At the heart of Karl Philipp Moritz’s psychological novel *Anton Reiser* (1785-1790) lies the faculty of the imagination, the seat of the mind’s aesthetic activity, that workshop which forges images out of the raw material of sense impressions and conveys them to the critical consciousness. Yet despite its prominence, the faculty of the imagination as it is represented in Moritz’s novel has yet to be exhaustively or conclusively discussed by scholars. Existing studies of the imagination in *Anton Reiser* are limited in two important respects. Firstly, while several scholars have remarked on the novel’s sustained attention to the categories or space and time, none has yet developed the connections between those categories and the workings of the imagination. Thus, Mark Boulby’s observations on Moritz’s representation of the power of place and time over the imagination, though perceptive, call for further development (Boulby 1979). Secondly, while scholars have devoted a great deal of attention to the imagination as a theme on the *histoire* level of the novel, they have tended to neglect it as a moment of *discours*.

The reader can be in no doubt about the prominence of the imagination as theme in *Anton Reiser* – the psychological malaise afflicting the young protagonist is unequivocally identified as “*Leiden der Einbildungskraft*” (*AR*, 88). But, as the preface to the first of the novel’s four parts makes clear, the imagination is not merely a central theme, it is a faculty of the reader’s mind, part of “*die vorstellende Kraft*”,¹ the power to make representations, that must be mobilized if he or she is to be enlightened by the protagonist’s suffering and development. It is with this aim in mind that Moritz departs from the conventional pattern of a late eighteenth-century
novel with its large cast of characters, a “große Mannigfaltigkeit der Charaktere”, because his purpose is to relate “die innere Geschichte des Menschen”. This last phrase was taken directly from Karl Friedrich Blanckenburg’s *Versuch über den Roman* (1774), a contemporary treatise which argued that the value of the novel, a genre then struggling for recognition, lay in its capacity for representing the inner life of a human individual (Pfotenhauer 1987, 96).

In the following, I will allow myself to be guided by two working assumptions. The first is that the faculty of imagination lies at the heart of Moritz’s psychological novel, and the second is that this vital yet potentially hazardous mental faculty is represented in such a way as to bring out its conditioning by environmental factors. If these assumptions are accepted as the basis of an approach to *Anton Reiser*, then it follows that an adequate reading will require a theory of the imagination that is attentive to the ways in which time and space bear upon that faculty. To be of value such a reading will need to build on previous studies of the representation of time and space, moving beyond them to show how these categories are the premises on which Moritz’s exploration of the image-making power of the mind is constructed. This, then, is my justification for deploying Bakhtin’s theory of the literary chronotope, that configuration of time and space which is “the elementary unit of literary imagination” (Keunen 2010, 35).

There exists no single authoritative definition of the chronotope for the simple reason that the term was a leitmotif that accompanied Bakhtin’s literary-historical work over decades; it was a concept that he returned to at intervals, augmenting, modifying and refining it. Bakhtin wrote most of the monograph that we know as “Forms of Time and of the Chronotope” in 1934, during a period of great interest in the genre of the novel in Russia and elsewhere, but he did not complete it until 1973,
when he added the “Concluding Remarks” as a tenth chapter (Bakhtin 1981). The picture is further complicated by the fact that Bakhtin uses “chronotope” and “motif” as synonyms, referring, for example, both to the “chronotope of the meeting” and the “motif of the meeting”.

Despite the absence of a precise definition, considerable progress has been made by scholars in elucidating the scope of the chronotope concept and its potential applications in literary scholarship, most notably at the 2008 Brussels conference “Bakhtin’s Theory of the Literary Chronotope”, the results of which were published in 2010. As Nele Bemong and Pieter Borghart remind us in their “Introduction” to the conference proceedings, although Bakhtin intended the concept primarily as a contribution to the historical typology of literary genres, it also has significance for the construction of plot (Bemong & Borghart 2010). These differences of application account for the distinction between major and minor chronotopes respectively. The minor chronotopes organize time and space over a relatively short range of the text, constructing a scene or chapter. The major chronotopes, by contrast, are those configurations of time-space that operate throughout the entire work, or a large part of it, giving it its particular character as an aesthetically-formed whole, and making it identifiable as a member of a genre. Those works of the imagination that are of hybrid character contain more than one major chronotope, combining, for example, the chronotope of the adventure novel with that of the Bildungsroman.

In his contribution to the Brussels conference proceedings, Bart Keunen employs the typology of cinematic images that Deleuze derived from his interpretation of Bergson’s philosophy of experience in an effort to think chronotopes as representations of the lived experience of time. Keunen turns his attention to the five minor chronotopes discussed by Bakhtin in the “Concluding Remarks” of his
essay, arguing that these chronotopic motifs “underline the importance of the psychologically relevant literary images in the more recent history of the novel” (Keunen 2010, 41). Because they correspond to Bergson’s durée, pure duration, or lived time, these chronotopes – in the order given by Bakhtin: the encounter on the road, the Gothic castle, the parlour or salon, the provincial town, and the threshold – are images that serve both to make history palpable and to carry an affective charge. The fact that Bakhtin draws his examples of these motifs almost exclusively from works of nineteenth-century literature indicates that he associates them with a specifically modern aesthetic experience of time.

Keunen uses the binary pairs saturation versus rarification and acceleration versus deceleration to map out the temporal and spatial parameters of Bakhtin’s five minor chronotopes, which between them express “four extreme forms of temporal experience that are frequent in nineteenth and twentieth century literature” (Keunen 2010, 43). The first binary pair, taken from the second chapter of Deleuze’s book on cinema, refers to changes in the spatial situation (Deleuze 2005, 13). At one extreme, the spatial situation may undergo little or no change, giving rise to few stimuli, a situation characterized by rarification. At the other extreme, the spatial situation may be subject to rapid change, producing new information at a great rate. The second binary pair refers to the experience of time by the observing consciousness as speeded up or slowed down, according to the rate at which information from the spatial surroundings is processed. The experience of deceleration, in which the processing of information is slowed down, may, for example indicate that consciousness is operating predominantly in the mode of memory; while acceleration, with its alertness to new information, would be characteristic of a mind operating in the mode of anticipation. When combined, these two binary pairs provide four poles representing
extremes of human temporal experience that can be summarized as follows: slowed down empty, slowed down saturated, accelerated empty, and accelerated saturated.

The provincial town, Emma Bovary’s Tostes, the example chosen by Keunen, is characterized by an experience of time-space that is slowed down and rarified. Few new objects of attention present themselves in a thoroughly familiar terrain, and consciousness works at a slow pace, ruminating on familiar impressions. The road and the salon are associated with the opposite time-space experience of acceleration and saturation. Both locations are the sites of encounter with new people and objects, a richness of stimuli that produces a corresponding quickening of consciousness, so that the mind races to catch up with the new impressions and process them.

