MUDDY WATERS:
FRAMING LITTORAL MARITIME SECURITY THROUGH
THE LENS OF THE BROKEN WINDOWS THEORY

Joshua Tallis

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews

2016

Full metadata for this item is available in
St Andrews Research Repository
at:
http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/9028

This item is protected by original copyright

This item is licensed under a
Creative Commons Licence
Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

Joshua Tallis

University of St Andrews

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of PhD at the University of St Andrews

March 1, 2016
1. Candidate’s declarations:

I, Joshua Tellis, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 81,000 words in length, has been written by me, and that it is the record of work carried out by me, or principally by myself in collaboration with others as acknowledged, and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.

I was admitted as a research student in August, 2013 and as a candidate for the degree of PhD in April, 2014; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St Andrews between 2013 and 2016.

(If you received assistance in writing from anyone other than your supervisor(s):

I, ......, received assistance in the writing of this thesis in respect of [language, grammar, spelling or syntax], which was provided by ......

Date: February 16, 2016 signature of candidate ________________________

2. Supervisor’s declaration:

I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations appropriate for the degree of PhD in the University of St Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that degree.

Date: February 16, 2016 __________ signature of supervisor ________________________

3. Permission for publication: (to be signed by both candidate and supervisor)

In submitting this thesis to the University of St Andrews I understand that I am giving permission for it to be made available for use in accordance with the regulations of the University Library. The time being in force, subject to any copyright vested in the work not being affected thereby. I also understand that the title and the abstract will be published, and that a copy of the work may be made and supplied to any bona fide library or research worker, that my thesis will be electronically accessible for personal or research use unless exempt by award of an embargo as requested below, and that the library has the right to migrate my thesis into new electronic forms as required to ensure continued access to the thesis. I have obtained any third-party copyright permissions that may be required in order to allow such access and migration, or have requested the appropriate embargo below.

The following is an agreed request by candidate and supervisor regarding the publication of this thesis:

PRINTED COPY
a) No embargo on print copy
b) Embargo on all or part of print copy for a period of ... years (maximum five) on the following ground(s):
   • Publication would be commercially damaging to the researcher, or to the supervisor, or the University
   • Publication would preclude future publication
   • Publication would be in breach of laws or ethics
   c) Permanent or longer term embargo on all or part of print copy for a period of ... years (the request will be referred to the Provost and permission will be granted only in exceptional circumstances).

Supporting statement for printed embargo request:

ELECTRONIC COPY
a) No embargo on electronic copy
b) Embargo on all or part of electronic copy for a period of ... years (maximum five) on the following ground(s):
   • Publication would be commercially damaging to the researcher, or to the supervisor, or the University
   • Publication would preclude future publication
   • Publication would be in breach of laws or ethics
   c) Permanent or longer term embargo on all or part of electronic copy for a period of ... years (the request will be referred to the Provost and permission will be granted only in exceptional circumstances).

Supporting statement for electronic embargo request:

Date February 16, 2016 signature of candidate ________________________ signature of supervisor ________________________

Please note initial embargoes can be requested for a maximum of five years. An embargo on a thesis submitted to the Faculty of Science or Medicine is rarely granted for more than two years in the first instance, without good justification. The Library will not lift an embargo before confirming with the student and supervisor that they do not intend to request a continuation. In the absence of an agreed response from both student and supervisor, the Head of School will be consulted. Please note that the total period of an embargo, including any continuation, is not expected to exceed ten years.

Where part of a thesis is to be embargoed, please specify the part and the reason.
To my mom,
who always said I would write a book.
Acknowledgments

First, I would like to thank Dr. Peter Lehr, my supervisor, for his continued support as I navigated the process of developing, researching, and writing this dissertation. Despite spending much of my time apart from the University, Dr. Lehr has been a constant resource upon whom I knew I could rely. Dr. Lehr’s support instilled within me the confidence to turn a passion into something I am proud to present. I would also like to thank the University of St Andrews and the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) for providing me with the opportunity to achieve a lifelong ambition at the feet of some of the most inspiring and intelligent faculty and doctoral students I have had the pleasure to know.

Writing a dissertation takes a village, and this acknowledgement would be incomplete without thanks to the incredible number of people who selflessly devoted time to the fulfillment of this work. My mother, who was a constant sounding board, a source of love in difficult times, and a partner in celebration in the good ones. My sisters, for listening to me talk about school constantly and for lending a helping hand when it was needed most. Katie Winters, on whose love and support I relied time and again to keep me not only focused but, more importantly, happy—not to mention the countless hours she spent listening to me rehearse presentations. Julian Waller for his counsel, without which this dissertation would be far worse off, as well as the invaluable proofreading and insight from friends and family including Jeff Messina, Raisa Dukas, Rebecca Faber, and Richard Ingebretsen.

Finally, I owe a debt of gratitude and sincerest thanks to my aunt, Mollie Faber, without whose incredible eye for detail, language, and grammar, not to mention enthusiasm and love, this dissertation would have suffered greatly.

To all who participated in this process with me, named and unnamed, please know your time, guidance, and patience were instrumental in helping turn a dream into an accomplishment.
Abstract

This dissertation explores the growing field of study around Maritime Security. While an increasingly common sub-heading in American naval strategy documents, maritime security operations are largely framed around individual threats (i.e. counter-piracy, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics). Here, we endeavor to explore how a seemingly disparate set of transnational issues fit into a more coherent framework to give greater theoretical substance to the notion of Maritime Security as a distinct concept. In particular, we examine, as our research question, whether the Broken Windows theory, a criminological construct of social disorganization, provides the lens through which to theorize maritime security in the littorals. By extrapolating from criminology, this dissertation engages with a small but growing impulse in studies on insurgencies, terrorism, and piracy to look beyond classic theories of security to better understand phenomena of political violence.

To evaluate our research question, we begin by identifying two critical components of the Broken Windows theory, multidimensionality and context specificity. Multidimensionality refers to the web of interrelated individuals, organizations, and infrastructure upon which crime operates. Context specificity refers to the powerful influence of an individual or community’s environment on behavior. These two themes, as explored in this dissertation, are brought into stark relief through an application of the Broken Windows theory.

Leveraging this understanding of the theory, we explore our research question by employing process-tracing and detailed descriptions across three case studies (one primary and two illustrative)—the Caribbean Basin, the Gulf of Guinea, and the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. In so doing, we demonstrate how applying the lens that Broken Windows provides yields new and interesting perspectives on maritime security. As a consequence, this dissertation offers an example of a theoretical framework that provides greater continuity to the missions or threats frequently binned under the heading of maritime security, but infrequently associated with one another in the literature.

Key words: Maritime Security, Broken Windows, Piracy, Terrorism, Trafficking, United States Navy, Coast Guard, Caribbean, Gulf of Guinea, West Africa, Southeast Asia, Malacca.
# Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

## Table of Contents

- **Acknowledgements**
  - ii
- **Abstract**
  - iii
- **Introduction**
  - 1

### Chapter One: Shifting Tides
- 1.0 Introduction
  - 8
- 2.0 Shaping Strategy
  - 9
- 3.0 Theorizing Sea Power
  - 14
    - 3.1 Strategy Versus Acquisition
      - 20
- 4.0 Conclusion
  - 24

### Chapter Two: Breaking Windows
- 1.0 The Power of Context
  - 32
    - 1.1 Theory and Terms
      - 33
    - 1.2 The New York City Subway
      - 37
    - 1.3 From the City to the Sea
      - 39
- 2.0 Broken Windows and Public Health
  - 43
    - 2.1 Room for Debate
      - 44
- 3.0 Roadmaps for Research
  - 48
- 4.0 Methodology
  - 51
    - 4.1 Evidence
      - 55
- 4.0 Conclusion
  - 56

### Chapter Three: Cocaine and Context in the Caribbean

#### Part One: The Physical Environment
- 1.0 Introduction
  - 64
- 2.0 Narcotics
  - 67
    - 2.1 Overview
      - 67
    - 2.2 Current Routes and Trends
      - 71
    - 2.3 Trafficking Flows
      - 77
    - 2.4 Summary
      - 81
- 3.0 Local Crime
  - 82
    - 3.1 Lessons Learned
      - 86
- 4.0 People
  - 88
    - 4.1 Human Trafficking
      - 89
    - 4.2 Irregular Migration
      - 93
- 5.0 Terror
  - 97

#### Part Two: The Psychological Environment
- 6.0 Halftime
  - 104
- 7.0 Money Laundering and Governance
  - 105
    - 7.1 Money Laundering
      - 105
    - 7.2 Graft and Corruption
      - 108
# Muddy Waters:
## Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

8.0 Conclusions 111
  8.1 Western Hemisphere Strategy 112
  8.2 Two Problems 116
  8.3 Context 118
  8.4 Concluding 119

Chapter Four: Piracy and Perception in the Gulf of Guinea 148
  1.0 Introduction 148
  2.0 Narcotics 151
  3.0 Life and Crime 155
    3.1 IUU 155
    3.2 Forgeries and Smuggling 156
    3.3 Illegal Oil Bunkering 157
    3.4 Vigilantism 157
    3.5 Money Laundering 158
    3.6 Irregular Migration 159
    3.7 Corruption and State Weakness 161
  4.0 Similarities Summary 162
  5.0 Critical Point of Departure—Piracy 162
    5.1 The Statistics 164
    5.2 The Tactics 166
  6.0 Broken Windows 168
    6.1 Enforcement Environment 168
    6.2 Discourse 171
  7.0 Conclusion 173

Chapter Five: Evolving Security Conceptions in the Straits 189
  1.0 Introduction 189
  2.0 Overview 189
  3.0 Piracy 193
    3.1 Response 194
    3.2 Resurgence 197
    3.3 Obstacles to Collective Effort 199
  4.0 Evolution to Broken Windows 202
    4.1 From Piracy to Terrorism 202
    4.2 Terror, Transnationalism, and Multidimensionality 205
  5.0 Conclusion 209

Conclusion 223
  1.0 Criticisms 223
  2.0 Summation 224
  3.0 Findings and Consequences 227
    3.1 Multidisciplinary Researchers 228
    3.2 Naval Strategists 229

Appendix A: Captain Mark Morris, USN (Ret) Interview 232
Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

Appendix B: Vice Admiral Charles Michel, USCG Interview 255
Appendix C: Dr. Thomas Mahnken, DoD (formerly) Interview 273
Appendix D: The Response to Transnational Threats in the Caribbean 282

Works Cited 294
Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

Introduction

Corrugated tin roofs stretch for miles, dotted and crossed by makeshift markets and roads with no names. Under this urban canopy, countless people subsist on dollars or cents a day. The lucky find work in a sweatshop or factory in the city center, making shirts or toys or shoes for export at pennies an hour. The less fortunate are forced to find work in the teeming illicit black markets found throughout the city’s neglected slums. Drug running, human trafficking, weapons smuggling, money laundering, armed robbery, and the myriad petty crimes that accompany these industries become familiar to the world’s poorest urban dwellers. As the sea of fragile metal huts meets the coastline, swarms of creaking wooden and fiberglass dinghies with small outboard motors ferry people, food, and goods on and off shore in a thick stream. There is no discernable municipal presence here, no sign of law enforcement, social services, or sanitation. Life here is dirty and hard, and all too often short. And yet this is life for hundreds of millions of people across the world, from the shantytowns of Mumbai to the favelas of São Paulo. In 2012, thirty-three percent of the urban population of the developing world lived in slums like this, a number approaching nine hundred million souls.¹ As these third world cities prepare to absorb hundreds of millions more in the coming decades, the world’s littorals are fast becoming some of the densest, most dangerous terrain on the planet. How navies meet the threats and crises indigenous to this expanding terrain will in many ways define their relationships with the third world. Yet, the littorals are a complicated place, a region large navies, like that of the U.S., have often preferred to eschew in favor of the familiar security of the open ocean. In the last decade, however, it has become obvious that ignoring the perils of the urban coastal poor can be dangerous in global proportions.

Late on November 23, 2008, Pakistani terrorists hijacked the Indian fishing trawler Kuber while it was out to sea.² The captain, Amar Narayan Solanki, had a history of smuggling and likely mistook the terrorists for the usual bands of illicit traffickers that frequent those waters.³ Solanki may not have resisted his assailants because of his familiarity with coastal smuggling, but his reluctant cooperation would go unrewarded this time. On the evening of November 26, Solanki was bound and killed as the terrorists disembarked to land near one of the many slums on the outskirts of Mumbai.⁴ Their presence did not go unnoticed; locals spotted both teams as soon as they grounded their inflatable boats near Badhwar Park and Machhimar Nagar.⁵ While one raiding party passed themselves off as students, the other was able to successfully intimidate the residents into remaining quiet, likely because the residents (as had Solanki) assumed them to be part of the fabric of political violence, including organized crime and smuggling, which defined their lives.⁶ The terrorists that had slipped out of Pakistan amid the traffic of coastal slums had infiltrated India in much the same way, easily “inserting themselves into a coastal fishing fleet to cover their approach.”⁷ Yet, the havoc they caused was exponentially greater than that of Mumbai’s typical smuggler. One of the world’s largest cities was brought to a paralyzed halt, as over one hundred people were killed and hundreds more wounded in one of the most shocking and successful terrorist attacks in modern Asian history.⁸ The terrorists, all but one of whom died in the attack, were at home in the urban camouflage of Mumbai’s slums. And while the result was unmistakably an act of terrorism, the method of its execution “blurred the distinction
Introduction

between crime and war: both the Indian ship captain and the local inhabitants initially mistook [the terrorists] for smugglers, and their opponents for much of the raid were police, not soldiers.\textsuperscript{9} The landing sites these terrorists chose are illustrative of the littoral terrain that navies so frequently hope to avoid, littered with “dense, complex informal settlements--coastal slums made up of thousands of tiny shacks, fishing huts, and moored boats.”\textsuperscript{10} To Solanki and the residents of these slums, there was nothing out of the ordinary about those strange men landing on their shores; it was part of the “normal background environment” of life on the margins.\textsuperscript{11} Yet, the littorals are bringing the margins to the foreground, and understanding this terrain is central to understanding its impact on the broader global system.

The famed British naval strategist Julian Corbett notes simply, “men live upon the land and not upon the sea,” and consequently a navy’s real task is to influence events ashore.\textsuperscript{12} Naval historian Captain Dudley Knox, a contemporary of Corbett, echoes the same principle: “the supreme test of the naval strategist is the depth of his comprehension of the intimate relationship between sea power and land power, and of the truth that basically all effort afloat should be directed at an effect ashore.”\textsuperscript{13} There is no easy definition for littoral, but the spirit of these quotes reveals the principle of the word, the region where sea power and land power overlap. Broadly speaking the littoral region is the “area of land susceptible to military influence from the sea, and the sea area susceptible to influence from the land.”\textsuperscript{14} In military terms, “a littoral zone is the portion of land space that can be engaged using sea-based weapon systems, plus the adjacent sea space (surface and subsurface) that can be engaged using land-based weapon systems, and the surrounding airspace and cyberspace.”\textsuperscript{15} The littoral is therefore defined by the technological capabilities of a military, and as a result the littoral is not like other geographic terms. A mountain remains a mountain no matter the century, a plateau and a river and a steppe do not require points of technological reference. Yet, time has changed what we mean by littoral.\textsuperscript{16} In an era of cannons, large shore-based batteries determined the distance of the littoral as far as a favorable wind could carry a projectile (about three miles, the original extent of the territorial sea).\textsuperscript{17} In the Afghan war, by contrast, the U.S. Navy demonstrated that it could contribute to operations hundreds of miles inland, radically changing what we mean by littoral.\textsuperscript{18} If we conservatively limit the littoral to just two hundred miles inland, that would encompass seventy-five percent of the world’s population, eighty percent of capital cities, and practically “all major centres of international trade and military power.”\textsuperscript{19} The littorals are a congested environment, crowded by freight in transshipment, oil and gas platforms, navigational markers, and geographic features like islands and reefs.\textsuperscript{20} The hive of human activity in the region only serves to constrict movement even further, with littoral zones cluttered by cargo ships, aircraft, and leisure and small commercial vessels.\textsuperscript{21} Furthermore, time has not only expanded the littorals horizontally. Today, navies must consider up to nine operational domains:

The seabed, the submarine environment, the sea surface, and naval airspace (airspace over the sea), which together make up the maritime domain; the land surface, subterranean space, and supersurface space (to include tunnel systems, canals, sewers, basements, exterior street-level
Muddy Waters: Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

surfaces, building interiors, high-rise structures, and rooftops), making up the land domain; the airspace domain; and the domain of cyberspace.²²

In other words, the littorals are where the threats are, where responses must be rapid, and where non-state and non-traditional actors can have an outsized impact on a global stage. How navies will recalibrate to meet the growing threats of the sprawling littorals will be central to defining their impact on the global system in the coming half-century. In this dissertation, we use an equally flexible interpretation of littorals, using a state’s Exclusive Economic Zone (measured as 200 nautical miles perpendicular from the coast as set forth in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) and the adjacent land as baselines. In so doing, we enable a holistic conversation on the distinct asymmetric actors and insecurities plaguing this ambiguous domain—the very actors and actions that straddle the lines of convention. And ultimately, discussing the littoral zone requires a comfort with ambiguity. Time and tide change the exact definition of the terrain from day to day, yet its fundamental role in human security and society remains constant.

Finally, before we continue, it is incumbent upon us to narrow our definition of the term maritime security. The emerging field of maritime security, even more so than similar disciplines like terrorism studies, has yet to settle on a universal definition of the term. This is so in large part because, as Christian Bueger of Cardiff University illustrates, maritime security in its modern usage can be portrayed at the nexus of a range of overlapping spheres of security.²³ This approach to the definitional issue is semiotic, an attempt to understand a concept in relation to known others.²⁴ Yet, one of the greatest challenges with such an approach rests in achieving a narrow enough definition to ensure fruitful dialogue. Until we can accomplish this much, as both Bueger and Basil Germond (of Lancaster University) make reference to, the concept of maritime security will remain more of a “buzzword” than a useful tool.²⁵ King’s College London’s Geoffrey Till is particularly concerned about the surging popularity of such an ambiguous phrase—one he regards as a complicating rebranding of the more conventional ‘good order at sea’²⁶ (itself not a particularly clear phrase). Indeed, as Till notes, and as seen in Figure 1, just the word maritime connotes a range of meanings, from entirely military, to purely commercial endeavors.²⁷ However, though we cannot yet point to a consensus definition,
we can at the least ensure that we employ a consistent and common usage within our own body of work.*

Here, maritime security is the state response to threats precipitated by non-state, frequently transnational actors who, while operating, break national and international law and maintain the capacity to use violence in the furtherance of such actions. (Climate change, while not a component of this definitional matrix, can aggravate remaining components and thus arises at points in our discussion as an indirect factor.) In other words, “maritime security has to do with (illegal and disruptive) human activities in the maritime” domain.28 This modifies Buenger’s original matrix by eliminating the marine safety quadrant as well as the inter-state component of the national security quadrant. We are still left with a term at the nexus of multiple conceptions of security, but one aimed at a single framing of security (asymmetric, illegitimate threats) in much the way traditional naval strategy is often conceived in terms of one major framework (symmetric, legitimate, inter-state threats). This is consistent with Germond’s definition of maritime security, which emphasizes the restoration or maintenance of the legitimate use of force by state actors.29 Consequently, the human security considerations of maritime security tie the field to liberal and critical interpretations, even as the overarching framework of the discipline incorporates realist conceptions of order. Both Germond’s and our definitions direct the application of maritime security studies towards the impact of non-state and unconventional actors on the Westphalian conception of sovereignty, and consequently towards an application of maritime security in environments close to a state’s area of influence. This set of definitions thus has both geographic and political components. Reference to the maritime space, here, is used to evoke principally brown (riverine) and green (coastal) waters. Thus, if we deconstruct the term ‘maritime security,’ *maritime* speaks to the geography of the domain—the littorals, as defined above—while *security* speaks to the nature of the threat—illegitimate non-state actors, as per Germond. Our use of the phrase naval (or naval strategy), meanwhile, is used more broadly to signify the wider body of work on what navies do, which is historically (in the American context particularly) focused on inter-state conflict.

---

* Maritime security has also been defined in the negative, as a lack of threats or insecurity. Freedom Onuoha, for example, of Nigeria’s National Defense College defines it as “the freedom from or absence of those acts that could negatively impact the natural integrity and resilience of any navigable waterway or undermine the safety of persons, infrastructure, cargo, vessels, and other conveyances...” See, Freedom Onuoha, “Piracy and Maritime Security off the Horn of Africa: Connections, Causes, and Concerns,” *African Security* 3, No. 4 (2010): 193.
The Research Question

While maritime insecurity takes place on the water, the literature we will explore throughout this dissertation reflects threats that often seem to have more in common with crime than naval warfare. The exposition above reads nothing like the imaginings of Mahan or Corbett, the canonical fathers of naval strategy. And so the question arises, can theories derived from research on crime help us understand maritime issues in a new way? More specifically, can the Broken Windows theory, a criminological construct of social disorganization, provide a lens through which to theorize maritime security in the littorals? American interests in coastal zones worldwide face a diversity of threats, many of which arise from non-state and transnational actors. These regions are hotspots for the trafficking of people, narcotics, and arms, operations that destabilize friendly governments and support terrorist activities. It is these transnational and global organizations, over the coming decades, which will pose some of the most prolonged threats to American security and the global system. This does not preclude the rise of other, more traditional threats. Yet, the unconventional nature of maritime insecurity poses an unusually fundamental identity crisis for large navies.

The Broken Windows approach provides guidance for developing a strategic framework for maritime security. This approach is informed by two components: Broken Windows in theory, and Broken Windows in practice. Theoretically, Broken Windows posits that people’s actions are influenced by the state of their environment, both physical and perceived. In other words, the rational actor model cannot fully explain deviant activities because individuals are constantly responding to subtle stimuli from their physical and behavioral context. Practically, when attempting to police the environmental signals that influence behavior, authorities found that low-level criminality is also multidimensional—policing small-scale disorder has an outsized impact on controlling more violent crimes. By evaluating maritime security threats through the lens of the Broken Windows approach (outlined in greater detail in Chapter Two), we can identify themes that aid in the construction of a truly littoral strategy of maritime security. As we will see in Chapter One, the need for such strategic development is paramount.

It is in this strategic context that this dissertation attempts to make the greatest contribution. As we will explore further in the following chapter, maritime security is a relatively new subfield, one that lacks a rigorous theoretical framework for discussing littoral security cohesively. This is particularly true within the U.S. strategic literature, which will be a focus of the review to come. It was only in 2007, for example, that Maritime Security was included as a distinct component in a U.S. naval strategy capstone document. (More broadly, the major focus of this research is the United States maritime services. Consequently, unless otherwise specified, references to the Navy, Coast Guard, or maritime services refer specifically to those of the United States.) In the furtherance of this discussion, our dissertation is also situated at the intersection of a number of related research efforts and debates across security studies and international relations. While, given constraints on time, space, and cogency, we cannot address all in depth, three are worth highlighting at the outset to better help the reader track their emergence over the course of the dissertation. First, this research engages heavily with the literature on transnational threats, bringing them into greater contact with the maritime security sphere. Works by Naim, Thachuk, and Kilcullen contributed heavily in this regard.
Introduction

Second, this research touches often on the changing conception of naval peacetime activities and what constitutes war, peace, and policing when interacting with non-state actors (see Chapter Two for more). Third, this research attempts to spark a greater debate over what good order at sea means, strategically, and how navies might think about order maintenance (again, see Chapter Two for more). Other important literatures (like those on critical studies of terrorism or maritime security) are relevant as well and can be found referenced particularly across the first two chapters for the interested reader.

Looking forward, our research question is best examined by beginning with two sub-questions: Why might a new naval approach be instructive? And, what is the Broken Windows theory? Answering these sub-questions is critical to building a foundation for the theory testing and building to come in our case studies. As a consequence, we will address them in turn in the following two chapters, followed finally by a discussion of methods and evidence. By answering these sub-questions we will demonstrate not only the theoretical foundation of this thesis, but also its relevance amid a broader strategic context.

Our first sub-question is answered in Chapter One, serving consequently as a literature review. Chapter One is divided into two sections—Shaping Strategy and Theorizing Sea Power—exploring the strategic relevance of the littorals and surveying the American strategic naval literature in the post-Cold War era. Our second sub-question is answered in Chapter Two and is likewise divided into two broad themes. The first offers a discussion of the development of Broken Windows in theory and practice within the discipline of criminology. The second theme explores how Broken Windows has been adopted and adapted outside of criminology, predominantly in the field of public health, and the lessons we can learn from those appropriations in our own cross-disciplinary application. Chapter Two concludes with an assessment of the best methodological framework for answering our larger research question, leading into three empirical case study chapters. First, however, we turn to Chapter One for an answer to the most important question of all: so what?

3 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 54.
4 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 54.
5 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 54-55.
6 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 55.
7 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 65.
9 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 65.
10 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 54-55.
11 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 61.
Muddy Waters: Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

16 The use of ‘we’, while a common rhetorical tool, has in the past stirred minor controversy over the relationship between a researcher and the subject of his or her work. In *Terrorism: How to Respond*, Richard English employs a similar style while maintaining what Peter Hart calls “scrupulously neutral” language. Still, Hart considered the implications of using ‘we’ worthy of note in regard to its impact on the author’s positionality, and so we relay the issue here briefly. Hart acknowledges that English is most likely referring to his association with Western liberal democracies, “for whom terrorism is a problem to be solved.” Yet, Hart nevertheless finds the possessive nature of the word and its implicit association with government uncomfortable. The word usage does not, however, appear too egregious. Hart is content to make the point and “leave it at that.” Our use of ‘we’ is likewise a stylistic decision that similarly evokes an association with the author’s positionality as a member of a Western democracy. This includes the perception that both crime and terrorism are problems in need of solutions. This usage does not, however, imply any deeper association between the author and government or an implicit concern over neutrality. Hart’s discomfort with the word and its theoretical implications could be equally applied here. That Hart ultimately resigns to its usage and that English employs it in a commendably balanced work suggest there is no real inherent threat to the stylistic choice. (See, Peter Hart, “Terrorism: How to Respond,” Review of *Terrorism: How to Respond*, Richard English, Critical Studies on Terrorism 3, no. 1 (April 2010): 155-157.)
19 Till, *Seapower*, 257.
21 Kilcullen, *Out of the Mountains*, 270.
22 Kilcullen, *Out of the Mountains*, 269.
30 See more on Mahan, Corbett and naval strategy in Chapter One.
Chapter 1: Shifting Tides

“Gentlemen, we have run out of money. Now we have to think.” — Attributed to Winston Churchill

1.0 Introduction

Why should we consider blending community policing and international relations in the first place? In Chapter Two we will establish a theoretical foundation upon which to build our case studies. Beforehand, however, there remains the most basic question for any researcher: why does it matter? This chapter, therefore, speaks to relevance. And the most effective way to address this question is to ask it in a slightly modified way—what has changed? What is different today that makes it worthwhile to approach strategy from a new angle instead of attempting to square the edges of older perspectives? “The United States faces a rapidly changing security environment,”\textsuperscript{1} answers the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in its opening lines. From “new centers of power” to “a world that is growing more volatile” to “unprecedented levels of global connectedness,” the nature of military strategy is being challenged at numerous points.\textsuperscript{2} The 2014 QDR’s predecessor (2010) “was fundamentally a wartime strategy.”\textsuperscript{3} Yet, the most recent strategic white papers out of the United States stress that as the U.S. and its allies attempt to move past these wars, what comes next will be no less ambiguous. Conflicts of the future may be characterized by hybrid threats emanating from non-state, asymmetric actors, to conventional, symmetrical adversaries armed with nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{4} The dynamic nature of littorals and the increasing interconnectedness of global commerce and information flows suggest that theorists revisit what we mean by ‘Maritime Security.’

Maritime Security (in capital letters)\textsuperscript{5} is an increasingly common sub-heading in naval strategy documents, particularly in the United States. Yet, while the usage of the phrase has expanded, there remains some ambiguity about the prominence of littorals in the wider realm of operations conducted by the United States Navy (USN). Global demographic changes and historical patterns of conflict, however, suggest that maritime security—naval operations in brown waters, often directed against non-state or unconventional actors—will play an increasingly important role in American and global foreign policy over the coming years. In this chapter, we endeavor to outline the most pressing trends substantiating an increased theoretical investment in maritime security as a distinct subfield. These are addressed in two sections. The first, Shaping Strategy, investigates the evolving nature of threats in the littorals, providing an understanding of the threat forecast in which international actors will operate over the coming decades. In the second section, Theorizing Sea Power, we analyze the timeline and content of post-Cold War, largely post-9/11 strategic naval literature to better place our research within a small but expanding narrative. We conclude that such trends, both real world and theoretical, will act to draw navies towards low intensity littoral operations in the decades to come.
2.0 Shaping Strategy

The Asia-Pacific’s resurgence, which precipitated the Obama administration’s Pivot to Asia, is not the only noteworthy geostrategic phenomenon of the early twenty-first century. There are a growing number of unconventional factors that are poised to demand greater consideration in the coming decades. In his book *Out of the Mountains*, David Kilcullen sets out a compelling argument for taking unconventional threats seriously, an argument primarily based upon the simple principle: conflict happens where people are. So, where are the people?

Kilcullen identifies four “megatrends” of demography and economic geography that suggest where we can expect to find the majority of the world’s population in the coming decades. “Rapid population growth, accelerating urbanization, littoralization (the tendency for things to cluster on the coastlines), and increasing connectedness” all suggest that populations are concentrating in networked, urban, dense, littoral communities. The United Nations projects that the global population will reach around 9.6 billion people by 2050, a number that has been revised upward to reflect sustained high fertility rates in the developing world, particularly across Africa. By 2050 as well, approximately three quarters of the global population will live in cities. Some estimates suggest coastal cities (now home to about three billion people) may double by 2025. By 2030 as many as forty percent of urban dwellers (two billion people) may live in slums. Already nearly one-and-a-half million people migrate to a city every week. In less than thirty-five years, cities are expected to absorb almost all new population growth. Moreover, most of this urban coastal expansion will take place where governments are least prepared for it, clustered in some of the world’s poorest regions. The Caribbean and Latin America, for example, will see its population grow by more than 200 million people, Africa could see its population expand by 800 million, and Asia will see a growth of 1.7 billion. In the 1990s the World Bank was already anticipating that slums would become the “most significant, and politically explosive, problem of the next century.” To give an indication of scale, consider the following. In one generation, the world’s poorest cities will absorb the majority of a population increase equal to all of the population growth ever recorded in human history through the year 1960. That is sure to produce astounding institutional strains, ones that will inevitably stress already fragile municipal governments to a breaking point. And yet, only since around 2006 and the “Trends and Shocks” project at DOD does it appear that demographic projections have played a substantive role in the strategic planning process.

And we need not wait for 2050 to see these statistics in action. Already half of the world’s population lives within about thirty miles of a coast, and three quarters of large cities are on the water. In the Mediterranean, for example, the urban littoral population grew by 40 million from 1970 to 2000, with seventy-five percent of that growth taking place in the poorer Middle Eastern and North African portion of the basin. Libya’s population is among the most densely coastal in the entire region, at eighty-five percent. In fact, worldwide, of the twenty-five largest cities on the planet, only four lay inland. But, how is demography dangerous? The answer comes from how communities respond to the pressures of these trends. (Libya, for example, is also a springboard in the ongoing European migrant crisis). When a city doubles in size it produces, on average, “fifteen percent higher wages, fifteen percent more fancy restaurants, but also fifteen percent
more [HIV/AIDS cases, and fifteen percent more violent crime. Everything scales up by fifteen percent when you double the size.”25 In cities already bursting at the seams, cities like Lagos or Mumbai or San Pedro Sula, the consequences of a fifteen percent spike in crime or AIDS rates act on preexisting stressors like poverty, climate change, and political violence, which can precipitate or aggravate still more disorder.26 The impact of these magnified stressors can cause a metropolis to turn ‘feral.’ In the Naval War College Review, Richard Norton defines a feral city as “a metropolis with a population of more than a million people in a state the government of which has lost the ability to maintain the rule of law within the city’s boundaries yet remains a functioning actor in the greater international system.”27 John Sullivan and Adam Elkus describe the feral city as “an area in which state power is nonexistent, the architecture consists entirely of slums, and power is a complex process negotiated through violence by differing factions.”28 At the time, Richard Norton considered only Mogadishu to truly exemplify the criteria of a feral city.29 Yet, a number of cities then contained feral pockets characteristic of Norton’s theory. In such pockets, segments of an urban or peri-urban (a region at the intersection of urban and rural spaces) sprawl exist outside the reach or interest of the government. Matthew Frick, in Proceedings Magazine, as well as The New York Times, both cite São Paulo, Mexico City, and Johannesburg (the Times also adds Karachi) as examples of modern cities with feral components. Frick explicitly links these feral cities to maritime security by arguing that they are modern incarnations of the pirate havens of lore, inheritors of the piratical legacy of leveraging ungoverned spaces.30 In feral cities, the legitimate governing fabric of the urban area erodes as the stress of an oversized population pushes it past the ability to cope with the pressures of crime, poverty, and health. Such violence perpetuates the cycle of urban exclusion, precipitating yet more physical, political, social, economic, and infrastructure neglect.31

The collapse or erosion of local governance therefore creates a power and services vacuum. That power vacuum creates disorder from which people crave a reprieve. In turn, the local actor that can produce a sense of order and stability is frequently adopted as a surrogate government. Yet, inevitably, these surrogates are not peaceful neighborhood watch groups. Kilcullen’s concept of “competitive control”32 posits that the surrogates most likely to survive in these environments are those that are capable of acting across a spectrum of power ranging from soft to coercive. Without soft power, the allure of an institutionalized set of normative community rules, the population is denied the sense of order it demands. Under such a rules-based system, a neighborhood is likely to tolerate a measure of violence because it can be predicted and avoided. Without violence, a competitor will find it easy to supplant the surrogate. What we are inevitably left with is a void filled by organized gangs, terrorists, militias, or criminal networks that manipulate a feral city’s disorder to establish fortifications within neighborhoods that often come to depend on them. Kilcullen illustrates this point with Kingston, Jamaica’s garrison neighborhoods, districts made loyal to gang leaders as a consequence of their dominant role in the local informal justice system and economy.33 When such groups offer locals enough of a sense of fair and predictable order, many are willing to tolerate their presence. Finally, one of the most sophisticated and successful examples of the rise of these surrogate groups comes from Hezbollah in Lebanon. The group is capable of acting across the range of Kilcullen’s spectrum, from responsive normative governance structures to armed coercive capacity.34 Hezbollah has opened hospitals and schools, and
Muddy Waters:  
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

provided job training and security to Lebanon’s impoverished Shia community. Filling an expansive power vacuum, the organization’s ability to operate everything from daycares to militia units, its subsequent subnational hold on southern Lebanon, and the 2006 war it precipitated with Israel are all proof of how entrenched and dangerous non-state actors can be, even in a realist paradigm. At its root, we are talking about the essence of sovereignty and Max Weber’s conception of the monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force. ³⁵

So far, however, surrogate groups and feral cities would appear a danger largely within their own neighborhoods. What brings these groups and populations into the international maritime orbit is Kilcullen’s final megatrend—connectedness. Crowded, poor coastal zones may turn feral, but feral regions do not implode. Instead they remain connected with the world around them through the Internet, ports, airports, and diaspora communities.³⁶,³⁷ As the U.S. Navy’s then-Chief of Information Rear Admiral John Kirby noted in 2013, “the littorals are where products come to market; it’s where seaborne trade originates.”³⁸ Thus, with all the implications of such connectedness, even a feral region remains a dynamic, strategic, and significant actor in the international arena.³⁹ This connectedness allows the feral elements of a community to interact with licit and illicit trade and information flows, offering local actors the capacity to directly impact events across the country and world.⁴⁰ The same pathways that facilitate normal trade and migration likewise enable illicit transfers such as the smuggling of narcotics, people and weapons, human trafficking, terrorism, and piracy.⁴¹ This connectedness is what gives rise to the potential for actions a world away, events like protests or acts of political violence, to have a rapid and meaningful impact on domestic considerations elsewhere.⁴² As a result of the indirect but consequential connection between local non-state groups and international security, “the distinction between war and crime, between domestic and international affairs” almost disappears.⁴³ We are left facing an amorphous hybrid threat, what John Sullivan calls “criminal insurgents,”⁴⁴ or the melding of criminal syndicates with the direct political control of territory.

Strategists infrequently use the term hybrid threat because it reflects the “large gray space between our idealized bins” and reality.⁴⁵ Military theorists have likewise proven resistant to dealing with something that a bureaucratized approach to security categorizes (perhaps even “curtly dismisses”) as an issue of law enforcement.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, the term is not without its proponents. Lt. Col. Frank Hoffman (Ret.) advances a definition similar to that which we use here. He describes a hybrid threat as “any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism and criminal behavior in the battle space to obtain their political objectives.”⁴⁷ And notwithstanding lagging terminology, the concept behind hybrid threats has gained prominence. In the 2010 National Security Strategy, the White House included a section on “Transnational Criminal Threats and Threats to Governance.”⁴⁸ In it, the administration acknowledges that illicit trades and the transnational actors who facilitate them continue to “expand dramatically in size, scope, and influence,” and that such groups have “accumulated unprecedented wealth and power.”⁴⁹ The relationship between transnational crime and terrorism is “well-established” and building, and the deleterious impacts for governments is a matter of record.⁵⁰ Thus, while the “local/transnational, criminal/military hybrid threat” concept has been slow in coming into its own phraseology, the growing influence of such threats
has already begun to command attention. Demographic trends portend that the hybridized threat may soon impact hundreds of millions more people in the coming decades.\textsuperscript{51} And the surrogate groups likely to produce these threats are diverse, including “urban street gangs, communitarian or sectarian militias, insurgents, bandits, pirates, armed smugglers or drug traffickers, violent organized criminal networks, vigilantes and armed public defender groups, terrorist organizations, warlord armies, and certain paramilitary forces.”\textsuperscript{52} All remain connected to the wider world through the littoral domain.

When it comes to hybrid threats, there is a great deal of overlap between crime and war, “and thus a great deal of commonality between constabulary, policing, and military operations.”\textsuperscript{53} For this reason, Australia fields an internationally deployable federal police unit.\textsuperscript{54} The Italian Carabinieri host NATO’s Center of Excellence for Stability Policing Units, which trains students in community policing methods.\textsuperscript{55, 56} Israeli police form Joint Operations Forces with the military to help close the gap between operational requirements.\textsuperscript{57} Even the United States military studies policing methods and has included police trainers on deployments abroad.\textsuperscript{58} These militaries do so because hybrid, often littoral threats are distinct. And they are not new, either. There exists a “long-standing historical pattern in which the United States conducts a large-scale or long-duration counterinsurgency or stabilization operation about once a generation and a small or short-term mission about once every five to ten years.”\textsuperscript{59} In truth, the American military faces these nontraditional challenges far more frequently than it does inter-state conflicts. As the line blurs between war and crime, it may be more attractive for strategic planners to circumvent consideration of these challenges.

What is remarkable about this pattern of conflict, however, is its irreverence for the preferences of policymakers.\textsuperscript{60, 61} Lyndon Johnson, who placed a premium on domestic reform, was eventually subsumed by a troop escalation in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{62} Bill Clinton delayed sending troops to the Balkans and resisted doing so in Rwanda, yet ultimately sent troops to Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Haiti, and Liberia over the course of his presidency.\textsuperscript{63} While candidate George W. Bush dismissed any interest in stability operations and nation building, President Bush launched two simultaneous large-scale counterinsurgency campaigns, and led the United States into the largest campaign of nation building since the Second World War and NATO into its largest stabilization mission in history.\textsuperscript{64} Even as President Obama initiated his Pivot to Asia, he was still negotiating the drawdown of two land wars while conflicts simmered (and flared) in Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, and the Congo.\textsuperscript{65} Even the most successful militaries in Western history have more often been involved in small wars than big ones.\textsuperscript{66} The British Army, for example, engaged in myriad low intensity “brushfire wars” across its empire.\textsuperscript{67} The American military too “has been drawn into literally dozens of small wars and irregular operations” since its inception, with its formative years defined by countless skirmishes with Red Coats and Native Americans.\textsuperscript{68} Even most large, recent conventional wars have included substantial nontraditional components such as guerilla tactics and postwar rebuilding.\textsuperscript{70} World War Two, for example, is famous for its partisans, but in no way unique. “American policy makers clearly don’t like irregular operations, and the U.S. military isn’t much interested in them, either,”\textsuperscript{69} but they will nevertheless continue to happen, and at increasing frequency according to Kilcullen’s trends. The Pivot to Asia, while perhaps an appropriate strategy for broad American
Muddy Waters:  
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

gеopolitical interests, will not signal an end to unconventional threats, but may well compromise the U.S. Navy’s capacity to adequately respond.

The realization of the frequency of these operations drives Kilcullen to reevaluate the very counterinsurgency theories he helped develop, concluding that the fundamental principle of ‘winning hearts and minds’ is flawed. The idea that “populations can be swayed if their conscious choices are influenced”

ignores the fact, as Broken Windows has shown for decades, that behavior and environment dynamically shape each other. In light of over a decade of urban conflict, defense practitioners understand that violence in cities does not conform to conventional twentieth century views of warfare. Traditionally, an adversary would have a ‘head’ to target, a headquarters or central node that could be the object of attack. Yet, hybridized urban violence often has no head—the control node is “embedded in the system itself.” As a consequence, the primary project is not defeating insurgents or winning hearts and minds; “the project is the community.” And so we return to the Power of Context.

Focusing on context, as Broken Windows practitioners came to understand when reclaiming New York City’s subway and streets, requires distinguishing between operational and strategic success. Brazil’s military policing unit (BOPE) is singularly effective at combatting cartels and gangs on a tactical level. Yet, the methods they have employed in the past alienate the poor and lock favelas into perpetual perceptions of conflict. The Israel Defense Force (IDF) has perfected a method of using the city as a medium for conflict, moving through walls in an effort to deny combatants a conventional theory of maneuver space. And yet, such tactics terrify noncombatants and leave the urban space in tatters. While the BOPE and the IDF are operationally adept, neither Latin American organized crime nor Hamas terrorists have been entirely dislodged from their strongholds. This is, in some part, because both BOPE and the IDF neglect the power of context. Thus, while these forces “may be masters at manipulating the city as fluid operational space, they have an overly materialistic conception of the city—it is not just the buildings but also people. They ignore the social spaces in their strategies, which center overwhelmingly on manipulating material forces to their advantage.” In the urban social arena, militaries have a great deal to learn from community policing.

And such lessons are not restricted to the cities. Increasingly crowded littorals, as we have seen, are critical in servicing the needs of a globalizing world. The criminal networks sheltered in urban settings harness the littorals to move people, weapons, drugs, and related contraband with impunity. Predictably, the connection between such hybrid threats and policing techniques is being increasingly recognized. Kilcullen asks, “what if we could combine what [he] learned in Baghdad about protecting urban populations from extreme violence with what law enforcement agencies know about community-based policing?” And as with Nagl, we see once again the conclusion that “the military could learn even more from police and emergency services” from how they delegate and disaggregate command. Effectively combating hybrid threats means meeting the needs

---

* Moving through walls is euphemistic. In actual fact, large holes are blown through the walls of adjoining houses. This helps soldiers avoid ambushes in hostile streets or narrow alleys.
† There exists an expanding call for a dialogue between police and the military. Yet, what stands out is the degree to which practitioners and academics merely cite that need. Kilcullen exemplifies the narrow band of scholars who have endeavored to develop these statements of intent beyond pure conception, so as to
Chapter 1: Shifting Tides

of the communities they infest. Operating in these environments without regard for the wider community is certain to choke the life out of cities, called “urbicide.”\textsuperscript{82} Such a population may be pacified, but the region neither serves nor enriches its inhabitants. Blunt force tactics produce “military urbanism,” a response to military-style incursions that “turns cities into fortresses and populations into denizens of occupied territory.”\textsuperscript{83} What is needed is a strategy that can “combine policing, administration, and emergency services, backed up with military-style capabilities so that police can deal with well-armed adversaries—capabilities traditionally associated with constabulary, gendarmerie, carabinieri, or coast guard forces.”\textsuperscript{84} Such a strategy would be more effective against hybridized threats precisely because it leverages greater capabilities than civil police possess yet less destructive tactical approaches than the military.\textsuperscript{85} It is logical to conclude that hybrid threats are best met with a hybrid strategy, one that equally blends the capabilities of the military with the theories of the police.\textsuperscript{86}

Any attempt to predict the exact location of a future threat or conflict would likely prove to be inaccurate.\textsuperscript{87} As a consequence, it is important to understand the function of Kilcullen’s megatrends. Note that we avoid the impulse to identify specific threats, countries, or actors most likely to precipitate conflict or intervention. Instead, these trends provide theorists with a threat forecast. Much like how climate modeling cannot tell us whether it will rain or snow next week, the demographic projections above say little about the near-term conflict forecast.\textsuperscript{88} Yet, just as with climate models, such forecasts “do suggest a range of conditions—a set of system parameters, or a ‘conflict climate’—within which [future] wars will arise.”\textsuperscript{89} These projections illustrate trends. And while those trends do not say much about what happens tomorrow or the day after, they speak volumes about the forces steadily reshaping our world. These forecasts are unequivocally telling us that dense, networked, and littoral communities are an emerging global force. How navies meet (or fail to meet) the challenges associated with that rise will be dictated by their attentiveness to the unique constraints of securing brown and green waters.

3.0 Theorizing Sea Power

If, as we have argued, much of the future lies in the littorals, why does there appear to have been so little by way of conceptual investment or interest in them by large navies, particularly that of the U.S.? One interesting answer lies in the belief that strategy may serve in part as a matter of bureaucratic self-defense. To demonstrate this point, John Shy (professor emeritus at the University of Michigan) identifies three historically significant American military strategies: Sea Power, Strategic Air Attack, and Limited War (flexible response).\textsuperscript{90} In each case, Shy argues, these strategies were just as much products of the military that employed them as they were responses to the needs of their time.\textsuperscript{91} These strategies are legacies of an impulse towards self-justification, according to this lens, each a response to a branch’s crisis of legitimacy: in the Navy in the 1880s, in the Air Corps in the 1920s, and in the Army directly following the close of World War II.\textsuperscript{92} Shy suggests that each of these strategies was “promoted with a zeal that blinded its proponents to alternative possibilities and to its inherent shortcomings.”\textsuperscript{93} His argument is reminiscent not only of modern takes on institutional learning (as seen in Nagl 2005) but

---

offer a credible foundation for debate. While we apply a divergent theory than Kilcullen, our intention in the coming chapters is similarly to exhibit the value in embracing theoretical crosspollination.
also of the bureaucratic politics model in foreign policy analysis (as seen in Allison 1969), wherein government departments competing with one another for influence, funds, and power are instrumental in shaping policies best suited to their ends. In this instance, the individual branches of the military compete with one another to legitimize budgets in a zero-sum game, a competition that can produce a rigid adherence to strategy inimical to development.

The first of the strategies Shy identifies, Sea Power, was the outgrowth of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s school of thought. According to Shy, the Sea Power doctrine proscribes that, “by offensive action a concentrated battle fleet could effectively deny the use of the sea to inferior naval forces and could pierce the coastal defense of any hostile power.” Sea Power was a product of, and co-contributor to, the era of American expansionism and interventionism that swept in a series of small wars and low intensity conflicts from the Caribbean to the Philippines. It is one of countless examples of how strategy and foreign policy serve to reinforce one another, creating a set of interdependent needs that can, in and of themselves, substantiate the continuation of a strategy. In the case of Sea Power, the Navy argued that a strong foreign policy required a strong Navy to support offensive capacity, and that a strong Navy required bases abroad (in part because of the twentieth century need for coal replenishment). As a consequence, American foreign policy became focused on entrenching American footholds abroad, for the purpose of securing the Navy, for the purpose of an expanding foreign policy. The cycle was self-perpetuating and only ended after contributing to World War I. The Sea Power doctrine suggests that “effective military action must be total, and that anything less is worse than useless.” And yet, today more than ever we see a blurring of the responsibilities of the soldier and the statesmen. The battles they fight are infrequently the symmetrical conflicts of warring nations, but often the “savage wars of peace” and “dirty little wars” of nation building. In The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, Mahan asks the reader to ponder the “true end of naval warfare.” It is a rhetorical exercise, for the answer is obvious; the raison d’être of a navy is the “preponderance over the enemy’s ships and fleets and so control of the sea.” But what if the enemy has no cruisers or destroyers? What if control of the sea has been achieved, in relation to other conventional state actors, and disorder remains? Such are the questions of maritime security, as a distinct component of broader naval and military strategy, and mandate revisiting the conversation on sea power and the very definition of control of the sea.

Yet, such an endeavor is fraught with division. Professor Colin Gray (director of the Centre for Strategic Studies at the University of Reading), for example, represents a camp that believes the principles of strategy remain unchanged over time. For those who agree with Gray, “Mahan is (mainly) right, always has been and always will be.” John Reeve (senior lecturer at the University of New South Wales), on the other hand, argues that none but the broadest concepts of strategy extend beyond a given context and that our conceptions of strategy must change as do circumstances. Spurring this divide is the reality that, as a consequence of his prolific writing, Mahan is easily misinterpreted and “the butt of much unjustified abuse.” In truth, Mahan’s theories are often more complicated than either side gives his work credit. He expressed, for example, in a very Sun Tzu style, that fighting is frequently tangential to the business of war. Mahan even wrote on littoral campaigns, mostly in The Gulf and Inland Waters. Nevertheless, the tradition of Mahan lives on in battles for control of the sea.
Chapter 1: Shifting Tides

and the “obvious blue-water preoccupations” of many of the world’s largest and growing navies. And yet, Mahan is not the only voice in the traditional naval strategic cannon. Julian Corbett’s work, for example, remains a popular alternative. Corbett returns Mahan’s navy to a broader political and economic context, consequently with less of an emphasis on the Mahanian-esque pursuit of decisive engagements. Still, both Mahan and Corbett (and their proponents) are frequently read in the lexicon of competition between armadas of conventional adversaries and the accompanying concerns of winning and exploiting control of the sea. No matter how one twists these canonical scholars, we cannot escape the fact that they help us very little in responding to the issues plaguing navies on a daily basis today (human trafficking, narcotics, piracy, IUU fishing, gunrunning). Hugh White, professor of strategic studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre in Australia (speaking of the Royal Australian Navy), summarizes the point: “fighting for control of the sea fits Mahan’s – and the navy’s – ideas about what a navy should be for. Unfortunately it does not fit the reality of naval strategy today.”

Geoffrey Till’s synopsis of the post-modern navy in his primer on sea power offers a good example of an increasingly popular alternative to Mahan’s conception of sea dominance. Post-modernism suggests that cooperative diplomacy, stability and humanitarian operations, and good order at sea can play instrumental roles in contemporary naval operations. Sea control in this context assumes a function different from what a modern take on Mahan prescribes. First, the theater of operations for sea control in the post-modern navy is littoral, a terrain with threats patently distinct from the open ocean that Mahanian writers envision. Second, post-modern navies conceive of security in a different theoretical framework. Post-modern navies view defense of the global system as a primary objective. As a consequence, defense against threats to worldwide commerce, shipping, and transportation encourage control of the sea, not for manipulation by one state, but for the common usage of all licit actors. And the attraction of this vision of sea power has even made inroads in the United States since the fall of the Soviet Union. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (and former Chief of Naval Operations) Admiral Michael Mullen once remarked, “where the old maritime strategy focused on sea control, the new one must recognize that the economic tide of all nations rises not when the seas are controlled by one but rather when they are made safe and free for all.” We can even see threads of post-modernism in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS21), to which we will return at greater length below. Robert Rubel, of the U.S. Naval War College, illustrates this point through the language of systems. Thinking of systems means emphasizing the interacting facets and gears that compose a wider network. Under such a rubric, it would be irrational to secure only one subsystem at the expense of others. As we will see, the Broken Windows theory is uniquely positioned to provide that same sense of systemic awareness. In this way, something previously inconsequential to a blue water navy, like transnational organized crime, now represents an exposed node and a point of weakness for the global system. Thus, post-modern sea power shifts from a focus on dominance to a focus on supervision.

A second conceptual obstacle to the development of strategies of maritime security as distinct from blue water strategies is the way such missions are bureaucratized. This atomized approach to maritime security is enduring because strategists “and even (perhaps especially) university faculties tend to prefer theories of
conflict framed around a single threat—insurgency, terrorism, piracy, narcotics, gangs, organized crime and so on." The consequences of such an approach, “counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, counter-piracy…might be fine in a binary environment, where one government confronts one threat at a time,” or frames it as such. Yet, that is not the world we live in, a world of “complex, adaptive social systems such as cities, trading networks, and licit and illicit economies.” To respond effectively to the needs of such dynamic environments, counterinsurgency scholar and practitioner David Kilcullen calls for a “unified field theory,” a theory that is “framed around the common features of all types of threats (rather than optimized for the particular characteristics of any one type of threat) and considers the environment in toto as a single unified system.” The littorals are such systems, qualitatively distinct from the high seas, and their rising prominence requires the attention of new and conceptually rigorous approaches to what navies do in green waters. As we will explore in the coming chapters, Broken Windows is the comprehensive theory that fits that prescription.

It is also important to situate ourselves within a broader framework of the existing (mostly post 9/11) strategic literature. At the national level, there are four major white papers on strategy: the National Defense Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review, the National Military Strategy, and the National Security Strategy. Throughout this chapter we made frequent reference to the 2014 QDR and the National Security Strategy. That is not to say, however, that the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS) are not relevant. In both of these publications we see many of the evolving themes noted across this chapter. The NDS makes note of the escalatory threat non-state actors pose to the international system, the risk of ungoverned or under-governed territory being expropriated for use by such actors, and the pressures induced by population growth and climate change. The NDS even speaks to the instability brought on by transnational organized crime (TOC) and highlights the need to build capacity across regional partners. The NMS includes references to urbanization and population growth in the third world, the risks to coastal or near coastal population centers, the growing prominence of non-state groups, and the role of illicit trafficking networks in aiding the spread of terrorists and weapons. Again, the NMS addresses cooperative capacity building, particularly with respect to combatting trafficking and smuggling, and there is even a short section dedicated to “Transnational Challenges.”

There is, additionally, the National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS), published in 2005. The NSMS is a short document (twenty-seven pages, including an appendix). It outlines three principles of maritime security: “preserving the freedom of the seas,” “facilitate and defend commerce,” and “facilitate the movement of desirable goods and people across our borders, while screening out dangerous people and material.” The first and second of these principles are common elements of naval strategy and relate to maritime security only in the very broadest definition of the concept. The last of the three fits squarely within our definition of maritime security, but is more an obvious statement of homeland defense than international strategy. In fact, while the NSMS does mention transnational crime and piracy, its primary international focus is on the threat of terrorism. The majority of the document is informed by the four objectives derived from these three principles (prevent terrorist and criminal acts, protect critical infrastructure and population centers, mitigate risks, and protect the marine...
Chapter 1: Shifting Tides

environment). And yet, the result is not so much an international strategy but a highly proficient domestic threat and vulnerability assessment (TAVA). Shoring up critical infrastructure, reducing the risk posed to significant targets, reducing recovery time in the event of an attack, and denying an adversary the opportunity to recognize and strike valuable assets, all found in the document, are components of a TAVA. The NSMS, therefore, is an ideal example of how maritime security should be addressed on a technical and strategic level within the United States and across ports servicing the United States. Though, while it broaches the importance of layered security and combatting unconventional threats (most notably terrorism), the strategy predominantly speaks to global shipping and drifts more towards statements of purpose in the broader international security context. The National Strategy for Maritime Security therefore brings us no closer to a serious discussion on a comprehensive strategy of littoral security.

At the force level, we delve deeper below into the primary maritime strategic document, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.* In addition, there exist still other important naval and maritime publications and statements, including Naval Doctrinal Publication 1 (NDP-1) and Naval Operations Concept 2010 (NOC). While maritime security is not the focus of NDP-1, there is still a short section on the need to build international capacity to combat transnational traffickers and terrorists using the seas for illicit purposes. The NOC, however, includes a whole chapter on the subject. This chapter offers a slightly more in-depth (and abbreviation rich) look at the same issues we have been discussing. The NOC was intended to give substance to A Cooperative Strategy’s broader strategic statements. It is therefore noteworthy that even here we see a lack of coherent strategy with respect to maritime security. Responses to seaborne threats continue to be framed as ‘counter-something.’ Counter-piracy, counter-terrorism, drug interdiction, migrant interdiction, and more become the cornerstones of a half-dozen unique and distinct international maritime security operations. Thus, even where maritime security receives long overdue attention, the way in which it is framed remains tied to combatting individual acts. This is more doctrine than strategy. And to borrow an analogy from Till, “if maritime theories are about the art of cookery, doctrine is concerned with today’s menu.” Put another way, strategy is how a military chooses to prioritize perspectives, while doctrine is more concerned with connecting this lofty conjecture to the practical reality of operating as an armed force. Both are important, but without the wider strategic framing, doctrine is inevitably shortsighted. This framing problem in the strategic literature is mirrored in the structure of security studies. Subfields on terrorism and piracy have grown rapidly, offering immeasurable value in their detailed investigations of specialized topics. And yet, the growth of sub-disciplines has also led to the ghettoization of literature, and we run the risk of increasingly ignoring the grey space as a matter of disciplinary purity.

A compounding contributing factor to the fragmentation of literature on maritime security, piracy, and terrorism is their relative newness. Global maritime security in

* In 2015, the maritime services published a revised Cooperative Strategy, to which the author responded in a post on CIMSEC’s NextWar journal (See, Joshua Tallis, “The New US Maritime Strategy,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) NextWar blog, March 13, 2015). However, for the purposes of understanding the impact of CS21 on acquisitions and strategic guidance, we focus on the original document, since the revision has not existed long enough to direct policy.
particular has risen in prominence alongside a renewed, post-9/11 interest in non-state threats. Again, the literature offers exposition. Prior to 2002, the term maritime security was virtually nonexistent in academia.\textsuperscript{141} Of the more than 16,000 Google Scholar hits for the phrase ‘Maritime Security,’ just over 200 were penned between 1914 and 1988.\textsuperscript{142} Since 2002, the term’s usage has increased linearly,\textsuperscript{143} a testament perhaps to a growing interest in dissecting the various components of the broader notion of what good order at sea means. We can also see this emergence in practitioner literature. We will discuss, in the American domestic context, the role of CS21 (released in 2007) in raising the prominence of maritime security for the Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps. In the international context, strategic documents have been even slower to emerge. NATO was the first of the major intergovernmental organizations to publish a modern maritime strategy document, \textit{Alliance Maritime Strategy}, in March 2011. While the document hits all the right notes, mentioning piracy, terrorism, WMD proliferation, transnational organized crime, and even global warming, it does so in a notably cursory fashion. NATO does not define what it means by the “maritime environment” or “maritime security,” which, alongside the strategy’s brevity, suggests that member countries may have failed to reach a deeper agreement on what such terms signify. One year later, the African Union (AU) set out its own agenda in \textit{2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy}. Far longer than the NATO document, the AU’s strategy is focused on rectifying the continent’s ongoing struggle with establishing maritime domain awareness (MDA). Its authorship appears motivated largely and logically by the untapped wealth of Africa’s long coastline, yet at times the document bridges into the weird (nestled halfway through is a section on “Giant Africa Aquariums”). Yet, more than anything else, the dominant impression from this comparatively lengthy text is that it is more a wish list than a strategy. The AU acknowledges the continent’s maritime porosity, but requires too much of a fundamental investment in capacity building to implement any comprehensive strategy.

Finally, the EU published the \textit{European Union Maritime Security Strategy} in June 2014. It is a relatively comprehensive document, strongest in its attention to the technical details of integrating so many member states. While the strategy succeeds in presenting many employable proposals, the ongoing EU tension between interoperability and sovereignty remains an undercurrent throughout the text. Yet, what is really significant about these documents is not so much their content but their dates of release. Maritime security is clearly a new and evolving field. Despite the fact that the illegal trafficking of people was an industry worth between five and seven billion dollars by 2004, despite the fact that a “substantial proportion” of interdicted drugs are seized in the maritime environment, and despite the fact that terrorist organizations increasingly use the sale of narcotics to fund their campaigns,\textsuperscript{144} maritime security has only recently emerged on most countries’ radars. Only in the last thirty years has the international community come together to address maritime drug smuggling,\textsuperscript{145} and the response to human trafficking was tragically slow. Of the roughly one dozen international treaties on terrorism signed in the decades before September 11, only one (the SUA Convention) addresses acts of terror at sea.\textsuperscript{146} For those willing to wade into the muddy waters, international maritime security offers few obvious niches in the literature, though it does present the opportunity to substantively contribute to an evolving field.
Chapter 1: Shifting Tides

Eisenhower said of the military, “If we have the weapons to win a big war we can certainly win a small one.”\textsuperscript{147} And yet, from Vietnam to Iraq, from Libya to Afghanistan, it is obvious that such guidance should be regarded with skepticism. Navies cannot remain effective against the range of global threats simply by tailoring themselves only for large-scale conflicts. In 1974, the Commandant of the Army War College, speaking to the lessons learned from Vietnam, wrote “it is most useful if one gets a force ready for an uncertain future rather than a certain future. There is great danger in being too certain about what the future will bring, and there’s much greater assurance in preparing for a future which you frankly admit you cannot precisely define.”\textsuperscript{148} To do so, balance is critical. In the coming years, navies will need to determine how to strike a balance between present and future threats, between modern and post-modern perspectives, “between preparing for a state-centric strategic future as opposed to a system-centric one,”\textsuperscript{149} and between a conventional high-seas strategy and one of maritime security.

3.1 Strategy Versus Acquisition

While some publications, including the \textit{Quadrennial Defense Review} and the \textit{National Security Strategy}, have begun addressing maritime security in broad strokes, these efforts often come in fits and starts. As recently as the 2009 joint publication on amphibious operations, the words urban and city are absent, and mention of littoral urbanization is absent in the 2012 doctrine on joint forcible entry.\textsuperscript{150} For over a decade, the American military has focused on a very narrow type of conflict.\textsuperscript{151} Yet, over the last several years, the military has slowly come to understand that remaining relevant and effective will require transitioning to a broader understanding of security. As the United States extricates its forces from the Middle East and Southwest Asia, strategists are likewise extricating their minds from the deserts and mountains to resume a conversation on littorals that was emerging before 9/11.\textsuperscript{152}

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Department of the Navy published \textit{...From the Sea} and \textit{Forward...From the Sea}.\textsuperscript{153} These papers highlight a transition from securing exclusive control of the sea, to securing maneuver space in regional littorals reminiscent of our primer on post-modernism.\textsuperscript{154} These publications wrestle with the responsibilities of a virtually uncontested Navy in a unipolar world. Their subsequent guidance aims to ease the inevitable transition “as Naval Forces shift from a Cold War, open-ocean, blue water naval strategy to a regional, littoral, and expeditionary focus.”\textsuperscript{155} In the 1990s, the Navy was preparing to retool and tackle the threats, not of an imposing national armada, but of the complicated geostrategic role of regional littorals. 9/11 interrupted that transition, but the maritime services have begun to resume this theme.\textsuperscript{156} In 2011, the \textit{Marine Corps Operations} manual emphasized “complex expeditionary operations in the urban littorals”\textsuperscript{157} and the “shifting strategic focus to the littoral regions.”\textsuperscript{158} In 2012, the Navy created a Coastal Riverine Force to help combat threats particular to brown waters.\textsuperscript{159} And in 2007, the maritime services (the Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps) published \textit{A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower} (CS21, later revised in 2015\textsuperscript{160}), which demonstrates yet another important step in the evolution of the strategic significance of the littorals. In order to critically analyze the
implications of this evolution, it is useful to juxtapose CS21 against the Navy’s ongoing approach to acquisition.” In other words, does the Navy put its money where its mouth is?

A Cooperative Strategy is the first joint publication of its kind. It attempts to connect the sea services under an umbrella strategy, which is particularly noteworthy for its allusions to the post-modern naval principle of defending the global system. The document opens with the pledge, “our commitment to protecting the homeland and winning our Nation’s wars is matched by a corresponding commitment to preventing wars.” Not to understate the point, that sentiment is restated in bolded italics. This calls to mind the transition of law enforcement from a crime fighting philosophy to one predicated on crime prevention, a shift facilitated by community policing and the Broken Windows theory. In fact, a number of themes we will highlight in Chapter Two resurface in CS21, most notably the rejection of a binary perspective on war and peace. Indeed, the joint publication’s wider premise is also not unlike our own. Both the white paper and this dissertation agree that the primary focus of the U.S. Navy will undoubtedly remain the capacity to deter, and, if need be, win large-scale conventional and nuclear conflicts. Yet, both the joint publication and this thesis also recognize that it is impossible to ignore the growing significance of crowded, networked, and impoverished littorals. Finally, the response to this divergence is similar in both papers: simply acknowledge the differences between these two responsibilities. A Cooperative Strategy shows that the Navy is willing to consider that two distinct threats might best be met by two distinct approaches to strategy.

The joint publication divides these two approaches into “Regionally Concentrated, Credible Combat Power” and “Globally Distributed, Mission-Tailored Maritime Forces.” Each is then further subdivided into a number of functional obligations. For the former group, these responsibilities include: containing regional conflict through forward deployed forces, deterring war among major powers, and winning wars when necessary. This first approach frames the Navy’s preference for perceiving its role more broadly, and describes how the Navy approaches the Asia-Pacific more specifically. It is for this approach and that region that the newest nuclear powered Gerald Ford class carrier was constructed. It is likewise for this strategy and adversary in which context nuclear powered submarines and large stealth Zumwalt-class destroyers have been designed. Admittedly, maintaining the capacity to win large wars will inevitably require expensive hardware. Still, the budgetary dominance of these acquisitions also demonstrates a corresponding interest in their associated missions. This is supported by Secretary Hagel’s remarks when, in late 2013, he was quoted as saying the Zumwalt “sends an important sign’ about U.S. commitment to the Pacific region.” Mr. Hagel stated that the destroyer is symbolic of the American rebalance of resources and attention to the Asia-Pacific. Thus, while the joint publication is equally split between the traditional and unconventional, we can see already that there remains a considerable institutional emphasis on symmetrical naval activities.

---

1 This is instructive because, as Lieutenant Commander John Bradford (USN) notes, “strategy and policy staff officers working on the Navy Staff (OPNAV) since CS21’s creation were directed to continually reference CS21 in the course of formulating and executing their work.” See, John Bradford, “The Maritime Strategy of the United States: Implications for Indo-Pacific Sea Lanes,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 33, No. 2 (August 2011): 185.
The second approach—globally dispersed, mission-specific forces—is, however, a demonstrative conceptual step towards the threats highlighted above. Here *A Cooperative Strategy* emphasizes the need to respond to natural disasters, climate change, non-state actors, social instability, criminal elements, and forced migration. These are precisely the underserved issues that precipitate severe global threats (what the QDR refers to as “stressors,” and factors reiterated by the Naval Chief of Information). As before, this category is subdivided into a number of functional obligations, including defending the homeland, cooperating with international partners (on operations such as humanitarian assistance and law enforcement), and combating local disruptions (threats such as piracy, human trafficking, drug smuggling, and arms trafficking) before they evolve into regional or global crises. These three responsibilities underscore the awareness that “increasingly urbanized littoral regions” and the unconventional threats they engender are fast becoming major points of concern for actors a world away. In this arena as well, the Navy’s acquisition program paints an insightful picture. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), with its shallow draft, comparatively expansive hanger space, large flight deck, small crew, fast speed, and sophisticated automation was designed to become the workhorse of the fleet. Even over budget, at around $400 million a ship, the LCS provides a cost-effective alternative to sending a multibillion-dollar destroyer into littorals to combat pirates, terrorists, or traffickers in open-hulled speed boats. The LCS’ small size optimizes its capacity to coordinate with other navies and coast guards, many of which do not have the port facilities, ships, or personnel sufficiently skilled to train with mammoth vessels. The LCS’ shallow draft also allows it to enter hundreds more ports than a larger ship, and some analysts contend that its speed and integration with manned and unmanned airpower increase the ship’s resilience to asymmetric threats.

Yet, the LCS has been repeatedly targeted for cancelation or truncated production. O’Rourke dedicates pages chronicling continued efforts to curtail the ship’s procurement. The LCS and its mission remain second to the Pivot to Asia. In a time of budget austerity, resources devoted to *A Cooperative Strategy’s* second approach will continue to be seen in opportunity cost of ships designed for combat with a symmetrical (Chinese) adversary in mind. Much of the debate surrounding the LCS stems from legitimate criticism of the ship’s performance and the Navy’s apparent build now, strategize later approach. And yet, the intensity with which the program has been targeted seems to exceed the standard criticism that routinely accompanies the launch of new classes of major surface combatants. There appears to be something different about the negativity surrounding the LCS. Thus while the current ship design may require modifications, critiques of its performance augur a deeper criticism, reflective of clashing schools of thought between the proverbial ‘big Navy’ and its post-modern wing. This criticism represents a fundamental misunderstanding about the duality of the Navy’s responsibilities, as seen in CS21. For example, “Secretary Hagel has correctly stated that the Littoral Combat Ship would not fare well in a major engagement with the future Chinese Navy.” The Littoral Combat Ship would be a sitting duck against a Chinese destroyer. The LCS, however, was not built to stand against the PLA Navy. The Navy is in possession of a substantively and theoretically distinct ship than the classes of warships it is set to replace, and that is “precisely what the Navy wanted.” That the office of the Secretary of Defense saw the ship in a dramatically different light indicates a
failure on the part of the Navy to effectively communicate the differences between its two missions, again emphasizing the undercurrents of dueling strategic schools. With the capability to deploy helicopters and fast rigid-hulled boats, and with a flight deck and modular internal storage space easily fitted to humanitarian needs, the LCS is optimized for an entirely different set of missions than engaging the Chinese Navy. The ship could, however, play a significant role in the second of A Cooperative Strategy’s two missions, that of international maritime security.

Moreover, that such a conclusion seems to lack traction, coupled with the debate around the LCS and the fervor with which many advocated its replacement, evidences more than just the Navy’s difficulty communicating its obligations. It highlights the enduring institutional resistance to addressing maritime security in the littorals as priority missions. This tradeoff will become increasingly obvious because of the very delicacy of naval acquisitions. As Dr. Thompson illustrates, the LCS may be here to stay strictly by default. Any wholesale replacement of the ship could take ten years to plan and execute. It would consequently come into production precisely when the replacement to the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine is expected to enter construction at a cost of five billion dollars a ship. With an annual acquisition budget of around fifteen billion dollars, there would simply be no money for an LCS replacement ship at the same time. And since the submarine is among the Navy’s preeminent priorities, there is no question which project would be scrapped if push came to shove. This would leave the Navy significantly undersupplied, and so is an unlikely avenue altogether. For a time, the Navy agreed to suspend the LCS’ run after issuing thirty-two of the initial fifty-two contracts. And while the exact status of the final warships was subject to rigorous debate, the Navy’s commitment to supporting some LCS variant may signal, at a minimum, that the institution require new ways of operating in the littorals.

As we will see in the coming case studies, the success of a community policing, Broken Windows approach to naval strategy by no means requires an embrace of the LCS specifically. Larger ships have their own advantages in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) and related missions, not to mention that any strategy of maritime security would be impossible without broader command of the sea. The freedom of movement of American ships ensured by more conventional assets allows the Navy to engage across the spectrum of unconventional and non-kinetic missions. Though our argument does not require a resolution of any ongoing acquisition debates, “a division of labor is indicated in which different classes of warship are configured for different levels of danger.” While such an approach logically encourages greater cost-saving, and many of CS21’s missions call for extensive capacity building and training with smaller navies ill-equipped to couple with larger American vessels, the outsized criticism directed at the comparatively inexpensive LCS signifies the failure to reconcile budgetary priorities with the conceptual principles of littoral operations.

For the time being, “most of the warships in the present and planned fleet aren’t well suited for littoral operations. They are too slow, they are designed for missions in deep water, and they are very costly to operate.” As a consequence, when read through the lens of ongoing acquisitions, we are forced to a more tepid conclusion about the significance of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. The Navy’s defense of the LCS encourages us to see the white paper as more than just lip service to the
importance of littorals and constabulary actions. And yet, acquisition realities make it obvious that CS21 falls far short of making these issues a priority. Still, even as investment lags, there can be no doubt that strategists are increasingly talking about the risks posed by the unconventional. The Pentagon is aware that, as Rhodes Scholar and retired Army Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl emphasizes, large conservative institutions require time and concerted effort to change and innovate. That the Navy is even discussing hybrid threats, global warming, and the illegal trafficking of people, drugs, money, and weapons is an encouraging sign that the evolution has begun.

Finally, we conclude this section with one last note on strategy. An important balance for the scholar of security studies is the relationship between strategy and policy, which, as we have seen throughout this chapter, are closely intertwined. As we near our case studies, a word on strategy and its interaction with policy would be helpful. Professor Everett Dolman of the U.S. Air University’s School of Advanced Air and Space studies explains strategy as follows:

The tactical thinker seeks an answer. And while coming to a conclusion can be the beginning of action, it is too often the end of critical thinking. The strategist will instead search for the right questions; those to which the panorama of possible answers provides insight and spurs ever more questions. No solutions are possible in this construct only working hypotheses that the strategist knows will one day be proved false or tossed aside. Strategy is thus an unending process that can never lead to a conclusion. And this is the way it should be: continuation is the goal of strategy not culmination.

The search for the right questions and the knowledge that new inquiries must inevitably replace such questions (and their answers) is equally true of strategy and academia. In scholarship derived from a problem-solving approach, there is an undeniable intimacy with policy. And yet, the nature of that relationship is significant. While the responsibility of scholarship should not be to draft policy, we should not shrink from the recognition of our role in political discourse. Such an engagement with policy may not be direct, but it is important to recognize. By shaping the context of academic and, if we are fortunate, public debate, the political scientist is held accountable not only to his or her peers, but to the communities we have the potential to enrich. Till writes that “maritime analysts and naval historians constantly bemoan the fact that the sea is given such scant intellectual regard in the study of international politics and history.” Rectifying that dearth begins with recognizing that strategy development and scholarship retain the same underlying impulse: the search for the right questions.

4.0 Conclusion

What has changed? Why should the U.S. maritime services take maritime security seriously as a body for strategic development and investment in its own right? As Kilcullen illustrates, the increasingly hybridized nature of urban coastal threats will only compound preexisting stressors like climate change and poverty in the coming decades. Demographic and human geographic changes are placing new and significant stress on
the maritime domain, and projections indicate that these factors will continue to drastically reshape international security. The resulting pressures those forces will inevitably bring to bear on navies like that of the U.S. are unlike the traditional conflicts Mahanian strategies are optimized to combat. As a consequence, what has also begun to change is the U.S. Navy’s longstanding attitude towards these issues. While not groundbreaking in practical terms, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* and documents like it are nevertheless invitations for “further experimentation.” The 2014 *Quadrennial Defense Review*’s references to non-state actors and their impact amid an interconnected world suggest that the Pentagon has begun to recognize the veracity of alternative security visions that only a decade ago it would have been unlikely to mention. We are consequently presented with a compelling picture of the substantive changes taking hold across littorals and naval theorizing. It is the need to address these changes that makes this dissertation relevant. The issues raised above—including austerity, sustainability, urbanization, poverty, globalization, global warming, and third world development—will become increasingly significant throughout the ‘Asian century.’ And while the Asia-Pacific may dominate navies’ attention and resources, finding an effective strategy of maritime security to meet the needs of the growing masses will be indispensable for national security and international affairs.

In the Introduction, we divided the research question into two sub-questions: why should we consider the need for a new perspective in naval strategy, and what is the Broken Windows theory? In this chapter we turned to the first question; why does it matter? To answer, we looked at demographic and human geographic trends, gaining a better understanding of the global threat forecast over the coming decades. We also looked at how the Pentagon is thinking about the future, how that perspective has the potential to obscure important developments in the littorals, and how the U.S. Navy is slowly addressing some of these most pressing issues. As a consequence, we were able to underscore how Broken Windows’ contextual and communal approach to crime prevention could prove fruitful as a strong foundation for a new naval littoral strategy. Combined, these factors answer the second of our sub-questions, the ‘so what’ of this research.

