Change and Continuity after the Arab Uprising: The Consequences of State Formation in Arab North African States

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How far can the state formation paths of North African (NA) states help us understand the variable impact of the Arab Uprising on them? Historical sociology's concept of ‘path dependency’ ¹ shows that history matters: the past tangents of states' formation close off some possibilities and make others more likely. While the Uprising was spectacularly the product of agency--reaction against the previous features of the regional states, structure--the durable inheritances from the past have constrained the outcomes of agency. As Marx put it, men make their own history but not in circumstances of their own choosing.

This article examines the literature on state formation in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt for evidence of how far it explains different mixes of continuity and change under the impact of the Arab Uprising, notably differences regarding the displacement or survival of the incumbent regime and also the extent to which the old authoritarian politics has been superseded by democratisation or has persisted in new forms. The aim is to provide a macro-historical context for the more contemporary micro studies that follow in this special issue.²

The article assesses the effect of the three regimes’ distinctive packages of authority (seen through Weberian lenses), institution-society relations (via Modernisation Theory) and political economy infrastructures (via Marxism). These approaches have dominated the state formation literature on the region and although each focuses on a particular--but indispensable--part of the picture, they can be subsumed loosely within historical sociology’s very broad church. Indeed, following the Marxist tradition, they can be seen as conceptually distinct interacting layers of a pyramidal structure, with the economic ‘infrastructure’ the base, elites (and social movements) the apex and institution-society relations, the intermediate layer. Elites and social movements provide agency while institutions and economic infrastructure constitute the structure, with each interacting to explain outcomes.

The colonial heritage

The starting point of state formation in North Africa (NA) goes back at least to the colonial period. Because the imperial powers merely took over and ruled through functioning pre-modern regimes, NA states started independence with more secure identities than the many regional states newly created by imperialism. Second, colonial rule, in introducing secular education, precipitated

² For an insightful historical overview of the region, see Michael J Willis, Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring, Hurst and Columbia University Press, 2012.
secular nationalist movements that, to an extent, marginalised Islam, thereby introducing enduring societal cleavages over the role of religion in public life. Thirdly, differences in regime type were shaped by the interaction of monarchs with the colonial power: where they were seen to collaborate with imperialism, they were pushed aside in the transition to independence, with the nationalist movement in Tunisia and the army in Egypt constituting alternative pillars of the post-independence republics; by contrast the conflicts of Morocco’s King with the French endowed the monarchy with a nationalist legitimacy that kept it as the centre of the post-independence state.

As will be seen below, the first phase in post-independence state formation (1945-70) further accentuated the initial divergences between the regimes, particularly between ‘traditional’ Morocco and the ‘modernising’ republics. Thereafter, however, a convergence among them was driven first by similar neo-patrimonial state consolidation strategies (1970-1990) and later by similar neoliberal ‘authoritarian upgrading’ (1990-2010), which, in turn, generalized similar grievances manifested in the Arab Uprising. Yet, remaining regime differences appear to explain greater post-Uprising continuity in Morocco and divergences in in the extent of democratisation in Egypt and Tunisia.

**Independence and modernisation (1945-70):**

Analyses of NA state formation in the first decades of independence was largely framed by modernisation theory, notably classics by Halpern and Huntington. A main theme was the mobilisation of new actors, notably the middle class, into politics and the rise of middle class-led modernising regimes. The building of new authority was seen as requiring that expanding participation be channelled through stable institutions; otherwise, ‘praetorian’ struggles for power on the streets and via military coups and countercoups destabilised regimes. Political effectiveness was measured by how far institutions performed vital political functions such as recruiting political elites, aggregating society interests and mobilising support. Regimes were distinguished, in terms of Weber’s authority types, according to their relative concentration of power for radical change or its constraint by tradition or legal institutions. In the period after independence, regimes diverged sharply: the new republics concentrated power for modernising ‘revolutions’ while monarchies put it in the service of ‘tradition.’ At least as compared to the Mashreq, however, key NA states stood out for their seeming greater ability to advance modernisation and contain praetorianism.

Republican Tunisia was the ‘poster child’ of modernisation theorists. The Tunisian state came to independence with important advantages. A small homogeneous society, Tunisia had a cohesive elite recruited from professionals sharing similar upper middle class, regional and educational backgrounds and the experience of the independence struggle. The regime, headed by the

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charismatic founder of the nation, Habib Bourguiba, enjoyed the ideological hegemony of a successful independence struggle and rested on a mass party incorporating middle class activists, the Islamic bourgeoisie, and a highly developed trade union movement. The regime was seen as the most effective in NA at development, notably via investment in education and modernisation of agriculture thru cooperatives. Its ‘soft’ version of populist authoritarianism put concentrated power in the service of rational development, albeit at some cost in institutionalisation.

Morocco’s monarchy also came to independence with an important advantage: by contrast to the Western-created monarchies of the Levant and Gulf, Morocco’s had deep historical roots, uncontested traditional legitimacy and the added legitimacy of its king’s alignment with the nationalist movement against the French colonizer. On the other hand, however, Morocco, resembled those Arab countries, such as Egypt, where monarchies fell in the revolutions of the 1950s and 1960s, in the large size of its cities, much lesser role of tribalism, large impoverished population and lack of oil wealth, combined with a fairly developed political society. It had a strong nationalist independence movement, the Istiqlal party, based on the urban commercial bourgeoisie and a mass incorporating opposition party of the left linked to the unions (the UNFP and its successors). This complexity of political society required the king be an effective politician in order to survive.