The other two poles, speeded up saturated and slowed down saturated, also form a diametric opposition in terms of the qualities of temporal experience described by each. The Gothic castle describes a situation in which space is rarified, there is a deficit of information accompanied by a sense of threat as the mind races in anticipation of danger or sudden revelation. The example Keunen gives is the passage from Ann Radcliffe’s *The Castle of Montoni* (1794), where Emma glimpses the villain’s castle for the first time. This chronotopic structure is thus closely connected with the affection of fear.

The opposite chronotopic configuration is described by the motif of the threshold, in which an individual’s will to process new information and take decisions is in conflict with his or her indecisiveness, with “the fear to step over the threshold” (Bakhtin 1981, 248). In this case the situation involves an excess of information: the subject compares new information with remembered material, perhaps struggling to reconcile the two, before either crossing the rubicon, or failing to do so. While the chronotope of the Gothic castle is associated with the affective charge of fear, and
with anticipation, the threshold describes a temporal experience that is strongly determined by memory.

The enumeration of these examples has shown that chronotopes are images of that particular kind of temporal experience which Bergson called “durée”, each of which is defined by its particular temporal and spatial parameters, and endowed with an affective charge. It is with these examples in mind that we now turn to an analysis of the minor chronotopes in Anton Reiser.

Each of the novel’s four parts is preceded by a preface, and it is in these prefaces that we encounter a narratorial persona whose interventions are designed to steer the reader’s responses and guide interpretation. Within the narrative proper, the perspective of this authorial narrator, described by Lothar Müller as a “philosophischer Arzt” (Müller 1987, 48), alternates with the viewpoint of the young Anton Reiser in the first twenty-one years of his life. The existence alongside one another of these two perspectives lends the novel its characteristic bilateral, or dialogic, structure.

We have noted that in the first preface the narrator explains that he has dispensed with a large cast of characters, so as to avoid dividing the “vorstellende Kraft” (AR, 11), which must be concentrated if the mind’s insight into its own workings is to be sharpened. By the “vorstellende Kraft”, or the power to make representations, Moritz means both the imagination and the power of judgement. Both faculties, and not the power of judgement alone, are to be enlisted in the process of enlightenment, otherwise Moritz would have written a treatise rather than a novel. In opting for an aesthetic form, Moritz eschews a purely analytic view in favour of the holistic mode of seeing in images. The faculty of the imagination, the main object of interest, is thereby introduced: it will recur at many intervals, most strikingly in the
phrase that describes the psychological malaise of its protagonist: “Leiden der Einbildungskraft” (AR, 88). This phrase, “the sufferings of the imagination”, does not have for us the resonance it bore for contemporary readers versed in developments in the field of empirical psychology. In the first place, the diagnosis contained in this phrase is a clear token of the weight given to the imagination as theme; its insistent repetition shows that Moritz wishes his reader to see Anton Reiser’s troubles not as a maladie imaginaire, but as a very real disorder of a particular mental faculty. Secondly, the phrase would have alerted contemporaries to the intention to deal with a province of the human mind deemed to exist between the senses and the intelligence – a sphere of intense interest to practitioners of the discipline of anthropology, the so-called “philosophische Ärzte”, in the latter part of the eighteenth century. This interest had already been a feature of the faculty psychology developed in the early part of the century by Leibniz and Christian Wolff. For Christian Wolff and his students, Johann Christoph Gottsched and Alexander Baumgarten, imagination was one of the lower faculties (facultates inferiores). But the tendency from rationalism towards empiricism in the eighteenth century brought with it a revaluation of the senses and the lower faculties. The rehabilitation of the senses that accompanied Enlightenment empiricism gave rise to heightened interest in that part of the mental apparatus that was involved in receiving and arranging sense impressions, and in conveying them to the upper faculties of intelligence and reason. Indeed, since the proper concern of anthropology was the interaction between mind and body, the commercium mentis et corporis, the imagination as a region deemed to exist between these poles had to be a source of profound interest.

That part of the imagination lying closest to the senses, and receiving impressions directly from them, and frequently identified as “Phantasie”, was
regarded as passive, whereas the part of the imagination in closest proximity to the faculty of reason, the imagination proper, was seen as active. Thus, Voltaire’s 1765 article “Imagination” in the Encyclopédie distinguishes between imagination passive and imagination active (Voltaire 2013, vol. 8, 560-564). The former is possessed by both man and animals. The latter is governed by the operation of “réflexion” and “jugement”, and it is a key characteristic of artistic genius. Contemporary English discourse made an equivalent distinction between “trivial” fancy and “solemn” imagination (Beattie 1783, 87). The rationalist philosopher Christian Wolff, whose Deutsche Metaphysik influenced German philosophers and aestheticians throughout the eighteenth century, was prepared to allow the imagination a cognitive function so long as it remained governed by such laws of nature as the principle of sufficient reason (Wolff 2009). The Deutsche Metaphysik plays a characteristically ambivalent part in Anton Reiser’s diet of philosophical reading. By acknowledging the contribution to cognition made by the imagination, Wolff had broken with the Cartesian disavowal of the senses and imagination in favour of reason.

When considering the status of the faculty of imagination in Late Enlightenment discourse it is therefore important to avoid identifying it as the “other of reason” – a tendency evident in some scholarship. In his otherwise magisterial survey of Moritz’s psychological novel, Lothar Müller risks encouraging just such a view when he presents the relationship between “Denkkraft” and “Einbildungskraft” in Anton Reiser in terms of a straightforward conflict. There are ample grounds for seeing Anton Reiser’s imaginative life as a hindrance to his intellectual development; and the narrator certainly encourages us to do so. Those scenes in which the imagination appears as the opponent of reason, as a dark and troublesome province of mind to be illumined as far as possible by introspective self-analysis, far outnumber
those in which it is the engine of self-development and creativity. Thus, the young Anton’s boyhood fantasy of emulating his namesake, St Anthony, which begins innocuously enough with daydreams of inhabiting a desert a few paces from his parents’ home, culminates in the boy pricking himself with needles in a self-harming effort to reproduce the ascetic life of an anchorite. Here, as on so many other occasions in Anton’s young life, reading is the source of these destructive fantasies; and Moritz’s condemnation of misdirected and indiscriminate reading as Lesesucht is fundamental to his critique of imagination.