In a domain where “the international architecture of the twentieth century is buckling under the weight of new threats,” the risk of disorder and poor governance is among the rising themes in American national security publications. From the *National Security Strategy*, to the Pentagon’s *Quadrennial Defense Review*, to *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, ensuring law and order in the face of threats that recognize no boundaries is among the leading problems of the early twenty-first century. We live in a time when pandemics, global warming, and worldwide networks of crime and terrorism make events in the farthest corner of the planet relevant to every citizen of every country. Developing a sustainable strategy of maritime security capable of addressing the instability of such unconventional threats requires new ways of thinking about what navies do, and where they do it.
Chapter 1: Shifting Tides

6 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 239.
7 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 25.
8 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 25.
10 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 29.
14 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 29.
15 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 29.
16 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 29.
17 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 29.
19 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 29.
20 Dr. Thomas Mahnken (former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning) in discussion with the author, June 24, 2014. For a transcript, see Appendix C.
22 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 32.
23 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 32.
24 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 30.
25 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 247.
26 Pentagon, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, 8.
31 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 40.
32 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 114.
33 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 89, 93.
34 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 141.
35 See, for example, Max Weber (1919): Politics as Vocationhttp://fs2.american.edu/dfagel/www/Class%20Readings/Weber/PoliticsAsAVocation.pdf.
36 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 45.
40 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 45.
41 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 34.
42 Pentagon, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, 8.
Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

43 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 99.
48 White House, National Security Strategy (2010), 49.
49 White House, National Security Strategy (2010), 49.
51 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 102.
52 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 126.
53 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 287.
54 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 287.
55 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 287.
56 Dr. Mahnken likewise identifies the role Italian and Australian police play in augmenting American law enforcement capabilities abroad. Mahnken offers that the lack of an American federal police force hinders the United States’ ability to train and advise law enforcement overseas and creates a capabilities gap often filled by the Italians or Australians. See, Dr. Thomas Mahnken in discussion with the author, June 24, 2014.
58 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 287.
59 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 23.
60 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 24.
62 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 24.
63 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 24.
64 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 24.
65 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 24.
66 The Marine Corps seems to be the most comfortable of the U.S. Armed Services, noting their “‘small wars’ legacy.” See, United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Operations, MCDP 1-0 (Washington, DC: HQ Marine Corps, 2011), 1-17.
67 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 5.
68 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 23.
70 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 23.
71 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 24.
72 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 127.
73 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 241.
74 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 85.
75 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 85.
76 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 261.
80 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 19-20.
81 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 288.
82 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 76, 110-112.
83 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 111.
84 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 112.
Chapter 1: Shifting Tides

85 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 112.
87 Penton, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, 62.
88 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 27.
89 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 27.
99 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 223.
103 Till, Seapower, 48.
104 Till, Seapower, 48.
105 Till, Seapower, 57.
106 Till, Seapower, 58.
107 Till, Seapower, 58.
108 Till, Seapower, 61.
109 Till, Seapower, 62.
110 Till, Seapower, 84-85.
111 Till, Seapower, 85.
113 Till, Seapower, 36.
114 Till, Seapower, 35.
115 Till, Seapower, 36.
116 Till, Seapower, 36.
118 Till, Seapower, 36.
120 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 16-17.
121 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 16-17.
122 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 114.
129 Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy, 2.
As an aside, and as we note in Chapter Two, the process by which states securitize various unconventional issues (or populations) is an area of robust critical debate, including in the maritime domain (as highlighted by Bueger). See, for example, Christian Bueger, “What is Maritime Security,” Marine Policy 53, (2015); Christian Bueger and Jan Stockbruegger, “Security Communities, Alliances and Macro-securitization: The Practices of Counter-piracy Governance,” in Maritime Piracy and the Construction of Global Governance, ed. Michael Struett, Mark Nance, and John Carlson (London: Routledge, 2013), 99–124. While important, however, investigating this body of work in greater detail lies outside of the scope of this research.


Pentagon, Naval Operations Concept, 1.

Pentagon, Naval Operations Concept, 37.

Till, Seapower, 51.


Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 49.

Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife, 205.

Till, Seapower, 348.

Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 279.


Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 261.


The word “littoral” is used nineteen times in the first and ten in the second of these papers.

Department of the Navy, ...From the Sea.

The resurgence of interest in the littorals is presaged in Admiral Vern Clark’s 2002 Proceedings article “Sea Power 21.” In the article, the significance of assured littoral access is a visible element of a yet wider strategy. A 2005 CRS article by O’Rourke, “Naval Transformation: Background and Issues for Congress,” similarly notes the Navy’s growing interest in a shift from blue waters to green.


Till, Seapower, 274.


Till, Seapower, 84.


The 2014 QDR echoes the same preventative ethos. See, Pentagon, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, 15.
Chapter 1: Shifting Tides

176 In a high-low mix, mission-tailored ships such as the LCS are frequently cheaper than their multi-mission counterparts because they require fewer systems and are typically much smaller than multi-mission platforms. See, Arena, Blickstein, Younossi, and Grammich, *Why Has the Cost of Navy Ships Risen?*, 67-68.
179 For more on the LCS’s potential capabilities, see Martin Murphy, *Littoral Combat Ship: An Examination of Possible Concepts of Operation* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010) in addition to O’Rourke and Work.
Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory


190 Pentagon, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, 30.
195 Till, Seapower, 123.

200 Till, Seapower, 348.
201 Till, Seapower, 307.
203 Pentagon, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, 3.
206 Pentagon, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, 6, 21.
Chapter 2: Breaking Windows

1.0 The Power of Context

At the center of the Broken Windows theory is the notion that confronting disorder does not necessitate the immediate resolution of complicated and amorphous ‘root causes’ such as global economic trends or religious radicalization. It is an argument that proposes that thinking big might not mean acting big, embracing Archimedes’ perspective on leverage: “Give me a place to stand and I will move the world.” By targeting perceptions, often through addressing small-scale disorder, even large-scale epidemics can be curbed. On the New York City subway, cracking down on fare-beating resulted in a dramatic turnaround for what was once one of the country’s most violent transportation systems. Above ground, policing quality-of-life misdemeanor crimes such as graffiti, prostitution, and aggressive panhandling helped reduce felony rates to their lowest level in years. In the maritime environment, understanding issues through the Broken Windows lens means placing a greater emphasis on understanding the interplay of perception and security. Doing so may look like offering more humanitarian assistance (HA/DR), combatting human trafficking, or targeting narcotics and arms trafficking. While these are catastrophic on a human scale, constabulary duties have always been small fish for the United States Navy. Yet, Broken Windows suggests that dealing with issues on the softer end of the threat scale can help restore a community’s confidence and ability to self-monitor. As human geographic and demographic projections anticipate a substantial rise in the conditions that produce these threats, such an approach may offer strategists what Archimedes ultimately lacked—a place to stand. Nowhere is this simplicity of disproportionate impact examined better than in Malcolm Gladwell’s *The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference*. In it, Gladwell seeks to expose and explain the levers which move everything from fashion trends to syphilis outbreaks by identifying three components of epidemics: the Law of the Few, the Stickiness Factor, and the Power of Context. The impacts of these factors are variable, dependent on the type of epidemic being analyzed. As a consequence, identifying which ‘law’ most directly applies to our discussion is a useful first step in understanding the logic behind Broken Windows.

The Law of the Few explains the power of word of mouth campaigns through the social sway of a small cadre of influential individuals. For us, however, this first law is ultimately incidental. The Law of the Few helps explain the human mechanisms that drive social movements, not their content. The second contributor Gladwell suggests is the Stickiness Factor, the content component absent in the Law of the Few; if you want to make an impact, you need people to remember what you said or did. This factor is similarly incidental to our research. The quality of the argument presented here will invariably impact its stickiness, but this factor focuses more on the attraction of a message and less on its real world relevance.

The third law, the Power of Context, stipulates that our environment influences all of us. That much seems obvious; clearly context impacts people. Yet, Gladwell’s contribution is in the depths to which he takes this assertion, demonstrating how
Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

profoundly that contextual influence is in fact exerted. Clinical and psychological studies on everyone from pre-teens to seminarians suggest that our surroundings have an almost overriding impact on how we behave. Students may cheat on arithmetic tests but not spelling tests, or they may cheat at home but not at school, but there always seems to be a circumstance in which a student will cheat.\(^6\) Their environment informs how and when they break the rules, not if they will. Likewise, seminary students told they were late for delivering a speech were more prone to literally stepping over a man in need of help (an actor) than ones told they were early. Critically, before the experiment, both groups were reminded of the parable of the Good Samaritan (the theme of the sermon).\(^7\) Being in a rushed versus relaxed context was the only explanatory factor for predicting whether a seminary student would stop to help a person in pain while en route to deliver a sermon on the Good Samaritan. Subtleties of context do not merely inform our actions, they appear to instruct them. As you may suspect, “Broken Windows theory and the Power of Context are one and the same.”\(^8\) Understanding how to influence the subtleties around the margins of an environment can reverse (in other words, tip) epidemics of crime, violence, and even maritime instability.\(^9\) Context can be changed, and therefore, so can actions—so the theory holds.

1.1 Theory and Terms

*The Atlantic* is over 150 years old. During its tenure as an opinion maker in American history, the magazine has published everyone from Mark Twain to Martin Luther King, Jr. It is therefore no small testament to the ingenuity and accessibility of George Kelling and James Q. Wilson that, amongst these figures, it is the piece they published in March 1982 entitled “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety” that endures as the single most reproduced article in the publication’s history.\(^10\) The forceful simplicity of their argument, and the sensitive nature of police policy in the turbulent 1980s, combined to catapult Broken Windows into the major competitor to ‘traditional’ views of police work.\(^11\) While Kelling in particular would go on to publish more specific elucidations of Broken Windows—notably with Catherine Coles in *Fixing Broken Windows*—this first article seemed to strike a chord in and beyond the field of criminology.

This chord resonated, in part, because the foundation had been laid 13 years earlier, with a transcontinental experiment. In 1969, two cars were parked and abandoned with their hoods up.\(^12\) One was in Palo Alto, a wealthy California suburb at the center of Silicon Valley; the other was left in the Bronx, a rough borough of New York City.\(^13\) Within ten minutes, individuals had set upon the car in the Bronx, many being families or white-collar workers. Within twenty-four hours, there was almost nothing left of it to take.\(^14\) The car quickly became a jungle gym for children, just a piece of rust on a dirty Bronx street.\(^15\) The fate of the Bronx car seems fairly obvious to anyone with a passing familiarity with one of New York’s grittiest neighborhoods. The Palo Alto car, not surprisingly, fared much better for a while, until Philip Zimbardo, the Stanford psychologist responsible for the experiment, hit it with a sledgehammer.\(^16\) Soon, the good-natured people of the Golden State, mostly middle class, had destroyed the vehicle and left it entirely overturned.\(^17\)
Chapter 2: Breaking Windows

The varied mindsets of Bronx residents—ranging from indifferent, to discouraged, to utter disregard—facilitated the early onset of vandalism there; the people of the neighborhood expressly believed no one cared what happened to abandoned cars. In Palo Alto, the community expectations were different. Law and order was well-maintained, and people had dramatically different experiences and expectations of behavior. Yet, even in that comfortable suburban enclave, the smallest signal that no one cared (i.e. the sledgehammer to the car) dissolved communal restraints almost instantaneously. The experiment, while preceding the *Atlantic* article, is a proof of concept for Broken Windows. It tells us not just that perceived environmental decay encourages the rapid disintegration of community self-policing, but also that no neighborhood is immune to the Power of Context.

The message, however, is not fatalistic. If Zimbardo had not smashed the car a week into the experiment, who knows how long Palo Alto’s residents would have continued to walk past it. Instead, the intent is to uncover why some communities precipitate behavior that results in action such as that in the Bronx, and how they may be altered to mirror Palo Alto. Criminologists have posited a number of theories about race, socioeconomics, narcotics, alcohol, and more to explain the turbulence of certain neighborhoods. While many highlight serious social issues, Broken Windows claims that none of these root cause explanations shares the same level of correlation with a community’s crime rate as does the prevalence of disorder.

This thesis seeks to apply the practically tested lessons born out of the Broken Windows theory, methods of policing that were originally made possible through the problem-solving approach and that proved wildly popular in some communities. The accompanying policies are often referred to as Broken Windows policing or quality-of-life policing. As the cases in the New York subway and New York City will highlight, through a qualitative narration of disorder’s impact on crime, law enforcement’s ability to leverage that hypothesized association produced a measurable result on the rate of violence. By adapting and applying the policing techniques emanating from Wilson and Kelling’s theory, it is our contention that the maritime security subfield can similarly conceptualize destabilizing actors across the world, even without a conclusion to the causal debate of root causes.

The qualitative process tracing approach starts at the beginning of the chain, the initiating incident. It asks, how does one dent in an abandoned car, or one derelict building, truly spark urban decline? This gets to the fundamentals of Broken Windows, and in response Wilson and Kelling sketch the following example:

A piece of property is abandoned, weeds grow up, a window is smashed. Adults stop scolding rowdy children; the children, emboldened, become more rowdy. Families move out, unattached adults move in. Teenagers gather in front of the corner store. The merchant asks them to move; they refuse. Fights occur. Litter accumulates. People start drinking in front of the grocery; in time, an inebriate slumps to the sidewalk and is allowed to sleep it off. Pedestrians are approached by panhandlers.

It almost sounds like Archie Bunker’s worst nightmare, and equally as dramatic. The truth is, however, that this outline has repeatedly proven illustrative of real world
cases. Disorder spreads steadily. First, a window is broken. If it goes unfixed, sociologists and police agree that soon all the windows of that building will likely be broken. Why? The destruction of property surely does not aggregate in certain districts because there is a disproportionate distribution of window-smashers to window-lovers; rather, the first broken window serves as a signal, like a sledgehammer to a car. It is a sign that no one cares, no one is watching, and there is nothing to stop someone from breaking the next one. Kelling and Wilson’s panhandlers are also broken windows. Muggers prefer to operate where people are already intimidated, they believe the chances of detection are lower where residents cannot even seem to keep their streets orderly. Why was Broken Windows needed? Nationwide crime rates for the 1970s through the late 1990s certainly suggest something was not working. Kelling and Coles make the argument throughout Fixing Broken Windows that modern law enforcement’s crime-fighting approach was an ineffective way of addressing the damage caused by disorder. Such a style of policing should be familiar to anyone living near an American city. It is typified by police in their cruisers, always available for dispatch calls, reluctant to engage with pedestrians, and directly attached to computerized 911 networks. Police and the communities they serve grow apart, distrust builds, and disorder is compounded by inaction and a sense of loyalty to the profession. For example, many felt that the NYPD’s guiding philosophy during this time was plainly, “stay out of trouble.” Kelling and Wilson’s suggestion was to control crime through controlling disorder, not trying to catch every crime in the act. Order maintenance (quality-of-life policing) is the effort to constrain the behavioral and physical manifestations of disorder, which serve as signs of neighborhood decay. This is crime prevention, not crime fighting. By stemming disorderly conduct, and perceptions thereof, the process of degradation can be intercepted, and order maintenance can break the cycle. Most empirical research studying Broken Windows uses misdemeanor arrests as a measure of quality-of-life policing. Such crimes include typical low-level malfeasance such as graffiti, vandalism, prostitution, public drinking, etc. Note that Kelling’s definition of Broken Windows policing accounts for the influence of more than just the physical environment on our actions. It is inclusive of a holistic understanding of context, to include behavior alongside more literal broken windows, as was Gladwell’s Power of Context. It is the intention of this research to apply that same perspective to maritime security by reframing the physical and behavioral domain of littoral communities, as expressed in the introduction.

Notwithstanding the obvious need for innovation in the police force, this alternative community-based policing model was greeted with strong criticism. Police simply could not be bothered to address minor issues when there was “real” police work to be done. A half-century of reform in police strategy had led many to believe there had never been any other function for law enforcement besides crime fighting. This cognitive dissonance is not uncommon in large institutions with their own cultures and agendas. In the military, for example, “a remembered past has always more or less constricted both action in the present and thinking about the future,” regardless of the
accuracy of that remembered past. In reality, before midcentury, police were seen as primarily responsible for “crime prevention” and order maintenance, “keeping peace by peaceful means.” Even the very phrase “law enforcement” was not in use until the 1960s, around the time that the idea of the criminal justice “system” first found expression. As a result, police were thrust into a systematized bureaucracy that effectively reduced their role to the apprehension of suspected criminals.

Another significant point of friction was the legal pushback from libertarian advocacy groups that see order maintenance tactics as veiled attempts to target the rights of homeless individuals. Kelling and Wilson were frequent targets of attacks of classism and racism, prompting Kelling and Coles to directly address the subject of homelessness in Fixing Broken Windows. By presenting a nuanced understanding of the homeless community, Kelling and Coles hoped to substantiate their focus on order maintenance while demonstrating a commitment to helping the underserved as much as the rest. While successful implementation of community policing programs quickly won over officers, legal challenges threatened to make these gains obsolete. This was such a threat to the survival of Broken Windows policing that Kelling and Coles dedicate a full chapter, and broad sections of almost every other, to discussing the legal support for their position and explaining some misrepresentations they deem typical of suits filed by advocacy groups on behalf of the homeless. The compelling legal arguments on both sides have resulted in pitched court battles in every city or state that has implemented order maintenance legislation (Seattle, San Francisco, New York, Texas, Baltimore, etc.).

Finally, community policing undeniably sounds “soft,” a tone belying order maintenance’s proactive approach to crime prevention. Some law enforcement officials consequently regarded Broken Windows as beneath their profession, or beyond the scope of their responsibilities within the criminal justice system. This too is paralleled in the armed forces. Order maintenance is relegated to “operations other than war,” at best something to do while waiting for a real war, at worst a distraction and a waste of resources. State building and community support on a large scale have often been perceived as the sole province of the State Department, an atomized (and incomplete) perspective on the role order truly plays in security. Yet, order maintenance reached receptive minds among police. New York City Police Commissioner William Bratton, serving in that post from January 1994 to April 1996 (and again from January 2014 to present), quickly became a Broken Windows adherent. Bratton would prove critical in demonstrating on a massive scale the potential of order maintenance policing, uncovering associations between disorder and violent crime that Kelling and Coles, publishing Fixing Broken Windows in 1996, were only just beginning to notice. Two cases chronicling Bratton’s stewardship of New York City’s Transit Authority Police Department (TPD), and later the NYPD, illustrate the power of Wilson and Kelling’s concept when put into practice. These cases are also the two dominant studies in Broken Windows literature, and therefore an understanding of each covers a substantive scope of the field. While not the first implementations of order maintenance, New York’s experimentation was the largest and most potent demonstration of any early foray into Broken Windows.
1.2 The New York City Subway

A day in the life of an average New York subway user in 1984 seems unimaginable now:

Chances are [her] train was late, because in 1984 there was a fire somewhere on the New York system every day and a derailment every other week…[The car she] sat in was filthy, its floor littered with trash and the walls and ceiling thick with graffiti, but that wasn’t unusual because in 1984 every one of the 6,000 cars in the Transit Authority fleet, with the exception of the midtown shuttle, was covered with graffiti – top to bottom, inside and out…Today the number two train accelerates to over 40 miles an hour…but it’s doubtful [her] train went that fast. In 1984, there were 500 ‘red tape’ areas on the system – places where track damage had made it unsafe for trains to go more than 15 miles per hour. Fare-beating was so commonplace that it was costing the Transit Authority as much as $150 million in lost revenue annually.\(^{54}\)

On any given day the system experienced over forty felonies (it would top fifty a day by 1989), and aggressive panhandling and the pervasiveness of petty crime had forced ridership to its lowest point in history.\(^{55}\) Extortion of passengers was common, with vandals disabling token machines and collecting fares from customers as they held open gates to the platform.\(^{56}\) In fact, the chairman of the New York City Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA, Kiley) and the future TPD commissioner (Bratton) were both caught in traps such as this.\(^{57,58}\) In short, life on the subway was dirty and dangerous. Then suddenly, from a record high felony rate, subway ridership improved and violent crime dropped seventy-five percent.\(^{59}\) How?

In the 1980s, Kelling began consulting for the MTA. Around that time, in 1984, the newly appointed Transit Authority President David Gunn launched the Clean Car Program, a multi-billion dollar initiative to eradicate graffiti from the subway.\(^{60}\) As Broken Windows suggests, graffiti on a train provides “inescapable [proof] that the environment [a rider] must endure for an hour or more a day is uncontrolled and uncontrollable, and that anyone can invade it to do whatever damage and mischief the mind suggests.”\(^{61}\) It took military diligence to take back the over 5,000 cars used by three and a half million people a day.\(^{62}\) Special police units rode in and defended reclaimed trains,\(^{63}\) and any clean car with new graffiti was either fixed in the short changeover at the terminus of a route or removed from the tracks.\(^{64}\) It was not until May 12, 1989 that the final subway car was ultimately cleaned,\(^{65}\) at which time the MTA had accomplished one of the largest urban restoration projects ever attempted.\(^{66}\) And yet, crime persisted. Was Broken Windows broken?

Not exactly. As a problem-oriented policing approach, Broken Windows is best applied when law enforcement identify, in concert with communities, the problems most directly affecting them. Effective policing, therefore, requires effective problem identification. While the graffiti removal was a necessary prerequisite to taking back the subway, it was not the end of the line. Disorder had become so rampant in the system that even this massive undertaking was not enough to bring it under police control.\(^{67}\) The
deeper problem had always been broadly labeled ‘homelessness,’ and homelessness was not the TPD’s problem.” It was not until Kelling headed an investigative study for the MTA that the issue of disorderly criminal behavior was identified as the real issue. Once that occurred, officers were given the tools to begin tackling the appalling conditions of their underground world. In October 1989, Operation Enforcement kicked off to a slow start, and in April 1990 William Bratton took the reigns of the Transit Police Department. Like Gunn, Bratton was a Broken Windows disciple, and his leadership saw an instantaneous spike in enforcement; “ejections for misbehavior tripled within a matter of months after Bratton took office.” His primary target? Fare-beaters.

In 1990 a quarter of a million people were avoiding paying fares every day, and, like graffiti, Bratton saw fare evasion as a signal of disorder. Despite costing millions of dollars to the city annually, TPD officers had been reluctant to pursue youths hopping turnstiles. It took almost an entire day to process someone for a $1.25 misdemeanor; it was just not worth it. Bratton sought to change that. He remodeled a transit bus and turned it into a mobile station house, while officers had fare-beaters stand in daisy chains until they had a full haul; soon, processing times were down to an hour even as arrests increased, and the tide began to change. The full impact of order maintenance became immediately apparent; one out of every seven fare beaters arrested had an outstanding warrant, and one out of every twenty was carrying a weapon. Put another way, about one in ten arrests for a $1.25 offense yielded a felony or Class A misdemeanor arrest. Nothing could have better exposed the links between disorder and crime than the proof that many fare beaters were not just misbehaving delinquents but possible felons or career criminals. Crime drops in direct correlation to an increased effort to maintain order because such policies put police in contact with violent offenders before any more offenses are committed. In other words, crime, and the individuals who engage in crime, are multidimensional. To their credit, “the bad guys wised up,” weapons were left at home, and everyone started paying their fares. By the early 1990s, crime was no longer a serious problem on the New York City subway, and, before the decade was out, it could be said to be “among the safest in the world.”

Some may argue that the subway case is too narrow an example to validate Broken Windows or use it to apply the theory to the littorals. Though New York’s subway is more extensive than most, it is in the end a “spatially bounded” network with defined points of ingress and egress. That, however, is precisely its advantage, serving as a contained natural experiment isolating many of the factors difficult to control in a city. The reclamation of the New York City subway was one of the largest municipal problem-solving exercises ever attempted, and its spatial restrictions make Bratton’s success difficult to attribute to anything other than direct police policy. Even more so, the root cause explanations often attributed to the decline in citywide (and nationwide) crime later in the decade do not apply: the subway was never a major drug market, the economy was still struggling, unemployment was on the rise, and the youth population had not shrunk. Target hardening, access restriction and managerial changes all played a role. But it was not until order maintenance was properly enforced that a ‘tipping point’ was reached and there were any noticeable changes in subway crime. The closed system gave Broken Windows an opportunity in which the many distracting variables endemic to large cities were naturally controlled. As a consequence, the physical environment was
Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

restored, the runaway behavior was curbed, and the MTA now operates one of the most popular transit systems around.

Among the most significant problems with taking Broken Windows into the maritime domain is the transition from urban to open. Even studies that have adopted Broken Windows in alternative disciplines have applied the theory overwhelmingly in urban settings. Wilson, Kelling, Sousa, and Coles have produced penetrating insight into the machinery of order maintenance, but their work remains tied to the basic metropolitan unit. No two cities are identical, but the existence of neighborhoods and communities is universal, even if at times their borders are ambiguous. The New York City subway experiment, however, suggests that habitation is not a prerequisite for the effectiveness of Broken Windows. Just as people do not generally live on the subway but rather use it as a means of transportation or employment, so too do people rarely live on open water but instead use it as a means of transport and economy. The mere presence of people in an area creates its own community with its own rules, or lack thereof. Like our “streets, parks, and sidewalks” the subway and waterways “belong to no one and therefore to everyone.”

The subway is one very small example relative to the global scope of this research. Nevertheless, its recovery lends strong support to Broken Windows as a theory of an overall behavioral, not strictly urban, condition. Broken Windows illustrates not only the mechanics of urban decline, but of human psychology. Indeed, the consensus among sociologists and police that one broken window inevitably leads to more is not dependent on the urban political-geographical setting of window breakers, but rather on their immediate context. This is Gladwell’s approach as well; The Tipping Point and the Power of Context are about creating, stopping, and altering epidemics on scales that are unencumbered by the confines of points on a map. In expanding Broken Windows beyond the basic city unit, we may run the risk of overextending its language; however, the literature supports the position that there is no concomitant risk of diluting the relevance of such principles.

Moreover, over the last several decades the spheres of criminology and international security have been in slow convergence. As the world’s growing population continues to crowd ever more people into the sprawling slums and shantytowns of the third world, urban issues such as poverty and crime have slowly become crises of international proportions. The increasing urbanization and littoralization of the third world—the tendency for people to cluster along the water—is a breeding ground for violence and crime, as overburdened megacities lose control over large portions of their population. We addressed this convergence in greater detail in Chapter One. Now, we turn to the second of Broken Windows’ two most oft-cited case studies, New York City.

1.3 From the City to the Sea

Broken Windows is a problem-oriented theory. Its principles are intended to apply broadly, and each community is afforded the flexibility to identify the particular issues plaguing it. In New York City, rampant crime was just as significant a problem as it was in the subway, yet its causes and manifestations were by no means identical. The subway experiment is illustrative of Broken Windows’ impact in a closed system. New York City’s experience has proven to be more contentious, no doubt because of the
Chapter 2: Breaking Windows

innumerable factors that may be attributed to crime reduction in such a large, open municipality. Nevertheless, the transition of William Bratton to Commissioner of the New York City Police Department (NYPD) in January 1994 suggests that the theory was an integral component of New York’s recovery strategy.

As a young child, I remember driving with my family through the city (we lived in the suburbs, approximately thirty miles outside of NYC), and always being a bit nervous of highway mergers and intersections. At the time, the last vestiges of ‘squeegeeing’ were beginning to be curtailed. Squeegeeing is the “unsolicited washing of car windows,” often by groups of washers approaching cars stopped at red lights or in heavy traffic by the entrances of tunnels, bridges, or mergers. While it sounds innocent enough, watching a crowd of men prowl between cars was a disquieting experience for a young boy. It was also unsettling for adults, as it turns out. Some squeegee-men who were denied compensation would fold themselves onto the hoods of cars to obstruct their passage, others would spit on windows or spray grimy water on them to obfuscate a driver’s vision, and occasionally vehicles might even be swarmed by a gang of squeegee-men. Just as Bratton and Kiley had been trapped in subway fare extortions, so too did then-NYPD Commissioner Raymond Kelly have his car serviced and subsequently spit on as he and his wife drove through the city. Soon after, Kelling was contacted to help curb the pandemic.

Squeegeeing was punishable by a Desk Appearance Ticket (DAT, usually a fine), often called the “Disappearance Ticket” because those served rarely made a point of keeping their appointments. Missing a desk appearance resulted in the issuance of a warrant, but they were almost always lost in the flurry of outstanding warrants on more serious crimes. Police found themselves helpless in the face of obstinate offenders who were outside the law. Eventually, a street officer came to the common-sense realization that if patrolmen could access warrants themselves, they could arrest previous offenders on their beat and bypass the warrant-service unit entirely. In a matter of weeks, squeegeeing was almost eradicated as growing numbers of arrests demonstrated police commitment. Through a focus on small-scale crimes, signaling a renewed emphasis on order maintenance, Broken Windows policing had made its debut on the streets of New York and proved decidedly effective. Concurrently, in January 1994, William Bratton was appointed police commissioner. As in the subway, Bratton’s tenure saw an immediate spike in attention to quality-of-life crimes. One and one-half years into his stewardship, a city so recently overrun with crime had changed enough to declare “The End of Crime As We Know It” on the cover of New York magazine.

In 1992, New York experienced 2,154 murders and a total of 626,182 index crimes. In five years, murder rates were down 64.3% (to 770) and total index crime had been cut in half (355,893). By way of contrast, in 1994, murder rates declined 5% nationally, while they far exceeded that mark at 17% in New York. As he did with the subway, Bratton ensured that enforcement focused on perceptions of disorder, this time at a local level. High profile weekly meetings between top chiefs and precinct commanders ensured that middle management were made aware of their accountability to the Broken Windows approach; misdemeanor policing became the dominant means of conveying a sense of control and presence on every block in the city. And just as in the subway, it soon became obvious that low-level crimes were often perpetrated by violent offenders, or those with knowledge of such offenders:
A person arrested for urinating in a park, when questioned about other problems, gave police information that resulted in the confiscation of a small cache of weapons; a motorcyclist cited for not wearing a helmet, on closer inspection, was carrying a nine-millimeter handgun, had another in his sidebag, and had several high-powered weapons in his apartment; a vendor selling hot merchandise, after being questioned, led police to a fence specializing in stolen weapons. Of course, not every minor incident led to such a find. Recall that in the subway, arrests of fare beaters only turned up a weapon or an outstanding warrant one time in ten. Yet, it was enough to turn the tide. Broken Windows policing allowed for the collection of “accurate and timely intelligence” by encouraging officers to interact with a subset of the criminal population they long ignored; local discretion allowed responders to follow up on the intelligence they gathered quickly, and proper oversight ensured that such discretion was employed effectively and appropriately.

There is no doubt that myriad factors were involved as well. We noted that crime rates across the country were shrinking, if not as dramatically as the rates in New York. Borrowing from Gladwell’s argument, Bratton, Kelling, and Sousa suggest that Broken Windows amplified such forces to create a tipping point in the fight against the crime epidemic, adding compelling leverage to pre-existing trends. Yet, even as we saw in the subway example, when applied consistently, Broken Windows can create a tipping point in and of itself. Furthermore, while New York is only one city, each of its seventy-six precincts is in truth a city unto itself, with distinct cultures, socioeconomics, and populations exceeding 100,000. Each of these precincts received the same policing style under Bratton, with the ability to tailor Broken Windows to their specific needs, and fully seventy-four out of seventy-six (over ninety-seven percent) did not differ significantly with respect to crime rate reduction.

The full story of New York has been outlined in detail in Kelling and Coles’ Fixing Broken Windows, Gladwell’s Tipping Point, Bratton’s Turnaround, and other works. The major lessons for our research can already be discerned without further detail. Both New York City and the NYC subway system illustrate the effectiveness of order maintenance as a means of violence prevention. The differences between the two highlight the flexibility inherent in Broken Windows, alongside its reliance on honest, transparent, and verifiable problem solving. Finally, its quick implementation by the TPD and NYPD demonstrates that Broken Windows can help retool large organizations to nimbly and judiciously enforce against pervasive disorder, employ timely intelligence, and interrupt the cycle of disorder and violence that Broken Windows would contend contributes to instability in hotspots across the globe.

In Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, John Nagl argues that for an institution to learn and evolve, the rank and file must have an opportunity to transmit their experiences upwards. Subordinates must be encouraged to question policy, offer suggestions from the field, interact with higher ranks, and inform informal procedures rather than have them bureaucratically imposed from the top down. Broken Windows is best applied with such management. Bratton is renowned for his ability to restore order not just to cities (he was police commissioner in Los Angeles and Boston as well), but also to police
departments. Upon taking the reins of the NYPD, he immediately devolved power from a few dozen chiefs down to the seventy-six precinct commanders because true order maintenance requires an intimate familiarity with local context and custom. Law enforcement activities may only comprise about twenty percent of the daily workload of a police officer walking his beat. The other eighty percent of his time is spent on unofficial order maintenance—circumstances in which police use discretion to determine not only whether a crime has been committed, but also whether the behavior at issue requires formal censure or extralegal responses. This process necessitates the exercise of discretion on the part of officers, which anticipates that the daily routine of police cannot rely on “rote application of specific rules, but on the application of general knowledge and skill.” There is a degree of flexibility in how police respond to factually identical situations, and chiefs have come to accept, borrowing military parlance, the “war being fought by junior commanders…[with] the responsibility to make decisions on the spot.”

“The American way of war,” on the other hand, has historically been “marked by a belief that the nation is at war or at peace; [a] binary nature of war” that resists the recognition that a soldier likewise may spend less than twenty percent of her career fighting ‘real’ wars. Further, today it seems fundamentally hard to know when states are at war and when they are at peace. The U.S. armed forces long adhered to the notion that “strategy begins where politics ends.” Despite a keen awareness that security is no longer so simple, the protracted and inconclusive conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, alongside instability across the Middle East, North Africa, the Caucasus, and Central America, demonstrate the continued lack of a strategic mindset fit to take the post-Cold War mantel. The midcentury American police focus on crime fighting rings similar. Police, like the military, retained a “remarkable aversion to the use of unconventional tactics,” despite the overwhelming rise in crime. The criminal justice system had “atomized” crime as befits the fractured nature of bureaucracies; yet, as each element of the system gained in efficiency, crime continued to get worse. Police experienced the same “Cult of the Offensive” that beguiles strategists, ignoring the benefits of an energetic defense in favor of a struggling offense. And yet, police managed to change, to allow for adaptive, nuanced techniques, embracing a more holistic approach to problem solving.

Navies too have long theorized about their roles in peace and war, but the grey spaces in between are far less conspicuous. Broken Windows provides a strategy that largely dispenses with the binary assumptions of war and peace, that embraces the ambiguity between soldier and statesman and replaces it all with a framework that allows the police and military to fix real problems in a time when absolutes no longer reign supreme. Marine Corps General “Brute” Krulak said, “You cannot win militarily. You have to win totally, or you are not winning at all.” In the twenty first century, militaries have struggled to find a strategy that supports this heuristic, but Broken Windows has proven its relevance and utility, to those besieged by violence, as well as to those responsible for its implementation.
2.0 Broken Windows and Public Health

Broken Windows is of course a metaphor, one that has gained such prominence in large part because its simplicity has elicited that stickiness to which Gladwell refers. Yet, metaphors can be too accessible, oversimplifying a concept to a point where its use becomes ubiquitous but its substance diminishes. We will demonstrate in this section that our application of Broken Windows is part of a continuum of interpretation that falls within the bounds of reasonable extrapolation.

While Broken Windows gained prominence as a criminological construct, this dissertation is not the first time its theoretical underpinnings have expanded into other disciplines. Medicine, psychology, and sociology all engage with the powerful relationship Broken Windows posits between context and behavior. And speculation about that interplay has existed for far longer than the theory itself. Above we noted the 1969 car experiment. In another study predating Broken Windows, academics at Johns Hopkins University established that, when it comes to neighborhood relationships and mental health, “space [i.e. context] in and of itself is an important factor.”¹²⁻¹ Twenty years later, Kelling and Wilson capitalized on the validity of that hypothesis, and fields like public health have quickly made it their own. Papers on topics ranging from obstacles facing integrated care,¹²⁻² to understanding self-esteem,¹²⁻³ to the spread of venereal diseases¹²⁻⁴ incorporate aspects of criminology for a fresh look at persistent, chronic issues.

In one study, partially funded by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Louisiana-based researchers analyzed the gonorrhea rates of 26,600 people across fifty-five block groups (a census term) in the city of New Orleans.¹³⁻⁰ Using digital mapping features to plot all reported cases of the infection (reporting is mandated by law) and visual data collected by the University of New Orleans on street conditions in each block group, the researchers were able to construct a Broken Windows index¹³¹ to quantify the degree of disorder on a given street and compare it with the spread of venereal disease.¹³² The methods employed make it a telling example of how Kelling and Wilson’s theory has been adopted by the medical community.

The researchers proceeded to map the other variables often associated with the spread of gonorrhea, such as the presence of liquor stores, the racial makeup of each block group, the marital status of those in the groups, and their level of poverty (all gleaned from census and city records).¹³³ Of all the variables tested using a least squared regression, only the Broken Windows index and the poverty index showed any significant relationship with the predominance of gonorrhea across blocks, with the Broken Windows index expressing a higher degree of relation with disease rates than poverty.¹³⁴ In fact, neighborhoods with low Broken Windows scores (orderly) and high rates of poverty showed no discernable difference in infection rates when compared to neighborhoods with low Broken Windows scores (orderly) and low rates of poverty.¹³⁵ The authors do not go so far as to determine the nature of any causality that this correlation implies, but the results nevertheless dramatically support the broader applicability of Kelling and Wilson’s idea. Measuring the deterioration of a neighborhood was a greater predictor of gonorrhea prevalence than any previous variable, including longstanding indicators such as race and socioeconomics. The report upends the traditional model of STI predictors, and despite stopping short of establishing causation,
the study does suggest a trial intervention program to assess the environment’s direct impact on high-risk sexual behavior.\textsuperscript{136}

The Louisiana gonorrhea case study focused primarily on a literal interpretation of Broken Windows, referring to the physical environment in which people live. While that environment impacted high-risk sexual behavior, it was the tangible setting of New Orleans that was the focus of examination. And for good reason—such a literal interpretation is easily observed and often produces useful propositions for practitioners. Yet, as Gladwell demonstrates with the Power of Context, environment can be interpreted far more broadly, to a state of mind. The seminary experiment from earlier offers a good example. It was the context of time (being late or early to deliver a sermon) that impacted the actions of those students, not something we can see, or touch, or hear. Studies that help forge a bridge between the more literal Broken Windows approach and Gladwell (and Kelling’s) broader contextual application include those like a 2003 survey of youth safety across Baltimore, Detroit, Oakland, Philadelphia, and Richmond.\textsuperscript{137} The paper established that feelings of fear at school among students were directly related to those students’ beliefs that their schools were disorderly.\textsuperscript{138} Once again, a majority of typically associated demographic variables appeared to be “less strongly associated with feelings of safety” when compared to disorderliness.\textsuperscript{139} Because, however, the interviews were conducted by phone, the authors could not evaluate, first-hand, the physical state of each respondent’s school. Instead, the authors used the reaction to the statement, “Kids can get away with almost anything at my school” to code for disorder.\textsuperscript{140} Because of this, the authors concede that the study is limited due to an inability to directly assess school conditions.\textsuperscript{141} It is not, though, a weakness for the theory at large. In this more emotional and constructed approach to the concept of disorder, papers such as this demonstrate a shift in the interpretation of Broken Windows within public health. This shift better reflects how the theory has long been used in criminology, an evolution from the literal to the metaphorical. Broken Windows and disorder are about how people feel about their environment (see Skogan),\textsuperscript{142} inclusive of behavioral disorder; in this case how they feel about the state of their school as opposed to any objective ‘reality.’ Contextualizing our surroundings, as these experiments demonstrate, is as much about how someone emotionally perceives their environment as the physical state of that space. It was this wider notion of context that allowed for a nuanced application of Broken Windows to New York City, and will likewise allow us to apply the theory to the maritime domain.

\section*{2.1 Room for Debate}

Broadly, there are three issues with quantitative analyses of Broken Windows. They can be described as ‘chicken and egg’ disputes, ‘too much noise,’ and cause versus correlation. In the first, it is unclear in what direction variables are acting on one another, or if they are collinear. In the second, the abundance of variables (noise) makes it difficult to identify which variables are important. In the third, it is difficult to discern whether a relationship exhibits cause or merely correlation. Sampson and Raudenbush, for example, leverage the first argument to critique Broken Windows. They posit that disorder and violent index crimes (with the exception of robbery) are not linked in a causal chain or cycle, but are instead both symptoms of the same underlying cause (collinear).\textsuperscript{143} Controlling for collective efficacy (a neighborhood’s willingness to
intervene in its defense and structural issues such as the blending of commercial and residential land use suggests that disorder may be part of a larger ecology of crime and not the initiating factor in the longer process of criminal decay. As a consequence, while patrolling disorder may have incidental effects on crime, from this perspective a Broken Windows approach is inefficient and unfocused, targeting a symptom of the same greater problem.

The legitimacy of Broken Windows is, however, not invalidated when other indicators are shown to have some relation to crime. The theory’s foundational premise is that crime and environment produce a feedback loop, and that crime builds on the presence of disorder. In our earlier example, one broken window did not decidedly cause a murder; rather, it initiated a series of events that produced that outcome. There are opportunities all along that chain reaction where intervening (at increasingly higher cost) could have prevented such an outcome, like fixing the broken window. Jang and Johnson say as much when refuting Sampson and Raudenbush’s criticism of the theory, explaining that Sampson and Raudenbush misinterpret the pathway through which disorder impacts crime. Sampson and Raudenbush explain, “a fundamental thesis of ‘broken windows’ is that observed disorder directly causes predatory or ‘serious’ crime.” Jang and Johnson take issue with the word ‘directly,’ suggesting alternatively that “disorder indirectly causes crime via weakened informal social control.” In such a case, Sampson and Raudenbush’s conclusion that controlling for collective efficacy reduces the impact of disorder on crime would actually be proof positive of Broken Windows’ basic premise. To wit, controlling for self-efficacy is controlling for the very effect to which Broken Windows speaks. Sousa and Kelling argue that when they stated that disorder, if “left unchecked by community and neighborhood controls,” would lead to serious crime, it was an illusion to this indirect pathway. This disagreement over the direct or indirect path of disorder is illustrative once again of the conflict surrounding causality, this time representative of the direction of influence, the ‘chicken and egg’ debate.

Wesley Skogan demonstrates statistically what Broken Windows theorizes: that there is evidence of a measureable causal relationship between community disorder and crime, even when other significant contributors to crime (the root cause factors) were controlled for. Yet, his findings are not universally acknowledged, even among Broken Windows proponents. Some Broken Windows literature embraces the murky endogeneity between environment and action (a feedback loop), suggesting they reinforce one another, arguing a different perspective on the question of direction of influence (chicken and egg). Indeed, Kelling, Bratton and Sousa’s adoption of Gladwell’s tipping point argument (that Broken Windows ‘tipped’ the crime epidemic) is implicit recognition of the continuous dialogue between environment and crime, a view in concert with the theory’s precepts.

The debate over causation remains unresolved. Jang and Johnson, for example, published a compelling critique of Sampson and Raudenbush. As a consequence, the argument for a clear, quantitatively proven causal link between disorder and crime remains one of the weaker points in the literature. Causation versus correlation is a particularly recurring disagreement in interpretations of Broken Windows’ statistical models, and it seems that the sheer volume of available data (too much noise) lends itself to ongoing disagreement. Crime is an expansive topic, as is disorder, and large cities
create an impossibly long list of noise in which models can invariably be shaped to fit. Harcourt and Ludwig, for example, employ such an argument to discredit Broken Windows research that uses single-city time-series data by creating their own theory, the Broken Yankees Hypothesis. The Broken Yankees Hypothesis suggests that when the baseball team does well, New Yorkers, united by a sense of common purpose and encouraged to bond with fellow bar and restaurant patrons, commit fewer violent crimes. Conversely when the team is doing poorly, residents of New York do not share a common goal and therefore crime escalates. And remarkably, there is some statistical evidence to suggest Harcourt and Ludwig are onto something. Most likely, the Broken Yankees Hypothesis is an aberration; there is no proven connection between the two variables (causation versus correlation). With a city full of possibilities, Harcourt and Ludwig could choose from hundreds of accidental correlates with crime. And while the authors were using such an example to criticize evidence in support of Broken Windows, the larger point is that some problems may be too complex to model effectively. It is difficult to unearth the relationships between key independent variables here, making it difficult to reasonably discern the impacts of variables upon one another. It is a confounding error, with high correlations to be found among innumerable factors.

Harcourt and Ludwig’s use of baseball in their critique is instructive because sports are in many ways similar to our conversation. The obsessive collection of statistics on nearly every measureable metric provides, like crime, a trove of data to analyze. Yet, just as with crime, the abundance of information can make discerning coincidence from cause a difficult process. Nate Silver offers a similar example in The Signal and the Noise. From the first Super Bowl in 1967 through the thirty-first Super Bowl in 1997, the winning team’s conference appeared to be a leading indicator for stock market performance. If the winning team was from the original NFL, the market would gain an average of fourteen points on the year. If the winning team was from the original AFL, the market would lose an average of ten points on the year. Twenty-eight of the first thirty-one Super Bowls accurately predicted the following year’s trend. If you took this marker seriously, you would calculate there was only a 1-in-4,700,000 chance that the relationship was merely coincidental. If you took this marker seriously, you would have lost your shirt starting in 1998. In fact, since then the results have almost been entirely reversed, with AFL teams predicting a ten percent growth and an NFL team clinching victory just before the 2008 housing bubble burst.

Broken Windows’ expansion beyond the field of criminology has also resulted in a subsequent expansion of the debate surrounding the theory. Perhaps the easiest criticism to make of Broken Windows is that it is counterintuitive—it simply grates against how we internalize the world. In a letter to the editor forum of the journal Environmental Health Perspectives, one public health practitioner responds to the claim that gonorrhea rates could be connected to environmental disorder by saying, “My instincts tell me this would not be the case. The ‘Broken Windows’ are a consequence of the behaviors of that particular community and they are not the cause of the behaviors” (the chicken or the egg debate). The response of the theory’s supporters is twofold. First, the breaking of windows is unlikely to be connected to an unusual coalescence of window-breakers in a given location. Instead, there is an intimate engagement between a community and its environment, each changing and shaping the other. Second, as scientists (social or natural), our instincts are of great value. They are, however,
incidental to the reality of empirical methodologies. Our instincts tell us nothing about subatomic particles or evolution, and yet science assures us that such theories are highly predictive. Psychologists including Walter Mischel suggest that this disconnect between what we see and what we think we see happens for a reason: the human brain has a “reducing valve” that allows us to filter out the complexity in life. Broken Windows is not inherently intuitive, at least not in the magnitude it purports that we are influenced by the world around us. Without closing the reducing valve, the true relationship between disorder and violence is easy to miss. In New York, and cities around the United States, it was little noticed for decades.

More powerful criticisms can frequently be advanced against the trials or case studies used to support Broken Windows. The Broken Yankees Hypothesis above was one such example. Another appeared in a paper investigating the cause of the dramatic downturn in homicide rates in New York City. That study suggests that dividing homicides by race would allow for a more accurate picture of causation. Factors such as firearm availability, changes in drug use, and increased incarceration rates were then compared to homicide statistics. Data was collected from the city’s Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, its Human Resources Administration, the NYPD, New York State’s Division of Criminal Justice Services, and the U.S. Census for the period of 1990-1999. The results show that decreases in African American homicides were strongly associated with decreases in crack cocaine consumption, Hispanic homicides were tied more to gun availability, and White homicides saw no strong predictive indicators among the variables tested. The authors conclude from this data that the cocaine hypothesis on crime reduction is supported, whereas the Broken Windows theory is not.

This is not altogether an inaccurate conclusion. Gladwell in fact agrees that the dip in cocaine use shows a relationship with decreased violent crime. However, was a nationwide trend in the 1990s, as were positive developments in the economy and changes in demography typically associated with lower crime statistics. The extraordinary collapse in crime rates in New York should therefore parallel other major cities if those indicators were the dominant causes of crime reduction. Yet they do not, nor do they explain the speed at which criminal behavior diminished in New York as compared to other cities. This is all the more noteworthy because New York City’s poorest had been hit hard with welfare cuts in the 1990s, and national aging trends (associated with lower crime) were not mirrored in a city that was actually getting younger. With respect to drug use specifically, cocaine had been in steady decline well before crime rates in New York showed signs of wavering. The study may obscure this confusion of long-term trend with short-term effect as a result of its analysis of the decade as a whole, whereas New York homicide rates dropped 64.3% in only half that time. Moreover, if anything, the confirmation that African American, Hispanic, and White homicide rates are associated with differing influences is an endorsement of the complications of tackling violent crime without Broken Windows. One could easily say the police simply need to target cocaine consumption to decrease black homicides, but how many factors contribute to cocaine usage and dealing? Does that vary by race as well? Does it vary by socioeconomics? And how many factors contribute to each of those factors? The inherent multidimensionality of crime breeds an impractical web of complications, all of which can be associated squarely with a person’s environment. In
other words, “the strength and direction of [other variables] is always dependent on the local context,” and that is something police and their policies can noticeably impact.\textsuperscript{182}

Hope Corman and Naci Mocan show, using municipal monthly data from 1974-1999,\textsuperscript{183} that “misdemeanor arrests [i.e. Broken Windows policing] have a significant negative effect on robbery, motor vehicle theft, and grand larceny.”\textsuperscript{184} Adding lag time, misdemeanor arrests also “have a significant impact in the case of murder.”\textsuperscript{185} This is again demonstrative of one of the broader issues in statistical criticisms (and indeed support) of Broken Windows—namely, identifying what variables matter most. As evidenced here, the long running changes in drug patterns throughout New York may correlate with dips in index crimes (particularly murder), but, seen at shorter intervals, it appears more likely that “the primary reason for the decrease in felony crimes in the decade of the 1990s is due to felony arrest and misdemeanor arrests,”\textsuperscript{186} in other words, more effective order-maintenance policing.

Additionally, criticisms of Broken Windows often rely on homicide rates as the “sole outcome measure” for overall crime.\textsuperscript{187} Yet, “while homicide may be the most \textit{reliable} measure of crime”—it is reported most consistently—“it is not necessarily the most \textit{valid} measure because it occurs so infrequently.”\textsuperscript{188} Perhaps for this reason Corman and Mocan saw the immediate impact of misdemeanor policing on robberies and larcenies, but only recorded an impact on murder after including the statistical lag time. Unfortunately, this is not a debate we can resolve with any finality. In the end, the exact mechanism by which crime dropped in New York can never be known with scientific accuracy; the exact mechanism by which crime drops through the lens of Broken Windows is hard to gauge in no small part because quantitative studies yield such wildly opposing results.\textsuperscript{189} It is ultimately on the basis of the strong qualitative evidence discussed above that Broken Windows has gained predominance. What the public health and criminology literature illustrates is that Broken Windows suggests trends and influences, however counterintuitive, which place context and multidimensionality at the center of human behavior. And it is this qualitative evidence, alongside the advocacy of instrumental practitioners, which has offered compelling support of the theory’s utility.

### 3.0 Roadmaps for Research

To understand how the Broken Windows theory relates to a number of other important spheres of research of potential interest, it is useful to disaggregate the theory into three components.\textsuperscript{*} First, the Broken Windows theory is one of order, norms, and social behavior. Second, the theory is one of crime. Third, it is a theory of policing and how to mitigate crime, leveraging an understanding of its origins and the social structure in which it proliferates. Triangulating Broken Windows within these three streams of research provides a final means for placing this dissertation within a broader framing, from psychology, to critical studies on security, to wider debates in criminology.

The first component of this triangle—the social psychological dimension of Broken Windows—can be seen throughout this chapter. Philip Zimbardo’s 1969 car experiment provided clear, early evidence of the interaction between neighborhood and context. Zimbardo’s experiment highlighted an emerging notion of how communities interact with their environment in the construction of social norms and, significantly, how

\* This novel breakdown was described by Christian Bueger in conversation with the author.
easily disorderly signals can fracture those norms. This emergence can also be seen in Wilner et al.’s 1960 study (see the Hopkins research above) on the importance of the physical environment in understanding individuals’ mental health status. Of interest as well is Zimbardo’s infamous Stanford Prison experiment, conducted in 1971, in which randomly divided groups of ‘inmates’ and ‘prisoners’ adopted their hypothetical personas to frightening ends. The experiment served to reinforce Zimbardo’s earlier hypothesis that actions (both at the community and individual level) are guided not simply by internal rational considerations, but by external stimuli and perceptions. Zimbardo’s prolific experiments have sparked whole fields of study that cannot be relayed here, but represent a good starting point for those interested in investigating the psychological origins of Broken Windows and its reliance on a body of work that lays the foundation for understanding the role, construction, and destruction of norms of order. Beyond Zimbardo, we also noted an array of psychological studies upon which Broken Windows rests (take those on seminary students or on grade school cheating), all of which demonstrate again the direct relationship between perceptions of context (both physical and behavioral) and actions. Finally, Walter Mischel’s concept of the mind’s reducing valve—wherein we filter out complexity to aid in decision-making, occasionally leading to oversimplifications—helped us understand how we might not consciously recognize all the subtle ways in which our environment shapes our behavior.

It is out of these norms that the theory also conceptualizes the roots of crime, how small scale disorder erodes communal self-efficacy and leads to more violent crime. In the example at the start of this chapter we sketched how a single Broken Window signals that the neighborhood is uncared for. This precipitates a flight of families and the degradation of the community’s self-policing. As the neighborhood becomes evermore disorderly, small-scale crimes escalate, perpetuating the cycle of criminality and the perception that the community is abandoned. This community-level focus, and particularly the emphasis on a neighborhood’s efforts to police itself, is reminiscent of another emergent literature—that of everyday security. As a critical study of security, everyday security literature aims to contextualize state-level power as average people experience it on a daily basis. Like our study here, everyday security places a premium on how communities perceive the state’s policing efforts and how that in turn shapes their relationship with their own neighborhoods. As Crawford and Hutchinson introduce the theory, everyday security offers two objectives: “drawing attention to both (1) the ways in which security projects are experienced, and (2) how individuals and groups deploy certain practices to govern what they understand and interpret as their own security.”

Crawford and Hutchinson even focus on many of the dimensions seen throughout this dissertation—“the temporal, spatial, and emotional features” of security. Ben Brown (of the University of Texas at Brownsville) similarly focuses on issues with the methods of policing themselves, dovetailing well with Crawford and Hutchinson’s approach.

Brown writes to the ineffectiveness of increasingly invasive police operations and the resentment that combative tactics can produce within communities. By placing regular people in the foreground—everyday security, and critical studies more broadly, aims to expose the vulnerabilities communities face when policed by the state, advancing security studies away from a strict focus on state-level policies to an understanding of how those policies influence real people.
An emphasis on the lived experiences of policed communities also touches upon research on cultures of insecurity. Marie Breen-Smyth (formerly of the University of Surrey), for example, addresses not how we construct community policing but rather how security forces construct the community itself. She writes to the risk of marginalizing populations by categorizing them broadly as suspect communities. Breen-Smyth details, through a powerful autoethnography, the self-defeating repercussions of the impulse for police to construct and target ‘others.’ While many of the specific legal and contextual objections raised in some critical works on security do not transfer to this research, the spirit of their perspective persists. Combative approaches have often played an undeniable role in reclaiming ungoverned space. Yet, keeping that space, without committing ‘urbicide’ (see Chapter One) or descending into institutionalized disenfranchisement, requires attentive consideration of the objections these authors raise to the security studies status quo. In part this dissertation demonstrates how embracing the community-level focus highlighted in these critical works may be in the interest of the state as well, forging a bridge between critical and conventional studies of security.

Armed with an understanding of what shapes communal disorder, and how disorder perpetuates an escalation in crime, we come to an understanding of how that informs policing as well. For Broken Windows approaches, this means being attentive to community concerns and focusing on interrupting the cycle of escalation at the softer end of the criminal spectrum (e.g. squeegeeing or fare beating). We referred frequently to these acts as signals of disorder. Martin Innes’ (of Cardiff University) work is a “natural successor to Wilson and Kelling’s ‘Broken Windows Theory,’” diving deeper still into such signals. Innes capitalizes on the relationship Broken Windows establishes between disorder and fear to better understand how some crimes generate greater fear in communities than others. These aptly named “signal crimes” help explain why neighborhoods may feel as if crime is getting worse even if overall rates of criminality decrease. And, as we noted extensively, a community’s perception is as important to the perpetuation of disorder as any objective reality. Throughout this dissertation we will return time and again to the importance of how communities internalize their environment and what this means for littoral security.

Finally, our discussion on policing and order maintenance is important as well for an arena in which there is particularly little debate. Geoffrey Till regards ‘Maritime Security’ as a (confusing) rebranding of the more conventionally understood notion of good order at sea. However one chooses to label the issue, though, the dearth of conceptual work on such a longstanding notion is starkly evident. That Till dedicates so

---


† Nigel Fielding (of the University of Surrey), a coauthor of Innes’, also describes the varying ideological constructions of community policing. He advocates building the institutional and theoretical foundations for enhanced community partnership in an effort to help construct community policing in the softer context, compared to zero-tolerance models (many truthfully born out of Broken Windows’ precepts, see the conclusion for more). See, Nigel Fielding, “Concepts and Theory in Community Policing,” The Howard Journal 44, No. 5 (December 2005): 460-472.
much space to order maintenance in his seminal book on Seapower is confirmation of maritime security’s growing importance on the naval strategic stage. That Till’s chapter on the topic is particularly theory-light, however, is confirmation of the work still to be done on developing frameworks of discussing good order. Till’s chapter, robust as it is, ultimately falls back on familiar mechanisms for discussing maritime security—specifically, through an evaluation of individual threats. Sequentially, and largely independently, Till covers shipping, terrorism, drug trafficking, and irregular migration, mirroring the conventional counter-threat approach to maritime security. It is our hope, as we prepare to proceed into the empirical portions of this dissertation, that the Broken Windows theory and its component parts—its aggregated theories on norms, crime, and policing—provide a useful framework for taking good order at sea beyond heuristics and into an employable, rigorous conceptual scaffolding.

4.0 Methodology

The first consideration when discussing methodology is identifying, broadly, whether a qualitative or quantitative approach best addresses the research question. To inform this determination, we began with an eye towards the various analyses already conducted of Broken Windows in criminology. These analyses, as seen above, fall generally into two categories—those debating the theory’s causal argument, and those leveraging the theory’s premises to inform specific questions of neighborhood disorder (or public health). The former are frequently quantitative in approach, like the study that introduced the Broken Yankees hypothesis as a means of critiquing Wilson and Kelling’s causal argument. The latter are frequently qualitative in nature, like the process-tracing narrative style initially used by Kelling and Wilson to introduce the theory in the Atlantic Monthly. Neither of these categorizations is exclusive, but they provide a valuable point of departure when determining methodologies. In this dissertation, as addressed above, we are interested not in contributing to the debate validating or disproving the efficacy of the theory, but in identifying whether the theory (as it currently stands) lends useful insights to the study of maritime security. Thus, an initial review of the criminological literature would suggest a qualitative framework for best answering our research question.

As this research seeks to extrapolate from existing applications of the theory, positivism’s logical epistemological approach best fits the task laid forth in our research question. Within criminology’s similarly positivist framework, however, there is disagreement about the efficacy of varying methodologies in Broken Windows analysis. As explored, statistical examinations of Broken Windows are frequently contested for a number of reasons, notably the overwhelming volume (noise) of available data and the resulting debate over exactly which variables test Broken Windows, and which merely indicate a correlation. Significantly, many such analyses require that a Broken Windows approach already be implemented in order to measure results. So far, however, the theory has not been consciously implemented on any quantifiable scale in a naval setting. Modeling faces similar obstacles as statistical analyses, including the conflict over accidental correlates. This suggests that an empirical quantitative approach would prove unwieldy, if not impossible, and would drive criticism of the research towards a discussion over the variables and away from the viability of the theory at large. We see
this in the exploration of Broken Windows literature below. Quantitative measurements will be a factor in the evidence we use to support our investigation, but such data has proven too reductionist in existing applications as a foundational methodology. In general, qualitative research leaves room for the nuance and subtleties of context that Broken Windows emphasizes, while its empirical perspective still allows for an evaluation of the theory’s generalizability.\textsuperscript{198}

Within the qualitative framework, this dissertation employs three case studies: one primary study followed by two illustrative cases. Cases one and two, the Caribbean and the Gulf of Guinea respectively, are “most similar” cases, as categorized by Seawright and Gerring.\textsuperscript{199} They share a key geopolitical similarity: a high concentration of weak states, unable to leverage enough resources independently or act collectively to adequately counter the threats and actors operating offshore. They likewise share the causal factor of interest in this dissertation: the crime and disorder that will illustrate how maritime insecurity reflects key characteristics of Broken Windows. These cases differ on one subcomponent of this causal factor—piracy. In the Gulf of Guinea, piracy plays a much more prominent role in the literature than in the Caribbean (wherein it has virtually disappeared from most meta-analyses of maritime crime in the region). We begin in the Caribbean, where we will apply a process-tracing approach employing detailed description\textsuperscript{200} to expose the linkages between an array of insecurities present in the region. By demonstrating in depth how crime and insecurity in the Caribbean are multidimensional in nature and contextually informed, the two major lessons from Broken Windows we illustrated in this chapter, we build a bridge between Broken Windows as a criminological theory and the maritime domain. We conclude the Caribbean study with an exploration of the unique roles and responsibilities of the United States Coast Guard. The Coast Guard is the only American hybrid military and law enforcement organization. It therefore “bridges traditional enforcement gaps between military and law enforcement organizations,”\textsuperscript{201} further facilitating the extrapolation of policing principles to the maritime domain.

In the Gulf of Guinea, we will begin by demonstrating that similar crimes and similar actors, and thus the same linkages and conclusions from the Caribbean, are relevant in West Africa. This represents the “most” part of “most similar.” Second, we will turn to a discussion of the variant sub-factor, piracy. By illustrating that piracy can be integrated into the same narrative on maritime crime’s multidimensional and environmental nature, we demonstrate that a Broken Windows lens is capable of adapting to previously unexamined issues and is not unique in its application to the Caribbean. The third case study, the second of our illustrative cases, is the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, which represents a “deviant” case from the Gulf of Guinea. In this third case study, we turn to evaluate a region that has responded forcefully to the threat of piracy. Unlike in the Gulf of Guinea (and, indeed, the Caribbean), the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are bordered principally by three states (referred to in the literature as the ‘littoral states,’ though geographically the southern most extension of Thailand is also part of the western edge of the Straits), two of which maintain strong to moderate capacity for action. Nevertheless, we will demonstrate that despite the concerted steps taken in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore to address piracy, issues in problem framing and theorizing have led to obstacles in practice. Moreover, we will demonstrate that the literature on maritime security in Southeast Asia, some of the most mature

\textsuperscript{198}.

\textsuperscript{199}.

\textsuperscript{200}.

\textsuperscript{201}.
literature on the subject, has begun to reflect elements of a Broken Windows lens as theorists integrate new threats with enduring challenges. In so doing, Chapter Three (the Caribbean) provides the proof of concept upon which we rely throughout the remainder of our argument, while Chapters Four and Five demonstrate the concept’s overall generalizability.

This unique, hybridized research framework is also derived of the singular demands presented by exporting a theory from one discipline to another. The methodology employed here is thus a fusion both of theory testing as well as theory building. In so far as the Broken Windows theory has never been employed in a maritime context, this dissertation plays a theory building role. Single, in-case examinations are common tools in such analyses. However, in so far as criminologists have already identified and debated the causal mechanisms of interest, this research is relieved of some of the heavier burdens in theory development. Thus, it also plays a theory testing role, taking existing concepts and stressing them in new ways. Cross case comparisons are typical tools for this type of analysis. Here, we fuse both. Case one, the Caribbean, represents an intense, in-case study to build our understanding of how the Broken Windows theory might be deployed in the maritime domain (providing a proof of concept). Then, using the language and scaffolding constructed in case one, the following cross case comparisons serve a theory testing role, introducing a previously unincorporated issue (piracy) and assessing the theory’s generalizability.

Limited case availability, as a constraint of research at a regional level, presents obstacles to case selection, and shapes our methodology. Single case studies leave us unable to prove a theory’s generalizability, a basic component of theory building. Hall argues that applying process tracing to a small set of intensively examined cases, however, is a justifiable solution to limited case availability and a tool for theory development. Process tracing is also among the more successful qualitative approaches similarly employed in criminological assessments of Broken Windows—the theory was initially introduced through such a method—and is utilized across our cases (Chapters Three, Four, and Five). In choosing cases, we aimed to select littoral clusters axiomatically recognized as distinct regions, corroborated by distinct literatures. These would include the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, the Gulf of Aden, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the Gulf of Guinea, and the Gulf of Mexico, for example. Cases also had to contain a persistent level of maritime crime and instability, the dependent variable in our analysis of our first cross case comparison. Our focus on navies and local state actors meant that regions with failed states were excluded, most notably the Gulf of Aden. The Broken Windows theory operates, as we will see below, under the expectation that communities can be induced to self-efficacy (or self-defense) through inclusive partnerships and problem solving alongside local authorities. In failed states, there is no capacity for communities to partner with a legitimate enforcement body, and consequently no opportunity to examine the role of community policing at a macro scale. Our need to juxtapose two regions in our first set of comparisons with variations on one subcomponent of maritime crime, with shared independent variables (similar geopolitical contexts), constrained case selection. The Caribbean and Gulf of Guinea share a plurality of littoral states that struggle to project power in their maritime space.

* None of this is to say other cases would not have provided valid insight, and indeed an avenue for expanding research on this topic would be the application of a similar investigation in other gulfs or seas.
The Mediterranean, on the other hand, is both too large a region to analyze in depth in the space provided, and presents too many variations in state power, culture, and wealth. One possible solution, selecting only a portion of the Mediterranean for study, meant artificially limiting an investigation whose primary focus is intended to emphasize the fluidity and multidimensionality of disorder in the maritime space, and thus at cross purposes to our research objective. The aim to juxtapose a third case against the second, both sharing the variant in the dependent variable but not sharing enforcement efforts (and consequently, differing state strengths and geopolitical compositions), further constrained case selection. Finally, among the most important criteria in case selection is the need to effectively scale up the Broken Windows approach from its urban roots to the maritime space. As discussed above, the social psychological nature of the theory should enable its application anywhere people (i.e. communities) exist. Nevertheless, a more sophisticated framework for case selection can help further justify the conclusions reached in the ensuing chapters.

Cabral et al note: “Cities, urban areas, and urban sprawl are multidimensional systems comprising individuals, communities, society, and economy, in a common geographical location where different types and degrees of interaction occur.” Discussing cities as systems means we explicitly (and intuitively) understand that urban areas exist as distinct geographical and sociological units. Without this fundamental isolation of the city as a base systemic unit of measure, any analysis at the urban level—including in criminology—is difficult to justify. When Broken Windows is placed in this context, as part of a broader set of literatures discussing cities as systems, we can clearly discern that the theory’s precepts are not tied uniquely to an urban context but to a systemic one. We noted this specifically with respect to Broken Windows’ application in the subway case, which we explored as a systemic surrogate for the broader city of New York. Thus, the first major criterion for selecting cases with an eye towards scalability is the need to similarly identify systems, albeit larger ones. The logical escalation here is from urban to regional. Regions, like cities, are marked by distinct literatures that axiomatically identify them as self-evident systems. Like cities, regions are of course not perfectly closed. The inherent artificiality of isolating a city from its peri-urban and hinterland roots is equally at issue in isolating one region from that of an adjacent one. That both cities and regions are recognized units of sociological (and criminological) study, however, suggests that regions may prove capable systemic surrogates for the urban environment at a larger scale just as the subway was a surrogate at the smaller end.

A second obstacle to scalability comes in understanding the demands on data, and consequently what type of data the project requires. As noted earlier, this dissertation does not seek to weigh in on the debate surrounding the efficacy of the causal mechanisms that the Broken Windows identifies. We do, however, seek to identify if the mechanisms that drive disorder according to the theory (context dependency and multidimensionality) are present in our cases. Identifying the presence of the mechanisms, or themes, most fundamental to the Broken Windows theory across case studies would suggest that the theory’s lens provides some utility in the maritime context. (Notably, this thematic approach is yet another consideration in favor of answering our research question from a qualitative framework.) This approach, however, requires the availability of a significant amount of descriptive data. Finding such data, barring field research within each region (which was beyond the resource constraints of this project),
Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

is most easily found aggregated at the regional level. Organizations like the United Nations, which compiles the *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons*, for example, use regions as their primary (and often smallest) unit of measurement. This demand for descriptive and uniform data (collected for a given area across a range of topics, from narcotics to human trafficking) is even more difficult in the maritime context. There, greater geographic distances and imperfect reporting make data collection and informed analysis at a smaller level exceedingly difficult.

Even at the regional level, however, within each chosen case it was not always possible to explicitly define exact borders. Assessments of the Caribbean, for example, may vary from the narrowest view of the region (core island states), to wider ones including portions of Central and South America, to assessments on continental or even hemispheric scales. This is important for its influence on the consistency of evidence available across sources, as some analyses may include the Caribbean in a discussion of North America at large, while others may discuss only Caribbean Community (CARICOM) states explicitly. Moreover, the nature of transnational crime obscures our ability to remain rigid in our understanding of regional boundaries. For example, “It is almost impossible to analyze smuggling in the Caribbean only, as smugglers do not often pay attention to the analytical boundaries of historians and criminologists.”

The illicit flows that will dominate our case studies do not easily match political categorization. For this reason, to the degree possible, we aim in our cases (primarily the Caribbean and the Gulf of Guinea, the most geographically obscure) to identify ‘core’ versus ‘peripheral’ states to help frame the conversation without artificially excluding certain evidentiary sources.

Thus, while case selection at the regional level is informed by the need to effectively expand the Broken Windows approach, it is also born of a practical consideration when assessing how best to scale up the theory thematically. Iconic cases (a conventional case selection method in qualitative research) offer the best synthesis of these two criteria. Iconic regional cases are both axiomatically regarded as distinct systems and are rich with data because of their visibility. Finally, these scaling considerations further help narrow the universe of appropriate cases, most notably by disqualifying the Mediterranean Sea. Bifurcating the Mediterranean, as had been suggested, would nullify its value as a reasonably self-evident system and thus invalidate its surrogacy for an urban system.

4.1 Evidence

The techniques used to support our methodology require a mixed sourcing to include interviews, document analysis, media sources, and quantitative data sets. The reason for incorporating multiple methods is that no singular source of information dominates the thesis; rather, this work presents an inclusive, holistic understanding of the case studies and associated disorders while attempting to control some of the biases inherent across methods. For example, document analysis of Department of Defense and congressional records on fleet numbers, budgets, and procurement proposals offers a compelling look at how resources are currently distributed and prioritized, yet may be of limited relevance regarding the more counterfactual elements of this research (e.g. what would happen if those resources were *not* distributed in such a way). While document
analysis research on military doctrine allows for an investigation of how navies express their interests, it is not always indicative of the ultimate practical application of such interests.

In general, quantitative data consisting of preexisting statistics was used to identify the most pervasive types of disorder per region. Business initiatives such as the International Chamber of Commerce and the International Maritime Organization collect, code, and disseminate maps and data on piracy worldwide. Intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, various American federal agencies such as the Department of State, and nongovernmental groups including the International Labor Organization and the International Organization for Migration are all sources of data providing estimates on human trafficking, labor trafficking and drug smuggling. Taken together, this statistical material does not provide a definitive list of the most pressing issues in a given region, but offers context and a point of departure for further investigation.

Semi-structured interviews with senior maritime service-members contributed context to the data culled from the above sources, socializing the author to the research area, and are included as appendices. Interviewees were afforded the right to speak anonymously (see interview consent form for details). Security experts, government employees, and researchers working in think tanks comprised another valuable community for investigation. Informal meetings with U.S. naval and Coast Guard staff, DOD civilians, members of the intelligence community, and industry personnel acted to provide invaluable if intangible background knowledge. These interviews and experiences were leveraged during one year of fieldwork in Washington, DC, as well as a follow-up write up year.

General textual sources played an equally important role as those methods already discussed. We touched on the use and significance of document analysis from governmental sources. The Congressional Research Service and various U.S. federal agencies were used extensively as primary sources of data and current strategy. Media reports, mostly digital copies of prominent print sources (e.g. The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal) and industry publications (Defense News, Stars and Stripes, etc.) were used as a means of accessing data and opinions, including public reaction to government policies. Still others provided relevant non-partisan scholarly analysis on topics ranging from government spending to military hardware. Finally, secondary sources of academic literature were used throughout this research. Taken together, with the exception of illustrative interviews, this research does not aim to produce new data or information, but rather to present largely preexisting information in a novel light through the application of Broken Windows. As the U.S. Department of Defense publishes annual long-run shipbuilding plans at thirty-year lengths, and the midcentury mark is a point of focus for population modeling, climate modeling, and policy planning, the year 2050 will serve as an appropriate horizon for which this dissertation has predictable application.

5.0 Conclusion

We opened this dissertation by exploring the environment of millions of impoverished people, living in dense and dangerous slums across the world. For them, it
is a crowded life amid the flux of licit and illicit trade networks, constantly winding through the informal settlements of urban peripheries. Such settlements punctuate the coasts throughout the Caribbean, West African, and Southeast Asian littorals. It was by way of such an introduction that we were able to best define the amorphous concept of littoral, the geographic focus of this thesis. With an understanding of where our research was aimed, we turned to the research question itself. Doing so allowed us to identify several other important features: who this research is discussing (maritime state actors, primarily the U.S. and states within case regions) and when in time our focus lies (from now to midcentury). In the sections on Methodology and Evidence we turned to the more technical considerations of how this thesis was to be constructed, discussing the need for a qualitative empirical approach and a variety of mixed evidentiary sources. Yet, two important components, what the Broken Windows theory is, and why this type of research is necessary, remained unaddressed. To answer effectively, the bulk of this second chapter was devoted to explaining the theory and literature of Broken Windows. Such an exploration allowed us to become familiar with Broken Windows’ content, as well as to discuss its relevancy beyond the field of criminology. Two critical lessons learned emerged in this discussion. First, Broken Windows embraces the multidimensional nature of disorder. Second, it does so by understanding crime through an environmental domain. Such a review also highlighted a number of unresolved issues in Broken Windows research, particularly the role of establishing a statistical causal relationship between disorder and index crimes. While it is clear that Broken Windows is not a perfect theory, we concluded that our research could nevertheless exploit the conclusions of the theory’s practical implementation of order maintenance policies—multidimensionality and context specificity—as bases through which to understand maritime security, even while the causal debate continues to rage.

With a better grip on who, what, where, when, why, and how, we are left only with our original research question—can the Broken Windows theory provide a lens for theorizing maritime security in the littorals? To find an answer we will turn next to present three case studies. The first, and largest, paints the security context in the Caribbean, building slowly, issue by issue, until a multidimensional picture emerges bringing transnational crimes into relief with individual communities. Thereafter, we will turn to the Gulf of Guinea, wherein we build upon the linkages and themes highlighted in the Caribbean case to demonstrate the applicability of our framework to new settings. Importantly, we will also incorporate a new issue into the equation—piracy—illustrating a critical element of flexibility (and thus, generalizability) in our construct. Finally, we will conclude with an investigation of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, a region that has received substantial investments in maritime security. Focusing on these investments, and determining how (if at all) a Broken Windows approach would inform security efforts in the region helps further underscore the theory’s utility and generalizability. Across all three chapters, we ultimately discern that Broken Windows’ two primary themes, as distilled here—multidimensionality and context specificity—prove capable and useful lenses for assessing maritime security.
Chapter 2: Breaking Windows

1 Wilson and Kelling, “Broken Windows.”
2 Dr. Thomas Mahnken (former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning) in discussion with the author, June 24, 2014.
4 Gladwell, Tipping Point, 34.
5 Gladwell, Tipping Point, 92.
6 Gladwell, Tipping Point, 158.
7 Gladwell, Tipping Point, 165.
8 Gladwell, Tipping Point, 146.
9 Gladwell, Tipping Point, 146.
11 In fact, the view of police we are familiar with today, the crime-fighting model, is in actuality not traditional. It is the result of a reformist movement in American politics, which finds its roots in the Progressives of the early 20th century and reaches fruition in midcentury. Before then police were charged with maintaining order, much in the way Broken Windows advocates. See George Kelling and Catherine Coles, Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities (New York: Touchstone, 1996), Chapter 3 for a history and Wesley Skogan, Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Neighborhoods (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1990), 85-90 for more resources.
22 Skogan likens disorder to a disease, calling petty crimes such as vandalism and littering “contagious” to explain the tendency for disorder to beget evermore disorder. See, Skogan, Disorder and Decline, 49.
26 Kelling and Coles, Fixing Broken Windows, 93.
27 Kelling and Coles, Fixing Broken Windows, 98.
28 Kelling and Coles, Fixing Broken Windows, 70.
29 Kelling and Coles, Fixing Broken Windows, 144.
30 Kelling and Coles, Fixing Broken Windows, 100.
32 Kelling and Coles, Fixing Broken Windows, 15.
34 Kelling and Coles, Fixing Broken Windows, 85.
36 Kelling and Coles, Fixing Broken Windows, 71.
37 Kelling and Coles, Fixing Broken Windows, 83.


Kelling and Coles, *Fixing Broken Windows*, Chapter 2. Additionally, there are over 20 individual cases cited throughout the text, for a list of all cited cases, see the Civil Liberties/Judicial System entry on page 305 of the index.


In 2014, a wave of police shootings in the United States in which white officers shot unarmed black men precipitated in protests throughout the country. In New York City, pickets demanded an end to Broken Windows policing, charging that the theory is both racist and criminalizes the homeless. And in practice, particularly the use of Stop and Frisk (which, we would argue, is a strategy anathema to the aims of Community Policing and the Broken Windows theory), police across the country have demonstrated a worrisome trend of bias. However, as we have just seen, Kelling and Coles are at pains to underscore the difference between poverty and crime in the development of their theory. The popular dissatisfaction with the Broken Windows theory is understandable given the association New Yorkers have between the term and the sentiment of police impropriety. Nevertheless, we maintain a distinction here between the colloquial use of Broken Windows popularized at the end of 2014 as a shorthand for police impropriety, and the theory as developed by Kelling, Wilson, and Coles and originally implemented under Kelling’s direction in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Bret Stephens’ (of the Wall Street Journal) use of the Broken Windows theory as the basis for foreign policy demonstrates the appeal of the underlying principles despite the tumultuous political context.


The Department of Defense has in fact had a long and often controversial relationship with foreign assistance. Serafino et al (2008) of CRS offers a summary of this in *The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress*. Long duration projects in particular tend to elicit a sense of ambivalence within the DOD (10). There are also critics outside of the DOD who criticize the militarization of American aid and its impact on neutral aid workers and general effectiveness (22-24).


Gladwell, *Tipping Point*, 137.

Gladwell, *Tipping Point*, 137.


