or bad as the other.'[3] Sustainable critique attempts to manage these reifications, limitations and insufficiencies of all theories by continuously *chastening* and *balancing* them against each other. That is, it aims to expose all theories as historically contingent convergences of values, interests and identities, and to see "them as highly parsimonious expressions of complex ideological positions or value positions, whose right to expression is neither to be denied nor to be co-opted, but simply let be, as they are." The aim is not to synthesize different perspectives into a rational whole but to preserve their incommensurability, and, in this way, to raise the prospect of IR theory as a 'dynamic hybrid' of 'polyvocal, pluralist and mutually critical narratives', which reminds the theorist 'that different things are true for different people in an indeterminate world'.[4]

I believe that the argument that the social scientific understanding of particularity is bound up with rationalization and moral judgement is in line with the writings of Hamati-Ataya and Levine to the extent that these writings argue that all scientific knowledge ontologizes certain values and thus becomes complicit in the production the world. However, I disagree with both scholars on the *implications* of this argument, e.g. on the way the constitutive power of social theory affects the nature of social (or IR) theorizing. I think it would be plausible to argue that,

[1] Levine (2012) 6, 9-10, 12-13, 37, 41-42.
[2] Levine (2012) 66-67, 80-82, 95-97.
[3] Levine (2012) 29, 54, 56-57, 63, 68-74, 76, 104.
[4] Levine (2012) 14, 23, 25, 29, 33, 38, 53-58, 63, 71-72, 77, 79, 89, 101-102, 104, 108.

for Hamati-Ataya and Levine, the normativity which is intrinsic to all theorizing is a *problem*. Both scholars see this normativity of social theories as a problem because it renders these theories *automatically* partisan, arbitrary and ideological. I think this becomes manifest in the fact that Hamati-Ataya and Levine use the terms 'normativity', 'values', ideology and partisanship almost interchangeably.[1] Levine makes this especially clear when he emphasises that each fact-value tradition is 'as good and bad as any other'. On this view, it becomes impossible to distinguish between explanatory frameworks that imply moral judgements which are universally grounded and those which are selective, partisan and arbitrary. The implication of this view for social theory then can only be, as both scholars emphasise, to continuously contextualize and historicize one's own fact-value-tradition in order to allow for a plurality or 'dynamic hybrid of mutually exclusive perspectives', which 'lets each of them be'.

I want to suggest a route which is opposed to the one chosen by Hamati-Ataya and Levine, and which adds to the criticism made by Richard Shapcott in his review of Levine's book, who argues that it remains unclear what the continuous contextualization of theoretical perspectives looks like in practice and that it seems more like an unachievable ideal.[2] I argue that the intrinsic normativity of social theory does not imply that each explanatory-normative framework is as good, bad and arbitrary as any other, and, consequently, that it would be wrong (and probably impossible) to continuously contextualize and historicize all theories in order to enable some kind of dynamic plurality in which reigns complete equality. I want to argue that it is possible in principle to distinguish between 'valid' and 'invalid' - arbitrary, selective, partisan or ideological - explanatory-normative theories, and that, as a consequence, the intrinsic normativity of social theory should not be taken as a starting point for endless contextualization but rather entail a reflection with a view to choosing the 'right explanatory-normative theory'. There have in fact been several philosophers and social theorists who are aware of the interwovenness of explanation and judgement, and who have attempted to solve this problem not by endlessly contextualizing their own theories but rather by *explicitly* grounding these theories in a priori human moral capacities. A reflection of this kind is also what is suggested by the discussion in the last chapter, the primary purpose of which was not to argue that all normative-explanatory frameworks are arbitrary but that the failure to reflect on those a priori capacities, which could give these frameworks a non-arbitrary grounding, will lead to an

[1] Hamati-Ataya (2011) 263, 273, 276, 279; Hamati-Ataya (2012) 671; Levine (2012) 12, 58, 62, 72.

[2] Shapcott (2014).

arbitrary positing particular of moral attitudes as universalizable positions.[1] Here, I will turn (again) to Taylor and then to David Hume in order to illuminate two attempts to provide such a grounding.