That critique can, however, obscure the role of the imagination in the development of Moritz’s protagonist. The internal differentiation into three modes of imagination made, for example, in the Zedler Universal-Lexikon, with its distinction between ‘sinnliche”, “ingenieuse”, and “judicieuse” imaginative representations, demonstrates that the relationship between the imagination and reason was not seen as a matter of mere opposition (Zedler 2003, vol. 8, 533-538). Indeed, each of these three modes could be seen as developmental stages, marking the maturing individual’s path from sensuality to reason. Reprising an idea from medieval faculty psychology, Roger Bacon separated human science into three divisions, each of which expressed a particular aspect of the human spirit: history derived from memory, poetry from the imagination, and philosophy from intelligence. This hierarchy could also be used to describe the progression of the individual from sensuality via the imagination to philosophy as the highest expression of the human spirit. In Addison’s influential essay On the Pleasures of the Imagination, serialized in The Spectator in 1712 – an important source for Voltaire’s Encyclopédie article – the delights furnished by the imagination are less hazardous than those of the senses, but less subtle than the pleasures of understanding. According to Addison, the enjoyment
provided by art avoids the dangers of sensuality; and it is less strenuous than the exertions of the spirit.

What is above all at issue in Moritz’s psychological novel is, then, the imagination; and this faculty is represented in such a way as to show the factors, material, social, and environmental, bearing upon it. Mark Boulby’s indispensable biography calls *Anton Reiser* “the outstanding, and the most unsentimentalized, portrayal of lower class life in German literature of the eighteenth century” (Boulby 1979, 45). Referring to “that remarkable study of environmental conditioning that is the great achievement of the book”, Boulby rightly observes that “Moritz’s understanding of economic oppression is purely subjective, his insight into political structures superficial. But he has an astonishing perception of the psychological determinants of time and place” (Boulby 1979, 45-46).

In *Anton Reiser* the situation of the protagonist acquires a high degree of concreteness as a result of the sharp delineation of the contours of time and space. Historical time is inextricably bound up with the development of the protagonist from infancy to his twenty-first year. The history of eighteenth-century Germany makes its presence felt in the form of the Seven Years’ War, which compels Anton’s mother to avoid a possible siege of Hameln by taking her infant son to live in the country for two years while her husband is away soldiering. But the century is manifested primarily in the literary milestones of Anton Reiser’s career as a reader, from Johann Gottfried Schnabel’s desert-island novel *Wunderliche Fata einiger See-Fahrer*, better known as *Insel Felsenburg* (1731-43), the book that stokes his early enthusiasm for reading, to Goethe’s sensational *Die Leiden des jungen Werthers*, published in 1774, at just the right time to inflame the eighteen-year-old Anton Reiser. But historical time is also manifested in the personalities encountered by Moritz / Reiser. There is
his employer, the Pietist hat maker, Johann Simon Lobenstein of Brunswick; the rhetorically gifted pastor at the Brüdernkirche in Brunswick, Johann Ludwig Paulmann; Moritz’s schoolfellow, August Wilhelm Iffland, one of the leading actors of the Goethezeit; or Madame Guyon, the Catholic mystic whose voluminous interpretations of Scripture became part of the canon of Pietism.

Such is the degree of historical concreteness in Anton Reiser that the work has often been taken as an important reference point for social and cultural histories of eighteenth-century Germany. In the introduction to his translation for Penguin Classics of Anton Reiser, Ritchie Robertson calls the novel “a picture of everyday German life that has no parallel in the literature of the day” (Moritz 1997, vii).

In common with many Late Enlightenment thinkers, including Kant, Moritz regarded time and space as a posteriori intuitions (Anschauungen) coming from the outside world, on which all other representations depend. This view is most clearly expressed by Moritz in one of a series of essays entitled “Sprache in psychologischer Rücksicht”, published in the Magazin für Erfahrungsseelenkunde, the collection of psychological case studies that Moritz edited for most of the decade of its existence between 1783 and 1793.


Unlike Kant in Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781), however, Moritz did not believe that time and space were “pure intuitions” (reine Anschauungen), devoid of any affective content. Instead, as we can see in Anton Reiser, Moritz’s view of time and space bears a strikingly resemblance to Bakhtin’s opinion that these categories are
“forms of the most immediate reality”, and imbued with emotional qualities by those experiencing them (Bakhtin 1981, 85).

There is plentiful evidence in Anton Reiser that Moritz regarded these forms of reality as the basic constituents of imaginative activity. In the novel we learn that while Anton’s earliest glimpses of meadows, a cornfield climbing a shrub-topped hill, thickly wooded inclines, the proximity of level and sloping ground, are blended with his most pleasant thoughts, they also form the basis for the deceiving images created by his imagination.

Nevertheless, the activity of the imagination is not wholly disqualified, or as unequivocally associated with the “Leiden der Einbildungskraft” as the didactic emphasis of the authorial narrator might incline us to believe. At times it participates in a symbolizing process by which the young Reiser anticipates the future by making representations. These representations do not at first amount to well defined and attainable goals; they have rather the status of wishes, whose fulfilment he desires and earnestly expects. This symbolizing activity is evident at the point where Anton, now a scholarship boy sustained by free meals and the charity of Prince Carl of Mecklenburg, is about to make the transition from the Neustädter Schule to the Gymnasium, located in a two-story timbered house in the Old Town of Hanover:

So bestanden von seiner Kindheit auf seine eigentlichen Vergnügen größtenteils in der Einbildungskraft, und er wurde dadurch einigermaßen für den Mangel der wirklichen Jugendfreuden, die andre in vollem Maße genießen, schadlos gehalten. – Dicht neben der Schule führten zwei lange Gänge nach den nebeneinander gebauten Priesterhäusern. Die machten ihm einen so ehrwürdigen Prospekt, daß das Bild davon nebst dem Schulgebäude Tag und Nacht das herrschende in seiner Seele war – und dann die Benennung, hohe Schule, welche unter gemeinen Leuten im Gebrauch war, und der Ausdruck, hohe Schüler, welchen er ebenfalls oft gehört hatte, machten, daß ihm seine Bestimmung, diese Schule zu besuchen, immer wichtiger und größer vorkam. (AR, 144).

A number of different aspects of Moritz’s understanding of the making of mental images, their effects and functions, are disclosed here. Images are made by the
association of ideas that are similar or contiguous in space or time, in a manner according to the rules of Wolffian faculty psychology.10 The imaginative faculty possesses a compensatory function, exerts influence on the emotions and upon the will, and plays a role in anticipating things to come. Each of these aspects is registered in eighteenth-century theories ranging from Addison to Sulzer.

An even more remarkable example of the power of the imagination to condense an image into a striking symbol occurs during Anton Reiser’s miserable time spent as an apprentice to the hatmaker Lobenstein in Brunswick. One of his only consolations are the impressive sermons of Pastor Paulmann which Reiser hears every Sunday without fail in the Brüdernkirche. A single phrase in one of Paulmann’s sermons, “die Höhen der Vernunft” (AR, 95), instantly associates the ideas of the choir gallery in the church where the organ is situated, and then, by the rule of contiguity, the organ itself whose inner workings Reiser longs to see. But this is not the end of the associative train of thought, which leads to the remembered image of the tower in Hanover with its imposing clockface and the lofty gallery where the town orchestra plays. This image is succeeded by a spatially contiguous idea, that of the inner workings of the clocktower, and by their effect, the wondrous pealing of the bells. Paulmann’s phrase thus sets in train a process by which absent objects are made present to the mind’s eye, and imbued with an affective charge, a textbook example of “die Vorstellung solcher Dinge, die nicht zugegen sind”, in Wolff’s memorable phrase from the Deutsche Metaphysik (DM, para. 235).