Gladwell, *Tipping Point*, 143.


Kelling and Bratton, “Insiders’ View,” 1221.

Kelling and Bratton, “Insiders’ View,” 1221.

Many criminals use homelessness as covers for elicit criminal activity, blurring the line between the needy and the predatory. See Kelling and Coles, *Fixing Broken Windows*, 67.

Kelling and Bratton, “Insiders’ View,” 1221.
Chapter 2: Breaking Windows

70 Kelling and Coles, *Fixing Broken Windows*, 121.
71 Kelling and Bratton, “Insiders’ View,” 1222.
74 Gladwell, *Tipping Point*, 143.
76 Kelling and Bratton, “Insiders’ View,” 1221.
77 Gladwell, *Tipping Point*, 144.
78 Gladwell, *Tipping Point*, 144-145.
79 Gladwell, *Tipping Point*, 144-145.
80 Gladwell, *Tipping Point*, 145.
83 Kelling and Coles, *Fixing Broken Windows*, 137.
84 Gladwell, *Tipping Point*, 145.
85 Kelling and Bratton, “Insiders’ View,” 1222.
86 Kelling and Coles, *Fixing Broken Windows*, 137.
87 Kelling and Bratton, “Insiders’ View,” 1222-1223.
88 Kelling and Bratton, “Insiders’ View,” 1223.
89 Kelling and Bratton, “Insiders’ View,” 1223-1224.
90 Kelling and Bratton, “Insiders’ View,” 1223.
92 Kelling and Coles, *Fixing Broken Windows*, 141.
93 Kelling and Coles, *Fixing Broken Windows*, 141.
96 Kelling and Coles, *Fixing Broken Windows*, 143.
97 Kelling and Coles, *Fixing Broken Windows*, 143.
100 Kelling and Bratton, “Insiders’ View,” 1217-1218.
106 Kelling and Bratton, “Insiders’ View,” 1228.
112 Kelling and Bratton, “Insiders’ View,” 1226.
113 Kelling and Coles, *Fixing Broken Windows*, 144.
114 Skogan also lists decentralization as one of his four principles of Community Policing. The others include commitment to problem-oriented policing, addressing community demands, and helping the community become a partner in its own defense. See Skogan, *Disorder and Decline*, 91-92.
118 Kelling and Sousa, *Do Police Matter*, 16-17.
119 Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, 74.
Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

120 Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, 43.
121 Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, 201.
122 Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, 43-44.
125 Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, 156.
131 The Broken Windows index was a scaling of multiple physical neighborhood characteristics. It was tabulated in part by referring to videos made of every street in the fifty-five block groups, assigning a number ranging from one to four to assess no or mild cosmetic damage, to minor or major structural damage. That information was combined with coded reports on public school conditions made by the city’s sanitation department, as well as assessments created by walking the streets to collect data on trash and graffiti. See, Cohen et al, “The Risk of Gonorrhea,” 231.
142 Skogan, *Disorder and Decline*, 47, 74.
143 Sampson and Raudenbush, "Systematic Social Observation of Public Spaces," 608.
144 Sampson and Raudenbush, "Systematic Social Observation of Public Spaces," 603.
146 Sampson and Raudenbush, "Systematic Social Observation of Public Spaces," 608.
147 Sampson and Raudenbush, "Systematic Social Observation of Public Spaces," 608.
152 Skogan, *Disorder and Decline*, 73-75.
155 Kelling and Bratton, “Insiders’ View,” 1224, 1228.
157 For examples on the contrasting data in homicide literature, see Cerdá et al. (2009) and Messner et al. (2007). For more on opposition to the order-maintenance/violent crime relationship, see Rosenfeld, Fornango and Rengifo (2007) and Harcourt and Ludwig (2006).
Chapter 2: Breaking Windows


160 Skogan, Disorder and Decline, 9.


166 Silver, The Signal and the Noise: 185.


169 There exists a spectrum of interpretations on how best to implement community policing and Broken Windows, often depicted as hard and soft alternatives. Bratton is associated with the former, as seen in his crackdown on fare-beaters. The latter philosophy dictates a more persistent, positive and communal interface between police and the community. Broken Windows, however, is not synonymous with zero-tolerance policing, and is compatible with a range of implementations. It is, at its root, a theory of problem-identification through a specified lens.


171 Gladwell, Tipping Point, 162.


175 Chauhan et al., “Race/Ethnic-Specific Homicide Rates,” 279.


177 Gladwell, Tipping Point, 140.

178 Gladwell, Tipping Point, 140.

179 Gladwell, Tipping Point, 6.

180 Gladwell, Tipping Point, 140.

181 Gladwell, Tipping Point, 6.

182 Kelling and Sousa, Do Police Matter, 19.


185 Corman and Mocan, “Carrots, Sticks and Broken Windows,” 257-258.

186 Corman and Mocan, “Carrots, Sticks and Broken Windows,” 261.

187 Kelling and Sousa, Do Police Matter, 3.

188 Kelling and Sousa, Do Police Matter, 3.

189 Kelling and Sousa, Do Police Matter, 18.


Muddy Waters: Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory


196 For another example, critical scholarship on terror leverages critical theories to deconstruct discourse and assumptions behind the field. This approach produces a wider range of critiques worthy on note for our study as well. Routledge has introduced a book series on critical terrorism studies, which includes titles on Women Suicide Bombers (Rajan 2011) and Arguing Counterterrorism (Pisoiu 2014). Such literature serves as a welcome reminder for scholars to continuously evaluate their normative assumptions. Wolfendale (2006), for example, argues that the scale and risk of terrorism is dramatically overstated when compared to deaths caused by disease, poverty, and even car accidents. Wolfendale thereby concludes that widely invasive counterterrorism tactics have no place given the limited nature of the threat, and in fact pose a greater risk to the public than terrorism itself. Under such a rubric, the securitization of terror yields policies marketed in exigent terms that may misrepresent the nature or scope of maritime threats. Bueger (2015) notes in a section on securitization how such a framework would impact the definition of maritime security. Such a framing provides an important self-awareness. In many ways this dissertation is a responson ongoing efforts to securitize the maritime space and the strategic needs that presents. Doing so, however, raises the potential to precipitate overreactions and overinvestments in maritime security, much in the way counterterrorism has swung since its securitization after 9/11. Nevertheless, there remain some issues with such criticisms. Critiques of counterterrorism, such as Wolfendale’s, for example, say little about the range of far more pervasive transnational threats (e.g. drug smuggling or human trafficking). Indeed, the frequent argument in critical approaches to studying terror, that the threat of terrorism is oversold and thus responses to it likewise overblown, is difficult to apply to such invasive transnational issues as the drug trade. While the degree of existential threat such activities pose to state sovereignty is a matter of reasonable debate, the immense distribution of transnational threats is far beyond that of terrorism. As a result, it would be difficult to oversell the significance of maritime security given our interpretation of its global scale. More generally, critical approaches to terrorism often fail to produce practical solutions in part because the nature and prevalence of the threat is so often the subject of debate. This again is not mirrored in maritime security given the immensity and variability of illegal activities in the littorals.


198 See Gary Goertz and James Mahoney, A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012) for a discussion on the toleration of both research cultures, qualitative and quantitative.


Chapter 3: Cocaine and Context in the Caribbean

Part One: The Physical Environment

Chapter 3: Cocaine and Context in the Caribbean

“In the trippy semiotics of the drug war, the cops dress like bandits, and the bandits dress like cops.”

Part One: The Physical Environment

1.0 Introduction

We began this dissertation in an effort to understand how the Broken Windows theory could be used as a lens through which to frame a theory of maritime security in the littorals. To answer that question, we dedicated our first two chapters to understanding two important sub-questions: what warranted a revisiting of maritime security, and what is the Broken Windows theory. In this chapter, we return to the central component of our research question: how can we use the Broken Windows theory in the maritime space? To answer this question, we will describe in depth the multidimensional nature of Caribbean security. We will draw on this theme throughout the case study by illustrating that actors in the Basin have long advocated a perspective on security that mirrors this multidimensionality. Our use of the Broken Windows theory is further validated by the understanding that Caribbean authorities have in fact already settled on community policing (of which Broken Windows is a subset theory) as a consensus enforcement model on land. We likewise validate the value of the research question by underscoring the need for more community-oriented enforcement models—employing lessons learned on urbicide in Chapter One. Finally, we illustrate that context is diffuse across the multidimensional spectrum of Caribbean maritime security, offering a new domain in which hybrid threats can be addressed under one governing theory.

Counter-narcotics, from a narrow perspective, is the effort to eradicate the sources of drug production and dismantle the networks that profit from their distribution. At the broadest level, however, nearly every act of law enforcement and national security in the Caribbean can be seen as a form of counter-narcotics policing. Money laundering, terrorist financing, drug abuse, homicide, ransom kidnapping, forced prostitution, irregular migration, and perceptions of failed governance are all interconnected elements of the smuggling and sale of drugs, as we will see in this chapter. From the Caribbean’s permissive attitude towards lax banking regulations, to government corruption, to local crime, to the illicit international trafficking in people and weapons, the movement of narcotics through Caribbean communities is made possible by, and contributes to, a much broader regional maritime insecurity. Thus, even while efforts at countering this trade in drugs have been renewed and redoubled since the temporary withdrawal of resources after 9/11, a truly effective maritime counter-narcotics strategy is one that places drugs within this wider, multidimensional framework. Doing so, however, requires an understanding of how these myriad crimes and disorders interact. In the ensuing sections, we will endeavor to highlight this interaction. By directly observing the multidimensional nature of Caribbean instability, and placing crime in a broader contextual narrative, we take the largest single step in
demonstrating the applicability of Broken Windows as a theoretical foundation for a strategy of maritime security.

The Caribbean Basin is among the most fragile littorals in the world, threatened by powerful currents of environment, economics, and crime. Such a multidimensional dynamic of stability, security, and sovereignty is not new to those who live and govern in the region. As Prime Minister L. Erksine Sandiford of Barbados notes:

Our vulnerability is manifold. Physically, we are subject to hurricanes and earthquakes; economically, to market conditions taken elsewhere; socially, to cultural penetration; and now politically, to the machinations of terrorists, mercenaries, and criminals.²

Hybrid threats dominate the Caribbean, not easily characterized as internal or external in origin. For that reason, research on the security of small states has evolved over the last two decades away from purely state-level power relations. The “preoccupation with external security has given way to recognition that internal security issues are not only important in their own right, but also they complicate, and sometimes aggravate, external challenges.”³ This sentiment has become such a staple in discussions on Caribbean security that at least four authors in one anthology alone, Ivelaw Griffith’s Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror, pointedly emphasize the multidimensionality of small state defense.⁴ The range of social, political, criminal, and economic obstacles facing Caribbean states compelled them to view security from this broader perspective.⁵ Another Barbadian Prime Minister, Owen Arthur, summarizes the regional attitude as follows: “It would be a fundamental error on our part to limit security concerns to any one area while the scourge of HIV/AIDS, illegal arms and drug trafficking, transnational crime, ecological disasters, and poverty continue to stare us in the face.”⁶

While such a perspective is common among Caribbean law enforcement practitioners, politicians, and local academics, it has made only a small impact on security strategies across the Basin. In a region fractured by so many small states, international cooperation often only comes at the behest (and expense) of an external patron.⁷ And while the region’s chief patron, the United States, has invested heavily in multinational institutions and capacity building, the U.S. has struggled to embrace a regional security outlook matching that of local actors. This was exacerbated by the United States’ seismic shift in priorities following the events of September 11. In the months and years after the attacks, the United States executed a massive transition of resource allocation, placing the greatest emphasis on counterterrorism operations. With limited deployable resources, much of that shift was manned and supplied by American assets in the Caribbean. Three-quarters of Coast Guard cutters and related aircraft, heavily drawn from the Caribbean, were tasked to counterterrorism responsibilities such as critical infrastructure protection for ports and tankers.⁸ Half of the Coast Guard’s federal agents responsible for combating drug trafficking, the signature crime in the Caribbean, were reassigned as air marshals.⁹ The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) moved approximately 400 agents from counter-narcotics to counterterrorism missions.¹⁰ From the perspective of the era, this divestment of Caribbean resources devoted largely to drug trafficking was an easy choice. The Caribbean core, apart from the rest of Latin America (and excluding rim states like Colombia and Mexico), was seen to face virtually
no direct threat from terrorism. While South and Central America ranked high on tables of international terror attacks in the years leading up to 2001, “the Caribbean sub-region remained absent from the radar screen tracking global terrorism.”¹¹ In an American context then defined by the threat of internationalized terror, a region at no perceived risk or relation to terrorism could afford to cede resources. This was supported even further given the Department of State’s 2002 Report on Foreign Terrorist Organizations in which none of the organizations listed appeared to have any overt connection to drug trafficking in the Caribbean.¹² Thus, while there persisted a widely acknowledged theoretical “connection between international terrorism and illicit drugs,” the lack of apparent evidence to that point doomed the region to irrelevance in an American conception centered on terrorism.¹³

Yet, such a narrow perspective on security is exactly what Caribbean experts have long argued against. While responses to insecurity (crime, terrorism, piracy, etc.) may be atomized and bureaucratized, the nature of political violence is infrequently so well defined. The choice between counter-narcotics and counterterrorism is artificial, as the United Nations International Narcotics Control Board argued when it urged the United States and others “not to reduce their drug control assistance in favour of measures against terrorism but to look for new ways to combine both.”¹⁴ In that spirit, this chapter seeks to place a variety of security issues endemic to the Caribbean into a related framework. In so doing, we will demonstrate how the Broken Windows theory helps us conceptualize America’s interest in Caribbean defense in a manner that ensures human, national, and regional security, avoiding false choices on enforcement options.

Throughout this chapter, it is important to remain cognizant of the primary lessons established in Chapter Two. There, we discerned two themes in our discussion of the Broken Windows theory—that crime is context dependent and multidimensional. First, at the social psychological core of the theory, lies the expectation that rational actors only behave rationally within a given set of restricting parameters (their context). Human behavior is inexorably tied to how we contextualize and internalize our environment. Gladwell illustrates just this point with his alternatively named Power of Context, calling our attention to experiments conducted with populations from seminarians to grade school students. Likewise, signals of government abandonment and community neglect act on the social psyche and create the conditions in which high-risk behavior (unsafe sex, drug abuse, crime) is more likely. Because of the spotlight this shines on perceptions of insecurity, Broken Windows places a premium on a community’s sense of safety. By focusing on a population’s attitude, community policing can make an impact on violent crime rates in part because it increases a community’s willingness to act in its own defense (self-efficacy).

The second lesson, multidimensionality, came when we evaluated the real-world applications of this theory. It became evident, in both the New York City subway and the streets themselves, that addressing the seemingly small gripes of the city’s residents (farebeating or window washing) had compounding success on crime prevention. This was the case in part because of the signal such initiatives sent to the public, that something new and responsive was being done to combat crime (context, as described above). Yet, practical experience taught that there was an added element to the success of cracking down on lower-order threats. It soon became apparent that those who committed petty crimes were often the same individuals, or knew of those individuals, who
committed more serious ones. Policing a city’s broken windows proved effective not only for its hypothesized social psychological component but also because of the operational impact of placing line officers in direct contact with those most at risk.

Both of these themes support a perspective on security that is multidimensional and context dependent. Moreover, the themes above suggest a vision of security that places the most pervasive and endemic issues (however ‘small’) at the top of the priority scale, precisely because they provide the daily context for the vast majority of people. One of the Broken Windows theory’s signature emphases is on problem solving at the community level. By taking seriously the ‘quality-of-life’ crimes that plagued New York City, the NYPD helped stabilize a city gripped in a perceived epidemic of violent crime. The same can be true on the world stage. Homicides in the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Puerto Rico seem irrelevant to the average American. Yet, as we will see, rising crime rates in these countries are directly related to the widespread trade in small arms and light weapons across the Caribbean Basin, which in turn are all interrelated with narcotics smuggling, human trafficking, and even terrorism. No element of Caribbean security can be understood outside of this multidimensional context. When police treated violent crime as a symptom of disorder, combating context over crimes, they quickly learned that securing community attitudes often meant impacting crime on a wider scale. The same principle applies on a global level. An American maritime security strategy guided by the Broken Windows theory emphasizes the endemic security issues that shape regional context, just as squeegeeing or farebeating shaped perspectives in New York. The Broken Windows theory is fundamentally one of context, and the strategic applications it engenders therefore necessitate a shift in the very way we frame security (i.e. its multidimensionality). To help assess this dynamic nature of Caribbean insecurity, this chapter explores transnational crime in its myriad facets by analyzing where and how illicit networks and flows interact at the macro-level. In the Caribbean, the most obvious and pervasive issue is that of narcotics trafficking, and so it is there that we start.

2.0 Narcotics

2.1 Overview

The Caribbean’s geographic location has long been among the region’s most lucrative commodities. For centuries, goods and people have moved between North and South America, between Africa and the Americas, and between Europe and the Americas, all passing through the Caribbean Sea. Since the completion of the Panama Canal, that traffic expanded to include commerce and migration from Asia and the Pacific utilizing the Caribbean as a transshipment point for destinations farther afield. At the convergence of major sea lines of communication (SLOCs), the Caribbean Basin is home to two of the world’s largest chokepoints (the Panama Canal and the Caribbean Sea). Ten percent of American trade still passes through the canal, while countries such as Chile, Ecuador, and Japan are even more dependent on safe passage through these shipping lanes. The Florida Strait, the Mona Passage, the Windward Passage, and the Yucatan Channel are all sea lines crossing the Caribbean to join Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf of Mexico shipping. Today, the Caribbean remains at “‘the vortex of the Americas…’ a bridge or front between North and South America” and the wider world. And while the significance of this bridge was “dramatised in geopolitical terms during
the Cold War,” the subtler role of the Caribbean in contemporary politics and conflict is no less impactful. For nearly a half century, the Caribbean Basin “has also been viewed as strategic by non-state drug actors…not in terms of geopolitics, but geonarcotics.”

The very concept of geonarcotics, the internationalized non-state distribution of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals, was made possible largely by the Caribbean’s distinct geographical identity as a cluster of small and comparatively weak, resource-poor nations at the world’s crossroads.

The drug trade is, at its roots, a business venture. It grew in size to meet the scale of demand emanating from the West, most heavily the United States. As post-War disposable income met baby boomer adolescence, the United States became an increasingly lucrative market for narcotics. Through the early 1970s, a growing percentage of American-smoked marijuana originated in Colombia’s Guajira Peninsula, an isolated jetty thrust into the southern Caribbean Sea. As the decade progressed, so too did the American palate. By the end of the 1970s, “U.S. consumption patterns were increasingly moving to cocaine,” and Colombia followed suit. By 1979, Colombia had already begun to structure its control over the flow of cocaine. At the time, the majority of coca cultivation remained in Peru and Bolivia, but processing and trafficking were increasingly centered on Colombia, with its access to both Caribbean and Pacific littorals. As cultivation was consolidated in Colombia, the country concurrently gave rise to the most infamous (and romanticized) personalities in drug lore. Reminiscent of the public fascination with Chicago’s mobsters or New York’s Mafioso, the 1980s witnessed the prominence of men like Pablo Escobar Gaviria, “whose tales updated the popular image of the drug kingpin and earned their subject something close to a cult following.”

At the helm of the Medellin Cartel, Escobar rose to become one of the wealthiest criminals in history. Yet, Escobar’s larger than life, self-styled Robin Hood persona belied a series of global shifts that would inevitably dislodge Colombia’s organized crime networks from the pinnacle of the drug trade. Escobar was killed in 1993. His death provided a brief moment of opportunity for the rival Cali Cartel, “but they too came down in short order.” Colombia would continue to remain the major global source for cocaine, but the “balance of power shifted.”

At the heart of this shift was geography, or better yet, geonarcotics.

The closer cocaine (or any drug) comes to an American consumer, the greater its value becomes. For this reason, many drug smuggling operations in the Western Hemisphere set their sights on the United States. And they have been unreservedly successful, though the tactics they employ have varied considerably over the decades. By the end of the 1970s, “entire fleets of speedboats lining up to offload drugs from mother ships were the norm.” Fishing boats and coastal freighters served as inconspicuous hubs from which so-called go-fast boats could on- or offload cargo stashed in coves and safe houses. Yet, the free-for-all elicited a considerable American response. By 1982, the

---

* We use the word ‘cartel’ in its vernacular connotation as a euphemism for criminal groups. In fact, transnational criminal organizations do not always fit the economic definition of a cartel (collaborating to fix prices), which explains much of the street violence across the Caribbean Basin. (See, Patrick Radden Keefe, “Cocaine Incorporated,” New York Times, June 15, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/magazine/how-a-mexican-drug-cartel-makes-its-billions.html?pagewanted=all& r=2&.) In other Caribbean states, alternative names are used to convey the same concept. In Trinidad and Tobago and the Dominican Republic, the word mafia is common, while in Jamaica the word posse is used for the same purpose.
South Florida Task Group had forced traffickers to transition from mother ships to aircraft, dropping payloads for elusive speedboats to collect and conceal. As cocaine distribution continued to grow in complexity and competency in the 1980s, American law enforcement presence similarly continued to build. In an effort to evade the tightening grip, traffickers in the late 1980s transitioned away from shuttling narcotics between the Bahamas and South Florida (the preferred avenue at the time) and increasingly turned to the nexus of Puerto Rico and the Lesser Antilles. Yet, American law enforcement was determined to close the Caribbean corridor. Radar placements in the Mona passage (between Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic) and Anegada passage (between the British Virgin Islands and the Lesser Antilles) made the use of aircraft increasingly risky. Another blow was dealt in the early 1990s, when the American anti-drug effort went multinational. This was an indirect result of the actions of traffickers, as drug use in the Caribbean began to spread following the practice of offering drugs in lieu of cash payments for distribution services. The combination of American enforcement and growing regional opposition to the traffickers brought a decline in the popularity of the Central and Eastern Caribbean Sea smuggling lines, at the time the “lowest cost supply route.” Yet, demand for a range of narcotics persisted, and so did the trade. In search of new avenues, the most obvious alternative became crossing the U.S.–Mexico border (the route next in cost efficiency). The rise of Mexican cartels was a direct result of Colombian criminal syndicates’ efforts to more effectively deliver their products to market. The transition in power became a matter of fact when Colombian networks began paying Mexican smugglers in cocaine instead of cash. With this shift in compensation, Mexicans became investors and wholesalers instead of merely “logistical middlemen.” The American border is the “single most lucrative bottleneck in the drug supply chain, the point where the most value is added,” and the Mexican criminal groups that operated on the border (mostly smuggling people at the time) “possessed the most enviable situational advantage of all: territorial control of the approaches to the U.S. border.” Soon, Mexican cartels had displaced Colombian organizations as the premier movers in the region. As with the Caribbean Sea route, this shift prompted heightened enforcement efforts on the United States’ southern border. The American government began to emphasize efforts against Mexican distribution schemes, notably “the Arellano Felix organization in Tijuana, the Carillo-Fuentes organization in Juarez, and Cardenas Guillen in Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon.” The increased presence once again highlighted the flexibility of the drug trade. This cat-and-mouse game is commonly referred to as the balloon effect, when enforcement efforts in one region or domain simply open enforcement gaps in another. This effect was on full display in 1993, when President Clinton’s anti-drug directive produced a considerable shift in trafficking routes through the transit zone, but precipitated no accompanying shift in drug use or sales. Before the directive, as much as eighty percent of cocaine shipments had entered the United States through Mexico. After, as much as eighty percent of American-bound cocaine was once again delivered via the Caribbean Sea. Today, the Caribbean remains a vital link in the distribution of narcotics. In fact, despite the decline in public fascination, this century’s kingpins, like the recently captured Chapo Guzman, sell “more drugs today than Escobar did at the height of his career.” Part of the reason for the persistence of the Caribbean smuggling route is the
exponential increase in sale price of cocaine as it approaches American consumers. The Sinaloa cartel, for example, the cartel Guzman headed and the largest in Mexico,

Can buy a kilo of cocaine in the highlands of Colombia or Peru for around $2,000, then watch it accrue value as it makes its way to market. In Mexico, that kilo fetches more than $10,000. Jump the border to the United States, and it could sell wholesale for $30,000. Break it down into grams to distribute retail, and that same kilo sells for upwards of $100,000—more than its weight in gold.  

While the figures vary, the principle holds true whether that kilo flows through the U.S.-Mexico border in a false panel on a truck or a hollowed-out fuel tank on a fishing trawler heading for Miami. These combined efforts support a multibillion-dollar industry as lucrative and logistically complex as any licit global enterprise. The proceeds, however, are notoriously difficult to assess. The U.S. Department of Justice places the revenue from American sales of cocaine for Colombian and Mexican networks between the wide range of eighteen and thirty-nine billion dollars annually—figures The New York Times rejects out of “a spirit of empirical humility.”  

The RAND Corporation provides a significantly reduced assessment, hypothesizing that Mexican cartels see revenue closer to $6.6 billion. Even with more conservative figures from RAND, the Sinaloa cartel, which controls between forty and sixty percent of the cocaine market, would net approximately $3 billion annually. By way of comparison, that is equivalent to the gross revenue of major corporations such as Netflix or Facebook. General John Kelly, Commander of U.S. Southern Command, told the House Armed Services Committee that his estimates place revenue closer to eighty-four billion dollars annually, though his figures include the distribution of cocaine worldwide. Kingpins like Chapo oversee organizations as sophisticated as any multinational, “doubly sophisticated…because traffickers must move both their product and their profits in secret, and constantly maneuver to avoid death or arrest.” In fact, the Sinaloa Cartel “might be the most successful criminal enterprise in history.”

Whatever the speculated revenue of drug trafficking, one thing is fairly certain—it is highly unlikely that any licit Caribbean endeavor could compete in size, influence, and presence. Today, ninety-seven percent of analyzed U.S.-bound drugs emanate from one country, Colombia, much of which passes along Caribbean routes. And the trade is crushing local governments. The United Nations Drug Control Program estimates total regional earnings for the illicit drug industry at almost half the GDP of Jamaica or Trinidad. Suriname, a small South American nation on the southern tier of the Caribbean Basin, has been entirely subsumed as a transshipment point for drug running; “no other economic activity in Suriname can compete in profits.” The same is true for many of the small island nations and littoral states dotting the Basin. And yet, despite the apparent efficiency with which illicit markets distribute their products, there is a great deal of experimentation and controlled chaos in the flow of narcotics across the Caribbean. Organized networks succeed in their endeavors by disorganizing, fracturing and federalizing responsibilities within a broader shared infrastructure. The Sinaloa cartel, for example, is occasionally referred to as the Federation because of its
semiautonomous structure.\textsuperscript{53} This structure isolates risk and produces more responsive operational models. It also makes it even more difficult than in the past to identify basic information, such as the size of an organization. Author Malcolm Beith speculates that Chapo had as many as 150,000 employees at any given time.\textsuperscript{54} Professor John Bailey, on the other hand, projects the number may be as low as 150.\textsuperscript{55} Part of the discrepancy stems from the varied characterization of salaried employees and contractors, a distinction with considerable implications for our conceptualization of what it means to be an organized criminal network. Narcotics trafficking is highly adaptive and creative. Combined with immense capital resources and strong demand in the United States, this creativity engenders myriad routes, tactics, and modes of transportation.

\subsection*{2.2 Current Routes and Trends}

As expected, after the 1990s boom in Caribbean Sea routes, American efforts emanating from Florida surged, again opening a resource gap in enforcement along the Mexican border. Cocaine interdicted in the Caribbean in the late 1990s and 2000s dropped to only five percent of total intercepted cocaine, while the Mexican route flourished.\textsuperscript{56} That figure roughly held until 2012, when the percentage of overall cocaine interdicted in the Eastern and Central Caribbean rose to nine percent.\textsuperscript{57} The Mexican drug wars, which began in earnest in late 2006, had hastened a process of re-conquest for drug traffickers on trans-Caribbean routes. With law enforcement presence growing on the Mexican border, and the murderous competition of rival Mexican cartels, trafficking is ebbing back towards the Eastern and Central Caribbean once again. A number of anecdotes support this observation, though as with any illicit trade we are forced to extrapolate heavily from the few visible points of reference. In 2013, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) reported a 483\% increase in cocaine washing up along Florida’s coast compared to the previous year.\textsuperscript{58} Also in 2013, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) reported that eighty-seven tons of cocaine were intercepted in the Caribbean transit zone over the previous twelve months—almost double the 2011 interdiction rates.\textsuperscript{59} Cocaine processing equipment, uncovered in the Dominican Republic, likewise indicates an effort to expand production facilities in the Caribbean.\textsuperscript{60} Sizeable increases in drug trafficking in Puerto Rico made headlines in 2014, spurring speculation that inter-cartel violence in Mexico had precipitated “shifting patterns by traffickers in Colombia and Venezuela.”\textsuperscript{61} In that same year, U.S. law enforcement calculated that Caribbean cocaine seizures rose nearly twenty percent since 2011.\textsuperscript{62} The agent in charge of the DEA’s Caribbean division suspects such indices do not portend “just a one- or two-year blip.”\textsuperscript{63} While the Caribbean never ceased to serve as a highway for illicit distribution chains, indicators such as these suggest an invigorated interest in the maritime domain as an avenue for transport.

The \textit{International Narcotics Control Strategy Report} (INCSR), a product of the United States Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), is the signature U.S. government document on narcotics trafficking. The report identifies two primary categories in the narcotics trade: major illicit drug producers and major drug-transit countries. The report defines a major illicit drug producing country as “one in which: (A) 1,000 hectares or more of illicit opium poppy is cultivated or harvested during a year; (B) 1,000 hectares or more of illicit coca
is cultivated or harvested during a year; or (C) 5,000 hectares or more of illicit cannabis
is cultivated or harvested during a year, unless the president determines that such illicit
cannabis production does not significantly affect the United States."64 A major drug-
transit country is defined as one: “(A) that is a significant direct source of illicit narcotic
or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances significantly affecting the United
States; or (B) through which are transported such drugs or substances."65 The 2014
INCSR lists twenty-two countries as either major production and/or distribution countries
of significance. Seventeen are in Latin America, fourteen of which dot the Caribbean
Basin. They include the Bahamas, Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
and Venezuela.66 Venezuela is further isolated, as one of only three nations to be
identified as “having ‘failed demonstrably’ during the previous twelve months” to
address narcotics trafficking and production.67 A memorandum detailing Venezuela’s
particularly deficient status is included alongside the other named and shamed states
(Burma and Bolivia).68 The report concludes with a country-by-country assessment of
counter-narcotics efforts." The Department of State’s report also identifies major
precursor chemical source countries. Precursor chemicals are necessary for the
processing of some harvested narcotics, and central to the production of synthetic drugs
like methamphetamine or ecstasy. The Caribbean Basin hosts six major precursor
chemical source countries: Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Mexico.69 Precursor chemical interdiction is incredibly complicated given
the myriad licit uses for many of the products labeled as precursors.

Varying sources and limited data point towards an incomplete picture of the most
frequented Caribbean trafficking routes. Of the states listed above, commonly noted
Central and Eastern Caribbean transshipment points typically include Jamaica, the
Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Puerto Rico, “though probably every
island in the Caribbean has at one point been used in some way or another by the
traffickers.”70 Puerto Rico in particular is fast becoming a significant destination for
traffickers, and Trinidad and Tobago, Curacao, Bonaire, Cuba, and a host of small islands
in the Lesser Antilles have all been identified as popular transshipment sights as well.71
In the Lesser Antilles, the most frequent English-speaking transshipment points include
Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and
the Grenadines, Anguilla, Monserrat, and the British Virgin Islands."72 In the Greater
Antilles, the most commonly used transit routes again include Cuba, Haiti, and the
Dominican Republic, all frequently operated as “springboards to penetrate Puerto Rico or
the continental United States.”73 According to a DEA threat assessment, Jamaica, St.
Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines are the major Caribbean actors who play a
significant role in marijuana exportation.74 With respect to methods of transport, the
assessment reports that traffickers in the Bahamas, Haiti, and Puerto Rico consistently
utilize the most diverse means of conveyance, including go-fast boats, containers,
airfreight or air drops, and hidden compartments in vessels.75 Barbados and the
Dominican Republic primarily utilize go-fast boats and containers, while Trinidad and
Tobago’s smugglers appear to prefer go-fast boats predominantly.76 A Panamanian
flagged vessel interdicted by the United States Coast Guard 780 nautical miles west of

* In the interest of time and space, and in line with our macroscopic interest in illicit flows, we leave
exploration of the fourteen individual countries to the reader.
Peru in 1995 demonstrates just how internationalized narcotics trafficking has become; documentation onboard confirmed it had smuggled cocaine all across the Caribbean. The ship, *Nataly*, called in Belize, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, Puerto Rico, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos, and even Louisiana. The *Nataly*, eventually intercepted in the Pacific Ocean, had also called in Ecuador and demonstrates the relative simplicity of moving between oceans.


Given the clandestine nature of smuggling, anecdotal information from ships like the *Nataly* offers some of the best insight into an otherwise opaque trade. More often than not, traffickers cross the transit zone with “almost complete impunity, using the myriad hidden bays, rivers, unmapped islands, ports,” crowded littorals, small fishing villages, and open ocean to evade detection. In the cross-border effort to remain under the radar, both literally and metaphorically, traffickers are aided by the diversity of political and geographical climes available within such a small radius. Each island and littoral state provides a unique set of geopolitical factors, enabling trafficking in variable ways. Trinidad and Tobago, for example, is only seven miles from mainland South America and serves as an ideal route for traffickers leaving Venezuela via the Orinoco River—police are obstructed from pursuing them beyond the international border. The proximity also means that small craft, even local pirogue, can make the journey quickly and inconspicuously. St. Vincent and the Grenadines is similarly well-positioned geographically, and offers an added allure with lax flag of convenience ship registration that has attracted Colombian smugglers for decades. Flag of convenience laws allow ship owners to register vessels in states other than their own, which in turn makes it difficult to implicate ship owners in any crime undertaken with the use of the vessel. The Bahamas, to the north, provides a different set of attracting qualities. Only sixty
miles from Florida, the Bahamas offers twenty-nine islands and 661 cays (keys) within a stone’s throw of mainland United States. It also sits astride three major sea lines of communication “connecting the Panama Canal, the South Atlantic, and the North Atlantic to the Gulf of Mexico.” All of this is contained with a national oceanic jurisdiction of more than 250,000 miles—far greater than the Royal Bahamas Defense Force can reasonably patrol.

The most significant conclusion from an overview of narcotics trafficking in the Caribbean is the versatility with which suppliers adapt (at a macro level) to meet the pressures of demand and enforcement. In the maritime domain, “everything from modern container ships to rusty small freighters, to fishing boats, to small ‘go-fast’ craft” have been used to move drugs. Frequently, trafficking through such means, especially small boats, is “decidedly low-tech.” Go-fast boats are a popular means of conveyance because, other than GPS and cell phones, they are largely free of complex instrumentation. Yet, just as narcotics traffickers have expanded their geographical routes and methods, so too have they experimented with the physical means of conveyance. One of the fastest-growing alternatives to the ubiquitous Caribbean go-fast boat is the narco submarine (or narco-sub). A narco-sub is a “custom-made, self-propelled” submersible or semi-submersible used to transport narcotics and related goods.

The Colombian cartels in particular have featured heavily over the last two decades in the development of submersible technology, even buying at least one submarine from the Russian mafia. It is within the last decade, however, that narco-sub have gained serious traction in response to repeated successes in narcotics interdictions in the mid-2000s. In part, go-fast boats began carrying smaller loads across more crafts to mitigate risk. Yet, increasingly, narco submarines began to play an important role in the effort to diversify maritime smuggling techniques.

Narco submarines come in two varieties, Self-Propelled Semi-Submersibles (SPSS) and Fully Submersible Vessels (FSV). They are purpose-built machines, designed by engineers, constructed in parts under the thick cover of the Amazon forest, and floated like logs down river for assembly and deployment. Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South) first detected an SPSS in operation in 2006. In less than three years, the task force was identifying up to sixty SPSS events annually, delivering more than 330 metric tons of cocaine. Through the summer of 2012, JIATF-South confirms 214 documented SPSS events, though only forty-five were disrupted. The Colombian navy has also facilitated the interdiction of several diesel-powered submersibles, each with a similarly impressive cache of cocaine. At a cost of approximately one million dollars a vessel, each narco-sub has the capacity to reap one hundred times that figure in revenue. For that reason, such craft are “effectively disposable” for traffickers. In the unlikely event of interdiction, the submarine can be flooded with water, taking evidence to the depths while operators are pulled from the sea. JIATF-South recorded five Caribbean SPSS disruptions between July 2011 and June 2012, with each vessel carrying over 6.5 metric tons of cocaine, or more than fifteen times the entirety of cocaine interdicted in Jamaica in one year. The fully submersible variant can traffic a hefty ten metric tons of cocaine up to 6,800 nautical miles. That is enough range to reach as far as Africa. From Colombia’s Caribbean littoral, an FSV can venture to Florida, Texas, or California in ten to twelve days, likely without a hint of detection.
### Preferred Products, Routes, and Methods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Production</th>
<th>Trans-ship</th>
<th>Go-fast</th>
<th>Container</th>
<th>Air Freight or Drop</th>
<th>Hidden Compartment</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Money Laundering</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aruba</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td>Low-price cocaine indicates easy availability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aircraft overfly Cuba for protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>United States, Canada, Europe</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Important international banking center, use of cruise ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cayman Islands</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Canada, Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td>Occasional smuggling, mostly offshore banking center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>United States, Puerto Rice</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Illegal migration overlaps drug smuggling via Mona Passage, overland from Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Guyana</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Europe, United States</td>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil, Venezuela to Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia to United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>United States, Panama</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Cocaine overland to Dominican Republic, by sea to United States; money in bulk to Panama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>United States, Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td>Major producer of marijuana and hash oil to Europe; links South</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Chapter 3: Cocaine and Context in the Caribbean

**Part One: The Physical Environment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>X</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dutch Antilles</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Puerto Rico</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>St. Lucia</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>United States, Lesser Antilles</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>St. Vincent and the Grenadines</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lesser Antilles</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Suriname</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trinidad and Tobago</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turks and Caicos</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **American smugglers with Bahamas insertion specialists**
- **Banking ties to the Netherlands, proximity to Puerto Rico (150 miles)**
- **Money laundering through Casas de Cambio**
- **Marijuana, body-carry or ingestion by couriers**
- **Major marijuana producer, sells citizenship, front companies**
- **From Brazil, Venezuela to Amsterdam**
- **Pirogue shipping from Venezuela, 7 miles away**
- **Proximity to United States attracts smugglers**

Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

“go-fast boats, airplanes, the hiding of narcotics inside bulk containers and smaller commodities, drug mules”\textsuperscript{106} and more, narco submarines provide a resiliency and carrying capacity that is quickly forming a central role in transnational crime. While far fewer in number than go-fast boats, SPSSs and FSVs potentially pose “an even more insidious threat to the security of the United States,” in the words of former JIATF-South Director Vice Admiral Charles Michel.\textsuperscript{107} Such narco-subss exemplify the nature of the hybrid threat. In many instances, the actors in control of such vessels retain criminal motives. Yet, the construction and deployment of these craft (not to mention the cultivation of the products they carry) frequently require political control of territory. And the capacity to move not just drugs, but people, money, and weapons (all of which we will explore below) means such submersibles encapsulate an inherent capacity to threaten international security.

2.3 Trafficking Flows

Within days in April 2014, investigators on the island of Puerto Rico intercepted two boats, each with millions of dollars of cocaine stashed onboard. In the first instance, law enforcement uncovered 1,774 kilograms of cocaine; in the second, agents uncovered 1,530 kilograms.\textsuperscript{108} The rising frequency of such interdictions in Puerto Rico has attracted national attention, resulting in a \textit{New York Times} profile recounting one such interception:

With its navigation lights off, the 35-foot speedboat raced north toward Puerto Rico one night this month, its two large engines at full throttle. Above, a Coast Guard helicopter chased it and then let loose a few warning shots. But the boat roared ahead. Then, thwack, the crew on the copter shot out one of [the] engines. By dawn, the frenzied scramble had come to an end and 1,280 kilograms of cocaine—worth about $37 million on the street—were in federal hands, much of it scooped from the Caribbean Sea, where the smugglers had tossed the bales.\textsuperscript{109}

Dramatic scenes such as this are a staple of life in counter-narcotics; hardly a week passes without one agency announcing a significant arrest or interdiction. And such are increasingly familiar sights on American soil.

The jewel in the Caribbean trafficking crown is Puerto Rico. The reason is readily apparent; “once cocaine successfully reaches Puerto Rico, it has reached the U.S. homeland.”\textsuperscript{110} Yet, Puerto Rico is only one stop on a long journey. Traditionally, the island of Hispaniola has served as a midway point in this trip. In 2013 SOUTHCOM Commander Kelly noted an increase of three percent (to thirty-two metric tons) of known cocaine passing through the island.\textsuperscript{111} Haiti, on the western end of Hispaniola, is an obvious target because of its endemic struggle with inadequate and corrupt governance.\textsuperscript{112} Yet, it is the island’s larger eastern state, the Dominican Republic, which may be the Caribbean’s largest island transshipment hub. As the “first point of contact for Puerto Rican operators,” the Dominican Republic plays a central role in the “US/New York/Miami/Puerto Rico/Dominican Republic axis” that moves narcotics throughout the transit zone.\textsuperscript{113} In 2013, the U.S. military predicted that a full six percent of all U.S.-
Chapter 3: Cocaine and Context in the Caribbean
Part One: The Physical Environment

bound cocaine would transit through the Dominican Republic.\textsuperscript{114} That is nearly half of all the cocaine passing through the Central and Eastern Caribbean (around fourteen percent of total interdictions in 2013),\textsuperscript{115} indicating that a plurality (perhaps even a majority) of cocaine trafficked via Caribbean islands passes between the Hispaniola–Puerto Rico corridor.

Dominicans make up a considerable portion of the immigrant population on the East Coast of the United States, particularly in New York. The number of Dominican immigrants in New York is so large that “Dominicans have created truly binational societies between the US and the Dominican Republic.”\textsuperscript{116} Better standards of living in the United States also mean that New York-based Dominicans contribute heavily to the Dominican economy through remittances. As David Kilcullen explored in \textit{Out of the Mountains}, remittance networks are one of the many ways communities remain interconnected (a ‘megatrend’) with the wider world.\textsuperscript{117} Kilcullen demonstrates this effect through Jamaican posses, which extort Jamaica’s massive remittance system to fund illicit ventures and their rule of garrison districts.\textsuperscript{118} International ties like remittances also contribute to trafficking, concealing illicit flows embedded within licit traffic. In much the same way, the heavy exchange of remittances, people, and goods between Dominican binational communities forms the basis for many Dominican smuggling routes. And this fundamental infrastructure of smuggling is a commodity in its own right. Such networks are by nature highly adaptable and can be easily co-opted by other actors or for the transport of alternative products. Thus, the existence of Dominican smugglers operating between the Caribbean and the United States has attracted attention from more than just law enforcement. The Drug Enforcement Administration believes that “Colombians are directly organising groups and routes in the Dominican Republic”\textsuperscript{119} in an effort to capitalize on this preexisting infrastructure. Whether organized by external forces or internally connected by ethnic ties, the centrality of the Dominican–Puerto Rican drug route now pervades Dominican language and culture. Dominican immigrants living in the United States are sometimes called “Dominicanyorks and are resented in the Dominican Republic, in major part because they have been stereotyped as being drug dealers.”\textsuperscript{120}

Trends rarely persist in the cat-and-mouse game of narcotics smuggling. As Puerto Rico grows as an attractive destination for Caribbean smuggling operations, efforts to evade detection and simplify shipment routes have resulted in increased attempts to bypass Hispaniola entirely.\textsuperscript{121} According to a Puerto Rico-based Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent, Angel Melendez, “cocaine is increasingly trafficked in larger amounts directly north from Venezuela on boats that refuel at sea during the roughly two-day voyage.”\textsuperscript{122} With the stronghold the Dominican Republic has on transshipment, and the strategic placement of ethnic and familial ties in New York, it is unlikely that Hispaniola will disappear from the trade. Nevertheless, as history proves, the drug market is highly adaptable. While squeezing the balloon at one end (i.e. the Dominican Republic) may decrease cocaine traffic through the island, experience suggests that the excess ‘air’ will simply find a place elsewhere.

One such ‘elsewhere’ is Jamaica, which originally made its mark in drug trafficking through marijuana. Alongside Belize (and a few smaller islands), Jamaica grows and exports marijuana for regional consumption, mostly in the Bahamas, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and the Eastern Caribbean.\textsuperscript{123} Inevitably, with the dramatic rise in
Muddy Waters: Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

sale price to American consumers, Jamaican marijuana eventually made its way into the United States as well. Jamaica remains the largest Caribbean supplier of marijuana to the United States. Yet, as we noted with Dominican smuggling networks, the infrastructure of trafficking is easily co-opted, and illicit marijuana distribution provided an avenue for more expansive smuggling operations. A similar trajectory took place in St. Kitts and Nevis. There, marijuana production attracted smugglers who sought to co-opt “the clandestine links already established by the locals” to develop alternative cocaine trafficking routes. Some Jamaicans, especially those who make their living on the coast, are made uneasy by the prospect of similar infiltration migrating into their towns:

Anxiety is expressed by a few residents of the tiny fishing village of Forum, on Jamaica’s southern coast, where the main road leads past rickety wooden shacks to a rocky shoreline lined with small boats. ‘If the drugs take over, this place will never be the same. It will be bad, bad,’ fisherman Oneal Burke said as he scaled fresh red snapper.

And in much of Jamaica, that anxiety has long since been validated. The central Caribbean region has reemerged as a route of favor for traffickers and Jamaica appears to play a significant role in that nexus. The scene along parts of Jamaica’s southern coast already threatens hamlets like Burke’s:

Assault rifles at the ready, police in a speedboat scan the coastline as they slice through the slate-gray water, aware that the rocky shorelines and fishing villages that line parts of southern Jamaica are not always very sleepy these days.

In the first half of 2013, cocaine seizures in Jamaica doubled over the previous year. Yet, that doubled figure only came to 354 kilograms, paltry when compared to individual hauls of over 1,000 kilograms in Puerto Rico and elsewhere. Thus, while Jamaica is widely suspected of being an increasingly popular transshipment point for northward bound cocaine, it does not rank highly on the list of Caribbean seizures by volume. The U.S. government nevertheless maintains that Jamaica is a “major drug-transit country.” While interdiction rates lag, tight-knit island communities also exhibit prescient concerns. The corrosive impact of the trade has made itself felt throughout the social fabric of the country, as expressed by the fishermen of Forum. The national security minister, in a speech to the Jamaican parliament a decade earlier in 2002, stated “the illegal drug trade has become the taproot for crime and violence in our country today.” While poor interdiction numbers offer little empirical support for claims of Jamaica’s rise in the drug trade, sensitive popular sentiments such as these do. Drug abuse serves as yet another indirect indicator of drug trafficking, and only serves to fuel social tension. Payment in kind, instead of in cash, is a common financing alternative for drug networks. This invariably breeds drug addiction growth within communities, and Jamaica is one such victim of this phenomenon. The country now “harbors thriving cocaine and marijuana markets,” which are still further evidence of the island’s heavy use as a transshipment
Chapter 3: Cocaine and Context in the Caribbean
Part One: The Physical Environment

point. Yet, while the Eastern and Central Caribbean may be growing in
popularity among criminal organizations, these routes still pale in comparison to
the sheer size of the trade along the Western Caribbean littoral.

According to Vice Admiral Charles Michel, “The Mexico/Central American
corridor, which includes the waters of the Eastern Pacific and the Western Caribbean, is
the primary threat vector toward the United States, accounting for more than 90 percent
of total documented cocaine movement.” Eighty percent of this traffic makes first
landfall in Central America, with the remainder heading directly for Mexico. About
thirty-five percent of all outward-bound cocaine makes landfall in Honduras alone.

Moving primarily in go-fast boats—“open hulled boats anywhere from 20 to 50 feet in
length with one to four powerful outboard engines”—traffickers move as much as three
and a half metric tons of cocaine as they ferry between Honduras (principally) and
Colombia. Of the 568 go-fast events documented by JIATF-South’s Consolidated
Counter Drug Database in 2011—which carried 490 metric tons of cocaine—ninety-four
percent “were along the Central American isthmus into Honduras, Guatemala and
Mexico.” Increasingly, narco submarines are also being used, and the DEA estimates
as much as thirty percent of the maritime movement of drugs in this corridor is now
undertaken by these vessels.

This traffic, between South America and Central America, is the primary instance
of maritime conveyance for most cocaine exiting the source zone. Here, between Central
America and Colombia and Venezuela, eighty percent of U.S.-bound cocaine first moves
by water. Once in Central America, much of the onward smuggling takes place
overland. Of those shipments that do progress on water, many embark along the Western
Caribbean shoreline, using the Bay Islands as a point of departure. The Bay Islands are
within reach of the small Colombian islands of San Andrés and Providencia, and the
modern inhabitants of the island trace their lineage to English-speaking immigrants from
Belize, Jamaica, and other British Caribbean possessions. Thus, Bay Islanders
frequently share ethnic and economic similarities with English-speaking Caribbean
communities across the Basin, as well as a shared history of “small-scale smuggling.”
The geographical position at the crossroads of Central America, South America, the
Western Caribbean, and Mexico, alongside the historical and linguistic ties to varying
parts of the Basin, all converge to make Honduras and its islands a predictable victim of
the narcotics trade.

The United States regards all seven of the Central American states—Belize, Costa
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama—as “major drug transit
countries.” And while they persist as actors in the trade, their individual roles are
constantly in flux. As traffickers diversify their product lines to include designer drugs
like methamphetamine, the littoral states of Central America are now playing a greater
role in the trafficking of precursor chemicals. Multiple tons have been seized in Belize, El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Given the lack of climate and soil requirements
for the production of synthetic drugs, the passage of precursor chemicals through Central
America and the Caribbean may portend a geographical expansion of methamphetamine
and ecstasy production. In Guatemala, this production is already an issue of increasing
significance.

* For a deeper assessment of existing U.S. efforts to combat drug trafficking, see Appendix D.
2.4 Summary

In the words of former Foreign Policy editor Moises Naim, “borders are a trafficker’s best friend and an enormous headache for those fighting him. This asymmetry is not new, but it has become more acute.”149 The capacity to transfer an illicit product between jurisdictions is a commodity in its own right. The infrastructure and networks required to facilitate this kind of movement are immense, clandestine in character, and by nature resistant to the efforts of single actors, even large ones. Even the myriad international partnerships in the Caribbean struggle to overcome the fundamental obstacle of international borders. Yet, the single greatest impediment to combatting narcotics trafficking is the perception that simply catching enough ‘bad guys,’ or interdicting enough cocaine, will solve the problem. Even in instances of high confidence intelligence, the Commandant of the Coast Guard concedes, “there aren’t enough ships to catch them all…We’re giving 60 percent of what we know, literally, a free pass.”150 This pertains despite the fact that the war on drugs represents “the largest deployment of money, technology, and personnel that humankind has ever devoted to stopping drugs from moving across borders,”151 costing the United States an estimated $200 billion annually in direct healthcare and enforcement costs related to cocaine alone.152 Given the scale of the narcotics trade (the DEA estimates $60 billion in illicit proceeds are laundered through the Caribbean annually),153 even frequent high-quantity interdictions have done little to slow the movement of drugs worldwide. All this suggests that the issue of narcotics trafficking is not one to be solved by sheer scale of investment. The value of drugs entering the United States is simply too high for the U.S. to impart a meaningful enough penalty to deter trafficking.

Since the launch of the war on drugs, the United States has constructed an immensely expensive apparatus devoted to counter-drug operations. At the federal level alone, the Drug Enforcement Administration, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Patrol, the Marshals Services, the Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Coast Guard, and countless other national agencies are funded for counter-drug missions at an estimated price of twenty billion dollars annually.154 Yet, despite the colossal size of the counter-drug apparatus, the task of detection and interdiction is exponentially larger. To be sure, there have been a number of successes over the years. Aid money to Colombia helped decapitate the leadership of the Medellin and Cali cartels,155 which helped dismantle large portions of their organizations. Weekly, news reports relay daring arrests and high-profile corruption charges. Yet, such successes come with little reward. Even when transnational organized crime was structured in a more hierarchical format, the death of a kingpin like Pablo Escobar had virtually no impact on cocaine production and distribution.156 Later, arrests of top leadership of both the Arellano Felix criminal organization and the Gulf Cartel in the early 2000s were similarly met by imperceptible changes in gross narcotics trafficking.157 More

---

* This is in the mold of midcentury American policing, profiled in Chapter One. This strategy of policing focuses on catching criminals in the act and responding quickly (via 911 call centers) to crimes in commission. Yet, in both policing and drug interdiction, police rarely respond quickly enough to catch a crime in commission. Instead, they remain apart from the communities they are devoted to serving, over time becoming mistrusted and perhaps even adversarial.
significantly, decapitation of cartels and a focus on interdictions ignore important changes in the structure of trafficking. As we explored above, Colombian organizations began losing dominance when they enabled Mexican TCOs to act as wholesalers. Today, that process has continued to devolve the narcotics trade. Crossing borders adds the greatest value to cocaine as it moves, shifting power and earnings to the “middle of the distribution chain, to the points where the greatest opportunities exist for high-value cross-border transactions, diversification, and strategic partnerships.”158 Opportunistic middlemen constitute networks of shared smuggling infrastructure moving goods in shifting patterns shaped by the demands of the market. The arrest of a distant kingpin in Mexico, or the interdiction of a small shipment in Jamaica, means relatively little to a facilitator in the Dominican Republic or Honduras.

It is not surprising, therefore, that counter-narcotics operations have met limited success, despite being the signature American maritime security task in the Caribbean. As we have seen, the reasons for this failure are born out of two significant misperceptions. First, “we still speak of drug ‘cartels,’ but the drug business today has largely dissolved the heavy organized crime-like operations of the past and works in more nimble, less traceable ways.”159 The perception of transnational organized crime as corporately hierarchical instead of fluidly franchised produces flawed strategies, most notably institutional decapitation. Yet, as we explored in Chapter One, hybrid threats in the modern age are frequently characterized by decentralized actors operating in formations more akin to swarms than coordinated groups. Decapitation of senior leadership makes little impact on the semi-autonomous middlemen and small-scale actors who carry out the drug trade. In the Dominican Republic, for example, in the “absence of a mafia controlled by one or even a few capos …the state fights a Hydra of decentralised and localised gangs without hierarchy or enduring central control.”160 Second, narcotics trafficking is not a conventional security issue. It is too extensive for the Coast Guard to handle on its own, and seen as too unconventional for the Navy to address with any enthusiasm (see Chapter One). JIATF-South’s mission is to deny traffickers the use of over six million square miles of sea and airspace.161 Despite accounting for over half of all drug seizures by U.S. authorities,162 the Coast Guard (alongside the Navy, CBP, DEA, and others in the Task Force) is fighting a losing battle. With the shifting structure and focus of the Navy, this effort will only become more difficult. The answer, consequently, comes not from budgets or force deployments but—as we explored in Chapter Two—in how we frame the problem.

3.0 Local Crime

Narcotics trafficking garners international concern because it crosses borders. Yet, the individual criminal incidents that collectively constitute transnational crime necessarily occur within nations, districts, and communities. The adage—all politics is local—is consequentially equally true of transnational crime and terrorism. Even global enterprises must operate within local contexts. In the Caribbean Basin, that context is often informed by alarming crime rates, including some of the highest murder rates in the world. Local crime is, therefore, the dominant political concern for many of the region’s inhabitants. And because local crime and related social grievances monopolize the limited resources of Caribbean lawmakers, regional security is typically left to foreign
bodies, financed (and as a consequence, tailored) to the needs and assumptions of someone else’s strategic perspective. Engaging and incentivizing the necessary participation of Caribbean partners to combat illicit trafficking require incorporating the region’s emphasis on the home front. And the regional focus on crime is an important one. Not only do rising crime rates obviously impact human security, they can have disastrous consequences on economies dominated by the tourism industry. In 2002, the British government issued a crime advisory for Trinidad and Tobago, a regular product issued by Western governments. Yet, the memorandum was seen as such a threat to the Trinidadian economy that it sent the government into a “tailspin.” The prime minister dispatched a special delegation to both New York and London in an effort to have the advisory withdrawn. Similar advisories for Jamaica, issued in response to increased shootouts between police and posses (drug traffickers), had a direct impact on tourism and the economy.

The scale and scope of narcotics trafficking would imply that indeed quite a large number of individuals participate in or facilitate the movement of illegal substances. In fact, organized or semi-organized networks cannot keep pace with demand. To keep product moving across the American border, large criminal groups frequently license the use of their routes to small or individual actors. Despite ‘taxes’ of up to sixty percent, moving narcotics is so lucrative that there is no shortage of part-time traffickers to fill demand. Such was the case with a Mexican business owner, ascribed the pseudonym Don Alfonzo. Alfonzo uncovered that some of his employees were using company vehicles to transport narcotics to supplement their incomes (one successful trip was worth a year’s salary). Instead of turning them into the police, Alfonzo approached them with a proposition. He would finance their purchase of narcotics (the largest up-front cost) and allow them to continue using his vehicles to cross the border while taking a percentage off the top. Alfonzo’s successful small-scale network operates largely independent of the major Mexican cartels. Over the years, businesses like this “have quietly prospered, no more affected by the cartel wars than by the billions of dollars the U.S. and Mexican governments have deployed to stop the trade.” Such entrepreneurs are aware that drugs offer the prospect of significantly enhanced supplemental income at minimal risk—Alfonzo jokes, “I think in this town the construction business is riskier than moving drugs.” In Alfonzo’s words,

The gringos and the police here are busy chasing the big guys, and if they go after the small guys like us they will need to build a new jail the size of this whole town. The economy of this entire region would go bankrupt. No government can touch this. Why should they? The big guys give good theater and are good for politics. We don’t.

Even those who do not physically transport drugs—by choice in Alfonzo’s case or by force in many others—are implicated in the trade. The logistical challenges of moving drugs across vast distances require an extensive support network. Costa Rican Coast Guard director Martín Arias describes how a boat laden with cocaine traveling from Colombia to Mexico “could require as many as 24 other boats along the way to successfully complete the journey.” David Chacón, the president of a fishing cooperative on Costa Rica’s Pacific coast, explains that local fishermen are press-ganged
Chapter 3: Cocaine and Context in the Caribbean
Part One: The Physical Environment

by traffickers to rendezvous at sea with fuel and rations as part of a series of way stations.\textsuperscript{174} In Costa Rica, as with many Caribbean and littoral Central American states, the existing coast guard forces are ill-suited to police the entirety of the country’s borders, leaving exposed the “economic vulnerability” of small fishing communities to predation.\textsuperscript{175} And there is no shortage of avenues through which communities are enveloped into the trade. Falcons, lookouts employed by the cartels, are paid as much as one hundred dollars a month “just to keep their eyes open and make a phone call if they notice an uptick in border inspections or a convoy of police.”\textsuperscript{176} Trafficking is so extensive, and the culture so pervasive, that the DEA speculates there are cities in which “virtually every cabdriver is on the payroll.”\textsuperscript{177} In the words of former DEA agent Michael Braun, “they have eyes and ears everywhere.”\textsuperscript{178} The drug culture in the Caribbean is not one that can be addressed by high profile arrests or interdictions. Drug abuse and widespread participation in narcotics trafficking erode the efficacy of the state and the self-efficacy of communities ubiquitously.

On the low end, police estimate that roughly sixty percent of crime in Caribbean Basin countries is related to drugs.\textsuperscript{179} That figure is considerably higher with regard to violent, gun-related crimes. In 2004, the Colombian president Alvaro Uribe alleged that “more than 90 percent of the crime in Colombia” was perpetrated with illegal firearms.\textsuperscript{180} Indeed, perhaps the most significant connection between narcotics trafficking and local crime is its impact on homicides. The reason is simple; much of the revenue from selling drugs is funneled directly into arms trafficking.\textsuperscript{181} Just as Jamaica’s or St. Kitts and Nevis’ marijuana smuggling networks were co-opted for cocaine trafficking, so too are cocaine networks co-opted for returning guns to transit and source countries. The groups operating these networks are often related; “narcotics trafficking and arms smuggling along the Andean Ridge are closely interlocked. Groups involved in narcotics also are the leading traffickers in armaments and much of the money used for arms purchases is generated by the narcotics trade.”\textsuperscript{182} One typical gun running case documented in November 2001 involved Panamanians, Israelis, Mexicans, and Guatemalans trafficking weapons through the transit zone and into Colombia.\textsuperscript{183} Another case from the 1990s documented the Medellin Cartel’s purchase of Israeli weapons using the Antiguan defense force as a legal cover for the shipment.\textsuperscript{184} These weapons are then used to defend transit routes from competition, terrorize the public into submission, and battle security forces. The avalanche of small arms and light weapons (SALW) pouring into the Basin has helped it become the most deadly region in the world. Eight of the ten countries with the world’s highest homicide rates are in the Caribbean Basin, and include Honduras, Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, Venezuela, and Colombia.\textsuperscript{185} And the impact of murder rates that rival those of warzones cannot be understated.

A 1996 survey in Latin America identified gun crime as the leading socioeconomic issue facing the region.\textsuperscript{186} In the intervening two decades, little headway has been made. In the last ten years, Jamaica has only fallen from number one to number six on the list; the country still experiences more than one thousand murders a year on average (since 2004).\textsuperscript{187} The island is swamped by the epidemic. Drugs are traded for guns in an exchange that exacerbates both local crime and international narcotics trafficking.\textsuperscript{188} The U.S. Department of State estimates homicide conviction rates at only five percent.\textsuperscript{189} According to Omar Davies, former Jamaican Minister of Transport,
Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

Works and Housing, and former Minister of Finance and Planning, “‘vicious criminal organisations’ permeate every level of society…[And] the loss of lives from serious crime is the biggest burden to the country.’” Jamaican even struggles to find enough places to house all the bodies. Jamaica has been without a national morgue since the 1970s, resulting in inadequate autopsy facilities and the frequent contamination of evidence. Bodies are stored in funeral homes that are paid so little (six to ten dollars per body, per day) that they often cannot afford to even keep them refrigerated. One consultant to the Jamaican police noted that he has “never seen such deplorable conditions and lack of support from a government to resolve these issues.” The former mayor of Kingston, Desmond McKenzie, noted plainly, “the simple fact is the government has failed miserably.” Puerto Rico, too, is not immune. In 2012, homicide rates on the island peaked at 26.5 per 100,000 people. This too is directly related to narcotics trafficking; the Coast Guard estimates that seventy-five percent of homicides in Puerto Rico can now be tied to the trade. Yet, of all the death and gun use in the region, Honduras lays claim to the title of the most violent place on the planet. Much of this violence takes place in San Pedro Sula (the deadliest city on Earth) and along the Guatemalan–Honduran border, both major transshipment chokepoints.

In Honduras, transportistas (trafficking groups) and territorial gangs are in constant struggle over control of the world’s most frequented cocaine passageways. Murder rates are highest in these “highly concentrated urban centres and strategic points (the Atlantic coast and border regions).” Maras (gangs) and pandillas (youth gangs) emerged in Honduras emulating the model of American gangs in the 1980s and 1990s and have been a major feature of these violent turf wars ever since. The numbers of gang involvement are so high that estimates project as many as 151 maras members per 100,000. Regionally, the numbers are no better. Guatemala stands at 146 per 100,000, and El Salvador is at a staggering 318 per 100,000. Between 2005 and 2014, more than 40,000 people were killed in Honduras, the vast majority with a gun. In 2012 alone, Honduras witnessed more than 7,000 violent deaths, and the figures have risen more than 200 percent since 2005. A homicide rate of 85.5 per 100,000 people is more than eight and a half times the global average. Illegal weapons, purchased with the proceeds of drug running and smuggled through many of the same mechanisms, drive Honduras’ murder epidemic. As is the nature of illicit trades, estimates on the number of SALW in the country are variable. Extrapolating the number of firearms based on the number of homicides would suggest the presence of around 420,000 illegal weapons in Honduras. The United Nations Development Programme estimates closer to one-third of the firearms in Central America are in Honduras, which would place the figure much higher, between 800,000 and one million weapons. While the relationship between traffickers, gangs, and firearms may be complex, the hyperbolic case of Honduras demonstrates just how interconnected they are. And gun violence is not simply at issue because of the rampant homicides (as if that were not enough). Just as with the movement of drugs, the trafficking of guns is itself a lucrative and complex international endeavor. The spike in crime across the Caribbean Basin can be directly tied to the impact of “a combination of drugs and money in the form of the naked display of power, through the use of arms.” In 2000, Trinidad’s Attorney General conveyed the scope of the relationship between transnational crime and local communities: “There is a direct nexus between illegal drugs and crimes of violence, sex crimes, domestic violence, maltreatment of children by
parents and other evils.” He went on to note that this disorder “changes democratic institutions, erodes the rule of law, and destroys civic order with impunity.” The relationships expressed here, between crime, disorder, and perceptions of eroding institutions, are all elements of the Broken Windows theory as explored in Chapter Two. We turn next to making these links even clearer.

### 3.1 Lessons Learned

Given the length of our primary case study, and the unique parallels between local crime in the Caribbean and our discussion in Chapter Two, it would be instructive at this point to step outside of our narration to analyze the regional and international response to Caribbean crime and its implications on our thesis. The interplay of local crime with international trafficking is not lost in American maritime strategy, if perhaps only implemented on a small-scale. In testimony to the House Armed Services Committee in 2014, SOUTHCOM Commander Kelly recognized that this “skyrocketing criminal violence exacerbates existing challenges.” In his words, the Caribbean Basin (and Latin America) “remains the most unequal and insecure region in the world.” The 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report also notes that “criminal activity in Caribbean states…is of deep concern to the United States.” In recognition thereof, the United States has utilized the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative to foster crime prevention programs in an effort to specifically address “citizen safety.” In one such initiative approximately 2,500 Caribbean police officers were trained in the Dominican Republic. These training exercises help build the capacity of law enforcement to meet the needs not only of investigating complicated crimes (for example, forensic accounting for international financial crimes), but also of mitigating the local fallout from transnational crime. The Department of State credits such mentorship programs in St. Kitts and Nevis, for example, with reducing homicides by forty-one percent. These programs came in response to the drastically changing nature of Caribbean crime. The threat of local crime became so profound, indeed so hybridized (the blending of crime and war), that Caribbean law enforcement underwent its own parallel hybridization in the 1990s. In Jamaica, for example, the fear of the economic impacts of violent crime prompted a militarization of police command when Colonel Trevor MacMillan was seconded from the army to the police. Yet, while militaries frequently provide superior logistics and resources, this militarization of local police work was doomed to failure. As police departments experienced in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s, a combative posture frequently alienates the very communities authorities need to reach. Kilcullen arrives at the same conclusion in his discussions about American military action in Mogadishu and the Jamaican siege of the Tivoli Gardens garrison district (both examples of urbicide), similar to our discussion of Israeli and Brazilian tactics in Chapter One. Today, in light of the shortcomings of military tactics in police contexts, the field of community policing research has attracted significant attention from Caribbean law enforcement. The relationship between local crime and transnational crime sketched in this subsection mirrors that of quality-of-life crimes and index crimes discussed in Chapter Two. Quality-of-life crimes create the chaotic conditions upon which more serious crimes graft, and these more serious crimes perpetuate a community’s inability (or disinterest) to police yet more crime. As with our earlier
conversation on causality, there remains an element of endogeneity, or a feedback loop, which makes it difficult to assess empirically which is the proverbial chicken and which the proverbial egg. Yet, what we do know is that tackling the former can mitigate the latter. And this should be true of crime virtually anywhere in the world. This is made evident by the fact that NYPD officers have deployed to the Caribbean, as in Haiti, to serve as advisors to local law enforcement. Even the statistical software introduced by Commissioner Bratton in New York City to map crime on a neighborhood level has become popular across the Basin. Both the Costa Rican Ministry of Public Security and the Panamanian National Police (PNP), for example, have begun implementing COMPSTAT (comparative statistics).

The adoption of technologies closely related to the Broken Windows theory is also accompanied by the adoption of many Broken Windows precepts. The Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police (ACCP) acknowledged community policing (of which Broken Windows is a subset) as its preferred, “modernised” strategy back in 2001. On the conceptual level, community policing is popular throughout the Basin. The ACCP has partnered with the Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of the West Indies to help better understand and pursue community policing. The Regional Police Training Centre in Barbados incorporates the model in its courses, noting on its syllabus for Recruit Training that students will be “exposed to the concept of Community Policing.” More senior officers are also eligible to enroll in a two-day seminar entirely devoted to community policing. In 2012, the Bahamian government launched Urban Renewal 2.0, an array of community policing programs aimed at tackling the schism between neighborhoods and law enforcement. The United States likewise supports community policing initiatives in the Bahamas, as well as in Belize, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Guatemala. The Panamanian National Border Service (SENAFRONT) is particularly noteworthy for its incorporation of community-oriented missions in addition to its traditional responsibilities. On the conceptual level, community policing has certainly won the day.

Yet, despite the strong preference for community policing techniques among Caribbean law enforcement, a number of factors slow the implementation of community policing theories. First, despite the organization’s consensus, it has met difficulty convincing the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) to pursue an integrated approach to policing. For reasons of geography and politics, “the tendency has been for individual countries to pursue their own national law enforcement strategies,” independent of one another. ACCP thus joins the “International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Programme (ICITAP)… the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), the Caribbean Customs Law Enforcement Council (CCLEC), the Regional Drug-Law Enforcement Training Centre (RDLETC), the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)...the Caribbean Anti Money Laundering Programme (CALP),” the Regional Security System, and the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) as one of many organizations struggling to build a unity of effort. Second, local disillusionment with crime perpetuates demands for heavy-handed rhetoric and action. This is explained in part by the small geographic and demographic dimensions of Caribbean states, which generate a distinct sociology in which even small spikes in crime can create “panic-driven concerns.” In this atmosphere, both “public
mood and political expediency” make the application of some community policing models “a dim prospect.”240 Ironically, the effort to bring security and trust down to the community level is imperative for addressing such pervasive attitudes of inadequate law enforcement and instability, the very malefactors that contribute to high crime rates according to the Broken Windows theory.

As General Kelly noted to Congress in 2013, regional security concerns, left unaddressed, have the potential to rapidly escalate into threats to the homeland.241 For this reason, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower includes among its guiding principles the obligation to limit regional conflicts.242 Understanding how local crime is related to regional disorder helps us conceptualize just how sophisticated an endeavor it is to mitigate regional insecurity. Crime in the Caribbean has become such a complicated and integrated part of the regional discourse on security that some scholars have even called for a distinct “Caribbean Criminology.”243 We would, however, suggest that there is no need for an entirely new paradigm on crime, nor is there anything wholly new about crime in the Caribbean. What is instead lacking is an application of criminological theories, like the Broken Windows theory, on a regional scale. This has been advocated, on a conceptual level, by ACCP, which unequivocally supports the community policing paradigm. As we noted earlier, Caribbean regional initiatives often require an external patron, thus shaping the initiative’s objectives in the eyes of the funder. At the termination of external funding, many of these initiatives are unsustainable in the ensuing financial vacuum.244 By integrating actors through the prevailing local practitioner consensus on best practices, a Broken Windows maritime security strategy offers a theoretical avenue for ensuring unity of effort across stakeholders. This unity is paramount, given that “the issue of crime is indisputably a regional security challenge and not merely a challenge for states within the region.”245 Any effective (and cost-effective) maritime strategy will have to address community policing if it intends to foster and utilize local partnerships.

4.0 People

The crime goes by many names: trafficking in persons (TIP), involuntary servitude, slavery, forced labor, debt bondage, sex trafficking.246 While definitions vary across these terms, they are all at heart characterized by the “act of recruiting, harboring, transporting, providing, or obtaining a person for compelled labor or commercial sex act through the use of force, fraud, or coercion.”247 Such a definition (that of the United States Department of State, and similar in language to that of the UN)248 fosters some interpretations that the word ‘trafficking’ might not immediately conjure. For example, an individual need not necessarily be physically moved in order to be a victim of trafficking. Children under the age of eighteen, for instance, cannot legally consent to prostitution under American (and much international) law.249 Thus, any child engaging in prostitution while employed in the services of a pimp or brothel is by definition a trafficking victim. Even those who move willingly may be victims of trafficking. If an individual is enticed to move based on fraudulent employment claims, and is then held with confiscated passports or charged exorbitant fees for his relocation, that person is a trafficking victim regardless of whether he moved under his own volition. Human trafficking is also frequently confused with human smuggling. And there are similarities
to be sure. Both frequently involve the movement of people in deplorable conditions, and both populations are vulnerable to abuse. Yet, the primary difference between the two is that smuggled individuals acquiesce (for lack of a better word) to their movement, paying or compensating smugglers for their services. Trafficking victims, on the other hand, are universally characterized by their lack of consent (or inability to legally consent, in the case of minors).* In this section, we explore the impacts of both of these vast, irregular movements of people throughout the Caribbean Basin and their interplay with the crimes and insecurities addressed thus far.

4.1 Human Trafficking

In the Western Hemisphere, between 2007 and 2010, children accounted for twenty-seven percent of all documented trafficking victims according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).250 Trafficking in children is most common along the periphery of the Caribbean Basin, predominantly in Central America and the northern tier of South America.251 These two sub-regions detected higher rates of children trafficked than adults.252 With respect to gender, a wide majority of trafficking victims in the hemisphere are female (both women and girls).253 In the reporting year before the publication of UNODC’s 2012 Global Trafficking in Persons Report, forty-four percent of victims (likely underestimated) were trafficked for the purposes of labor exploitation.254 The percentage of victims trafficked in the Caribbean and Latin America for the purposes of forced labor is higher than in both Europe and Central Asia.255 In this region, profits from coerced domestic servitude are estimated at half a billion dollars, and forced labor at one billion dollars, annually.256 The International Labor Organization (ILO) estimates 1.2 million forced labor victims in the region.257

The majority of detected victims in the Americas, however, were trafficked for sexual exploitation. Sex trafficking in Latin America is estimated to generate approximately $10.4 billion annually in business, according to the ILO.258 The International Organization for Migration (IOM) places that figure closer to sixteen billion dollars annually.259 The ILO estimates there are 400,000 victims of forced sexual exploitation in the region,260 which would average out to an annual profit of twenty-seven thousand dollars exploited off of every individual sex-trafficking victim.261 Human trafficking has historically been regarded as less of an enforcement concern in the region compared to narcotics. As a consequence, the penalties for human trafficking are frequently less than those for narcotics trafficking. Skyrocketing profits and lower risks (compared to narcotics) have driven the trade in human beings to new heights. Trafficking in persons is likely the fastest growing illicit trade in the world,262 and the second-most prevalent transnational crime in the Caribbean after narcotics smuggling.263

Generally, trafficking in the Western Hemisphere is intraregional. Victims detected in North and Central America typically originated from North and Central

* This confusion is particularly conflated in Spanish. The most appropriate translation for human trafficking is “la trata de personas (the trade of people).” The most frequently used phrase, however, is the more literal sounding “el tráfico de personas (the traffic of people).” While the latter sounds closer to the English terminology, it is a false cognate and means something more akin to human smuggling. See, U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Trafficking in Persons in Latin America and the Caribbean, by Clare Ribando Seelke, CRS Report RL33200 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, July 15, 2013), 2 (footnote 9).
American states; the same pattern is true of South America. Francis Miko, a Congressional Research Service (CRS) analyst, relays that most hemispheric victims are trafficked from Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Mexico (mostly Caribbean Basin states). Just as with narcotics, however, the Caribbean Basin is also a major channel for transshipment, including the interregional flow of Asian trafficking. Victims from East Asia make up more than twenty percent of total detected victims across the Western Hemisphere. More specifically, South and East Asian victims accounted for between twenty-seven and twenty-eight percent of detected victims in North America, Central America, and the Caribbean, while they accounted for ten percent in South America. In other words, one of every five detected victims in the hemisphere was trafficked from Asia. Chinese victims have been found in Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico and Ecuador, and East Asians in Costa Rica, El Salvador, and some Caribbean island states. On the other hand, South American, Central American, and Caribbean victims were detected in “significant numbers” across Western and Central Europe, and to a lesser extent in the Middle East and East Asia. The 2012 Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, published by UNODC, records that victims from South America were uncovered in eighteen countries within the region and twenty-three without. North and Central American and Caribbean victims were detected in sixteen countries within the region and thirteen without. While comprising a proportionally small segment (seven percent) of victims detected in Western and Central Europe, South American and Caribbean victims were recorded routinely trafficked to Spain. Dominicans appear particularly at risk, with trafficking flows ending in at least eighteen countries worldwide.

As with legal migration, in both intra- and interregional cases, the general trend is ‘south to north’ trafficking, from poorer to wealthier regions. In line with this, a large degree of victims detected in the United States originate from the Caribbean Basin, states of which are generally perceived as less developed. Yet, South-North migration is true even on less extreme scales. Most detected trafficking victims in Mexico are Guatemalan, most trafficking victims in Guatemala are from El Salvador and Nicaragua, and many trafficking victims in El Salvador originate from Honduras. The Bahamas, which has a thriving tourism industry, demands low skilled and low priced labor, which is frequently supplied by irregular (sometimes forced) migration from Haiti, Jamaica, and Cuba. Thus while the Caribbean Basin is often spoken of as a source region in the trade of people (as most countries are so labeled in the U.S. Trafficking in Persons Report), the intraregional flow is equally dynamic.

