Hannah Arendt and the Political: The contemporary challenges posed by sovereignty, nationalism and imperialism

Donna Nicholas

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of PhD at the University of St Andrews

30th September 2015
REQUIRED DECLARATIONS

1. Candidate’s declarations:

I, Donna Nicholas, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 80,000 words in length, has been written by me, and that it is the record of work carried out by me, or principally by myself in collaboration with others as acknowledged, and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.

I was admitted as a research student in February 2008 and as a candidate for the degree of PhD in February 2009; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St Andrews between 2008 and 2015.

Date ................................ signature of candidate .............................................

2. Supervisor’s declaration:

I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations appropriate for the degree of PhD in the University of St Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that degree.

Date ................................ signature of supervisor .............................................

3. Permission for publication: (to be signed by both candidate and supervisor)

In submitting this thesis to the University of St Andrews I understand that I am giving permission for it to be made available for use in accordance with the regulations of the University Library for the time being in force, subject to any copyright vested in the work not being affected thereby. I also understand that the title and the abstract will be published, and that a copy of the work may be made and supplied to any bona fide library or research worker, that my thesis will be electronically accessible for personal or research use unless exempt by award of an embargo as requested below, and that the library has the right to migrate my thesis into new electronic forms as required to ensure continued access to the thesis. I have obtained any third-party copyright permissions that may be required in order to allow such access and migration, or have requested the appropriate embargo below.

The following is an agreed request by candidate and supervisor regarding the publication of this thesis:

PRINTED COPY
a) No embargo on print copy

ELECTRONIC COPY
a) No embargo on electronic copy

Date ................ signature of candidate .................... signature of supervisor
ABSTRACT

This thesis seeks to show how the reassessment of Arendt’s thought for contemporary international political theory must be grounded in her first major published work, The Origins of Totalitarianism, and, more specifically, in the concept of the political she outlines therein. The thesis begins by examining how Arendt interprets the political sui generis. It shows how this concept, which influences much of her scholarship from the 1950s onwards and serves as a critical measure against which she assesses modern-day events, is disclosed for the first time in Part II of Origins through her engagement with particular topics and phenomena related to European colonial imperialism. Using this somewhat neglected text as a point of departure, the main body of the thesis examines Arendt’s thoughts on three ‘anti-political’ impulses of the contemporary world that have clear international ramifications: sovereignty, nationalism and imperialism. The work is divided into three corresponding sections. Each contains a chapter providing an interpretive study of Arendt’s text on the subject, followed by a chapter applying the key themes, insights and dangers previously highlighted to some of the most intractable global situations today such as the international human rights regime, atomic weaponry and war, biopolitical control, genocide studies and neoliberal globalisation. In so doing, the thesis does not aim to ‘find’ in Arendt’s work determinate answers to the crises of our time, but rather to use her perceptions as critical inspiration to think about them differently.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Patrick Hayden. The unswerving support and encouragement he has provided to me in the face of numerous challenges cannot be overstated. His mentoring and meticulous, critical and yet always insightful comments on various chapters and drafts have been invaluable in helping me to develop and shape the arguments herein.

Sincere thanks also go to my family and friends who have been with me every step of the way. They have kept me sane and ensured I remained positive no matter what life threw at me. I could not have got this far without them. Particular appreciation has to go to my parents who have always believed in me and encouraged me to follow my dreams. For their love, support and trust I am most grateful.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AJC</td>
<td>Hannah Arendt Karl Jaspers Correspondence: 1926-1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPF</td>
<td>Between Past and Future: Eight Essays in Political Thought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR</td>
<td>Crises of the Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>The Conquest of Space and the Stature of Man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EJ</td>
<td>Eichmann in Jerusalem: The Banality of Evil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Essays on Understanding 1930-1954: Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HC</td>
<td>The Human Condition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JW</td>
<td>The Jewish Writings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOM Thinking</td>
<td>The Life of the Mind (Thinking)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOM Willing</td>
<td>The Life of the Mind (Willing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDT</td>
<td>Men in Dark Times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR</td>
<td>On Revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OT / Origins</td>
<td>The Origins of Totalitarianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OV</td>
<td>On Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>The Promise of Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RJ</td>
<td>Responsibility and Judgement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RLC</td>
<td>Reflections on Literature and Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RV</td>
<td>Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## CONTENTS

REQUIRED DECLARATIONS

ABSTRACT

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Hannah Arendt on the Political

The Importance of *The Origins of Totalitarianism*

CHAPTER I ARENDT ON SOVEREIGNTY

Introduction

Sovereignty as Inequality of Rule

On Freedom

Sovereignty as Mutual Enmity

Concept of Modern Sovereignty

Concluding Comments

CHAPTER II INTERNATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY

Introduction

The International Human Rights Regime

The International Human Rights Regime and Sovereignty

The International Human Rights Regime as Maintenance and Augmentation of the Status Quo

The International Human Rights Regime as a Threat to Human Agency

Concluding Comments on the International Human Rights Regime and Sovereignty

Atomic Weaponry and War

Effect on the Relationship between Power, Strength and Violence

Implications for Sovereignty

Effect on the Human Condition

Concluding Comments on Atomic Weaponry and War

Concluding Comments – Section One

CHAPTER III ARENDT ON NATIONALISM

Introduction

Review of J.T. Delos’ *La Nation*
## Western Nationalism

---

**Liberal Individualism and the Rise of the Class System**

---

**The Rise of the Social Realm**

---

**Tribal Nationalism**

---

**Nationalism as an Ideology**

---

**Racism, the Pan-Movements and National Socialism**

---

**Antisemitism, the Pan-Movements, National Socialism and Political Zionism**

---

**Concluding Comments**

---

### CHAPTER IV INTERNATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS OF NATIONALISM

**Introduction**

---

**Nationalism and Biopolitics**

---

**Ethnic Nationalism, Biopolitics and Israel**

---

**Arendt on Zionism**

---

**Israeli Biopolitical Control over Citizenship**

---

**Biopolitical Management of Palestinian Population**

---

**Concluding Comments – Section Two**

---

### CHAPTER V ARENDT ON IMPERIALISM

**Introduction**

---

**Colonialism and Overseas Imperialism**

---

**Continental Imperialism**

---

**Concluding Comments**

---

### CHAPTER VI INTERNATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS OF IMPERIALISM

**Introduction**

---

**Arendt’s Influence on Genocide Studies and Post-Colonialism**

---

**Arendt’s Influence on Thinking about Globalisation**

---

**Globalisation and Neo-liberalism Defined**

---

**The Infiltration of Economics into the Sphere of the Political – The Rise of the Social**

---

**Superfluousness**

---

**Neoliberal Globalisation as an Ideology**

---

**The Occupy Movement**

---

**Concluding Comments – Section Three**

---

### CONCLUSION

---

### BIBLIOGRAPHY

---
INTRODUCTION

Hannah Arendt (1906-75) was a philosopher, political theorist, and social commentator who sought to understand the ‘monstrosities’ of the twentieth century. A divisive scholar with fervent supporters and ardent critics, before her death she wrote more than a dozen volumes and has since been the subject of hundreds of books and articles. The passion and dedication clear in her work encourages readers today – both sympathisers and detractors – to confront, without undue sentiment or equivocation, the sufferings of “this none too beautiful world” (JW:374).

Following the controversy which surrounded her report on the Eichmann trial, and world events such as the end of the Cold War which seemed – superficially – to date her thought, interest in Arendt’s work declined (King & Stone 2008:5). In recent years however there has been a revival of scholarly engagement with her texts, leading Mark Reinhardt (2003) to conclude that it is becoming difficult to say much that is original about her. Given that international thought has only latterly and belatedly turned to her work (Owens 2009a:3), this is to overstate the position. Despite the significant groundswell of interest among international political theorists in the last decade, there remains a gap in the secondary literature concerning Arendt’s interpretation of sovereignty, nationalism and imperialism, which is surprising given the current international context. In the first collection of its type, Anthony Lang and John Williams (2005) suggest two of Arendt’s greatest contributions to the sphere of international relations are her “powerful critique of an excessively narrow concept of politics as ‘ruling’”, and her specific understanding of agency and responsibility (Lang & Williams 2005:21/222). These topics are clearly derived from Arendt’s analysis of sovereignty, nationalism and imperialism; although to date the centrality of these concepts for Arendt’s political thought is rarely made explicit.

Arendtian themes have of late been applied to disciplines such as genocide studies (Mamdani 2002), and African and postcolonial studies (Gines 2008; Bernasconi 2008; and Lee 2008); and to topics such as human rights (Isaac 1996; Benhabib 2004; Cotter 2005), war (Owens 2009a), political evil (Hayden 2009), and nuclear weapons (Schell 2010). Thus whilst her work has begun to influence present-day cross-disciplinary scholarship, given her vast corpus and wide-

---

1 John Williams notes that Arendt is primarily regarded as a theorist of the bounded community, which may help explain her relative neglect (at least until recent years) in international relations (2006:99).
2 For instance: Villa (2002); Lang & Williams (2005); Young-Bruehl (2006); King & Stone (2008); Owens (2009a); Hayden (2009); Benhabib (2010).
ranging scope, and recent global events such as the ongoing violence in Israel; the proliferation of immigration and asylum camps; Russian aggression in Ukraine; the Arab Spring; the rise of Islamic State; and the strengthening of nationalist (potentially xenophobic) political parties in Europe,\(^3\) it seems that the field of international political theory still has much to usefully learn from Arendt.

Referenced today, the political insights she drew can perhaps serve as an ‘illumination’ in the ‘dark times’ we are still living through (MDT:ix). In support of this proposition this thesis will seek to show how the reassessment of Arendt’s thought for contemporary international political theory must be grounded in her first major published work, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (henceforth abbreviated to *Origins*), and, more specifically, in the concept of the political she outlines therein. In secondary literature to date, engagement with *Origins* has focussed predominantly on the section on Totalitarianism to the neglect of much of the section on Imperialism (Benhabib 2003:75).\(^4\) It is however in this section that Arendt sets out three anti-political impulses of the contemporary world that have clear international ramifications: sovereignty, nationalism and imperialism. This thesis will examine Arendt’s thoughts on each, and will engage with much of the existing secondary literature noted above, in order to demonstrate how these insights are relevant to the current global situation, international political thought, and the crises in our times. In so doing, it will contribute to Arendt studies and ongoing multi-disciplinary debates.

This work is divided into three sections – Sovereignty, Nationalism and Imperialism – and each section contains a chapter providing a qualitative study of Arendt’s text on the subject, followed by a chapter applying these insights to specific present-day international crises. Whilst much of the exegesis relies on text from *Origins*, Arendt’s entire body of work is considered to provide greater depth to the arguments made. In adopting this methodology the accusation made by Roy Tsao (2002a) has been acknowledged. To mitigate the risks inherent in a purely thematic approach – one in which Arendt’s most striking statements on any given topic are culled from a variety of sources at once, potentially “severing those statements from their intended argumentative context and treating her books themselves as little more than

\(^3\) Such as United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), the National Front in France, the Swiss People’s Party, and the Freedom Party of Austria. Level of domestic support for such parties varies, but in 2014, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity secured 43% of the national vote and became the ruling party.

\(^4\) The exception to this is Arendt’s final chapter in Imperialism on ‘The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man’ which has received much scholarly attention as it is in this chapter that Arendt introduces her concept of the ‘right to have rights’.
haphazard collections of aphoristic dicta” (Tsao 2002a:98) – this work employs a whole-text based approach to ensure her words remain contextualised. As argued by Jeffrey Isaac (1993:540), “it is within the framework of her arguments that their value lies.”

Chapter I therefore analyses Arendt’s interpretation of sovereignty as a concept, emphasising one of the fundamental problems she diagnoses in modernity – the inability of theorists and practitioners alike to imagine or enact political relationships in any ways other than either via the inequality of rule and dominance, or as relations of mutual enmity. This chapter begins by highlighting Arendt’s objections to these modes of interpretation, and a major omission of these analyses is discussed via an examination of ‘freedom’. Finally, the work of Thomas Hobbes is critically discussed since, in Arendt’s view, it encapsulates the concept of modern sovereignty.

Chapter II then addresses two practical international ramifications of considering sovereignty to be a political construct – the international human rights regime, and atomic weaponry and war. This chapter begins by examining the attempt to institutionalise international human rights norms and considers the effect this has on the human condition. Using insights from Arendt’s notion of the right to have rights the importance of human agency for any effective future human rights regime is then emphasised, before a thematic examination of several important implications engendered by the existence and proliferation of atomic weaponry is undertaken using the concept of sovereignty as an interpretative lens.

In Chapter III key themes associated with nationalism are identified and their contribution to the contemporary crisis in the public realm is examined. The human need to belong is reflected upon, and the chapter addresses the themes highlighted in Arendt’s review of J. T. Delos’ La Nation. A more extensive reading of Arendt’s thoughts on nationalism and the political is then undertaken, primarily, although not exclusively, via Origins. In this text Arendt clearly distinguishes between two types of nationalism – Western Nationalism and Tribal Nationalism – and in this chapter both are examined and critiqued. Finally, a more general examination of nationalism as an ideology is undertaken before moving on to discuss a contemporary international ramification of nationalist thought in the next chapter.

Chapter IV addresses nationalism as it pertains to biopolitics. Arendt’s engagement with the introduction of organic concerns into the political realm is first explored and the link between nationalism and biopolitics highlighted and critiqued from an Arendtian perspective. Then,
using Arendt’s insights in *The Jewish Writings* as a point of departure, Israeli nationality laws and practices, and Israeli control over Palestinian territory and populations are appraised as two contemporary forms of biopolitics which both strengthen, and are strengthened by, nationalistic claims.

The final section engages with Arendt’s interpretation of imperialism. Chapter V first sketches an account of Arendt’s theories of both colonialism and imperialism as expounded in *Origins*. Overseas Imperialism is contrasted with Continental Imperialism, and some of the key themes and threats to the political Arendt associated with each version are examined. For instance, the danger of introducing economic motivations into the public realm is highlighted and the issue of superfluity addressed, before racism and bureaucracy are shown to harbour endemic threats to authentic politics.

Chapter VI develops the themes identified in Chapter V and assesses how a more comprehensive understanding of such leitmotifs can contribute to the engagement with international political phenomena such as post-colonialism and genocide studies as well as neoliberal globalisation. The work of scholars such as Raphael Lemkin and Mahmood Mamdani is first examined to demonstrate the linkages between Arendt’s thesis on imperialism and contemporary genocide studies. Then a brief engagement with the relevant literature on Arendt is undertaken and the question of how we may use her work to think past the polemics of the debate surrounding globalisation is addressed. The chapter concludes with a reading of the ‘Occupy’ movement as a contemporary example of the alternative ‘elementary republic’ system Arendt advocated.

The final chapter provides concluding remarks and points to areas worthy of future contemplation and scholarship.

The remainder of this Introduction will contextualise the rest of the thesis by initially defining what Arendt meant by politics and the political, and by emphasising the importance of *The Origins of Totalitarianism* – particularly the still somewhat neglected second part of the work pertaining to imperialism.
Jeremy Valentine (2006:505-511) notes that in the English language the notion of ‘the political’ is an awkward grammatical formulation whose presence can be explained in part as a consequence of the translation of works such as Carl Schmitt’s *Der Begriff des Politischen* (*The Concept of the Political*). He goes on to say that the problems of translation are not incidental to the notion of the political, but are indicative of a deeper characteristic which he summarises in the following manner: “the concept of the political is the name of a problem which traces the conceptual and empirical incompletion of politics” (Valentine 2006:506). There is therefore a qualitative difference between ‘the political’ and ‘politics’, which was first explored in German political theory with Schmitt, but soon became an object of wider political thought for scholars as diverse as Chantal Mouffe, Jean-Luc Nancy, Claude Lefort, Paul Ricoeur and, at least indirectly, Hannah Arendt.

At the most rudimentary level, the distinction between politics and the political can be explained thus:

On the one hand, politics – at the ontic level – remains a specific discursive regime, a particular social system, a certain form of action; while on the other hand – at the ontological level – the political assumes the role of something which is of an entirely different nature: the principle of autonomy of politics (Marchart 2007:7-8).

The purpose of the concept of the political is therefore “to explain politics by designating that which is political *sui generis*” and thus distinct from all other spheres (Valentine 2006:506). The twentieth century marked a turning point in the western political tradition and from this point on there has been a clearly discernible move to explicitly examine such concepts. What unites interested scholars is the notion that since the twentieth century humanity has been facing unprecedented crises which political theory has to mobilise to address. The specific interpretation of the crises varies from author to author, and so therefore do the solutions they propose. For instance for Schmitt it was the undermining of state sovereignty in the Weimar Republic which constituted the crisis and led him to draw a distinction between ‘politics’ and ‘the political’ (Schmitt 1996a); whilst Lefort believed that it was necessary to redefine the political in light of certain ‘momentous’ events and changes (crises) in his era, especially the emergence of totalitarianism and the bureaucratisation of the social realm (Lefort 1988). And Ricoeur used contemporary realities (such as the Hungarian Uprising in

---

5 Many theorists explicate this difference in similar terms including Vollrath (1977) and Valentine (2006).
1956) to reflect on the constancy of the problematic of power, the general incomprehension of which constitutes his version of crisis (Ricoeur 2007:247-270). Similarly, we can pinpoint the day – almost to the moment – when Arendt became a political theorist (Sluga 2008:91). The shock she experienced as a result of the Reichstag fire and subsequent illegal arrests on 27th February 1933 engendered in her a feeling of responsibility and a belief that she had to respond to the fearful challenge of totalitarianism in some way (EU:4-5/xii). In August of 1950, after the completion of Origins, she asked herself explicitly for the first time, in a diary that she was to keep for the next 23 years, “What is politics?” This marked the beginning of a life-long philosophical enquiry into this and its related questions. Elisabeth Young-Bruehl (1982a:322) sees what Arendt did as “question[ing] the contemplative attitude philosophically, as a reformer” (emphasis added). “In its simplest form,” she argues, “Arendt’s question was: How shall we take political events, the political realm, seriously?” She goes on to suggest that Arendt began to envisage a new form of politics for a world in which political events such as world war, totalitarianism, and atomic bombings demanded serious attention. In essence, Arendt wanted to provide a new political understanding based on contemporary political reality.

Arendt never wrote a systematic political philosophy, rather, notes Dana Villa, her work is “grounded upon a series of striking conceptual distinctions” such as between action, labour and work; public, private and social realms; freedom and sovereignty; and thinking, willing and judging (Villa 2002:1). She integrated these distinctions into “complex thematic strands” (Villa 2002:1) which she augmented with reference to discrete events. Consequently, contingency and the role of the event were of central import to Arendt, her explicit assumption being that “thought itself arises out of incidents of living experience and must remain bound to them as the only guideposts by which to take its bearings” (BPF:14). Arendt’s political thought and key political values are therefore disclosed in her treatment of specific topics such as sovereignty, nationalism and imperialism. Underpinning all this though is her interpretation of the political, central to which is the concept of plurality.

Lefort is convinced that the greater part of Arendt’s work is bound up with her experience and interpretation of the totalitarian phenomenon (Lefort 1988:48), however it would be more accurate to assert that it is actually men and women in their plurality – the human condition as it were – and its numerous manifestations that bind Arendt’s work. Few passages better express the importance of plurality for Arendt than the following:
If it is true that a thing is real within both the historical-political and the sensate world only if it can show itself and be perceived from all sides, then there must always be a plurality of individuals or peoples and a plurality of standpoints to make reality even possible and to guarantee its continuation. In other words, the world comes into being only if there are perspectives (PP:175).

Plurality is the fact that relates to our irreducible sameness as members of the human species whilst simultaneously expresses our individual difference from one another. It corresponds to the human activity of action – “the only activity that goes on directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter” (HC:7) – because we are “all the same, that is human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live” (HC:8). Moreover, since, for Arendt, men and women are apolitical at birth and remain apolitical in isolation (PP:95), plurality is specifically the condition, “not only the conditio sine qua non, but the conditio per quam” (HC:7) of all political life. Politics arises between different, distinct individuals as a result of their interactions and interrelationships expressed through speech (lexis) and action (praxis). Strictly speaking therefore, Arendt sees genuine politics as being not so much about men and women as it is about the common world that comes into being between them and endures beyond them (PP:175), and thus the political sui generis is the sphere grounded on this plurality.

For Arendt the facticity of plurality has been misinterpreted since the Romans who equated it with a mere social companionship of the human species imposed on us by the needs of biological life. Instead, the value and definition of plurality for her originates with Greek thought in which the human capacity for political organisation “is not only different from but stands in direct opposition to that natural association whose center is the home (oikia) and the family” (HC:24). Indeed, although Arendt was famous for her frequent nomination of the adjective ‘political’, she did not consistently differentiate it from ‘politics’, but from ‘the social’. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin highlights this tendency and identifies Arendt’s three ‘most valuable themes’, which span her entire body of work as being freedom, action and politics. She argues, “Each of the three elements...has its negative, evil counterpart for Arendt. Freedom contrasts with what she called ‘necessity’, action with ‘behaviour’, and the negative counterpart to politics is society, or ‘the social’” (Pitkin 1998:2). Perhaps more accurately, Arendt’s work clearly differentiates between traits which foster and support the political realm (freedom and action), and those which are the antithesis of it (necessity and behaviour), which are instead characteristic of the social realm.
In *The Human Condition* Arendt concentrates on ‘the rise of the social’, asserting that in the modern world the distinction between the social and the political realms has become blurred (HC:33). The result she identified was that ‘politics’ has become merely a function of society – a realm which prohibits the possibility of action since it expects a certain kind of behaviour and thus aspires to exclude spontaneity and outstanding achievement. A complete victory of society leads to what we traditionally call state and government being superseded by pure administration i.e. the substitution of behaviour for action, and the eventual substitution of bureaucracy/the rule of nobody, for personal rule. This represents a threat to humanity properly understood and contributes to the crisis of our times:

*The monolithic character of every type of society, its conformism which allows for only one interest and opinion, is rooted in the one-ness of mankind. It is because this one-ness is not fantasy...that mass society, where man as a social animal rules supreme and where apparently the survival of the species could be guaranteed on a world-wide scale, can at the same time threaten humanity with extinction (HC:46 emphasis added).*

In other words, as she argued elsewhere, “human beings in the true sense of the term can exist only where there is a world, and there can be a world in the true sense of the term only where the plurality of the human race is more than a simple multiplication of a single species” (PP:176). Implicit in this discussion is the concept of freedom. Freedom exists, Arendt believed, “only in the unique intermediary space of politics” (PP:95). Indeed, it is only within the relative stability or balance of the human artifice that a space for free action may be opened – a space relating men and women who desire to act, thereby revealing who they are as beings in and of the world (Kohn 2002b:125). The perversion of the notion of freedom is one which will be returned to in Chapter I, but it is important to note here that the idea of freedom is one of the most significant lessons that Arendt drew from genuinely political epochs in history. In modern times, being ‘free’ in the sense of a positive, freely unfolding activity is now confined to what Arendt designated the private realm – a realm that deals with things which by nature cannot possibly be held in common by all and therefore cannot be considered political, namely with life and property, with those things that are specifically our own. The new phenomenon of a societal space has dramatically enlarged this sphere of personal ownership and has led to the modern conception of politics, in which the state is seen as a function of society or a necessary evil for the sake of social freedom (PP:142). It is for this reason that she considered politics in modernity to be apolitical at best because it does not demand the existence of ‘the political’ –

---

6 See also Wellmer (2002).
“the disclosure of commonality from this plurality through public interaction” (Schaap 2007:64) – it is actually destructive of any such realm in its concern for life’s necessities.

The Arendtian philosopher, Ernst Vollrath, credits Arendt with the achievement of having ‘invented’ the political difference: “What Arendt had discovered might be called, in contradistinction to the Heideggerian ‘ontological difference’, ‘the political difference’, the difference between politically authentic politics and politically perverted politics” (cited Marchart 2007:38).\(^7\) Politically authentic politics, as Arendt understood it, “is based on the fact of human plurality” (PP:93),\(^8\) which, in turn, secures our status as fully human beings (PP:115). Arendt was clear that whilst we are born and thus exist naturally as part of the human species, we only become completely human upon our insertion into the shared political realm i.e. on the basis of the natality (the capacity to begin something new (HC:9) of our ‘political’ birth (HC:176). It is through our shared capacity for speech and action, argued Arendt, that we constitute a common world in which we reveal ourselves as distinct and unique individuals – the “‘who’ in contradistinction to ‘what’ somebody is” (HC:179) – and through which we guarantee our equality (OR:31). Our potential to achieve full human status, and thus human dignity, is therefore predicated upon each individual having their equal political status reciprocally recognised and respected within a community of plural others.

Arendt’s notion of the political served as a critical measure against which she assessed world events, and the ‘crisis’ of the twentieth century that she diagnosed, which crystallised into totalitarian rule, was, in effect, preceded by the apoliticisation of politics. The introduction of anti-political traits into the political realm led to the defining experience of the first half of the century in which “the abstract nakedness of being nothing but human” was revealed to coincide with men and women being stripped of their political status (OT:380-1). Alienated from any organised community in which one is judged by one’s actions and opinions (OT:376), vast swaths of displaced persons (refugees/stateless) were rendered superfluous (uprooted, impoverished and lacking state protection), and this, ultimately, is the real and enduring crisis Arendt identified – one that exists today just as it did in her time.

Written in the latter half of the 1950s, the essay in which Arendt most overtly addresses politics as a topic is ‘Introduction into Politics’. However, it is in The Origins of Totalitarianism

\(^7\) See also Vollrath (1977).

\(^8\) Margaret Canovan describes the concept of plurality as Arendt’s most fundamental contribution to political theory (Canovan 1992:281). And Dana Villa notes that Arendt persistently stresses “human plurality and the sharing of diverse opinions as the *sine qua non* of any politics worthy of the name” (Villa 2002:15).
that she first examines the realities of modernity such as the rise of the nation-state system, the advent of imperialist domination, racism, and genocide. Upon examination, her treatment of these realities suggests “she was properly worried about the powerfully effective subterranean forces at work that undermine, distort, and seek to eliminate the conditions required for genuine action and public freedom” (Bernstein 2002:391). The tenets of an underlying political theory based on plurality, freedom, action and equality are thus revealed; a theory predicated on her very specific interpretation of the political.

The Importance of The Origins of Totalitarianism

“Finally it dawned on me that I was not engaged in writing a historical book, even though large parts of it clearly contain historical analyses, but a political book...” (Arendt on The Origins of Totalitarianism in 1958 on publication of its Second Edition (OT:617-8)

“The crowning achievement of Arendt as a political and historical analyst” (Seyla Benhabib on The Origins of Totalitarianism 2010:5)

Originally published in 1951 when Arendt was 45 years old, The Origins of Totalitarianism was revised more often than any of her other books, leading her student and biographer, Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, to conclude that “a biography of the book, encompassing its gestation, its birth, its development, and the reactions to it (which continue to the present day), would illuminate how the political history of the first half of the twentieth century was understood in the second half” (Young-Bruehl 2006:35). During her own lifetime, Origins defined Arendt’s public reception and reputation, and whilst today it occupies a more ambiguous place in current scholarship, some commentators now consider it to be fundamental for framing Arendt’s political thought (Mantena 2010:84; Court 2008:1). Bernard Crick for instance sees the text as being so important, “that many or most of her other works are like huge footnotes to resolve difficulties left behind in the postwar urgency and immediacy of its exposition” (Crick 2001:99; see also Crick 1979:27-47), whilst Margaret Canovan (1992) offers a compelling and extensive interpretation of Arendt’s work in which Origins and the political problem of totalitarianism set the agenda for Arendt’s later thought. Similarly, Wayne Allen argues The Human Condition and the essays in Between Past and Future can be viewed as theoretical alternatives to the forces Arendt believed were behind the rise of totalitarian rule (Allen 1986:238).
Interested scholars have drawn out key themes that run like ‘red threads’ through Origins and which intonate Arendt’s political theory – some of which will be elaborated on in this work. In his essay for the special issue of Social Research (2002) dedicated to revisiting Origins fifty years on, and in the wake of the events of September 11th 2001, Richard Bernstein usefully reflects on Arendt’s sense of contingency and the unpredictability of catastrophic events, the notion of radical evil, and superfluousness (Bernstein 2002). Young-Bruehl (2002) reiterates and reworks many of these themes in her contribution to this publication (and develops on them in her later work Why Arendt Matters), but also highlights supranationalism (or perhaps more accurately, tribal nationalism) and antipolitical purposes as being of central import. In general however, most academics refer almost exclusively to Arendt’s thoughts on totalitarianism proper in the last section of the book, which is to overlook key political insights she drew in the earlier section and to denigrate important chapters in what Arendt “originally thought of...as her ‘imperialism’ book’” (Bernstein 2002:383). Indeed, as Tsao makes clear, Arendt’s arguments about the state and the integrity of the body politic, its essential functions, and its fatal vulnerabilities, appears primarily in the first two parts of Origins – ‘Antisemitism’ and particularly ‘Imperialism’ (Tsao 2004:107/115). But even the major interpretative work on Origins is curiously silent on her analysis of the latter (Mantena 2010). There are notable exceptions to this trend, but the neglect within mainstream Arendt scholarship to engage with her account of the topic is particularly perplexing given her hypothesis linking imperialism to totalitarianism has undergone a resurgence in other disciplines. Genocide studies, for instance, takes Origins as seminal, particularly, note King and Stone (2008:2), “for its focus on the premonitory historical role that European imperialism played in genocide on European soil.”

More important here though is the rarely acknowledged fact that the notion of the political which underpins much of Arendt’s work from the 1950s onwards, is first visible in her engagement with the history of the Jewish experience in Europe and her subsequent discussion on the rise of imperial movements. One of the few commentators to address this is Jacques Taminiaux (2002), who notes that what unites Arendt’s discussion on antisemitism is

---

9 Scholars writing for the special edition of Social Research (2002), make only passing reference to the Imperialism section and Stephen Whitfield’s historical treatment of Origins (1980) focuses entirely on the last part of the text (Mantena 2010:84FN7). More recently, in her discussion on the importance of Origins today, Young-Bruehl offers only a very brief engagement with the Imperialism section, despite noting that it is full of ‘important reflections’ for contemporary global realities (Young-Bruehl 2006:74-6).

10 Such as Dossa (1986); Kateb (1984); Moruzzi (2000); King & Stone (2008); Owens (2009a); Hayden (2009); and Mantena (2010).
the continuous and more or less explicit use of a distinction between the social and the political, and between the private and the public, which “work in many ways as leitmotifs throughout the entire investigation and that later will be carefully thematized at the beginning of The Human Condition” (Taminiaux 2002:427). That said, it is in Arendt’s later deliberations in Imperialism that the ‘essence’ of her interpretation of the political is first alluded to. When reflecting on the rise of the bourgeoisie and the introduction of economic principles into the political realm she contrasts the economic structure to the political structure in a manner which indicates the distinction between the economy and politics is crucial to her arguments (OT:171/183-196). The notion that genuine politics requires consent and limits is acknowledged and she goes on to recognise the link between plurality and the political realm in her engagement with Hobbes as the philosopher of the bourgeoisie (OT:187). She also introduces the distinction between work, labour and action in her discussion on the Boers in South Africa in which she articulates that labour is for survival; work creates a world of human artifice; and action is predicated upon, and conditioned by plurality (OT:252-3). Taminiaux argues that Arendt’s analyses in Origins “tell too much and too little about many issues” (2002:429) and that political notions introduced merely remain operative and lack ‘thematization’. Closer reading of the text does however belie this view, and this thesis will demonstrate that systematically working through the second book of Origins actually gives Arendt’s notion of the political more substance than is sometimes claimed.

Political preoccupation with totalitarianism is not new. In her 1967 preface to Origins, Arendt noted how her contemporaries focused almost exclusively on examining Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia at the expense of their predecessors. She termed this ‘deplorable’ since the conditions for, and traits evident in, imperialist rule had become ‘rather obvious’ in postwar global politics (OT:164). She was referring to the situation in Vietnam, but the ‘lessons’ from imperialist practices are equally salient today as will be established in the ensuing discussions.

Arendt viewed herself as a ‘discoverer of existing problems’, and the aim of Origins was “not to give answers but rather to prepare the ground” (Young-Bruehl 1982a:201). In a similar way, the chapters that follow pursue Arendt’s ‘thought trains’ pertaining to sovereignty, nationalism and imperialism, not necessarily to provide solutions to current international problems, but to suggest using a different interpretive lens – one inspired by Arendt’s political thought – to reframe the salient questions.
SECTION ONE: SOVEREIGNTY

CHAPTER I ARENDT ON SOVEREIGNTY

“If men wish to be free, it is precisely sovereignty they must renounce” (BPF:163).
“Modern power conditions...make national sovereignty a mockery except for giant states” (OT:344).

Introduction

Arendt did not write comprehensively about sovereignty as a discrete topic, but particular comments and references made in Origins (and elsewhere) indicate the traits she believed the term encompassed. In much of her subsequent scholarship one can then read an implicit critique of the concept as it pertains to political values she considered key such as freedom, authority and power. Reconstructed, her interpretation suggests sovereignty is both potentially destructive of the political and “no longer a working concept of politics” (EU:143). Her insights may therefore provide a useful alternative lens through which to examine the contemporary global situation – a task that will be attempted in the next chapter.

Broadly speaking, as a normative concept sovereignty is understood to be a final and absolute authority in the political community, one which for Arendt is “bound by no universal law and acknowledging nothing superior to itself” (OT:297). Embodied within the sovereign therefore, is a ‘supreme power’ or ‘supreme order of human behaviour’ (Hinsley 1966:1; Kelsen 1960:627). The concept encompasses two dualities: the political relationship between individuals and between states; and more recently, the political relationship operating within a defined territory (internal or domestic sovereignty) and external sovereignty – a modern construct, invented to signify “independence from outside authorities” (Bull cited Piirimäe 2010:65). Both of these elements must be addressed as both are contemporarily significant, and both are disclosed, discussed and critiqued at least implicitly by Arendt through her consideration of interrelated concepts.

Theorists have long understood that the nature, origin and history of sovereignty are inextricably linked with the nature, origin and history of the modern state (Hinsley 1966:2;

---

11 See Cohen (2012:163) and Hinsley (1966:1) for a discussion on sovereignty as concept rather than fact of state power.
Indeed sovereignty has famously been defined as “the absolute and perpetual power of a commonwealth” (Bodin 1992:1). This inevitably means that notions of nationalism become intertwined with understandings of sovereignty. Whilst equally true in Arendt’s work, this chapter will attempt to isolate her thoughts on sovereignty from those on nationalism – the subject of Section Two. To fully appreciate the significance of sovereignty for Arendt, it is first necessary to appreciate that one of the fundamental problems she diagnoses in modernity is the inability of theorists and practitioners alike to imagine or enact political relationships in any ways other than either via the inequality of rule and dominance, or as relations of mutual enmity. This chapter therefore begins by highlighting Arendt’s objections to these modes of interpretation and a major omission of these analyses is discussed via an examination of freedom as a concept. After demonstrating the importance of freedom for making politics possible and examining how sovereignty traditionally understood denies it, the work of Thomas Hobbes is discussed since, in Arendt’s view, it encapsulates the concept of modern sovereignty. Chapter II will then address the practical international ramifications of considering sovereignty to be a political construct, and together both chapters will demonstrate why Arendt considered sovereignty to be such a pivotal yet essentially anti-political notion that is as unable today as it was at its inception to preserve the human condition.

**Sovereignty as Inequality of Rule**

“The origins of sovereignty were in rulers’ search for power and domination” (Sheehan 2006:10).

Defined as “the ideal of uncompromising self-sufficiency and mastership” (HC:234), it is not perhaps surprising that theorists of sovereignty often appear ‘trapped’ within paradigms whose central tenets are command-based. Although Henry McIlwain argues “the fatal identification of sovereignty with might is damnosa heriditas of the English Civil Wars” (McIlwain 1955:387), such tendencies can be traced even further back to the work of the ‘father’ of state sovereignty – Jean Bodin. Arendt saw his *Six Livres de la Republique* as still offering “One of the most illuminating discussions on the principle of sovereignty” (OT:297
FN), which has led Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen to charge that she “seemed to regard Bodin’s treatise [as] the last serious word on the subject and did not seem to be aware of its critiques in German Staatslehre and French public law” (Arato & Cohen 2009:326 FN18). This is however to miss the point. Arendt did not engage with the concept of sovereignty to produce a rigorous theoretical model, in fact, as noted above, much of her critique of sovereignty is oblique. Rather, the argument made in this chapter is that Arendt’s interest in the concept is largely confined to an examination of how its implications in the real world impact on the political and thus damage what it is to be human, so the fact that her method of interpreting both Hobbes in Origins and the Abbé Sieyès in On Revolution uses a Bodinian framework for example, is somewhat moot. The conditions, rights and prerogatives Bodin ascribes to the sovereign resonate with Arendt and she identifies practical manifestations of these features in the modern state which she fears threaten genuine political action. This section therefore proceeds by highlighting some of the elements within Bodin’s discourse which pertain to sovereignty as a relationship of unequal rule, and examines the implications of this on the political.

The theory of sovereignty expressed within the Six Livres de la Republique is essentially the “assertion that there must exist, in every ordered commonwealth, a single centre of supreme authority, and that this authority must necessarily be absolute” (Franklin 1973:23). Bodin seeks to establish absolute sovereignty through law thus in his theory the distinctive mark of sovereignty is a state of juridical prerogatives. The power to legislate and to alter or repeal existing laws is the primary sovereign power which “includes all the other rights and prerogatives of sovereignty” (Bodin 1992:58). In truth, “the main point of sovereign majesty and absolute power”, states Bodin, “consists of giving law to subjects in general without their consent” (Bodin 1992:23 emphasis added); “Law is technically...the most accomplished form of domination, since typically and in the long run it makes possible the most precise and effective

---

12 Hardt and Negri attribute the continuing relevance of Bodin’s work to his adoption of a ‘realistic standpoint’, which enabled him to “anticipate modernity’s own critique of sovereignty” (2001:97).
13 Arato and Cohen do in fact temper their argument with the acknowledgement that Arendt does implicitly engage with Schmitt’s theory which, as expounded in Political Theology, contains within it a critique of Bodin. Arendt’s references to Schmitt within Origins are examined in greater detail in a subsequent section of this chapter.
14 See also Hinsley (1966:121).
15 Other sovereign powers include the power to declare war and make peace; hear final appeals; impose taxes; grant pardons and receive oaths of fealty and homage (see Bodin 1992:58-9 for full list).

The establishment of the legislative power has been given primacy in many other theories of sovereignty too. For example Locke believed it to be the “first and fundamental positive Law of all Commonwealths” and “not only the supreme power of the Common-wealth, but sacred and unalterable in the hands where the Community have placed it” (Locke 1970:373-5).
orientation and ordering of political activity” (Heller cited Poggi 1978:103 emphasis added). Sovereign princes ‘command’ others in such a way that they must respect and revere their majesty in complete obedience, and do them honour in thought and speech, yet, since law is a manifestation of sovereign power, the sovereign himself is *legibus solutus* – he cannot be bound by it. Precursors of this notion can be identified in the fourteenth century theory that “the first and highest act of royal power is to judge” as Alvarus Pelagius put it in *Speculum Regum* (cited Wilks 1963:213), although it is in *Six Livres de la Republique* that the notion the king is above man-made laws was for the first time comprehensively and systematically developed (Lewis 1968:207).\textsuperscript{16}

Julian Franklin convincingly argues that the indicia of sovereignty Bodin lists in Chapter 10 of his magnum opus were derived “from the concept of supremacy itself” (Franklin in Bodin 1992:xv), because Bodin is precise in his use of the term ‘absolute’. He takes it to mean that the body in question must be autonomous – “not be subject in any way to the commands of someone else” (Bodin 1992:11) – since, as Chief Justice John Marshall declared in 1812, “any restriction upon it, deriving from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction” (cited Elshtain 2008:154).\textsuperscript{17} Deducible from this is Bodin’s rejection of a right of resistance and recognition that command is entirely a top-down process.\textsuperscript{18} Moreover, it speaks to the fact that for Bodin human society is comprised of a variety of mutually independent states, each defining themselves as sovereign (Poggi 1978:60; Hinsley 1966:181). That Bodin’s theory of sovereignty owed much to developments seen during the Middle Ages does not seem to be in dispute. Paradoxically however, throughout the Middle Ages absolute power never was absolute. For example, even Hostiensis (c1200-1271), who launched the doctrine of *potestas absoluta* (absolute power) into mainstream Western political thought, did not lay the foundations for arbitrary power as he was insistent that one must always act with cause (Pennington 1993:74). Nonetheless, Kenneth Pennington (1993)

\textsuperscript{16} The traditional notion of limited supremacy i.e. that “what you have prescribed for others, you have prescribed for yourself; the emperor issues laws that he ought to be first to preserve” (St Ambrose cited Pennington 1993:79), is confirmed by Bodin in his *Methodus* of 1566 but is seemingly refuted in his major work, *Six Livres de la Republique* written a decade later. Interpreters are divided over whether the move represents continuity or a sharp break, see Prokhovnik (2008:35-6) for a brief examination of the positions in the debate. It does however seem implausible to assume that the major events Bodin witnessed in the intervening years did not have some influence on his thinking.\textsuperscript{17} The sovereign is however limited by considerations from natural law. This, in conjunction with a second restriction that “the property of private citizens is beyond the sovereign’s reach”, has led some to argue Bodin’s logic of sovereignty is faulty and internally inconsistent (Lewis 1968:209). See Lewis (1968) for a greater discussion and attempted reconciliation of the perceived inconsistencies in Bodin’s work.\textsuperscript{18} Although there is a qualification – if the ruler is a tyrant who has usurped power, he can be lawfully slain under Bodin’s theory of absolute sovereignty through law.
argues that it was during these centuries that a shift in focus occurred in the views of jurists.\textsuperscript{19} When most jurists of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries explained \textit{dominus mundi} they concentrated on the relationship of the prince to the law, and they were not concerned by the problem of whether the Emperor exercised \textit{de iure} or \textit{de facto} jurisdiction over kings. This changed after 1350, by which time jurists always defined kings as independent from the Emperor, which had an associated effect of diminishing the power of the Pope. If Christendom was no longer to be conceived of as a body united under the Emperor, the Church of Rome could no longer exercise its power in the same way. This double faceted independence from secular and church rule strengthened the hierarchical and autonomous nature of Bodin’s sovereign by ensuring the populus had only one master in the political realm.\textsuperscript{20}

Inseparable from autonomy is the perception of sovereignty as inalienable and indivisible. For Bodin, “the notion of a sovereign (that is to say, of someone who is above all subjects) cannot apply to someone who has made a subject his companion,” since this would be an “annihilation of his power” (Bodin 1992:50). In his account, sovereignty consists in the ‘victory’ of one side over the other, “a victory that makes the one sovereign and the other subject” (Hardt & Negri 2001:98). The force and violence used to create the sovereign, and the non-questioning acquiescence expected thereafter, is exemplified for Arendt in the dictatorships adopted in many European countries prior to the outbreak of the Second World War.\textsuperscript{21} Such a division between ruler and ruled is actually seen in work in the genre even prior to Bodin. In his article tracing the influence of Niccolò Machiavelli on Arendt’s political thought, Faisal Baluch draws attention to the fact that as the ‘theorist of beginnings’ (Althusser cited Baluch 2014:162), Machiavelli only ascribes this ‘praiseworthy’ trait to the founder of republics or kingdoms. This must be the case he argues, primarily because individuals hold divergent opinions which makes agreement on a collective course of action difficult. A ‘founder’ must therefore institute a political order alone. Moreover, in Chapter XXIII of \textit{The Prince}, Machiavelli is adamant that a wise ruler will choose shrewd men for his service, permitting them alone to speak frankly – but only when he asks them and not otherwise. He should then listen to their views, but make his own decision and apply his decrees in isolation (Machiavelli 2002:81). Similarly, in Hobbes’ philosophy, in which sovereignty “denotes a relationship of command and

\textsuperscript{19} See also Hinsley (1966).
\textsuperscript{20} However it must be acknowledged that Bodin did simply assume the absolute status of the King of France and explained any evidence to the contrary away with sometimes less than convincing arguments (see Franklin:1973). See also Sheehan (2006) for a discussion on the relationship between church and state in the history of sovereign development.
\textsuperscript{21} See Arendt’s discussion on the decline of the party system in Chapter 4 of the ‘Imperialism’ section in \textit{Origins}. 
obedience” (Pemberton 2009:36), sovereign powers are seen as indivisible for, “Powers divided mutually destroy each other” (Hobbes 2003:225). Sovereignty is seen to be intrinsically monastic or monarchical in nature – “the ‘sway’ or ‘dominion’ of one person over others, the first ruling and the others being ruled” (Franklin 1973:26), where ‘rule’ is taken to be the giving and obeying of commands (Poggi 1978:1). Likewise, in 1629 Cardinal Richelieu wrote a summary of the main directives of royal policy in which he suggested Louis XIII concentrate power, that he “reduce and restrict those bodies which, because of pretentions to sovereignty, always oppose the good of the realm [i.e. the good of the monarchy]” (Richelieu cited Poggi 1978:62). As a notion, sovereign indivisibility of command has therefore had longevity in both theory and practice.

The relationship between sovereign theory and practice is, for James Sheehan (2006), at the heart of all problems pertaining to sovereignty. In his view, sovereignty should be understood both as a ‘unified and inseparable’ doctrine and as a set of ‘plural and divisible’ activities. He warns that we must avoid what Quentin Skinner calls the ‘reification of doctrines’ i.e. “the tendency to turn ideas into things, concepts into conditions, norms into descriptions” (Sheehan 2006:2), but such a bifurcation seems manufactured in this instance and would not be recognised by Arendt. In practice, she notes, sovereignty as an activity is just as unified as in its theoretical mode. The centralisation of control evidenced in the nation-state system for instance, was underpinned by a belief that sovereignty required unity. This led, in her opinion, to the destruction of all authentic desire for local autonomy, thereby undermining the political vitality of all provincial or municipal bodies (EU:267).

Arendt’s fundamental concern is that sovereignty in this tradition is construed as the rule of an ‘uncommanded commander’ who is above the law; accordingly it is “arbitrary, levelling, homogenising, and solipsistic by definition” (Arato & Cohen 2009:307). In contrast, genuine politics is essentially a condition of ‘no rule’, a notion conveyed by the Greek concept of isonomy – “a political organisation in which citizens lived together...without a division between rulers and ruled” (OR:30). Sovereignty in the Bodinian mode extends the hierarchical or paternalistic relationship operating within the household (oikos) to the public sphere, thereby eliminating the plurality of equals necessary for communication and deliberation. It

---

22 Rousseau echoed Hobbes in emphasising the necessary unity and singularity of the sovereign, although for him absolute power was vested in ‘the people’. As noted by Pemberton, Rousseau’s sovereign is “wholly absolute’, ‘wholly sacred’ [and] ‘wholly inviolable’ on the one hand, but...limited on the other, by the end which is the common good” (Pemberton 2009:42). See also Hinsley (1966:153-4) and Elshtain (2008:131).
consequently destroys the potential for genuine political action and thus what it is to be human i.e. to be free. Intrinsic to the concept of isonomy is the “beautiful freedom of the Greeks” (Hegel), a freedom of which it is only possible to conceive when one has left the oikos – a sphere characterised by a form of absolute rule – and entered public life in which political relations are ‘relations without domination’ (Brunkhorst 2002:186). Thus, for Arendt, freedom is always to be understood politically as the freedom of equals where equality is “an attribute of the polis and not of men, who received their equality by virtue of citizenship, not by virtue of birth” (OR:31). It is predicated on plurality and the ability of each to express their opinions. Hence, it is qualitatively different from the form of freedom often associated with the concept of sovereignty which equates sovereignty with freedom from constraint and the ability to dominate and prevail over others. Indeed Arendt believed that it takes courage for individuals to enter public life precisely because the sovereign control enjoyed as master of the household is lost.

The equation of freedom with dominance owes much to the introduction of the concept of ‘free will’ – synonymous for Arendt with ‘will-to-oppression’ – into the political arena. Consequently, to fully appreciate Arendt’s critique of sovereignty it is necessary to understand the basic incompatibility between the notion of political freedom and free will – the subject of the next section.

**On Freedom**

In her ‘A Reply to Eric Voegelin’, Arendt argues that the “more apparent unity” of *The Origins of Totalitarianism* “is provided by certain fundamental concepts which run like red threads through the whole” (EU:403). In the genealogy of totalitarianism she traces, one can infer that for her both the ‘mastership’ or command aspects of political relations examined above, and the features of enmity explored below, are modern rather than ‘natural’ features of political life. In her schematic outline of the simultaneous rise and decline of the European nation-state system and European Jewry, she notes the seventeenth and eighteenth century “witnessed the slow development of nation-states under the tutelage of absolute monarchs” (OT:25). The hierarchical command aspects of sovereignty noted above were discernible in the feudal system; ultimate control was evinced by the crown, including via its “new device of tax monopoly” (OT:27), and subservient obedience was expected. Moreover, absolute monarchs
provided for their financial needs in part via the exercise of their sovereign capacity to decide between friends and enemies and to declare war on and loot the latter. After the French Revolution, nation-states claiming to be above all classes and independent of society, i.e. nation-states in the modern sense, emerged. The very foundation of these “tremendous business concern[s]” (OT:28) were however undermined with the rise of imperialism, which introduced a ‘competitive spirit’ into the comity of nations (OT:26). That understood, command and enmity remained visible features of political relations under totalitarianism as the final part of Origins evidences in great detail. Whilst not explicitly noted within this text, there are indications, which can be supplemented from evidence drawn from Arendt’s other works, that what is overlooked in this ‘story’ of political operation is the possibility of political relations being manifest in and securing of mutual freedom. When addressing the concept of freedom we are faced with a difficulty Arendt sums up “as the contradiction between our consciousness and conscience, telling us that we are free and hence responsible, and our everyday experience in the outer world, in which we orient ourselves according to the principle of causality” (BPF:142). Arendt contends that properly understood, freedom is a condition of politics and human affairs in general, and that it was only within the context of religious conversion first with Paul, then with Augustine that the concept became fatally equated with the notion of free will.

While some such as Suzanne Jacobitti (1988:53-76) argue that the will did not figure significantly in Arendt’s early scholarship, the concept of the will is one that Arendt remained cognisant of at all times, and her entire body of work is ‘book-ended’ with explicit considerations on the topic that largely rely on her reading of Augustine (Martel 2008:288). In her doctoral dissertation Arendt clearly accepts Augustine’s understanding of the will as the central faculty of the mind, which derives its power in part from the fact that it mediates between the inner life of the mind and action in the outside world. According to Duns Scotus, whom Arendt very much respected, “the will is a power because it can achieve something” (cited LOM Willing:142). Whilst in Paul’s earlier version the will is seen to comprise two separate elements, in the case of Augustine and thereafter in Arendt, the will is a single entity inherently and necessarily divided between the ‘I will’ (velle) and the ‘I nill’ (nolle). This internal division can make the will impotent since one can will a thing without having sufficient agency to achieve it; in the words of Augustine (oft-quoted by Arendt) “Non hoc est velle quod posse” (cited LOM Willing:87). Such paralysis is a surprising condition (which can only be resolved by acting), since the very essence of the will is obviously to command and to be obeyed (BPF:157;
LOM Willing:58) – an insight taken directly from Chapter 9 Book VIII of the Confessions and one that causes Arendt anguish when applied to the political realm.