As should have become clear by now, Taylor argues that social scientific explanation not simply involves a descriptive account of particular self-understandings but also a challenge or transformation of these understandings. To the extent that social theory not just explains but also makes explicit or adequately defines intersubjective self-understandings, it functions as a 'self-definition'. That is, it adequately or perspicuously formulates the goods, values and norms which the agents seek, and it identifies particular practices which realize these goods.[2] For Taylor, this raises the crucial question of how social theories as self-definitions can be validated. While he rejects the validation by simple correspondence to the facts, he is equally critical of the idea of completely abandoning the notion of validation and of simply regarding any theory as partisan. Rather, he does believe that certain transformations wrought by theory are validating while others are mistaken. This is because all theories *claim* to offer a perspicuous account of a good which is the point of a certain practice.[3] That is, the goods and the practices realizing them, which are identified by self-defining theories, are linked to a certain schedule of human moral wants, needs and purposes, and a priori capacities. The grounds, or reasons, which these theories adduce in order to commend certain practices, must be *general* grounds which relate in some intelligible way to what humans 'need, desire, or seek after', in order to avoid the charge of partiality. While this does not mean that all debate and pluralism among competing normative-explanatory theories is foreclosed, it opens up the possibility of arbitration among them. For it renders those theories more plausible which are grounded in a well-reflected view of human moral wants and capacities. That is, it becomes possible in principle to evaluate how theories fare when shaping certain practices, and to distinguish between self-defeating theories, which misidentify the moral wants we can seek, and 'valid' theories, which enable practices that realize a plausible conception of human wants and capacities.[4]

In the *Philosophical Papers*, Taylor has provided a particular conception of these a priori capacities. This is the 'prior human feel for perspicuous contrasts between right and wrong',

[1]Although I have to concede that this chapter also goes further and expresses a scepticism towards the possibility of universally grounding *cosmopolitan* moral attitudes, as the discussion of the limits of Fierke's logic of dialogue shows. But that still does not imply that *all* moral attitudes are generally arbitrary, or that none of them could be grounded in a plausible conception of a priori human capacities.
[2] Taylor (1985b) 93-94, 98-99, 101, 104-108.
[3] Taylor (1985b) 98, 101-104, 108-110.
[4] Taylor (1967) 38-42, 52-56; Taylor (1985b) 109-113, 190-195.

which provides the enabling condition for processes of intersubjective (re-) constitution and which I briefly discussed in chapter 4. Taylor argues that what distinguishes humans from animals, e.g. what makes us 'rational animals', is a *capacity for expression*, which we possess in virtue of having language. It is because we are language animals that we possess a prior sense for recognizing, expressing and articulating moral standards of right and wrong. It is through this capacity that humans become *moral agents*, which do not simply follow mere inclinations but are capable of recognizing standards of acceptability *qua* standards of acceptability. Language endows us with a fundamental concern for moral right and wrong as well as many other concerns, which are characteristically human and which allow us to stand in specifically human relations to each other.[1] In the essays dealing with political philosophy, Taylor argues against utilitarian conceptions of human nature, which emphasise a natural capacity for choice that leads them to advocate the 'primacy of individual rights', that one of these foundational a priori capacities is a 'natural obligation to belong'; for the capacity to choose freely can only be realized and developed through political society, the maintenance of which requires commitment, recognition and allegiance that go beyond individual satisfaction.[2] For Taylor, on of the implications of this natural obligation is that political theories of 'shared goods', which have arisen from the civic-humanist tradition of political thought (Aristotle, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Arendt, Machiavelli and Habermas), effectively challenge atomist, or utilitarian, political theories. Atomist theories conceive of society as a locus of cooperation among independent agents with their individual goals, which renders this cooperation a simple convergence of individual wills on certain goods. Theorists of shared goods, by contrast, emphasise that atomist theories fail to see that a society consisting of independent individuals would be capable of very little cooperation and common action. Rather, what a society with a strong capacity for common action requires is that actions take place within the context of and be driven by shared ends and common purposes, which are significant not *qua* mine but *qua* ours, e.g. which are recognized by us together in the public space.[3]

Not only Taylor but also many enlightenment philosophers have followed a similar path and explicitly attempted to ground their explanatory-normative analyses in particular a priori moral human capacities. I believe that a very good example of this grounding is offered in the writings of David Hume, provided we follow the interpretations of Hume's work that have been given by Donald Livingston and Spencer Wertz. Both interpretations significantly diverge from the

[1] Taylor (1985a) 228-230, 234-236, 246-247, 260-263.
[2] Taylor (1985b) 198-211.
[3] Taylor (1985b) 96-97, 99-100.