Risk Factors

Figures on human trafficking are ambiguous not only because of its clandestine nature, but because of the sheer scale of individuals at risk. The United States Department of State suspects that at least 100,000 Latin Americans are trafficked across national borders annually, many from Caribbean Basin states such as the Dominican Republic and Colombia. The State Department has estimated that perhaps as many as one million children are employed as domestic workers in Latin America, leaving them highly vulnerable to coercion and trafficking. The International Labour Organization estimated in 2010 that fourteen million children worked in Latin America, two thirds (9.4
While child labor may not always qualify as human trafficking, it serves as a significant risk factor for forced labor. This also operates on a family level. Children of parents in forced labor are significantly more vulnerable to forced labor and trafficking themselves. The ILO explored this hypothesis in Guatemala, where over forty percent of those with jobs were recruited under deception or coercion, and where eighteen percent of working children had parents who were victims of (or vulnerable to) forced labor. The ILO also estimates that almost two million people across Latin America are victims of forced labor, many of whom may be (or become) trafficking victims. On an individual basis, the list of risk factors is extensive: “poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, a history of physical or sexual abuse, homelessness, drug use, and gang membership” all increase the likelihood of being trafficked. Even climate change and natural disasters are risk factors. More extreme weather occurring at greater frequency destabilizes communities and causes considerable dislocation. After the earthquake that struck Haiti in 2010, hundreds of thousands of orphaned children found themselves at risk of trafficking. From a demographic perspective, children and women are most at risk. Women and children from the Dominican Republic and Guyana have been detected trafficked into Venezuela, while Venezuelan children have been detected trafficked into Guyana for sexual exploitation in the rural mining communities. Panama is noteworthy as a destination for Colombian and Central American women trafficked for sexual exploitation. And while children are most frequently trafficked for sexual exploitation and domestic servitude, they have also been victimized for “illegal adoptions, for use as child soldiers…and to work for organized crime groups.” Venezuelan children, for example, have been trafficked into Colombia and pressed into service as child soldiers for the guerrillas operating there. With regard to industries, the United States Department of Labor reported in 2012 that children in Latin America were coercively employed in the production of “bricks, gold, coffee, sugarcane, and other agro-export crops.”

Beyond the statistical risk factors endangering potential victims, there is the culture of movement in the Caribbean. On a per capita basis, the Caribbean Basin exhibits “extensive migration, with a rate of movement in relation to the population that may be one of the highest in the world.” Of the thousands of economic migrants transiting from Haiti to the Dominican Republic alone, many lack adequate documentation and are forced to resort to human smuggling. And while smuggling is not the same as trafficking, being smuggled is an associated risk factor for further victimization. The same networks occasionally run both smuggling and trafficking operations, the former easily morphing into the latter, indicating a shared infrastructure as well. This places migrants at significant risk of trafficking, either through exorbitant smuggling fees or forced labor. Migrants are at risk of kidnapping for ransom too. Kidnappings have the potential to escalate into trafficking if perpetrators sense an opportunity for greater profit. Kidnapped migrants have been forced to pay off their smuggling “debt” through forced labor, domestic slavery, sexual exploitation, or even recruiting other migrants for trafficking. The International Organization for Migration noted in a 2005 report that the region’s open borders, poorly regulated prostitution industry, and generally liberal enforcement of entertainment visas and work permits make trafficking considerably easier.
prostitution (and thus trafficking) is present outside the zone. St. Lucia provides yet another example, in which loosely regulated entertainment visas have been thought to be related to illegal prostitution. These lax travel restrictions have contributed to the ongoing rise of sex tourism in the Caribbean. The Dominican Republic, Mexico, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Trinidad and Tobago have all been identified as destinations of concern in this industry. According to interviews of individuals in Jamaica, Barbados, St. Lucia, the Netherland Antilles, and the Bahamas, all believed there was a connection between sex tourism and human trafficking in the region. As sex tourism continues to expand into the Caribbean, in part due to attempted crackdowns in Southeast Asia, regional countries will continue to face mounting pressures to balance the needs of a hospitality economy with the demands of enhanced travel restrictions.

Yet, perhaps the most relevant risk factor for trafficking is the presence of preexisting transnational networks. These groups and individuals are at heart capitalists, and any opportunity to diversify ‘products’ means both a greater chance for profit and more distributed risk. Like drug smuggling, human trafficking networks are frequently disaggregated, characterized by small groups temporarily collaborating with other small groups on an “ad-hoc basis.” As a consequence, the architecture for human trafficking is often shared with that of narcotics. In Guatemala, such crime syndicates are known to traffic Central American women. In Mexico, where much of the research on trafficking has taken place, Los Zetas (a breakaway group of the Gulf Cartel) have become prominent in human trafficking. Mexican organizations have even partnered with other ethnic cartels, including Ukrainians and Chinese, to further diversify into human trafficking. “By chaperoning other shipments against a fee,” narcotics networks have expanded into virtually “every illicit product entering the United States.” In fact, many organizations (particularly Mexican) grew as human smuggling networks before taking to narcotics. The multidimensional dynamic of maritime security in the Caribbean cannot be on greater display than in the relationships among crime, narcotics, and human trafficking. Context, as we are also beginning to see, is an equally important actor, if often in the subtext.

**Fallout**

The fallout from human trafficking on Caribbean communities is acute, even beyond the basic, unquestionably heinous concept of trading in human beings. The impact on communities, which the Broken Windows theory identifies as of compounding significance, is particularly devastating. The International Organization for Migration illustrates this, as well as the multidimensionality of human trafficking:

The appearance of a victim of human trafficking in a country usually means that there are one or more criminal groups that are manipulating

---

* CRS’ Clare Seelke notes that “despite the relatively large number of victims trafficked for forced labor in the region, there are relatively few studies on the topic.” As a result, as with most elements of illicit trade, we are forced to extrapolate upon the available points of reference. See, U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Trafficking in Persons in Latin America and the Caribbean*, by Clare Ribando Seelke, CRS Report RL33200 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, July 15, 2013), 6.
official or unofficial mechanisms to deceive, recruit, transport and exploit persons. These organizations are often linked to criminal activity, including arms and drug trafficking and money laundering. Consequently, this may indicate corruption among officials that facilitates the illicit activities of human trafficking.\textsuperscript{308}

Victims of trafficking send a powerful signal of widespread disorder, violence, mistrust, and collusion. They signify a broken system. And this signal is conveyed in more than simply conceptual terms.

In Chapter Two we noted the extensive relationship between the Broken Windows theory and public health research (including that on sexually transmitted infections, STIs, like gonorrhea). Human trafficking presents acute risks to public health through the same mechanisms. Victims forced into sex work are at significantly higher risk of contracting and transmitting HIV/AIDS and other STIs.\textsuperscript{309} Human trafficking is also directly related to local crime and the narcotics trade. Victims are frequently pressed into service for gangs and cartels to steal, produce, and smuggle drugs, even kill.\textsuperscript{310} Reports chronicle that Mexican organizations have forced children to serve, not only as lookouts and mules, but also as assassins.\textsuperscript{311} Informants to an IOM study in Jamaica noted that boys were used as “watchdogs” for drug dealers, who sexually abused them, while girls were sold on the local sex trade.\textsuperscript{312} The impacts of these crimes are similar to those discussed in the sections above. Human trafficking, therefore, can be seen to have as corrosive an impact on Caribbean society and security as narcotics trafficking and local crime, though it receives comparatively less attention.

4.2 Irregular Migration

Irregular migration (migration through unofficial, often illegal, channels) is driven by an array of pull and push factors. Obvious pull factors include the prospect for employment or reuniting with family members already living abroad. More subtle, contextual pull factors include favorable notions of migration, which is “perceived very positively by Caribbean peoples” as a mechanism for progress.\textsuperscript{313} Push factors include much of what we have discussed in this chapter (crime, corruption, unemployment). In Central America, for example, excessively high crime rates have pushed migrants northward, to Mexico and the United States.\textsuperscript{314} And, as with human trafficking, this is seen on a sub-regional as well as interregional scale. In fact, while much of the undocumented population in the United States crosses the U.S. border through Mexico, there has actually been a negative net flow of licit emigration from Mexico into the United States. Most immigrants traveling north through Mexico and Florida are of Central American and Caribbean origin. Mexico can only respond to a handful of the masses flooding its southern borders. The country deports more than 100,000 Central American migrants every year, many in a bid to reach the United States.\textsuperscript{315} The United States, meanwhile, has witnessed a “44-fold increase in Haitian migrants in the Mona Passage” in the last several years.\textsuperscript{316} Between 2005 and 2012, Southern Command detected a total of 200 Haitian migrants in the passage; in the first few months of 2013,
more than 2,000 were detected. Facilitating this surge are many of the same networks and smuggling infrastructure seen throughout this chapter.

The media and politicians still favor the term ‘coyote’ as a label for those who help illegal migrants over the Mexico–U.S. border (one of the busiest mixed migration routes and the most crossed border in the world). Yet, in recent years, greater enforcement efforts on the border and rising migration rates from Central America and the Caribbean have acted in concert to raise the cost of transit from only three hundred dollars in the mid-1990s to several thousand dollars in the early 2000s. Larger, integrated networks have an advantage in coordinating more expensive and complex operations, and thus, the “old-fashioned coyote may soon be obsolete.” If the coyote were the “small-scale entrepreneurs,” their replacements, polleros, are “professional smugglers.” The longer the distance an immigrant needs to travel, the more likely they will need to employ the services of a criminal network to help them move. And today, people are moving considerably farther distances than they were only a decade or two ago. Migrants from China’s Fujian province or Thailand, for example, rely on sophisticated networks to help move them halfway around the world (frequently by sea) to Central America or Mexico before continuing overland to the United States or Latin America. Regionally, similar forces are at work. Pulled by economic potential and pushed by criminal insurgencies, migration from Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador rose sixty percent on the year in 2013. Similarly, most asylum claims in Mexico originate from Central America, and all three major North American countries have seen a rise in asylum claims from the Caribbean Basin. As with human trafficking, the context in which irregular migration takes place is significant. Dire circumstances produce a pervasive desperation, which can push people to escape at any cost. Unemployment rates in the region are “among the highest in the world, up to 42.9 per cent in Guatemala and 44.6 per cent in Honduras.” The concurrent spike in gang membership and criminal violence throughout the Basin has made things even worse. In the words of one Salvadoran migrant: “we are going to die, one way or another.” The sudden arrival of tens of thousands of Caribbean children on the U.S. southern border in 2014, sparked by nothing more than a rumor, speaks to the panicked context in which this massive scale of migration takes place. This was confirmed only months later, in early 2015, when the announcement of an American–Cuban rapprochement triggered a massive wave of Cuban migrants, many afraid that the ‘wet foot, dry foot policy’ would soon be repealed (despite Coast Guard statements to the contrary). Migrant smuggling networks expanded in the Caribbean in 2014 largely because “new laws in Cuba and erroneous perceptions in Haiti of changes in U.S. immigration policy” have increased flows from the Eastern Caribbean. The U.S. Coast Guard announced that nearly 10,000 Cubans, Haitians, and Dominicans were caught attempting to illegally enter the United States by sea in fiscal year 2014. In FY13, that number was only slightly lower, near seven thousand. Migrants are increasingly entering the Dominican Republic through Haiti (the largest demographic of interdicted migrants) to take small boats to Puerto Rico. This can be seen as mirroring the narcotics flows transiting the same routes (occasionally even using the same boats—see Appendix A).
Sub-regional irregular migration in the Caribbean Basin takes place for much the same reasons as migrants flow to Mexico and the United States. Uneven prospects for employment and varying levels of governance act to direct Caribbean migrants across the Basin, often in illicit ways. Barbados, for example, has strong literacy and per capita income numbers, and ranks high in the UN Human Development Report’s Human Poverty Index, thus making it an attractive destination for irregular migration.\textsuperscript{332} Bermuda, Puerto Rico, and Trinidad and Tobago, considered “borderline countries” (between developing and developed) are also enticing destinations,\textsuperscript{333} as are the Bahamas, Guyana, Jamaica, the Netherland Antilles, and St. Lucia.\textsuperscript{334} It is within this flow of people that human trafficking is nested even more deeply, and it is the undocumented status of irregular migrants that places them at heightened risk of trafficking. The cons used to deceive trafficking victims—predominantly employment offers—are made all the more believable by this pervasive irregular migration pattern. The Bahamas, whose geographic position between Florida, Haiti, Jamaica, and Cuba makes it a hub for such activity, offers an illustration.\textsuperscript{335} Small boat and plane captains are alleged to be in frequent transit between Hispaniola and the Bahamas, advertising construction and hospitality jobs in the country.\textsuperscript{336} Guyanese migration to Barbados is similarly spurred by agencies advertising employment overseas.\textsuperscript{337} In Guyana, Jamaica, and Suriname, children are often solicited by recruiters who offer cash incentives to impoverished parents for their services.\textsuperscript{338} Industrious Haitian boat owners also charter migrants to the Bahamas for a cost,\textsuperscript{339} all to serve the needs of a burgeoning tourism sector. While such trips may not be coerced, in the most direct sense, they are nevertheless very dangerous. Boats are frequently loaded beyond capacity, and reports of migrants drowning in sinking vessels are tragically common. After three successive fatal incidents involving individuals from Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Jamaica in 2013, the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees “expressed its official concern” over the plight of economic and political migrants.\textsuperscript{340} In one incident, more than one hundred Haitians were crammed into an “overloaded sail freighter,” which ran aground off of the Bahamas’ Staniel Cay.\textsuperscript{341} Thirty migrants died before the U.S. Coast Guard and Royal Bahamian Defense Force arrived.\textsuperscript{342} This tragedy is part of a wider trend in the northern Caribbean, which saw a steep rise in maritime deaths between 2012 and 2013.\textsuperscript{343}

Just as with human trafficking, human smuggling and irregular migration present a number of challenges for communities. We have already addressed how smuggling places migrants at risk of trafficking, which opens communities up to the exploitative schemes of transnational crime. We have also discussed how illicit networks are multidimensional, opportunistic, and capitalistic, expanding into a range of interconnected trades.\textsuperscript{344} To put it simply: “clearly, criminal networks can move just about anything on these smuggling pipelines.”\textsuperscript{345} Criminal networks may even use human smuggling to swell their ranks. The deputy commissioner of police in Guyana once voiced concern that “foreign mercenaries” were augmenting gang membership in the

\textsuperscript{*} GDP per capita is as low as one thousand dollars in Haiti, and as high as twenty thousand dollars in Trinidad and Tobago. Life expectancy ranges between sixty-one and over seventy-eight, while adult literacy can be as low as sixty-two percent and as high as one hundred percent. See, International Organization for Migration, Exploratory Assessment of Trafficking in Persons in the Caribbean Region, Second Edition (Washington, DC: IOM, 2010), 25.
Chapter 3: Cocaine and Context in the Caribbean
Part One: The Physical Environment

country. There are similarly public health risks that accompany the mass underground movement of people. In the midst of the 2014 Ebola epidemic in West Africa, the commander of Southern Command told an audience at the National Defense University that the spread of the disease in Central and South America was worth considering. Haiti and Central America are of particular concern because of poor healthcare and their significant roles in irregular migration. General Kelly noted especially that the individuals smuggled by transnational criminal networks into the United States may be infected and enter without medical oversight. And the fear may not be merely theoretical. The region is a cauldron for epidemiological tragedy; the Caribbean is in fact the hardest hit region in the HIV/AIDS epidemic after sub-Saharan Africa. In a visit to the Costa Rican–Nicaraguan border, General Kelly recounts meeting several African migrants. The men told U.S. embassy personnel they were Liberian and had been traveling for a week, with the aid of a network from Trinidad, to the United States (illegally). The General noted that those men could have made it all the way to New York City within Ebola’s incubation period. And while fear of Ebola in the West was almost certainly overblown, the premise is nonetheless significant. Smuggling helps transport not only people, narcotics, and goods, but also diseases which can ravage the underprepared littoral and small island states of the Basin.

Finally, there can be no greater metaphor for the implementation of the Broken Windows theory in maritime security strategy than the impact of climate change on local communities. As climate change becomes an issue of greater concern for Caribbean islands and littoral states, issues of irregular migration and human trafficking will only become more significant. Storm surges, flooding from changing precipitation patterns, extreme weather, coastal erosion, and droughts will all “disrupt trade routes, threaten lives, and drain national economic resources,” pushing climate refugees into greater motion. The demographic factors addressed in Chapter One, “coupled with climate change, will impose extreme stress in the region.” The 2010 earthquake in Haiti, while not related to climate change, illustrates just how much upheaval natural disasters can bring to bear on irregular migration patterns. Even efforts to combat drug smuggling, such as the crop dusting of wide swaths of farmland, can damage the environment and instigate irregular migratory flows. As Caribbean communities continue to respond to the stimuli of their environment, any theory of maritime security must take pains to acknowledge and address the context within which these lives are lived.

Repatriation and Deportation

Of those irregular migrants and asylum seekers detected during passage, the vast majority are repatriated to their country of origin. While not an illegal flow, this irregular migration pattern is nonetheless noteworthy. The Bahamas, for example, consistently repatriates Caribbean nationals to their countries of origin, chief among them Haiti and Jamaica. Migrants from Hispaniola make up such a significant proportion of irregular migrants, in fact, that Haiti and the Dominican Republic are the only two Caribbean countries for which nationals are required to procure a visa before entering Barbados. Yet, perhaps the greatest flow comes in the form of deportations, and the numbers can be
staggering. The high gang membership figures noted in the section on local crime are owed in large part to this practice. Some estimates say that as many as seventy percent of gang members arrested in the United States are eventually deported, most to the Caribbean Basin. As a consequence, gang networks have gone multinational—so much so that anti-gang investigations in the Caribbean Basin have direct impact for American law enforcement. Some such cases originating or pursued in the Basin have led to “a homicide arrest in Oklahoma City, the prosecution of felony extortions in Annapolis and the capture of one of the FBI’s top ten most wanted fugitives…in El Salvador.” These gangs are tethered to affiliates across Latin America because of such widespread deportation. According to the FBI, “MS-13 [Mara Salvatrucha] gang leaders in El Salvador have initiated assassination plans against U.S. law enforcement personnel” and targeted Americans throughout the region. MS-13 poses such an obstacle to law and order in the region that General Kelly included the gang in his written remarks to Congress in 2014. He notes that the group has a particularly strong American presence in California, North Carolina, New York, and Northern Virginia. MS-13 “specializes in extortion and human trafficking,” and has succeeded in part because deported members help provide international reach. As with crime and narcotics trafficking, Honduras has suffered exceptionally from deportations. Migrants are sent back en masse from American prisons, many members of Barrio 18 and MS-13. In testimony before Congress, General Kelly relayed the estimates of the National Drug Threat Assessment that Mexican-based TCOs now operate in at least 1,200 American cities. Deportations are such a staple of the American criminal justice system that, despite sour relations on most issues between the United States and Venezuela, the two principally coordinate on just two missions: maritime narcotics interdiction and fugitive deportation. Yet, this is not solely an issue of American providence. Intraregional criminal deportation is also a frequent occurrence. Barbados, which we noted was a borderline country and the target of regional irregular migration, allegedly deports around twenty Caribbean nationals a week, principally to Guyana, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. Deportation and repatriation thus serve not only to facilitate irregular migration, but also as unexpected contributors to transnational and local crime.

5.0 Terror

Finally, no conversation on maritime security would be complete today without mention of terrorism. As we noted in the introduction to this case study, terrorism is frequently an issue at the periphery of the Caribbean. Colombia, on the edge of the Caribbean Sea, is the major exception with its ongoing struggle to wrestle territorial control away from Marxist terrorist organizations such as the FARC. Nevertheless, for the same multidimensional reasons explored throughout this chapter, terrorism remains an issue of significance for broader Caribbean

* For more on the regional response to human trafficking, see Appendix D.
† In this section, we choose not to use the word ‘narcoterrorism.’ Like terrorism, the term is highly politically charged, and perhaps even less well-defined. André Hollis, in Thachuk’s anthology on transnational crime, offers a brief account and history of the terminology. See, André Hollis, “Narcoterrorism: A Definitional and Operational Transnational,” in Transnational Threats: Smuggling and Trafficking in Arms, Drugs, and Human Life, ed. Kimberley Thachuk (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 24-26.
Chapter 3: Cocaine and Context in the Caribbean
Part One: The Physical Environment

Basin maritime security. In many ways, an analysis of terrorism in the Basin is emblematic of how the individual sections discussed above are even more tightly related.

The extensive infrastructure for moving people and goods in the Caribbean can just as easily be co-opted for use by terrorist organizations. By forging relationships with transnational criminal networks, and establishing their own, terror organizations absorb the capacity to “exploit porous borders and ungoverned zones at will,” just as do TCOs. This is particularly troubling when coupled with the scale of human smuggling discussed in the previous section. The commander of Southern Command warned Congress in 2014 that the same networks that facilitate human smuggling and narcotics trafficking could as easily be leveraged by terrorists. This sentiment was echoed by Vice Admiral Michel in his testimony to Congress in 2012. Terror operations launched against the United States or Europe could be concealed and facilitated in the Caribbean for the same reasons illicit trafficking passes through the Basin: prime geographic and political positioning. The Caribbean is “easily a strategic gateway to all the Americas and Europe, and is accessible by modern air and sea carriers so that it could become a link to any part of the world.” The political relationships maintained by the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and France provide avenues for migration and transportation that further facilitate the “easy movement of people, money, and arms.” The CARICOM Regional Task Force on Crime and Security notes that terrorists could utilize the region’s lax banking regulations, air- and seaport facilities, and vast shipping networks to facilitate attacks or financing. The reality is, the infrastructure of transnational crime, which supports human trafficking and smuggling, as well as narcotics and weapons trafficking, “could easily facilitate terrorist operations.”

While no available evidence suggests any widespread collaboration between terrorist organizations and human smugglers, analysts have not ruled out the feasibility of such a scenario. And in a considerable shift from the reports issued just after 9/11, the U.S. Department of State now asserts that at least twelve of the world’s twenty-five largest terrorist organizations have ties to narcotics trafficking. Drug traffickers in the Caribbean Basin have been documented selling transport to “non-Latins” seeking to enter the United States illegally. Hezbollah has also been accused of engaging in human trafficking in an effort to fund its operations, which demonstrates the technical capacity for human smuggling as well. A case in U.S. District Court, US v AJ Tracy, highlights both the ease with which such pathways can be used by terrorists, and the difficulty in gathering substantial intelligence to that effect. Anthony Joseph Tracy, an American-born white male, converted to Islam while in the prison system. As the leader of an international human smuggling ring based out of Kenya, Tracy admits to facilitating the emigration of nearly 300 Somalis to the United States over seven months in 2009 (five to ten a week). Using fake documents, Tracy would obtain visas for his clients to travel to Cuba, booking round trip flights to demonstrate an intent to return to Kenya. Two representative clients, K.A. and D.H. (Somali men in their early twenties), traveled to Cuba from Kenya via Dubai and Moscow. From Cuba, their trail becomes muddled, transiting South
Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

America (perhaps also Honduras) to arrive in Mexico, where they successfully crossed the border into the United States. Tracy facilitated his business through the use of a contact in an unnamed South American embassy, where he secured at least three visas for Somali men. While Tracy maintains that he did not knowingly facilitate the transport of terrorists into the United States, he does admit that he was approached by al-Shabaab for the use of his services.

Terrorism is likewise complicated by the Caribbean attitudes we have noted at length. The need to generate revenue in such resource-poor countries means that Caribbean states are incentivized to make freedom of movement a priority. This is no more evident than in the practice of selling citizenship. Merely by demonstrating sufficient assets, some Caribbean islands will grant long-term residency visas (which attracts criminals and, perhaps, terrorists). There are legitimate uses of this service, to be sure. Hadi Mezawi, a Palestinian man living in the UAE, obtained full citizenship in the small island of Dominica (without ever having been there) for the sum of around $100,000. The freedom of movement this offers can be a lifeline for individuals whose countries or nationalities impose upon them severe travel burdens. Such ‘investor visas’ are not exclusive to the Caribbean, but the very low barrier for entry makes the region a popular choice. Nowhere is the process faster, and more worrisome, than in Dominica and St. Kitts and Nevis. A passport from Dominica does not require a visa in over fifty countries; one from St. Kitts and Nevis does not require a visa in nearly 140 countries. And St. Kitts can process an application from start to finish in three months, without the applicant ever visiting the island. Such programs are so popular that a firm in Dubai is developing a community in St. Kitts where individuals can “buy citizenship and property at the same time.”

While we underscore there is no evidence of such programs being used by terrorists, the vulnerability of these visa and citizenship offers to nefarious use is one that deeply concerns governments and analysts. Canada has long placed visa requirements on Dominica passports over concerns that transnational criminals employed them. In 2010, Britain considered doing the same. Even Caribbean officials recognize the risk. Despite supporting the program, a St. Kitts opposition leader, Mark Brantley, conceded that the government does not have “sufficient controls” in place to ensure that “bad people, for want of better language, do not get access to citizenship.”

Hinting to these same fears, Grenada suspended its program after September 11, and St. Kitts closed its program to Iranians (previously a major applicant pool) in the wake of an attack on the British Embassy in Tehran in 2011. Nevertheless, in 2013 the Associated Press reported that Antigua and Barbuda was launching a new citizenship program, and Grenada was considering reviving its own.

Despite the potential for terrorist attacks staged in the Caribbean, many experts agree that there remains little conclusive evidence that any such plans exist. That is not to say, however, that there is no terrorist activity in the Caribbean at all. While evidence of plans for terror attacks are scant, the same cannot be said for evidence of terrorist financing and support. * The Lebanese

* Much of this support is facilitated through the corrupt system of money laundering found throughout the Basin, which we will explore in greater detail in Section 7.1.
group Hezbollah, listed as a terrorist organization by the United States (and its military wing labeled a terrorist organization by the European Union), offers the most sophisticated example. Hezbollah established a presence in the Tri-Border area of Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina in the mid-1980s and has since grown into a significant regional player. Early after September 11, academics hypothesized that sympathizers in that region had raised upwards of $50 million in support of known or suspected terrorist organizations (dominantly Hezbollah). It should be noted that the region also hosts “support activities” for Hamas, Amal, the Party of Islamic Unification, and factions of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. And while the Tri-Border region is beyond the scope of this case study, evidence suggests that Hezbollah has been financed in part by narcotics trafficking in Latin America. In May 2013, this was reinforced when Assad Ahmad Barakat, the head of Hezbollah’s activities in the Tri-Border area, was arrested in possession of two kilograms of cocaine, which he intended to sell in the Middle East to help fund the organization. His arrest verified that a “wing of narco traffickers” was in fact operating in Latin America in support of Middle Eastern terror. The former U.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American States, Roger Francisco Noriega, noted in 2013 that Hezbollah was involved in a diverse array of criminal enterprises in Latin America, including narcotics smuggling, gunrunning, human trafficking, money laundering, and counterfeiting. According to the Naval War College, these endeavors generate approximately $10 million annually.

Iran, designated by the United States as a state sponsor of terror, is also a source of concern in the region. In 2013, an Argentine special prosecutor investigating the 1994 bombing of the Jewish community center in Buenos Aires accused Iran of establishing terrorist networks “throughout Latin America.” The report in which this allegation was made names the Caribbean Basin states of Surname, Trinidad and Tobago, and Colombia as possible locations with an Iranian presence. Alleged Iranian collusion with narcotics trafficking and access to the Caribbean through partners like Venezuela only serve to fuse terror, transnational crime, and international relations in still more complex ways. Two Venezuelans were also sanctioned in 2008 in relation to Hezbollah financing. And while Hezbollah may be interested in securing financial support in Latin American, some indications suggest Iranian factions see the region in more violent hues. Reports of an Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington, DC in 2011, for example, involved a suspect soliciting aid from an agent posing as a Mexican cartel-member.

Not only is it important to uncover any relationship between terrorism and narcotics trafficking, it is even more significant to note that the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Some politically motivated organizations and individuals, “out of necessity or convenience, do business with drug traffickers to

---

* Cuba was also designated a state sponsor of terror by the United States from 1982 until 2015, though even before 2015 the U.S. government’s *Country Reports on Terrorism* (2013) noted that there was no recent evidence that the Cuban government was arming or training terrorist groups. See, United States Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2013: Executive Summary*, (Washington, DC: DOS, April 2014), 19).
 fund their cause while others will circumvent the intermediary and deal directly in the drug business. Thus, while transnational crime is recognized as a far greater threat to the Caribbean Basin than terror, the nexus between the two is a matter of increasing concern. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC, in the Spanish acronym) offer prime examples of how the line is blurred between terror and trafficker. The FARC, staged in Colombia’s hinterland, began as an ideologically motivated left-wing terror organization. The group’s original intersection with narcotics was therefore seen as a mechanism to finance a political cause, which was accomplished by taxing or selling protection to local coca growers. As the organization began to operate greater effective control over territory, its capacity to exact greater revenue from the trade enhanced, and its mission slowly shifted from political to capital. Simultaneously, the FARC came under increasing pressure in the 1990s as right wing paramilitary forces organized in opposition, raising the cost of operations. By the middle of the decade, the FARC had largely solidified their position as the intermediaries between coca farms and cartel-run processing labs. The FARC soon leveraged its extensive territorial control to directly coordinate coca growth and even its own cocaine production, the products of which now contribute as much as fifty percent to FARC’s budget. The Colombian government estimates the FARC earned nearly $800 million in cocaine revenue annually in the years after 9/11. Time Magazine placed that figure closer to $700 million, while Rhea Siers (of The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Relations) relays more conservative estimates between seventy-five and one hundred million dollars annually. The remainder of the budget is supplemented by kidnappings for ransom and related extortive and criminal schemes. With profits like these, “rebels turn into traders” and political objectives are left as veiled excuses for the pursuit of financial gain. Drugs became the FARC’s raison d’être. The AUC offers a mirror image of the FARC. The AUC was formed in 1997 as a right-wing response to the FARC, when drug barons across Colombia banded together to create a network of militias to defend themselves against militants. The AUC was thus, from the outset, an instrument of narcotics trafficking, with its roots in the cartel armies of the 1980s. The group reached a peace settlement with the Colombian government in 2003 but until that time, estimates suggest that seventy percent of the AUC budget was supplied by cocaine revenue.

In recent years, the Colombian government has progressed significantly in peace negotiations with the FARC as well. The number of FARC militants has been reduced by as much as half since 2001. Signals of de-escalation, however, may not portend good news for narcotics trafficking in the Caribbean. The particular skill sets associated with terrorism are equally well-suited to a variety of criminal activities. When terrorist organizations wane, it is inevitable that at least some former terrorists, with years or

---

* The FARC has also been involved in human trafficking. One Colombian NGO estimates that between 2001 and 2009, three quarters of a million women were sexually exploited, raped, or enslaved in Colombia by groups like FARC. See, General John Kelly, “Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly, United States Marine Corps Commander, United States Southern Command” (testimony, before the 113th Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, February 26, 2014), 20.
decades of professional expertise in illicit operations, will shed their ideologies and gravitate towards crime for profit. This trend can be seen globally. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), for example, largely eschewed the world of drugs for the duration of its armed campaign against the British. The group frequently operated as vigilantes and did, in fact, help keep the burgeoning drug trade of the 1980s and early 1990s out of Belfast. Alongside ceasefire agreements in the mid-1990s, however, came a steady rise in Northern Irish drug consumption, aided both by the dissolution of the IRA’s armed opposition to the trade and also the prevalence of skilled and available labor. The IRA itself turned to the smuggling of illicit goods and counterfeits to help sustain itself. In the mid-2000s, estimates placed IRA revenue from smuggling at between $7.7 and $12.3 million annually. The IRA is also suspected to play a major role in the Dublin heroin market, and some relationships exist between the IRA and the FARC.

In some instances, terrorist organizations move en masse from terror to crime, saving foot soldiers the hassle of finding work on their own. For example, the Abu Nidal Organization, a Palestinian terror group, evolved from a largely political agenda to one increasingly defined by “gunrunning, extortion schemes…and even a coupon fraud scheme.” In Colombia, the National Liberation Army (ELN), a left-wing paramilitary group founded in the same year as the FARC, evolved down a similar path. At its inception, ELN was regarded as even more politically motivated than its ideological competitors (FARC). For that reason, like the Provisional IRA, the ELN chose to remain largely outside of the narcotics business. Since creasing in influence and membership in the 1990s, however, the group has increasingly allied itself with criminal gangs that principally serve the drug industry. And while terrorist and paramilitary violence have racked Colombia for half a century, it is these criminal bands (bandas criminales, called bacrim) that are now regarded as the country’s single greatest rising threat. These groups have moved in to fill the void left by the stream of demobilized paramilitary groups in the country. In 2010, the Colombian think-tank Indepaz reported that approximately a dozen new bacrim had emerged across Colombia in place of the AUC and were now the cause of even more violence than the FARC. These criminal bands, despite inheriting the legacy (and some personnel) of former terrorist and ideological movements, display no political agenda. This may illustrate a potential evolution for parts of Hezbollah, as well. When financing from Iran waned in 2006, the organization became far more active in illicit trades in Latin America and West Africa in an effort to compensate. While the group still maintains its ideological agenda, Hezbollah has been shown to be diversely involved with the FARC and transnational crime in the Caribbean Basin. In 2008, for example, Operation Titan (a joint U.S.–Colombian investigation) uncovered a cocaine ring directing profits to Hezbollah. In 2010, a Lebanese man was arrested selling cocaine to Los Zetas to fundraise for the Hezbollah as well. Mexican cartels are also believed to have partnered with Hezbollah in the trafficking of precursor chemicals for the manufacture of methamphetamine. Despite this growing evidence, threats of sequestration forced the cancellation of one of only two counterterrorism exercises planned for Southern Command in FY13.

While the relationship between terror and narcotics was once predominantly thought of as theoretical, the last two decades have shown the relationship to be “real and growing.” At a DEA symposium held in Washington, DC only two months after
September 11, then-Administrator Asa Hutchinson noted the “extraordinary link between drugs and terrorism.” To illustrate this point, former DEA Assistant Administrator for Intelligence Steven Casteel noted that, two days prior to 9/11, law enforcement “seized 53 kilos of Afghan heroin in New York. It was being distributed by Colombians, to show you the [potential] link.” Thus, we come full circle. Terrorist organizations have the capacity to leverage the smuggling and trafficking architecture of the Caribbean to fundraise or even stage attacks. Yet, such organizations may also fuse with the narcotics industry, seemingly becoming more invested in profit than ideology. Finally, partnerships with criminal gangs link terrorism to local crime. As terror organizations search for financial independence in the wane of state sponsorship, the financial relationships between these two worlds are increasingly significant. CRS analyst Raphael Perl notes that both terror groups and transnational organized crime function best in an environment of intimidation and fear, creating a climate in which people feel helpless and abandoned by traditional security guarantors. In this critical dimension, there is virtually no difference between transnational crime and terrorism. And in a theoretical construct that takes aim at context, counterterrorism and counter-narcotics (no matter how complex the underlying relationship) can and should pursue the same objective: changing the culture of Caribbean security.
Chapter 3: Cocaine and Context in the Caribbean
Part Two: The Psychological Environment

Part Two: The Psychological Environment

6.0 Halftime

As explored through the lens of the Broken Windows theory and the community policing framework, these past sections have demonstrated the patent interconnectedness of local crime, transnational trafficking (in people, drugs, and goods), and terror. And if theory is useful to governments because it helps distribute scarce resources, the existing theories for security in the Caribbean Basin fall far short. In the narcotics context, we explored how Coast Guard, naval, and Homeland Security personnel are routinely underfunded for blanket patrols and interdictions—so much so that, according to both General Kelly and Admiral Michel, three quarters of high-confidence trafficking incidents go unchecked because the ships and aircraft required to interdict them do not exist. Partnerships, which help distribute this massive cost, are slow in forming and easily dissolved in large part because the American approach to regional security bypasses many of the primary political and community concerns regarding local crime. Yet, as we explored in Section 3, local incidents are inevitably part of a wider fabric of criminality and insecurity. And efforts to mitigate irregular migration are even more underfunded than narcotics, though nearly as corrosive to communities and regional order. Finally, terrorism touches on each of these worlds by viewing it as part of a multidimensional framework on security. As we can see, signals of disorder prevail in the Caribbean Basin, while overwhelmed law enforcement cling to a midcentury model (interdiction-oriented) out of favor in communities across the United States.

Until this point, we have primarily discussed the impacts to physical and human security of the Caribbean’s dynamic criminal environment. We have seen how the maritime domain supports an expansive trade in illicit goods—from narcotics to weapons to people—and bears witness to the ensuing local fallout from these transnational crimes. The multidimensional construction of the Broken Windows theory is well-equipped to frame the interrelated components of this extensively interwoven system of criminality. As we explored in Chapter Two, the Broken Windows theory is capable of addressing complex and causally obscure security dilemmas. By directly addressing endemic concerns and fears, the theory employs a community’s perception of crime as a mechanism for impacting real change. In other words, by targeting context (perceptions of crime, physical decay, appearances of governmental abandonment, pervasive acts of petty crime) authorities are able to influence epidemics of crime in a way that has proved more successful than the midcentury policing model. Multidimensionality thus represents the first major theme in this discussion. The second major theme interwoven throughout the conversation above was context. We underscored the role of context both in identifying the local perspective on security as well as in providing for a better understanding of the broad impact of enforcement efforts. Context, as we explored in Chapter Two, is the signature lens through which the Broken Windows theory guides analysis. As we also emphasized in the previous chapter, context is far from narrowly defined. We noted that both Kelling and Gladwell’s proffered definitions of context include a psychological component, incorporated across Broken Windows research in a
variety of disciplines. Recall, for example, the study on attitudes towards school safety, or the seminary students to whom Gladwell turned our attention. Such research underscored the psychological significance of synthesizing and internalizing our environment, the filter through which we process the physical world. Thus, given the fundamental significance of the *perceived* environment to Broken Windows literature, we shift our focus in the remaining subsection to address two factors that influence heavily the perception of Caribbean security—money laundering and corruption.

### 7.0 Money Laundering and Governance

#### 7.1 Money Laundering

In light of continuous resource shortfalls and the devastating threats posed by natural disasters, which can handily erase a year’s GDP, small island developing states (SIDS) have become known for pursuing creative opportunities for financial gain. Tuvalu, in the Pacific, is perhaps even infamous for this. The state makes a considerable portion of its revenue from licensing its domain tag, .tv, to major websites (such as MLB.tv). The small island has even leased its country telephone prefix (688) for use by a phone sex company. Tuvalu also has a booming international finance industry, despite being a virtual microstate. In fact, island states across the world, particularly in the Caribbean Basin, have become renowned financial centers. All that is necessary is a small shelter with enough electricity to power some servers, and an international bank is born. Just as the easy movement of people facilitates greater revenue for the Caribbean’s tourism sector, so too does the easy movement of money facilitate a lucrative banking sector. And just as the easy movement of people obscures and facilitates myriad trafficking and smuggling operations, so too does the easy movement of money. Lax banking restrictions breed corruption, and “the problem is compounded by the fact that many Caribbean governments provide tax havens that [further] attract criminal elements.” Of the major money laundering countries identified in the 2014 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, one quarter of the list are Caribbean Basin nations and territories. They include: Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Colombia, Costa Rica, Curacao, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Panama, St. Maarten, and Venezuela. The Caribbean is recognized as such a focal point for money laundering that, in 2013, eighty percent of the UNODC’s Global Programme Against Money Laundering training participants were Caribbean states and territories (Antigua, Anguilla, BVI-Tortola, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines). In this vortex of illegal money, the Cayman Islands’ financial system is notorious for providing perhaps the best “climate” for laundering, facilitating the cleansing of as much as ten billion dollars in criminal proceeds annually. (The use of the word ‘climate’ here is noteworthy. Even in a trade increasingly migrating to cyberspace, human perceptions continue to play an important role in financial crimes.) With a population under 60,000, the Cayman Islands have attracted more than six hundred banks (virtually one bank for every hundred people), “several thousand mutual funds and tens of thousands of offshore businesses.” Other states, competing for the windfall of cash from offshore financing, provide an equally liberal climate for
laundering. St. Kitts and Nevis, for example, permits the establishment of corporate trusts designed to completely conceal the identities of proprietors.\footnote{453}

The same characteristics that make the Caribbean attractive for narcotics and human trafficking also make it appealing for cash smuggling and money laundering. They include: a modern IT infrastructure, a large English-speaking population, expatriate Westerners living on the islands, émigrés living in the United States and Central America, geographic proximity between North America and South America, access to Europe, and the presence of transnational crime.\footnote{454} Thus, while the Caribbean is frequently portrayed as an exporter in the flow of illicit goods, the region is in fact also a massive importer—of smuggled cash. The \textit{New York Times} explains how the process works with respect to Mexican cartels (which can be extrapolated to the system at large):

Cash is collected in small denominations from individual buyers and then bundled in great stacks of broken-in bills that are used to pay wholesalers…These bills are counted, hidden in the same vehicle compartments that were used to smuggle drugs in the opposite direction and then sent to stash houses in Los Angeles, San Diego and Phoenix. From there, they move across the border into Mexico.\footnote{455}

While cash likely returns to traffickers using many of the maritime methods discussed earlier, most interdicted shipments occur in airports.\footnote{456} The Department of Homeland Security suspects this trend may simply be a result of the enhanced screening available for air travel when compared to land and sea conveyance (especially small maritime vessels).\footnote{457} And while money laundering is increasingly trending digital, the all-cash business of illicit smuggling continues to necessitate the movement of bulk shipments of cash. These shipments, running parallel and in reverse to trafficking flows ebbing through the Caribbean transit zone, employ an equally diverse range of techniques—“from cash stuffed in the mail or carried in small amounts by couriers known as ‘smurfs’ to complex laundering operations involving front companies, offshore banks, and correspondents and intermediaries in multiple countries.”\footnote{458} Law enforcement has interdicted Colombian bound cash transiting the Caribbean “secreted into cars, dolls, television sets,” and even in “shipments of bull semen” (seriously).\footnote{459} Remittance networks, which we referenced in Section 2.3, are yet another source facilitating the movement of money throughout the region, and have been shown to exacerbate money laundering and related crimes.\footnote{460} As a depiction of the scale of remittance networks, which support entire economies in the Caribbean, one large money transfer company has over 300 branches on Jamaica alone.\footnote{461} Once safely back in the hands of trafficking ringleaders, smuggled cash is used for a variety of applications. Some is used to pay bribes to keep networks open, some is reinvested in purchasing cocaine from wholesalers, and some is laundered by laundering professionals for fees upwards of fifteen cents on the dollar.\footnote{462} An unknown quantity may also be destined for terror financing, a nexus we highlighted in Section 5. Former DEA Administrator Asa Hutchinson noted to this effect that there is a “strong case to be made that drug trafficking proceeds are being funneled to terrorist organizations,”\footnote{463} the potential for which was made clear in DEA Assistant Administrator Casteel’s remarks on the relationship between cocaine distributors and Afghan narcotics producers. Finally, while bulk cash payloads frequently make their first stop in Mexico, trends from airport
seizures suggest that most illegally transported money is ultimately destined for points farther afield, likely moving by maritime means at some stage. The scale of bulk cash being smuggled across the transit zone is difficult to imagine (in Section 2.4, we relayed that the DEA estimates Caribbean money laundering of the proceeds from transnational crime exceeds sixty billion dollars annually). In fact, so much money crosses between the United States and the transit zone that it is difficult to launder all of it—and so it begins to pile up. One Chinese-Mexican businessman, allegedly involved in the supply of precursor chemicals for the production of methamphetamine, was arrested in 2007 with $206 million in cash piled in his home (the largest single such seizure in history, and this from a midlevel trafficker). The movement of cash intended for laundering, corruption, and investment in expanding transnational crime has even produced several models for bulk cash smuggling. The Department of Homeland Security categorizes these into two headings, the Insource Model (in which shipments are handled internally) and the Outsource Model (in which cash smuggling is contracted out). The former has obvious advantages in maintaining control over large sums of money, while the latter ensures greater diversity of smuggling routes and allows transnational criminal networks to employ local trafficking infrastructure.

The United States does provide technical assistance to help Caribbean authorities tackle the complexities of modern day money laundering. Alongside the Association of Supervisors of Banks of the Americas (ASBA), the FDIC has provided anti-money laundering (AML) seminars in the Caribbean, which have served representatives from states including Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and the Dominican Republic. Nevertheless, the unobserved linkages between money laundering, transnational crime, and even terrorist financing remain extensive and “only exacerbate the challenges faced by the financial, law enforcement, supervisory, and intelligence communities.” The Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), established on the European model in 1992, contains twenty-nine local members and aims to help coordinate AML efforts across the region. Much of this is directed through the Caribbean Anti-Money Laundering Program (CALP), which went into force in March 1999. Yet, the CFATF’s effectiveness is limited by the funding constraints, strategic disputes, and transnational dilemma that plague most Caribbean security institutions. And as with all the transnational crimes discussed in this chapter, the persistence of money laundering makes it all the more difficult to address related insecurities. Money laundering acts as a lubricant for the diversity of Caribbean crime, washing assets originating from a range of criminal enterprises, collectively referred to as predicate crimes. Yet, while the presence of widespread transnational crime places the Caribbean at heightened risk of money laundering, it is the permissive attitude towards financial services that has served to propel the problem into an endemic culture. As a consequence, AML is not accomplished strictly by transferring technical knowledge, but requires the recalibration of local government perspectives on the value of addressing money laundering. Thus, in so many ways, the issue of money laundering exemplifies the challenges discussed throughout this chapter: it is intricately interwoven with a variety of criminal activities, aggravated by an environment that invokes a sense of complacency, and is particularly difficult to combat due to its transnational nature. As with drug smuggling, irregular migration, terrorist financing, and gunrunning, when it comes to
money laundering, “no individual country or single region stands alone—each is connected by a trail of dirty dollars.”

7.2 Graft and Corruption

Corruption and money laundering, like all of the transnational elements discussed here, are interconnected. The extensive infusion of corruption and graft in regional states ensure that the Caribbean’s offshore banking services remain “ideal” for the laundering of criminal money. Thus, through corruption, Caribbean states become facilitators of grey and black market economies that encourage the development of yet more illicit ventures. The implications of corruption are potentially volatile. This is on full display across feral and under-governed communities, as we discussed in the first chapter. Garrison districts in Jamaica offer one such example of the result of the fusion of governance and crime through corruption. In these communities,

lowly paid police officials are bribed and co-opted by the drug ‘dons’ or lords – the de-facto leaders of these areas – with guns and money to ensure community support for the [political] party [associated with that neighborhood]. The authorities are essentially providing ungoverned functional spaces for the illegal gangs to operate...

In 2010, the Jamaican government relented to American pressure to arrest the head of one such district, Christopher Coke, the leader of the Shower Posse syndicate. Coke reigned in the Kingston community of Tivoli Gardens as the de facto mayor, delivering political support for his patrons and administering a wealth of extralegal social and judicial services in his fiefdom. However, Jamaican efforts to catch Coke epitomized the pitfalls of urbicide we explored in Chapter One. The community of Tivoli Gardens was literally besieged by police and the military, and several community members were killed as they defended their neighborhood. The tactics employed by Jamaican forces typify the shortcomings of cutting military strategies and pasting them in police scenarios. A cable, sent by the U.S. embassy’s chargé d’affaires Isaiah Parnell, is worth quoting at length:

Assault on Tivoli Gardens Stronghold

2. Following two days of civil unrest and gang-related violence in several parts of the metropolitan Kingston area, at midday on May 24 the

---

* It should be noted that not all scholars normatively assess corruption as a negative. In 1967, Nye registered an early voice on the subject as a subscriber to the realist (or functionalist) view of corruption. This school argues corruption is a net positive for development, acting to facilitate the economy, even if informally. In the 1970s and 1980s, the very term corruption underwent a shift in implications, used in the context of Marxist research to characterize whole systems of economies and social classes. By contrast, in 1978, Susan Rose-Ackerman helped pioneer one of the most enduring models of corruption, the rational actor model, which frequently approaches corruption as an issue to combat and suggests doing so by raising the associated costs of corruption (jail time, fines) for the corrupt actor. See, Anthony Maingot, “The Challenge of the Corruption-Violence Connection,” in Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror: Challenge and Change, ed. Ivelaw Griffith (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004), 130-132.
Jamaican Defence Force (JDF) launched an all-out assault on the heavily-defended Tivoli Gardens “Garrison” stronghold controlled by Christopher “Dudas” Coke, the alleged overlord of the “Shower Posse” international crime syndicate who is wanted to face extradition to the USA on drugs and weapons trafficking charges…The JDF fired mortars and then used bulldozers to break through heavy barricades which Coke’s supporters had erected to block entry to the fortified enclave. As of 6:00 p.m. May 24, heavy fighting continued within Tivoli Gardens, and a fire was burning out of control in the adjacent Coronation Market. The JDF plans to continue operations through the night. Large numbers of women and children have fled the area. While casualty figures are not yet available, at least six JCF/JDF officers are known to have been killed in recent days, and many more wounded; the numbers of gang members and civilians killed or wounded are not yet known.477

The cable goes on to detail ensuing gang violence across the city, insufficient hospital resources, and flight cancelations through the next morning. In the aftermath of Operation Garden Parish, the scene was surreal; “Kingston had become a war zone in the course of enforcing a United States extradition request against a single international drug trafficker.”478 Tivoli Gardens exemplifies how “crises in governance have generated the perfect ecosystems for private power brokers,”479 as well as the unique challenges in dismantling them (Coke eluded capture for weeks). “When order is lacking and public institutions are rife with patronage and graft,”480 drug lords have the capacity not only to govern real political space but also to captivate the genuine admiration and loyalty of large swaths of the population.

Police and government officials are on the ‘payroll,’ as in Tivoli Gardens, across the Caribbean. The result is a capsizing of public confidence and a sustained flow of narcotics, weapons, and people throughout the region. Anecdotes on corruption, which like all things illicit tell only a fraction of the story, suggest an extensive system of criminal infiltration. In 1991, Trinidad and Tobago’s Assistant Commissioner of Police Rodwell Murray alleged that a drug trafficking cartel was operating within the police department.481 A later report expanded on Trinidad’s intricate system of corruption in which competing factions hidden within the police force recruited officers from early in their careers. These mafias provided career services including promotions within the force, protected members, and opened access to sources of corruption.482 Such institutional corruption has only persisted. In 2002, Jamaica registered twenty-seven official allegations of police corruption; a 300 percent increase over the previous year.483 A non-representative sampling of informants in a 2010 IOM study from the Bahamas, Jamaica, St Lucia, the Netherland Antilles, and Suriname all believed that local immigration officers either facilitated or ignored instances of human trafficking in their country.484 In Barbados, a passport scam implicated law enforcement accused of facilitating the passage of irregular migrants from Guyana.485 Trinidad and Tobago police have been arrested in connection with ransom kidnappings.486 In the summer of 2013, the United States withdrew aid from St. Lucian law enforcement after allegations that police had participated in extrajudicial killings.487 Ironically, the killings coincided with St.
Chapter 3: Cocaine and Context in the Caribbean
Part Two: The Psychological Environment

Lucia’s Operation Restore Confidence, an initiative to battle rising local crime rates that had been negatively impacting tourism.\(^{488}\)

And it is not just poorly paid beat-cops who are involved in transnational crime. In August 2013, the director of Suriname’s counterterrorism unit, Dino Bouterse, was arrested in Panama and turned over to the DEA.\(^{489}\) He was accused of narcotics trafficking, with an indictment alleging that Bouterse smuggled cocaine in a suitcase on a commercial flight across the Caribbean that July.\(^{490}\) Bouterse had previously been sentenced to eight years in prison in August 2005 for fencing cocaine, weapons, and stolen cars.\(^{491}\) Even more astounding than a country’s counterterrorism chief being arrested on multiple occasions for narcotics trafficking, gunrunning, and smuggling, Bouterse’s father (himself a convicted drug trafficker) actually became president of Suriname in 2010.\(^{492}\) And corruption runs to American shores. In May 2013, the director of environmental enforcement in the Department of Planning and Natural Resources of the U.S. Virgin Islands was arrested on drug trafficking charges after allegedly using a government boat to transport cocaine.\(^{493}\) Then-DEA Administrator Michele Leonhart expressed concern over the rise in drug trafficking in the Caribbean and its propensity to corrupt law enforcement in American-administered Caribbean territories (the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico).\(^{494}\)

The impact of this corruption on communities is difficult to measure but undeniably degrading. Sociologist Anthony Maingot notes of St. Kitts and Nevis, for example, that corruption eroded confidence in the government and that basic governance and sovereignty suffered as a consequence.\(^{495}\) Corruption acts as an echo chamber, amplifying the psychological context of Caribbean security. Perceptions of governmental fragility have the potential to become so pervasive that, at one point, Sir Shridath Ramphal, former Commonwealth Secretary-General noted without exaggeration, “it only takes 12 men in a boat to put some of these governments out of business.”\(^{496}\) Narcotics is unlike any other criminal enterprise in its capacity to spread corruption and graft, which has profound and often understated impacts throughout domestic politics and international relations.\(^{497}\) The interplay between corruption, context, and disorder is no more clearly exhibited than in the confusion of identities surrounding so much of the region’s crime. In Mexico and the Caribbean, “daylight killings are sometimes carried out by men dressed in police uniforms, and it is not always clear, after the fact, whether the perpetrators were thugs masquerading as policemen or actual policemen providing paid assistance to the thugs.”\(^{498}\) Meanwhile, “on those occasions when the government scores a big arrest…police and military officials pose for photos at the valedictory news conference brandishing assault weapons, their faces shrouded in ski masks, to shield their identities. In the trippy semiotics of the drug war, the cops dress like bandits, and the bandits dress like cops.”\(^{499}\)

Obviously, corrupt agents of law enforcement and national security hamper the effective action of those organizations. But the implications of corruption reach far deeper. Poor or lacking governance, as we explored in Chapter One, invites vigilante, criminal, and terrorist groups to fill the ensuing power vacuum. And critically, as the Broken Windows theory would suggest, it is not only the inefficiency of corrupt authorities that invites competition from non-state actors; even the very perception of corruption can breed disorder.\(^{500}\) Vigilantism took root so strongly in the Caribbean between the 1980s and the early 2000s that, at one instance, the national security minister
for Trinidad and Tobago was compelled to issue a notice on national radio and television reminding the population that self-styled self-defense organizations remained illegal.\textsuperscript{501} There are also political ramifications for reduced confidence in the government. Public disaffection undermines the validity and stability of the democratic process, which puts the very authority of the state in jeopardy.

Finally, not only does corruption degrade perceptions of government, it impacts the capacity of the government to defend its own survival.\textsuperscript{502} In Section 3, we explored the debilitating implications for communities of the illegal trade in weapons. When law enforcement is complicit in gunrunning, the devastation reaches even deeper, as authorities facilitate their own reduced capacity to respond to violence.\textsuperscript{503} Similarly deleterious impacts can be seen in human trafficking. The corruption of border personnel, law enforcement, and politicians directly impedes the adequate enforcement of existing laws criminalizing human trafficking (however lacking they may be).\textsuperscript{504} This leaves communities vulnerable to greater human trafficking, which as we highlighted in Section 4 is part of an even wider network of irregular migration. Every tentacle of illicit transnational crime inevitably reaches to the heart of Caribbean states through corruption and graft. As a result, stamping out corruption has proven to be the single greatest obstacle to more effective enforcement in the region. With a hold on the very institutions designed to safeguard the people, crime and trafficking suffuse the body politic with corrosive ease.

8.0 Conclusions

Trafficking in the Caribbean is not new. The trade stems from a history spurred on by the region’s earliest European inhabitants. With the introduction of Spanish restrictions on trade and migration in the early 16\textsuperscript{th} century, the Western Hemisphere was ensnared by the great Eurasian tradition of smuggling. Just as today, the implementation of government regulations inevitably provided an arbitrage opportunity for individuals willing to shoulder the risk, known to Spanish colonialists as \textit{piratas} (pirates), or what the British called the “private trade.”\textsuperscript{505} For centuries, this trade made use of ample lawless territory. Such ungoverned spaces “were out of control, but they were also out of touch, having little if any impact on the major concerns of central governments.”\textsuperscript{506} Out of sight and out of mind, the region slowly adapted “what many refer to as a culture of smuggling, an ambivalence toward national or international regulations or laws that affects the very survival of many of the region’s governments.”\textsuperscript{507} Over the past century, as signaled in Kilcullen’s megatrends from the first chapter, interconnectedness has replaced isolation, and this culture of smuggling has burst forth as a genuine threat to Caribbean and international security.

We have noted throughout this chapter that financial and political constraints across the Caribbean serve as obstacles to effective regional security apparatuses. At the expense of external patronage, typically from the United States, Caribbean security initiatives frequently but halfheartedly embody the strategic vision of the funding country. This half-heartedness is precipitated by a “discernable divergence between [the] multi-dimensional view on security threats predominating in the region and the more narrowly focused law enforcement emphasis of the US authorities” seen in the compartmentalization of responsibilities across agencies and bureaus.\textsuperscript{508} This asymmetry
Chapter 3: Cocaine and Context in the Caribbean
Part Two: The Psychological Environment

strains efforts to build strong partnerships, which, in the words of General Kelly, are theoretically “the cornerstone of U.S. Southern Command’s engagement strategy and [are] essential for our national security.” This dedication to partnership is a key element of the Coast Guard’s approach to regional security. Indeed, in light of the profoundly transnational character of Caribbean crime, economy, and sociology, the Coast Guard and Navy have come to place considerable weight on their reliance on international partners.

Given the centrality of these partnerships to American capabilities and the effective maintenance of Caribbean security—recall that half of successful JIATF-South operations would not have taken place without international cooperation—any strategy the United States employs in the Caribbean would be markedly more successful if it were one of consensus. Yet, unified action has been difficult to effect, and much of the issue is institutional. In the United States, dozens of federal agencies participate in counter-narcotics missions, but “without clear lines of authority [and] the absence of a lead agency...the counter-narcotics struggle is in jeopardy of falling between the same regional bureaucratic gaps as have other unconventional threats.” Further, myriad intergovernmental organizations throughout the Basin struggle to command the resources and authority necessary to motivate sustained local action. These organizations are reflections of the geography that engendered them. The Caribbean Basin is home to more than 1,200 islands under the jurisdiction of more than twenty-five countries. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) represents fifteen states, most of British tutelage, while many of the Central American states lining the Basin are represented both in Caribbean organizations as well as the more exclusive Central American Integration System (SICA). The Caribbean is noteworthy for having the greatest concentration of defined maritime borders on the planet (though still far from entirely resolved), but even this accomplishment invites unique bureaucratic hurdles in fighting transnational issues. Complicating factors even further is the high concentration of foreign dependencies, with local territories under the authority of the Netherlands, France, the United Kingdom and the United States. With so much institutional fragmentation, “only an integrated strategy that synchronizes the various organizational efforts under a unifying concept can address these problems.” As we explored in Section 3.1, Community Policing, of which Broken Windows is a subset theory, is among the few security ideologies of consensus in the region. Constructing an American maritime security strategy in the language and approach of a community policing framework would better enable regional security cooperation by elevating American leadership beyond strictly the financial and technical, to the strategic and ideological. And in the words of one expert, “law enforcement cannot hope to succeed without adequate strategic guidance from political leaders. This fact has been proved over and over throughout the history of smuggling in the Caribbean.”

8.1 Western Hemisphere Strategy

As we explored throughout Chapter One, transnational issues (which predominate in the littorals) are a “defining issue of the 21st century.” No branch of the American armed forces perceives this better than the United States Coast Guard, which has dedicated itself to combating transnational crime and irregular migration. The Coast
Muddy Waters:  
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

Guard is aided in this pursuit by its decidedly hybridized nature; it is “the only military law enforcement organization which is a member of the national intelligence community,” and thus “bridges traditional enforcement gaps between military and law enforcement organizations.” The Coast Guard’s inherent cross-bureaucratic nature seemingly frees the organization to conceive of its mission in different (perhaps broader) strategic terms than that of other maritime services. This conceptualization was on display during the Vietnam War, when the Coast Guard uniquely applied its counter-smuggling expertise in Operation Market Time, “an intensive multi-year campaign to stop the Communist flow of arms and supplies by sea.” This institutional flexibility is likewise on display on America’s northern border with Canada. Integrated Cross-Border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations (ICMLEO) are specialized missions that permit certain U.S. Coast Guard and Canadian officers to hold law enforcement authority on both sides of the border. This is a highly noteworthy act for an American military branch, ceding a degree of sovereignty, designed to undercut one of transnational trafficking’s greatest advantages (borders). This conceptualization can also be seen in one of the Coast Guard’s newest strategy papers, Western Hemisphere Strategy. Of the three primary “priorities” identified by the Coast Guard in this document, the first is explicitly intended to address the spread of transnational networks. The white paper notes these networks present “new threats to maritime safety, security, and efficiency.” The Caribbean Basin, Central America, and Mexico all face the “destabilizing impacts of violence, corruption, terrorism, natural disasters, and trafficking in drugs, humans, and arms.” Most notable is the Coast Guard’s recognition of the ambiguity and flexibility of networks. The authors relay, as we have, that organizations that “evolve and mature for one illicit purpose have shown an increasing propensity to diversify their nefarious activities.” They continue, “In the next decade, the links between networks initially formed for illicit activities including drug smuggling, human trafficking, or terrorist activity will continue to blur.” In response, the Coast Guard has migrated towards a strategy with numerous similarities to one guided by the Broken Windows theory.

The most significant evolution in the Coast Guard’s approach to Caribbean security is its emphasis on networks. Recognizing the perennial shortfall of resources required to make interdiction a successful deterrence strategy, the USCG’s paper has instead turned to dismantling TCOs themselves. This approach moves pointedly away from the mid-century police enforcement model rejected by Kelling, Wilson, and Coles. That model, as mentioned in Chapter Two, is both resource intensive and of limited success in catching criminals in the act (its signature intention). The Coast Guard’s updated approach to networks consists of three prongs: understanding and fostering network culture, identifying networks, and prosecuting networks. Of these, the greatest challenge to a hierarchical organization comes in understanding the fundamental components of networks and co-opting their most dynamic qualities. Yet, this is precisely what Commissioner Bratton executed in New York City. The application of community

---

* The European Union has taken some significant steps that similarly demonstrate the need to combat the value of borders for “trans-sovereign” criminal groups. The EU’s European Police Office (EUROPOL) is an evolving experiment in this regard, and may offer a model for how a CARIBPOL could structure trans-sovereign of its own. See, Clifford Griffin, “Regional Law Enforcement Strategies in the Caribbean,” in Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror: Challenge and Change, ed. Ivelaw Griffith (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004), 504-505.
policing necessitated a better, less centralized understanding of neighborhood needs. This bred a federalization of enforcement, offering officers on the streets and their immediate superiors greater flexibility to make operational decisions in real time. Much like the recommendation of counter-insurgency theorists such as John Nagl and David Kilcullen, this disaggregation of command produced responses better suited for local needs and better equipped to leverage time-sensitive intelligence. In an effort to meet community demands, Broken Windows policing produced a network of enforcement in place of a strict corporate system. Better collection and timely employment of intelligence, stronger community relationships, and stronger institutional effectiveness—all components of the Coast Guard’s emphasis on defeating networks—are proven outcomes of the Broken Windows theory as seen in Chapter Two. All of this can directly guide the Coast Guard’s efforts to embrace network culture, which it outlines as: “decentralized authority, highly adaptable members and practices, valuing competency above rank, perpetual self-analysis, shared ‘consciousness,’ developing partnerships with non-traditional actors, and achieving a national ‘unity of effort.’”

In conversation with Vice Admiral Michel at a public conference on the sea services in Washington, DC on December 4, 2014, the assistant USCG Commandant for operations remarked to the author that no Coast Guard asset should turn a propeller without a purpose (for a follow up conversation with Admiral Michel, see Appendix B). The Admiral was referring not only to the more economically efficient use of JIATF-South assets but also to the smarter use of ships and aircraft to defeat networks instead of more labor intensive and less effective patrols. Vice Admiral Michel placed particular emphasis on the Western Hemisphere Strategy’s pivot to networks, both combating them and mimicking their construction. The admiral similarly recognized the shifting nature of transnational organized crime, and was receptive to the notion that they may better be described as a network of networks instead of one singular organization. Admiral Michel recognized the challenge of adapting a bureaucratic military organization to better reflect a network; his evident appreciation for the difficult institutional transformation this requires is indicative of the USCG’s deep understanding of the complexities of hybrid maritime threats. In a subsequent interview, the admiral even made explicit reference to the Coast Guard’s aim to produce a “tipping point” on crime in the Caribbean, reminiscent of Gladwell and Kelling et al’s assessment of Broken Windows influence on crime trends in New York.

The Coast Guard has even adopted a definition of Transnational Organized Crime that better accommodates the fundamental restructuring of criminal networks in the last two decades. According to the white paper, “Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) is defined as criminal activity that is coordinated across national borders, usually involving networks of individuals or groups working in multiple countries in an attempt to execute illegal business ventures.” The underlying sentiment in this definition is an awareness of the loose application of the word “organized,” underscored by the depiction of TCOs as a collective of networks. Even the more traditional components of the Western Hemisphere Strategy highlight an important rhetorical shift, one closer to community policing and the Broken Windows theory. The document suggests strengthening interdiction capacity by expanding the scope of suspicion beyond narcotics trafficking to include any kind of transnational crime. This seemingly innocuous recommendation would provide the legal and strategic recognition of one of Broken Window’s primary
Muddy Waters:  
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

premises: that violent crime is not atomized, not a stream of isolated incidents. In theory, Broken Windows expresses this interconnectedness in the process tracing we outlined in Chapter Two (broken windows lead to abandoned houses which lead to drug use which leads to panhandling which leads to muggings etc). In practice, Broken Windows also expresses this interconnectedness by demonstrating that policing quality-of-life crimes puts police in contact with wanted felons and knowledgeable informants (e.g. about one fare-beating arrest in ten on the subway produced someone wanted for a Class A misdemeanor or felony). By focusing on the climate of enforcement instead of specific crimes (i.e. narcotics)—which is consistent with the Coast Guard’s newly expressed perspective on networks—Broken Windows would suggest that maritime enforcement bodies stand a greater chance of impacting Caribbean security. While such implementation lags, the inclusion of language symbiotic with a Broken Windows lens lends greater credence to the argument that the mechanisms identified in community policing are likewise applicable in the maritime domain.

The document also provides a number of suggestions that could directly impact the context of Caribbean security, the most significant element of any Broken Windows approach. For example, the strategy recommends expanding the deployment of LEDETS (law enforcement detachments) to “non-traditional platforms and/or locations with increasing TOC network activity and threats.” This initiative would not only increase the reach of American enforcement efforts but would place authorities in direct contact with local enforcement and communities. In so doing, LEDETS become sounding boards for Caribbean communities in much the same way many officers do in neighborhoods policed by a community-oriented approach. Gathering intelligence is a positive outcome of this contact, but the primary assets are in expressing an honest commitment to improve a community and in genuinely responding to local needs. As a result, LEDETS and their partners can help restore an element of self-efficacy among Caribbean communities, which would magnify their efforts greater than any new cutter or warship could. For this same reason, Southern Command’s decision to cancel Civil Affairs deployments in FY13 under budget pressure should be seen as contrary to the community policing value of building local familiarity and credibility. Another component of shaping the context of Caribbean security is in providing for an effective, “persistent presence” in the Basin. Such a presence, alongside gathering timely intelligence, would similarly signal the enduring commitment of the United States (and, critically, its local partners) to the mission of bettering life for local communities. To this end, the U.S. Coast Guard, with its smaller ships and valued law enforcement reputation, is thought of within the United States government as the most sought-after military partner for Caribbean states. This is so in part because, for many Caribbean states, constabulary and police bodies maintain the primary obligation for law enforcement and security policy, with the military serving as an auxiliary. As such, the Coast Guard is a more relatable institution. Even many of the contributions of major Western states come in the form of constabulary or police forces, notably Scotland Yard and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Complementing this is the Coast Guard’s investment in “access to international littorals,” which has the potential to bring the USCG, LEDETS, local partners, and local communities into even greater and more productive contact. And while the Navy has struggled to deploy goodwill missions in the Caribbean Basin over the last few years, the Coast Guard’s partial role as a relief organization has left it well-adapted for
humanitarian missions in the hemisphere. After the 2010 Haitian earthquake, the United States Coast Guard was the first American agency with assets on hand (including almost one thousand Coast Guardsmen and women). A Broken Windows perspective on maritime security would suggest that the goodwill generated by humanitarian aid and disaster relief (HA/DR) is as important to regional security as are conventional enforcement operations. Indeed, the infrastructure support provided by HA/DR has the capacity to literally fix broken windows, restoring a sense of order in communities hit hardest by crime or nature.

Targeting networks is not a flawless approach. As we have encountered throughout this chapter, the underground world of illicit smuggling and trafficking is notoriously difficult to understand because of a dearth of available data. Anthony Maingot wrote of this void of knowledge, even in the basic relationship between the primary syndicates of the time:

Are the three reputed mafias in Trinidad and Tobago...or the Jamaican posses, or the Dominican mafias, subordinate to the Cali cartel? Or are they autonomous players that act sequentially, segmentally, and local in a chain of individual conspiracies running from producer to consumer? Because of the secrecy involved, direct empirical evidence is difficult to come by. This means that any attempt to illuminate the structure of the Caribbean drug business will have to depend on a series of assumptions.

Perhaps the greatest such assumption the Coast Guard’s new strategy makes is that with enough intelligence, these structures can be understood well enough to be dismantled. The Broken Windows theory provides central guidance for this pitfall as well. The Coast Guard should place even greater emphasis on impacting the environment in which all networks operate, instead of investing too deeply in identifying and targeting particular organizations or individuals.

8.2 Two Problems

General Kelly summarizes the leviathan we have depicted throughout this case study as follows,

Picture an interconnected system of arteries that traverse the entire Western Hemisphere, stretching across the Atlantic and Pacific, through the Caribbean, and up and down North, South, and Central America. Complex, sophisticated networks use this vast system of illicit pathways to move tons of drugs, thousands of people, and countless weapons into and out of the United States, Europe, and Africa with an efficiency, payload, and gross profit any global transportation company would envy. In return, billions of dollars flood back into the hands of these criminal enterprises, enabling the purchase of military-grade weapons, ammunition, and state-of-the-art technology to counter law enforcement. This profit also allows these groups to buy the support—or silence—of local communities.
Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

through which these arteries flourish, spreading corruption and fear and undermining support for legitimate governments.\textsuperscript{542}

Threats to maritime security in the Caribbean exhibit the ambiguities of the hybrid threats discussed in Chapter One. Some non-state actors have even grown so large and influential that they are thought to leverage more financial and military weight than some regional states.\textsuperscript{543} The Coast Guard and White House refer to this hybridization directly, referencing a new “crime-terror-insurgency nexus” that connects transnational crime to political violence across the Basin.\textsuperscript{544} And while the Coast Guard is cognizant of the growing threat to the maritime domain posed by hybridized transnational threats, the organization concedes that only now are the deep impacts of illicit trafficking making themselves understood.\textsuperscript{545} As we saw throughout Section 2 on narcotics, the Coast Guard’s progressive policy paper has yet to be implemented in practice. Interdiction remains the most persistent form of American counter-narcotics in the transit zone. And by some metrics, the strategy has had remarkable success. Between efforts in the Pacific and Caribbean, not a week passes without reports of a “spectacular” seizure.\textsuperscript{546} Such an approach, however, has not systematically reduced the overall flow of drugs, which continues “virtually unabated.”\textsuperscript{547}

The problem is twofold. First, as we noted throughout this chapter, such an approach deemphasizes the flexibility of modern networks, ignoring the seismic changes undergone in the structure of transnational crime. Naim presciently wrote in 2006 that the Mexican kingpin “[Chapo] Guzman will eventually be arrested or killed…[Yet,] that victory too will be transient.”\textsuperscript{548} Writing this chapter only a year after Chapo’s arrest in 2014 (he would later dramatically escape, only to be recaptured in early 2016), Naim’s prescience would seem prophetic if not for the predictable pattern of ineffective enforcement techniques. As Naim notes,

That one high-profile criminal rises to replace another is a fairly easy notion to absorb…The diffusion of the drug business into the fiber of local and global economic life is much harder to fathom, let alone combat…More than any cartel, kingpin, or rebel warlord, it is this pervasive global mainstreaming of the business that the fight against drugs is up against.\textsuperscript{549}

The nature of the threat has changed, and enforcement bodies have struggled to integrate these realities with the strategies they employ. As we noted in Section 3.1, the militarization of crime has produced an impulse towards militarizing law enforcement, with mixed results at best. With Caribbean police “fully committed with their primary law enforcement missions…it is now commonplace to have armies deployed on the streets and on the seas alongside the police in support of anti-crime efforts.”\textsuperscript{550} While the added resources of the military can be invaluable, the strategic conceptions common among militaries make them ill-equipped to operate as auxiliary law enforcement. Turning the region into a “fortress Caribbean” would not only be inimical to tourism but to the very survival of local communities (see our conversation on urbicide in Chapter One).\textsuperscript{551} And as General Kelly notes, “given its history, the region is sensitive to any appearance of increased militarization.”\textsuperscript{552} Until such a time as police and the military
can effectively combine the best of their strategies and resources, the evolution of the structure of criminal groups will continue to vastly outpace that of the enforcement strategy designed to combat them.

Second, the issue is not exclusively a failure in the capacity of law enforcement to evolve with dynamic networks, “but a spreading culture of lawlessness” and “no heritage of respect for the administration of justice.” This cultural ambiguity towards central authority and a marred criminal justice system is evident across our case study. It is evident in Alfonzo, the Mexican entrepreneur engaging in small-scale trafficking without regard for the rise and fall of kingpins. It is evident in the Costa Rican fishermen pressed to provide way stations and supplies for transiting traffickers. It is evident in the vast and poorly regulated torrent of human traffic whisking victims across borders with impunity. It is evident in the smuggling of migrants throughout the Basin, many of whom become victims or facilitators of transnational crime in the honest pursuit of a better life. It is evident in the free flow of billions of dollars, smuggled, laundered, and invested in drugs, guns or campaigns of terror. It is evident in the rise of self-defense militias, fractured sovereignty, and the popularity of gang leaders like Christopher Coke. It is evident in the proliferation of local violence, tied directly and indirectly to transnational crime. And finally, it is evident in the graft and corruption that blocks meaningful progress on Caribbean security. This context pervades and defines this case study, yet its significance is understood most thoroughly through the lens provided by the Broken Windows theory.

8.3 Context

Cutting between both of these problems is the need to address context rather than any one particular crime, criminal, or criminal syndicate. If local Caribbean communities provide the ‘arteries’ (in General Kelly’s words) through which these networks flow, then Broken Windows can play a prominent role in shaping and constraining the illicit actors navigating through these avenues. Throughout this chapter, and throughout the literature on Caribbean security, references to context predominate. We began this section with a reference to the Caribbean’s long cultural history with the private trade. Historically, over the five centuries of Caribbean smuggling, traffickers have time and again sought out ungoverned spaces and regions of “tolerant government attitudes” in which to ply their craft. Academics and politicians alike have seized upon this theme. The former Colombian ambassador to the Organization of American States Fernando Cepeda Ulloa, made reference to the corrosive impact of this culture when he noted the region’s “tolerance of criminal conduct” and the population’s “growing belief in the invincibility of the drug barons.” The ambassador also noted that this psychological defeat is intertwined with the consequences of a “lack of an effective international anti-drugs strategy.” In testimony to the House Armed Services Committee in 2013, General Kelly made similar note of the region’s “corrosive criminal violence,” which is enabled in part by “permissive environments for illicit activities.” In 1992, the West Indian Commission expressed dismay at the appearance of “powerlessness” of regional governments in the face of transnational crime. James Zackrison, an intelligence analyst at the Office of Naval Intelligence, refers to a “culture of smuggling that permeates the Caribbean.” In Section 2.3, we quoted an Associated Press article that used the word “anxiety” to characterize the mood of a small Jamaican fishing village
concerned about expanding trafficking.\textsuperscript{560} Even the United States government references perceptual obstacles to security in the region. In the Department of States’ 2014 \textit{International Narcotics Control Strategy Report}, the authors cite a “culture of impunity” in Guatemala and the need for “culture of lawfulness training” in Mexico, the only two instances in the entire report where this wording is employed.\textsuperscript{561} The INCSR also references “frustration” in Jamaica, among both officers and the public, over the country’s struggle to meet its criminal justice obligations prosecuting corruption and narcotics, which extract “a significant social cost.”\textsuperscript{562}

The Broken Windows theory (or the Power of Context), as detailed in Chapter Two, offers compelling evidence that environment impacts the decisions we make. In that chapter, we noted this impact in New York City, as well as in literature across psychology and medicine. Yet, we need not rely exclusively on extrapolating the theory’s applicability from criminology and public health. In the weeks after the attacks of September 11, narcotics trafficking across the U.S.–Mexico border plummeted by eighty percent, not because of any new program, but because of the “perception that security had been increased.”\textsuperscript{563} In the Caribbean, drug smuggling remained constant, but authorities registered a similar decline in illegal immigration “because of the same perception.”\textsuperscript{564} There are examples on an even more local level. In November 2000, DEA and Colombian counter-drug officers uncovered the first credible evidence of Russian–Colombian collaboration on the manufacture of narco-submarines. Authorities were tipped off by villagers in the small town of Facatátiva, who became suspicious of Russian newcomers who eschewed interaction with locals and remained sequestered in a warehouse.\textsuperscript{565} Police succeeded because locals believed authorities could respond to their needs and, more critically, because locals were invested enough in their community to identify and report threats. This is an ideal, organic representation of self-efficacy and community policing.