In Willing Arendt illustrates the traditional (but not ancient) philosophic position regarding the will, demonstrating philosophers’ distrust of it as concept due to its inevitable connection with freedom. Two distinct and quite different notions of free will (and thus freedom) emerge from this historical examination, the first of which can be considered as the original and most prevalent view – that of liberum arbitrium which “decides between things equally possible and given to us, as it were, in statu nascendi as mere potentialities” (LOM Willing:29). Freedom in this instance is derived from the tension between an ‘I will’ (velle) and an ‘I nill’ (nolle) – both of which must be present to secure freedom. However this is not a simple relationship. Arendt concludes this concept of free will rests on the assumption that “if man has a will at all, it must appear as though there were two wills present in the same man, fighting with each other for power over his mind. Hence, the will is both powerful and impotent, free and unfree” (BPF:160). The link between power and freedom is crucial and is played out within one’s self. The liberum arbitrium is the freedom of the philosopher, an ‘inner freedom’ into which the politically coerced can escape and hope to sustain themselves “in sovereign independence of the outside world” (MDT:9). Indeed she notes in Origins, even under the terror of totalitarianism, concentration camps sometimes offered the only place “where certain remnants of freedom of thought and discussion still existed” (OT:376 FN50). However, since when we act, we cease to will (LOM Willing:101-2), such freedom is necessarily private and hidden and thus for Arendt, politically irrelevant. It is a ‘fool’s freedom’ since, as in the case of the concentration camp detainee, “nothing they think matters anyhow” (OT:376 emphasis added). Using the example of Christian will-power Arendt illustrates how in practice the liberum arbitrium is characterised by oppression. Will-power was supposed to liberate the self from worldly desires and intentions, but because it lacked the capacity to generate genuine power, all it succeeded in achieving was oppressing the I-nill – “will-to-power turned at once into a will-to-oppression” (BPF:161) and thus freedom in this notion appears to be secured by domination.

The other view considers the will to be an organ of the future equivalent with the power to begin something new and which therefore “could not very well be preceded by any potentiality” (LOM Willing:29). Scholars such as Andreas Kalyvas (2004:320-346) and Jacobitti (1988:53-76) criticise Arendt for what they consider to be her inconsistency regarding the role
of the will in freedom. They argue that in her last work Arendt recognises this second view of the will and that for her, understood in this manner, the will is no longer alien to freedom. Yet this does not seem to be an accurate reflection of Arendt’s work. More convincing is the view of Young-Bruehl who concludes that Arendt considers both thinking and willing as activities that do not have direct results in the world, but that they are not without result in the individual (1982b:290-1). The will’s conflict shapes the character of each individual – it is “the sheer activity of the Will [that] is the principle of human individuation, the principle which, so to speak, sustains for the future the capacity of beginning which is each man’s by virtue of birth” (Young-Bruehl 1982b:290). One may agree with Young-Bruehl that Arendt’s aim in the Life of the Mind was to show how a philosophical investigation of the mind can offer political theory a portrait of the thinking, willing and judging faculties in their freedom, it does not however follow that Arendt wished to apply these characteristics to the political realm as seems to be implied by Kalyvas and Jacobitti. It is more justified to argue that such application would be an anathema to her since she was always convinced that the concerns of the vita contemplativa differ significantly from those of the vita activa.

The confusion demonstrated by some scholars is partially understandable when one considers that Arendt praises Augustine’s concept of political freedom as distinct from philosophic freedom. In his only political work De Civitate Dei, political freedom is conceived of as spontaneity and the creation of something completely new and unpredictable – characteristics seen in the second definition of the will. However, he is clear that such freedom is evidenced, “not as an inner human disposition but as a character of human existence in the world” (BPF:165). Simply expressed, for Augustine man does not possess political freedom so much as his coming into the world is equated with the appearance of freedom in the universe; “man is free because he is a beginning and …Because he is a beginning, man can begin; to be human and to be free are one and the same” (BPF:166).

The coincidence of beginning and freedom is supported linguistically with both the Greek and the Latin language possessing two verbs to designate what in English we uniformly call ‘to act’. The first in Greek essentially means to begin, to lead and to rule; the second is to carry something through. The capacity to begin is the “outstanding quality of a free man” and thus being free and the capacity to begin something new coincide in this term. “Freedom, as we would say today, was experienced in spontaneity” (BPF:164). In Latin, to be free and to begin are also interconnected, albeit in a different manner. Roman freedom resided in the notion
and event of foundation. It was a legacy bequeathed by the founders of Rome to the Roman people that they had to ‘augment’: “The Roman historians always felt bound to the beginning of Roman history, because this beginning contained the authentic element of Roman freedom and thus made their history political” (BPF:165). Such an interpretation of freedom is what revolutionaries have historically been striving for, and it is thus clear why Arendt has sympathy with revolution properly conceived and executed. It also has wider implications. In her discussion of totalitarianism Arendt alludes to the bounded nature of freedom – that it needs the limits of human artifice. She explains how positive laws enacted by constitutional government are specifically designed to both “erect boundaries” and to “establish channels of communication [conditions of worldliness] between men whose community is continually endangered by the new men born into it” (OT:599). She goes on to note how the stability of such laws corresponds to the constant motion of human affairs (the natality possible with each new birth) and that therefore “the laws hedge in each new beginning and at the same time assure its freedom of movement…they guarantee the pre-existence of a common world, the reality of some continuity which transcends the individual life span of each generation” (OT:600). Politics requires the maintenance of this ‘in between’ space and ultimately she argues that to abolish the ‘fences’ of laws between men destroys any potential for genuine political relations of mutual freedom for “the space between men, as it is hedged in by laws, is the living space of freedom” (OT:600).

The division between philosophic and political freedom is one that Arendt considers vital, and she appreciates both Augustine and Montesquieu for their recognition of this distinction. Arendt regards Montesquieu as the greatest representative of political secularism precisely for his awareness of the inadequacy of the Christian and philosophers’ concept of freedom for political purposes. For Montesquieu, philosophers demand of freedom no more than “the exercise of the will, independent of circumstances and attainment of the goals the will has set.” Political freedom however consists in “being able to do what one ought to will (the emphasis is on pouvoir)” (BPF:159). The conclusion Arendt draws is that political freedom is distinct from philosophic freedom “in being clearly a quality of the I-can and not of the I-will” (LOM Willing:200). She believes that political freedom was known as a fact of everyday life in one of the few genuinely political realms – the Greek polis – because “it provided men with a space of appearances where they could act, with a kind of theatre... where freedom as virtuosity [an excellence attributed to performing arts i.e. politics] can appear” (BPF:152-3
emphasis added). The ability to act without motive and be unable to know for certain the ends of our action are the vital factors. In a sense therefore her understanding of freedom dates back to Greek and Roman antiquity where freedom was recognised as the free man’s status – i.e. his ability to move into the world and engage with others as equals. Liberation is thus a necessary but insufficient condition for freedom; it also requires “the company of other men who were in the same state, and... a politically organised world...into which each of the free men could insert himself by word and deed” (BPF:147).

Plurality – understood as the existence of equal, distinct individuals free to discourse and contest with each other24 – is therefore crucial. As Dietrich Bonhoffer contends, it is only in relationship with ‘the other’ that I am free, “no substantial or individualistic concept...can conceive of freedom” (cited Elshtain 2008:237). This is one of the major reasons why Arendt objects to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s concept of sovereignty.25 His interpretation of sovereignty is predicated on the concept of the General Will which is generated by individuals autonomously as citizens, looking into their hearts and voting in what they believe to be the public interest. Rousseau believes that the result of this personal reflection will be a unanimous, single opinion and that to achieve the most pure, incorrupt expression of the General Will the people need to be adequately informed, and have “no communication among themselves” (Rousseau 1997b:60). Plurality of perspectives and opinions is thus essentially denied. Furthermore, Rousseau believes that whilst the General Will can never be wrong, it can be misguided and therefore individuals “must be obligated to conform their wills to reason” (Rousseau 1997b:68). This suggests, as is recognised by Canovan (1983:292), “that if what unites the General Will follows logically from a single common interest, then a single rational man can work out what the General Will requires without any need for real public deliberations.” Politics, in the sense of public action and discussion is therefore redundant, and ‘the other’ is systematically abolished (Charvet 1974:145).

23 The value Arendt places on political action as a performative art is seen by Baluch as emerging from her engagement with Machiavelli see Baluch (2014: 154-177).
24 See Arendt on Lessing in *Men in Dark Times* for a discussion on the value of contestation to the human condition (MDT:3-32).
25 Rousseau’s concept of sovereignty is archetypal of the popular sovereignty tradition which ‘radicalised’ Bodin’s modern doctrine without fundamentally altering it (Merriam cited Pemberton 2009:22). Gourevitch believes that sovereignty in its popular form is “The theme of the *Social Contract*” and that “every issue and argument which Rousseau takes up in the course of the work seeks either to strengthen the case for it, or to ward off challenges to it” (Gourevitch in Rousseau 1997b:xxiii). Prokhovnik credits Rousseau with providing us with the classical statement of a radically popular sovereignty (2008:95), and as highlighted by Canovan (1983:286), like Arendt he also “in a sense, wrestled with human plurality, but [his] solution rarely has been thought entirely satisfactory” – especially by Arendt.
It is clear that Arendt respects both the philosophic understanding of free choice and freedom as a genuinely political attribute, but equally she believes that the realms in which these two concepts operate are distinct, and have non-transferable characteristics. Young-Bruehl essentially concludes that the two types of freedom are in fact, for Arendt, mutually exclusive when she points out that “The price for action...is loss of that freedom in which both I-will and I-nill are active: mental freedom. But action can gain for men the freedom in political terms which Arendt considered in the final pages of ‘Willing’” (Young-Bruehl 1982b:288-9). Great danger is inherent in superimposing the philosophical notion of freedom onto the political realm because it appears to legitimate an oppressive, commanding relationship in the name of securing freedom in a sphere whose existence depends entirely on a spontaneity to begin that such a relationship precludes. It is “one of the causes why even today we almost automatically equate power with oppression or, at least, with rule over others” (BPF:161). Despite these dangers however, freedom did become a philosophical problem of the first order with Paul and Augustine and “the philosophic shift from action to will-power, from freedom as a state of being manifest in action to the *liberum arbitrium*” has resulted in the attendant problems that “the ideal of freedom ceased to be virtuosity... and became sovereignty, the ideal of free will, independent from others and eventually prevailing against them” (BPF:161-2).

In the context of this chapter we have reached the crux of the issue. Arendt is explicit in her denunciation of equating freedom with sovereignty stating:

> Politically, this identification...is perhaps the most pernicious and dangerous consequence of the philosophical equation of freedom and free will. For it leads either to a denial of human freedom – namely, if it is realised that whatever men may be, they are never sovereign – or to the insight that the freedom of one man, or a group, or a body politic can be purchased only at the price of the freedom, i.e. sovereignty, of all others (BPF:163).

In practice, freedom has become intertwined within the myriad theories of sovereignty, which has led to the mistaken assumption that sovereignty in some manner guarantees freedom. For example freedom for Rousseau meant both political and personal liberty, which he saw as working hand in hand. For Rousseau “men can be both ruled and free if they rule themselves”, thus “A people can be free if they retain sovereignty over itself” (Cranston cited Prokhovnik 2008:96). Arendt addresses this point directly in her examination of the Dreyfus Affair. Quoting Clemenceau, she agrees that the actions of the French people during this episode “‘proclaimed before the whole world the failure of their ‘democracy.’” That, through them, “a sovereign people shows itself thrust from its throne of justice, shorn of its infallible majesty... A collective
tyrant, spread over the length and breadth of the land,” he notes “is no more acceptable than a single tyrant ensconced upon his throne” (Clemenceau cited OT:146). This is not to say that Arendt interpreted every manifestation of sovereignty as anti-political, indeed James Martel (2008:287-313) and Hanna Pitkin (1998:199-200) question her consistency of thought on the topic. In The Human Condition Arendt writes:

Sovereignty, which is always spurious if claimed by an isolated single entity, be it the individual entity of the person, or the collective entity of a nation, assumes, in the case of many men mutually bound by promises, a certain limited reality. (HC:245)

This ‘certain limited reality’ pertains to the force of mutual promise or contract which keeps people gathered together enabling them to ‘act in concert’ and thus to generate genuine power as Arendt understands it. She provides an example of sovereignty thus understood in On Revolution in which she commends the Mayflower Compact, the first governing document of the Plymouth Colony.26 From this document she draws the conclusion that the obvious fear each as an individual had of everyone else was accompanied by an obvious confidence in their power as a group, “held together solely by the strength of mutual promise ‘in the Presence of God and one another’” i.e. “granted and confirmed by no one and as yet unsupported by any means of violence” (OR:167). The body politic resultant from such a covenant “becomes the very source of power for each individual person who outside the constituted political realm remains impotent” (OR:171), it is thus political for Arendt. However, the sovereignty of such a body politic only remains intact whilst there is an “agreed purpose for which alone the promises are valid and binding” because such sovereignty resides in a “limited independence from the incalculability of the future” (HC:245). It is quite limited and can only ever reign in a “body politic that rel[ies] on contracts and treaties”, one that “unlike those that rely on rule and sovereignty, leave[s] the unpredictability of human affairs and the unreliability of men as they are” (HC:245). Contracts or promises are “certain islands of predictability” (HC:244), or more simply, limits facilitating political action. The moment promises lose their character as ‘isolated islands of certainty in an ocean of uncertainty’ and are misused to cover the whole ground of the future, they alter the nature of human affairs on which their role is predicated and thus lose their binding power and the limited sovereignty to which Arendt alluded above is destroyed.

26 Arendt is explicit that the new political bodies resultant of the Mayflower Compact and the deeds it inspired were really ‘political societies’ laying the foundation for political realms “that enjoyed power and…[were] entitled to claim rights without possessing or claiming sovereignty” (OR:168).
It is therefore clear that the sovereignty Arendt recognises as potentially political can only ever exist in a community that has renounced the command/obedience aspect of sovereignty and recognises that plurality and limits are sacrosanct. In short, it is the modelling of political freedom upon command notions of the will that has ‘pernicious and dangerous consequences’. Such consequences are also manifest in Carl Schmitt’s influential theory of sovereignty which is similarly predicated on a commanding relationship. But moreover, his work is paradigmatic of that which perceives all political relationships in terms of mutual enmity, the implications of which are discussed below as they pertain to Arendt’s critique of sovereignty as destructive of the political.

**Sovereignty as Mutual Enmity**

Michael Hardt has perceptively observed that “the renewed interest in the concept of sovereignty in the field of political theory is related in part to the analyses of the autonomy of the political that first focussed on the work of Hannah Arendt and more recently on that of Carl Schmitt” (Hardt cited Lipping 2010:203). Although Arendt does not explicitly engage with Schmitt’s theorising in her writing, she was obviously aware of his work and notes his “very ingenious theories about the end of democracy and legal government still make arresting reading” (OT:449FN65). Moreover, she quotes his words in the course of Origins in her discussions on the state and sovereignty. And lately commentators such as Arato and Cohen have argued that in order to fully comprehend Arendt’s understanding of sovereignty “it is important to uncover Carl Schmitt’s direct or (since she has not left us with the needed references) indirect role in her train of thought” (Arato and Cohen 2009: 310). It is therefore necessary to briefly examine Schmitt’s ideas.

In response to the problems facing the Weimar Republic after their defeat in World War One, Schmitt sought to differentiate the political from other domains of the social and to create a theory which restored the state’s monopoly on politics and reinstated its sovereign position. Ultimately, concepts such as politics and the political concerned Schmitt only in so far as they informed the notion of state sovereignty. His manner of theorising led him to represent categories by polemical opposites, each deemed to have a level of independence. “A definition of the political”, he argues, “can be obtained only by discovering and defining the specifically

27 See for example pp. 321(FN76), 336, 340 and 449.
political categories... to which all actions with a specifically political meaning can be traced” (Schmitt 1996a:25-6). The specific political distinction he arrives at in his thesis is between friend and enemy, and this division “denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation” (Schmitt 1996a:26). By this he means that the political can exist both theoretically and practically without having simultaneously to draw upon any other distinction. That said, as the political is seen to be the most intense of all distinctions it can easily employ other categorisations such as morality for support, without however jeopardising the independence of either sphere.

At its most fundamental level the enemy has two essential characteristics. The first is that he is ‘the other’, ‘the stranger’, “existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible” (Schmitt 1996a:27). Antagonism is therefore crucial for Schmitt in the realm of the political and in reality, as noted by Arendt (particularly in her discussion on imperialism in Origins) such a concept of the ‘other’ is used to instigate and justify humanitarian atrocities. The second characteristic is that “An enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity” (Schmitt 1996a:28). Schmitt recognises that this presupposes that “The enemy is solely the public enemy” (emphasis added) and that, in common with Arendt (although using different justification), “the political world is a pluriverse, not a universe” (Schmitt 1996a:53).

The friend-enemy dichotomy of sovereignty is exemplified for Arendt in matters pertaining to “‘emigration, naturalisation, nationality, and expulsion’ [Preuss]” (OT:354). In these matters the sovereign is able to concretise ‘us’ and ‘them’, but she believes it was only with the rise of totalitarian regimes that sovereignty as mutual enmity became fully manifest. “One is almost tempted”, she argues, “to measure the degree of totalitarian infection by the extent to which the concerned governments use their sovereign right of denationalisation” (OT:354-5). Before this point, European states recognised the impossibility of fully exercising these rights – “that full national sovereignty was possible only as long as the comity of European nations existed; for it was the spirit of unorganised solidarity and agreement that prevented any government’s exercise of its full sovereign power” (OT:354). It was totalitarian administrations which perceived political relationships exclusively in terms of ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’ or ‘us’ and ‘them’, although seeds had been planted for this development under the imperialist rule of the nineteenth century.
In essence, for Schmitt, the seriousness of the political can be reduced to the fact that the state controls the possibility of declaring war and of subsequently publicly risking the lives of its population. In concrete situations the state is able to decide upon the enemy and to fight said enemy with its monopoly of force. Furthermore, as argued by Charles Frye “the political sphere is sovereign, according to Schmitt, because in the exceptional situations which arise in human activities, it is always the political sphere that determines the course to be taken, that decides what is to be done” (Frye 1966:825 emphasis added). The decision is thus fundamental to Schmitt’s notion of sovereignty – “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception” (Schmitt 1988:5).

Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty can be read in opposition to liberal ideology which owes much to ideas drawn from theorists such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant. According to Raia Prokhovnik (2008), the liberal conception of sovereignty mirrors liberal individualism since, in both, equality pertains to a sense of mutual recognition via legislation or convention of equal formal rights. For liberal theorists the autonomous individual is the operative notion, thus liberalism requires that sovereignty be, or incorporate, self-rule by individuals. Schmitt believes that the modern constitutional state cannot be preserved in this manner and that the personal, indivisible element had to be reinstated in sovereignty replacing the nineteenth century liberal idea of the sovereignty of law (Schwab in Schmitt 1988:xvi). For Schmitt, sovereignty is not only a legal model but it is also profoundly political. Indeed Étienne Balibar notes that sovereignty in Schmitt’s hands is an “unlimited and purely referential competence to suspend the laws in order to re-establish the conditions of their effectiveness” (Balibar 2004:136). Central to Schmitt’s revision of the concept is his belief in the inadequacy of existing theories to deal effectively with political crisis or the exception, and for him “It is precisely the exception that makes relevant the subject of sovereignty” (Schmitt 1988: 6).

28 Whilst Schmitt is foremost a proponent of state sovereignty the concept of the decision is also politically problematic for theories of popular sovereignty. Arendt illustrates this in her critique of the French Revolution which she sees as having failed in part because of the capriciousness of the decision makers “that the so-called will of a multitude (if this is to be more than a legal fiction) is ever-changing by definition, and that a structure built on it as its foundation is built on quicksand” (OR:163).

29 It is on these grounds that Gabriella Slomp (2009:51) sees Schmitt as objecting to Hobbes’ theory of sovereignty. The implication she draws from Schmitt’s work is that Hobbes “lays the power to decide on the case of the exception at the door of the individual, and for this reason the individual and not the state is sovereign.” See also Rousseau, The Social Contract for an alternative version of this principle.

30 It should be recognised that in Political Theology, Schmitt reaches distinctly different conclusions on concepts such as the exception and the norm from those he arrives at in earlier works (McCormick 1997b:171). Similarly, as noted by Wolin, in Political Theology, unlike in Schmitt’s previous scholarship, “one is left with the idea of dictatorship in all its authoritarian starkness” – the earlier distinction between commissarial dictatorship (for a specific purpose) and sovereign dictatorship (unlimited power) disappears (Wolin 1990:400). The position
Definitions are important, and in *Political Theology* Schmitt notes “the decision on the exception is a decision in the true sense of the word because it cannot be entirely derived from the norm”, whilst “[T]he exception, which is not codified in the existing legal order, can at best be characterised as a case of extreme peril, a danger to the existence of the state, or the like” (Schmitt 1988:6). The exception cannot be subsumed into the prevailing legal order and “defies general codification”, whilst “simultaneously reveal[ing] a specifically juristic element – the decision in absolute purity” (Schmitt 1988:13). It is therefore clear that Schmitt was at pains to distinguish between ‘politics-as-usual’ in which legal norms operate, and politics during times of crisis when any such norms are suspended. As recognised by Ellen Kennedy, Schmitt disclaimed any originality in his thought. He viewed Bodin as one of his intellectual forefathers and saw what he was doing as a ‘purification’ of Bodin’s theory (Pemberton 2009:30). Schmitt read in Bodin’s work the recognition that sovereignty relates to the critical case or the exception – that “the prince is duty bound toward the estates or the people only to the extent of fulfilling his promise in the interest of the people; he is not so bound under conditions of urgent necessity” (Kennedy 2004:80). Moreover, in his ‘despair’ about the religious wars (Schmitt 1996b:43), Schmitt understood Bodin to have introduced decisionism into sovereignty when he “reduced his analysis of relations between prince and estates to a simple either/or” (Schmitt 1988:8). And Schmitt acknowledged that it was seventeenth century natural lawyers such as Pufendorf who recognised that the real question was “whose decision in the final and crucial case is decisive. Not the end, but the decision about the means to an end is what matters” (Schmitt: *De Diktatur* cited Kennedy 2004:80).

Decisionism – “the lynchpin that [for Schmitt] holds together both the ‘topdown’ homogeneity of the state and the heterogeneity of a structured plurality of states” (Rasch 2004:37) – is characterised thus:

It is not the command as command, but the authority or the sovereignty of an ultimate decision given in command, which constitutes the source of all law, that is, of all the norms and the orders that follow from it...Consequently the sovereign decision can be juridically explained neither from a [i.e. antecedent] norm nor by a concrete order because for decisionism it is the decision that grounds both the norm and the order. The sovereign decision is an absolute beginning, and the beginning...is nothing else than a sovereign decision. It springs out of a normative nothingness and from concrete disorder (Schmitt cited Kalyvas 2004:323).

predominantly examined here is Schmitt’s later one, which is more explicitly about the concepts of decision and exception.
The difference between constituting and constituted power is relevant here. As is noted by Giorgio Agamben, both theory and positive legislation have always encountered difficulties in formulating and maintaining the difference between the two. He quotes a recent treatise of political science that reads:

If one really means to give the distinction between constituting power and constituted power its true meaning, it is necessary to place constituting and constituted power on two different levels. Constituted powers exist only in the State: inseparable from a pre-established constitutional order, they need the State frame, whose reality they manifest. Constituting power, on the other hand, is situated outside the State; it owes nothing to the State, it exists without it, it is the spring whose current no use can ever exhaust (Agamben 1998:39).

The extensive quote on decisionism alludes to the constituting power of the decision. In this instance the sovereign decision is “instituting, productive and norm-creating...[it] signifies the radical beginning of a new regime that cannot be reduced or traced back to any anterior procedure, set of rights, legal structure, or fundamental laws” (Kalyvas 2004:323). Whilst Kalyvas does see similarities between Schmitt and Arendt, such a beginning should not be confused with Arendt’s notion of natality. Schmitt’s ‘radical beginning’ has nothing to do with an individual’s insertion into a pre-existing common world and the attribute of freedom as a beginning; it is rather the imposition of one entity’s will onto a subordinate mass. Beginning, for Schmitt, is simply the form of rule as command and obedience. Once this type of sovereign decision has been made, the stability and strength of the state is maintained by other sovereign decisions being applied in a similar manner. Schmitt’s decisionism is thus “devoid of substantive goals”, directed as it were to a “rather unexalted end...the end of political self-preservation” (Wolin 1990:404). Parallels can be drawn between this form of sovereignty and the form of rule by decree Arendt recognised as operating under imperialism.

It is important to note that not every sovereign decision is an ‘absolute beginning’ as is clear from reflecting on the relationship between the sovereign and the law or legal norms. The sovereign is above the law – he or she creates and has the power to negate legal norms – but such endeavours can only be understood in the overall context of the legal order within which their authority operates. This is clarified when considering what, for Schmitt, characterises an exception:

31 Drawing parallels between the ‘radical’ nature of this beginning and Arendt’s notion of spontaneity should also be resisted since for Arendt spontaneity is a characteristic of the single individual and cannot be applied to institutions (PP:113).
An exception is principally unlimited authority which means the suspension of the entire existing order. In such a situation it is clear that the state remains, whereas law recedes because the exception is different from anarchy and chaos, order in the juristic sense still prevails even if it is not of the ordinary kind (Schmitt 1988:12).

He is explicit, the existing order can be suspended – it is not necessarily completely destroyed and therefore a new ‘absolute beginning’ is not necessarily resultant. In essence, sovereignty entails the political decision to save politics by temporarily suspending normal political activity (Rasch 2004:29).

Whilst George Schwab believes that Schmitt’s sovereign makes only two fundamental decisions – what must be done to eliminate the exception, and whether order and stability have been restored and normality regained (Schwab in Schmitt 1988:xvii) – there is a third and it is arguably the most important. The decision on what actually constitutes the exception and thus conscribes the norm underpins both of these decisions and has to be made before either of the other two. These decisions are evidently of different typologies. The determination of what is ‘normal’ and what is ‘exceptional’ are clearly examples of decision between two given things (the norm and the exception) by a predetermined motive (what the sovereign believes will strengthen and stabilise the state). In practice this type of decision is visible when administrations declare ‘a state of emergency’ in response to a perceived threat whether it be from a natural disaster, for instance the powerful storms in the USA in 2012, or a political event such as in response to the activities of terrorist organisations including Boko Haram in certain Nigerian states in 2013. They justify Arendt’s belief that sovereignty can appropriate the command aspect of the will for the political sphere thereby eliminating the freedom that should characterise this realm. However, the decision on ‘what should be done to eliminate the exception’, which Kalyvas sees as a variation on ‘the event as miracle’ (Kalyvas 2004:322), can, in a limited sense, actually be classified as a ‘productive power’ in that it looks for solutions that are yet to exist. This is exemplified by responses in states of emergency such as the declaration of a ‘War on Terror’ post 9/11.

Even so, freedom is precluded in the sense

---

32 McCormick (1997b:169) notes that in Political Theology Schmitt seems to merge the normal (deciding that an exceptional situation exists) with the exceptional moment (deciding what to do about it) that in his previous work Die Dictatur he analysed as politically pathological. He actually conflates the two decisions making them the province of a single entity.

33 In such political emergencies, the friend-enemy characterisation of sovereignty is often clearly visible.

34 Elshtain convincingly argues that since it is increasingly difficult today to distinguish between ‘peacetime’ and ‘wartime’ because the national security apparatus has become permanent (especially in post 9/11 America), “the exception is operating, on some ‘normalised’ level, pretty much all the time” (Elshtain 2008:157).
Arendt means since command and obedience are still the prevailing characteristics – the sovereign in isolation devises the ‘solution’, the populus are expected to submit to it.

Arendt’s attitude towards the decision remains a contentious issue among many commentators on her work (Kalyvas 2004:320-1; d’Entreves 2003:86-7). At one extreme are scholars such as Kateb (1984:28-33) and Kohn (1990:105-134) who believe her political existentialism and her views on the groundlessness of politics and the arbitrariness of freedom point to a ‘veiled theory of decisionism’, whilst at the other end of the spectrum her rejection of the will and sovereignty are invoked to demonstrate her ‘principled opposition’ to any such concept. In this context, i.e. understanding decisionism as an expression of an incontestable sovereign will, exemplified most clearly by Schmitt, the latter position seems most convincing. The arguments made in the present chapter suggest that it would be specious to assume Arendt’s view on freedom leads to a Schmittian form of decisionism since the very characteristics she ascribes to freedom can only be conceived of outwith the matrix of his definition of the decision. However, this form of decisionism is by no means necessarily the same as a modified form of decisionism in political existentialism orientated towards non-sovereign freedom. Martin Jay notes that Arendt’s ‘tender’ variant of decisionism substitutes the freedom inherent in natality (the capacity to begin) for what Alfred Bäumler describes as action’s “setting off in a direction” (cited Jay 1986:242). Jay however argues that the meaning is essentially the same – Arendt wants to liberate political action from all extraneous considerations because to be free action must be “free from motive on one side, from its intended goal as a predictable effect on the other” (BPF:150). Thus it is perfectly possible and consistent for Arendt to hold different opinions towards the decision in different contexts.

Despite the myriad differences between the theories of Schmitt and Arendt, there are in fact ‘striking parallels’ between the two. As noted by Jüri Lipping, “It is precisely in reference to these thinkers that the political is discussed as a space of commonality or a field of relations (Beziehungsfeld). They both emphasise the political has neither substance (Substanz) nor sphere of reference (Sachgebiet) of its own; that it is inherently plural and that it initially appears only in-between men” (Lipping 2010:190-1). Equally, both were more interested in ‘concrete application’ rather than abstract concepts, with Hans Sluga arguing that Arendt’s methodology in analysing concepts was historical and critical in tone, “always driven by

---

35 Hinchman and Hinchman (1991) argue Jaspers’ categories reappear, politicised, in Arendt’s thought, and they make specific note of Arendt’s concept of freedom and the language she uses when depicting natality to make their case.
practical and political ends...recall[ing] identifiable motivations in Schmitt’s analyses of political concepts (Sluga 2008:96). Furthermore, just as Arendt is a theorist of the bounded community, in characterising modern Europe as comprised of distinct entities in which the state is sole subject of politics (Schmitt 1996a:6), Schmitt also presupposes the spatiality and bounded nature of politics (although his definition differs significantly from Arendt’s). Such limits were however threatened throughout the course of the twentieth century, which led Arendt to argue that not only is the concept of sovereignty potentially destructive of the political, but that it is essentially moribund “lead[ing] the life of a walking corpse” (EU:143). This notion will be taken up and examined in the next section.

**Concept of Modern Sovereignty**

The decline of the nation-state and national sovereignty is one of the most contentious arguments Arendt makes in *Origins*. Whilst she provides empirical examples from history to make her case, she also examines the work of Thomas Hobbes – “the only great philosopher to whom the bourgeoisie can rightly and exclusively lay claim” (OT:186). In effect, Arendt contends that Hobbes’ theory of sovereignty – in which the public good is derived from private interest and the ultimate aim of any Commonwealth is the accumulation of power – became the cipher for the concept of modern sovereignty. In this she is supported by commentators such as Prokhovnik who notes that Hobbes’ theory of sovereignty has a crucial place in the discourse “having been taken as providing the paradigmatic definition of sovereignty not just for the modern state but also (and inter-relatedly) for the modern international system” (Prokhovnik 2008:55).

For Hobbes, political sovereignty (as opposed to the sovereignty instituted “by Naturall force; as when a man maketh his children” (Hobbes 2003:21), comes not from the positive actions of the sovereign, but from the active and deliberative deeds of the people in relation to each other (Hobbes 2003:121). Power is the central concept, indeed the Hobbesian Commonwealth from which “[is] derived all the Rights, and Facultyes of him, or them, on whom the Soveraigne

---

36 Arendt’s abiding concern with freedom, plurality, and the public realm highlight her privileging of practice over abstract concept. Whilst the value she places on the action of men and women over theory and concept is surmised succinctly in her Preface to *Men in Dark Times* in which she writes, “even in the darkest of times we have the right to expect some illumination, and that illumination may well come less from theories and concepts than from the uncertain, flickering, and often weak light that some men and women, in their lives and their works, will kindle under almost all circumstances” (MDT:ix). See Chandler (2008:43-48) for an examination of the importance of application in Schmitt.
Power is conferred by the consent of the People assembled” (Hobbes 2003:121), is based on the delegation of power and not of rights:

Security is provided by the law, which is a direct emanation from the power monopoly of the state...[A]nd as this law flows directly from absolute power, it represents absolute necessity in the eyes of the individual who lives under it. In regard to the law of the state – that is, the accumulated power of society as monopolised by the state – there is no question of right or wrong, but only absolute obedience... (OT:188-9).

Sovereignty is thus legally unfettered instituted power, in which the sovereign will is both unpredictable and incommunicable, the consequences of which are seen under imperial rule.

Power or authority (used interchangeably in Leviathan) is taken by Hobbes to mean the capacity to ensure compliance with any order issued by the sovereign – ‘the present means to secure the future’ – and is therefore fundamentally different from what Arendt understands by the terms. In brief, compulsion is a necessary element for Hobbes’ notion of authority and the methods he deems just to enforce obedience comprise “either Corporall, or Pecuniary, or Ignominy, or Imprisonment, or Exile, or a mixt of these” (Hobbes 2003:217). However, for Arendt, although authority demands obedience it precludes the use of external means of coercion – “where force is used”, she argues, “authority itself has failed” (BPF:92). Likewise, Arendt’s understanding of power is very different. For her it is a genuinely political attribute which is predicated upon conditions of plurality and “corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert” (OV:44). It therefore requires the existence of a public sphere and cannot be ascribed to an individual. It is ‘for the world’ and “belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keep together” (OV:44). In contrast, violence is an anti-political manifestation of strength and domination over others. More appropriate in her view then, is to consider Hobbes’ sovereign as possessor of the means of violence.

Violence is, and always has been part of sovereignty’s history, and all too often argues James Sheehan, “the boundaries marking the limits of sovereign power [traditionally understood] were drawn with blood” (Sheehan 2006:6). Arendt recognises the misguided temptation to think of power in terms of command and obedience and hence to equate power with violence when considering administration in the political realm. Violence she understands “appears as a last resort to keep the power structure intact against individual challengers – the foreign enemy, the native criminal” (OV:47), but the danger in conflating violence and power is far

---

37 To the distress of Arendt who notes the failure to distinguish between key words such as power and authority “not only indicates a certain deafness to linguistic meaning, but...has also resulted in a kind of blindness to the realities they correspond to” (OV:43).
more than one of semantics. It centres on the fact that when a concept, which by its nature is destructive of the freedom that characterises the political realm, is introduced into it and left to run its course, “it ends in [genuine] power’s disappearance” (OV:56). Arendt wrote extensively about the consequences of introducing violence into the political realm and this is a topic which will be reflected upon throughout this thesis.

Hobbes elaborates on the content of the Leviathan’s power, and of particular relevance to Arendt is his understanding of it in economic terms as “the accumulated control that permits the individual to fix prices and regulate supply and demand in such a way that they contribute to his own advantage” (OT:187). This is to disregard one of political science’s oldest perceptions – that power cannot be measured in terms of wealth (OV:10). But more, since for Hobbes public good is derived from private interest, desire for power is not simply the fundamental passion of each as individuals, but also of the Commonwealth. This has significant implications and risks realising the insight that an abundance of wealth may in fact erode power, particularly in republics – an intuition which, Arendt contends, “does not lose in validity because it has been forgotten” (OV:10-11).

Arendt suggests that Hobbes is exclusively concerned with the political structure itself. His depiction of humankind is therefore predicated upon the needs of the Leviathan rather than the result of any accurate understanding of the human condition. Significantly however, as Arendt understands it, a body politic akin to the Leviathan came into being under imperialism and thus the picture of being Hobbes devised was in effect “a sketch for the new type of Man who would fit into it” (OT:188). These beings are deprived of political rights since public life is seen in economic terms and thus “manifests itself in the guise of necessity” (OT:189); and since Hobbes’ sovereign has a right to non-questioning obedience, discussion, contestation and action is irrelevant and political life is therefore effectively abolished.

The Leviathan actually amounts to a permanent government of tyranny, in which “the tyrant is the ruler who rules as one against all, and the ‘all’ he oppresses are all equal, namely equally powerless [a homogeneous whole]” (BPF:99). In his own words as quoted by Arendt, “the name of Tyranny signifieth nothing more nor lesse than the name of Soveraignty” (Hobbes cited OT:193). Marginalised and excluded from public participation, the individual loses any meaningful place

38 The Soveraignes Actions cannot be justly accused by the subject - Book 1 Chapter XVIII of Leviathan (Hobbes 2003:121-126).
39 More so even than under Bodin’s theory of absolute sovereignty which, according to Prokhovnik, does not seek to “eliminate or foreclose political debate” and is thus “more open than Hobbes’ to a space for politics [in the general rather than Arendtian sense]” (Prokhovnik 2008:51).
in society and any ‘natural’ connection with his peers. Each can now only judge their private life by comparing it with that of others – it becomes a form of competition which “presupposes a zero-sum game and a quantitative notion of power” (Kalyvas 2004:331), thus relations of mutual enmity are fostered.

Extrapolated to the level of the Commonwealth, this exclusive concern with power understood as domination and thus competition manifests itself in the ceaseless demand for expansion seen under imperialist rule, because any community founded solely on power degenerates with stability. Moreover, such a necessity is encapsulated in Hobbes’ theory of the state of nature (the condition of ‘perpetual war’ of all against all). The ever-present spectre of international conflict guarantees these “vacillating structure[s], in need of “new props from the outside”, a “prospect of permanence because it makes it possible for the state to increase its power at the expense of other states”, without which it would “collapse overnight into the aimless, senseless chaos of the private interests from which it sprang” (OT:190).

The fundamental ill Arendt diagnoses in such political relationships is the realisation, acknowledged by Hobbes, that this ‘accumulating’ process must of necessity eventually destroy all existing territorial limits and institutions of stability. Not only does this predict and explain the decline of the sovereign nation-state,40 but it subsequently means that political action is not simply ‘effectively abolished’ as under tyranny, but is completely impossible because action as a manifestation of genuine freedom requires limits. Moreover, the ‘idolatry’ of power encouraged by the Leviathan as tyrant, reduces each distinct individual to one of a homogeneous bloc, to a “poor meek little fellow who has not even the right to rise against tyranny” (OT:195),41 one “degraded into a cog in the power-accumulating machine” (OT:195) in a world where “everything human and normal…has been wrested out of men’s hands to be endowed from without – or, as Kafka puts it, from above” (EU:73). The human condition is therefore irrevocably damaged, and, moreover, as a functionary of necessity “man becomes an agent of the natural law of ruin… [a] natural tool of destruction” (EU:74).

40 “An organisation that is territorially defined…delimited in an external sense, vis-a –vis other actors, by its formal borders” (Spruyt cited Prokhovnik 2008:22).
41 The Subjects cannot change the form of government: ‘Soveraigne Power’ is monarchical in nature and “they that are subject to a Monarch, cannot without his leave cast off Monarchy, and return to the confusion of a disunited Multitude” (Hobbes 2003:122). More prosaically, as argued by Prokhovnik (2008:57), this sovereign right demonstrates that Hobbes authored a theory about the emergence of a political leader who cannot be resisted (the popular basis of the institution of the sovereign being non-reversible) because the process of ‘authorising’ was accompanied by an obligation which could not be withdrawn.
Concluding Comments

Hobbes’ theory encapsulates all the elements of modern sovereignty which cause Arendt consternation – domination, competition, enmity, singularity, homogeneity and the unbounded ‘law’ of power.\(^{42}\) Crucially, it also demonstrates that the concept of sovereignty contains within it anti-political traits which preclude freedom. The importance for Arendt of understanding both freedom and power as ‘worldly’ i.e. plural concepts has been highlighted in this chapter and it has been amply shown that politics requires the maintenance of a non-hierarchical (or egalitarian) space in which reciprocal speech and action can occur. Traditionally understood as inequality of rule and domination or as a relationship of mutual enmity requires that sovereignty be seen as ‘for the ruler’ rather than ‘for the world’, it therefore suppresses the plurality which makes politics possible. Furthermore, Hobbes’ theory illustrates why sovereignty can no longer be seen as a ‘working concept’ of politics. However, in practice the contemporary international system is still predicated on a system of sovereign nation states, and the political relationships thus resultant contribute to a world in which ‘evils’ such as total nuclear war and human rights abuses are not only possible, but prove difficult to guard against. This is addressed in the following and subsequent chapters.

\(^{42}\) Of which Arendt makes explicit note in her remarks on the political situation post World War Two (EU:157).
CHAPTER II INTERNATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY

“Human dignity needs a new guarantee which can be found only in a new political principle.” (OT:xxvii)

Introduction

The previous chapter used Arendt’s thought to challenge prevailing notions of sovereignty and highlighted the anti-political traits she feared were endemic within the concept. Domination, designation of enmity and threat to freedom were some of the elements of sovereignty explored, and in what follows these, and other similar damaging traits, are identified and further reflected upon as they pertain to two current international political concerns – the International Human Rights Regime and atomic weaponry and war.

The twentieth century witnessed some of the worst human rights atrocities in recorded history; yet, it was also the century in which the language of human rights increasingly became a political lingua franca. Today, as noted by Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann (2010), anyone who queries or expresses doubt about human rights apparently moves beyond the accepted bounds of universal morality. The concept is however still hotly contested at both the political and the philosophical level, and many innocent people are still subject to human rights abuses on a daily basis. This chapter therefore begins by examining the attempt to institutionalise international human rights norms and explores the effect this has on the human condition. Using insights from Arendt’s notion of the right to have rights, the traditional dichotomy between idealism and realism is challenged, and the importance of human agency for any effective future human rights regime is emphasised. The chapter concludes with a discussion on atomic weaponry and war to further illustrate the dangers inherent in an international system predicated on anti-political notions such as sovereignty.

The International Human Rights Regime

The International Human Rights Regime and Sovereignty

It is generally recognised that “International regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-
area [such as nuclear proliferation and human rights]” (Krasner 1982:185). They therefore encompass both formal international law\(^{43}\) and informal guidelines and expected standards.\(^{44}\)

Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed by the United Nations in 1948, there has been a steady increase in both the number and activity of international human rights treaties and organisations. The international human rights regime (IHRR) now comprises global organs such as the UN and regional bodies such as the Organisation of American States (OAS)\(^{45}\) and the myriad particular committees, working groups, treaties and covenants these agencies initiate; issue specific bodies such as International Criminal Tribunals; international human rights non-governmental organisations (INGOs); and efforts by individual states to promote human rights.

The IHRR has undoubtedly had some success. For example in August 2012, the International Criminal Court (ICC), established in 2002, issued its first landmark decision on reparations for victims in the case against Thomas Lubanga – the first person ever convicted by the ICC;\(^{46}\) transnational human rights INGOs such as Amnesty International helped effect positive human rights changes in Kenya and Uganda in the last decades of the twentieth century; and major regional organisations such as the African Union (AU) have integrated human rights into their mandate and established courts to which citizens can appeal if a nation violates their rights. This has led, for instance, to important rulings on slavery in Niger.\(^{47}\) Nevertheless, despite the apparent explosion in the pursuit of international human rights standards, a tension remains between human rights and state sovereignty which many observers have discussed.\(^{48}\) State sovereignty has traditionally been understood as the complete autonomy of the state to act as

---

\(^{43}\) Chayes and Chayes (1998:1) argue that at the centre of international regimes there is usually at least one formal treaty. Currently there are nine leading international human rights treaties: the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD); the International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDW); the International Covenant Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families; the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; and the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.

\(^{44}\) See Donnelly (1986:599-642) for an in-depth examination of regime types.

\(^{45}\) The OAS’s 1993 Managua Declaration requires each member to “consolidate, as part of the cultural identity of each nation in the Hemisphere, democratic structures and systems which encourage freedom and social justice, safeguard human rights, and favour progress” (Vacky & Muñoz 1993 cited Risse et al. 2002:9).

\(^{46}\) As noted by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “The decision sets out important principles for reparations before the ICC, confirming that victims should receive reparation, and that the needs of vulnerable victims, including women, children, and victims of sexual and gender-based violence, must be addressed as a priority” (cited http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/OHCHR20_Backup/Pages/Achievements.aspx Accessed 9th August 2014).


\(^{48}\) Including Donnelly (1986); Hathaway (2003); Moravcsik (2000) and Sikkink (1993).
it chooses within its own territorial boundaries (the domestic\textsuperscript{49} and Westphalian\textsuperscript{50} aspects of sovereignty Steven Krasner defines and explores). International regimes have often therefore been treated with suspicion; as limiting independence, and thus being problematic from the perspective of the state. Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes (1998:206) note that the USA in particular “has been at best ambivalent” about relinquishing sovereignty to a non-American entity, and such sentiment is increasingly being expressed amongst member states of the European Union.\textsuperscript{51} In practice however, state sovereignty has rarely been absolute in this way. Sovereign authority is regularly challenged at home by external bodies either through invitation or intervention (Krasner 1999:8). That withstanding, since the entire international system is predicated upon a system of independent states, other commentators argue such regimes actually enhance sovereignty – a position which will be examined in more detail below. Since Arendt fears the threat to the political inherent in the machinations of the sovereign entity, the focus of this chapter is on the international human rights regime itself rather than on specific human rights abuses.

\textit{The International Human Rights Regime as Maintenance and Augmentation of the Status Quo}

The previous chapter illustrated how for Arendt, the principle of sovereign supremacy quashes characteristics essential to the human condition both within specific territorial states, and in the space between different entities to which no sovereign lays claim. Modern sovereignty was shown to be conceived of as either a command-obedience relationship or one of mutual enmity in which basic human dignity as Arendt understands it was threatened, reflecting the truism that the modern state (the institution in which sovereign authority is embodied) is the principal threat to the enjoyment of human rights. Furthermore, international recognition of sovereign equality acts as a prohibition against “states acting coercively abroad against torture and virtually all other violations of human rights” (Donnelly 2003:34).\textsuperscript{52} It is against this

\textsuperscript{49}Krasner defines domestic sovereignty as “the organisation of public authority within a state” and the “level of effective control exercised by those in authority” (Krasner 1999:9).
\textsuperscript{50}Westphalian sovereignty is defined as the “exclusion of external actors from domestic authority configuration” (Krasner 1999:9).
\textsuperscript{51}The recent rise in opposition to the ‘sovereignty’ of European Union law among member states is a case in point. A survey in February 2014 for Open Europe, an independent thinktank, was unequivocal. Majorities of 73% in Britain and 58% in Germany want their parliaments free to block new EU laws, while only 8% of Britons and 21% of Germans think the European Parliament, rather than national parliaments, should have the right to block new EU laws (http://www.openeurope.org.uk/Page/Polling/en/LIVE accessed 12th April 2014).
\textsuperscript{52}See also Forsythe (2000).
philosophical background and the realities of the twentieth century that the rise in the international human rights regime should be interpreted.

Unlike many of her contemporaries such as Hans Morgenthau, Arendt recognised that the international system is not wholly anarchic, that it “operates in terms of reciprocal agreements and treaties between sovereign states” (OT:379). In her discussion on refugees and the stateless she explicitly notes “full national sovereignty was possible only as long as the comity of European nations existed; for it was this spirit of unorganized solidarity and agreement that prevented any government’s exercise of its full sovereign power [i.e. denationalisation /deportation on a large scale]”(OT:354 emphasis added). International cooperation and recognition makes state sovereignty a reality by paradoxically limiting its scope. Empirically therefore, sovereignty is never quite absolute. It is, rather, an example of ‘organized hypocrisy’ (Krasner 1999).

That understood however, in the sphere of international human rights, sovereign states are still the key agents and such rights are actually built around the dominant norm of state sovereignty (Meckled-García & Çali 2006:17). Moreover, despite arguments to the contrary, the very bodies created to initiate human rights protections are still controlled by sovereign states. For example, as James Crawford notes, although NGOs had a strong influence in debates preceding the Rome Conference, when decisions were actually made on the scope and structure of the International Criminal Court (ICC) the coalition of NGOs was excluded from the room (Crawford 2012:121). Sovereign states were effectively able to dictate terms and the resultant weakness of the ICC in the face of opposition from sovereign states has often become manifest. The case of Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir is a case in point. Much of Africa and the Arab world united around him after the ICC had indicted him for genocide which made it impossible to secure an arrest and showed the Court to be effectively powerless – unable to even induce its own Member States to cooperate.

State sovereignty is further manifest in international law, which actually protects statehood implying that once achieved, sovereignty is, in reality, entrenched (Crawford 2012:120). Law made pertaining to human rights is “a form of public international law creating rights for

53 Besson (2010) for example argues that international organisations and INGOs now play a significant part in the law-making process – an argument which does not seem to take sufficient account of the continuing role of sovereign states.

54 See Luban (2013:508) for further examples. Also significant is the fact that principles such as complementarity in the Statute of the ICC may actually expand and reinforce national sovereignty (Crawford 2012:129).
individuals and duties for states” (Meckled-García & Çali 2006:14), however decisions made by international organisations are rarely seen as self-executing (Sarooshi 2005:76) – such agreements are adopted, enacted and complied with at the discretion of the state.\footnote{For example, as noted by Benhabib (2009b:700 FN35), despite ratifying CEDAW and CRC, Saudi Arabia has made a general reservation to the effect that where there is a conflict between a Convention article and Islamic law principles as they interpret them, Islamic law will have precedence.}

In David Luban’s colourful phrase, international justice “cannot leapfrog over politics”; it needs instead to continually “persuade the world of its own legitimacy” (Luban 2013:508). There is rarely any manner of enforcement since there is no supranational law, and state-to-state enforcement procedures are typically ineffective because of the generalised ‘sovereignty costs’ involved (Moravcsik 2000). Such costs discourage one state from charging another with human rights abuses because this “indirectly... compromises its own sovereignty by assailing sovereignty norms more generally” (Cole 2005:492). Paraphrasing Alexander Hamilton, judicial institutions have “no influence over either the sword or the purse”, possessing as they do, “neither force nor will, but merely judgment” (cited Luban 2013:509). The most they can achieve is to “nudge the world political system in the direction of accountability” (Luban 2013:509). In a subtle way therefore, the IHHR actually reinforces the sovereignty of states by enhancing the hierarchical relationship so typical of modern sovereignty. Examining the language used by scholars on the subject is revealing and clearly reflects Arendt’s concerns pertaining to sovereignty as a political doctrine. For example, Crawford notes “the more we look to the state for human rights compliance, the more we may seem to concede to a state domain” (Crawford 2006:122 emphasis added). Similarly, Susan Marks argues states are empowered to “order and control the social environment in which right-holding arises and becomes consequential” (Marks 2012:319 emphases added). The implication of both phrases is that the command aspect of modern sovereignty is actually augmented by the IHRR which, from an Arendtian point of view, may actually threaten the human condition of those the regime sets out to protect.

Ultimately, what the sovereign authority – whether that be state, individual ruler or general population – perceives to be in its best interest is the guiding principle.\footnote{See for example Donnelly (1986:616).} To effectively pursue any objective, the sovereign authority must be perceived as legitimate both by those over whom it rules, and within the international system.\footnote{“Rulers seek legitimization”, argues Inis Claude, “not only to satisfy their consciences but also to buttress their positions” (Claude 1966:368) – an understanding which seems to speak directly to the need to be an acknowledged sovereign within the international community of states. Pogge for instance argues that a central feature of our global institutional order is that sovereign status is conveyed onto any group controlling a preponderance of the means of coercion within a country (2012:386).} Whilst some such as Krasner (1999:7)
take an actor-orientated approach which takes rulers or specific policy makers (usually the executive head of state) as the ontological givens, Arendt’s work is much more focussed on the concept of sovereignty as it pertains to (anti)political doctrine and the formal office in which sovereign control is embodied i.e. the modern nation-state. Since, as Arendt recognised, “modern power conditions...make sovereignty a mockery except for giant states” (OT:344), scholars such as Chayes and Chayes (1998) argue that today, the only way the majority of states can ‘realise and express’ their sovereignty is via participation in various regimes – including the human rights regime – which regulate and order the international system. They are members of a school of thought that has recently developed which attributes human right treaty ratification to intangible benefits such as a sense of belonging, acceptance, respect, or inclusion (Nielson & Simmons 2014). Scholars who advance such a position acknowledge the maxim “sovereignty, in the end, is status” (Chayes & Chayes 1998:27), and therefore recognise that a key national objective is often to secure international prestige.

Quite simply, according to this school of thought, in the current international climate respect for human rights and ratification of relevant treaties is seen as strengthening one’s position in the world. State leaders adopt international human rights treaties because they want other state leaders to “think well of them” (Risse et al 2002:8), thereby bolstering their position. In reality however, Richard Nielsen and Beth Simmons (2014) found little evidence that states regularly receive intangible rewards for human rights treaty ratification. In particular they concluded, “the idea that acceptance into a circle of modern statehood can explain ratification is not supported by an uptick in state visits, which is one of the most important visible displays of peer acceptance” (Nielsen & Simmons 2014:26). But whilst in practice intangible benefits may not be forthcoming, Nielsen and Simmons perhaps wrongly assume the sovereign engages in rational cost-benefit analysis. They go some way to concede this by noting they were unable to observe “the privately held expectations of state leaders” (Nielsen & Simmons 2014:2) – a factor which should not be underestimated. This is reflected by Christine Wotipka and Kiyoteru Tsutsui (2008) who underscore the importance of sociological processes and argue we can only fully understand a state’s decision to ratify international human rights

58 This might in part explain why the USA - perhaps one of the few states able to express their sovereignty outwith the framework of regimes - has been so reluctant to ratify many of the basic international human rights treaties. See Blau & Moncada (2007) for further discussion.

59 Others include for example Risse et al (2002); Nickel (2002); Hafner-Burton et al. (2008); Donnelly (2006); Levy & Snaider (2006).
treaties if we acknowledge the role of normative pressure and imitative process. They found that the more a specific government required legitimacy in international society, whether as a result of their economic status or internal political situation, the more likely they are to ratify human rights treaties. Particularly, they found that states which needed a ‘cover’ for their domestic human rights problems were more inclined to ratify international human rights treaties – a troubling conclusion supported by Sarah Spence who argues that “one reason why many ratifiers have poor human rights records is that these states derive the greatest potential reputational benefits from ratification” (2014:16). These benefits become manifest in terms of assured sovereign status (the right to non-intervention and recognition as an equal on the international stage) and the ability to attract foreign aid and investment.

Wotipka and Tsutsui (2008) also allude to economic factors in their work, noting that the less economically developed a state, the more likely they are to ratify human rights treaties. Although not drawn out in their study, the link they make between the economy and legitimacy directly speaks to the concept of sovereignty, as does the more general argument that economic incentive or material reward explains why states apparently voluntarily ratify international agreements that create obligations to protect human rights at home. The validity of the so-called ‘rewards-for-ratification’ hypothesis is subject to debate; with Nielsen and Simmons (2014) concluding that any link between human rights treaty ratification and actual tangible reward is tenuous at best (25). What underpins such hypotheses however is the recognition that states ratify human rights treaties and ostensibly accept human rights norms at least in part to augment their status as sovereign. Using Krasner’s terminology, sometimes authorities have to compromise their Westphalian sovereignty (the exclusion of external authority at home) in order to secure recognition and international legal sovereignty. This was the ‘fate’ of states newly constituted after the First World War (Krasner 1999:237). When the sovereign authority no longer finds it politically expedient to comply with such practices and treaties however, they have a variety of options. They can simply decide to ignore them and withdraw from any regime they may have delegated power to because, in practice, “any such

---

60 They argue that states appear to imitate the treaty ratification practices not only of the global community, but more specifically of their regional neighbours too. Whilst they do not explicitly explain the strength of regional imitation as a factor predicting ratification, since traditionally threats to sovereign integrity have come from proximal states, the importance of appearing legitimate at a local level cannot be underestimated in terms of sovereign security, which makes the conclusion they draw – that international society does not always operate on power and interest – appear less valid.

61 See also Neumayer (2005) who argues that in very autocratic regimes with weak civil society, human rights treaty ratification can be expected to have no effect and is sometimes actually associated with more rights violations.
conferral of powers are always revocable” (Sarooshi 2005:29). Or they can take advantage of the profligate number of international regulatory institutions “with overlapping jurisdictions and ambiguous boundaries” (Benvenisti & Downs 2007:596), and ‘fora-shop’ to find another set of terms more conducive to their interest. Nowhere are these options exploited more fully than in the realm of national security.

Despite, or perhaps as a result of developments in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, considerations of security remain paramount to sovereign states and although international human rights regimes have been accepted by many, state security still ‘trumps’ human rights. Perhaps the most paradigmatic recent example of this is the global response to 9/11, particularly in the United States of America, which declared a ‘war on terror’. In 2001, just weeks after the terrorist attack on the Twin Towers, Congress passed the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (the so-called PATRIOT Act). This legislation severely limited the civil liberties of both US and non-US citizens and effectively prioritised territory over people (Gearty 2005:19).

Whilst some of the most controversial parts of the Act pertained to issues of privacy and government surveillance and were therefore objectionable to US citizens and non-citizens alike, several provisions were condemned for the disproportionate impact they had on those who could not claim US citizenship. The section which entitled the Attorney General to indefinitely incarcerate or detain non-citizens based exclusively on suspicion, and to deny re-admission to the United States of non-citizens (including lawful permanent residents) for

62 See for example The Maastricht Decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht which insisted that member states do have the right to withdraw unilaterally from the European Community. Similar approaches and conclusions have also been drawn by the UK (1975 Report on the 1972 European Community Act) and in France in 1992.

63 It should however be noted that the USA was not alone in pursuing courses of action which posed a threat to human rights legislation. See for example Gearty (2005) on the UK example whose 2001 Anti-Terrorism and Security Act contravened UK obligations under the European Convention of Human Rights.

64 The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) expressed its view in a letter to the Senate, commenting that: “While it contains provisions that we support, the American Civil Liberties Union believes that the USA PATRIOT Act gives the Attorney General and federal law enforcement unnecessary and permanent new powers to violate civil liberties that go far beyond the stated goal of fighting inter-national terrorism. These new and unchecked powers could be used against American citizens who are not under criminal investigation, immigrants who are here within our borders legally, and also against those whose First Amendment activities are deemed to be threats to national security by the Attorney General.” Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Director, ACLU Washington Office, and Gregory T. Nojeim, Associate Director and Chief Legislative Counsel, ACLU, to the United States Senate (Oct. 23, 2001), available at https://www.aclu.org/national-security/letter-senate-urging-rejection-final-version-usa-patriot-act (accessed 14th April 2014).

65 For example, Section 215 searches which the American Civil Liberties Union filed a lawsuit against in 2003 on the grounds that the searches violate the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures as well as First Amendment freedoms of speech and association. Moreover, the ACLU warned “Section 215 is likely to chill lawful dissent. If people think that their conversations, their emails, and their reading habits are being monitored, people will feel less comfortable saying what they think—especially if they disagree with government policies” (Beeson & Jaffer 2003:13).
engaging in speech arguably protected by the First Amendment, is a timely example of the sovereign prerogatives to designate enmity and exclude recognised by Arendt. Statistics from Human Rights Watch suggest that in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Immigration and Naturalization Service took around 1,200 (largely Muslim and/or Arab) noncitizens residing in the United States into custody, many without charge, and accusations abound of rampant abuse being inflicting on these detainees whilst they were in custody (Acebes 2002).\(^66\)

Since states are essential to the protection offered by human rights it is true, as Talal Asad notes, that states ‘can and do’ use human rights discourse against their citizens to, in his words, “realize their civilising project” (Asad cited Brown 2004:462FN2). This is not however the whole story. “By entering into contracts and covenants”, argues Krasner, “rulers have extended invitations that engage external authority structures with their own polities” (1999:73 emphasis added). This threatens the strictly hierarchical relationship the concept of sovereignty assumes to exist between rulers and ruled by allowing the populace to appeal to an alternative authority. In this respect, the IHRR is simply “the latest example of a long standing tension between autonomy and international attempts to regulate relations between rulers and ruled” (Krasner 1999:126). In this way, Krasner later notes, rulers who endorse respect for human rights – particularly those who do so for cynical reasons – may find “that what they thought was an empty gesture has altered concepts of legitimacy within their own polities and precipitated changes in domestic authority structures” (Krasner 1999:121). From an Arendtian perspective this is crucial because it not only challenges the anti-political hierarchical relationship assumed in the politics of modernity, but it also presents an opportunity for greater genuine political engagement amongst the populace who now have an alternative body to petition.

Optimistic commentators see the proliferation of human rights norms and an international human rights regime as evidence that the world has entered the ‘age of rights’ (Bobbio 1996), and that we should therefore celebrate this as a ‘precarious triumph’ (Reiff 1999). However, as shown above, from an Arendtian perspective it would be very dangerous to embrace this position without reservation, not least because it fails to take into account that the IHRR is

---

\(^66\) In 2003 an independent report by the Office of the Inspector General, Glenn Fine, found that there were "significant problems in the way the September 11 detainees were treated" at the Metropolitan Detention Centre (available at [http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0306/press.pdf](http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0306/press.pdf) accessed 12th April 2014), and in February 2006, the first of a number of lawsuits was settled when the federal government agreed to pay $300,000 to Ehab Elmaghraby who alleged that he was physically abused while held in a federal detention centre for over a year.
predicated on a system of sovereign states. Whilst ‘inviting’ outside authorities into the domestic arena by, for example, signing international agreements, does offer those resident the opportunity to appeal to a different authority and may thus help foster political engagement, often in reality the IHRR can be seen as perpetuating the status-quo of sovereign supremacy. Even more worryingly, the regime may in fact strengthen state control and thus exacerbate the threats to the human condition recognised by Arendt and examined in the previous chapter. In what follows, the interaction between the IHRR and state sovereignty is examined more specifically as it pertains to particular threats to humanity such as human agency and equality of person.

The International Human Rights Regime as a Threat to Human Agency

Citizenship Status

“The Rights of Man, supposedly inalienable, proved to be unenforceable – even in countries whose constitutions were based upon them – whenever people appeared who were no longer citizens of any sovereign state” (OT:372).

“It is citizenship—real actual belonging in political community—not abstract belonging to the human species—which will protect the human rights of all” (Ignatieff, Hannah Arendt Prize Ceremony, 2003:7).

One of the most insidious dangers of the IHRR as currently conceived is that, predicated as it is on the system of sovereign states, governments only have human rights obligations towards those to whom they grant citizenship status. “When individuals do not fall within the mandatory jurisdiction of a State”, Cedric Ryngaert argues, “that State is not under the obligation to secure human rights to these individuals” (2013:210 emphasis in the original). The Burmese government for example has long denied Rohingya (a Muslim minority group) the right to obtain citizenship in Burma which, Human Rights Watch maintains, has facilitated human rights abuses against them and rendered them stateless (Human Rights Watch 2012).

In reality, the universal human subject assumed by the human rights legislator is ‘a fiction’ unless each individual can act within a political and legal framework based on equality

---

68 Meckled-Garcia and Çali note, “the one special capacity possessed by states is their ability to determine the status of individuals, by, for example, withdrawing citizenship rights or by defining which rights citizens have” (2006:17).
(Chandler 2006:129). Where states exceed their obligations and protect the human rights of non-citizens they do so on a discretionary basis only – they act, as Arendt understands it, from charity rather than obligation – and, crucially, the non-citizen has no entitlement to claim protection.

The fundamental disconnect between those considered citizens and those deemed alien is one which Arendt examines in detail. Unlike many human rights theorists Arendt believes equality is a political attribute we have to guarantee to ourselves in our interaction with others, rather than a trait we are born with. Political life therefore “rest[s] on the assumption that we can produce equality through organisation, because man can act in and change and build a common world, together with his equals and only his equals” (OT:382). As she understands it, in order to lead a fulfilling life speech and action must be effective – one must be guaranteed a place in the world in which one can meaningfully discuss and contest opinions with equals and act in a public arena to which one ‘belongs’. But, as it stands, the criteria states use in granting citizenship status (a term which is already both too ‘statist’ and too ‘legalist’ in its current usage to fully convey the interpretative breadth of Arendt’s notion of belonging), is one area in which public authorities have no international human rights obligations. This means, as Meckled-García and Çali note, “individuals can indefinitely be excluded from a set of rights on an arbitrary and discriminatory basis” (2006:18). Moreover, “non-citizens can also be deported from the country they live in based on criteria in which human rights considerations have limited impact or none at all” (ibid). Ultimately therefore, not only does the IHRR perpetuate the sovereign inscribed inequality between citizen and non-citizen and therefore limit human agency, but whilst purportedly giving specific entitlements to all individuals (Meckled-García & Çali 2006:15), it fails to institutionalise any guarantee that each individual always and irrevocably will be a citizen of somewhere. For Arendt this is a ‘basic and acute issue’ which requires addressing:

As long as mankind is nationally and territorially organised in states, a stateless person is not simply expelled from one country, native or adopted, but from all countries – none being obliged to receive or naturalise him – which means he is actually expelled from humanity. Deprivation of citizenship consequently could be counted among the crimes against humanity, and some of the worst recognised crimes in this category have, in fact, and not incidentally, been preceded by mass expatriations...It seems absurd, but the fact is that, under the political circumstances of this century [and still today], a Constitutional Amendment may be needed to assure American citizens that
they cannot be deprived of their citizenship, no matter what they do (Arendt to Robert Hutchins, Fund for the Republic, 27th January 1957; cited Young-Bruehl 1982a:275-6).

But whilst ‘basic and acute’, this is an issue that has still to be tackled by the IHRR and human agency therefore continues to be conscribed by sovereign decision.

Subjectification or Disenfranchisement of Individuals

“The international humanitarian order...does not acknowledge citizenship. Instead it turns citizens into wards” (Mamdani 2008).

“The victim of human rights is a largely passive identity, defined by suffering, and waiting for vindication through the heroic agency of the international human rights system” (Marks 2012:319).

Human agency is further damaged by the IHRR as a result of the manner in which regulations and expectations are formulated and applied. In an article entitled ‘Why More Africans Don’t Use Human Rights Language’, Chidi Anselm Odinkalu presents Africa as an example of both the human rights crisis and the crisis for human rights. She argues that whilst human rights abuses are ubiquitous in Africa, few on the continent describe their problems in human rights terms. She attributes this “retreat from the human rights paradigm as an engine of struggle” to the fact that the injustices inflicted upon Africans can only be addressed by channelling these frustrations into articulate political demands which evoke political responses. The insistence of the IHRR on being ‘impartial,’ ‘unbiased,’ ‘neutral,’ and ‘non-political’ means that this is the one thing such a regime cannot offer. Increasingly in the twenty first century human rights are seen as an object of specialist knowledge. The human rights movement is becoming a ‘privileged domain’ of a “select professional cadre with its own rites of passage and methods of certification” (Odinkalu 1999), and international law pertaining to human rights is increasingly made by ‘networks of national technocrats’ (Koskenniemi cited Knop 2012:111).

Bureaucratisation and lack of local accountability are obvious results – the dangers of which, from an Arendtian perspective, are examined in Section Three. The point of note here

71 The threat to plurality is also alluded to. Odinkalu alleges that the majority of human rights organisations are modelled on those located in urban areas in the North, and are funded by, and accountable to, western donors. “Local problems” she go on to argue, “are only defined as potential pots of project cash, not as human experiences to be resolved in just terms.” Whilst she focuses on the resultant delegitimisation of human rights language, it is not too far a step to assert that under these circumstances it is likely a homogenisation might occur, with difference being quelled and western frames of reference being adopted to attract aid. From an Arendtian point of view, such
however is that within the IHRR there is very limited potential for genuine participation and contestation by the constituents it is supposed to protect. The IHRR “often acts as if it knows what justice means, always and for everyone”, rather than acknowledging the fact that the concept must be continually disputed, “struggled for” and “imagined in new ways” (Kennedy 2012:25). It embodies the ‘seeming necessity’ that human rights discourse is “something the powerful do for the powerless” (Ingram 2008:405).

Whilst scholars such as Michael Ignatieff argue “the very purpose of rights language is to protect and enhance individual agency” (cited Ingram 2008:405), they are not cognisant of the fact that the ‘we’ they so readily talk of in their account exclusively comprises of the citizens and decision makers of strong states, ‘national technocrats’ and human rights ‘professionals’. It effectively creates a ‘ruling class’ who supposedly know best and impose their will accordingly. Moreover, the right to democratic governance is rarely secured by international agreements on human rights, which helps perpetuate the dichotomy between the ‘powerful’ and the ‘powerless’ – even within states who actually adopt human rights treaties and covenants. For example, whilst the ICCPR (1966) does include a right to ‘participate in public affairs’, such a right does not appear until Article 25 – after detailing the many ways in which individual rights must be protected from the state. Lang and Williams (2005:226) suggest the location of this right in the document as one of the last civil rights indicates other rights remain paramount. The IHRR is therefore largely anti-political, more akin to a hierarchical sovereign relationship rather than one in which human agency and pursuit of political equality is allowed to thrive.

Odinkalu is writing on the situation in Africa, but, as noted by Susan Marks in her insightful essay ‘Human Rights in Disastrous Times’, the concerns implicit in her analysis are more generalizable. Of particular relevance in this context is the derivation of the appropriate right-holder. The IHRR does more than simply ascribe rights to those already constituted as subjects, it actually constitutes those subjects “for rights produce the particular sort of right-holders

a result would be dangerous since any loss of plurality fundamentally undermines the common world between humankind (see section on nuclear weaponry).

72 See also Brown (2002) and Brown (2004).
73 Although in the last decade international lawyers have been examining more critically the right to democracy, Brad Roth argues that the ‘democratic entitlement’ thesis still remains underdeveloped in international law (see Lang & Williams 2005:226).
who fit them” (Marks 2012:319). In practice, the subject of human rights is pitiable. Human rights holders are identified as submissive ‘victims’, powerless to secure the obligations owed to them. Whilst individuals can access institutions such as the European Court of Human Rights and the International Criminal Court in their capacity as a specific right-holder, in most instances individuals seeking to make a claim pertaining to a violation of their human rights must first seek the assistance of an intermediary. As argued by Ashfaq Khalfan, ‘victims’ are usually dependent either on a state to make a complaint before a juridical body or an INGO that could raise their claim in the periodic reporting process (2013:416). Effective access to, and operation of, the IHRR therefore depends on political – often sovereign – considerations, and whilst the operation of law always requires intermediaries, since human rights violations most often occur at the hands of those in the position of gate-keepers (i.e. sovereign states), individual agency can therefore be severely limited. Furthermore, even if the IHRR does intervene to protect individuals from human rights abuses, as Wendy Brown notes, there is little guarantee that these ‘subjects’ of human rights do not simply trade one form of subjugation for another as was arguably the case for the Iraqi people in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion by British and American troops. The IHRR does not fundamentally alter the often conflictual relationship between rights holder and rights ‘withholder’, it simply attempts to ‘civilise’ it by limiting the exercise of control, which, in turn, can only be secured by another, still greater power (Ingram 2008:405).

It was concerns about agency and the empowerment of the individual which led Arendt to propose an alternative to the concept of human rights traditionally understood. The notion of the right to have rights is well known and oft-cited by theorists in the field; however, as argued by Peg Birmingham (2006:1), it is one which remains little understood. In a section significantly subtitled ‘The Perplexities of the Rights of Man’, Arendt critiques the prevailing concept of human rights and notes how these rights which supposedly belong to man “not by virtue of the body politic to which he belonged but by virtue of birth” (OR:108) were, in reality, coeval with the nation-state. ‘Man’ was subsumed into ‘citizen’, and since the people’s sovereignty was proclaimed in the name of ‘man’, it became demonstrably more evident that these so-called inalienable rights could only be recognised and guaranteed through a right of sovereign self-government. For Arendt, pace Edmund Burke, the ‘rights of man’ are therefore more

---

74 Michael Ignatieff also argues that “Rights language has been central not simply to the protection, but also to the production of modern individuals” (cited Brown 2004:455).

75 Indeed, in support of Edmund Burke, she goes on to argue that the case of Israel proves the restoration of human rights has, to date, only been achieved through the restoration or establishment of national rights (OT:380).
accurately identified as the ‘rights of peoples’, and thus minorities and the stateless are effectively exempt. Consequently, human rights thus understood were both perplexing and paradoxical from their inception. As Arendt notes, “the moment human beings lacked their own government and had to fall back on minimum rights, no authority was left to protect them and no institution was willing to guarantee them” (OT:370). Stateless persons are the paradigmatic case. Such individuals may be granted certain rights such as the right to life, but they are still rightless to the extent that rights so granted are not an entitlement, they are dependent on the charity or benevolence of others. Conversely, citizens may forfeit the same rights (for instance in times of war) and still remain rights-bearing entities. It was the insight that one can lose all so-called human rights without losing the essential quality which makes each truly human (i.e. a recognised and potentially effective member of a community conscribed by law) – that “only the loss of a polity itself expels [us] from humanity” (OT:377) – which led Arendt to champion the alternative concept of the right to have rights. Simply expressed, the right to have rights is essentially the right to belong to humanity. The right to “all those parts of the world and all those aspects of human existence which are the result of our common labour, the outcome of human artifice” (OT:381). The right to have rights is therefore the right to be empowered; the right to a political community where our speech and action is taken into account and where we can “produce equality [of person] through organisation” (OT:382). It is therefore fundamentally political (Birmingham 2006). That said, such a right cannot be reduced to the specific claim rights of citizens such as freedom of speech. It is both greater and more fundamental than these rights. Indeed, in an essay entitled ‘The Rights of Man’: What Are They?’, Arendt criticises the United Nations for its failure to include ‘the right of men to citizenship’ in its Universal Declaration of Human Rights as it is the “one right without which no other can materialise” (Arendt 1949:37). But this insight lacks the nuance necessary to fully appreciate how Arendt’s notion of the right to have rights actually facilitates and encourages political agency and action – a trait reflected on in some of the interpretations prevalent in the secondary literature. 77

76 It should be noted that whilst Arendt sees the events of the twentieth century as an “ironical, bitter, and belated confirmation” (OT:380) of Burke’s critique of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, as rightly noted by Gündoğdu, she does not simply restate his position. To avoid the political dangers inherent in grounding rights in history, Arendt affirms the significance of citizenship without renouncing human rights altogether. See Gündoğdu (2014:117).

77 There are a range of other interpretations of the right to have rights which cannot be examined here, but which also highlight significant considerations. Cotter (2005) for example contends that Arendt’s critique of the prevailing human rights regime is less about offering solutions and more about diagnosing structural weaknesses of the
Seyla Benhabib offers an influential reading of Arendt’s concept of the right to have rights in which she splits the phrase into two halves. The first invocation of the term ‘right’ she argues in *The Rights of Others*, is addressed to humanity as a whole and “enjoins us to recognise membership in some human group” and to practice a form of treatment compatible with that claim (Benhabib 2004:56). The second ‘rights’ claim is predicated upon the prior claim of membership and refers to rights within a specific community. These civil and political rights or ‘citizen’s rights’ generate reciprocal obligations thus: “I have a claim to do or not to do A, and you have an obligation not to hinder me from doing or not doing A” (Benhabib 2004:57).

Critics of Benhabib’s interpretation such as James Ingram and Charles Barbour argue that she has ‘dislocated’ the right to have rights from the capacity to act which, “in Arendt’s work, characterises every other meaningful right” (Barbour 2012:315). Most significantly, they believe this interpretation “has the potential to transform ‘the right to have rights’ into a passive experience of being recognised, rendering it politically neutral” (Barbour 2012:315). Such a critique is however too strong given that in her more recent work Benhabib clearly contends that reciprocal recognition of each as beings who have the right to have rights comes about through “political struggles, social movements, and learning processes within and across classes, genders, nations, ethnic groups, and religious faiths” (Benhabib 2013:40). That acknowledged, Benhabib’s model does perhaps miss some of the important points other more traditional action-based interpretations of the right to have rights make.

Ingram’s starting point is that human rights have a fundamental political significance and pose a significant political challenge. Following Arendt he notes that it is better to see rights not in terms of moral ideals or legal declarations, but as “created from the bottom up, through practices of communication and interaction”, as “emerging with and through, political activity itself” (Ingram 2008:410). As Jeffrey Isaac reiterates, “the primary impetus” for human rights thus understood will always come “from the praxis of citizens who insist upon these rights and who are prepared to back up this insistence through political means” (Isaac 1996:71).

---

international system. Whilst Gündoğdu (2012) stresses that Arendt’s ideas about human rights are intended to move beyond binaries such as universal/particular and human/citizen, and to encourage critical thinking about human rights which traverses between these notions. 78 Michelman similarly sees the right to have rights as a ‘two-place expression’ which he renders as: “a (certain) right, to have (other) rights,”. He then goes on to refer to ‘right,’ as an *acquisition* right, and ‘rights,’ as *object* rights. See Michelman (1996:200-208).
Following this line of thought, Étienne Balibar equates the right to have rights with a right to politics, or more specifically, a right to action. According to Balibar, the right to autonomous political action is possessed universally by each “on his or her own behalf” and is inalienable in that “no one can be liberated or emancipated by others, from ‘above’, even were this ‘above’ to be right [in the Kantian sense] itself, or the democratic state” (Balibar cited Ingram 2008:411). Similarly, Barbour recognises that in Arendt’s account, the capacity to act is both an ontological given inscribed in the natality represented by each new birth, and an existential achievement which requires a public space of human plurality. He maintains “Arendt’s extensive consideration of this paradoxical or circular aspect of action provides a framework or basis for interpreting the paradoxical, circular aspects of the phrase ‘the right to have rights’” (Barbour 2012:308). Barbour believes (contra Andrew Schaap and Jacques Rancière) that when Arendt talks of the right to have rights she is referring to the possibility of action and politics that remains even after one has been expelled from a specific community. It is innate as it were – a result of the miracle of natality that each human being is a new beginning rather than localised in a single sphere or realm.

Textual support for reading the right to have rights against her theory of action is found in Arendt’s essay on René Char and the French Resistance in World War Two. In her Preface to Between Past and Future Arendt praises the Resistance for taking the initiative and creating a public space between them where freedom could appear, and where “all relevant business in the affairs of the country” could be transacted “without the paraphernalia of officialdom [i.e. the sovereign nation-state] and hidden from the eyes of friend and foe” (BPF:4&3). Barbour convincingly argues that members of the Resistance were in fact enacting what Arendt means by the right to have rights. That despite living under occupation, in a state ruled by violence, the men and women of the Resistance really did ‘belong to humanity’ and managed to instigate a genuine public sphere in which to discharge political affairs. This, he argues, demonstrates Arendt’s belief that, in his words, “literally anyone may take up the task of appearing before others in word and deed, and that not some natural essence or predetermined predilection for glory but the completely unpredictable nature of action itself –

79 Other interpreters also stress the political nature of the right to have rights. See Birmingham (2006) for example.
80 Peg Birmingham uses the concept of natality differently. In her interpretation, the event of natality contains within it the principle of publicness which demands the actor has the right to appear, or, as Arendt put it, that the actor has the right to have rights. Such a right, notes Birmingham, “is not predicated on a metaphysical understanding of the human being as having a nature; instead it is predicated on the fundamental event of human existence – natality” (Birmingham 2006:57).
81 A contention supported by Balibar (2013:25).
or the unpredictable interplay of virtue and fortune – will determine who does so” (Barbour 2012:317).

Whilst at times focusing on different elements and concepts and offering disparate interpretations, the secondary literature referred to above emphasises that Arendt’s notion of the right to have rights is best situated within her theory of action or agency. These scholars recognise the inherently political nature of the right to have rights which is expressed via contestation between a plurality of equals within the protected confines of artificial, non-sovereign, institutions (with all their attendant limitations). Furthermore, they see the value of Arendt’s refusal to offer a prescriptive ‘solution’ to the problem of human rights abuses which have, in reality, developed together with the rise of the international system of sovereign nation-states. Instead, the importance of her contribution lies in her understanding that the current human rights regime is plagued with perplexities and paradoxes which any effective reinterpretation and remedy must acknowledge. Moreover, in reframing the issue thus, Arendt is, once again, challenging one of the “outstanding characteristics of our time” – “thoughtlessness – the heedless recklessness or hopeless confusion or complacent repetition of ‘truths’ which have become trivial and empty” (HC:5).

Concluding Comments on the International Human Rights Regime and Sovereignty

The International Human Rights Regime was born in the second half of the twentieth century when experience had taught that “killing is far from the worst that man can inflict on man” (MDT:127). Although the world today is very different from the one Arendt was writing about, and conditions have improved in places, many of the fundamental issues she highlights remain the same. Perhaps most notably from an Arendtian perspective, Amnesty International has recently reported that at the beginning of 2012 there were at least 12 million stateless people and 15 million registered refugees (Amnesty International World Report 2013). Countless national minorities continue to clamour for human rights protection and even in supposedly rights respecting countries such as the United Kingdom there are increasingly audible calls to exclude ‘foreigners’ in the name of ‘real citizens’. This suggests it may be time to revisit the basic premises on which the current IHRR is built. The importance of Arendt for this project

83 The 2014 success of UKIP in the European elections is a worrying trend in this regard since their only platform is to exit the European Union and stop migration.
lies, as argued above, in using a different lens through which to view the regime – one which acknowledges the inherent contradiction between human rights conceived of as ‘universal and inalienable’ and the international system of sovereign states, and which recognises the mutually constitutive relationship between sovereign states and an understanding of human rights as fabricated constructs of the international system. This contradiction and complementarity is the main reason why human rights remain ‘perplexing’ and ‘paradoxical’. Recognising that the current regime may actually strengthen state sovereignty and thus limit human agency is a crucial first step.

In generic terms, some of issues addressed above, particularly those pertaining to the maintenance and augmentation of the status quo, apply equally to regimes concerned with atomic weaponry and nuclear proliferation. More specifically, the absolute and totalising elements of sovereignty can be clearly discerned in the atomic arena and the attendant consequences in terms of superfluity and damage to the world we have in common will be examined in the last sections of this chapter.

Atomic Weaponry and War

“With the appearance of atomic weapons, both the Hebrew-Christian limitation on violence and the ancient appeal to courage have for all practical purposes become meaningless, and, with them, the whole political and moral vocabulary in which we are accustomed to discuss these matters” (EU:421).

The Allied decision to use atomic bombs against Japan in August 1945 was justified on the grounds of saving thousands of both military and civilian lives and truncating a war in the Pacific that had been raging for four years. The use of such weapons was contested, even at the time, because it introduced a qualitatively different method of warfare. Although totality in war has been in evidence since World War One when the distinction between soldier and civilian proved increasingly difficult to preserve, fusion weapons facilitated a different kind of destruction, one neatly summed up by Robert McNamara thus:

Any military commander who is honest with himself, or with those he's speaking to, will admit that he has made mistakes in the application of military power. He's killed people unnecessarily — his own troops or other troops — through mistakes, through errors of judgment. A hundred, or thousands, or tens of thousands, may even a hundred thousand. But ... he hasn't destroyed nations (cited Stoddart 2012:199).
It is the ability to annihilate whole nations that signifies the qualitative shift, one which rendered ‘the whole political and moral vocabulary’ used to discuss such matters until this time, unintelligible.

Arendt did not write an exhaustive treatise on atomic weapons, and whilst she does mention the topic in certain places, Jonathan Schell sees her lack of direct engagement with the subject as a ‘conspicuous gap’ in her work (Schell 2010:247). However, within much of her writing Arendt addresses both explicitly and obliquely issues that the existence of such weapons brings to the fore, many of which can only be effectively understood when considered through the lens of sovereignty.

Arendt’s closest interlocutor on the political ramifications of atomic weapons was Karl Jaspers. Many relevant passages in *The Human Condition* draw on his reflections from *The Atom Bomb and the Future of Mankind* – a book which is itself deeply indebted to Arendt’s *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (Young-Bruehl 1982a:300). Like Jaspers, Arendt fears the acceleration of ‘superfluity’ of individuals the atomic age would precipitate, and is concerned about the inability of scientists to effectively ‘think what we are doing’. She was however more critical of the rationale for nuclear weapons. And although she too believed that deterrence and the bomb were contemporary geopolitical facts that could not and should not be reversed, she did have sympathy with the anti-nuclear movement. Crucially, she also accused Jaspers of treating the question of atomic weaponry in an overly moral, rather than essentially political way (Yaqoob 2014:208). Whilst sharing some common ground therefore, Cara O’Connor concludes that, on reflection, on this topic, “what we can see is a subtle pattern of disagreement, like the creases in a map made by two friends who fold it differently” (O’Connor 2013:114).

Reflecting on Arendt’s contribution to the nuclear debate, in what follows, a brief thematic examination of several important implications engendered by the existence and proliferation of atomic weaponry will be discussed, and the question of how we may use her unique and critical insights to begin to “embark on the course of fundamental thinking that might one day open the way to solutions” (Schell 2010:258) is considered.

*Effect on the Relationship between Power, Strength and Violence*

“More and more, war has changed from combat to technological extermination. In the age of technology, violence itself has taken on a basically new form” (Jaspers 1963:47).
In her essay ‘On Violence’, Arendt considers the rise of extraordinary new ordnances like nuclear and biological weapons and robot warriors. Herein she argues that there has always been an interplay between warfare and general technical developments since violence always needs tools, but that in the twentieth century there was a ‘decisive shift’ from production to destruction. In the pre-nuclear era the brute force required to destroy the world did exist, but it corresponded exactly to the violence innate in all human productive processes – the ability to destroy and the ability to produce stood in balance (PP:154). This delicate balance lasted only so long as the technology involved dealt exclusively with pure production. This is no longer the case. Humanity is now able to imitate processes which do not occur naturally on earth (nuclear fission/fusion) and since these powers are of a ‘nonearthly nature’, Arendt argues, “they can destroy nature on earth in the same way that natural processes manipulated by men can destroy the world built by men” (PP:158). In her review of The Technocratic Mind she is emphatic that the capacity of contemporary machines for catastrophic destruction cannot be controlled by other machines. “Since the stage of overkill has been reached,” she argues, “such hopes are rather absurd” (Arendt 1969). Arendt sees the twentieth century as one of ‘uncomfortable novelties’, when instead of war being “an extension of diplomacy (or of politics, or the pursuit of economic objectives),’ peace [has become]... the continuation of war by other means” (Report from Iron Mountain cited OV:9); “a few weapons” can now “wipe out all other sources of national power in a few moments” (Wheeler cited OV:10). In combination, these ‘uncomfortable novelties’ therefore add up to a “complete reversal in the relationship between power and violence” (OV:10) as Arendt understands it.

Conceptually, as noted in the previous chapter, power corresponds to the human capacity to act in concert. It is predicated on plurality, exists only so long as a group associates together and is therefore fundamentally political. Violence in contrast is phenomenologically akin to strength – a property inherent in an individual entity. It is by nature instrumental and should therefore be guided by and justified with reference to the political goal it pursues (OV:51). Arendt is clear that whilst violence can be justified it can never legitimate, Iris Marion Young (2007 Ch.4) therefore argues that any specific deployment of violence for political ends always requires rigorous justification, irrespective of the apparent legitimacy of the actor involved. The latter cannot substitute for or guarantee the validity of the former.

Reflecting on the modern world, Arendt opens her essay ‘On Violence’ with the comment “the technical development of the implements of violence has now reached the point where no
political goal could conceivably correspond to their destructive potential or justify their actual use in armed conflict” (OV:3). The ever-present danger inherent in violent action – that the end becomes overwhelmed by the means which it justifies – has been actualised in the nuclear age. Violence can no longer be deemed rational because it is ineffective in reaching the end that must justify it. “The feasibility of all-out atomic war” as noted by Morgenthau, “has completely destroyed the rational relation between force and foreign policy...[it] obliterates not only the traditional distinction between victor and vanquished, but also the material objective of the war itself” (Morgenthau 1962:156). Furthermore, since the goals nominally pursued by violence in the modern age cannot be achieved rapidly, the result, as Arendt notes, “will not merely be defeat but the introduction of the practice of violence into the whole body politic” (OV:80). Violence is destructive of the authentically political and since “the means used to achieve [ostensibly] political goals” are now of “greater relevance to the future world than the intended goals” (OV:4), the ultimate consequence is that professed political goals have been transformed by the means available – they have in fact been completely corrupted and can no longer be considered ‘political’ at all. When we are in the position that the Indian Military Chief of Staff reportedly replied that he thought the most significant lesson of the first Gulf War was “Never fight the U.S. without nuclear weapons” (cited Manning 1997-8:79), it is clear that goals which were, and for Arendt should be, political, have become subservient to and constrained by the technological capabilities of the parties involved.

Moving from conceptual language to practical reality, Arendt uses examples from history to show that prior to the advent of the modern world, which she dates from the first atomic explosion (HC:6), no government based exclusively on the means of violence has ever had long term viability. Even the despotic rule of master over slaves relied on the ‘obvious truth’ noted in the latter-day official Report on Violence in America (1969), that “force and violence are likely to be successful techniques of social control and persuasion [perhaps more accurately coercion] when they have wide popular support” (cited OV:19).

Power was therefore traditionally able to marshal the implements of violence (Berkowitz 2013), to control and even render them ineffective (in Vietnam for example). This does not obviate the facts that in their pure forms violence can always destroy power, nor that rule by sheer violence often occurs as a last resort when a regime is failing. Instead, it is to argue that

---

84 Arendt notes that this process is facilitated by the increasing bureaucratisation seen in government – a point which will be returned to in Section Three.
Before the technological revolution which made weapons of mass destruction possible, power and violence appeared together in the theatre of war (i.e. troops and weaponry), and wherever combined, power was the “primary and predominant factor” (OV:52) – the people could refuse to fight. This relationship altered with the arrival of the atomic bomb. Today, the theatre of war can be devoid of troops; individuals or state administrations are now capable of extraordinary destruction simply by possessing a nuclear weapon which they can deploy, with devastating effect, without relying on the cooperation of men and women in the field – power is usurped. Although this capacity has been used rarely to date, and in practice ‘conventional’ warfare still predominates, the crucial point for Arendt is that it remains, and, since knowledge can never be ‘unlearned’, always will remain, a possibility.

As argued by Roger Berkowitz (2013), from an Arendtian perspective, modern warfare alienates the larger population from sovereign decisions over life and death. The traditional limits politics placed on violence have been displaced, and as a result violent warfare can be controlled absent of consent, human participation or political support. We have reached the point where “one man with a pushbutton at his disposal [is able] to destroy whomever he pleases”; “the fundamental ascendancy of power over violence” (OV:50) has been reversed. This consequently means that deliberative reflection is curtailed (Bertman 2007:75), and in a public sphere subject to such threats, Ronald Dworkin observes that all that is expected of citizens and states alike is ‘terrified prudence’ (2006:49-51) rather than political engagement. This truncation of deliberation reflects what Young (2007:120) calls the ‘the logic of masculinist protection’. The stakes are seen to be so high that the state acts in a manner analogous to a patriarchal model of a male protector of the domestic space inhabited by vulnerable women and children. In this logic, citizens are primarily positioned as dependent subordinates and are therefore precluded from genuine political participation.

Decision making and execution is centralised, and for Arendt, one of the two experiences that she believes “ignite the question about the meaning of politics in our time” is the “monstrous development of modern means of destruction over which states have a monopoly” (PP:109

---

85 This is still true in situations of conventional warfare today. For example, on 29th August 2013, the UK Parliament voted against the Conservative motion to intervene militarily in Syria against the Assad regime.
86 See Hassner (2007) and Quinian (2009) for more on the impossibility of eliminating knowledge and ‘disinventing’ nuclear weapons.
emphasis added).\textsuperscript{88} Scholars such as Morgenthau agreed, and he argued that the nuclear age had radically changed relationships between individuals and “concentrated unprecedented destructive power in the hands of governments…fundamentally alter[ing] the relations which have existed throughout history between governments and people and among governments themselves” (Morgenthau 1962:19). In reality this is evidenced for Arendt in nuclear testing. In her considerations on the Cold War in 1962, Arendt notes how the then recent resumption of nuclear tests were no longer conducted for the perfection of specific armaments, but were meant as an instrument of policy and were internationally recognised as such. She argues these tests “gave the rather ominous impression of some sort of tentative warfare in which two opposing camps demonstrate to each other the destructiveness of the weapons in their possession” (OR:16 / Arendt 1962:14). The underground nuclear tests conducted by North Korea in February 2013 can perhaps be seen in the same light. The New York Times quoted a spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry as saying that his country could move towards dismantling its nuclear arms programme only if the United States took ‘simultaneous’ action toward abandoning what he called its ‘hostile policy’ against Pyongyang (Sang-Hun 2013). The nuclear tests were, in effect, a bargaining chip. Such coercion is possible without popular support, ultimately therefore technology has irreversibly eliminated the need for widespread human consent because it reduces human participation and thus destroys the basis of the political realm.

Echoing these concerns today, historians such as Garry Wills have argued that atomic weaponry demands a monopoly of information and centralised control. In his book Bomb Power: The Modern Presidency and the National Security State,\textsuperscript{89} he argues that the atomic bomb fundamentally altered the constitutional roots of the USA “by redefining government as a ‘National Security State, with an apparatus of secrecy and executive control” (cited Weart 2012:69). In what the possessor of such weapons deems to be the ‘exceptional case’ they embody the hierarchical command aspects of sovereignty enumerated above, and are able to coerce not just the homogenous bloc of ‘poor meek little fellows’ within their own territorial boundaries, but are able to threaten much more widely across the globe. This has obvious implications for the international system of sovereign nation states which are now seen by

\textsuperscript{88} The other is the rise of totalitarian regimes. For Arendt and many others, notably Jaspers, these two facts should be treated in conjunction because they form a single Gordian knot that stands at the centre of a broader threat to humanity.

some as “vestigial obstructions in the circulatory system of the world” (Cousins cited Bates 2005:174).

**Implications for Sovereignty**

In the era of globalisation it is increasingly difficult for states to retain ultimate control within their borders, but this has not prevented states pursuing sovereignty by making security the goal of politics. Freedom, rather than security is the end of genuine politics for Arendt, but the perceived risk of terrorist attack experienced to varying degrees since the beginning of the Cold War, peaking again since 2001, has led to an insecurity which has resulted in the militarization of the entire world and a subsequent decline in freedom. Thus, many of the reasons attributed to nuclear development and proliferation rest upon considerations of sovereignty.

International interest in nuclear energy has been evident since the rise of the nuclear age. In fact, by its first resolution (24th January 1946), the General Assembly established the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to deal with the ‘problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy’. Proposals were advanced for placing nuclear programmes under international control in order to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons (at that time held only by the United States). These efforts were unsuccessful however, and nuclear energy became subsumed in the ultimate expression of sovereignty—national security and preparations for war (Carlson 2011). The notion of a ‘nuclear sovereignty’ was therefore adopted in which the substitution of violence for power was made explicit. As Nagen and Jacobs argue “this notion is, in effect, founded on the principle that force, control, and naked power trump the moral force and compulsion of global authority and the welfare of humanity” (Nagen & Jacobs 2012:118). The reversal of precedence between power and violence, as Arendt foretold, has foreshadowed another reversal. When states such as North Korea possess nuclear weapons, the relationship between small, previously insignificant powers and great powers has also altered. For Robert Manning, this was first realised in the 1990s with the Gulf War when “Iraq

---

90 The term ‘nuclear sovereignty’ has been adapted by some ‘have-not’ states, for example South Korea started talking of ‘peaceful nuclear sovereignty’ in the context of U.S.-ROK negotiations for a nuclear cooperation agreement. Proponents of a nuclear power programme unfettered by U.S. restrictions adopted ‘peaceful nuclear sovereignty’ as a slogan representative of their ambitions. See Dalton and Francis (2015) for further information.
dramatized the reality that small powers can now threaten U.S. forces and allies on distant battlefields with missiles and chemical, biological and nuclear weapons” (Manning 1997-8:79).

Atomic capability is also used for defensive purposes. As the former Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk noted in 1993, “nuclear weapons are a means of protection against threats to the integrity of Ukrainian territory” (cited Manning 1997-8:75), and Doug Bandow suggests that one of the unintended consequences of the Western military action against the Gaddafi regime in Libya has been to persuade Iran and North Korea that their nuclear weapons programmes are “the only shield against Western military intervention” (cited Pant 2012:2).

In response to Kofi Annan’s suggestion that “sovereignty implies responsibilities as well as powers” (Address to the International Peace Academy 15th February 2002, cited Walker 2010:449), William Walker addresses the notion of ‘responsible nuclear nations’, noting “nuclear armed states have from time to time exercised sovereignty to avoid clear enunciation, let alone formalisation, of responsibility, partly so that they can retain freedom of action in the shaping and usage of their nuclear forces for deterrence” (Walker 2010:449). Nation states therefore often strive to acquire nuclear capabilities both as a form of deterrence and as a guarantor of sovereignty. As Jaspers wrote more than half a century ago; “National independence today is bound to technology” (Jaspers 1963:114).

Security considerations are however only one motivating factor for proliferation. In reality state sovereignty requires international recognition, some states therefore aspire to attain (or retain) nuclear weapons purely for reasons of reputation. As Anne Harrington de Santana has pointed out, nuclear weapons have a constitutive effect on power – they confer power on their possessors because others treat them as powerful (cited Tannenwald 2012:71). For instance, in 1993 a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) spokesman said “We don’t want to be blackmailed and treated as oriental blacksies. An Indian will talk straight and walk straight when we have the bomb” (cited Perkovich 1998:16). Whilst “irrelevance is the only ‘clear and present danger’ against which France’s nuclear weapons defend” (Perkovich 1998:16).

Ultimately, the militarization of politics has been at the expense of freedom. It is, notes Young-Bruehl, “a key contribution to the elimination of politics from our world” (Young-Bruehl &

---

91 See Miller (2003) for a more detailed examination of the concept of responsible sovereignty.
92 See for example Hassner (2007:455-467); Manning (1997-8:70-84); Wendt (1999).
Kohn 2006), and is therefore destructive of the human condition as Arendt saw clearly many years ago.

**Effect on the Human Condition**

“An altogether novel situation has been created by the atom bomb. Either all mankind will physically perish or there will be a change in the moral-political condition of man” (Jaspers 1963:vii).

“Has not each of the advances in science, since the time of Copernicus, almost automatically resulted in a decrease in his [humanity’s] stature?” (CS:51)

What it is to be human is the motif underpinning all of Arendt’s work. In *The Human Condition* for instance, she argues that what distinguishes us from all other animals is our ability to create a political realm and to initiate speech and action i.e. to ‘appear’ amongst a plurality of our equals and disclose our ‘unique distinctness’. The existence of atomic weapons threatens both the world we create in common and our specific individuality.

As reflected on by Douglas Klusmeyer, “it is against the twin threats of totalitarianism and thermonuclear war that Arendt sought to rethink the core principles of modern politics” (Klusmeyer 2005:142). Where she discusses the topic explicitly, the atomic bomb is often mentioned in conjunction with totalitarian rule, and she praises Jaspers’ *The Future of Mankind* as being “the only discussion on the war question I know of which dares to face both the horrors of nuclear weapons and the threat of totalitarianism, and is therefore entirely free of mental reservation” (OR:285 FN1). She uses these new conceptions as twin starting points to begin addressing the question ‘what is the meaning of politics?’, or perhaps more accurately: “if not this, then what?” (Schell 2010:254). The manner in which totalitarianism destroys genuine political action is discussed at great length in *Origins*, but essentially the threat can be reduced to the fact that such rule “uses systematic terror to destroy all inter-human relationships” (PP:162) and thus the common world between them. Arendt draws parallels between the danger inherent in totalitarianism and that manifest in total war. The first, she argues, abolishes freedom; the second extinguishes all life by which she means more than simply the decimation of a people or even many peoples. Nuclear war is able to turn the world mankind inhabits into a desert (PP:154); it is able to destroy “the entire world that has arisen between human beings” (PP:162 emphasis added). Both therefore threaten the world
humankind has in common – “totalitarianism destroys from within...nuclear war (but not conventional war) destroys from without” (Schell 2010:254-5).

In her essay on Jaspers, Arendt posits that with the advent of atomic weaponry humankind has become visibly united, and although recognition of this fact is no longer at the forefront of most people’s minds, all are now equally at risk of elimination because “the political wisdom of a few might ultimately come to be the end of all human life on earth” (MDT:83). Whilst some see as potentially positive the fact humankind as one are now subject to a common, all pervading threat, Arendt perceives this solidarity as ‘entirely negative’, underpinned as it is on “a common desire for a world that is a little less unified” (MDT:83).

More specifically, addressing the situation philosophically, Arendt identifies the possible danger inherent in mankind being unified by the technical means of communication and violence thus:

>This unity...destroys all natural traditions and buries the authentic origins of all human existence...Its result would be a shallowness that would transform man, as we have known him in five thousand years of recorded history, beyond recognition. It would be more than mere superficiality; it would be as though the whole dimension of depth, without which human thought, even on the level of technical invention, could not exist, would simply disappear (MDT:87).

In such a situation, the historical peculiarities of specific peoples which makes up the world between individuals of different nations, would be seen as an obstacle to achieving this ‘horridly shallow unity’. This is not however an inevitability. Jaspers opines that it is theoretically possible to instigate a new unity of humankind which brings disparate national pasts into communication with each other enabling humankind as a whole to acquire a past of its own, in which “the origins of mankind would reveal themselves in their very sameness” (MDT:89). In this manifestation of a united mankind, solidarity does not consist in universal agreement upon one religion or philosophy or fear of nuclear annihilation, “but in the faith that the manifold points to a Oneness which diversity conceals and reveals at the same time” (MDT:90). Whilst Arendt obviously finds some solace in this vision, she is clear that any such development “still lies in a far distant future” (MDT:94), and that as it stands, even if humankind is not yet superficially unified, nuclear weaponry still threatens the common world.

As Arendt understands it, the ‘mortal sin’ of the unrestrained violence apparent in nuclear war is two-fold and is akin to the dangers inherent in sovereign rule. First, it is totalising in nature. ‘Murder’ in this case concerns a whole people and its political constitution which makes
immortality impossible (the implications of which are discussed further below). Second, the violence is inflicted not only on tangible ‘things’ that have been produced by the labour of men and women and which can therefore be reproduced, but, more significantly, on political freedom as guaranteed by the “historical and political reality housed in this world of products, a reality that cannot be rebuilt because it is itself not a product” (PP:161). Arendt theorises that this ‘world of relationships’ is more difficult to destroy than the ‘manufactured world of things’, but that once destroyed by a totalising force (be it sovereign rule by command or nuclear war) “then the laws of political action…are replaced by the law of the desert, which, as a wasteland between men, unleashes devastating processes that bear within them the same lack of moderation inherent in those free human actions that establish relationships” (PP:190). Schell concludes that Arendt assigns physical survival “a kind of derivative value, as the undergirding of freedom and the common world” (Schell 2010:255), and whilst true, it would be incorrect to assume Arendt was blasé about loss of life in and of itself. Nuclear war introduces the possibility of “severing the roots of the species at the biological level” thereby “barring all hope of regeneration forever” (Schell 2010:255), and for a theorist who saw a new beginning in each birth and believed the ‘miracle’ of action resides as a potential within each individual, the maxim ‘where there is life there is hope’ is undoubtedly true. More, she wished to reinforce the original horror experienced when the world first learned about the atomic bomb – the “horror of an energy that came from the universe” and was therefore “supernatural in the truest sense of the world” and able to destroy all nature on earth (PP:158). This initial fear of the “eerily impressive symbolic power” of atomic weaponry (PP:158) was for her far more authentic than the fear for simple loss of life which came to replace it, for it alluded to elements crucial for a rewarding political life.

In the course of her work, Arendt often returns to the various attitudes and traits of character that make authentic politics possible. She refers to these characteristics using the Machiavellian concept of virtù and key among these qualities are “courage, the pursuit of public happiness, the taste of public freedom, [and] an ambition that strives for excellence” (OR:275-6). Following the Greeks she sees courage as “the political virtue par excellence” (HC:36), an attribute required of men and women before they can act politically. But courage does not require “the daring of adventure which gladly risks life for the sake of being as thoroughly and intensely alive as one can be only in the face of danger and death” (BPF:154). Arendt simply acknowledges that it requires courage to leave the private sphere with its concern for biological life, to enter a realm that pre-exists and is supposed to endure beyond
our limited lifespan and is thus unable to give our individual existence and personal interests, primacy. In his discussion on the topic, Jaspers elaborates on this point. He interprets the risking of death with a will to live in the world as being qualitatively different from the ‘unworldly’ sacrifice inherent in battle: “Only those live constructively who are prepared to give their lives and will sacrifice them in the constant wear of service to their task. This sacrifice, if not consummated in death, works creatively, builds the world, provides fulfilment” (Jaspers 1963:43). Courage is therefore indispensable in Arendt’s view, precisely because “in politics not life but the world is at stake” (BPF:155).

Courage is predicated on the fact that unlike animals, men and women do not exist only as members of a species whose immortal life is guaranteed through procreation (HC:18). In being courageous and entering the public sphere they are therefore only potentially jeopardising a life that will one day end anyway. Courage would be inconceivable if men and women were not the possessors of individual lives with recognisable life-stories from birth to death because the stakes would be too high (HC:19). As Arendt notes, were this to be the case “life would not only appear to be the highest good, it would become the central human concern, overruling all other considerations” (EU:421). Biological survival would therefore become the chief motivator in the public sphere, just as it is in private. Whilst courage requires that men and women recognise their own mortality, in practice it is only possible when they are equally assured that their sacrifice will be recognised, understood and respected by future generations of similar beings. They must believe they are fulfilling a role in something more permanent than themselves; that they are contributing to “the enduring chronicle of mankind” (Faulkner cited EU:422).

The capacity of men and women for immortal deed is at once their task and their greatness (HC:19). Indeed “Man gives his life and death meaning by his ability to make himself and his works remembered after his death” (Morgenthau 1962:23). As argued in The Human Condition, mortal beings can attain a certain immortality by leaving behind non-perishable traces of who they are and what they have done, which can be understood by posterity. Crucially, as noted by Morgenthau, what is remembered however, “is not only the specific human quality, but also and most importantly the quality in which he lives on as a unique individual, the like of whom has never existed before or since” (Morgenthau 1962:22 emphasis

---

93 Jaspers believed “Sacrifice is the inescapable foundation of true humanity...without sacrifice we are not truly human” (Jaspers 1963:55).
added). Since the inception of the Greek *polis*, one of the most significant functions of any political space is to facilitate “a kind of organised remembrance” (HC:198), to “assure that the most futile of all human activities, action and speech, and the least tangible and most ephemeral of man-made ‘products’, the deeds and stories which are their outcome would become imperishable” (HC:197-8). All this is threatened by the possibility of nuclear annihilation.

War has always been degrading, but as Patricia Owens rightly recognises, for Arendt “the implied insult to human dignity has always been overlain, for some of the dead, in glorification; bearing witness to the great deeds’ of warriors is as old as human civilisation” (Owens 2009a:34). This is no longer the case. Modern battlefields “are like meetings of speechless robots, some of whom kill and some of whom are killed” (Young-Bruehl 2006:95). They preclude the disclosure of “who” in contradistinction to ‘what’ somebody is – his qualities, gifts, talents, and shortcomings” by making impossible speech and action (HC:179). Increased mechanisation started this process, but only with the advent of nuclear weaponry, which threatens the existence of all public space, is the full horror of this predicament realisable. In ‘Death in the Nuclear Age’, Morgenthau is succinct and disheartened: “nuclear destruction destroys the meaning of death by depriving it of its individuality. It destroys the meaning of immortality by making both society and history impossible. It destroys the meaning of life by throwing life back upon itself” (Morgenthau 1962:22).

In her essay ‘Europe and the Atom Bomb’, Arendt confronts the ‘fearful image’ of American political power as typified by a “supreme, irresistible power of destruction” (EU:420). She highlights the usual defence made – that American atomic energy would only be used for defence or retaliation – and questions its veracity. She believes that proponents of American proliferation essentially underpin their arguments with the assumption that the preservation of freedom justifies the use of the means of violence and notes this argument is predicated on the political philosophy which prizes courage as “the one virtue without which political freedom is wholly impossible” (EU:420). This pre-Christian philosophy considers there to be conditions under which life is not worth living, when one is “utterly delivered to the necessities of preserving sheer animal life, and therefore…judged incapable of freedom” as in the case of slavery or incurable illness (EU:420). Whilst Arendt concedes there are certainly circumstances under which individual life is not worth living, the same cannot be true for humanity as a whole. Nuclear weaponry jeopardises the survival of humanity and is thus capable of
transforming the “individual mortal man into a conscious member of the human race, of whose immortality he needs to be sure in order to be courageous at all and for whose survival he must care more than for anything else” (EU:422). She goes on to argue that the moment war can even conceivably threaten the continued existence of people on earth, “the alternative between liberty and death has lost its old plausibility” (EU:422) and the capacity of men and women to act in a politically courageous manner is destroyed. This thereby denigrates what it is to be human because “Man does not know his humanity until he proves it by courage and by contempt of death” (Jaspers 1963:42).

As alluded to above, akin to the concept of courage is the notion of sacrifice, and although Arendt did not examine this as pertains to nuclear weaponry, in *The Atom Bomb and the Future of Man*, Jaspers highlights the altered role of combatants under conditions of modern warfare and much of what he says resonates with Arendt’s thought. Whilst some of his discussion on the disintegration of the ‘soldierly idea’ appears outdated in the milieu of the twenty first century, several aspects are still highly pertinent and link to Arendt’s wider arguments pertaining to the superfluity of men and women in modernity. “About to vanish”, he argued in the 1950s, “is the soldierly spirit...truthfulness and decency and personal freedom” (Jaspers 1963:48). Machinery has replaced traditional standards and has thus led to an “automatic debasement of man” (Jaspers 1963:48) where his individual qualities become at best an irrelevance. The soldier’s ability to think is constrained, and though to the detriment of the human condition, this is perhaps not wholly bad since, as Jaspers goes on to note, one’s inner attitude is fundamentally altered “if every skirmish is fought under the threat of the last trumpet” (Jaspers 1963:51). If one’s own fight may set off the holocaust, being able to conceive of and think about the consequences is likely to be too much to bear. In sum, modern warfare has become “a mere mechanism of obedience and discipline without the freedom of soldierly ethics, a total inhumanity cloaked in hollow words” (Jaspers 1963:49) – sovereignty as command rules and individuals are as interchangeable as cogs in a machine.

---

94 This is why she indignantly repudiates the ‘give me freedom or give me death!’ approach to nuclear annihilation as “not even hollow... [but] downright ridiculous” (OR:13).
Concluding Comments on Atomic Weaponry and War

Although nuclear weapons have not been deployed since Arendt wrote about their potential danger in the height of the Cold War, today, according to the Federation of American Scientists, there are approximately 17,300 nuclear warheads across nine sovereign states.\(^95\) The threats Arendt identified are therefore still highly relevant. Despite this fact however, debate surrounding the issue has declined and a gap has developed between nuclear reality and public perception with the prevailing attitude amongst lay people being one of “Nuclear weapons? I thought we got rid of those when the Cold War ended” (Manning 1997:8:70). It is perhaps therefore time to adopt Arendt’s maxim, ‘think what we are doing’ and engage in substantive discussion. Current debates, when they do happen, occur within the paradigm of state sovereignty and tend to revolve around demands from the ‘haves’ that the ‘have nots’ remain that way. Despite significant reductions in nuclear forces compared with Cold War levels, all the nuclear weapon states continue to modernise their remaining nuclear forces and from an Arendtian perspective, as noted by Jean Bethke Elshtain, such efforts can perhaps be seen as “the arms race under another name negotiated by a bevy of experts with a vested interest in keeping the race alive so they can ‘control’ it” (Elshtain 1985:53-4). Elshtain goes on to argue that Arendt’s perspective invites strong dominant nations to take “unilateral initiatives in order to break symbolically the cycle of vengeance and fear signified by... nuclear arsenals” because “just as action from an individual or group may disrupt the automisms of everyday life, action from a single state may send shock waves that reverberate through the system” (Elshtain 1985:54). Considering the dangers of nuclear weaponry that Arendt identified and the apparent lack of substantive progress over the last 60 years, perhaps it is time new strategies are pursued – ones which fully recognise the logic of sovereignty and the threats to humanity.

Concluding Comments – Section One

Chapters I and II have demonstrated that state sovereignty fundamentally damages the human condition, which highlights Arendt’s recognition that protecting and promoting human dignity is actually a political rather than a moral imperative and therefore must foster and adopt genuinely political methods to achieve its goal.

There are some encouraging steps in this direction. In her essay introducing the 2004 edition of *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Samantha Powers argues Arendt underestimated the ‘intrinsic resonance’ of human rights principles across the world which she sees as having resulted in a more ‘bottom up’ promotion of human rights than the ‘top-down’ one envisaged in 1948 (OT:xxi). Powers cites the significant budget increase to non-state entities like Amnesty International – groups which now conduct rigorous field investigations to shame perpetrators of human rights abuses and bystanders alike. Such organs still fare relatively poorly in a system predicated on sovereign states, much more potentially important however, are the myriad organic groups of committed and engaged individuals who see themselves not as “human beings in general” (OT:383), but as political activists who want to effect change to improve conditions. In her article Odinkalu (1999) argues that “throughout history, the protection of human rights has been won by struggle, and struggle requires mobilization.” Mobilising those actually affected both validates the movement and creates spaces in which individuals can become political agents of change. Many such groups can be found in the developing world campaigning for issues such as women’s suffrage, education and healthcare for the poor amongst others, but there are also some notable examples in the West – including those campaigning against nuclear proliferation and for the abolition of Trident.

In his article on Arendt and human dignity, Jeffrey Isaac examines the Helsinki Citizens Assembly, established in 1990 in Prague by civic activists from Eastern and Western Europe. Mary Kaldor, co-founder, describes the purpose of the assembly as “a strategic dialogue, and attempt to change society through the actions of citizens rather than governments...in short, to create a new political culture”, one in which “the behaviour of governments either changes or becomes less and less relevant” (Kaldor cited Isaac 1996:71). Whilst not indifferent to government policy, Isaac argues, the power its members have been able to constitute is key to affecting change. “Our power”, asserts Kaldor, “rests not on whom we represent but in what we do – in what we say, in our ideas, in our quest for truth, in the projects we undertake. It rests on our energy and commitment” (Kaldor cited Isaac 1996:71 emphasis added).

As fora of civic participation such forms of collective empowerment may well provide a new foundation for human dignity – something desperately needed when it is still true that “under the most diverse conditions and disparate circumstances, we watch the development of the same phenomena – homelessness on an unprecedented scale, rootlessness to an unprecedented depth” (OT:xxv).
SECTION TWO: NATIONALISM

CHAPTER III ARENDT ON NATIONALISM

“The fundamental political reality of our time is determined by two facts: on the one hand, it is based upon ‘nations’ and, on the other, it is permanently disturbed and thoroughly menaced by ‘nationalism’” (Arendt 1946:138).

Introduction

The previous section focussed on sovereignty and several of its interrelated notions, and began to demonstrate that Arendt’s political theory is disclosed through an examination of political concepts and a critique of ‘politics’ in modernity. Often seen as contiguous with the notion of sovereignty is that of nationalism, and whilst the term ‘nation-state’ implies state and nation cannot be separated, for Arendt this was an erroneous assumption. Arendt believed that there is a “secret conflict between state and nation” which “came to light at the very birth of the modern nation-state, when the French Revolution combined the Declaration of the Rights of Man with the demand for national sovereignty” (OT:297). As such her work establishes that there are distinct concepts and political realities associated with each of the two terms and moreover, that each of these distinct concepts contributes to the contemporary crisis of the political as she understood it.

The discussion on the right to have rights highlighted that in order to be truly human men and women need to ‘belong’; to be reciprocally recognised as equal members of a political community. The concept of nationalism speaks to this need, but the manner in which the two are associated pose intractable problems for Arendt. It was in a short review piece in 1946 that Arendt’s views on nationalism were first formulated, and the tensions and contradictions the concept encompasses first explored. This chapter will proceed by addressing the themes highlighted in this article before undertaking a more extensive reading of Arendt’s thoughts on nationalism and the political primarily, although not exclusively, via Origins. In this text Arendt clearly distinguishes between two types of nationalism and in this chapter both will be examined, drawing out some of the features about which Arendt was most critical. A more general examination of nationalism as an ideology will then be undertaken before moving on to discuss contemporary international ramifications of nationalist thought in the next chapter.
Review of J.T. Delos’ *La Nation*

As Susannah Young-ah Gottlieb rightly suggests, in light of Arendt’s essays on literature in particular, a theory can be formulated that “just as political judgement creates public space, aesthetic judgement, which suspends direct involvement in all pragmata, grants access to political time” (Gottlieb in Arendt RLC:xiii). In her review of Delos’ *La Nation* Arendt indulges in aesthetic judgement concerning the presentation of his prose, but her political judgement is also clearly discernible when the content is examined, and the views she expresses therein can be seen as a precursor for the theory she developed more fully in *Origins*.

The quote opening this chapter is taken from Arendt’s review of *La Nation* and it is instructive in laying the foundation for her later thoughts. She attributes to Delos’ work a central concern to find a political principle which would facilitate the creation of an international community whilst precluding the development of nationalism and thereby protecting the civilisation of the modern world. Expressed thus, this interpretation of Delos’ work discloses several factors which underpin Arendt’s political theory – a theory which is explicitly international in scope. First, it acknowledges Arendt’s belief that to be fully human, by which she means civilised – where plurality is recognised and supported; individual thought and opinion are significant and expressed through speech and action; and each is conditioned by human artifice – people need to belong to a community. Her review does however also underline her mistrust of nationalism as the manner of achieving this.

In contextualising her main arguments Arendt enumerates the ‘main phenomena’ of the modern world in which several of her key concerns for the political are evident. In recognising that civilisation has rejected universality and now presents itself in the form of a particular – a ‘national civilisation’ – she is both establishing a tension which becomes of central import in her later theories, and is alluding to the fact that civilisation has become more exclusionary and hierarchical, traits addressed and critiqued in the previous section as being anti-political. The notion of state sovereignty is implicit in her assertion that the reconstitution of the state post feudalism has failed to address the fundamental problem concerning the origin and legality of its power; and the new phenomena of masses reveals Arendt’s concern about the rise of the social, which she sees as being at the expense of both the genuinely political and the authentically private. Whilst this paragraph in the review situates her evaluation of Delos’ work, it is noteworthy how much of Arendt’s own political thoughts it reveals.
When addressing the topic of race Arendt’s opinions are even more explicit. It is clear she agrees race classifications are based on physicalities which ‘artificially unite’ without taking into account social links or communities, but she strenuously disagrees with Delos’ assertion that this is a scientific mistake. Instead she charges that this is “the ultimate, political aim of the racial pseudo-sciences which prepare the destruction of societies and communities whose atomisation is one of the prerequisites of imperialistic domination” (Arendt 1946:139 emphasis added). This supports her assessment that the “only important mistake in emphasis” she can see in Delos’ work is his conviction that imperialism is a logical development of nationalism, which in her opinion “is only partially true” (Arendt 1946:139) as the subsequent discussion on tribal nationalism will illustrate.

In the current context arguably the most instructive paragraphs in this article concern those in which Arendt summarises Delos’ definition of terms. It is upon these definitions that Arendt’s theory of Western nationalism is predicated and some of the tensions and contradictions with which she is grappling are revealed. Craig Calhoun (1993:215) highlights that ‘‘nationalism’’ and corollary terms like ‘nation’ have proved notoriously hard concepts to define”, but in an unusually direct manner and quoting Delos, Arendt defines the term ‘nation’ thus:

A people become a nation when ‘it takes conscience of itself according to its history’; as such it is attached to the soil which is the product of past labour and where history has left its traces. It represents the ‘milieu’ into which man is born, a closed society to which one belongs by right of birth (Arendt 1946:139).

Fundamentally, it is the closed nature of the nation which causes Arendt consternation – any community in which inclusion depends primarily if not solely upon ‘right of birth’, rather than any action taken by an individual or their appearance (presence) within a shared space is potentially destructive of the genuinely political.

Nation is contrasted to the state which is:

An open society, ruling over a territory where its power protects and makes the law. As a legal institution, the state knows only citizens no matter of what nationality; its legal order is open to all who happen to live on its territory (Arendt 1946:139).

When, in the nineteenth century, the nation conquered the state (initially with the declaration of national sovereignty), nationalism ensued which resulted in the “confusion of the Rights of Men with the rights of nationals or national rights” (Arendt 1946:139) – the harmful consequences of which are elaborated on in Arendt’s later works.
The danger of liberal individualism to which Arendt returns in *Origins* is also introduced in this article. She notes that the discrepancy between the increasing tendency towards centralisation within the state machinery and social atomisation could only be bridged ‘through the solid cement of national sentiment’. This explains in part the longevity of the concept, and the dangers inherent in such thought paradigms – modern genocide for example – highlight another reality that Arendt feels needs to be addressed.

Whilst it is evident that for Arendt in reality “the fusion of the state and nation is a fatal one” (Beiner 2002:53), there is some dispute over whether Arendt believed the nation corrupts the state or vice-versa. The preponderance of textual evidence suggests that Arendt considers “the nation as the more sinister partner in this unhappy alliance” (Beiner 2002:52). However Ronald Beiner (2002) notes that in Arendt’s review of Delos’ *La Nation* she sees the state as the ‘power-institution’ likely to become ‘aggressive’, whilst the national body on the contrary, ‘has put an end to migrations’ and only acquires aggression/the desire for expansion through its identification with the state. When considering this seeming contradiction in thought it is important to consider how Arendt believes the political realm can be damaged. It seems justified to argue that whilst aggression and violence are undoubtedly anti-political traits in Arendt’s view, so too is the notion of a closed community, unwilling to allow full emancipation for non-nationals and thus limiting diversity within the community. It is perhaps misleading therefore to celebrate one and vilify the other, and would be more accurate to assert that the worst traits of each are only fully developed in combination, as will be returned to below.

In summation, it is clear that this very short article introduces several issues including race, history, exclusion, violence and conflation of disparate terms that Arendt develops into a more detailed theory on nationalism. Taken as a whole, her review suggests it would be difficult to overemphasise the importance of nationalism for informing Arendt’s political theory and for reshaping how we view the modern world. Indeed as Delos wrote, “the relations between Nation and State – or in more general and exact terms, between the political order and that of nationality – raise one of the essential problems which our civilisation has to solve” (cited Arendt 1946:140).

---

96 See for example “It is therefore quite erroneous to see the veil of our times in the deification of the state. It is the nation which has usurped the traditional place of God and religion” (Arendt 1946:139).
**Western Nationalism**

Arendt examines the ‘national question’ in great detail in Part II of *Origins* – Imperialism. This text has been “long neglected by Arendt scholars” (Benhabib 2003:75), in part, according to Joan Cocks, because she pursues therein patterns of thought on Africa and Africans “that not only reveals but instantiates the phenomenology of European racism, making sections of the work distasteful to the contemporary palate” (1995:222). However, the global situation today, with its “resurgence of rootlessness, ethnonationalism, and sociopolitical estrangement about which ‘Imperialism’ above all has so much to say, *demands* that Arendt’s attention to nationalism be approached...but with delicacy” (Cocks 1995:222 emphasis added) – a task that will be attempted below.

In *Origins* Arendt develops theories of two modalities of nationalism – Western and Tribal. Beiner (2002:50) believes that Arendt’s two typologies correspond to the distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism, i.e. between claims “to have superseded traditional identities such as ethnicity by the founding of a true and modern nation, and claims to national identity and sovereignty rooted precisely in ancient ethnicity” (Calhoun 1993:221). Much of her Delos review was concerned with the former which resulted from the combination in the nineteenth century of the notions of state and nation. Whilst for Arendt it was conceivable that such a union could have combined “national identity, political equality, and social plurality, with politics having primacy in national life over economics” (Cocks 1995:235), the reality was far from this utopia.

Whilst qualitatively different, both Western and Tribal nationalism fail to reconcile the human need to belong in a manner that respects the political as Arendt understands it. Like much of Arendt’s thought, her views on nationalism reflect dichotomies. Examination of her work in *Origins* reveals that one of the fundamental concerns she has with Western nationalism is the manner in which its universalist tendencies are undermined by particularist assumptions.

The ‘universalist tendencies’ are derived from the institution of the state which as a result of centuries of monarchical rule is ‘open’ and intended to protect all. The state:

97 For in depth discussion on the origins of nationalism see for example Calhoun (1993: 211-239; 1997); Smith (2000); Bhabha (1995a & 1995b); Kamenka (1976); Kedourie (1985); Hobsbawn (1999); Breuilly (1993); and Canovan (1996).
Inherited as its supreme function the protection of all inhabitants in its territory no matter what their nationality...[it] was supposed to act as a supreme legal institution (OT:296, emphasis added).98

Such universalism was damaged irretrievably when the particularisms associated with the concept of the nation exerted an effect. This is not to say that Arendt believes the concept to be intrinsically anti-political, indeed interpretation of her definition of ‘nation’ reveals just the opposite:

Nations entered the scene of history and were emancipated when peoples had acquired a consciousness of themselves as cultural and historical entities, and of their territory as a permanent home, where history had left its visible traces, whose cultivation was the product of the common labor of their ancestors and whose future would depend upon the course of a common civilization (OT:295).99

Conscripted thus, Arendt’s definition of the nation bears striking similarities to that expounded by Ernst Renan in the nineteenth century. He saw the nation as possessing shared memories in the past and a present-day and future desire to live together (1995:19). Arendt’s understanding of the nation in its basic (Western) form is therefore perhaps best read and engaged with in the milieu of civic nationalism. This ‘pole’ of nationalism predicates inclusion in terms of a voluntary commitment to certain rules and institutions and is thus potentially political in Arendtian terms. Early scholars of this type of nationalism include Renan, John Stuart Mill and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and whilst the specifics of their theories vary, in all cases political legitimacy is derived from the voluntary, active participation of its citizenry. Such theories therefore reflect Arendt’s understanding of the nation in its original form as being “based upon the sovereignty of the people and its active consent to the government” (Arendt 1945:444-5) – a ‘daily plebiscite’ (Renan 1995:19).

Like Renan before her and contemporary theorists such as John Breuilly, Arendt makes clear that the concept of the nation arose ‘in close association’ with the development of the modern state (Breuilly 1993:xii/2). She concurs with Renan that the origins of the nation can be traced back to the French Revolution and she goes on to note the presupposition of a plethora of similarly sovereign national organisations. Three relevant inferences can be drawn from the information above, the first, already mentioned, is that for Arendt the concept of nation is not by necessity anti-political. Indeed in Origins (297) and The Promise of Politics (PP:142) she is explicit that national sovereignty did originally have a connotation of ‘freedom of the people’,

98 See Tsao (2004 :105-136) for an insightful comparison of Arendt’s thought on the modern state with those expressed by Hegel.
99 See also Arendt (1946:138-141).
by which she meant that each person has the freedom to act – a trait only possible in the shared or collective political realm. She also recognised that at its inception the concept of nation was built upon the political principle of equality (OT:214). Further, an understanding of Arendt’s political theory and terminology reveals that within her entire definition of what constitutes a nation is implicit the potential for its political relevance. The invocation of history is indicative in this sense in that for Arendt, history is political; it is a “story of action and deeds” (HC:185). A people becomes a nation when they are free\(^{100}\) to act together, and when the resultant deeds are ‘narrated’ by a historian looking back, perceiving and making the story (HC:192).

Secondly, Arendt believed that a national body must participate in its own governance. In seeking to situate Arendt within the body of scholarship on the nation this view is of particular relevance since it is a doctrine echoed by many modern and contemporary theorists. Writing at a similar time, Isaiah Berlin recognises that people prefer to be ‘ordered about’ by those they could identify with – members of their own nation (Berlin 1990:251). More recently, Breuilly’s whole thesis is built upon the premise that nationalism is a form of politics and as such he posits that the nationalist argument is a political doctrine built upon three basic assertions, the third and perhaps most important is that the nation must be as independent as possible which usually requires at a minimum the attainment of political sovereignty (Breuilly 1993:2). Similarly, scholars such as Elie Kedourie (1985) and Martin Sökefeld (2001) believe the doctrine of the nation holds national self-government is the only legitimate form of rule.

Finally, like the aforementioned scholars, Arendt recognises that calls for nationhood are more than domestic claims to social solidarity; they are also an assertion of distinctiveness to, and distinction from, other nations. They are “claims to at least some level of autonomy and self-sufficiency, and claims to certain rights within a world system of states” – in short, such assertion of nationhood is an ‘inherently international’ action (Calhoun 1993:216).

When distinct from the state it has been demonstrated that the nation is potentially political, it was only when state and nation conflated and engendered nationalism in the nineteenth century that the latent particularisms of the latter came to the fore. The ultimate consequence of the state identifying itself with the nation was that “the state was forced to recognize only

\(^{100}\)Where freedom is understood to need “the company of other men who are in the same state, and...a common public space to meet them – a politically organised [and legally secured] world...into which each of the free men could insert himself by word or deed” (BPF:147).
‘nationals’ as citizens, to grant full civil and political rights only to those who belonged to the national community by right of origin and fact of birth” (OT:296). Ultimately this meant “the state was partially transformed from an instrument of the law into an instrument of the nation” (OT:296). It is therefore a product of modernity which in effect removes the criterion of action as the defining factor for the creation of a public realm between equals, replacing it with what is in essence a pre-political notion of membership or identity within a given nation. The practical corollaries she went on to note were that henceforth “the very institution of a state, whose supreme task was to protect and guarantee man and his rights as man, as citizen, and as a national, lost its legal, rational appearance and could be interpreted by the romantics as the nebulous representative of a ‘national soul’ which through the very fact of its existence was supposed to be above the law” (OT:297). Crucially for Arendt this therefore meant “National sovereignty…lost its original connotation of freedom of the people and was being surrounded by a [prepolitical] pseudomystical aura of lawless arbitrariness” (ibid).

In Origins Arendt argues that the conquest of the state by the nation was aided immeasurably by the collapse of the absolute ruler. Whilst the absolute monarch epitomised and served the interests of the nation as a whole, peace and stability were guaranteed. With the downfall of the enlightened despot however, a vacuum was created which Arendt saw as facilitating the rise of the class system and the development of an ‘atomised, individualised, liberal’ society. These factors will be examined in greater detail below, but there are two important points to note here, the first that, as recognised by Tsao, for Arendt the modern state has a dual function: to integrate diverse populations and to uphold the rule of law for all (2004:106); and secondly, that in combination these two factors resulted in the general interest being “supposedly guaranteed in a common origin, which sentimentally expressed itself in nationalism” (OT:297) – a particularist limitation.

**Liberal Individualism and the Rise of the Class System**

The system of nation-states ostensibly replaced the old ‘unfair’ feudal system with one underpinned by equality for all regardless of familial position. The attempt to secure this...
equality required an independent state machine which could, “in splendid isolation, function, rule, and represent the interests of the nation as a whole” (OT:21), rather than simply the interests of the upper echelons. Such a centralised state-machine was undeniably anti-political in Arendt’s view since it had to operate on a command-obedience basis, and whilst the overt aim was ‘equality for all’, the result was a long way from this lofty ideal.

In Arendt’s view, modern Western society was suffused by liberal individualism in which each is viewed in isolation and rights are seen to be conferred exclusively on men and women in their singularity. In her opinion the prevalent assumption was that to be equal to the task of protecting the nation from the consequences of its social atomisation, whilst simultaneously guaranteeing its possibility of remaining in a condition of atomisation, the state had to reinforce all earlier tendencies towards the centralisation and monopolisation of the instruments of violence. The introduction of violence into the realm of the political and the mistaken belief that the state ruled over discrete individuals and was therefore seen as “a kind of supreme individual before which all others had to bow” (OT:297), echo some of the factors Arendt deemed destructive of the political realm examined in the previous section.

Further, and potentially equally as damaging, this manner of thinking had an effect on the interpretation of nationalism. Renan’s notion that a nation exists if people will to belong to it converged with the liberal notion of self-determination and resulted in a shift from the rights of the nation itself to the rights of the people who are its members (Canovan 1996:9). Such liberal individualism is paradigmatic of the ‘monochromic effects of nationalism’ which so worried Arendt. As Cocks recognises, for Arendt this type of nationalism, “raises the citizen to the highest political principle” and “consequently it seeks to obliterate all symptoms of group particularity in society” by “suppressing public signs of ethnocultural difference, which in effect means the suppression of ethnic minority difference” (Cocks 1995:223 & 237). This particularist assumption thereby circumscribes the number of relationships possible between people and damages the quality of the world subsequently brought into being (PP:176).

Such liberal individualism however failed to take into account what Arendt saw as the reality of the times – the existence of classes, which, in effect, “separated the nationals, economically and socially as efficiently as the old regime” (OT:23). Under the class system non-nationals were at the bottom of the hierarchy, unable or unwilling to assimilate into established classes as exemplified for Arendt by the experience of the Jews. Political equality before the law was contradicted by a society based on the class system. An individual’s status was therefore
defined by the class they were associated with and the relationship between that class and others, rather than by their position in the state or within its apparatus.

Although society was divided into classes, no one of these new classes proved desirous or capable of becoming the new ruling elite. It was the constant danger of permanent conflict between classes for control of the state that led, in Arendt’s view, to “the full development of the nation-state and its claim to be above all classes, completely independent of society and its particular interests, the true and only representative of the nation as a whole” (OT:28). That notwithstanding, Arendt argued that not even this concerning fusion of state and nation could effectively heal the divorce between state and society that eroded the basis upon which the body politic of the nation rested, and left the state in a tenuous position since it was unable to ally itself with any of the major estates. Only in times of crisis did the citizenry deal with the state in any comprehensive way. The state therefore reinvented itself as a ‘tremendous business concern’, which eventually became so great that one could not but recognise the existence of a ‘special sphere’ of state business from the 1880s onwards.

The Rise of the Social Realm

Whilst it is in The Human Condition that Arendt explicitly focuses on the rise of the social realm, its consequences are alluded to in Origins. In The Human Condition Arendt examines the fundamental differences between the public and the private realm. In brief, as Arendt understands it and following Ancient Greek distinctions, the private sphere corresponds to the household realm and the things of biological necessity, and the public sphere to the political realm and activities relating to a common world. With the rise of the social realm however the dividing line between the private and the public became entirely blurred because:

We see the body of peoples and political communities in the image of a family whose everyday affairs have to be taken care of by a gigantic, nation-wide administration of housekeeping ...the collective of families economically organized into the facsimile of one super-human family is what we call ‘society,’ and its political form of organisation is called ‘nation’ ” (HC:28-9).

Behaviour was substituted for action, and the distinct individuality characteristic of the public realm was replaced by conformity “which allows for only one interest and one opinion, [and] is ultimately rooted in the one-ness of man-kind...centered around the one activity necessary to sustain life” (HC:46). Arendt is wholly critical of ‘materialism’ in public life and traces its roots
back to the “Platonic-Aristotelian assumption that political communities (poleis) ...owe their existence to material necessity” (HC:183 FN8). For Arendt such a confusion of concepts and realms is symptomatic of the crisis of the political, and with the introduction of matters of ‘housekeeping’ into the public realm, the effect has been to destroy both the purely private and the genuinely political and to replace them with the social which is, ‘strictly speaking’, neither.

In combination, the rise of the social realm and the reinvention of the state as a ‘tremendous business concern’ meant that in the mid-nineteenth century, when the owning classes became increasingly conscious that “their private destinies were becoming more and more dependent upon those of their countries” (OT:30), the bourgeois pursuit of private profit entered what should have been the political realm. Such recognition bears striking similarities with the opinions expounded by Hegel, although Arendt never explicitly acknowledged an intellectual debt to him, and was in fact profoundly critical of much of his dialectic philosophy.\footnote{Tsao opines that Arendt, like Hegel, believed the basic challenge confronting the modern state in securing its people’s allegiance to a single political community lies in the “particularistic interests that arise with the emergence of a market orientated ‘bourgeois’ society” (Tsao 2004:108). Whilst it is questionable whether Arendt’s views on the challenges to the state can be reduced to this one facet, the role of the bourgeoisie is certainly significant. Thinking in ‘unbounded’, limitless (essentially economic) terms was a “key ingredient in Arendt’s analysis of the witches brew of modern nationalism” (Cocks 1995:222) – one which “ultimately corrupt[ed] the nation’s public life and geographical limitations” (ibid.), and finally brought to fruition the disintegration of the nation-state and the rise of imperialism which will be addressed in the next section.

Arendt’s critique of Western nationalism clearly demonstrates the hazards she saw in its political mobilisation. However, the terrible potential consequences of identifying the citizen with the national, such as ethnic cleansing and genocide, were initially guarded against. Whilst Arendt recognised danger had been inherent in the structure of the Western nation-state since its inception, the simultaneous establishment of constitutional government meant that, at least in the beginning, the nation-state was bound by the rule of law. It had an independent integrity to it (Cocks 1995:235), which meant the state was still sufficiently legally independent from the nation such that it could, and did, ‘naturalise’ (give rights to) non-nationals. Whilst

\footnote{See for example The Promise of Politics.}
acknowledging that native citizens often looked down upon naturalised citizens, Arendt clarifies “they never went so far as to propose the Pan-German distinction between ‘Staatsfremde’ aliens of the state, and ‘Volkfremde’, aliens of the nation, which was later incorporated into Nazi legislation” (OT:298). The crucial point for Arendt is that even though the state was partially perverted into an instrument of the nation, it did still “remain a legal institution”, which thus meant that Western nationalism “was controlled by some law, and insofar as it had sprung from the identification of nationals with their territory, it was limited by definite boundaries” (OT:298).

These limitations, which cannot be discerned in the second type of nationalism Arendt perceived, held until after World War One. At this point European nation-states exhibited a “constitutional inability...to guarantee human rights to those who had lost nationally guaranteed rights [the stateless/dispelled/refugees]” (OT:343). It was impossible for European nation-states to naturalise, or even offer asylum, to the hundreds of thousands of stateless people created in the interwar period. The process broke down when faced with mass applications from ‘non-naturals’, and the states involved even began to cancel earlier naturalisations (OT:361-2). In effect these countries “resorted to exclusionary politics as soon as [they] were besieged by refugees from elsewhere en masse” (Cocks 1995:237).

In reality, the potentially horrific effects of Western nationalism only became manifest when another ‘main ingredient’ – nationalism based on ethnicity or what Arendt labels ‘tribal nationalism’ – crystallised. The ultimate result was that “those whom the prosecutor [often ethnonationalist nations] had singled out as scum of the earth – Jews, Trotskyites, etc. – actually were received as scum of the earth everywhere; those whom persecution had called undesirable became the undesirables of Europe” (OT:343).

Tribal Nationalism

The defining characteristic of tribal nationalism as Arendt understood it is that the concepts of nationality and state remain separate, such as in Russia and Austria-Hungary in the nineteenth century. For these peoples, ethnic consciousness is the defining factor of national belonging, although Arendt was adamant that this new phenomenon was clearly distinguishable from the ‘chauvinist mystique’ perpetuated by the ‘nationalisme integral’ of Maurras and Barres which actually appealed to something that really did exist in the past. In distinction, tribal nationalism
“starts from nonexistent pseudo-mystical elements which it proposes to fully realise in the future” (OT:293), and is resultant of the assumption that all peoples are effectively nations. This left to the ‘belt of mixed populations’ (Macartney) in the Baltic-Adriatic corridor, the only option of appealing for unity on the basis of common language or, what was for Arendt worse, “to their Slavic, or Germanic, or God-knows-what soul” (OT:299). Politically speaking, she explains that tribal nationalism:

Always insists that its own people is surrounded by ‘a world of enemies,’ ‘one against all,’ that a fundamental difference exists between this people and all others. It claims its people to be unique, individual, incompatible with others, and denies theoretically the very possibility of a common mankind (OT:293).

Not only do tribal nationalists see themselves as different, they also ultimately preach the ‘divine origin’ of their own people,\(^\text{103}\) echoing the concept of chosenness expounded by Smith,\(^\text{104}\) and therefore for Arendt such nationalism is inherently racist.

In a sense this genre of nationalism is perhaps more honest than Western nationalism whose policy decisions are informed by the rarely acknowledged belief that “national unity can assert itself only in foreign affairs, under the circumstances of, at least, potential hostility” (OR:77). Moreover, as Berlin writes, full blown nationalism is signified when “if the satisfaction of the needs of the organism to which I belong turns out to be incompatible with the fulfilment of the goals of the other groups, I, or the society to which I indissolubly belong, have no choice but to force them to yield, if necessary by force” (Berlin 2001:343). Such thought patterns contribute to the international perpetration of wars, human rights abuses and genocide,\(^\text{105}\) and embody the ‘monochromatic effect of nationalism’ Arendt so mistrusted.

Cocks reads in Arendt a critique of tribal nationalism for “rais[ing] group particularity to the highest political principle” and consequently seeking to “rid society of all particular groups except one” (1995:223). In effect therefore, where the universalist tendencies of Western nationalism were undermined by particularist tensions, in this case particularist tendencies are subsumed by universalist elements. Smith (1996:456) also highlights this potential danger when he argues that the strongest, most united ethnic cultures (as typified in Arendt’s tribal nationalism), are often characterised by a fanaticism which manifests itself by an exclusive

\(^{103}\) After tribal nationalism organised itself along pan-movement lines – precursors to Nazism and Bolshevism.  
\(^{104}\) See Smith (1996:445-458), particularly pp452-3: “In emphasising the unique features of the ethnie or nation, nationalism encourages the belief that the people who are to form the nation are also unique and incommensurable” (Smith 1996:453).  
\(^{105}\) As recognised explicitly by Berlin (1990:252).
attachment to their own culture which precludes ‘cultural borrowing’ from external sources. Such an intolerance of ‘difference’ is fundamentally incompatible with the plurality required for Arendt in the political realm. After all, she believed “the more peoples there are in the world who stand in some particular relationship with one another, the more world there is to form between them, and the larger and richer that world will be” (PP:176).

It is important to note at this juncture that for Arendt there is clearly a hierarchy of typology with Western nationalism being superior. This has led some commentators to judge Arendt’s thought on this topic as intrinsically racist. However despite the language she sometimes uses which can undoubtedly imply a Western bias, the more convincing reason for this hierarchy is not racial but is based upon the manner in which each type of nationalism damages the authentic political realm. As noted above, whilst Western nationalism is flawed as a political concept, its negative effects were initially at least in part restricted by law and territorial boundaries. No such limitations were ever effective on tribal nationalism since it is not essentially aligned to the state and further, it was tribal nationalistic policies which exacerbated the negative effects of Western nationalism after World War One. Consequently for Arendt, tribal nationalism will always be more potentially harmful to the political. Such a view is supported by commentators such as Benhabib who briefly engages with the accusation of racism in Arendt in The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt. In this text one of the arguments she uses to reject Anne Norton’s interpretation of Arendt as anti-African is that Arendt’s political theory takes “political distinctions more seriously than culturally unexamined placatives of demonstrative political gestures” (Benhabib 2003:85). Although written in response to Arendt’s refusal to talk of Africa ‘en-bloc’, the argument is equally applicable to Arendt’s theories of nationalism. Western nationalism is predicated on more potentially political premises/distinctions than tribal nationalism whose last resort is the appeal to a shared language or common soul – undoubtedly a ‘culturally unexamined placative’.

Moreover, it is significant that incidents of tribal nationalism also appear in the Western context (for instance such nationalism is present in Greek and German immigration policies)\textsuperscript{106} – it is not a phenomena restricted to non-Western regions of the world. That said, it is perhaps justified to argue that whilst it is not on the grounds of race that Arendt criticises nationalism in its tribal form, her understanding of the political is such that she can more reasonably be accused of an anti-primitivism, which Jimmy Klausen contends, produces racial and

\textsuperscript{106} In Germany, citizenship is open to ethnic Germans and according to the Greek nationality law, Greeks born abroad may transmit citizenship to their children from generation to generation indefinitely.
dehumanising effects. He maintains that Arendt relegates primitives (the Hottentot) to the limits of the human, that “she simultaneously includes primitives within humanity qua humankind but excludes them from humanity qua historically developed faculty of culture” (Klausen 2010:396). Therefore whilst it is important to remain cognisant of the criticism of racism levied in this context, one can appreciate the value of Arendt’s conceptual analysis in the context of understanding the crisis of the political without attributing it to a racial motivation.

With that in mind, the relevance of Arendt’s designation of tribal nationalism as being ‘inarticulate’, belonging to peoples’ whose languages “had not yet outgrown the dialect stage through which all European languages went before they became suited for literary purposes” (OT:298), should be seen from a political, not a racial stance. Shared language is often cited by those from the German Romantic tradition as being a key test of the existence of a nation. “Language”, states Kedourie, “is the external and visible badge of those differences which distinguish one nation from another; it is the most important criterion by which a nation is recognised to exist, and to have the right to form a state on its own” (1985:64). Arendt is however scathing of this view, no more so than when she is describing the characteristics of tribal nationalism; of peoples that thought “language itself were already an achievement” (OT:299). In Arendt’s view, tribal nationalists may have a shared dialect – they are not of course mute – but they are deprived “of a way of life in which speech and only speech made sense and where the central concern of all citizens was to talk with each other” i.e. a political life (HC:27 emphasis added). Speech in such instances lacking ‘human togetherness’ is ‘merely talk’, where “words reveal nothing” (HC:180), and thought is impossible. In this context it is important to note that for Arendt, just as genuine action is able to initiate a ‘new beginning’, ‘literary’ language has to be sufficiently developed to be able to disclose the agent in his distinction and uniqueness, and together the end result of these activities “will always be a story with enough coherence to be told, no matter how haphazard the single events and their causation may appear to be” (HC:97).

107 The phrase further implies that for Arendt Western nationalism made use of literature, a point systematically developed by Anderson (cited Calhoun 1993:224). He theorises that newspapers and novels made possible in part by the spread of a commonly understood, transcribable language, not only “engage in history making but constitute the nation as a community of like readers in the imagination of each.” This has echoes of Arendt’s notion of the enlarged mentality required for judgement and for the creation of a world in common which could therefore foster a genuine political realm. In a related point, Calhoun goes on to note that it is not only literacy but “space-transcending communications technologies from print through to broadcast” which can play “a crucial role both in...
As explored in previous chapters, speech is inextricably linked to action and thus the realm of the political. “Speech corresponds to the fact of distinctness and is the actualisation of the human condition of plurality, that is, of living as a distinct and unique being among equals” (HC:178). Strictly speaking, Arendt sees genuine politics as being not so much about discrete individuals as it is about the world that comes into being between them and endures beyond them. It is therefore clear, that in her appellation of tribal nationalism as ‘inarticulate’, in essence she is saying such nationalism can never be political – it “appeared to be much more a portable private matter, inherent in their very personality, than a matter of public concern and civilisation” (OT:298).

Further, since the defining characteristic of this type of nationalism is that it can lay claim to no country and lacked the trinity of people-territory-state, such peoples are ‘rootless’ and have “not the vaguest notion of responsibility for a common, limited community” (OT:299). They feel at home wherever other kinsfolk live, and significantly for Arendt they mistakenly “proclaim[ed] a folk community that would remain a political factor even if its members were dispersed all over the earth” (OT:299). As Arendt understood it, these peoples could never really experience politics because the genuine political realm is spatially bound and organised. Politics can only occur in the space of appearance and becomes a potentiality whenever people gather, but it is power that keeps the public realm – the potential space of appearance between speaking and acting individuals – in existence. Since “power springs up between men when they act together and vanishes the moment they disperse” (HC:200), Arendt argues that the singularly most important factor in the generation of power is the living together of people. To retain power individuals have to live in close enough proximity that the potentialities of action are always present and to keep these individuals together after the moment of action has passed requires some form of organisation – a factor Arendt believes is recognised in the Western tradition in which city-states are the norm. Those exhibiting tribal nationalism however are seen to be far too dispersed to retain any potentiality for meaningful action/speech and are consequently precluded from exercising power. Peoples without territorial boundaries could never therefore, in Arendt’s theorising, be genuine political actors.

Moreover, Williams (2006) argues that in Arendtian terms the construction of territorial borders is crucial in facilitating the essential human and political condition of plurality. Humans

linking dispersed populations and in creating the possibility for producing a popular memory beyond the scope of immediate personal experience and oral traditions” (1993:224).
are essentially conditioned beings – the product of a process that takes place within communities – and following Arendt, Williams’ notes that the opportunity to effectively engage with others requires a shared understanding that is strongest within established communities. He goes on to suggest that in order to recognise diversity between communities and create a world-in-common built on speech and action rather than violence, we must first know who we are by comparison and engagement with others with whom we share much in common i.e. those within our bounded community (Williams 2006:99). Understood thus, territorial borders can be viewed as devices for creating a space in-between where politics can flourish \(^{108}\) – something necessarily precluded within tribal national movements. \(^{109}\)

In *The Human Condition*, Arendt dubs this type of nationalism ‘organic’ in that it rests “on an identification of the nation and the relationships between its members with the family and family relationships” (HC:256). In these versions “society becomes the substitute for the family, ‘blood and soil’ is supposed to rule the relationships between its members” (ibid.). The similarities between this understanding of tribal nationalism and the view of ethnic nationalists are clear. Such theorists believe:

‘Kinship’ and ‘blood’ have obvious advantages in bonding together members of a group and excluding outsiders, and are therefore central to ethnic nationalism. ‘Culture (Kultur) can’t be acquired by education. Culture is in the blood’ (Hans Hanak cited Hobsbawm 1999:63).

The manner in which ethnic nationalists try to understand nations is to “see a nation as a ‘politically conscious ethny’ and a nation-state as a state that is ethnically homogeneous” (Canovan 1996:57). Canovan points out that this approach has “obvious continuities with the Romantic belief that humanity is naturally divided into peoples, each with its own Volksgeist creating its own culture” but that “an ‘ethnic’ approach need not involve the claim that peoples are genetically distinct but is likely to stress, as Donald Horowitz does, that ethnicity is usually transmitted through families and is a form of identity relying heavily on ‘birth and blood’” (ibid).

Calhoun (1993:221) recognises that there are many rhetorical attractions for nationalists to claim their nations are simply given and immutable i.e. ethnic. However Canovan (1996:57)

---

\(^{108}\) Williams (2006) also highlights the role territorial borders play in limiting politics too – important for Arendt given her fear of totalitarianism see pp.105-6.

\(^{109}\) Territorialisation is of further political relevance in that it enables speech and action, and the deeds and stories they inspire, to endure. This point is reaffirmed by scholars such as Smith who writes convincingly on the territorialisation of memory (Smith 1996:453-5). Chapter II contains a more detailed discussion on the importance of remembrance for the human condition.
notes that exclusively ethnic conceptions of nationhood have fallen out of favour recently. Smith (2000:46) for example believes that modernist theories fail to account for the historical depth and spatial reach of the ties that underpin modern nations because they have no theory of ethnicity and its relationship to modern nationalism, but he argues against any absolutely ethnic approach, valuing the role of factors such as history and economic development too.

The similarities between Arendt’s concept of tribal nationalism in which “the individual’s own soul...is considered as the embodiment of general national qualities” (OT:292) and an ethnic nationalism in which, equally as nebulously, ‘culture is in the blood’, are clear. But for Arendt such ‘ties’ are pre-political at best, and at worst antipolitical because “love [including ‘familial love’ of the type exhibited in tribal nationalism], by reason of its passion, destroys the in-between which relates us to and separates us from others” (HC:242) – it is ‘unworldly’ and therefore ultimately destructive of the political. Shin Chiba (1995:505-535) opines that throughout her career, Arendt showed a sustained interest in love and the political that was influenced by her search for a new ‘public vinculum’ that would unite without recourse to naturalist bonds of any sort, because political life belongs to the ‘artificial’ rather than the ‘natural’ dimension. By introducing ‘organic’/’naturalistic’ modes of belonging into this sphere, genuine political citizenship based on the equal claim of all to political activity and the ability to distinguish oneself through speech and action, is destroyed.

At its fundament, tribal nationalism is a version of identity politics, i.e. is a “nationalism based on the principle of identity representation” (Ringmar 1998:537), a concept Arendt believes to be anti-political. In all discourses in which identity is a topic of concern, the concept comprises a duality. Within the social sciences/nationalism debates, this dualism is expressed thus: “identity’ mean[s] being on the one hand identical (or in less extreme versions, similar) to a group/category and on the other hand it also mean[s] being different from another group/category” (Malešević 2006:15). This duality has always been paradoxical because the social sciences deal with realities that cannot be reduced to a binary status. However, despite this paradox there was a dramatic proliferation of identity discourse pioneered by Erik Erikson in the 1950s and 1960s. Today, some such as Siniša Malešević argue the term is overused creating a “cacophonic confusion with many mutually competing understandings of ‘identity’”

---

110 A view shared by contemporary theorists such as Malešević who, in a recent book noted that “Despite talk about identity politics, the celebration of cultural difference, and self-actualisation, identity is, in analytic terms largely framed as a profoundly de-politicising concept” (Malešević 2006:4).
which has led to attempts at ordering.\footnote{See Brubaker and Cooper cited Malešević (2006:16-17).} Reduced to the most basic level there are two main schools of thought regarding national identity, primordialism and constructivism, and it is the former position to which ethnic or tribal nationalism is most akin.

Primordial scholars of ethnic nationalism such as Smith and Isaacs understand national identity to be derived exclusively from within; it is unconditional in nature, not subject to or derived from any external relation. According to Isaacs, national identity “is the identity derived from belonging to what is generally and loosely called an ‘ethnic group’. It is composed of what has been called ‘primordial affinities and attachments’. It is the identity made up of what a person is born with or acquires at birth” (cited Malešević 2006:19). It is therefore very much pre-political as Arendt understands the term. Identity thus understood is seen as being something that is inherited rather than invented or constructed which therefore means that assimilation into nations organised along these lines is very difficult. As Calhoun (1993:221) notes in his discussion of Renan, there is a distinction between nations and nationalisms which are “the result of the free choices of their members” i.e. Arendt’s Western nations (in times of stability at least), and those “whose identity and cohesion are given to their members independently of any voluntary will” i.e. Arendt’s tribal nations. Calhoun notes a practical consequence of this even today is that “since voluntary will is so crucial to the narrative of French nationalism, for example, France makes it easier than Germany does for immigrants to attain citizenship” (1993:221). But consequently, this strong nationalist republicanism places much more onerous obligations upon allegiance to the collective identity as a continual process than is present under the German model.

Identity as Arendt understood it is something very different. In her coherently argued paper on ‘Arendt, Identity and Difference’, Bonnie Honig argues that Arendt’s entire opus is characterised by divisions. In The Human Condition Arendt describes a self that is fundamentally divided. She distinguishes between the ‘what’ and the ‘who’ of a person: “A life-sustaining, psychologically determined, trivial and imitable biological being in the private realm” (Honig 1988:82) – the ‘what of a person’, has no identity, no “specific uniqueness” (HC:181) and can only become a ‘who’ by entering the public realm and acting. This “disclosure of the ‘who’ through speech, and the setting of a new beginning through action...start a new process which eventually emerges as the unique life story of the newcomer” (HC:184). Stories are very important to Arendt, indeed she sees history as political in nature because it is “a
story of action and deeds rather than of trends and ideas” (HC:185). Arendt notes the fact that every individual life between birth and death can be told as a story with a beginning and an end is prepolitical. However, she goes on to explain that the reason why each human life tells its story yet is not ‘made’, is because it is the outcome of action. Thus “the only ‘somebody’ [our real life story] reveals is its hero, and it is the only medium in which the originally intangible manifestation of a uniquely distinct ‘who’ can become tangible ex post facto through action and speech” (HC:185-6). This understanding of identity therefore abandons the very features primordialists see as central to personal identity – the psychological features that define one in the private realm. Clearly then, identity “like freedom…according to Arendt, is not given; it must be attained through action. Until we act we only know ‘what’ we are” (Honig 1988:83).

Tribal nationalism as a form of primordial identity politics is particularly concerning for Arendt because instead of correctly interpreting identity as the product of action, it believes identity to be the condition of action. The political realm is one of appearances, namely “the space where I appear to others as others appear to me” (HC:198), “where men me[e]t one another as citizens and not private persons” (OR:31). Following Roman legal terminology Arendt recognises that citizens have a mask or persona (their identity as she understands it) which has two functions: “to hide, or rather to replace, the actor’s own face and countenance, but in a way that would make it possible for the voice to sound through” so that “it is not the natural Ego which enters a court of law. It is a right-and-duty-bearing person, created by the law, which appears before the law” (OR:106-7). The focus is thus on the content of the political act rather than the identity of the perpetrating agent and a distance can therefore be created between the actor and the act. As Owens recognises, conventions such as these “were essential to opening up communicative spaces for individuals to appear and express opinions in public” (2009a:100). When torn away as required by tribal nationalism, all that is left is a ‘natural man’ – “that is, a human being or homo in the original meaning of the word, indicating someone outside the range of the law and the body politic of the citizens…certainly a politically irrelevant being” (OR:107).

The examination above demonstrates that whilst both forms of nationalism Arendt identifies are distinct in their characteristics, neither resolves the contradictions inherent between the national form of belonging and the political. In different, but equally effective ways, they deny the keystone principles of plurality and equality. And when the two forms work in concert, the
dangers to the political realm are magnified as the lived experience of Palestinians in Israel will demonstrate in the next chapter. That understood, an analysis of nationalism as an ideology will now be undertaken.

Nationalism as an Ideology

“Ideologies are harmless, uncritical, and arbitrary opinions only as long as they are not believed in seriously” (OT:590/622).

Arendt explains that an ideology is quite simply the logic of an idea, such as race or nation, which is comprehensively applied to history. The result “is not a body of statements about something that is, but the unfolding of a process which is in constant change” (OT:604). She argues that ideologies are a relatively recent phenomenon, whose influence is best divined in hindsight, and whose ‘real nature’ was revealed only in the role they played in the “apparatus of totalitarian domination” (OT:606). That being so, Arendt recognises that ideologies have an inherent appeal because they respond to immediate political needs. They are created and perpetuated as political weapons rather than theoretical doctrines (OT:212), however the ultimate result as she sees it, is antipolitical. As Beiner argues, as a whole Origins “is directed at showing how modern ideologies disfigure political life” (2002:49 emphasis added).

Ideologies are seen to be akin to science since they adopt a scientific approach whilst dealing with results of philosophical relevance, and for Arendt they are subject to the limitations of both genres. Ideologies differ from ‘simple opinions’ in that they are all-encompassing. They “claim to possess either the key to history, or the solution for all the ‘riddles of the universe’” (OT:211). Fundamentally they “are systems of explanation of life and world that claim to explain everything, past and future, without further concurrence with actual experience” (EU:350 emphasis added). They are therefore infallible, eliminating coincidences by “inventing an all-embracing omnipotence which is supposed to be at the root of any accident” (OT:463). This has several important implications which Arendt explicitly draws out, both in Origins and other keys texts including several pieces collected in Essays in Understanding.

The first issue of note, and one of the “three specifically totalitarian elements peculiar to all ideological thinking” (OT:606), is the fact that in their claim to total explanation they “have the tendency to explain not what is, but what becomes, what is born and passes away” (OT:606). They perpetuate the ‘customary’ view of history concerned with motion and refuse to take
into account human agency or action, which in Arendt’s view makes reliable explanation of the past, total knowledge of the present, and prediction of the future, impossible.

Of greater relevance in this context is the second element Arendt deems totalitarian. Ideologues insist on a reality ‘truer’ than the one we can perceive with our five senses – one that can only be discerned by a ‘sixth sense’: ideological indoctrination. This is contrary to Arendt’s theory in two main ways. The first is her mistrust of looking for ‘hidden’ meanings in the realm of the political since a crucial feature of this sphere is that it is one of appearance. She raises this in *The Life of the Mind* where she implies that since we are living in an appearing world, it is likely that what is relevant and meaningful for us is located ‘on the surface’ (LOM Thinking:27).

Secondly, ‘facts’ as such can no longer be perceived, they are “transformed into opinions” (BPF:232) and are treated with contempt (OT:590), or at the very least as an irrelevance (BPF:231) by ideologists who replace them with ‘ice-cold reasoning’. Facts can be considered truths with significant political implications since they occur as the “invariable outcome of men living and acting together” (BPF:227) as Arendt makes clear in ‘Truth and Politics’. In this essay she is unambiguous in the value she places on truth in this arena. “What is at stake”, she contends, “is survival...No permanence, no perseverance in existence, can even be conceived of without men willing to testify to what is and appears to them because it is” (BPF:225). She goes on to note that facts and events are more fragile than anything produced by the human mind precisely because “they occur in the field of the ever-changing affairs of men...Once they are lost, no rational effort will ever bring them back” (BPF:227). The value of truth in the political realm is manifold, it enables accurate recording of events of import, but further, since fact and opinion belong to the same realm with the first informing the latter, undisputed facts guarantee freedom of opinion as a possibility. Opinion formation is a political activity – the debate necessary between well informed actors to reach a valid opinion is the ‘very essence’ of political life. Opinions enable authentic i.e. representative political thought to occur since “I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them” (BPF:237). The strength and validity of one’s final opinion is dependent upon the number of standpoints present in the mind whilst considering a given issue, but opinions can only be legitimate as long as they respect factual truth (BPF:234). When factual truths are contested, genuine opinions cannot be formed, and without this possibility the plurality characteristic of the
political realm would be limited. The world created between actors would be thinner and less diverse, and the dignity accorded to others in their manifest diversity would no longer be affirmed.112

Examined from a different perspective, lying about facts, whether acknowledged or not, always involves an element of violence. Organised lying as practiced by ideologues tends to destroy whatever it has decided to negate (BPF:248), which thus destroys at least one element of plurality by eliminating a relationship or position so that it can no longer enhance the political realm. Further, the lies manufactured by ideologues are often so large that they require a complete alteration of the whole factual milieu that is designed to deceive all. As Arendt argues, politically, the self-deception required in ideological thinking often transforms an ‘outside’ matter, such as mistrust or hatred towards other nations, into an ‘inside’ matter. The result is always to the detriment of the domestic polity as the violence originally focussed outwards is reversed, or boomerangs back onto the scene of domestic politics (BPF:251), and as illustrated amply in Arendt’s work, “violence can always destroy power” (OV:53).

Whilst factual truth is non-discursive, lies are a form of action. As Arendt explains it, only the future is open to action and there is danger inherent in any attempt to introduce action into either the past or present. Rendering the past or present into a state of potentiality deprives the political realm of its main stabilising force and a concrete starting point from which to begin something new. It would therefore deprive it of its genuinely political character. The truthteller is simultaneously a storyteller, whose political function is to teach acceptance of things as they are. Out of this acceptance writes Arendt, arises the faculty of judgement – a politically relevant function performed outside the political realm. She concludes her essay once again highlighting the central value of truth with the thought that “conceptually, we may call truth what we cannot change; metaphorically, it is the ground on which we stand and the sky that stretches above us” (BPF:259).

Returning to Arendt’s critique of ideologies in Origins, the final totalitarian element she examines is the methodology by which they achieve the emancipation of thought from experience. She charges that “ideological thinking orders facts113 into an absolutely logical procedure which starts from an axiomatically accepted premise, deducing everything else from it; that is, it proceeds with a consistency that exists nowhere in the realm of reality” (OT:607).

112 See Hinchman (1984:331) for further explanation.
113 Not the factual truths examined above, but the ‘facts’ that are in essence mere opinion/interpretation.
Ideologies therefore treat world events as the logical exposition of its motivating idea. The idea becomes an instrument of explanation that posits everything is determined by its causes; consistency becomes the only thing that matters.

The ramifications of this are discernible at the level of the individual where:

The danger in exchanging the necessary insecurity of philosophical thought for the total explanation of an ideology and its Weltanschauung is not even so much the risk of falling for some usually vulgar, always uncritical assumption as of exchanging the freedom inherent in man’s capacity to think for the strait jacket of logic with which man can force himself almost as violently as he is forced by some outside power (OT:605 emphasis added).

But at the level of the political the effects are even more pronounced for Arendt who sees the consistency exhibited by racism and antisemitism as precursors to the nationalist ideologies of the Pan-Movements, and consequently to National Socialism, as will be discussed below.

**Racism, the Pan-Movements and National Socialism**

“In political warfare – racism was calculated to be a more powerful ally than any paid agent or secret organisation of fifth columnist” (OT:210).

Arendt recognised that only two ideologies have ever become strong enough to enlist state support and become official national doctrines – one interprets history as an economic struggle between classes, and the other sees history as the story of conflict between races. Whilst by deliberately cutting across all national boundaries racism tends to destroy the body politic of the Western nation, it did however become one of the foundation principles of Arendt’s tribal nationalism which developed into a new form of organisation, the Pan-Movements.

As examined above, the nationalistic aspirations of those peoples without territory could only be realised by appealing to a common divine origin – a notion invented by men “who needed ideological definitions of national unity as a substitute for political nationhood” (OT:220). The notion of common tribal origin as an essential of nationhood was formulated by German nationalists after the 1814 war, and together with the ‘personality-worship’ expounded by the Romantics, the way was intellectually prepared for race-thinking in Germany and for the sympathetic reception of Joseph-Arthur Gobineau’s work.
Gobineau was the first to develop the theory that the ‘fall of civilisations’ was due to a degeneration of race, and that the decay of race was due to an admixture of blood. He looked to politics to define and create an ‘elite’ to replace the aristocracy, whose fate as a caste he feared, and he proposed a ‘race of princes’ – the Aryans – who he said were in danger, as a result of democracy, of being subsumed by lower non-Aryan classes. It was the idea of race, consistently applied, that made it possible to organise the ‘innate personalities’ of German romanticism and to designate them members of a ‘natural’ aristocracy destined to rule over all others of inferior racial stock (OT:228). Arendt notes that Gobineau never lived to see the hideous yet effective manner in which the two contradictory consequences he drew from the decline of the nobility – the decay of humanity and the rise of a new ‘natural’ aristocracy – were resolved in practice. It was a trait of the National Socialists that they identified useful ideological notions and utilised them in such a way that they became all-pervading as can be seen with antisemitism too.

Antisemitism, the Pan-Movements, National Socialism and Political Zionism

The first book within Origins – Antisemitism – makes it clear that whilst anti-Jewish sentiments were widespread in Europe throughout the nineteenth century, antisemitism as an ideology remained the prerogative of ‘crackpots’ and ‘lunatics’, often amongst the Pan-Movements, until the catalysing events of the twentieth century. It then became of central importance to their successors, Nazism and Bolshevism. That withstanding, it should be noted that the relationship between modern antisemitism and Western nationalism followed a very different course, in fact as Arendt oft-noted “modern antisemitism grew in proportion as traditional nationalism declined” (OT:11).

Pan-Slavism’s occasional antipathy towards Jews degenerated into antisemitism when, as a result of the assassination of the Czar in 1881, the government instituted pogroms and thereby brought the Jewish question centre stage. Arendt argues that Schoenerer, the father of Pan-Germanism, inadvertently recognised the possibilities inherent in antisemitism at the same time. His ultimate aim was to destroy the Hapsburg Empire and he foresaw that the entire fabric of this ‘peculiar’ constitution, which rested on a multitude of nationalities, could be undermined if one nationality was excluded. His choice to discriminate against the Jews rather than the Slav nationalities (who were already hated by the Pan-Germans at the time) was due
in part to the example set by the Stoecker movement who had demonstrated the usefulness of antisemitism as a tool of political propaganda. However Arendt perceived it had more to do with the discernible affinity between the pan-movements’ theories about peoples and the rootless existence of the Jews. Jews were seen to exemplify a people in the tribal sense and the pan-movements were striving to emulate their organisational model. Moreover, their supposed power was seen to prove the validity of racial theories (OT:308). In essence, tribal nationalists/the pan-movements saw the Jews as ‘happier, luckier, competitors’ in that they had managed to constitute a form of society with no visible organs of representation which could thus become a substitute for the nation – the pan-movements were envious.

This envy was most profound however when the claim to chosenness was considered. Arendt believes what drove the Jews into the centre of such racial ideologies more than any other single factor was that the pan-movements’ claim to chosenness could conflict seriously only with the Jewish claim. This, despite the fact “the Jewish concept had nothing in common with the tribal theories concerning the divine origin of one’s own people” (OT:309). The leaders of the pan-movements recognised this fundamental incompatibility which is why Arendt believes they were unconcerned with the reality of Jewish power and made hatred of the Jews the foundation of their ideology regardless. She argues the true significance of the pan-movements antisemitism was that “hatred of the Jews was, for the first time, severed from all actual experience concerning the Jewish people, politics, society, or economics, and followed only the peculiar logic of an ideology” (OT:295, emphasis added). She identifies a parallel between the fact that their own national pride was independent of all achievements and the emancipation of hatred of the Jews from all specific deeds, and concludes that in this belief the pan-movements were in agreement although, significantly, “neither knew how to utilize this ideological mainstay for purposes of political organisation” (OT:310).

As alluded to above, it was Hitler who “knew how to use the hierarchical principle of racism, how to exploit the antisemitic assertion of the existence of a ‘worst’ people in order properly to organise the ‘best’ and all the conquered and oppressed in between, how to generalise the superiority complex of the pan-movements so that each people, with the necessary exception of the Jews, could look down upon one that was even worse off than itself” (OT:310-11). The fundamental difference between ideologies as a typology and totalitarianism comes to the fore here. In both ‘Understanding and Politics’ and ‘On the Nature of Totalitarianism’ Arendt differentiates between the two thus:
If it was the peculiarity of the ideologies themselves to treat a scientific hypothesis...as an 'idea' which could be applied to the whole course of events, then it is the peculiarity of their totalitarian transformation to pervert the 'idea' into a premise in the logical sense, that is, into some self-evident statement from which everything else can be deduced in stringent logical consistency (EU:317).

To elucidate, Arendt uses the example of the Nazi movement which actually organised people according to objective race criteria so that race ideology eventually constituted practical reality, rather than mere opinion (EU:351; OT:475-6). As a totalitarian movement it mobilised the ideological concept. For instance, by forcing Jews to leave Germany passportless and penniless the Nazi's realised the legend of the Wandering Jew, “and by forcing Jews into uncompromising hostility against them, the Nazi’s had created the pretext for taking a passionate interest in all nations’ domestic policies” (OT:537).

It was almost in response to this utilisation of antisemitism that political Zionism was born. Whilst this topic will be examined in much greater detail in the next chapter, it is introduced here to illustrate further the relationship between antisemitism and nationalist ideology.

As Arendt understood it, Herzl’s political Zionism was predicated on the doctrine of eternal antisemitism in a manner similar to that of other nineteenth century ideologies. And like these other ideologies it also “attempted to explain reality in terms of irresistible ‘laws’ and history in terms of ‘keys’” (OT:378). The result was a form of nationalist ideology that sought to ‘solve’ the problem of the Jewish question by cooperating with ‘honest antisemites’ who Herzl believed would help him “implement his grand scheme to rid them of their Jews, gain Jewish independence, and solve the Jewish problem once and for all” (JW:liii) via the creation of a Jewish state. As an ideology Arendt identified several significant problems with it as a thought paradigm, and she also questioned both its fundamental assumptions and conclusions, but she did acknowledge that it was “the only political answer Jews have ever found to antisemitism and the only ideology in which they have ever taken seriously a hostility that would place them in the center of world events” (OT:155).

The point of significance at this juncture is that there is undoubtedly a correlation between the rise of antisemitism and the strength of nationalist ideologies in all their forms, albeit in differing directions. Since its inception antisemitism, like racism, has cut across territorial boundaries therefore with its rise traditional (Western) nationalism predicated on the trinity people-territory-state, waned. The opposite effect is however visible with tribal nationalism/the Pan-movements and paradoxically with Herzlian Zionism. Both of these
ideologies utilised antisemitism to further their goal of nationhood through common origin, and both were prey to potentially antipolitical tendencies to reduce plurality and invalidate equality.

Although the worst excesses of ideological thought patterns are realised only under totalitarian conditions, the potentiality for this development is possible to see. For Arendt this is what makes ideological thinking inherently dangerous, and the evidence of both racism and antisemitism in tribal nationalism provides additional justification for her designation of this typology as being more potentially dangerous to the political than its Western counterpart.

**Concluding Comments**

This chapter has used *The Origins of Totalitarianism* as the point of departure for examining key themes present in nationalism that contribute to the crisis of the political as Arendt understood it. In their attempt to address the human need to belong, in different but equally damaging ways, both Western and tribal nationalism have the potential to destroy what is for Arendt the very essence of the political – plurality and equality. The next chapter will apply what we can learn from Arendt on the dangers of nationalistic thought to contemporary politics as biopolitics. Using Israel as a case study, it will then examine why, in combination, these two concepts are so damaging to both the political and to the human condition.
CHAPTER IV INTERNATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS OF NATIONALISM

“It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed” (Foucault 1991:260).

Introduction

A plethora of present-day global realities such as the state of emergency declared in the United States post 9/11, the so-called ‘war on terror’, and the propagation of internment camps for asylum seekers in many Western states, resonate with conclusions drawn from the biopolitical school of thought articulated by scholars such as Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben. Biopolitics makes human life the direct object of power and knowledge for the first time, instead of simply being “an uninvestigated substratum of both” (Harrington 2005:428). An exhaustive examination of the biopolitical genre is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, building on the work of the previous chapter, in what follows, Arendt’s engagement with “organic thought in political matters” (OV:75) is first explored and the link between nationalism and biopolitics, highlighted and critiqued from an Arendtian perspective. Then, using Arendt’s insights in The Jewish Writings as a point of departure, Israeli nationality laws and practices, and Israeli control over Palestinian territory and populations will be assessed as two contemporary forms of biopolitics which both strengthen, and are strengthened by, nationalistic claims which “only make sense in the closed framework of one’s own people and history” (JW:430 emphasis added).

Nationalism and Biopolitics

Biopolitics is the study of the strategies and mechanisms through which organic human life is managed under regimes of authority over knowledge and power. It operates through investigation of biological processes “regulating the triadic relationship between individual, nation, and state” (Turda 2007:413), and targets collective phenomena rather than individuals as living beings (Braun 2007:11).\(^{114}\)

\(^{114}\) Individuals as specific beings are, argues Foucault, controlled via disciplinary power. This will be alluded to in the subsequent discussion of Israeli biopolitics, but is not the main focus of this chapter.
Although Arendt herself never used the terminology, scholars such as Howard Caygill rightly argue that biopolitical concerns underpin much of her political theory and inform her diagnosis of the contemporary crisis of the political. Whilst perhaps most explicit in The Human Condition where she analyses the process by which *homo laborans* (and thus biological life) left the private sphere of the *oikos* and came instead to “occupy the very centre of the political scene” (Agamben 1998:3), the biopolitical dimensions of Arendt’s account of total domination is in fact central to her discourse in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. Here she “link[s] the history of colonial domination with the European experience of extreme genocidal biopolitics” (Caygill 2013:152). This book can therefore be seen as “the inauguration of the critique of the biopolitical”; and as a text that “remains unsurpassed for the way it brings together the emergence of a discourse of race in the nineteenth century with the experience of colonialism” (Caygill 2013:152-3), it is a valuable starting point for highlighting the link between nationalism and biopolitics.

It is in her discussion on the political emancipation of the bourgeoisie and the concurrent adoption of racist doctrines that Arendt first obliquely references the introduction of biological concerns into the public realm. The growing tendency under imperialist expansion to transform business into a political issue necessitated a revision in methods of governance and administration predicated on theories of racial hierarchy and led to the “eventual substitution of bureaucracy, the rule of nobody, for personal rulership” (HC:45). The once private practices and devices for money-making were gradually transformed into rules for conducting public affairs, first abroad and then, via a boomerang effect, at home signalling that ‘life-as-survival’ had truly become the highest value. Eventually Hobbes’ dictum that “the private interest is the same with the publique” (cited OT:186) was realised.\(^\text{115}\) Properly understood, for Arendt, the ‘private interest’ pertains to those activities necessary to the biological processes of the human body and should, she argues, remain categorically distinct from the ‘publique’ interest which consists of activities relating to a common world in which genuine freedom is possible. In modernity, asserts Arendt, this distinction has been ‘entirely blurred’ (to the detriment of both spheres) because the political community is now envisaged in familial terms, the maintenance of whose affairs relies on “a gigantic, nation-wide administration of housekeeping” (HC:28). Society, and its political form of organisation – the nation – was born,

---

\(^\text{115}\) Arendt reflects on the coincidence of this identification with the totalitarian pretence of having abolished the contradictions between individual and public interests – a point she returns to later in *Origins* in her discussion of totalitarian rule (Part 3, Chapter 3).
and with it, behaviour replaced action as the foremost mode of human relationship (HC:41). In essence, it is through society that the life process itself has been channelled into the public domain (HC:45) and with the “unnatural growth of the natural” (HC:47) exhibited thus, in modernity, argues Arendt, we have witnessed a “lifesizeation’ of politics” (Blencowe 2010:119).

In The History of Sexuality, Foucault similarly concludes that politics only became biopolitics at the beginning of modernity when the population was treated as a problem that was simultaneously scientific and political, and processes such as birth, morbidity and mortality first became the objects of knowledge and the targets for measurement and control (Foucault 2004:243-5). Sovereignty came to be understood not just as the ability to control people by exercising the right to kill, but by having “power over ‘the’ population as such, over men insofar as they are living beings”; the emergence of a power of regularisation, which “consists in making live and letting die” (Foucault 2004:247). From an Arendtian perspective, this definition of sovereignty is equally as damaging to the human condition as that which went before since it treats individuals or ‘populations’ as objects to be controlled, rather than as distinct autonomous acting beings. However, Foucault sees biopolitics as being positively charged (Blencowe 2010:118) – a politics of life which exemplifies liberalism and is addressed to a world of autonomous agency. It is therefore ‘subjectifying’ rather than ‘objectifying’ (something Arendt very much doubts) and retains at its centre the liberal dilemma: “how not to govern too much” (Foucault 2003:202).

In contrast, Arendt believes the danger inherent in ‘biologizing’ the political inheres in the fact that it differentiates between individuals on the basis of ‘what’ rather than ‘who’ they are. With its “homogenizing tendency” (Forti 2006:11), it obliterates individuality, treating each as an interchangeable member of a specific group or population (nation or race for example). It precludes creativity and action, and since “the least durable of tangible things are those needed for the life process itself” (HC:96), these ‘good things’, ‘useful to the life of man’ (Locke), do not endure – they are the least ‘worldly’ or the least political of all things. Biopolitics thus ultimately destroys the constructed and enduring political realm within which equal, distinct individuals can act.

116 It is interesting to note that, like Foucault, Arendt examines the use of statistics as a method of biopolitical control only available in modernity (see HC:42-4).
This is not to say that Arendt is unaware of the affective appeal of biopolitics. Firstly, just as theories of nationalism aim to address the basic human need to belong, so too do theories of biopolitics. Indeed Ryan McVeigh argues, “The fundamental question of biopolitics...becomes: Who belongs?” (McVeigh 2013:79). The centrality of belonging is manifest in different ways in each particular biopolitical theory, but is most clearly visible in the fact that biopolitical regimes dictate and control the types of relationships that come into being as a result of their practices. This will be elaborated on below, but it is important to note here that just as nationalism is unequal to reconciling this need to belong in a manner that respects authentic political values, theories of biopolitics similarly fail as this chapter, in its entirety, will evidence.

Secondly, “Through however gritted teeth” (Blencowe 2010:120), Arendt does point out that the emancipation of labour from the private realm “transformed it into a swiftly progressing development whose results have in a few centuries totally changed the whole inhabited world” (HC:47). This has however been at the expense of both the human condition and the world we share in common (HC:256). Thus, as Claire Blencowe rightly argues, “The fact of the positivity, processuality, expressive character of life in the public sphere is not in any way an argument against its culpability in the reductive, conservative, objectifying and thanatopolitical processes that it invites or augments” (Blencowe 2010:121). In acknowledging these dangers, Arendt is perhaps closer to Agamben than Foucault in her understanding of the relationship between biological life and the political.

Richard Ek argues that Agamben in a sense ‘completes’ or ‘radicalises’ both Foucault (Fitzpatrick & Gregory cited Ek 2006:367) and Arendt (Ek 2006:368). Instead of dating the rise of biopolitics with the advent of modernity, Agamben theorises that “Western politics is a biopolitics from the very beginning” (Agamben 1998:181). The novelty of modernity, he goes on to suggest, is that for the first time the biological aspects of life and political existence proper have become completely indistinguishable, exemplified by the fact that today it is not the camp that is the fundamental nomos or biopolitical paradigm of the West (Agamben 1998:181).

117 Whilst it is not the purpose of this thesis to interrogate the integrity of any one particular reading of biopolitics, it is important to note that the continuity between Foucault, Arendt and Agamben is questioned by some. Claire Blencowe for example argues instead that Agamben’s presentation of Foucault’s and Arendt’s theses on the (bio)politics of modernity is hugely problematic: “The thrust of at least some of Foucault’s arguments is all but inverted in their representation in Homo Sacer”, she argues. “Foucault’s biopolitics for life become Agamben’s thanatopolitics for unity and order”, and whilst “these problems are less acute with respect to Agamben’s reading of Arendt they are,” she goes on to note, “nonetheless, present” (Blencowe 2010:114).
Following Foucault, Agamben asserts that the referent object of the modern state is citizens as naked life – a distinct modality of existence in which the biological fact of life – zoē – is politicised. But more, he suggests that their very birth “becomes the sovereign powers’ stake and fundament” (Bartonek cited Ek 2006:367). This reflects Arendt’s argument that with the appearance of the animal laborans in the public realm, individual life is now seen to be the highest good (HC:208/313-4). Unlike Foucault’s ‘emancipatory’ interpretation of biopolitics however, Agamben (much like Arendt) sees the nations’ citizens as subordinate to the biopolitical apparatus which always determines the extent of each individual’s rights, rendering every human being a potential homines sacri, subject to biopolitical strategic deliberations for civil and political entitlement (Žižek cited Ek 2006:368). However, it was only with the rise of Nazism that biopolitics was first truly realised as a method of total control.

As noted in the previous chapter, National Socialism, and Hitler in particular, “generalise[d] the superiority complex of the pan-movements” (OT:311), ‘mobilised’ racism and antisemitism, and through totalitarian organisation, made them a living reality. When the differentiation and categorisation endemic in racism becomes inscribed in the mechanisms of state power, argues Diken and Laustsen, “racism goes biopolitical” (cited Ek 2006:369). The role of what Foucault categorised as ‘State racism’ in biopolitics has, suggests scholars such as Mark Kelly (2004) and Laura Ann Stoler (1995:55-94), been somewhat neglected in the secondary literature. This is a surprising omission given that Foucault conceived of racism as something without which the modern state “can scarcely function” (Foucault 2004:254), and one which may help explain why the link between biopolitics and nationalism is sometimes overlooked.

Foucault defines state racism as “A way of separating out the groups that exist within a population...a way of establishing a biological-type caesura within a population that appears to be a biological domain” (Foucault 2004:255). It enables the state to fragment the population according to “the distinction among races”, thereby creating a “hierarchy of races”, some described as good and thus worthy of preservation, and others seen as inferior and moreover as a threat to the wellbeing of society (Foucault 2004:255). However, Foucault’s understanding of race is informed by centuries of discourse in which race had little to do with physical appearance. Indeed, as Kelly notes, the words ‘nation’ and ‘race’ were once used

---

117 Esposito also explores this mobilisation, noting that Nazi vocabulary gives a ‘physical shape’ (corpo) to the metaphor of the Jew as a parasite. The effect of the ‘total biologization of the lexicon’ is that “Jews do not resemble parasites, they do not behave like bacteria – they are such things” (Esposito 2012:86).
118 And colonial endeavours – see Section Three.
interchangeably (Kelly 2004:62). State racism – which demarcates between what must live (our society) and what must die (enemies of the population) – should therefore be understood in this broad sense as the vilification of ‘the other’ (regardless of the specific form it takes), and thus the relationship between nationalism (particularly Arendt’s version of tribal nationalism) and biopolitics should also be recognised.

Although limited in number, some commentators are cognisant of the synergies between racism, nationalism and biopolitics and allude to the underlying human need to belong. Ahmad Chehab for example argues that Foucault sees racism as “an ongoing social war, nurtured by biopolitical technologies and imbued with perverse notions of nationalist identity” (Chehab 2012:4). Whilst Michael Omi and Howard Winart (1994) maintain that as a result of biopolitics, the state has become an actor that ‘racializes’ its population and constantly develops the meanings attributed to ‘race’ via engagement with civil society actors. Arendt would however question how much influence civil society actors actually have in this process. Alternatively, Steve Garner (2007) links racism, nationalism and biopolitics by noting that in practice the biopolitical state produces the people and therefore non-nationals123 because it “holds the legitimate monopoly of violence; controls the definition of the nation through education, immigration and nationality/citizenship legislation; and carries out practices of enforcement” (Garner 2007:72). It is therefore a ‘racializing machine’. Conversely, others specifically argue that such thought paradigms actually contribute to a feeling of national belonging. Marius Turda for instance posits that racial eugenicists such as Făcăoaru and Râmneanțu were representatives of a general intellectual and political process in interwar Romania that he sees as the “biologization of national belonging” (Turda 2007:437). What these scholars neglect to make explicit however, is the manner in which the ‘evils’ of nationalism reinforce, and are reinforced by, the dangers inherent in ‘biologizing’ politics.

---

121 It is interesting to note that The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination specifies, “In this Convention, the term ‘racial discrimination’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life” (Article 1 available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CERD.aspx accessed 14th December 2014). This suggests that even today a wide definition of race is operative within the international regulative framework. Moreover, in 2004, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (UN CERD) observed “xenophobia against non-nationals, particularly migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers, constitutes one of the main sources of contemporary racism” (General Recommendation 30, Discrimination against Non-citizens (Sixty-fourth session, 2004), U.N. Doc. CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (2004). Available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/genrec30.html. Accessed 14th December 2014.

122 See also Esposito (2012) Chapter 6.

123 Conversely, McVeigh (2013:82-3) argues that in his examination of Nazism and their biopolitical regime, Agamben showcases an attempt to define belonging negatively, by what a group is not.
Arendt is renowned for repudiating all polities based on ‘being not doing’, a repudiation Joan Cocks rightly argues “stems in part from her disdain for biologist and racial conceptions of identity and in part from her conviction that the political sphere is a sphere of freedom only when a plurality of equal yet distinct selves is admitted there” (Cocks 2009:113-4). Throughout her entire body of work, Arendt repeatedly condemns ethnonational sovereign projects for their attempt to remake the polity in the image of blood relations, often linking such nationalism with oppression. In The Jewish Writings for example, Arendt notes in 1942 that “Few things are as important for our current politics as to keep the oppressed people’s struggles for liberation free from the plague of fascism. This war will be won only if in its course all peoples are liberated, and that means transforming all ‘races’ into [civic] peoples” (JW:171 emphasis added). In her critique of tribal nationalism Arendt is equally critical of the violent methods such states are obliged to employ in their pursuit of a territory for their people. This often necessitates ‘fending off’ or subordinating all external groups that threaten the project thereby limiting plurality and damaging the common world. Moreover, internal differences have to be quashed and members of one’s own group have to be tightly controlled and corralled in pursuit of ‘the national mission’. The rationale underpinning biopolitics both explains these dangers and allows them to be fully realised. In her conceptual and empirical discussions in On Violence Arendt surmises that nothing, in her opinion, is theoretically more dangerous than the tradition of organic thought in political matters, in which power and violence are interpreted in terms of biological metaphors that can only produce more violence, especially where racial matters are involved (OV:75).

With the ‘biopoliticisation’ of race, or state racism, one form of life (in the case of Nazism, predominantly those of Jewish descent), is perceived as endangering another form of life (Aryans in this case, or, more generally, ‘society’ as defined by Foucault), and has thus to be killed. The killing of ‘the other’ ‘defends’ society and contributes to its life. It “makes one biologically stronger insofar as one is a member of a race or a population” (Foucault 2004:258), and, as Arendt notes, under Nazism antisemitism was equated with ‘delousing’ – “not a question of ideology”, rather, “a matter of cleanliness” (Himmler cited OT:504FN112); Jews were seen as ‘degenerates’ and therefore “should not be allowed to contaminate the population” (OT:589 emphasis added).

124 André Duarte praises Arendt as “a master of chiaroscuro political thinking” in her acknowledgement of “the contrasts between the open possibilities of radically renovating the political and the strict chains of a logic that binds violence and political exclusion under a biopolitical paradigm” (Duarte 2005:14).
The novelty of Nazism, according to Roberto Esposito, is that it is actually \textit{biology} realised – ‘nothing but applied biology’ (Rudolph Hess). Just as “communism has history as its transcendental, class as its subject, and economy as its lexicon,” Esposito argues, so “Nazism has life as its transcendental, race as its subject, and biology as its lexicon” (Esposito 2012:81). In her discussion of Nazi totalitarian policy Arendt reflects on how, for the SS, the question of blood was a reminder of their own worth, “a reminder of what is actually the basis holding this German people together” (Himmler cited OT:504FN112), and she notes that Hitler was striving for a condition “in which each individual knows that he lives and dies for the preservation of his species” (Hitler cited OT:565FN125). Nazi officials assumed a medical-biological principle as the guiding criteria of their actions and when Hans Reiter, speaking in the name of the Reich of occupied Paris declared, “this way of thinking in biological terms must eventually be adopted by the entire people,” because with them the ‘substance’ of the very ‘body of the nation’ was at stake (cited Esposito 2012:82), he was in effect imbibing nationalism with an explicitly biological connotation.

For Arendt, the connection between racism, (tribal) nationalism, and biopolitics ‘crystallises’ under the conditions of total domination practiced in concentration and extermination camps. She sees the camp as serving “the ghastly experiment of eliminating...spontaneity itself as an expression of human behaviour and of transforming the human personality into a mere thing” (OT:565). The “infinite plurality and differentiation of human beings” was thus replaced with a “never-changing identity of reactions, so that each of these bundles of reactions can be exchanged at random for any other” (OT:565). Conditions in the camps transformed the mass of inmates, regardless of their previous social standing, into “a degenerate [essentially worldless] rabble, entirely submissive to the primitive reflexes of the animal instinct” (Rousset cited OT:586FN160; see also HC:115). However, the camps did not simply destroy spontaneity in those detained, but also within the societies from which the camps emerged (Caygill 2013:155). In reality, the camp is the ultimate product of a segregation along biopolitical lines which first involved the destruction of the juridical rights of a minority (for instance Jews, Gypsies, Poles) and then the “murder of the moral person” in these people (OT:582). The camp simply facilitated the final step in rendering the lives of the victims totally insignificant by destroying their unique identity.

More specifically, Agamben sees the camp as the form of organisation in which naked life is exemplified in modernity, and this summation leads to his argument that the refugee provides
a limit concept demonstrating the inclusion of bare life into politics. The refugee as the “only thinkable figure for the people of our time” (Agamben 2008:90) is the problematic which has attracted most scholarly attention, and undoubtedly with the significant numbers of asylum seekers, refugees and stateless people suffering in the world at the beginning of the twenty first century, this is important. However, such focus has been at the expense of a significant examination of biopolitics within the broader context of nationalism – particularly a nationalism which has significant affinities with the tribal nationalism examined by Arendt and one that is still intractable in many regions of the world today such as Russia/Ukraine. The previous chapter delimited some of her key concerns with tribal nationalism as a version of politics in which assimilation is difficult because identity is understood as being something that is inherited rather than invented or constructed. It is therefore pre-political as Arendt understands it and is moreover guilty of seeking to “rid society of all particular groups except one” (Cocks 1995:223). Developing the survey of biopolitics undertaken above, and reflecting Arendt’s longstanding concern with the Jewish question, in what follows, two specific examples of biopolitical practices are examined as they pertain to nationalism. Biopolitics will be shown to effectively govern the external and the internal dimensions of the Israeli nation, and the impact this has on both the political realm and the human condition will be explored.

**Ethnic Nationalism, Biopolitics and Israel**

“It is incredible and sad, but it is true, that more than three decades of intimate proximity have changed very little the initial feeling of complete strangeness between Arabs and Jews...The Jewish and Arab failure to visualise a close neighbour as a concrete human being has many explanations...” (‘Peace or Armistice in the Near East’ (1950) JW:430).

Modern Israel was officially created on 14th May 1948 with the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel. Enshrined within this declaration is the notion that Israel is the national homeland for Jews, a corollary of which is that the state of Israel must by definition always be majority Jewish. Understood thus, it is unsurprising that biopolitical measures and controls are a necessary feature of Israeli state management. To provide a relevant context for the forthcoming discussion, this section will initially examine Arendt’s interpretation of Zionism, highlighting her concerns – many of which are biopolitical in nature. It will then explore current Israeli citizenship control and the management of Palestinian minorities through the lens of a biopolitics which seeks to mediate, with a zero-sum game
mentality, between two competing forms of life (Foucault) – the dangers of which Arendt predicted more than 70 years ago.

Arendt on Zionism

Arendt’s relationship with Zionism and the Zionist movement was a complex one which both reflected and refined her broader political values: “What she [Arendt] says on the ‘Jewish question’ – which for her means mainly assimilation, but also anti-Semitism, Zionism and Israel”, argues Elhanan Yakira, “largely determines, even if this is often concealed, what she has to say, for example, on the nature of action in the political sphere or on what she terms the ‘human plurality’” (Yakira 2006:35 emphasis in the original).125

Throughout the 1930s and 1940s Arendt was actively engaged in Zionist politics, first practically by documenting fascist antisemitism in Berlin and working for Youth Aliyah in Paris, then contributing to the wider debate around the state of Palestine once she arrived in New York in 1941.126 Throughout this period she was consistently critical of Zionist tactics and aims. However she never rejected Zionism itself since she was absolutely committed to the primordial aspirations of political Zionism, she was simply “infuriated by the political naïveté of her fellow Zionists” (Dossa 1986:220). As she saw it, Zionism “was the only political answer Jews have ever found to antisemitism” (OT:155 emphasis added). Moreover, it had been the only ideology that placed them in the centre of world events and could thus, in theory, facilitate Jewish participation as responsible political actors (OT:467). This was crucial since Arendt always regarded Jewish identity as being profoundly political. That said, she was also always aware that Zionism grew out of two apparently contradictory nineteenth century European political ideologies – socialism and nationalism (JW:348) – and was thus subject to the same general failings of all ideologies, and of nationalism in particular.127

Shiraz Dossa opines that her quarrel with mainstream Zionists was both political and normative, and centred around four connected issues: the Jewish question; antisemitism; the content of Jewish politics; and the question of Palestinian Arabs (Dossa 1986:221).128 Arendt’s

---

125 See also Aschheim (2012); Botstein (1983); and Feldman’s Introduction in The Jewish Writings.
126 See Young-Bruehl (1982a), particularly Part 2.
128 Similarly, in his Introduction to The Jewish Writings, Ron Feldman notes that Arendt’s criticism of Zionist politics is founded on a deep concern with the fate of the Jewish people following the Holocaust (JW:i-viii).
conviction that the Zionist movement mishandled these issues is clearly expressed in many of her writings from the 1940s and 1950s,\(^{129}\) and in what follows a brief exegesis of some of this work is undertaken to contextualise the later discussion on the contemporary biopolitics of Israel.

Reflecting on the status of the Jewish minorities in Europe led Arendt to surmise that the creation of a separate physical homeland, in which Jews would not have pariah status and could speak and act in the public arena, would actually provide impetus to achieving future political equality and sense of belonging for Jews in the diaspora. She therefore notes in ‘To Save the Jewish Homeland’ (1948), “Palestine and the building of a Jewish homeland constitute today the great hope and the great pride of Jews all over the world” (JW:394). This simple sentence contains the essence of Arendt’s ideal – a Jewish homeland rather than a Jewish state, which would be a centre for worldwide Jewry (mutually supporting rather than detracting from diaspora communities),\(^{130}\) and a place that is built i.e. constructed as an explicitly Jewish form of human artifice, which is therefore culturally specific and inherently political for “only within the framework of a people can a man live as a man among men without exhausting himself” (JW:297).\(^{131}\)

Crucially, Arendt believed it was possible to establish a Jewish homeland as a political space in which Jewish culture could develop, without political sovereignty, and without Jews being a majority in Palestine. Indeed she argues that national sovereignty should actually be seen as the greatest threat to national survival for small nations (JW:446/450). She points to the Yishuv (the pre-state Jewish community in Palestine) as having embodied the ideal of a Jewish homeland through endeavours such as the kibbutzim and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.\(^{132}\) In Arendt’s opinion, one of Zionism’s major mistakes was the spurious demand for a sovereign Jewish state since it ignored the fact that the majority of Palestine’s population was Arab, and that any Jewish settlement in the Near East “will always remain a comparatively small island in an Arab sea” (JW:423). In demanding a nation-state along traditional European lines Zionists were, in effect, demanding the Arab majority emigrate, assimilate or eventually

\(^{129}\) Perhaps most explicitly in her 1946 essay ‘The Jewish State’ (JW:375-387).

\(^{130}\) Botstein notes Arendt reversed the Diaspora-homeland dialectic shared by American Zionists, believing instead that a Jewish presence in Europe and America was vital for the creation of a Jewish homeland since it would provide protection against the creation of a race-based nation-state on the nationalist European model (Botstein 1983:85). Again, this reflects Arendt’s abiding concern with the Western nation-state model as illustrated in previous chapters.

\(^{131}\) In her correspondence with Jaspers, Arendt makes clear that under conditions of social assimilation and political emancipation the Jews could not ‘live’ (AJC:198) – they need something more; a homeland.

\(^{132}\) See ‘Peace or Armistice in the Near East?’, particularly (JW:441-3). Also (AJC:98-9).
accept a minority status – none of which they were inclined to do. To secure such a homogenous state would therefore require violent methods of (biopolitical) control, often betraying Zionism’s “plain racist chauvinism” (JW:393) as will be illustrated below. Arendt also believed that imperial attitudes contributed to this tendency towards violence. Palestinian Arabs were seen as classical natives – lazy, uncivilised, irrational, inferior and most significantly, undeserving of Palestine. When she writes in ‘Peace or Armistice in the Near East’ that “the Jews regarded the Arabs...as backwards people who did not matter” (JW:434), Dossa (1986:225) suggests she uncovers the real reason why Zionist leaders “simply overlooked the native population” (JW:432). These factors, she presciently feared, would ultimately result in political thought being redirected away from the development of a Jewish homeland to instead centre around military strategy – “economic development would be determined exclusively by the needs of war” (JW:396). Furthermore, such a solution to the Jewish question, with its insistence on group solidarity and unanimity, would, she correctly predicted, both prevent the Jewish people in Palestine from assuming international political participation and responsibility (Barnouw 1990:134), and ‘merely’ produce “a new category of refugees, the Arabs” (OT:368).

In ‘The Political Organisation of the Jewish People’, Arendt notes the Arab world neither recognises nor respects Israel as the Jewish national homeland and since “a home that my neighbor does not recognise and respect is not a home”, so “a Jewish national home that is not recognised and respected by its neighboring people is no home but an illusion – until it becomes a battlefield” (JW:235). Her ideal solution, much explored in various essays and articles, was of ‘a kind of Mediterranean federation’ (JW:197) in which Arabs and Jews cooperated along with other regional factions “to show the world there are no differences between two peoples that cannot be bridged” (JW:396). “The truth is” she argues, “Palestine can be saved as the national homeland of the Jews only if (like other small countries and nationalities) it is integrated into a federation” (JW:195). Her understanding of a genuine

---

133 Arendt wrote that “For the sake of Palestine it [Zionism] has abandoned Jewish politics on a global scale” (JW:57).
134 At present 32 United Nations member states do not recognise the State of Israel: 18 of the 22 members of the Arab League; a further 11 members of Organisation of Islamic Cooperation; and other countries which do not recognise Israel include Bhutan, Cuba, and North Korea (Source: Jewish Virtual Library http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/recogIsrael.html#never. Accessed 1st January 2015). Moreover, in November 2014, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned that France’s parliament would be making a “grave mistake” if it recognised a Palestinian state in a vote on December 2nd (passed) (see AFP 2014). France’s plans for a non-binding but highly symbolic vote follows similar resolutions passed by the British and Spanish parliaments, and an official decision to recognise Palestine by the Swedish government (see also Black & Beaumont 2014).
federation is a system comprised of multiple different, clearly identifiable nationalities or other political elements, none of which has any dominion whatever over any other, and all of which together govern. It therefore fosters plurality and allows citizens to build a common world through actively participating in local fora (such as regional councils), following her alternative model of council democracies. It reflects her view, accurately summarised by Judith Butler, that not only may we not choose with whom to share the earth, but that we must actively preserve and affirm the unchosen character of inclusive and plural cohabitation (Butler 2012:125).

In ‘Peace or Armistice in the Near East’, Arendt argues the second best solution would be a bi-national state – a confederation of Palestine akin to that proposed by Dr Magnes and Ihud after partition and a sovereign Jewish state had become a fait accompli (JW:446). This would have the advantage of joint rule and mutual recognition, and enable a spirit of cooperation to be cultivated. However, her fears that such a solution would never be adopted have, to date, been realised.  

Israel remains a sovereign state attempting, by policy and force, to fulfil the Zionist dream “that Jews can attain their highest human and spiritual possibilities only as members of a political community composed of Jews and accountable to no one but Jews” (Dossa 1986:220).

**Israeli Biopolitical Control over Citizenship**

"The state of Israel provides full equal rights, individual rights, to all its citizens, but it is the nation state of one people only – the Jewish people – and of no other people” (Binyamin Netanyahu on promoting a change to Israel’s Basic Laws to codify Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people, cited Beaumont 2014)

In order to validate the much vaunted (and much maligned) Zionist claim that Israel represents a ‘state without a people for a people without a state’, successive administrations have enacted legislation which seeks to ensure citizenship status is ascribed according to the *jus*
**sanguinis** and **leges sanguinis** principles which effectively rely on 'objective' markers of ethnicity or race (Johann Fichte). This follows the Herzlian tradition which Arendt notes was uncritically derived from German sources – a form of tribal nationalism which “holds a nation to be an eternal organic body, the product of inevitable natural growth of inherent qualities; and...explains peoples, not in terms of political organisations, but in terms of biological superhuman personalities” (JW:367). In practice, today, as noted by Ahmad Chehab, prominently displayed on the Israeli Judiciary’s website is Isaiah 1:27: ‘Zion shall be redeemed with judgment, and her converts with righteousness’, which, he argues, impresses that law is “admittedly utilized to achieve collective Jewish nationalistic superiority” (Chehab 2012:5).137

The interpretation of Israel as a Jewish homeland was first given legal effect in the Law of Return, which was passed by the Knesset on 5th July 1950, and whose first principle states that “Every Jew has the right to come to this country as an Oleh.” In 1970 this right was extended to include non-Jews with a Jewish grandparent, and their spouses,138 and since this time various other legislative measures have been adopted to encourage Jewish immigration. Most recently, in October 2014, the Knesset adopted new procedures which expiate the process for Jews who have undergone conversions abroad.139 Legislation of this type constitutes the ‘highest track’ of naturalisation in the State of Israel – Jews and those of Jewish descent or affiliation through marriage are automatically entitled to Israeli citizenship (Jabareen & Zaher 2012).140 However, following the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Law of Return enabled a large number of non-Jewish immigrants (olim) to arrive in Israel. The state responded to this perceived demographic threat by endorsing a pro-Jewish conversion policy targeted at this population of new citizens – the ‘halakhic issue of conversion’ became a ‘national-Zionist calling’ or a ‘national mission’ (Kravel-Tovi 2012:744). In his analysis of this policy, Michal Kravel-Tovi (2012) argues that religious conversation is best understood as a mechanism of national population policy, and since the aim of population policy is to control demographic trends, it is a modern biopolitical practice. Moreover, reflecting the fact that Jewish identity

---

137 This echoes Arendt’s argument that the Eichmann trial was a mobilisation by the ruling Jewish population of state institutions and the entire legal system exclusively in the service of the Jewish nation, and not in the service of the entire Israeli citizenry.


139 Applicants are now allowed to reside in Israel under temporary visas and not be forced to spend nine months in their communities abroad (Maltz 2014).

140 Crucially, since its creation, the modern Israeli state has secured Orthodox hegemony and retains ultimate control over who may claim the status of a Jew for matters of immigration, naturalisation and civilian registration (Neuberger cited Kravel-Tovi (2012:741).
follows the matrilineal principle, the manner in which the policy has been pursued is undoubtedly gendered. During a parliamentary committee meeting in 2010 for example, Rabbi Rosen declared “For the national mission, I propose that we recruit the female converts. We should do this because of fertility issues. It is obvious to everybody that our main motivation is fertility” (cited Kravel-Tovi 2012:750). Such distinctions, Kavel-Tovi rightly argues, are rooted in the logic of the nation-state and demonstrate the extent to which this ‘national mission’ is a biopolitical one, “sustained by the blurry line between nationality, religion and citizenship in Israel and connected to national population trends” (Kravel-Tovi 2012:750-1).

The second track of naturalisation is for non-Jewish foreigners, who can apply for permanent residence status if they can show special reasons for wishing to live in Israel. The granting of such status is at the complete discretion of the Minister of the Interior and is rare, with Christian clergy being the most frequent recipients (Rosenberg 2005:2). The third, and critics argue, the lowest track is for the Palestinian spouses of Israeli citizens, who are subject to very restrictive legislation as explored below.

Israel’s Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (Temporary Provision), henceforth referred to as the ‘Citizenship Law’, has provoked much debate since its enactment in July 2003. The law prevents Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza, and residents of ‘enemy states’ (such as Lebanon, Syria, Iran and Iraq) from gaining citizenship, or permanent residency, through marriage to an Israeli citizen. It therefore restricts – and in many cases entirely denies – family unification of Israeli citizens and residents with Palestinians from the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). In many respects, this law demonstrates how Palestinians are excluded from recourse to the law, but remain subject to it – the epitome of Agamben’s exclusion/inclusion paradox (see Hanafi 2009:116).

The law was originally passed as a temporary measure, purportedly on grounds of national security, using the rationale that inhabitants of ‘enemy states’ pose a threat to the safety of Israeli citizens. Critics however argue there exists little grounding for this claim – particularly since the law does not prevent Palestinians from entering Israel, it simply prevents them from

---

141 This used to be possible via a procedure known as ‘family reunification’.
142 When the law first came into force, Israeli Minister Avraham Poraz, stated the halt in the citizenship process was “an essential security measure, made necessary by a few spouses from the occupied territories and their offspring [c. 20], who have misused citizenship to join terrorist attacks” (cited Nikfar 2005:2).
gaining citizenship or permanent residence.\textsuperscript{143} It has now been renewed 15 times\textsuperscript{144} and amended on several occasions, despite being legally challenged on a regular basis (predominantly on the grounds that it violates the fundamental human right to family life and unfairly discriminates against Israeli Arabs) and thus is, in effect, a permanent prohibition.

Viewed through a biopolitical lens, this law effectively reduces citizenship to a form of biopolitical management since it discriminates on the basis of birth and nationality. As a result of its restrictions, many couples are obliged to live apart\textsuperscript{145} thus imposing constraints on marriage and consequently on reproduction (Nikfar 2005:2). In other cases, subject to age requirements (over 25 for women and 35 for men), the spouses from the OPT live in Israel with periodic stay permits that have to be renewed annually – a process which involves invasive personal and security checks. Their legal status as resident aliens rather than permanent residents or citizens means they are precluded from participating in public life; prevented from working, earning a living and contributing to society (nor can they drive); and they have no social security rights or certainty as to their future. Children born of these marriages are also at risk. The law prohibits granting Israeli status to children over the age of 14 who have one Israeli-resident parent and are considered by Israel to be residents of the OPT. Even those children who are ordinarily resident in Israel are not guaranteed the right to remain once they reach the age of 18. This demographic are, as Arendt understands it, treated as less than fully human. Moreover, they are unable to speak or act in any way that will materially alter their condition. They remain subject to a law they have no political or legal recourse to challenge and cannot, in any meaningful way, enrich the public sphere in Israel.

Furthermore, since the law makes no effort to discern security threats on a case by case basis instead creating a generalised ban, the basic premise of the legislation appears to be that “all Palestinians are potential terrorists” (Meretz MK Zehava Gal-On cited Lis 2013). Not only is this practice anti-political from an Arendtian perspective, treating Palestinians as homogeneous, indistinct representatives of ‘the other’ rather than as discrete acting beings (a politics of being rather than doing), it also illustrates state racism in a Foucauldian sense. Palestinians are seen

\textsuperscript{143} Human Rights Watch cite the 2011 Israeli High Court Ruling which acknowledged that between 2001 and 2011, only seven of the more than 130,000 Palestinians entering Israel for family reunification were convicted due to involvement in acts against the State (Human Rights Watch 2012:2).

\textsuperscript{144} Most recently in March 2014 at the behest of Shin Bet, who argued there was still activity in the Gaza Strip that was liable to endanger the security of Israel and its citizens, and that the population of those requesting family reunification pose a risk that it could provide assistance in carrying out terror attacks and espionage (Lis 2014).

\textsuperscript{145} In June 2008, the government decreed that Gaza residents would no longer, under any circumstances, be allowed to live with their Israeli spouses in Israel.
as enemies that have to be eliminated rather than contingent political adversaries; as essentialist threats both to the population and for the population. This consequently augments feelings of belonging amongst full citizens of the Israeli state. Indeed Chehab (2012) argues the ‘population’ in Israel discursively forms a separate Jewish nationalist identity and that the emphasis on Israel’s Jewish identity has reached unprecedented heights since the Second Intifada. Nadim Rouhana and Nimer Sultany agree and suggest that this has given rise to a new Zionist hegemony defined thus:

In sum, the New Hegemony among Israeli Jews is characterized by a dangerous mix of Jewish political ethnocentrism and self-deception exacerbated by the sense of existential threat and the conviction that the state is permanently embroiled in a quagmire emanating from the perceived insolubility of the conflict with the Palestinians (Rouhana and Sultany 2003:10).

Whether this is actually a ‘new’ hegemony is however open to dispute since the definition above accurately reflects Arendt’s concerns about the Zionist movement as expressed many years earlier. For instance, in remarkably similar terms, in her article, ‘The Jewish State: Fifty Years After, Where Have Herzl’s Politics Led?’ (1946), Arendt opines that by the mid-1940s Herzl’s understanding of the Jewish people as “surrounded and forced together by a world of enemies” had in reality “conquered the Zionist movement and become the common sentiment of the Jewish masses” (JW:385). Disregarding any debate pertaining to the longevity of this ‘hegemony’, it is important to note that such ‘sentiment’ does appear to influence Israel’s policies towards Palestinians. Certainly, this ‘fear of all others’ translates to a heightened interest in traditional demographic questions amongst scholars, planners and state officials who consistently argue for a ‘policy of containment’ to preserve the ‘Jewish character of Israel’ (see Chehab 2012:5). This will be examined in greater detail below, but worthy of consideration here is that in the (unsuccessful) 2006 appeal of the Citizenship Law, Justices in the minority argued that the law conflated security issues with demographic concerns about maintaining Israel’s Jewish majority. One noted the law was based on a government decision from 2003, which considered the possibility of a quota system for family reunification. As he rightly noted, since quotas have “no connection to security considerations”, this aspect of the decision appeared to be “based merely on demographic considerations” (cited Human Rights Watch 2012). Even more explicitly, the Chairman of the Knesset “warned against family
reunifications as a mechanism that was designed to implement *de facto* a right of return” (cited Human Rights Watch 2012).\footnote{See also Nikfar (2012).}

The above withstanding, the law does contain an exception. The Minister of the Interior may award citizenship or grant an Israeli resident’s permit:

if he is convinced that the aforesaid resident or citizen identifies with the State of Israel and its goals and he or his family members have been engaged in concrete activity towards the advancement of the security, economy or other important matters of the state, or that the awarding of citizenship, the granting of an Israeli resident’s permit or the granting of a permit to stay in Israel, as the case may be, is in the special interests of the state (Section 3C – Special Permit (Amendment No. 1) 5765-2005 (Amendment No. 2) 5767-2007).\footnote{Full text available in English at http://www.hamoked.org/files/2010/5727_eng_new.pdf Accessed 1\textsuperscript{st} January 2015.}

In light of the previous discussion, this is a very important clause. It effectively illustrates the legislative drive to make Israel a homogenous state comprised of citizens who share the goals of the State of Israel (generally understood to be Judaism and democracy).\footnote{In November 2008 for example, Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni addressed the United Jewish Communities General Assembly in Jerusalem. In her speech, she announced: “These two goals of Israel as a Jewish and a democratic state must coexist and not contradict each other. So, what does that mean, a Jewish state? It is not only a matter of the number of Jews who live in Israel. It is not just a matter of numbers but a matter of values. The Jewish state is a matter of values, but it is not just a matter of religion, it is also a matter of nationality. And a Jewish state is not a monopoly of rabbis. It is not. It is about the nature of the State of Israel. It is about Jewish tradition. It is about Jewish history, regardless of the question of what each and every Israeli citizen does in his own home on Saturdays and what he does on the Jewish holidays. We need to maintain the nature of the State of Israel, the character of the State of Israel, because this is the raison d’etre of the State of Israel” (Full text of the speech available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/pressroom/2008/pages/address_fm_livni_ujcGa_19-nov-2008.aspx). Accessed 2\textsuperscript{nd} January 2015.} It is thus an explicit example of treating citizenship as biopolitical management. Nationality cards (colloquially known as ‘blue cards’) hold great significance in Israel. They allow Palestinians from the impoverished Occupied Territories to pass through checkpoints and access jobs and healthcare provision in Israel – “a blue card serves as a passport to a better life” (Nikfar 2005:7). The Interior Minister therefore retains important leverage that may be utilised to recruit and reward defectors from the OPT. Bethany Nikfar argues that Shin Bet (the Israeli Security Service) has a long history of using access and family reunification permits as a reward for informers. She notes for example, “residents of the occupied territories are enticed to turn against their neighbours in exchange for access to medical treatment in Israel” (Nikfar 2005:7).\footnote{See also Gorenberg, G., ‘The Collaborator’, *New York Times*, 18/08/2002} Controlling individual behaviour thus is an example of Foucault’s disciplining aim of
Furthermore, controlling access to healthcare provision to gain “a wealth of intelligence used to prevent terror attacks” (Nikfar 2005:7) is a clear expression of biopower “that has taken control of both the body and life or that has, if you like, taken control of life in general – with the body as one pole and the population as the other” (Foucault 2004:253). Other manifestations of such biopolitical control will be examined below via a discussion on the management of Palestinian populations and territory, but it is clear from the discussion above that biopolitical control over citizenship effectively governs the external dimension of the Israeli state, to the detriment of both its public realm and the ‘good life’ of Palestinians.

Biopolitical Management of Palestinian Population

“The Arab problem is what it has always been, namely the only real political and moral issue of Israeli politics” (‘Magnes, the Conscience of the Jewish People’ (1952), JW:451).

Whilst citizenship legislation regulates the external dimensions of the Israeli nation in a biopolitical manner, internally biopolitics plays a crucial role in controlling both territory and Palestinian populations. Arab Palestinians are seen as ‘the other’, and Israeli practices appear to follow the Foucauldian principle that “the more the ‘other’ is regulated, controlled, or even eliminated the more the racial identity of the State will become ‘purer’” (Chehab 2012:4). As a competing ‘form of life’, the Palestinian population is therefore subject to strict and oft-altering controls which maintain them in a condition of dependent statelessness that functions to legitimate Israeli statehood. Adherence to this principle is not new, indeed Arendt saw the ‘original sin’ of Zionism as being “the notion that we can use our enemies for our own salvation” (JW:479). In what follows, several contemporary manifestations of biopolitical control are examined to demonstrate how the military and security apparatuses have primary responsibility for matters of non-Jewish ‘life’ in Israel. The result being, argues Michael Shapiro, “the state’s biopolitics has constituted itself as an ‘ethnocracy’ [Oren Yiftachel] masquerading as a democracy” (Shapiro 2002:266), with the attendant ramifications for both the people and the political that Arendt predicted.

Saree Makdisi identifies the common thread running through Israeli policy towards the Palestinians since 1897 as Zionism’s ‘inexhaustible will’ to separate Jews from non-Jewish

---

150 For discussion on this point see for instance O’Farrell (2005) and Crampton & Elden (2007:159).
populations in a biopolitical practice that, as Meron Benvenisti (Israel’s former Deputy Mayor) puts it, dominates and oppresses “precisely through the logic, the discourse, and the biopolitical practice of separation” (Benvenisti cited Makdisi 2005:447). In reality, the practice of separation relies on a ‘matrix of control’ (Halper 2001) which has three components: physical control of key links and nodes (such as checkpoints – many of which are temporary and may appear and disappear the same day, the arbitrary nature of which reinforces the biopolitical dimension of occupation); bureaucratic and legal control (the planning, permits and policies that restrict the Palestinians and seek to ensure Israeli control over key areas such as airspace, aquifers and quarries); and finally, the use of violence to maintain control over the matrix – the military occupation itself manifest in the police and security forces. In combination these measures mean Israel’s biopolitics operates in what Eyal Weizman has termed the ‘politics of verticality’ – “namely, Israel’s simultaneous attempts to control three spatial levels – the land, the air, and even the subterranean level – in order to systematically manage (and subjugate) its Palestinian neighbours” (Chehab 2012:4–5). The systematic management and subjugation of Palestinians (in both the Occupied Territories and in Israel proper) involves a variety of controls which affect Palestinian life on a daily basis. Space dictates that only four can be mentioned here: barrier controls; curfews; land management policy in Palestine; and residential screening legislation in Israel proper.

Following the Oslo peace negotiations, by 2000 the Israeli state had fragmented the previously territorially coherent West Bank and Gaza into dozens of separate Palestinian enclaves, many of which were less than two kilometres square. Families, friends and communities were dispersed, and each enclave was isolated from all others by Israeli checkpoints and roadblocks which required permits to cross. Authorisations were made difficult to obtain, and the parameters for approval altered with seemingly little justification save citing ‘security considerations’. The link to elements of racialized (biopolitical) bureaucratic control by decree exhibited under imperialism is clear. The Palestinian people “never know what rules them because of the impossibility of understanding decrees in themselves and the carefully organised ignorance of specific circumstances” (OT:313-4).

151 In December 2011, the High Court of Justice rejected a petition to stop the operations of Israeli-owned quarries in the West Bank on the basis that they violated Israel’s obligations as an occupying power. Human rights organisation, Yesh Din, petitioned that the profits from the quarries benefitted the Israeli economy, rather than the Palestinian economy, because Israel granted the quarrying concessions without tendering to Palestinian companies. The court rejected these pleas (Human Rights Watch 2012:4).
Palestinians do however recognise that the granting of permits ‘differentiates’ and ‘disciplines’ (Parsons & Salter 2008:712). It ‘encourages’ the ‘right sort of Palestinian’ in the ‘right mode of behaviour’ and is thus a clear example of Foucault’s disciplinary power which, in turn, conditions the whole population. Moreover, Israeli transport policy works in conjunction with barrier controls to actually encourage Palestinian’s to ‘self-police’ mobility. Yellow (Israeli) plated vehicles are not permitted to carry passengers without ‘blue cards’; any driver in violation of this policy risks arrest, imprisonment and licence confiscation. In effect, this legislation brings concerns of the private realm – whom one can invite into their personal space (i.e. their private car) – into the public forum. As Arendt understands it, this is dangerous since it denigrates the “non-privative characteristic of privacy” that allows one a ‘darkness’ for what needs to be hidden against the light of publicity which consequently ensures that the public realm does not become ‘shallow’ (HC:71). The overall result of this fragmentation, restriction on movement and self-policing has been an atomisation of the Arab community and the almost complete paralysis of Palestinian life. For example, Makdisi notes, “a journey from Hebron to Ramallah, which should take about an hour even with traffic, could now take up to ten hours when it was possible at all” (Makdisi 2005:448). From an Arendtian perspective, the fundamental danger inherent in restricting movement is the resultant limitation of freedom and human agency (MDT:9/OT:600). In this case, Israeli border controls specifically make it very difficult for Palestinian youths to get an education, for adults to attend work and for the Palestinian communities as a whole to receive necessary goods and access vital services such as hospital care.

Multiple scholars have suggested that the restrictions on movements have destroyed the Palestinian economy – particularly the agricultural sector. Farmers require permits to cross security barriers and work their plots, and Israeli authorities are able to reduce the number of gates and checkpoints that these farmers can use, and to restrict the amount of time the gates

---

152 Moreover, since “both action and thought occur in the form of movement” (MDT:9), freedom of movement is inextricably linked for Arendt to human agency and thus, argues Patrick Hayden (2009:88), to the right to have rights. See also Blitz (2014).
153 For example, according to the Palestinian Education Strategy 2014-19, “education in Jerusalem as well as Area C, which makes up 60% of the West Bank, has been suffering from an increase in Israeli violations and interference.” It states that “full Israeli military and civil control over this area deprives 5% of the Palestinian population (about 300,000 residents) from proper and secure educational services” (p.49). Available at http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Palestine/Palestine_Education_development_strategic_plan_2014_2019.pdf. Accessed 3rd January 2015.
154 See also Fassin (2011).
or barriers are open (Stefanini & Ziv 2004). This makes it difficult, and sometimes impossible, for farmers to reach agricultural land. Restricting farmer’s access to land has a significant impact in the Palestinian territories, leading to shortages, malnutrition and associated health problems. More generally, the most recent Palestinian Monitoring Report conducted by the World Bank (September 2014) notes that as a direct result of Palestinian businesses being ‘crippled’ by the restrictions on movement of people and goods, a quarter of the Palestinian population now lives in poverty (World Bank 2014).156

Schooling is also affected. The current Palestinian Education Strategy notes that in addition to repeated violations by Israeli settlers and soldiers, “Twenty percent of students and teachers [in Area C and Jerusalem] are forced to cross military checkpoints and electronic gates at least twice a day, exposed to humiliation, prevention, and getting late to school” (Education Strategy 2014-19:50).157 This therefore impacts on literacy, numeracy and other levels of educational achievement. Access to Al-Quds University has also been limited as a result of barrier control. The campus consists of properties on both sides of Israel’s municipal boundary and the ability of Palestinian students to reach their classes is in the gift of Israeli border guards. As the university administration noted in 2015, the “Al-Quds Campus in Abu Dis is located in Area B, which means the Israeli military authorities are in control of these localities” (cited Abu Toameh 2015);158 this has resulted in the University severely curtailing its educational activities in East Jerusalem since the “consistent denial of access to both students and professors” has made it increasingly untenable (Al-Quds University website).159

In terms of health inequality, in March 2013, the World Health Organisation issued a report on barriers to accessing health care in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The report highlighted that in 2011 and 2012 one in five patients, companions and visitors from the West Bank who applied through the Palestinian Authority for Israeli permits to enter Jerusalem to access

158 According to the university administration, in 2013, 1,769 students and staff were injured by the Israeli army in 26 separate attacks on the University campus in Abu Dis and staff and students are frequently summoned, arrested and intimidated, both in the Abu Dis campus and in the premises in the Old City, which have also been raided, and sometimes closed down, on numerous occasions (Source: http://www.alquds.edu/en/about-us/history.html#faqanchor). Accessed 3rd January 2015.
hospitals were denied. In Gaza, approval rates were higher at 90% (WHO EMRO 2013); however the situation has since deteriorated in this part of the Occupied Territory. Accessing care to prolong life is therefore influenced by border control; access to maternity care is also similarly impacted. There was international outcry when, in 2007, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) reported that even before the escalation of conflict in 2000, one fifth of pregnant women in Gaza and the West Bank could not receive prenatal care because of the difficulty travelling through checkpoints and that delays at these checkpoints have resulted in dozens of unattended roadside births, some of which ended in death. This issue therefore became one of UNFPA’s top priorities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

Controlling life processes and the minutiae of daily living thus suggests that in the West Bank and Gaza, human life has been “reduced to its naked rudiments”; “little more than a nightmare of mundane details” (Makdisi 2005:449).

The barriers do not however completely incarcerate the Palestinian population; rather, they radically confine the flow of both population and goods. Since biopolitical power is not about absolute prohibition so much as about the management of flows and norms, in their 2008 paper Nigel Parsons and Mark Salter therefore argue that these barriers are archetypal methods of biopolitical control. They go on to suggest that these barriers also reinforce other kinds of Israeli state biopower such as identification, residency and authorisation (Parson & Salter 2008:703).

Further, they note that border checkpoints facilitate military surveillance which is one of the most effective techniques of control envisaged by Foucault. And more, the obvious nature of the checkpoints is seen to augment Israeli power in a Foucauldian sense – a central tenet of which is visibility.

In practice, controlling the barriers is a manner in which Israeli authorities police the fragmented Occupied Territory. But regulating barriers is just one of the methods of biopolitical control Parsons and Salter (2008) identify as a form of ‘closure’ practiced on the occupied Palestinian population. Curfews, they argue, take biopolitical control to an extreme.

---


163 Torpey for example connects state control of legitimate mobility with identity management and state documentation, arguing that the ability of the state to legitimate movement both within and across borders evolves with the ability to know its population and to manage that information (cited Parson & Salter 2008:703).
Curfews prohibit individuals from leaving the houses they are residing in at the time of the announcement, and are usually declared in individual towns and villages by local security forces. Controlling free movement thus is an expression of biopolitical sovereignty which regulates the public space and the activities and behaviours of the Palestinian population. It therefore limits the opportunity for Palestinians to speak and act in public, precluding the pursuit of genuine political endeavour as Arendt understands it.

This is examined by Eric Corijn, Bas Van Heur and Zahraa Zawawi (2013) in their analysis of the transformation and use of Dawar, the main public space of the city of Nablus, during the First (1987–1993) and Second (2000–2005) Intifadas. They highlight how, by enforcing strict time schedules in which one was allowed to be on the streets, the Israeli military circumscribed the right of Palestinians to be in and use their public spaces (748-9). When the curfew was in effect during the First Intifada, the people of Nablus were obliged to stay in their homes and backyards served as communal spaces for very close neighbours. These partially replaced the public spaces, albeit with a significantly reduced scope. However, the Second Intifada prevented even this world-in-common from forming since people were at risk of being shot if they were merely seen at their windows or balconies. In Arendtian terms, such measures depoliticise Palestinians since they result in the destruction of a ‘power-generating’ space of appearance (HC:200), “where I appear to others as others appear to me” (HC:198) – a precondition of any political realm (PP:123).

Corijn et al. (2013) conclude that the curfew has become the most effective technique for military control. In practice, it generally ensures full military control (Corijn et al 2013:750) and thus facilitates the degeneration of the lives of subject populations to “the life of homo sacer ... a function of the imposition of regulations on the rhythms of ordinary life” (Enns 2004:14). The concerns of the Palestinian population are reduced to mere biological matters such as the logistics of getting sufficient food and water to survive when the curfew is suspended. They become ‘worldless’ entities, concentrating on nothing but their own being alive (HC:115). Their circumstances therefore correspond to the modern imagery of the social question, or, more simply, the existence of poverty as recognised by Arendt in On Revolution. Poverty she argues, “is more than deprivation, it is a state of constant want and acute misery whose ignominy consists in its dehumanizing force; Poverty is abject because it puts men under the absolute

---

164 Hanafi notes that the discretionary power of a soldier in a military administration office in any area of the West Bank is absolute (2009:116).
dictate of their bodies” (OR:60). Palestinians in the Occupied Territory are therefore not only subject to biopolitical restrictions pertaining to the creation and use of public spaces, but are controlled to such an extent that even when free to gather, they are all-consumed with preserving bodily existence and are therefore not at liberty to act in a political manner.

In addition to regulating Palestinian populations, Israeli authorities also practice biopolitical control over territory in their undisclosed, but often visible, attempt to deal with this demographic as a competing ‘form of life’. In September 2007, Israel’s security cabinet approved a ‘hostile entity’ classification for the Gaza Strip which effectively branded the region as an insurgency zone and, argues Lisa Bhungalia, constructed a conceptual framework based upon an ontological distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Gaza became “the antagonistic, ‘otherized’ space, a manifestation of Barnett’s (2003) strategic ‘threat environment’” (Bhungalia 2010:349). One of the consequences of this has been to classify the area as a terrorist zone which has helped justify what Sari Hanafi labels a ‘spacio-cide’. In a paper from 2009, Hanafi argues that Israeli policy is ‘spacio-cidal’ (rather than genocidal), in that “it targets land for the purpose of rendering inevitable the ‘voluntary’ transfer of the Palestinian population, primarily by targeting the space upon which the Palestinian people live” (Hanafi 2009:107). The annihilation of space is seen to be the ‘primary leverage of political pressure’ and the strategy is realised by four actors: the military forces; Jewish settlers appropriating land under Israeli legislation; urban planners; and capitalist real-estate speculators.

Arguably the military play the most important role in executing this policy, particularly in times of extreme conflict. For example, Hanafi notes that following the April 2002 Israeli invasion of the West Bank, all but two Palestinian ministries and 65 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were totally or partially destroyed. “What was striking about this wanton destruction”, he argues, “was the vandalism...why did soldiers...also have to smash computer screens and tear apart furniture?” (Hanafi 2009:109-10). In explanation, in a manner which would resonate with Arendt, scholars such as Nurham Abu Jidi, Stephane Graham and Hanafi (2009) explain that the ‘urbicide’ regularly practiced by the Israeli forces aims to destroy not just the built environment, but also the collective memory of the population, which thus fragments or atomises the once cohesive group. The Israeli project therefore attempts to transform the Palestinian topos to atopia, to turn territory into mere land without necessary infrastructure or ‘cultural memorial’ (Edward Chaney) and thus, suggests Hanafi, force a ‘demographic transfer’ of the now rootless Palestinian population (Hanafi 2009:110).
In essence, Israeli spacio-cide denotes a deliberate yet dynamic ideology that adapts its intensity and methods in response to circumstance to effect widespread destruction of Palestinian territory. It therefore connotes a particular kind of biopolitics – “one intended to establish a delicate balance in which the health and wealth of the population, and especially the physical terrain on which it exists, are minimised, without effecting a total elimination” (Hanafi 2009:113). It aims to conscribe where Palestinians live and call ‘home’, and thus shares characteristics with the final method of biopolitical control to be examined here – residential screening legislation.

In 2008, Adalah165 estimated that Palestinians, who make up 20% of Israel’s population, were blocked from living in 80% of the land controlled by the state which equates to 93% of all present-day Israel (cited Silver 2014). This, despite the Ka’adan ruling (2000) which decreed that an Israeli-Arab couple could not be barred from living in a community built exclusively for Jews. This landmark decision was believed to herald a new dawn for democratic politics, end decades of segregation, and loosen the ethnic control over Israeli territory. In reality however, the court did little of substance to enforce the rights of Palestinian citizens to equal access to land or community membership. In fact, to avert any potential integration of Palestinians into Jewish communities, in 2011, the Knesset changed the law to give legal backing to admissions committees.

In September 2014, the Israeli High Court upheld the Admissions Committees Law, which allows rural towns in the Negev and Galilee to reject Palestinian citizens of Israel (and other marginalised groups such as Jews of non-European ancestry and single parents) from residing in them on the basis of vague ‘social suitability clauses’. This law requires that anyone seeking to move to these small towns obtain approval from committees consisting of local residents and at least one member from either the Jewish Agency or World Zionist Organization. Eligibility for residence does not therefore depend on citizenship status, it is effectively determined by race or nationality since the law empowers these committees to reject candidates if they are perceived to be “ill-suited to the community’s way of life”, “might harm the community’s fabric” or do not fulfil specific community criteria such as having served in the Israeli army (which few Palestinian Arabs do) (Human Rights Watch 2011). Crucially, although Palestinian Arabs are in the majority in the Negev and Galilee, the state has never allocated lands to allow these citizens to establish communities there. Instead, all the towns to which

---

165 A non-profit, non-sectarian Palestinian-run legal centre in Israel.
the new law applies were established for, and have a Jewish majority, and thus “preserve the ability to realise the Zionist dream...through population dispersal” (Yisrael Hasson of the Kadima Party in defence of the Admissions Committee Law, cited Human Rights Watch 2011). This legislation approves an ‘apartheid on housing’ (Suhad Bishara), and shows that in Israel, even citizenship does not enable Palestinians to have recourse to laws to which they are subject.

In summation, the range of biopolitical controls examined here support the assertion that Palestinians are treated as a ‘competing form of life’ in Israel, to be oppressed and forced to emigrate or live in small, strictly conscribed enclaves in a bid to legitimise Israeli statehood and nationality. Just as citizenship legislation governs the external dimension of the Israeli state in a biopolitical manner that seeks to preserve Israel as a Jewish nation; internally, biopolitical practices augment Jewish national dominance and preclude the flourishing of a dynamic public realm in which plurality is valued.

Concluding Comments – Section Two

In making human life the direct object of power and knowledge, the biopolitical school of thought from Foucault, through to Agamben and Esposito has contributed much to significant cross-disciplinary debates in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In designating the refugee or stateless person the ultimate ‘biopolitical’ subject, Agamben captured the interest of scholars and has enriched the discussion on human rights immensely. However, this has been at the expense of a detailed examination of the links between biopolitics and the wider paradigm of nationalism. Although the vocabulary of biopolitics was never used by Arendt, her work in texts such as The Human Condition and The Origins of Totalitarianism reflect her abiding concern with the introduction of biological necessity into the public realm, and she clearly highlights points of intersection between the rise of the social and nationalism – particularly in its tribal form. Understanding how the biopolitical practices which govern the external and internal dimensions of the Israeli state are inextricably linked to Zionism and the human need to belong, and how both biopolitics and nationalism are damaging to the genuinely political, is perhaps a useful first step in reframing peace dialogues along Arendtian lines, which think outside the model of the nation-state. After all, it should by now be clear, as

166 Attorney for Adalah who drew up the petition challenging the law.
Arendt foresaw in 1943, that “there is no reason to hope that the national problem, which is what we are dealing with in Palestine, can be solved in terms of national politics, and it makes no difference whether one seeks that solution in a small sovereign Jewish state or in a huge Arab empire” (‘Can the Jewish-Arab Question Be Solved?’ (1943) JW:195).

Returning to Arendt’s review of La Nation perhaps provides some indication as to how we might reconcile the political with the need to belong; how we should think and act when our civilisation is faced with “its ‘growing unity’ on one side, and its growing national consciousness of peoples, on the other” (Arendt 1946:141). The answer, Arendt suggested, is the idea of federation. She concurred with Delos’ assessment that “being French, Spanish or English is not a means of becoming a man, it is a manner of being a man” (Arendt 1946:141 emphasis added), which implies nationality should become a personal status rather than a political or territorial one. She saw this as being possible within a federated structure. Organised thus, the state “without losing its legal personality would appear more and more as an organ charged with competencies to be exerted on a limited territory” (cited Arendt 1946:141). This is a notion Arendt returned to in various later works and is one that will be engaged with more fully in subsequent chapters.

Whilst the examination of sovereignty and nationalism has provided an indication as to the content of Arendt’s political theory and how it may be relevant to the international situation today, there is one other key concept which must be examined to gain a comprehensive understanding – Imperialism. This concept is also subject to all of the generic limitations of an ideology, but contains within it specific factors Arendt saw as being implicated in the contemporary crisis of the political. Indeed, as she notes in her concluding remarks on La Nation (1946:141) “neither the racism of modern nationalism nor the power-craziness of the modern state can be explained without a proper understanding of the structure of imperialism.”
SECTION THREE: IMPERIALISM

CHAPTER V ARENDT ON IMPERIALISM

“Imperialist policies, more than any other single factor, have brought about the decline of Europe” (OT:161).

“Colonial enterprise is to the modern world what Roman imperialism was to the ancient world: the prelude to Disaster and the forerunner of Catastrophe” (Césaire).

Introduction

As early as 1940 Arendt was analysing the nation-state in theoretical terms and according to her biographer Young-Bruehl, although the shape of the work to come out of these reflections was not yet clear to her, “she had accepted as her task the writing of a comprehensive work on anti-Semitism and imperialism, a historical investigation of what she then [accurately] called ‘racial imperialism’, the most extreme form of suppression of minority nations by the ruling nation of a sovereign state” (Young-Bruehl 1982a:158). Clearly contained within this rationale for what became The Origins of Totalitarianism are the concepts of sovereignty, nationalism and imperialism and the manner in which they work in unison to ‘suppress’ sectors of humankind. The influence of sovereignty and nationalism on both Arendt’s political thought and the contemporary international situation has been addressed in the previous sections. To complete the triad, in what follows Arendt’s reflections on imperialism are explored and applied.

Arendt is clearly influenced by J.A. Hobson, whose seminal work Imperialism: A Study was first published in 1905 and helped make the term ‘imperialism’ one of common parlance. For Arendt as for Hobson, the period of imperialism from 1884 to 1914 was characterised by a “stagnant quiet in Europe and breathtaking developments in Asia and Africa” (OT:167). Fundamental aspects of totalitarianism were becoming discernible, but at this juncture “even horrors were still marked by a certain moderation and controlled by respectability, and therefore could be related to the general appearance of sanity” (OT:167). Scholars such as Karuna Mantena argue that “Arendt’s interest in the legacies of late-nineteenth-century imperialism was subsumed by her attempted deconstruction of the elements of totalitarianism” (Mantena 2010:101). Whilst it is true that she did not enter into any sustained engagement with the crisis of decolonisation, to simply interpret Arendt’s work on imperialism
in relation to totalitarianism is to miss the novel and nuanced thoughts she brings together around the topic.

Arendt’s study of imperialism within *Origins* has been characterised by one commentator as “one of the most insightful analyses of the phenomenon of European imperialism from the end of the nineteenth century to the end of World War I” (Benhabib 2003:75). Within Part II, in a relatively short discussion, Arendt clearly distinguishes between colonialism, overseas imperialism and continental imperialism and highlights the political implications of each for the human condition. This chapter will proceed by sketching an account of Arendt’s theories of both colonialism and imperialism as expounded in *Origins*, highlighting some of the key themes of each. Developing on the identified themes, Chapter VI will assess how a more comprehensive understanding of such leitmotifs can contribute to the engagement with international political phenomena such as post-colonialism and genocide studies as well as neoliberal globalisation.

**Colonialism and Overseas Imperialism**

“Imperialism, grew out of colonialism and was caused by the incongruity of the nation-state system with the economic and industrial developments in the last third of the nineteenth century” (OT:159).

Central to Arendt’s understanding of overseas imperialism, as practised for example by Britain, France and the Netherlands, is the role of the nation-state and the political emancipation of the bourgeoisie.167 “Imperialism was born” says Arendt “when the ruling class in capitalist production came up against national limitations to its economic expansion” (OT:170), and whilst it grew out of colonialism, it was in fact distinctly different. The specific lexicon used is important since the “wild confusion of modern historical terminology” has played a part in allowing historians to “dismiss the disturbing fact that so many of the important events in modern history look as though molehills have labored and had brought forth mountains” (OT:177). Central among these misappropriations is the confusion of modern imperialism with ancient Empires, mistaking expansion for conquest and Commonwealth for Empire.

---

167 The characteristic of the bourgeoisie class was that “everybody could belong to it who conceived of life as a process of perpetually becoming wealthier, and considered money as something sacrosanct which under no circumstances should be a mere commodity for consumption” (OT:194).
In the preface to Section II of *Origins Arendt* is unambiguous in asserting imperialism was an entirely new occurrence. In short, as noted by Hobsbawm, “a novel term devised to describe a novel phenomenon” (Hobsbawm 1987:60). This ‘novel phenomenon’ grew out of colonialism but pursued an entirely new policy of expansion for expansion’s sake “that was as different from national conquests in border-wars as it was from true empire-building Roman style” (OT:159). In essence, like Carlton Hayes she sees the ‘new’ imperialism as differing markedly from that which went before in that “it is not primarily a colonizing or simply commercial imperialism, but rather an investing one in regions ill adapted to European settlement” (Hayes 1961:82). Paraphrasing Baker she reduces the difference between colonialism and overseas imperialism to the difference between the export of people and the export of money.

Such a position has been critiqued by some who have recently engaged with her work. In ‘Race thinking and Racism in Hannah Arendt’s *The Origins of Totalitarianism*’ for example, Kathryn Gines questions Arendt’s characterisation of late nineteenth century imperialism as a distinct and necessarily more destructive period of colonial history, believing that in so doing she overlooks the brutality of centuries of settlement, genocide and slavery. Gines also argues that Arendt appears to neglect the fact that like imperialism, the colonialism practiced in regions such as the Americas and Australia employed similar violent and even racist tactics in their pursuit of economic expansion (Gines 2008:39). Even some generally sympathetic to Arendt’s position such as Mantena maintain that whilst she rightly insisted on the specificity of late-nineteenth-century imperialism, there is some weight to the charge that the “strict temporal delimitation” she posits “is not entirely persuasive” (Mantena 2010:103). Such arguments draw on the multidisciplinary body of scholarship which sees the imperialism of the late nineteenth century as simply being the latest manifestation of an empire building in existence since the time of the Romans. This position is exemplified by Norrie MacQueen who identifies key themes present in the imperialism of 1870 onwards, and concludes that ‘not all that much’ was in fact ‘new’ about the ‘new imperialism’.\(^{168}\) He sees any transformations that have occurred as being of an incremental rather than a fundamental nature, and merely highlights that “the most striking feature of the new imperialism was the extent and rapidity of change across all aspects of the colonial venture” (MacQueen 2007:23).\(^{169}\)

\(^{168}\) Such a view is quite widespread among scholars such as Magdoff (1978:34).

\(^{169}\) It should be noted that historians and theorists were not alone in asserting the imperialism of the late nineteenth century was not in any way novel. Economists from the global strategist school of thought such as Robinson and Gallagher in *The Imperialism of Free Trade* (1953) maintain there is no such thing as ‘new’
More specifically, reflecting Gines’ argument, Frederick Cooper notes “brutality, enslavement, land grabbing, the denigration of indigenous cultures, and coerced religious conversion are not unique to any era or place” (Cooper 2005:28). Likewise, in The End of Empire John Strachey puts forward a thesis centred on the idea that exploitation was the most fundamental characteristic of the imperialism at the end of the nineteenth century. His aim (not necessarily systematically pursued, nor successfully achieved), was to demonstrate that empire building can be conceptualised as exploitation of a dependent territory. Such a definition supposedly “holds good for all empires at all times”, the corollary of which it that it is the means rather than the fact of exploitation that varies (Fieldhouse 1961:194). The validity of this assertion is predicated on the assumption that ‘empire’ is a feature in the modern international system comprised of nation-states – one assumption among many which Arendt questions.

The relevance of the ‘new’ versus ‘continuous’ argument in this context is to highlight the fundamental distinction Arendt draws between the concepts of colonialism and imperialism. In essence proponents of the continuous view, and those who criticise Arendt’s position, conflate imperialism with colonialism. Although imperialism is often seen as the ‘concept’ and colonialism as the ‘practice’, the definition of imperialism often adopted by these theorists as “the exercise of power either through direct conquest or (latterly) through political and economic influence that effectively amounts to a similar form of domination” (Young 2001:27), fails to account for the elemental difference between the two.

According to Wolfgang Reinhard, in terms of a history of ideas, colonialism constitutes a ‘developmental differential’ due to the control of one people by an alien other, and has existed in almost all periods of world history in different degrees of expression (cited Stuchtey 2011:4). Colonies become an integral part of the mother country in which the legal and political institutions of the aggressor are integrated. The colonial nation is therefore seen to be ‘indivisible’ and ‘at home’ on several continents (Stuchtey 2011:5). In reality, the principle of ‘colonial freedom’ is valid only insofar as the colony is formed of members of the mother country or, as Arendt notes “such admixture...as to make it safe to introduce representative institutions” (OT:177 FN). Members of the home nation settle or were ‘exported’ (Barker) to the colonies, and Arendt reflects that prior to the 1880s one of the major advances European imperialism, “merely an intensification of what had already been going on” (MacQueen 2007:41). They use fiscal data on tariff policies etc. to argue that those who believe the annexations at the end of the nineteenth century represented a ‘sharp break’ in policy “due to the decline of free trade, the need to protect foreign investment, and the conversion of statesmen to the need for unlimited land-grabbing” were mistaken – that all such explanations were ‘questionable’ (Gallagher & Robinson 1953).
colonialism made in newly discovered and sparsely populated territories such as America and Australia was “the founding of new settlements which adopted the legal and political institutions of the mother country” (OT:244). 170

In its original guise, as recognised by Stephen Howe, colonialism was a “system of rule, by one group over another, where the first claims a right (a ‘right’ usually established by conquest) to exercise exclusive sovereignty over the second and to shape its destiny” (Howe 2002:30-1). Conquest often necessitates the forced removal or assimilation of indigenous populations and the destruction of their political, legal, societal and cultural institutions prior to the imposition of structures from the conquering country. 171 It goes hand in glove with empire building, but both concepts, according to Arendt, were inherently problematic and anti-political in modernity. The foundation of the Roman Republic – empire-builder extraordinaire – was primarily law. It was therefore able to integrate the most heterogeneous of peoples by imposing upon them a common legal system, but it was also self-limiting in that it could only expand as far as ius and imperium could be fused. The modern nation-state however lacks such a self-limiting yet unifying principle, predicated as it is on the notion of genuine consent, something which “cannot be stretched indefinitely, and is only rarely and with difficulty, won from conquered peoples” (OT:171). 172 This made all genuine attempts at empire building impossible because the nation-state would have to “assimilate rather than to integrate, to enforce consent rather than justice, that is, to degenerate into tyranny” (OT:170).

Instead, modern overseas imperialism is characterised for Arendt not by exporting members of the home nation to far away locations but by exporting capital; not by integrating subject peoples but by an inability and lack of desire to incorporate them into a single legal-political entity and, even more destructive of political potentiality, a complete severance of any grounds for public connection between rulers and ruled that serve, even in despotic regimes, as immanent limits to violence. To see overseas imperialism as a purely political concept is therefore a fundamental mistake – the interaction between economic interest and the political is vital. Of even greater significance, but often neglected by scholars in the field, is the

170 The other outstanding achievement was “the establishment of maritime and trade stations whose only function was to facilitate the never very peaceful exchange of the treasures of the world” – this is “well known though exotic countries in the midst of foreign peoples” (OT:244).
171 Even the colonisation of America and Australia was accompanied by “periods of cruel liquidation” (OT:244 FN). The parallels with Lemkin’s understanding of genocide are striking – see below.
172 Only the French attempted empire-building in the Roman tradition and the result was the particularly brutal exploitation of overseas possessions for the sake of the French nation. This was because where the nation-state appeared as conqueror, a national consciousness and desire for sovereignty was awakened in the conquered peoples which had to be quashed.
distinction between the *cause* of imperial expansion and the *devices* of imperialist rule. Drawing particularly on the work of both Hobson and Rosa Luxemburg, Arendt presents a theory of imperialism which is not new; instead argues Mantena, she offers a “historical-theoretical account of the *nature* and *consequences* of imperialism” which is new (2010:87 emphasis added).

Arendt believes overseas imperialism was sparked by the overproduction of capital and the emergence of ‘superfluous’ money which could not find productive investment opportunities within the boundaries of the home nation-state. Ergo, its essential *cause* was economic. In this she is influenced by Hobson and some of those on whom his work had an impact. In his seminal book on the topic which took as its subject Great Britain, his main argument is that from 1870 capital production exceeded domestic demand and thus sought an outlet abroad – the surplus capital theory of imperialism. He explained how capitalism led to the concentration of capital production in fewer hands and how this monopoly resulted in greater profits for which there were insufficient investment opportunities at home. The solution taken was to expand, “to take other foreign areas under her flag in order to secure new areas for profitable investment and speculation” (Hobson 1988:56).

Hobson’s theory was taken up and adapted by Lenin who praised Hobson for his “comprehensive description of the principal economic and political characteristics of imperialism” (Lenin 1934:15). Of crucial importance to Lenin’s economic thesis is that the export of finance extends capitalism into the host country by increasing demand for capitalist goods. In this manner the spread of capitalism across the world is secured, but since there is only a finite number of non-capitalist states to indoctrinate, Lenin sees imperialism as “capitalism in transition, or, more precisely, as moribund capitalism” (Lenin 1934:121) – it contains within it the potential for its own destruction.

In contrast, Luxemburg “wishes to establish that the coming disintegration of the capitalist system is not merely probable on the evidence, but is a logical necessity” (Robinson in Luxemburg 1963:24). As such she created “the first comprehensive theory of imperialism sculpted by a Marxist” (Lee 1971:847) – one that had resonance for Arendt. The central

---

173 Critics such as Fieldhouse (1961) have charged that the aim of Hobson’s treatise was to argue for social reform at home rather than to explain imperialism and thus that he neglected and skewed data to make his case. It is true both that Hobson believed demand could be stimulated at home by raising the living standards of the working class (which is why he believed trade unionism and socialism to be the enemy of imperialism), and that the data is contested, thus Fieldhouse’s charge may be valid. That notwithstanding, the impact of Hobson’s work was widespread and became the basis of many future interpretations of imperialism.
argument in *The Accumulation of Capital* is that investment can only take place in an ever-accumulating stock of capital if capitalists are sure there is an ever-growing market for their goods – “it is the invasion of primitive economies by capitalism which keeps the system alive” (Robinson in Luxemburg 1963:26). The ‘third-man theory’ Luxemburg developed highlighted the fact that capitalist production cannot survive without the labour power, resources and increasing consumer demand from the pre-capitalist sectors of the home country. Once this process had infiltrated the entire national territory, capitalists had to annex other pre-capitalist parts of the earth and “go all out to obtain ascendency over these territories and social organisations” (Luxemburg 1963:365). In other words, as Arendt writes in her essay on Luxemburg, according to her theory:

> Marx’s ‘original accumulation of capital’ was not, like original sin, a single event, a unique deed of expropriation by the nascent bourgeoisie, setting off a process of accumulation that would then follow ‘with iron necessity’ its own inherent law up to the final collapse. On the contrary, expropriation had to be repeated time and again to keep the system in motion (MDT:39).

Luxemburg explains the various stages in the accumulation of capital – against the natural economy, against the commodity economy, and finally (à la Lenin) the competitive struggle on the international stage for the remaining pre-capital societies and the conditions of accumulation they possess i.e. imperialism (Luxemburg 1963:368/419).

George Lee argues that for Luxemburg the growth of capitalism is not a ‘forest fire’ but that discrete territories are only integrated after a considerable transition period and he cites her repeated focus on the importance of infrastructural developments such as the opening of steamer services and railways to facilitate the transition (Lee 1971:853). That withstanding, Luxemburg sees force as the ‘only solution’ open to capital to ensure its continuing development – “a permanent weapon, not only at its genesis, but further on down to the present day” (Luxemburg 1963:371). Paradoxically however, the more violently imperialism precipitates the decline of non-capitalist peoples, the more quickly it hastens the demise of capitalism for which it is a pre-requisite “and the collapse of capitalism follows inevitably, as an objective historical necessity” (Luxemburg 1963:417).

Her focus on the importance of non-capitalist economies for capitalist expansion, the insight that the capitalist mode of production “from the beginning had been calculated for the whole earth” (Luxemburg cited OT:198), and the significance she places on the role of political
violence leads Arendt to credit Luxemburg with providing a “brilliant insight into the political structure of imperialism” (OT:198FN) – one which influenced her greatly. As Arendt explains it, the export of capital and foreign investment which had been going on for years is not imperialism per se, and does not of necessity lead to expansion as a political device. Whilst the owners of superfluous capital were content to invest in overseas projects without any political protection from their home government they had little or no influence on the political agenda at home, alienated as they were from the national body “on which they were parasites anyway” (OT:199). It was only when the bourgeoisie in Europe sought protection of their overseas investments that they became politicised, appealing to political institutions to protect their individual property, and attempting (with limited success) to impose a policy of ‘expansion for expansion’s sake’ upon their home governments. Overseas imperialism was born.

Expansion as the permanent and supreme aim of politics was a completely new concept in the history of political thought. Whilst such novelty is rare in politics, Arendt argues it is not properly seen in this instance since expansion is not political at all, but is in fact derived from the realm of business speculation. Using capitalist logic the dominant classes in Western society succeeded in convincing the majority at home who, conveniently, were beginning to define themselves in economic terms as property holders, that “economic interest and the passion for ownership are a sound basis for the body politic” (OT:203). Arendt goes on to explain this phenomenon in great detail in *The Human Condition* where she examines the ‘rise of the social’, but in *Origins* she highlights that capitalist rhetoric was unrivalled at the time and led even non-imperialist statesmen to reluctantly enter world politics since the only other alternative portrayed was to sacrifice significant national wealth and, ergo, the common good. For Arendt then, “imperialism must be considered the first stage in political rule of the bourgeoisie rather than the last stage of capitalism” (OT:185).

Despite all attempts to “clothe imperialism with the old grandeur of Rome and Alexander the Great” (OT:178), Arendt is clear that the phenomenon could be explained exclusively with reference to capitalist desires and their subsequent effects. Superfluous wealth was a by-product of capitalist production in the 1880s she argues, but the creation of superfluous humanity – ‘the mob’ – was characteristic of every period of industrial (or capital) growth.

---

174 See *The Human Condition* especially pp28-49.
The ‘discontented masses’ of which Hobsbawm speaks are synonymous with Arendt’s understanding of ‘the mob’. Like historians from Burckhardt to Spengler, Arendt identifies the rise of the mob with the growth of capitalist organisation, but what she further recognised in a manner few who were preoccupied with the phenomena in itself did, was that the mob was a direct by-product of bourgeois society comprising the ‘refuse of all classes’ (OT:138/206) and that it was therefore never quite separable from it. Many accounts of superfluousness focus exclusively on those of no further use as functionaries of production in an era in which profit was now contingent on commission. These people are seen to have no choice other than a negative one, “a decision against the workers movements, in which the best...established a kind of counter society through which men could find their way back into a human world of fellowship and purpose” (OT:294 emphasis added). In reality however, owners of excess wealth are potentially just as liable to exclusion from society as “entirely superfluous and parasitical” (OT:200). Expansion, Arendt argues, rescued the bourgeoisie from the consequences of maldistribution such as superfluousness and membership in the mob, and rejuvenated the concept of ownership.

Members of the mob were disenfranchised – they “stood outside all social ramifications and normal political representation” (OT:417). In Arendt’s terminology, the world between them lost its power to gather them together, to relate and to separate them in a genuinely political manner (HC:53). They therefore had to rely on their “virile and primitive ‘strength’” (OT:145) – a pre-political characteristic of the socially atomised – which turned of necessity to extraparliamentary action and sought “the real forces of political life in those movements and influences which are hidden from view and work behind the scenes” (OT:140). Given the authentically political is the ‘sphere of appearances’, such forces are, by nature, anti-political. In essence therefore, the mob were pre-political beings who adopted anti-political behaviours. Such traits and behaviours, exhibited in the antisemitism of the nineteenth century, were recognised by the bourgeoisie as of potential value. This encouraged them to call on the mob

175 Hobsbawm recognises that imperialism encouraged the potentially discontented masses to identify themselves with the imperial state and nation, thereby giving both a legitimacy they would otherwise have lacked. He concludes that “empire made good ideological cement” (Hobsbawm 1987:70).
176 Arendt’s understanding of ‘masses’ differs from Hobsbawn’s in that whilst he believes masses can identify themselves politically, she feels the term only applies “where we deal with people who either because of sheer numbers, or indifference, or a combination of both, cannot be integrated into any organisation based on common interest...[they are] neutral, politically indifferent people who never join a party and hardly ever go to the polls” (OT:414).
177 She goes on to note that “the political principles of the mob, as encountered in imperialist ideologies and totalitarian movements, betray a surprisingly strong affinity with the political attitudes of bourgeois society, if the latter are cleansed of hypocrisy and untainted by concessions to Christianity” (OT:208).
to advocate its private property interests and thus support imperialist ventures. One of the manners in which this was achieved was identified by Hobson who argues that through their control of the ‘yellow press’ financiers were able to ‘stir up’ primitive lusts – jingoism – the “lust of the spectator, unpurged by any personal effort, risk or sacrifice, gloating over the perils, pains and slaughter of fellow-men whom he does not know, but whose destruction he desires in a blind and artificially stimulated passion of hatred and revenge” (Hobson 1988:215).

Such a deception was possible since, as Arendt recognised, “a mixture of gullibility and cynicism had been an outstanding characteristic of mob mentality before it became an everyday phenomenon of masses” (OT:499).

The alliance between capital and mob is evident from the inception of every consistently imperialist practice, but Arendt goes further and argues that imperialist expansion would actually have been impossible without the mob:

The occasion – superfluous wealth created by overaccumulation, which needed the mob’s help to find safe and profitable investment – set in motion a force that had always lain in the basic structure of bourgeois society...At the same time, completely unprincipled power politics could not be played until a mass of people was available who were free of all principles and so large numerically that they surpassed the ability of state and society to take care of them. The fact that this mob could be used only by imperialist politicians and inspired only by racial doctrines made it appear as though imperialism alone were able to settle the grave domestic, social and economic problems of modern times (OT:208).

In the imperialist era this superfluous labour power joined with superfluous capital and together left the home country, whilst the owners of superfluous capital from many European states became engaged in a worldwide search for new investment possibilities. This led to the introduction of a further economic principle into the realm of the political – competition.

“The Age of Empire” notes Hobsbawm “was essentially an age of state rivalry...[it] was no longer monocentric” (Hobsbawm 1987:51). Arendt’s mistrust of applying non-political principles in the political realm is a topic she addresses in much of her scholarship. 178 In the context of overseas imperialism she is very critical of the notion that “competition between fully armed business concerns – ‘empires’ – could end in anything but victory for one and death for the others” (OT:171). She emphasised that in practice both the principles of expansion and competition “relied heavily on political, and even more on police institutions”

178 See particularly The Human Condition.
to prevent competitors from using revolvers (OT:171). This differed from power-politics in the traditional sense in that although there is some truth to the position advocated by Fielding that “the fear of being left out of the partition of the globe overrode all practical considerations” (Fielding 1961:205) and that colonies were seen as assets in the struggle for power and competition for influence overseas, the methodology was different. Whilst traditional brokers of power politics welcomed the export of institutions of order, for imperialists this created something of a problem since they really wanted an expansion of political power without the foundation of a body politic. They desired protection of their investment without any corresponding restriction on their operations. Various national governments acquiesced to such an arrangement because they were caught in a paradigm in which the choice, as summarised by Arendt, seemed to be between “greater losses than the economic body of any country could sustain and greater gains than any people left to its own devices would have dreamed of” (OT:183). Not surprisingly, they chose the latter, which had disastrous consequences as the discussion on rule by administration will highlight. Important here is the fact that the ultimate result was so-called ‘laws’ of capitalism actually created realities. The unlimited accumulation of power brought forth the unlimited accumulation of capital the bourgeoisie desired. Money finally beget money and it was generally understood that nothing could hinder, conscribe or regulate political machinations.

Whilst the cause of overseas imperialism is clearly economic, Arendt’s primary interest in Origins is attempting to understand the political consequences of imperialism, which highlights a point of fundamental disagreement between her and Luxemburg. As recognised by Benhabib:

Arendt’s threefold distinction between capitalism as a socioeconomic formation, the bourgeoisie as a social class, and the nation-state as a modern polity makes her avoid the reductionism of much Marxist theory that sees the state as an instrument for administering the interests of the capital class alone (2003:79).

Consistently throughout her examination of imperialism Arendt distinguishes between economic interest, the political and the social. She highlights the interaction and opposition between each sphere and notes it was only when the nation-state proved incapable of facilitating the limitless growth of the capitalist economy that “the latent fight between state and society [the bourgeoisie class] become openly a struggle for power” (OT:168). The nation-state by definition was supposed to rule “over and beyond a class-divided society” (OT:168) and Arendt provides numerous examples of how “the salutary restraint of national institutions
and politicians” (OT:177) militated against the worst excesses of capitalist interest.

‘Administrative massacres’ (Carthill) that may have broken the rebellion in India for example were never authorised because “the moral scruples and political apprehensions of the fully developed nation-states” advised against such extreme measures (OT:159). One of the grounds on which such measures were fiercely guarded against was the much feared boomerang effect, a term Arendt coined to refer to the process by which destabilising and dehumanising i.e. anti-political practices in the periphery rebound and return to infiltrate European politics. The metaphor is seen to designate “the extra-European world – especially Africa – as a space of political exception, of practical experiments in lawlessness and violence that eventually return to deform domestic politics” (Mantena 2010:88).

Whilst Arendt’s boomerang effect has been singled out as a seminal thesis, its validity is questioned by many. Even those sympathetic to Arendt’s work such as Canovan and Benhabib see the fact that Britain – the most successfully expansive nation in the nineteenth century – neither became totalitarian nor even had its political institutions undermined by imperialism as being a strong challenge to the validity of the boomerang effect. Mantena addresses this accusation in her perceptive essay ‘Genealogies of Catastrophe: Arendt on the Logic and Legacy of Imperialism’, wherein she argues that the historically consequential boomerang effects “have less to do with the undoing of a specific mother country’s liberal institutions than the step-by-step degeneration and disruption of the underlying principles of Western politics tout court” (2010:92). Isabel Hull offers an alternative interpretation. In her examination of the Wilhelminian state Hull argues that the imperial experience strengthened pre-existing tendencies within the military and that this led to the implementation of a ‘Final Solution’ at home. The link she identifies between imperialism and the Holocaust is military culture – “the dogma of the single battle of annihilation”; the belief, realisable and realised in the colonies, “that there were no limits at all to sheer force” and that the point of conflict was “to achieve a total and final solution: the permanent end of any possibility of further revolt, disorder, or challenge to German authority” (Hull 2003:148, 154 & 157). Imperialism therefore encouraged these ‘habits and inclinations’, which, importantly Hull argues, were present to some degree in all military nations in Europe. The reason Germany practiced ultimate solutions

179 Arendt also evoked the notion in reference to the infiltration of bourgeois values into the realm of the political (see OT:203), and in her discussion of the effect of South Africa’s race society on the behaviour of European peoples (see OT:267).
180 See the introduction to King & Stone (2008) for an insightful overview and analysis of scholarly engagements with Arendt’s boomerang thesis.
at home while Britain for example did not, is for her explained by the political culture and institutions at home in Germany in which parliament was truncated and the military was given much more latitude. Consequently she argues, the “propensity to grasp at ‘final solutions’ became reinforced and ever more ingrained, and therefore more likely to be resorted to in future” (Hull 2003:161).

Whilst different, the theses expressed by Mantena and Hull are not necessarily incompatible. Mantena notes that the specificity and novelty of Arendt’s thesis\textsuperscript{181} is its focus on the ideological rather than the instrumental; that the ‘specific reverberations’ of imperialism at home were “transformations in habits of mind that led to the loss of respect for the institutional foundations of the nation state” (Mantena 2010:93). Hull in effect argues that in states such as Germany military culture was permitted to undermine the ‘institutional foundations’ of the nation state even before imperialism. That the ‘transformation in habits of mind’ was most manifest in Germany may therefore have been due to its already weaker institutions, but this is not to say, pace Mantena, that the foundations of other European nation states were not similarly (albeit less obviously) undermined.

The essence of Mantena’s argument appears to be convincing based on what can be drawn from Arendt’s texts. What should however be noted in any discussion concerning the validity of the boomerang thesis is the fact, repeatedly highlighted by Arendt but neglected by Mantena, that during the imperialist era neither the state nor the bourgeoisie won a decisive victory because although “the brutality and megalomania of imperialist aspirations” were a powerful force, national institutions resisted their influence and “bourgeois attempts to use the state and its instruments of violence for its own economic purposes were always only half successful” (OT:168).

The political consequences of imperialism are however apparent in the devices of imperialistic rule. Recognising the impracticability of attempting empire building in the Roman tradition the British, the nation which Arendt uses as “exemplary in setting up some of her key concepts for analysing imperialism in general” (Benhabib 2003:76), actively followed the Greek model of colonization – an allegedly more humane and sensitive alternative. Political power was expanded without exporting the codified rights of citizenship – power was in essence

\textsuperscript{181} Most pronounced when set against that proposed by Hobson who saw how “the arts and crafts of tyranny, acquired and exercised in our unfree Empire, should be turned against our liberties at home” (Hobson 1988:152), “usurping the voices and authority of the people” (Hobson 1988:127) and “stri[k]ing at the very root of popular liberty and the ordinary civic virtue” (Hobson 1988:133).
disassociated from the concept of consent (Bowring 2011:176; Benhabib 2003:79). The mandate system instituted by British imperialists was an attempt to avoid awakening the conquered people’s national consciousness by allowing them to continue practicing their culture, religion and law as before. Indeed for Arendt it is characteristic of imperialism for ‘native’ institutions to retain some autonomy but to be controlled through colonial service administrators. This model made manifest the two devices for political rule and domination over foreign peoples which Arendt believes were ‘discovered’ during the early imperialist age – race as a principle of the body politic and bureaucracy as a principle of foreign domination. Whilst crucial to Arendt’s theory of imperialism Hans Joas acknowledges that there is almost total silence in the secondary literature about her claim that racism and bureaucratic control over foreign nations are intimately intertwined with the practice of ‘new’ imperialism (see Owens 2009a:54). This is a significant omission if we are to fully comprehend the value of Arendt’s contribution to the scholarship and appreciate the wider applicability of her thoughts to contemporary global realities.

Arendt’s analysis of both race and bureaucracy appeals to the notion of a hierarchy of beings, a variation on the arguments concerning ‘civilisation’ put forward by those such as Rudyard Kipling and J.S. Mill. As the “author of the imperialist legend” (OT:271) Kipling delineates the character and traits of both those attracted to colonial service and those who have been colonised. The ‘white man’ is seen to be superior – industrious, magnanimous, working to eradicate famine and disease and ultimately seeking the good of those over whom he rules. The colonised man in contrast is seen as childish, lazy, ungrateful and in need of guidance. This understanding of imperialism adopts a form of social Darwinism which believes ‘more evolved’ nations must guide those which are ‘less evolved’ into a more ‘civilised’ way of running their societies. Arendt examines the tale of the ‘First Sailor’ in Origins and sees in it a form of foundation legend in that it portrays the British as the politically mature people, ‘burdened’ with the welfare of the world and surrounded by ‘barbarian tribes’ oblivious and incapable of understanding what keeps the world together. Such an interpretation of Kipling’s work, whilst undoubtedly superficial, does reflect his fundamental belief that the ‘white man’ has a moral obligation, regardless of personal cost (which can be great), to “educate [the] immature native” (Osterhammel 1997:57).

---

182 For Mamdani this is a key precursor to genocidal violence as will be seen below.
‘Civilisation’ was a term much discussed in the nineteenth century and as a concept was often seen to be “the direct converse or contrary of rudeness or barbarism” (Mill 1867a:161). In the mid-1800s Mill devoted several dissertations to the topic of ‘barbarians’, their place in the international system and how they should be treated – indeed Jahn argues “the justification of imperialism...is an integral part of Millian political and international theory” (Jahn 2005:613). Mill determined that ‘barbarians’ could not be expected to understand or reciprocate the rules of international morality as pertained between civilised nations because “their minds are not capable of so great an effort, nor their will sufficiently under the influence of distant motives” (Mill 1867b:167). Such peoples he believed were incapable of society and “have not got beyond the period during which it is likely to be for their benefit that they should be conquered and held in subjection by foreigners” (Mill 1867b:167 emphasis added). Like Kipling he too stressed that a civilised government may find itself obliged to conquer ‘barbarous’ nations and, emphasising the reciprocal nature of the relationship between the two parties, he notes that subsequently the civilised become “morally responsible for all the evil it allows them [barbarians] to do” (Mill 1867b:169). Intervention in the affairs of others is therefore justified on Mill’s view “not for commercial advantage but for moral purposes, such as to end slavery, reconcile belligerents, end civil wars, or intercede for mild treatment of the vanquished” (Tunick 2006:591-2). The form of imperialism he thus defends is beneficent not self-interested, reluctant not self-aggrandising (Tunick 2006:591).

The significant difference between the theories of Kipling and Mill above and that adapted by Arendt, is that she believed the devices of imperialist rule were predicated on the fact that the British Empire had indeed been acquired ‘in a fit of absentmindedness’, and that those “who were confronted with the accomplished fact and the job of keeping what had become theirs through accident, had to find an interpretation that could change accident into a kind of willed act” (OT:269-270). Race and bureaucracy (and the imperial legend as illustrated below) were the means of doing this, not the fundamental cause of imperialism.

“Race was the emergency explanation of human beings whom no European or civilised man could understand and whose humanity so frightened and humiliated the immigrants that they no longer cared to belong to the same human species” (OT:242). As Villa and Owens rightly note, Arendt makes it clear that imperialist expansion necessitated the construction of a moral reality or lens through which groups were distinguished from each other not via any genuinely

183 See also Goldstone (2008).
political difference based on citizenship, but through racial and ethnic categories fundamentally destructive of the political (Villa 2002:4; Owens 2009a:61-2). It was virtually inevitable, Villa argues, that such categorisation would soon be used by Europeans against other Europeans in such a horrific manner.\(^{184}\)

The basis of race society as Arendt understood it was discovered by the Boers in South Africa when they confronted the “fright of something like oneself that still under no circumstances ought to be like oneself” (OT:251).\(^{185}\) What made these natives different was not the colour of their skin but the fact that they had not attempted to master nature nor create a definite human artifice. They were not civilised in her understanding of the term since they did not belong to that part of the world “which as the product of human work and human thought...is ruled through institutions and organisations” (EU:207). Since for Arendt it is the human artifice of the world which separates human existence from mere animal environment (HC:2), in essence these natives were seen as “‘natural’ human beings who lacked the specifically human character, the specifically human reality” (OT:251). Even before imperialism reached South Africa race thinking and racism were the chosen method of rule because they satisfied the European need to understand and rationalise a “horrifying experience of something alien beyond imagination” that led the ‘white men’ to “reconsider their own humanity and decide that they themselves were more than human and obviously chosen by God to be the gods of black men” (OT:254). The Boer’s reaction was to enslave the natives and they became absolutely dependent on their labour in a truly parasitical manner. The ultimate result was the complete degradation of the Boers when, rather than labouring in the mines they were content to accept charity as the right of a white skin.

In Birmingham’s interpretation of Arendt’s work this was the real world manifestation of imperialist power as biopower – “a power that uses racial doctrines to destroy the inherent wordliness of zoē” (Birmingham 2006:91). Through the framework or discourse of race thinking, the life of both the African and the European was reduced to the merely biological, all natural connections between human beings were lost and each was “subsequently subjugated and excluded from any appearance in the public space” (Birmingham 2006:91) – the African

\(^{184}\) An example of the boomerang effect reflected on by others such as Allen who notes that ‘imperial adventurers’ took such attitudes back with them when they returned to Europe as the elite and thereafter became “leaders of the mob that brought totalitarianism to power” (Allen 1986:248).

\(^{185}\) Mamdani believes Arendt is mistaken in attributing the discovery of racism solely to the Boers in South Africa. He argues “the nurturing ground of scientific racism was not as much the Boer experience in South Africa as the imperial encounter with continental Africa” (Mamdani 2002:78).
because he was enslaved and the European because he was dependent and unwilling to ‘act’. Race is, for Arendt, “politically speaking, not the beginning of humanity but its end, not the origins of peoples but their decay, not the natural birth of man but his unnatural death” (OT:209). Paradoxically race came to define the Boers more completely than it did those they enslaved who, although still excluded from the political realm, did eventually become productive members of a ‘normal’ human civilisation by labouring in the gold and diamond mines.

South African race society was not replicated across the imperial world but there were real and immediate boomerang effects of Boer racism on the behaviour of European peoples which became manifest in the Far East. Cheap labour from India and China had been imported into South Africa whenever the domestic supply was limited. This precipitated a change in attitude towards the native population of Asia and they were, for the first time in history, “treated in almost the same way as those African savages who had frightened Europeans literally out of their wits” (OT:267-8). The racism seen in Asia differed markedly from that evident in South Africa – the notion of ‘alien and strange peoples’ was replaced by a concept of ‘higher and lower breeds’ which suggests the possibility of development. Whilst this does represent a progression in thought, it is not without more negative consequences. As Arendt explains, this modified principle of race was a “much more consciously applied weapon for domination” in Asia than the older notion was in Africa (OT:268) – a weapon exploited in the twentieth century under totalitarian regimes and in the perpetration of genocide.

The Boer experience also introduced the idea that the profit motive is not *sine qua non* – that it can be overruled in favour of other principles such as “securing the dominant position of the white race” (Kiewiet cited OT:269 FN). This notion of racial dominance was adapted by the National Socialists who promoted Aryan superiority at all costs, and similarly in the Rwandan genocide Hutu dominance was the motivating factor.

Whilst Boer racism was somewhat unique with “a touch of authenticity and, so to speak, of innocence” (OT:255), what unites all forms of racism for Arendt is that “it is always closely tied to contempt for labor, hatred of territorial limitation, general rootlessness, and an atavistic faith in one’s own divine chosenness” (OT:257). These characteristics clearly echo many of the features comprising tribal nationalism and continental imperialism (explored below), and whilst the most horrific consequences of introducing race into the realm of the political were not seen until the rise of totalitarian regimes, the imperial experience both prepared the
human mentality for such a development and instituted administrative mechanisms to facilitate such a move.

Also significant for Arendt is the fact that racism is inherently linked with a contempt for one’s own people. Men and women are seen simply as a means to an end, whether it be promoting capitalist expansion at all costs in the imperialist era, or Hitler’s remark that “as far as he was concerned the German people might as well perish if they failed to win his war for him” (EU:294). Such instrumentalisation of human beings is destructive of the human condition, making genuine action impossible just as effectively as rule by bureaucracy – the other device of imperialistic domination.

Arendt identifies imperialist bureaucracy as being discovered in Algeria, Egypt and India. It was seen to be as a direct consequence of the administration by which Europeans attempted to rule foreign peoples “whom they felt to be hopelessly their inferiors and at the same time in need of their special protection” (OT:269). This sense of paternalistic responsibility sprang from the ‘accident’ of empire acquisition and required a reinterpretation to provide suitable justification – a metamorphosis traditionally brought about by legends (OT:270).\(^1\) The imperial legend as authored by Kipling played a decisive role in evolving from the fabled ‘dragon-slayers’, the bureaucrat and the secret agent, “forc[ing] or delud[ing] into its service the best sons of England” (OT:271).\(^2\) Edward Said’s work supports this view, and one rationale for Culture and Imperialism was to inventory various strategies that may fruitfully be employed to “widen, expand, and deepen awareness of the way the past and present of the imperial encounter interact with each other” (Said 1994:45). The legend, and Kipling’s work in particular, is one such strategy he examines. Said notes how both duty and ‘boyish pleasures’ are recurring themes in many forms of imperial-colonial writing. He argues that Kipling’s work, Kim in particular, has great artistic merit that “cannot be dismissed simply as the racist imagining of one disturbed and ultra-reactionary imperialist” (Said 1994:182). Its influence as art was “supported by (and therefore could use) the authorised monuments of nineteenth century European culture, and the inferiority of non-white races, the necessity that they be ruled by a superior race” (Said 1994:182). He goes on to suggest that the undeniable attraction of Kipling’s work to ‘the best sons of England’ was because it offered an antithesis to the

\(^{186}\) A similar phenomenon is noted by Mamdani who reflects that scholars of Hebrew myths note oral traditions “grew out of a need of the Israelites to rationalise their subjugation of Canaan” (Mamdani 2002:81).

\(^{187}\) Arendt recognised this had an impact at home in that English society was deprived of the most ‘honest’ elements leading to a “petrification of boyhood noblesse which preserved and infantilised Western moral standards” (OT:274).
“lustreless world of the European bourgeoisie, whose ambiance as every novelist of importance renders it reconfirms the debasement of contemporary life, the extinction of all dreams of passion, success, and exotic adventure” (Said 1994:192).

To understand the role of the bureaucrat it is first necessary to return to the fact that the bourgeoisie wanted their overseas interests protected without being subject to any institutional restraint. In practice this meant instruments of violence such as the army and police were exported and separated from the restraining influence of the other institutions of the body politic. In essence they were “promoted to the position of national representatives in uncivilised or weak countries...where violence was given more latitude” (OT:183). As Finn Bowring rightly notes, overseas imperialism was critical to Arendt “for the way it succeeded in liberating the use of organised violence from normative, legal and parliamentary constrains, and in doing so facilitated the disintegration of the nation state as a stable and legitimate political system” (Bowring 2011:165). Consequently, in dominated nations, in the place of institutions of state grew up a new class of state-employed administrators who, instead of acting as a moderating influence, “were actually nothing but functionaries of violence” that “could only think in terms of power politics” (OT:184). Violence is by nature instrumental and thus “stands in need of guidance and justification through the ends it pursues” (OV:51), but in imperialist politics violence is simply administered for the sake of control (rather than for the sake of law) and since power (understood as dominance and control) left to itself can achieve nothing but more power (OT:184), imperial administrators became convinced that unfettered control and violence was the essence of every political structure. This had devastating consequences because it undermined the institutional foundations of the nation-state.

Whilst their sphere of operation was overseas, these administrators were also vastly influential at home and did in fact provide a case in point of the much feared boomerang effect. The violence they administrated and perpetuated ‘rebounded’ onto the domestic stage and in reality the ‘victor’ paid the price in terms of undermined power at home. The lived experience of such administrators was that the country over which they ruled was merely a means for some supposedly higher purpose, they were therefore supremely indifferent to their subjects and “lost [their] role as protector of ‘backwards peoples’” (OT:275). This attitude of aloofness was epitomised for Burke by the manner in which Britain ruled India. He noted the unsuitability of the “young men (boys almost) [who] govern there, without society, and without sympathy with the natives” and alluded to the fact that in times gone by those who
ruled did so with a healthy regard for “retributory superstitions, by which a foundation of charity compensates, through ages, to the poor, for the rapine and injustice of a day” – something sadly lacking in the Indian Empire (Burke 1783). This was a highly dangerous form of governance in Arendt’s view because it allowed for an absolute division of interests in which the ruler and the ruled no longer shared the same goals or desires. Crucially, they no longer shared a world in common. This entirely new form of governance fostered the notion that the administrator held his position by right of birth – that he belonged to “a nation which had reached a comparatively high plane of civilization” (Zetland cited OT:276) and that action and achievement – authentically political characteristics – no longer mattered.

At the end of his life Lord Cromer\textsuperscript{188} compiled what can be seen as a philosophy of the bureaucrat in which he recognised that covert ‘personal influence’ without legal support was sufficient and preferable for rule in foreign countries because it could be altered immediately without involving the home government. These bureaucrats stood at the juxtaposition between the European and non-European world and as Albert Memmi argues were in effect ‘chained’ within the colonial relationship (Memmi 1990:7). It is interesting to note scholars such as Pierre Renouvin argue that in order to understand colonial history, biographical study is vital. He asserts that the “partition of the world would not have been effected with the same rapidity if...there had not been men who almost simultaneously made the same effort towards projecting their countries into the conquest of colonies” (Renouvin 1961:96). He is talking here of men such as Chamberlain, Ferry and Leopold II of Belgium who had a ‘passion for power’ and the ability to make use of circumstances. That being so, the thesis could easily be extended to take into account the vital, yet covert role administrators played, who were just as driven by their own temperaments as the statesmen about which he talks.

In a legalistic sense, government by bureaucracy is government by decree in which power becomes the direct source of all legislation and requires “no justification except applicability” (OT:313). As a form of command it is destructive of the genuinely political, but in overseas imperialism it also proved effective in oppressing heterogeneous populations and establishing a centralised administration because nothing exists between the issuance of a decree and its application. Decrees reflect ever changing circumstance and are based on no general principle. This makes it impossible for native populations to rationally interpret why something has

\textsuperscript{188} Cromer held the position of British Consul General in Egypt, and became the first genuine imperialist administrator “second to none among those who by their services have glorified the British race” (Lord Curzon cited OT:274).
happened, and consequently further circumscribes their ability to actively engage in the
‘political’ process. Bowring notes the similarity between Arendt’s account of rule by decree
and Weber’s description of pre-bureaucratic patriarchal domination in which “the master
wields his power without restraint, at his own discretion and, above all, unencumbered by
rules” (Weber cited Bowring 2011:183). The most insidious effects of rule by decree however
were visible in continental imperialism where the native bureaucracy was accepted as the
legitimate government. For instance in the Russian Empire there prevailed an “atmosphere of
arbitrariness and secretiveness which effectively hid its mere expediency” (OT:314).

The intimate connection between imperialist politics and rule by ‘invisible government’ is one
Arendt felt was neglected in most accounts; in contrast she is explicit that the rule of the
bureaucrat can only ever be effective if anonymity is guaranteed – neither praise nor blame
can be allocated which thereby makes accountability impossible.

Secrecy was secured amongst imperial administrators – even the very vain like Rhodes – when
they realised expansion only made sense if conceived of as an endless process. Understanding
imperialism as perpetually in motion effectively unites the principle of domination by decree,
the bureaucrat as functionary and the desire for secrecy. In this situation the administrator is
essentially dehumanised because he will as it were:

- Cease to be what he was and obey the laws of the process, identify himself with
  anonymous forces that he is supposed to serve in order to keep the whole process in
  motion; he will think of himself as a mere function, and eventually consider such
  functionality, such an incarnation of the dynamic trend, his highest possible
  achievement (OT:279 emphasis added).

A body politic operating under these essentially economic criteria, obeying no man-made laws
“because a law’s inherent stability threatens to establish a permanent community” (OT:280),
contains within it the seeds of its own demise since without the export of any legal institutions
all violence administered will be to further the spread of power as control – a principle which
very quickly becomes destructive. It “makes the foundation of new political bodies – which up
to the era of imperialism had always been the upshot of conquest – well-nigh impossible” and
in fact leads logically to the destruction of all living communities, both of the conquered
peoples as well as at home, since any political institution is an obstacle to the “eternal stream
of growing power” (OT:184). With the adoption of the philosophy of power thus understood,
the elite fully recognised that the thirst for power could only be quenched through destruction
which Arendt sees as the essential cause of their nihilism “which replaced the superstition of progress with the equally vulgar superstition of doom” (OT:192).

**Continental Imperialism**

If constant expansion for its own sake is the major identifying characteristic of overseas imperialism, the “monstrous immorality of ideological politics” in which “all that matters is embodied in the moving movement itself” (OT:320) is emblematic of continental imperialism. The crystallisation of Pan-Slavism and Pan-German sentiment into imperial movements only occurred in the 1880s when the imperialist expansion of the Western nations proved to be so successful. Continental European peoples decided they were equally entitled to expand, but they were obliged to seek colonies on the continent and “to expand in geographic continuity from a center of power” (OT:288). Whilst according to Arendt such imperialism shared with the overseas variant a contempt for the narrowness of the nation-state, it did so on the basis of an enlarged tribal consciousness “which was supposed to unite all people of similar folk origin, independent of history and no matter where they happened to live” (OT:289).189

Whilst overseas imperialism feared fixed institutions, the continental version was hostile to all existing political bodies. It simply offered an ideology and a movement which generated an “all-embracing mood of total predominance, of touching and embracing all human issues, of ‘pan-humanism’ as Dostoevski once put it” (OT:291). The elimination of private concerns endemic in this form of imperialism can clearly be seen as a precursor to the total domination exhibited under totalitarian regimes. Moreover, a fundamentally xenophobic tribal-nationalism was the driving force behind the continental imperialist determination to expand to unite a disparate people against what was portrayed as an encroaching enemy. Continental imperialism was therefore closely aligned to concepts of race with all the attendant issues engendered.

189 There are similarities between such imperialism and the concept of ‘Saxondom’ or the notion of a ‘Greater Britain’. As an advocate of a ‘Greater Britain’ Seeley believed that taken together England and her colonies made a large state – “a community bound by shared norms, values, and purpose” (Bell 2007:113). He therefore saw the expansion of Britain as a state responsibility to preserve for all times a unity of the British race (Mommsen 1981:6). Those who ascribed to such a theory almost universally asserted that Greater Britain was principally populated by the same race, an ‘ethnological unity’ as Seeley put it. Similarly, in Dilke’s work ‘Saxondom’ had a genuine political meaning for a nation no longer confined within a single country and was predicated on “the grandeur of our race already girdling the earth, which it is destined perhaps, eventually to overspread” (Dilke cited OT:239). This subsequently introduces a xenophobia and racism into the debate as there was a “conspicuous...lack of attention paid to the position of indigenous populations within the proposed polity” (Bell 2007:115).
The role of the mob in the pan-movements was significant and in both pan-Slavism and pan-Germanism the initiative lay exclusively with such bodies. They were led by a specific type of intellectual who knew instinctively how to organise them by manipulating race concepts – a method only fully exploited in Nazism and Bolshevism. In the endless process of power accumulation necessitated by imperialism Arendt saw as inevitable the organisational transformation of the mob from nations into races. The argument that imperialism is but one version of nationalism is therefore, for Arendt, completely misleading. Arendt opined that it was the experience of race society in South Africa that taught the mob “the great lesson of which it had always had a confused premonition, that through sheer violence an underprivileged group could create a class lower than itself” (OT:268). The danger inherent in such lusts, recognised by both Arendt and Hobson, is that with little encouragement they “become a nucleus of a sort of patriotism which can be moved to any folly or to any crime” (Hobson 1988:216). The ‘mob mentality’ supresses genuine thought, substituting for it a hero worship of glory and adventure which thus irreparably damages the human condition.

Conditions in mainland Europe in the nineteenth century precluded any attempts to export superfluous money (or superfluous people), thus the major factor distinguishing continental imperialism from overseas imperialism in terms of methodology is the lack of capitalist support. In terms of effect, the striking difference between the two variants, and one that Arendt considered ‘fateful’, was that whilst overseas imperialism succeeded in annexing more and more territory at the expense of obvious change in the political structure at home, continental imperialism “succeeded in realising the imperialist hostility against the nation-state by organising large strata of people outside the party system, and always failed to get results in tangible expansion” (OT:321). It was thus continental imperialism which proved most efficacious in rejecting, attacking and undermining domestic political institutions and safeguards. Despite the politically damaging traits exhibited by the pan-movements Arendt argues they have been given ‘scant attention’ in the literature on imperialism because of their relatively insignificant gains and lack of interest in economics (OT:289). This remains true even today; however, given the current situation in Russia and Ukraine, this is perhaps an oversight which should be addressed as a matter of urgency.
Concluding Comments

With their overriding concern with foreign policy issues, imperialists ‘invented’ world politics and the imperial reality of competition and emulation which subsumed local conflicts and forced rivals to imitate their counterparts was played out across the globe in the struggle for supremacy (Mantena 2010:99). Despite the argument that imperialism signified a nationalist ideology devoted to extending the domination of a particular nation-state (Mommsen 1981:4), and the charge that it was the “nationalistic masses who made it possible and who most vociferously applauded and most consistently backed it” (Hayes 1961:88), to see in this ‘patriotism’ any genuine nationalist sentiment is, for Arendt, a fundamental mistake.

Hobson sees imperialism as a perversion of nationalism in which “nations trespassing beyond the limits of facile assimilation transform the wholesome stimulative rivalry of varied national types into the cut-throat struggle of competing empires” (Hobson 1988:11). Arendt however recognises the appeal of imperialist policies to the clique of civil servants who could only ‘escape’ an increasingly class-riven society at home and “much better pretend to be heroic servants of the [home] nation” (OT:205) in faraway countries. The colonies therefore became “the very backbone of… nationalism”, and the policy of continual expansion gave such nationalism “a new lease on life and therefore was accepted as an instrument of national politics” (OT:205). Even so, Arendt is clear that using imperialism as a means of shoring up the European nation-state was a ‘desperate measure’, and that in the end “the remedy proved worse than the evil – which, incidentally, it did not cure” (OT:205). Arendt sympathised with the statesmen who thought primarily in terms of established national territory since they instinctively recognised that this new expansionism “in which ‘patriotism…is best-expressed in money making’ (Huebbe-Schleiden) and the national flag is a ‘commercial assert’ (Rhodes)”, would ultimately destroy the political body of the nation-state (OT:169).

Whilst Arendt notes that having lost its very foundations the nation-state “leads the life of a walking corpse, whose spurious existence is artificially prolonged by repeated injections of imperialistic expansion” (EU:143), few saw how potentially destructive imperialism could actually be. Indeed, many became convinced that it was the only way to conduct world politics – a decision which has had far-reaching and enduring practical consequences and which, as the next chapter will show, still influences scholars and thought paradigms today.
CHAPTER VI INTERNATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS OF IMPERIALISM

Introduction

The traits and practices Arendt identified as characteristic of imperialist rule had a significant impact on the human condition and on institutions of political governance. Chapter V illustrated how her account demonstrated that native populations were dominated in a paternalistic manner which diminished plurality and precluded genuine political action; whilst the apparatus of rule was shown to be the embodiment of violence. Moreover, as Arendt understood it, imperialism truly invented world politics and the boomerang effect acted to ensure that conditions at home in imperialist nations were similarly denigrated, ultimately resulting in vast swaths of people being rendered apolitical and superfluous.

The legacy of this period is still evident today, and the anti-political tendencies Arendt believed imperialists relied on and augmented are clearly discernible in contemporary global realities. This chapter will proceed by developing Arendt’s political insights identified in the previous chapter, and will assess how a more comprehensive understanding of such themes can contribute to scholarship on the international political phenomena of genocide and post-colonial studies as well as on neo-liberal globalisation. It will conclude with a reading of the ‘Occupy’ movement as a modern-day example of the ‘elementary republic’ system Arendt advocated as an alternative to the current system of political organisation – “the solution to one of the most serious problems of all modern politics, which is not how to reconcile freedom and equality but how to reconcile equality and authority” (OR:278).

Arendt’s Influence on Genocide Studies and Post-Colonialism

“Genocide is one of those rare concepts” state Ann Curthoys and John Docker, “whose author and inception can be precisely specified and dated” (2008:9). Raphael Lemkin created the term in his book *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* and brought it to the attention of the world as a result of his influence in bringing to fruition the 1948 United Nations (UN) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.190

190 It should be noted that although the Convention was widely cited, it was not translated into action in the international courts until the 1990s (Card 2003:66).
Despite the fact that genocide has been codified into international law, what the term actually encompasses, requires and implies has been a topic that continues to generate significant scholarly attention and disagreement. It is not possible to do justice to such a nuanced discussion here. Instead, the work of Lemkin as the original author of genocide is explored to demonstrate the influence of colonialism and imperialism on this distinct and pernicious form of violence. Mamdani’s study of the topic is also examined to support the contention that colonialism and imperialism have a lasting legacy in the twenty-first century.

The term ‘genocide’ was derived from the Greek word ‘genos’ meaning ‘tribe or race’ and the Latin word ‘cide’, from ‘caedere’, meaning to kill. It therefore signifies “a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of the essential foundations of life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves” (Lemkin 2002:27 emphases added). For Lemkin a genocidal plan is characterised by the destruction of political and social institutions and of specific group characteristics as they are manifest within culture, religion, language and national sentiment. The economic survival of the targeted group is threatened and the personal safety, liberty, health and dignity of individuals identified as members of the group are put at risk. The fundamental point to note is that genocide focuses on the group and that whilst the actions involved are directed against individuals, it is “not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national group” (Lemkin 2002:27).

Whilst Arendt clearly values the group as a construct she differs markedly from Lemkin who gives the (national) group an ontological status. As Benhabib rightly notes, for Arendt “the group is not ascribed but formed; it is not discovered but constituted and reconstituted through creative acts of human association” (Benhabib 2009a:342). She concludes that the fundamental value of the group as Arendt understands it is in “its manifestation of human

---

191 For example whilst most consider that genocide constitutes a crime against humanity, especially since developments in international law now indicate that the predication of crime against humanity upon the ‘war nexus’ has been removed, and it is now defined as “a crime by state or non-state actors against any civilian population, which can take place in either peacetime or wartime” (Ratner & Adams cited Hayden 2009:16), some disagree. Card (2003:63-79) for instance argues that genocide is ethically different from crimes against humanity. She sees the evil of social death only being attributable to genocide but this is predicated on her assumption that not every ‘population’ (and here she cites political groups) contribute significantly to its member’s cultural identity. The position taken here is in line with Arendt's view that men and women are conditioned beings and everything they encounter has an effect on them and their opinions (HC:9). Thus, to draw a distinction as Card does would, for Arendt, be a mistake (see Arendt's views on the value of the group below).

192 See also Curthoys & Docker (2008:11); and Kuper (1981:22).

193 This definition of genocide is seen by many as being too broad. For example some such as Chalk and Jonassohn believe only the physical extermination of a group constitutes genocide (see Curthoys & Docker 2008:30).
diversity; in its disclosing a new perspectival outlook on the world” (Benhabib 2009a:342 emphases added).

Implicit is the recognition that plurality is of vital importance in Arendt’s work. Indeed her understanding of the ‘universal concept of the human being’ (AJC:69) is predicated on the condition of human plurality in which the unique distinctness of each as an individual is revealed through speech and action. This is expressed clearly and perhaps most relevantly in this context in The Promise of Politics and a lengthy quote is justified:

The world comes into being only if there are perspectives; it exists as the order of worldly things only if it is viewed, now this way, now that, at any given time. If a people or nation, or even just some specific group, which offers a unique view of the world arising from its particular position in the world\(^1\) – a position that, however it came about, cannot readily be duplicated – is annihilated, it is not merely that a people or a nation or a given number of individuals perishes, but that a portion of our common world is destroyed, an aspect of the world that has revealed itself to us until now but can never reveal itself again. Annihilation is therefore not just tantamount to the end of a world; it also takes the annihilator with it (PP:175).

Genocide is thus qualitatively more than mass murder since while “murder is intended to destroy a particular in-itself”, genocide is “intended to eradicate the universal ‘concept of the human being’ without which particularity could not exist” (Hayden 2009:17). The danger of genocide is therefore twofold: with it we risk something that is potentially immortal – the public, political world of human artifice which develops as the outcome of different individuals and peoples living together and debating their common affairs.\(^2\) Secondly, if the plurality necessary to guarantee ‘the concept of the human being’ is destroyed, particularity as the basis of the human condition is also a victim. Understood thus, it seems right to concur with Young-Bruehl that “Crimes against humanity might be defined in Arendtian terms as crimes against human plurality, and to judge them as such one needs to prove not a motive to genocide but only a motive to deny plurality, for example, by making a group stateless [or by using nuclear weapons]” (2006:59-60).

In Origins Arendt examines the Holocaust, highlighting the ideological and methodological approach which sought to destroy Jews as a group. She is adamant that strict causality should not be read into her discussion of antisemitism and imperialism as precursors to the rise of

---

\(^1\) Different worldviews arise in part according to Arendt because of the conditioned nature of humankind. Culture, traditions, literature and religion for instance, all influence men and women’s views and are often group specific. This is why genocidal massacres destroy religious symbols and burn books.

\(^2\) See for example Owens (2009a:110).
totalitarian regimes and thus one should be cautious in making any deterministic assertions linking colonialism/imperialism with genocide. Whilst Ahmed is not necessarily wrong to argue that “genocide pre-supposes colonial dynamics” (Ahmed 2011:24), it is probably more accurate to argue that, just as with totalitarianism as a phenomenon, imperialism is not a cause that inevitably leads to the certain effect of genocide; rather it “became [an] origin only after the event had taken place” (OT:618).

The parallels between colonialism, imperialism and genocide become apparent in Lemkin’s identification of two phases of genocide. Phase one comprises the “destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group” and phase two “the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor” (Lemkin 2002:27). Implicit in both phases is an appeal to violence in pursuit of what is seen to be a total or ‘final’ political aim. The similarity between the methods employed in settler colonialism and genocide are remarkable. Indeed Ahmed notes, “the instantiation of genocide inherently imposes a social form, both internationally and internally, that appears colonial in its dynamic” (Ahmed 2011:15). But a comparable methodology is also operative in Arendt’s continental imperialism with its appeal to unite those of a common blood regardless of territorial location or the institutions/’national patterns’ under which they lived at the time.

The oppression of nationalities was characteristic of the system of rule in Austria-Hungary and Czarist Russia and it was widely understood that one might achieve nationhood only at the expense of all others. Moreover, that one would gladly be deprived of personal freedom if such oppression came from one’s own national elite. The ascendancy to power of the Young Turks on a platform of Turkism and ‘Pan-Turanism’ relied on similar methods. As noted by Rouben Adalian, Turkism altered Ottoman self-perception from a religious to a national, ethnically based identity and promoted the notion that the region should be the exclusive domain of the Turkish nation. Pan-Turanism extended this notion and “advanced the idea of conquering lands stretching into central Asia inhabited by Turkic-speaking peoples” (Adalian 2013:122-123). Pan-Turanism was therefore ‘an expansionist ideology’ (Ahmad cited Suny 1993:109). By 1914 the dictatorial triumvirate of Enver, Talaat and Jemal came to represent a “xenophobic, intolerant clique [the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) or Unionists for short] intent on pursuing a policy of racial exclusivity” (Adalian 2013:118). The portrayed enemy of the Ottoman Empire, the element that became the scapegoat for its weakness, was the minority Armenian population. Long seen as “gavur, infidels inferior to Muslims” (Suny

---

196 McDonnell and Moses observe that unpublished manuscripts show Lemkin saw the concept of genocide as ‘colonial in nature’, as it intrinsically ‘entails occupation and settlement’ (cited Ahmed 2011:12).
1993:97), with the introduction of Turkism and Pan-Turanism and defeat in the First World War, genocide was perpetrated to ‘solve’ the ‘Armenian Question’.

It is perhaps more difficult to see overseas imperialism in such a precursory light. Arendt is explicit in declaring such imperialism is characterised by a semblance of autonomy being retained by ‘native’ structures, and she highlights how strenuously imperial administrators fought against the export of Western institutions to subject nations. Instead, in reality, rule was through arbitrary decree by bureaucrats who prided themselves on being aloof and genuinely indifferent to their subjects. In regarding the ‘oppressed’ country as merely a means for some supposedly higher end, it could be argued the national pattern of that group was destroyed, but nothing substantive replaced it. There was an absolute division between administrator and subject that obliterated any vestige of human dignity and it is this experience that is best seen in an antecedent light to genocide.

The techniques of genocide as enumerated by Lemkin share some striking similarities with the devices of imperialist rule Arendt describes. Mamdani goes further and believes genocide cannot be brought within the realm of comprehension without examining such devices. Most obviously, the concept or ‘lens’ of race clearly plays a central role in both imperialism and genocide. It acts as a justification for imperial rule but Lemkin sees in genocide a biological decline or obliteration of the oppressed which is not seen in imperialism. This point is echoed by Arendt – “race fanatics in South Africa” to paraphrase her words, would never have thought of “organising massacres for the purpose of establishing a circumscribed, rational political community (as the Nazis did in the extermination camps)” (OT:243). Such a view is contestable, and evidence from both South Africa and other colonial contexts, especially settler colonial contexts, seems to belie such a position. The undeniable point of note however is that both imperialist rule and genocidal practices operate on a notion of a hierarchy of beings. In the imperialist age, all matters of state and other equally significant endeavours such as higher education were conducted in the language of the imperialist ‘master’; economic security was also predicated on belonging to the ‘higher’ race. Native populations were alienated from political action and their concerns were reduced to biological survival. Arendt therefore saw these populations as dehumanised. Similarly, Lemkin notes the Nazi technique of lowering the living standards of non-Aryan groups resulted in “a daily fight literally for bread and for physical survival [which] may handicap thinking in both general and

197 See Fanon (1993) on the importance of language.
national terms” (Lemkin 2002:31 emphasis added). They therefore fundamentally damaged the human condition of those against whom they eventually deployed genocidal practices.

The infantilisation of native populations had always been a key feature of colonialism – one ‘well-grounded’ in Western philosophy. As noted by Samar Attar, “Had not Hegel’s Philosophy of History mythologised ‘Africa proper’ as the ‘land of childhood’? Did not settlers in British colonies call every African male regardless of age, a boy?” He goes on to quote the opinion of Albert Schweitzer who believed “the Negro is a child, and with the children nothing can be done without authority” (Attar 2010:130). The most important insight is that in the colonial/imperial mind ‘native’ populations were no ordinary children; they were destined to be so perpetually. In the words of Christopher Fyfe they were ‘Peter Pan children’ with no possibility of development or maturation. Native populations were seen as unfit to be political actors. Such a perception was fully exploited and realised in practice by the National Socialists. Via moral debasement of non-German nationalities where “cheap individual pleasure [was] substituted for the desire for collective feelings and ideals based upon a high morality” (Lemkin 2002:35), not only was the ability to act in a genuinely political manner proscribed, but the desire to do so was now also severely limited. The race principle of the imperialist age did therefore prepare the human mentality for the horror of genocide, but cannot be seen as a direct cause.

‘Linkage’ is the terminology used by Mamdani. In his influential body of work, he identifies a link that connects the 1904 massacre of the Herero and the Nazi Holocaust to the Rwandan genocide. “That link”, he argues, “is race branding, whereby it became possible not only to set a group apart as an enemy, but also to exterminate it with an easy conscience” (Mamdani 2002:13). In an Arendtian manner Mamdani seeks to show “how the unthinkable becomes thinkable” (Mamdani 2002:17) – how the Rwandan majority (the Hutus) could be convinced to kill or at least acquiesce to the killing of the Tutsi minority. As he understands it, the ‘great crime’ of colonialism was to politicise indigeneity – to see race as politically relevant and constitutive of political identity. He argues “If the law recognises you as member of an ethnicity [or race], and state institutions treat you as member of that ethnicity [or race], then you become an ethnic [or racial] being legally” (Mamdani 2001:663). Since inclusion or

198 Herbst notes that “perhaps Mamdani’s most interesting contribution is the manner in which he is able to tell a coherent story of race formation, starting in the colonial period and continuing through independent Rwanda” (Herbst 2001:124).

199 The parallels between Mamdani’s argument and Arendt’s critique of ‘biologizing’ politics are clear.
exclusion from rights is based on legally defined and inscribed ethnicity or race, both must of necessity be understood as political rather than cultural or biological identities. Whilst ethnicity as a political identity marks an internal difference, race signifies an external difference. In this way genocide – which “questions the very legitimacy of a presence as alien” and “attempts to obliterate the other physically and totally” (Mamdani 2002:14 and 232) – was made possible.

Mamdani asserts that the colonial state used both race and ethnicity discourse to divide and rule. In this way they ‘naturalised’ as politically distinct the coloniser and the colonised, but a diametric opposition was also established (and enforced by the state) between two types of colonised – those who were supposedly indigenous and those who were not. The Tutsi were classified non-indigenous ‘aliens’, seen, as per the Hamitic hypothesis as a ‘civilising force’ and thus superior to the ‘indigenous’ Bantu Hutu. They were therefore treated preferentially, granted limited rights as a ‘subject race’, “virtual citizens, deprived of rights of citizenship, yet considered to have the potential of becoming full citizens” (Mamdani 2002:27). Hutus as natives had to live according to custom – governed through customary law which “did not circumscribe power [but]...enabled power” thereby making rule of law impossible (Mamdani 2001:654). With the demise of colonialism, positioning in the hierarchy reversed but the paradigm parameters remained the same. In the post-colonial state indigeneity became a prerequisite for rights and thus Hutus rose to power seeing Rwanda as a state exclusively for the Hutu nation. Tutsi populations were expelled in periodic waves and created diaspora populations in neighbouring countries in the region. These diaspora mobilised and wanted to return when they were forced to acknowledge that as a direct result of colonial politics, in post-colonial Africa “one’s political home was equated with an ancestral home, and an ancestral home with the pre-colonial home” (Mamdani 2002:156). In short, the reason violence continued in the post-colonial state, Mamdani explains, is inextricably linked with the failure of Rwandan nationalists to transcend the colonially devised and enforced indigenous/alien divide – Hutu and Tutsi remained ‘crystallised’ as binary political identities. It also had much to do with the legacy of colonial administration and bureaucracy.

Lemkin explains the techniques of genocide represent a “concentrated and coordinated attack upon all elements of nationhood” (Lemkin 2002:29 emphasis added). Consequently genocide

---

200 The identities ‘Tutsi’ and ‘Hutu’ were politically enforced through state issued identity cards (Mamdani 2002:229).
is carried out in a variety of fields – including in what he calls the political. His use of the term differs significantly from the manner in which Arendt understands it since he equates administration, by which he means command (the anti-thesis of genuine political action), with political rule. Reich Commissioners on the ground, who, like Arendt’s imperial bureaucrats, felt they belonged to a ‘higher’ civilisation, imposed oppressive measures in all areas of life and remained unchecked within the occupied territories. The reporting line went directly from the Commissioners and governors to Hitler himself. It is this lack of restraint and ineffective accountability to the oppressed which runs like a red thread from the imperialist experience to genocidal massacre. Rule by decree without any institutional constraint was symptomatic of imperialist rule, which is not to say a judicial system did not exist in countries under imperialist rule, but that such a system could not act as a check or restraint on the bureaucratic administration. For example, as noted by Carthill, “there was no trial by jury in India and the judges were all paid servants of the Crown, many of them removable at pleasure” (cited OT:280 FN). The judicial language was that of the imperialist nation which prevented the majority from being able to access the legal system, but further, since the judiciary were not independent of the state any ruling simply augmented the position of the bureaucrat anyway. Similarly, under Nazi occupation local law and local courts were abolished and German law and courts imposed which, like the Commissioners and governors, reported directly to the Führer and were therefore mutually reinforcing.

Mamdani has written extensively on the administrative legacy of colonialism and its contribution to postcolonial dilemmas. Central to his thesis is the notion that in order to effectively maintain their control the colonising power divided the indigenous population horizontally into different ethnic groups, each of which was then assigned their own native authority that imposed its own customary law. The colonial state was therefore best seen as an ethnic federation under central, colonial, supervision. “European rule in Africa”, Mamdani argues, “came to be defined by a single-minded and overriding emphasis on the customary” – an “effective administrative strategy” the point of which was to create a dependent yet autonomous system of rule, “one that combined accountability to superiors with a flexible response to the subject population” (Mamdani 1996:50 and 60). As such even where customary law was employed, the colonial administration retained jurisdiction to overturn its rulings and enforce compliance with national rules – customary law was not therefore any

201 In a similar vein, Chanock argues the intervention of customary laws provided a screen that obfuscated the far reaching institutional changes brought about by colonialism (see Kohn & McBride 2011:83).
limit on colonial power. Such ceding of nominal power to ‘native’ institutions was recognised by Arendt, but what is not clear in her account (but in no way runs counter to her argument) is the point recognised by Mamdani that the coloniser sanctified only one among many pre-existing customary authorities as the native authority for that group – it silenced all the rest. In so doing not only did the colonial power effectively ordain and endorse native custom as unchanging, but it also reduced plurality by defining it as singular.

Genuine political action was further conscribed in that each native authority was despotic in nature since the executive, legislative and administrative ‘moments of power’ were fused in the hands of the colonially appointed (or at least approved of) chief. As recognised in Origins, British imperialism exemplified indirect rule through traditional authority, but even they ensured that the agent of tradition be not a hereditary but a colonial appointment: “once the colonial order stabilised, even the position of pre-colonial kings and native aristocrats was made subject to appointment and dismissal” (Mamdani 1996:55). Corporal punishment was common; indeed Mamdani argues “the very definition of a customary authority was an authority that had the customary right to use force to coerce subjects to follow custom” (Mamdani 2001:656). Such an inheritance, he goes on to note, significantly contributes to many postcolonial dilemmas – including genocide. In his case study of Rwanda Mamdani asserts that the colonial legacy was best reproduced in post-colonial state institutions – particularly in the reorganisation of the local state (Mamdani 2002:142-3). The new post-colonial state officials were administratively appointed from above and shared rights and privileges comparable to their colonial predecessors. Salvaging from the African tradition “a widespread and time-honoured practice...of a decentralised exercise of power” (Mamdani 1996:48), the colonial state had used its coercive powers to back the ‘chiefs’ which meant these leaders no longer had any need to build consensus or respect shared norms. This subsequently laid the foundations for a ‘decentralised despotism’ fully utilised in the postcolonial state. Coercive practices seen under colonialism were also reproduced and built upon with the ultimate result that the administrative machinery of the local state became “key to organising the series of massacres that constituted the genocide of 1994” (Mamdani 2002:144).

Since customary power had been employed throughout the colonial and postcolonial periods to enforce obligations on entire communities it was far from surprising, argues Mamdani, “that the génocidaire tendency decided on ‘customary’ power as the agency most suited to cleanse
the community of threatening alien influences”, not least because customary obligation was supposed to distinguish the indigenous from the non-indigenous (Mamdani 2002:194). It also appealed to the fundamental survival of the poor. Ethnic citizenship was a result of membership within the Native Authority and was the source of mainly social and economic rights (granted to groups not individuals) – key among them, the right to use land as a source of livelihood. Being defined as an indigenous citizen granted ‘customary’ access to land non-indigenous populations were denied or charged for. In using customary power to ‘cleanse’ the community of Tutsi, the Hutu were reminded their survival depended on being identified as a member of the indigenous population. The enemy was defined in the context of a war situation – a threat to the survival of the current way of life – which provided a coherence that would otherwise have been lacking.\(^{202}\) It encouraged the full mobilisation of the entire Hutu population – “if you stayed at home” explained a Hutu resident of Kigali “you risked being labelled an accomplice [of the Tutsi]” (cited Mamdani 2002:195).\(^{203}\) However the appeal to custom and thus the colonial legacy is not sufficient to explain mass involvement in the genocide. Instead Mamdani emphasises what he calls the political aspect. Drawing on the philosophy of Hegel he writes:

> When the life in question is that of groups, involving large numbers, the decision is inevitably political. Though it may be taken under the pressure of necessity (economy) or the force of habit (culture), we need to highlight the decision as conscious, as the result of a deliberation...Though we need to take into account circumstances that constrain or facilitate – that is, necessity – we must resist the temptation to present necessity as choice and thereby strip human action of both the dimension of possibility [Arendt’s natality] and that of responsibility (2002:196-7 emphases added).

In talking of the group Mamdani alludes to the plurality necessary for the existence of politics as Arendt understands it, but the implication that each Hutu was acting politically when they joined the genocide requires examination. For Arendt genuine political action at the individual level is an exhibition of originality, showing distinction from all others through unique deeds (HC:41). It requires a public space in which equals come together to speak and act. Understood in this manner the notion that each of those who participated in the Rwandan genocide took a conscious decision to join the génocidaires – a genuinely political action – seems untenable. It seems more persuasive that most participants were simply ‘behaving’.

\(^{202}\) This is clearly an example of Foucauldian biopolitics in practice.

\(^{203}\) A similar sentiment was expressed by George W. Bush when he declared 'war on terror' after the 9/11 bombings. In an address to a joint session of Congress on September 20\(^{th}\) 2001 he said, "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists." Available at [http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html](http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html)/ Accessed 20\(^{th}\) February 2013.
In ‘The Power of Local Ties: Popular Participation in the Rwandan Genocide’, Lee Ann Fujii utilises Granovetter’s concept of ‘social embeddedness’ to argue that social ties and immediate social context offer the most plausible explanation for mass participation in the genocide. As recognised by Arendt, members of any group or society are expected to conform to various rules which tend to ‘normalise’ them “to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement” (HC:40). The fieldwork Fujii conducted in Rwanda reflects some of these thoughts. She identified that for certain personality types interaction with specific groups ‘shifts’ judgements. One’s view of the situation becomes aligned with that of the group and group allegiance can pull one along by erasing doubts and hesitations (Fujii 2008:584). This is not to say that these individuals -‘Joiners’ to use Fujii’s term - were simply unwitting followers, they also helped create the ties that bound the group. As individuals ‘Joiners’ felt powerless but by “looking to the group they could shift the locus of agency away from themselves as individuals” (Fujii 2008:585), the individual was therefore no longer seen as the operative agent. Group ties were seen as empowering – “it was through ties that Joiners knew how to think and thus how to act” (Fujii 2008:596), or more accurately in Arendtian terms, how to behave. In these circumstances genuine thought and action is challenging. This is not to deny that as human beings the Hutus had the innate ability to begin something new, but to argue the conditions under which they were living made exercising this faculty very difficult. Nor is it to absolve them of responsibility. Arendt clearly argues any member of a political organisation who appears in a court of justice using the defence “he was a mere cog who acted only on superior orders” is judged according to what he did. Indeed she notes that “it is the grandeur of court proceedings that even a cog can become a person again” (RJ:148). Nevertheless, in the context of this chapter the significant aspect of Mamdani’s theory on the Rwandan genocide is that mass participation can in part be explained with reference to economic and cultural necessities, but that crucially, the influence of the colonial period cannot be overlooked.

The parallels between Arendt’s devices of imperialist rule and the techniques of genocide are clear, and the influence of both race and administrative bureaucracy are easily identifiable in

---

204 He argues most behaviour is embedded in networks of interpersonal relations. Social relations are seen to have an independent effect on actors, one that is neither ‘merely frictional’ nor overly deterministic (Fujii 2008:578).

205 Joiners are to be contrasted to Resisters. For the latter, group ties exerted no influence – these people never looked to the group to determine how to think or act; they also did not go along with group activities they knew to be wrong (Fujii 2008:587).

206 Mamdani urges us to put the truth of the genocide into historical context and highlights seven consequences this would entail including seeing the genocide as one outcome of defeat in the civil war, i.e. as political violence – an outcome of a power struggle between Hutu and Tutsi elites (see Mamdani 2002:268-30).
both instances. This suggests imperialist thought paradigms did not die out with
decolonisation. The legacy of imperialism is not limited to the atrocity of genocide however; it
is felt more widely within contemporary international spheres. Some of the key insights Arendt
drew from the age of imperialism will now be applied to the topic of globalisation.

Arendt’s Influence on Thinking about Globalisation

“If the new imperialism inaugurated a distinct era of global politics and global rivalry, when
every nation saw its economic livelihood intimately connected to the expansion of political
power, it is an era to which our politics are still held captive, with all its calamitous
consequences” (Mantena 2010:111).

Whilst globalisation is a vast topic which has generated significant literature, comparatively
little has been written specifically on Arendt’s contribution to the scholarship. This is in part
due to the still limited engagement with the international application of her thought, and in
part due to the nebulous nature of globalisation itself – “a term whose meaning is not clear
and over which substantial disagreement exists among those who use it” (Cooper 2005:96).
There are some recent exceptions to this which highlight features within Arendt’s work
which are salient to the effects of globalisation, many couched in terms of cosmopolitanism,
but the explicit link between her work on imperialism and the contemporary experience is still
under-examined. In what follows, after defining the relevant terms, a brief engagement with
the salient literature on Arendt is undertaken and the question of how we may use her work to
think past the polemics of the debate surrounding globalisation is addressed. The chapter
concludes with a reading of the ‘Occupy’ movement as a contemporary example of the
alternative ‘elementary republic’ system Arendt championed.

Globalisation and Neo-liberalism Defined

Any attempt to define globalisation will meet with opposition, and theorising around the
subject often degenerates into polemics that are either ‘pro’ or ‘con’ the phenomena defined
in one way or another. For example, critics such as Tony Schirato and Jenn Webb view

For example: Lang & Williams (2005); Axthmann (2006); Rensmann (2006); Benhabib (2006); Young-Bruehl (2006);
Fraser (2008); and Hayden (2009).

It should be noted that in Political Evil in a Global Age: Hannah Arendt and Political Theory, Hayden highlights the
role of imperialism in creating conditions of superfluousness in the international and global realms.

176
globalisation as a “discursive regime, a kind of machine that eats up anyone and anything in its path” (cited el-Ojeili & Hayden 2006: 12-13), whereas John Lechte “gestures to the connectedness implied by Marshall McLuhan’s 1962 phrase ‘the global village’, according to which globalization is to be viewed as an emerging global consciousness” (el-Ojeili & Hayden 2006: 13). From an Arendtian perspective however, neither side of the debate pays sufficient attention to the novelty of globalisation (particularly neoliberal globalisation) and to what is ultimately at stake for the political. This will be the focus below and thus it is suffice to argue that many different topics are included under the rubric of globalisation (including global governance, global citizenship, the human rights paradigm, migration and the creation of diasporas), but fundamentally it is a process of widening and deepening integration, interdependence and reciprocity between territorially dispersed individuals, groups, states and localities.209

The process of globalisation is multidirectional and does not simply refer to the spread of multinational corporations (although this is the focus for many). As noted by Benhabib, there is also the phenomenon of ‘reverse globalisation’ through which the peoples of the poorer world regions ‘flock’ to global cities such as London and Paris (Benhabib 2006b:51). With a prescience which Roland Axtmann remarks upon (2006: 103), as early as the 1950s Arendt recognised such processes by which “men now live in an earth-wide continuous whole” (HC:250), and she describes international developments with a decidedly contemporary terminology:

For the first time in history all peoples on earth have a common present: no event of any importance can remain a marginal accident in the history of any other. Every country has become the almost immediate neighbour of every other country, and every man feels the shock of events which take place at the other side of the globe (MDT:83).210

Nancy Fraser notes that it is a measure of Arendt’s ongoing relevance that many thoughtful observers, either wittingly or unwittingly, invoke Arendtian motifs “as they seek to locate our twenty-first-century present in the space between past and future” (Fraser 2008: 134), with those such as Habermas, Held and Benhabib “deriving hope from the post-Arendtian strands of cosmopolitanism, pluralism, and postwestphalianism” (Fraser 2008: 134). Such theorists

209 See for example Bauman (1998); Held & McGrew (1999); and Ritzer (2007).
210 Typified for example by the media coverage of atrocities and human rights abuses which some believe effect international policy – “Television has become part of the event it covers,” warns Boutros Boutros-Ghali, UN Secretary General, “It has changed the way the world reacts to crises” (Gowing 1994).
note for example the emergence of an international human rights regime and the establishment of international institutions. Many however see globalisation as primarily an economic phenomenon.

Whilst contested and taken to mean a myriad of different things, fundamentally “for friend and foe alike, the ideological framework of globalisation is liberalism” (Cooper 2005:96), or, perhaps more accurately, neoliberalism. Neoliberalism implies a reduction in regulatory frameworks and the adoption of national policies which foster free trade, privatisation/deregulation, and enhancing the role of the private sector in modern society.

It is widely acknowledged that with the demise of the Soviet Union neoliberalism, which encompasses many features of globalisation, has become the contemporary dominant ideology, and we have witnessed an increase in trade and financial flows across borders and greater cultural interdependence between states.

From the necessarily brief definition of terms outlined above, several key themes are apparent whose danger to the political Arendt addressed in her work pertaining to imperialism. In what follows a thematic examination of three will be undertaken: the infiltration of economics into the sphere of the political; superflousness; and ideological thinking.

The Infiltration of Economics into the Sphere of the Political – The Rise of the Social

The guiding principle of neoliberal globalisation is the integration of national economies on the basis of ‘laws’ of the market i.e. free competition and free exercise of supply and demand. Indeed since the 1970s, the restrictions on capital have been progressively lifted and institutional arrangements have been transformed (Brie 2009:20). Individuals are the operative actors and of particular import but often overlooked, state representatives are reduced to the status of administrators or managers of public affairs whose ultimate aim is to boost competitiveness and efficiency – policies which are likely to be destructive of the political as Arendt understands it. As examined above, the introduction of economic principles into the public realm was first seen under imperialism and it was in the imperialist era that, according to Arendt:

\[211\] As they are for cosmopolitan norms of justice – “whatever the conditions of their legal origination, [they] accrue to individuals as moral and legal persons in a worldwide civil society” (Benhabib 2006a:16).
Businessmen became politicians and were acclaimed as statesmen, while statesmen were taken seriously only if they talked the language of successful businessmen and ‘thought in continents,’ these private practices and devices were gradually transformed into rules and principles for the conduct of public affairs (OT:185-6).

She goes on to note that the process of revaluation (i.e. the introduction of economic principles into the public realm), which began at the end of the nineteenth century was affected across the globe via the policy of ‘expansion for expansion’s sake’. In subsequent years, and right up to the 1950s when Arendt was writing, she saw the process spread slowly from the realm of foreign affairs into domestic politics so “the nations concerned were hardly aware that the recklessness that had prevailed in private life, and against which the public body always had to defend itself and its individual citizens, was about to be elevated to the one publically honored political principle” (OT:186). The neoliberal laissez-faire state, employing its monopoly of the means of violence to enforce strong individual property rights and contracts without being subject to any institutional limitation, is clearly akin to the bourgeoisie demands of the late nineteenth century and represents a realisation of their ultimate aim. Indeed, the neoliberal interpretation of freedom in purely negative or economic terms necessitates that in order to secure such freedom both politics and law must be subordinated to the market. Simon Tormey notes, “in the neoliberal perspective, the function of the state is to monitor, protect, support and encourage the opening of markets to global exchange and the movement of capital, without ‘interfering’ with capital itself” (cited Hayden 2009:105-6). Quite clearly then, the state has become an agent of society and the political is largely moribund. Paraphrasing Hans-Peter Martin and Harald Schumann “the state and politics are visibly in retreat...economics is devouring politics” (cited el-Ojeili & Hayden 2006:97) – neoliberalism has realised the temptation incited by imperialism to escape the constraints of consent and to render power unaccountable (Benhabib 2003:79).

That being so, according to Patrick Hayden, the corruption of the political realm has been less conspicuous than may have been envisaged because “the imperative of capital is to accumulate more capital, generating an interminable process which conveys a sense of permanence nearly equal to that provided by the ‘stable structure’ of a commonly shared world” (Hayden 2009:102). The major distinction between the genuinely common world and the accumulation of capital is that this capital remains inherently private – possessed solely by

---

212 David Harvey points out, although presented as the unfolding of the logical necessity of an inevitable process, neoliberal economic globalisation would not have been possible without undemocratic and unaccountable forms of coercive state intervention (Harvey cited Hayden 2009:114).
its owner. It is such a development, Arendt argues, that completed “the substitution of private preoccupations for public concerns, and the valorisation of the social at the expense of the political” (Hayden 2009:102). Moreover, it is interesting to note that scholars such as Michael Brie assert we are actually experiencing a new ‘overaccumulation crisis’. He argues that as a result of the “institutional revolution of neoliberalism (established in the US empire),” capital valorisation has grown to an extent never seen before (Brie 2009:20).^{213} Only a part of capital can now be invested productively – a particular problem for the East Asian ‘tigers’ – whilst conversely, significant finance and ‘debt bubbles’ have built up through the indebtedness of developing countries. This has created development disparities on a scale not seen since 1928 (Brie 2009:20), but more, the parallels between these circumstances and conditions of superfluous capital which precipitated overseas imperial expansion are clear. Whilst “valorisation interests and developmental necessities are fundamentally opposed” (Brie 2009:20), it is nonetheless true, as Hayden notes, that the ultimate result of neoliberalism has been the effacement of the political through the global spread of exclusively social interests.

Just as the cause of imperialism (economics) is discernible in neoliberal globalisation, so too is one of the devices it employed. As highlighted by Benhabib, the rule of law has now been transformed to facilitate “‘fast-track legislation,’ pushed by national legislators without adequate debate and deliberation” (Benhabib 2006c:176). Citing William Scheuerman’s argument from *Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time*, she notes that contemporary capitalism, exemplified in neoliberal globalisation, is a novel development in which “high speed social action ‘compresses’ distance”; the separation between domestic and foreign concerns has been eroded, and with it “basic standards of legality in the domestic sphere as well” (Benhabib 2006c:176). She quite rightly concludes therefore, that administrative discretion has come to replace general legislation. Arendt would concur with the designation of the contemporary system as ‘relatively novel’, but moreover, these insights also demonstrate that the boomerang effect, which she first identified in the era of imperialism, is clearly operative today. Furthermore, rule by ‘administrative discretion’ without ‘adequate debate and deliberation’ bears a striking similarity to the rule by administrative decree seen under imperialism. Further parallels between the imperial legacy and modern neoliberal globalisation can be seen in the way in which individuals are treated as superfluous.

---

{213} See Panitch & Gindin (2008:17-47) for further information.
Superfluousness

“Globalisation certainly distributes some beneficial features of advanced technology...But it also implicates the entire world in a mentality that – with an Eichmann-like indifference to life and death – identifies people as superfluous and leads to the imperialist techniques of ghettoization and massacre Arendt portrays” (Young-Bruehl 2006:76).

“It is...politically imperative to diagnose the worst offences of global capitalism as being none other than making numerous human beings superfluous” (Hayden 2009:39).

The Arendtian notion of the social is partly connected to, and illuminated by, the situation in Europe in the aftermath of the First World War. The emergence of a ‘mass’ society of apathetic, and essentially superfluous individuals, “indifferent to their rights and civic responsibilities”, led to a generalised lack of interest in public affairs, solidarity and responsibility for the body politic (Hayden 2009:112). With neoliberal globalisation the situation has only been exacerbated. Quoting Manuel Castells, Hayden notes the emergence of an ‘underclass’ of “millions of homeless, incarcerated, prostituted, criminalised, brutalised, stigmatised, sick and illiterate persons’, across every country, who are excluded from the benefits of globalisation and marginalised in terms of political participation and social belonging” (cited Hayden 2009:40). In Bauman’s pithy phrase, the era of neoliberal globalisation necessarily produces ‘human waste’ (cited Hayden 2009:41).

Such superfluousness can be seen as a legacy of the late nineteenth century bourgeois-dominated class society from whose breakdown masses of disenfranchised individuals emerged (as examined above). Young-Bruehl explicitly draws such a link and offers the example of the ‘crucial’ role played by movements in population. In the late nineteenth century under imperialism, Europe’s ‘surplus populations’ were shipped off to ‘dark’ continents, and today under conditions of neoliberal globalisation “while middle managers and technicians are being exported to the developing world from developed nations, war refugees and economic immigrants are coming into the developed nations by the millions” (Young-Bruehl 2006:75).214 The superfluous are “victims without use or function”, they do not have the agency to act or make decisions but are simply “living symbols of what happened to them” (OT:247). They are thus are excluded from the realm of the political but moreover, any system which facilitates the creation of superfluousness cannot foster genuine political action – something

214 See also Brie (2009:21) for his discussion of the reproduction and immigration crises precipitated by neoliberal finance market capitalism.
not sufficiently recognised in the literature on the subject but one which Arendt’s work on imperialism draws attention to. It is also in her work on imperialism that the danger to the political of ideologies is examined, the final theme referenced in this analysis of neoliberal globalisation.

Neoliberal Globalisation as an Ideology

“In the age of globality we witness the formation of the One World, a process of unification which, at the same time, brings with it the destruction – or, at least, the transformation – of ‘local’ communities as well as the potential for global destruction and, concomitantly, a ‘negative solidarity’ among humanity based on a fear of such global destruction” (Axtmann 2006:103).

As a paradigm, neoliberalism purports to be “the single true interpretation of human and social reality, the principles of which possess a timeless validity inaccessible to alternative traditions of thought” (Hayden 2009:108). It offers an “all-encompassing system of control whose expansive logic would drive out all possible alternatives” (Fraser 2008:139) and is therefore an ideology. In her essay ‘Threats to Humanity’, Fraser draws attention to the work of John Gray who posits “human spontaneity and plurality are currently endangered by a totalising project that is every bit as arrogant and freedom-threatening as communism was: the project of imposing a single ‘free-market society’ everywhere” (Fraser 2008:138). Gray goes on to note that contrary to the argument that the ‘free market’ is ‘natural’, such a (neoliberal) society can only arise through social engineering which presupposes at least some level of violence. Similarly, Brie argues the dangerous effects of neoliberal finance market capitalism215 create such great economic, social, cultural and political tensions in and between states and groups of states, that violence necessarily increases (Brie 2009:22).

Whilst Fraser notes that the source of the threat implicit in neoliberalism is more difficult to discern than in the cases analysed by Arendt, it is clear that as a totalising ideology grounded in the expansion of private interests and predicated on the use of violence, neoliberalism is destructive of the genuinely political as Arendt understands it. More specifically, some of the particular tenets of neoliberalism attack the very basis of political life. For example, according to Milton Friedman’s formulation, human beings are subjects of desires which are administered by calculated reason. The market mechanism is not only external but functions

215 Brie identifies five crises of neoliberal finance market capitalism: the overaccumulation crisis; the reproduction crisis; the immigration crisis; the democracy crisis and the security crisis (Brie 2009:15-32).
so that economic calculation becomes the defining and explanatory principle for all human phenomena. By making rationally self-interested consciousness the key motivator for all social activity, humanity is homogenised (Hayden 2009:109). Not only are diversity and plurality therefore eliminated, fundamentally impoverishing the world-in-common and thus the political, but under this ‘imperialism of economics’ (Tullock) all political behaviour is reduced to rational economic self-interest so “the political itself, as a mode of action possessing its own specific meaning and autonomy, has been effaced” (Hayden 2009:110). Meaningful political life is thus threatened with annihilation.216

Using Arendt’s argument that “the end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective” (HC:58), Hayden concludes the neoliberal impulse to depoliticise the public realm is an evil of the global age. He argues that as an ideology which seeks to liberate the ‘laws’ of free-market capitalism from the constraints of diverse political opinions and action, it desiccates the space needed by genuine political freedom (EU:344). But by understanding the legacy of imperialism in the rise of neoliberal globalisation, is it possible to militate against this evil? If we accept with Arendt that imperialism was in part a result of the decline of the nation-state and the erosion of genuine political action, does the escalation of ‘alter’ global movements represent the recovery of a public realm? Hayden notes that even the rise of a diverse and vigorous alternative globalisation movement may not protect Arendt’s vision of the genuinely political since it is “underpinned by the particular concepts, values and philosophies associated with (neo)liberalism’s ascendance, and concomitant depoliticization of the public realm” (Hayden 2009:120),217 but this is perhaps an ‘over-systematic’ and ‘over-totalised’ analysis (Fraser).

Following Fraser it is perhaps wise to adopt a ‘third’ approach – one inspired by Arendt – which would “alert us to potential dangers lurking in even apparently favourable social

---

216 A charge, which valid, would be similarly destructive of the genuinely political, is levelled by Honig against Benhabib’s Arendt-inspired understanding of cosmopolitanism. Honig argues that in Benhabib’s model any new claims for rights are assessed via a “subsumptive logic...not in terms of the new world they may bring into being but rather in terms of their appositeness to moulds and models already in place” (Honig 2006:110). Benhabib refutes this accusation in her ‘Reply to Commentators’ and subsequently clarifies her explanation to emphasise that within her cosmopolitan paradigm “there really is no...‘original’ to which all subsequent forms must conform but, rather, there are historically encrusted practices of interpretation as well as action that are always open to future modifications” (Benhabib 2006c:159). That she devotes several pages to this point is indicative of the seriousness of the charge – particularly when assessed against the work of Arendt.

217 Similarly, Haiven notes neoliberalism would not have persisted in the face of multiple crises had it not been for the fact that we are all perpetuators and beneficiaries of capitalism, “even those fighting against the system tooth and nail – we all consume, we all work, many of us employ or manage, we all participate in hierarchies of race, class, gender and privilege. No one is a pure victim in this economic system, though almost everyone is ultimately a loser” (cited Vrasti 2012:122).
tendencies...[and] seek to ascertain the relative weight of positive and negative crystals within them” (Fraser 2008:140). Such an approach would not simply take neoliberal globalisation in isolation, but would seek to uncover the dynamics of mutual interaction of myriad formations including “apparently emancipatory transnational movements, such as...the anti-neoliberal globalisation movements” (Fraser 2008:140). The goal of such an approach would be to discern the amalgam of ‘pro’ and ‘anti’ political crystals and hence to “encourage us to guard against the first and to foster the second” (ibid.). The spontaneous rise of the ‘Occupy’ movements in 2011 can perhaps be read as contemporary examples of the ‘elementary republics’ of which Arendt was such a keen advocate and they are examined below in an attempt to follow a ‘third’ way in a manner akin to that expounded by Fraser.

The Occupy Movement

On Occupy: “In the last months there have been, time and again, mass demonstrations on the street, in the square, and though these are very often motivated by different political purposes, something similar happens: bodies congregate, they move and speak together, and they lay claim to a certain space as public space” (Butler 2011).

“The councils say: We want to participate, we want to debate, we want to make our voices heard in public, and we want to have a possibility to determine the political course of our country” (CR:232).

The Occupy movement is an international phenomenon which rose up in response to widely perceived social and economic inequality, although local groups had different particular foci. The first protests to receive significant media coverage were in the USA, starting in Zuccotti Park in September 2011, but by early October the movement had spread to more than 90 cities in over 80 countries. Whilst the Occupy ‘philosophy’ still exists today, the number of specific protests occurring has much diminished from its heyday in 2011/12, and the subsequent methodological discussion pertains particularly to this period. The strategy espoused at the inception of the movement was to “generate ‘a general assembly in every backyard’ and on ‘every street corner’; to give birth to new spaces of occupation that open possibilities for new ideas, tactics and forms of resistance; and to allow for occupations that generate possibilities without imposing ideologies” (Harcourt 2012:35). If enacted such a strategy would undoubtedly contain pro-political ‘crystals’ and further, may exemplify a
modern-day version of an elementary republic which Arendt saw as the institutional form most likely to guarantee freedom.

In the preceding chapters it has been made clear that Arendt regards the international system of sovereign nation-state states as being destructive of the genuinely political. Plurality, freedom and action are constrained and the human condition is fundamentally impoverished. Arendt began tentatively examining alternative institutional arrangements in her work on Palestine in the 1940s, and as early as 1943 she suggested only a federated structure based on mixed Jewish-Arab municipal councils would constructively address the conflict and allow political participation. It was in *On Revolution* that Arendt most systematically elaborated an alternative vision which owed much to her interpretation of Jefferson’s model of elementary republics/the ward system. In these wards or councils “every man in the State’ could become ‘an acting member of the Common government, transacting in person a great portion of its rights and duties, subordinate indeed, yet important, and entirely within his competence’” (Jefferson cited OR:253). There are several key factors of elementary republics which in concert promote and protect the political; the Occupy movement will be examined against these factors to assess whether such groups can be so termed.

“The raison d’être of politics is freedom, and its field of experience is action” (BPF:145), it therefore follows that Arendt sees in the councils or elementary republics “spaces of freedom” (OR:264), and that “by constitution and character the councils were action-orientated” (McConkey 1991:18-19). They provide a defined community and protect the ‘space in-between’ individuals – “the ephemeral and intersubjective moment of dialogue [contestation of diverse opinions] between people taking on a public face and presenting themselves in the public role of active and engaged citizens” (Williams 2006:203). Elementary republics thus promote the political by fostering freedom, understood as the ability to start something new (natality), which requires the company of other, equal yet different men and women, and a politically organised world of bounded communities into which each can insert themselves by word and deed (BPF:147). But more, as noted by Lars Rensmann (2012:146), instead of turning to abstract principles, Arendt studied ‘living struggles’, and she drew inspiration for her vision of elementary republics from her interpretation of the history of revolutionary councils. In a manner that could not be predicted, these councils ‘sprang up’ within disparate strata, for example, in the 1956 Hungarian Revolution councils emerged in neighbourhoods, universities, factories; they grew out of fighting together in the street and from talking together in the
coffee houses in Budapest (OR:266-7). What united each group was a desire to form opinion and to act; indeed, for Arendt, the council system “seems to correspond to and to spring from the very experience of political action” (CR:231-2).

Something comparable can be said of the Occupy movement. It is widely acknowledged that at its peak this movement was effective in spontaneously creating spaces in which individuals could come together and act. Groups ‘sprang up’ in numerous cities, encamped in various locations, held rallies, discussions, debates and through popular mobilisation, direct action and civil disobedience sought to challenge global systemic inequality in a rather ad-hoc manner (Buell 2011:1). Fundamentally, Steve Williams sees the camps as being useful in that “different groupings of people who have been disaffected and disenfranchised by this economic system have had a space to come together” (Williams 2011:78); see also Kiersey 2012:159). Judith Butler however goes further. In a speech entitled ‘Bodies in Alliance and the Politics of the Street’ in which she engaged with the work of Arendt, she argues not only have the demonstrations and modes of resistance produced a space of appearance, but more, often the locations in which the camps ‘sprung up’ were politically significant (for instance Wall Street and Tahrir Square). Consequently, “the bodies on the street redeploy the space of appearance in order to contest and negate the existing forms of political legitimacy” (Butler 2011). But for Arendt action without speech is unintelligible (HC:180), thus creating a space which fosters both action and speech is crucial for the authentically political. Arguably this has been achieved with the Occupy movement. In John Buell’s opinion “OWS’ [Occupy Wall Street’s] greatest contribution has been to find a way to forge a public space for a continuing discussion of a set of crucial issues long excluded from our politics” (Buell 2011:2). Similarly, Ali Aslam argues that the Occupy movement has “created dialogic spaces from which to criticise and consider alternatives to the current neoliberal political order” (Aslam 2012:2).

In his chapter ‘Governance and Political Action: Hannah Arendt on Global Political Protest’, when evaluating whether the Seattle World Trade Organisation protests advanced certain ideas and contributed to global governance, Lang highlighted the importance of creating a public space in which not only action but also speech could be conducted. The Occupy movement learnt from the Seattle protests and exploits modern technology to explain their actions in real time:

Twitter, Facebook, text messaging, email, and digital imaging provide the technical basis and open new media spaces for political assembly and contestation. A virtual and
highly mediated ‘space of appearance’...sprang up alongside new forms of immediacy in real places and times of face-to-face encounter; the mic check and drum circles of Zuccotti Park, the dancers, banners and posters of Tahrir Square... (Mitchell 2012:4, emphasis in the original).

Whilst creating and conscribing spaces of appearance in which speech and action are possible, the movement has no designated narrator or narrative thus its purpose, claims and identity are essentially undefined. Whilst many allege this evidences the movement’s ineffectiveness, Aslam rightly argues that in 2011 this was one of its chief strengths: “As those associated with the Occupy Movement continued to document their ordinary experiences around its empty centre, the lack of stable definition and narrative pushed upon viewers the responsibility of investigating the purpose of the protest”, thereby offering the curious the opportunity to join in the action (Aslam 2012:5). It is therefore valid to surmise that the conclusion Lang drew on the Seattle protests is equally applicable to the Occupy movement – the active media presence does indeed demonstrate “the protestors were interested and were successful (in part) in creating a space for speech as well as action” (Lang 2005:195).

In reality the Occupy movement draws its strength and endurance from collectivity; from the experience of diverse groups coming together to occupy and protest. However, as Lang argues, whilst political actions must be seen as interventions into the public space and contributions to the creation and sustenance of that space, for Arendt they must also be seen as moments in which identities are constituted and revealed (Lang 2005:193). Actions initiated under the auspices of Occupy fulfil this criteria since the movement offers ‘ordinary citizens’ the opportunity to “develop a clearer sense of who they are” (Buell 2011:1). In a manner akin to that seen in the 1999 protests in Seattle, although in 2011/12 many individuals and groups congregated with the basic goal of challenging inequality, particular views, opinions and positions varied widely. Despite this, several factors facilitated a solidarity which perplexed many observers. For example, echoing a rationale that resonates with Arendt’s vision of elementary republics, the ethos underpinning the Occupy movement was essentially “that politics involves making ourselves heard, and, especially, taking the time to listen” (Manning 2012:2 emphasis in the original). Out of this interaction grows a ‘world in common’ which ‘conditions’ and thus alters one’s identity.

Occupy also adopted language and practices such as the People’s Mic which facilitated the development of alliances (strengthening the concept of the ‘world in common’) and perhaps even created new identities. After bullhorns were confiscated the practice of collectively
repeating the words of a speaker so that everyone could hear them became commonplace. This, argues John Protevi, led to an “intermodal resonance’ between the identity of the 99%, their democratic practices, and their joyful, shameless disposition” (Protevi 2011a). It is therefore justified to argue that although no single group or permanent identity has coalesced as a result of actions undertaken by the Occupy movement – and indeed this would be contrary to the fundamental plurality on which the movement is based which “embraces a heterogeneity that finds resonances and affinities because of its productive differences and antagonisms, rather than in spite of these differences” (Hughes 2012:131) – this does not mean new identities have not been created.

In addition to the conditioning role, the dialogic ethos adopted by Occupy may also help develop judgement in a political sense. As Arendt understands it, political judgement depends on considering an issue from different viewpoints; by ‘representing’ disparate positions in one’s mind (Kant’s ‘enlarged mentality’). The Occupy movement appears to allow participants in communicative interaction to “meet across distance of time and space”; to “touch, share, overlap their interests” and bring to the relationship “a history and structured positioning that makes them different from one another, with their own shape, trajectory, and configuration of forces” (Young cited Axtmann 2006:115). Interpreted through Young’s Arendt-inspired concept of ‘asymmetrical reciprocity’, which asserts that reciprocity of equal respect and acknowledgement of one another is dependent upon an asymmetry between individuals, the Occupy movement is apparently predicated on each being “open to learning about the other person’s perspective” via a “volley of practical dialogue” (i.e. taking the time to listen and make oneself heard). It therefore appears to recognise that “even though there may be much I do understand about the other person’s perspective through her communication to me” there is also much that I do not understand (ibid.). In accounting for all this the movement is therefore in a position to enrich the political judgement of those involved.

Overall, just as in Seattle, “by remaining fluid and contingent upon the protests in which they engaged, the various groups and individuals who conducted the protests can be seen as truly Arendtian political agents” (Lang 2005:195). In general therefore, just as the elementary republics were fundamentally concerned with human agency and action, so too is the Occupy movement. Mike McConkey (1991:18-19) however discerns two further aspects of Arendt’s vision of the council system that in particular promote the political. The first is their consistently non-partisan nature. As the historical examples Arendt examined show, the
councils were in fact “political organs for people who belonged to no party” (OR:263). The same can be said of the Occupy movement which has rejected conventional political rationality, discourse and strategies; indeed it “defied the party system [and]...refused to align or identify itself along traditional lines” (Harcourt 2012:34).\textsuperscript{218} By the movement’s own declaration it is ‘not politically affiliated’ and is for people of many ‘political persuasions’ (www.occupywallstreet.org). In Bernard Harcourt’s opinion, the movement is therefore ‘politically disobedient’ – it resists the way in which we are currently governed – just as elementary republics do in Arendt’s construal.

McConkey also draws attention to the ‘a-economic’ basis of the councils, or, more accurately, to the fact Arendt believed they should be so. At their most fundamental level, many criticisms of Arendt’s vision of elementary republics concern the limitations that she placed on political action; that politics should be ‘walled off’ from social questions (Sitton 1987:92).\textsuperscript{219} She terms any failure to distinguish clearly between participation in public affairs and administration or management of things in the public interest as a ‘fatal mistake’ (OR:273), which results in the denigration of the political and often leads to violence.\textsuperscript{220} In Arendt’s interpretation, elementary republics should concern themselves with topics which require the formation of opinions rather than those for which the expert should be consulted (i.e. the economy). This could have significant implications for any attempt to assess ‘Occupy’ as a contemporary example of an elementary republic, but this issue is not necessarily intractable.

John Sitton argues that economic issues/resource allocation are in fact “value decisions that can only be solved by consensus of the participants: they are issues of discussion and persuasion” rather than questions with one right answer and thus he concludes, “the economic sphere is [consequently] an arena of political issues in the Arendtian sense” (Sitton 1987:99&98). It is therefore possible to deem the Occupy movement as being concerned with fundamentally political issues. Axtmann also attempts to justify the discussion of economic issues within a public arena in an Arendtian manner. He acknowledges that Arendt is ‘rather prescriptive’ in delineating the type of issues that should be raised in the public realm and those that should not i.e. those pertaining to necessity, “grounded in the urgency of the life

\textsuperscript{218} A similar argument is made by Simon Tormey (2012:134).
\textsuperscript{219} It is beyond the scope of this work to examine in detail the criticisms levelled at Arendt’s vision of elementary republics, suffice to note that one of the other significant challenges it has been subject to – traditional elitism – is discussed and dismissed in the discussion below.
\textsuperscript{220} See One Revolution for Arendt’s discussion of the failure of the French Revolution for this reason.
process itself and the inescapable scarcity of resources” (Axtmann 2006:111). But he goes on to state:

Remaining within an Arendtian framework, we may argue that it must surely be left to public deliberation of a reasoning citizenry whether they come to define a problem of common concern. To relegate the question of poverty, or social issues more generally, from the public arena means in effect the curtailment of the citizenry’s power to determine for themselves what concerns them all (ibid.).

Both arguments have merit, and it is thus perhaps prudent to conclude with Arendt, “It would be tempting to spin out further the potentialities of the councils, but it is certainly wiser to say with Jefferson, ‘Begin them only for a single purpose; they will soon show for what others they are the best instruments” (OR:279).

Underpinning Arendt’s vision of the council system is the basic assumption she ascribes to Jefferson’s ward system, “that no one could be called happy without his share in public happiness, that no one could be called free without his experience in public freedom, and that no one could be called either happy or free without participating, and having a share in public power” (OR:255). Such sentiment is echoed in comments on the Occupy movement, many of which recognise the protestors were happy precisely because they were participating: “one reason why so many people have caught the bug of prefigurative politics is because the protestors are enjoying themselves to the chagrin of the observers, and in so doing, they are reclaiming something that has been…forgotten entirely: living in common” (Vrasti 2012:125).

Following Jefferson, Arendt considers forms of government in which all powers are concentrated “in the hands of the one, the few, the well-born or the many” to be degenerate (OR:254). To guard against this, elementary republics strengthen the power of everyone within the limits of their competence by “breaking up ‘the many’ into assemblies where every one could count and be counted upon” (OR:254). In the contemporary context the concept of ‘the many’ applies just as significantly to mass society as to systems of government. To be considered an elementary republic today, a group must therefore act as an instrument to ‘break up’ or ‘intersperse’ modern mass society at the grass roots by encouraging those who were ‘neutral’ and ‘politically indifferent’ to integrate on the basis of an interest held in common. Since the Occupy movement is characterised by the coming together of a myriad of disenfranchised and disengaged individuals and groups from all sectors of the community, it seems to have made some (if limited) in-roads into breaking up mass society.
Whilst believing the power of each should be strengthened, Arendt recognises that not all will wish to be involved in public affairs and she argues an elite will develop who are not compelled to consider the views of those who have opted to pursue their ‘private happiness’. This has led some interpreters such as Margaret Canovan to charge Arendt with an elitism which arbitrarily precludes many – such as the sick, the elderly, the working, and the inarticulate – from participating whether they want to or not (Canovan 1978:19). Sitton (1987:91-2) however responds that it should be possible to alter the social structure sufficiently to allow all to participate if desired, in which case these criticisms lose much of their force. Indeed contra other forms of elitism, within a system of elementary republics the process is self-selecting – Arendt asserts that each person must be given the opportunity to be a “participator in the government of affairs, not merely at an election one day in the year, but every day” (OR:254). Furthermore, Arendt argues that those who self-exclude, far from being arbitrarily discriminated against, “would in fact give substance and reality to one of the most important negative liberties we have enjoyed since the end of the ancient world, namely, freedom from politics” (OR:280). Axtmann notes that Arendt is silent on what the relationship between the ‘self-chosen’ and the ‘self-excluded’ ought to be, but, it would not be contrary to Arendt’s political theory to assume the relationship maintained, at a minimum, a respect for plurality that would preclude any form of destruction of the ‘excluded’.

The principle of ‘self-choice’ is enshrined within the system of organisation pursued by the Occupy movement, with one protester declaring that “the new power is the power of people who get engaged” (Lawson 2011:81). “Drawing on successful recent mobilisation strategies” argues Harcourt, “the Occupiers cobbled together – in a form of bricolage that resembles their tarped tents and cardboard posters – a unique mix of rhizomic leaderlessness, consensus-based general assemblies, and spatial occupations” (Harcourt 2012:51). Organisation is horizontal rather than hierarchical and Occupy pride itself on being ‘leaderless’ with positions on assemblies and social media fora, for example, rotating regularly between volunteers. In the 2011/12 demonstrations, a wide diversity of individuals were able to contribute, with some joining ‘full time protestors’ at rallies, group discussions and on specific committees (such as the security committee) after spending time elsewhere such as in education or at work. Moreover, the tactic of ‘step up/step back’ actually privileged the most alienated. Those requesting time to speak within fora such as the general assemblies considered whether they

---

221 Some Occupy members suggest rather that the movement is not so much leaderless as ‘leaderful’ i.e. that everyone in the movement is a leader.
might ‘step up’ by recognising their relatively privileged role in society at large and cede the floor, or ‘step back’, to allow someone from a group with traditionally fewer opportunities to have their voice heard instead (The Writers, cited Harcourt 2012:53). Just as Arendt envisaged of elementary republics, Occupy therefore provides public spaces “where the plurality of opinions can express itself and where these opinions are ‘purified’ in debate and discussion without having to be filtered through the medium of ‘representation’” (Axtmann 2006:110).

The movement has resisted making decisions and issuing specific demands which has attracted some criticism. In reality however, as recognised by Greg Mitchell, the refusal to designate leaders and issue policy recommendations is better interpreted as “an effort to prolong this moment of rebirth and renewal of the political” (Mitchell 2012:4). Following Foucault, “It is simply in the struggle itself and through it that positive conditions emerge...[that] in the end possibilities open up” (cited Harcourt 2012:39). That Occupy manage to “dilate the period of what Arendt called ‘natality’” (Mitchell 2012:4) is perhaps one of its greatest achievements and may offer a ‘beacon of light’ in a dark global landscape.

Adopting a ‘third approach’ allows us to identify a range of pro-political crystals within the Occupy movement. Like Arendt’s vision of elementary republics, in the months after its inception the movement seemed to offer space for public deliberation and contestation among diverse, previously excluded populations and thereby enable the creation of a ‘world in common’. According to some the movement ‘actualised an alternative’ to the status quo and for others it managed to alter both political discourse and politics on the ground – “It is telling” notes Harcourt, “that as soon as the alter-G8 invitation went out – ‘IN THE TRADITION OF THE CHICAGO 8. #OCCUPYCHICAGO. MAY 1 – BRING TENT’ – the entire G8 summit meeting was swiftly moved to Camp David” (Harcourt 2012:39). But, following Fraser, Occupy cannot be seen in isolation. Despite its attempts to eschew the system, the movement still operates within a neoliberal paradigm and is thus subject to the associated anti-political ‘crystals’, nor does it offer credible alternatives to the system. Further, since the movement is dominated by a specific set of (neoliberal) norms it “might prove inaccessible for those who are not in possession of the requisite cultural capital” (Gagyi 2012:146). Nonetheless, this is to miss the

---

222 Speakers were also encouraged to consider the WAIT (Why Am I Talking?) principle, which urges speakers to consider how pressing their contribution is to the discussion.
224 See for example Kiersey (2012); and Bailey (2012).
point. As Lang notes, what is lacking today is “free speech and political action” (Lang 2005:196), and reading Occupy as an elementary republic that has reawakened an appetite for debate suggests the movement may offer hope for the future – “a consciously devised new polity...[that] will eventually be able to reintegrate those who in ever increasing numbers are being expelled from humanity and severed from the human condition” (OT:631).

Concluding Comments – Section Three

The brief engagement with the topics of genocide and globalisation undertaken in this section demonstrates that the legacy of the imperialist age is still relevant today. One of the key insights that can be drawn from Arendt’s engagement with colonialism and imperialism is that introducing non-political thought paradigms and motivations into the public realm – whether it be the principle of economic competition or race as a form of identity politics – is to risk both the world we share in common and to simultaneously damage the human condition. Arendt believed the international system of sovereign nation-states was moribund and that an alternative system was possible. She proposed the creation of federated structures comprised of a multitude of discrete elementary republics in which authentic politics was promoted. No idealist, she herself recognised this vision was a long way from realisation. That said, positive signs may be embryonic. Reading contemporary events such as the WTO demonstrations and the Occupy movement in light of Arendtian political criteria confirms that within the realm of human affairs it is still possible to spontaneously begin something new. However, whether these “organs of action” can ever become “organs of order” (OR:263) still remains to be seen.
CONCLUSION

During her lifetime Hannah Arendt witnessed some of the most horrifying and destructive things that men and women can do to each other on a mass scale, but her personal experiences only strengthened her ‘love for the world’. Underpinning her entire body of work was a concern with the human condition and a desire to understand that was always orientated in one way or another by political reality. “The originality of her political thought”, argues Jerome Kohn, “stems from the fact that what was phenomenally revealed to her as new and without precedent actually goes on now, in the ordinary world” (Kohn in EU:xii). The role of the event was therefore crucial for Arendt; indeed, as this thesis has shown, her political theory is actually disclosed through her engagement with specific real-world incidents and experiences.

The basic intent in Chapters I–VI was to demonstrate the contemporary relevance of Arendt’s thought for international political theory, and to highlight how the concept of the political she sketches in The Origins of Totalitarianism can be usefully employed to reinterpret modern-day global realities. Via a textual analysis of three clearly anti-political impulses she identifies in the still-understudied ‘Imperialism’ part of Origins – sovereignty, nationalism and imperialism – this thesis has highlighted several of her key insights and concerns which can actually be discerned in some of the most intractable international situations today. Its aim has not been to ‘find’ in Arendt’s work answers to the crises of our time, but rather to use her perceptions as inspiration to think about them differently. After all, as Kohn notes in his introduction to the collection of Arendt’s essays entitled Responsibility and Judgement, “It is not theoretical solutions she advances but an abundance of incentives to think for oneself” (Kohn in RJ:xii).

In what follows, the main arguments made in Sections One to Three are briefly rehearsed and the significant conclusions emphasised. Commonalities between the themes will then be highlighted and reflected upon to assess how they may enrich international political thinking.

Arendt was concerned with realities, and the central political reality of modernity is the institution of the nation-state. Not surprising then, much of her political thought is derived from her attempt to understand the real world implications of the concepts underpinning this institution – sovereignty and nationalism.

The discussion on the dangers of sovereignty from an Arendtian perspective demonstrated the folly of envisaging and enacting political relationships in conventional manners as either
expression of command and obedience, or in terms of mutual enmity. The engagement with notions of sovereignty which view politics in terms of hierarchy of rule revealed this method of order extends the paternalist relationship operating within the household (oikos) to the public sphere. The modern political realm is thus characterised by relations of sovereign domination secured through violence and compulsion, rather than the condition of ‘no rule’ (isonomy) in which men and women are equal and free to act, discuss and contest, which, for Arendt, is the hallmark of authentic politics. Freedom, as Arendt understood it, is best conceived of as the freedom of equals since it always requires a plurality of others in the same political community to be realised. As such it was shown to be fundamentally incompatible with traditional notions of sovereignty espoused by those such as Bodin, Hobbes and Schmitt which in effect appropriated the philosophical notion of free will. With them “the ideal of freedom ceased to be virtuosity...and became sovereignty, the idea of free will, independent from others and eventually prevailing against them” (BPF:161-2). Equality, plurality and agency are also threatened by the friend-enemy dichotomy of sovereignty which underpins theories of mutual enmity. Via an examination of Schmitt’s work, such theories were shown to presuppose the existence of an existential ‘other’ and give the sovereign the power to determine who is ‘different and alien’. Arendt recognised that this has severe consequences in practice in terms of policy towards immigration, naturalisation and human rights protection which was more fully exploited when the state became subsumed by the nation. More generally, the anti-political traits endemic in sovereignty that Arendt’s work alludes to, can be detected in many current international concerns.

In Chapter II the international human rights regime (IHRR) and atomic weaponry and war were examined through an Arendtian lens which highlighted such anti-political traits. Interpreted thus, as currently instituted one of the most insidious dangers of the IHRR identified was that despite its expressed purpose of securing human rights protection for all, it is predicated on a system of sovereign states. Governments only have human rights obligations towards those to whom they grant citizenship status, and as the discussion on Arendt’s concept of the right to have rights highlighted, there exists no supra-political guarantee for a right to belong to a political community. Using Arendtian terminology, the discussion essentially concluded that the IHRR can threaten human agency in a variety of ways. In exemplifying the total command aspect of sovereignty and representing the ascendance of violence unchecked by power, the existence of atomic weaponry was similarly seen to threaten humanity. Overall, Section One demonstrated that state sovereignty fundamentally damages what it is to be human. This
reinforces Arendt’s recognition that protecting human dignity is a political rather than a moral imperative which must therefore adopt genuinely political methods to achieve its goals – ones which recognise the values of equality, plurality and action (such as through mutual recognition and mutual promising), and reject notions of command and compulsion.

Section Two moved on to consider the anti-political traits Arendt believed inhere in nationalism as a concept. As a totalising ideology, nationalism in all its guises was portrayed as a system of “all-embracing omnipotence” (OT:463) and explanation; an anti-political phenomenon that takes no account of human agency and ignores actual experience. More specifically, in their attempt to address the human need to belong both Western nationalism and tribal nationalism were shown to have the potential to destroy plurality and equality. One of Arendt’s basic concerns pertaining to Western nationalism highlighted was the manner in which its universalist tendencies, derived from the institution of the state, are undermined by particularistic assumptions associated with the concept of a nation. When the state began to identify itself with the nation, she argued, it was compelled to recognise only ‘nationals’ as citizens; the ‘politics of doing’ was eventually replaced with the anti-political notion of a ‘politics of being’. More dangerous however in Arendt’s view is tribal nationalism. As explained in Chapter III, tribal nationalism is seen to raise group particularity to the highest political principle and thus seek to rid society of all particular groups but one. In effect therefore, in this guise, particularist tendencies are subsumed by universalist elements. Arendt dubbed this version of nationalism ‘organic’ in that it rests on an identification of the nation with the family and familial relationships; with ‘kinship’ and ‘blood’. It therefore introduces into the public realm biological concepts and concerns – issues properly understood as ‘private interests’ – which Arendt believed destroys its essential tenets.

Biopolitical concerns underpin much of Arendt’s thought and go to inform her diagnosis of the contemporary crisis of the political. Using Arendtian insights, in the discussion on nationalism and biopolitics undertaken in Chapter IV, ‘biologizing’ politics was critiqued on the grounds that, much like tribal nationalism, it differentiates between individuals on the basis of ‘what’ rather than ‘who’ they are. Biopolitics therefore obliterates individuality by treating each as an interchangeable member of a specific group or population. Moreover, just as with tribal nationalism, ‘society’ or the ‘good’ form of life, is seen to be at risk from all other forms of life and must therefore eliminate all ‘others’ to ensure its survival. This necessarily violent practice was realised under National Socialism, and as the case study of Israeli further demonstrated, it
remains an anti-political practice still visible in the world today. The principal message conveyed in Section Two is that neither nationalism nor biopolitics is able to reconcile the human need to belong with the authentically political.

Neither the racism of modern nationalism nor the thirst for power exhibited by the modern state can be explained, in Arendt’s view, without a comprehensive understanding of the structure of imperialism (Arendt 1946:141). Accepting this proposition, Section Three highlighted some of the key themes of colonialism and imperialism as described in Origins and assessed how a more comprehensive understanding of such leitmotifs can contribute to the engagement with international political phenomena. The fundamental cause of overseas imperialism was shown to be the result of introducing economic principles and motivations such as competition and lack of limits into the political realm. The consequences however obviously undermined the political both overseas and, via the boomerang effect, at home. These political costs were identified in the devices of imperialistic rule: race as a principle of the body politic, which discriminated according to who somebody was rather than what they did; and bureaucracy, understood as the administration of the instruments of violence, as a principle of foreign domination which absolutely divided ruler and subject and thus obliterated any vestige of human dignity. It was continental imperialism, though, which Chapter V proved was most effective in rejecting and attacking domestic institutions and protections.

Understanding the devices of overseas imperialist rule and the appeal to unite those of a common blood made by continental imperialists was seen, in Chapter VI, to facilitate a more nuanced interpretation of modern-day genocide and post-colonial studies. Furthermore, reflecting on Arendt’s insights, the ‘evil’ of neoliberal globalisation was shown to share affinities in both cause and effect with imperialism. The underlying argument of Section Three therefore was that introducing non-or even anti-political thought paradigms and motivations into the public realm – whether it be the principle of economic competition or race as a form of identity politics – is both to risk the common world and to undermine the human condition.

Taken in its entirety, what does all this mean for international political theory? This thesis has sought to demonstrate that endeavouring to gain a more thorough understanding of some of the key political principles Arendt disclosed via her engagement with concepts such as sovereignty, nationalism and imperialism will allow us to more accurately diagnose, and effectively reflect on, political conditions and experiences today. In so doing, several themes have consistently recurred. Arendt’s diagnosis of the ills of sovereignty, nationalism and
imperialism all refer, in one way or another, to her belief that agency – as the capacity to initiate something new in collaboration with plural others – is the very essence of the human condition and the trait underpinning the political realm. Any event, institution, or system of order which fails to protect and promote one’s ability to openly contest opinions and act as an equal with others is therefore a threat to both human dignity and the world we share in common. As Arendt understands it, institutions are important in guaranteeing access to the political world, but the language and systems of order they use and operate by must be compatible with the authentically political. Introducing paternalistic, economic, scientific, or biological thought paradigms and practices into the public political realm is therefore dangerous as the effects of sovereignty, nationalism and imperialism have all proved.

But the thesis has also shown that politics, for Arendt, is about much more than institutions. It occurs between men and women, and between pluralities of communities. The myriad organic groups of committed and engaged individuals who see themselves “not as human beings in general” (OT:383), but as political activists who want to “change society through the actions of citizens rather than governments” (Kaldor cited Isaac 1996:71), should perhaps therefore, on this basis, be encouraged.

Acknowledging these insights may embolden scholars to ask different questions about contemporary events such as the rise of political extremism in Europe, nuclear proliferation and poverty across the globe. Questions that focus on human agency and acknowledge the evil of superfluousness, and which may therefore inspire different patterns of thought and put forward novel responses. Above all, they might remind us that “not a single man but Men inhabit the earth” and encourage us to “cry out to each one of those who is rightly in despair: ‘Do thyself no harm; for we are all here’ (Acts, 16:28)” (OT:631/2).
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Lenin, V. I. (1934). *Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism.* Moscow: Co-operative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR.


Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in International Law (pp. 233-258). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