The two examples just given should serve to illustrate the grip of place on the mental life of Anton Reiser: they are images of place, given symbolic significance, but they are perhaps not chronotopes, understood as images of time-space in which experience takes on substance, and subjectivity is, as it were, fleshed-out, acquiring a
specific density and palpability. According to Moritz’s *Kinderlogik* of 1786, a high degree of place-dependency in the workings of the imagination is to be associated with the mental activity of children. This assertion is, however, problematic from the point of view of upholding the superiority of the mature imagination, which must by contrast appear both less place-dependent and less vivid.

I now want to suggest three minor chronotopes that seem to me most characteristic of the ways in which Moritz’s protagonist – or hero, to use a more Bakhtinian term – experiences space and time, an experience mediated by the activity of his imagination. I shall call these the chronotopes of the walled town, circumambulation and the excursion, without intending to suggest that these are the only minor chronotopes present in this work.

Walled towns were still among the most distinctive features of the landscape of the Holy Roman Empire in the late eighteenth century, although with the onset of the nineteenth century the medieval walls were beginning to make way for parks and new suburbs, as towns acquired new functions and their populations grew. *Anton Reiser* is a novel confined for its first three parts “to the labyrinthine streets and claustrophobic rooms and garrets of the poorer quarters of Brunswick and Hanover” (Boulby 1973, 111), before opening out in the fourth part into the wider world traversed by the hero in his wanderings, an opening with developmental consequences, as we shall see. The townscape is a setting of the greatest significance for Moritz’s hero. It is the scene of his fleeting joys and more enduring disappointments, of his activity and his languishing; its painstaking evocation as a life-world subsisting at a particular moment in European history is the source of the novel’s value as cultural-historical commentary. Temporally, the walled town is dominated by the rhythms of the trades and professions carried on within it. Spatially,
it is separated from the surrounding countryside by its walls, with gates regulating the exchange between inside and out. It is internally organized by its streets and squares, but also by the compartmentalization of its inhabitants into different estates, made visible by the sumptuary laws prescribing the distinctive clothing of each.

Let us turn our attention to the components of Anton’s lived experience as a young apprentice in the town of Brunswick. In spatial terms his existence is hemmed in by the walls of the house-cum-workshop of the hatmaker Lobenstein, curbed and constrained by the demands of work, his employer’s rules, and his official status as artisan. Only on Sundays is he at liberty to accompany his friend August to hear Pastor Paulmann preach at the Brüdernkirche, or to undertake solitary walks in the surrounding countryside. From the point of view of time, Anton’s life is dominated by the rhythms of the workshop, where the mealtimes punctuating the hours of monotonous work appear in the mind’s eye like bright oases. Time is lived by Anton and his fellow artisans in cycles. The daily round has its moments of respite; the cycle of the week is relieved by Sunday; and the wheel of the year is studded with festivities, Easter, Whitsun and Christmas, which further relieve the tedium. Beyond these the significant prospects in the artisan’s life are the completion of the apprenticeship, and the beginning of a new life-phase as a journeyman. The overall impression is of privation, scarcity and eventlessness: we are reminded of the chronotope of the provincial town with its rarification and deceleration, but supplemented by the aspect of recurrence. That is not to say that Moritz is sparing with his description of town-life. On the contrary, the environment of Brunswick is evoked in a wealth of material details, from the nitric acid fumes in the Lobenstein workshop to the tasks of washing, carding and dying the animal skins processed there. While privation and scarcity characterize Anton’s impressions of his environment,
they are not features of a narratorial description that is proto-Naturalist in its comprehensiveness.

Following approving remarks on the wise order of things that has endowed the artisan’s arduous and tedious life with its breaks and distinct phases, the narrator observes that “Antons Seele war durch seine romanhaften Ideen einmal zu diesem Takt verstimmt” (AR, 61). That is to say, the hero’s attunement to cyclical artisan time is precarious, because his imagination, nourished by reading, is working at a rate out of step with the tempo of his surroundings.

The experience of time in the walled town is not, of course, confined to artisan time with its cyclical nature and monotony. In this life-world the experience of temporal flow is differentiated subtly by social estate and function. As a Primaner at the Gymnasium in Hanover, Anton is still oppressed by the tedium and repetitiveness of his life; but the evenness of the temporal flow is also disturbed by social, political and cultural events that offer themselves to the imagination as developmental landmarks, or rungs on the ladder of a career. One such is the address that Anton is selected to give on the birthday of the Queen of England, the protectress of Hanover, and the sister of Moritz’s patron, Prince Carl von Mecklenburg, on 18 January 1776. Another is Reiser’s discovery of Goethe’s Werther in the summer of 1774, an encounter as ambivalent as that with Wolff’s Metaphysik because it simultaneously stokes the flames of fantasy and sharpens the hero’s powers of judgement. It does so by confirming those incipient reflections on space, “seine Idee vom Nahen und Fernen”, that Anton had sought to develop in his never-completed “Aufsatz über die Liebe zum Romanhaften” (AR, 283).

The prevailing impression that the apprentice in Brunswick and the scholarship boy in Hanover has of his existence within the chronotope of the walled
town is that of fragmentation or dismemberment, Moritz’s word is “Zerstückbarkeit” 
(*AR*, 253). The impression made on him when he witnesses the execution of four 
criminals before the gates of Hanover brings home to him the vulnerability of 
physical being. But the incident is also set in the context of a melancholy fugue of 
thought on the body as a windowless monad, inescapably isolating each individual 
from his fellows, musings accompanied by feelings of smallness and insignificance.

This manner of thinking has its counterpart in a persistent longing for 
wholeness and integration. Such longing is the motor for Anton’s aesthetic activity, 
but it finds its fulfilment less frequently in such activity than it does in unsought 
epiphanies. The most striking of these occurs near the end of Anton’s apprenticeship 
in Brunswick. Out on a solitary walk one spring day, Anton suddenly finds himself 
standing at that very spot in the country road where he had stood with his father a year 
and a half before, gazing at the towers of Brunswick, the gate and the sentry on the 
ramparts, before entering the strange town to begin his apprenticeship.