\textbf{8.4 Concluding}

The avenues for applying the Broken Windows theory as a framework for maritime security in the Basin are extensive. And given the nature of the myriad hybrid threats plaguing Caribbean littorals, the application of a criminological theory to international security proves a relatively straightforward conceptual leap. Smuggling is a crime, after all, and traffickers are criminals. Epidemics of crime in New York City or the Caribbean may express themselves through different global implications, but the principles of epidemics and environment as expressed by Gladwell, Kelling, Coles, Wilson and Bratton endure. Until now, American-led enforcement in the region has taken a combative approach to local issues, alienating communities without affecting change on a large scale. And yet, society’s role in alleviating Caribbean insecurity is not expressly new. Among others, Zackrison reached that conclusion when he remarked that the only way to effectively combat smuggling is “when done in concert with society.”\textsuperscript{566} For Zackrison, however, this was strictly hypothetical, noting that “history records no such coincidence to prove the hypothesis.”\textsuperscript{567} On a macro scale, in international relations and security studies, that may be true. On a micro scale, though, this is far from theoretical. In cities employing varying iterations of community policing across the United States and
Chapter 3: Cocaine and Context in the Caribbean
Part Two: The Psychological Environment

around the world, authorities have demonstrated that policing with society is as possible as policing against it.

We began this research process with one question: *Can the Broken Windows theory, a criminological construct of social disorganization, provide the lens through which to theorize maritime security in the littorals?* It soon became apparent, however, that answering this primary question required addressing numerous sub-questions. In Chapters One and Two respectively, we strove to answer the two most fundamental of these sub-questions: Why is a reevaluation of maritime strategy necessary, and what is the Broken Windows theory? Having answered these, we finally turned in this third chapter to the central theme of our dissertation: How can we use the Broken Windows theory as a unifying framework in maritime security strategy? To frame a response, we began by meticulously describing the multidimensional nature of Caribbean security. We carried this theme throughout the chapter by demonstrating that academics and politicians in the region have long since argued for an approach to security that mirrors this reality. Significantly, we validated our selection of Broken Windows by underscoring that, among the fractured web of competing strategic visions, Caribbean authorities have already agreed upon community policing (of which the Broken Windows is a subset theory) as the region’s consensus enforcement model. We similarly highlighted the need for more constructive enforcement solutions—employing lessons learned on urbicide in the first chapter—noting that “security can no longer be limited to traditional military operations.” The experiences of Caribbean enforcement, and the lessons of the Broken Windows theory, both endorse the values of “an integrated approach to ‘the conditions which create instabilities in societies,’” or what we have framed as “the need for the adoption of a ‘multidimensional approach to hemispheric security.’” Finally, we identified how context cuts across this multidimensional spectrum, offering a domain in which this range of hybrid threats can be combatted under a single rubric.

We have demonstrated repeatedly how the primary theoretical and practical tenets of the Broken Windows theory provide a lens through which to frame multidimensionality and complexity, unifying disparate components of maritime security in the Caribbean under a common banner and purpose. In so doing, we have reliably addressed the central element of our research question, demonstrating that the Broken Windows theory indeed provides suitable scaffolding upon which to construct a comprehensive theoretical model of maritime security. What remains of our research inquiry is one of the most significant components of any theoretical evaluation: generalizability. Our remaining two case studies are thus not approached with the same comprehensive scope employed in the Caribbean context. Instead, we turn in the following two short chapters to conclude our investigation with the job of demonstrating the generalizable application of our new construct.


Chapter 3: Cocaine and Context in the Caribbean
Part Two: The Psychological Environment

Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

Chapter 3: Cocaine and Context in the Caribbean
Part Two: The Psychological Environment

60 General John Kelly, “Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly, United States Marine Corps Commander, United States Southern Command” (testimony, before the 113th Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, February 26, 2014), 5.
Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory


96 Rear Admiral Charles Michel, “Written Statement of Rear Admiral Charles Michel, Director, Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South)” (testimony, before the Subcommittee on Border and
Chapter 3: Cocaine and Context in the Caribbean
Part Two: The Psychological Environment


Muddy Waters: Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

116 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 97-98.
117 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 89-99.
Chapter 3: Cocaine and Context in the Caribbean
Part Two: The Psychological Environment

Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

Chapter 3: Cocaine and Context in the Caribbean
Part Two: The Psychological Environment


185 United States Coast Guard, Western Hemisphere Strategy (Washington, DC: USCG, September 2014), 21.


195 United States Coast Guard, Western Hemisphere Strategy (Washington, DC: USCG, September 2014), 21.

196 United States Coast Guard, Western Hemisphere Strategy (Washington, DC: USCG, September 2014), 21.


Chapter 3: Cocaine and Context in the Caribbean

Part Two: The Psychological Environment


Chapter 3: Cocaine and Context in the Caribbean
Part Two: The Psychological Environment

Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

Chapter 3: Cocaine and Context in the Caribbean

Part Two: The Psychological Environment

318 Lara Talsma, Human Trafficking in Mexico and Neighboring Countries: A Review of Protection Approaches (Geneva: UNHCR, June 2012), 1.
325 Lara Talsma, Human Trafficking in Mexico and Neighboring Countries: A Review of Protection Approaches (Geneva: UNHCR, June 2012), 9.
326 Lara Talsma, Human Trafficking in Mexico and Neighboring Countries: A Review of Protection Approaches (Geneva: UNHCR, June 2012), 11.
327 Lara Talsma, Human Trafficking in Mexico and Neighboring Countries: A Review of Protection Approaches (Geneva: UNHCR, June 2012), 11.
Muddy Waters: Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory


353 United States Coast Guard, Western Hemisphere Strategy (Washington, DC: USCG, September 2014), 16-17.

354 United States Coast Guard, Western Hemisphere Strategy (Washington, DC: USCG, September 2014), 22.


358 Lara Talsma, Human Trafficking in Mexico and Neighboring Countries: A Review of Protection Approaches (Geneva: UNHCR, June 2012), 13.

Chapter 3: Cocaine and Context in the Caribbean
Part Two: The Psychological Environment


Muddy Waters: Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

Chapter 3: Cocaine and Context in the Caribbean
Part Two: The Psychological Environment

Muddy Waters: Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

Chapter 3: Cocaine and Context in the Caribbean
Part Two: The Psychological Environment

451 James Zackrison, “Smuggling and the Caribbean: Tainting Paradise Throughout History,” in
Transnational Threats: Smuggling and Trafficking in Arms, Drugs, and Human Life, ed. Kimberley
452 Moisés Naim, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy
453 Moisés Naim, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy
454 James Zackrison, “Smuggling and the Caribbean: Tainting Paradise Throughout History,” in
Transnational Threats: Smuggling and Trafficking in Arms, Drugs, and Human Life, ed. Kimberley
Proceeds Study (Washington, DC: DHS, 2010), 4-3.
Proceeds Study (Washington, DC: DHS, 2010), 4-3.
458 Moisés Naim, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy
459 Moisés Naim, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy
460 Mary Alice Young, “Dirty Money in Jamaica,” Journal of Money Laundering Control 17, no.3 (2014):
360.
461 Mary Alice Young, “Dirty Money in Jamaica,” Journal of Money Laundering Control 17, no.3 (2014):
359.
Proceeds Study (Washington, DC: DHS, 2010), 4-3.
466 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, United States of America—Mexico: Bi-National Criminal
Proceeds Study (Washington, DC: DHS, 2010), 4-1.
467 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, United States of America—Mexico: Bi-National Criminal
Proceeds Study (Washington, DC: DHS, 2010), 4-1.
468 United States Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume 2 Money
469 United States Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume 1 Drug
470 United States Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume 2 Money
Control 5, no. 2 (2001): 158.
Control 5, no. 2 (2001): 158.
474 Mary Alice Young, “Dirty Money in Jamaica,” Journal of Money Laundering Control 17, no.3 (2014):
362.
475 Mary Alice Young, “Dirty Money in Jamaica,” Journal of Money Laundering Control 17, no.3 (2014):
392.
478 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 91.


510 United States Coast Guard, Western Hemisphere Strategy (Washington, DC: USCG, September 2014), 10, 15.


512 United States Coast Guard, Western Hemisphere Strategy (Washington, DC: USCG, September 2014), 20.

513 United States Coast Guard, Western Hemisphere Strategy (Washington, DC: USCG, September 2014), 20.


518 United States Coast Guard, Western Hemisphere Strategy (Washington, DC: USCG, September 2014), 28.

Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

530 Vice Admiral Michel, USCG, in conversation with the author at the U.S. Naval Institute Defense Forum Washington 2014, hosted in the Newseum’s Knight Conference Center.
Chapter 3: Cocaine and Context in the Caribbean
Part Two: The Psychological Environment


United States Coast Guard, Western Hemisphere Strategy (Washington, DC: USCG, September 2014), 31.


Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

Chapter Four: Piracy and Perception in the Gulf of Guinea

Chapter Four: Piracy and Perception in the Gulf of Guinea

Hostis humani generis.

1.0 Introduction

Thus far, we have explored what the Broken Windows theory and community policing are, what justifies an exploration of maritime security in the littorals, and how this converges in the Caribbean context. In so doing we have answered the largest component of our research question, demonstrating how the Broken Windows theory serves as a framework for a strategy of maritime security. What remains is an evaluation of this theory’s generalizability. Without opening our theory to a wider context, we demonstrate only that it has proven its merit in the Caribbean Basin.

As detailed in our section on methodology, the Caribbean and the Gulf of Guinea are “most similar” cases, differing on one subcomponent of the causal factor of disorder—piracy. In the prior case study, we employed a detailed descriptive approach to demonstrate the capability to apply Broken Windows’ social psychological lens on disorder to the maritime domain. In so doing, we illustrated that maritime insecurity in the Basin can be framed at a multidimensional and contextual level, yielding new insights into what security in the littorals means. In the first half of this chapter, we endeavor to illustrate, through a brief description of the insecurities plaguing the Gulf of Guinea, the similarities these issues share with those in the Caribbean. To better emphasize this connection, and to more succinctly facilitate coverage of these crimes, we refer extensively to the linkages to multidimensionality and context specificity highlighted at length in Chapter Three. We do so in two portions. First, we detail the parallel nature of the narcotics trades in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Guinea, establishing clear relationships both in theory and in practice between the two cases. Next, we detail several of the quality-of-life, small-scale crimes endemic to West Africa. This parallels our discussion in Chapter Three of the local crimes and context of Caribbean insecurity. By illustrating the myriad similarities between these cases—with respect to actors, crimes, and linkages—we validate the utility of the cross case comparison to serve as a mechanism for extrapolating Broken Windows applicability beyond the Caribbean.

In the second portion of this illustrative study, we investigate the characteristics of piracy, the variant subcomponent of disorder between the two cases. In this investigation, we will demonstrate that piracy, despite being absent from our theory-validating discussion in Chapter Three, fits comfortably in the lens and language of Broken Windows (as laid out in Chapter Two). By incorporating a new issue area into the theory, we demonstrate that the theory building conducted in Chapter Three is applicable in a more global context (generalizability). Or, as we noted in Chapter Two: by illustrating that piracy can be integrated into the same narrative on maritime crime’s multidimensional and environmental nature, we demonstrate that a Broken Windows lens is capable of adapting to new issues and locales, and thus is not unique in its application to the Caribbean.
The literature is at pains to define the Gulf of Guinea’s exact boundaries. In its narrowest application, the Gulf of Guinea is the body of water bounded by the Prime Meridian and the Equator (0°0′0″, 0°0′0″), from around Togo to the northern portion of Gabon.1,2 More broadly, the Gulf of Guinea is characterized as emanating from -15°0′0″, -15°0′0″, which would expand it as far west as Guinea and as far south as Angola.3 Rear Admiral Adeniyi Adejimi Osinowo of the Nigerian Navy defines a “wider Gulf of Guinea” as the 5,000 nautical miles of coastline from Cape Verde to Angola.4 Commander Ali Kamal-Deen of the Ghanaian Navy, on the other hand, promotes an institutionally guided definition, using the membership of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) as templates.5 This would extend the region as far northwest as Senegal. Similar institutionally guided efforts to achieve a definition using just one organization, the Gulf of Guinea Commission, in a 2012 report by the International Crisis Group, resulted in the need for ad hoc expansions—including Ghana, Togo, and Benin.6 Freedom Onuoha of Abuja’s National Defence College notes, in reference to this inconsistency, that the term is “almost too obtuse to be a gulf” at all.7 Tension among these definitions subtly permeates the literature, and the definition employed frequently “varies depending on the issue or interest at stake.”8 In line with our treatment of the Caribbean Basin, we do not seek to elevate one definition. Rather, we again recognize this geographic ambiguity as an important feature of the theoretical landscape.

Just as in the Caribbean, where local disorder in Colombia or Haiti can precipitate regional discord, so too is the case in the Gulf of Guinea. Nigeria in particular is a linchpin, an economic and demographic powerhouse that for years has struggled to exert control over internal conflicts. That Nigeria shares direct sea borders with Benin, Cameroon, Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, and São Tomé and Príncipe9 serves to facilitate the ‘transnationalization’ of these conflicts. The Niger Delta is also evocative of the risk factors from Chapter One. The delta is home to thirty million people, as many as ten million of whom are unemployed.10 It lays claim to forty ethnic communities across just nine states, epitomizing the complexity and density we have discussed.11 The topography is an extreme example of littorals, with a “vast transitional zone between the sea and the huge inland delta with its networks of waterways leading to and from the Gulf of Guinea.”12 “These waterways serve as arteries for the syndicates” involved in the region’s myriad criminal activities.13 More broadly, Nigeria is a study in Kilcullen’s megatrends. As of April 2013, the country is the continent’s largest economy,14 and, at 150 million people, represents more than half of the West African population.15 Broader still, the region’s “many port cities and capitals are among the most densely populated on the continent.”16 And these “dense conurbations along the coast helped to create the conditions for an increase in crime.”17

While maritime security has long taken a back seat to landward issues conventionally associated with threats to state sovereignty,18,19 the littorals are fast becoming a point of concern for governments undergoing a “paradigm shift” in
Chapter Four: Piracy and Perception in the Gulf of Guinea

Unfortunately, systemic underinvestment in maritime domain awareness, resulting from the longstanding neglect of maritime issues in favor of a “land-centric” security perception, had by then greatly facilitated the use of West African littorals for illicit maneuver.\(^{21}\) Angola, with the longest regional coast at 1,600 kilometers has a naval strength of one thousand individuals—compared to the air force’s six thousand and the army’s one hundred thousand.\(^{22}\) Liberia, “the second-largest flag state in the world,” has a coast guard of approximately fifty people and eight boats (all ten feet and under).\(^ {23}\) While security funding at-large may be weak, regional navies and coast guards have suffered sustained neglect.\(^ {24}\)

The Gulf of Guinea’s rise in oil exportation has furthered focus on its littorals. As a major link in the international energy market, the region is attracting ever greater attention from abroad (in 2007, Nigeria overtook Saudi Arabia as the third largest exporter of crude to the U.S.,\(^ {25}\) and in 2013, 15% of American oil was supplied from the Gulf).\(^ {26}\) United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) was born in part due to this strategic emergence in Western conception.\(^ {27}\) The boon in production has also been a windfall for militants, fueling local conflicts through the sale of illegally ‘bunkered’ oil. West African production accounts for almost 70% of the African total.\(^ {28}\) That crime often emanates from Nigeria is in part due to its significant share of production, 47% of the regional total.\(^ {29}\) Like the Caribbean, the region is at trade crossroads—it is placed at the center of trade lines that connect North America and Europe to West, Central and South Africa—which makes local insecurity relevant to international actors.\(^ {30}\) This geographic placement, combined with state weakness, has precipitated the use of the Gulf of Guinea as a transshipment point similar to the role of the Caribbean in transnational crime. Through recent history, the Gulf has attracted the Russian mafia, South American cartels, and Lebanese smugglers, among others.\(^ {31}\)

Alongside the rise of violent extremism, maritime insecurity is now recognized as a leading threat facing African states.\(^ {32}\) In response, rhetoric in the Gulf increasingly reflects that which we saw in the Caribbean context; multilateralism and the multidimensionality of crime are emerging tropes. In an interview with \textit{MilTech}, Rear Admiral Geoffrey Biekro, then Chief of Naval Staff for the Ghanaian Navy, remarked that it was a “commonly shared picture that most of the criminal activities going on in the whole region are transnational” and that “the need for multilateral-cooperation cannot be over-emphasized.”\(^ {33}\) Raymond Gilpin, chair for defense economics at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at NDU, likewise writes that the Gulf’s potential and wealth is being “undermined by multifaceted domestic, regional and international threats and vulnerabilities.”\(^ {34}\) As in the Caribbean, such multifaceted insecurities include narcotics trafficking, weapons trafficking, vigilantism, irregular migration, the specter of terrorism, and corrosive corruption. In the section below, we endeavor to illustrate a number of these issues and the similarities they bear to the conversation detailed in Chapter Three. In so doing, we reaffirm the applicability of the lessons learned in Chapter Three to the Gulf of Guinea by underscoring the “most similar” nature of the cross case comparison.

---

2.0 Narcotics

West Africa has emerged as a significant route in the trafficking of narcotics, particularly South American cocaine. As Mexican cartels grew in influence, as trafficking routes came under greater surveillance, and as demand grew in Europe, West Africa became a “hub” for the trade. In 2007, the UN estimated that more than a quarter of the cocaine annually consumed in Europe passed through West Africa (at a wholesale value of $1.8 billion). Between 2005 and 2007, thirty-three tons of cocaine were seized en route from West Africa to Europe—previously, annual African seizures across the whole continent rarely surpassed one ton—and 2007 seizures were more than sixty times those of five years prior. The largest such seizures have taken place on the high seas.

Some examples include one seizure by a French naval ship of a Togolese tugboat laden with two tons of cocaine from Venezuela; the 2002 Nigerian seizure of a Brazilian ship carrying sixty kilograms of cocaine docked at the Tin Can Island wharf; and a 2003 haul intercepted between Senegal and Spain. In 2004, arrests in the Ghanaian port of Tema uncovered over 500 kilograms of cocaine. In 2006, a ship off of the Canary Islands was found carrying almost four tons of cocaine. In January 2008, more than two tons of cocaine was found by the French Navy onboard the Blue Atlantic as it passed the Liberian coast on its way to Nigeria. Stephen Ellis of the Free University in Amsterdam notes that shipments have been detected across Cape Verde, Senegal, Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Benin. A smaller amount of heroin is also imported by sea, often from Thailand. Lieutenant Commander Stephen Anderson, while serving as executive officer of HMS Dauntless, referred to this avenue as “Highway 10,” as much of the trafficking from the Caribbean east takes place around ten degrees north latitude. Though not geographically direct, the use of Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea for drug trafficking is similar to Haiti’s use in the Caribbean as a trafficking way station.

The methods employed are familiar from our Caribbean study, like using modified mother ships (freighters or large fishing vessels). This has been the case in Ghana, which the U.S. Department of State identifies as a transshipment point for cocaine as well as Afghan and Pakistani heroin. Traffickers unload these laden mother ships onto smaller fishing vessels for transfer. In response, Ghana formed a Marine Police Unit in June 2014 to operate as a de facto coast guard, and the United States has provided maritime law enforcement training for the Ghanaian Navy, emphasizing littoral narcotics interdiction. Once imported, narcotics leave the Gulf in one of two ways. Larger shipments are generally sent by sea, landing most often in Spain (which leads Europe in cocaine seizures). This is one of three predominant sea avenues for bulk importation into Europe. It is likely that Latin American cartels retain tight control over bulk shipments, as they often did when employing nascent Mexican cartels that initially

---

† Heroin is sourced by Nigerian exporters in Thailand buying from sources as diverse as Myanmar and Afghanistan. Bulk shipments are sent by air and sea from Southeast Asia back to Nigeria. See, Moisés Naim, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy (New York: Anchor Books, 2005), 73.
provided protection and logistics support without purchasing the drug. The 2009 discovery of precursor chemicals further suggests that cartels may have moved entire portions of their operations to West Africa. Ellis notes that some prominent traffickers from Latin America are suspected to have already moved to the region. The notion that cartels may be integrating the Gulf of Guinea into a global distribution chain lends greater significance to the rise of narcosubs, which can reach the African coast from Colombia.

The portion of cocaine sold wholesale to Nigerian networks comprises a parallel distribution network. While the maritime route is used for bulk methods, Nigerian schemes typically employ drug mules (or “swallowers,” so called for swallowing cocaine in condoms) flying out of Lagos into Europe. As with Mexican cartels, the expanded use of payment in kind by producers will likely broaden the exploitation of mules, as well as local narcotics abuse; drug usage already seems to correlate to regional transshipment patterns. As Nigerian travelers face greater scrutiny, traffickers have also increasingly turned to Nigeria’s porous borders, including seaports. Yet, regardless of method, the presence of South American cocaine in Africa marks not only a matter of local human security, but for the fight against narcotics in the Caribbean. Proceeds from African trafficking will make their way west and will be used in part to finance the Western drug trade.

We can learn more about West African crime using our Caribbean case for comparison. For example, preexisting networks in the Gulf of Guinea formed ready-made partners for South American traffickers, just as local infrastructure in Jamaica or St. Kitts and Nevis was co-opted by cartels. One American drug official claimed that Nigerian networks were so sophisticated that they were sought after by drug syndicates from both Asia and Latin America. The fluid dynamic of Caribbean TCOs is also reflected in the Gulf, pointedly described as an “adhocracy.” Some Nigerian groups, for example, employ middlemen who act as insulators between foot soldiers and bosses, ensuring that relationships are often in flux. Another component of Nigerian transnational crime is also familiar from Chapter Three, particularly our discussion of Dominican traffickers—diasporas. North America and Europe are home to large Nigerian immigrant communities. In Chicago, for example, Nigerians were historically heavily documented in the wholesale market for heroin. In an analysis of U.S. heroin seizures in 1998, the majority were connected to Nigerian networks. Largely blameless, immigrant communities unfortunately acted as a substrate within which traffickers navigate with obscurity, often manipulating for their own ends the accountability and trust common in communal ethnic networks.

Narcotics trafficking in the Gulf of Guinea is also multidimensional. For example, militants in the Niger Delta who steal, or illegally bunker, oil from pipelines sell that contraband to tankers waiting offshore in exchange for cash, weapons, and also cocaine. As oil travels downstream, it represents one component of a complex regional market in which oil, drugs, and weapons serve as surrogates for cash. Narcotics may even play a role in funding extremism. A trans-Saharan smuggling route has been purported by some to provide funding for Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). This appears to be the case in Northern Mali, where AQIM (alongside local militias) operates protection schemes against traffickers. While Francois Vrey of Stellenbosch University in Cape Town categorizes the volume of drugs entering from the sea as “alarming,” he is quick to
note that it is these multidimensional connections that are the most “disturbing” element of the trade, “dovetailing with criminal statecraft, terrorist groups and oil theft syndicates.” As in the Caribbean, drugs have a long relationship with power and warlordism in West Africa. Samuel Doe and Charles Taylor both did little to dissuade the use of Liberia as a staging ground for trafficking. Former Togolese president Gnassingbé Eyadema stands accused of complicity in narcotics trafficking. In 1998, a former Nigerian senator was arrested in New York on charges of heroin trafficking. In 2005, American authorities arrested a Ghanaian MP carrying over one hundred pounds of heroin.

As in Chapter Three, “criminal statecraft at times typifies governance” in the Gulf of Guinea. This is no more visible than in the case of Guinea-Bissau, which poses an interesting parallel to many Caribbean states. Like them, Guinea-Bissau is “off of most people’s radar screens…poor, weak, and yet not so unstable as to attract attention.” It has, consequently, been subsumed by narcotics. As with Caribbean states, the value of transshipped cocaine in Guinea-Bissau likely exceeds the country’s entire GDP ($304 million in 2006, or about six tons of cocaine at wholesale value). The government’s annual budget is matched by the wholesale value of just two and a half tons of cocaine. In 2007, the heads of the United Nations Peace Missions gathered in West Africa expressed their concerns that Guinea-Bissau posed a threat to regional stability. Here, as in neighboring Guinea, Latin American dealers exercise some of their tightest control over the African–European route. As Andre Le Sage of NDU’s Institute for National Strategic Studies notes, the country’s narcotics problem earned it the distinction as the continent’s first “narco-state.” On one day in 2009, both the president and a senior military official were killed in “tit-for-tat” assassinations linked to the trade. Ellis relays the assessment of a Nigerian drug enforcement official, who alleged that Guinea-Bissau’s military has provided storage space for outward-bound cocaine. At least one (possibly two) FARC affiliates were arrested in the country in 2007, an obvious sign of the expanding connectedness of hybrid threats. FARC officials have been reported in Accra, Conakry and Monrovia as well as other major cities in the region.

Narcotics trafficking is not new to the Gulf of Guinea. It is only over the last fifteen years, however, that bulk shipments have been consistently recorded entering from South America. As a consequence, a number of international actors recognize the narcotics trafficking threat. In November 2007, West African UN Peace Missions expressed “the crucial importance of addressing drug trafficking and organised crime.” The European Union’s fact sheet on a strategy for the Gulf of Guinea makes direct reference to narcotics’ billion-dollar industry. Members of the Economic Community of West African States expressed, during a 2013 summit, the significance of cooperating on counter-narcotics. The United States, through the newly established Africa

---

* Drugs have been used not only to enrich warlords and as goods to barter for weapons, but also as a means of controlling pressganged militiamen. As Audra Grant, of the RAND Corporation, notes, drug use by combatants in Sierra Leone and Liberia was likely a contributing factor to the duration of the conflicts in those countries. See, Audra Grant, “Smuggling and Trafficking in Africa,” in Transnational Threats: Smuggling and Trafficking in Arms, Drugs, and Human Life, ed. Kimberley Thachuk (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 119.

Chapter Four: Piracy and Perception in the Gulf of Guinea

Command (AFRICOM, activated in 2008) lends increasing maritime law enforcement training in the region, including littoral interdiction training. The United States Coast Guard, in testament to the hybrid nature of Gulf of Guinea security, has participated in AFRICOM training, principally through the African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership. The West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative (WACSI), launched by the U.S. in 2011, aims particularly to address drug trafficking in the region. The U.S. has also provided vessels for littoral operations, including two ships donated in May 2012 to Nigeria’s marine police. Many of these ships are former Coast Guard vessels. This was the case with NNS Thunder, the former USCG Cutter Chase, re-launched by the Nigerian Navy in 2011.

While the West African trade in narcotics may not be the region’s most pressing transnational issue, the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report identifies West Africa as a region of “growing concern.” Consequently, West African authorities have less counter-narcotics experience and fewer anti-trafficking resources than their Caribbean counterparts. Yet, to dismiss West African narcotics trafficking as less than a “salient” threat is to disregard our exploration of Broken Windows’ two critical lessons: multidimensionality and context. Geoffrey Till, using language reminiscent of Broken Windows, speaks to this dynamism:

Disorder at sea only makes things worse ashore. The success of transnational crime such as drug smuggling elevates the power of the kind of people who challenge civilized states…it undermines their prosperity, security and ability to connect with other countries. Countries that fail for such reasons tend, moreover, to become security concerns for others.

Barack Obama similarly warned against the regional “destabilizing effects of increasing drug trafficking in West Africa.” Like a vacant lot leading to loitering, fear, community abandonment and crime, maritime disorder is contagious. Thus, while the region may face more prominent threats, this should not diminish the significance of the Gulf’s emergence as a “major narco-trafficking hub.” And just as in the Caribbean, this trade lends itself to analysis through the Broken Windows theory.

On June 27, 2007, fishermen from the Senegalese village of M’bour noticed a strange boat, which they reported to the local Gendarmerie, who found it laden with bricks of cocaine. As with the Colombian villagers from Chapter Three, who reported suspicious foreigners whom police found to be building a narco-submarine, this incident reflects just how critical police–community partnerships are, even in transnational crimes. Moreover, the converse is equally true; “in a vicious cycle, citizen cooperation declines with each police failure, further undermining the ability of officials to do their jobs.” The very rhetoric used to describe West African narcotics trafficking is reminiscent of the importance of perception and context we saw in Chapter Three. Ellis, for example, notes that smuggling is “widely tolerated” and that “tolerance” from government officials

---

encourages criminality. Ellis also makes reference to the significance of perception, noting that the expansion of narcotics trafficking in the Gulf of Guinea is a partial result of the “exceptionally favourable political context offered by ineffective policing” and “governments that have a reputation for venality.” Speaking of Ghana, the Department of State comments on the degrading impact of public perception and “rumors” of government complicity in trafficking. Of Nigeria, the Department of State notes that the “perception of high levels of corruption and impunity encourages narcotic trafficking.” According to a former head of the Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), some of the agents charged with combatting narcotics trafficking are even more invested in the trade than traffickers themselves. Corruption, spurred on by enormous profits, entrenches criminal interests while “deepening fear and mistrust,” characteristics seen in Chapter Two to be so destructive for communities. Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, whose attention to the perception of corruption is evocative of Broken Windows, ranks Nigeria 144th out of the survey’s 175 countries.

Colombian economist Francisco Thoumi affirms that illicit trades require “weak social and state controls on individual behavior, that is, a society where government laws are easily evaded and social norms tolerate such evasion.” The parallels between drug trafficking in the Caribbean and Gulf of Guinea suggest that this norm setting, such a critical element of Broken Windows, is equally relevant in the West African context. Combating transnational crime in Africa will undoubtedly require fundamental investments in capacity building and situational awareness—even basic office supplies. Just as in the Caribbean, mere strategizing cannot overcome the limits of poor, weak states without enough fuel to power their police cars or enough ships to patrol their coasts. And yet, as we saw in Chapter Three, by placing narcotics trafficking within the framework of a wider transnational flow, we can demonstrate the applicability of the Broken Windows theory’s core principles—multidimensionality and context specificity.

3.0 Life and Crime

As in the Caribbean Basin, local crimes in the Gulf of Guinea are interwoven with national and transnational themes. This can be seen in an array of issues, from illegal fishing, to smuggling, to oil theft. These crimes are interrelated, often using the littorals as a shared domain for transferring illicit commodities. The resultant security crisis has bred the proliferation of vigilantes and militias, which present yet more obstacles with similarities to our discussions on the relationship between perception and vigilantism found in Chapter Three. In this section, we highlight several such issues in brief. In so doing, we illustrate the context in which security and disorder are framed in the Caribbean, and demonstrate further the multidimensionality of local crimes, just as in Chapter Three.

3.1 IUU

In coastal communities, human security includes the ability to fish for sustenance and profit. Fish account for more than half of all protein consumed by those in the Gulf of...
Chapter Four: Piracy and Perception in the Gulf of Guinea

Guinea, \(^{127}\) the poorest forty percent of whom depend critically on this supply. \(^{128}\) Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing challenges this dependence. A 2013 report by the International Labour Organization concluded that West Africa is “particularly vulnerable to illegal fishing,” and that more than a third of catches were illegal in the time studied. \(^{129}\) Rear Admiral Osinowo regards these waters as the most abused on the planet. \(^{130}\) The European Union reinforces such a claim, relaying a World Bank estimate assessing the annual damage to coastal economies at $350 million. \(^{131}\) Ships engaging in IUU fishing off West Africa have also been documented as perpetrators of other crimes, including forced labor. \(^{132}\) European and Asian trawlers in West African waters have become increasingly predominant, and trafficking victims have been detected on lakes in Ghana. \(^{133}\) IUU fishing and related toxic dumping pose serious risks to the socioeconomic health of coastal communities (environmental degradation is a push factor for migration). \(^{134}\) As of 2014, more than one-and-a-half million tons of petroleum had spilled in the Niger Delta, making it one of the most oil-drenched places on earth (and an obvious correlate to the physical Broken Windows of Chapter Two). \(^{135}\) Moreover, as noted in commentaries on Somali piracy, \(^{136}\) the loss of traditional fishing grounds can increase the likelihood of piracy. \(^{137}\) And while some IUU fishing is the product of local fishermen, organized crime is also a contributor. \(^{138}\) In recognition of IUU fishing’s relationship to crime and piracy, Chatham House notes that it may even be “far more important in West Africa than piracy,” the most publicized regional maritime issue. \(^{139}\)

3.2 Forgeries and Smuggling

The Gulf is rife with forgeries and contraband smuggling. In Lagos, one survey of pharmacies found that eighty percent of merchandise was counterfeit. \(^{140}\) The UNODC estimates the annual value of fake and low-quality anti-malarial medications at over $400 million. \(^{141}\) Cigarette smuggling from the Gulf of Guinea to Europe and North America approaches low-end estimates on the region’s cocaine trade. \(^{142}\) Guns too are a problem, which circulate with relative impunity. By some accounts, Africa houses twenty percent (100 million) of the world’s stock of illegal small arms and light weapons (SALW). \(^{143}\) Audra Grant, a RAND political scientist and former State Department analyst, writes that the trade in SALW is particularly worrisome in West Africa, where she estimates seven million firearms are in circulation. \(^{144}\) The region has also emerged as a producer of craft firearms. Ghana boasts more than two thousand manufacturers selling pistols for as little as six dollars. \(^{145}\) The smuggling and production of SALW, as from Angola into Nigeria, makes regional insurges “almost intractable.” \(^{146}\) Liberia similarly funneled weapons to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, as did Burkina Faso and the Ivory Coast. Togo was likewise a staging ground for SALW transshipping to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). \(^{147}\) Blood diamonds, themselves a smuggled commodity, have been used routinely to finance weapons procurement. \(^{148}\) The

---


\(^{†}\) In line with our assessment, the report also goes on to call for a widening of perspective on maritime security issues, to include the illicit trade in people, goods and contraband. See, Chatham House, *Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea* (London: Chatham House, March, 2013), 16.
Muddy Waters: 
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

diamond trade from Sierra Leone has even been accused of enriching al-Qaeda, though the evidence is disputed.\textsuperscript{149} Grant relays an estimate that Al-Qaeda earned $15 million in the trade.\textsuperscript{152} Doug Farah, reporting for the Washington Post, records that the organization, after its assets were frozen by the U.S. in 1999, leveraged connections in Liberia to shelter millions of dollars in diamonds in Sierra Leone.\textsuperscript{153} The diamond trade, bound up as it is in gunrunning, commodity smuggling and money laundering, is representative of yet another multidimensional and “difficult to control” transnational trade.\textsuperscript{154} Commodity smuggling is, consequently, “deeply tied to African civil wars” and insecurity.\textsuperscript{155} Even more so, they have turned parts of the region into “a ‘duty free’ port for organized crime.”\textsuperscript{156}

3.3 Illegal Oil Bunkering

One of the most predominant crimes in the Niger Delta is illegal oil bunkering, or theft from pipelines, in part made possible by the availability of small arms.\textsuperscript{157} In 2013, AFP reported daily losses of 150,000 barrels to the theft, representing seven percent of Nigerian production.\textsuperscript{158} One analysis of media reports estimated annual losses in Nigeria at $12 billion, twenty percent of GDP.\textsuperscript{159} Oil theft bears a connection to political violence. According to Patrick Dele Cole, a former Nigerian ambassador, illegal bunkering began “because of the political need to raise a lot of money during the elections. The whole idea of selling oil illegally was sponsored and maintained by our political leaders.”\textsuperscript{160} As Vreÿ notes, oil theft is bound up in an intense competition for resources for which political actors compete for access against other criminal organizations.\textsuperscript{161} Control of territory, whether by criminal syndicates or militias, is required to tap and guard ‘wellheads.’\textsuperscript{162} If local neighborhoods and police cannot be avoided, they may be bribed\textsuperscript{163} in much the way narcotics traffickers co-opt communities. The Gulf of Guinea acts as the downstream distribution hub for this petroleum, where tankers offshore receive deliveries of oil from smaller barges.\textsuperscript{164} Here too the political-criminal dynamic is on display. One pirate tanker, the African Pride, intercepted by the Nigerian Navy was allowed to offload more than 10,000 barrels of crude to a different pirate tanker while under guard.\textsuperscript{165} Two rear admirals eventually lost their jobs in the scandal, but the incident highlights the complicity of political (government, naval, and business) actors in the crime.\textsuperscript{166}

3.4 Vigilantism

Self-defense groups, militias, and terrorist organizations, as chronicled in Chapter One, often rise to fill the void left by governments. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) is one such example. It is an outgrowth of political grievances, notably the inadequate distribution of revenue from locally drilled oil and the resulting pollution. Forty percent of Nigeria’s GDP, over eighty percent of federal revenues, and virtually all export earnings come from such oil, while little investment makes its way back.\textsuperscript{167} The group is also criminal, though, perpetrating crimes with the veneer of a political agenda. MEND has since earned the distinction of “one of the most active of militant groups involved in maritime crimes.”\textsuperscript{168} That MEND can use community issues as a basis for the “intense criminality [that] dominates its practical
existence and activities”¹⁶⁹ is a tribute to the myriad applications of this research. In particular, it speaks to the relationship between context and action explored in Chapter Two, the former informed (perhaps even driven) by the latter.

MEND has targeted the petroleum industry as a symbol of federal overreach, kidnapping workers and tapping and destroying pipelines.¹⁷⁰ This also includes attacks on offshore oil platforms¹⁷¹ such as one in 2008 on the Bonga, a floating production, storage, and off-loading unit (FPSO), which helped force an agreement between MEND and the government in 2009.¹⁷² That MEND’s leadership benefited from this amnesty disproportionately than the rank-and-file, that the organization’s leaders have disputed influence, and that MEND’s activities were often capital-driven in nature have all complicated that agreement. MEND’s structure is characterized by a familiar amorphousness and it is suspected that the group is “highly fractious, with several autonomous branches operating in its name.”¹⁷³ Martin Murphy, of Dalhousie University’s Center for Foreign Policy Studies, writes that MEND was “never a formally organized, hierarchical body but a loose coalition of armed militias, many of them motivated by local grievances.”¹⁷⁴ What leadership did exist involved the interplay of both “insurgents and criminals in a way that made it difficult...to draw any clear distinction between the two.”¹⁷⁵ Plunder frequently replaces politics as an operating principle.¹⁷⁶ As such, and as explored, even in instances of political settlement, “insecurity and criminality tend to linger.”¹⁷⁷

Vigilantism thrives throughout the region. *⁴ In Onitsham, southeastern Nigeria, a businessman refers to one such group’s (the Bakassi Boys) relentless pursuit of armed robbers as “the only thing that makes us sleep with full eyes closed.”¹⁷⁸ Perception plays a vital role in the creation and support of such organizations. When communities become so wary of authorities that they “opt to avoid direct contact with officials,” they are forced to “seek security and welfare in nonstatutory arrangements.”¹⁷⁹ While efforts to modernize Africa’s militaries have increased professionalism, “the continent’s police forces are considered a front line of corruption and human rights abuse.”¹⁸⁰ It was in part this “popular perception that the federal state [had] failed as a security guarantor” that made the emergence of the Bakassi Boys possible.¹⁸¹ Criminal gangs across Nigeria’s Rivers state, often sponsored by local politicians, operate with “near-total impunity.”¹⁸² Such politically sanctioned gangs helped spawn the earliest leaders of MEND, as well as the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV).¹⁸³ And as we have seen, the belief that law enforcement is ineffectual can be enough to threaten such fundamentals as the monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

3.5 Money Laundering

Money laundering and corruption are interwoven throughout transnational crime. Nigeria, in part for its role as a gateway for foreign investment in West Africa, is listed

* Threats to sovereignty do not only come from informal actors. Africa has also proliferated a major industry of security contractors. In Cameroon, vigilantes serve lower income communities while nearly two hundred official private security firms serve the country’s wealthy. A similar phenomenon was recorded in Nigeria, where a growth in private security paralleled the expansion of organizations such as the Vigilante Groups of Nigeria, which in one Nigerian city served more than four thousand households (for a fee). See, Moisés Naím, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy (New York: Anchor Books, 2005), 61.
by the United States as a country of primary concern for money laundering.\textsuperscript{184} Angola, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Sierra Leone are also noted of concern, while Cameroon, Congo (Republic of), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe and Togo are among those monitored by the Department of State.\textsuperscript{185} Elements of West African money laundering are familiar to our Caribbean case, including bulk cash smuggling,\textsuperscript{186} some of which likely takes place using maritime routes given the proliferation of maritime illicit conveyances. Money laundering is also bound up in the smuggling of commodities from West Africa—we have already noted the trade in blood diamonds. Ivory too is a major trafficked commodity through Cameroon, Nigeria, Angola and Côte d’Ivoire.\textsuperscript{187} Like narcotics and blood diamonds, ivory and other poached products are occasionally used as cash surrogates to purchase weapons.\textsuperscript{188} The open borders and trafficking infrastructure that supports these and other laundering transactions are open to exploitation by all transnational criminals, including terrorist organizations, which have repeatedly used Africa as a “safe haven.”\textsuperscript{189}

3.6 Irregular Migration*

Human trafficking and smuggling is bound up, as we saw in Chapter Three, in a wider transnational web of actors, routes, and crimes. And like much illicit activity in the Gulf of Guinea, it is no surprise that irregular migration in West Africa predominates on the sea.\textsuperscript{190} Human trafficking in West Africa has “exacerbated the criminal element in maritime trade” and is “closely related to piracy and robbery as all revolve around the acquisition of weapons and illegal monetary transactions.”\textsuperscript{191} In this regard, it is truly multidimensional, and only by placing irregular migration in a broader context can we hope to understand its role in maritime insecurity.

The push and pull factors leading to irregular migration, and the risk factors of human trafficking and exploitation (all explored in Chapter Three), find echoes in the Gulf of Guinea. As in the Caribbean, a great deal of trafficking is sub-regional, and most West African countries reported that trafficking victims were found sub-regionally.\textsuperscript{192} Major flows include “from Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Togo to the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. In Togo, major flows are from Benin, Ghana, and Nigeria.”\textsuperscript{193} Le Sage identifies major human trafficking and smuggling flows emanating from Nigeria, Ghana and Benin in particular.\textsuperscript{194} Globally, West African victims are transported on international flows and comprise a sizeable portion of those detected in Europe.\textsuperscript{195} In West and Central Europe, fourteen percent of detected victims (around 3,000 individuals)\textsuperscript{196} came from West Africa during the reporting period, found in at least twenty countries across the continent.\textsuperscript{197} Only around one percent of all victims detected in West and Central Europe originate from elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa.\textsuperscript{198} Nigerians are particularly victimized. They were detected in sixteen West and Central European countries, where the UN estimates they make up eleven percent of victims.\textsuperscript{199} Individuals from Cameroon, Ghana, Guinea and Sierra Leone have also been detected throughout Europe.\textsuperscript{200} The UN estimates that revenue from transfer fees for smuggling from West Africa to Europe totals $300 million

annually.\textsuperscript{201} The flow also operates in reverse, with victims trafficked into West Africa. Filipino victims have been reported in Côte d’Ivoire, and Chinese victims have been detected in Ghana.\textsuperscript{202} The International Labour Organization (ILO) calculates the number of forced laborers in Africa at 3.7 million (eighteen percent of the global total) and the annual profit from this labor at just over thirteen billion dollars (higher than in Latin America and the Caribbean).\textsuperscript{203} Africa trails only Central and Southeastern Europe in the prevalence of exploited laborers, according to the ILO.\textsuperscript{204} The UN similarly notes that Africa recorded a higher rate of victims trafficked for forced labor than other regions.\textsuperscript{205} This is true of children as well. In Côte d’Ivoire, more than twenty five percent of children participate in the economy, leaving them vulnerable to exploitation.\textsuperscript{206} Lake Volta, in Ghana, is a magnet for children exploited in the fishing industry.\textsuperscript{207} Trafficking victims are also disproportionately children; Africa’s share of child trafficking is greater than the world average;\textsuperscript{208} more than sixty percent of detected victims in the region are children.\textsuperscript{209} In Côte d’Ivoire, the United Nations office noted only cases of trafficking in children.\textsuperscript{210} In Nigeria, minors account for half of victims, while Ghana and Sierra Leone report that a majority of trafficking victims are children.\textsuperscript{211}

Of the estimated 3.7 million African victims of exploitation, approximately 800,000 are engaged in forced sexual exploitation, 2.5 million in forced labor, and 400,000 in state-imposed forced labor.\textsuperscript{212} The UN estimates that just fewer than fifty percent of victims in Africa and the Middle East were trafficked for forced labor and just over one third for sexual exploitation. The remaining victims were trafficked for crimes such as use as child soldiers or in ritual practice.\textsuperscript{213} In all categories, that is nearly double the figures in the Caribbean and Latin America.\textsuperscript{214} Annual profits for sexual exploitation in Africa are approximately $8.9 billion, $300 million for domestic work, and $3.9 billion for non-domestic labor ($13.1 billion total).\textsuperscript{215} We noted extensively in Chapter Three the community and public health ramifications of irregular migration streams. This was on acute display in August 2014, when the Liberian Coast Guard helped enforce an unpopular quarantine of Liberia’s West Point neighborhood. The region, “a sprawling slum with tens of thousands of people,” much of which is “made up of shanties separated by alleys wide enough for only one person,” was cordoned off in an effort to stop the spread of Ebola.\textsuperscript{216} The move, a manifestation of the global fears of infectious contagions, was also representative of the need to address issues of human movement in partnership with communities, not in opposition to them. And while Ebola dominated headlines in the summer of 2014, parts of Africa continue to be ravaged by a range of infectious diseases. HIV/AIDS, for example, is still the number one cause of death on the continent,\textsuperscript{217} and human trafficking has been linked to its spread.\textsuperscript{218} We also noted, above and in Chapter Three, the impact of environmental degradation on irregular migration. In West Africa, illegal logging, appropriation of forestland, and unregulated charcoal making all present threats to local ecologies that precipitate migration.\textsuperscript{219}

\textsuperscript{* The Naval Health Research Center in San Diego administers the DOD’s HIV/AIDS Prevention Program, which is intended to help reduce the infection rate of members of Africa’s armed forces, some of which report rates as high as 60%. See, U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, \textit{Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa}, by Lauren Ploch, CRS Report RL34003 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, October 2, 2009), 17.
As with narcotics trafficking, human trafficking is not West Africa’s most visible security threat. Of the top twenty migration corridors identified by the International Organization for Migration, only one African route makes the list, from Burkina Faso seaward to Cote d’Ivoire. On the Department of State’s ranked index for trafficking in persons, most Gulf of Guinea countries are listed as Tier Two. Only one (Angola) is listed as a Tier Two Watch List state and one (Equatorial Guinea) joins the short list of Tier Three non-compliant states. Nevertheless, as we underscored in Chapter Three, crimes, criminals, and the vectors through which they operate are interconnected. Until a theoretical framework is presented that coherently places irregular migration within the wider context of West African littoral insecurity, combatting the trade in people will remain ad hoc and underemphasized.

3.7 Corruption and State Weakness

Corruption in West Africa is widely documented. Its most relevant element for our study, however, is the social psychological component, as expressed in Chapter Three. In an article on piracy, Major Eero Tepp of the Estonian Army writes that a “permissive political environment” is one of the noteworthy consequences of corruption. This permissiveness creates an atmosphere conducive to disorder and whereby corrupt officials lend protection to allied criminal elements. The result, as in the Caribbean, is the questionable legitimacy of political or security establishments. For example, despite the overt criminality of Niger Delta militants, Murphy considers it undeniable that the perception of the oil industry “supporting a corrupt political class” helped groups like MEND substantiate their actions. This political-criminal nexus led Murphy to scrutinize the solution to maritime insecurity, noting that “the attempt to brand it as solely criminal and impose law-based solutions in the absence of a shared appreciation of what criminal means can lead to a sense of frustration.” Such problems cannot be tackled without a shift in how security apparatuses conceptualize criminality.

Corruption is also related to state weakness, which we noted has greatly contributed to the growth of crime in the Gulf of Guinea. Many states in the region score in the bottom ten percent of both rule of law and political stability rankings. Even in Nigeria, West Africa’s largest country by demography and economy, sustained “failure to fund and train coast guards, navies and police has created a situation where the readiness of the Nigerian Navy (NN) is low, the coast guard ineffective and the vast network of river transportation routes is poorly policed.” Though the largest naval force in the region, at around 18,000 people, the Nigerian Navy’s capacity is so degraded that, in 2012, Tepp considered it doubtful any vessel larger than a small patrol boat was serviceable. Here, pirates and criminals are often more seaworthy than the navies set to combat them. That ineffectual security sectors also operate in a “climate of impunity,” employing torture and intimidation, further weakens their effectiveness while generating an attitude of fear and resentment. As we saw with narcotics, the resulting political space afforded by weak or permissive states acts as a surrogate for the “physical sanctuary of coves, creeks, and swamps” where malicious maritime actors have historically settled.

Finally, as with vigilantism, state weakness is also manifested in the growth of private maritime security companies (PMSCs). Some companies have begun employing
Chapter Four: Piracy and Perception in the Gulf of Guinea

armed guards to shepherd ships through dangerous waters, though this has proven a controversial move, and the record of embarked security is mixed. Some fear it will result in escalation with pirates and criminals, and others note a number of legal questions regarding the presence of armed personnel onboard a ship flagged to one state in the territorial waters of another. Yet, state weakness and corruption has often meant that distress calls from ship operators in West Africa go unanswered “eight times out of ten.” It is then no surprise that the continued use of PMSCs remains likely, especially because the presence of patrol boats (even non-navy contractor vessels) seems to aid in deterrence. After oil, private security is the largest sector in the Nigerian economy. As Major Tepp notes, “private navies are on the rise,” and their relation to and influence over weak states is still a matter of debate. While the presence of PMSCs may signal a growing willingness among the able to pay for added security, at a broader level their predominance may only reinforce the perception that states in West Africa do not retain the capacity to project power in the littorals.

4.0 Similarities Summary

The Gulf of Guinea exhibits the same basic traits—multidimensional threats and references to perception and context in its discourse—that make the Caribbean so amenable to an application of the Broken Windows theory. Speaking to multidimensionality, Le Sage writes that “Africa’s irregular threats are not isolated phenomena,” which facilitates a “vicious circle of insecurity.” We know from Chapter Three that trafficking infrastructure is easily co-opted. Likewise in the Gulf of Guinea, where crime, insurgency, and corruption “provide both criminals and terrorists with ready networks for weapons proliferation, illicit finance, and illegal movement of men and material.” Speaking to context, we have seen that local violence, fed by transnational flows, permeates the environment in which so many live. West Africans “are beset by all forms of criminal violence on a day-to-day basis, including robberies, assaults, carjackings, kidnappings, and sexual violence, with little recourse.” Poor healthcare, squalid living conditions, and schools in disrepair are literal broken windows, precipitating “disillusionment and frustration,” which we know from Chapter Two to be so corrosive. In such an environment, “resentment would be at its height...leading to restiveness, conflict, and crime.” All of this is familiar, and suggests that the precepts of the Broken Windows theory are as applicable in the Gulf of Guinea as we showed them to be in the Western Hemisphere. Yet, this particular “malignant environment” has produced one feature unlike what we saw in the Caribbean—rampant piracy. Demonstrating how this can be integrated into a Broken Windows framework is critical for demonstrating the theory’s generalizability.

5.0 Critical Point of Departure—Piracy

Piracy was the first act criminalized under international law—*hostis humani generis*, enemies of all mankind—and its cross-jurisdictional nature helped develop the notion of the high seas as the common heritage of humanity. Yet, piracy today in the Gulf of Guinea is not that of Hollywood lore, and contemporary definitions prove insufficient in addressing it. The most widely used definition of piracy is set out in
Muddy Waters: 
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

Article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the international benchmark for maritime law. According to the convention, piracy is an action that can only take place on the high seas, beyond the territorial sea maximum of twelve nautical miles (nmi) from the baseline.\textsuperscript{249} The high seas include the contiguous zone (the next twelve nmi), the exclusive economic zones (up to 200 nmi from the baseline), and the remainder of international waters beyond. Piratical acts that take place within the territorial sea or internal waters are de jure not piracy but merely armed robbery at sea.\textsuperscript{250} Lisa Otto, of the University of Johannesburg, notes that, while UNCLOS’ intent was to preserve coastal state sovereignty, the resulting arbitrary distinction between piracy and robbery where such actions frequently take place between the territorial and high seas hampers enforcement efforts.\textsuperscript{251} In the case of Somali piracy, this debate has been largely sidestepped. Somalia’s status as a failed state, and the great distance from the coast at which Somali pirates operate, negate many of these legal issues.\textsuperscript{8} In the Gulf of Guinea, however, armed robbery is prevalent in territorial waters—pirates in Nigeria operate from a web of thousands of inland creeks and stream\textsuperscript{252}—and so the dogmatic delineation in legal language has become a pronounced hindrance.

A range of definitions has been proposed to correct the artificial distinction when acts of violence occur along the divide of the territorial sea. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) emphasizes intent over geography, folding robbery at sea and piracy together.\textsuperscript{253} The IMB’s definition, favored by Onuoha over that of UNCLOS’, defines piracy as “an act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act.”\textsuperscript{254} This reflects the wider Gulf of Guinea scholarship, which avoids geographically conditional definitions.\textsuperscript{255} Even the United Nations Security Council’s choice of rhetoric includes robbery at sea as de facto piracy.\textsuperscript{256} While this may help ensure that counter-piracy efforts avoid UNCLOS’ self-imposed strictures, Otto notes that existing legal constructs remain significant institutional barriers.\textsuperscript{257} Otto concludes that a more dynamic construction is imperative in order for piracy to be considered “holistically rather than in individual parts specific to the distance from the coast at which the crime takes place.”\textsuperscript{258} Here, we adhere to the above functional definitions, recognizing that for all practical accounts, the threats, actors, and motivations behind piracy and robbery at sea are “largely the same despite the legal distinction.”\textsuperscript{259}

Formulating a more realistic definition of piracy also includes an understanding of the nexus between piracy and political violence. In 2008 and 2009, militants from the Niger Delta mounted cross-border attacks into the Bakassi peninsula (governed by Cameroon), as well as Malabo (the capital of Equatorial Guinea) in 2009.\textsuperscript{260} Political unrest in the Bakassi peninsula in particular may be an influence,\textsuperscript{261} with the Bakassi Freedom Fighters linked to some attacks.\textsuperscript{262} Of Nigerian pirates, Dirk Steffen, director of maritime security at Risk Intelligence, notes that they are “the same youths who face both oppression and extortion by corrupt security forces in the Niger Delta.”\textsuperscript{263} The interconnectedness of piracy, criminality, and politics leads Vreÿ to identify a “pirate-insurgent-criminality threat.”\textsuperscript{264} He notes that piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is often a

\textsuperscript{1} Somali Piracy has ballooned outwards, now reaching as far as 1,300 nm off the coast (more than half way to India). In Nigeria, on the other hand, piracy is predominant within the twelve nautical miles of the territorial sea and its near environs. See, Lisa Otto, “Westward Ho! The Evolution of Maritime Piracy in Nigeria,” Portuguese Journal of Social Science 13, No. 3 (2014): 322.
display of a “political-criminal link,” just as with oil bunking ashore.\textsuperscript{265} And just as political unrest serves as justification for theft on land, pirates masquerading as insurgents feed predation at sea.\textsuperscript{266}

Perhaps the surest sign of the relationship between piracy and politics is the hypothesis that pirate attacks increase around elections. The managing director of Risk Intelligence, the director of Chatham House’s Africa program, and the International Maritime Bureau have all advanced this theory.\textsuperscript{267} This trend appears to be supported by piracy patterns (though 2011 is an outlier), including an increase in attacks leading up to the 2015 elections.\textsuperscript{268} This brings important questions to the fore about piracy’s role as a “campaign finance mechanism,”\textsuperscript{269} which have not yet been thoroughly understood. As Tepp notes, “piracy has always been tied to the prevailing political situation,” though he stops short of addressing piracy as overtly political.\textsuperscript{270} Otto goes still farther. She questions whether UNCLOS’ apolitical categorization of piracy accurately captures the motivations of some Gulf of Guinea actors.\textsuperscript{271}

This examination of the relationship between piracy and politics bears directly on the hybrid nature of crimes in the littorals. The difficulty in constructing a theory of maritime security is born in part out of the tension between the criminal patina of actors operating in littorals, who possess the capacity (and sometimes the will) to project or influence political power. Police, in our case studies, infrequently have the capabilities necessary to combat threats in the maritime sphere. Yet, leveraging military tactics or materiel is not an easy solution. As we explored in Chapter One, with our conversation on urbicide, militaries have a tendency to ignore the communal nature of security, resulting sometimes in disastrous circumstances. We reinforced this in Chapter Three with our conversation on fortress Caribbean and the standoff in Kingston, Jamaica to arrest Christopher Coke. The solution we presented was melding criminology and military strategy in an effort to bring the theory of community policing in line with the might often imprecisely leveraged by navies or coast guards. By identifying the complicated hybrid nature of Gulf of Guinea piracy, we validate the notion that piracy is similarly amenable to framing in a Broken Windows context.

5.1 The Statistics

Nigeria had a “serious piracy problem” a decade before widespread Somali piracy burst to the fore.\textsuperscript{272} In the early 2000s, Nigeria registered more acts of piracy than did East Africa.\textsuperscript{273} And Gulf of Guinea piracy appears to be enduring. In 2012, it again overtook Somalia in number of attacks.\textsuperscript{274} According to figures from Kamal-Deen, attacks nearly tripled between 2005 and 2007, and swelled yet again between 2010 and 2013 after a short decline (2008-2009).\textsuperscript{275} During the heyday of the Niger Delta insurgency, until the 2009 settlement, incidents were often worst off of Warri, Port Harcourt and Calabar.\textsuperscript{276} The spike in pirate activity following the lull precipitated by the 2009 accord between Nigeria and MEND\textsuperscript{277} demonstrates that piracy persists, even in the face of political settlement, as an increasingly popular option for financial gain. In the aftermath of this agreement, insurgents have not so much joined forces with pirates as simply become pirates themselves.\textsuperscript{278} Recall, in Chapter Three, we detailed the relationship between terrorists and transnational crime—particularly the potential for one to migrate to the latter. We noted that the skillset required to operate as a terrorist are
often exportable to the less ideologically motivated elements of international crime, creating linkages and potential nodes between terror and transnational crime. Moreover, as Le Sage notes, piracy may be ‘contagious,’ producing a copycat effect elsewhere. While the progression from pirates’ political motivations to financial motivations (above) represents a multidimensional element of West African piracy, this contagion serves as a fundamental example of the impact of context. Near Lagos, for example, piracy increased commensurate with spikes in the Delta, with attacks taking place well within range of shore. Acts of piracy also migrated upstream in the Delta, where waterways such as the Port Harcourt–Nembe axis and the Calabar River became hotspots for robbery. Today, Nigeria remains the epicenter of West African piracy. In 2013, according to the International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre, of the approximately 230 incidents they noted worldwide, thirty took place off Nigeria alone. Nigerian waters have seen the greatest number of incidents directed against offshore oilrigs anywhere in the world. This has profound consequences for the cost of shipping in the region, as well as the billions lost to regional countries (estimated up to $2 billion annually). Further, numbers for West African piracy are likely underreported to a greater degree than elsewhere, perhaps by as much as half, giving greater significance to these figures. That piracy breeds more piracy, in part merely by inspiring copycats, is indicative of the crime’s viral quality—and it was an epidemiological representation of crime that Broken Windows produced in Chapter Two, even down to the theory’s adoption in public health. This feedback is likewise expressed in Philip Gosse’s piracy cycle, which outlines a familiar evolution of maritime piracy, from small scale, opportunistic attacks to larger and more organized operations.

Piracy’s contagion is on display across the Gulf of Guinea. While piracy emanates primarily from Nigeria, it is quickly becoming a regional issue. This is difficult to measure in part because states likely underreport acts of piracy. Nevertheless, we can at least discern trends. Attacks on oil tankers, for example, have been registered throughout the “Ghana-to-Angola and Nigeria-to-Côte d’Ivoire axes.” In the summer of 2013, a Maltese ship was hijacked off of Gabon, the first such incident in its waters. Piracy from Guinea appears to have spilled into Sierra Leone, which Kamal-Deen regards as a “portent of organized criminal activity.” Equatorial Guinea reported its first major attack in February 2009, which was particularly telling. In what was first thought to be an attempted coup, approximately fifty armed and poorly informed assailants launched a raid on the presidential palace in Malabo; they later admitted they thought it was a bank or in possession of large sums of money. Some of this piracy outside of Nigerian waters is born of the balloon effect. As Nigeria made gains countering piracy in the late 2000s, Benin went from zero reported attacks in 2009 and one in 2010, to more than twenty in 2011. Greater enforcement off of Benin (with Nigerian help) was then followed by a rise in attacks in Togo (and Nigeria once again). Piracy has also ballooned outward into the high seas, where the number of incidents has continued to grow since 2005.

Piracy is not evenly distributed in the Gulf. Between 2012 and 2014, Togolese and Nigerian piracy accounted for three quarters of incidents in West Africa. Angola only reported its first major hijacking in February 2014. Piracy off of Cameroon and

---

* By Contrast, thirteen incidents were recorded off the coast of Somalia. See, European Union, Fact Sheet: EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea (Brussels: EU, March 17, 2014), 2.
Chapter Four: Piracy and Perception in the Gulf of Guinea

Equatorial Guinea has declined since its height in 2009. Moreover, incidents off of many countries often entail petty theft in ships located very close to shore. Nevertheless, trends in 2013 and 2014 showed piracy continuing to grow and spread southward. The secretary general of the ECCAS acknowledged that maritime insecurity stretches the length of the Gulf of Guinea, from Côte d’Ivoire down to Angola. Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone have become of increasing concern, and Guinea has established itself as a secondary enclave of piracy entirely. Steffen relays that the Gulf of Guinea has averaged, in recent years, between eighty and 100 attacks annually. The definitional disagreements we discussed above, as well as obstacles to full data collection, make reliable statistics difficult to gather. Still, the trends are clear. As the IMB concludes, the Gulf of Guinea is one of the most insecure waterways in the world.

5.2 The Tactics

The word piracy often evokes images of Johnny Depp (or Errol Flynn) swashbuckling in Tortuga, or Captain Phillips held hostage for days. In West Africa, however, piracy takes a much different form. The International Crisis Group identifies three types of maritime criminality there: “the spread of political gangster-ism from the Niger Delta to the Bakassi peninsula; seaborne raids; and increasingly sophisticated acts of piracy.” The latter two can also be described as opportunistic and organized piracy. According to Tepp, opportunistic piracy is “not as much a way of life as a crime of opportunity,” lending the issue particularly well towards an evaluation through a Broken Windows perspective. If crime is opportunistic, that means it is rooted fundamentally in the perceptions of those who perpetrate the acts. And, as we detailed in Chapter Two, if perceptions can be altered, so can actions. Moreover, Kamal-Deen categorizes most Gulf of Guinea piracy leading up to 2005 as opportunistic, when robberies were mostly “subsidiary activities.” He notes that this label is not a commentary on capabilities, but rather about the centrality of piracy for an organization. Such robberies, stealing easily portable cargo and equipment, can net between ten and fifteen thousand dollars in one attack, grossing as much as $1.3 million annually. Coordinated attacks, such as those choreographed against oil tankers, can net nearly triple that figure. In such attacks as many as thirty men in up to five speedboats converge on a target at speeds of sixty knots. This is a surgical strike requiring operational intelligence, unlike the prowling technique often employed in Somalia. Groups including MEND, the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force, and the Niger Delta Vigilante have been identified with this type of attack. Oil theft also includes the involvement of organizations from as far as Eastern Europe or Asia. This connection to transnational crime can be seen in the hijacking of the Duzgit Venture, during which pirates were “in cahoots with other actors about four thousand kilometers away from the point of hijack.” In an attempt to meet, “they sailed the commandeered ship across the coastal waters of five states.”

* Speedboats, which can often outrun naval craft, were already in use by littoral insurgents and were easily repurposed for piracy. See, Ali Kamal-Dee, “The Anatomy of the Gulf of Guinea Piracy,” Naval War College Review 68, No. 1 (Winter 2015): 104.
crime fits into the Broken Windows’ theoretical lens. At the most granular level, transnational crime does not exist in a vacuum—real crime happens in real communities. Organized operations trace their origins to the 1970s, as the oil industry took hold, bringing with it an upsurge in shipping for construction materials (the “cement armada”). Then, piracy was centered on Lagos. As the petroleum industry migrated southeast, stirring feelings of disenfranchisement, piracy followed suit. And note, once again, that something so seemingly intangible as sentiments of discontent, when framed through Broken Windows, takes on greater significance in the context of broader maritime insecurity. This antecedent to contemporary piracy exhibited a number of characteristics that have proven durable. Robbery, for one, was no longer the only apparent motive. Sabotage (and, to a lesser extent, kidnap and ransom) became prominent, and it had become evident that piracy was increasingly part of a complex set of criminal, political, and tribal concerns. Violence also becomes a motif at this stage. Nigerian pirates are accused of being more violent than their Somali counterparts, usually for tactical reasons. The former aim to facilitate an efficient robbery while the latter employ kidnap for ransom and thus need live victims. The use of violence to ensure complicity may also be a result of a lack of safe havens from which Nigerian pirates can conduct ransom negotiations. This violence is also important because successful boardings are more common in the Gulf of Guinea than elsewhere in Africa, which is also noteworthy for the high rate of successful attacks. The use of automatic rifles and rocket-propelled grenades is not uncommon in such attacks.

As Broken Windows would predict, these attacks have an impact on local communities. In particular, piracy has impacted West African fishing more than any other local sector, according to Tepp. Between 2003 and 2008, Nigeria documented nearly 300 pirate attacks on fishing boats. Fishing vessels are also targeted for hijackings. Pirates use stolen trawlers’ expanded ranges to operate as mother ships with which to stage attacks on oil tankers farther to sea, as well as for use as a ruse to approach oil tankers. Recall, above, we discussed the importance of local fishing to the livelihood of regional communities. Moreover, recall the vignette in Chapter Three on fisherman Oneal Burke, from the Jamaican hamlet of Forum. Burke’s community, and those like them, are bellwethers of security. By engaging with such populations, as community policing recommends, authorities are afforded the opportunity to identify the problems most often first detected by communities themselves. It should be no surprise, therefore, that counter-piracy operations frequently see benefits in the fight against IUU fishing as well. This is an explicit endorsement of the multidimensional nature of security in the littorals.

That piracy and terrorism may become linked, therefore, is also not inconceivable, particularly given our understanding of the multidimensionality of crime. Pirates maintain capabilities that many terrorists would envy. Though such a relationship remains a matter of speculation, an attack on a pipeline in February 2012 sparked concerns that Boko Haram might begin to target petroleum infrastructure, including maritime targets. Similar concerns, with some more supporting evidence, in Chapter Three suggest such crime-terror partnerships are possible. Fluid criminal dynamics and

the potential for TCOs to co-opt existing infrastructure make the terror-piracy nexus worth monitoring. Aside from acts of piracy committed in the maritime space, terrorists may also adapt the infrastructure of piracy for use entering and exiting Africa in obscurity, like the Caribbean could be used as a staging ground for acts elsewhere. As we explored in Chapter Three, the capabilities inherent in human smuggling, narcotics trafficking or, as seen here, piracy, overlap. As we also saw in Chapter Three, as well as in our conversation with Captain Morris (see appendix), these linkages are not simply theoretical. While every link may not be of equal strength or validity, the multidimensionality of maritime crime is a fundamental component of framing littoral security. As we saw above, pirates in the Gulf of Guinea threaten good order at sea alongside poachers, narcotics traffickers, and other criminals and insurgents. Piracy is, therefore, not an isolated phenomenon. It is one node in a dynamic web of interrelated issues.

6.0 Broken Windows

6.1 Enforcement Environment

In Chapter Three, we detailed that insecurity in Caribbean littorals, seen through two of Broken Windows’ central tenets (multidimensionality and context specificity), evinced the relevance of applying a criminological lens to maritime security. We also identified that the enforcement environment in the Caribbean added yet more incentive to apply community policing methods in littorals. Heavy-handed tactics employed by hybridized military and law enforcement units often alienate the neighborhoods they were meant to protect. Moreover, the predominance of small actors, each unable to independently address maritime insecurity, necessitates a consensus theory of security to ensure unity of effort. Community policing, for its focus on community problem-solving and its popularity among regional practitioners, presented itself as a ready solution. The Gulf of Guinea faces similar obstacles in the enforcement environment.

First, like the Caribbean, West Africa is highly sensitive to perceptions of militarization of the region, particularly with respect to American military involvement. In part for this reason, the United States has not maintained dedicated counter-piracy assets in the Gulf of Guinea, and programs like the Africa Partnership Station (APS) have been slow to put down roots. This reluctance towards militarization is also part of the reason for AFRICOM’s limited continental footprint (it is based in Stuttgart, Germany). Liberia is in the minority, offering to host an African headquarters for the command. After the announcement of the creation of AFRICOM, most West African military heads issued a statement expressing reservations about the command. And after Nigerian president Umaru Yar’Adua hinted optimism about the command in a 2007 visit to Washington, domestic backlash prompted the foreign minister to walk those comments back. In 2008, Ghana’s president expressed relief after a meeting with George Bush that the U.S. was not planning barracks on African soil. There are, of course, other reasons for nations, particularly those with colonial pasts, to fear the presence of foreign military installations on their soil. Yet, just as the fear of urbicide and ‘fortress Caribbean’—both rooted in the perceptive domain—played a role in framing security in Chapter Three, so too does it in West Africa. In an evaluation for Congress of
the Africa Command, the Congressional Research Service noted concerns over the potential “militarization of development and diplomacy,” with some fearing the Department of State and USAID would play junior roles to the larger DoD.\(^{352}\) And this is not solely an issue of American intervention. As in the Jamaican example of Tivoli Gardens, West African states have also ‘militarized’ their responses to criminality. As Chatham House notes, some countries have created Special Forces units specifically to perform police functions.\(^{353}\)

Second, as in the Caribbean, there is a proliferation of interested regional actors with competing incentives, complicating shared security framing. West African organizations have created a veritable alphabet soup of counter-piracy players—ECCAS, ECOWAS, MOWCA, GGC and more.\(^{354}\) In 2008, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) produced its Integrated Strategy for Maritime Security (ISMS), which aimed to construct a “common regional framework” for action.\(^{355}\) The Yaounde Code of Conduct, signed in June 2013, represents an effort to coordinate counter-piracy efforts by dividing the Gulf into alphabetized areas of responsibility.\(^{356}\) The Maritime Organization for West and Central Africa (MOWCA), in partnership with the IMO, seeks to facilitate an integrated coastal force, though progress has been sluggish.\(^{357,358}\) MOWCA’s membership—it is represented through transport ministers who wield limited influence—and the bureaucratic threat coast guards pose to navies have contributed to this lethargy.\(^{359}\) A similar effort put forth by the Gulf of Guinea Commission, the Gulf of Guinea Guard Force, has also stalled.\(^{360}\) The most successful example of cooperation in recent years comes from a joint cross-border patrol undertaken by Nigeria and Benin in late 2011.\(^{361}\)

Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea also attracts the attention of international actors. UNODC and the International Maritime Organization have both facilitated regional maritime security training,\(^{362}\) and the United Nations Security Council has passed resolutions calling for greater focus on Gulf of Guinea piracy.\(^{363}\) In January 2013, the EU introduced its Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf of Guinea (CRIMGO) program.\(^{364}\) In the spring of 2014, the PLAN visited Cameroon and allegedly participated in counter-piracy drills.\(^{365}\) France has bolstered partnerships with Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Congo-Brazzaville.\(^{366}\) NATO has indicated an interest in a greater presence in the Gulf.\(^{367}\) Even INTERPOL is involved, providing investigative support, underscoring the hybridized nature of littoral security and the potential role of criminology.\(^{368}\)

To provide aid without sparking sensitivities, the United States offers support primarily through partnerships and capacity building. Like SOUTHCOM, AFRICOM’s priorities are not depicted as combat-oriented.\(^{369}\) Responsibilities in both regions include the issues fundamental to perceptions and the contextual domain as seen throughout the preceding chapters: humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, counter-narcotics, and maritime interdiction operations.\(^{370}\) As we discussed in Chapter One, these constabulary operations require “a major break with conventional doctrinal mentalities,” given how they differ in scope and substance with what a navy ‘typically’ does.\(^{371}\)

Africa Command’s naval element has also attempted to “breathe life” into regional agreements, emphasizing joint exercises like Obangame and Saharan Express.\(^{372}\) The Africa Partnership Station and the African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP) programs are particularly aimed at maritime security. These programs draw
Chapter Four: Piracy and Perception in the Gulf of Guinea

still greater parallels to Chapter Three and the hybrid nature of maritime security. APS, for example, began in 2007 with the deployment of HSV-2 Swift and USS Fort McHenry. These ships operate primarily as “floating schoolhouses” to partner with local maritime forces. And given the overlap with constabulary responsibilities, the U.S. Coast Guard is a partner in APS.

Gulf of Guinea states have also begun unilaterally investing in maritime security. In December 2013, Nigeria installed surveillance posts along its coast in a creative effort to dissuade piracy. In early 2014, Côte d’Ivoire publicized its intent to expand its navy by forty ships. In June 2014, Equatorial Guinea debuted a “jury-rigged frigate to lead its emerging naval force,” while Gabon chose to purchase two offshore patrol vessels during a naval exhibition that year. In 2012, the Ghanaian navy greatly expanded its capacity through the acquisition of two German and four Chinese ships. The rate of growth signals the newfound prominence of maritime security and the need for a strategy to guide investment. Yet, it is in multilateralism that the need for a coherent strategy is most apparent. Cooperation will be the theme of West African counter-piracy, since regional national authorities lack the resources to address the problem and international forces lack the legal authority to act independently.

As foreign actors grow ever invested in counter-piracy, and as regional states invest greater sums in capabilities and organizations, the need to arrive at a consensus strategy of maritime security—one that does not lose sight of the local context and inhabitants—is compelling.

West Africa’s panoply of security concerns is leading to greater engagement on the part of Europe, NATO, the United States, and China, not to mention all of the regional littoral states. And yet, maritime security cannot be achieved simply by detaching more ships to the Gulf of Guinea. As the International Crisis Group notes, the only way to successfully address an issue such as piracy is to see it “not just as a security problem but as a form of transnational organised crime.” Consequently, navies in such hotspots are only likely to take on even greater constabulary responsibilities in the future. Moreover, as in the Caribbean, West African transnational criminal organizations diversify into as many product streams as possible. Not only do landward criminal groups engage in the trafficking of people, narcotics, commodities, and weapons, they are also directly related to pirates plaguing coastal waters. Scholars and practitioners who observe the region are in agreement that, despite the public (and academic) fascination with piracy, “it is but one aspect of a wider problem of maritime disorder.” So, why should counter-piracy efforts exist in a void if piracy does not?

A senior official at INTERPOL, Yaron Gottlieb, speaks of the “glocalization” of anti-piracy efforts. He argues, “as criminals take global ideas and implement them at a local level, addressing the problem requires global solutions that are tailored to local environments and conditions.” This is precisely the impetus for the theoretical framework put forth in this dissertation. The decision to investigate a community policing construct is also increasingly relevant. While piracy’s impact on global shipping and oil prices may garner the interest of Western powers, maritime insecurity is particularly

* AMLEP, meanwhile, is similar to the law enforcement detachments (LEDETs) operating in the Caribbean. In this partnership, embarked USCG teams operate alongside host nation law enforcement, often on American ships, to provide law enforcement training and support. See, Chatham House, Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea (London: Chatham House, March, 2013), 32.

† Glocalization reflects the intersection of local phenomena with globally sourced solutions.
important for the havoc it wreaks on local communities. In fact, in West Africa, all of the themes of the previous three chapters converge—multidimensionality, context, Kilcullen’s megatrends, hybrid threats, the need for cooperation, and the shortfalls of evaluating maritime security without reconciling its political and criminal components. We have demonstrated throughout this dissertation that any maritime security proposal will need to embrace communities in order to bring lasting impact. We have even seen this in limited practices, as in Chapter Three when locals in Colombia uncovered a narco-sub operation simply through communal vigilance and collaboration with police. In West Africa, the International Crisis Group similarly advocates engaging with artisanal fishermen, who know their coastal neighbors and could provide intelligence and partnership to maritime authorities. This offers one such step towards incorporating a community policing component to West African littorals, and demonstrates yet again that the Broken Windows theory provides scaffolding compatible with many isolated recommendations in maritime security. Any counter-piracy proposal will also need to address piracy’s multidimensionality. As with transnational crime in the Caribbean, we have seen piracy to be dynamic. Chibuike Rotimi Amaechi, then governor of Nigeria’s Rivers State, notes, “an attacker may one day kidnap on oil worker in order to buy a flashy car; the next day he may join a raid by a militant group and, on the third day, hijack a rig to generate cash for his chief or to get jobs, a new hospital or generator for his village.” This fluidity runs counter to the usual counter-piracy, counter-insurgency, counter-narcotics divides. By improving perceptions and environments—in other words, quality of life—the Broken Windows theory tackles transnational crime by overcoming sophistical barriers and addressing the reality Governor Amaechi describes.

6.2 Discourse

Perceptions and attitudes play a crucial role in Gulf of Guinea piracy. As in the Caribbean, a careful review of the literature reveals frequent allusions to the role of context in maritime security. Otto, for example, notes how a “political culture” of corruption has precipitated “an enabling environment for pirates.” Otto also references “the rise of a culture of violence,” which may inform the character of West African piracy. Otto proposes that the primary difference between Somali and Nigerian piracy is that the former’s state weakness turned into state failure, whereas Nigerian weakness has manifested in “a state in which violence is the norm.” The International Crisis Group refers to a palpable “criminal culture” in the region. This language of norm setting invites a deeper analysis of the discourse on piracy.