'official view' of Hume, according to which the latter was a positivist and an early advocate of the covering-law model in the social and historical sciences. Livingston argues that, for Hume, the historian has to take the intrinsic *contingency* of social life as a starting point for analysis. In line with constructivist and hermeneutic reasoning, Hume argues that humans are social beings, whose 'self-knowledge', or identities, are constructed in relation to each other; practices, identities and institutions are constituted by particular narrative associations of ideas that are woven together by the temporally reflective imagination. As a result, the moral world is variable and constantly changing in that humans constitute different social orders through different narratives across space and time.[1] For Hume, the goal of the historian is precisely to render these contingent contexts and practices, which often appear to him irregular and irrational, *intelligible*. That is, an historical explanation involves making intelligible the *good moral reasons* which an agent had for acting in particular way, or, alternatively, to show why a particular action was the *best* the agent could do in relation to some standard of evaluation; explaining entails uncovering the rational or moral sense of an act.[2] Livingston emphasises that, for Hume, this rendering intelligible of the good moral reasons of an act is not a purely descriptive process. For to *ascribe* a moral reason to an action is, at the same time, to *appraise* the rationality of this action - historical explanation implies judgement. And, as Livingston points out, this a leap that Hume consistently makes throughout his historical investigations: in *The History of England*, the explanations of particular actions are closely tied to the evaluations of the individuals' characters; 'the warring factions of historical personages' are presented as portraying 'a dialectical tension between virtue and vice'.[3] Moral judgements also enter into Hume's selection of the historical agents in that some of them are worthy of being included in the historical narrative while others are not.[4]

Livingston and Wertz argue that this normative dimension in Hume's historical investigations does not render these investigations, as some have claimed, arbitrary, subjective or 'unhistorical'. For what enables the historian to enter into, understand and appraise the actions of 'moral strangers' is an 'original universal principle' which is rooted in human nature. This what Hume calls *sympathy*. It is important to point out this principle does not denote some 'innate human substrate'; rather, it stands for a universal *capacity* for moral sentiments, e.g. for approval and disapproval; it is a means for *communication* with moral strangers, which allows

[1] Livingston (1984) 208, 217-218, 223, 227-228.
[2] Livingston (1984) 189-192, 205-207, 223-224.
[3] Livingston (1984) 230-231, 244; Wertz (1996) 349, 361.
[4] Livingston (1984) 235-236.

the historian to recognize the intentional activity in others and the goods they pursue, however strange these goods appear him.[1] In other words, the principle of sympathy seems to come very close to what I have referred to in this thesis as a *formal* or *procedural* universal principle, which underlies the concept of intersubjectivity: an a priori principle that does not postulate any particular moral good but which implies that all human beings are capable of pursuing *some* moral good.[2] While Hume does not provide a 'definitive empirical proof' of the universal existence of sympathy (that would be impossible), his *A Treatise of Human Nature* offers a rather elaborate and explicit defense of its existence and operation in the arousal of moral sentiments.[3] It is precisely through his explicit recourse to the principle of sympathy that Hume manages to give his explanatory-normative analyses an 'objective', or non-arbitrary, grounding. These analyses are objective not because they represent past events 'as they really were' or because they give an internal understanding of those who lived through these events, but because they aim to give *a true account of the past in the light of its significance for the possibilities and limits of human progress*.[4] I believe that this particular kind of objectivity, which historical science aims at, is well-captured in this famous quote:

"History (…) places the objects in their true point of view. The writers of history, as well as readers, are sufficiently interested in the characters and events, to have a lively sentiment of blame or praise; and, at the same time, have no particular interest or concern to pervert their judgement."[5]

I think there is good reason to believe that this kind of theorizing, which attempts ground explanatory-normative frameworks through an explicit reflection on a priori moral human capacities, has not been limited to the works of Taylor and Hume. In fact, one could argue that it was one of the defining features of enlightenment philosophy and historiography from Hobbes to Kant. In her superb studies on the concept of *popular sovereignty*, Ingeborg Maus argues that enlightenment philosophy stood for a shift from what she calls (medieval) *material* natural law to *procedural* natural law. While material natural law denoted a natural order of 'things', the procedural natural law of the enlightenment shifted its focus on the human subject, attempting to establish those rational capacities which it possessed independently of all social contexts and which could be taken as standard to understand and evaluate existing institutions.[6]

[1] Livingston (1984) 218, 220-225, 245-246; Wertz (1996) 344-346, 351-352, 360.
[2] Livingston (1984) 222, 242.
[3] Hume ([1888] 1978), Book III.
[4] Livingston (1984) 234-235, 238-239, 243, 245; Wertz (1996) 344, 347, 356, 359, 362.
[5] Hume quoted in Livingston (1984) 244.
[6] Maus (1994); Maus (2007) 123-125.

Another example would be the work of Mead who, as discussed in chapter 4, builds his social theory and political activism on the a priori human capacity for functional differentiation. It is important to note that these thinkers have produced very different kinds of reflections on a priori moral capacities, ranging from rather pessimistic (i.e. Hobbes and Waltz) to more progressivist or even 'cosmopolitan' (i.e. Mead, Taylor, Habermas or Locke) theories of human reason and motivation. What they have in common, and what separates them from the analyses of Fierke, Kessler, Jackson and others, however, is their awareness of the interrelation of social scientific explanation and judgement, and their *explicit attempt* to avoid the problem of partisanship by justifying their normative-explanatory frameworks through an inquiry into those moral capacities which humans possess independently of all social contexts.

I believe that this kind of theorizing not only offers a plausible alternative to positivist-minded scholars, who try to eliminate moral judgements from their analyses and which end up arbitrarily endorsing certain judgements at the expense of others, but also to post-modernists such as Hamati-Ataya and Levine, who recognize the role of moral judgements in social explanation but whose attempt to make sense of this role through the endless contextualization of their explanatory-normative frameworks does not seem to lead anywhere. For, as Taylor has shown in his critique of Michel Foucault's historical works, it seems impossible to maintain a stance of neutrality among different fact-value traditions and to regard each of these traditions as good and arbitrary as any other. By arguing that every regime of truth, knowledge or valuation masks an imposition of power, that we cannot judge among different regimes of truth and that the transformation from one regime to another is not a gain in truth and freedom but only a substitution of another system of power, Foucault smuggles in a hidden standard of moral evaluation. For, as Taylor argues, the notion of 'power' does not make sense without corresponding notions of 'liberation' and 'freedom'; and the notion of a 'mask' does not make sense without a corresponding notion of 'truth'.[1] Levine seems to run into a similar problem when he argues that the main goal of his notion of sustainable critique is not emancipation but the *negation of false emancipations*.[2] For one can only know what is a 'false emancipation' if one has some idea of what is a 'right emancipation'. What this suggests is that a stance of neutrality among different fact-value-traditions, which continuously contextualises each of them and which implies some kind of general incommensurability among them, seems to be an impossibility. And if that is the case, e.g. if the scholar cannot avoid taking a moral stance that

[1] Taylor (1985b) 162, 172-177.
[2] Levine (2012) 113.

lays claim to universal validity, the best way to go forward is to attempt to ground this stance through an inquiry into its universalizability in human reason.

(2) I believe that this thesis also gives rise to a second implication. I argue that the discussion of the last chapter suggests that it may be plausible to reconsider the worthiness of a political ethic in world politics that is more strongly centred on the *national interest*. Such a suggestion points, of course, to the relevance of realism and, hence, speaks to those debates that centre on the recent revival of the ethics of the realist tradition in international theory.[1] Yet, although I am not entirely sure about this, I believe that this suggestion to some extent departs from this recent turn to realism. One of the main aims of the writers associated with this turn has been to show the relevance of realist thinking for contemporary world politics by revealing its moral dimension, which makes it more than an advocate of 'pure power politics'; and they have done so mainly by drawing on classical realist thinkers such as Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr or Edward Carr, and by opposing them to 'immoral' neorealists such as Waltz, Mearsheimer or Hobbes. Prolific writers such as William Scheuerman and Ned Lebow, for instance, make a distinction between an immoral neorealist view that advocates egoism, the priority of power politics, realpolitik, the balance of power and the national interest, and a 'normatively-minded' classical realism, which attempts to temper the struggle for power with international morality, ethics and justice; Scheuerman goes even so far as to attribute cosmopolitan ideas to the classical realists, which he believes to be compatible with a gradual transformation to a 'world state'.[2]

Both scholars see the realpolitik view to be present in the recent history of world politics, and use this presence to advocate a more reformist, ethical or progressive realist agenda. Lebow, for instance, argues that the realpolitik view indirectly provided the foundation for the Cold War. While US Cold War policy was publicly justified in terms of collective security, the promotion of democracy and the rule of law, its real purpose was rather the pursuit of power and self-interest. For Lebow, this neorealist language of self-interest has become fully and publicly entrenched in foreign policy discourses in the post-Cold War era.[3] This language has become so acceptable that it is difficult to "gain public support for goals, like humanitarian intervention and economic development, that are neither intended to advance short-term economic interests nor cope with immediate threats to national security."[4] For Lebow, it is the

[1] Bell (2009); Lebow (2003); Scheuerman (2011).
[2] Lebow (2003)14-16, 39; Scheuerman (2011) vii, 1-4, 7, 15, 67-68, 94-97, 99, ch 2 &3.
[3] Lebow (2003) 16-17.
[4] Lebow (2003) 17-18.

administration of George W. Bush in particular that 'refracted every important foreign policy decision through the prism of narrow self-interest'. The policies of the Clinton and Bush administrations were 'blinded by the modern realist view of realpolitik' that equates power with material capabilities and influence, pursuing a policy of hegemonic self-aggrandizement. Against this background of the predominance of the realpolitik view in world politics, he advocates self-restraint and leadership through consent rather than through coercion.[1] Scheuerman offers a similar evaluation of contemporary world politics. The Bush administration's enmity to international law, its attempt to discredit the UN and its sacrifice of human rights bore the signs of the neorealist 'Realpolitiker instinctive', which has an appreciation of the harsh game of power politics but which assaults the realist political ethics that emphasises humility, moderation and prudence. Scheuerman argues that this realpolitik view stands in opposition to the progressive realism of the Obama administration, which has, for instance, reaffirmed the US commitment to international law and acknowledged the need to fight climate change.[2]

While I do believe that notions such as self-restraint, humility or prudence are very valuable, I want to raise the question whether Lebow and Scheuerman actually offer a plausible diagnosis of the problems of contemporary world politics (and its recent history) and whether their advocated solutions actually constitute adequate responses to these problems. Both scholars are in line with a broader strand in IR Scholarship, which tends to see historical events which we usually condemn, such as the two World Wars, the Cold War or US unilateralism in the post-Cold War era, as an expression of the neorealist view of realpolitik. While I am unable to give a thorough account, I want to suggest, and I think that my discussion of Jackson and Fierke's case studies points into this direction, that these historical events were less instances of neorealist-like realpolitik than caused by a clash of opposing *cosmopolitan* or *universalist* designs that turned out to be non-universalizable. Take, for instance, WWII, which is normally seen as a confirmation of the neorealist view. I think there is a good point to be made that notions such as the national interest, realpolitik, balance of power or traditional diplomacy played a minor role in the policy of Nazi Germany. Hitler no longer thought in terms of the national interest but rather pursued a crude totalitarian-universalist project that was centred on racial hierarchies and 'living spaces'; this project may have been one of the most radical attempts to go beyond the Westphalian state system.[3] I think such a view would also be confirmed by

[1] Lebow (2003) 18-19, 311-316.
[2] Scheuerman (2011) 169-171.
[3] See also Timothy Snyder's new book entitled *Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning*.

Franz Neumann's socio-legal analysis entitled *Behemoth*, which argues that Nazi Germany was essentially a 'non-state'.[1] In the same vain, I believe it is more plausible to argue with Kennan, whom I discussed in the last chapter, that the Cold War was not an expression of old-style realpolitik but rather a clash of two different ideas about political constitutions and ways of living (or, in Jackson's language 'civilizations'), and that this rendered this conflict so absolute, intense and protracted, entailing things such as proxy wars, excessive nuclear build-ups, and distant military interventions that would have been absurd from the standpoint of the 'narrow national interest'. I believe that the same problem diagnosis applies even more to the post-Cold War period. NATO enlargement (as the discussion in the last chapter tries to show), the Western military interventions from Bosnia to Libya, and the War on Terror seem to be less instances of traditional realpolitik than of a cosmopolitan endeavour to promote Western liberal values, which has sparked resistance in various parts of the world. In particular, the unsuccessful attempt by the Bush administration to fight terrorism through the violent promotion of democracy can hardly be seen as a case of traditional realist realpolitik (in fact Bush could be regarded as one of the most 'idealist' American presidents since the end of WWII). Therefore, I believe that Lebow's claim that the notion of self-interest has become fully and publicly acceptable and that this has caused all of the evils of the post-Cold War era is wrong. Rather the opposite seems to have taken place: it seems no longer permissible to justify foreign policy in terms of narrow national interests, and precisely *this* seems to be the problem.

This diagnosis is underpinned by, and the same time confirms, a pessimistic view of human reason. According to this view, the a priori moral capacities of human beings to agree on what counts as right and wrong, which they possess independently of all concrete social contexts, are - albeit not absent - rather limited. I think that Waltz, whom I discussed in the last chapter, provides a defense of such a view when he argues, by drawing on Rousseau and others, that situations of social interdependence inevitably give rise to moral conflicts of interpretation. A more elaborate and sophisticated account of this view of human reason may be found in Hobbes' account of 'natural man', as has it been presented in a couple of insightful essays by Richard Ashcraft. Ashcraft shows, on the one hand, that Hobbes' state of nature is not an 'asocial condition', in which 'atomistic beasts' confront each other in a constant war of all against all. What puts humans above animals is their possession of reason, e.g. the self-willed ability to *make rules for themselves*. This means humans are capable of creating relationships through *consent*. The implication is that, even in the natural condition, humans are certainly capable of

[1] Neumann ([1944] 2009).

engaging in and forming peaceful social relations through contracts and covenants, such as the family (whose relationships of obedience are based on some kind of tacit consent), economic groupings or larger collectivities. They are also naturally capable of accepting a modest right to property, which follows from the natural right to self-preservation.[1] On the other hand, Ashcraft makes clear that, for Hobbes, this natural capacity for reason limited. For he does not believe that humans are naturally capable of forming collectivities that are based on bonds stronger than self-interest or personal gain. These collectivities are only *temporary multitudes*, in which individuals come together to realize their specific interests, and which dissolve as soon as these interests are realized. That is, humans are naturally not capable of creating stronger bonds of affection with strangers, or of developing common standards with strangers that distinguish between the innocent and the guilty. This is why, in the natural condition, individuals do nothing more than *prudentially* pursue their right to self-preservation.[2]

If the diagnosis and the view of human reason and motivations underpinning it are plausible, the implication should be not to render realism more cosmopolitan but to formulate a realist ethic that offers a serious moral alternative to a cosmopolitan project that seems inherently flawed. While I am not in a position to provide a detailed account, I believe that the prudential pursuit of the national interest could be at the heart of such an alternative. This does not imply that states could not participate in international institutions or try solve global problems in concert with other states or institutions. What it would imply, however, is a certain amount of moderation and self-restraint (which Lebow emphasises) in that the question of different political constitutions and ways of life should not have the importance on the foreign policy agenda which it has had during the last decades. Such a proposal may be dubbed 'conservative', 'state-centric' or 'anti-reformist'. In addition, it would entail grave costs in that it implies that Western states in particular would limit themselves to the role of 'by-standers', who watch how people die, suffer or are oppressed in other parts of the world - a prospect which is incredibly cruel. Yet this may be the best stance if the cosmopolitan alternative amounts to little more than, at least in public debates, telling us that “we have do to something”.

[1] Ashcraft (1971) 1083, 1088, 1100-1104; Ashcraft (1988) 67-71, 74-75.
[2] Ashcraft (1968) 902, 905; Ashcraft (1971) 1106; Ashcraft (1988) 75, 77-80.

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