Er konnte sich nicht enthalten, hinaus zu gehn, und die mit Weiden bepflanzte breite 
Heerstraße zu verfolgen, die er damals gekommen war. Sonderbare Empfindungen 
entwickelten sich dabei in seiner Seele. – Sein ganzes Leben von jener Zeit an – da er 
zuerst die Schildwache auf dem hohen Walle hin und hergehend erblickte, und sich 
allerlei Vorstellungen machte, wie nun wohl die Stadt inwendig aussehen, und wie 
das L[obenstein]sche Haus beschaffen sein würde? – stand jetzt auf einmal in seiner 
Erinnerung da. – Es war ihm, als ob er aus einem Traume erwachte – und nun wieder 
auf dem Flecke wäre, wo der Traum anhube; – alle die abwechselnden Szenen seines 
Lebens, die er diese anderthalb Jahre hindurch in B[raunschweig] gehabt hatte, 
drängten sich dicht ineinander, und die einzelnen Bilder schienen sich nach einem 
größern Maßstabe, den seine Seele auf einmal erhielt, zu verkleinern. –
(*AR*, 89-90)

This extraordinary occurence of *déjà-vu*, in which the return to a familiar place 
triggers an imaginative process whereby the protagonist’s blinkered view of his 
oppressive circumstances is briefly supplanted by an overview of his existence, has 
been aptly characterized by Helmut Pfotenhauer as a case of Proustian *mémoire*
involontaire (Pfotenhauer 1987, 99-101). It might be objected that, if Pfotenhauer is right, the participating faculty is in this case memory, not imagination. But the distinction is unimportant in an eighteenth-century context that regarded these as filiated lower faculties. Thus, while Voltaire in his Encyclopédie article reminds us that the nine muses (the mythical embodiments of imagination) are the daughters of Mnemosyne, Christian Wolff takes the opposite view, subordinating memory to the activity of the imagination. In any case, the strong involvement with mnemonic material suggests that Anton’s experience at the gates of Brunswick is similar to that described by Bakhtin’s minor chronotope of the threshold.

It is difficult to reconstruct Moritz’s view of the relationships among the faculties, for he is by no means a systematic thinker, and during his editorship of the Magazin für Erfahrungsseelenkunde he veered back and forth between rationalistic and empirical psychology. Apart from remarks in the previously mentioned essay in the series “Sprache in psychologischer Rücksicht”, in the Kinderlogik, and in Anton Reiser, the following observation in the pamphlet Ideal einer vollkommenen Zeitung offers a useful clue to the relationship between analysis and synthesis in Moritz’s thought: “Denn nur das Einzelne ist wirklich, das Zusammengefaßte besteht größtenteils in der Einbildung” (Moritz 1784, 12). For Moritz, analysis evidently takes priority over synthesis. Nevertheless, the imagination appears to fulfil for him a synthetic role that complements the analytical work of the intelligence; it is the locus of that synthesizing activity without which it is impossible to perceive meaningful wholes, including the whole of life itself.

At times Anton Reiser experiences visions of wholeness and integration that are not the mere flashes of mémoire involontaire, but the results of deliberate aesthetic activity. His solitary night walks on the town ramparts of Hanover deserve to be seen
in this category. As in the previous episode of déja-vu, the spatial setting is significant; in both cases the holistic vision takes place in and is stimulated by a liminal space, the town boundary. In the first case the hero’s spatial position at the gates of Brunswick also marks a temporal threshold; it is the place, which, when revisited, recalls to the protagonist the transition between childhood and the time of his apprenticeship, and what we might call the affective content, the feelings of anticipation that accompanied his former standing at that spot. The complexity and self-reflexivity of the mental activity at this juncture can hardly be overstated. What takes place here is an imaginative event which summons up a past effort of the imagination to anticipate the future. The temporal circuit briefly closes in a true moment of apperception – an interval pregnant not merely with the memory of a past situation, but with the hero’s cognizance of his own perception of that past situation.

Let us now return to consider Anton Reiser’s solitary night time walks along the walls of Hanover. These circuits are motivated by feelings of confinement in the cramped and noisy butcher’s house where he has his lodgings, but they are also deliberate efforts at psycho-physical therapy in which the image making power of the mind plays its part.

Wenn er dann auf den Straßen, die an den Wall grenzten, in den Häusern Licht angesteckt sahe, und sich nun dachte, daß in jeder erleuchteten Stube, deren in einem Hause oft so viele waren, eine Familie, oder sonst eine Gesellschaft von Menschen, oder ein einzelner Mensch lebte, und daß eine solche Stube also in dem Augenblick die Schicksale und das Leben und die Gedanken eines solchen Menschen, oder einer solchen Gesellschaft von Menschen in sich faßte; und daß er auch nun nach dem vollendeten Spaziergange in eine solche Stube zurückkehren würde, wo er gleichsam hingebannt, und wo der eigentliche Fleck seines Daseins wäre; so brachte dies bei ihm zuerst eine sonderbare demütigende Empfindung hervor, als sei nun sein Schicksal, unter diesem unendlichen verwirrten Haufen sich einander durchkreuzender, menschlicher Schicksale gleichsam verloren, und werde dadurch klein und unbefriedend gemacht. – Dann erhoben aber auch eben diese Lichter in den einzelnen Stuben in den Häusern am Walle, zuweilen seinen Geist wieder, wenn er einen Überblick des Ganzen daraus schöpfte, und sich aus seiner eigenen kleinen einengenden Sphäre, wodurch er sich unter allen diesen im Leben unbemerkten und unausgezeichneten Bewohnern der Erde mitverlor, herausdachte, und sich ein besonderes ausgezeichnetes Schicksal prophezeite, wovon die süße Vorstellung,
In terms of the lived experience of time and space, Anton’s circular strolls do not correspond to the chronotope of the walled town proper. Within that chronotope, being is experienced in terms of fragmentation: space is privative, and time repetitive. The wall, by contrast, marks a threshold between the chronotope of the walled town, and the world beyond the walls, which is, as we shall see, endowed by the imagination with its own spatio-temporal characteristics. Walking along the elevated platform of the wall, Anton is able to survey the scenes of his mundane toil and woes, his consciousness quickened to match his rapid steps. The initial response of the imagination is to process the sense impressions analytically, isolating individual elements from the view, and producing the associated idea of monad-like isolation, with its accompanying affective charge of a “demütigende Empfindung”. But the imagination then switches from the analytic mode to the synthetic, fusing the individual points into an integral image that provides an overview of the whole. This whole is, of course, not objectively given, nor is it an idea that the hero has ever had before. Instead it is something entirely new, a construction of the productive side of the imagination, a fiction, or, to use Wolff’s phrase, a product of the “Krafft zu erdichten” (Wolff 2009, 242). I propose to call the lived experience of time and space that accompanies Anton Reiser’s creation of such fictions the chronotope of circumambulation. On this occasion, the integral image produced by this aesthetic activity is not sustained for long; it yields to the fugue on the theme of Zerstückbarkeit mentioned earlier. But this stroll on the walls of Hanover inaugurates a habit of circumambulation that is both “ein schönes Mittel gegen seine schwermütige Laune” (AR, 307), and a stimulus to poetic creativity. The spatial

indem er dann mit schnellen Schritten vorwärts ging, ihn aufs neue mit Hoffnung und Mut belebte. (AR, 251-252)
content of this “Umgehung des Ortes” derives in part from the status of the town wall as a threshold marking the distinction between the “dicht ineinandergebaute Stadt” and the “ländliche offene Natur”, a contrast that produces a “lebhafte Wirkung” (AR, 308) in the imagination of the promeneur. Furthermore, the chronotope of circumambulation resembles Bakhtin’s threshold chronotope temporally to the extent that it marks a heavy involvement with remembered material, and gives rise to anticipations and hopes. The imagination is thus simultaneously engaged in its retrospective and forward-looking aspects, and the result is a requited moment in which the hero’s memories and anticipations enter into his consciousness of the present, enriching it with interest and with the fullness of time.

The chronotope of circumambulation, which is distinct from that of the walled town, has its counterpart in the chronotope of the excursion. Numerous activities of Moritz’s hero, and the lived experience associated with them may aptly be characterized as excursive. The most obvious of these is his travel: there is the long journey to Bremen, undertaken on a whim, from which moment he begins to live up to his name – Reiser, traveller. There are night wanderings in the environs of Hanover – alone and in company – and the long march to Erfurt in futile quest of an acting career. Together these excursions form a pattern of dromomania that soon became a byword in German literature. But, viewed chronotopically, Reiser’s Lesesucht and his addiction to the theatre are also excursive. The hero’s “unwiderstehliche Begierde zum Reisen” that consumes him following his “abenteuerliche Wallfahrt nach Bremen” is closely associated with “der Gedanke, sich aus allen seinen bisherigen Verhältnissen [...] hinaus zu versetzen” (AR, 344). At this very time, “die glänzendste Schauspielerepoche in Deutschland” (AR, 344), Reiser entertains vain hopes of being cast in the title role of a production of Goethe’s Clavigo. The related activities of
theatre-going and wandering are here brought into close association in such a way as to underline emphatically their excursive nature.

On actually departing Hanover and seeing the town’s towers recede in the distance the hero’s feelings are of elation: his breast swells, the entire world seems to lie open before him, and his mind is filled with a thousand prospects. The opening of the fourth part of the novel is focalized from the hero’s perspective. Here, the sense is powerfully conveyed of an escape from oppressive circumstances: “er dachte sich den Faden seines bisherigen Lebens gleichsam wie abgeschnitten – er war nun aus allen Verwickelungen auf einmal befreit” (AR, 372). If the chronotope of circumambulation is heavily involved with memory, then the excursive chronotope is decisively oriented towards the present, and, to a degree, the future. In any event, it stands under the sign of forgetfulness, of Lethe. The past, insofar as it features in this mode of being, serves merely as a foil for fantasies of rebirth and glorious regeneration in the eyes of those for whom the hero has effectively died by leaving the scene of his quotidian existence. Time and space are experienced in wandering as the wave of the present moment, bearing the hero passively along with it, and presenting new scenes to his gaze. Both of our chronotopes, circumambulation and excursion, describe modes of being associated with certain kinds of aesthetic value; but, more than that, they are modes by which the hero produces his own aesthetic value. The value with which the hero endows his own life in the excursive chronotope can be called the value of open-endedness, of unlimited possibilities, or of indeterminacy. As he traverses the world beyond the walls, the open lands between Hanover and Erfurt, Reiser amuses himself by playing out the numerous theatrical roles encountered by him as an avid reader and theatre-goer. At first he does so inwardly, but, increasingly carried away by the force of his imagination, he soon finds
himself declaiming the parts of Beaumarchais and Guelfo, of Hamlet, Lear, and Othello in the open field. The ecstatic state of “Trunkenheit” (*AR*, 379) that accompanies this role-playing clarifies for us the attraction that the excursive chronotope and its concrete manifestations as travel and theatre hold for Anton Reiser. For him the value of this chronotope lies in the means it offers to savour the openness of his own existence to the future, undetermined by any defined role. And indeed, apart from the literary roles mentioned, Reiser toys with the idea of becoming a farmer, a soldier, or even a monk. In none of these cases is the vocation itself important; rather, it is the lived experience of becoming that endows the roles with value. At this stage in his development, the young Anton Reiser craves the opportunity to live out life’s inner and outer possibilities to the full, and it is this living out of the manifold possibilities of existence that constitutes the aesthetic value to the hero of the excursive chronotope. Bakhtin employs the term “life’s fabular possibilities” to describe precisely this kind of aesthetic worth in the context of his discussion of the different kinds of biographical value by which a hero can organize his actions and his life (*Bakhtin* 1990, 155). The values by which a biographical hero is guided and those to which the biographer subscribes are, of course, in principle quite separate and distinct, though they may coincide. This observation leads me to the final question that I intend to pursue in this essay, that of the relationship between author and hero in Moritz’s psychological novel.

The relationship between author and hero goes to the heart of what Bakhtin calls “architectonics”, the study of those processes by means of which wholes are constructed by manipulating relations among their constituent parts. The specific case of architectonics with which Bakhtin is concerned in his early essays on literature is that of the aesthetic event, understood in the broad sense as the event or act of
perception. Thus, when Bakhtin refers to aesthetics he has in mind not the technical
debate about what makes an artwork beautiful or sublime, but the event of sense-
perception, a sense authorized etymologically by the Greek *aisthesis*. Bakhtin’s basic
assumption is that every act of perception requires a particular point of view. We are
able to perceive by virtue of the fact that each one of us occupies a unique and
irreplaceable position in space. The unique view of the world embodied by every
human individual is what Bakhtin terms the individual’s “excess of seeing”, a
situation that he illustrates by the following example:

> When I contemplate a whole human being who is situated outside and over against
me, our concrete, actually experienced horizons do not coincide. For at each given
moment, regardless of the position and the proximity to me of this other human being
whom I am contemplating, I shall always see and know something that he, from his
place outside and over against me, cannot see himself: parts of his body that are
inaccessible to whose own gaze (his head, his face and its expression), the world
behind his back, and a whole series of objects and relations, which in any of our
mutual relations are accessible to me but not to him. (Bakhtin 1990, 22-23)

This existential situation is the basis of Bakhtin’s thinking about aesthetic activity in
general, and the composition of the literary artwork in particular. In both cases the
aesthetic event involves my perceiving another human being who necessarily stands
outside my space and over against me. My “excess of seeing” is the starting point for
filling in the horizon of the other human being, ascribing values to him or her, and
taking up a position with respect to those attributed values. This involves in the first
place entering into the life of the other by an imaginative act of empathy, and,
secondly, returning to my own position, from which I complete the knowledge gained
from the empathetic imagining of the other person’s situation. It is only on returning
to my own position to complete this knowledge with knowledge exterior to the other’s
situation, and available only to me, that the aesthetic act takes place. The aesthetic act
consists, therefore, in a twofold movement: an act of imagination that brings me into
the sphere of the other’s consciousness, and an act of completion, whereby I return to
my own position to consummate my image of the other’s consciousness with elements
from my own. These elements by means of which I consummate the material obtained
by projecting myself into the other’s consciousness are given by the exteriority of my
position with respect to the other: that is to say the elements are transgredient to the
world of the other’s consciousness.¹⁴

It is important that the author as a constitutive moment of a literary work is not
misunderstood as the historical person, in our case Karl Philipp Moritz, the writer of
the novel, but as that instance within the work whose consciousness encompasses the
consciousness of the hero or heroes. Ordinarily such an instance has to be inferred. It
may be thought of as an “implied author”; but in Anton Reiser it is given flesh and
blood, as it were, in the figure of the authorial narrator. The consciousness embodied
by this narrator is transgredient to that of the hero. It comprehends the hero’s
situatedness and the directionality of his existence in a way that the hero himself
cannot from within his own limited horizon. Regardless of whether the authorial
instance is manifest, or has to be inferred, the relationship between the author and the
hero, that other whose life and consciousness are encompassed by the author’s
“excess of seeing” organizes each and every literary artwork. Indeed, for Bakhtin the
relationship to the axiological, or value-related, category of the other is “the
organizing power in all aesthetic forms” (Bakhtin 1990, 189). The purpose of that
relationship is to consummate the hero: that is, to concentrate and collect the hero in
his entirety, a whole that is by definition not visible to the hero himself; and to justify
the hero’s existence not in terms of the hero’s own actions and achievements, or the
meaning he reads into his own life, but with reference to values that are transgredient
to that existence.
This consummation can only come from outside the moment of the hero, since the hero can never be consummated by or for himself; instead, he can only be consummated by another’s act of perception, and completed for that other. The hero can never view his own existence as completed for the simple reason that it is impossible to live a life from within that particular existence unless it is unconsummated. In order to have freedom of action the hero must be open to himself and experience his life not as something finalized, but as something emerging, something always in excess and ahead of his being at any given moment.

Because they represent separate standpoints or positions, it is useful to think of the moments of the author and of the hero as separate chronotopes. In the case of our novel, the author chronotope is not, admittedly, explicitly defined in terms of time and space. Yet it is apparent that the author occupies a slice of time-space, an Archimedean vantage point from which it is possible to survey that of his hero.

The distinction between the author and hero chronotopes is most visibly marked by the different aesthetic values associated with each, though it is necessary to recognize that the distinction is not categorical, but one of degree. Certainly, the author does not yearn to live out life’s “fabular” possibilities as the nineteen-year-old Reiser does during his wanderings beyond the walls. But that is not to say that the author has repudiated biographical value of the adventurous-heroic kind, with its grounding in the will to have significance in the life of others. The author’s position is transgressient to that of the hero; but it does not contain any transgressient elements that are not in principle available to the hero. Because the author with his work is bringing to fruition that which is embryonically present in the life of the hero, we cannot speak in the case of Anton Reiser of an absolute breach or rupture separating the chronotope of the hero from that of the author. The authorial narrator is critical of
the values held by Anton Reiser. But the criticism resembles that of a teacher who, rather than exasperatedly expecting his pupil already to have learned it all, is keenly sensitive to the environmental determinants acting to constrain the pupil’s horizon.

That the difference in aesthetic values is one of degree is apparent from Reiser’s attempts to keep track of his own thought processes by setting them down in writing. The first of these involves the hero keeping a diary while attending the Hanover Gymnasium, and it fails because of an over-concentration on minutiae and a failure to develop the connection between outward events and inner life. Near the end of his time in Hanover, Reiser begins to reflect on the capacity of works of literature to impart lustre to distant places and objects, and to analyse the grip exerted by such images on his own thoughts. The hero is at this juncture beginning to acquire an insight into the manner in which objects and places impinge upon his imagination. It is his intention to develop these ideas in an essay on the charm of the novellesque ("Liebe zum Romanhaften", AR, 282), and to publish the work in the Hanoverische Magazin. The plan is, characteristically, not brought to fruition, but the episode shows a hero grappling with the interplay between literary representations and ideas of place, and gratified to find his ideas on proximity and distance corroborated by his reading of Goethe’s Werther.

The hero is at this point beginning to bring an aesthetic category ("das Romanhafte") to bear on his reflections on existence, in a way that indicates a dawning awareness of the possibility of choosing among different kinds of life-organizing biographical value. This awareness is only incipient and is not actualized as a deliberate choice of one kind of value over another, but it represents a shift in the direction of the author chronotope, that Archimedean point, occupied by the narrator, which is of course ultimately inaccessible to the hero within his chronotope. In the
preface to the third part of the novel the narrator describes the hero’s period of wanderings beyond the walls, the interval between his quitting Hanover and his brief enrolment as a student of theology at the University of Erfurt, as “der eigentliche Roman seines Lebens” (AR, 230). The phrase stems from an ironic outside perspective on what is experienced from the inside as the value of life’s fabular possibilities. When the reader encounters the hero’s phrase, “die Liebe zum Romanhaften”, he or she is reminded of the narrator’s earlier ironic remark, with the result that the word “Roman” forms a conceptual link between the differently-situated consciousnesses of hero and author, the former in its limitations, and the latter with its ampler scope.

What has perhaps most impressed critics ranging from Mark Boulby to Ritchie Robertson about Anton Reiser is the exhaustive and uncompromising evocation of circumstances. For Moritz, as for Bakhtin, situatedness in a circumstance bounded by time and space is the basic datum of human existence. We have seen how, for Bakhtin, the fact of situatedness is the condition of possibility of all aesthetic activity, but its significance extends beyond the aesthetic domain, and into the ethical, since it is through the knowledge of this datum that the character of our life as task is disclosed.

No chronotopic reading of Anton Reiser can afford to neglect the contribution made by the theatre motif to the evocation of circumstances. These circumstances are constructed as much by the gazes of others as they are by the material and intellectual conditions whose realistic enumeration has been justly praised by critics. I wish to cite the following lengthy passage, because I believe it encapsulates all aspects of the significance that the theatre holds for Anton Reiser:

Da es Sommer wurde, verreiste der Rektor auf einige Wochen, und er blieb nun während der Zeit allein in dessen Hause zurück, wo er die Zeit zu Hause ziemlich
vergnügt zubrachte, indem er sich aus der Bibliothek des Rektors einiger Bücher zum Lesen bediente, und unter anderem auf Moses Mendelssohns Schriften und die Literaturbriefe verfiel, woraus er sich damals zuerst Exzerpte machte. –

Insbesondere zog er sich alles aus, was das Theater anging, denn diese Idee war schon jetzt die herrschende in seinem Kopfe, und gleichsam schon der Keim zu allen seinen künftigen Widerwärtigkeiten.

Durch das Deklamieren in Sekunda war sie zuerst lebhaft in ihm erwacht, und hatte die Phantasie des Predigens allmählich aus seinem Kopf verdrängt – der Dialog auf dem Theater bekam mehr Reize für ihn, als der immerwährende Monolog auf der Kanzel – Und dann konnte er auf dem Theater alles sein, wozu er in der wirklichen Welt nie Gelegenheit hatte – und was er doch so oft zu sein wünschte – großmütig, wohltätig, edel, standhaft, über alles Demütigende und Erniedrigende erhaben – wie schmachtete er, diese Empfindungen, die ihm so natürlich zu sein schienen, und die er doch stets entbehren mußte, nun einmal durch ein kurzes, täuschendes Spiel der Phantasie in sich wirklich zu machen.

Das war es ohngefähr, was ihm die Idee vom Theater schon damals so reizend machte – Er fand sich hier gleichsam mit allen seinen Empfindungen und Gesinnungen wieder, welche in die wirkliche Welt nicht paßten. – Das Theater deuchte ihm eine natürlichere und angemessnere Welt, als die wirkliche Welt, die ihn umgab. (AR, 190-91)

This passage, attentively read, offers the clearest possible indication that the theatre possesses a psychological significance for Anton Reiser exceeding the flight from reality or compensatory fantasy so frequently, indeed repetitively, mentioned in interpretations of the novel. Let us consider the manner in which biographical value, that aesthetic and ethical value by which we organize and live our lives, is created. Such value can only be created dialogically. In order for me to live up to the biographical value I have chosen for myself – heroic, social, or whatever – it is necessary that I imagine not just myself, but a spectator for whom the event of my life is enacted, and who is capable of affirming that event. Living up to a particular aesthetic and ethical value entails a problem of self-objectification that can only be resolved by the imagined presence of a possible other whose evaluation of my being and my actions is authoritative for me. Now, the dialogic ratification of the event of his life is substantially denied to the hero of Moritz’s novel. True, he is very often capable of enacting a role before others in such a way as to be affirmed in that role, as when he successfully delivers the Queen’s birthday oration before the assembled
dignitaries of the town of Hanover; but, more often than not, he is the object of disapproving, even contemptuous gazes. It is the hero’s heightened, perhaps pathological, sensitivity to these gazes that causes him, so to speak, to fall out of the role, of student or tutor for instance, which he happens to be playing at that moment. It is worth recalling in this connection Bakhtin’s remarks on the absolute requirement for a possible other, real or imagined, for self-objectivation to take place: “ethical and aesthetic objectification requires a powerful point d’appui outside itself; it requires some genuine source of real strength out of which I would be capable of seeing myself as another” (Bakhtin 1990, 31).

This, then, is what draws Reiser so powerfully into what, for him, is the fatal orbit of the theatre: the possibility of fully occupying a role, for however brief an interval, within which the moral sentiments animating his inner being find complete and unbroken expression in his outward self. Of course, in chronotopic terms, fully occupying a role entails effectively appropriating a segment of time and space and filling it with action. Being and appearance, Sein and Schein, come together in a whole that is ratified by the approving gazes of the spectators, a consummation denied the hero in his mundane existence, and one that is all the more intense for being transitory. For the duration of his narrated biography Anton Reiser is incapable of the kind of self-objectification that the author can perform, though we see him tentatively beginning to acquire this capability. Our hero does not possess insight into the mechanism of his consummation, but the dialogic structure of the novel, manifest in the interplay of the author and hero chronotopes, makes it available to the reader.

NOTES

1 Karl Philipp Moritz, Anton Reiser, ed. by Horst Günther (Frankfurt am Main and Leipzig: Insel, 1998), p. 11. Subsequent references to this edition of Anton Reiser are
indicated in the main body of the text by the abbreviation AR followed by the page number. I have chosen to refer to the widely-available Insel Taschenbuch edition rather than to the Werke edition (also edited by Horst Günther) for the convenience of readers. Emphasis in all quotations is as it appears in the original text.

2 Boulby’s 1979 monograph Karl Philipp Moritz: At the Fringe of Genius treats the observations on the representation of time and space in his 1973 article in greater depth. See also Durden 1979.

3 Dirk Göttsc he appears to be the only scholar to date to have performed a reading of Moritz’s novel informed by Bakhtin’s concept. Göttsc he’s reading occupies eight pages of his valuable and extensive monograph on time in the novel. But even here the chronotope is mentioned only in passing and is not the lead term of interpretation (Göttsche 2001, 80-87).

4 Bakhtin here uses the term “motif” with the meaning of ‘situational motif’. See Frenzel 1970, 28.


6 Panajotis Kondylis has characterized Enlightenment empiricism in terms of “Rehabilitation der Sinnlichkeit” (Kondylis 1981, 19).

7 See also Mainusch / Warning 1976.

8 “Im psychologischen Roman wird die ›innere Geschichte‹ Anton Reisers zum Schauspielort [sic] des Kampfes zwischen Einbildungskraft und Denkkraft” (Müller 1987, 87).

9 See also Dürbeck 1998, 19-20.
In his *Treatise of Human Nature* (1739/40), David Hume distinguishes three laws governing the imaginative association of ideas: similarity, contiguity and causality. Wolff, by contrast, recognizes only the first two (Hume 1978, 10-13). See also Dürbeck 1998, 39).

In the *Deutsche Metaphysik*, Wolff departs from traditional definitions of the relationship between the two faculties, arguing that the role of the imagination is to reproduce thoughts that we have previously had, while the function of the memory is merely to recognize that we have previously had these ideas.

In Goethe’s *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre* (1829) a minor character, a well-travelled Weltmann, is ironically dubbed “der unruhige Anton Reiser” (Goethe 1957, 110).

Bakhtin distinguishes “two basic types of biographical consciousness of a life and of giving a form to that life”, the “adventurous-heroic” and the ‘social-quotidian”. In the ‘social-quotidian’ type the source of value is not history but society. The value-context is not the historical humanity of heroes but the contemporary humanity of one’s fellows.

Bakhtin follows the neo-Kantian philosophers Jonas Cohn and Wilhelm Windelband in preferring the term “transgredient” to “transcendant” as an antonym for immanent. In doing so he avoids the sense “beyond the limits of possible experience” carried by the latter term. See Cohn 1901, 27.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