Murphy notes that some communities, including in West Africa, are “more likely to resort to piracy because of cultural reasons,” born of a maritime heritage. While Tepp is skeptical of this reasoning, asserting that “Nigeria does not have a true culture of piracy,” he nevertheless agrees that “the crime [now] enjoys social acceptance amongst riverine communities of the Niger Delta.” This support comes in part because of the

feelings of financial and political marginalization discussed above. Of the seven factors Murphy identifies as contributors to piracy, he includes the role of “conflict and disorder,” “permissive political environments,” and “cultural acceptability,” all contextual and perceptual characteristics with obvious relation to our discussion of Broken Windows in Chapter Two. In Nigeria, Murphy continues, “resentment” plays an instigating role in maritime crimes. Harkening back to our conversation above on the contagion of piracy, Murphy contends it can also turn endemic, with its “corrupting influence” becoming self-perpetuating. Many states even lack “the culture to protect maritime matters,” which is “weakly developed” in deference to security threats on land.

Murphy argues that “piracy is a business and can be analyzed as a rational economic activity.” That is a valid lens, and has been applied for decades in criminology as well. Yet, as we have illustrated, crime understood purely on the rational actor model fails to emphasize important elements—namely, multidimensionality and environmental impact. As the Broken Windows theory highlights, and as the discourse on West African piracy supports, disorder breeds disorder. Failure to address insecurity at the ‘softer,’ communal end of the spectrum only increases the cost of intervening at the more violent end.

Proposed solutions to piracy in the Gulf of Guinea are equally evocative of Broken Windows. Rear Admiral Osinowo explicitly includes failure to implement community policing methods as among the major limitations to better addressing maritime insecurity. The European Union similarly identifies aiding “vulnerable communities” as among its primary values in the construction of a Gulf of Guinea strategy. René-Eric Dagorn of Sciences-Po Paris likewise writes that counter-piracy should involve not only state building, but “society building” as well. The sentiment underpinning each of these assertions is that crime cannot be disassociated from communities.

Journalist Stephen Starr, writing for West Point’s Combatting Terrorism Center, speaks directly to the relevance of this dissertation and the comments above. Starr evokes the utility of a theory that joins criminology and maritime security, expressing that the “line between piracy and conventional criminality is becoming increasingly blurred in Nigeria, resulting in the ‘cross-pollination’ of the country’s naval and police forces.” Starr is referencing not only the hybridization of security threats, but the hybridization of responses to those threats (as seen in Chapters One and Three), which we have argued would benefit from greater framing and theorizing. Moreover, as we noted in Chapter One, while this “cross-pollination” is increasingly a reality in practice, there has been little collaborative follow through among the academic disciplines that comment on these issues (Kilcullen and Murphy are among the few who have). This dissertation is an attempt to address that vacuum of cross-pollination.

---

7.0 Conclusion

In this Chapter, we began by illustrating that the Caribbean and the Gulf of Guinea were “most similar” cases. We identified major similarities between the narcotics industry in both regions, and detailed the myriad ‘quality-of-life’ crimes that affect the lives of many living on West Africa’s coast, just as in the Caribbean Basin. We demonstrated, through this approach, that maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea reflected the core components seen in Chapter Three—multidimensionality and the importance of context. As a consequence, we validated the applicability of this cross case comparison as a means of extrapolating Broken Windows relevancy outside of the Caribbean (its generalizability).

In the second half of this illustrative study, we evaluated the crime of piracy, the variant subcomponent between the two cases. In this analysis, we underscored that piracy, despite not being present in Chapter Three’s theory-validating analysis, fits comfortably in the framing provided by the Broken Windows theory. By incorporating this variance into our discussion, we depicted that Chapter Three’s proof of concept demonstration is applicable in a more global context and to a diversity of maritime threats. By highlighting that a variant issue, piracy, can be incorporated into the framing of maritime insecurity’s multidimensional and environmental components, we demonstrated that Broken Windows is capable of serving as a theoretical lens adaptable to new issues, not singular in its application to the Caribbean.

Chapter Four: Piracy and Perception in the Gulf of Guinea

Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

Chapter Four: Piracy and Perception in the Gulf of Guinea

91 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa: The Threat to Stability and Development (with Special Reference to Guinea-Bissau) (New York: UNODC, December 2007), 1, 10.
Muddy Waters: Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory


Chapter Four: Piracy and Perception in the Gulf of Guinea


Muddy Waters: Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

Chapter Four: Piracy and Perception in the Gulf of Guinea


Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

Chapter Four: Piracy and Perception in the Gulf of Guinea


Chapter Four: Piracy and Perception in the Gulf of Guinea

Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

Chapter Four: Piracy and Perception in the Gulf of Guinea

Muddy Waters: Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory


Chapter Four: Piracy and Perception in the Gulf of Guinea

Chapter Five: Evolving Security Conceptions in the Straits

“Whoever is lord of Malacca has his hand on the throat of Venice” Fifteenth century saying,¹ attributed to Duarte Barbosa.

1.0 Introduction

In Chapter Three, we employed the Caribbean as a primary case study in which we illustrated the feasibility of applying the Broken Windows theory as a lens for framing maritime security. To do so, we traced in detail the lifecycle of transnational crime in the Caribbean Basin, from major international trends to the local insecurities that accompany them. Next, in Chapter Four, we turned towards our first illustrative case study, the Gulf of Guinea, the primary burden of which was to demonstrate the applicability of our Caribbean conclusions to a more global framework. To emphasize the generalizability of our findings, we employed a narrative structure similar to Chapter Three, in which we sketched in parallel many of the same crimes and attitudes that lent themselves to our framework in the Caribbean. Finally, we strengthened our argument for generalizability by highlighting an element, piracy, far more prominent in the Gulf of Guinea literature than in the Caribbean. This demonstrated that the theory was capable of framing a new issue through the same lens we constructed in Chapter Three. In this second illustrative case study, we disengage from the parallel structural approach used in the last two chapters. In this concluding study, we turn towards a conversation on a region that is widely considered to have met its maritime insecurity head on, along the way developing some of the most mature literature in maritime security research. By demonstrating the relevance of a Broken Windows lens even here, we lend yet still greater credibility to the argument for generalizability.

This third case study, the second of our illustrative cases, represents a “deviant” case from that of the Gulf of Guinea. In this case, we turn to evaluate a region that has responded forcefully to the threat of piracy—the divergent subcomponent of maritime disorder highlighted in the second half of Chapter Four. Unlike in the Gulf of Guinea or Caribbean Basin, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are not bordered by a proliferation of weak states (only one, Indonesia). Here, only three states ring the region of study, two of which maintain strong or moderate capacity for local power projection. Nevertheless, we will demonstrate in this chapter that, despite dedicated efforts to address and suppress piracy (the dependent variable between cases two and three), issues in framing and theorizing have led to obstacles in practice. Moreover, we will demonstrate that the literature on maritime security in Southeast Asia, some of the most established on the subject, has begun to echo sentiments of a Broken Windows lens as theorists wrestle with the durability of piracy. Thus, while Chapter Four provides proof of generalizability through the inclusion of another variant of disorder (piracy), this chapter reinforces the argument for generalizability by analyzing longstanding counter-piracy efforts and demonstrating the value of Broken Windows even in this context.

2.0 Overview

A strait is a narrow stretch of water connecting two larger bodies—in this case, two very narrow stretches of water, connecting some of the most vital shipping routes in the world. Collectively, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore constitute the longest and most used waterways in international shipping.² The Strait of Malacca runs approximately six hundred
Chapter Five: Evolving Security Conceptions in the Straits

nautical miles, from the Andaman Sea to the South China Sea. More specifically, the International Hydrographic Organization places the Malacca Strait “between the west coast of Thailand and Malaysia in the northeast, and the coast of Sumatra in the southwest.” At its narrowest, the six hundred mile long Strait of Malacca is only one and a half miles wide, situated between Peninsular Malaysia and Sumatra. The Singapore Strait, which bridges the Strait of Malacca with the South China Sea, is even narrower at points, winnowing down to 1.2 miles across, never more than fifteen miles wide, as it winds between peninsular Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia’s Riau Islands. These narrow lanes serve as arteries for the global economy. By tonnage, more than half of the world’s shipping traffic passes through the Straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok annually. And according to Japan’s Ministry of Land Infrastructure and Transport, regional maritime traffic could exceed 100,000 ships by 2020. This traffic carries much more than just goods bound for market in the west. These shipping lanes have deep strategic significance to China, Japan, South Korea and other rapidly industrializing states in need of Arabian oil and natural gas. And it is not only commercial vessels that rely on the maritime highways of Southeast Asia. American warships likewise employ this causeway to the Middle East, transiting from operations in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea to the South China Sea. With the advent of the pivot to Asia, and a post-9/11 emphasis on radical Islamic groups, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore have drawn still greater attention from American naval planners. The Bush administration, for example, launched three maritime security initiatives during the 2000s—the Container Security Initiative (CSI), the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI)—each with an eye towards Southeast Asia.

As we also noted in Chapter One, Southeast Asia’s population is heavily clustered in the littorals. Two-thirds of Southeast Asian residents live in, or are reliant on, the maritime sphere—perhaps as many as 40% living within 60 miles of the coast. These waterways connect three of the most populous states in the world: China, India, and Indonesia. As we intimated in Chapter One, climate change presents real concerns for such coastally concentrated populations. The combination of coastal congestion and global climate change precipitates real concerns, not only of human security but also of regional instability through disruptions to traditional livelihoods and irregular migration. Already Southeast Asia is, according to some, the “most disaster affected area in the world,” prompting the establishment of a regional coordination center for disaster relief in Singapore, and increasing focus on HA/DR by local armed forces.

Unlike in our previous case studies, however, the area of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is dominated geographically by few (only three) littoral states—though other nations

---

† Whose companion piece is the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT).
along adjacent sea routes and critical user states serve to augment the ranks of interested parties. Yet, even without this cadre of interested parties, the three littoral states alone—Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia—are widely diverse in wealth, size, and governance. Justin Hastings of the Georgia Institute of Technology notes the extent of this diversity: “Singapore, one of the wealthiest countries (with one of the highest levels of state capacity) in the world, is connected to Malaysia, a middle power, by two bridges, and is within sight of Indonesia, one of the globe’s weaker (but non-failed) states.” 19

Singapore is a city-state. The country’s position at the southern extremity of the Strait of Malacca has helped it develop as a focal point for global shipping, both as a hub for oil refining20 and as one of the two busiest container ports in the world.21 More than 100,000 ships visit Singapore annually, averaging out to a vessel entering the Singapore Strait every four minutes.22 And while Singapore dominates financially, Malaysia and Indonesia dominate geographically. Two non-contiguous halves principally form Malaysia, one on the peninsula north of Singapore, the other on the island of Borneo, which it shares with Indonesia (and Brunei). Indonesia is far more fractious by comparison. It is an archipelagic state composed of 17,000 islands23 spread across three million square kilometers of territorial and archipelagic waters, in addition to another three million square kilometer EEZ.24 Beyond Indonesia’s 39 legally recognized ports, the country’s archipelagic nature has bred thousands of illegal ports, called “jalan tikus [alternative routes],” according to Brigadier General Dedy Fauzi Elhakim of Indonesian counternarcotics.25 The gradations in capacity and priorities among the three littoral states, and neighbors including the Philippines and Thailand, make for a compelling environment in which to test our Broken Windows best practices.

In another distinction from our previous case studies, Southeast Asia is wracked by more obvious great-power conflicts than is visible in the Caribbean or West Africa. These tensions promulgate a variety of significant threat scenarios of which naval planners must be cognizant, as noted by Sam Bateman, professor at the University of Wollongong’s Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security. One of these major threats includes the potential for sovereignty skirmishes.26 The conditions that make such skirmishes possible, born of regional territorial disputes to which we will return, serve as obstacles to greater intraregional maritime cooperation. Mutual hostilities reign, particularly with respect to Singapore’s perceived, contradictory character as both an apparent Western and Chinese outpost. Such skirmishes could even precipitate what Bateman labels “catastrophic threats,” such as a conflict between ASEAN states and China, perhaps over the disputed Spratly islands, around which the Straits would serve as the primary trans-oceanic chokepoint.27 Yet, as Bateman also notes, the probability of an incident occurring decreases as its lethality increases, meaning that the most endemic threats—namely, the small scale, ‘quality of life’ crimes we have discussed at length—are not the ones about which strategists think most.28 Bateman identifies many of the same low level issues as we described in the Caribbean Basin and the Gulf of Guinea, including pollution, piracy and robbery at sea, trafficking in goods and people, IUU fishing, and climate change.29

Just as in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Guinea, narcotics trafficking and, consequently, money laundering, are endemic. More than sixty percent of global opium is cultivated across South and Southeast Asia, presenting real threats to good order at sea.30 Two-thirds of illicit poppy is cultivated in the Golden Triangle region adjacent to these busy waterways, in Burma,
Chapter Five: Evolving Security Conceptions in the Straits

Thailand and Laos, drawing comparisons between Southeast Asia and the Caribbean.\textsuperscript{31} There is similarly a tradition of moving drugs through maritime conveyance, either from Burma through seaports to Singapore and Malaysia or farther east departing from Thai coasts.\textsuperscript{32} From Singapore and Malaysia, narcotics have been shipped to destinations as far as Australia and New Zealand.\textsuperscript{33} Amphetamines also built momentum in the late 1990s and early 2000s, moving between the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, where the use of such drugs reached “epidemic proportions.”\textsuperscript{34} The impact of this trade is the same the world over. As seen in Chapters Three and Four, “the networks and illicit markets supporting traffickers undermine the rule of law and weaken public institutions. They perpetuate corruption and contribute to geopolitical tensions throughout the region.”\textsuperscript{35}

Similarly, IUU fishing, as in the Gulf of Guinea, threatens the livelihood of regional subsistence fishermen, some of whom are catching just 15 percent of what they did a half-century ago.\textsuperscript{36} An estimate by the Indonesian government placed annual losses to IUU fishing at $4 billion, much higher than the estimated cost of regional piracy.\textsuperscript{37} For this reason, the current Indonesian government has expanded a policy of sinking captured illegal trawlers.\textsuperscript{38} Clashes among law enforcement, illegal fishers, and other fishing groups are frequent, occasionally violent, and run the risk of escalating tensions stoked by disputed maritime boundaries.\textsuperscript{39,40} The region is in fact replete with unresolved border disputes, including: “the northern Malacca Straits where there is no EEZ boundary between Malaysia and Indonesia, [and] the eastern approaches to the Singapore Straits where sovereignty over key features is divided between Malaysia and Singapore.”\textsuperscript{41} Indonesia and Malaysia took a dispute over two islands near Borneo to the International Court of Justice, which, in 2002, ruled in Malaysia’s favor.\textsuperscript{42} China, with the Nine Dash Line map through which the nation lays claim to a substantial portion of the South China Sea, is a party to a great number of border disputes throughout the region.\textsuperscript{*} Consequentially, “virtually all shipping” transiting the Malacca and Sunda Straits must pass the Spratly Islands\textsuperscript{43} and some of the most contentiously disputed real estate in the world.

Like narcotics and IUU fishing, irregular migration and human trafficking are also abundantly present in the region. Extensive international coverage of the plight of stranded Rohingya Muslims, abandoned by their traffickers at sea in 2015, brought global attention to an issue of longstanding in the region.\textsuperscript{44} Migrants take various routes, many beginning on foot passing between Bangladesh, Burma and Thailand on through the latter’s land border with Malaysia,\textsuperscript{45} though maritime routes persist. Indonesia and Malaysia in particular serve as gateways for the smuggling and trafficking of people from as far afield as Afghanistan and Iraq into Australia, in everything from fishing boats to container ships.\textsuperscript{46} Lieutenant Commander John Bradford (USN) notes that criminality has pervasive effects on a population, including a proliferation of disease and communal violence,\textsuperscript{47} factors that precipitate migration flows. Bateman, moreover, notes that greater poverty and climate change could provoke still greater human migration, much as we discussed in Chapters One, Three, and Four.\textsuperscript{48} And, as usual, corruption plays a critical role in greasing the wheels for the myriad maritime crimes committed in Southeast Asian waters, from “fees” paid by illegal fishermen to Indonesian naval personnel, to the involvement of some of the same personnel in human trafficking.\textsuperscript{49} None of these issues can be resolved simply or in isolation.

---

* The ICJ is also currently hearing a territorial dispute case between the Philippines and China.
Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

Finally, as in the Gulf of Guinea, the maritime crime for which Southeast Asia is most commonly associated is piracy. The region’s geography plays a large role in the growth of this predation. Chokepoints like the narrower segments of the Straits force vessels to sharply reduce their speeds, making for easier targets. High ship volumes (70,000 a year in 2011), combined with natural hazards such as shallow reefs and numerous small islands, further force ships to reduce speed when entering the Straits. The narrowness of the waterways leaves slower ships vulnerable to attack from land-based pirates, an important tactical distinction from Somali piracy. This geography was so forgiving for maritime criminals that, by 2000, the IMB declared the Strait of Malacca the world’s piracy hub. Meanwhile, Lloyd’s, the insurance giant, labeled the region a de facto war zone in response to rising concerns over the nexus between piracy and terrorism (to which we will speak below). As in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Guinea, criminals manipulate borders and geography while engaging in “state capacity arbitrage,” leveraging the weaknesses of neighboring countries against one another (i.e. stealing goods in an unsecured Malaysian port and laundering the proceeds through Singapore’s modern financial infrastructure) and evading pursuit by crossing maritime borders.

As the 1990s came to a close, Southeast Asia boasted the highest piracy rates in the world—and they were only on the rise. From 1997 to 2002, attacks increased from 22 to 164. Moreover, as pirates became wealthier and more organized, the sophistication of attacks grew from hit-and-runs to hijackings and kidnappings. The shipping community was quick to respond, establishing in 1992 the International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) in Kuala Lumpur. The international community lagged only slightly in comparison, taking an interest in the latter half of the decade, according to the Joint Services Command and Staff College’s Catherine Zara Raymond. According to Raymond, piracy in the region built momentum as coastal communities responded to the Asian financial crisis. Several high-profile attacks from 1997 through the end of the decade may have also encouraged shippers to report attempted attacks, causing reports to rise from virtually zero to 75 in the span of only a few years (though likely still underreported). As we will see in the coming sections, the regional response to piracy, its initial success, and its long-term struggles offer a clear strategic case for the inclusion of Broken Windows principles as a lens for maritime security planning in the region.

3.0 Piracy

For two decades, more than half of piracy reported worldwide has taken place in and around the South China Sea, clustered around Malaysia, Singapore and, predominantly,

---


† Piracy imposes a number of costs on shipping. Beyond the value of goods stolen and rising insurance premiums, the need for tankers to sail at higher speeds to avoid being targeted could add almost $90,000 a day per ship in added fuel consumption costs. See, Ted Kemp, “Crime on the High Seas: The World’s Most Pirated Waters,” CNBC, September 15, 2014, http://www.cnbc.com/2014/09/15/worlds-most-pirated-waters.html.
Indonesia. According to the Nottingham Trent University’s Renwick and Abbot, between 1991 and 1997, 328 of Southeast Asia’s 579 reported attacks took place in Indonesian waters alone. Notwithstanding Indonesia’s heavy footprint, piracy by its nature remains an international problem around the straits. For Singapore, whose financial health depends on the free flow of goods through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, piracy has been a driving priority from the earliest signs of trouble, prompting investment in coastal surveillance and patrols from the 1990s. Malaysia soon followed suit, as did Indonesia under pressure from the other two littoral states, and counter-piracy became akin to a regional specialty. While initially promising, these individual state efforts and nascent bilateral initiatives proved insubstantial in the face of mounting attacks, and the three states fell behind the crushing growth of piracy in the straits. As the international community took notice as the millennium came to a close, counter-piracy in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore entered a phase of investment and scrutiny that would prove fruitful, if perhaps unsustainable.

3.1 Response

A number of diverse parties helped drive the littoral states towards an investment in maritime security. First, the growing impact of piracy on international shipping brought the IMB, IMO, shipping companies and insurance companies to the table. Second, following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States took a greater interest in securing the straits from terrorism, an interest heightened by rumors circulating that pirates were hijacking ships in the straits in order to learn how to navigate (seen in the guise of the 9/11 hijackers attending flight school). When, in June 2005, the insurance giant Lloyd’s Joint War Committee listed the Strait of Malacca as a war risk zone, raising the cost of shipment for producers and user states alike, it became financially imperative for Singapore, and to a lesser extent Malaysia and Indonesia, to respond emphatically to the piracy epidemic.

The regional response was robust and international at the highest reaches of government. As early as 2003, the members of the tenth ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) addressed the threat of piracy at a ministerial level through a declaration of cooperation on maritime security. In 2004, the littoral states initiated Trilateral Coordinated Patrols under the operational name MALSINDO to better organize their independent surveillance activities. These patrols produced no immediate impact on piracy rates, though they signaled a willingness on the part of regional states to act collectively on maritime security. One year later, the littoral states introduced joint air patrols under the Eyes in the Sky (EiS) program. In 2006, the two programs were merged into the Malacca Straits Patrols. Also in 2006, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) was announced in Singapore. The agreement is another noteworthy example of successful multilateralism in the region—ReCAAP was the world’s first intergovernmental organization devoted to counter-piracy—and was established to provide better reporting on maritime crime and best practices.

The importance of the free and financially expedient flow of goods through the straits weighs not only on the littoral states, but on user states as well. One of the largest user states is Japan, which has been an enthusiastic contributor to stabilization efforts. Since the 1990s, the maritime authorities of Southeast Asian nations have been invited to Japan to train with the

---

Japanese Coast Guard (JCG). Japan’s Coast Guard makes frequent visits across the region, offering instruction and collaboration, in addition to the country’s founding role in ReCAAT. With Japanese help, Jakarta instituted a coast guard to augment and synthesize the disparate enforcement responsibilities of its nine agencies and the local jurisdictions that organizationally maintained authority over maritime enforcement. Indonesia, it should be noted, has made strides to unify this structure, creating Navy Control Command Centers and establishing regencies along international borders in an attempt to address piracy’s perceived root causes, like poverty. Indonesia’s Ministry of Home Affairs, meanwhile, has initiated similar “dissuasion programs,” whose name itself implies an implicit understanding of the importance of perception in maritime crime. Malaysia has also attempted to centralize its maritime components under a unifying coast guard, the Malaysian Maritime Law Enforcement Agency (MMEA), which reorganized five agencies under one roof in spring 2005. Also in 2005, Malaysia invited the JCG to train personnel in this newly formed coast guard. The Japanese non-profit Nippon Foundation donated training vessels to Malaysia in 2006. That same year, the Japanese government announced it would donate several patrol boats to Indonesia. Malaysia has also been investing in capacity and surveillance independently. In 2000, the nation stood up a counter-piracy task force within the Royal Malaysian Marines and trained dozens of officers in a special “marine police tactical unit.” In 2003, it acquired new patrol vessels and invested in radar stations to more effectively monitor traffic along the Malacca Strait. In 2006, Malaysia announced it would acquire up to fifteen new police vessels to aid in its goal of twenty-four hour surveillance of the Strait, while the country’s navy acquired an auxiliary vessel to support maritime security operations as recently as January 2016.

The United States has also played a role in response, often through capacity building facilitated by the Global Train and Equip Program, and funding lent to the South East Asian Regional Center for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT). Through the installation of coastal radars, ship transfers, and multinational exercises, the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard have delivered further millions in aid and training to the three littoral states. The Cooperation and Readiness Afloat (CARAT) program is one such example, through which the United States’ maritime services annually exercise alongside the three littoral states as well as Thailand, the Philippines, and Brunei. SEACAT, Southeast Asian Cooperation Against Terrorism, is yet another U.S.-led multinational maritime exercise in the region, begun in 2002. The U.S. has also donated materiel, including fifteen patrol boats to the Indonesian Marine Police in 2008. In 2011, a retired Coast Guard cutter, USCGC Hamilton, became the Philippine Navy’s flagship. Port visits have increased over the last decade as emphasis on the region has grown, with USN visits to Malaysia nearly tripling from 2006 to 2010, and a large naval delegation (including the aircraft carrier USS George Washington) attending Indonesia’s independence celebrations in 2009. Also in 2009, the United States Navy established “formal, recurring talks” with Japan, South Korea and Australia, all prominent user states, initiated high-level talks with Singapore, and expanded exchanges between fleet and combatant commanders and their regional counterparts, to build personal and institutional relationships across services. Yet

* In maritime security, as in criminology, the focus often remains fixed on ‘root causes.’ While these are doubtless important to address, recall that a value of Broken Windows in New York was its ability to impact crime rates even while long-running root causes eluded quick solutions.
† Singapore, by contrast, has historically maintained a highly structured approach to maritime security, with a Maritime and Port Authority, a Police Coast Guard, and a Navy; a Maritime Security Task Force coordinates their collective maritime efforts. See, Yun Yun Teo, “Target Malacca Straits: Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30, No. 6 (2007): 543.
another program, the Maritime Law Enforcement Initiative (MLE), builds more directly on the constabulary nature of maritime insecurity in the region, providing resources to help regional states combat human trafficking, narcotics and weapons smuggling, IUU fishing, and environmental crimes. Even intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations have lent a hand. In addition to the IMB’s Piracy Reporting Centre, the International Maritime Organization has inaugurated programs including the Marine Electronic Highway Project to enhance safe passage of the waterways. Other international organizations involved in maritime security in Southeast Asia include ASEAN (including ARF and the ASEAN Security Community), APEC, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, and the World Bank.

Despite figures suggesting a decline in piracy as a consequence of so much investment, not everyone interpreted the data as a blanket success. Sheldon Simon, of the Arizona State University, wondered in 2011 whether piracy had disappeared in the Straits or “simply relocated to the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean approaches to the strait,” like the balloon phenomenon would suggest. Bradford similarly notes that piracy rates did not decline uniformly, and that rates increased near Sabah, driving Malaysian piracy rates up threefold at the same time they were declining more broadly. Simon notes surges in 2008 in the Riau Archipelago south of Singapore, as well as in the region of the northern Malacca Strait, between Sumatra and Malaysia’s west coast. Piracy suppression in the Malacca Strait may have driven piracy eastward to the Singapore Strait and deeper into Indonesian waters, but it has had impacts farther afield as well. Raymond notes that while the international community was focused on reducing piracy incidents in the Strait of Malacca, insecurity grew in other waters connecting Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, including the Sulu and Celebes seas. These seas create a “triborder sea area” linking the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia, a critical junction made a haven by transnational criminals.

Nevertheless, by conventional acceptance, piracy was on the wane by the mid-2000s. Figures peaked at 165 attacks in 2004, according to the IMB-PRC, and declined in 2005 (108), 2006 (83), and 2007 (70) across Southeast Asia. More specifically, figures within the straits declined from 38 reported in 2004 to 10 in 2007. Something, it seemed, was working. The literature, however, is inconclusive regarding what particular initiatives were most responsible for this overall decline in piracy rates. This is a critical point. Despite apparent downward trends in piracy rates, the literature remains largely unable to identify specific actions or programs responsible for the decline. Lieutenant Commander John Bradford (USN) notes, for example, that four years after the initiation of trilateral surface patrols among the littoral states, it remained unclear if such actions shared any relationship with declines in incident rates. ‘Probably,’ ‘may have,’ and ‘most likely’ are often the closest analyses come to linking the decline in reported incidents through the mid-2000s to the myriad initiatives underway at the time. There are even a few competing explanations on the piracy decline that discount state action entirely. Perhaps the most common dissenting theory is that the 2004 tsunami that ravaged the region played a role in the reduction in piracy, though this is perhaps undercut by the reality that rates fell in regions untouched by the disaster as well. Raymond posits a theory that the devastation wrought by the tsunami on piracy-prone Aceh, an Indonesian province long plagued by a separatist insurgency and hit hard by the surge, may have contributed to ending the conflict and, by extension, piracy in the broader region. The contagious and multidimensional nature of piracy depicted in the previous chapter, and the tipping point argument explored in Chapter Two, would certainly lend credence to an argument that a reduction in piracy in a particular hotspot could radiate effects outward. Such unique hypotheses aside, however, the general
consensus has been that a combination of the efforts noted above had a collective impact on the issue of piracy. And they may have—for a time.

3.2 Resurgence

As Simon notes, “there is an important distinction between piracy deterrence and suppression—currently effective in the strait—and alleviation of the underlying causes of maritime crime.” Until maritime insecurity is addressed in a broader context, states can only hope to cope with piracy. By dint of the frequent focus on a single threat vector, the counter-piracy suppression initiatives employed in Southeast Asia generally failed to target the architectures of intertwined security relationships” that make transnational crime so resilient, and to which we have dedicated so much space in this dissertation. Lessons learned from our application of Broken Windows suggest that this narrow lens ignores the driving effect of the environment on decision-making and disorder. The rise in regional piracy rates in recent years suggests that piracy suppression is no longer adequate in the face of wider maritime insecurity. Indeed, after an interlude of rampant growth off of the Horn of Africa, piracy prevalence has, since the early part of this decade, drifted across the Indian Ocean back to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore where the issue has thus far proven endemic—despite laudable efforts.

Despite decades of investment, the IMB continues to issue piracy warnings for mariners transiting near Indonesia, the Malacca Strait, and the Singapore Strait. And while rates have stayed low in some places, they have climbed in others, as near Malaysia’s Tanjung Piai cape and Indonesia’s Bintan Island, adjacent to Singapore. Overall, reports of piracy in the region tripled between 2009 and 2014, and once again half of the world’s reported piracy takes place off the coasts of the three littoral states. Of the six countries that represent three quarters of the world’s reported piracy incidents, only Nigeria is outside of the Indian Ocean, with Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia comprising more than half of the attacks counted among those six nations. Of the thirty-six “serious attacks” listed in the IMB’s 2014 report (the most recent at the time of writing), twenty took place in Southeast Asia, and almost half occurred near the three littoral states alone. Worldwide, of the ports that reported three or more incidents in 2014, half belonged to the littoral states (five in Indonesia, one in Malaysia, and one in the Singapore Straits), constituting two-thirds of incidents reported in those anchorages. Similarly, of the 204 actual reported attacks in 2014, nearly two thirds took place in the straits or waters adjacent to the littoral states. According to ReCAAP, 2014 was among the most dangerous years in nearly a decade, something the IMB-PRC corroborates. Early data for 2015 shows these trends have continued, as Southeast Asia—particularly the Straits—struggles with a nearly twenty percent increase in reported piracy.

---

* Indonesia is in a class all its own with respect to piracy rates. 100 vessels were reported attacked in Indonesian waters in 2014, the most recent reporting year as of writing. Almost all of these attacks were incidents of attempted or successful armed robbery within the archipelago. The Indonesian Marine Police have succeeded in driving down armed robbery rates in about a dozen designated safe harbors, though hundreds of anchorages remain vulnerable. See, ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for the Period 1 January-31 December 2014 (London: ICC IMB, January, 2015), 29, 32
Chapter Five: Evolving Security Conceptions in the Straits

Piracy rates have ebbed higher since a trough in the mid-2000s and, between 2008 and 2012, Southeast Asia was still the second most pirate-prone region in the world;[140] only the Horn of Africa ranked higher.[141] Year-on-year trends paint an even less optimistic picture. Incidents in Indonesian waters are up 150% compared to 2010; incidents in Malaysia are up by one-third from that same year; and reported incidents in the Singapore Strait have more than doubled in that same time.[142] While overall incident rates (attempted and successful) have declined globally over recent years, the number of successful attacks has jumped, due predominantly to incidents in Southeast Asian waters.[143][144] And Indonesia is not alone as a target among littoral states; Malaysia witnessed some of the largest year-on-year increases in incident reports in 2014.[145] Most of these attacks, some targeting small oil tankers,[146] are far more reminiscent of the small-scale attacks described in the Gulf of Guinea, than the more sensational Somali model.[147][148] As one news report remarked: “if Somali pirates act like muggers, attacking isolated targets out of sight of the authorities, south Asia’s [sic] pirates act more like pick-pockets, using the crowd itself as cover.”[149] Crowded waterways conceal criminals, like they did for the terrorists coming ashore in Mumbai in 2008, the scene with which we opened this dissertation.[150] This cover is part of the environment within which maritime disorder persists, and cannot be disassociated.

Muddy Waters: Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

from our understanding of security in the littorals. Similarly, as ReCAAP’s Assistant Director Lee Yin Hui notes, more than half of the incidents reported in the most recent reporting period were petty thefts, opportunistic in nature.151152 These are the very types of crimes to which the Broken Windows theory is most relevant. Recall, in Chapter Four, that we linked opportunistic piracy with the ‘quality-of-life’ crimes outlined in Chapter Two.

3.3 Obstacles to Collective Effort

Even a weak state, with help, can garner investment to meet a specific threat in a specific location for a defined duration, as was the case in 2005 and 2006 when the littoral states were induced to action by Lloyd’s war risk zone designation.153 Indonesia, for example, initiated Operation Gurita in 2005, deploying at least 20 ships to piracy prone waters.154 Such surges are often unsustainable, however. In 2005, almost a decade into the piracy spike in the region, perhaps as little as 25155 to 30 percent of Indonesia’s naval vessels were seaworthy,156 and the country maintained as few as one or two functional aircraft for maritime surveillance.157 Indonesia’s defense minister put operational estimates higher, but at a still dispiriting sixty percent.158 Even at full operational levels, the Indonesian fleet is less than half the size necessary to patrol its waters, according to then naval Chief of Staff Admiral Slamet Soebijanto.159,160 As noted by Noel Choong, former head of the Piracy Reporting Centre, Indonesia’s investments matter; “a lot lies with Indonesia and with how long they will sustain their patrols, which do cost millions.”161 Indonesia’s “anemic maritime budget,” which was funded at only a third of the requested amount as recently as 2009, makes it impossible for Jakarta to maintain situational awareness over its 17,000 islands.162 Low pay and poor morale, a direct consequence of resource shortfalls, have even led some analysts to suspect elements of the Indonesian Navy and maritime police of complicity in local crimes.163 Some peripheral states are no less well off. In late 2014, the Philippine Navy announced plans to modernize a fleet that, until now, has been marked predominantly by “museum pieces.”164 To compensate, authorities have asked local fisherman to report crimes they see in their coastal and maritime communities,165 inadvertently instituting the central element of any good Broken Windows, community policing approach. As we saw in Chapters Three and Four, this community engagement can have an impact. In the former, locals in Colombia detected and disrupted a narco-sub production ring in partnership with local authorities. In the latter, fishermen from a Senegalese village reported a suspicious vessel to the local Gendarmerie, who found it packed with cocaine.

Yet, there is more to the shortfalls of maritime security in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore than resource constraints. A range of issues, including sovereignty sensitivities and issue prioritization, serve as obstacles to the collective framing and action necessary to make the midcentury policing model (enforcement and interdiction) effective in the maritime space. As we mentioned above, territorial claims in Southeast Asia bracket any conversation on regional security frameworks. Sovereignty concerns are a recurring refrain in the literature and are of particular importance for Malaysia and Indonesia.166 This emphasis on territorial integrity is an outgrowth of the non-contiguous, archipelagic and maritime nature of these two states, whose wealth and influence are directly related to the extent of their dominion over adjacent waterways. Due to such sovereignty concerns, Indonesia and Malaysia have been slow to engage in multilateral pacts beyond the three littoral states. They are not, for example, signatories to the SUA Convention, nor are they party to ReCAAP.167,168 Even Indonesia, most in need of capacity building aid, has drawn a red line around the presence of foreign militaries.169
When, in 1999, Japan’s Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi proposed a regional coast guard initiative, ASEAN states responded tepidly, and China with outright opposition. While some of this tepidity is a result of Japan’s wartime legacy in East Asia, modern politics plays a role as well. China, for example, viewed the Japanese initiative as an avenue through which to expand regional influence. Indonesia and Malaysia went so far as to agree to participate in exercises, but balked at the prospect of armed vessels in their territorial waters. An inadequate appreciation for the depths of sovereignty considerations was also a factor in the defeat of an earlier Japanese proposal in 1996. As a result of these defeats, Major Victor Huang (Republic of Singapore Navy) concludes that, “in general, attempts by extraregional powers to exert leadership are likely to trigger unfavorable reactions from rivals.”

American initiatives are viewed no less suspiciously by the littoral states. In March 2004, misreported (and misinterpreted) remarks by Admiral Thomas Fargo, who was quoted as suggesting the presence of American sailors in the straits under the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), prompted quick rebuke. Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi quipped, “I think we can look after our own area.” One Malaysian maritime security commentator considered the perceived American attempt to send troops to the region under RMSI as a Singaporean ploy intended to thwart the modernizing Malaysian military. Another expert, B.A. Hamzah, former director general of the Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA), wondered if RMSI disguised an American effort to seek out new enemies in the region, “using the Straits of Malacca as a pretext” or concealing a “hidden agenda.” Retired Malaysian Navy Captain and MIMA research fellow Mat Taib Yasin enumerated several elements of the RMSI program that rankled regional officials, including familiar references to sovereignty and political spillover, as well as doubts of American sincerity and intentions. The overt regional hostility to RMSI’s perceived intentions demonstrates this tendency towards “ambivalence or outright rejection” of most frameworks introduced by extraregional powers. Any successful vision for maritime security in the region must negotiate the need to balance external funding with a perspective on security that recognizes territorial concerns.

Bateman makes a similar argument, writing that “a fixation on resolving sovereignty claims reinforces distrust and inhibits cooperation, whereas cooperative actions on ‘softer’ issues should be seen as CBMs [confidence building measures] helping build trust.” Just as we have argued throughout this dissertation, Bateman concurs that “the region desperately needs a more cooperative mindset,” one that moves away from a zero-sum concept of maritime security. Without conceptualizing a theory of maritime security that allows the region to move beyond sovereignty clashes and build cooperation, the myriad quality-of-life crimes that prey on lives and livelihoods in the region will continue to proliferate. This was precisely at issue in the regional response to RMSI. According to some reports, the Indonesian administration understood that Admiral Fargo’s comments were misquoted, but nevertheless opposed the program because

---


† U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia Ralph Boyce was later forced to issue a clarification, stating that the news reports were inaccurate. See, Yann-huei Song, “Security in the Strait of Malacca and the Regional Maritime Security Initiative: Responses to the U.S. Proposal,” International Law Studies 83, (2009): 104.
Muddy Waters: 
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

it was “perceived as overly militaristic,” thereby failing to circumvent the conventional political model used by many in the region to interpret security issues.\(^\text{185}\)

And, as we saw in our discussions of both the Caribbean and the Gulf of Guinea, attempting to coordinate a vast array of governments and intergovernmental organizations invested in maritime security is in itself a daunting challenge.\(^\text{186}\) On June 14, 2014, for example, the tanker Ai Maru sent a distress signal to the IMB-PRC. Six ships from four agencies belonging to three countries were dispatched to respond to the call, and the pirates still evaded capture.\(^\text{187}\) The mere presence of international coordination does not pre-ordain its success. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that those international agreements that have entered force have often been viewed as “uncoordinated and incomplete.”\(^\text{188}\) ReCAAP, for all its accomplishments, remains “incapable of having a large impact,” according to University of Wollongong’s Ahmad Amri.\(^\text{189}\) Amri is even less optimistic about the impact of ASEAN’s forums, calling them “merely talk shops.”\(^\text{190}\) Critics have also seen the cooperative sea and air patrols discussed above as “more show than substance.”\(^\text{191}\) That as many as seventy air sorties a week are estimated as necessary to effectively monitor the waterways, while EiS generally executed only eight,\(^\text{192-193}\) lends further justification to this criticism—and the inadequacies of the midcentury policing-inspired interdiction model in the littorals.

Most importantly, however, the littoral states failed to maintain a parallel level of effort in the fight against piracy because piracy is simply not a priority for all parties. Malaysia, for example, whose Maritime Enforcement Agency maintains a respectable seventy patrol ships, regards illegal fishing and tourism development as higher priorities than piracy, according to both Simon and Major Huang.\(^\text{194-195}\) Meanwhile, Indonesia, whose goods principally traverse alternative straits (Lombok and Makassar), does not face the same financial incentives that motivate Singapore’s interest in piracy suppression.\(^*\text{196,197}\) Moreover, Jakarta maintains a long list of nautical issues, including maritime territorial disputes, concerns over smuggling and IUU fishing,\(^\text{198-199}\) not to mention landward sovereignty,\(^\text{200}\) all of which rank higher in the interest of the state than counter-piracy. Both Malaysia and Indonesia regard human trafficking as a major issue as well.\(^\text{201}\) Singapore, by contrast, is far more concerned with hazards to the free flow of traffic through its adjacent straits, a symptom of its heavy dependence on the shipping industry.\(^\text{202}\) Even user states have conflicting priorities and perceptions. The United States, as we will see, has been predominantly concerned with the threat of terrorism, Japan with piracy, and Australia with overall capacity building (given its role as a destination for smuggled products and people).\(^\text{203}\) That the range of maritime crimes represented in these seemingly divergent interests is interconnected, as we have seen, at the contextual domain, is diminished in a strategic lexicon pitted against individual threats. These barriers to collective action—resource allocation, concerns over sovereignty, and mismatched threat perceptions—are illustrative of the pitfalls of strategies that do not consider the broader context of maritime insecurity.

The Straits of Malacca and Singapore represent a unique case in our study. For a time, efforts predicated on traditional notions of threat framing seemed to be making a real impact. Indeed, they likely were, despite a lack of reliable corroboration in the literature (as noted above). Yet, what makes this case all the more powerful, is that even promising counter-piracy efforts do not offer the theoretical frameworks that are critical to sustaining “resolve and resources” over the long run—two pillars that Bradford identifies as Achilles Heels of Southeast

\(^*\) Singaporean flagged or managed ships were among the most victimized in the world in 2014. See, ICC International Maritime Bureau, *Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for the Period 1 January-31 December 2014* (London: ICC IMB, January, 2015), 16, 18.
Asian counter-piracy.204 Bradford argues that, should the littoral states manage to succeed in maintaining momentum and resource investment in counter-piracy, this success can be parlayed into a mechanism to drive cooperation on a wider degree of maritime insecurities in the region.205 As we have argued throughout these pages, however, buy-in can also be elicited by appealing to a strategic conception that addresses all of the insecurities that matter to the littoral states at the outset, placing an emphasis on context over a given threat. A strategy such as this, which by its law enforcement heritage may be able to avoid the type of regimes that “[set] off power rivalries and sovereignty concerns” common in the region, can make real inroads in Southeast Asia.206

Obstacles to effective piracy reduction in the Straits, in the face of a midcentury policing-like model of interdiction and disruption, provide strong evidence that greater security could be achieved through an alternative strategic perspective. Yet, this is not the only argument supporting the value of a Broken Windows application in the littorals. The literature on Southeast Asian maritime security is itself representative of the utility of the Broken Windows lens, as the themes outlined in this dissertation begin to emerge organically. While the literature lacks the framing and language of the Broken Windows theory provided here, a manifest gravitation towards a multidimensional and contextual understanding of maritime security in the discourse is indicative of the theory’s relevance even in this advanced literature.

4.0 Evolution to Broken Windows

While we may disagree with Bradford’s conclusion, his argument is nevertheless revealing. Bradford’s explicit linkage of piracy with terrorism, smuggling, and migration is implicit acknowledgment of the multidimensional nature of maritime crime.207 So too are references in the literature to linkages among instability, corruption, poverty, and transnational crimes an acknowledgment of the need for a more holistic interpretation of what maritime security means.208 As terrorism gained ground as a popular field of study, it inadvertently served as a vehicle by which the literature on Southeast Asian maritime security became exposed to a more multidimensional perspective on security—a key component of the Broken Windows theory as identified in practice in Chapter Two. This evolution was precipitated in part by the shortcomings of the midcentury model as applied to piracy, which was resource intensive yet unable to interdict criminals in the act. In this section we trace that transition in an effort to highlight the linkages between the piracy literature and our Broken Windows lens.

4.1 From Piracy to Terror

No article on maritime security in the straits is complete without reference to terrorism—often right in the title. The relationship between 9/11 and the maritime security literature is profound and difficult to overstate. Raymond, for example, writes simply: “one year after piracy incidents peaked in the Malacca Strait, al-Qa’ida launched its attack on the Twin Towers in New York.”209 Raymond was of course not arguing any correlation; rather that 9/11 demonstrated that conveyances (i.e. planes and, by extension, ships) were now seen as vessels for terror attacks.210 Nevertheless, the acute juxtaposition is illustrative—and common. As we noted above, the literature draws frequent parallels between the flight school training of the 9/11 hijackers and concerns over similar activities in the straits.211 Reports of ship hijackings are often portrayed as potential “dry runs” in which terrorists gain operational knowledge for later use—perhaps
ramming an explosives-laden ship into a port—though some experts have disputed these conclusions. One example portrayed in this light is the March 2003 hijacking of the chemical tanker *Dewi Madrim*, which, after being commandeered, was steered through the Malacca Strait for an hour before the assailants fled with a trove of technical documents. Gal Luft and Anne Korin, of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, even relay reports that al-Qaeda owns dozens of “phantom ships,” hijacked and repainted vessels. Young and Valencia posit a more exact figure—fifteen ships—and regard their existence a “widely disseminated, and largely accepted, fact.”

The list of scenarios involving merchant shipping disasters is extensive. Bateman, for example, sketches a number of theoretical catastrophic attacks, including exploding liquid natural gas (LNG) tankers, ferry bombings, and cruise liner attacks. Such acts of terrorism would have particularly adverse economic consequences for Singapore given the nation’s reliance on an extensive, advanced coastal infrastructure, itself an attractive target. Should a tanker be sunk in a narrow portion of the straits, such as the Phillips Channel in the Singapore Strait, the cost in loss of business alone to Singaporean ports could amount to hundreds of millions of dollars annualized. Regardless of the sensational nature of some of these scenarios, their underlying premises remain true. Given the preponderance of local extremist movements in Southeast Asia, there remain concerns over a crosspollination between piracy and terrorism. Several organizations in the region, including the Free Aceh Movement, the Abu Sayyaf Group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) have employed maritime tactics or engaged in piracy.

Similar to the use of narcotics trafficking in funding terror in Latin America, and the use of piracy in West Africa to fund hybrid political-criminal organizations, piracy in Southeast Asia has also been suspected as a source of funding for extremism. Senia Febrica, a researcher at Universitas Indonesia, notes that terrorist organizations (including the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front) have been indicted for attacks in the adjacent Sulu Sea designed to provide their organizations with funding. Febrica also notes that sea passages between Indonesia and the Philippines have been used as conduits for terrorist movement, including the passage of individuals from Malaysia destined for training camps in the Philippines. Luft and Korin relay that international efforts on countering terrorist financing have pushed terror organizations towards alternative funding streams like piracy, and that this is particularly evident in the Strait of Malacca. As Aditi Chatterjee, of New Delhi’s National Maritime Foundation, notes, “the rampant trafficking of illegal drugs and smuggling of arms in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Myanmar and Thailand provides nourishment to insurgency and terrorism” as far afield as India, sustained by fishing boats crisscrossing the Andaman Sea. The movement of narcotics, as we have seen, also precipitates the involvement of criminal syndicates, most prominently Japanese yakuza, Chinese triads, and Vietnamese gangs. As Luft and Korin note, pirates also often have relationships with the transnational criminal organizations operating in Southeast Asian waters.

The focus on terror is not, however, merely academic. While incidents of maritime terrorism have been scarce in the waters around the South China Sea, they are not unheard of, often coming in the form of ferry bombings. In 2000, the Philippine ferry *Our Lady Mediatrix* was bombed, allegedly by the MILF, killing approximately forty people. In 2001, the Indonesian ferry *Kalifornia* was attacked, killing ten passengers. In one of the most frequently

---

* As noted by Peter Lehr in discussion with the author, the ship’s master later confirmed it was just a ‘run-of-the-mill’ pirate attack.
cited examples in the literature, the 2004 attack on Superferry 14 in Manila Bay, resulted in the most lives ever lost to an act of maritime terror; more than 100 people died. Abu Sayyaf claimed responsibility for that bombing. All told, between 2000 and 2004, attacks on ferries in the region killed approximately 300 people.

States, too, have exhibited real concern over the issue. Singapore’s former defense minister Teo Chee Hean has “consistently maintained” that maritime terrorism poses a real threat to the region. Malaysia, which has previously downplayed the threat of terrorism, also now warns of the threat in the region and has referred to it as a “real and possible” threat. Indonesia, which has similarly demurred from linking piracy and terrorism in the past, has also in recent years been drawing connections between the two. Indonesian officials have relayed intelligence that Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has considered attacks on shipping passing through the straits. Videotapes recovered from JI have included footage of MMEA patrols.

Only months after September 11, authorities uncovered a Jemaah Islamiyah plot to attack American naval ships docked at Singapore’s Changi Naval Base. Captured al-Qaeda member Omar al-Faruq has also reportedly acknowledged attempting to plan scuba attacks against American ships in the Indonesia port of Surabaya. In 2010, all three littoral states issued warnings of potential maritime attacks within the straits. More recently, there has even been concern that sympathizers from Southeast Asia may be using sea routes to travel to and from the Islamic State, prompting an investigation by the Indonesian Navy (they could find no evidence to support such claims).

This attention to terrorism was also a major factor in the United States’ interest in regional maritime security, as noted earlier. In the months after 9/11, the United States collaborated with the Indian Navy to help protect American-flagged ships transiting the northern portion of the Strait of Malacca. In 2004, the United States Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, Matthew Daley, told an audience at the Dialogue on Security in Asia that “Asia’s waters are prime targets for Al-Qaeda and other terrorists,” and that the threat “is not to be underestimated.” During Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s visit to Indonesia in 2006, she discussed with her counterparts terrorism’s interface with the security of the straits, and an American-Indonesian joint exercise on maritime counterterrorism took place shortly after Rice’s departure. American concerns over the safety of the straits became so critical so quickly that, by only 2002, the region had already earned the moniker “the second front” in counterterrorism by some observers. The United States’ focus on maritime terror has in part made it easier to partner with littoral states, which have themselves come to see terrorism both as a regional problem and an avenue for American aid.

As Young and Valencia rightfully address, the post-9/11 “conflation” of piracy and terrorism appeared ubiquitous and was undoubtedly overstated. Nevertheless, the commingling of terrorism and piracy in the Southeast Asian literature inadvertently marks an important theoretical step in conceptualizing maritime security in the straits. The predominance of terrorism in the approaches of policymakers and academics encourages progress towards multidimensionality, blending two previously bifurcated policy spheres into a single threat picture. Within this framing, piracy and terror are still often regarded as “distinct crimes,” largely treated as separate issues. Still, as a consequence of their juxtaposition, piracy and terror come to be presented in the same context, manipulating the same vulnerabilities. While the motivations driving piracy and terror remain split when evaluated from this perspective—the former economic, the latter political—the actions of both organizations are seen to overlap, as are the environments in which they thrive.
4.2 Terror, Transnationalism, and Multidimensionality

Concurrent with this shift in emphasis towards terrorism and terror financing, in both the academic literature and international attention, was an expanding focus on other transnational crimes in the straits. In some cases, these crimes were seen in similarly narrow lenses as piracy and terrorism, as isolated threats. Drug trafficking, for example, which came into greater focus as a critical issue for many states as consumption rose,\textsuperscript{262} was often discussed in isolation. Yet, the blending of terrorism, piracy, and transnational crime in the literature also bred an increasingly multidimensional view of maritime security. This shift was facilitated by the global nature of Al-Qaeda’s attacks in the early 2000s, which precipitated a vision of terrorism as thoroughly internationalized. Thus, while piracy was typically regarded as a matter for the littoral states to address among themselves, the integration of terrorism into the maritime threat landscape enabled regional states to more broadly consider non-territorial non-conventional threats.\textsuperscript{263}

Fabrica, for example, relays the common concern that irregular migration across porous maritime borders may be used to facilitate the easy movement of terrorists in the larger migrant flow.\textsuperscript{264} Moreover, as Bradford notes, transnational criminal activity, particularly the movement of weapons and people, has a real impact on the capacity of non-state actors to engage in political violence.\textsuperscript{265} Luft and Korin posit that the maritime domain has even become a key operational realm for terrorists, and that attacks at sea might represent more than merely attempts at financial gain.\textsuperscript{266} Young and Valencia term this “political piracy,” something which bares similarities to the hybridized maritime violence we explored in Chapter Four.\textsuperscript{267} Yann-huei Song of Taiwan’s Academic Sinica notes that the United States “sensed increasing synergy between transnational threats like terrorism, illicit drugs, trafficking in humans, [and] piracy.”\textsuperscript{268} Nazery Khalid, of the Maritime Institute of Malaysia, represents the evolution in the literature well; “the threats facing the Straits are multidimensional. Although in recent years the international media has given extensive coverage to piracy and sea robbery, there are many other threats facing this key artery of world trade.”\textsuperscript{269} These conclusions are not revolutionary, but they demonstrate a progression towards a wider understanding of the maritime security domain. Now, it is axiomatic that the threats of maritime security in the straits are “complex, asymmetrical, multidimensional and transnational.”\textsuperscript{270}

As we saw in Chapters Three and Four, it is a logical conceptual step from imagining terrorists and other transnational actors operating alongside one another, to the fusion of actor and infrastructures. Chatterjee comes to this same conclusion, noting that “it is plausible that pirates and terrorists could collaborate” with one another, one gaining financially, the other logistically.\textsuperscript{271} This leads to what Donna Nincic of the California Maritime Academy considers to be “the most significant threat” in the maritime domain, “the emerging ‘web of criminality’ with pirates, terrorists, and ordinary criminals working in an ad hoc manner.”\textsuperscript{272} Nincic refers to this expansion of piracy into a range of other maritime crimes as “diversion,” or diversification, something we discussed at length in our previous chapters, and something that is evocative of the multidimensional element of Broken Windows.\textsuperscript{273} A report from a maritime news service similarly suggests that Southeast Asian piracy groups are highly international in nature, with Indonesian foot soldiers and Malaysian and Singaporean bosses, and often engage in a wide variety of illegal maritime activities.\textsuperscript{274} As we explored in Chapters Three and Four, maritime criminals are more dynamic than the atomized state response suggests. As Bateman remarks, smuggling networks in Southeast Asia are not only “highly dynamic,” but the same gangs may be involved in smuggling one day and piracy the next.\textsuperscript{275} Chatterjee writes of human traffickers
that they are likewise connected to transnational networks engaging in the trade of narcotics, guns, money, and counterfeit products. Captain Richard Phillips, of the famed MV Maersk Alabama, notes that pirates operating in Southeast Asian waters are part of a larger criminal infrastructure. Raymond, too, notes the significance not only of deterring pirates at sea, but tackling the broader network of criminality that sustains them. What connects these crimes, beyond the people and networks involved, is the context in which they take place.

The inclusion of transnational crimes in the literature drastically alters the perception of the success of midcentury-style counter-piracy initiatives. As E.L. Dabova, of Saint Petersburg State University, notes, “while the actual number of piracy cases may be perceived as dropping, the total number of maritime crimes in the Strait of Malacca has actually increased.” Weighing heavily on this rise is the role of human smuggling and trafficking. Dabova estimates that a boat of between 50 and 100 migrants could net traffickers as much as $30,000, while products from stolen motorcycles to timber all yield lucrative sums. The transportation of hazardous waste, one of the most obvious visible symptoms of disorder, is among of the fastest growing crimes in the region. Like the decentralized criminal syndicates we have discussed so much, these trafficking groups are often small in size, between five and ten people. This nodal view of crime is seized upon by the Broken Windows theory’s community-oriented perspective, and is missed by a midcentury model focused on interdiction, or the ‘beheading’ model used against more corporately structured criminal organizations. As a consequence of the growing awareness of the multidimensional, contagious nature of littoral insecurity, issues that were once predominantly the concerns of one or two littoral states are now gaining traction internationally. Even less prominent crimes, like the smuggling of cigarettes, counterfeit medication, and even sand, are receiving “substantial attention.” The impact of these crimes may, individually, be small. Yet, as Nincic argues, collectively they are “even more problematic because [they are] all part of the increasingly overlapping ‘web of criminality’ connected through the global maritime domain.” Just as Kelling and Wilson argued in 1982, so too does Khalid; disorder compounds and, if unattended, could have profound implications for the security of littoral states.

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations are also increasingly a part of the conversation. As Huang notes, the United States’ role in humanitarian relief in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami built operational capacity and political goodwill. Lieutenant Commander Bradford similarly notes that HA/DR operations performed in times of peace are integral to building the trust necessary for effective naval cooperation in times of crisis. Moreover, as Broken Windows would suggest, by aiding in recovery efforts and physically cleaning up after a natural disaster, non-military actions can directly improve an environment, and thus regional stability. The United States has embraced this premise in Southeast Asia. Since 2006, the U.S. has partnered with other Indo-Pacific nations in the Pacific Partnership initiative, providing humanitarian assistance across the region. In 2010, the hospital ship USNS Mercy participated in the Sail Banda exercise alongside medical ships from Indonesia and Singapore. As the author Robert Kaplan expresses, such deployments are likely to become increasingly common. Echoing sentiments from our exploration of population growth, climate change, and natural disasters in Chapter One, Kaplan writes, given “population growth in climatically and seismically fragile zones…placing more human beings in danger’s way than at almost any other time in history, one deployment will quickly follow another.”

Even the Littoral Combat Ship, that much maligned vessel from Chapter One, has made an appearance in the straits. The U.S. Navy intends to station four LCS in Singapore by 2018, first announced by Secretary Gates at the 2011 Shangri-La Dialogue.
Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

according to the Commodore of LCS Squadron One, Captain Randy Garner, offers “an amazing return on the shipbuilding dollar.”203 The ship’s smaller nature allows it to better perform Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) in concert with the smaller ships of adjacent navies and coast guards.204 In a similar vein, Scott Cheney-Peters, of the State Department’s maritime security desk, notes that the “white hulls” of the U.S. Coast Guard are better suited yet for the constabulary and criminal challenges faced by littoral states.205 And despite being short on assets, the Coast Guard does send vessels through the region to participate in joint exercises, as in 2012 when USCGC Waesche participated in that year’s CARAT operation.206 Cheney-Peters likewise notes, as we did in the Caribbean context, that LEDETs (law enforcement detachments) provide a unique solution for augmenting Coast Guard and law enforcement assets in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, and that they “have a strong case to represent U.S. support” in the region,207 underscoring further the hybrid dimension of maritime security needs.

The special role of the Coast Guard in this sphere should not be understated. As Bateman notes, regional states are often concerned that the American interest in maritime security and counterterrorism “has placed too much emphasis on the military dimension” of current strategy.208 Just as academics and practitioners in the Caribbean were concerned with a ‘fortress Caribbean’ approach to security, leading to the hostility and urbicide we explored in Chapters One and Three, so too are practitioners and politicians in Southeast Asia concerned over a ‘fortress Malacca.’ The use of LEDETs in the Caribbean,209 as well as the Basin’s strides in developing a cooperative theory of maritime security,210 are even explicitly held up as models for adoption in the straits. Through such a perspective, regional states can “build operational trust by disconnecting forms of maritime cooperation on the ‘softer’ issues from the military and political issues that underpin strategic distrust” throughout Southeast Asia.211 As a consequence, “this will mean a better framework for maritime cooperation in the region and ‘demilitarizing’ the way in which regional states approach maritime security.”212

This transition—from piracy, to terrorism, to transnational crime, to a multidimensional perspective on security—inevitably begs the question: how do states reconcile the criminal dimension of these issues with the resources necessary to combat them? That tension has been at the core of this dissertation, and is present at times in the literature on Southeast Asian maritime security.213 As Young and Valencia note, it is not the traditional responsibility of militaries to provide police functions.214 While navies are often tasked to address such problems because they possess the needed hardware, they often lack the arrest authority and knowledge base necessary to police effectively. Yet, the hybrid nature of crimes like piracy, terrorism, and trafficking in people, weapons, and goods, are not easily lent to conventional policing authorities.215 As far back as 1999, Alan Dupont, then Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Australian National University, wrote of narcotics trafficking in Asia: while the matter has been “traditionally regarded as principally a matter for law enforcement agencies,” this is “demonstrably no longer the case.”216

There is, similarly, an impulse to emphasize root causes, often with the assumption that short term mitigation is unlikely to make a significant difference. Young and Valencia are emblematic of this argument, advocating for a strategy of maritime security that stresses addressing root causes, rather than their symptoms (something we saw earlier in the chapter, and across Chapter Two).217 And undoubtedly, states should focus on governance, poverty alleviation, and human rights. Yet, as our investigation of the Broken Windows theory has shown, the symptoms matter as well. By tackling symptoms, we influence perceptions, which impact how people behave. As the implementation of Broken Windows in New York suggests,
even without solving ‘root causes,’ maritime forces, “acting in a law enforcement capacity, can still have a significant effect.”

Still, perhaps the greatest endorsement of the need for an alternative way of looking at maritime threats in Southeast Asia comes from the limits of the dominant, midcentury policing-style strategy expounded over the years. The littoral states responded robustly to the rise of piracy in the region, and have sustained a focus on maritime insecurity to varying degrees for more than twenty years. Yet, after a period of temporary piracy decline, renewed incident rates, and concerns over resources and matched level of effort, there is yet a more fundamental question about Southeast Asian maritime strategy. Are any of the lessons learned in the region, after two decades of counter-piracy operations, applicable elsewhere? Does the existing theory in the region pass the generalizability test we have striven to apply to our own? Simon, directing his evaluation towards the Gulf of Aden, answers emphatically no: “any isomorphism seems remote” because of mismatches in geography, sociology and governance (all variant components of this ‘deviant’ study). That after so many years the practice of maritime security in Southeast Asia may not have produced generalizable applications suggests the need for continued theorizing, an exercise this dissertation has attempted to accomplish.

On piracy studies in particular, some authors have even echoed some of the core sentiments of the Broken Windows theory. Nincic, for example, suggests that the disorder brought along by piracy breeds greater disorder. Her depiction is reminiscent of that which we presented in Chapter Two, of a broken window’s cascading impact on a local community. She writes, “left unchecked, piracy tends to transition through levels of increasing complexity and violence. When it first appears, piracy tends to be little more than petty crime; left unchecked, it will tend to become more organized, moving from ‘mom and pop’ operations to sophisticated criminal gangs.” There is even reference to the contagious nature of piracy, something we noted in our Gulf of Guinea study, akin to the vision of crime and disorder expressed by Kelling, Coles and Wilson. Chatterjee even makes reference to the impact of context, identifying the region’s “permissive environment” as a contributing factor to the proliferation of maritime crime. References to the “synergetic” impact of transnational crimes can likewise be read as references to the compounding nature of disorder as understood in the lexicon of Broken Windows. Robert Kaplan summarizes, “piracy is the maritime ripple effect of land-based anarchy.” Broken Windows substitutes the word disorder for anarchy, but the principle remains. As one saying from the fifteenth century quips, “whoever is lord of Malacca has his hand on the throat of Venice.” A feature of this dissertation, of the lessons gleaned from the Broken Windows theory, and a point of convergence within the literature on Southeast Asia, is that “more safety and security in one of the world’s busiest waterways constitutes a positive sum outcome” for everyone, as resonant today as ever, it would seem.

The literature on Southeast Asian maritime security is among the most mature on the subject in the world. The growth of the piracy epidemic in the 1990s, and the intensity with which the global community demanded action, have spurred an ongoing interest in maritime security research from Singapore to Australia. There is perhaps no greater endorsement of the potential usefulness of the Broken Windows theory than the growing prominence of our two main themes—multidimensionality and context-specificity—in this body of work. As Chatterjee relays, “there is a growing need to expand the traditional notion of security to address non-traditional threats, and thereby adopt a more comprehensive approach to security…Apart from being non-military in nature, these challenges are also transnational.” Dabova likewise writes of the need to “develop a complex concept of non-traditional threat to maritime security.”
Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

because current frameworks on security face “conceptual and institutional weakness.”

The scholarship on Southeast Asian maritime security suggests simultaneously that there is an ongoing need to place maritime security strategy in a greater theoretical context, and that the critical themes we have distilled from the Broken Windows theory meld with the lessons emerging in this robust literature. Thus, in demonstrating the applicability, and viability, of a Broken Windows-inspired strategy in a region with a long relationship with maritime insecurity, and piracy in particular, we underscore again the generalizability of this research.

5.0 Conclusion

Across every region, “policymakers have a hard time conceptualizing non-traditional, transnational and human security issues, which do not respect national boundaries and which transcend institutional and policy stovepipes.” In response, Donna Nincic summarizes the need for this research best: “the global maritime community should focus less on stopping a particular form of maritime crime, be it piracy, terrorism, or trafficking, and more about creating holistic measures to counter an increasing ‘web’ of maritime criminality.” The Broken Windows theory, through an emphasis on multidimensionality and context, cuts across these stovepipes to present a holistic view of maritime security. Such a perspective presents more than just another way of looking at threats. As argued by Richard Bitzinger, of Singapore’s Rajaratnam School of International Studies, “above all you need a common threat perception” to engender genuine cooperation and impact in the maritime domain. A theory of maritime security, such as one predicated on the lens and lessons of the Broken Windows theory as explored in this dissertation, provides one such avenue for redefining a shared threat perception.

In this illustrative case study, we diverged from the parallel, most similar model employed in the cross case comparison between the Caribbean and the Gulf of Guinea. In this ‘deviant’ case, we assessed a region that has directly addressed the variant subcomponent highlighted in Chapter Four (piracy). Also unlike in our previous cases, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are dominated by only a few states, some with real capacity for action in the maritime space. Nevertheless, in this chapter we underscored that despite concerted regional efforts to respond to piracy, the issue remains nearly endemic. Through an assessment of piracy’s resurgent presence in Southeast Asia, we highlighted in clear relief the continued need for theorizing about maritime security. This was further reinforced in our survey of the literature on Southeast Asian maritime security, which struggled to attribute piracy’s initial decline to specific polices, and has remained dynamic as new issue areas are incorporated into the discipline. This body of work, through an infusion of terrorism research into the maritime sphere, has come to echo elements of the Broken Windows theory we laid out in Chapter Two—multidimensionality and context. By identifying a region with longstanding investment and investigation into counter-piracy, and even in this context demonstrating the potential contribution of the community policing model in contrast to techniques similar to interdiction or institutional decapitation, this chapter reinforces the argument for generalizability of a Broken Windows lens beyond the Caribbean Basin and West Africa.
Chapter Five: Evolving Security Conceptions in the Straits

Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

Chapter Five: Evolving Security Conceptions in the Straits

68 Yun Yun Teo, “Target Malacca Straits: Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30, No. 6 (2007): 541.
69 Yun Yun Teo, “Target Malacca Straits: Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30, No. 6 (2007): 541.
Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

89 Yun Yun Teo, “Target Malacca Straits: Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30, No. 6 (2007): 554.
90 Yun Yun Teo, “Target Malacca Straits: Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30, No. 6 (2007): 543.
95 Yun Yun Teo, “Target Malacca Straits: Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30, No. 6 (2007): 547.
Chapter Five: Evolving Security Conceptions in the Straits

118 Ian Storey, “The Triborder Sea Area: Maritime Southeast Asia’s Ungoverned Space,” *Terrorism Monitor* 5, No. 19 (October 2007), [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4465#Vq6GTYrJE6](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4465#Vq6GTYrJE6).
Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

Chapter Five: Evolving Security Conceptions in the Straits

Muddy Waters: Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory


Chapter Five: Evolving Security Conceptions in the Straits

223 Senia Febrica, “Securing the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas from Maritime Terrorism: A Troublesome Cooperation?” Perspectives on Terrorism 8, No. 3 (June 2014): 64.
224 Senia Febrica, “Securing the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas from Maritime Terrorism: A Troublesome Cooperation?” Perspectives on Terrorism 8, No. 3 (June 2014): 64.
Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

264 Senia Febrica, “Securing the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas from Maritime Terrorism: A Troublesome Cooperation?” Perspectives on Terrorism 8, No. 3 (June 2014): 75.
Chapter Five: Evolving Security Conceptions in the Straits

Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

Chapter Five: Evolving Security Conceptions in the Straits

Conclusion

1.0 Criticisms

The Broken Windows theory is not without its flaws, and neither is its legacy. In recent years, the theory has become used as shorthand for an increasingly adversarial relationship between police and minority communities. In New York City, controversial stop-and-frisk policies have served to aggravate racial tensions, which burst to the fore in late 2014 after a series of unarmed black men were killed in police custody across the United States (including Eric Garner on Staten Island). While perhaps inspired by Broken Windows’ emphasis on addressing quality-of-life crimes, stop-and-frisk is—as our investigation in Chapter Two should suggest—anathema to the broader aims of community policing. Moreover, despite the colloquial use of the term Broken Windows, a household phrase in New York since Rudolph Giuliani held office, stop-and-frisk was implemented not under Commissioner Bratton, but a successor.

The discrepancy between the vernacular use of Broken Windows today, and its representation in the academic literature, has been reiterated by some in the criminological community, including the theory’s creator, George Kelling. Nevertheless, even if only in the pop lexicon, Broken Windows has been cast as a coconspirator in a growing movement to overhaul American policing. And, in part, police departments own this responsibility. Instead of elevating Broken Windows’ emphasis on people and perceptions, police across the country invested deeper in zero-tolerance policies, missing the corrosive degradation in relations that should have been the bedrock of community policing. In so doing, even as crime in cities like New York remain at record lows, police constructed an environment in which the enforcement of law was perceived by the community to be unequal. The very lessons in this dissertation, which suggested an aversion to militarizing police and fortress mentalities, were lost on some of the police forces that first pioneered community policing.

While an important conversation, however, the ongoing debate over Broken Windows’ successor does not negate the value of the lens this theory lent to our investigation of maritime security. In this dissertation, we exported the theory’s most fundamental and transformative conclusions, as understood by our evaluation in Chapter Two—that crime is multidimensional, and that environment matters. Or, as Kelling writes in his recent defense of the theory, “that small things matter in a community and, if nothing is done about them, they can lead to worse things.” It was this fundamental mixture that propelled the Broken Windows theory to popularity, especially in New York, and these core principles are those that we sought to apply to the littorals. That citations, searches, and arrests have historically been skewed against minority communities may be more expressive of a broken system than a broken theory. To this very point, the language of Broken Windows, that which directed our understanding to the importance of perception and context, only underscores the consequences of festering mistrust between law enforcement and communities of color.

There are, to be sure, more enduring criticisms of this research. Time and financial constraints made regional field research infeasible, but would have undoubtedly offered a still more nuanced understanding of the interplay between perceptions, environment, and security. Without the capacity to implement real-world tests, our
argument is forced to stand on thought experiments, however copious. The very focus on
theory creates competing incentives, most obviously the hope to explain a complicated
phenomenon while being as parsimonious as possible to ensure the development of a
useful model. Perhaps most of all, reaching between disciplines invariably sparks
controversy over exportability. Each of these critiques is mitigated by the research design
and the progression in which we advanced our argument.

2.0 Summation

We opened this dissertation with an illustration of a world far outside the minds of
many naval strategists, but one well within the lived experience of millions of people
around the world. Dense slums. Congested waterways. Contested spaces. These
conditions predominate in the lives of a rapidly growing percentage of the global
population. Maritime security embodies the hybrid threat. And because such threats are
so often manifested in criminality, those responsible for addressing insecurity in the
littorals would, we suspected, be well served by an understanding of criminology. The
Broken Windows theory was particularly fitting for this task. Just as it revolutionized a
midcentury policing model built on fighting and interdicting crime, so too did Broken
Windows offer a similarly intriguing redefinition of security in the littorals. It was this
reality that inspired the kernel of our research question: How does this maritime space
relate to the functions of navies today?

This core question grew in complexity and specificity until we arrived at our main
point of inquiry, as laid out in the Introduction: Can the Broken Windows theory, a
 crimino\gi\oise construct of social disorganization, provide the lens through which to
 theorize maritime security in the littorals? To answer that question, however, required a
better understanding of two underlying issues. First, why should we care? What was so
wrong with existing theories, or so different about the world today, that made an
investigation like this relevant? Second, what is the Broken Windows theory? Without
understanding the fundamentals of this theory, we would be unable to test its lens against
the realm of maritime security. Answering each of these two sub-questions satisfactorily
was the objective of our first and second chapters, respectively.

First, what in the strategic literature made this research relevant to begin with? We
addressed that in two complementary sections. First, we elucidated the threat forecast
from which we were operating. This forecast illustrated the major trends shaping the
future of the littoral space over the coming decades, including Kilcullens four
megatrends: population growth, urbanization, littoralization, and connectedness. This
analysis told us not only where to expect future tensions to arise (in the littorals), but
hinted at the cause of these hotspots (transnational issues of human security). It was in
this conversation that we were introduced to the idea of feral cities, urbacide, and hybrid
threats, upon which we relied over the course of the subsequent case studies. These
themes legitimized an investigation on maritime security by asserting the inevitable role
coastal zones will play (indeed, already are playing) in global stability.

In the second portion of Chapter One, we turned towards an analysis of the post-
9/11 strategic literature to understand the space for this course of research. It was here
that the strategic gap in discussing the maritime sphere was underscored. U.S. maritime
and strategic documents were shown to address maritime security in broad strokes,
leaving unanswered fundamental questions about what maritime security means. Strategic documents from NATO, the European Union, and the African Union similarly offered little guidance on broader theoretical concerns. Maritime security strategies most often read like laundry lists of activities that did not belong in more conventional naval operations, and were consistently framed around specific threat-vectors (i.e. counter-piracy or counter-narcotics). A more detailed look at one particular strategy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (CS21), underscored further the dichotomy between language on maritime strategy and the platforms and programs being funded by the Department of Defense. What emerged was a strategic space without much theory; a domain to which analysts widely referred but that appeared to lack a coherent framing. Combined, these two avenues of investigation—threat forecasting and strategic literature review—underscored why this research was relevant, answering the second of our two initial sub-questions.

Still, the second of our initial sub-questions remained—what is the Broken Windows theory? And, significantly, how would we set about answering the researcher question? In Chapter Two, we therefore began with an exploration of the theory at large, ascertaining some of the central tenets of Broken Windows. To gain a deeper familiarity with the theory and its literature, we turned to an illustration of its use in the New York City subway. In so doing, we introduced not only a common case study in Broken Windows scholarship, but depicted the theory in the conditions of a natural experiment. This was the first major step in demonstrating the exportability of a criminological theory beyond the urban space and into a maritime one. That extrapolation was then reinforced in our discussion of Broken Windows in the greater New York City environment, wherein we further underscored the broader social implications of Broken Windows outside of a rigid, urban application. To validate this conclusion, we turned the conversation towards Broken Windows’ use across disciplines, particularly in the realms of public health and psychology. Through this investigation, we confirmed what we had postulated, that the Broken Windows theory speaks to broader psychological and sociological states—ones that lend themselves to applications beyond those its initial authors had hypothesized. Whether fighting crime in New York, venereal diseases on the streets of Louisiana, or pirates off the Gulf of Guinea, Broken Windows’ central components appeared to be reasonable lenses for understanding the actions and conditions of communities around us. Across this discussion, we identified two components in particular, which we have carried throughout this dissertation—multidimensionality and context specificity. In the subway, in New York City, among seminary students and middle schoolers, these two elements played an ongoing role in our understanding of disorder. And while debate remains surrounding the particular pathways of cause and influence in the criminological literature, of those two elements we could be certain. So we closed Chapter Two, acknowledging the ongoing conversation within the theory, while underscoring the validity of adopting Broken Windows’ central tenets as a foundation for understanding insecurity globally.

Having addressed the underlying sub-questions raised of our main research inquiry, we turned in Chapter Three to the heart of that question. How can the Broken Windows theory provide a lens through which to theorize maritime security in the littorals? In response, our Caribbean Basin case explored in granular detail the life, crimes, and transnational flows of actors across the region in an effort to highlight the
two Broken Windows themes in Chapter Two: that context influences action, and that such actions are not isolated. Through a look at narcotics trafficking, local violence, irregular migration, terrorism, corruption and more, in Chapter Three we repeatedly illustrated the utility of this lens. Maritime insecurity across the Basin was shown to be heavily multidimensional, with social cues shaping not only crime in the Caribbean, but the recommendations for enforcement models as well. Local murders interplay with the transnational flow of drugs. Crimes committed within a community compound to create a chain of criminality extending across continents. People moving irregularly in search of better lives obscure deeper illicit trafficking flows. The transnational distribution of money throughout the Caribbean lubricates crime while corroding faith in political institutions. Terrorists are allegedly granted access to fundraising and resources through infrastructure established by criminal organizations. Local contexts—crime, poverty, corruption—contribute to how Caribbean authorities conceptualize security, while multidimensional actors frustrate enforcement efforts centered on interdiction or single threats.

The relevance of this Broken Windows approach was reinforced by our exploration of local perspectives on transnational crimes, which illustrated that academics in the Basin have long viewed security as multidimensional. We even saw that Caribbean law enforcement has already embraced community policing’s precepts in region-wide trainings and seminars, validating further the feasibility of appropriating the Broken Windows theory as a lens for framing maritime crime. Perception permeated this conversation, providing a new lexicon for discussing littoral security and allowing us to identify subtle themes across the literature. In so doing, we presented the environment as a domain in and of itself, a contested space of ideas, behaviors, and physical signals that inform the actions of those living within the Basin. Consequently, Chapter Three served as proof of concept for the exportation of Broken Windows’ primary lenses to the maritime space.

Can the Broken Windows theory, a criminological construct of social disorganization, provide the lens through which to theorize maritime security in the littorals? Up to the end of Chapter Three, we had explained what the theory was, why it mattered, and that it did, in fact, provide an interesting perspective through which to evaluate maritime security in the Caribbean Basin. What remained was the capacity to generalize this applicability, to demonstrate that the theory applied in more than one (albeit robust) case study. So we entered into the first of our two illustrative case studies—Chapter Four, the Gulf of Guinea. In this study, we leveraged the extensive relationships and vocabulary established in the Caribbean Basin to identify commonalities between the two regions. By illustrating the similarities between the Caribbean and West African trade in narcotics, as well as the myriad quality-of-life crimes endemic to both regions, we underscored the most similar nature of the cross case comparison. Throughout this demonstration of the analogous nature of Caribbean and West African maritime insecurity, we noted the value (and relative ease) of applying Broken Windows’ lens in a new region.