The consensus verdict among modernisation theorists at the end of the first decade of independence depicted Morocco as an ‘immobile monarchy,’

eschewing modernisation and preserving tradition. The ‘Commander of the Faithful’ enjoyed enormous powers of patronage, including the constitutional power to dissolve parliament and appoint its upper house, thus weakening the elected parliament. He was seen to rule by exploiting Morocco’s divisions, balancing between Berber, rural notable and city Arabs. He used the pro-monarchic notable parties, which delivered the conservative rural votes of clientalised peasants and pastoralists, to contain the politically mobilised cities. The Berber tribal recruited army and interior ministry were turned into royal fiefdoms and used to repress the urban nationalist-left. Governments were picked from a rotating menu of king’s men and the bourgeois opposition politicians recruited via family connections from a small upper strata of landlords and rich merchants satisfied with the status quo. Decision-making was paralysed, with landed interests obstructing land reform and education preserved as an elitist bastion. While the monarchy was congruent with still dominant traditional structures, it was being de-legitimised in the eyes of the emerging modern middle class.

Egypt was a coherent society similar to Tunisia and also with its own distinct historic identity, although suffering from the worst resource to population deficit in the region. By contrast to Morocco, the monarchy and landed oligarchy were quickly overthrown once British protection diminished. Weberian writings, such as Dekmejian’s *Egypt under Nasser,*

interpreted the authority of the first republican president as charismatic, resting on his anti-

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imperialist foreign policy victories. Attempts were made to institutionalise the leader’s legitimacy in institutions, the presidency, but also parliament and in various versions of the ruling single party that were meant to incorporate pro-regime participation but which were seen as weak and chiefly instruments of control. Less sympathetic writers framed Free Officer rule as ‘praetorian.’

Political economy approaches, such as those of Abdul Malik and Ayubi, saw Egypt as a modernising bureaucratic state fostering import substitute industrialisation to deal with land to population constraints; nationalisations of banking and industry and agrarian reform were breaking the hold of the old oligarchy over the economy and giving the regime the means to co-opt the masses.

Egypt’s revolution significantly levelled what had been an oligarchic social structure. Indeed, Egypt’s more thorough social reforms, especially land reform, which had no analogue in either Tunisia or Morocco, produced significantly lower long-term inequality levels (a Gini index of 33 in the late 1990s compared to 40 in the latter cases). Egypt was widely seen as a successful model in much of the Arab world during the pan-Arab era.

**Regime Consolidation (1970-90)**

If the 1950-60s appeared to be a period of radical change and mobilisation, the next two decades were ones of regime consolidation and de-mobilisation. In the republics, the main change, in Weberian terms, was the ‘routinisation’ of charismatic legitimacy in some combination of neo-patrimonial leadership and rational institutions, while in Morocco the monarchy’s persistent traditional legitimacy and political dexterity allowed it to survive a period of major crisis.

Two iconic collections edited by Zartman et al. explained regime consolidation in terms of increased institutionalisation. Power was seen as conferred by top office in the centralised Tunisian and Egyptian republics. Office made the man, elites typically originating in modest societal strata, rising through occupations such as the military and teaching, from which they were co-opted into elite ranks. The technocracy, more interested in efficiency and growth than redistribution, had moved to the centre of decision-making somewhat at the expense of the party politicians and military officers recruited from the first post-independence generation. In parallel, the oil wealth available in the region from the mid-1970s price boom provided patronage for clientelist strategies and neo-patrimonial practices that made regimes more autonomous of society. In Marxist accounts, the first generation elite of modest origins used its command of the public sector to enrich itself, consolidating a new privileged and status quo-oriented state bourgeoisie at the heart of the state. If the holders of private wealth still only enjoyed uneven access to power, ordinarily people were being demobilised.

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Variations in regimes were, however, significant and Morocco's monarchy remained different. Property, traditional status and clientele connections to the monarchy were more important than formal office or technocratic skills in part because the private sector was more developed and the lack of land reform kept the rural notability fully intact. Morocco still stood out in the persistence of the traditional elite and lack of elite recruitment from the lower middle strata that was typical in the republics; for its lack of mass incorporation; by the government's disinterest in development programs; and by the absence of ideology in public life. Morocco had never had a populist social contract; however, rent transferred from the Gulf monarchies allowed increased public spending and a burst of growth in the late 1970s. Growth of educated youth with identities shaped by education in Arabic rather than French generated petit bourgeois radicalism formerly seen in the republics. Marked increases in social inequality and mass impoverishment and slowing economic growth as rent declined in the 1980s, combined with increased social mobilisation, were seen to threaten the regime.14

Mounting unrest in the late sixties was met by repression and a shutdown of parliamentary life; this, however, left a vacuum, issuing in two attempted military coups in the early 1970s which pushed the king to re-liberalise the political system in 1975. This decision was made easier by the fact that the monarchy had recovered its legitimacy through the annexation of Western Sahara, which won the acclaim of urban nationalist opinion and where also the military could be employed away from politics. The return to political liberalisation strengthened the regime: Zartman highlighted the advantage the Moroccan monarchy enjoyed from allowing opposition parties and semi-competitive elections, with the king periodically forming a government that could include ministers from the loyal opposition; even though ultimate power remained with the palace, competition for office was a means of co-opting and setting ambitious elites against each other. In retrospect, the monarchy's mix of quite selective coercion, the safety valve of greater political freedoms, and 'opposition as a form of support,'15 gave it a greater resiliency than the authoritarian republics.

In Tunisia, the president for life retained unmatched legitimacy within the elite and brokered intra-elite rivalries and circulation. Though tolerant of opposition (with dissidents out of favour later forgiven and readmitted to the elite), Bourguiba nevertheless purged any potential competitors within the ruling party and when the party became too autonomous used the government to weaken it, moving the system toward a neo-patrimonial order. Circulation at the top was blocked by the elderly leadership, with ‘change held in abeyance.’ The party had lost mobilisational capacity while the trade union movement, formerly a regime partner, now led a general strike against it. Small opposition parties were secular liberal or leftist, many of them splinters from the ruling party, with Islamists still on the margins and directing their fire at secularists.

Analysis of Egypt in this period, marked by the transition from Nasser to Sadat, stressed the continuity of a presidential-dominated bureaucratic regime. The presidency did, however, evolve from charismatic to neo-patrimonial authority, with Sadat appealing to religion and tradition to legitimise himself. And this was paralleled by considerable turnover in ministerial and military elites accompanying Sadat’s policy breaks with the past, including the ousting of the Soviet backed Nasserites, periodic waves of further purges of centre-left elites accompanying economic liberalisation (infitah) and then of opponents of the Peace Treaty with Israel. Technocratic recruitment to top elite posts advanced, while ex-revolutionary officers declined. Bureaucratic politics over jurisdictions and clientelist rivalries over patronage replaced ideological conflicts. An experiment in controlled political liberalisation and party pluralism appealed and contained dissident elites whose views were being marginalised without allowing them to mobilise mass support, even as the ruling party reconnected with the rural notability to sustain control in the villages. Economic opening led to a burst of prosperity, mostly for the well off and increased economic insecurity for the masses as the regime attempted to disengage from the social contract, albeit incrementally owing to fear of mass protest such as that which broke out in 1977. A post-populist transition was shifting the social power balance toward those with wealth and against Nasser’s populist constituency.16

The main vulnerability of all three regimes was that they were starting to ‘overproduce’ elites relative to the co-optative economic capacity of the state to absorb: new generations were fingered as the main possible threat to stability as the era of ‘political full employment’ came to an end. Although political Islam was starting to express the protest of the lumpenproletariat, it remained marginalised. Morocco, whose large impoverished masses were becoming more socially mobilised, was seen as the most vulnerable of the regimes and Tunisia as the least.

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their peoples. A parallel economic opening (*infitah*) led to unequal competition from Western exporters, driving national industries under, while tax breaks were accorded to foreign companies. Labour rights were removed, and welfare provision was delegated to private networks linked to the regime or to Islamists. Iconic of the shift in regimes’ social bases was the partial reversal of land reform in Tunisia and Egypt that allowed the restoration of the rural oligarchy at the expense of the peasantry initially favoured by populist regimes. As regimes abandoned efforts to politically incorporate their populations, they faced rising Islamist and anti-Western opposition. As such, authoritarian power was retained albeit now to protect new inequalities on behalf of the bourgeoisie and against the mass public.

Analysts asked how regimes could initiate economic liberalisation that potentially weakened state control over the economy and also antagonised their original popular constituencies while remaining in control and even politically liberalising. King argued that the authoritarian survival formula amounted to a cultivation of new constituencies to substitute for those being abandoned: the privatisation of public sectors provided patronage to co-opt rent-seeking supportive crony bourgeoisies. Heydemann argued that economic liberalisation replaced public with private monopolies; rather than generating an independent bourgeoisie able to check the state, privatisation created a rent-seeking state-dependent bourgeoisie that supported authoritarianism. By comparison to such concentrated entrenched interests supportive of regimes, the collective action problem deterred the mobilisation of the lower strata to contest the upward redistribution of wealth that neo-liberal policies promoted. Finally, regimes became dependent on Western powers to provide financial or security support used to co-opt or control opposition, all legitimised after 2011 by the ‘war on terror’—which however, tended to further radicalise some opposition elements.

In parallel, regimes found ways to ‘upgrade’ and adapt authoritarian rule in an age of democratisation. ‘Lop-sided’ limited political liberalisation favoured those who supported neoliberal policies. Pluralisation of party systems permitted the emergence of competing opposition parties, facilitating the co-optation and division of the opposition, while various electoral manipulations and bureaucratic restrictions prevented them from mobilising mass constituencies. Gerrymandering of electoral systems fostered neoliberal parties incorporating the regimes’ new crony capitalist constituencies. The republics’ original corporatist ruling parties situated themselves between the

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23 Raymond Hinnebusch, ‘Liberalization without Democratization.’
conservative and radical opposition parties, but they and their corporatist organisations, such as workers’ unions, that had mobilised the masses in the populist era (against the colonizer or old oligarchy) now functioned to keep them demobilised.\textsuperscript{26} Able to stand above and balance between winners and losers, presidents and kings become more autonomous of their former party/bureaucratic/popular bases, while ruling families, going into business, were aggrandized; yet, reneging on the former social contract, they suffered legitimacy losses and had to rely more on divide and rule and on coercion.

In Tunisia, neoliberalism followed an incremental path. The trade union federation initially effectively resisted moves against worker interests with protests and strikes, hence reforms had to be agreed via a tripartite state-business-union corporatism. However, this changed when debt led to negative growth and an IMF structural adjustment program in the 1980s; union leaders were arrested and purged and loyalists appointed. Under Ben Ali, who brought in technocrats, neoliberalism deepened. The new union leadership agreed to Ben Ali’s economic policies, claiming workers had to adapt to economic globalisation and there were few strikes even though worker gains were eroded.

Political developments were shaped by this political economy context. The Ben Ali era started with political liberalization, under a national pact in which the ruling party was to forfeit its privileged position; however the Islamist Al-Nahda movement grew, posing as the new champion of those being marginalised. Unable to co-opt the opposition, Ben Ali banned Al-Nahda, and initiated controlled elections in which the ruling Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD) always won big majorities. The contraction of political and press freedoms put Tunisia among the more authoritarian of the Arab states despite its relatively high socio-economic indicators.\textsuperscript{27}

Privatisation took an increasingly crony capitalist form, with the president’s and his wife’s relatives the biggest business operators. Typically, state banks gave unsecured loans to insiders to buy up state assets, who laid off workers, sometimes sold the machinery, and neglected to repay the loans. Also an agrarian counter-revolution transferred 600,000 ha. to a rural elite and privatised peasant cooperatives, all with support from a World Bank loan. Joining of the Euro-Med partnership forced tariff cuts and bankruptcies on local manufacturers. By 2007, the private sector dominated and the IMF gave Tunisia star marks. The growth rate was 5% in 1982-86, and 3.5% in 1992-96 but, owing to unequal distribution, the standard of living of the masses still fell. Nonetheless, Tunisia retained more of a social safety net and investment in health and education than other NA states; and to keep social peace, firms had to make contributions to national insurance, which deterred investors who had to operate in a neoliberal global market wherein labour costs must be driven down.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{26}King, The New Authoritarianism.
\textsuperscript{27}Emma Murphy, Economic and Political Change in Tunisia: From Bourguiba to Ben Ali (London: Macmillan, 1999); RH Haugbolle and F Cavatorta, 'Will the real Tunisian opposition please stand up? Opposition coordination failures under authoritarian constraints,' \textit{British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies} 38 (3), 323-341.
A similar economic tangent was evident in Morocco. In the late 1970s, the country had suffered a sharp drop in export earnings from phosphates while oil import costs had risen. Soaring debt and later slashes in Saudi aid forced structural adjustment involving public spending and subsidy cuts that led to bread riots in 1984. While the riots delayed austerity, by the 1990s Morocco was a model of budgetary discipline. Privatisation of the public sector concentrated its assets in the hands of the royal family and a handful of cronies or foreign firms. Public employment, wages and the HDI all fell while the percentage in poverty rose from 13% in 1990-1 to 25% in 2005. Since, under these circumstances, urbanization was increasing the dangers of protest, private and foreign aid funds were channelled into charities under royal control. At the same time, to organise a constituency among the beneficiaries of neoliberalism, the regime created a new centre-right party, the Constitutional Union, representative of the higher bourgeoisie and championing militant neoliberalism; the regime used gerrymandering, fraud and rural notables to deliver the votes to put it in power.

With the regime weakening in the early 1990s, as the king lost legitimacy for his stand with the West in the Gulf war and royal succession imminent, the *makhzen* placated the opposition with increased freedom of the press and civil society, reductions in repression and fairer elections. This allowed the populist Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP) which had opposed structural adjustment, to win an electoral plurality and form the government under Abdul Salam Yussufi, the first time the opposition had taken power after an election; yet this seeming watershed in democratic accountability was diluted by the royal-appointed upper house and the king’s veto over policy from his power to dismiss the government. As its co-optation by the regime cost the USFP popular support, the opposition’s rise to government turned out to be a variation on classic divide and rule.

In 1999, the new King, Muhammad VI, came to power, promising political reform but by 2003 his opening was reversed as the civil war in Algeria, 9/11, and terrorist incidents in Morocco legitimised a ‘war on terror’ against Islamic militancy that extended to all dissent deemed threatening. Indeed, the very moderation of the mainstream Islamic movements, increasing their appeal, and their attempts to create a secular-Islamist coalition to pressure the monarchy into democratisation, made them special targets of repression. From 2003-2011, power flowed away from politicians and political institutions to a newly empowered monarchy and technocrats attuned to the demands of IFIs.

Egypt’s post-populist political development was also marked by cycles of opening, when the regime had sufficient rent to sustain patronage, and closing, when opposition mounted, often associated with deepening neoliberalism or

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unpopular foreign policy moves. Egypt's regime had cracked down in the late Sadat period on mounting opposition, notably to peace with Israel, but re-liberalised politically in the early Mubarak period when enough rent was accumulated to resist external neoliberal pressures. The ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) positioned itself between populism, represented by the left-wing NPUP, and neo-liberalism advocated by the Wafd, representative of the infitah bourgeoisie with ties to Western capital. However, the oil price collapse of the late 1980s, debt and IMF pressures put harder reforms, notably privatisation of the public sector, on the agenda. For its anti-Saddam stand in the 1990 Gulf war, Western donors accorded Cairo a big windfall in debt relief in exchange for deepening of economic 'reform.' Having previously referred to the IMF as a 'quack doctor,' Mubarak now claimed that under globalisation there was no alternative to its demands. The regime fostered a supportive coalition: business organisations were well organised and got increasing political access thru parliament, while the NDP lurched to the right. The Wafd was co-opted, allowed 15% of the vote and 58 parliamentary seats, while the Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood), representative of Gulf capital, was allowed to join the Wafd's lists. All shared support for neo-liberalism, privatization of the public sector, and revision of land tenancy laws to favour owners. The parties of the left, Hizb al-'Amal and the NPUP, were prevented from forming a joint list and from actively campaigning among the mass public. However, in parallel with neoliberalisation, the regime faced throughout the 1990s an increasingly violent Islamist Uprising; and, instead of strengthening the moderate Ikhwan in order to isolate the radicals, the regime turned against and repressed the Ikhwan, thus contracting the political opening.

In the 2000s, the NDP moved even further right as it increasingly co-opted the emerging business class. Businessmen and Western educated neoliberal oriented technocrats encouraged by Gamal Mubarak took over the government under the 2004 ministry of Ahmad al-Nazif. Under it, privatization involved selling public assets at below market prices to a small group of crony capitalist bureaucrats and investors. Lucrative franchises on foreign firms were also acquired by crony capitalists. In parallel, a new labour law, no. 12 of 2003, increased the right of employers to dismiss workers and a new tax law shifted the burden from the rich to the middle class, with the rate levied on the superrich cut to 10%. The 1990s reversal of Nasser's tenancy laws led to expulsions of peasants from the land, protests and repression by police and landlord thugs; by the end of 1990s, 7% of the population owned 60% of the land. This was paralleled in foreign policy by growing ties, including business relations, with Israel.

How were the masses controlled and opposition marginalised? World Bank and other funders provided funds to pay off those dismissed from public employment in the transition period. Much of the politically conscious urban population did not vote while the ruling party distributed patronage in elections, rural notables delivered their clients and businessmen trucked their workers to the polls. The labour union leadership was co-opted, endorsing the 1991 privatisation law and containing pressures for strikes while the government.

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repressed independent unions; yet, from the mid-2000s, Egypt experienced the longest wave of worker protests and strikes since WW II. On and off repression continued as emergency law was replaced by counter-terrorism law.

The neoliberal NDP government and perceived plans for Mubarak to pass power to his son, neoliberal icon, Gamal Mubarak, provoked the kefaya demonstrations calling for Mubarak to go; this, combined with US democracy pressures, led to the relatively free 2005 parliamentary election in which the MB emerged as the main opposition, with 88 seats and 20% of the vote; as, however, US pressures receded, political liberalisation was again reversed, with the Brotherhood facing new repression. One of the factors that helped spark the Uprising against Mubarak was the 2010 election, when the regime engineered the virtual expulsion of the opposition from parliament.

The regime’s zig-zag, combining selective relaxation of control over the political arena—e.g. greater freedom of the press and opposition access to parliament—with subsequent re-tightening and closing of access, turned limited political pluralisation into a source of frustration rather than a safely value as intended.

The Arab Uprising (2010--)
The underlying causes of the Arab Uprising, a combination of neoliberal economics and neo-patrimonial regimes, were relatively uniformly present across North Africa. The Uprising also took the quite similar-and unprecedented-form of large scale peaceful mass protest against incumbent regimes, indicative of similar high levels of social mobilisation (e.g. education, middle class formation) across the region.\(^3^3\) Notwithstanding this, NA regimes sharply diverged, with Tunisia and Egypt experiencing leadership change and state weakening while Morocco seemingly escaped this.\(^3^4\) Do their state formation tangents help explain these variations in the extent of change? Do they equip NA states for a post-Uprising transition to stable democracy or make for more authoritarian continuity than change?

Regime Change or Adaptation
Why has Morocco’s monarchy proved more resilient, in spite of the fact that analysts long saw it as more, not less, vulnerable because of its disinterest in development and social reform? Moreover, the neoliberalism that helped provoke the Arab uprising had actually been more damaging in Morocco than in the republics: its starting point was a more unequal society that only got more unequal. By contrast, the pre-neoliberal developmental heritage in the republics left behind better scores on indicators such as growth, equality, poverty reduction and education (Table 1). Ironically, Tunisia, where the Uprising began, had the lowest poverty rate in the region, higher education, literacy rates, life expectancy, and per capita income compared to Egypt and Morocco, combined with respectable growth rates of 5% per year.


\(^3^4\) Ricardo Laremont, ed. Revolution, Revolt and Reform in North Africa: The Arab Spring and Beyond, London and NY: Routledge, 2013
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE (from pg 35)

The enduring legitimacy of the centuries-old Moroccan dynasty compared to that of republican presidents was crucial. The republics’ legitimacy relied on some combination of nationalism and development performance. But Egypt’s regime squandered the nationalist legitimacy of Nasser; its founding president, especially under Mubarak whose collaboration with Israel and dependence on the US, paralleled by the self-enrichment of the presidential family, was particularly delegitimising.\textsuperscript{35} The enrichment of the presidential family was similar in Tunisia. The aggrandizement of the Moroccan monarch and his close cronies was no less egregious, yet the king retained hegemony over society, especially the poor; owning big chunks of the economy he was, according to LeVine,\textsuperscript{36} enabled to both profiteer at the expense of the poor and provide them with charity. Kings, responsible to God, are perhaps expected to aggrandize themselves while the legitimacy of republican presidents, responsible to the ‘People,’ is debilitated by the same process. In addition, while presidents cannot easily avoid responsibility for policies, kings are better able to distance themselves, however much they have the last word, from the policies of their governments and to deflect public anger onto those incumbents, who can be rotated as a way of appeasing discontent. While Morocco’s system diffused responsibility away from the king, in Tunisia and Egypt the concentration of power and patronage in the presidential families concentrated responsibility.

A second factor was the deeper and more authentic political pluralisation in Morocco \textit{combined with} a lower level of social mobilisation compared to the republics. Morocco’s limiting of education also limited employment absorption pressures while the preservation of patriarchal society contained political demands. By contrast, Tunisia combined, of the three states, the most educated and socially mobilised population, which, however, could not be sufficiently absorbed into jobs, with the least open political system, where the Islamists and secular opposition were thoroughly excluded from the political arena, the press least free, and NGOs most controlled. Egypt was more open than Tunisia and less than Morocco, with its limited pluralisation periodically reversed and nearly shut down just prior to the Uprising. Morocco’s system afforded more effective mechanisms for co-optation of the political opposition, which was largely excluded in Tunisia or frustrated by the regime’s cat and mouse games in Egypt.

Third, the republics were less advantageously positioned to manage Islamic-secular cleavages than Morocco’s monarchy. Ironically, in the secular Egyptian and Tunisian regime political Islamists were both alienated and marginalised in the short run. Yet they were actually relatively empowered in the longer run: regimes’ repression tended to disproportionately weaken secular forces whose associations and access to the public could be more easily contained compared to Islamists who enjoyed the advantage of mosques and religious networks relatively more immune to state control. The privatisation of state welfare functions inadvertently positioned Islamists to move into the

\textsuperscript{35} Mark Sedwick, ‘Measuring Egyptian Regime Legitimacy,’ \textit{Middle East Critique} 19:3, Fall 2010, 251-67.
\textsuperscript{36} Mark LeVine, ‘In the Arab world’s deepest state the revolution continues,’ \textit{al-Jazeera}, 20 February, 2013
\url{http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/02/20132209305838184.html}
vacuum where the post-populist republics withdrew from welfare provision. The republics, especially Tunisia, passed up the opportunity to effectively co-opt moderate Islamists in order to marginalise the militants. Many secular opposition parties, such as the Egyptian NPUP, saw the Islamists as a greater threat than the regime, allowing them to be co-opted and neutered by the latter, thereby losing their popular bases; as such, the spearhead of opposition passed to younger generation of activists, among whom secularists and Islamists united in the protests that brought down Mubarak.

In Morocco, by contrast, the King’s religious legitimacy made it harder for Islamists movements to challenge the regime and easier for him to split them and co-opt the moderates among them: thus, he was able to diffuse pressure for regime change after 2011, most notably by co-opting the moderate Justice and Development Party (PJD) Islamists, and allowing it to form a government after it gained a plurality in elections, while the rival anti-monarchist Justice and Charity Islamists founded by Abdesslam Yassine remained in (peaceful) opposition and Salafist, a third grouping, remained opposed to the latter two. The regime also exploited the Islam-secular divide to abort a democratic coalition against the monarchy. Ironically, secularists supported the religious legitimacy of the king as a bulwark against Islamists; in turn, many Islamists saw themselves closer to the king than to secularists. Some secularists wanted Islamists excluded from politics because, being cut off from mass culture, they could not compete with the Islamist’s ability to use mosques and charity to reach the people. Many Westernised women felt threatened by the Islamists but the King, immune to Islamist criticism, promoted and protected their rights, giving them a stake in the regime. However, the many cultural conflicts in Morocco’s political space continued to prevent the opposition coalition needed to pressure the palace into thorough democratisation.

Finally, how regimes responded to the Uprising mattered, with repression proving quite counterproductive in the two republics and increasing the scope of anti-regime mobilisation to the point where regime cohesion, hence its capacity to repress, broke down. Decisive was the unwillingness of the Egyptian and Tunisian armies to repress the protests in defence of the president. In Egypt the highly developed mukhabarat had successfully contained protest for decades; yet resentment against police corruption and brutality and experience of street protest built up over many years, and, combined with internet organising, led to a watershed massive mobilisation that overwhelmed the police; once the army proved unwilling to step in and fire on massed civilians, the regime’s coercive capacity was spent. In Tunisia also, the small army was unwilling to fire on protestors while the combined mobilisational role of the trade unions and middle class activists was accelerated by police brutality. Morocco also experienced demonstrations by the February 20th movement that briefly combined Islamist and secular elements demanding a constitutional monarchy.

38 Frederic Volpi, ‘Explaining (and re-explaining) political change in the Middle East during the Arab Spring: trajectories of democratization and of authoritarianism in the Maghreb,’ Democratization. 20, 6, 2013, p. 969-990
Being better situated to make political concessions, the King responded with less repression and a more credible power sharing initiative that allowed him to divide his opponents while stopping well short of democratization. Protests of 100,000 youth activists were contained by the royalist loyalty of the illiterate rural masses and the newly co-opted established parties, an outcome very different from that in the republics.40

**Between Democratisation and Authoritarian Persistence**

It is one thing to overthrow incumbent presidents and quite another to make the transition to democracy. However, Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia have relative advantages in making a transition compared to other Arab states. Unlike the Mashreq states, ethnic and sectarian cleavages are not insurmountable obstacles since the three NA states enjoy relative homogeneity, long histories of statehood and relative incorporation of minorities, whether Berbers in Morocco or Copts in Egypt. Governing largely de-tribalised societies and without huge amounts of rent, they cannot clientalise and co-opt tribal society to marginalise participatory pressures in the way possible in the GCC regimes. Tunisia in particular, with its larger middle class, mass literacy, secular tradition and moderate Islamist movement was widely seen as having the best prospects for democratic consolidation. In all three states, Islamist movements, with large constituencies embraced the democratic political process and were the initial winners in post-Uprising elections. Yet, at the same time, the enduring power of the ‘deep state’ and the enduring intractability of inherited problems meant the extent of democratic change remained constrained.41

In Morocco, democratization depended on whether the king was willing to concede enough real power-sharing to increase incorporative capacity. He did concede constitutional changes requiring that he appoint the government from the party that achieved a plurality in elections; yet he could still dismiss the prime minister, dissolve parliament and he also retained control over the armed forces, security and foreign policy. This limited change was enough to revitalise political parties that had been marginalised by neoliberal technocrats.42 The moderate Islamist JDP won a plurality on the basis of promises to attack the corrupt crony capitalism around the makhzen and formed a coalition government with the Istiqlal party and two smaller parties, around a platform of a ‘third way between revolution and authoritarianism.’ However, once the threat of the Uprising passed, especially as secular-Islamist tensions split the youth movement, the king moved to block the PJD’s investigations into his cronies. His constitutional concessions were yet another variant on the monarchy’s tested techniques of diffusing and absorbing popular discontent rather than a serious movement toward a constitutional democracy. It worked because of the monarchy’s continued prestige among what is the most illiterate and patriarchal

of North African societies. In Morocco, the monarch continued to possess the hegemony to define and manipulate the rules of the game.

By contrast, in the republics, the removal of entrenched presidential monarchies exposed sharper and less manageable societal divisions. First, a three-way division opened up between state establishments, secular opposition, and Islamic forces. The main initial outcome of regime collapse in Egypt and Tunisia was the empowerment of Islamists, alarming secularists and liberals; the Islamist victories in the first post-democracy elections were, however, partly a result of the dissolution of ruling parties and the disorganisation of the secular opposition and revolutionary youth; in Egypt, the presidential election in which the old regime candidate was barely edged by his Islamist rival, Muhammad Morsi, better reflected the actual distribution of social power. But this was not reflected inside political institutions dominated by Islamists; and the MB, finding that winning an electoral mandate did not give real authority over the bureaucratic ‘deep state’ was unwilling to more widely share power. This precipitated an alignment of the secularists and youth with the remnants (falool) of the old regime to subsequently shift the power balance away from the Islamists.

Second, in these struggles, the rules of the game, notably constitutional provisions regulating political competition became themselves the objects of contestation. Particularly in Egypt, adherence to democratic rules by all three camps was contingent on the effect on their power positions. Unelected bodies such as the military and judiciary acted in a highly partisan way while Islamist dominated assemblies pushed through provisions alienating secularists. Both Islamists and liberals competed to get the military on their side against the other, with the MB striking a power-sharing deal that left the military autonomous of civilian oversight and entrenched as a powerful economic actor.

In the absence of institutionalized rules of the game, praetorianism was unleashed, again particularly in Egypt, with the struggle for power taking place not just through elections but also via street protest and violence, strikes, repression, and intrigue to win over the military and external funders. The weakened state was less capable of restoring order at a time when mobilisation exceeded institutionalisation but in Egypt the split between secular and Islamist civil/political society restored a certain capacity for the army-led ‘deep state’ to balance between them and position itself as the guardian of order appealing to a population tired of constant turmoil in a way similar to the role of the makhzen in Morocco.

However, despite somewhat similar Islamist-secular splits, the trajectories of the two republics also diverged, reflective of their earlier state formation differences. In Egypt, deepened praetorianism sharply reversed democratisation. The convergence of mass street protests with the military coup of 30 June 2013 to depose the elected president restored the power of the deep state: in deposing the elected Islamist president, using violence against Morsi’s supporters and outlawing the MB as a terrorist organization, the military and the

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deep state, with the complicity of secularists and revolutionary youth, in effect made a transition to democracy impossible. No democracy that excludes one of the most important socio-political forces in Egypt can be consolidated. Only a regime retaining extra-constitutional powers for the security forces can possibly marginalise the Islamists and cope with the violent spill-over of their resistance to repression. The result appears to be a hybrid regime, Bonapartist, but with pluralistic appendages and restoring the army to the central role it assumed in Egypt’s state-building after the 1952 revolution.

In Tunisia, on the other hand, a precarious democratic transition remained on track, despite problems similar to Egypt’s. The Islamist Al-Nahda won a plurality in the first post-Uprising elections, owing to its unique name recognition, lack of complicity in the Ben Ali regime, grassroots organising capacity, higher penetration of rural areas compared to city-centric secularists, and a moderate Islamic message attuned to Tunisia’s political culture. Unlike the Egyptian Ikhwan, however, Al-Nahda shared power with two secular parties, and a secularist politician became president alongside an Islamist prime minister. To be sure, once in power the Nahda party sought to ban members of the two-million member former ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) from participating in politics, a move that would weaken secularists and liberals some of whom were associated with the old regime at various points and prevent them joining in a counter-coalition which, polls showed, could have mounted a major challenge to Al-Nahda. Former regime party members were behind growing protests against the government; the trade union movement called a general strike and faced attack by the Islamist militia, the League for Protection of the Revolution. Militant Salafists’ attempts to restrict cultural expression they considered anti-Islamic seemed tolerated by the government. The acrimonious discourse and the murders of secular political leaders critical of the Al-Nahda government plunged the country into crisis in 2013 similar to what was, in parallel, happening in Egypt. The main difference was that the unpolticised Tunisian military lacked the ambition to use the crisis to assert dominance; indeed, because there was no ‘man on horseback’ in the small politically unambitious military that rival political forces could call upon to ‘rescue’ the country from the other, they needed to compromise their differences through dialogue. In brokering a compromise, the powerful trade union federation played a role similar to the monarchy and army as arbiter; this reflected its historically pivotal role going back to the independence struggle.

Whatever the variations in political practices among the three states, a deeper obstacle to democratic consolidation in all of them is that democratic procedures by themselves are unlikely to deliver solutions to problems rooted in a political economy where globalised neoliberalism dominates. This is particularly likely to disillusion those who backed political change in order to


45 For a thorough analysis of Tunisia’s prospects, see Emma Murphy, The Tunisian uprising and the precarious path to democracy, Mediterranean Politics, 16:2, 2011, 299-305.

redress the wealth mal-distribution under neoliberal crony capitalism. Revolution has so far remained purely political, with no attempts to attack unjust economic inequalities; at the same time, it actually worsened economic growth, hence prospects for addressing unemployment, by deterring investors and tourism. What has changed for the unemployed is increased political freedom to express their frustrations. Nor are elected governments necessarily better able to manage deep-rooted economic crises: while they might enjoy greater legitimacy to take hard economic decisions—although there is so far no sign of this—they will also be caught between the need to favour investors and to deliver material benefits to voting constituents; hence they may prove less able to manage the economy than the old regimes. Nor will elected governments, facing the deep state, be likely to promote thorough reform of past abuses; thus, in Morocco limited democratisation was not enough to break down the regime’s unwillingness to countenance attacks on crony capitalism and in post-Morsi Egypt Mubarak’s crony capitalists were rehabilitated. Moreover, the fragmentation of political parties, with often indistinguishable socio-economic programs, will make governance and the capacity of voters to hold governments to account difficult, especially as many of the big issues, notably wealth distribution, will remain excluded from the political agenda by neo-liberal measures pushed by IFIs on vulnerable economies; as in the West, all parties will follow similar economic policies, hollowing out democracy and discouraging participation. Elections will therefore likely turn on cultural and identity issues framed in de-stabilising zero-sum terms.

Finally, irreversible dependence on the West will continue to be a legitimacy liability in MENA as many of the grievances that motivated the uprising can be traced back to Western pressures for neo-liberalism and policies toward the region. If elected governments are unable to assert any more independence than their authoritarian predecessors, the new regimes will be deprived of one key-ingredient crucial to democratic consolidation elsewhere, nationalist legitimacy.

**Conclusion**
The North African experience allows us to assess the agent-structure debate regarding the extent to which path dependency closes off possibilities for agency. First, it suggests that the deep political economy infrastructure shapes developments at the institutional and leadership level. Thus, in the age of statist modernisation (coterminous with bi-polarity and Keynesian mixed economies globally), populist authoritarianism dominated the region. In the republics, charismatic ideological leadership governed through single-party institutions and corporatism led by the ‘new middle class’ and including peasants and workers. In this period, traditional monarchy, eschewing state-led development, was on the defensive. Later, rent from the 1970s oil boom drove parallel institutional expansion and clientelism, with charismatic authority routinised in neo-patrimonial institutions; conversely, the oil bust opened the door to neoliberalism. The movement toward US hegemony and neo-globalisation, driving neoliberalism at the regional level, was reflected in a post-populist authoritarian reconfiguration of state-society relations giving privileged access to new bourgeoisies and excluding populist constituencies. Neo-liberalism uniformly fostered crony capitalism regardless of regime type, pushing a
convergence toward deepened patrimonialization of leadership in all three NA states.

Yet persisting variations in state formation paths help explain the variations in continuity and change accompanying the Arab Uprising in the three states. The much lesser extent of change in royal Morocco as compared to republican Tunisia and Egypt can be explained by several factors. First, as modernisation theory argued, the increased social mobilisation accompanying modernisation must be matched by higher levels of economic development and political incorporation if regimes are not to face destabilisation. As regards economic development, the very virtues of the modernising republics, notably greater investment in education, exacerbated their crisis of job creation. As regards political incorporation, the Moroccan monarchy incrementally increased its techniques of co-optation to match delayed social mobilisation; the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes did the opposite, propelling modernisation at a greater rate than political incorporation. Additionally, where neo-patrimonial leadership dominates, traditional monarchs are more ‘naturally’ legitimate: while presidents’ legitimacy depended on nationalist or socio-economic achievements, which they did not sufficiently deliver, the traditional legitimacy of Morocco’s monarchy was impervious to its socio-economic under-performance. Finally, while the monarchy exploited inherited secular-Islamic divisions, the republics’ attempts to marginalise Islam only generated a permanent opposition-in-waiting.

Such persisting structural differences made for key differences in agency: the lesser mobilisation and more moderate demands of protestors in Morocco reflected the divided, co-opted political arena structured by the monarchy over decades; while the more thorough and radical mobilisations in Tunisia and Egypt reflected the imbalance between social mobilisation and political inclusion. This variation in agency—mass mobilisation—profoundly mattered for the differences between regime survival in Morocco and removal in Egypt and Tunisia; so also did the choices of the military commanders not to defend presidents in the republics, a function of the greater de-legitimation of presidential monarchs. The agency of democratic movements to go beyond regime leadership change toward democratic transition also varied according to inherited structure; thus, democratisation made more headway in Tunisia because it was more compatible with this structure, such as the historic centrality of trade union power, and less so in Egypt where it was obstructed by the military-dominated deep state; and in Morocco where the monarch’s semi-pluralistic practices substituted for it.

This points to how state formation trajectories generated enduring structures that make it likely the coming years will bring as much authoritarian continuity as democratic change. First, especially in the republics, the Uprising unleashed levels of political mobilisation that could not readily be absorbed by institutions; the lack of consensus on rules of the game, particularly regarding the roles of the army and religion in politics, set back moves toward democratic consolidation. Second, the Uprising exposed the enduring secular-Islamic cleavage that undermined the shared identity needed for democratisation. In Egypt the army and in Morocco the king exploited public weariness with disorder and cultural cleavages to limit democratisation.

Political economy analysis identifies a further obstacle to democratisation. The Uprisings were a reaction against the period of neoliberal
globalisation in the region, which created both acute social inequalities and enduring dependencies on the Western-centred international financial system. However, the latter locks Middle East states into neoliberal practices and removes the big issues of politics—distribution of wealth—from domestic political agendas; doses of authoritarian power, as well as divide and rule, will likely be needed to turn back demands for social justice that cannot be accommodated in a neo-liberal order.

As inherited structure closes in on the agency unleashed by the Uprisings, the most likely outcome in all three states is hybrid regimes, with varying mixes of the authoritarian features of their earlier state formation with the mass mobilising effects of the Uprising. Now politicians must use and manipulate the more mobilised masses in their rivalries, but they must also share power with the ‘deep state’ and are constrained by external dependencies. While such hybridity appears to have greater legitimacy in a monarchy because of its ability to stand ‘above’ politics, in all three states it is congruent with current circumstances.

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