Yet, this was only half of the effort. In the second portion of Chapter Four, we identified one variant subcomponent of maritime disorder between the two cases—the heavy presence of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Our intention was to demonstrate that this new issue, unaddressed in the Caribbean case upon which the first half of Chapter
Four so heavily rested, can also be analyzed through the lens provided by the Broken Windows theory. By doing so, we added additional support to the generalizability of our Broken Windows lens by moving beyond the strict reliance on the groundwork laid out in our primary (Caribbean) case. As we noted at the start of this dissertation—by illustrating that piracy can be integrated into the same narrative on maritime crime’s multidimensional and environmental nature, we demonstrate that a Broken Windows lens is capable of adapting to new issues and locales, and thus is not unique in its application to the Caribbean.

Finally, to solidify our argument for generalizability, we turned in our second illustrative case study, Chapter Five (the Straits of Malacca and Singapore), to present a deviant case from those prior. Unlike the preceding cases, Chapter Five’s core actors revolved around only three littoral states—two of which maintained capacity for at least moderate maritime operations. Moreover, around the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, piracy (the variant subcomponent of Chapter Four) was an issue of relatively longstanding study and state action. Moreover, in this region, the flagship issue of maritime security, piracy, was even successfully suppressed for a time. Notwithstanding so much attention and investment, we demonstrated in Chapter Five that piracy in Southeast Asia lent itself to an analysis through a Broken Windows lens. The evolution of the literature on the region, which has begun to echo the multidimensional and environmental themes discussed here, was further evidence that theorizing a wider conception of maritime security in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore was both possible and necessary. Our Gulf of Guinea case offered justification for the inclusion of another threat type (piracy) into the framework we established in Chapter Three. Our final body chapter built on that incorporation. In it, we demonstrated further that, even in a region long accustomed to discussing and responding to piracy, a Broken Windows lens provided a new and interesting perspective.

3.0 Findings and Consequences

This research speaks most directly to two distinct audiences. First, the multidisciplinary nature of this dissertation serves a bridging role for a variety of streams of literature—from security studies, to naval research, to criminology. While it is impossible to address sufficiently every debate upon which this research touches, we endeavored throughout to highlight linkages across disciplines (see Chapter Two in particular). Second, it has clear overtones for naval strategists and policymakers. As discussed at length in Chapter One, littoral security will likely play a dominant role in the 21st century, regardless of policymakers’ disinterest in the grey spaces of order maintenance. For both audiences, this research fills a void in the emerging field of Maritime Security, which is noticeably absent of strategic frameworks. Hopefully, such a framework (as well as the unique research model used in its development) will prove useful for both communities, academics and policymakers alike. To help in that process, it would be instructive to identify some of the most significant conclusions this research has for each audience.
Conclusion

3.1 Multidisciplinary Researchers

Briefly, it is instructive to reiterate many of the debates upon which this research touched, and hopefully informs. To begin, this dissertation helped bring the study of maritime security into greater contact with an expanding literature on transnational threats. Chapter Five served as an archetypical example of the evolving role transnational issues play in the way we understand maritime insecurity. There, we detailed how a focus on piracy in Southeast Asia merged after 9/11 with an interest in terrorism, and eventually a wide variety of non-state threats, yielding over time a multidimensional understanding of the complex world of illicit international flows. Since September 11, there has been a concerted effort by some to bring the transnational world into greater relief (see, in particular, Naím or Thachuk). And yet, this body of work often remains isolated from wider security studies literature, particularly maritime security, which is itself already an outlier for many security studies programs. The point, made in practice throughout this dissertation, however, is that any one portion of security or maritime research is incomplete without an accompanying transnational component. It is among our greatest hopes that this research helps facilitate an awakening of transnational maritime considerations in the academic and strategic consciousness.

Of course, any consideration of non-state threats leads implicitly towards a conversation on the role of navies in peacetime, a theme found throughout this dissertation and yet another ongoing debate in policy and academic circles. Beginning in Chapter One, we identified the very concept of peacetime versus wartime operations to be an outdated way of understanding non-state conflict. From the ‘savage wars of peace’ to the demands of stability and development operations, we underscored at the outset that the conventional paradigm of war and peace loses some relevance in a transnational framework. Significantly, we noted that even the United States maritime services have begun to express an understanding of this evolution in their 2007 capstone document (CS21). In the context of maritime security, the maritime services hint in CS21 at a drift away from the war and peace dichotomy towards an appreciation of order maintenance and conflict prevention. Still, as we concluded, the Navy has yet to metaphorically ‘put its money where its mouth is’ when tackling maritime security—with respect to both monetary and intellectual investments. The debate over ambiguous security postures (peace or war) continued to surface across this dissertation. In Chapter Two, we connected the role of police in keeping the peace (itself a contentious debate) to the evolving conception of a less binary perspective on war and peace. In our empirical chapters we also touched on themes—such as urbicide and the conflicting demands of using military equipment and personnel to counter criminal actors—with obvious implications for the debate on peacetime military operations. For nearly two decades the United States and the world have struggled to understand how a seemingly endless war on terrorism fits—legally, ethically, and strategically—into a world order built around a black and white understanding of conflict. This dissertation does not resolve that debate, but it is clearly contoured by it.

Finally, in a narrower maritime lens, the Navy’s peacetime responsibilities are equally relevant for an area in which there should be significantly more debate—what

* Chapter Five in particular spoke directly to the role of peacetime humanitarian assistance in fixing literal broken windows.
does good order at sea mean, strategically? Till, as noted in Chapter Two, regards the phrase ‘Maritime Security’ largely as a rebranding of the more conventional ‘good order at sea.’ Yet, no matter the language we use, it remains clear that promoting good order is a particularly sparse arena of strategic debate in the naval world. It makes sense that a theory of order maintenance (i.e. the Broken Windows theory) would provide a foundation upon which to lend greater conceptual depth to such a longstanding but poorly framed notion as maritime good order. In that guise, this dissertation serves as a potential launching point for further theoretical work on good order at sea. Perhaps in so doing, we can even come to a better understanding about just how ‘good order at sea’ and ‘Maritime Security’ actually relate to one another.

3.2 Naval Strategists

Understanding, now, how the Broken Windows theory helps navies think about littoral spaces and the insecurities that inhabit them—what does this mean for U.S. strategy in practice? To answer that question, we need to revisit the fundamentals of Broken Windows as expressed in Chapter Two. Community policing is, by nature, a problem-oriented approach. Its central tenets are, therefore, not as overtly prescriptive as perhaps Mahan’s conclusion to control sea and trade. Instead, in every city, in every precinct, even on every block, Broken Windows arms police with the means to identify problems in conjunction with community-members and understand how enforcement decisions shape communal self-efficacy. Thus, we have avoided making too many specific operational recommendations. Still, while the findings we reach here are not as prescriptive as other strategic frameworks may be, they are nevertheless consequential for how the U.S. Navy should perceive its role operating in crowded littorals. Some practical strategic guidance is detailed below.

First, navies need to understand and adapt to the dichotomous demands of military objectives on one hand, and law enforcement (or peacetime) objectives on the other. While pursuing the latter may require military technical capabilities, given the advancing sophistication of non-state threats, these two objectives require patently different ways of interacting with communities (think of the consequences of the Tivoli Garden raid in Jamaica, for example). The U.S. Navy should continue to invest in diverging strategies to meet these divergent objectives, embracing the groundwork laid by A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower’s (CS21) hint towards two complementary but distinct spheres of strategy.

Second, the U.S. Navy cooperates extensively with local authorities across the world. A Broken Windows inspired approach would require, however, that policymakers place local partners at the focal point of littoral strategies. Just as police, in community oriented models, let neighborhoods help set the enforcement agenda to meet their fears and concerns, so too does a navy operating in littoral spaces need to be seen as working in line with local social objectives. In many cases, those local (and national) objectives vary significantly from American strategic considerations. Consider, for example, the diverging security priorities even of the three littoral states in the Straits of Malacca case, detailed in Chapter Five. This should consequently inform the third consideration—remember multidimensionality.
Conclusion

Even if communities or nations have different first order concerns than those of the United States Navy, the multidimensional nature of littoral crime sketched throughout this dissertation reinforces the notion that nothing is in fact isolated. Combatting illegal fishing may precipitate declines in piracy, or combatting human trafficking may reduce the spread of public health concerns. The point for the U.S. Navy is that focusing on placing local communities in the driver’s seat and building communal self-efficacy—no matter the individual points of concern—helps breed greater stability across a spectrum of issues. In other words, navies and coast guards should emphasize the positive mobilization of maritime communities in pursuit of their own security. Partnership is not zero-sum, and pursuing a local agenda helps ensure long-term buy-in from local authorities and the people they will rely on to help keep communities safe.

Finally, do not neglect context and perceptions. Missions on the softer end of the operational spectrum “are not ancillary to the broader strategic landscape, but pivotal in its construction.” Unlike in blue waters, in the littorals the Navy will routinely find itself operating with and around maritime communities. Without a clear understanding of how enforcement at the communal level shapes broader disorder, the Navy (and Coast Guard) will inevitably fail to achieve long-term strategic success. In planning deployments in the littorals, the Navy should prioritize understanding, and positively impacting, local perceptions. This is, ultimately, at the root of any community policing objective—the endeavor to help communities feel as if they have a stake in their neighborhoods. That objective is as consequential to maritime security as it is to urban crime control.

As Chris Trelawny, a Royal Navy reservist and IMO staffer, writes, “there does seem to be an almost existential crisis around the question of what navies are for. Politically, there does not seem to be much evidence of grand strategic thought and planning—many states are hampered by governance ‘by accountant.’” And while, as we saw in Chapter One, “the need for navies to maintain the deterrent capability of their high-end war-fighting skills remains critical” in the eyes of Western (predominantly American) strategists, the first half of the 21st century presents a threat forecast replete with hybrid threats that do not conform to convention. As we have explored, there is a growing body of work that underscores that navies would be well served to help states in troubled regions develop constabulary, “coastguard functions” to address the disorder of that emerging dynamic. This dissertation is a manifestation of that sentiment, taking conclusions such as Trelawny’s—and those of Kilcullen and Nagl, who reference explicitly an ideological and strategic exchange with law enforcement—to a logical extension. The tides are shifting, and the littorals are re-emerging. Conceptualizing muddy waters, and the opaque world of crime and war they harbor, is paramount.
Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

Josh: But if I can just start because your, I guess your last posting was as Chief of the Naval Mission in Bogota?

Morris: From 2006 to 2010 I was Chief of the U.S. Naval Mission in Bogota, Colombia. That’s the security assistant side. Within our embassies we typically have the attachés who do their attaché job, and then we have the security assistance folks which advise host nation militaries, divide funding for things, and in Colombia of course it’s one of our largest in the world, certainly the largest in the Western hemisphere.

Josh: Okay.

Morris: But so my job was administering the various types of funding support, the Colombian Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, advising them, channeling all of our support whether it’s things like improving their radars, using our security assistance money to buy weapons, ammunition. Whatever they needed, as long as it’s within our law and wasn’t prohibited by Congress we would provide, but our goal was, you know, improve their counter-narcotics.

Josh: Okay, so would you say counter-narcotics was the preeminent focus for the naval mission there? Is that…

Morris: Oh yes.

Josh: Okay.

Morris: The whole U.S. Embassy, the number one focus was counter-narcotics. The number two focus was helping the Colombians with their insurgency.

Josh: Okay.

Morris: The Colombians had that reversed.

Josh: Right.

Morris: Their number one focus was counterinsurgency and then counter-narcotics.

Josh: Okay, and I’ll come back to that stuff because I find those conflicting interests interesting, and also obviously overlap between, you know, the insurgency and narcotics in and of itself. But before we get to that, I’m just interested also in the structure of the relationship that you had as
the Chief of Mission with working with JIATF-South and SOUTHCOM. What was sort of like the structure of the relationship there?

Morris: Okay, the U.S. military group was headed by an Army Colonel, and under him was the Naval Mission, the Air Mission. So my boss was the Army Colonel there in Bogota. His, he directly reported to Commander of U.S. Southern Command. So his boss was, my evaluation was written by the Deputy Commander of U.S. Southern Command.

Josh: Okay.

Morris: So, what we did was, our relation with JIATF-South was quite good, and we, a lot of times, facilitated information flow between JIATF-South and the Colombian Navy. Although they had a liaison officer in Key West. So, it was a flow of both ways of information. Also, when JIATF-South visited I was his host, or any of his people visited I hosted them, made arrangements for all their travel within Colombia, the meetings and things like that. Of course the other components are, JIATF-South is just one component of Southern Command. There’s also Naval Forces South, Marine Corps Forces South, which for me were supporting the U.S. effort. They’re the ones when I needed Navy people, Navy support, I talked to NAVSO, when I needed Marine Corps support I talked to MarFor. The way I got Coast Guard support was talking either District 7 or 11, which they’re the ones that own the forces.

Josh: Okay so you don’t go through JIATF-South for that.

Morris: I would go through JIATF-South too because it was always a Coast Guard guy even though it’s not a Coast Guard command. But also I had good relations with the Director of International Affairs at Coast Guard Headquarters. So, I tried to keep as many people in the loop as possible what we were doing, you know, hey here’s the effort, and you know what I needed, what support I needed whether it was a training team, whether it was... Let me give you an example. Colombia, like Mexico, is changing over their law legal system from the traditional Hispanic accusatorial system to more of a common law adversarial system, and, which empowers the judges more, so the judges have a say now in which evidence is accepted, which evidence is not accepted, and under common law, there has to be a chain of custody, I guess there didn’t have to be a chain of custody before. So the Colombians had a, the Colombian Navy had several cases thrown out when their Coast Guard officers did not have proper chain of custody under the new system so they came to me and said, how to do it. So I brought in Coast Guard Training teams as well as DEA people to help train the Colombian Navy in terms of, hey how do you do this thing called “chain of custody.”

Josh: Okay.

Morris: The other thing is that SOUTHCOM, the money appropriated by Congress to help the Colombians came in a couple of different forms. If it was the foreign military financing, the State Department money, even though we administered it, we still had to get a buy in from SOUTHCOM.

Josh: We as in the Navy Mission or as in the Embassy?
Appendix A

Morris: Well, okay all of it. I mean when you think about it, the Naval Mission, I had to give approval, but them someone within the Embassy, the Ambassador had to approve it. If it didn’t get approved by the Ambassador, it didn’t go.

Josh: It didn’t go.

Morris: So then someone at SOUTHCOM would have to approve it and then finally, since it is State Department money, someone at the State Department would have to approve it. So, there was other money, counter drug money, that I didn’t have to get anyone else’s approval for. I just say okay, I want to buy this, this and this. Now, at the end of the day the Ambassador would say yes or no. There’s other type of money, like where we had to approve Colombian facilities, engineering money. It was U.S. money, it didn’t have to go through SOUTHCOM, but there was someone else in the embassy, head of the Narcotics Affairs section, for some reason there had been some memorandum of understanding that the head of Narcotics Affairs section would approve spending for that.

Josh: And that person is State, or?

Morris: State Department.

Josh: Okay, from like INL?

Morris: Yes, they report to INL. They might not necessarily be from INL, they may have been from another thing but they have detailed work for INL in Colombia.

Josh: Did you find that, was that system complicated in a good way or was it so overcomplicated that it could take so long to get funding or programs approved that by the time they were executed, they were a little past their due date? That’s kind of a leading question, but it just sounds like a very complicated system.

Morris: It is a very complicated system. It dates to the Cold War. The idea was we wanted to be slow in providing assistance so that there’s no rapid change in the balance of power in the region. In fact, one of the things when you do either an arms sale or a foreign military financing, which is our money, you had to comment in the cable that was written, typically the mil group originated it but then it had to go throughout the rest of the Embassy. You had to have a paragraph that commented on the effect on regional stability. So you know, if all of a sudden you’ve sold a hundred tanks to someone whose neighbors has no tanks and there’s no threat to this country, why would they need tanks, what’s the reason? It’s not internal defense, it’s aggression.

Josh: It’s aggression.

Morris: But the idea was, and there’s other things too, for example if you wanted to have like a high tech item and it had to go through a different process, it was difficult. I’ll give you an example. Before I arrived there, Congress did an earmark and I believe it was in the FY04 budget, that said that this money, specific money of FMF was being set aside so that the Colombian air force could have a Medevac system. And by the time I left in 2010, we’re still negotiating over what we want. We’ve got some aircraft in country, some Bell Helicopters but
they also want Blackhaws and then they want Grand Caravans, air ambulances, and there’s a piece of some type of rare metal in a Grand Caravan that requires someone else. Oh it’s crazy trying to get through the approval process. So the approval process is slow and even Secretary Gates said he wanted to streamline it, Secretary Hagel, Panetta, all said hey, we want to streamline this system, but [unclear]...

Josh: Okay. So it’s hard to extract it from that. And it sounds that you had a good working relationship, obviously with the Coast Guard. It also sounds like a lot of your responsibilities overlap a little bit more with the Coast Guard’s, not just jurisdiction but interest a little bit more than the DOD and the Navy interest. I guess what I’m asking is how does the Navy characterize the maritime issue in the Caribbean? Because my impression is that that characterization, or the interest level, is substantially different than that of the Coast Guard, because they’re different organizations, their objectives are different. Did you feel like that was the case? Either that there wasn’t the level of interest or?

Morris: I certainly can’t comment on how the whole Navy thinks. Let me give you this observation. When I arrived in Colombia, I had great support from the Coast Guard. I had very little support from U.S. Naval Forces South.

Josh: Financial support or just overall?

Morris: Just overall support. They had no financial interest in me at all, so they held none of my money. My money, was either I held and spent or SOUTHCOM held it and we spent it and said hey, here’s where it’s going to go. But getting things like training teams down from the Navy, you know getting NAVSO to buy off on that was often difficult. When Admiral Stavridis came in, he said Colombia’s the number one priority. And even then I had trouble with NAVSO agreeing with it, they said we don’t agree with that. Then when Admiral Kernan became both the Commander of Naval Forces South and the new Fourth Fleet, that all changed. I got great support from them in terms of training teams, in terms of things like intelligence, bringing intelligence training teams down to help train Colombian Naval Intelligence, things like that. That sort of waned once Admiral Kernan left. So the Navy’s focus in the Caribbean has not necessarily been… but let me say the working relationship between the Navy and Coast Guard’s great. The Navy controls frigates, they have Coast Guard boarding teams on it. We have agreements, bilateral agreements that a lot of the Caribbean basin nations. So not only can U.S. Coast Guard boarding teams ride our ships, other nation’s boarding teams can ride our ships too. So the relationship, I didn’t get as much support. Now there were a couple other parts of the Navy that I got great support from. Colombia has two Diesel-Electric Submarines. There’s a program where we bring the Latin American Diesel-Electric Submarines up to the United States to exercise with our battle groups because we don’t have any Diesel-Electric Submarines and all of our potential enemies do. So a nuclear sub can’t act as a, you can pretend but you can’t act so we would get the South American nations to send their submarines. We had more support from the Colombians so I would get lots of ports from the Submarine Force when they said, okay the Colombians need a visit, they need this and that, I got it. The other one was, the Office of Naval Research has a global outreach program. They finally realized the gringos don’t necessarily have all the greatest ideas in the world. There’s a lot of ideas coming out of a lot of places, so there’s
actually an ONR office in Santiago, in the Embassy in Santiago, and I get visits from those guys 2-3 times a year coming to talk to the Colombian Navy, their R&D folks, their shipyard, things like that to exchange ideas.

Josh: Less on the maritime security front and more on your classic naval issues...

Morris: But, when I needed a Coast Guard guy, I got it.

Josh: Right.

Morris: No matter what. The epicenter of the drug trade is Buenaventura, Colombia. My whole four and a half years there I never had a U.S. Navy admiral visit Buenaventura. Lots would go to Cartagena but never to Buenaventura. And as far as the Colombians remembered, they can never ever remember a U.S. Navy admiral visiting Buenaventura. Coast Guard guys, four or five visits to Buenaventura, Coast Guard Admirals, easily they would, yes let’s go, let’s go. And there’s a lot of times when training teams would want to come down and we’d want to do a meeting with the Colombians, we want to use Cartagena and I sort of realized it’s just military tourism. Well you know, 10 years ago Cartagena would be a great place to hold that meeting but now everything shifted to the Pacific. I want you to hold the meeting, the training in Buenaventura, and about a week later it’s like, ah we don’t want to go there.

Josh: And so, I mean I guess what that subtly gets to is that, obviously the Navy has different interests in, let’s just say different perspectives on what it considers most significant, what it considers its responsibility and what the Coast Guard considers its responsibility. As a Naval Officer yourself...

Morris: Well, let me back up, let me explain something. One of the reasons that, and one of the guys at JIATF-South explained this to me, one of the directors of JIATF-South I don’t recall which one, was saying post-Cold War, assets were not a problem. They could send ships and aircraft, both Navy and Coast Guard out on pure patrol and it wasn’t a problem, and they in fact they ignored a lot of the bilateral working arrangements, a lot of working with other countries.

Josh: Because they didn’t have to.

Morris: They didn’t have to, they didn’t have to. And so as the fleet draws down post-Cold War and assets become more and more rare and the ability to do pure patrol disappears, you’ve got to launch aircraft only on missions that are verified intelligence, or sending ships out to patrol known drug lanes rather than just patrol in general. And so one of the things the Navy did do was really good at help building bilateral relations, especially with Colombia. So while maybe I didn’t receive as much support from NAVSO as I wanted to, I got great support out of Washington, especially the CNO’s office, and so got lots of visits from the CNO.

Josh: Because it sounds like there was an appreciation for the role that Colombia should play, which you centered in, and less of an appreciation of how hard assets can be detailed there I guess because they felt that they were needed elsewhere at this point.

Morris: Yeah.
Josh: You know the fleet is shrinking and the Caribbean just isn’t a priority in that regard. Okay, and this goes more I guess towards your education and experience as a Navy officer, and as a captain in the US Navy, did you feel like, or how did those experiences, your coming up and educating as a US Navy officer prepare you for a lot more of the unconventional components of security in the Caribbean, your dealing in your position with counter-narcotics, and you were saying before [before start of recording] the issue with wildlife traffic. And I can’t imagine that features prominently in something, the courses that you take.

Morris: No none of it. In fact, going to Colombia was an eye opening experience. I’ll give you, this is a true story that when I arrived in Colombia, there were still a lot of go-fast boats leaving the Caribbean coast not far from Cartagena. We had started pushing them out from Cartagena towards the Guajira and [Uraba] but there were still quite a few, they were being stopped and captured by either US Navy with Coast Guard boarding teams, US Coast Guard, Colombians. And at the time, they weren’t smart enough to throw their Sat phones and GPS’s overboard, so we were capturing the GPS. Well I realized, if you captured the GPS, you know where they left the coast. So I made a comment to the head of DEA in Cartagena one day, says okay I’m going to get the Colombian Marines to do a landing right where they left the beach and we’ll find the caleta, the big cash of cocaine. And he goes no, I mean I thought I was giving him a heart attack, he says no, no, no, no, no. I said, why not? He says, because we’ve given the Colombians landing craft, we’ve trained their Marines, they have either the second or third largest Marine Corps in the world depending on how you count the numbers, it’s either the South Koreans or the Colombians are number two or three. They’ve adopted a whole bunch of US Marine Corp programs whole cloth, so they are amazing marines. One of the classes we do ongoing is called lasso landing attack and subsequent operations, mainly for a riverine force but it also applies for amphibians, so they had landing craft, they had all this stuff so we could send the Marines ashore. So the idea of doing that, and the DEA guy said, look if you ask the Colombians to do it, they’ll do it, but please don’t. I’m like, well, why not? Don’t we want to capture the cocaine, and the DEA guy goes, no we don’t want to capture the cocaine. I’m like, hold it, I thought you guys were the Drug Enforcement Agency. He says, we want to capture the people, and we don’t really care about the guys who load the boat or guard the caleta, because they’re nobodies. They’re replaceable. What we want is we want the head of the DTO, the Drug Trafficking Organization, and we want the guy who keeps the books, which is either his brother or first cousin. And so they told me a story, they said in the early 2000s, a small boat near Cartagena was captured with like 120 kilos. Which is nothing in Colombia, doesn’t even make the news in Colombia. In New York City, 2 kilos makes the front page news, Los Angeles, but in Colombia 100 or 120 kilos, because the average go-fast carries between 1000 and 2000 kilos. The fishing boats, when they were using fishing boats could carry between 6 and 10 thousand kilos. The semi-submersibles carry between 4 and 8 thousand kilos. So 120 kilos in Colombia is not much. He said, what we did is, we got a conviction on the guy in the boat, and we started talking to him, he told us what he knew. So we arrested this guy, who did he talk to? And over a patience of like 7 years, they built up this case and they finally took down the head of the Drug Trafficking Organization and seized $200 million of property in South Florida and $200 million of property in Colombia. He said, if you send the Marines ashore, they’ll destroy evidence. He says, we’re not about arresting the little guys, we’re about collecting evidence to take down the head of the organization and

Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory
seize all his assets. That’s how we hurt them. So if you think about that, the military method is sending the marines. You know, capture the whatever.

Josh: Take the beachhead.

Morris: Take the beachhead. And had I asked the Colombians to do it, they would have done it. They would have figured out a way to do it because they would’ve seen that as, hey they’ve given us all this money, they’ve given us landing craft, they’ve done all this stuff, they want us to use them now, they would’ve done it. They would’ve certainly captured a hole in the ground with a whole bunch of cocaine, they probably would’ve captured one or two guys and some AK47s and that’s it, they would’ve destroyed all the evidence. So if you think about it, that’s a whole different attitude from a military guy, which is you know, kill, seek out and destroy and kill the enemy. It’s capture evidence. Use that evidence to go higher and higher and higher up their chain of command, so there’s really nothing that I could have done that could’ve trained me for that. I never did an exchange tour with the Coast Guard, I’ve done a lot of work with the Coast Guard before that, but never, you know anything like that, so it’s just a whole different attitude than the military ones. So I was not very well prepared. The thing that I knew is, also an economics background, so I’m like okay, when you seize $200 worth of property in South Florida and $200 million in Colombia, that hurts. That makes sense, that’s taking the profit out of them.

Josh: Alright, we were talking before about sort of the structure of the Colombian Navy, how they don’t have a distinct Coast Guard but it’s one of the multiple elements of the Colombian Navy. This is kind of a two-part question, I guess the first part is, in character or in strategic perspective, does the Colombian Navy operate in a different way than the US Navy? And I assume the answer, obviously the US Navy is global in perspective and so global in strategy. Would you characterize the Colombian Navy, which includes that Coast Guard Component, more in terms of I guess constabulary nature, that they’re far more interested with maybe even law enforcement in a way that more resembles the US Coast Guard or do they have more of that I guess conceptualization of the world that’s similar to the US Navy?

Morris: That’s a very good question and it requires a two-part answer. It’s one of those, do you speak Spanish?

Josh: Not a lot.

Morris: In Colombia there’s a lot of questions answered si pero no, yes but no. Or si como no, yes however no. They do perceive external threats. They have an ongoing maritime dispute with Nicaragua and it has to do with the islands in the Caribbean that the Colombians have and then the treaty that drew the line that the Nicaraguans have been challenging in more recent court decision, international court decision that said, well no we’re going to give some of those waters to Nicaraguans. They also perceive that Venezuela is a threat. A lot of times privately the Colombian admirals would say their worst case scenario is a worsening economic situation in Venezuela, would become much like Argentina in 1982 where the Argentinians, bad economics, things that need an external enemy to turn away from the internal problems so they invade the Falklands. So in the Colombian mind, they do worry about Venezuelan… So their attitude is
they need frigates and submarines as a deterrence, as a deterrence. They also, and the Colombians have written about this for decades, about responsibility in world affairs. They had a war with Peru in the ‘30s down in the Amazon and they submitted to international arbitration and said we’ll accept whatever. They felt so strongly about being part of the UN when the UN called for troops to go to Korea, the Colombians sent a battalion of troops in 3 ships to fight in Korea. When, if you remember the Suez Crisis of 1956 after the Israelis, the British and French invade the Suez, which had been nationalized by Nasser, Colombia, one of the Scandinavian countries and an Asian country sent peacekeepers. Then when the Camp David Accords come along, having needing someone who had troops with experience in the Sinai, the Colombians are still part of the Sinai Peacekeeping Force. So the Colombians have this attitude that as a member of the world community, there’s a responsibility, so they realize we need to have a certain amount of forces to help them. So they do see that, hey there’s this problem. They made a commitment to one of our CNO’s that they want to work towards deploying one of their frigates with one of our battle groups of some type.

Josh: Outside the fourth fleet or?

Morris: Yeah outside the fourth fleet, yeah. So they’re our best friend, they want to participate in stuff with us. They would express that they want to be up to NATO standards. They would even say, you know, maybe NATO membership is not out of the realm of possibility, they actually have observer status at NATO now. So that’s it. On the other hand, the problem in Colombia’s so bad that the Navy, the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard is a big constabulary force. For example, while the Colombian police, national police, have jurisdiction over all the land, the Colombian Navy has jurisdiction over all the navigable waters and 500 meters on either side.

Josh: Oh wow.

Morris: And they get to say what’s navigable. At one point the police came to me and said they wanted to buy some boats so that they could patrol the non-navigable rivers and the Navy came to me and said…

Josh: There are none?

Morris: No, no. At the time there was 18,000 kilometers of rivers, and all the briefings would say 12,000 kilometers navigable so the army said, well we’re responsible for the other 6,000. And over the next few months, all the briefings changed. Colombia has 18,000 kilometers of navigable rivers, because the Colombian Navy looked at the law and the Navy gets to define what’s navigable, not the police. So, so yeah. There’s also a land jurisdiction on the Pacific Coast in 20 kilometers and the department, the northern parts of three departments around Cartagena, is the Navy’s responsibility for security. So you see marine’s patrolling the streets with the national police and in some places there’s only marines patrolling the streets. So, yes they do see this responsibility to protect Colombian sovereignty, they do perceive that there’s outside threats. They do think that some of the internal actors are talking to some of the external actors, so that weighs heavily on their mind. But there’s also this, you know, hey what is out part in this internal war? And it’s the rivers, the Pacific Coast and the area around Cartagena. And there’s another area that they’re responsibly for, it’s called the [Montes de Morenas], it’s south of
Cartagena and it is some of the richest agricultural land in the world. You drive through it, you think you’re in Kentucky, Tennessee, the Shenandoah Valley type of Virginia, these giant farms or ranches and so it’s just this huge rich agricultural land. It was never a drug producing area, but it was areas to get from the interior where the drugs are produced out to the coast so the FARC moved in, started extorting farmers so Uribe, President Uribe sends in a marine rifle brigade to pacify the area and kill the FARC, and they did. And so, we kept asking to withdraw their brigade, turn them into a riverine brigade, President Uribe kept saying no. So they do see the big national security picture, but they also see this internal threat that they’re responsible for a great deal of.

Josh: Okay. Well that kind of leads into, and we were talking about this before, before I turned on the mic, but this sort of, not conflicting but maybe competing interests between US maritime forces and the Colombian forces, which you were saying that in the United States the narcotics issue is sort of perceived as number one and the Colombian insurgency issue is perceived as number two, whereas in Colombia that’s flipped. Maybe if you would just talk a little bit more about how, if at all, that impacted your relationship with the Colombian officials, particularly your relationship with the Navy that, did you feel like you were working at cross purposes ever because you had those mildly conflicting priorities or was it just something managed because both of them got attended to?

Morris: The Colombian Navy saw the relationship between the insurgency and the drugs, so they felt their role was to stamp out the drugs as much as possible as a way to choke the insurgency’s funding. I ended up writing a paper, a point paper in circulating around the ministry defense and them trying to get the Colombians to build up their Navy as a way of the defeating the FARC, using some examples of the US submarine force attacking Japan but the main example was the North versus the South during the American Civil War. The South was agriculture society based on an export of one particular product trying to fund their war effort. The FARC is growing one particular product, although they make money from extortion and kidnapping, the vast majority of the money…

Josh: They were really only exporting one major product.

Morris: …is cocaine, to some extent heroin, but heroin and cocaine. And so you build up the Navy, you choke off their trade and they go out of business. The Navy always bought into that.

Josh: The Colombian Navy.

Morris: The Colombian Navy. Of course the army didn’t, because the Colombian Army in the last, you know hundred years or so that there’s been a Colombian commando general the joint command and everything and a commando general, their equivalent of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs with one exception like five years ago for one year, it’s always been army, was a Navy guy for one year and the army hated that. And the army is dominant and the national police are dominant, so they on average get 45 percent each of the budget, and it’s a struggle each year. One is going to get 46 and one 44 and then the Navy and the Air Force share the remainder of the defense budget which is…
Muddy Waters: Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

Josh: Wow. Pretty minimal.

Morris: Five or Six percent. So where I think the struggle was not within the quantity because the army’s dominant and so, at one point in the late nineties is the FARC is been given the despeje the demilitarized zone, they build up their forces to 20,000 uniformed and then somewhere between 40 and 60,000 militia. And they basically have a ring around Bogota. They imagined themselves riding into Bogota, much as Castro rode into Havana being given keys to the armory, all the armories and then they take over. And I think that there was a lot of people here in Washington that thought that was going to happen, that the Colombian government was about to fail and we were going to end up with a narco-state not only a two-hour flight from Miami. We had already approved, and remember it started under President Clinton, in the last years of President Clinton this thing called “Plan Colombia.” Plan Colombia was a Colombian idea that said hey help us, we need the resources to attack this narcotics fight. And at the time our law and our policy prohibited the State Department from helping the Colombian military and the Defense Department from helping the Colombian police because the police were fighting narcotics and the army was fighting the insurgency. Okay so at some point in ’99, 2000 we see the assessment from the joint chiefs is that the government in Colombia is going to fail. So they see all this money that we have already approved by Congress and with the approval of Congress, they say okay, we’re going to focus on the survival of the Colombian government first. So that meant mainly providing the Colombian army with mobility, rotary wing mobility, lots of helicopters, both through State Department buying and operating helicopters in Colombia and the US DoD using FMS to buy and start shipping down the, both of them have your advantages and disadvantages. The disadvantage of the FMS system is it’s slow. The big advantage of the FMS system is that we believe in a thing called, gosh I forget the term for that, but basically it’s a whole solution. We don’t just give you helicopters.

Josh: Right.

Morris: We give you training for pilots, training for mechanics, oh yeah. You gotta buy all the special tools you need. You’ve gotta set up all the special shops you need. You’ve gotta train all those people so that a year after you have that helicopter, it’s still operating and not a piece of junk on the ground because all you did was buy the helicopter. We believe in the whole solution and that takes time. I mean if taking and airplane mechanic and turning him into a Black Hawk Helicopter mechanic is done but…

Josh: It’s a complicated process.

Morris: It takes time. It takes a lot of US people advising them year after, how to maintain maintenance records. You know, if you’ve got helicopters that are flying near the coast, how do you inspect for corrosion, how do you get the salt off of them. All those sort of things that you just don’t think about, but it’s part of the whole package approach. So that’s a slow process. So, we also built up what we called mobile brigades within the Colombian Army and riverine brigades within the Colombian Marine Corps. They were mobile, not like a US or European mobilized brigade, which means motorized, they were mobile in the sense that they were not constitutionally tied to a piece of territory like some of their divisions, where their divisions were
Appendix A

constitutionally tied to a piece of territory and if there was no problem in that area, that
department, you couldn’t pick that division up or move it. So we created about twenty mobile
brigades as well as two or three riverine brigades that could go anywhere in the country. They
were very, a lot of guys carrying weapons, not too many administrative people, so the logistics
administrative support came from the regional divisions, but these guys could go anywhere in
Colombia and fight. Later on while I’m there, the tension is a lot less between the US and the
Colombians, we just agreed to disagree. And then the Colombians were going to focus on what
they thought was the biggest threat and then we would try to prod them to do a lot more counter-
narcotics work. So that was working with the police, that was NAS and that was us working with
the Colombian Navy and we had certain money, earmarked specifically for riverines specifically
for Coast Guard that couldn’t be touched, that the US army couldn’t pick up and move and say,
oh we need this for rotor wing stuff. Because if you look at the funding for Plan Colombia, even
once Uribe is in office for a couple years and there’s no longer a threat to the Colombian
government, the vast majority of Plan Colombia money went to Colombian Army rotary wing
aviation. Tens and tens and tens of millions of dollars and the Colombian Army, while they had a
counter-narcotics brigade, that was not their focus. The Colombian Navy from 2006 to 2010
went from seizing 68,000 kilos to 98,000 kilos a year and the Colombian National Police was
always in their, Colombian National Police, Colombian Marines destroying hundreds and
hundreds of labs a year and while the Colombian Army did that, their numbers are in the
hundreds of kilos, not in the tens of thousands of kilos. Their number of labs are in the dozens,
not in the hundreds.

Josh: What was the priority there?

Morris: Fighting the FARC.

Josh: Was it just directly engaging with…

Morris: Going after the FARC in that area that used to be the demilitarized zone, which is their
heartland. Pushing them further and further back, establishing civil control in cities and
departments and municipalities and then keep moving forward, keep moving forward.

Josh: Okay. This kind of blends right into another…

Morris: So the tension is that the US Army wants to continue to support and continue to pour
more and more money into rotary wing aviation and I wanted money to build patrol boats. I
wanted money, now I didn’t have to worry about the riverine money because that was between
five and ten million dollars a year to support Colombian riverine, and that money could not be
touched, no group could not say ‘oh, I want to give that to the air force, I want to give that to the
army.’ It was…

Josh: Earmarked for that.

Morris: Earmarked specifically for the riverine forces. And then occasionally I’d have money for
some other stuff that was earmarked, but it was all going to the counter-narcotics fight by the
Colombian Navy. So but, I would say, okay I want to build patrol boats. You guys, and so in a
book that was a great book about the history of the US military relationship between Colombia
and the United States from the beginning up until about 1960, I read that the support for Colombian army rotary wing aviation started under Eisenhower. And so I would ask in meetings, okay so we’ve got to protect our investment, we’ve got to protect, we’ve got to finish building this special shop to do maintenance on these engines, these turbines because we’ve got to protect our engines. Okay well how much longer do we protect our investment? Well what do you mean? I said, well we have been supporting Colombian army rotary wing aviation since Eisenhower, when does it end?

Josh: When does it stop?

Morris: When does it stop? And they just look at me and say, what do you mean? We gave them 24 helicopters, all sorts of stuff in the last few months of the Eisenhower administration, training, all sorts of stuff like that. When does it end? Is fifty, you know fifty years is enough? Or do you need sixty years? And the army would, they kept pushing back because they kept wanting support, they wanted to go from just individual helicopter units to an aviation battalion, to an aviation brigade. And they had full buy in from the US army mission to do that. And so, there, I think a lot of the internal struggle was within the mil group, within the mil group in trying to convince people. In fact, one officer, you know I kept talking to him in one briefing about, and I think it was Congressional delegation, about how Plan Colombia was counter-narcotics, and this guy pulled me aside and said, hey Lieutenant Colonel, Army Lieutenant Colonel, he said, hey sir you just don’t understand. I said, what do you mean? He said, Plan Colombia was never about counter-narcotics, it was about supporting Colombian army rotary wing aviation. And he’s right, that’s where the money went. Another example, we did a program called Air Bridge Denial. We brought in Cessna Citations with radar and communications gear. We built up Colombian air force ground based radars so that they could reassert sovereignty over their airspace. And they had airborne use of force. They never had to shoot down an aircraft. I think, I think one time they had to fire warning shots, but basically anytime they’d encounter an aircraft in their airspace that was unregistered or didn’t have a flight plan, they could force it down and arrest the guys. And so basically the drug flights disappear from over Colombia, yet, and the best I can, over the number of years that program from whenever it started until 2010, we spent probably between 80 million and a hundred million dollars for that program. And yet, JIATF-South will tell you that on average, on average, narcotics flights are only five percent of the traffic. Maybe there’s one or two years where it may have gotten up to ten percent, but on average the narcotics trafficking, only five percent is done by air, 95 percent is done by sea. And yet there was never a corresponding Sea Bridge Denial Program where we poured tens of millions of dollars into coast radars and maritime surveillance aircraft and things like that. We didn’t do it. It was, you know, support…

Josh: Because there’s this legacy I guess of that, of this rotary wing investment for some reason.

Morris: And then so, and then to help the air force out. But also I think part of it was, there was this concept within the American public, you’ve got all these drug flights coming into the States. You know, there weren’t that many and they don’t care that much.
Josh: Right. But for some reason they captured the imagination and that’s what people were talking about. I want to bleed in, I’ve just got a couple more questions, I don’t know what your time frame is but…

Morris: I’m supposed to go to lunch over in Fairfax at about 12:30, but let me see… Perfect, yes so I have to be over at Fairfax City at 12:30.

Josh: Okay.

Morris: Or thereabouts.

Josh: I mean I’ve only a couple more, like formal more questions I have written out. So as we’re talking about terrorism or insurgency, you know depending on your specific definitions of the term, are a big issue in Colombia. But in a lot of the literature that I read, the relationship between narcotics trafficking and terrorist financing, or human smuggling and terrorism, the relationships between terrorism and a lot of the other illicit trades in the Caribbean and in Colombia are spoken about in theoretical terms, but there seems to be very little hard evidence or forensic evidence that’s put forward in a lot of the literature about the relationship between terrorism and broader illicit trades. And I was wondering if maybe you could speak broadly to what sort of direct relationship, of course the FARC is obviously known to be funded through narcotics trafficking, but of any other or more diverse relationships between terrorism and illicit trafficking or human trafficking, or you know things of that nature in the Caribbean?

Morris: Well certainly the FARC and the ELN are involved in cocaine trafficking, and then the terrorism, I was, right after I arrived in Bogota was about four blocks away from a hundred kilo car bomb that targeted their National War College and then there were a lot of smaller bombs in Bogota throughout my time there. Typically, we certainly think a hundred kilo car bomb was designed to kill people but I think it only killed one person. But there was supposed to be something going on nearby that ended up being canceled at the last minute for some reason. And, but there was a lot of other smaller bombs, typically they were extortion. The idea was you know, hey, you pay us money and your business stays safe. And the FARC is involved in a lot of kidnapping and extortion, those are other sources of revenue for them. But also, a lot of the paramilitary groups that didn’t demobilize through the government program, they just sort of disappeared and stopped doing paramilitary work, basically became organized crime elements. So there’s still a lot of kidnapping and extortion through that. In fact, my wife is in Bogota right now, her mom’s got cancer so she’s down with her. And she just, you know, how much things, I mean I’ve mentioned it several times but hey, we can move to Bogota. And she’s like no I don’t want to do that, because the crime is…

Josh: Still rampant.

Morris: Yeah, has gone up, in fact.

Josh: Oh really?

Morris: Now, it’s not murders, but it’s just a lot of street crime and stuff like that. The millionaires ride where they kidnap you and take you around every ATM machine until midnight
New York time and then start again until your credit/debit card won’t give out any more then they just they either dump you off on the streets somewhere. Sometimes they dump you off where they picked you up. So as long as you don’t resist, you know, you’re okay but a lot of that’s organized crime. Now, I think the FARC was into a lot of other types of things too. If you believe the newspaper stories about the computer files captured from Raul Reyes, the guy that was killed in the bombing raid in Ecuador, one mile into Ecuador, they were looking to do false carbon credits, they were looking to sell some nuclear material, which was later captured in Colombia. It was all like medical waste that couldn’t have been used for anything but they didn’t know that. They thought it was…

Josh: Right, they thought it was real.

Morris: Well, I mean it was real nuclear materials, but it was so depleted that it had no, it couldn’t have been used for anything but they didn’t know that it couldn’t be used for anything. They knew it was real nuclear materials. So there’s money laundering schemes, all sorts of other stuff. Counterfeiting is big in Colombia too. In fact, the Secret Service has an office within the US Embassy in Bogota mainly for counterfeiting. The Colombians counterfeiters, some of them which are organize crime, some them which may be involved in, with the terrorist groups, are sets that they still engrave plates. They’re not using digital stuff to do anything. They’re actually still engraving plates.

Josh: Does that make better forgeries or?

Morris: According to Ambassador Bill Wood, yeah. He was the Ambassador when I got there. He said that when the banks, the national bank of Iraq fails after the invasion, the organized crime moves in, takes all the money, Denari or whatever the Iraqis had, Denari, and they bleach it, and then they ship the paper to Colombia because that, the Iraqi money was the closest paper to American money.

Josh: Interesting. Well that, so well that obviously points to pretty extensive international connections. Are there, I mean I’ve read about, you know, relationships between, you know, Russian organized crime and narcotics traffickers and between even the Provisional IRA and maybe the FARC. Are there…

Morris: Yes, there were three members of the Provisional IRA that were involved in training the FARC on improvised mortars, they were convicted in Colombian Court. They were appealed, let out on bail and they’ve never, they skipped the country and never been back. Colombians still want them; I don’t know if they’re back in the Republic of Ireland, the Republic of Ireland doesn’t extradite to South America. Whatever, yeah. There’s also possibilities of money laundering for Hamas. There is a small in the Guajira Peninsula. Are you familiar with that?

Josh: Yeah. That sort of juts out into the Caribbean.

Morris: Lots of Lebanese, Colombians of Lebanese or Syrians.

Josh: Okay so fundraising for Hezbollah, it would probably be that.
Appendix A

Morris: Fundraising and then maybe some money laundering, but certainly not as much as in Venezuela.

Josh: Right

Morris: Or Trinidad.

Josh: In the Tri Boarder. I know there’s a Muslim population in Trinidad, is that… I’m always sort of, I try and air on the side of skeptical that I see in a lot of papers that, you know, they’ll link the location of a Muslim community to some sort of extremist sympathies. Is there any sort of real evidence that anything like that or do people just cite that like it’s a potential because of the community there?

Morris: It’s a potential. You know, the money laundering may be really just sending money back to families. Because when the civil war erupted in Lebanon, the Colombians actually sent an aircraft to pick up Colombian-Lebanese citizens and bring them back, or whatever.

Josh: And I guess it’s hard to know in sort of that flow of remittances and the flow of people. It’s hard to know.

Morris: And I don’t think it’s that big. It’s certainly not like the Tri Boarders

Josh: Right, it’s more extensive.

Morris: I mean the Colombians never really had much of anybody immigrating. I mean, the numbers are very, very small. I mean, not like Argentina where you had waves of European Jews, waves of Germans, waves of Italian, waves of Welsh, waves of Irish.

Josh: Yeah, the Welsh ended up in like Patagonia right?

Morris: Patagonia, yeah, yeah. In fact, I met a guy in Colombia on one of the humanitarian missions who’d been on, he was a retired British officer, he’d been on, in the Falklands War, and his unit never went ashore until after the Argentinians surrendered. He was responsible for rounding up all of the Argentinian prisoners. He’s taking down the names, like every fifth names of Welsh. Yeah it was all in Patagonia. The Spanish wouldn’t go to Patagonia but the Welsh would. So, yeah, so the Colombians never… there’s only a handful of non-Spanish surnames there. Like there’s one guy that I met who is Mario Eastman, and there’s some Eastman’s in my family, I was like wow. And one of the senators was Klovkosky and, but the numbers are so small. It’s not like, like you know some of the Cabinet in Venezuela or Syrian distraction or something like that. The numbers are very small. What we were worried about is the interchange of technology between illegal groups, illegally armed groups. Colombia has, the Colombians call them anti-personnel mines, and what we would call IEDs. More mine incidences than any country in the world for civilians. Thousands of people that are walking around on one leg because the FARC uses mines to protect their camps, to protect their labs, to protect coca fields and things like that. So, you know, were there increases of technology transfer, triggering devices and stuff like that?
Josh: Is that, were you concerned about that being direct between the groups, some sort of interaction or just by being proximity to one another that there’s a technology transfer?

Morris: No, we were talking internationally. You know, what type of triggering devices were the Middle Eastern terrorists using that maybe the FARC could pick up on, and through the internet, through the dark side of the internet. The other thing that we were worried about is both the semisubmersible and the submersible technology. In one of the semisubmersibles captured off Central America, there were two Colombians, a Sri Lankan, and someone from some other country. What the hell is a Sri Lankan doing on a semisubmersible? Later on, someone sent me some pictures of some semisubmersibles in my e-mail that had just gone out, that I finally realized, they weren’t Colombian semisubmersibles. They were Tamil Tiger semisubmersibles. Was there in interchanged of technology before the Tamil Tigers, don’t know. But if you look at the pictures, holy moly. Now they were using them for suicide attacks as all as trafficking arms, bringing arms from the mainland into Sri Lanka. So certainly, I mean that was one of the nice things about working in Colombia, even though technically the FARC was an atheist group, a lot of good Catholics that were not willing to commit suicide. So, like the British would tell me, with the IRA, the one thing that they would do is if you can cut off the escape route, if you cut off the escape routes, they wouldn’t do whatever they were going to do because then it becomes a suicide mission and good Catholics don’t commit suicide. And so even atheist Catholic FARC members don’t commit suicide. There was a couple of cases where there was some suicide attacks that basically it was people who were duped into it. Club Nogales Bombing, I don’t know if you’re familiar with that. Club Nogales was a very high end social club on one of the main streets in Colombia, right across the street from the house of the Spanish Ambassador. And in 2002, it was car bombed. It was like sixty people killed, there were a couple of quinceañera’s going on, the fifteenth birthday party celebration, and things like that. The people were, the car was loaded up with explosives and people drove it in. The handlers told them, okay, we want you to get away and then we’ll trigger it remotely.

Josh: Oh okay.

Morris: And or set the timer, whatever. They set the timer, you’ll have time to get away don’t worry about it. And they detonated it remotely and killed the guys driving in, so… And then occasionally they’d put a backpack on a kid and tell him to walk into a police station and stuff like that. They’re using kids so young that really don’t even know what they’re doing. The other one’s a burro, on a donkey.

Josh: Really?

Morris: Putting bombs on donkeys.

Josh: Just let them walk.

Morris: Walk into the main square, they detonate them.

Josh: Wow.
Appendix A

Morris: So, they seem to do about one a year of those. So, yes. There’s this increasing worry about the interconnection between these people. Is there a direct connection? I don’t know. There’s always stories about, with the counterfeitters, if they could counterfeit, if they could counterfeit US currency, could they counterfeit a US passport? And who from the Mideast would want a US passport?

Josh: Right. I mean that’s one of the connections…

Morris: The Colombians don’t need to have…

Josh: Right.

Morris: Yeah, because so many Colombians have Visas to get here anyway, they don’t need to have a false US passport. But now with the Venezuelans giving away to the Iranians…

Josh: These investor Visa programs in the Caribbean also.

Morris: Yeah, so we were worried about that. We were worried about the transfer of technology from maritime trafficking. That was a big concern. And then once I, so the question we would always ask though is, and look at some of the stories that, about the semisubmersible captured. The nationality of the crews. Now, if there, if you have, we always thought it was more than a thousand kilos. If you have about more than a thousand kilos of cocaine in a boat, there’s an owner’s representative onboard because he wants to make sure it gets to the destination, it gets to whoever. Now, the FARC, the ELN, the paramilitaries, they could fight each other in one area but they’ll do a handshake deal to move drugs, pool their risk. The cocaine brick is stamped with an ownership mark, so that does a couple things. Who owns it, but also some of them have a reputation for better quality too so you know hey, this is the Cadillac version.

Josh: Right, the good stuff.

Morris: Yeah, this is the good stuff. So when they capture it, they would make, and you’d see all sorts of marks in a load. You’d see FARC marks from this front, that front, ELN marks, you’d see paramilitary groups, other bandas criminales, the criminal bands that aren’t paramilitary, or former paramilitary. And so, so while they, we’d fight and kill each other, they would also do business together. So, if you’ve got these people that are ideologically opposed to doing business with each other, who else would they do business with? Is it farfetched that they would build a semisubmersible that could leave the coast of Colombia with ten tons of something undetected, and so the question we’d always ask is, what could it enter a US port with undetected, ten tons of something. Ten thousand kilos is a lot, a you could do lot of things with ten thousand kilos and if you only make it five thousand, and then the rest is fuel, that increases your range even more. I mean, five tons of fuel is, that’s a lot.

Josh: I’ve heard some of these, some of those semisubmersibles or fully submersibles can reach the coast of Africa. That some of them are that technically competent at this point.

Morris: I don’t know about technically competent, that’s probably not…

Josh: A little too generous.
Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

Morris: Yeah, that’s a little too generous, if you’ve ever been on one there’s nothing technical about it, they’re rudimentary at best. But, yeah you’re right, they do have the range. One that was, I mean semisubmersibles and even the submarines have mainly been a Pacific Coast phenomenon, but, one of the ones captured in 2009 was caught on the Guajira, twin engine, twin screws, twin rudders, quite a wide beam and large gas tanks. Do you go from the Guajira to Puerto Rico or Hispanola? Or do you go east? I don’t know. I think most of the drug trafficking going in Africa is done by fishing boats. And fishing boats that are no longer fishing, they’re outfitted to carry six to eight tons, six to ten tons the cocaine. They travel in groups, there’s one guy that’s the decoy, there’s one guy that’s got extra fuel, there’s one guy that is, you know, watching. And so when the Coast Guard comes in, you’ve got six boats traveling in a group, which one do you stop?

Josh: Right, who do you follow?

Morris: You’ve only got assets to stop one at a time and you can’t force them all to stop so you know, you stop one, the decoy, the rest of them keep going, they’ve already changed course, they’ve refueled, the guys got the coast they split off. But yeah no, not technology, that’s rudimentary. But, but they’re building them for a purpose and they build them… There’s, as far as I know there’s been no, although no, there was a semisubmersible that was caught off Spain, right? Or Portugal a couple years ago.

Josh: Was there?

Morris: Yeah, but I don’t know that there was evidence that it came from South America or if it was coming up from North Africa or West Africa, yeah. Mostly, and then using old cargo planes because now that you have some countries in there that don’t mind whatever a cargo plan landing, coming from Venezuela. Venezuela is the, it’s all going through Venezuela, going to West Africa.

Josh: Okay. So the African trade coast for Venezuela just because there’s…

Morris: The West African trade, there’s stuff that goes down through the Amazon, down to Brazil and Argentina, it goes to Southern Africa across there.

Josh: Okay.

Morris: So, if you’re in the ‘80s and ‘90s and you’re Brazil and Argentina, cocaine is not a problem for you because, and from even in, yeah, in the ‘80s and ‘90s it’s not your problem. And in fact, you’re getting quite wealthy over it not being a problem because the drug trafficking groups pay for services in cash. About 2002, and we only found this out in retrospect about four to five years after it happened, the drug trafficking groups made a business decision no longer to pay in cash, they pay in kind for services. So, what was not previously a Brazilian or Argentinian problem has become a big problem for them because they’ve now created...

Josh: Right, they’ve created local markets.

Morris: Local markets to sell the in kind that you’ve got. And in fact, outside of the United States, Brazil was the number two consumer of cocaine and right now they’re number one
consumer of crack cocaine. We don’t really have a crack problem; I guess all our crack addicts all died. We don’t have much of a crack problem anymore. There is a huge crack problem in Brazil, and they have become the number two consumer of cocaine after the United States.

Josh: That’s interesting.

Morris: But it wasn’t their problem in the ‘80s and ‘90s. Now it’s their…

Josh: Right, now it’s become their problem.

Morris: Yeah.

Josh: Alright, then moving on. So a lot of, sort of the crux of my research is a little bit more strategically oriented and one of the things that I’ve come across is that it seems that the ideas that environment or attitude, not environment as in climate but as in context, have a significant impact on enforcement outcomes and in the course of that research, I’ve read a lot of descriptions, many of whom were former Ambassadors or, you know, Chief of Missions, Naval Officers, who describe the Caribbean as wrestling with a culture of permissiveness, or even a culture of smuggling. And this is sort of a multi part, but is that a description that you’re familiar with, do you find it accurate and if so, how have you dealt with getting things done in a climate that’s frequently described as incredibly permissive for transnational crime?

Morris: I’ve never heard that term applied to the Caribbean, I did hear it applied to the Pacific Coast of Colombia. The history of the Pacific Coast of Colombia is that the Spanish brought in more African slaves in the New World than the English did. Most, if they didn’t go to the Caribbean Islands, if they came in to South America, they almost all came in through Cartagena. And originally they were to work the mines near, between Cali and Medellin. A lot of those slaves escape, go over the Andes, the last ridge of the Andes, the western ridge of the Andes, and set up, live on the Pacific Coast and they support themselves through contraband. An example is that, according to this book I was telling you about the history of the US/Colombian military relation, it’s estimated that one sixth of the platinum that reached Nazi Germany came from Colombia. It was illegally mined, given to German agents, smuggled south to Argentina, put on neutral Spanish ships, and then, you need platinum to make all sorts of high specialty steels. And it’s estimated that as little as one sixth, and maybe more, of Nazi’s needs for platinum came from that. So there’s this, so just an example, but they’ve been engaged in contrabanding for hundreds of years and in the Pacific Coast, on the Pacific Coast of Colombia. And contraband, just the cocaine, is just a contraband of choice today.

Josh: Okay.

Morris: If the cocaine were to disappear, they would find another. And in fact, since the, in recent times it’s basically with the price of gold and platinum so high, and some new finds of new discoveries on the Pacific Coast, it’s illegal mining again, it’s huge in Colombia. So, so I’ve heard that describe. So, and then that breeds corruption. On Transparency International’s index of countries, Colombia is actually fairly good, and better than most Latin American countries, and the Colombians say when you take out the Pacific Coast of Colombia, Colombia is actually pretty good. Now, they’re not like Finland, you know but they, you know the Colombians would
Muddy Waters: 
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

say that except for the Pacific Coast of Colombia, the rest of Colombia on the corruption index would probably be fairly European, fairly European. But it’s this corruption on the Pacific Coast that does that, and so I don’t know about the Caribbean. My limited experience in the Caribbean is with the Colombian islands in the Caribbean, and there, while there is, there is no drug production on those islands, what there is, is support for the drug trafficking trade. For example, a go-fast boat that leaves from the Caribbean coast needs to be refueled, and so the fuel comes out of San Andreas, that’s the Colombian island. So the Pacific Coast, the Colombians would say and admit is very corrupt. So part of the US efforts were trying to reduce that corruption by a lot of different things, but mainly by some sort of way of providing alternative means of earning a living. Whether it’s sustainable logging, because they have some amazing exotic woods out there that you could use for veneers, for furniture that actually would be more valuable than cocaine, developing plantations of African palm that could be converted to biodiesel, plus whatever else you use African palm products for, things like that. Coca, excuse me, cacao, Colombia is also known for cacao. Coffee, although you need a little bit higher elevation. So part of, but just, you know, trying to work with vetted units and holding local officials accountable, getting the main government in Bogota to hold local officials accountable for limiting corruption. One of the things that they would do, of course, is if the, Colombia’s divided into departments and departments are divided into municipalities, typically governors of departments and alcalde, the mayor of the municipality are elected officials. However, if they’re removed from office for corruption, then the president appoints someone to fill the rest of the term.

Josh: Okay.

Morris: And so, you know, getting Uribe to act was not very hard. He was happy to do that, happy to exercise that power. In fact, I worked with one of the men who’s later a Vice Minister of Defense, that was one of the governor, he was the governor of Antioquia for a while, appointed by Uribe to replace a governor who had been removed for…

Josh: Some sort of corruption.

Morris: Corruption connection, yeah. The Colombians are very good, they went back and anybody that had connections with the paramilitaries, they got rid of them, including in one fell swoop of like sixty members of Congress. So they were very good, just a lot of corruption to find especially on the Pacific Coast.

Josh: Okay.

Morris: Not so much on the Caribbean Coast, although you know, certainly it’s there, but the Pacific Coast, it’s because not only you have all the drugs flowing out, but everything that’s needed to make the drugs comes in. So little that’s available in Colombia has got to be brought in, and that’s why Buenaventura is so violent. The drug trafficking organizations, all the different illegally run groups are fighting for control over different neighborhoods of Buenaventura because you control the territory. You also get the workers which can serve as boat crews and they work in the ports and stuff like that, so that’s why things are so bad in Buenaventura. So much corruption there being brought in, so having to fight the corruption. Yeah.
Appendix A

Josh: Alright, okay. And then I just kind of, now that we’re kind of at the end we’ll loop back to what we were talking about before we officially got started, on that relationship between multiple transnational crimes. And maybe if I could just get you to relay again what you were talking about with organizing that environmental conference.

Morris: Sure. The head of the economics section of the US Embassy came to me with an idea to organize an economics, excuse me, environmental law enforcement conference. He knew about tapping into DOD environmental money to do that. He wrote up the paper, I approved it, we sent it out, SOUTHCOM, they approved it, and we got DoD environmental money to do a DoD sponsored environmental law enforcement conference with the Colombian Coast Guard, some of their environmental authorities and some of their national police. The first year was, I believe was 2009, we held it in Cali, brought in these people from the Pacific Coast and then, a couple days in Cali, and then the rest of the time in Cartagena, the Caribbean coast. Then next year we just did it in Cartagena, brought everybody to Cartagena. It turned out to be much more productive. But, part of the group in addition to Coast Guard, US Coast Guard people involved in environmental law, including environmental law enforcement, brought in people from the US Fisheries and Wildlife Service or the marine fisheries, and they were, some of them were actually federal law enforcement agents that worked for those agencies. When we held the meeting in Cartagena, of course I invited the DEA to participate and the head of DEA came over and started talking to his fellow law enforcement officers and soon they realized they were talking about some of the same people. So, what the DEA didn’t realize, but these other people did, is, and now the DEA realizes, is that the same people involved in narco-trafficking are also involved in other types of trafficking, whether it’s illegal fish and game, it’s illegal human trafficking, arms and explosives, money laundering, it’s, whatever route they use is the same route by water and it’s the same people. One week they’ll transfer drugs, the next week they’ll bring in bales of laundered money or money that needs to be laundered. There’s a lot more of that after post 9/11 with all the restrictions moving money around electronically. So we actually saw increases of seizures of cash, bulk cash being brought back into Colombia. Illegal conk and lobster, you know, caught in Colombian waters and then bound for restaurants in the United States. And so, what we saw is, because the Colombian Coast Guard now knew of this, now knew more of the US laws and environmental protections and things like that. We even saw a few arrests by the Colombians and extraditions over international waters turned over to the United States, if it’s in international waters, not really an extradition. And then, so the guy instead of getting twenty years for drug trafficking, he gets two years for illegal wildlife. But still, that’s two years that he’s not moving drugs, not moving arms and explosives back into Colombia, not laundering money. It’s two years that the guy is off the street, and so helping the Colombians do that. A couple of things that would benefit that is some US environmental groups actually bought some patrol boats for the Colombian Navy. There’s an island that the Colombians have out in the Pacific called Malpelo, it’s a breeding ground for Hammerhead Sharks, and so the US environmental groups bought a boat for the Colombian Navy just to patrol out there. So it goes out, patrols 21 days, comes back, seven days in port, 21 days, seven days in port, and so it actually reduces the amount of time that the bad guys are out doing that because it’s the same people. The big thing there was shark finning, where the captured the shark, cut of
the fins, dumped the shark back in the water and then keep the fins. Other things, but it’s the same people.

Josh: Right.

Morris: And it’s all about the money, you know, whatever money they can get. Making money moving drugs, making money moving people. There’s one case in one particular week, may even be in the same day, the Colombian’s Navy captured a boat from the Caribbean and in the Pacific, because Colombia has both a Pacific and a Caribbean Coast, with illegal immigrants. The one in the Pacific Coast had illegal immigrants from China, or Asia I should say, I don’t necessarily know that they were Chinese, and then the one in the Caribbean had African illegal immigrants, all with the goal of getting into the United States, but captured. But the boats arrived by the same people they had seen transferring drugs before.

Josh: Those are, those are really the types of stories that I’m very much interested in because that sort of stuff, not just I think in law enforcement but in the academic portion of it too, they’re very atomized. The approaches are, one person is writing on narcotics trafficking and one person is writing on, you know, human trafficking or regular migration and there’s very little of that flow where they get together and realize, oh, you know...

Morris: We’re talking about the same people.

Josh: We’re talking about the same people, they’re using the same boats, same routes, same infrastructure.

Morris: Well it’s, it’s, the Colombians started telling us in the ‘80s that the FARC was involved in the drug trade, that the FARC was involved in drug trading and we didn’t believe it. I remember, shortly after arriving in Colombia, attending a seminar where the head of the Colombian military brought in every general and admiral. It was a big meeting in Cartagena and they talked about strategy and stuff like that and one general said, we started telling the gringos in the ‘80s, we started telling the gringos in the ‘80s that the FARC was involved in the drug trade, and they didn’t believe us. It’s only post 9/11 when President Bush signed the special authorities that allowed, showed the connection between narcotics and terrorism, narcotics and the insurgency in Colombia and allowed the DoD to go more after the drug traffickers, the State Department to go help more against the insurgency. And but before that it was divided, you know, one part of the Embassy worked with the police on the drug guys and another part worked on, but I mean overlap has always been the Naval Mission because of the Coast Guard functions of the Colombian, and Coast Guard and customs functions of the Colombian Navy.

Josh: Well I mean, this has been really fantastic.

Morris: Okay, I hope it’s helpful.

Josh: No absolutely, I mean this is, this is really the sort of information that lends a little bit more...

Morris: But you’re absolutely right, there’s very little academic writing. There’s a lot of journalists. There’s a guy that writes for the Los Angeles Times, he spends a lot of time in...
Appendix A

Colombia. Really good reporting and stuff like that, but again, is it sourced like an academic paper? No, but in a lot of cases, his name’s Chris. I’m not remembering his last name. There’s an independent writer out of, he’s an American but he lives in Lima? Lima or Santiago. He’s got like eight kids so he has to write a lot to support them. And so he did an article on the narco-subs and he interviewed me and took pictures of them, used some of my pictures of them, things like that. And I think in the US it was published in like Maxim or British Maxim, stuff like that. And then in Colombia, it was their version of Maxim, I think it’s called Don Juan or… anyway. So even then, you know, you’ve got a good article but you look at the magazine it’s punished in, like can I really cite that in an academic paper? Because that’s a lad’s magazine.

Josh: Yeah, it’s something you’re flipping through at the barber shop, but. Yeah, and that’s, it’s interesting that it’s not really something that the academic establishment has latched onto, even at places like…

Morris: One of the guys you could look up is a guy, Roman Ortiz.

Josh: Roman Ortiz.

Morris: He used to be a member, work in a place called [Foundations Ideas y la Paz], Foundation for Ideas and Peace.

Josh: Is that just, Indepaz, is that?

Morris: Yeah.

Josh: Yeah, yeah okay.

Morris: He doesn’t work there anymore. He did work for a, are you on LinkedIn? Are we hooked up on LinkedIn?

Josh: I’m on it but I don’t think I’ve…

Morris: Okay, I’ll see if I can introduce you through linked in. But he does a lot of security studies. He has his PhD from a University in Spain, and he’s actually Spanish but he lives now in Colombia, does a lot of research. He’s got some papers he’s written. He’s written, done research for SOUTHCOM, he’s done research for some other people from the Colombian Ministry of Defense. So he’s got some stuff that’s published. And there are a few others. One guy that I really like but he’s been off the radar screen for the last two and a half years is, I can’t think of his name now. But he was the founder of the [Foundations Idea y la Paz], he’s one of the negotiators in Havana so he hasn’t been writing anything at all either. And he didn’t write anything when he was Vice Minister of Defense because, he was Vice Minister of Defense. He was real critical of the government so Uribe said, okay, come join, so.

Josh: Good move on his part.

Morris: Yeah.

Josh: Alright well, again I appreciate the time.

Morris: Cool.
Muddy Waters: Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

Appendix B

Vice Admiral Charles Michel, USCG
Interview at U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington DC, 2 PM on January 27, 2015

United States Coast Guard
Presently Vice Admiral, USCG Vice Commandant
Formerly, Deputy Commandant for Operations,
Director of Joint Interagency Task Force—South

Michel: Looks like you’ve got a good topic to work on.

Josh: Appreciate it.

Michel: Yeah, there’s a lot of work to be done in this area, and very timely, obviously I can see why you’re interested in the Coast Guard.

Josh: So, yeah well one of the things that got me really interested in this is the fact that you see sort of the subheading naval maritime security popping up a lot in the national security documents a lot lately, but it’s still a very atomized approach. There is counter-terrorism, there’s counter-narcotics, you know, there’s, you know, counter-human trafficking, all those things. But they’re not linked in the documents in any sort of coherent strategic language, so a lot of my research just looks at, can we build a theoretical framework that makes those relevant to one another, which theoretically should help over all, you know, unified government effort in countering them.

Michel: Yeah, we can talk for a long, long time about what you just said there because it really, what you talked about, you know the different types of threats that exist in the maritime environment go all the way from symmetric threats like nation state upon nation state, which is still out there, and that’s why we have a Navy and those type of things. But then you have all different types of asymmetric or non-homeland defense type scenarios, so all the way from terrorists down to recreational boaters who become intoxicated and sort of everything in between.

Josh: Right, so my interest is sort of right in that middle spot, the area that I think often gets lost in the gray space that it’s sometimes it’s perceived as a homeland issue, sometimes it’s, you know, it’s perceived as nobody’s issue, so.

Michel: I can give you a bunch of different scenarios, and the interesting thing about it Josh is, and the reason I think it’s so compelling in the maritime is the jurisdictional lines are different than they are on land and the availability of resources to respond to an incident are different than on land. If you just go to downtown D.C., there’s probably an agency that takes care of everything from, you know, parking tickets to speeding to car fires to anything, there’s going to be somebody there who can respond to that particular thing so the agencies arguably don’t have to work as well together. But when you’re out on the water, you may not, first of all the platforms to be able to get there may or may not exist, and when they do, they may be, you know, full on combatant all the way down to police vessels or good Samaritan or something else
because of what happens on water. And the jurisdictional lines are very different than they are landside, so it’s a different and unique problem as I’m sure you’re aware of.

Josh: It’s good that you started off that way because, sort of, I’ve got sort of a loose list of questions and I kind of wanted to start on the broader end. Oh thank you.

Michel: They needed to move there to give you the [unclear, closing blinds]…

Josh: But because I’m interested at looking at it more at that 30,000-foot level and getting the broader strategic overview, one of the things that interests me the most in the Coast Guard’s approach is the fact that it is a member of the armed forces, it is a member of the intelligence community, it is a federal law enforcement agency and I’d like to know, in what way if any, that impacts you in the Coast Guard’s prospective on strategy and strategy development.

Michel: Well, we were talking about pocketing all those different threats. The beauty of the Coast Guard is the Coast Guard can address almost all of those, I mean if we’re there we have the authorities to do everything from, you know, basic law enforcement, worker search and rescue or environmental response, all the way up to, you know, symmetric work in the Coast Guard and every single symmetric conflict that this nation has had, you know, all the way from Persian Gulf, Vietnam, World War II all the way back to Civil War. I mean if you read some of our history, if you’re aware it’s a Revenue Cutter Service ship that actually fired the first shot in the Civil War, most people don’t know. But we participated in all the different battles so the beauty of having the Coast Guard is it gives you that flexibility across the span of threats that exist there, and I would say in that regard, at least in the Federal Government it’s unique, I mean there’s no other member in the armed services who’s also a law enforcement agency, a regulatory agency, a humanitarian agency and an environmental agency, and all the things that come with it and I think it is the master stroke of this government to create a domain-based organization rather than, like here when you’re talking landside, there’s one who does parking tickets, there’s one who does car fires, there’s one who does EMT and stuff. I would argue, because of the scarcity of resources in the maritime, and the primary responsibility for jurisdiction being federal rather than state and local, through time the creation of a domain-based organization that has the authorities, capabilities, competencies and partnership to respond to that entire range is ultimately where we need to go, but it’s extremely difficult to achieve in the Federal Government and I’ll give you an example. So, you know, we deal in some of the offshore areas, one of DHS’s Department of Homeland Security’s is down on the southwest border. You look on down at the southwest border, any particular spot of land down there has multiple jurisdictions, not only to have the multiple people who can respond to you, whether it’s local, state, tribal, you know, EMT, DEA, DoD under certain circumstances, I mean everybody’s just completely overlapping jurisdictions and you can argue efficiency or otherwise, but the Coast Guard’s uniquely efficient in that it has all those, that entire toolkit, and can perform basically as a whole of government within and of itself. Not that we have every single piece of it, we’ve got almost all of it and I think a domain-based organization like that, if you can do that, there’s no place else that government’s replicated, not even in the aviation side which arguably always grew up under federal tutelage, but if you think about it FAA which is in the Department of Transportation, has the safety kind or portfolio, but TSA…
Muddy Waters: Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

Josh: Has the security.

Michel: Has the security portfolio. It isn’t like that in the maritime.

Josh: Right.

Michel: And you can go back and consider the reasons why and why you would develop a domain-based organization, there’s a lot of good reasons for doing it. I think the maritime makes it easier to develop one of those kind of organizations, again because of the scarcity of resources and the clarity of jurisdictional lines, it lends itself to an efficient federal solution covering the entire piece. I mean I don’t know if you’re even aware that back in our history when Alaska was still a territory, Coast Guard officers basically acted as federal judges, and you can read back in Coast Guard history like the Revenue Cutter Bear which was essentially the federal law in the territory of Alaska. Again because of the scarcity of resources, the remoteness of the location, the Coast Guard even picked up those duties of actually being the federal court that floated around and took care of, you know, disputes between the native populations and, that’s just another aspect of why it’s different and why it’s efficient to do that, that type of organization.

Josh: Right, well and then, that sort of brings me to the next part where maybe we muddy the waters a little bit because there are certain areas in which the jurisdiction is obviously maritime but seems to overlap in responsibility with the U.S. Navy.

Michel: Okay.

Josh: And, you know, I’m talking predominately in the Caribbean which is what my first major case study is looking at, and so you’ve got the, you know, Southern Command, you’ve got the Fourth Fleet, you’ve also got JIATF-South which you were the director of, which is always directed by a Coast Guard admiral, and the Navy obviously…

Michel: Not always. And it’s…

Josh: Oh it’s not?

Michel: Yeah, this is interesting. It’s original founding was a Coast Guard Vice Admiral who stood up the command and then the next three admirals after that were Navy admirals.

Josh: Oh they were Navy. Okay, well that almost brings the point a little bit.

Michel: Since then, since I think 1994, they’ve all been Coast Guard admirals.

Josh: Okay, okay but I didn’t know that that wasn’t an official…

Michel: No, no it could be any, it could be any…

Josh: Armed…

Michel: Yeah, I mean it’s a DoD, it’s a joint DoD command.

Josh: Right.
Michel: So it could be anybody. As a matter of fact, the deputies have been switching back and forth between the Air Force and the Navy.

Josh: Okay.

Michel: But there’s, that’s one of the beauties of the Coast Guard, when we’re operating under title ten authority like that, I’m purple just like all those other DOD guys. That’s not a Coast Guard.

Josh: Okay, well that…

Michel: Just by practice, I mean that’s been…

Josh: Okay, well that kind of brings the point down a little fuller I think because you do have that, that melding there of responsibilities or at least a melding of leadership, but the Navy obviously approaches its mission with a different historical perspective, you know a different strategic legacy. And in your position as Director of JIATF-South, did you experience any sort of, not conflicting but competing interests or competing perspectives with the Navy?

Michel: No, no, no, no. It’s interesting we should talk about the Coast Guard and the Navy relationships, and they go all the way back. If you’re not aware, the Navy during the Revolutionary War was actually stood down at the end of the Revolutionary War, there was no Navy…

Josh: Right.

Michel: … after the end of the Revolutionary War, and then Alexander Hamilton championed the founding of the Revenue Cutter Service in 1790 to basically prevent smugglers. So we would be the federal law outside the ports to prevent smuggling of goods and the collection of tariffs, which were absolutely essential to the nation. And at that time, we were the country’s only maritime force at all, there was no other force. It wasn’t until the Barbary pirates came along that we felt like we had to have a Navy. And the Navy was reestablished I think it’s 1798, you can go back and look at these, don’t quote me on that but it was basically to confront Barbary pirates overseas. Interesting, were the pirates a law enforcement or were they a national security mission? We could talk about that for a while, that’s one of those tweeners kind of like terrorists, you know, are they law enforcement or national security, could kind of go either way on it. But it’s interesting, and you see Captain Bainbridge, who was one of the heroes at taking down the Barbary pirates. If you’re not aware, the Bainbridge was the one that rescued Captain Phillips. USS Bainbridge was the one that rescued Captain Phillips, so it all ties together…

Josh: It’s interesting.

Michel: You know, Muslim origin pirates, and you can go back in the history, it’s all interesting there, but the Navy has, just like all Navies, it’s primary mission is to defend the nation. Coast Guard has a defense role as well; we do the exact same role they do, but they’re built for, now high end symmetric warfare. I mean, they’re constructed that way. When you look at their fleet of ships, when you look at the way they train their sailors, they’re all about, you know, the fight. And I’m talking really the full on symmetric fight, whether it’s with Russia or China or Japan or
whoever, whoever, and they build their fleet that way. Their fleet also is flexible enough to undertake some of the other missions that they undertake, like piracy, anti-piracy is one of them. Humanitarian relief and you regularly see, like after the big tsunami over in…

Josh: Yeah, the typhoon, yeah…

Michel: Indonesia, that was all supported. You know, that was combat designed equipment but you can kind of use it for other things. And one of the other things that they use it for is the detection and monitoring mission which if you’re not aware, the Department of Defense, not the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense under 10-USC124 have the statutory lead for the detection monitoring of illicit trafficking that moves throughout the western hemisphere.

Josh: Okay.

Michel: Were you aware of that?

Josh: I’m not sure.

Michel: Because I think that…

Josh: Does that come into conflict with posse comitatus. It sounds very.

Michel: Let me explain this to you so, let me pull this apart for you. So go back to the history, the Coast Guard’s always done anti-smuggling work, I mean that’s where we were founded in 1790, that’s our forte. In the 70s when, you know, drug trafficking became a big thing, it’s really not just drug trafficking like growing marijuana like here in the United States, it’s transnational drug trafficking which has its own flavor because it reaches across boundaries, it’s gotten to such magnitude it actually threatens nation states. So you remember back in the days, Pablo Escobar, I mean he almost brought the government in Colombia, almost became a narco-state. And one could argue that some of the counties in Central America right now, this is national security, an existential national security threat for them, it’s not just organized crime. TCO’s if you read the President’s strategy are really kind of another one of those tweeners that you can pbin them as criminals but they’re not just, well that’s the old lady’s purses.

Josh: That’s the central focus of my dissertation is looking at them as hybrid threats, as those in between sort of where do they fall, how do you combat them?

Michel: Yeah, and we could talk about that so, you know just take your scenic consistent threat here of threats that range all the way from, you know, very low end threats that a criminal justice system, a regular criminal justice system is responsive to all the way up to sort of nation-state threats, and we know how to deal with those kind of smoking hole in the water. And then we’ve got all these things in between, so you’ve got organized crime which is a higher level magnitude, and treated by the law here, I’m talking domestic RICO and stuff like that, conspiracies, all those types of crimes, that crime plus and they get treated a little bit differently. Then you’ve got transnational organized crime to read the President’s strategy, it basically says, yes these are criminals, yes we’re going to treat them as criminals, i.e. use force rules for criminals, our end game is to try them in a court of law, etcetera etcetera. When they become of such magnitude
that they actually start becoming a national security threat, we’re going to treat them in a different way, it doesn’t answer exactly how we’re going to do that, but that’s the same thing. Pirates are another example; pirates, if you look under the law, they’re hostis humanis generis, the enemies of all mankind and they have universal jurisdiction. Any state can grab pirates on the water and try them in a court of law and that’s, the law of the sea. So they’re universal criminals, but even our Navy, posse comitatus doesn’t apply to Navy actions against pirates because it’s not considered a law enforcement action. I mean you could look at the statutes and stuff and how you pull that apart but they’re different. It’s just like why we built a Navy to go fight Barbary pirates, why didn’t we give it to the law enforcement agency to go do it, because these were national security threats or deemed to be national security threats, so where do you bin those things it becomes very important because, let’s take TCO’s for example. If you bin in transnational criminal organization as criminals, then what’s your end game? Your end game is to gather evidence in a lawful manner and to try them in a court of law based on evidence and you put them in jail.

Josh: Right.

Michel: And you’re only allowed to use law enforcement use of force rules, so if you’re smuggling cocaine in an airplane, guess what we probably can’t shoot you down. If you bin those as a national security threat, what’s your end game? Smoking hole in the water. You know, that’s your end game. Same with terrorists, I mean we debate this in the country right now, are those guys down in Guantanamo Bay, should they be tried in the military tribunals as unlawful combatants or should they be criminals and tried in the criminal justice system? Get the right to remain silent, get a lawyer and all other stuff. I mean you can, even the Attorney General of the United States I don’t think completely agrees with how it is, those tweener things because if you bin them as criminals, there’s things that come along with it. If you bin them as national security issues, then there’s a whole different rule set and typically a whole different end game that comes along with it. So that thread that we’re talking about, you know if becomes very clear on the low end. You know, common criminals, you deal with them in the criminal justice system. As a matter of fact, most of them are domestic common criminals, like you know guys, like I said stealing purses down here, we know how to deal with those. But, and we know how to deal with the Chinese Navy. But these in between ones.

Josh: In between ones, right.

Michel: And this becomes important from a maritime perspective. I’ll give you an example, so you tell me what the answer to this one is. There’s a offshore oil structure down in the Gulf of Mexico that produces, you know, a mixture of natural gas and hydrocarbons and it’s important to the nation’s economy and if it were destroyed, it would create not only economic impact but potentially kill a bunch of people, and also create a huge oil spill, like Deep-water Horizon so it could be a really very serious issue. Okay, you have murky intelligence, you know, like typical. I mean if I’ve told you that these people were this or that, it becomes an easy problem solved but that’s not what you get down there. So you have some murky intelligence, maybe there were a couple tax overseas on offshore infrastructure and stuff like that, and you have some murky intelligence telling people to be on the alert in the Gulf of Mexico for potential attacks by, say
small boats, and you end up with a small boat out there, let’s say a fishing boat that could be a fishing boat, it could also be something else and it’s not answering on the radio and it’s approaching one of these offshore platforms, what is it and what do you do about it?

Josh: Yeah, well those are those enduring, they have those questions and you know those checkpoints, you know between Israel and the West Bank. The questions of whether a car or an ambulance is, yeah.

Michel: Well let me, I heard one of the most coaching comments so if you can get your arms around this, it was made by, I think it was made by the Israeli Defense Minister and he had one of our DHS people was talking to him and saying, you know we’ve got these homeland security related issues here where we’ve got terrorists in our country, and you know like the Boston Bomber and stuff like that and you know how we’re going to try them in courts and stuff like that. And the Israeli guy said, every one of those scenarios that we deal with that’s exact like you do, for us it’s not a homeland security issue, it’s a homeland defense issue. Because we don’t have the luxury of treating these as homeland security issues because we’re in a sort of an existential fight, there’s no time, space and distance to treat those things that way and if you can get your arm around that, it changes the equation. So you got that, let’s say you got that terrorist guy and he’s doing something and the guy’s a stripper or whatever, I mean your end game there is probably a smoking hole in the ground. They’re not criminals, they’re, but you know, the Boston Bomber? Was there ever any indication that we could just sort of create a smoking hole in the ground with that guy? No, I think we came to the conclusion, or at least we have that this guy’s a criminal. We’re going to use our criminal justice system to get this guy even though he blew up people with a bomb. I mean, you do the same thing in Israel and you’d just be a smoking hole in the ground. So it’s once again that…

Josh: Right, finding where the line is somewhere.

Michel: It’s very important how you bin these things, at least the way the law’s currently constructed, because if you bin them down criminal, you get a certain use of force rules, you got a certain end game that drives a bunch of things, you know collections evidence, non-exposure of intelligence products to the, that’s another one. On the criminal side of the house, if you’re using a highly sensitive intelligence product to develop your probable cause…

Josh: Yeah you’ve got to make it public.

Michel: Or you don’t try the case.

Josh: Right. Well I guess this goes back to that advantage.

Michel: On the smoking hole in the ground, so much of your intelligence apparatus is exposed to that end game, absolutely nothing except, you know whatever they can draw from the fact that there’s a smoking hole in the ground.

Josh: And I guess it does come back to the advantage that the Coast Guard has which is that you get to operate wherever that line is drawn because you have both ends, whereas there are agencies that may have competing interests on billing it on one side or the other because…
Appendix B

Michel: Not only competing interests but competing platforms and competing [trainings], like that scenario I talked about where you’ve got maybe a boat there, you’re not sure exactly what’s going on with the situation. Could be legitimate, it might not be legitimate, you know the consequences are pretty great, you put a Coast Guard unit on there, you can go both ways. The Coast Guard unit can create that smoking hole in the water. The Coast Guard can always grab these people…

Josh: Catalog the evidence.

Michel: And the way that we’re trained is we know how to actually stop boats in a non-deadly force manner.

Josh: Right.

Michel: So we, our guys are trained to shoot at the engines and rudders, we have certain procedures we go through to do that, we could do that day and night. As a matter of fact, we do that with vessels from helicopters day and night, we have a long track record of being able to deliver ordinance fire in a non-deadly force manner, which means in accordance with the law enforcement use of force rules. You get a Navy platform out there…

Josh: Yeah, they’re not even quite so, so deliberately at an engine.

Michel: They’re not trained to do that type of work, they’re not trained to, and they don’t have the authorities either, I mean we can go on posse comitatus for a while but you know, the typical general rule is DoD can’t do law enforcement. I mean, there are exceptions to that, piracy is one of them.

Josh: Piracy is one.

Michel: I mean, yeah like those pirates who were taken down with Captain Phillips, that was, that guy they caught was caught by Navy guys and he was arrested and brought before a court of law because he was a pirate. He’s one of those tweeners.

Josh: Right.

Michel: But, you know. Your question about how we operate in the Caribbean, there’s a lot in what I was just saying there, but how it’s operated in the Caribbean, the Department of Defense has a statutory lead for the detection and monitoring of drug trafficking events.

Josh: Okay.

Michel: They’ve got the lead, it isn’t D.H.S and there’s a good reason for that because they’ve got the most sophisticated radar systems, intelligence systems, platforms to be able to do this work. I mean, some of the stuff that they’re dealing with down there, like the semi submersible’s vessels, you know what I’m talking about there?

Josh: Yeah.

Michel: Law enforcement agencies don’t have acoustic detection gear and the DEA has no frigates, and neither does the FBI have any ships and they’ve got to rely on other people to do
that work. So even as we speak right now there are U.S. Navy ships down there working for JIATF-South, they carry Coast Guard law enforcement detachments onboard. Were you aware?

Josh: Yep, the LEDETs, right?

Michel: Yep, the LEDETS and what ends up happening is, let’s say they find one of these semi submersibles out there, they will actually shift tactical control to the Coast Guard so that that Navy ship actually becomes a Coast Guard ship with the authority to do it. You know they actually raise the Coast Guard flag, Coast Guard ensign goes up on that Navy ship and that Navy ship essentially becomes a Coast Guard ship and we can use the Navy small boat to take our Coast Guard boarding team to the work, and we can even bring Navy guys to assist us if we need to.

Josh: And that sort of gets in a little bit deeper into the weeds of some of the strategy that I’m looking into because it does seem like that gives just a little bit more of an opportunity for expanding minimal resources, that if you can detach a couple of Coast Guard guys on, not just American naval ships but I know that they’re on British, French ships, Dutch ships, so…

Michel: Yeah, that sharing of resources that becomes, it’s not only sharing of resources but the melding of authorities’ capabilities, competencies and partnerships between the maritime partners that allows each to be more effective than they were on…

Josh: Well I think that’s something that’s also unique to the Coast Guard, just from my reading and my experience, there seems to be a comfort with the ambiguities of sovereignty that are required in the maritime domain that I think are a little bit more uncomfortable for the U.S. Navy to deal with. I know that there’s an authority sharing program between the Coast Guard and the Canadian authorities, which essentially allows Coast Guardsmen but also Canadian enforcement officers to operate on both sides of the border.

Michel: Yeah, that’s the ICM LEO inter boarder maritime law enforcement whatever, that’s a very unusual one. That takes it on steroids because that involves cross deputization of officials; there’s nothing else like that that I’m aware of but it’s very interesting so I took a snapshot picture of two Canadian RCMP guys on a Coast Guard boat with some Coast Guard guys and I asked, I was given presentation of the audience, I said, what do you guys see before you here right now? And they said, well we see these two Canadian RCMP guys and Coast Guard guys on this Coast Guard boat, and I said, yep that’s what you see, but if you see this south of the U.S/Canadian border, you’re actually looking at two Coast Guard members on a Coast Guard boat, but also two cross deputized, essentially U.S. Marshals.

Josh: Right.

Michel: They’re RCMP guys but they’ve been deputized as U.S. Marshals…

Josh: As federal agents, yeah.

Michel: And they’re federal agents. If I took this picture north of the border, you’re looking at two Canadian RCMP guys and two Canadian deputized RCMP guys riding with them having also to be U.S. Coast Guard members. That type of inter-border cooperation, first of all doesn’t
exist anywhere else on the planet except between the U.S. and Canada and there are good reasons for that, probably, you know two of the closest partners that exist but long histories working together and our judicial systems match up pretty well. But, yeah that’s on steroids and I would argue they tried to replicate it on land, they even tried to do like air, air…

Josh: Doesn’t work as well?

Michel: Yeah, it’s just because maritime is different and there’s a long history of cooperation, and again you’ve got to have the scarcity of the assets, and in that particular one you don’t want the, you’ll have to stop at the border and do a hand off or something like that so it arises out of necessity, so that’s it on steroids because that actually is on sovereign territory, you know that’s sovereign territory. When you’re out on international waters things become a little bit easier for those cooperative things. I don’t know if you know this but U.S. also does with People’s Republic of China, People’s Republic of China ship riders on Coast Guard ships and they do the high seas drift network…

Josh: Okay.

Michel: Out on the Pacific, because it’s in both our countries’ interest to be able to do that, that type of work and the assets are so scarce and so expensive…

Josh: Right, because you have to just cooperate.

Michel: yeah, you have to cooperate on that stuff.

Josh: So if you don’t mind, I’d like to sort of shift gears and zero in a little bit more on the Western Hemisphere strategy and so as you’ve noted and General Kelly’s noted that about three quarters of high confidence trafficking events usually go unmolested. The scale of that shortfall suggests to me that this is more than just an issue of scarce resources or to put it another way that it can’t be resolved with a simple influx of resource, that the deficiency is too extreme so…

Michel: I wouldn’t make that…

Josh: Do you disagree with that?

Michel: Yeah, I wouldn’t make that conclusion, the point being that having been director of JIATF-South there are more intelligence cases than there are platforms to actually respond to.

Josh: Right, but so my, so I guess my first question is, do you foresee a circumstance in which JIATF-South and the Coast Guard receive enough funding to bridge that gap?

Michel: Well, if you go, you can search in the open source but the Commandant’s publically gone out and said that the Coast Guard is going to put more ships into the Western Hemisphere transit zones specifically to address that problem and he said we’re going to accept some risk in some of the other areas that we’re working on, fisheries work and some of the other things. So he’s already gone out and announced it and he wants to try to change that strategic equation down there for Central America and Mexico and the different countries that are impacted by this stuff so, and it’s hard, it’s, my opinion is you probably can’t ever get a hundred percent of it, you know you’ve got a sophisticated adversaries doing that but if you could get it at a more
significant portion of what’s going on there, you stand a chance of actually changing the strategic
calculus. And if you go on and look at the national targets, we’ll just take cocaine, the national
target for cocaine is forty percent removable rate. They didn’t pull that number out of the air. I
don’t know if you can actually get the study but there’s a very thick study and it basically comes
down to the conclusion that, as a business model if you’re able to take forty percent of the bad
guy’s product, it fundamentally shifts the way they’ve got to do business in order to remain
profitable.

Josh: So you’re looking for a tipping point.

Michel: Yeah, looking for a tipping point, exactly right. And the removal rate, I think at its
highest was maybe in the upper twenties or low thirty percent. They’ve never gotten up to the
forty percent; we’d like to see if we can actually get up there and test that theory and see whether
we can actually change the equation. I mean we’ve been on a very good track on cocaine
reduction anyway and when you look at the ships that are out there, there’s less ships but they’re
a lot more effective than they used to be primarily because intelligence driven operations and a
more sophisticated way of doing business than we have in the past. So I guess I take a little bit
of, I don’t agree with your, the foundation of your theory there. At its heart it really is a resource
problem, it’s not just ships. Ships can be made more effective by things like maritime patrol
aircraft or any way to better fill in the space in the battle space down there, whether it’s
unmanned aerial systems or satellites of other different intelligence techniques, and so on and so
forth. That problem set is amendable to being pushed around and we pushed it around before
when I first started they used to come directly into Florida and we pushed them out of there and
then they came into the Bahamas and we pushed them out of there, came through the Caribbean
and we pushed them out of there. Now they’re in Central America and hopefully we’ll be able to
turn the screws on these guys again on the cocaine trade in particular. The other drug trades have
their own rhythm to them, we can talk about that but the Commandant’s gone out publically if
you see the remarks that he, he just made some remarks over at CSIS.

Josh: Yes.

Michel: He talked about increasing the ship presence down there, specifically to get at that
problem set that’s identified there which really is a shortfall in boarding platform. Again, if we
treated this as a national security threat, we’d probably shut this down very quickly but you
know, you’d be creating smoking holes in the water, what you’d be doing. You know, the go-fast
boat operating without lights at night with the bales on board, I mean I’m talking mixed in with,
I’m talking fully illegitimate semi submersibles. You know, if you were treating them as a
national security threat where your end game is just a smoking hole in the water, I think you’d
probably shut it down fairly quickly but now you have to get a boarding team out there. I mean,
you don’t have this smoking hole in the water, you’ve got to collect evidence, you’ve got to use
non deadly force rules to stop it and so on and so forth, and that requires boarding teams and
people to be there.

Josh: Right, okay. And now, so I see that element but I also, I sort of detected in the Western
Hemisphere strategy that there is also the recognition that there are certain upgrades, or let’s say
Appendix B

emphases that need to be placed in a different element of Coast Guard strategy in the Western Hemisphere which seems to be coupled alongside that change in resource allocation and I know that, and I think when I met you at the conference in, at the Newseum, you’d emphasized this idea of network cultures and so that struck me but it struck me for a number of reasons not least of which because in a lot of the literature on transnational organized crime and cartels now, there’s the idea that those terms are a little mid of a misnomer, that they’re not corporately structured in the sense that they were in the 1980s and when you made reference to, you know to Escobar that now they’re much more, they’re franchised, they’re fluid, they’re networks of networks and..

Michel: Yep, I agree with all that.

Josh: And so the definition of transnational criminal organizations in the Western Hemisphere strategy leaves that probably helpfully ambiguous, but I was wondering if you could comment maybe about how the Coast Guard’s perception of what networks are have changed over time, over the last several decades.

Michel: Yeah, well I mean they morph all the time. I mean in this particular threat that we’re talking about with cocaine, so back in the battle days you had Pablo Escobar, he was the man, he basically had the entire thing so he was at the top of the organization and his, well the peasants always grew the coca but his guys would buy the leaf from the peasants, his guys would do the processing, his guys would transport it to the fishing vessel or to the airplane or wherever it was going. His guys would meet the airplane and the fishing vessel wherever it was going. His guys would take that product and they cut it and do whatever, and his guys were selling it on the streets of New York, I mean it was a fully integrated, you know on the lines of Exxon. So Exxon is an integrated oil, you know it drills the oil, it processes the oil, it even sells it at the pump you know to the user, that’s an integrated system and that’s how Pablo Escobar had the whole thing. Keeping strategy, you know you had the Cali Cartel you had the Medellin Cartel you know these big ones that were the big integrated oils and they’ve taking those all apart and they don’t exist anymore so what you end up with, you end up with fragmented organizations so if you’re familiar with like the oil industry works, you’ve got upstream, midstream, downstream, downstream refiners and then you’ve got retailers.

Josh: Right.

Michel: And that’s kind of the way that, what has happened now is they’ve become specialized so you have organizations that just do transport, you have organizations that just by the coca leaf, you’ve got organizations that just do the processing of the coca leaf, they’ve got organizations that will meet it in Central America and they’ll take it for, you know between Honduras and Guatemala but once it ends up in Mexico they’ll give it to somebody else, they take it up on the border, much less you know the guy who sells it on the street in Chicago. Each one is very fragmented and specialized but the point being that each one of those organizations because they’re transnational criminal organizations, maybe not all of them one may be just be in Mexico or whatever but in its entirety, it operates as a system. So I guess the best way to describe it is, it is a unity of effort amongst a number of different networks that all communicate, they’ve got to
Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

have the basic things that make a network function so you know a transportation organization has to have conveyances, it has to have a certain amount of capital, it has to communicate, it may have to corrupt somebody, it may have to, you know have a security side that whacks the competitors or whatever. I mean those basic traits of a functioning organization, some may be hierarchical and some may be distributed, depends on the way that they are. I will tell you that this, the important part about the combatting networks, there’s a number of important pieces, one is, it’s my belief and it’s Admiral [unclear] belief that it takes a network to most efficiently combat a network. And my Coast Guard organization I can most definitely tell you is a hierarchical organization, it goes, like in the Pablo Escobar model, it goes from the Commandant all the way down to the non [unclear] who’s doing the boarding, you know it’s a hierarchical organization, it’s really not organized in a distributed network fashion like a flatter organization. But a number of those organizations down range are just like that. I mean they don’t have a corporate headquarters, they’re all over town and they’re very fluid too. You know, and they’re kind of changing alliances and different types of things, but very nimble so you know we figure out a technique to get at them, they just write a check or they corrupt an official or they kill a competitor or whatever bad guys do in a very nimble fashion. Whether we can ever replicate that? I don’t know, but we’ve got some people who are trying a lot of new things in a more nimble manner. So that’s on our side of the house. On the network side of the house, this is what I would say about the difference in the mentality of a network, and I’ll take it from extremes. So when I first started in this organization thirty years ago dealing with drug traffickers, we would drive around in a box in between Cuba and Mexico in a place called the Yucatan Pass which we knew was a trafficking area, we knew they were there, didn’t know really anything else but they would drive, we would have a box and we would fly our helicopter and we would go around looking for people and we would find them and we would find bad guys on, you know with bales out on deck and we’d arrest them and we’d take them into Key West, we’d all get our pictures taken in front of the dope and we went away and we went back next time we went looking in the box for people, that’s what we did. We never apprehended that every encounter that we had out there was an encounter with the node of a network. Never thought of it that way, it was just an individual interdiction, we took it down. You know DEA had their kingpin strategy which you can say is kind of network focused, it really wasn’t, it was kind of going after the top guys in the pyramid. But if you treat that event as a contact with the node of the network and you treat that as a learning opportunity to expose the logistics, conveyance, communication, modus operandi, the human capital piece of that enterprise and you use that, all that to be able to identify other nodes in the network, that’s a higher level thinking about the problem set, a higher level of thinking than we’d done in the past, and the ability to recognize that and more importantly the ability to exploit that and counter with the node is where we want to get at. And then when we, if you’re able to start identifying the network, you’re able to also potentially predict, or better predict future operation of that network, so a future event. So if you’ve got, if you can exploit that network node, it may tell you not only about sort of what happened there and help you build a case or whatever your end-game is going to be on it, but if you get really go at it, you can predict what that network will do. If you understand how a network operates and functions, its MO, they become, every network has a certain level of predictability, and even bad guys have a certain level of predictability because they just can’t go out and sort of hire somebody that they
trust or someone smart enough to build a semi-submersible, or someone who’s smart enough to navigate one of these things. I mean there’s a certain cadre of people that they’re going to work with and when they do that and there are humans involved in that type of a system and they use certain communication methods or fund transfer methods or, you know transportation routes, they become predictable and so if you can use that encounter to the network to build that knowledge level and then become predictability, that feeds on itself and that’s what the Commandant’s talking about, getting at those networks. And also, that’s facilitated by your own appreciation of network type activity and your own appreciation...

Josh: Right

Michel: So that, it’s a higher level of functioning. Same thing with the securing border’s piece, when you look at that in the strategy, that’s not just about a line in the sand. That’s actually about treating those whole threat streams holistically, and interdicting that particular threat stream at the optimum point whether it’s here, whether it’s on foreign soil, whether it’s on land, whether it’s at somebody else’s border or our border. We’ve never done that, never done that before, but there’s certain organizations in the U.S. that are not designed to look any further than our border with another country. Is that the best place to interdict a threat stream? Maybe, maybe not. If a threat stream can be interdicted like cocaine can be interdicted on the water down range, in the you know a thousand kilo quantity before it even gets on the land, number one it’s closer to the head of the snake the evidence that you’re getting there, that encounter with the network is probably closer to the heart of the network than it is further downstream. Plus you keep it out of Central America with all the problems there, and on our U.S. southern border, the average cocaine siege is somewhere between four and seven keys. And you stand the greatest chance of actually interfering with legitimate commerce if you’ve got to search every flipping car for four to seven kilos. So, where’s your best investment? Or against cocaine threat stream, you know do you want to aerial eradication in Colombia, you know actually trying to...

Josh: Source control, right.

Michel: …or other things. The treatment of those threat streams holistically, whether it’s methamphetamine precursors, illegal migrants or firearms, bulk cash, you name your thing, where on those, where on that continuum in the threat stream is it best to invest national effort.

Josh: Well it’s very, to me it’s very relevant that you include those other functions because what I’m finding is that sort of the right hand doesn’t always talk to the left hand but the reality is that there aren’t always such things as narcotics traffickers as there are traffickers. On Monday they’re trafficking cocaine and on Tuesday they’re trafficking guns and on Thursday it’s people. And so, is that also an element, is there recognition now that there’s a focus on this, on nodes of networks? Is there an integration of the idea that we’re not just looking at one form or one product being trafficked?

Michel: Yes, now it’s because the traffickers have gone that way, you know. Take the guys in Mexico, I mean lots of times you’ll have illegal migrants mixed, you know and they’ll be carrying a thing of dope for you know, somebody else, yeah. I mean there, well and that’s what I mean about nimbleness and flexibility but, take it from a U.S. government perspective, okay
you’ve got a migrant, illegal migrant is carrying dope, what, let’s say you catch him in southern Arizona. Who’s got responsibility for that and how do we deal with that in the whole of government solution? Is it DEA? DEA only has, is a single focus. They only do drugs, they don’t do illegal migrants. That’s not in their charter, that’s not what they do. FBI does the entire panoply, you know, border patrol, they’ve got bits and pieces, they do all that, you know, state, local, tribal, you know. I don’t know, it’s, the answer to your question is as they morph, we want to morph with them. And we’re sort of, I don’t want to say that we’re traffic or crime ambivalent because we’re not, because the government is segmented. The Coast Guard can do all of it if it’s out on the water, Coast Guard can do all of it and it doesn’t make any difference to us, I mean whether they’re migrants or whatever. When you get on the land side, you do have jurisdictional issues, I mean ICE, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, only typically does certain things. DEA only does certain things, FBI, and they all, they have overlapping jurisdictions, much less you add in state’s locals, that’s a whole...

Josh: Well it seems, it appears to me that Caribbean authorities, Caribbean academics, Caribbean politicians, all sort of emphasize the multidimensionality of crime in the region so and it sounds like that, while that’s not mirrored in the structure of most federal agencies in the United States, you’re saying that it is a big element or a comfort factor in the Coast Guard.

Michel: Yeah, well I mean again you’ve got a large domain based organization, we can deal with all of those things. That’s why on the water it’s lots of times easier to create whole of government solutions on the water just because you have to. I mean it’s the same thing, if DEA had a fleet of frigates who could go down there and bust their own dopers, they might very well do that but right now they don’t have any ships. So if they want to, and the beauty of it is let’s say you’ve got a trafficker or something you want to get, do you want to get him in Colombia, you know where you might or might not have access to him or he might or might not get prosecuted? I mean Colombia’s a pretty good partner but, put it in Honduras, you know, do you want to take the guy down in Honduras land side, or do you want to wait until he goes on a go fast boat, you get him on international waters and guess what? That guy could end up in a U.S. court. If you want that type of end game, and DEA lots of times wants that type of end game, guess what, they’ve got to come to somebody who’s got a boat who can actually do that work, or not only that but somebody who’s got a sensor network who can pick up that boat and can communicate with somebody and get out there and the only people who typically have that is you know navies or coast guards so they’ve got to come to us in order to use those scarce resources.

Josh: I’ve just got one more question if you’ve got time for that, or…

Michel: Sure.

Josh: So, and this one I think might be a little bit more difficult to react to and, the idea is that in my dissertation I explore at length the idea that context and attitude environmentally have a big impact on enforcement outcomes. I’m using the theoretical framework of the Broken Windows Theory which is a subset of community policing which looks very heavily at how people are, people interact with their environments and in the course of a lot of that research, I’ve come
across a number of individuals, politicians, former American Ambassadors, who describe the Caribbean as wrestling with a culture of permissiveness with respect to crime, or even a culture of smuggling and this is sort of a tri-part question, but it all comes down to, is that a description that’s even familiar to you? Is it accurate? And if you would consider that accurate, how is that something that the Coast Guard addresses in its operations there?

Michel: Yeah, I think, well, you know I’ve dealt with the Caribbean countries. Whatever I’m going to say here is just a broad brushstroke, I mean, this is not meant to any particular government and stuff but a lot of those countries are small. I mean, they’re small countries, their government institutions are, they’re small and can easily be overwhelmed by someone dropping a big load of dope or a big load of cash or, you know a big load of killing in a relatively small community. I mean, a lot of the islands down there are, they’re not well equipped to deal with, you know, violent transnational criminal organizations who can parachute in there and do what bad guys do, and a lot of what bad guys do is, you know, plomo o plata, either play or we’ll kill you and we’ll kill your family and one of those type of things, and they’re not well equipped to deal with that. So I think that they’re vulnerable to those type or organizations, that’s been demonstrated over time and if you look back when a lot of the stuff came through the Caribbean, a large number of corruption cases. You know, look at Pindling in the Bahamas for example, and the Bahamas has been kind of the smugglers haven for a long, long time and there is a, within certain parts of the population, there is a culture of permissiveness to smuggling type activity. I mean, if you look in the Bahamas, and that’s not meant, the Bahamas is actually one of our best partners in the world. Bahama’s defense forces and those guys, they’re committed to the fight and they’re a really good government partner, but there are elements, just like in our society. I mean there are elements in our society that are smugglers. I mean, if you look when those loads used to come directly into Florida, it wasn’t just Colombian guys, you know parachuting stuff into Florida, there were a bunch of Floridians down there who were deeply, deeply involved in this business. So when the temptation’s there, yeah people take advantage of those situations and the Caribbean is showing itself to be vulnerable to these type of organizations, but it’s not just the Caribbean. Take a look at Central America right now.

Josh: Right.

Michel: Those are, and those are much bigger countries. I mean Honduras I think has about 8 million people, Guatemala’s I don’t know 6 million, Mexico, a huge country. Mexico is a very serious country, I mean that is one of the largest countries here in the Western Hemisphere, one of the closest allies to the United States and they’re in a very serious fight with these transnational criminal organizations. I mean, very serious and that shows you the power of those. You can imagine if those got unleashed on anybody in the Caribbean, and even just a tiny fraction of what goes on in Mexico got unleashed in the Caribbean, it would be a serious situation, so. I don’t know about your Broken Window Theory because I don’t view the Caribbean as, really any of those islands as broken windows. I mean they’re…

Josh: Not that the islands are broken windows, it’s more an application of that the Broken Windows Theory brings the idea that you’re combating context, that the domain that you’re operating on is different that, so for example police officers don’t operate in terms of counter-
murder, counter-robbery, you know. They, what Broken Windows is, it cuts through that and creates a new domain on which to operate and that domain is the context or the environment in which these activities are happening. The environment that might induce or enable somebody to, you know, to operate as a smuggler or traffickers, not that the government’s a broken but…

Michel: Yeah. I would say that historically, the Caribbean has had problems with smugglers and they had a problem with pirates too. I mean, they had pirates and smugglers because of the geography of the area, because of the government institutions there, because the islands themselves are just very small and susceptible to, you know, organizations throwing their weight around in those locations so, yeah I mean the Caribbean’s vulnerable. I’ve testified on that the Caribbean’s vulnerable and we particularly need to watch it here because it’s all part of our strategy. So you know right now we’re focusing on Central America because that’s where most of the bad guys are and that’s where the Commandant wants to get at most of the instability, we’ve got to watch there because history has shown that there’s a little bit of, well there is a balloon effect so you push in on one area we don’t want to make sure that if we get it out, you know if it moves, one of the places it may move is out to the Caribbean and you’ve seen some testimony on that. I haven’t seen any, you know, cosmic or seismic shifts in trafficking but you know, we watch that extremely carefully because the bad guys, like I said are networks and they’ll adapt and change things. I, I’m really concerned about what’s going on in Central America and so is the Commandant just because the homicide rates are there, the governments are there, we’ve sort of seen this movie before when the TCO’s become so imbedded in there that they actually become an existential threat to the nation state and I would argue, you know Honduras, Guatemala, Belize to a certain degree, El Salvador’s its own kind of world with the maras and stuff like that but those countries are in a very serious fight, Mexico is too, and you know. Whatever we can keep out of Central America and Mexico is less fuel to the fire so that’s what the Commandant wants to get at. So I think an answer to your, about the Western Hemisphere strategy, all three of those lines of effort are higher level thinking than we of an organization have ever done before. Seems interesting as a Coast Guardsmen who’s been in this that when I started off thirty years ago I thought we were smart, I mean I really thought we were smart. I thought we were doing everything possible to get at this, at the threat stream that existed at the time but we’re a lot smarter now. And my guess is, you know ten years from now they’ll be another guy sitting in this chair who you’ll hear say, yeah ten years ago they thought they were smart, you know. But your government gets better and better and your thesis about whole of government solutions, you know thirty years ago we weren’t even talking about stuff like that, we were just talking about the Coast Guard getting its business done on whatever.

Josh: Right.

Michel: And maybe somebody at a higher level was but I wasn’t, but now we actually have organizations like JIATF-South, we have in the Southern Border Approaches campaign plan, are you watching that?

Josh: Yeah.
Appendix B

Michel: Actually going to have JTF’s headed up by homeland security members where the department will act as a department. I don’t know if you’re familiar with that, you should probably Google that because that’s another higher order of DHS operating as DHS. So prior to Southern Border Approaches, down on the southwest border, the secretary could go to ICE, secretary could go to CBP, secretary could go to the Coast Guard but there was not sort of who you could go to in the department. The Southern Border Approaches campaign plan stands up three joint task forces: JTF-East which is mostly maritime focused led by the Coast Guard, JTF-West, southwest border plus the water areas around the southwest border led by CBP and then JTF-Investigations led by ICE, and each one of those will have deputies from the other two components. So secretary on the southwest border, the secretary has one guy you can go to. And so if you’ve got Rio Grande valley’s got a surge operation, you can surge across that entire border, never had that capability, not just CBP, CBP, ICE Coast Guard, TSA, FEMA, and hopefully those will act as concentrating points for other interagency partners like FBI, DEA, state and local, and then if you can really get amped up, bring in the international partners-Mexico, Colombia, you know whoever you want to do and create JIATF’s. So the secretary’s got that, they’re mirror images of JIATF-South. JIATF-South is detection monitoring only. They don’t do any law enforcement in JIATF-South, they facilitate it but they don’t do it. The JTF’s will have the law enforcement authorities that go with that. So you can see everybody’s taking the game up to a higher level, so it’s all about whole of government and getting the government to work well together. And what you’re seeing, in my opinion, is an evolution over time. We’ve had a government that’s been responsive to problem sets for 200 something years, you know to varying degrees of effectiveness but the technology, sophistication of adversaries, expectations of the public, tight budget strings that don’t allow for just boutique stove pipe solutions, all of government is driving towards these whole of government solutions where you actually share those authorities, competencies, capabilities and partnerships. Sharing sounds easy but you’ve got to get communication, it’s the culture, the legal stuff, all that stuff that, it’s a lot harder to do than you would think so. But I think you’re hitting on the right thread by attacking maritime because in my opinion it’s some of the most sophisticated and effective methods of creating whole of government solutions have grown up in the maritime for the reasons that I described. So your paper, I think is right on.

Josh: I appreciate it, and this has been a really interesting conversation and I’d sort of like your permission to, maybe I’ll, when I type up the transcript to produce a maybe a more consolidated, edited version and include sort of a consolidated transcript as an appendix.

Michel: Yeah sure.

Josh: And I can run that past somebody here if you’d like an advance but…

Michel: That’s fine, I mean whatever I said there is just generic, generic stuff and any things that I said regarding any particular countries, you know hopefully I told you those are just kind of examples or whatever.

Josh: Okay, well again I, this was really interesting, I appreciate you taking the time to chat with me about it.
Appendix C

Dr. Thomas Mahnken
Interview at Hopkins, SAIS DC, 1 PM on June 24, 2014

The Johns Hopkins University, U.S. Naval War College
2006-09 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning
Primary author of the 2008 National Defense Strategy
Contributing author to the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review

Josh: So, mind if I jump right into it?

Mahnken: Sure

Josh: Okay, so I was listening to a podcast from the New America Foundation a couple of days ago and they had Former Assistant Secretary for Operational Energy Plans and Programs Sharon Burke on, and she was talking about how people speak of the Pentagon as if it has artificial intelligence, that the building wants this or that, or doesn’t want this or that. Then you’ve got scholars like John Nagl and John Shy who similarly speak of the Pentagon’s institutional memory, and how that institutional memory sort of shapes certain preferences. My first question off the bat is, do you believe that such an institutional memory exists, does the building have a brain, so to speak?

Mahnken: No. Look, I think if you want, whether you want to think about institution memory, or if you want to think about culture, strategic culture, you really need to think about it on a number of different levels. So I would say, you know, starting at the top there is sort of, there is a national strategic culture, which is the way Americans think about the use of force and think about national security. Then there is you know what I’ve called a military strategic culture, which is kind of basically equivalent to the ‘fill in the blank’ way of war, whether you want to say the American way of war, you know, apply it to Britain, the British way of war, which are kind of enduring strategic preferences about the use of force and the way we as a country use force. And then below that I think you need to think about individual services and their organizational cultures and even within services different communities within those services and their strategic cultures as well. So yeah I don’t think you could say, yeah I don’t think, you know, the Department of Defense is a unitary actor.

Josh: Right, so individual units might have certain institutional preferences but essentially the Pentagon is too large of an institution to really have its own distinct culture?

Mahnken: Yeah. So I mean my book on Technology and the American way of war is really a book about service strategic culture and how that shaped the, you know, the weapons that we bought and the weapons that we didn’t buy. So yeah, I think thinking about it in terms of services, because services are still, you know, are still the—nobody joins the U.S. Military, they join the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps because of aspects of those organizations that, you know, they see reflected in them or that they
would like to see reflected in them, and it’s still the services that are primarily responsible for organizing, training and equipping the U.S. Military.

Josh: Okay, and then, moving more towards projection over let’s say the next three decades, where would you yourself identify the most significant threats over that, I guess, medium-range limit? Particularly with an interest in, are you classifying those threats by country, geography, demography, non-state actors, what’s your vision of what the threat environment looks like over the medium-range?

Mahnken: Okay well those are two different questions, so which is the question? Is the question the most significant threats?

Josh: Yes.

Mahnken: Okay well I think the most significant threat over the next two to three decades is the rise of China and the, you know, its implications for the balance, the global balance of power. I would say, you know, also significant, you know, regional rogues such as North Korea, such as Iran, increasingly equipped with nuclear weapons, because of their ability to cause damage. And I also think, you know, violent jihadist organizations also will continue to be a pretty considerable threat.

Josh: Okay

Mahnken: But again so I’m thinking of significance in terms of ability to, you know, to cause damage to the United States and to disrupt the international system.

Josh: Okay, that actually answers one of my other questions which is, is that risk particularly to the global system or the United States and you’re saying essentially both. Would you say the two are intertwined?

Mahnken: Yeah of course.

Josh: Okay

Mahnken: Because the United States has played a central role in preserving the international system and we have also been beneficiaries of a stable international system.

Josh: Okay. Moving right along, David Kilcullen argues that urban third world littorals (as I was telling you) present one of the most likely theaters for conflict in the future. How significantly would you rank those regions as threats? Would you categorize them also as threats more towards the global system or more towards the United States directly?

Mahnken: Well look I mean I think, I think what he’s talking about is, you know, is the confluence of several, you know, several trends, so demographic trends—both in terms of
age structures in developing countries but also demographic trends in terms of urbanization—you could also extend that to talk about, you know, trends in climate, and things like that. So, you know, that is a concern. Now whether, you know, how much of that is a global concern I think is very much open to question. You know, Karachi today is a pretty, pretty nasty place, it’s particularly nasty if you’re a Pakistani, so I can certainly see circumstances where, you know, threats could emerge from those trends, I could see circumstances in which those might [said with emphasis] threaten the United States, but I, you know, I would say that’s not a certainty. I could see sima—I could also see circumstances where the U.S. Military would be called upon to operate in that type of an environment, whether in a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, or some sort of intervention. I mean I think all of those are possible. Those are all policy choices though.

Josh: Okay, so—you’re not viewing those as threats that will impose themselves on the United States, policy choices meaning that’s something that we either choose to get involved in or choose not to get involved in.

Mahnken: Right, yeah.

Josh: And kind of, that cuts right to this question, which is, are these types of threats the responsibility of the Department of Defense to respond to?

Mahnken: I think, you know the, the Department of—the services have traditionally thought about humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as lesser-included capabilities. In other words, if you, if you buy capabilities (you mentioned the Navy earlier), so the Navy by and large does not organize, train and equip itself for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The, however, the capability and the capacity that the Navy acquires gives it a substantial ability to perform those missions. And I think that’s right. I think there certainly are some, maybe some specialized capabilities you might want to invest in, but by and large if you buy a world class navy, it is a world class navy that’s capable of getting there rapidly with lot’s of humanitarian assistance and, you know, disaster relief capabilities. If you take a look at say the aftermath of the Japanese tsunami, who were the first responders? Well they were forward deployed naval forces, conventional naval forces, deployed in Japan. And they brought with them immense capacity to do humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Josh: Okay, well and considering that these are policy choices, is there, I guess a strategic plan in place, I guess at higher levels at the Pentagon, for how the United States (again I’m mostly interested in the Navy but generally speaking the services at large) engage with, I guess what are being ca—hybrid threats, criminal insurgencies, these groups that operate in these coastal littorals?

Mahnken: Well, okay so, so, a couple of different pieces to it. I would say the Defense Department, certainly since 2006, since the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the, you know, Defense Department’s force planning construct, so the construct that’s used to portray the demand for DOD capabilities, beginning in 2006 explicitly considered peacetime demand for DOD capabilities, and that includes dealing with, you know,
irregular warfare, it includes humanitarian assistance/disaster relief. It also includes a lot of other things like noncombatant evacuation operations, presence, all sorts of other things. So I would say that, that when the Defense Department looks at what capabilities it needs, for the last eight years that demand signal has included these types of, these types of things. And so yes while each humanitarian assistance mission is a policy choice, you can look back historically and say, you know— look historically we’ve, disaster relief is probably a better, better example. X number of times a year, or once every X number of years we’ve done this so we need to program in the capacity to do that.

Josh: I think that’s, that’s Kilcullen’s argument is its—I think, what he’s essentially, I think, trying to say is it’s, it’s not quite the policy, the independent policy choice that it’s often advertised to be, that these things, no one really likes to get engaged with these sort of long term stability operations or short term, you know, low intensity conflicts but they do thrust themselves upon the United States, you know, like you said, once a generation or every ten years or so, so. Moving, I guess, towards the hardware element of this, on the acquisition side, the, it looks as if the Navy is continuously defending its choice in the Littoral Combat Ship against an ever-widening body of critics, I think now including the Secretary of Defense. I was wondering, first, if you could articulate the ship’s mission. Is that something that, sort of, has been made readily apparent in the policy community?

Mahnken: No, look I think the rationale. First off I don’t think it’s a great investment, so, but I think the rationale, I mean the real rationale, is you, you know, that the Navy needs more hulls, and they need more hulls than you can afford if you’re building only destroyers and cruisers and aircraft carriers and attack submarines. You need more hulls to be able to project presence, and you need more hulls to do things like minesweeping, help with anti-submarine warfare, a whole bunch of things.

Josh: Okay, so your argument, from that perspective, the choice to move towards the Littoral Combat Ship doesn’t signal so much an interest in the littorals as an interest in a cheaper alternative to more expensive destroyers and?

Mahnken: The Navy for generations, for you know really, actually navies, always have a high/low mix, right? And in the past, for the, the previous generation of the U.S. Navy, the low part of the low mix was frigates, was Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates. Those are gone, and the, I will say the functional replacement is the Littoral Combat Ship. Again we can argue about how good or how bad a replacement it is as a particular ship…

Josh: Right, right

Mahnken: But that’s, but in a way that’s, you know, that’s a level of analysis that’s below what I think you’re asking me. No, the purpose of the Littoral Combat Ship is to provide the low end to allow for a high/low mix and therefore to allow a larger navy.

Josh: Okay
Mahnken: If you were only, you know, if you were only procuring destroyers, say destroyers and cruisers, you’d have a much smaller navy.

Josh: Right, okay. So from the—

Mahnken: And, sorry, and one could have very good arguments as about, as to what that low end should look like. Should it be Littoral Combat Ships, should it be a new design frigate, should it be, you know, a frigate purchase with a design that somebody else has come up with? I don’t know that anybody argues that we don’t need to have a low end in naval force structure.

Josh: Right, well, it just seems as if the ship itself has garnered a lot of critical attention

Mahnken: Absolutely

Josh: And I was wondering, is that criticism because of the Navy’s failure to articulate a specific mission for it, does it, is there a deeper objection to moving the navies into the brown waters to a larger extent, or is it honestly just a badly designed ship? Why its garnering so much criticism.

Mahnken: Well, I think it is definitely true that the Navy has not fully articulated the, you know, the strategic rationale for its force structure. Whether it’s a badly designed ship or not, in a way it’s kind of too early to tell. What I would say is traditionally, you know, new, new classes of ships always have a breaking in period, they always have a teething period, they always have, you know, they always have problems. The good thing about a good design is kind of work through those problems, it winds up being a huge success, and people forget that they talk about these things. In the case of the Littoral Combat Ship, I think part of the question is, well part of it has to do with the philosophy of the design, which is this notion that it was going to be a modular design. And I think in practice that’s just never worked out with naval combatants. In other words you, or, rather you build in modularity at the, at the design phase, you don’t really have it in operationally. So, there certainly are designs, you know the MEKO-class frigates are probably the best examples, where they’re modular in terms of their design, you can order one and say “hey I want one that does x,y, and z,” and it’ll be built with those modules included. With the Littoral Combat Ship the notion, or the conceit was, that you’d have this ship and then you could swap out modules.

Josh: Okay

Mahnken: In practice that just doesn’t happen. And then the problem with the Littoral Combat Ship has been that, part of the reason, and part of the reason it doesn’t happen is, those modules get, you know, aren’t funded. And so now you have a truck, but nothing for the truck to carry.
Appendix C

Josh: Okay. And I’ve seen also, it’s been at least advertised partially as also a sealift issue, that you might have a ship where it needs to be but you don’t have the modules that you need to put there. I don’t know how legitimate a criticism that is—

Mahnken: Yeah that’s true too but you first actually have to purchase the modules, have them operational, which we’re not even at that stage.

Josh: Right, okay. Very interesting. This next question kind of just gets right to the crux of what I’m talking about, which is: with the growing cost of modern fleets like you’re talking about, and this redistribution of resources we’re seeing very heavily towards the Asia-Pacific, and I think we can—

Mahnken: Okay but when you say “redistribution heavily towards the Asia-Pacific,” the U.S. Navy today has about 55 percent of its major surface combatants in the Pacific

Josh: Right.

Mahnken: And the goal is to get to 60 percent.

Josh: Right. Okay, fair heavily, is a normative—

Mahnken: Already a majority of U.S. naval assets are in the Pacific

Josh: Right, right

Mahnken: You’re talking about 5 percent more.

Josh: You’re talking about five percent more ships, you are also talking about a substantial intellectual investment at, you know, the Naval War College which I think is where you are also affiliated, at the Naval Postgraduate School, so there is, I think generally speaking, there is a political orientation with the Pivot to Asia so, but yes at a hardware level five percent we can argue how significant or not. But I think that’s also a growing percentage of a shrinking pot.

Mahnken: Absolutely.

Josh: So with all of that in mind, how, or will, that affect the Navy’s capacity to operate globally, how will that impact the Navy’s commitments elsewhere?

Mahnken: Look I think, I think, the United States has no, we are a global power, we’re not a regional power, so the, and the part of the U.S. armed forces that is most flexible is the Navy. So the Navy will, you know, be present, will operate globally. That having been said, you know I think it’s been recognized by multiple administrations, certainly going back to the 2001 QDR, that Asia’s strategic weight is growing, and so that needs to be taken, taken account of.
Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

Josh: Okay, and then continuing to how the actually planning process works, particularly of late (these are two questions, we can parse them out). But one is, sow does the threat of sequestration influence strategic planning, if it does at all? And then, the other side is, how does, I think most commentators would say that we’re seeing far more heightened political partisanship, particularly in the budget process than historically is normal, and how (if at all) does that influence the planning process as well?

Mahnken: So on the partisanship issue I guess it depends on what your, you know, what your historical lens is. I mean more partisanship than in the recent past? Maybe. More partisanship than other points of American history? Well that’s debatable. We hadn’t had members of Congress beating each other up with canes or dueling with pistols, both of which have happened in our history, so you know. But look I would say that sea power I think is one, is one issue where there is a lot of bipartisanship, and also the Asia-Pacific is another area where there is a lot of bipartisanship. So, you go to the people’s chamber of Congress, you go to the House, which was designed by the founders to be closer to the voter and more closely represent voter, you know, voter preferences, and you see the, you see the Asia-Pacific caucus co-chaired by Congressmen Forbes and Congresswoman Hanabusa. You see a whole sea power, you know, coalition, that’s quite bipartisan. So I would say, the general point I would take, that there certainly is a lot of, a lot of discontent, sequestration is terrible because it really, the way it’s implemented actually disproportionately hurts successful acquisition programs because it salami slices, you know, ten percent out of every program, and so it winds up really again hurting programs like the Virginia attack submarine that are actually very good acquisition programs. So that’s bad.

Josh: Is it, sorry, is it disproportionate just because they’re successful programs? Or…

Mahnken: Yeah, well a successful program runs on time and on budget or under budget, and so it’s a successful program, you’ve demonstrated that you can deliver on time and on budget, and now you go take ten percent away from it. Whereas, you know, if it’s a program that’s in trouble, that’s behind, it’s already in trouble, so you go from, you know, being on pace to acquire two Virginia attack submarines a year, at a sustainable rate, and then you take ten percent out every year and it’s like, well what’s ten percent off of two? It’s not 1.8, it’s one or one and a half, and so whereas if you have a program again that’s behind, that’s over, yeah there, it’s hurt but it’s already a program that’s, you know, that’s not performing. So all that was a preface to saying that all that’s bad, but I think there is certainly more bipartisanship comparatively on issues of sea power and Asia-Pacific.

Josh: Okay. I’ve certainly noted that there’s strong bipartisanship, especially on the Asia-Pacific issue. That seems to be, sort of, the one strategic issue that everybody can get behind. Okay, I’ve only just got a couple more questions for you.

Mahnken: And, you know, Congressman Forbes represents a district in Virginia, so on the Atlantic coast, it’s not, Congresswoman Hanabusa it’s a little bit easier to understand coming from Hawaii, but still so that’s a good example I think.
Appendix C

Josh: Right, okay great. This kind of gets us back to that issue of Kilcullen’s thesis with the question: how do, if at all, do strategists traditionally look at indicators like demography or urban concentration when they’re guiding, let’s say, broader national strategy?

Mahnken: That’s the topic for a whole long conversation but certainly, I mean, when I was in the Pentagon, and it continued after me, the answer was you know we looked at long-term trends a lot, and there was actually a project called “Trends and Shocks” which was, which looked at a whole series of trends, including demography, including climate, including governance, science and technology, and looked at how they may play out over years, and also looked at potential shocks—discontinuities including, you know, a natural disaster in a littoral urban area, including all sorts of things like that. And, again since sort of 2006/2007 that’s been incorporated into U.S. defense planning. If you read the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review section on the strategic environment carefully I think what you’ll see is the evidence of just that sort of thinking. There’s a couple paragraphs that really talk about trends and shocks their implications for defense planning.

Josh: This question is kind of out of left field, but in your experience both in academia and in policy have you witnessed any significant interdisciplinary exchanges between criminology and defense? A lot of the stuff that I read, I sort of hear people say, “there should, we should see what we can learn from, you know, law enforcement” but there seems to be very little in the way of actual engagement, at least as far as the literature I’ve seen.

Mahnken: I think that’s true but of course you know the thing is most policymakers don’t think in terms of disciplines or talk in terms of disciplines, I mean that tends to happen in the academia much more than in policymaking circles. So, you know, to the extent that that expertise is brought in it’s not brought in in terms of criminology its brought in by the various fields of expertise, various experts, various communities, so that’s kind of a hard one to answer.

Josh: Okay. But, the law enforcement community, would you say it has a reasonable involvement in defense planning or?

Mahnken: Well, defense planning, I mean that’s. Well I don’t know that anybody other than defense planners have a reasonable input into defense planning. I mean, but our law enforcement, you know. Look so, so again back to 2006, you know again the 2006 QDR I think was instrumental in talking about building partner capacity, and, and it was actually, when we talked about building partner capacity it was mainly building the capacity of foreign countries to meet national security threats. The other half of it which, until it was, well, the other half of it was about building capacity within the United States. And, and so that would include law enforcement. And the point there was, because in so many ways DOD was the 800 pound guerilla, DOD was tasked with doing all sorts of things that really aren’t central to Title Ten U.S. code which defines the mission of the Defense Department. And so the notion was, was very much you need to build up the
Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

capacity of other parts of the national security community to handle things, including law enforcement. I think that was certainly the case, also, not just in general, but if you look at in Iraq and in Afghanistan, as two examples, building both domestic law enforcement capacity and using that to combat irregular threats, and also building law enforcement capacity in partner states, was key. Now we’re, you know, we’re hindered by the structure of law enforcement agencies in the United States, which is, again, it’s a product of our government, our constitutional system. We don’t have a federal police force. It’s why countries like Italy, countries like Australia actually have very valuable roles to play, because there is the Carabinieri, and there is the Australian Federal Police. For the U.S., I mean there’s FBI, but the FBI is not a federal police force. And so we are disadvantaged when we the United States, say, you know, are working with the Afghan government trying to build their law enforcement capability, because we don’t… Unless it’s the Military Police as part of the Army, or Navy Criminal Investigative Service, we really don’t do that.

Josh: Right, okay very interesting. This is just generally a question of philosophy because this is something I—St Andrews is a very theory and constructivist heavy university, you probably had some interesting talks while you were there, and I just wanted to know because you’ve had successful careers, sort of, melding and moving between academia and policy, what do you think the role of academia is in advising or shaping policy?

Mahnken: Look I think, I think ideas matter, I think they matter both directly and indirectly, and I think they matter most indirectly, meaning by kind of setting up debates, getting ideas out there, they affect the context within which decisions are made. I think it’s much rarer that, you know, a particular book or article has a real, has a real influence in and of itself. It’s in part because policymakers are by and large very bright people already, they know quite a lot, but they’re also very busy people and they kind of operate in this hermetically sealed environment, and so it’s very difficult for outsiders to influence policymaking. I would go so far as to say it’s not even a good objective. I don’t do my scholarship to affect policymakers, if it does that’s wonderful but I do it, you know for, to affect academic discussions.

Josh: Okay, very good. And then my last question is, is there anybody that you would recommend that I talk to that you think generally speaking this would be interesting for?

Mahnken: Have you, who have you talked to in the Pentagon?

Josh: I just got to DC, so this is my, my first meeting.

Mahnken: Okay. Yeah, I mean I would talk to people, you know, you might want to talk to Mara Karlin, she’s the deputy in the strategy shop in OSD policy, she’s also a former student of mine. So, she might be able to give you a good read on those things. Yeah, she’d be a good person to talk to.

Josh: Okay, great. Thank you very much for taking the time, I appreciate it.
Appendix D

The Response to Transnational Threats in the Caribbean

The Response to Narcotics Trafficking

Because of the dominance of the littoral Western Caribbean route for drugs smuggling, the most concerted law enforcement efforts of late have been directed in this region. Operation MARTILLO, the primary international anti-drug effort organized out of U.S. Southern Command,* "seeks to deny the use of the Central American littorals by TCOs [Transnational Criminal Organizations]...while maximizing the drug interdiction efforts of our interagency partners in the principal geographic corridor through which the bulk of illicit drugs moves towards the United States." These littorals became increasingly popular smuggling routes after a series of record enforcement years in the mid-2000s drove traffickers out of the high seas, where coast guards and navies have the advantage.² As Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Zukunft notes, traffickers have "very few allies at sea, and that’s where we do have the upper hand."³ By increasing enforcement in the littorals, Operation MARTILLO hopes that the balloon effect will actually work to their advantage, forcing smugglers back into vulnerable deep water.⁴ Yet, interdiction-based enforcement efforts have been increasingly inefficient. After the Cold War, abundant U.S. Navy and Coast Guard assets made blanket patrols feasible (see Appendix A conversation with Captain Mark Morris (Ret.), Chief of U.S. Naval Mission in Colombia). As resources decline, the same principle can no longer be supported by the available resources. Operation MARTILLO typifies this evolving mismatch between the scale of the problem and the scale of American investment in a ‘solution.’

Operation MARTILLO is credited, in fiscal year 2013, with disrupting 132,191 kilograms of cocaine, 42,232 pounds of marijuana, $3.5 million in bulk cash shipments (proceeds from drug sales), and 107 vessels and craft.⁵ In its first two and a half years, MARTILLO disrupted a total of 272 metric tons of cocaine, seized $10.7 million in bulk cash, and seized 198 vessels and aircraft.⁶ JIATF-South, which coordinates MARTILLO under Southern Command, even reported declines in illicit maritime activity in Western Caribbean littorals of forty-three percent.⁷ There is no broader evidence, however, that this has precipitated a decline in overall traffic. Even JIATF-South hints that the declines it measures may not translate to overall dips in the drug market but are seen as successes if they drive the trade out of the littorals.⁸ It is likely that decreased traffic in go-fast boats in the littorals is mostly an indication of the increased use of alternative means and routes. This resilience of the narcotics industry is an astonishing feat given JIATF-South estimates it disrupted almost $2.6 billion (wholesale) in cocaine trafficking in 2013⁹ (and an estimated $3 billion denied to TCOs in 2012).¹⁰ And as the ceaseless back-and-forth continues, Southern Command is now concerned that its success in closing more direct routes to Honduras will propel traffickers even deeper into congested and camouflaged

---

Muddy Waters:  
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

littorals. Without a massive increase in available resources, which is unlikely, this balloon effect will continue to dictate ambiguous enforcement outcomes. Limited assets, deployed in limited locations, will inevitably create enforcement gaps elsewhere.

Despite this effort, what is perhaps most notable about MARTILLO is the relative paucity of the Pentagon’s investment in it and similar operations. In March 2014, SOUTHCOM’s commander told Congress (speaking of drug trafficking), “I simply sit and watch it go by.” Sequestration-induced cuts have made particularly deep incisions in Southern Command’s capacity, which already sees itself as “an economy of force Combatant Command” (read: low priority). General Kelly continues, “because of service cuts, I don’t expect to get any immediate relief, in terms of assets, to work with in this region of the world.” Southern Command perceives itself “as the lowest priority Geographic Combatant Command” and expects to receive “little, if any, ‘trickle down’ of restored funding.” Southern Command has seen a further draw down in capacity due to the declining availability of U.S. Navy frigates as well as the expected decommissioning of the Coast Guard’s High Endurance Cutters. In 2013, the forced furlough of 572 SOUTHCOM civilian employees had a “significant impact” on counter-drug operations, and despite a reprieve through fiscal year 2015, Kelly fears the instability will spur a talent drain in civilians looking for more stable employment. Kelly testified that the forces under his command failed to capture an astounding eighty percent of estimated Caribbean-trafficked narcotics. In his assessment, SOUTHCOM receives about five percent of the resources necessary to pursue this mission. Southern Command appears to feel so neglected that General Kelly felt compelled to dissuade against a total disengagement from the region, as “some might argue.” In an effort to offset cuts in resources, Southern Command relies “heavily on the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection, which now provide the bulk of the ships and aircraft available.”

Even in its primary area of responsibility, however, the Coast Guard receives a fraction of the budget and resources compared to what the Navy has the potential to wield. Sequestration has further imposed budget tensions and threats of downsized assets for the USCG. Admiral Michel said in 2012 that his Task Force was “unable to target 74 percent of high confidence events” because of resource scarcity. Even of the remaining twenty-six percent, interdictions were frequently hampered by an inadequate distribution of sensors to provide necessary domain awareness. Yet, such financial constraints are not strictly an expression of frugality. To put this resource deficiency to scale, in 2013 the Coast Guard “expended over 2,900 cutter days, 900 Airborne Use of Force capable helicopters days, and 8,000 surveillance aircraft hours on counterdrug patrols.”

*†See Appendix A for an extended conversation on the relationship the U.S. Navy has with its operators in the region.

†By contrast, in that same year, U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO) provided a total of “six frigates, [one] High Speed Vessel (HSV) SWIFT, four fixed-wing Maritime Patrol aircraft and two Scientific Development Squadron ONE detachments” for MARTILLO. See, General John Kelly, “Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly, United States Marine Corps Commander, United States Southern Command” (testimony, before the 113th Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, February 26, 2014), 36-37.
Appendix D

narcotics trafficking in a conventional, midcentury law enforcement manner (interdiction-oriented blanket patrols). The task is simply Sisyphean.

Despite the enormity of this task, a number of progressive programs can be discerned amid the range of partnerships and law enforcement missions in which Southern Command participates. U.S. Marine Corps Forces South (MARFORSOUTH), for example, employs Joint Riverine Training Teams (JRTT) comprised of Marine Corps and Naval personnel to train local littoral and riverine police, coast guard, and navy units in best practices for interoperating between land and sea. Operation UNIFIED RESOLVE, launched in September 2012, promotes interagency Puerto Rican interdiction efforts across JIATF-South, Coast Guard District Seven, Customs and Border Protection, and others. Towards the end of 2013, SOUTHCOM launched a collaborative Counter-Threat Finance Branch with the Department of the Treasury to map and combat illicit networks through financial means. In many respects, these SOUTHCOM operations are a model for ‘whole of government’ efforts. In fact, U.S. Southern Command headquarters contains thirty-four representatives from fifteen distinct federal agencies on its staff. The commander of Southern Command maintains that the “maturity, strategic leadership, and tactical collaboration between JIATFS, the USCG, and CBP have greatly enhanced the effectiveness of countering illicit trafficking (CIT) operations in the Northeastern Caribbean.” The Coast Guard’s comfort with constabulary responsibilities and close collaboration with the Navy demonstrates both the value and the feasibility of incorporating such missions as sub-fields of naval strategy (indeed, as it is already being done on this small scale).

International collaborations also play a significant role in Caribbean operations, both as a means of partnership and capacity building, but also in an effort to leverage limited resources. Southern Command reports that, of the nearly 150 interdictions supported by JIATF-South in FY2013, one half would have failed without some degree of international support. In 2012, Admiral Michel told Congress that international partners were active participants in eighty-three percent of disruptions the preceding year, acting as a “force multiplier.” Alongside the aid of local Caribbean enforcement agents (typically small coast guards, police, and occasional naval forces), larger international players also assist in counterdrug efforts. Some of the most significant of these partners include those with regional dependencies, territories, and associated states such as the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands, as well as important hemispheric actors such as Canada. This extensive partnership provides an answer to one of the most frequent comments faced in researching this dissertation: the limit of Posse Comitatus, the regulation forbidding the U.S. armed forces from acting in a law enforcement capacity. The international experience of Southern Command has directly and efficiently addressed this by embarking Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETS) onboard naval ships. The Coast Guard operates in both a military and law enforcement capacity, and thus is exempt from the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act. In 2013, the U.S. Coast Guard deployed LEDETs onboard U.S. Navy ships, as well as British, Dutch, and Canadian ships (seventeen in total). RFA Wave Knight, for example, an auxiliary ship in the British fleet, supported multiple interdictions with the aid of one such team, even hosting a U.S. Coast Guard helicopter for over half of the ship’s 471-day deployment, the first time ever a tactical Coast Guard helicopter squadron has deployed on a non-U.S. ship. During its time in the Caribbean, the Wave Knight (part of Atlantic
Patrol Tasking North) housed eleven American law enforcement personnel, an embarkation that dramatically widened the impact of limited American resources. In the span of only two months in early 2014, RFA Wave Knight made or facilitated at least three interdictions, one seizing drugs worth up to £300 million. Each mission incorporated the participation of the U.S. Coast Guard.

A related arrangement that addresses some of the legal points of performing maritime security operations in the littorals are the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) common throughout the Caribbean. Similar arrangements date as far back as 1926, when the British government allowed the U.S. Coast Guard to interdict ships in the Bahamas suspected of smuggling alcohol into the United States. Interdiction arrangements have since continued to play an important role in the Caribbean. Today, MLATs facilitate the exchange of information and coordinate international law enforcement efforts throughout the basin. The United States maintains such agreements with, among others in Latin America, Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Mexico, the Kingdom of the Netherlands (which covers Aruba, Bonaire, Curacao, Saba, St. Eustatius, and St. Maarten), Panama, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Kingdom (which covers Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Montserrat, and Turks and Caicos), and Venezuela. At the time of writing, another such treaty had been negotiated with Colombia but had yet to enter force. Such international counter-drug cooperation is widespread in the Caribbean. In the summer of 2013, Interpol coordinated an operation in the region netting $822 million in seized drugs and 142 arrests. Europol, the EU police agency, was a partner in the operation that included thirty-four countries and territories, most of them Caribbean. Notably, the operation also included participation by Western constabulary forces, including the French Coast Guard and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The United States has invested heavily in such partnerships. Southern Command has provided millions of dollars in counter-narcotics training and equipment in recent years, most notably delivering forty-two interceptor boats to regional navies and coast guards. In 2013, the U.S. Coast Guard facilitated two Multilateral Maritime Counterdrug Summits in partnership with the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI, a thirteen nation collective) and other South and Central American states. In yet another multinational effort, the maritime forces deployed Technical Assistance Field Teams (TAFT) to an expanding number of Caribbean maritime forces to offer logistical and mechanical training. In these and similar programs, Southern Command (with considerable Coast Guard leadership) has exhibited an important inclination towards creative problem solving that suggests it may be among the most strategically flexible of any unified combatant command.

The Response to Irregular Migration

Responding to the implications of mass human movement in the Caribbean Basin is a monumental challenge. As human trafficking continues to grow faster than any illicit trade, as human smuggling continues to transport people and diseases across borders, and as the networks that perpetrate these deeds expand in scope and ‘product,’ irregular migration in the Caribbean is an issue of security concern. Yet, the obstacles to any

* We speak to the implications of this international orientation and strategic flexibility in Section 8.
strategy aimed at this task are manifold. First, there are the economic disincentives to greater enforcement. As the Caribbean attempts to further regional integration, barriers to human trafficking and irregular migration will continuously come in conflict with efforts like CARICOM’s Single Market and Economy (CSME) initiative. While Schengen Zone-inspired freedom of movement is far from a reality in the Caribbean, many in the region aspire to such a community “[without barriers].” Economic incentives favor the open exchange of goods and people, and U.S. direct investment in Latin America at large exceeds one trillion dollars (second only to U.S. investment in Europe). Of the twenty states with which the U.S. government has signed free-trade agreements (FTAs), “more than half are in the Western Hemisphere.” Furthermore, the industry that drives the demand for so much cheap labor across the Basin, tourism, is in its own right the source of the largest movement of people in the Caribbean (more than twenty million visitors annually). On top of tourism, the constant flux of domestic migration flows, particularly in Guyana and Jamaica, add to an ever-dynamic movement of people. This extensive domestic migration makes it all the more difficult to detect victims of trafficking, as well as irregular migrants. The most obvious obstacle, however, is access to resources.

If counter-narcotics operators believe they receive a fraction of the resources they require, anti-human trafficking and human smuggling operations receive even less. According to the Congressional Research Service, American funded, anti-human trafficking-specific initiatives in Latin America totaled less than eight-and-a-half million dollars in fiscal year 2011. More than sixty percent of those funds went to one country (Haiti). This American anti-TIP funding for Latin America represents about ten percent of the U.S. total. The increases in migration flows exhibited in the first half of this decade “would place additional burdens on already overstretched U.S. Coast Guard” and Caribbean assets. What action has been taken is done in the same vein as narcotics interdiction. But that enforcement must come as part of a broader strategy, which recognizes that trafficking is not an isolated act. We highlighted above the interplay between human and narcotics trafficking. The multidimensional nature of human trafficking often means that victims are also implicated in local crime (prostitution or theft, for example). Treating human trafficking with a midcentury criminal model perspective frequently misidentifies victims as criminals or illegal migrants. The theme of the 2014 Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report, with its emphasis on victims’ rights, is intended to provide a set of principles to realign policing with this nuanced perspective on counter-TIP. UNODC also funds numerous projects that seek to develop local law enforcement’s capacity to respond to the unique challenges of human trafficking. Engagement on issues of human rights and human dignity is a sensible cornerstone for a strategy guided by Broken Windows. As the theory illustrates, a population’s psychological well-being is instrumental in building communal security and interrupting individual criminal actions. Southern Command is acutely aware of this need, as well as the difficulty in building and sustaining goodwill. SOUTHCOM Commander Kelly testified to Congress, “our persistent human rights engagement also helps encourage defense cooperation, trust, and confidence, which cannot be surged when a crisis hits, and cannot be achieved through episodic deployments or chance contacts.” Southern Command prides itself on this commitment to human security: “Everything we do at U.S. Southern Command begins and ends with human rights…A lot of people talk
about human rights, but the U.S. military *does* human rights. We live it. We teach it. We enforce it." Yet, budget cuts have targeted the very missions necessary to maintain human security and human rights. In 2013, General Kelly told Congress that sequestration would “likely result in the cancelation of this year’s deployment of the USNS Comfort to the region.” And goodwill is a competitive commodity in the Caribbean. Failure to deploy hospital ships to needy communities comes in “stark contrast to China’s recent efforts,” noted in Chapter One, and contributes to the disintegration of public health. Local competition is also stiff. Cuba, with which the United States has had an inimical relationship until détente in late 2014, sends nearly 30,000 medical professionals (mostly to Venezuela) every year; the U.S., by contrast, sends approximately 700 to the entire Basin. Thus, instead of offering the “next generation of global citizens direct experience with the positive impact of American values and ideals,” Southern Command’s resources for humanitarian assistance are shrinking. And while Broken Windows reminds us that it is important that *someone* cares for a community, the proliferation of non-state actors seen in Chapter One reminds us that *who* cares for a community is just as important.

None of that is to say United States authorities have not devised innovative programs to address the issues explored in this section, particularly in the Caribbean Basin. Many such programs are aimed at alleviating administrative constraints in creative ways. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inaugurated the Operations Against Smugglers (and Traffickers) Initiative on Safety and Security (OASISS, anything for an acronym) in 2005. The program enables American law enforcement to hand over those Mexican traffickers and smugglers who cannot be charged in the United States to Mexican officials for prosecution. In its first six years, 2,617 cases went through the OASISS program, though CRS was unable to unearth figures on eventual prosecution rates. The Department of Justice’s Civil Rights and Criminal Division has performed extensive training and provided technical assistance on human trafficking for foreign law enforcement. The U.S. has also provided assistance in helping Caribbean and Latin American countries establish laws for combatting trafficking. As we noted, human trafficking is still less risky (with respect to potential penalties) than narcotics trafficking in most of the world, and the issue is a relatively new on the world stage (the United Nations treaty on trafficking in persons went into force only in 2003). To help build the basic legislative infrastructure necessary to adequately combat issues of human trafficking and migration, the United States’ Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training (OPDAT) has provided assistance to several Latin American countries to help draft local TIP laws. The Caribbean Border Security Initiative (CBSI), co-managed by the Department of State and USAID, spread over $200 million across the Caribbean to combat multiple facets of transnational

---

* The PLAN has conducted several goodwill visits to the region, and the Chinese government has begun pursuing greater investments in the region, including a prospective $40 billion for an alternative canal in Nicaragua and $3 billion in infrastructure projects across the Caribbean. See, General John Kelly, “Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly, United States Marine Corps Commander, United States Southern Command” (testimony, before the 113th Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, March 20, 2013), 11.
Appendix D

crime, including human trafficking.\textsuperscript{71} And much as in the case of narcotics, international organizations have played a role in anti-TIP as well. By 2012, the Organization of American States had trained more than 1,000 law enforcement and justice system officials in the Caribbean and Central America on addressing human trafficking.\textsuperscript{72} A decade earlier, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) founded an internal panel to help explore ways the organization could aid governments in the fight against human trafficking.\textsuperscript{73}

Still, though the region has made progress in recognizing the severity of human trafficking and related irregular migration flows, the Caribbean Basin continues to struggle considerably with these issues. Even in instances where governments have forged new legislation to address TIP and human smuggling, “some countries have modeled their national TIP laws so closely to TVPA [the American Trafficking Victims Protection Act] that they do not have the resources or the manpower to implement the complicated legislation.”\textsuperscript{74} The State Department’s \textit{Trafficking in Persons Report} shows, country by country, the uniform lack of arrests and prosecutions across the Basin for TIP-related crimes. And of the entire Basin, only one country (Nicaragua) achieved a Tier One (most desirable) ranking in the 2014 report. The vast majority of Caribbean Basin states are ranked Tier Two or Tier Two Watch List, indicating efforts to comply with TIP protocols but continued shortfalls. Cuba and Venezuela have the distinction of being two among only twenty-three states listed in Tier Three, completely non-compliant.\textsuperscript{75} Much of this reticence to action stems from an unwillingness or inability to dedicate scarce resources to a set of issues perceived to be less damaging than more pressing concerns. As we explored in the previous sections, both political will and limited resources are tied up in the issues of local crime and narcotics trafficking. Yet, as we have seen in Chapter Three, the multidimensional nature of security in the Caribbean cannot be so easily segmented.

There is valid criticism against the American response to TIP as well. The United States ‘names and shames’ countries in the \textit{Trafficking in Persons Report} with poor records on human trafficking, and has the legislative authority to impose sanctions on those governments who fail to make adequate improvements. Some contend, however, that sanctions endanger countries undergoing political instability, or that critical allies may find themselves immune to sanction and criticism (no Latin American countries besides Cuba and Venezuela have been subject to sanctions for over a decade).\textsuperscript{76} In response, others suggest that the demotion of the Dominican Republic to Tier Three status in 2010 motivated that government to take more serious action.\textsuperscript{77} And while TIP cases lag in Latin America compared to global averages, the region at large reports an increase in trainings and workshops convened on the subject.\textsuperscript{78} Finally, there is also some criticism with regard to the bilateral exchanges in place to help repatriate trafficking victims to countries like Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and the Dominican Republic.\textsuperscript{79}

\textsuperscript{71} Launched in 2009, CBSI is the “first major security aid program to the region since President Reagan’s Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) in 1983.” See, United States Coast Guard, \textit{Western Hemisphere Strategy} (Washington, DC: USCG, September 2014), 22.
and Nicaragua.\textsuperscript{79} In states with such a high gang presence, victims may be at continued risk of re-victimization.\textsuperscript{80}

\begin{enumerate}
\item General John Kelly, “Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly, United States Marine Corps Commander, United States Southern Command” (testimony, before the 113\textsuperscript{th} Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, February 26, 2014), 17.
\item General John Kelly, “Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly, United States Marine Corps Commander, United States Southern Command” (testimony, before the 113\textsuperscript{th} Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, February 26, 2014), 42.
\item General John Kelly, “Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly, United States Marine Corps Commander, United States Southern Command” (testimony, before the 113\textsuperscript{th} Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, February 26, 2014), 43.
\item General John Kelly, “Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly, United States Marine Corps Commander, United States Southern Command” (testimony, before the 113\textsuperscript{th} Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, February 26, 2014), 42.
\item General John Kelly, “Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly, United States Marine Corps Commander, United States Southern Command” (testimony, before the 113\textsuperscript{th} Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, March 20, 2013), 16.
\item General John Kelly, “Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly, United States Marine Corps Commander, United States Southern Command” (testimony, before the 113\textsuperscript{th} Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, February 26, 2014), 43.
\item General John Kelly, “Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly, United States Marine Corps Commander, United States Southern Command” (testimony, before the 113\textsuperscript{th} Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, March 20, 2013), 22.
\item General John Kelly, “Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly, United States Marine Corps Commander, United States Southern Command” (testimony, before the 113\textsuperscript{th} Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, February 26, 2014), 2.
\end{enumerate}
Appendix D

34 General John Kelly, “Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly, United States Marine Corps Commander, United States Southern Command” (testimony, before the 113th Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, February 26, 2014), 43.
Muddy Waters: Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

Appendix D

59 Lara Talsma, Human Trafficking in Mexico and Neighboring Countries: A Review of Protection Approaches (Geneva: UNHCR, June 2012), 16.
71 United States Coast Guard, Western Hemisphere Strategy (Washington, DC: USCG, September 2014), 22.
Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

79 Lara Talsma, Human Trafficking in Mexico and Neighboring Countries: A Review of Protection Approaches (Geneva: UNHCR, June 2012), 27.
80 Lara Talsma, Human Trafficking in Mexico and Neighboring Countries: A Review of Protection Approaches (Geneva: UNHCR, June 2012), 29.
Works Cited


Cheney-Peters, Scott. “Joint Patrols and U.S. Coast Guard Capacity.” *Asia Maritime*
Works Cited


Darling, Juanita. “Submarine Links Colombian Drug Traffickers With Russian Mafia.” Los
Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory


Works Cited

Febrica, Senia. “Securing the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas from Maritime Terrorism: A Troublesome Cooperation?” Perspectives on Terrorism 8, No. 3 (June 2014): 64-83.


Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory


Hribernik, Miha. “Southeast Asia’s Piracy Headache.” *Diplomat*, February 15, 2015,


Muddy Waters: Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory


Muddy Waters: Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory


Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory


Works Cited


Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory


Teo, Yun Yun “Target Malacca Straits: Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia.” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30, No. 6 (2007): 541-561.

Works Cited


Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory


Works Cited


Muddy Waters:
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory


