P Stones and Provos: 
Group Violence in Northern Ireland and Chicago

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This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of PhD 
at the 
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Although the government of the United States of America was established to protect the rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness among all American citizens, this thesis argues intractable gang violence in inner-city Chicago has persistently denied these rights, in turn undermining fundamental (and foundational) American political values. Thus, gang violence can be argued to represent a threat to both civil order and state legitimacy. Yet, where comparable (and generally lower) levels of community-level violence in Northern Ireland garnered the sustained attention and direct involvement of the United Kingdom's central government, the challenge posed by gang violence has been unappreciated, if not ignored, by the American federal government. In order to mobilise the political commitment and resources needed to find a durable resolution to Chicago's long and often anarchic 'uncivil war', it is first necessary to politicise the problem and its origins. Contributing to this politicisation, this thesis explains why gang violence in Chicago has been unable to capture the political imagination of the American government in a way akin to paramilitary (specifically republican) violence in Northern Ireland. Secondly, it explains how the depoliticisation of gang violence has negatively affected response, encouraging the continued application of inadequate and largely ineffective response strategies. Finally, it makes the case that, while radical, a conditional agreement-centric peace process loosely modelled on that employed in Northern Ireland might offer the most effective strategy for restoring the sense of peace and security to inner-city Chicago lost over half a century ago.
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Introduction

Over the course of the last fifty years, widespread gang violence in Chicago has presented itself as a serious and persistent yet under-appreciated threat to American civil order and the principles of liberal democracy upon which the United States was founded. Since the emergence of the city's 'supergangs' in the 1960s, the scale of gang violence in the city has consistently been comparable with (often surpassing) that experienced in Northern Ireland during the thirty-year period of low-intensity civil conflict known as the Troubles. Yet, where civil disorder and violence in Northern Ireland resulted in a robust and sustained response from the central government of the United Kingdom, the political response to gang violence on the part of the American state at the federal level has remained troublingly muted and inconsistent. It is only in recognising the seriousness of the threat posed by gang violence and its political significance that it becomes possible to mobilise the political resources needed to restore full civil order in Chicago for the first time in generations. The aim of this thesis is three-fold. It sets out to: (1) Help account for the failure of gang violence in the city of Chicago to gain recognition as a political and civil order issue of national significance meriting a serious and sustained federal-level response in a manner similar to central government prioritisation of the Northern Ireland 'crisis' in the United Kingdom; (2) Explain how the failure to recognise the politically-determined roots and political implications of gang violence have facilitated the persistence of ineffective and inadequate responses to the issue; (3) Explore how an approach similar to the Northern Irish peace process, if adapted appropriately offers a radical, yet potentially more effective, means of pursuing a transition from a state ‘uncivil war’ to ‘civil order’ in Chicago.

The most recognisable passage of the foundational document of the United States of America, the Declaration of Independence (1776) reads:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.

Inspired by the the social contract theory of John Locke, the Declaration of Independence establishes that the fundamental purpose of the American government is to secure and ensure the rights of the citizenry defined as life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Though the Declaration speaks of the universal equality of men, it limits direct government responsibility to those who partially transfer their individual sovereign authority to the state in exchange for its protections (citizens).

3 Something that can be argued to be an outgrowth of the ‘social contract’ thinking behind the Declaration and early American republicanism.
The penalty for the failure of the government in its paramount responsibility as set out in the Declaration is severe:

That whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness... But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security.

Thus, where the government has, in the opinion of the citizenry, shirked or failed in its basic responsibilities, it is to be replaced. Where it engages in long-term abuse of its position and refuses to abide by the will of the people, it may be overthrown. However the means of exercising discontentment is indirect, mediated through elected representatives (in keeping with the state's republican nature as established by the Constitution of the United States (1787)). Furthermore, taking into consideration the bipartisan nature of American politics, in practice there only ever been one ready option for the replacement of any given government.

Citizenship, or the right to participate in the American state project, has always been exclusive. Blacks, male and female alike, were also denied citizenship. Basic citizenship was only extended to the black population in the years following the American Civil War with the passage of the Fourteenth Constitutional Amendment in 1867 (voting rights would come later). Prior to emancipation in 1863 the majority of blacks were denied legal personhood by virtue of their status as slaves (with slaves the legal property of their owners). As detailed extensively in chapter 2, it would take another century for African Americans to achieve full legal equality. But just as African Americans were finally able break down many of the legal and political barriers to formal institutional equality during the civil rights movement, the growth of lethal and intractable gang violence came to present a new threat to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness in socio-economically deprived black urban neighbourhoods across Chicago and other major urban centres. While Los Angeles and New York also experienced a considerable growth in gang violence starting in the mid-to-late 1960s, Chicago could be argued to be the first major city hit by this new supercharged wave of community violence. Since the emergence of sustained and intense gang violence in the early 1960s, the American federal government has failed to take the measures needed to protect and uphold the rights inner-city Chicagoans. Most disheartening perhaps, there is a significant portion of the citizenry without any hope that things might change, as faith in the local agencies and officials left with the burden of response has been long lost: “After watching one highly visible police action after another fail, many tenants gave up hope for improvement and believed neither the police nor CHA [Chicago Housing Authority] officials could protect them effectively.”

Threats to liberty and the pursuit of happiness are numerous.\textsuperscript{5} Though one should be cautious about overstating risk, many parents in high-violence neighbourhoods are terrified to allow their children to play outside freely, even in playgrounds and parks, for any time spent outside (particularly during the tense summer months)\textsuperscript{6} increases the likelihood of being caught in a crossfire. For example Leone Sowell, quoted in Leonard S Rubinowitz and James E Rosenbaum's \textit{Crossing the Class and Color Lines} laments, “It was unsafe for [June] to go outside. There were gangs all around the area where we lived. We lived in a bad area. Children were getting shot all around there.” Over the last 15 years, Chicago Public Schools' decision to close dozens of schools (disproportionately located in inner-city communities), resulting in mergers which place students from rival neighbourhoods (and thus rival gangs/factions) within a single school, has generated a tremendous amount of anxiety for both students and parents.\textsuperscript{8} Though many adults raised in these areas have found ways to mitigate risk and retain a sense of normalcy, adults too have expressed concerns about their own safety, especially in the evenings.\textsuperscript{9} Such restrictions on geographic mobility most certainly impede one's basic liberties such as the freedom to associate with others, seek and maintain gainful employment, conduct necessary business and avail of the services made available by the state. They also affect one's ability to pursue even the simplest forms of happiness such as playing a game of pick-up basketball with friends or using the swings at a nearby park.

Additionally, gang violence has under-considered spill-over effects. For example, where parents fear for their own safety after dark, this can create a reluctance to attend the parent involvement and information meetings. These events are generally held in the evenings so teachers do not lose valuable classroom teaching time and in


\textsuperscript{6} The summer months have traditionally featured a spike in gang-related homicides and shootings as school vacation and good weather conspire to bring gang-involved youth from all factions out into the streets, and in conflict with one another. Thus, rather than looking forward to the break from school, many young people fear the end of the school year. (Jane Penley, “Urban Terrorists: Addressing Chicago's Losing Battle with Gang Violence,” \textit{Depaul Law Review} 61 (2012): 1186; Wesley G Skogan, Susan M Hartnett, Natalie Bump and Jill Dubois, \textit{Evaluation of CeaseFire – Chicago} (Washington: National Institute of Justice, 2009), 3-22.) As Chance the Rapper (from the South Side of Chicago) raps on the track “Paranoia”: “It just got warm out/This the shit I've been warned 'bout/I hope that it storm in the morning/I hope that it's pouring out/ I hate crowded beaches/ I hate the sound of fireworks/ And I ponder what's worse/ Between knowing it's over and dying first/ Cause everybody dies in the summer/ Wanna say your goodbyes?/ Tell them while it's spring/ I heard everybody's dyin' in the summer/ So pray to God for a little more spring.”


\textsuperscript{9} David Wilson, \textit{Inventing Black-on-Black Violence: Discourse, Space, And Representation} (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2005), 34.
order to help 'accommodate' working parents, although high rates of unemployment and precarious employment (shift-work; multiple jobs) in low income communities calls this particular rationale into question.\(^\text{10}\) With parent involvement widely recognised as a key factor in a child's educational success, and education the key to socio-economic mobility for economically disadvantaged young people, this example illustrates how pervasively gang violence affects one's right to pursue happiness in ways both direct and indirect.\(^\text{11}\)

What then of the right to life? The American gang landscape is incredibly heterogeneous and while there are affiliations/alliances that appear to have spread nationally (ex. Bloods and Crips), gang violence remains a highly localised phenomenon in terms of intensity, historical development and patterns of ground-level interaction. Thus it can be argued that the level of the individual city remains the most amenable context for understanding this phenomenon, with this thesis focusing specifically on Chicago. Chicago has developed an on-off reputation as the 'murder capital' of the Unites States, albeit always with numerous qualifiers.\(^\text{12}\) Over the last decade, comparisons of city homicide rates and American casualties in the Iraq war prompted the emergence of a new nickname for the city - 'Chiraq'. Still, what is most interesting about the city's gang problem is its historical entrenchment.

With gang violence part of Chicago's urban landscape since at least the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century,\(^\text{13}\) it was also the first American city to experience the rise of the 'supergang'\(^\text{14}\) in the 1960s. As such, Chicago was among the first cities to face serious sustained lethal gang violence.\(^\text{15}\) Although, based on Chicago Police Department (CPD) figures, there were only 763 gang related deaths between 1967 and 1980, the true figure is likely many times higher.\(^\text{16}\) At this time (and beyond), the CPD employed quite probably the strictest definition of 'gang-related' homicide used in the country, counting only those deaths which could be determined to be gang-motivated and which occurred within the context of a collective exchange (ex. gang fight).\(^\text{17}\) Though it still arguably represents a

\(^{10}\) Anthony S Byrk et al, Organizing Schools for Improvement: Lessons from Chicago (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 7-8.


\(^{14}\) Consolidations of small neighbourhood groups into larger, more powerful gang organisations.


\(^{16}\) Ibid , 85.

\(^{17}\) Miller, Crime by Youth Gangs and Groups in the United States, 82-83; Irving A Spergel, Gang Suppression and Intervention: An Assessment (Washington: Office of Juvenile Justice and
significant underestimation of the problem, the Chicago Police Department's most recent Crime Trends Report on gang-related homicide reveals that there were approximately 3,422 gang-motivated homicides in the city of Chicago between 1991 and 2004, accounting for roughly a third of all homicides.

This number – 3,422 – is strikingly close to the total number of deaths suffered as a result of the thirty years of low-intensity civil conflict in Northern Ireland, known more commonly as 'the Troubles' (1968-1998) – 3,635. It is this particular statistic that inspired the work of comparative analysis presented here. Of the three major American cities (New York, Los Angeles and Chicago) most known for their gang problems, Chicago is most comparable in size to Northern Ireland (although there remains a noteworthy population difference between Chicago and Northern Ireland, the former 219% more populous than the latter in 1970 and remaining approximately 149% larger today). Yet, this population difference can by no means adequately explain a 15 year 'peace time' single-source violent death toll approaching that of an


18 To put this in national perspective, the 2010 Small Arms Survey estimates a total of approximately 7,800 gang related deaths nation-wide between 2002 and 2006. (Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Small Arms Survey 2010, 133) Furthermore: “For the same five-year period, the mean gang-related homicide rate was 893.4 per 100,000 gang members [emphasis original]. If all law enforcement agencies employed a motive-based classification model and Maxson and Klein's 'half as great' was equally true for large cities in the United States, a conservative estimate would be in the range of 450 gang-related homicides per 100,000 gang members – consistent with the figures reported by Maxson. Even this homicide rate is alarmingly high, especially when compared to the overall homicide rate in the United States (5.7 per 100,000) and to other countries such as Australia, England and Wales, or even South Africa (1.2, 1.6, and 54.0 per 100,000 respectively).” (Ibid, 134)


20 Though the start and end points of the Troubles remain a point of contention in the literature, this research takes as its starting point 5 October 1968, the day police violence against a civil rights protest in Derry ignited riots in the Bogside. It takes as its end point the signing of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) on 10 April 1998. Although violence was not eradicated entirely with the GFA, it did represent a firm commitment to peace on the part of the Provisional IRA, the paramilitary organization responsible for far-and-away the most Troubles-related deaths. The GFA also illustrated the capacity for long-term meaningful and peaceful co-operation among the main political representatives of both communities. (The Right Honourable Lord Maclean, The Billy Wright Inquiry – Report (London: The Stationary Office, 2010), 54; Simon Prince, Northern Ireland's '68: Civil Rights, Global Revolt and the Origins of the Troubles (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2007); Peter Rose, Making Sense of the Troubles (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 79; Paige Whaley Eager, From Freedom Fighters to Terrorists: Women and Political Violence (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 151.)


internationally-recognised low-intensity civil conflict precipitating an unprecedented 38-year domestic military operation. Troubling and infuriating in equal measure is that in the early 1990s the American federal government remained mute on the gang violence which reached new heights in Chicago\(^\text{23}\) while taking an active role in the Northern Irish peace process at a time when violence levels had stabilised at a small fraction of that seen in Chicago.

This comparative work is particularly interested in the development and evolution of community violence in Chicago and urban Northern Ireland. It focuses on Chicago's African American supergangs and republican paramilitaries violence in Northern Ireland (with a special focus on the Almighty P Stone Nation in Chicago and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland).\(^\text{24}\) Speaking first to the latter group, the Provisional IRA\(^\text{25}\) was the largest separatist republican paramilitary organisation active in the modern Northern Irish conflict, responsible for more conflict-related deaths than any other group (paramilitary or state) over the course of the Troubles.\(^\text{26}\) In addition to being the deadliest participant, the articulacy of its political rhetoric and strength of its communications strategy allowed the Provisional IRA to dominate their loyalist rivals not only militarily but in the propaganda war as well. At the same time, as the dominant non-state player in the conflict, the Provisional IRA's transition to non-violence can be argued to be the most remarkable. If Martin McGuinness and Gerry Adams can move from authorising mortar attacks against 10 Downing Street (the headquarters of the British government) to skateboarding with the Prime Minister's son in the back garden in the space of a decade,\(^\text{27}\) it is certainly within the realm of possibility to hope that Chicago's street gangs might also be able to transform themselves into non-violent organisations.

At the same time, by virtue of their emergence at the same time as the first (and only) major political mobilisation of black Americans, African American street gangs should theoretically have been best placed to establish themselves as a political threat at a time when race and urban issues sat high on the national political agenda. Of these groups it has been the Almighty P Stones Nation that has been the most outwardly political. However it was only when the group flirted with outwardly 'revolutionary' groups such as the Black Panthers or terrorist states such as Libya that the group attracted any concerted political attention. It is true the the Stones remain the only street

\(^{23}\) Except with continued financial investment in largely ineffective anti-gang programmes.


\(^{25}\) Known less formally as the PIRA or Provos.

\(^{26}\) English, *Armed Struggle*, 379

gang organisation to face conviction for domestic terrorism offences, yet these convictions related not to the 'terror' caused by hundreds (if not thousands) of murders and many more assaults, but a bizarre 'rocket-purchasing' plot on behalf of representatives of Colonel Gaddafi's Libyan government in the early 1980s. Perhaps more than any other series of events in the long history of Chicago's uncivil war, this highlights the skewed understanding of 'national security' held by the American government.

**The Landscape of Violence: Chicago's 'Supergangs'**

As is the case elsewhere in the United States, the street gangs of Chicago are comprised largely (but not exclusively) of young men resident in low income/inner-city neighbourhoods. These neighbourhoods also house a disproportionate percentage of the city's racial/ethnic minority population. Reflecting their geo-social environment, Chicago's street gangs tend to be either African American or Latino/Hispanic in composition (with fewer numbers in mixed gangs). Today, the street gang landscape of the city of Chicago is fragmented to the point of appearing almost entirely anarchic, yet nearly all gangs continue to claim some form of affiliation with one or more of the early black or Latino/Hispanic supergang networks that emerged in the late 1950s/early 1960s. The use of the term 'supergangs' distinguishes these groups from the city's earlier white 'ethnic' (Italian, Irish, Polish, Lithuanian, German, other central/eastern European or Jewish) and African American (Clovers, Apaches, etc.) delinquent youth gangs who were minimally involved in illegal activity and violence.

The first of these groups, the Latin Kings (also known as the Almighty Latin King and Queen Nation), was founded in the 1940s as a response by Chicago's Puerto Rican communities to attacks from ethnic gangs keen to show their displeasure with neighbourhood ethnic transition. Though they developed separately from the other supergangs, they would come to be seen as 'one of the group' as a result of the loose

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29 Still, it would be irresponsible to suggest these alliances continue to have much bearing on violence carried out by these groups.
alliances that would develop between the Latin Kings and some African American supergangs. The first African American supergang to emerge was the Vice Lords, first founded in 1958 in North Lawndale on the West Side of the city. They were followed a year later by the Blackstone Rangers (now known as the Blackstone Disciples) in Woodlawn on the South Side. The Gangster Disciples emerged to rival the Stones for South Side dominance in the mid-1960s, eventually growing significantly larger than the elder group, while the Maniac Latin Disciples developed in 1966 on the West Side. Together these five groups would represent the core Chicago supergangs.

By the 1980s, they combined their energies and those of other groups in the 'People' and 'Folks' super-alliances. The 'People Nation' is comprised of the Almighty Latin King and Queen Nation, Vice Lords, Almighty Black P Stone Nation, Four Corner Hustlers, Mickey Cobras and respective affiliates. The 'Folks Nation', on the other hand, consists of the Gangster Disciples (currently the largest gang constellation in the City), Black Disciples, La Raza Nation, Maniac Latin Disciples, Spanish Cobras and Spanish Gangster Disciples. There remain a few small but persistent white gangs who have forged alliances with the People and Folks. The Almighty Gaylords and Insane Southside Popes are People affiliates while the Northside Popes and Almighty Saints represent the Folks. Though the People and Folks are the main supergang alliance networks, it is very much the case that the supergangs might accurately described as alliance networks in their own right.

The major supergangs built their empires in a way remarkably similar to how most major corporations have developed over the last half-century - through mergers and acquisitions. Small local 'gangs' (often little more than informally organised friend groups) would, as they grew outwards, merge with existing gang clusters. For example, the Blackstone Rangers (Almighty Black P Stone Nation) began life as a group of young toughs led by a 13 year-old named Jeff Fort who merged with a similar group called the Harper Boys that was led by Eugene 'Bull' Hairston. Now separate once again, in the late 1960s the Gangster Disciples (known at the time as the Black Gangster Disciple Nation) started as a merger of the High Supreme Gangsters (led by David Barksdale)}
and Black Disciples (led by Larry Hover), themselves amalgams of smaller local groups including the likes of the Dutchtown Disciples and African Sniper Gangsters. Once officially part of the gang, these smaller local groups become 'sets' or 'clicks' and represent the organisation's front-line. Being part of a larger organisation enhances the power of these local sets, providing back-up in disputes with other gangs and offering new 'business' opportunities. However, it also means cutting the larger organisation into a share of the profits, something groups have increasingly resented since the mid-to-late 1980s. Often presented as large, cohesive and well-organised criminal operations, in reality even at the peak of gang cohesiveness a significant amount of autonomy has always remained at the local level.

Considering the longevity of the gang violence problem in Chicago, the true 'heyday' of the cohesive supergang would be relatively short-lived. Following the simultaneous arrest/murders of major leadership figures in the Vice Lords, Almighty P Stone Nation and Gangster Disciples during the late 1970s and early 1980s, Chicago's African American supergangs (Stones, Vice Lords, Disciples, Micky Cobras, Four Corners Hustlers) became increasingly fragmented. This fragmentation process has sped up tremendously in the twenty years since the Chicago Housing Authority first embarked on a plan to demolish and refurbish the city's major high-rise public housing complexes (ex. Robert Taylor Homes, Carbrini-Green, Dearborn Homes and Ida B Wells Homes), controlled by gangs since the late 1970s.\(^37\) One of the important goals of this 'urban renewal' effort was the disruption of existing gang structures through the dispersion of gang members (and public housing residents more generally) across the city.\(^38\) The loss of the public housing projects as a base for drug-selling and prostitution did bring about changes in the way gangs conducted their business and played a role in dismantling hierarchies, with central leadership increasingly irrelevant to local sets, but it did not eradicate the African American supergangs by any stretch. Instead, it facilitated the development of evermore splinter groups, renegade factions and 'independent' sets who operated independently from broader gang hierarchies. These groups sought not total isolation nor a lack of affiliation, with nearly all continuing to 'rep' (display affiliation through colours, symbols, clothing, hand gestures and graffiti tags) their previous supergang. Instead the move towards independence could be seen as a result of a desire for local control and freedom from the financial obligations that came with formal affiliation. With gang hierarchies disrupted through dispersal and imprisonment, central leaderships lost the power (or, just as likely, the will) to enforce compliance upon rebel sets. The overall result has been the creation of a landscape of loose and transitory alliances among sets that are more often based on kin, personal or business relationships than formal affiliation.

**The Grounds for Comparison**

From above and at a distance, the temptation to see Troubles violence in Northern Ireland and gang violence in Chicago as incomparable is obvious. Where gang violence has been widely perceived as an insular urban community problem, the


spectacle of the violence perpetrated by the Provisional IRA combined with its political artificersy garnered a wide and international audience for the group. Yet, in spite of the differences in articulated aspiration among the perpetrators of paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland and gang violence in Chicago, there are fundamental similarities at the individual, group, community and state levels that prime these two contexts of group violence for comparison.

**Profiling the Perpetrators and Victims of Community-level Urban Group Violence**

In the introduction to his study on the process of leaving violent groups, John Horgan aptly warns that a psychological profile which can be ascribed to all (or most) individuals involved in political violence (even within the same group) has not yet been discovered. Nevertheless, it is possible to offer a demographic profile of those engaged in paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland. Recruits to both republican (separatist Irish nationalist) and loyalist (Protestant ultra) paramilitaries tended, by and large, to be young men aged between 16 and 25 residing in highly segregated working-class neighbourhoods who came from working-class backgrounds. Common to the working-class population of Northern Ireland they also tended to skew towards the lower end of the educational qualification spectrum. Gang membership is also near exclusively male and recruitment appears to skew young here also, with some evidence indicating gang recruits are even younger than paramilitary recruits in Northern Ireland (age 12-20 as opposed to 16-20). As previously alluded to, gang members, in keeping with their geographical distribution, tend to come from the lowest echelons of the class stratum.

Young socio-economically disadvantaged males are not simply those most likely to become engaged in paramilitary or street gang violence, but violence more generally. It thus comes as perhaps little surprise that this same demographic group is

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also at greatest risk of violent victimisation. According to the Sutton Index of Deaths, approximately 91% of those who died as a result of the Troubles were male, with young men under the age of 25 accounting for nearly a third of all victims. Although information regarding the income/employment status (full-time employed/part-time employed/unemployed/long-term unemployed) of conflict victims is not readily available, the geospatial pattern of death indicates that residents of Northern Ireland's urban working-class neighbourhoods were those most likely to be killed as a result of the conflict. Gang violence in Chicago (and the United States more generally) is similarly concentrated in economically disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Still, there is an imperfect correlation between gang violence and poverty. The neighbourhoods with the highest levels of absolute poverty may not be the most violent, though all neighbourhoods with high levels of violence also have high overall levels of poverty or pockets of high poverty (for example a public housing project). With the Troubles lasting from 1968 until 1998 and supergang violence in Chicago a serious problem since the mid-1960s, it can thus be summarised that both gang violence and the Troubles represent prolonged endemic low-level urban conflict concentrated in economically deprived communities, primarily engaging young socio-economically disadvantaged males as perpetrators and victims.

State-level Comparability

Internationally, urban group violence is by no means limited to Chicago and

45 Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Small Arms Survey 2010, 135.
49 Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum, Crossing the Class and Color Lines, 88.
50 The link between racial minority status and street gang membership (predominately African American and latino) has been written about extensively. While the strength of both republican and loyalist paramilitary organisations during the Troubles might, under other circumstances, indicate that minority status (defined in ethno-religious terms) is not as relevant in predicting paramilitary involvement in Northern Ireland, this is not quite the case. Catholics represent the minority within Northern Ireland, but its existence as a legal entity is largely the result of the extreme apprehension on the part of Ireland's Protestant population (concentrated largely in the north east of the island) about their minority status within an all-Ireland context. The Protestant population and its political leaders appear not to have given significant consideration to the fact that in the creation of Northern Ireland, Catholics within the six secessionist counties would be subjected to the same fate they themselves feared so greatly. Nonetheless, it remains that Protestant unionists and loyalists justify their claims to regional self-determination on the basis of the threat to Protestant minority religious and cultural freedoms Irish independence/reunification would present. (Alex A Alonso, “Racialized Identities and the Formation of Black Gangs in Los Angeles,” Urban Geography 25, no 7 (2004): 658-674; Bilchik, 1996 National Youth Gang Survey, 26; Sean Byrne, Growing Up in a Divided Society: The Influence of Conflict on Belfast Schoolchildren (London: Associated University Presses, 1997) 51-52; John M Hagedorn, “Race Not Space: A Revisionist History of Gangs in Chicago,” The Journal of African American History 91, no 2 (2006): 194-208; John Whyte, Interpreting Northern Ireland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 100-101.)
Northern Ireland and thus a case for their comparability must also be made with
reference to state-level factors. Fundamentally, both the United States and United
Kingdom are considered bastions of liberal democracy in an international context.
Perhaps just as importantly, the strength of their relative economies over the past several
centuries has meant both (first the US then the UK) have been charged with taking on
an informal global leadership role. Although the global power of the United Kingdom
has declined considerably over the last century, the UK and US alike remain economic
leaders and members of the exclusive G7 group of countries while holding 'veto powers'
on the United Nations' Security Council. The latter essentially ensures international
military intervention must be approved by both (as well as China, France and Russia) in
order receive official UN-sanction (and also, essentially, provides immunity from
international intervention). This is interesting, for while it is almost unimaginable that
any third-party state would seriously consider intervention in the localised violence of
the Troubles/in Chicago, both states are routinely responsible for organising
interventions in civil order and civil conflict situations around the world (often in
developing countries).

Technically, the United States, as a constitutional republic (the constitution
responsible for codifying in detail the formal limits of governmental authority) is a more
clear-cut example of liberal democracy when compared with the United Kingdom's
constitutional monarchy. Still, the United Kingdom, although it lacks a formal written
constitution is nevertheless, like the United States, a:

...constitutionally based (primarily) representative government,
resting on the separation of powers of rule and law. Based also on the
principle of the accountability of power holders to the people, it
requires free and relatively frequent elections as well as the effective
protection of basic civil liberties.\(^{52}\)

As liberal democracies, the US and UK share a belief in the basic equality of all human
beings,\(^{53}\) but as discussed earlier with regards to the *Declaration of Independence*
the state's primary responsibility is seen to be towards its citizens as participants in a social
contract. Since the establishment of liberal democracy on both sides of the Atlantic, the
definition of who qualifies for citizenship (and even personhood) and therefore full
membership in the state has expanded considerably. From the fairly restrictive
'propertied men' (with varying definitions of acceptable property), 'the people' (or
citizensry) has grown to include unpropertied men, women and, lastly (in an American
context) persons of colour. Also crucial is the fact that as *liberal* states, legal equality is
disconnected from economic equality. Where the social hierarchy continues to be based
in large part on wealth, legal equality is thus disconnected from social equality. Limited
government involvement in the economic (wealth-generating) activities of the citizenry,
either individually (as labourers/workers or entrepreneurs) or collectively (as
corporations or in partnered businesses) is characteristic of liberal democracy, with
extensive government regulation seen as infringing upon the same individual freedoms

\(^{51}\) Piers Brendon, *The Decline and Fall of the British Empire, 1781-1997* (New York: Vintage,
2008).

\(^{52}\) William E Sceuerman, *Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time* (Baltimore: The

\(^{53}\) Ibid, 230.
the state was established to protect.

Internationally, these leaders and pioneers of liberal democratic development are also second and fourth respectively among the world's most advanced economies (OECD members) in terms of income inequality.\(^{54}\) This inequality manifests itself at a community-level in pervasive residential clustering along socio-economic lines to the point of segregation by class. As will be discussed at length in chapter 2, the existence of major social cleavages has also affected patterns of residential segregation, particularly in working-class/low income neighbourhoods. Within the United Kingdom residential segregation along sectarian lines also remains common in, and limited to,\(^{55}\) Northern Ireland, while de facto (informal, not legally supported) racial residential segregation persists in the urban America. The link between these overlapping forms of segregation and the development of community violence in Chicago and Northern Ireland will be a running theme throughout this work.

**P-Stones and Provos in Context**

This is not the first scholarly comparison between Northern Ireland and the United States. Frank Wright's *Northern Ireland: A Comparative Analysis*, still the most extensive and outward looking comparative work of Northern Irish studies scholarship, makes extensive use of American history and includes a thoughtful consideration of the Northern Irish and American civil rights movements.\(^{56}\) Brian Dooley's *Black and Green: The Fight for Civil Rights in Northern Ireland* and Simon Prince's *Northern Ireland's '68: Civil Rights, Global Revolt and the Origins of the Troubles* also examine the development of popular civil rights movements on both sides of the Atlantic, while simultaneously considering issues of social inequality and discrimination.\(^{57}\) On the other hand, the group violence that overlapped with and followed the civil rights movements has escaped similar (or any) serious consideration, a gap that this work uniquely fills. At the same time, where Wright, Dooley and Prince have sought to use the American experience to help shed light on events in Northern Ireland, this work (again uniquely) does the reverse, using the experience of violence in Northern Ireland to shed light on American urban community violence. Still, it is not in its comparative aspects that this

\(^{54}\) Wilkinson and Pickett, *The Spirit Level*, 17.


work’s originality solely rests. Most significantly, this is the first work to present gang violence in the United States, Chicago specifically as a politically-significant major civil order issue and threat to state security arguing that there is essentially an unrecognised low-intensity civil conflict in the heart of the mid-west.

The 'violence transformation' approach to gang violence reduction presented in chapter 4 offers a radically innovative way forward, marking a clear departure from the dominance of traditional intervention/suppression approaches (in keeping with the advocated need for high-level state response). The tone of the argument presented thus far might lead one to assume this work will advocate for military involvement in Chicago (or increased suppression-style efforts at the very least). Instead, it is proposed that a political resolution is needed as, fundamentally, gang violence represents a political crises and a threat to core American political values. In order to achieve resolution, the state must put aside issues of moral legitimacy and recognise the considerable amount of local power wielded by street gangs in large swaths of Chicago. As uncomfortable as such an admission (one that need not be made publicly) may be, in Chicago's 'gangland' the authority of the gangs is often stronger than that of the state, for the fear of summary execution by gang violence is greater than the fear of prison time which has become almost a right of passage.

Furthermore, given the persistence of high levels of gang violence, it is clear that the Chicago Police Department has neither the capacity nor mandate needed to truly manage the gang violence problem. Quite simply, if the CPD had been able to manage the gang problem successfully, there would be no need for continued discussion of how to deal with ever-mounting death tolls. An appropriate response to gang violence acknowledges the limitations of not only community intervention approaches to gang violence reduction, but also the suppression approaches the government has been more directly involved. The government of the United Kingdom had to recognise that a significant portion of Northern Ireland would remain beyond its authority (and under the influence of republican paramilitaries) so long as conflict persisted in Northern Ireland before it was able to invest the political resources needed to make the peace process work. It is these political resources which are most urgently needed. Financial resources do need to be mobilised in order to make progress in gang violence reduction, however their appropriateness as the core component of the federal response to gang violence in Chicago (and across the United States) to-date needs to be challenged.

The Lay of the Land: Outlining the Remainder of the Thesis

The first substantive chapter of this thesis is titled 'Scholarly Binaries, The State of the Field(s) and Definitional Debates'. It contains overviews of the key patterns and trends in the gang studies/Northern Irish studies literature and presents some of the critical gaps this thesis works to fill. It argues the lack of comparative analysis incorporating gang violence in Chicago (or the United States more broadly) and paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland stems not from the absence of similarity, but in the cleavage between the study of 'political violence' (as internally defined) and other forms of group violence, including gang violence. The intense focus on the distinctive political aspects (motivations and aspirations specifically) of 'political violence' has led
to the denial of the political meaning and significance of those forms of violence excluded from political violence's scholarly self-definition. The strong influence of criminology, sociology and anthropology in the gang studies literature and the comparative absence of political science voices has meant that the impetus, especially in an American context, for challenging either this de-politicisation or the exclusivity of the existing scholarly conceptualisation of 'political violence' has been lacking.

Chapter 2, titled 'The Emergence and Reproduction of Politicised and Depoliticised Difference: The Legacies of Sectarianism & Nationalism in Northern Ireland and Race in the United States' addresses the historical origins of the depoliticisation of African American supergang violence in the city of Chicago. The central question framing this chapter is that of why Chicago’s African American street gangs have failed to elicit a state-level response adequately reflecting the scale of the threat they pose to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness while the Provisional IRA was able to galvanise a significant state-level response before its first significant attack. It argues the key to understanding differential response lies in understanding how the major social cleavages out of which these violent groups emerged have historically been ascribed or denied political meaning and significance over the course of centuries. The politicisation of sectarian difference in 16th century Ireland (and the mapping of political attitudes towards Irish separatist nationalism onto this difference at the end of the 18th) created a context in which the Provisional IRA could not escape becoming framed as a political issue and threat to state stability. The scale of violence affected the scale and form of response, but not the fact of response in itself which was prompted by the group's very existence. Though Chicago’s African American supergangs emerged in the midst of the American civil rights movement, there did not exist a similarly politicised history of violent contestation. Initially seen as simply the next iteration of the transitional juvenile ‘delinquent’ gangs first studied by Frederick M Thrasher in the late 1920s, there was little these groups could do to establish themselves as a serious political threat or concern regardless of the intensity of their violence. This chapter covers: the development of sectarianism and nationalism in Ireland and post-partition Northern Ireland; the emergence of the Provisional IRA; early British state response to Troubles violence; the history of racial inequality in the United States, the limits and legacy of the civil rights movement; and the evolution of the Almighty P Stones.

The third chapter, 'Previous Responses to Gang Violence in Chicago: The Limitations of Intervention, Suppression and Integration', works to answer the question of how this framing of Chicago's gang violence as a community social problem and crime issue has affected response strategy and facilitated the promulgation of inefficient and inadequate responses. This chapter argues that the myriad of community-based intervention and crime-focused suppression efforts have not been able to yield the major reductions in the city’s gang violence programme to which they have aspired in spite of their strong theoretical underpinnings. Though these efforts have often received financial support from the federal government and its departments/ agencies (with funding also frequently provided by state and local governments), the federal government has adopted a laissez-faire approach to gang violence reduction. Without

direct high-level involvement, existing intervention and suppression approaches have been inadequate. There was a major (and sustained) drop in overall levels of violence and crime in Chicago since the mid-1990s (reflecting national trends), yet existing evaluative evidence does not support a view that any particular gang violence reduction effort (or all efforts in combination) can claim any real credit for this decline. Included in chapter 3 is discussion of: the Chicago Area Project begun in the 1930s by sociologist Clifford Shaw; the Youth Manpower Project administered by the Woodlawn Organization in 1968; the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project of the 1990s; the more recent CeaseFire-Chicago initiative (now Cure Violence); Project Safe Neighbourhoods; the Chicago Police Department's gang specific operations; and federal, state and municipal legislation specifically targeting gangs.

If previous and current approaches to gang violence reduction in Chicago have been ineffective and inadequate as a consequence of the durability of their framing of the issue as a community social problem and crime issue, what might an approach reflective of the threat gangs pose to civil order and liberal democratic values look like? Answering this question is the purpose of the fourth and final substantive chapter of this thesis, 'Violence Transformation: A New Way Forward'. This chapter argues that the eventual transformation of the Provisional IRA from the preeminent agent of violence during the Troubles into a political organisation devoted to advancing its political agenda solely through political means provides hope for a similar transition in Chicago. In coming to understand gang violence as a political problem and a threat to the liberal democratic values at the heart of the state, it becomes easier to make the case that a new approach is needed, one that recognises the severity of the situation and the need for drastic action if there is any hope for creating a lasting peace. This chapter proposes a new approach to gang violence reduction referred to herein as 'violence transformation'.

Violence transformation is modelled on the Northern Irish peace process, but adapted to reflect the fragmentary nature of Chicago's gang landscape and the impact of centuries of the depoliticisation of American racial inequality on the shape of gang violence in the city. It argues that the creation and implementation of a negotiated non-violence agreement between the upper echelons of the federal government (including presidential involvement) and Chicago's most lethal gang factions where strictly enforced carries strong, albeit radical, potential to generate major lasting reductions in gang violence. This process grants groups the ownership over their own transformation necessary for sustained buy-in, while at the same time bounds the transformation process with clear-cut accountability measures. This approach requires tremendous political courage, but with great risk comes the potential for great reward – the restoration of true civil order in Chicago for the first time in over half a century.
Chapter 1
Scholarly Binaries, The State of the Field(s) and Definitional Debates

Over the course of the last thirty years there has been a rapid proliferation of scholarship in the terrorism & political violence field. One consequence of this tremendous growth has been that, intentionally or unintentionally, what was (and to a certain extent remains) a radically, fundamentally and proudly interdisciplinary field has come to display increasingly disciplinary tendencies most prominently under the banner of 'terrorism studies'. Concurrently, one of the most frequent and persistent criticisms of 'terrorism studies' in its most orthodox and Anglo-American form is that the leaders of the field have maintained very close relationships with government, military and law enforcement agencies of the United Kingdom, United States and other Western countries. For some, this undermines the field's scholarly independence and willingness to engage in serious critical analysis. Combined, these factors have worked to increasingly separate, if not isolate, the study of 'political violence' from the study of other forms of violence, including the broader 'group violence' category to which it would naturally belong. This has had a serious impact on the fields of 'Northern Irish studies' and 'gang studies' which have also experienced considerable growth over the same time frame.

The politicised framing of the Northern Irish conflict in public/political discourse (discussed in greater detail in chapter 2) together with the relative influence of terrorism studies & political science scholarship within 'Northern Irish studies' has meant that the Troubles have been readily (and to a certain extent unquestionably) recognised as a case of political violence. 'Gang studies' on the other hand, being more sociologically and criminologically oriented, lacks a comparable relationship with the political violence field or the political science and international relations disciplines that have become increasingly influential within it. Thereby, gang violence has been excluded from the study of 'political violence' even as the definition of the term and, consequentially, the parameters of the field have continued to evolve through debate and contestation over the last few decades. As with other forms of violence which lie outside the bounds of 'political violence', gang violence has come to be constructed by the political violence field as criminal, lacking in political aspiration/motivation and devoid of broader political meaning and significance. The disciplinary dominance of

59 In keeping with one of the major critiques of interdisciplinary studies as levied by Stanley Fish. (Stanley Fish, “Being Interdisciplinary is so Very Hard to Do,” Issues in Integrative Studies 9 (1991): 99-112.)
62 A reflection of the continuing (but not unchallenged) importance of the Weberian notion of statehood, defined in terms of the state’s monopoly on the use of violence, within political scholarship more generally. (Max Weber, The Vocation Lectures, eds. David Owen and Tracy B
criminology and sociology has affected the field's ability to challenge this misrepresentation. Furthermore, the increasing self-referentialism of 'Northern Irish studies' and 'gang studies' as the fields have grown has contributed to the perpetuation of this highly problematic binary.

While this work as a whole seeks to challenge these presumptions and assumptions, this chapter focuses first on exploring the political/non-political violence binary and its implications for the study of both the Troubles in Northern Ireland and gang violence in Chicago. It argues the political/non-political violence binary has contributed to the denial of the political significance of endemic gang violence in Chicago and the non-recognition, or at the very least underestimation, of the serious threat it poses to the liberal democratic principles outlined in the Declaration of Independence. The first half of this chapter is dedicated to bringing the existence and significance of the polarised political/non-political violence binary out from the shadows for the purpose of its problematisation. The latter half of this chapter provides general overviews of the state of the gang studies and Northern Irish studies fields in order to set the stage for the descriptive and comparative work to follow. Within these cartographic sojourns the extent to which existing the gang studies and Northern Irish studies literature plays into the political/non-political violence binary becomes even clearer, especially with regards to the failure of existing gang studies scholarship to (thus far) present a serious intellectual challenge to the depoliticisation of gang violence. In this light it becomes easier to understand how heavy academic involvement in the design, development and implementation of most of Chicago's major gang violence reduction efforts since the 1930s has contributed to a lack of radical innovation in the area, with efforts failing to keep pace with the changing lethality and scale of the city's gang violence problem.

The fact that bombings, shootings, stabbings and punishment beatings constitute criminal homicide and physical assault regardless of the identity of the individual responsible and their motivation (with exceptions made in the case of mental illness) is something that has seemingly gotten lost in the academic analysis of political violence. The focus on eradicating the root causes of political violence and understanding political motivation have contributed to the perception that speaking to its criminality denigrates its political meaning and significance while at the same time heralding a return to an outdatedly orthodox view of the subject couched in moralistic language unbefitting of contemporary social science. The pre-eminence of criminological and sociological thinking within the gang studies field in combination with its close relationship to law enforcement agencies (rather than state governments and military as is the case with the political violence field) means that it lacks pressure to present gang

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64 Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism, 3.

65 The shift in the terrorism studies field away from discussion of the criminological aspects of terrorist attacks and the activities of groups engaged in acts of ‘political’ violence is an important theme running through Stampnitzky. (Stampnitzky, Disciplining Terror, 7, 61-64, 153.)
violence as something beyond simple criminality. Nevertheless, the field has remained keen to maintain, if not celebrate, a sense of distinctiveness between gang and non-gang violence. Together, a continued emphasis on the distinctiveness of gang and political violence (including Troubles violence) only reinforces the barriers between these two areas of study, discouraging the cross-pollination of new ideas that can contribute to a stronger understanding of both types of violence and strategies for violence reduction in a more general sense.

There is a pronounced lack of consensus around many issues within the Northern Irish studies literature, but one area of considerable agreement has been in the framing of the Troubles as an example of ‘political violence’. Though consensus quickly breaks down over whether it might best be described as ‘civil conflict’, ‘ethnic conflict’, ‘ethнопolitical conflict’, ‘insurgency’, ‘guerilla warfare’ or ‘terrorism’, the idea that group violence in Northern Ireland during the Troubles constituted political violence has escaped serious contestation. However this does not mean that there is a universally accepted understanding of exactly what is meant by the term ‘political violence’. As is the case with the term ‘terrorism’, the definition of political violence remains fraught. In Social Movements, Political Violence and the State, Donatella della Porta argues, “political violence then is the use of physical force in order to damage a political adversary [emphasis original].” On the other hand, Ted Gurr makes the case for understanding political violence as, “all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors – including competing political groups as well as incumbents – or its policies.” Most broadly still, ABK Kasozi defines political violence as, “violence connected with the struggle for, and maintenance of, political power and of the ‘the definition of the political community itself’. Though they vary in nuance, these definitions are bound together by the sense that political violence is exceptional and different from other forms of violence, especially ordinary criminal violence.

There have been efforts in the past to integrate theories of general violence within theories of political violence, with notable examples found in Ted Gurr’s (at the time) seminal Why Men Rebel (1970) and James B Rule’s Theories of Civil Violence (1988). However, these theories have largely fallen out of favour having been found

67 Among these terms, this is the most difficult to define. (Jeffrey Stevenson Murer, “Ethnic Conflict: An Overview of Analyzing and Framing Communal Conflicts From Comparative Perspectives,” Terrorism & Political Violence 24, no 4 (2012): 561.)
72 Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel; James B Rule, Theories of Civil Violence (London: University of
unable to fully account for fluctuations in levels of political violence across time and culture. From a bird's eye view, efforts to connect/re-connect thinking about political violence with more general explanations of violence have made little lasting headway. The result is a conceptualisation of political violence which positions itself as both separate from and almost oppositional to the violence excluded from its definition and subsequently constructed as 'non-political violence'.

The 'greed' versus 'grievance' debate among scholars of contemporary civil war offers some particularly useful insights into the political/non-political violence binary. Of those engaged in this debate, it is perhaps Stathis Kalyvas who has the most to offer as his "The Ontology of 'Political Violence': Action and Identity in Civil Wars" problematises the way in which the popular conceptualisation of political violence has granted blanket political significance to civil war violence despite it taking a diversity of forms at the ground level. He argues that although civil war is broadly recognised as an important part of the 'political violence' landscape, (unlike terrorism) it has been extensively explored and understood through two dichotomously juxtaposed interpretive frames labelled 'greed' and 'grievance'. The 'greed' framework as understood by Kalyvas offers a Hobbesian interpretation of civil war violence. This label is most commonly applied to ethnic civil wars and 'new wars', alleged to "encourage the privatisation of violence, bringing to the fore, in a virtually random fashion, all sorts of motivations in what is a 'war of all against all'." Although the 'greed' framework should, theoretically, offer the greatest challenge to civil war's place in 'political violence' discourse, or at the very least contest the boundaries of the broader field, it has failed to make these broader connections. 'Grievance' on the other hand adopts what

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75 Also see: Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).


77 Ibid, 475.

78 Ibid, 475.
Kalyvas calls a Schmittian approach, stressing the political dimension of civil wars above all. He argues this frame, “entails an ontology of civil wars based on abstract group loyalties and beliefs, whereby the political enemy becomes a private adversary only by prior collective and impersonal enmity.”

The strong influence of the political science and international relations disciplines as well as the relative dominance of the related terrorism and security sub-fields within the political violence field as a whole has arguably contributed to the favouring of 'grievance' over 'greed' in terms of understanding the development and perpetuation of political violence more broadly. Consequentially, economic explanations of political violence which engage with the 'greed' framework (both supporting and challenging it) have become marginalised, as have discussions of the relationship between economic inequality (relative or absolute) and political violence. Taking into consideration the impact political violence has had on the history of state development (think the American or Algerian revolutions) and international relations (Gavrilo Princip's assassination of Franz Ferdinand set in motion the course of events which would develop into World War I after all), there is indeed a great deal of temptation to presume political violence is motivated primarily by grievance. After all, with most contemporary states (liberal democracies included) having been born out of one form of political violence or another (revolution, civil war, terrorism), to argue that greed is an equal or even a considerable motivator for such violence is unsettling. Such an argument implies, by extension, that greed has played a role in the state-building process. For liberal democratic states, this poses a direct challenge to the moral justifications for liberal democratic governance.

Unfortunately, the dominance of the grievance-based framework within the political violence field combined with its efforts to distinguish and distance political violence form other forms of violence has meant that the field has, by and large, come to view non-political violence through a 'greed' framework. 'Grievance' versus 'greed' has become an additional means through which political violence seeks to separate and distinguish itself from 'ordinary' or 'non-political' violence more broadly. The imposition of a greed framework reinforces the political/non-political violence binary and has had the (perhaps unintentional) effect of stripping legitimate political motivation, meaning and significance from non-political violence, gang violence included. Although there have been some who have worked in the space between (or above the divide), collective violence scholars for example, this gulf works to subtly discourage many more from

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80 Kalyvas, “The Ontology of ‘Political Violence’,” 475.


considering gang violence (or political violence from the perspective of gang studies scholars) as an area of concern. The persistence of this gulf serves to subtly reinforce the perception that even if criminology, sociology, psychology and anthropology have important contributions to make in both fields there is little political science and international relations can offer the study of gang violence. If unchallenged, this misperception will only serve to ensure that the threat gang violence in Chicago poses to American political values and civil order will continue to be ignored.

Returning to the relationship between the terrorism and political violence field(s) and government policy making, it is important to clarify here that the fundamental disagreement between critical terrorism scholars and those whom they label 'orthodox' is not over whether such relationships exist. Both agree that they do. The difference of opinion lies in over whether these relationships have a positive or negative impact on the field as a whole. Orthodox/traditionalist terrorism studies scholars have argued prescriptive policy-oriented scholarship represents one of the most valuable contributions the field makes to broader society: what is the purpose of understanding such violence if the objective is not to ultimately reduce or eliminate suffering?

Critical terrorism studies scholars take issue with these relationships for two differing reasons. Some argue that while strong relationships with the sources of official power are not inherently problematic and should be encouraged to a certain extent, orthodox terrorism studies has been too one-sided in its approach, communicating and connecting with governments without building similarly robust lines of communication with non-state actors engaged in political violence or other affected sections of society. Others take the position that maintenance of close relationships with government officials, the military and policy makers (particularly advisory and funding relationships) jeopardises the independence, neutrality and integrity of the scholarly community (something those scholars labelled 'orthodox' contest).

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Without becoming embroiled in a debate over the merits and limits of the orthodox terrorism studies approach (or whether a true 'orthodox' terrorism studies exists), when one considers that some key scholars in the field have played important governmental advisory roles, it is unsurprising that there exists a synchronicity between key academic and 'official' conceptualisations of political violence. 89 Whether it is scholars who have shaped governmental definitions or governmental definitions influencing scholars is less important here than the outcome of this overlap – reinforcement of existing boundaries and limits that perpetually leave gang violence beyond the realm of 'political violence'. 90

In practice, this has meant that the role of centuries of American political decision making (as expressed through public policy) in generating the urban conditions under which street gang violence has thrived and become embedded within Chicago's urban landscape has been ignored by scholars, policy makers and government officials alike. Yet, this has not meant that federal politicians and government officials have never spoken out about gang violence in Chicago. Recently, both President Barack Obama and First Lady Michelle Obama responded publicly to the January 2013 gang-related bystander shooting death of majorette and honours student Hadiya Pendleton. The 15 year-old was killed only a week after performing in Obama's second inauguration ceremony and with her death taking place approximately a mile from the Obama's Hyde Park home, an official response was implicitly demanded, if not by the public than the media. During 2013 First Lady Michelle Obama also reached out to staff and students of Harper High School in nearby Englewood who had seen 27 current/recent students shot and eight killed as a result of gang/gun violence within a single 13 month period. 91

Yet, the opportunity to use these high-profile incidents to launch gang violence in Chicago onto the federal agenda was lost, President Obama instead using Pendleton's death specifically as an opportunity to fan the flames of the ongoing American gun control debate. 92

With only two years left in Obama's second term, there is little hope that Chicago's first president will use the opportunity of his remaining time in office to politicise the city's endemic gang violence and mobilise the resources needed to bring lasting relief to his South Side neighbours. Still little hope remains an infinitely better prospect than none at all.

There is also hope for change in the academic sphere. Just because the political/non-political violence binary appears to have become part of the woodwork does not mean that it must remain so. It can and must be challenged. The first step is to begin to see and understand both gang and paramilitary violence as violence first and foremost. In order to find new ways of connecting existing knowledge with new
avenues for the exploration of political and gang violence, it is necessary for this research to operate between the micro and the macro levels. An important part of this work involves pushing against boundaries and binaries, particularly that of political/non-political violence which imposes artificial limitations on existing research.

As the meeting between Jonathan Powell and Birmingham’s infamous Burgers and Johnsons depicted in Penny Woolcock’s recent documentary One Mile Away (2013) illustrates, the experience of attempting to find a political solution to paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland has much to offer gang violence reduction efforts. Yet without official support, even the incredible personal risks taken by gang leaders to forge peace, such as those taken on by influentials within the Burgers and Johnsons, are unlikely to be lasting. The question thus becomes: how has our understanding of violence more generally, and gang violence in particular been limited by the conceptual barriers between political violence and non-political violence? With political violence and gang studies scholars seeing the subjects of their research as different beasts entirely, one important missing discussion has been the way in which the words ‘terrorist’ and ‘gangster’ have both become, in many instances, mere pejoratives within public discourse conveying little useful information as actor ‘categories’.

Somewhat ironically, ‘gangster’ is frequently used as a pejorative term within the terrorism studies literature. ‘Gangster’ has even been used pejoratively by individuals engaged in political violence, who might rightly be classified as ‘terrorists’ themselves. For example, with a great deal of self-realisation, a Provisional IRA ‘volunteer’ may come to accept that being referred to as a ‘terrorist’ is a statement of fact, yet to even dare compare volunteers with ‘gangsters’ remains a great insult. Thus, the type of

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93 An examination of the relationship between individual decision making and communal violence, particularly in terms of political self-sacrifice, can be found in Karin Fierke’s Political Self-sacrifice: Agency, Body and Emotion in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
94 Chief negotiator on behalf of the British government during the talks leading up to the Good Friday Agreement.
95 More formally, the Burger Bar Boys and Johnson Crew.
96 The term by which Provisional IRA members refer to themselves and each other, derived from the tradition of people’s volunteer militias that developed in the period preceding World War I. (Charles Townshend, Easter 1916: The Irish Rebellion (Toronto: Penguin, 2006), kindle loc 799-1392.)
97 Something reflected in the approach taken by Patrick Magee, the Provisional IRA volunteer responsible for the 1984 Brighton bombing targeting the annual conference of the Conservative Party, in his truly impressive Gangsters or Guerillas? where he argues: “After a wide reading of this type of fiction for a doctoral thesis, the composite Irish republican to materialise was of a Mother Ireland-fixated psycho-killer aka a Provo Godfather, readily discernible with recourse to an identikit indebted to Tenniel’s ‘Irish Frankenstein’ and other images from Punch redolent of Victorian racism.” (Patrick Magee, Gangsters or Guerillas?: Representations of Irish Republicans in ‘Troubles Fiction’ (Belfast: Beyond the Pale, 2001), 2.) Magee does not shy away from expressing his disdain for these kinds of representations, never seriously considering that the popular representations of gangster upon which he bases his charged opinions are as fictive as those of Irish republicans. Though this should not detract from the strength of this particular work, there is also a lack of recognition on Magee’s part that his expression of republican superiority to common gangsterism contributes to a dehumanisation of gangsters akin to the
comparative work in which this thesis engages will likely draw the ire of some republicans and Northern Irish studies scholars unable to accept that an increased political consideration of gang violence does nothing to diminish the political significance of the conflict in Northern Ireland. Yet, to sacrifice comparison for the sake of palatability to any group is to continue with the perpetuation of the artificial binary that has greatly hindered the response to gang violence, something which is a far less favourable option than unpalatability.

Although the focus thus far has been on opening up the study of political violence to an exploration of the possibilities of including gang violence within a broadened definitional space, there are aspects of the political violence studies approach that could strengthen gang studies as currently carried out. Most significantly, gang studies could adopt a greater willingness to consider the self-perceptions of those who engage in community-level street gang violence. Indeed, this recognition of self-perception has been one of the most resounding strengths of contemporary political violence scholarship. Even with the rapid growth in terrorism and political violence research following 9/11, the necessity of considering (but not necessarily accepting) how agents of violence understand themselves and the purpose of their actions has been a rare area of some agreement between the orthodox and critical studies schools of thought. The former incorporates self-perception as part of its pursuit of objectivity at a time when public (and scholarly) discussion has become increasingly moralised.98 Critical studies, while simultaneously striving for and rejecting the possibility of a 'pure' objectivity, recognises the capacity of self-perception to counter the pro-state bias it argues has plagued much research in the field.99

However in defining ‘terrorists’, ‘guerrillas’, ‘rebels’, ‘insurgents’, ‘freedom fighters’ and ‘volunteers’ in contrast to ‘criminals’, ‘gangsters’ and ‘hoods’, the same consideration of self-perception has not been extended to those engaged in 'non-political' violence. A great deal of research has largely accepted that perpetrators of political violence see themselves not as criminals in the traditional sense, but as akin to soldiers. Violence, according to common self-perception, is a necessary evil required for the protection and defence of kin and community and the best (if not the only) means of overhauling a broken and corrupt political system.100 In other words, agents of political violence see themselves as the products of their bleak environment whose actions are justifiable given the injustice they face.

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Although the gang studies field as a whole may not take self-perceptions as seriously as they could or should, among those who do (a small but not insignificant body of literature), what emerges is that many of these explanations for the use of violence mirror those offered by agents of political violence. In *The Culture and Politics of Contemporary Street Gang Memoirs*, Josephine Metcalf insightfully argues:

The main narrative action of these contemporary gang memoirs revolves around tales of violence: that of the narrators toward other gang members, and that committed against them by the state. Descriptions of state violence are included to rationalize and explain the behaviour of the narrators. Violence is viewed through the lens of a war in which the system is the enemy, and as warranted because the rules of war make combat temporarily acceptable.

The memoirs of gang life Metcalf uses in here study remain some of the most insightful pictures of gang life publicly available today. In *Blue Rage, Black Redemption*, Stanley ‘Tookie’ Williams, co-founder and ex-leader of the Crips (one of the largest and most pervasive networks of loosely affiliated North American street gangs) argues:

Though I cannot condone it, much of the violence I inflicted on my gang rivals and other blacks was an unconscious display of my frustration with poverty, racism, police brutality and other systematic injustices routinely visited upon residents of urban black colonies such as South Central Los Angeles.

“I was frustrated because I felt trapped,” writes Williams further on, acknowledging the constraints imposed by an unjust political system and the economic and racial hierarchies instrumental in upholding it. The sense of entrapment is one shared by Chicago’s Black Soldier, a gang-affiliated rapper interviewed by Geoff Harkness for “Gangs and Gangsta Rap in Chicago”:

If seven out of ten rappers are motherfucking gang niggas, that’s gonna come out in the music. Gang niggas are angry. Most of the time, motherfuckers feel like there’s no way out. So you’re gonna get gangsta music from a bunch of angry gangstas: young niggas that ain’t got shit…

In addition to the conflict & combat rhetoric (‘soldiers' or in a 'war'), what emerges quite clearly is a sense of interlinked political and economic injustice.

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104  Ibid, 218.

Although those engaged in political violence share a sense of injustice and frustration with gang members, there remains a crucial difference. Those engaged in political violence (including Provisional IRA volunteers) hold firm to the belief that, no matter how difficult, radical change remains possible and direct their violence externally, targeting the political system with which they take issue. In contrast, agents of street gang violence can be seen as pessimists. They have long given up on the possibility of the type of penetrating social and structural change needed to eradicate poverty, racism, and other forms of social injustice (including education inequality). They perceive the barriers as insurmountable and resistance as futile. Violence is thus inwardly directed, carried out primarily towards those who are images of themselves (rivals from the same or similar neighbourhoods, class stratum & racial backgrounds) as opposed to those with socio-political 'power'.

With little else to convey status and belonging (or even basic human dignity), affronts to hard-won respect are met with rage and violence becomes normalised as a response.

In sum, where the political violence committed by groups such as the Provisional IRA has often been presented as an act of 'last resort' – the desperate actions of individuals with nothing left to lose, this not only glosses over the violence inflicted upon constituent communities, but also highlights the extent of its own hypocrisy. Provisional IRA volunteers and others engaged in political violence have something invaluable left to lose – hope. Those involved in political violence share a hope in the possibility of a brighter future that gang members have lost in all but the crudest sense (success is staying alive). It is this hope which may just be the most important thing of all.

A Brief Cartography of Gang Studies

Frederic M Thrasher’s *The Gang: A Study of 1, 313 Gangs in Chicago*, published in 1927, is widely considered to be the foundational text of the gang studies field. However, as Scott H Decker and Barrick Van Winkle point out in their carefully considered historiography of gang research, the first academic work dealing with

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106 Williams, *Blue Rage, Black Redemption*, 218.
111 Though it should be noted that the literature on Latino gangs is arguably overrepresented (with
youth/street gangs was in fact published almost thirty years prior. In “The Institutional Activities of American Children” published in 1898, Henry D Sheldon explores how young people, without adult influence or assistance develop ‘spontaneous organisations’ which assist in the coordination of their social lives. Reflecting the terminology used by his young research subjects, Sheldon acknowledges that 'gang' is another word for the type of informal predatory organisations that develop among young boys over the age of 10 (and usually under the age of 14). Though much group activity remained both legal and typical for boys of this age, these nascent gangs often also took part in what amounted to small scale robbery, vandalism and violence (brawling). Like later gangs, a central function of these groups was to promote camaraderie, instilling a sense of belonging among the boys and helping one and each develop a network of social support. While Sheldon's work has largely been forgotten, “What we know about contemporary gangs and the best ways to respond to them still is influenced by the work of Frederic M Thrasher.” As part of the Chicago School, Thrasher’s work invoked the urban ecology theory introduced by colleagues Robert Ezra Park and Ernest W Burgess in their Introduction to the Science of Sociology (1921) and The City (with Roderick D McKenzie, 1925). The Gang posits that gangs in the city of Chicago tended to emerge from environments of social disorganisation as a result of, “the spontaneous effort of boys to create a society for themselves where none adequate to their needs exits.”

While Thrasher was the first to establish a link between gangs and neighbourhood deprivation, the persistence of African American gangs in spite of relative community stability challenge his argument that gangs were a direct product of urban environments, specifically in their ‘home base’ of Chicago. More rarely known as the Ecological School, this group of scholars developed and advanced an ‘urban ecology’ approach to understanding human behaviour, arguing that individual behaviour is profoundly shaped by both the physical environment and the social structures which inhabit it. (Martin Blumer, The Chicago School of Sociology: Institutionalization, Diversity, and the Rise of Sociological Research (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.)

The term 'Chicago School' is used to refer to the group of scholars working within the University of Chicago’s Sociology Department who sought to combine theory with ethnographic fieldwork in the study of urban environments, specifically in their ‘home base’ of Chicago. More rarely known as the Ecological School, this group of scholars developed and advanced an ‘urban ecology’ approach to understanding human behaviour, arguing that individual behaviour is profoundly shaped by both the physical environment and the social structures which inhabit it. (Martin Blumer, The Chicago School of Sociology: Institutionalization, Diversity, and the Rise of Sociological Research (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.)


Thrasher, The Gang, 37.

Individuals who move into the neighbourhood tend to stay in the neighbourhood for a significant period of time as opposed to treating residency as a stop-gap on the way to somewhere else (ex. the suburbs as opposed to student housing).
of ‘transitional’ neighbourhoods in a state of deterioration with ethnic and racial groups replacing and displacing one another. Though much gang activity remained non-delinquent and varied little from the recreational pastimes of those not involved in such groups, when gang violence (generally inter-gang fighting) did occur it generally developed out of a desire to defend one’s territory against the threat posed by outsiders.\footnote{Decker and Van Winkle, 	extit{Life in the Gang}, 5; Monti, “Origins and Problems of Gang Research in the United States,” 8-9.} However, as the gang studies field expanded, the benign nature of much gang activity came to be ignored as scholars increasingly focused their gaze specifically on ‘delinquent’ or ‘deviant’ activity.\footnote{Simon Hallsworth and Tara Young, “Working with Gangs and Other Delinquent Groups,” in 	extit{Practical Interventions for Young People at Risk}, ed. Kathryn Geldard (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2009), 82; Felix M Padilla, 	extit{The Gang as an American Enterprise} (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1992), 4; Andrew V Papachristos and David S Kirk, “Neighborhood Effects on Street Gang Behavior,” in 	extit{Studying Youth Gangs}, eds. James F Short and Lorine A Hughes (Oxford: AltaMira, 2006), 63-66.} Today, there exists a greater diversity of positioning. Many continue to speak of gang activity primarily in terms of deviance, delinquency and crime.\footnote{Some of the most blatant examples of this approach include: G David Curry, “Self-reported Gang Involvement and Officially Recorded Delinquency,” 	extit{Criminology} 38, no 4 (2000): 1253-1274; Rachel A Gordon et al, “Antisocial Behavior and Youth Gang Membership: Selection and Socialization,” 	extit{Criminology} 42, no 1 (2004): 55-88; Terence P Thornberry, Marvin D Krohn, Alan J Lizotte and Deborah Chard-Wierschem, “The Role of Juvenile Gangs in Facilitating Delinquent Behavior,” 	extit{Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency} 30, no 1 (1993): 55-87.} Others, critical of this approach have returned to a broader and more organic understanding of gangs that recognises the range and diversity of group behaviour.\footnote{Irish American, African American, Puerto Rican, Chicano, Dominican, Jamaican and Central American. (Sánchez-Jankowski, 	extit{Islands in the Street}, 7, 11.)}

Although criminology retains a special place within the gangs studies field, the field still maintains a high degree of interdisciplinarity. Anthropological and sociological field ethnographies comprise one of the most established bodies of literature within the field. Martin Sánchez-Jankowski’s 1991 	extit{Islands in the Street: Gangs and American Urban Society} remains quite probably the most ambitious of these projects to date. 	extit{Islands in the Street} studies 37 gangs of varying sizes and ethnic compositions across three cities (New York, Los Angeles and Boston) over the course of ten and a half years (1978-1989).\footnote{Irish American, African American, Puerto Rican, Chicano, Dominican, Jamaican and Central American. (Sánchez-Jankowski, 	extit{Islands in the Street}, 7, 11.)} The result is a rich text painting a valuable portrait of gang life across America despite, quite understandably, sacrificing some depth of analysis. Though violence and other acts of ‘delinquency’ are discussed, Sanchéz-Jankowski takes after Thrasher in his early description of Chicago’s gangs by making it clear that when the lives of gang members are considered in full, participation in delinquency (especially violence) occupies a small minority of most members’ time. John Hagedorn’s 	extit{People and Folks: Gangs, Crime and the Underclass in a Rustbelt City} offers a compelling examination of gangs in Milwaukee following a period of rapid industrial decline. Quite interestingly, these gangs have often appropriated the symbols,
emblems and even names of Chicago's supergangs, though they not connected to the Chicago groups in any meaningful way.\textsuperscript{126} Another key work in this vein is Elijah Anderson’s highly controversial \textit{Code of the Street}, which brings the ethnographic study of gangs to the comparatively (and peculiarly) under-researched streets of Philadelphia.\textsuperscript{127}

Given that the field of gang studies was essentially born in Chicago, it is surprising that there has been relatively scant ethnographic attention paid to the city’s gangland. The most notable studies include those by Ruth Horowitz (1983) and Felix M Padilla (1992) which focus on the city's Latino/Hispanic gangs.\textsuperscript{128} Over the last decade sociologist Sudhir Venkatesh has built a considerable profile and sizeable readership with the release of ethnographic-style works built upon fieldwork originally carried out during the 1980s and 1990s with a 'Black Kings' set\textsuperscript{129} based in one of the Robert Taylor Homes project's high-rise apartment buildings. The most significant of these works include the books \textit{American Project} (2000), \textit{Off the Books} (2006) and \textit{Gang Leader for a Day} (2008) as well as the article “An Economic Analysis of a Drug-Selling Gang’s Finances” written with Steven D Levitt.\textsuperscript{130} As his remains the only substantial academic work delivering an intimate longitudinal picture of gang activity on the South Side (where the P Stones are based), it would seem obvious that his purportedly landmark findings would feature prominently in this work. However, there are serious concerns around inconsistencies within his body of work\textsuperscript{131} and whether his research embodies

\textsuperscript{128} Ruth Horowitz, \textit{Honor and the American Dream} (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1983); Padilla, \textit{The Gang as an American Enterprise}.
\textsuperscript{129} The lowest and most localised component group of a street gang.
\textsuperscript{131} A set of gang ledgers belonging to the 'Black Kings', the group in which Venkatesh embedded himself, sit at the heart of his landmark discoveries in the field of gang economics. However, there are some discrepancies in the story of how he came into possession of the ledgers that cast some doubt over the veracity of this data. While it is understandable that Venkatesh would be reluctant to release his source into the public domain, that there is no scanned images or itemised table makes it difficult to move past the surrounding inconsistencies and accept the veracity of the data. Thus, neither this data nor the works which rely upon it are used in this thesis despite their obvious relevance. In order to further clarify and justify this decision, key inconsistencies will be highlighted as follows. Firstly, in \textit{Gang Leader for a Day} (Toronto: Penguin, 2008) - Venkatesh's memoirs of his field work in the Robert Taylor Homes - he argues that 'T-Bone', the Black Kings' bookkeeper gave him the ledgers. Though T-Bone doesn't reveal why he ultimately gave over the books, Venkatesh speculates this was an altruistic decision and that he wanted to increase the public's understanding of gangland. At the time of the transfer, T-Bone was under considerable stress from a combination of police pressure and the plan to dismantle the Robert Taylor Homes. (254-256) Ultimately, T-Bone would go on to die in prison but was fondly remembered for his unwillingness to co-operate with the police even if doing so may have saved his life. (277) The data from the ledgers was used by Venkatesh in “An Economic Analysis of a
the type of ‘ethical scholarship’ that must be at the heart of modern social scientific research. As a result, a conscious decision has been made not to engage with Venkatesh’s ethnographic work, though his cartography of gang studies theory is referenced as it represents a reasonable critique of the delinquency/deviance paradigm not reliant upon his own fieldwork.

This thesis also draws quite heavily from the evaluative studies of past and present gang violence reduction efforts in Chicago. Irving A Spergel, over the course of a career spanning more than four decades, has been the most prolific researcher in this area. Seeing himself as part of the community action research tradition, Spergel’s work argues for a bidirectional relationship between theory and practice. Grassroots interventions should be theoretically grounded, but lessons learned on the streets should also be used to evaluate theory. Spergel’s earliest work in this style, Street Gang Work: Theory and Practice, published in 1966 examined the Chicago Area Project’s efficacy during the 1960s, thirty years after it was first established by Clifford Shaw of Drug-selling Gang’s Finances”, where its origins were less fully discussed, but this article and the ledgers more broadly also form the basis of “Why Do Drug Dealers Still Live With their Moms?”, the third chapter of Steven D Levitt and Stephen J Dubner's Freakonomics (Toronto: Penguin, 2006) on which Venkatesh collaborated but remains uncredited. However in this version of events the ledgers come from 'Booty' (clearly T-Bone in the later work), who turned the ledgers over to Venkatesh because he feared for his life after sparking a federal indictment. In stark contrast to T-Bone's fate however, Booty was killed by the gang for his suspected treachery. (88) While not directly related to this data, there is another important inconsistency in Venkatesh's work worth mentioning here, pertaining to the mother-son relationship between the leader of the Black Kings and his mother as presented in Off the Books (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006) and Gang Leader for a Day. In Off the Books, the gang leader 'Big Cat' has a tumultuous relationship with the adults in his life, including his mother who was ultimately unable to care for him. Thus he was left with no 'real' family from an early age. (279) This is a far cry from the mother-son relationship experienced by the gang leader, rechristened 'JT' two years later in Gang Leader for a Day. In this work, not only does JT continue to live with his Mother 'Ms Mae', but treats her with a great deal of respect and deference. (40, 104) In this latter work Venkatesh himself has a close positive relationship with Ms Mae, using her apartment to write up his notes and frequently indulging in her home cooking. That these works represent a mixture of popular non-fiction and scholarly work should be taken into consideration, but given the importance of ethnographers' believability and credibility, these inconsistencies are particularly worrisome.

Gang Leader for a Day details a number of instances where ethical good practice was openly flouted in the gathering of research, another cause for concern. It is entirely possible, as is the case with much memoir, that some of the details of the data collection process were embellished to ensure that Gang Leader for a Day made compelling reading and that his research gathering was not as 'exciting' or murky as it is presented as being, but this would still call into question the reliability of Venkatesh as a scholarly ethnographer. As it is his experience as an academic researcher that is the subject of Gang Leader for a Day, even the argument that writing a memoir constitutes a personal rather than professional exercise and thus should be exempt from critical academic scrutiny does not hold much sway. Not directly pertinent to the material which would normally be under consideration for this project, his recent work on the underground economics of New York City has also come under intense fire from the New York chapter of the Sex Workers Outreach Project on ethical grounds. (Sex Workers Outreach Project New York City and Sex Workers Action New York to Joyce Plaza and Yinon Cohen, 15 October 2011, <http://swop-nyc.org/wpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/SWOP-October-15th-letter-on-venkatesh.pdf>).

Venkatesh, “A Note on Social Theory and the American Street Gang”,

Decker and Van Winkle, Life in the Gang, 9.
the Chicago School. This would be followed in 1972 by his evaluation of the highly controversial Youth Manpower Project administered by the Woodlawn Organisation (TWO) in 1968. In the 1990s and 2000s, Spergel would shift his attention to Chicago’s Latino/Hispanic gangs, designing and evaluating the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project and basing it upon his nationally implemented Comprehensive Gang Model (also known as the Spergel Model of Gang Intervention and Suppression). More recently, Wesley G Skogan, who originally made his name in the study of community-police relations in Chicago, was responsible for the National Institute of Justice-supported independent evaluation of the CeaseFire – Chicago project.

'Gangsters', 'Gangstas' and Gangs: Core Debates in Gang Studies

In spite of the existence of a wealth of research into gang violence and its reduction, “[t]here is little, if any, consensus as to what constitutes a gang and who is a gang member let alone what gangs do, either inside or outside the law.” This is a central problem as identified by numerous gang studies scholars and as such is worth addressing. Perhaps, part of the definitional problem within the field is related to the problem of two distinct images of the gangster evoking two different time periods capturing the public imagination simultaneously, complicating the perceived relationship between gangs and illegal activity. The first of these is the 'classic' gangster of yesteryear, an Al Capone or Arnold Rothstein. In the United States, the heyday of the classic gangster coincided with the prohibition era of the 1920s and 1930s. The ban on the production and sale of alcoholic drinks resulted in a flourishing black market that seemed to promise untold riches to all those who were willing to take on the risks of engaging in black market activity. Following the end of prohibition, racketeering became the largest source of income for a number of the major organised crime groups,

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139 Skogan, Hartnett, Bump and Dubois, Evaluation of CeaseFire – Chicago.
including the infamous Chicago Outfit led by Al Capone.\textsuperscript{143} Illegal gambling,\textsuperscript{144} loansharking, robbery (of both the armed and unarmed varieties), narcotics and money laundering also proved lucrative, as they had in the years before prohibition. Past and present imaging of the classic gangster is defined by material excess. From the elaborate parties thrown by Jay Gatsby\textsuperscript{145} to the flash cars and tailored suits of Tony Camonte,\textsuperscript{146} this high-stakes world appears to come with fantastic rewards. Yet, there remains an acute awareness on the part of the classic gangster that everything is temporary, including life.\textsuperscript{147}

Popular representations of the classic gangster, especially the ‘gangster film’ have developed and perpetuated the image of the gangster as an anti-hero.\textsuperscript{148} In these American 'classic gangster' films, which include numerous adaptations of F Scott Fitzgerald’s \textit{The Great Gatsby} (Herbert Brenon, 1926; Elliot Nugent, 1949; Jack Clayton, 1974; Robert Markowitz, 2000; Baz Luhrmann, 2013), \textit{The Godfather} (Francis Ford Coppola, 1972), both versions of \textit{Scarface} (Howard Hughes, 1932; Brian de Palma, 1980) and \textit{Bugsy} (Barry Levinson, 1991), the classic gangster is either ethnically or geographically marked (non-Anglo-Saxon/from the rural south). These classic gangsters, from poor southern, Italian, Jewish,\textsuperscript{149} Central/Eastern European or German families, overcome the class and racial barriers that stand before them to achieve their own 'American Dream' by any means necessary.\textsuperscript{150} However the consequences of operating outside of the law, and beyond the realm of what is considered ‘moral society’ ultimately creates, “an almost Shakespearian tragic figure, whose inevitable downfall

\textsuperscript{144} Including numerous instances of ‘fixing’, the most notable being the 1919 World Series (baseball). Infamous New York gangster Arnold Rothstein is widely believed to have orchestrated the fix which saw the relatively unproven Cincinnati Reds defeat the Chicago White Sox who had been the bookies’ strong favourites. The incident led to permanent bans for a number of White Sox stars including Shoeless Joe Jackson (whose involvement in the plot remains under dispute), Lefty Willians and Eddie Cicotte, (James Kirby, “The Year They Fixed the World Series,” \textit{ABA Journal} 74, no 2 (1988): 65-69.)
\textsuperscript{145} F Scott Fitzgerald, \textit{The Great Gatsby} (Toronto: Penguin, 1950), 41-59.
\textsuperscript{146} \textit{Scarface} (Brian De Palma, 1983).
\textsuperscript{148} Julia Hallam and Margaret Marshment, \textit{Realism and Popular Cinema} (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 88.
\textsuperscript{149} Though 'Jewish' is a religious identification as opposed to an ethnicity, it has nevertheless been treated as an ethnicity on screen. Jewish individuals, at least in cultural representations (and not dissimilar to the treatment of Muslims in popular culture today), have traditionally been denied the expression of a national identity or ethnicity. Thus, while many American Jews originated in Germany, Central & Eastern Europe and Russia, it remains impossible to specify where the roots of the majority of fictional Jews lay. (Jacob Neusner, “Immigration and Religion in America: The Experience of Judaism,” in \textit{Religion and Immigration: Christian, Jewish, and Muslim Experiences in the United States}, eds. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, Jane I Smith and John L Esposito (Oxford: AltaMira, 2003), 106; Ross Perigoe and Mahmoud Eid, \textit{Mission Invisible: Race, Religion, and News at the Dawn of the 9/11 Era} (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2014), 62.)
was documented in near-Aristotelian terms."\(^{(151)}\)

The classic gangster both realises and challenges the meritocratic notion that anyone can make it in America. His wealth allows him to obtain the symbols and markers of status (money, cars, expensive clothing, grandiose accommodation). Yet acceptance into the exclusive upper stratum of American society remains blocked, not necessarily because of the dubious morality of his lifestyle, but because, as was the case all along, his lack of pedigree and ethnic impurity do not allow him to meet the conditions for belonging imposed by the old-moneyed White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) gatekeepers.\(^{(152)}\) The relationship between the gangster, the gatekeepers and those who are responsible for enforcing a law written to uphold the power of the latter group is complex. While it has been argued that the lifestyle of the classic gangster embodies a lack of respect for authority,\(^{(153)}\) the lengths to which he goes to acquire the material wealth upon which the American status system is largely predicated undermines any claim that he is not concerned with ‘fitting in’.

Though not displacing the classic gangster entirely, from the late 1980s forwards a rival image of the gangster began to fight for dominance in the public image. Tony Camonte\(^{(154)}\) and Vito Corleone\(^{(155)}\) were replaced by Doughboy\(^{(156)}\) and Caine\(^{(157)}\) as the assimilation of European ethnic groups into American ‘whiteness’ left low-income inner-city African Americans and Latinos at the bottom of the social hierarchy.\(^{(158)}\) In this image of gang life, the grandiosity of the classic gangster is replaced with the bleakness of ‘gangsta’ life in the ‘hood’.\(^{(159)}\) Where the classic gangster image focuses on shadowy large-scale operations, the new-look gangster is enmeshed in micro-level operations carried out by small localised networks of operatives. Drug dealing and prostitution replace racketeering and illegal gambling as major revenue streams and it is an excess of trust as opposed to an excess of hubris which appears to pose the biggest threat to these contemporary ‘gangstas’.\(^{(160)}\) The world in which they operate cruelly juxtaposes the stark minimalism of poverty with a life of not absolute, but relative access and excess (drink, drugs, romantic partners). The far-flung dreams of street youth are set against a backdrop of urban decay in a world where fifteen year-old boys rock bullet

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\(^{(151)}\) Wilson, “The Left-Handed Form of Human Endeavour,” 152.


\(^{(153)}\) Hallam and Marshment, Realism and Popular Cinema, 88.

\(^{(154)}\) Scarface (Howard Hawks, 1932).

\(^{(155)}\) The Godfather (Francis Ford Coppola, 1972); The Godfather Part II (Francis Ford Coppola, 1974).

\(^{(156)}\) Boyz n the Hood (John Singleton, 1991).

\(^{(157)}\) Menace II Society (Albert Hughes and Allen Hughes, 1993).


wounds as badges of honour and baby-faced hustlers are more concerned with how many dime-bags and rocks\textsuperscript{161} they can shift in an afternoon than preparing for college entrance exams, having long ago rejected the idea that the ‘conventional’ path to mainstream success is open to them.\textsuperscript{162} Some may occasionally sojourn into other social worlds, but their lives seem unalterably embedded in the communities they call home. In these communities, young people, children even,\textsuperscript{163} will see more ‘untimely death’ over the course of their short lives than the overwhelming majority of their fellow countrymen ever will, bar those who have served on combat duty in the armed forces.\textsuperscript{164}

This dysphoric image of gang life is reflected in films and television programmes such as \textit{Boyz n the Hood} (John Singleton, 1991), \textit{Juice} (Ernest K Dickerson, 1992) and \textit{The Wire} (David Simon, 2002-2008) or, in a British context, \textit{Top Boy} (Ronan Bennett, 2011-present), \textit{My Brother the Devil} (Sally El Hosani, 2012) and \textit{Ill Manors} (Ben Drew, 2012). Regardless of the extent to which these popular representations of gangs and gang life are accurate or ‘authentic’, they have framed public, policy and even academic debates around inner-city issues from welfare reform to youth criminal justice.\textsuperscript{165} At the same time, one should not read too much into academic and critical assessments of authenticity and accuracy when it comes to these representations,\textsuperscript{166} which often conflate authenticity with the degree to which images on screen conform to perceptions of urban life held by individuals who, by and large, are as likely, if not more, to spend time on safari in South Africa than in a Chicago housing project.\textsuperscript{167} Simultaneously, there is also the concern that in spite of the best intentions of

\textsuperscript{161} Common units of sale for marijuana and crack cocaine respectively.
\textsuperscript{162} Jay MacLeod, \textit{Ain’t No Makin’ It: Aspirations and Attainment in a Low Income Neighborhood}, 3ed (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995).
\textsuperscript{163} Though there are some regional variances in the data, it is widely reported that the peak age for participation in street gangs is 14-15 years old. (Malcolm W Klein and Cheryl L Maxson, \textit{Street Gang Patterns and Policies} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 41.)
\textsuperscript{166} One particularly problematic notion of authenticity was that employed by Tiffany C Potter and CW Marshall who argue, “Despite the literary sophistication of \textit{The Wire}, there is an authenticity that bleeds through the screen. Part of the reason for this is the deliberate blurring of truth and fiction that the creators have inscribed into the casting and characters of the series.” (Tiffany Potter and CW Marshall, “‘I Am the American Dream’: Modern Urban Tragedy and the Borders of Fiction,” in \textit{The Wire: Urban Decay and American Television}, eds. Tiffany Potter and CW Marshall (New York: Continuum, 2009), 10.) Though Potter and Marshall are able to offer a number of interesting insights regarding \textit{The Wire}’s impact on perceptions of low-income urban communities, their argument that authenticity is derived from the blurring of fact and fiction is highly problematic in that it obscures the role show-runners play in mediating knowledge and grossly misrepresents the relationship between authenticity and truth. (Nicole Ives-Allison, “Irish Accents, Foreign Voices: Mediated Agency and Authenticity in \textit{In the Name of the Father} and \textit{Fifty Dead Men Walking},” \textit{Journal of Terrorism Studies} 4, no 1 (2013): 43-63).
\textsuperscript{167} It should be noted that although they may not constitute a majority in terms of overall numbers, many of the most respected academic commentators on inner city and race issues are from low
those responsible for the creation of these representations, the focus on drugs and violence for dramatic purposes gives further strength to prevailing stereotypes of hood life, further exoticising and distancing these communities from wider society.168

There is also a significant amount of confusion and disagreement over the nature of the contemporary gang.169 It is largely agreed that the term ‘gang’ has been used to refer to two rather different organisational archetypes, the first more loosely-organised and territorially based groups with a younger 'gangsta' membership drawn from local low-income/working-class neighbourhoods. The second refers to larger, more tightly regimented groups committed to scalable illegal enterprise (the type of organisation which a classic gangster might lead). The extent to which these two types overlap or bleed into one another in reality is much less clear, though there does appear to be some consensus around the existence of a degree of upward mobility between the first and second type.170 It is also agreed that smaller, more loosely organised groups tend to rely upon larger (increasingly international) criminal organisations for their ‘product’ supply.171 The Eurogang research programme has done some exceptional work on these links,172 yet it continues to be an issue that is chronically under-explored within the gang

170 For those ‘successful’ in low-level drug dealing and criminal activity there are opportunities to advance one’s career by engaging in higher-level distribution and related activities, an attractive proposition for those who perceive themselves as excluded from mainstream economic opportunities. (John Pitts, “Mercenary Territory: Are Youth Gangs Really a Problem?” in Youth in Crisis: ‘Gangs’, Territoriality and Violence, ed. Barry Goldson (London: Routledge, 2001), 171.)
studies literature.

Some have sought to deal with this conceptual complexity by dismantling or otherwise avoiding the use of the term ‘gang’ altogether, but this comes with its own set of challenges and drawbacks. As Barry Goldson writes:

Indeed semantic slippages between terms such as ‘peer group’, ‘informal peer group network’, ‘fluid and transitional youth group formation’, ‘street-based group’, ‘delinquent peer group’, ‘delinquent youth group’, ‘gang’, ‘criminal gang’, ‘organised criminal group’, ‘organised crime network,’ and ‘crime firm’ obfuscate meaning, create confusion, produce contrasting and contradictory findings and impede coherent analysis.173

Thus whether ‘gang’ has been used as an ‘all-purpose’ term or highly specific terminology has been employed instead, the lack of conceptual clarity within the gang studies field has presented a number of problems for researchers. As with other definitional debates, such as the one encircling ‘terrorism’, there is the concern that, “Indeed, in many ways, gang seems to be not an indicative term (e.g., a denotative noun) at all but an expressive term (e.g., a connotative expletive) uttered either when certain emotions are evoked or in order to evoke such emotions in others.”174

As previously argued, the word ‘gang’ has, undeniably, been applied by policymakers, government officials, law enforcement and even some academic researchers in pejorative ways.175 However, there does not exist a more suitable (or clearly defined) term, especially when one takes into consideration the size and strength of the gang studies literature. For the purposes of this research, the most suitable definition of gang is, “any durable, street-oriented youth group whose involvement in illegal activity is part of its group identity.”176 Taken from the Eurogang project’s consensus definition of the ‘street gang’ this definition highlights the importance of space and place to gangs and gang members.177 Though this definition has been problematised on the basis that embedded within it is a connection between gangs and illegal activity,178 this criticism is slightly unfair. The Eurogang definition does claim participation in illegal activity as a distinguishing feature of gangs, however, it also recognises that these activities are only a part, and not even necessarily the most important part, of gang life. The result is a definition that is both broad and robust, allowing for critical reflection on the connection between gangs and delinquency/deviancy.

175 John Pitts, “Mercenary Territory,” 162.
177 Ibid, 2-5.
178 Hallsworth and Young, “Gang Talk and Gang Talkers,” 185-186.
The Opportunities, Limits and Nomenclature of Northern Irish Studies

As a small, relatively isolated region of the United Kingdom with a population of under two million there was, in proportion to its perceived importance, relatively little literature focusing specifically on Northern Ireland before the Troubles broke out in 1968. However, the Troubles would generate a tremendous amount of scholarly attention for this previously under-explored region. The first major political attitudes survey to include questions around the legitimacy of the existing constitutional arrangement was carried out by Richard Rose in 1968, coinciding with the rise of the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland. His results, however, were not published widely until 1971’s Governing Without Consensus hit the shelves. Others would quickly follow Rose (though few of these initial studies would match his intellectual rigour) once the situation on the streets of Belfast and Derry began to draw significant media attention, becoming a regular feature on the evening news through much of the English-speaking world. By 1983 the Social Sciences Bibliography of Northern Ireland listed over 5,000 published items on the region and its conflict, with John Whyte predicting that by the time he wrote his evaluative survey of the field in 1991, the scholarly literature may have totalled as much as 9,000 pieces.

In spite of his valiant efforts, the speed with which scholarly writing was being produced and published at the time of his writing Interpreting Northern Ireland prompted Whyte to write, “There was so much coming out that it was beyond the scope of one researcher to keep up with the literature.” This, it comes as little surprise that it would be Whyte who would assert that, taking its size into account, Northern Ireland is perhaps the most heavily researched region of the world. This is a point of view commented upon by Paul Arthur and Keith Jeffery who argue, “One of the clichés concerning the Northern Ireland problem contends that if all the publications, the explanations, the analyses and the solutions were put side by side they would span the circumference of the world,” while at the same time positing that in spite of this, for many the conflict remains obscure. To even begin to study Northern Ireland involves a commitment to wade through a mountainous volume of literature which is growing by the day, with much containing insights immediately recognisable as useful. Unsurprisingly, in sub-fields such as community relations, peace-building, conflict transformation and state responses to domestic terrorism, efforts to engage with cutting edge research beyond existing work on the region are often necessarily limited.

179 Although, as is argued by John Whyte, there were some exceptions to this general pattern including Emrys Jones’ A Social Geography of Belfast (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960) and The Northern Ireland Problem: A Study in Group Relations by Denis P Bartlett and Charles Frederick Carter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962). (Whyte, Interpreting Northern Ireland, 3-5.)
180 McGarry and O’Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland, 4.
181 Dooley, Black and Green; Prince, Northern Ireland’s ’68.
182 Rose, Governing Without Consensus.
183 Whyte, Interpreting Northern Ireland, viii.
184 Ibid, ix.
185 Ibid, viii.
Northern Ireland frequently continues to be treated as 'a place apart' in much of this literature, though there have been an increasing number of works that do an excellent job of integrating lessons from or about Northern Ireland into debates around broader non-region specific concerns, illustrating it is possible to strike a balance between introspection and external engagement. For example, Siobhán McAlister, Phil Scraton and Deena Haydon’s contribution to Barry Goldson’s *Youth in Crisis? Gangs, Territoriality and Violence* examines the class dynamics of youth territoriality in Northern Ireland and builds a bridge between Northern Irish studies and one of the key concerns in the gang studies literature. *Urban Segregation and the Welfare State: Inequality and Exclusion in Western Cities*, edited by Sako Musterd and Wim Ostendorf, includes an excellent chapter on Belfast by geographer Frederick W Boal (and also includes a chapter on Chicago by Jerome L Kaufman). By embedding his discussion of sectarian segregation in Belfast in contemporary urban sociology and by incorporating elements of its marginality discourse, Boal illustrates that urban divisions in Northern Ireland are as much a matter of class as religion. Additionally, there are numerous examples of deep interdisciplinary work focusing on representations of Northern Ireland and the conflict within the context of representational politics more broadly. Yet these works remain exceptions rather than the rule. For research on Northern Ireland to avoid stagnation and buck the current trend of increasing solipsism, a better balance between deep introspection and innovative externally-directed research is needed, something this thesis aspires to contribute to the field.

**The Nomenclature of Northern Irish Studies**

As Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd argue, “A study on Northern Ireland always requires reference to nomenclature,” for, “Unfortunately a neutral terminology is not available and choices must be made.” This is an aspect of writing on Northern Ireland from which this work makes no attempt to remove itself. There are a number of

193 Ruane and Todd, *The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland*, xiv.
194 Ibid, xv.
geographical terms in particular which have, over time, become firmly embedded within the sectarian language of Northern Ireland. The result is that everyday conversations with strangers on street corners from Belfast to Ballinamallard are peppered with decisions of word choice where carelessness can risk causing offence or provocation. For example, discussion of spending one’s weekend in ‘Londonderry’ is likely to raise more than a few suspicious eyebrows outside the Divis Flats at the start of the almost entirely Catholic Lower Falls Road. The same can be said for referring to Northern Ireland as ‘the six counties’ while walking down the near-exclusively Protestant Sandy Row. For academic writing to mean something, not simply to the academic community but to the people of Northern Ireland, it is important that the words used to describe the land, its society and its people be considered carefully. As much as reckless terminological usage is distracting and weakens the analytical strength of scholarship on Northern Ireland, to the people about whom these works are written, such carelessness is disrespectful and demonstrates a lack of interest in taking seriously the identification markers that matter considerably to so many.

At a local level, the names Londonderry and Derry are both commonly used to refer to Northern Ireland’s second city, with their simultaneous usage indicative of the extent of sectarian division. ‘Derry’, an Anglicisation of the Irish ‘Daire’, was the original name of the settlement, with the prefix ‘London-’ added in the drawing up of the city’s Royal Charter signed by King James. Until the 1960s, Derry was the name most commonly used by members of both communities, however as sectarian politics intensified at the end of the decade, many Protestants began to refer to the city exclusively by its legal name. Catholics, on the other hand, continued to refer to the city by its ancient name. Since the end of the Troubles both names have been used together as ‘Derry/Londonderry or ‘Derry ~ Londonderry’ in some official circles and in the promotion of large scale events such as BBC Radio 1’s Big Weekend (2012) and UK City of Culture 2013. Yet, the use of both names has not gained traction among the people of Northern Ireland (or the city specifically), being a bit awkward and bulky whether spoken or written. With the Catholic majority in the city and increasing numbers of Protestants (Loyalist and unionist politicians being notable exceptions) now comfortable using Derry, that will be the name employed throughout this research both for brevity and to mirror language use within the region.

The various political positions in Northern Ireland reflect disagreement over the optimal constitutional relationship between Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom. While both unionists and loyalists support the current constitutional arrangement which positions Northern Ireland as an integral part of the United Kingdom (though it operates with a considerable amount of autonomy), they differ in both the beneficiary of their allegiance and the lengths to which they are willing to go to defend the current

195 This is, at least partially, related to the practice of ‘telling’ in Northern Irish society that readily establishes on which side of the sectarian divide an individual falls on first encounter. (Frank Burton, “Ideological Social Relations in Northern Ireland,” The British Journal of Sociology 30, no 1 (1979): 61-80.)

constitutional arrangement. Loyalists, almost exclusively Protestant, are loyal to ‘Queen and constitution’, with only conditional loyalty granted to the government and its supporting state institutions.\(^{197}\) As long as the state ensures that religious rights (defined in Protestant terms) and civil freedoms (specifically around loyalist/British cultural expression) are protected and supported, loyalist paramilitary organisations such as the Ulster Defence Association/ Ulster Freedom Fighters\(^{198}\) and Ulster Volunteer Force are prepared to engage in violence ‘on its behalf’ (though any claim that the state has been grateful for this ‘assistance’ is dubious at best).\(^{199}\) When the interests of the state and, more specifically, the government are seen to betray loyalist values, violence and disorder can be directed at official institutions.\(^{200}\) The 2012/2013 flag protests are a recent example of this. Following Belfast City Council’s December 2012 vote to reduce the number of days on which the Union Jack would fly over Belfast City Hall (bringing local policy in line with that of the Northern Ireland Assembly and central government guidance) loyalist protests erupted throughout the city. On a number of occasions, these protests escalated into full-blown riots.\(^{201}\) Unionist politics by contrast eschews extra-judicial violence. Allegiance tends to lie in the constitutional link and active governance relationship between Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom.

While the unionist and loyalist political parties attract predominantly Protestant support, nationalist and republican parties receive the overwhelming majority of their support from Catholics. Both nationalists and republicans aspire to a united Ireland, but where nationalists remain committed to achieving reunification/independence through exclusively constitutional means, republicans believe that a free, independent and united Ireland must be won by any means necessary including the use of violence. Another significant difference between the two political traditions is their position on the political spectrum. Official nationalists are generally considered to be more conservative in their politics, republicans have elected to present themselves as left-leaning.\(^{202}\)


\(^{198}\) Because the Ulster Defence Association remained legal throughout most of the Troubles, its paramilitary violence was carried out under the banner of the Ulster Freedom Fighters so as to avoid the main group joining the rest of the loyalist and republican paramilitary organisations on the proscribed organisations list.


\(^{202}\) McIlroy, Shooting to Kill, 19; Smithey, Unionists, Loyalists, and Conflict Transformation in Northern Ireland, 23-24; Jon Tonge, Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change, 2ed (New York:
Controversially, this work will use religious rather than political labels to refer to the two groups on either side of Northern Ireland’s sectarian divide. This is for two reasons. Firstly, religious labels, though referring to a broader group of people, can nevertheless be considered to be more precise than political or ethnic labels. Secondly, it is with religious terminology that the people of Northern Ireland most frequently refer to themselves and others. Though a great deal of scholarship maps out residential segregation in Northern Ireland according to political terminology and labels areas as ‘unionist’ or ‘nationalist’ (or just as commonly ‘republican’ or ‘loyalist’), these terms do not accurately reflect the nature of segregation. It is true that Catholics in Northern Ireland largely support the idea of a united Ireland (reflected in their overwhelming support for nationalist and republican political parties) and it is also the case that unionist and loyalist parties are almost exclusively supported by Protestants, but the interchangeable use of political and religious terms is highly problematic. Even in the most religiously homogeneous neighbourhoods, political support is divided. In neighbourhoods that are almost exclusively Catholic, political support is still split between the nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party, Sinn Féin (the political branch of the Provisional republican movement) and, albeit to a much lesser extent, the non-sectarian Alliance Party. Protestant political support is distributed between Ulster


204 Whyte, Interpreting Northern Ireland, 18.


206 Provisional Sinn Féin was born in 1970 out of the same split that created the Provisional Irish Republican movement, a descendent of the party of the same name founded by Arthur Griffith in 1905. Literature dealing directly with Sinn Féin (as opposed to the IRA/Provisional IRA) includes: Kevin Bean, The New Politics of Sinn Féin (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007); Aignès Maillot, New Sinn Féin: Republicanism After the IRA (London: Routledge, 2004); Murray and Tonge, Sinn Féin and the SDLP; and Eoin Ó Brion, Sinn Féin and the Politics of Left Republicanism (London: Pluto Press, 2009).

207 The Alliance Party would generally be considered the main non-sectarian party in Northern Ireland. Though it has members and supporters of both Catholic and Protestant background (and others who prefer to remain ‘non-aligned’), it was initially founded by liberal unionists in 1970 with the intention of improving community relations in Northern Ireland through political reform. It has commanded a largely middle-class membership, and in its early days, it captured a significant amount of the support previously given to the Northern Ireland Labour Party. (Cornelia Albert, The Peacebuilding Elements of the Belfast Agreement and the Transformation of the Northern Ireland Conflict (Frankfurt: Peter Laing, 2009), 63-65; Gordon Gillespie, The A-
Unionist Party and the Democratic Unionist Party, with the Alliance Party also getting a small, but significant, share of the vote.

As support for these parties has fluctuated over time, even within the same neighbourhoods, it cannot reasonably be asserted that even where a given party has enjoyed (or currently enjoys) a great deal of support in an area, the neighbourhood’s electoral habits are its defining feature. Ethnic terminology, such as ‘Irish’ or ‘British’ has never held much currency in terms of describing local geography. Besides, ascribing Protestants in Northern Ireland a single national identity is a much more complicated endeavour than with Catholics who largely self-identify as Irish and referring to a specific neighbourhood as ‘British/Ulster/Northern Irish/Anglo-Irish/slightly Irish’ would complicate things considerably. Thus, while there is consensus that Northern Ireland is a divided society, neither the existing political nor national/ethnic terminology is up to the task of adequately representing these divisions.

It is best then to take one’s cue from how people talk about themselves and others in Northern Ireland, which is with religious labels. When a small child in one of Belfast or Derry’s homogeneous working-class neighbourhoods wishes to ascertain whether a new face is part of his or her collective ‘us’ or a distant and threatening ‘them’, the newcomer will be asked whether they are ‘a Protestant’ or ‘a Catholic’, or just as likely, a ‘hun’ or ‘taig’ despite the continued pejorative connotations of both words. This is a reality recognised by Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd who argue:

> Religion more than ethnic or historical origin or politics or identity is the mark of community membership. It is religion which sorts into communities, even though the overt communal conflict is much more about economics, politics or identity than theology. That it why, when two people meet in Northern Ireland, the first priority is to establish each other’s religion, and why it is important not simply to know whether a person is nationalist or unionist but whether he or she is a Catholic or a Protestant nationalist or unionist. In each case, the difference is profound.

Indeed whether a Catholic man votes for the Ulster Unionist Party matters little if he is cornered by a loyalist mob in the back allies of a Protestant neighbourhood, for those looking to attack will not stop long enough to ascertain his voting history. Political allegiance means relatively little in a world where every readily accessible identifying feature is coded along sectarian lines – name, address, primary school attended, football tops, and brand of stadium pants. Thus, while Richard Rose has argued that the pervasiveness of sectarian politics means religious labels carry as much political weight


Todd and Ruane, *The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland*, xiv.
as 'left' and 'right' do in societies where politics are driven primarily by socio-economic issues,\textsuperscript{211} in reality Northern Ireland's religious labels are much heavier. Nonetheless, appropriate terminology will continue to be used when referring to specific political or ethnic groups.

**Conclusion**

As illustrated in the introduction to this work both gang violence in the United States and low intensity civil conflict in Northern Ireland have most profoundly affected low-income urban neighbourhoods comprised largely of ethnic minorities. In both cases, this group violence is carried out predominately by young males with socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds reflective of their communities. The United States and United Kingdom alike are liberal democratic states and global economic leaders who have historically embraced capitalism. The United Kingdom may have a stronger welfare state, yet both are among the most domestically unequal economically advanced societies. Still there has not yet been any serious comparative work addressing the similarities between Northern Irish paramilitary and American street gang violence. This chapter has argued that the major barrier to such comparative work has been the existence of a binary division between 'political' and 'non-political' violence within the existing group violence scholarship. Political and gang violence scholars alike are keen to establish the distinctiveness of 'their' type of violence. However an increasing reluctance to discuss the criminal aspects of political violence has distanced the study of this type of group violence from that dedicated to understanding other forms of violence, including gang violence. With political violence scholars claiming political motivations, aspirations and implications as the hallmarks of 'political violence', the political meaning and significance of gang violence (and all forms of group violence which do not fit the 'political violence' definition) has been denied. The dominance of criminology, sociology and anthropology in the gang studies field, combined with the paucity of political science involvement, has meant that despite its interdisciplinary nature, mounting a campaign for the politicisation of gang violence or even a recognition of its political dimension, has not been seen as a major priority. In shedding light on the existence and problems of the political/non-political violence binary it becomes possible to challenge its unspoken dominance, which is the aim of the remaining chapters.

The political/non-political violence binary contributes to the lack of meaningful high-level politicised response to endemic gang violence in Chicago and its recognition as a threat to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness by subtly discouraging a reframing of the issue. It also plays a more active role where scholars are involved in making or advising on policy that reinforces an apolitical view of gang violence. The next chapter will explore the origins of mismatched response in greater detail. It focuses on how the historic under-politicisation of race in America has made it difficult, nigh impossible, for African American street gangs to present themselves as legitimate political agents while the political significance accorded to all mobilisation along the sectarian divide in Northern Ireland has created a situation where the Provisional IRA could hardly avoid political consideration. The extent to which Northern Irish society is

\textsuperscript{211} Rose, *Governing Without Consensus*, 113-114.
comparatively and absolutely politicised can be seen in both the discussion of appropriate nomenclature above and the need for such a discussion in the first place, something for which there is no gang studies equivalent.
Chapter 2
The Emergence and Reproduction of Politicised and Depoliticised Difference: The Legacies of Sectarianism & Nationalism in Northern Ireland and Race in the United States

It is in understanding how the major historically-rooted cleavages in Northern Irish and American society have been accorded or denied political significance that we can begin to understand how levels of gang violence in the city of Chicago exceeding those experienced in Northern Ireland during the Troubles have failed to generate a similarly robust state-level response. Furthermore, in understanding how the 'response gap' has emerged and sustained itself over time, it becomes easier to see how the prevailing 'community intervention' and 'legalistic suppression' approaches to gang violence reduction in Chicago (and the United States more broadly) have failed to escape major scrutiny and true reform in the face of their limited efficacy. This chapter will explore how sectarianism and nationalism together created a political context in which the sheer existence of the Provisional IRA represented a salient political threat requiring state response. It argues that while the shape and intensity of this response was determined by the intensity and targeting of its violence, the fact of response in itself was not. Even though a good deal of Provisional IRA violence did not take the form of externally directed 'political violence' as we have come to understand the term, there was very little the group could do to avoid generating a state response. In rather stark contrast, the absence of a similarly politicised backdrop in Chicago has meant that, even at greater levels of intensity, the group violence carried out by the city's African American supergangs has failed to capture a political response befitting the scale of damage caused to both individual and community life in the city's most socio-economically disadvantaged neighbourhoods.

Race is the most recognisable and potent source of social division in the United States and the handling of race issues has had a profound affect on how African American street gangs have been 'handled' by official bodies. Further, race issues have often become an important source of political contention. However, the near wholesale exclusion of African Americans from the public and political sphere until the emergence of the civil rights movement in the 1950s has meant that historically these tensions have

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212 According to available Sutton Index data, the Provisional IRA was responsible for 510 civilian deaths, the vast majority occurring in Northern Ireland. Although this pales in comparison to the 1,009 members of the British security service whose deaths the organisation was responsible for (453 being members of the British Army), one 'collateral damage' death for every two 'combat' deaths is not exactly a glowing argument on behalf of a militaristic justification for the Provisional IRA's violence. During the conflict, loyalist paramilitaries were responsible for 877 civilian deaths, the overwhelming majority Catholic civilians. Although the Provisional IRA does not bear responsibility for these deaths, their targeted attacks against British security forces (particularly the localised Ulster Defence Regiment and the police (Royal Ulster Constabulary)), prompted retaliatory attacks from loyalist paramilitary groups who, in aligning themselves conditionally with the British state, saw any security service deaths as a hit to 'their side' and a step closer to the dreaded united Ireland. Thus, not only did the Provisional IRA actively engage in violence leading to numerous civilian deaths, they also played an important role in the overall escalation of community-level conflict. (Malcolm Sutton, “Sutton Index of Deaths,” CAIN (Conflict Archive on the Internet), accessed 27 July 2014.)
played themselves out in the economic and community (neighbourhood composition; crime; 'neighbourly' conduct) spheres with our understanding of the meaning and significance of gang violence greatly informed by this positioning.

Chicago's supergangs emerged in the midst of civil rights mobilisation across the American south. Southern blacks banded together in unprecedented numbers during this period to demand full legal equality, dismantle the system of local 'Jim Crow' legislation that supported southern racial segregation, and ensure equal access to public space. It was the first, and remains the only, significant political mass mobilisation of African Americans in the history of the United States. Quite crucially however, the civil rights movement began to dwindle in size and strength as it moved northward into Chicago where de jure segregation had long been replaced by de facto segregation and the latter proved a much tricker force to overcome. Both the broad political mobilisation of the civil rights movement and the violent mobilisation of the 'supergang' street gangs lacked precedence in African American history. Still, the emergent African American (and Hispanic/Latino) supergangs would quickly surpass those studied by Thrasher and contemporaries in both lethality and involvement in illegal operations.

However, the situation of these groups within a class-focused version of urban history has led to a failure to recognise the way in which the long history of American racial inequality's has contributed to the inappropriate depoliticisation of gang violence, reinforcing the perception of gang violence in Chicago as a local rather than a national issue and as an economic and social problem as opposed to a political one. Over the last half century, Chicago's gangs have together claimed thousands of lives and the liberty of many of the city's most socio-economically marginalised residents. Their violence has seriously undermined the idea that the American state is willing and/or capable of protecting the 'universal' and 'inalienable' rights to 'life liberty and the pursuit of happiness' the Declaration of Independence claims it was founded to secure. This therefore begs the question of whether the liberal democratic state stable can truly be considered stable when it repeatedly fails to live up to its end of the social contract.

The Politics of Group Violence in Ireland and Post-partition Northern Ireland

The limits of the Protestant Reformation in Ireland during the 16th century in combination with the 'colonising' aspects of Scottish settlement in Ulster in the 17th would mean that by the time of the emergence of modern nationalism in Ulster, political mobilisation across the sectarian divide was already a difficult and complicated endeavour. Nevertheless, the failure of early republicans to secure wide cross-sectarian support would lead to the classification of Irish republicanism as a violent and Catholic form of political mobilisation. This mapping of nationalist political expression onto sectarian difference would most significantly impact political life in Ulster, the most religiously heterogenous part of Ireland. The creation of Northern Ireland as a distinct administrative unit within the UK on the basis of these sectarian politics during the Irish War of Independence generated a zero-sum sectarian political landscape in the region wherein any 'gains' (real or perceived) secured by one side of the sectarian divide came to be read as an equivalent ‘loss’ for the other. With each change in the balance, the

213 Cooley, “’Stones Run It’.”
constitution was reinforced or undermined depending on who believed themselves as victorious.\textsuperscript{214} In such an environment the emergence of the Provisional IRA as a militant republican organisation would affect the power balance immediately and before it even had the chance to conduct its first action.

\textbf{Divide or Conquer: The Development and Entrenchment of the Sectarian Cleavage in Irish Society (Mid-16th Century to Late-18th Century)}

Before it is possible to speak of the development of the sectarian cleavage in Ireland or Northern Ireland, it is first worth defining 'sectarianism'. For some, the term sectarianism, which has its roots in Irish history,\textsuperscript{215} has become synonymous with religious bigotry and hatred.\textsuperscript{216} Though the term has always spoken to the frequently acrimonious nature of Catholic-Protestant relations on the island, there is a greater degree of nuance than the common perception belies. This is perhaps best captured in the definition offered by Robbie McVeigh who argues, “Sectarianism in Ireland is that changing set of ideas and practices, including, crucially, acts of violence, which serves to construct and reproduce the difference between, and unequal status of, Irish Protestants and Catholics.”\textsuperscript{217} Quite crucially, sectarianism is non-theological in nature.\textsuperscript{218} Theological differences do assume some importance, particularly among religious fundamentalists, but even in the period between the beginning of the Reformation in the mid-16\textsuperscript{th} century and the emergence of modern Irish nationalism in the mid-to-late 18\textsuperscript{th} century, it was the political organisation of religion that assumed primary significance.\textsuperscript{219} More simply put, Protestant objections to Catholicism are rooted in issues with papal (foreign) authority to a much larger degree than they are in animosity towards the specific theological claims made by the principle of transubstantiation or devotion to the Virgin Mary.

The experience of Ireland during and following the Reformation is reflective of the fact that the Reformation in England was born out of perceived political necessity as opposed to major theological difference, differentiating itself in this way from the


\textsuperscript{215} Though it has since been used in reference to religious and ethnic divisions in other parts of the world, particularly in Lebanon. (Paul WT Kingston, \textit{Reproducing Sectarianism: Advocacy Networks and the Politics of Civil Society in Postwar Lebanon} (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2013); Max Weiss, \textit{In the Shadow of Sectarianism: Law, Shi’ism, and the Making of Modern Lebanon} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).


\textsuperscript{218} Ibid, 643-644.

Reformation on the continent. This lack of theological animosity is something which can be seen in the extremely close parallels between Catholic and 'high church' Anglican theology and practice. The Reformation in Ireland was carried out only half-heartedly, providing a fertile breeding ground for future disagreement, distrust and discrimination. As in England, the early Reformation project in Ireland was carried out as part of a project aimed at strengthening the authority of the monarchy who had assumed the position of head of the official church. In other words, church-building was to play a crucial role in the process of state-building.

With tension brewing between the formerly close King Henry VIII of England (then Lord of Ireland) and the Roman Catholic Church following Pope Clement's refusal (or restricted theological ability) to annul Henry VIII's marriage to Catherine of Aragon, the Church in England incrementally separated from the Roman Catholic Church during the early 1530s, resulting in full official separation in 1534. Though these changes, by virtue of the political and governance relationship between England and Ireland during this period, came into immediate effect in Ireland, the Irish Reformation really began with the 1536 Irish parliamentary declaration of Henry VIII as supreme head of the Church in Ireland. As English political authority in Ireland was largely restricted to Dublin and the immediate surrounding area, known as 'the pale', "declarative statutes could only represent the start of what needed to be a wider and longer process of actually implementing change on the ground – a process which did not occur in Ireland." If English authority did not effectively permeate within Irish society when it came to governance matters, a warm welcome for its Reformation, especially where local ties to the church were particularly strong, could hardly have been expected. As Alan Ford writes:

The essential problem which dogged the reformation throughout the sixteenth century and after was inherent in its very inception: it was conceived in England and imposed upon Ireland as an exercise in dynastic politics. The legislation passed by the Pale parliament in 1536 had little direct relevance to Irish needs or demands, nor did it take into account the various ways in which conditions in Ireland

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222 Jeffries, The Irish Church and the Tudor Reformations, 71.
224 English, Irish Freedom, 45; Meigs, The Reformations in Ireland, 47.
225 English, Irish Freedom, 49.
226 Jeffries, The Irish Church and the Tudor Reformations, 71.
differed from those in England. The specific roots of the failure of the Reformation to gain popular support in the Pale and beyond, whether it was the socio-psychological connection of the medieval Catholic church to 'the Gaelic world' or a matter of clergy income and resource paucity, are less important than its implications on political relations throughout Ireland. The failure of the native population to embrace the new state church added an additional dimension of disloyalty to English perceptions (shared by some Anglo-Irish leaders) of the cultural/moral inferiority of the native Irish. Where the head of the official state church also stands as the head of state (the monarch), a lack of religious allegiance simultaneously represents a lack of political allegiance and vice versa. Any time where a sizeable portion of the population who is to be governed refuses allegiance actively or passively, this becomes a problem for the governing regime. At a time when there existed a fear that an attack might be launched upon England with Papal support by one or more of its Catholic rivals (namely France and Spain), this constituted a threat to state security as well. The strategic threat a Catholic Ireland presented at a time when war between European states was commonplace made the religious divide an important (if not central) policy issue for the British state in its governance relationship with Ireland.

By the early 17th century, it had become clear that the haphazard approach to Reformation in Ireland which relied upon willing the native Irish to adopt the state church of their own accord was failing to yield the hoped for (or expected) results. Even the faint glimmers of hope for the conversion of the 'Old English' that had appeared during the mid-Elizabethan era had largely vanished. Yet, the matter really could not be left unaddressed, especially in the wake of the Anglo-Spanish War and the assistance provided by Spain to Gaelic Chieftains during the Nine Years War (1594-1603). Plantation, a form of punitive colonisation on lands seized from defeated rebel Chieftains and (more rarely) Old English landlords, emerged as a political strategy for increasing British control in Ireland in the mid-16th century. In bringing increasing numbers of British settlers to Ireland, it was hoped that plantation might also help to modernise the religious beliefs of local natives. The end of the Nine Years War and the defeat of Hugh O'Neill, Earl of Tyrone (the most powerful Chieftain in the ancient province of Ulster) provided the opportunity for plantation on a far greater scale than had occurred previously. What became known as the 'Plantation of Ulster', began at a

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228 Meigs, The Reformations in Ireland.
231 English, Irish Freedom, 54.
233 Jeffries, The Irish Church and the Tudor Reformations, 239-240.
234 Strong historical overviews of the plantation of Ulster can be found in: Nicholas Canny, Making
time when the King of England and King of Scotland were one in the same (James I) and differed from early plantation efforts in that it consisted of major waves of immigration from Scotland.

The concentration of new arrivals in Ulster would, irrevocably, give Ulster a more heterogeneous religious composition than the rest of the island. Where previous plantation efforts brought Anglican English settlers into Ireland, most notably in Munster, Ulster's mostly Scottish settlers were largely Presbyterian and other forms of Dissenter (non-Anglican Protestant), a reflection of the fact that the Presbyterian church had established itself as the official church of Scotland in the late 16th century.\(^{235}\) Financial incentives, specifically free or very inexpensive land, also managed to attract Scots from across the class spectrum, a change from previous waves of migration which tended to bring middle and upper class English to Ireland. Critically, those new arrivals without family wealth depended wholly upon their ability to generate wealth from their particular allotment for survival. The need to secure tenancies/labour from the native population brought native Irish Catholic and settler Scottish (or 'Ulster Scots') into close contact and positioned them in complex and dynamic dependence/rivalry relationships.\(^{236}\) The experience of Ulster indicates that it was not immune to the tendency of rapid demographic change (specifically a relatively homogenous influx of newcomers) to generate intergroup conflict.\(^ {237}\) Tensions frequently flared, and at times violence ensued. The worst of this violence came during the 1641-1642 rebellions which started as a push against the British government by an alliance of Catholic Old English\(^ {238}\) and native Irish before descending into brutal sectarian/ethnic conflict.\(^ {239}\)

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\(^{236}\) Foster, *Modern Ireland, 1600-1972*, 60-61.


\(^{238}\) Though it may appear an obvious alliance given their shared religious allegiance, the Old English saw themselves as culturally superior to the native (Gaelic) Irish, even after they came to be perceived as inferior by the Protestant New English settlers. (Declan Downey, “Purity of Blood and Purity of Faith in Early Modern Ireland,” in *The Origins of Sectarianism in Early Modern Ireland*, eds. Alan Ford and John McCafferty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 220.)

\(^{239}\) “Religion is certainly a major determinant of Irish nationality; but, until the mid-seventeenth century, religion was not a unifying political force among Irishmen, though attempts were certainly made to make it so.” (D George Boyce, *Nationalism in Ireland* (London: Croom Helm, 1982), 46)
Rather than forcing the government to meaningfully address the grievances and insecurity of the native population, the rebellions instead deepened mistrust and reinforced the perception of the Catholic native population as fundamentally disloyal.

In the late 17th century penal laws were introduced in Ireland (similar to those in operation in England), with the hope that by restricting opportunities for Catholic and Dissenter participation in political and economic life conversion would ensue, in turn reducing the potential for unrest at the grassroots level. These laws sent the clear message that Catholics and Dissenters alike were second-class citizens, if 'true' citizens at all, and reinforced the position of the 'Anglo-Irish' (Old English/New English who accepted the official church) at the top of Ireland's socio-economic hierarchy. There may have been some genuine concern for the state of the souls of those who failed to accept the truth of the official church, but these policies should be seen as political rather than theological in nature. As opposed to serving as a robust and comprehensive policy framework, “The Penal Laws were a rather muddled and complex set of anti-Catholic restrictions which had been enacted by the Irish parliament in piecemeal fashion.”

Anyone wishing to serve in political office, the armed forces, much of the civil service or in other high profile positions (professor, attorney, chancellor, school master, etc.) was required to take an Oath of Supremacy (if not also the 'Declaration Against Transubstantiation') swearing allegiance to the monarch as head of the state church. Catholics were also barred from sending their children abroad to be educated in the faith, possessing weapons (including guns, pistols and swords), holding long leases (more than 31 years), inheriting land from Protestants, buying new land/taking out mortgages and (from 1727) voting in Parliamentary elections. The Banishment Act of 1697 ordered all Catholic clergy out of Ireland and neither Catholics nor dissenters could enjoy the benefits of legally-recognised marriages.

It is difficult to dispute the severity of these restrictions by the letter of the law, however the limited power (or will) to enforce these laws in Ireland meant they failed to achieve full suppressive or conversionary effect, even if they were enforced more regularly during times of unrest. Recognising their limited efficacy, most of the penal laws were in fact revoked before the turn of the 19th century, having been relaxed in the latter half of the 18th century. Where the penal laws perhaps had their greatest impact was, rather counter-productively, in strengthening the solidarity and resolve of the Catholic population, as they found themselves bound together by a shared experience of
Like the government itself, the law also came to be seen as foreign and exclusionary. It was punitive on the basis of identity rather than behaviour and thus something which could not be trusted to protect Catholic inhabitants, even if Catholicism itself was not illegal. Where, “Generally, a lack of trust leads to a lack of respect,” this had an impact on relations between the local native population and those responsible for upholding and enforcing the law, including the local settler population. Rather than lessening over time, this sense of distrust was allowed to ferment, especially among Catholics in post-partition Northern Ireland. This notion of the law as something imposed upon a reluctant minority Catholic population is raised on a number of occasions by interview respondents included in Robert White's *Provisional Irish Republicans: An Oral and Interpretive History.*

In reflecting on the Divis Street riots of 1963/1964, one respondent recalled, “... there was a terrible lot of people injured and I remember my mother and my father being—and my mother especially—being terrified. And most other mothers in the area being terrified at the RUC running about.”

**Republicanism: Mapping New Languages of Political Expression onto the Old Sectarian Divide**

To understand the impact that the emergence of republicanism had on the Irish political landscape at the end of the 18th century, it is first necessary to understand what precisely is meant by the term 'nationalism'. In turn, any understanding of nationalism rests upon how one defines the nation and it is with this that our discussion of republicanism begins. Benedict Anderson has provided what is, arguably, the most widely-recognised conceptualisation of the nation: “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.” He continues, “It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”

Because of the contrasts between Anderson and contemporary Ernest Gellner's competing visions of nationalism, attempts to reconcile their definitions of 'nation' have become coloured. However, there is much offered by...
Gellner's understanding of the nation. Unlike Anderson, Gellner refuses to provide a formal definition, seeing it as an unfruitfully difficult enterprise.\(^{257}\) Instead he outlines the space in which to develop his theory of the nation.

Gellner first captures the cultural basis of the nation writing: “Two men are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture, where culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating.”\(^{258}\) Secondly he emphasises its co-operative nature:

Two men are of the same nation if and only if they recognize each other as belonging to the same nation. In other words, nations maketh man; nations are the artefact of men’s convictions and loyalties and solidarities. A mere category of persons (say, occupants of a given territory, or speakers of a given language, for example) becomes a nation if and when the members of the category firmly recognize certain mutual rights and duties to each other in virtue of their shared membership of it. It is their recognition of each other as fellows of this kind which turns them into a nation, and not the other shared attributes, whatever they might be, which separate that category from non-members.\(^{259}\)

Both the Gellnerian and Andersonian conceptions of the nation emphasise that nations are built on a sense of mutual recognition – whether two co-nationals are personally known to each other or not they are bound together and responsible to/for one another through the nation.

Nationalism concerns one's ideological relationship with the nation. An important principle, if not the most important principle, of modern nationalism is that of congruence between national and state borders with Gellner writing: “Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent... a theory of political legitimacy.”\(^{260}\) The related principle of national self-determination holds that nations have the right to choose for themselves how they are to be governed and it has generally been assumed that governance in a single-nation state will yield the best results for the nation.\(^{261}\) However, it has been a rather rare occurrence where the boundaries of nations and states have perfectly aligned and it is in the pursuit of boundary reconciliation that nationalism becomes actionable.\(^{262}\) This reconciliation process is often neither simple nor peaceful. Richard English argues nationalism, “involves struggle [emphasis original]: activity, movement, collective mobilization, sometimes a pragmatic striving for goals and certainly a commitment to necessary change.”\(^{263}\) Arjun Appadurai takes the idea of struggle even further writing, “In plainer terms, nationalism involves the willingness to kill – or die – for the good of a plainly
artificial collective form.” As previously alluded two there are two main nationalist traditions in Ireland (constitutional and republican) dedicated to the pursuit of an independent and self-governing state.

Although in Ireland nationalism and the (immediate or ultimate) pursuit of independent statehood have generally been intertwined, the 18th and 19th century parliamentary nationalists are an important exception, instead seeing greater local political autonomy within the United Kingdom was the way forward for the Irish nation. In the 18th and 19th centuries, both the Irish Patriot Party (led first by Hentry Grattan, later by Henry Flood) and the Irish Parliamentary Party advocated for local devolution, but not separation from Great Britain. However, the extent to which these groups represent 'true' nationalism has been debated within the literature. Both Richard English and Jon O’Beirne Ranelagh have put forward a compelling case for the nationalism of these groups. The Patriots shared a concern for territorial (Irish) identity and a belief that it was important to act for the good of 'the nation' as opposed to merely one's own political group and its interests. There was also an emphasis on political liberty in keeping with the Enlightenment thinking of the period. Others, including Jacqueline Hill and Seán Connolly, have argued the opposite positing that this parliamentary nationalism might best be considered patriotism rather than nationalism in keeping with the self-labelling of these groups. There is also the issue of how the Catholic population and its exclusion from formal politics was dealt with by the Patriot Party in particular. Despite constituting the overwhelming majority of the Irish population, Flood was quite resistant to Grattan's hope for the full inclusion of Catholics. Thus, the question of whether any movement willing to politically exclude the vast majority of 'the nation' can really qualify as nationalist arises. It is beyond doubt leaders such as Grattan and, more importantly Charles Stuart Parnell (long-time leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party) have had an effect on subsequent separatist nationalist thinking, but these early parliamentary nationalists did not share in the aspiration for total Irish independence from Britain that is the defining feature of Irish nationalism today.

The first major separatist nationalist group in Ireland was the Society of United Irishmen founded in the autumn of 1791 by a small network of liberal thinking, middle-class, Protestants (mostly Presbyterians) in Belfast. The group, inspired by the


265 English, Irish Freedom, 80-83; O’Beirne Ranelagh, A Short History of Ireland, 3ed, 90-93.


268 The history of the Society of United Irishmen (United Irishmen for short) is discussed in greater detail in the following works: Nancy J Curtain, The United Irishmen: Popular Politics in Ulster and Dublin, 1791-1798 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); Marianne Elliot, Partners in
political radicalism of the time and the American Revolution in particular sought not just Irish independence, but the creation of a democratic republic. For the past two centuries, the United Irishmen have been exalted as an example of how revolutionary Irish nationalist activity need not be sectarian in nature. Those who see the group as non-sectarian point to Tone's aspiration to, “unite the whole people of Ireland, to abolish the memory of all past dissensions, and to substitute the common name of Irishman in place of the denominations of Protestant, Catholic, Dissenter.” Yet, the reality is significantly more complex this image belies. Indeed, only a few lines after this statement of aspiration in United Irishmen leader Wolfe Tone's biography he admits that at the time of the publication of his political pamphlet, “An Argument on Behalf of the Catholics of Ireland” he had not yet made the acquaintance of a single Catholic. As the United Irishmen transitioned from a 'club' working for reform and Catholic emancipation into a revolutionary organisation, the group understood it needed to expand its support base if it wanted to really impact the shape of the nation. In doing so an alliance was forged with the Defenders.

In stark contrast to the leadership of the United Irishmen, the Defenders were a loose-network of secret societies peopled by agrarian Catholics. Initially set up by individual communities to defend Catholic homes from night-raids by Protestant agrarian secret societies such as the Peep O'Day Boys and their Orange Boys offshoot (especially in Armagh, now part of Northern Ireland), the Defenders eventually came to model Protestant fraternal organisations such as the Freemasons and were strongly sectarian in both their outlook and violence. The Defenders were not the first choice for an ally, but the Volunteers who the United Irishmen may have been better off partnering with had been banned in March 1793. Gaining the support of the Protestant militias, even before taking the decision to align themselves with the Defenders would have been extremely difficult given their animosity towards the Catholic population who would have, by nearly any measure, had the most to gain from a new political order rooted in equality. Ideologically, the Defenders did share with the United Irishmen an affinity for French-style republicanism and its revolutionary principles. Nevertheless,
The alliance with the Defenders would come with a heavy cost to the United Irishmen, seriously undermining their genuine non-sectarian and communalist aspirations stymying the extent to which they were able to inspire a revolution among the general population as a whole.

The autonomy with which the Defenders operated at the local level meant that in the execution of the United Irishmen-organised 1798 rebellion some local operations quickly descended into sectarian violence. Though both Protestant and Catholic groups participated in the violence, the massacres of Protestant civilians would stick in the mind of the Protestant population of Ulster for centuries to come. From this point forward for Protestants republicanism represented a serious threat not just to the political stability of the region (or the island as a whole) but their lives as well. If Catholics were rebellious, violent and untrustworthy by nature, republicans were even more so. But the covert nature of republican organisation meant that it was difficult to tell the difference between a republican, a sympathiser and an 'ordinary' Catholic. As popular politics began to develop throughout the 19th century, these fears, threats and the sectarian cleavage from which they emerged ascribed 'natural' (if imperfect) modern political positions to both sides of the sectarian divide in Ulster, further complicating the boundaries between republicans, supporters, sympathisers and those who wished to remain uninvolved. The Catholic population, who already conceived of themselves as Irish, were seen as the natural support base for popular nationalism and violent republicanism alike. With more to lose from possible independence than ever before, the Protestant population became increasingly invested in maintaining the constitutional arrangement of the newly established United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

The industrialisation and urbanisation of Ulster, Belfast in particular, during the 19th century would see Ulster's distinctiveness from the rest of Ireland grow considerably. This helped further entrench the politics of sectarian difference in the debate over the relationship between Ireland and Britain. In 1800 Belfast had a population of a mere 20,000 but, in keeping with other Victorian industrial cities (Manchester/Salford, Glasgow, Liverpool) it grew exponentially over the course of the century. By 1900 the population had grown 17 and a half times over, reaching 350,000 and overtaking Dublin as the most populous city in Ireland. Though Catholics remained excluded from prime positions in the largely Protestant (Dissenter) owned industrial enterprises, large numbers came to the city as labourers. This Catholic migration would change the composition of Belfast considerably. Where the city had been only 10% Catholic at the start of the century, Catholics represented approximately

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1798-1998: Politics and War (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 14; O'Beirne Ranelagh, A Short History of Ireland, 94.
279 English, Irish Freedom, 92; O'Beirne Ranelagh, A Short History of Ireland, 95.
one-third of the population by its close.\textsuperscript{282} The worsening economic conditions in much of the rest of the Ireland, including severe crop failures, encouraged massive urban migration. Belfast was by no means the only (or even the most common) recipient of Irish Catholics looking for an opportunity to better their lives and escape the worst of the Great Famine that raged mid-century. Glasgow, Liverpool, Manchester and London all received large numbers of Irish immigrants as did the United States and Canada (then still a British colony, but it was on the verge of requesting partial independence to be granted without bloodshed).

However the long history of sectarian tension in the north-east of Ireland created a tension not replicated elsewhere. It has been argued that in the latter half of the century sectarian violence was endemic,\textsuperscript{283} a function of the growing pains of rapid social and economic change exacerbated by a resurgence in militant Irish republicanism in the form of the Young Irelanders and Irish Republican Brotherhood.\textsuperscript{284} The organised push for home rule from southern parliamentary nationalists was an additional pressing concern. Having lost the quasi-independent Parliament of Ireland with the Act of Union (1801), Charles Stuart Parnell's Irish Parliamentary Party focused its activism on pressuring the parliament in Westminster to devolve power to a local democratically elected parliament. His efforts were successful in convincing the Liberal Prime Minister William Gladstone to table the issue in Westminster.\textsuperscript{285} Though the first Home Rule Bill, (introduced in 1886) was defeated, it sparked serious sectarian violence in Ulster. Protestants feared that, “'home rule' in Ireland would prove to be 'Rome Rule',”\textsuperscript{286} as it was clear the Catholic majority could no longer be denied formal political participation. With the benefit of hindsight, the Protestant reaction to the bill – keeping in mind it was introduced into the British Parliament by the British Prime Minister following the advocacy of a Protestant (albeit Irish) politician - might strike some as peculiar, a matter addressed head-on by Charles Townshend:

Looking back, a century on, it may seem hard to grasp why Home Rule unleashed such passionate hostility. It was a cautious measure of devolution, and the degree of independence it offered Ireland was distinctly limited. (Ireland would not have defensive forces, for instance, or the power to levy customs duties.) For Gladstone and his Liberal successors, its central purpose and justification was to strengthen the Union – not break it – by reducing Irish discontent to a

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{282} Boal, “Integration and Division,” 151.
  \item \textsuperscript{283} Sean Farrell, Rituals and Riots (The University Press of Kentucky, 2000), 136.
  \item \textsuperscript{285} Paul Bew, Enigma: A New Life of Charles Stewart Parnell (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 2011);
  \item \textsuperscript{286} United Kingdom, Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 3d ser., vol 207 (1871), 1542.
\end{itemize}
manageable level. It was presented as heralding a wider scheme of devolution which would give the rest of the regions of the UK similar autonomous powers, so eliminating the sense of Irish ‘exceptionalism’ that had unbalanced British politics and the Union itself.\footnote{Townshend, Easter 1916, kindle loc 853.}

But, as Belfast's economy grew so too did its distance from local Irish politics,\footnote{Parnell was aware of the importance of Catholic support for his political ambitions in an age when the formal exclusion of Catholics from the body politic was no longer morally justifiable or politically advantageous. However, his hospitable relationship with the Catholic Church gave those with suspicions around 'papist' involvement in the Home Rule movement plenty to fret over. (English, Irish Freedom, 213-221.)} its fortunes tied more to Britain and its empire than Dublin or Sligo.\footnote{JJ Lee, Ireland: Politics and Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 8.} Between the very real fear that Home Rule in any form would ultimately lead to complete independence (in turn leading to the loss of religious freedoms) and the economic argument for strong integration with Britain, the prospect of a devolved Parliament in Dublin held no appeal for many Protestants, irregardless of who was responsible for advocating on its behalf. Sectarian violence, historically a largely rural and/or working-class phenomenon, may not have been carried out by those with the greatest direct economic interests in the region, but it served unionist interests nonetheless.

The defeat of a second attempt at Home Rule, the *Government of Ireland Bill 1893*, in the House of Lords (the upper house of the UK parliament) heightened the stakes. Though not from Ulster nor, quite probably, a fan of its political culture,\footnote{Feargal Cochrane, Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism since the Anglo-Irish Agreement (Cork: Cork University Press, 1997), 113.} pre-eminent unionist politician Edward Carson, saw that his best opportunity for ensuring the defeat of future home rule efforts lay in the mobilisation of Ulster's Protestant majority behind the unionist cause. The Ulster Covenant, signed by 471,414 men and women, was intended to serve as a message to the British government that any attempt to impose Home Rule would be met with major resistance, a threat backed up by the mobilisation of between 90,000 and 100,000 men initially called Ulster Volunteers, later the Ulster Volunteer Force.\footnote{Timothy Bowman, Carson's Army: The Ulster Volunteer Force, 1910-1922 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007).} Unsurprisingly, sectarian tensions reached fever pitch in the lead up to the introduction of the third legislative attempt at home rule, known formally as the *Government of Ireland Act, 1914*.\footnote{Boal, “Integration and Division,” 151; Robert John Lynch, The Northern IRA and the Early Years of Partition, 1920-1922 (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2006), 227.} But the outbreak of The Great War would put the implementation of the newly passed law on the back-burner until 1919, by which time Ireland was in the midst of a full-blown war of independence with the original Irish Republican Army leading the revolutionary republican charge.

The Easter Rising, initiated on the 24 April 1916, was organised by the Irish Republican Brotherhood and carried out by a group comprised of: a rebellious subsection of the Irish Volunteers (led by Patrick Pearse); the Irish Citizen Army (under James Connelly); and Cumann na mBan (Winifred Carney and Constance Markiewicz playing a key role).\footnote{Lisa Weihman, “Doing My Bit for Ireland: Transgressing Gender in the Easter Rising,”} Considered on its own, it was a failure. The republic the rebels so
boldly declared on Easter Monday failed to materialise when the Irish public was uninterested in seizing their supposed new-found independence by joining the revolution. However, frustration with the number of casualties and damage caused by the Easter Rising, followed by outrage over the execution of Pearse and Connolly, would turn the tide of public opinion more decidedly against the British (outside the Protestant-majority area of Ulster), paving the way for the events which evolved into the War of Independence.

In the 1918 General Election, the republican Sinn Féin party won 73 of Ireland's 105 seats in the House of Commons in spite of the fact that many party members, including a significant number of those elected, were serving prison sentences related to their rebellious activity. In January the 27 available elected Sinn Féin representatives (who refused to accept their seats in Westminster) declared the first meeting of a new legislative assembly for Ireland – the Dáil Éireann. The Dáil issued its own 'Declaration of Independence', ratified the 'Proclamation of Independence' read during the Easter Rising and declared itself the new government of Ireland. Elsewhere, two armed police officers (members of the Royal Irish Constabulary) were killed in a Tipperary attack by independently-minded Irish Volunteers, triggering the Irish War of Independence. During the early stages of the fighting the Irish Volunteers were adopted as the official force of the Republic by the Dáil. Though they retained the name Óglaigh na hÉireann in Irish, the group was rechristened the Irish Republican Army in the English language.

The War of Independence also gave rise to Northern Ireland as a political and legal entity. As opposed to the rest of Ireland where fighting was largely between the IRA and British forces, the differential composition and history of the Ulster meant violence there took on a sectarian quality. There were relatively few republican attacks in Belfast during the War of Independence. This did not stop unionists from exacting revenge against the Catholic minority as a whole for southern republican attacks, but it did delay the escalation of conflict in the region. In 1920, the IRA stepped up attacks

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294 Further consideration of the Easter Rising can be found in: Tim Pat Coogan, _1916: The Easter Rising_ (London: Phoenix, 2001); Townshend, _Easter 1916_.


297 Richard English, _“Belfast's Unholy War: The Troubles of the 1920s_ by Alan F Parkinson
in Ulster. These attacks, which they claimed would inflict economic damage on Britain, frequently took the form of burning out 'big houses' and businesses owned by the Protestant elite. Simultaneously, tens of thousands of returning soldiers were less than pleased to return home from the battlefields only to find Catholics and 'left-wing' Protestants (only marginally less disloyal) doing their jobs on their assembly lines and factory floors. Catholics and left-wing Protestants were forced out of the factories en masse and widespread rioting ensued generating the most intense period of sectarian violence the region had seen up to that point.\footnote{Just as importantly it would help to create the pattern of violence the contemporary Troubles would follow, with Richard English writing: Here, in the birth-period of Northern Ireland, was the recognisable pattern of Ulster's sectarian war: responsive sequences of killing destroyed inter-communal trust, as one side's outrage prompted vicious retaliation in the struggle between loyalists and republicans. And behind all this, nationalist Ireland refused to recognise the legitimacy of Northern Ireland, while unionist Ulster ignored the depth or justness of nationalist disaffection from the new state.\footnote{299}} The early 'Troubles' in Northern Ireland would last until 1922, by which time the political landscape of the island had changed tremendously.

While the British government was very much keen to find a quick resolution to the Irish War of Independence, it understood northern unionists would not quietly accept the unqualified Home Rule most likely to appease republicans. Even if the UVF revival following World War I was not nearly as successful as the unionist leadership might have hoped, unionist military capacity needed to be taken into consideration as they threatened to escalate the conflict in new directions. The result was an imperfect compromise: two sets of Home Rule institutions for a partitioned Ireland. The Government of Ireland Act (1920) proposed two regional parliaments, one covering the 26 southern and easternmost counties with strong Catholic majorities (Southern Ireland) and the other (Northern Ireland) for the six north-easternmost counties where there existed (overall) a clear Protestant majority (Antrim, Armagh, Tyrone, Londonderry, Down and Fermanagh).\footnote{The bill, approved on 11 November 1920, was accepted by northern Unionists who quickly moved to establish their devolved government and the Parliament of Northern Ireland was inaugurated in June 1921. The Government of Ireland Act did not find similar favour among IRA volunteers now resolute in their pursuit of total unqualified independence and so the War of Independence raged on in the south of the island. Though the Anglo-Irish Treaty that brought the war to a close a year later would require similar compromises, it ultimately proved more palatable to most republicans. The treaty, quite importantly, gave the six-counties of Northern Ireland a degree of self-governance and autonomy. It was a compromise that would eventually lead to the establishment of the Northern Ireland Assembly in 1998.} The bill, approved on 11 November 1920, was accepted by northern Unionists who quickly moved to establish their devolved government and the Parliament of Northern Ireland was inaugurated in June 1921. The Government of Ireland Act did not find similar favour among IRA volunteers now resolute in their pursuit of total unqualified independence and so the War of Independence raged on in the south of the island. Though the Anglo-Irish Treaty that brought the war to a close a year later would require similar compromises, it ultimately proved more palatable to most republicans. The treaty, quite importantly, gave the six-counties of Northern Ireland a degree of self-governance and autonomy. It was a compromise that would eventually lead to the establishment of the Northern Ireland Assembly in 1998.

\footnote{For more detailed information and considered reflection on the violence of this period please see: Peter Hart, \textit{The IRA at War 1916-1923} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 241-258; Alan F Parkinson, \textit{Belfast's Unholy War: The Troubles of the 1920s} (Dublin: Four Courts, 2004); TK Wilson, \textit{Frontiers of Violence}.}
Ireland the right to opt out of the Irish Free State and operate under the conditions set out in the *Government of Ireland Act*, which its new government promptly exercised.

**Zero Sum Politics: Northern Ireland, the Provisional IRA and State Response**

The establishment of Northern Ireland as a distinct legal and political entity might reasonably be considered the pinnacle of sectarian politicking. Although the demographic trajectory of the time made it appear as though the Protestant majority had been secured almost in perpetuity, the unionist majority could not rest on its laurels. Catholics still constituted about one-third of the Northern Irish population and stuck in a state not of their own choosing, cut off from family, friends and co-religionists in the rest of Ireland, they had plenty of reason to bemoan the new arrangement. After centuries of tension and conflict, unionists and militant loyalists remained hypervigilant when it came to the ever-present threat of republicanism within their borders. If the IRA had been able to defeat the mighty British Army and secure the independence of 26 counties, surely they had the potential to at least make a push for the independence of Northern Ireland. The refusal of Irish republicans to accept the legitimacy of the border and the claim to 'the whole of Ireland' included in the southern state's *Bunreacht na hÉireann* (*Constitution of Ireland*) did little to reassure northern unionists of the stability of Northern Ireland. Still, after the violence of 1920-1922, life in Northern Ireland became relatively peaceful as the Catholic minority settled into the new political arrangement.\(^{301}\)

A lack of active violent resistance did not necessarily mean support for the regime. Most Catholics continued to harbour long-term aspirations for Irish reunification, even if the overwhelming majority only supported peaceful political means of achieving this end. Constitutional nationalist politics emerged in the north as result of this sentiment and established itself as a moderate alternative to violent republicanism. However the development of constitutional nationalist politics only served to further reinforce the perception of the Catholic minority as disloyal and a persistent threat to the union. Yet, the unionist party was also unwilling to really open itself up to the minority population, perceiving Catholics as beyond political reason. Furthermore, so long as sectarian politics prevailed, there was no need to appeal to Catholics as potential supporters in order to secure a clear democratic majority. Unsurprisingly, the Catholic minority became increasingly politically marginalised and distanced from both unionism and its Northern Irish governance more broadly. This

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\(^{301}\) The Republic of Ireland, still finding its feet economically, had a much less generous welfare state than that available in Northern Ireland. Therefore, even though the latter was not on-par with what was available on mainland Britain, working-class Catholics in Northern Ireland fared better materially than the working class of the Republic of Ireland. For those with very little, these marginal differences had a significant impact, much more so than for those at the top of the socio-economic ladder. As neither sectarian nor state violence was not an immediate concern during this period, the principle of political equality could be considered something of a luxury by many working-class Catholics. (Nicole McEwan and Richard Perry, “Devolution and the Preservation of the United Kingdom Welfare State,” in *The Territorial Politics of Welfare*, eds. Nicola McEwen and Luis Moreno (London: Routledge, 2005) 46-47; Eileen Reilly, “Modern Ireland: An Introductory Survey,” in *Making the Irish American: History and Heritage of the Irish in the United States*, eds. JJ Lee and Marion R Casey (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 130.)
sense of disconnection was exacerbated by nationalist abstentionism which left the Catholic minority without any voice in the regional parliament at Stormont.

The expansion of the welfare state in post-war Northern Ireland had the peculiar effect of increasing opportunities for discrimination in some areas (the negative impact of gerrymandering grew alongside the power of local councils)\(^{302}\) while decreasing it in others, most notably access to tertiary education.\(^{303}\) Catholics, having long suffered much higher rates of unemployment, and thus disproportionately represented among those at the bottom of Northern Ireland's socio-economic ladder, benefitted greatly from the expansion of the welfare state, including increased provision in the way of public housing and unemployment benefits.\(^{304}\) At the same time, the welfare state established in the rest of Britain was not imported wholesale into Northern Ireland. Its basic tenants remained, but the Unionist government retained the right to adapt policy to reflect local political circumstances (essentially maintaining the existing balance of power by suppressing Catholic political advancement).\(^{305}\) Nevertheless, by the 1960s the post-war education reforms began to yield a new problem: an expanded well-educated and articulate Catholic middle class keenly aware of not only the second-class status of Catholics in Northern Ireland but social injustice more broadly (including in an international context).\(^{306}\)


John Hume, *A New Ireland: Politics, Peace, and Reconciliation* (Boulder: Roberts Rinehart,
Michael Farrell, and Eamonn McCann. Aspirationally cross-sectarian but largely Catholic in composition and support, the civil rights movement nevertheless differed greatly from previous nationalist and republican agitation by first and foremost framing its demands as British rights for British citizens. If the constitutional arrangement could not be altered, the important thing was to ensure that the full rights, opportunities and benefits of British citizenship were extended equally to all, regardless of religion. Although it would have been very difficult at the time for loyalist groups, or even mainstream unionist politicians, to know to what degree active nationalists/republicans were involved in civil rights agitation, the fact of Catholic mobilisation in itself sent alarm bells.

The failure of socio-economic 'spectrum' politics to take hold in Northern Ireland meant that any political demands, however reasonable, spoke to the instability of constitutional relationship between the region and the rest of Britain thereby indirectly challenging state legitimacy. With persistent pressure from hard-line loyalists ready to take matters into their own hands should the government be deemed too 'soft' in responding to the republican threat, anything less than a robust response, regardless of the scale of the actual republican threat, was unthinkable. This was especially the case when one considers that, unlike the Catholic minority, loyalists represented an important constituency for unionist politicians who relied on their electoral support to secure a Protestant/unionist majority along sectarian lines. With tensions mounting, the sense of increasing threat on both sides led to the battening down of the proverbial hatches, intensifying the salience of in-/out-group identities and renewing both in-group solidarity and out-group suspicion.

As previously alluded to, similar to the United Irishmen, the civil rights movement attempted to appeal to a cross-sectarian audience. However, given the entrenchment of sectarian loyalism within the region's Protestant working-class urban communities, those Protestants most likely to benefit from the civil rights movements were also the most suspicious of its motives. For a working-class Protestant residing in a traditional working-class neighbourhood taking up a civil rights placard on a weekend march was an act of betrayal. To do so would not only show a friendly allegiance with the 'other', but (more importantly) display a willingness to contribute to their political advancement. In this zero-sum political environment any advancement on the part of the Catholic population represented a 'loss' to the Protestant community as a whole, even if many of the demands of the civil rights movement (when implemented) had the effect

310 Dooley, Black and Green, 28.
312 English, Armed Struggle, 94.
313 English, Irish Freedom, 366.
of substantially improving the material and political conditions of many individual working-class Protestant families.

The state, represented on the ground by an overwhelmingly Protestant police force\textsuperscript{316} and the near-exclusively Protestant 'B Specials' (developed out of the remains of the old Ulster Volunteer Force after their return home from World War I), played an important part in escalating violence. It was the loyalist proto-paramilitary groups which emerged at the cusp of the Troubles however, who held the decisive hand during this period. The threat of violence that hung over each civil rights demonstration, with the probability that it would spill over into serious civil disorder and sectarian violence if left unchecked, necessitated a heavy police presence at civil rights demonstrations. The pre-existing tension between the Catholic population and the RUC (something of which loyalist groups would have been all too aware) served to heighten overall political tensions. Civil rights marchers refused to relent, even in the face of loyalist threats and armed police presence. Protestant groups stepped up their counter-protests. In the end the police came down with a heavy hand upon the marchers who were, in marching illegally against bans on civil marches and demonstrations, insubordinate.\textsuperscript{317}

This violence led to greater civil disorder and unrest amongst the general Catholic population, particularly in the working-class urban communities most engaged in the civil rights movement. These neighbourhoods also happened to be those most historically prone to rioting and sectarian conflict. During the summer of 1969 this downward spiral of protest, violence and disorder gained such momentum that it grew well beyond the control of the local security services who were themselves perceived, by the minority population at least, to be actively contributing to the problem. There is little disputing that the Royal Ulster Constabulary failed to prevent Catholic neighbourhoods from coming under attack by loyalist mobs.\textsuperscript{318} More worryingly, there is also evidence that in some cases members of the security services actively participated in offensive violence against Catholic civilians ('Battle of the Bogside' (Derry), burning of Bombay Street (Belfast)).\textsuperscript{319} Hardly likely given the fractures within and limited armaments of the republican movement at the time, loyalists nevertheless believed that a full-scale republican rebellion was imminent and responded according to the perceived threat. With violence begetting further violence, it appeared as though there was no ready end in sight to the civil disorder in Belfast and Derry.\textsuperscript{320}

\textsuperscript{316} The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) was the main police force in Northern Ireland from 1922 until 2000 at which point it was significantly reformed and rechristened the Police Service of Northern Ireland. Mostly Protestant, it was also a highly controversial force, enjoying little support from the Catholic minority. (Graham Ellison and Jim Smyth, \textit{The Crowned Harp: Policing Northern Ireland} (London: Pluto Press, 2000); Aogán Mulchay, \textit{Policing Northern Ireland: Conflict, Legitimacy and Reform} (Devon: Willan Publishing, 2006).)


\textsuperscript{319} A particularly compelling and detailed account of Derry during this period is: Ó Dochartaigh, \textit{From Civil Rights to Armalites}.

Chichester-Clark, then Unionist Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, had little choice but to prepare himself to issue a request to central government for military aid.\footnote{Wright, Northern Ireland, 201.} After taking the necessary (and escalatory) step of calling out the controversial B Specials, his request, formally issued on 14 August 1969, was swiftly granted, ultimately changing the course of the conflict.\footnote{Aaron Edwards, The Northern Ireland Troubles: Operation Banner 1969-2007 (Oxford: Osprey, 2011), 29.}

The Provisional IRA: Emergence and Response

It is often forgotten that the arrival of the British military preceded the emergence of the Provisional IRA and the formal schism in the republican movement out of which it emerged. The Irish Republican Army developed from a subsection of the Irish Volunteers and was first active during the War of Independence, suffering their first serious schism in the wake of the \textit{Anglo-Irish Treaty}. Many former IRA went on to join the forces of the newly-established Irish Free State. Others, opposed to the treaty's conditions and limitations, continued to fight for full independence during the Irish Civil War. It was this latter group who carried the title of 'Irish Republican Army' forward and from which, eventually, the Provisional IRA would descend. Where the border, and the existence of a separate Northern Irish statelet continued to serve as a bone of republican contention in the decades following the Irish Civil War, the continued existence of the IRA represented an ongoing concern for state stability in both parts of the now divided island. As such, the IRA was proscribed in both Northern Ireland (the United Kingdom) and the Republic of Ireland. Driven underground, the conspiratorial character of the post-civil war republican movement affected its recruitment and ability to disseminate its political platform.\footnote{Rekawk, Irish Republican Terrorism and Politics, 12.} Unsurprisingly, it was family and personal connections that were largely responsible for bringing subsequent generations of republicans into the movement, or at least this was the case among those who eventually moved into the Provisional republican movement post-split.\footnote{White, Provisional Irish Republicans, 37.} Although one might be forgiven for presuming northern Catholic marginalisation would foster broader support for the republican movement in the years following partition, support actually waned considerably with the failed 'Border Campaign' of the 1950s biting hard what little support was left.\footnote{English, Armed Struggle, 75; English, Irish Freedom, 361.} By the time civil disorder erupted on the streets of Northern Ireland, the IRA was no longer an active military threat. They lacked the necessary resources to provide adequate local defence let alone stage any sort of significant revolution. But in the face of heavy loyalist violence and state aggression/inaction, the Catholic population had nowhere else to turn in the hope of securing some sort of armed protection.

Not explicitly, widely or immediately admitted, the diminished military capacity of the republican movement was well understood by Cathal Goulding who led the republican movement in the period leading up to the 1969 split.\footnote{Brian Hanley and Scott Millar, The Lost Revolution: The Story of the Official IRA and The Worker's Party (Dublin: Penguin Ireland, 2009), 22.} Although it would be
a difficult pill for many of the hard-line/cradle republicans to swallow, by the early
1960s the Irish Republican Army's militarism was ineffective, if not counter-productive
given the distance between the group and the broader population. Goulding saw
politicisation (without the full renunciation of violence) as the best opportunity to
breathe new life into the organisation and attract the wider support needed to ensure the
movement's continued ability to pursue its ultimate aims. By 1968-1969, it was clear
that the 'Gouldingites', as Goulding's supporters came to be known, comprised the clear
majority of republicans in the movement, the hard-liners having lost their battle for
control.

However all hope was not lost for those who sought to stay true to a more
militarist vision of republicanism, the situation in Northern Ireland presenting an
opportunity to strike an alliance with northern republicans enraged and embarrassed by
the IRA's unwillingness (or inability) to adequately protect and defend Catholic
communities under siege. Internal tensions within the republican movement would
come to a head in December 1969 at the General Army Convention after the assembly
accepted two resolutions (flexibility on abstentionism; support for international
socialism) which would irrevocably shift the movement father to the left and further
down the path to politicisation. Dissenters, some of whom walked out of the convention,
held a meeting across the street where the foundations of the Provisional IRA were laid.
The newly-established movement agreed the initial priority should be the provision of
defence to Northern Catholics, with southern hard-liners acutely aware of the potential
for destabilisation of the Northern Irish statelet that came with persistent civil unrest in
Northern Ireland. Further, where IRA had come to stand for 'I Ran Away' in the minds
of many Northern Catholics, defence was seen as the most important means of regaining
the trust and (with time) support of Northern Ireland's Catholic minority. With support
and instability, the leadership of the Provisional IRA truly believed they could force a
British withdrawal from the region paving the way for reunification.

With continuing sectarian and state violence compounded by routine harassment
form the security forces, solidarity was high among Northern Ireland's Catholics. In the
years immediately following the republican schism when both Official and Provisional
IRA violence was still primarily defensive, this translated into support for republican
paramilitaries, with the Provisional IRA going to great lengths to present itself as the
most capable community defender. However, this did not mean that the Provisional IRA
was particularly successful as a community defence organisation. In fact, the
Provisional IRA likely increased the amount of violence visited upon Northern Irish
Catholics. As Timothy Shanahan quite passionately writes:

What evidence is there that the IRA provided an effective defensive
shield for Catholics, either at the outbreak of the Northern Ireland

327 John F Morrison, The Origins and Rise of Dissident Irish Republicanism: The Role and Impact
Of Organizational Splits (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 44.
328 White, Provisional Irish Republicans, 51-54.
329 Bowyer Bell, The IRA, 80.
330 Rekawk, Irish Republican Terrorism and Politics, 12.
331 English, Armed Struggle, 174-174; O'Doherty, The Trouble with Guns, 72; Charles Townshend,
conflict or over the decades to follow? Clearly the pre-split IRA did not prevent loyalist mobs from attacking peaceful civil rights marchers in October 1968, or from destroying Catholic neighbourhoods in Belfast in August 1969. The Provisional IRA did not prevent the British army from ransacking Catholic homes during the Falls Road curfew in July 1970; nor did it resist the imposition of internment without trial throughout the Six Counties in August 1971; nor did it take up defensive positions when British paratroopers began killing unarmed civil rights demonstrators in Derry in January 1972. Ironically, although the incidents just mentioned loom large in the standard republican narrative, in none of them did the IRA provide effective defence. Indeed, in the first three years of the Provisional IRA's existence, 171 Catholic civilians were killed by loyalists or by the security forces, the very people from whom the Provisional IRA claimed to be providing effective protection for Catholics.332

But, the Provisional IRA (and the Official IRA too, albeit to a lesser extent)333 were at least seen to be doing something and throughout Northern Irish history perceptions have often mattered more than reality in terms of determining group behaviour.

The focus of the Provisional IRA on defence and rearmament during its first year of existence is evidenced by the fact that offensive operations were not sanctioned by the organisation until January 1971. The first British Army death would come just weeks later.334 However, from the summer of 1970 forwards, an increase in Catholic working-class hostility towards the British military presence in Northern Ireland meant that a shift towards offensive operations was not out of sight for the Provisional IRA's leadership. Although the significance of this early chronology is often underplayed in the literature, it illustrates just how detached state response was from the scale of Provisional IRA violence and actual threat, all of the most oppressive response measures instituted prior to the Provisional IRA's development of a successful offensive campaign. Just as crucially, and contradicting the common republican caricature of the British government as the evil oppressors, the most oppressive counter-terrorism measures were put in place before the central government of the United Kingdom seized full control of Northern Ireland and its rapidly deteriorating security situation in 1972.

Together and individually, the Falls Curfew and the introduction of internment (Operation Demetrius) were measures taken with the intent of destabilising, weakening and quelling republican activity. However the way in which these measures were applied would prove decisive in terms of increasing the animosity between the Catholic population and the British military who were, at the time, operating essentially on instructions from Stormont filtered through central government. Aside from Bloody Sunday, these two measures, the effects of which were felt as heavily by non-involved Catholics as republicans themselves, would ultimately counter-productively increase  

333 Following the defection of those who went on to form the Provisional IRA, those who remained came to be known as the Official IRA or 'stickies' in honour of the press-on lilly lapel emblems they sold at Easter time. The Official IRA is discussed in far greater depth in: J Bowyer Bell, “Wayward Guerillas,” *Society* 28, no 3 (1991): 49-60; Hanley and Millar, *The Lost Revolution*; Rekawk, *Irish Republican Terrorism and Politics*.
support for republican paramilitaries among Northern Irish Catholics with the Provisional IRA the key beneficiary.335

The Falls Curfew lasted for 36 hours from 3 July to 5 July 1970. After loyalist marches on 27 June ended in violence, the state wanted to ensure such violence would not be readily repeated. Thus, a weapons search was launched in the Catholic community of the Lower Falls Road, an Official IRA stronghold. The search prompted riots, far from unusual at this time. The riots escalated in severity as the Officials became involved, keen to keep the Army out so as to prevent their weaponry (already in short supply) from being seized. At 10 pm an indefinite curfew was announced for the area, covering 3,000 homes. Anyone found on the street would be immediately arrested, however the announcement failed to stop either the rioting or, more troublingly, the exchange of gunfire in the area. Yet, the Army managed to seal it off in order to begin door-to-door weapons searches and seizures.336 The curfew lasted for 36 hours until women and children from nearby communities broke it by marching foodstuffs into the affected area. Sensing a public relations disaster, the military did not follow through on its threat of arresting those in violation of the curfew.337

During the curfew, the Army did uncover and seize what was (considering the size of the area) a rather remarkable amount of weaponry, including over 100 firearms, 21,000 rounds of ammunition and 250 kg plus of explosive materials.338 For both the Army and the unionist government in Northern Ireland, the size of the haul in itself was evidence of the merit of the operation. Still, (rather unsurprisingly) many Catholics, especially those of the Lower Falls, were outraged. For the majority who had done nothing wrong, they saw their liberty promptly suspended and the damage caused to many homes during the searches presented a serious financial hardship to working-class (including unemployed) Catholics who could ill-afford the cost of repairs. If there had been any hope left among the Catholic population that the British Army might be impartial and professional in their dealings with them, this illusion was promptly shattered by these events.

Internment (arrest and detention without charge) was made possible through the permanence of the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1957, initially enacted in 1922 as temporary measures designed to allow the Northern Irish government to maintain civil order during its tempestuous state-building years. Internment has a long history in Ireland. It was used during the War of Independence and on both sides of the border during the Irish Civil War. It was reintroduced in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland in 1938 and 1939 respectively during the Second World War and again in the late 1950s/early 1960s to deal with the IRA's border campaign.339 During the Troubles however, internment was an exclusively Northern

336 Gillespie, The A to Z of the Northern Irish Conflict, 40.
337 Campbell and Connolly, “A Model for the 'War Against Terrorism'?,” 355.
338 English, Armed Struggle, 136.
Irish phenomenon, reintroduced by Northern Irish Prime Minister Brian Faulkner on 5 August 1971 with the reluctant and passive approval of central government. Four days later, at the crack of dawn, the British Army began to sweep through Catholic working class neighbourhoods on the hunt for 450 republicans named on a list prepared by the Royal Ulster Constabulary.340

The intelligence provided to the military was quite poor and although the army succeeded in rounding up 342 suspected republicans in the first 24 hours after the launch of Operation Demetrius, fewer than 100 were actually volunteers or affiliates of the Provisional or Official IRA.341 The RUC's intelligence was outdated and incomplete (multiple persons in the same area with the same name), while on the republican side the leadership who expected their names would be on the list used the four days' notice to make themselves scare before they could be captured. Accompanying the outrage caused by the internment of many wholly innocent individuals was anger amongst the Catholic population over the total one-sidedness of the operation. Although loyalist violence had been as incendiary as republican violence, and indeed in the immediate run-up to internment it was loyalist groups responsible for inciting much of the worst violence there were untouched by the raids.342 In fact the first internment of loyalists did not come until February 1973, a full 18 months after it was first introduced in a Troubles context.

Unfortunately, this sense of injustice begat outrage which would create further violence and disorder with widespread rioting, violence, and a surge of recruits flowing into the Provisional IRA.343 The increased support provided the organisation with the capacity needed to mount an offensive campaign on a scale previously almost unimaginable. Thus, the re-introduction of internment ultimately represented a tremendous 'own goal' on the part of British counter-insurgency/counter-terrorism efforts in Northern Ireland.344 Still, the most spectacular own goal on the part of the British government would come a year later with the killings of 13 unarmed Catholic civilians (and a 17 year-old boy who may or may not have been armed) during an anti-internment march in Derry on Sunday 30 January 1972 (also known as Bloody Sunday) and initial attempts to 'whitewash' the incident with the hastily commissioned and carried out Widgery Tribunal. Bloody Sunday, and subsequent government response o the events of that day, would prompt the largest surge of support for republican paramilitaries and violence against the British state experienced over the entire course of the thirty year conflict.345

341 Coogan, The Troubles, 126; English, Armed Struggle, 139-140.
342 Coogan, The Troubles, 126.
345 English, Armed Struggle, 151; Shanahan, The Provisional Irish Republican Army and the
In the existing literature on the Troubles, there has been much consideration of how the Falls Curfew and internment together contributed to the further development of the conflict. For the purposes of this research however, it is more important to understand why republican violence, or the threat of republican violence elicited the strength and type of state response that it did. This can help to explain why state reaction in Northern Ireland was comparatively far stronger than the American federal response to endemic gang violence in the city of Chicago (and other major American cities). Critically, what emerges here is a disconnection between levels of actual republican violence and response. Simply put, at least in the early and most violent years of the Troubles it was not republican violence (terrorism) that was responsible for prompting state response but perceptions of the threat posed by republicanism as an organising philosophy. The fact of actual violence provided justification for the profound infringements of basic civil and political rights long taken for granted on the British mainland that the Falls Curfew, internment and Bloody Sunday represented, but state response spoke more to the existence of republicanism and its potential for inciting civic disorder and violence among the loyalist population than the scale of the threat itself. How else to explain a response strategy that had begun before the formal emergence of conflict, years before the Provisional IRA had fired a bullet or planted a bomb or even existed? It was the perception held by loyalists and hard-line unionists that the civil rights movement was little more than a republican front movement which set in motion the chain of events which would evolve directly into the modern Troubles. Given the involvement of leading nationalists and republicans in the civil rights movement, this misperception might be understandable, however that does not change its implications. There was no way for fledgling loyalist groups in the mid-1960s to understand the full extent of the IRA's internal troubles as republicans themselves were hardly likely to broadcast their woes.

Hard-line southern republicans nostalgic for the days when the IRA was able to display some military prowess could not have created the Provisional IRA, one of the most significant violent political organisations of the twentieth century, on their own. The IRA as a whole was ill-equipped to launch a revolution and this insular, conspiratorial, militant subset was even weaker. As argued by Richard English, “It is


important to stress that the new [Provisional] IRA were generated by northern realities: they would have come into being regardless of southern [Irish government] support." This argument, made within the context of a discussion of the limited (but important) financial and arms smuggling support the fledgling Provisionals received from certain individuals within the Irish government, holds true for the situation more generally.

Moving beyond English's argument, it is possible to claim that, while certainly not single-handedly responsible for the Troubles as a whole, it was the early informal loyalist groupings which developed over the course of the 1960s around individuals such as Rev Ian Paisley and Gusty Spence (founder of the modern Ulster Volunteer Force) who dreamed the Provisional IRA into existence. Loyalist violence and the threat thereof, logical only within the distorted perceptual framework created by centuries of highly-politicised sectarian division, necessitated active response on the part of the state before republicanism could re-establish itself militarily thereby weakening the state and increasing loyalist violence. Thus, whether or not republicans were at the time actually engaged in violence against loyalist groups or the state (which loyalists believed themselves responsible for protecting) the existence of republicanism as an organising political ideology was capable of triggering loyalist violence and disorder based of dynamic threat perceptions constructed by fear and based on limited intelligence. Therefore, bringing conflict and violence down to a manageable level meant managing perceptions as well as realities, especially in the early years of the conflict. It is indisputable that Provisional IRA violence, when it did begin to occur, demanded a swift response. Indeed, looking at the conflict as a whole, it can be argued that the size and shape of PIRA violence shaped the scale and intensity of state response, especially after the implementation of direct rule in 1972. However, this does not change the reality that the fact of response in itself was not dependent on the scale, or even the actuality, of Provisional IRA violence. This seriously challenges the notion that state response to violence in liberal democratic states is rooted in a clear understanding of actual violence levels or threat (as measured primarily by loss of life) and highlights how framing can matter more than reality.

Race in America

If political ascription is a recurring theme in the history of sectarianism and nationalism in Northern Ireland, the same might be said for political denial in the case of race in the United States. The early, sustained and reinforced politicisation of the sectarian divide in Ireland, and the extent to which it became embedded in the governance structure of Northern Ireland, meant any act of political contestation affected the sectarian balance of power and any act of sectarian contestation threatened the political balance of power. In this environment, the Provisional IRA as a militant republican orientation could not escape becoming inscribed with sectarian and political meaning as republicanism itself had long become enmeshed in the history of violent Catholic contestation and resistance. The Provisionals embraced and even played upon the political significance attributed to the group in state response. Yet this does not change the reality that it was in the political framing rather than direct impact that the nature of the threat was determined and response was generated.

347 English, Armed Struggle, 119.
From the time of slavery through to the emergence of the contemporary civil rights movement, African Americans have largely been denied the opportunity to participate in the realm of formal politics. Therefore, for much of American history the political significance of race issues has been determined exclusively by white Americans. With African Americans excluded from the formal political sphere it became easy to frame race relations and racial inequality as economic and community concerns (slaveowner/slave relations; competition for jobs; crime; local unemployment) and thus part of the 'private sphere' rather than a matter of national importance. This framing has in turn deprived race issues of the language of political contestation. The civil rights movement succeeded in challenging this denial and carved out a place for African American voices in the realm of formal politics, seemingly eliminating the need for political mobilisation along its perimeter. But the legal equality (equality of treatment) achieved by the civil rights movement has not translated into equality of opportunity or equality of condition. \textit{De jure} (by force of law) segregation and racial equality may be a remnant of the past, but \textit{de facto} (in fact) segregation and inequality, is alive and well.

Chicago's African American supergangs emerged on the cusp of the 1960s around the same times as the civil rights movement was reaching its peak in the south. Although the civil rights movement promised improvements in the lives of \textit{all} black Americans, those who joined Chicago's gangs, along with most northern blacks, understood very early on that the \textit{de facto} segregation that prevailed in the north would be left largely untouched by a movement focused on legal equality. Many of those who populated the fledgling supergangs came from families who had migrated north during the Second Great Migration and understood acutely how deeply ingrained racial inequality had become within America's supposedly open social structure. These gangs would benefit from the increasing marginalisation and alienation of low income black inner-city youth in the 'post-racial' era by offering their own alternative version of the 'American Dream'. Much of the violence carried out by these gangs would differ little from the Provisional IRA's involvement in community violence (tit-for-tat or retaliatory killings, execution of 'traitors', punishment beatings), but the absence of a tradition of violent black political contestation meant that these groups went undifferentiated from the city's early 'ethnic' white street gangs.

This lack of political framing does not change the reality that Chicago's African American street gangs emerged as a result of the impact of decades of economic and social policy that enforced upon black Americans a second-class citizenship. It also does not change the fact that the scale of violence carried out by these groups would greatly restrict the ability of many of Chicago's inner-city residents to realise their American rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. It has however affected the federal government's willingness to take a leadership role in responding boldly to the politics and political implications of gang violence, something that has led to persistence of ineffective strategies largely developed to deal with the small, mostly non-violent and largely transitory youth gangs of the 1920s and 1930s. This is not to say the efforts to reduce gang violence, particularly those carried out by coalitions of community organisations and academic researchers have not been well-intentioned, simply that they have been thus far inadequate and ineffective. They have failed to fully consider how
the perpetuation of racial inequality and its evolution from full-blown 'white' dominance to *de jure* segregation/inequality and finally to *de facto* segregation have contributed greatly to African American gang violence's intractability.

The subject of race comes up time and time again in the American gang studies literature. In fact it would be difficult to find an example of American gang studies literature that makes no mention of race in some way. However the politics, or more appropriately, the political history of race are given short shrift, especially when compared with the extensive consideration of the role of history in the research on Northern Ireland. Within the gang studies literature, it is perhaps Robert J Durán's *Gang Life in Two Cities: An Insider's Journey* that most blatantly attempts to buck this trend. He argues, “An analysis of race and ethnic relations is essential to understanding gangs. I argue that if one wants to learn about gangs, one should first learn the history of race and ethnic relations in the community of interest and explore how contemporary patterns maintain this inequality.”\[348\] However his work focuses on *local* ethnic relations, *local* history and the *local* politics of race, with his emphasis on a grassroots approach to gang violence reduction reinforcing the relegation of gang violence to the level of community concern.

What remains missing is an understanding that while gang violence (in Chicago) is very much embroiled in local neighbourhood and inter-personal dynamics, it has been born out of a *national* history of race, presents a *national* political concern requiring a federal-level response and is a threat to the principles upon which the American state was founded – essentially an integration of the macro- and meso- levels of analysis. As chapter 4 will illustrate in greater detail, the federal government should not declare a 'war on gangs',\[349\] but the threat does warrant serious high-level political consideration and most importantly a commitment of financial and (most importantly) human resources that only the federal government can provide. This is not to say there is no hope that the type of grassroots approach Durán advocates for will not or cannot work in Denver, Colorado or Ogden, Utah, simply that it does not make sense in a Chicago context where levels and entrenchment of gang violence are such that the situation clearly remains beyond local (community or police) control.

**Absent from the Public Sphere: Slavery and the Origins of Racial Division**

The truth of how the first African Americans arrived on American shores has never been a mystery. Unlike Scottish Protestants who were encouraged to migrate to Ulster through British government policy,\[350\] there existed no formal state policy...
explicitly encouraging slavery. However, as slavery proved itself to be an effective and economical solution to labour shortages on southern plantations, its popularity grew immensely. Approximately half a million African men, women and (far more rarely) children would be shipped across the Atlantic to meet British colonist demand for labour in the south's growing plantation economy from mid-17th century forwards.\textsuperscript{351} Through natural reproduction and inter-colony trade, the slave population would eventually reach approximately four million by the 1850s.\textsuperscript{352} At the precipice of the American Civil War in 1860, slaves represented a third of the population of the south.\textsuperscript{353} However, they were not counted in the official population statistics of the time, for slaves were not persons but property or 'human chattel'.\textsuperscript{354} The differences between slaves and other property (slaves could be punished, wheelbarrows could not) would go on to inform the abolitionist debate. Yet, without personhood these human beings were denied not only the rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness set out in the \textit{Declaration of Independence}, but inclusion in 'the people' for whom the government bore the responsibility of ensuring these 'inalienable' rights.

While the southern economy was heavily dependent on slave labour, the comparatively advanced industrialisation of the north and its success in recruiting European immigrants to fill labour shortages meant that while slavery existed, it was neither common nor essential. During and following the American Revolutionary War (or War of Independence), slavery and its abolition would emerge as a political issue and a source of tension between the southern and northern states. In spite of its framing as a moral scourge and morally unjustifiable, slavery was, above all, a proxy issue in the negotiation of the national balance of power during the early years of the union. In the early 19th century slavery remained the most visible divide between northern and southern states, the former having abolished slavery one by each in the decades immediately following independence.\textsuperscript{355} Over the course of the early 19th century slavery came to stand, at least for northern politicians, intellectuals and moral crusaders, as the most flagrant example of southern moral and intellectual inferiority.\textsuperscript{356} The north

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\textsuperscript{351} The number of Africans imported into the United States would pale in comparison to the numbers imported by the island colonies and South America. Brazil, the largest importer, received approximately 3.2 million slaves. (Bob Deans, \textit{The River Where America Began: Journey Along the James} (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 120.)


\textsuperscript{353} Mary Lethert Wingerd, \textit{North Country: The Making of Minnesota} (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 175.


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struck its first victory over the south when participation in the slave trade was made illegal nation-wide in 1808, and the push for full national abolition and emancipation grew substantially from that point forward. The prospect of national abolition and emancipation presented the opportunity to claim not only a moral victory over the south, but a chance to ensure the dominance of northern culture and political sensibilities in the new state at a time when tension between the north and south was relatively high.

As nice as it would be to think that the northern adoption of a pro-abolition stance was rooted in a genuine desire to improve the conditions of life for American blacks and fully integrate them into society, this does not appear to be the case even in looking beyond the usefulness of pro-abolitionism in the on-going north-south state rivalry. Pressure to abolish slavery certainly did not translate into a willingness to relinquish attitudes of racial superiority. After the abolition of slavery, the north found new ways to embed white racial supremacy subtly and not-so-subtly within the economic and social order through widespread discrimination in the labour market and public/social life (housing, education, middle-class social societies and friendly associations). This set the template for the system of \textit{de facto} segregation and racial inequality that has persevered beyond the victories of the civil rights movement.\textsuperscript{357} Just as importantly, in the lead-up to and immediate aftermath of emancipation there seemed to be little rush in extending full citizenship and voting rights to the African American population. In spite of their 'free' status, blacks therefore continued to lack a voice in the public sphere and in formal politics more specifically. Although there were a number of important and highly influential blacks active in the abolitionist movement, Frederick Douglass the most obvious example,\textsuperscript{358} they still lacked direct access to the political decision making processes that led to emancipation and abolition.\textsuperscript{359}

The Civil War was instrumental in paving the way to emancipation, but contrary to popular perception, it was not fought over the issues of slavery. At its heart was a battle over the relative position of the northern and southern states and, more importantly, the freedom with which the southern states should be able to operate going forward as the balance of power tipped decidedly against them. The lack of thought as to what would happen to the newly-emancipated \textit{after} their freedom has been secured serves as additional evidence here. At the same time it should not be forgotten that while not the primary consideration in the lead-up to war, emancipation would still change the history of American race relations profoundly and irrevocably.

\textsuperscript{357} Litwack, \textit{North of Slavery}.
\textsuperscript{358} Frederick Douglass, \textit{Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass an American Slave} (Boston: The Anti-slavery Office, 1845); Frederick Douglass, \textit{The Life and Times of Frederick Douglass from 1817 to 1882} (London: Christian Age Office, 1882).
\textsuperscript{359} Other key black abolitionists (north and south) included: Ellen and William Craft (fugitive slaves); Thomas Dalton (free man); John Parker; and Harriet Tubman. Much writing on black abolitionists does not share the same pessimism of the overall political impact of these undoubtedly courageous and inspirational individuals presented here. Key works include: RJM Blackett, \textit{Building an Antislavery Wall: Black Americans in the Atlantic Abolitionist Movement} (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1983); William Craft and Ellen Craft, \textit{Running a Thousand Miles for Freedom, or The Escape of William and Ellen Craft from Slavery} (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999 [1860]); Benjamin Quarles, \textit{Black Abolitionists} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969); Shirley J Yee, \textit{Black Women Abolitionists: A Study in Activism 1828-1860} (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee, 1992).
The decision on the part of Abraham Lincoln to issue the *Emancipation Proclamation of 1863* was the result of tremendous generalised political pressure faced by the President.\(^{360}\) Yet, it is also possible to argue that this political pressure would have been bearable had there not existed an immediate need to bolster the fighting power in the Union Army. This view is supported by the importance placed on the incorporation of African Americans (specifically newly-freed slaves) into the Union Army within the *Proclamation* itself. If less integral, surely this measure could have been introduced separately, at a later date.\(^{361}\) Emancipation however, did not immediately beget formal abolition. Slavery was abolished at the end of the Civil War with the addition of the *Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution*: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”

New-found freedom for these former slaves was bittersweet as, “[t]he war left slaves with nothing but their freedom.”\(^{362}\) The economy was ill-equipped to deal with the transition from slave labour to waged labour and many former slaves ended up working on the same or similar plantations to the ones on which they had previously been enslaved. The establishment of the Freedmen's Bureau, though inadequate to deal with the full gamut of challenges faced by introducing more than 4 million new wage-workers into the southern economy, was able to assist former slaves in using their new (limited) bargaining power to improve their working conditions.\(^{363}\) Nevertheless, the reconstruction years would yield some definite improvements in the legal and political position of blacks. The *Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution* (1868) granted free men and freedmen alike citizenship rights thereby finally including black Americans as part of the 'people'.

With the ratification of the *Fifteenth Amendment* on 3 February 1870 blacks gained the legal right to participate in federal politics through the extension of the vote. Later that month Hiram Rhodes Revels became the first African American congressperson when elected as Senator for Mississippi. Such a flurry of activity inspired a great deal of hope that, for the first time, African Americans would be able to conquer racial inequality and participate fully in political life. However, early African American success in electoral politics was a short lived and entirely southern phenomenon.\(^{364}\) It would quickly come up against an elaborate system of Jim Crow laws

\(^{360}\) There had been limited emancipation attempts made prior to this by individual Union generals, but Lincoln quickly ended them, believing emancipation as a constitutional issue. Yet, reaction to Lincoln's curtailment of limited emancipation put additional pressure on the President to issue national emancipation, even if it was still something he personally was uncomfortable with. (Edna Greene Medford, “Imagined Promises, Bitter Realities: African Americans and the Meaning of the Emancipation Proclamation,” in *The Emancipation Proclamation: Three Views* by Harold Holzer, Edna Greene Medford and Frank J Williams (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006), 11-13.)


\(^{364}\) The first northerner to be elected to congress was Oscar Stanton De Priest who represented the 1st Congressional District of Illinois (covering part of Chicago's South Side and The Loop
that set the bar for political participation much higher for African Americans than most could possibly reach (for example through literacy and documentation requirements in areas where it was known former slaves had neither the opportunity to learn to read nor official papers). Drastically reducing the group of potential African American voters made it nigh on impossible for African American candidates to get elected. Jim Crow laws, guided by a federal acceptance of 'separate but equal' as adequate for guaranteeing basic citizenship rights and civil liberties, would come to define the south in the post-civil war era and beyond.365

The rigidity of segregation in the Jim Crow south did allow for the development of an African American middle class and small black elite comprised mainly of those in the service professions (medicine and education) and capitalists who met the material needs of their black community (a process that had already been occurring in northern industrial centres).366 However, for the vast majority of blacks life continued to be both difficult and dangerous. Even decades after emancipation, access to economic and educational opportunities was generally poor. This was particularly the case in the rural areas many African Americans continued to call home. White supremacist organisations such as the Ku Klux Klan (first and second incarnation) and locally-organised mobs routinely engaged in racially-motivated attacks including lynchings.367 As the 19th century rolled into the 20th, agricultural mechanisation further reduced employment opportunities for those with low skills and education.

Onwards and Upwards: Northern Migration and Civil Rights

The harsh conditions of life in the rural South prompted millions of blacks to move towards the 'promised lands' of the cities and the north where they believed


366 Leslie Brown, Upbuilding Black Durham: Gender, Class, and Black Community Development in the Jim Crow South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 249-284; Fairclough, “'Being in the Field of Education and Also Being a Negro... Seems... Tragic’,” 65-91; Thomas J Ward, Black Physicians in the Jim Crow South (Little Rock: The University of Arkansas Press, 2010).

opportunities would be greater and more colour-blind. During the first half of the twentieth century more than 6 million African Americans moved to southern cities and the northern states (most settling in its industrial cities) during two major migration waves. The First Great Migration, coinciding with World War I or The Great War in Europe, was the smaller of the two. During this period as many blacks moved to the southern cities as moved north, but even still Chicago's black population doubled. These rapid demographic changes and the tensions they generated would prompt a major race riot in 1919. Thus, if the new Chicagoans had expected to receive a warm welcome in the north, they would have been sorely disappointed. Migration did, at least theoretically, increase access to new economic opportunities in the Northern industrial economy, however they were often temporary and exploitative in nature.

Life in the north also offered an escape from the system of de jure segregation and racial inequality that prevailed in the pre-civil rights south, but it did not mean an escape from segregation altogether. This is something any African American seeking to buy a house in Chicago would quickly find. Housing open to African Americans was in short supply and housing conditions were often both cramped and dangerous. Restrictive covenants championed by 'neighbourhood associations' (often with the backing of large institutions such as the University of Chicago) consisted of, “contracts signed by white homeowners who agreed neither to sell nor rent to blacks.” They closed off many middle-class areas to all African Americans, regardless of income, and put further pressure on 'the black belt' as it came to be known. A lack of access to traditional financing routes made homeownership an unrealistic dream for many, including those with stable incomes. The severe overcrowding in housing led to similar problems in the public schools serving Chicago's growing black communities. Double- or even triple-shifts were brought in by the public school system to cope with the strain jeopardising the education of those already disadvantaged by race and (generally) class, while leaving scores of young people on the streets all day with little to occupy them.

The Second Great Migration, prompted by new industrial opportunities in the post-war consumerist era, lasted until 1970. More than with the previous wave,

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372 Pattillo, *Black on the Block*, 33.
migration concentrated on the northern industrial centres, something that put further strain on already tense race relations in Chicago. Though in some neighbourhoods the efficacy of the covenants had begun to wane in the face of demand, others, including Woodlawn remained closed to African Americans until the 1948 Supreme Court ruling in Shelly v Kraemer rendered racial covenants were legally unenforceable. The ruling could not have come at a more critical time. Although the Second Migration had less of an impact on the overall racial composition of Chicago than the first, it far outstripped the latter in sheer numerical impact. The city's African American population swelled by more than half a million persons between 1940 and 1960. The elimination of racial covenants may have eased the problem of housing availability, but did nothing about the dire housing conditions in many of these neighbourhoods. At the same time, inner-city neighbourhoods were becoming increasingly black. ‘White flight’ to the suburbs meant that low and middle income neighbourhoods in Chicago were increasingly filled by African American and (as a result of different migration patterns) latino families.

Unsurprisingly, the local economy had difficulty absorbing the massive influx of low-skilled and unskilled labour. Though opportunities were still comparatively better in the south (where the need for labour was increasingly shrinking), many were left on the outside looking in at the glory years of the American industrial economy. At the same time, the expansion of the welfare state and public housing provision (the result of the Housing Act of 1949 developed as part of Truman's 'Fair Deal') created a situation whereby those at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder had a measure of government support but few opportunities for self-sufficiency (let alone social mobility). Though the concentration of ethnic minorities and poverty in the city of Chicago was certainly nothing new, it was during this period that the modern conditions of 'hood' life would establish themselves, with Arnold Hirsch arguing, “Out of the chaos [of the second migration and postwar expansion/restructuring of the welfare state] emerged the second ghetto, an entity now distinguished by government support and sanction.”

The American civil rights movement that began in the mid-1950s was initially, and in its most potent years, a southern phenomenon. Nevertheless, it represented the first and (to-date) only major mass political mobilisation of African Americans. It

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378 Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto, 16-17.

379 Ibid, xvii.

380 Key literature on the American civil rights movement includes: Taylor Branch, Parting the
began with the goal of dismantling the system of Jim Crow segregation that had relegated African Americans to second-class citizenship since the reconstruction era, yet it also changed the shape and language of race relations in the United States more broadly. The United States Supreme Court ruling in Brown v Board of Education in 1954 determined that, “in the field of public education, the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal,”

kickstarting desegregation in education, transportation and public facilities (parks, washrooms, drinking fountains, etc.). However, the process of moving from segregation to integration could not be achieved overnight. It was long, arduous and too often violent.

Indeed, a full decade after Brown v Board of Education, the slow progress on integration would prompt the enactment of The Civil Rights Act (1964). In a way not dissimilar to loyalist mobilisation in the face of Northern Irish calls for civil rights, it was the counter-mobilisation of those opposed to integration (known as the 'massive resistance') that complicated the process considerably.

Unlike in Northern Ireland, the stakes in this context, both nationally and internationally, were too high and the threat of civil war too low to give in to Southern dissent. With the United States locked in a cold war with the Soviet Union, southern racial discrimination provided ready fodder for the Soviet propaganda machine and was becoming a source of increasing international scrutiny.

In the north, this dismantling of de jure segregation had a negligible impact on the prevailing system of de facto segregation. De facto segregation intertwined race and class so wholly that racial inequalities had become self-reproducing within the class system, eliminating the need for legislative reinforcement.

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386 Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, La reproduction. Éléments pour un théorie du
reforms had taken place, the southern civil rights movement became increasingly aware of the force of *de facto* segregation in the north and turned its attentions to national mobilisation (starting with Chicago). But as difficult and bloody the battle was in the south, as blacks and their supporters were frequently subject to intimidatory violence, the relegation of northern inequality to the private sphere, where it was beyond the direct control of the government, created a much murkier (if comparatively bloodless) battlefield in which the 'enemy' was disparate, hidden or both. The shift in the priorities of the civil rights movement from legally-supported discrimination and segregation to pervasive yet unofficial residential segregation would, as James Ralph argues, ultimately weaken support for the civil rights movement. Yet, it cannot be denied that without the efforts of the Chicago Freedom Movement it is unlikely that helpful measures such as the *Fair Housing Act (1968)* (precluding discrimination in the sale, rental and financing of housing) would have been passed. Even still, the ultimate impact of this measure would prove limited as new workarounds such as redlining and steering (not covered by the act) became more widespread.

The civil rights movement did however prompt a change in the language of discrimination in Chicago and across the United States. With it no longer legally or socially acceptable to discriminate on the basis of race, the language of class, culture and crime replaced the language of race in establishing boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. This change was facilitated by an unspoken broad-cultural understanding of the relationship between race & income/socio-economic status and the perceived relationship between socio-economic status & crime. Euphemisms such as 'a rough neighbourhood' replaced formal demographic descriptors yet still conveyed a wealth of information – such neighbourhoods were predominately black/Latino with average incomes lower than the city median, crime rates much substantially higher than average and public schools of questionable quality ('underperforming').

Though the impact of the civil rights movement is measured by, and largely limited to, the creation of legislative measures granting legal and formal political equality, the movement uniquely rallied black Americans around a common cause. It

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388 A collaboration between the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) led by Dr Martin Luther King Jr, the Coordinating Council of Community Organizations (CCCO) and the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC).


390 Labelling of certain areas as ineligible for mortgages on the basis that they represent poor quality investments, where poor investment potential is often synonymous with high levels of concentrated poverty and ethnic minorities.

391 The actual extent of any correlation between socio-economic status and criminality as loosely defined remains highly debated within the scholarship as an issue with little to no consensus in sight. (James Maguire, *Understanding Psychology and Crime: Perspectives on Theory and Action* (Berkshire: Open University Press, 2004), 72-73.)

also put race issues at the centre of political debate for the first time in American history. No longer were they a mere proxy for other political concerns. The civil rights movement fostered a genuine interest in extending full membership in the state (and its full protections) to all American citizens without significant ulterior motives. The promise of civil rights was the promise that no longer would African Americans have to live under a government that refused them a role in its composition and alteration. The question thus becomes how did African American street gangs emerging in this highly politicised environment escape becoming a political issue.

Where four-hundred years of Irish and Northern Irish history and the very structure of the body politic itself conspired to ensure that the Provisional IRA was readily and immediately coded as political, two and a half centuries of American history conspired to ensure these gangs were not, with geography contributing in an immediate sense. Chicago's street gangs and the civil rights movement were both reactions to racial inequalities supported and perpetuated by centuries of government action and inaction on race issues in an America where the status of African Americans had been imposed upon them by successive white governments from which they were formally and informally excluded. Yet, African American street gangs in Chicago were far removed both geographically and politically from the civil rights movement. The civil rights movement was still very much a southern affair when the Vice Lords and Blackstone Rangers (Almighty Black P Stone Nation) first began to make their presence felt on the West and South sides respectively.

There were attempts to integrate Chicago's street gangs into the civil rights movement as it expanded into Chicago, though the gangs remained skeptical of its ideology and potential. Collaboration remained ad hoc and on the gangs' terms. The 'hope gap' between agents of political violence and gang violence presented in the previous chapter can also be seen between civil rights activists and Chicago's supergang pioneers. The southern civil rights movement, and its black middle-class SCLC and NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) leadership\(^3\) genuinely believed that legal and political equality, by removing the formal barriers to access (education, employment, public spaces), would lead to racial equality through equality of opportunity.\(^4\) For the black middle-class and elites, the perception of the particular constraints and opportunities they themselves faced proved accurate. They, their children\(^5\) and the small minority who managed to overcome the tremendous odds against them in the face of educational and socio-economic disadvantages\(^6\) were able

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\(^6\) Similar to the socio-economic advancement of middle-class and highly educated Northern Irish Catholics in the wake of the enactment of anti-discrimination legislation in the mid-1970s.
to compete and advance within 'post-racial' American society because of the security provided by legal and basic political equality.\(^{397}\) Unfortunately, for the vast majority of African Americans the 'new tomorrow' ushered in by the civil rights movement was not nearly as bright.

Even before the civil rights movement faded away, those who founded and flocked to Chicago's emerging supergangs in their earliest years instinctively knew not to believe the grandiose promises made by the civil rights movement. After all, these were the children of the disappointed and disillusioned who gave in to the promise of the north during the Second Great Migration. They keenly understood that unbolting the door to prosperity made little difference without the tools to prise it open and step through. Their parents had made tremendous sacrifices, leaving behind their rural roots and families, accepting whatever work was available even if pay and working conditions were worse than that offered to white employees, and suppressing parts of their culture found objectionable by the majority population, yet they gained little from playing 'the white man's game'. Therefore, rather unsurprisingly, even as the civil rights movement expanded northward theoretically offering supergang members the opportunity to fully politicise (and thus move away from violence), ideological and practical skepticism prevented these groups from fully giving in to the southern civil rights movement's idea of a united peaceful political front.

One area of particular discomfort was over the way in which civil rights leaders presented themselves culturally – they seemed to be begging for a place at the white man's table\(^{398}\) at a time when inner-city African Americans in both the north and the west were starting to really question why they would to break bread with him at all.\(^{399}\) Quite logically, though gang members, and even gangs themselves, flirted with participation in the civil rights movement, the bulk of their energy was focused on improving their own material conditions of life and that of their families. Still seeing themselves as locked out of prime legitimate opportunities illegal activity became an increasingly attractive way to meet these material needs as black organisations displaced white organised crime in running vice markets and racketeering rings in inner city neighbourhoods.\(^{400}\)


\(^{400}\) Cooley, “'Stones Run It'.”
The black power movement held greater appeal among Chicago's gangs and gang members during the mid-to-late 1960s, better capturing the cynicism and rage of black youth in the inner city. However, the gangs had only tenuous relationships with the major black nationalist and black power organisations, the Black Panthers in particular. Therefore, as local law enforcement and politicians were faced with decisions about how to classify the city's growing street gangs, there was little in the way of concrete evidence to convince them that they were not simply a more lethal evolution of the delinquent gangs that had populated inner city ethnic neighbourhoods since the top of the century. While there was no precedent for the type of mass African American political mobilisation that the civil rights movement represented, it is also important to keep in mind that neither had their been a history of African American group violence in the city.

The Almighty P Stone Nation: Street Gangs and 'Domestic Terrorism'

The Almighty P Stone Nation was one of the first African American supergangs to emerge in Chicago and at 55 years old is one of the oldest active street gang organisations in the United States. It experienced its heyday in the late 1960s and early 1970s when it could claim to be the largest of street gang network in the city. There are two factors that make the Almighty P Stone Nation a particularly interesting case study in terms of trying to further our understanding of political threat and response. First and foremost, the Stones, at least during the period lasting from the mid-1960s through the mid-1980s, was the most explicitly political of Chicago's street gangs. They flirted with involvement in the civil rights movement through the Chicago Freedom Movement, including meeting with Martin Luther King Jr himself, before integrating black nationalist and black power ideology and style into the 'nation' (bringing the group briefly into contact with the Black Panthers). Although a number of Chicago's gangs would experiment with Afro-centric Islam, none would adopt it as fully as a quasi-religious and political organising philosophy, the main branch of the Stones going as far


as reinventing themselves as the El Rukns.\textsuperscript{403} Secondly, as a result of the connections they forged with civil rights, black power and radical Islamic groups (regardless of how tentative these connections proved to be), the Stones were able to attract more attention as a political threat at the federal level than any other Chicago gang.

With the release of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's COINTELPRO papers on 'black extremist' organisations it has been discovered that the group's relationship with the Black Panthers had been a source of federal concern in the late 1960s.\textsuperscript{404} In the 1980s the El Rukn faction of the Stones received the distinction of becoming the first (and only) African American street gang organisation to be convicted of conspiracy to commit domestic terrorism (state sponsored terrorism no less). Yet, in both cases 'political' attention came independently from the destructiveness of the group, a product of organisational relationships and government perceptions of how partnerships might develop as opposed to levels of actual violence and destruction for which the group was responsible. Otherwise put, concern was a product of regime self-preservation (perceived threat to state structures) rather than any real commitment to the fundamental principles of American statehood the governance regime was established to protect. Thus, the Almighty P Stones provide the best demonstration of the level of wilful ignorance shown by successive federal governments to the very real threat to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness posed by gang violence, with the federal government abdicating its responsibility to protect the universal and inalienable of all Americans regardless of race, income or neighbourhood of residence.

Natalie Y Moore and Lance Williams' \textit{The Almighty P Stone Nation: The Rise and Fall of an American Street Gang} remains not only the most significant work on the Almighty P Stones Nation to date, but the most in-depth historical profile of any of Chicago's supergangs. Though this work does draw upon \textit{The Almighty P Stone Nation} quite heavily in terms of factual detail, it is possible to argue that in concentrating on the 'golden years' of the late 1960s and El Rukn period, Moore and Williams paint a picture of the organisation far more cohesive than it ever truly was. As much as Jeff Fort was able to wield a considerable (and uncompromising) amount of power within the main body of the organisation, there has always been a significant amount of grassroots autonomy in its operations. Although leaving the main body of the group came at a cost, but it was one many individual sets or clusters found bearable, especially as it reinvented itself as the El Rukns. At the same time, while Moore and Williams do engage in a discussion of the facts around the Stones' more politicised activities and the domestic terrorism convictions, these episodes are used as part of a larger conversation about the overall internal power dynamic, specifically the influence of Jeff Fort who they present as the mastermind group's ideological shifts. In order to understand the broader significance of the Stones' political involvements and flirtations, it is necessary to move beyond Fort alone and into a consideration of the group's political distinctiveness both from other gangs and the political groups with whom they interacted. It is in this space where it becomes possible to better understand the determining role played by framing in state response.

\textsuperscript{403} Moore and Williams, \textit{The Almighty Black P Stone Nation}, 21;
\textsuperscript{404} James Kirkpatrick Davis, \textit{Spying on America: The FBI's Domestic Counter-intelligence Program} (Westport: Greenwood, 1992), 111-112.
By mid-1959, the Vice Lords were already solidifying their presence on the West Side, but on the South Side African American street gangs were still generally quite small and geographically limited – more like the ethnic gangs of the 1930s and 1940s than the supergangs which were to follow. As alluded to in the first chapter, the Blackstone Rangers would develop from a merger of two of these smaller informal neighbourhood groups. Jeff Fort, who had moved to Chicago from Mississippi with his parents only a few years earlier, led a small group of boys known as the 'Blackstone Rangers'. Fort was only 13 years old, but his crew proved a real challenge for their Woodlawn rivals 'the Harper Boys', a small crew led by Bull Hairston (then aged 15) with whom they would frequently brawl.\(^405\) Both Hairston and Fort had personal connections with Leonard Calloway, co-founder and leader of the Vice Lords. Hairston and Calloway were first cousins while Calloway had often provided refuge for the young Fort when tensions with his parents flared.\(^406\)

The peak of the group's power from the mid-1960s through mid-1970s coincided with its flirtation with the civil rights movement and adoption of black power ideology (including a brief involvement with the Black Panther Party). The flurry of grassroots political activity in inner city Chicago taking place at the same time meant that, to a certain extent, engagement with the era's black politics was almost unavoidable given the deep relationships gang members and their families had with these neighbourhoods. In Woodlawn (the epicentre of Blackstone Ranger activity) the Saul Alinsky inspired Woodlawn Organisation (TWO)\(^407\) and affiliate groups were actively encouraging residents to take greater leadership in their communities in order so as to take back the power from (mostly white) outsiders and elites. Groups engaged in grassroots politics found it useful to have gangs like the Stones on board both for the practical assistance they could provide (ready pools of between dozens and hundreds of volunteers) and to minimise the risk of 'disruption' from the gangs.\(^408\)

When, in 1965, Dr Martin Luther King Jr's Southern Christian Leadership Conference looked to bring its brand of (non-violent) direct action northwards to Chicago, the Stones made it very clear they wanted to be involved.\(^409\) But it was quickly

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\(^{406}\) Ibid, 7, 21-22.

\(^{407}\) Saul Alinsky is simultaneously the most well-known and controversial community organiser in the history of Chicago. After cutting his teeth with the Chicago Area Project, he played an instrumental role in designing The Woodlawn Organisation, his first attempt at organising an African American community. His community organising tactics have been cited by both President Barack Obama and former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton as having had a great impact on their own approaches to grassroots activism in the city, which represented the first stage in the political careers of both figures. (Saul Alinsky, “Community Analysis and Organization,” *American Journal of Sociology* 46, no 6 (1941): 797-808; Saul Alinsky, *Revile for Radicals* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946); Saul Alinsky, *Rules for Radicals: A Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals* (New York: Knopf Doubleday, 2010); James Bennett, *Oral History and Delinquency* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 211-238; Mark R Warren, *Dry Bones Rattling: Community Building to Revitalize American Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 40-74.

\(^{408}\) Cooley, “'Stones Run It,'” 911-912, 916-917; Moore and Williams, *The Almighty Black P Stone Nation*, 39.

realised that the relationship was not going to fly as the SCLC and Stones were quite far apart in their views on the acceptability, practicality and necessity of violence. Yet, in spite of their differences, a number of Stones became actively involved in SCLC's work where they were particularly well suited to the role of march steward.  

For Adam Fairclough, the inability of the SCLC to turn the Stones into non-violent civil rights devotees is seen as an indication of the group's lack of genuine political interest. This is more than a little unfair to the Stones as it's a terribly large leap to go from arguing that the Stones were unwilling to accept the programme of non-violent political activism espoused by the SCLC to claiming that this is somehow evidence that the Stones did not hold any genuine political aspirations. The Stones may not have been as politically articulate as King, but their interest in willingly engaging in thoughtful discussion and debate indicates a depth of commitment to political thinking and engagement.

One should be cautious of overstating the 'pro-social' orientation of the Blackstone Rangers in the late 1960s, for it was at this time that the Stones (first individually, then as a group) became more involved in the illegal economy including extortion/'protection' rackets, illegal gambling, prostitution and the growing drug trade. The negative impact of these activities on community life may have equalled, if not surpassed in magnitude, the positive contribution made by the group's community building efforts. But this is not a matter of one cancelling the other out, nor are their nefarious activities proof that the Stones' never had any genuine political aspirations. Although the Stones' involvement in the Youth Manpower Project (administered by the Woodlawn Organisation) can be best described as an unmitigated disaster, even this project began with a genuine commitment to improving the employment prospects of black inner city youth. As it turned out, the gang did exploit the program at every available opportunity. However, the available information on the Youth Manpower Project leaves open the possibility that the Stones lost faith in the ability of the program to deliver results as a result of the poor administration and training provided and decided to take what they could from it, rather than the intending to defraud the program from the outset.

It was during the late 1960s that the Stones' relationship with the 'black power' movement grew and a relationship with the Black Panther Party began to develop. The Stones adopted red, green and black as their official colours inspired by the Pan-African flag used by Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities League. They were drawn to the Panther's focus on economic

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410 Moore and Williams, The Almighty Black P Stone Nation, 39-42; Fairclough, To Redeem the Soul of America, 288-289.
411 Fairclough, To Redeem the Soul of America, 289.
412 Cooley, "'Stones Run It,'" 912.
414 Moore and Williams, The Almighty Black P Stone Nation, 42.
inequality, confrontational politics and unapologetic acceptance of their blackness. The Stones' relationship with the Panthers was a source of concern for the FBI who had long been concerned by the activities of the Black Panther Party, a group which used revolutionary language and advocated for the use of force to overthrow the federal government.\footnote{Bloom and Martin, \textit{Black Against Empire}, 2010.} Given the Stones' man and firepower at the time, the development of a fruitful alliance between the groups threatened to strengthen the Panthers in Chicago and their potential for serious violence considerably. The FBI responded by trying to sow the seeds of distrust between the two groups. The Chicago office of the FBI sent fictitious letters to Fort and Panther leader Fred Hampton warning each leader that the other organisation had ordered a hit out on him.\footnote{Noam Chomsky, “Domestic Terrorism: Notes on the State System of Oppression,” \textit{New Political Science} 21, no 3 (1999): 310; Moore and Williams, \textit{The Almighty Black P Stone Nation}, 96-98.} These efforts would prove ineffective and unnecessary. Not only did neither side believe the letters, but by the time they had been received a mutual decision to end the relationship before it got too deep had already been made. Both the Stones and the Panthers were unwilling to sacrifice the amount of autonomy (or power and control) needed to make a truly meaningful partnership work. The Stones were already suffering from an internal leadership battle between Fort and Hairston, and a deepened relationship with the Panthers ran the risk of stymying Fort's push for total leadership as Hairston had always espoused a more nuanced understanding of black power ideology than Fort, even if the latter had been enthusiastic about developing the Stones' community connections.\footnote{Cooley, “'Stones Run It,'” 916; Moore and Williams, \textit{The Almighty Black P Stone Nation}, 3, 133.}

Once satisfied the relationship with the Panthers had ended, the FBI's COINTELPRO programme lost interest in the Stones. Regardless of the body count being racked up on the South Side, the group was no longer as a threat to the United States. Interestingly, despite the FBI's extensive campaign of surveillance, harassment and infiltration of the Black Panther Party, the group was only ever responsible for three deaths (one police officer and two suspected informants) between its emergence in 1966 and split in 1971. That the Stones, described by the FBI as a group, “to whom violent type activity, shooting, and the like, are second nature,”\footnote{Chomsky, “Domestic Terrorism,” 310.} were only considered a 'threat' as a result of their relationship with the Panthers speaks volumes about how American governments see threat in terms of protecting existing governance structures rather than ensuring the government is able to meet its duty of care for its citizens without malicious interference.

In the early 1970s Hairston was serving a lengthy prison sentence for conspiracy to commit murder but he retained his commitment to black power principles. Fort too was serving time for defrauding the federal government as a result of the mismanagement of the Youth Manpower Project. However during Fort's stint in prison he converted to Islam (Moorish Science Temple of America) and upon his release, which came before Hairston's, he began to work his newfound belief into the organisation. In 1978 he seized control of the main body of the Stones and renamed it...
The El Rukn Tribe of the Moorish Science Temple of America', El Rukn for short. This move prompted numerous defections, not just of individuals (including Hairston) but whole factions. Even if not themselves religious, some flat-out refused to accept the group's new style and outlook, seeing it as a betrayal of their Christian mothers. These breakaway groups were no less (or more) violent than the El Rukns, and the involvement of all sections of the Almighty Black P Stone Nation in illegal activity grew during this period. It would be the El Rukns however who drew renewed federal attention as a political threat, this time on a far grander scale than that previously experienced.

Though the El Rukn 'faith' was inspired by the Afro-centric Moorish Science Temple of America, the group would develop a relationship with Louis Farrakhan of the Nation of Islam in the early 1980s. Farrakhan's anti-American and anti-Semitic rhetoric had already landed him on the radar of United States counter-terrorism agencies and his international connections were a growing political concern. In 1985 Farrakhan announced that he had received a $5 million loan from the Libyan government under Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, ostensibly for the purposes of developing African American economic self-sufficiency. The El Rukns saw the Libyans as an easy financier and went on to make an approach for funds themselves claiming the money was to go towards building a mosque.

Although the details of any conversations between Libyan officials and the El Rukns are murky to say the least (as was the whole domestic terrorism case), interactions between the group and individuals affiliated with the Libyan government gave rise to the allegation that the El Rukns had accepted $2.5 million to carry out terrorist attacks on strategic American targets on the Libyans' behalf. In 1987 Fort and high-ranking El Rukns Reico Crenshaw, Alan Knox, Leon McAnderson and Roosevelt Hawkins were convicted of conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism against the United States. Yet, the trial itself was complicated (to put it mildly) and even with a conviction secured, the government's case can still be considered less than wholly persuasive.

There remain important questions around the credibility of the prosecution's key witness and the methods used in the evidence gathering process. Further, though technically irrelevant when it comes to conspiracy charges, as Moore and Williams point out, “there was no proof that money ever changed hands between the El Rukns and Libya.” As a result, it is difficult to say whether and to what extent the group was actually guilty of the crime for which it was accused. The extent of the El Rukns guilt, however, matters less than the fact that the federal government remained more concerned by, and invested in, a vague potential collaboration between the El Rukns and the Libyan government than the loss of life and public order for which the former group was responsible in large swaths of the city of Chicago (including housing developments.

sponsored through federal grants). At the same time, there was no consideration of the
effect such a massive destabilisation of the El Rukn leadership would have at the
grassroots level as disparate factions and potential leaders were put in direct (and
violent) competition for control. Thus, even this domestic terrorism case was guided
by framing (or perception) as opposed to the actual nature of the threat (reality) in a way
eerily similar to the governmental response in Northern Ireland, particularly in the
critical early years of the conflict. However, the results were wildly different.

Without an understanding of the political relevance of gang violence, the federal
government only paid attention to the Stones as a political threat when they flirted with
crossing the line between ‘gang’ and ‘political activists’ as a result of potential
partnerships with external bodies. It was through these partnerships, which never
amounted to much in reality, that the group came to be cast as potential 'terrorists' – a
group willing to use violence to support partners' clear political demands – irregardless
of how much terror the group was responsible for in the inner city neighbourhoods of
the South Side. It is certainly worth asking whether any of the partnerships federal level
agencies deemed worthy of investigation would have generated the same destabilising
effect on American life that decades of endemic and intergenerational gang violence
have.

Summary

Major social cleavages in Northern Irish and American society have been
responsible for the generation and perpetuation of socio-economic, legal and political
inequality on both sides of the Atlantic for centuries. This chapter however, has focused
on the issue of how these cleavages have contributed to differential response to serious,
mostly urban, group violence in the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) and United
States. It explains how gang violence in Chicago has failed to generate a response in any
way mirroring the seriousness with which Provisional IRA violence was treated during
the Troubles in Northern Ireland despite higher levels of violence and argues differential
response is the result of differential framing. In Northern Ireland centuries-old sectarian
animosity feeding directly into nationalist politics ensures that all group violence, or
even group mobilisation, on either side of the sectarian divide carries intrinsic political
meaning and political implications. The opposite has been the case in the United States.
The lack of African American political mobilisation has meant that only those violent
African American groups who engage the government directly using the language of
political threat (for example calling for the violent overthrow of the government à la the
Black Panthers) are seen as warranting high-level response. This is regardless of the
scale of violence or impediment they present to the expression of the intrinsic rights to
life, liberty and pursuit of happiness for many of the most marginalised American
citizens.

That gang violence not only poses a threat to the stability of the American social
contract but also makes a statement about its validity has been roundly neglected in the

November 2009, 39A; John Hagedorn and Brigid Rauch, “Housing, Gangs and Homicide: What
gang studies scholarship. Where the federal-level response to American gang violence has been muted, so too have serious demands for political accountability. It is not that gangs cannot attract federal attention, as the above discussion of the Almighty Black P Stones demonstrates. It is simply that when they do it is not because of their very real participation in endemic community-level violence but their links (however tenuous) to pre-identified political players/threats. Even as levels of gang violence (not just in Chicago but nation-wide) sky-rocketed in the 1970s and early 1990s, the framing of gang violence as a community and criminal justice issue has not been seriously challenged and, as the next chapter will explore, this has led to the perpetuation of inadequate intervention and suppression-dominated responses to the problem.

Much of the Provisional IRA's routine community violence varied little from that carried out by the likes of the Stones – tit-for-tat or revenge killings, punishment beatings or executions and defensive violence aimed at providing the community with protection from outside attack. Both the Provisionals and the Stones also grew primarily because of their successful mobilisation of socio-economically disenfranchised and educationally disadvantaged young men seeking to protect and defend themselves and their immediate communities from inter-community and state violence. These commonalities are aspects of the Provisional IRA's operations that have been routinely ignored or marginalised within the prevailing scholarly narratives of the organisation which focus primarily on its development as a political force.

This chapter has put forth the argument, missing from our current understanding of the Provisional IRA, that its existence rather than its actions were what necessitated a significant political response. The level of violence perpetrated by the organisation and its routine targeting of the institutions and representatives of the British state within and outside of Northern Ireland no doubt shaped the form and intensity of the response, but not the fact of response itself. Because in Northern Ireland any real or perceived alteration in the sectarian balance of power affects a change in the political balance of power, the existence of the Provisional IRA as a militant republican organisation constituted a threat to the security of the constitutional status of Northern Ireland as much because of its own potential for action as from the loyalist response it was likely to incite. Where the civil rights movement has already been perceived as a republican conspiracy by loyalists, conditions on the ground made it such that even limited defensive action by the Provisional IRA, by denying loyalists the opportunity to regain ground 'lost' or 'under threat', posed a threat to the existing balance of power. That many in the Dublin-based Provisional leadership also sought from the very beginning to use unrest as an opportunity to provoke the British into leaving Northern Ireland exacerbated the scale of the real and perceived threat, but did not create it.

The roots of this politicisation (and thus differential response) date back to the

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426 In stark contrast to the level of federal attention given to the gang violence issue, a tremendous amount of attention at the federal and state levels has been devoted to tackling gangs’ drug selling activities as part of the American ‘war on drugs’ first announced in 1971. However drug sales are not the focus of this thesis. Federal response to drug trafficking does not change the fact that endemic gang violence has failed to warrant consideration as a public order crisis despite the fact that it undermines the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and American founding principles.
mid-16th century Protestant Reformation. The nature of the Reformation of England and the governance relationship between England and Ireland imposed upon Ireland a new relationship between church and state that alienated native and Old English alike who retained their ties to the Catholic church. Where the Reformation in England combined the heads of church and state into one person (the monarch), it created a dynamic where religious disloyalty automatically begat political disloyalty. On the other hand, Protestantism came to signify political loyalty and trustworthiness. In the 17th century the British government, recognising the failure of its early reformation efforts in Ireland, sought to increase the ties between Britain and Ireland through plantation. The influx of Dissenters (non-Anglican Protestants, mostly Scottish) into Ireland, specifically the north-east corner of Ulster, would change the demographic composition of this part of the island and distinguish it permanently.

By the time of the first modern Irish separatist nationalist uprising in the late 18th century, the depth of the social cleavage was such that it was already possible to doubt whether mobilisation across the sectarian divide on any major scale could take place. However, the alliance between the United Irishmen and the Defenders, a Catholic secret society responsible for sectarian attacks during the rebellion, would deepen the divide even further and add a new political dimension to sectarian conflict in Ireland. Rather than being 'disloyal' in an abstract sense, Catholicism was ascribed a deep and enduring link with militant separatist Irish nationalism (republicanism) even though only a small minority of Catholics in Ulster would ever be supportive of republican violence. This coalescence of Catholicism, political disloyalty and separatist nationalism would come to define Irish politics especially in the territory of Northern Ireland created by Government of Ireland Act 1920. With Northern Ireland's existence the result of Protestant political insecurities, any political challenge by the Catholic minority population, whether justified or not, risked cascading into a threat to the existing constitutional arrangement. The avowedly non-sectarian civil rights movement and its limited demands for social and political equality regardless of class or religious identity dared to question the ability (or willingness) of the Northern Irish state to fulfil its responsibility to uphold the basic rights and dignity of all citizens as established in British common law. This was interpreted as a challenge to Northern Ireland's constitutional legitimacy by militant loyalists, who in turn responded by threatening, and then carrying out, acts of violence in an effort to quell the civil rights movement.

Though the Provisional IRA claimed (like the United Irishmen) that it wanted to attract cross-sectarian support, the rigidity of the sectarian division in Northern Irish society and the long-established association of republicanism with Catholicism made recruiting more than a few brave Protestant followers an unrealistic aspiration.427 What little chance there may have been of mobilising the Protestant working class largely evaporated before the Provisional IRA had even been formed. Not only was its position as a republican group intrinsically tied to 'the Catholic side', but it emerged in response to Catholic demands for protection against sectarian violence. Thus, it was automatically embroiled in the cycle of sectarian violence and civil disorder taking hold in Northern Ireland. The methods, tactics and strategy of the Provisional republican

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movement changed considerably over the course of the Troubles. Diminishing levels of mob-based sectarian violence and the growth of the PIRA's base of volunteers, supporters and sympathisers allowed the group to become more proactive and explicitly political in its violence. Yet, any external activity, whether it be the defence of residents of Short Strand from sectarian attack or the ambush of British soldiers along the border, affected the balance of sectarian and political power and deepened the cycle of violence and increasing civil disorder.

The Almighty P Stone Nation developed in Chicago at the same time as the American civil rights movement began to expand into the northern cities with demands moving beyond and end to segregation and the assurance of voting rights. While demands made by the American civil rights movement would bear close similarities to those made by the Northern Irish civil rights movement it helped to inspire, the framing differed considerably. The Northern Irish civil rights movement demanded the fair allocation of social housing, an end to discrimination in public employment and the dismantling of local structures of disenfranchisement (gerrymandered electoral boundaries; the company vote). They pursued 'British rights for British citizens' regardless of whether these citizens saw themselves as British, Irish or something in between. As basic legal equality for Catholics already existed in Northern Ireland, the civil rights movement focused on securing political and social equality.

Conversely, the American civil rights movement at its most potent and well-supported was still in the position of advocating for basic legal equality. They demanded safe access to the public and political spheres and it succeeded in dismantling the jim Crow system of *de jure* segregation and legally supported racial inequality that prevailed in the south. However it would be those African Americans already in the upper echelons of the black class structure who would benefit most from these changes. While a few low income inner-city blacks would achieve social mobility against the odds, for the bulk of young inner-city African American men in Chicago the civil rights movement fail to yield a demonstrable improvement in their quality of life. Furthermore, it eliminated racial inequality and discrimination as a viable explanation for one's failure to succeed in a world where race was supposedly no longer an issue, even if race continued to matter profoundly through its ties with socio-economic status. Those who joined the ranks of Chicago's African American nascent supergangs were keenly aware of the limitations to the promises made by the civil rights movement. They understood all too well that neither legal equality nor 'hard work' (alone or together) were sufficient to guarantee a life resembling 'the American Dream'.

From the arrival of the first slaves on the shores of what would become the United States in the 18th century through to the civil rights movement of the 1950s and

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428 A Catholic enclave in East Belfast.
1960s the fate and status of 'black America' had been decided (positively and negatively) by 'white America' and its slaveholders, politicians, policy makers, intellectuals, major business leaders, abolitionists, activists and reformers. With black voices almost wholly absent from the public/political sphere, there was no tradition of violent black political agitation into which the emergence of African American urban group violence could be readily situated. That the behaviour of the early African American gangs in Chicago bore such close similarities to the white 'ethnic' street gangs long a feature of the city's urban landscape meant that there was a precedent for understanding these groups from the view point of 'community history' or 'urban sociology'. What has been missing from this view of the gang problem however has been a broader consideration of how black street gangs fit into the history of American racial politics. Without this, the depoliticised framing of street gang violence in Chicago has failed to generate a substantial intellectual or practical challenge.

It took centuries for African Americans to win legal protections for their rights as set out in the *Declaration of Independence*. Thus, it is unfortunately unsurprising that the full realisation of their citizenship rights, especially for the most marginalised African Americans, has been less than forthcoming. Such negligence is even more inexcusable now than it was in 1776. After all, can the demand that the state uphold the fundamental principles upon which it was founded really be considered unreasonable? At the same time, where the state has failed in its most basic responsibility can it ever truly be considered stable and secure? With framing the source of differential response to group violence, the next chapter will explore how the lack of political significance accorded to the problem of gang violence in the city of Chicago has lead to the perpetuation of inadequate, ineffective and poorly-organised responses to gang violence. Framing gang violence as a community and criminal justice issue has meant that the responsibility for dealing with this violence has been left to a myriad of government agencies, community groups (with and without government backing), law enforcement and haphazard, often ad-hoc coalitions. It is hoped that by understanding the source and nature of differential response, it will become possible to question the wisdom of existing approaches and start the process of mapping a new way forward.
Chapter 3
Previous Responses to Gang Violence in Chicago: The Limitations of Intervention, Suppression and Integration

The scale and intensity of gang violence in the early 1960s may not have appeared altogether different from that perpetrated by the early 'ethnic' gangs described by Thrasher in *The Gang*. However, 'supergang' violence would soon escalate significantly in both intensity and lethality during the mid-to-late 1960s. The central argument of this chapter is that in continuing to see the city's street gangs as *simply* more organised and lethal versions of the 'ethnic' gangs of the 1930s, the path was paved for the continued application of strategies developed to deal with these comparatively tame groups. Where these strategies were only limitedly effective against early ethnic gangs, they have been almost wholly inadequate in the face of increased levels of serious gang violence. In order to illustrate the inadequacy of existing approaches to gang violence reduction, this chapter examines the history of gang violence reduction/elimination efforts in the city of Chicago, something peculiarly under-explored in the existing gang studies literature. When compared with the tremendous amount of scholarly attention devoted to the state's response to civil disorder and paramilitary, specifically Provisional IRA, violence in Northern Ireland, this extreme paucity of research on responses to gang violence in Chicago becomes even more noticeable.

Previous and current gang violence reduction efforts have followed along two main tracks. *Suppression* focuses on reducing gang violence by putting gang members beyond action (prison/parole/house arrest/restrictions around access to public space) and deterring future illegal behaviour. Suppression, closely linked with the

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431 Brotherton and Barrios, *The Almighty Latin King and Queen Nation*, 40.
432 The first chapter in Irving Spergel's *Reducing Youth Gang Violence* is the obvious exception to this rule. However, in trying to survey the whole of the American gang landscape a considerable amount of depth is sacrificed. Furthermore his survey fails to consider what the broader pattern of inadequacy and inefficacy says about the 'gang violence reduction' project as currently designed more broadly. This is understandable, given his response to the limits of previous approaches was to combine what appeared to be best practice from the suppression and intervention worlds, however it differs from this work which argues it is necessary to look beyond the dominant binary entirely. (Spergel, *Reducing Youth Gang Violence*, 1-26.)
435 Anthony A Braga, David M Kennedy, Elin J Waring and Anne Morrison Piehl, “Problem-
legal/criminal justice system, relies upon the criminalisation of gangs and quasi-criminalisation of gang membership. *Intervention* approaches (inclusive here of those approaches labelled 'prevention' elsewhere)\(^{436}\) generally focus on inspiring individual disengagement from violent activity and 'gang life' by facilitating attitude change and highlighting/providing alternatives to gang involvement (education, training, legitimate employment). Attitudinal change, defined loosely as the adoption of 'pro-social' or 'mainstream' values (often defined by a vague white middle-class notion of normality)\(^{437}\) is seen as important in ensuring the longevity of behavioural change. Intervention approaches have been widely adopted by social service agencies, non-governmental organisations and community groups. They often receive their funding from the public sector including the federal government and its organs. Yet, this funding has not historically been accompanied by high-level government involvement in programme design or operations, with involvement generally limited to loose oversight provided by specific government departments/agencies responsible for funding the initiatives.

Over the course of the last half century, the efficacy of these suppression and intervention efforts has been underwhelming. Though homicide rates have roughly halved since their peak in the early 1990s, this drop (which still does not go far enough so as to restore civil order) appears part of a broader national trend and cannot be linked to the city's most noteworthy gang violence reduction efforts on either the intervention or suppression sides. From the late 1980s forwards, frustration with the limited efficacy of existing approaches gave rise to a small number of 'integrated' or 'comprehensive' efforts. However neither the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project nor Project Safe Neighbourhoods (the two main Chicago programmes in this vein) has achieved the level of integration aspired to, the former tipped quite heavily towards intervention, the latter towards suppression. At the same time, with evaluation often left in the hands of programmes themselves or the independent (academic) evaluators with whom they work, a lack of standardised evaluation measures has made comparing efficacy across programmes (or even different aspects of the same programme or the same programme

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\(^{436}\) Much of the existing gang literature has advocated a four-pronged classification system for gang violence reduction efforts (prevention, intervention, suppression, integrated/comprehensive). (Robert J Chaskin, “Introduction,” in *Youth Gangs and Community Intervention: Research, Practice and Evidence*, ed. Robert J Chaskin (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), kindle loc 109; James C Howell, “Lessons Learned from Gang Program Evaluations: Prevention, Intervention, Suppression and Comprehensive Community Approaches,” in *Youth Gangs and Community Intervention: Research, Practice and Evidence*, ed. Robert J Chaskin (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 53; Klien and Maxson, *Street Gang Patterns and Policies*, 88.) However, where Klien and Maxson argue intervention, “involves affecting individuals, groups, and communities already stereotyped with the gang label [emphasis added],” there is a strong case for combining the categories of prevention and intervention in a Chicago-specific context. The intergenerational and intractable shape of the gang problem in Chicago means that preventing the emergence of gangs has been replaced by intervening in the intergenerational environmental transmission of gang values and memberships. (Klien and Maxson, *Street Gang Patterns and Policies*, 239.)

at different periods) very difficult. Nevertheless, despite any strong evidence of substantial success, innovation in the field of gang violence reduction has been largely limited to expansions or modifications of pre-existing intervention and suppression approaches. This perpetuation of inadequate and limitedly effective (thus largely ineffective) response has led to the entrenchment of the gang violence problem within the fabric of urban Chicago.

Although there has been very little federal-level political involvement in the response to gang violence in Chicago federal politicians have been involved in funding renewal and mandate expansion, commonly using pledges of more money and resources to convince the public that the issue is being taken seriously by the federal government with little-to-no follow up. Real political resources, most importantly genuine commitments of time and effort to cracking the problem, have not been forthcoming. Individual government departments and agencies provide funding and some institutional support to non-governmental organisations, educational institutions and community groups responsible for administering and/or evaluating gang programs. While the value of this financial investment, which fluctuates between millions and hundreds of millions of dollars per election cycle, should not be ignored entirely, it needs to be considered against the comparative resourcing of other security-related priorities. Although terrorism has cost very few lives when compared with gang violence over the last several decades, domestic counterterrorism and homeland security expenditures run between $50 and 100 billion annually.\(^{438}\) Where the United States started two wars, ostensibly, on the back of the 9/11 attacks, even this, the deadliest terrorist attack on US soil, resulted in fewer deaths (2,996) than Chicago's gang violence problem between 1991 and 2004 (3,442).

Hands-on governmental response to the gang violence problem in Chicago has commonly been left to the state of Illinois and the municipal governments of Chicago and the surrounding areas. However, these local governments lack the resources needed to affect lasting change. Resource scarcity has meant gang violence prevention, intervention, reduction and suppression efforts have often become victims of political posturing as resources are shifted from one target area to the next in order to chase public opinion and capture votes. Consequentially, there has been a promulgation of temporary, ad-hoc and/or inadequate efforts that have proven ineffective in dealing with Chicago's gang violence problem. What is missing form the discussion of gang violence reduction (with view to elimination) has been a reflection on the comment that this inadequacy and inefficacy makes about how particular (vulnerable) portions of the population are valued by broader society.

**Suppression and Legal Approaches to Gang Violence Reduction in Chicago**

Spergel traces the history of legalistic 'suppression' approaches to gang violence

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reduction back to the mid/late-1960s. However it is possible to trace the roots of suppression-focused responses to gang-like youth activity back to the turn of the twentieth century when Chicago became home to the first juvenile court in the United States. The court was established in 1899 out of concern on the part of child welfare advocates (social workers) over the treatment of children by the normal (now 'adult') criminal justice system. They were also very worried about the lack of distinction between children and adults in police arrest/detention procedures and the danger this posed for delinquent minors. There was also an emerging awareness of the role the prison environment played in the criminal socialisation of young people who might otherwise be 'saved'. The efficacy of these early juvenile courts in turning young peoples' lives around is beyond the remit of this thesis, however it is important to understand they played an instrumental role in responding to the gang-like activity of Chicago's urban youth long before gangs themselves became an area of academic study. This is something which also illustrates just how entrenched legal/criminal justice thinking has always been in the response to Chicago's gangs.

At the same time, it is suppression-focused efforts which most closely resemble the counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency operations carried out in Northern Ireland during the Troubles. The Chicago Police Department's specialised gang unit, in its focus on intelligence gathering and organised tactical response bears closer similarities to the Royal Ulster Constabulary's 'Special Branch' than has been recognised to date. It was also as a result of developments coming out of Northern Ireland that the United Kingdom set a modern liberal democratic precedent by introducing 'specialty' anti-terrorism legislation (The Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974). Anti-terrorism legislation would subsequently inspire anti-gang legislation in both the United Kingdom and the United States, sometimes going so far as to incorporate the word 'terrorism' into the title of specific acts (such as California's Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (1988) and Illinois' Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus Prevention Act

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441 Tanehaus, Juvenile Justice in the Making, 7.
442 A fascinating account of the evolution and criminalisation of the juvenile justice system and its disproportionate effect on African American and ethnic minority youth can be found in: (Barry C Feld, Bad Kids: Race and the Transformation of the Juvenile Court (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999)).
(1993)). The United States has yet to go so far as to adopt an equivalent to Northern Ireland's infamous Diplock Courts, (established under the *Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973*),

but legislative responses to both political and gang violence in the UK and US continue to push the limits of 'acceptable' infringements on civil liberties and human rights.

Although anti-gang legislation has been modelled on anti-terrorism legislation first developed in the United Kingdom to deal with the Provisional IRA and Troubles-related violence/civil disorder more broadly, it has often been forgotten that legislation (and suppression more broadly) was not what brought about the end to the Troubles. The Provisional IRA ultimately came to abandon its campaign of violence when it was offered the opportunity to become a full participant in the decision making process over the 'solution' to the conflict and the design of post-conflict Northern Ireland. Anti-terrorism legislation, particularly its expansions of arrest and detention powers, undoubtedly had an impact on the Provisional IRA's operations, but the loss of volunteers to arrest and imprisonment did not bring the organisation to its knees. For instance, the *Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974* was enacted in response to the Provisional IRA's pub bombing campaign on the British mainland with the goal of punishing the perpetrators and helping prevent future mainland attacks, yet Provisional IRA activity in England increased following 1974. While the loss of volunteers from active service as a result of the detention powers of new legislative measures was inconvenient, this is cited less commonly than intelligence successes in prompting the Provisional IRA's late 1970s reorganisation.

Even still, while intelligence success helped to create a stalemate situation between the Provisional IRA and the British government's security services they did not bring about the 'defeat' of the Provisional IRA in conventional military terms. Thus, it is important not to lose sight that it was the peace process culminating in *The Good Friday Agreement* (1998) (also known as *The Belfast Agreement*) which brought an end to the conflict and not curfew, internment, heavy handed military suppression, anti-terrorism or any these initiatives in combination or sequence. The experience of Northern Ireland should be read as a cautionary tale to those committed to suppression-oriented approaches or keen to declare a 'war on gangs'.

**The Chicago Police Department's Specialised Gang Units**

The Chicago Police Department (CPD) was one of the first police departments in the United States (the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) being the other) to create

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a specialised gang unit. Initially known as the Gang Intelligence Unit (GIU), specialised gang policing in Chicago officially dates back to 1967, however many districts had already established unofficial district-level gang units prior to this. The GIU was populated by youth-division officers drawn from across the city and its first priority was suppressing the Stones and Disciples whose South Side rivalry was becoming increasingly lethal. There are also indications that the relationship of these groups to the Youth Manpower Project which the CPD strongly opposed also ensured they were priority targets of GIU surveillance and suppression tactics. Providing evidence that the Stones and Disciples remained actively involved in illegal activities stood to not only demonstrate that skepticism of the Youth Manpower Project was justified, but also that suppression was the only way to deal with these groups going forward, making the case for the continued funding of the GIU and greater resourcing of the CPD more broadly.

Over the last 47 years, the CPD gang unit has changed in scope, shape and name numerous times. During the 1970s the GIU would evolve into the Gang Crimes Section (Gang Crimes). Gang Crimes fluctuated in membership from around 100 officers to an all-time high of 455 in the early 1990s. Officers assigned to Gang Crimes were responsible either for intelligence (and were assigned to one of three sections of the city) or tactical operations (also assigned primarily to one section of the city, but deployable city-wide). The unit collaborated with other CPD units (narcotics, homicide, etc) and state/federal agencies as required. The most significant change to Gang Crimes came with the 1982 staffing injection authorised by Mayor Jane Byrne which quadrupled the size of the unit from just under 100 officers to nearly 400, elevating the Section to Bureau status. With African American and Hispanic/Latino voters the key to Byrne's 1979 electoral victory, this might have been seen as a surprising move given the tense relationship between the CPD (and Gang Crimes more specifically) and the city's low income minority residents. However, Byrne remained committed to acting on behalf of the people and it was inner city residents who put increasing pressure on the mayor to intervene. Beyond the decision to increase the size of gang crimes, this

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448 Spergel, Reducing Youth Gang Violence, 15.
453 Ibid, 26-27.
intervention also, at times, took unconventional forms. Most notably, after a spate of ten murders and 35 shootings (including random 'snipings') in the Carbrini-Green public housing project, Byrne and her husband took the unprecedented step of moving into the complex for three weeks. They hoped the public attention would prompt greater action on the part of the police and housing authority, if not stop the shooting entirely.\textsuperscript{456} At the same time, despite her 'tough on gangs' stance, both the El Rukns and Gangster Disciples are alleged to have assisted with Byrne's (ultimately failed) mayoral re-election campaign.\textsuperscript{457}

Though well-intentioned, the boost Byrne provided to Gang Crimes would be rather short lived. The massive increase in size of the gang unit increased its relative power within the CPD, substantially increasing the freedom with which it could operate relative to prevailing CPD hierarchies and structures. This freedom meant that Gang Crimes, and the CPD by extension, could crack down harder on gangs than ever before, however for the residents who had called for stronger action not too long ago, the CPD went too far. The heavy hand of the new Gang Crimes Bureau was accused of insufficiently discriminating between gang members and non-involved citizens by residents and civil liberties groups and it soon faced a drastic staffing cut which returned the Gang Crimes Bureau to unit status.\textsuperscript{458}

The next major change to the organisation of the Chicago Police Department's gang unit came in the mid-1990s alongside the city-wide roll-out of the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS).\textsuperscript{459} CAPS sought to fundamentally reorient policing in Chicago by placing the community policing approach at the heart of its operation.\textsuperscript{460} The routinisation of beat meetings helped develop stronger relationships

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\textsuperscript{460} In keeping with the CPD's renewed emphasis on community engagement, the CPD rolled out its own version of the Gang Resistance Education and Training (G.R.E.A.T.) Program that seeks to develop awareness of the consequences of gang involvement, highlight alternatives to gang involvement and develop positive police/youth relationships in an effort to reduce gang violence. G.R.E.A.T., initially developed in Phoenix, was rolled out nationally during the early 1990s as
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between the police and some residents of high crime neighbourhoods, including areas plagued by gang violence. Through these meetings it came to light that the centralisation of Gang Crimes was widely seen as ineffective and poorly reflective of ground-level realities. Decentralisation of tactical officers followed and gang 'specialists' (intelligence) were reorganised into the Gang Investigation Section where they were responsible for building/investigating cases against gang leadership and high-ranking members and solving gang-related homicide, narcotics, assault, intimidation and forced recruitment cases. \textsuperscript{461} In 2008, the Chicago Police Department recentralised control over its gang-specific tactical teams under the tactical Gang Enforcement Unit (GEU) working in close collaboration with the existing GIS. The CPD also assigns tactical gang officers to specialist units such as Mobile Strike Force (CPD gang and narcotics officers in co-operation with state and federal agencies) and the Targeted Response Unit.\textsuperscript{462}

It is difficult to gauge impact given the absence of formal evaluation of the CPD's gang-specific operations. This is a problem shared with those measuring the efficacy of police gang units across the United States. Though a very rudimentary measure of effectiveness at best, it is worth pointing out that in the years immediately following the creation of the gang unit in 1967, homicides (of which gang-related deaths count for a significant proportion) increased from 395, 512 and 548 in 1965, 1966, and 1967 respectively to 645 in 1968, 715 in 1969, 810 in 1970 and 824 in 1971, with city homicides well over the 800 mark (including a staggering 1974 homicide total of 970) throughout the 1970s, except in 1972 (705) and 1978 (787).\textsuperscript{463} If nothing else, this

\textsuperscript{461} Ibid, 28-29.
indicates the gang unit got off to less than a glowing start and likely did not fulfil the hopes of the police department or the city at the time of its founding. This being said, during 1982, the year of the Byrne-sponsored shake-up within the unit, homicides dropped to 668 from 863 and 877 in 1980 and 1981 respectively, though this decline would be temporary. Homicides increased to 729 and 741 in 1983 and 1984 respectively, before dropping again to 666 in 1985.\textsuperscript{464} Murder rates declined in the wake of the shake-up of the mid-to-late 1990s, but this coincided with the as-yet inadequately explained national decrease in gang violence meaning it is impossible to reliably attribute this decline to changes in the gang unit. Following the 2008 establishment of the GEU, homicides dropped from 513 in 2008 to 461 in 2009.\textsuperscript{465} Yet, looking at the longer term picture, from 2004 forwards, Chicago's annual number of homicides has appeared to stabilise in the mid-400s, with 2008 and 2012 exceptionally violent years, breaking the 500 mark.

\textbf{Gang-specific Legislation}

As with terrorism, nearly all the most objectionable gang activity is already covered under ordinary criminal law. Homicide, assault, narcotics trafficking and money laundering are all clear criminal offences regardless of who is responsible for their commission. Yet, like with terrorism, lawmakers have felt it increasingly necessary to enact specialty gang legislation. One of the most common justifications for gang specific legislation is that it fills the gap between existing criminal offences and facilitative gang behaviours, such as loitering in groups in a known open air drug market\textsuperscript{466}.\textsuperscript{467} However, where much anti-gang legislation is enacted as part of a knee-jerk political response to a particularly 'outrageous' incident (often the killing of an 'innocent


\textsuperscript{466} As compared with closed drug markets where buyers and drug dealers come to know each other through inter-personal networks (most notably through other drug users), open air drug markets do not rely upon pre-existing relationships. They also tend to be located in low-income and/or ethnically marginalised neighbourhoods, especially those with relatively easy access to major transportation arteries. The public nature of these transactions makes them more liable to interception by law enforcement. (Alex Harocopos and Mike Hough, \textit{Drug Dealing in Open-Air Markets} (Washington: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, US Department of Justice, 2005), 1-7; Ramiro Martinez Jr, Richard Rosenfeld and Dennis Mares, “Social Disorganization, Drug Market Activity, and Neighborhood Violent Crime.” \textit{Urban Affairs Review} 43, no 6 (2008): 849; George Rengert, Sanjoy Chakravorty, Tom Bole, and Kristin Henderson, “A Geographic Analysis of Illegal Drug Markets,” \textit{Crime Prevention Studies} 11 (2000): 221.)

bystander')\textsuperscript{468} there is a strong case to be made that such legislation is enacted more to give the appearance that something is being done than to ensure law enforcement has the tools they need to deal effectively with the gang problem.\textsuperscript{469}

If determining the efficacy of police gang units is extremely difficult, determining the efficacy of gang-specific legislation is nigh on impossible. Statistics on the numbers of convictions under specific legislation are not readily available, but even if they were, such numbers might offer fewer answers than questions. It is exceptionally difficult to gauge the percentage of illegal incidents that result in legal action, making it difficult to tell whether legislation has impacted offending behaviour in any substantial way without asking offenders (apprehended and not) directly, something which is beyond the scope of this study. Also problematic is the fact that where gang-specific and ordinary criminal law overlap (as they often do), the prosecutor (in conjunction with the arresting police department) is able to use discretion. Therefore whether someone is convicted under gang-specific legislation or not is something that can be affected by the possibility of a plea bargain, a need for judicial expedience or even the electoral cycle (Illinois State's Attorneys are elected officials). The impact of such factors is beyond measure. Nevertheless, it is still important to understand the key pieces of anti-gang legislation that operate in Chicago as they frame police work and can reveal a great deal about political attitudes towards gang activity.

Prior to the introduction of gang-specific legislation in the late 1980s, the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act, more commonly known as the \textit{RICO Act}, was the key piece of legislation responsible for ensuring that the collaborative nature of gang crime received fair punishment. The \textit{RICO Act} was introduced in 1970

\textsuperscript{468} It has been the case that the younger, 'whiter' (less African American/Hispanic/Latino) and more female a victim is presented as being, the more 'innocent' they are made to appear, the greater the outrage generated by the death and the likelier it is that a political response will ensue. This ignores the uncomfortable truth that while young black and Hispanic/Latino men may predominately be responsible for the perpetration of violent gang-related offences, they too are most likely to become the victims of bystander violence. It is on the basis of their race, age and gender that their innocence unjustifiably becomes automatically contestable. (John A Rich, \textit{Wrong Place, Wrong Time: Trauma and Violence in the Lives of Young Black Men} (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 40-41.) Supporting this claim, the first piece of American gang-specific legislation was drafted and quickly enacted by the state of California in response to the murder of 27 year-old graphic artist Karen Toshima. Additionally, while 2005 saw record-high levels of gun violence in Toronto, Canada, with 52 gun homicides over the course of the year (many during the 'summer of the gun') it took the death of 15 year-old bystander Jane Creba (caucasian) in a Boxing Day shoot-out (26 December) to generate a serious political response, with gun control (previously off the radar) instantly becoming a key federal election issue and prompting the introduction of Bill C-10 (which ultimately was not passed) which proposed increases to minimum sentences for firearms offences. The Toronto Police Service also quickly developed the Toronto Anti-violence Intervention Strategy, which included a rapid response unit responsible for gun seizure and a greater police presence in known gang hotspots. (Julian V Roberts, Nicole Crutcher and Paul Verbrugge, “Public Attitudes to Sentencing in Canada: Exploring Recent Findings,” \textit{Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice} 49, no 1 (2007): 77-78; Kim Strosnider, “Anti-gang Ordinances After City of Chicago v Morales: The Intersection of Race, Vagueness Doctrine, and Equal Protection in the Criminal Law,” \textit{American Criminal Law Review} 39 (2002): 108.)

\textsuperscript{469} Strosnider, “Anti-gang Ordinances After City of Chicago v Morales,” 108.
with a view to helping legislators secure convictions for the leadership of major organised crime groups (specifically the mafia), and has since found much broader application. More relevantly, it has been used extensively against street gangs from the 1980s forwards.\footnote{Moore and Williams, \textit{The Almighty Black P Stone Nation}, 169; A Laxmidas Sawkar, “From the Mafia to Milking Cows: State RICO Act Expansion,” \textit{Arizona Law Review} 41, no 4 (1999): 1137; Joseph Wheatley, “The Flexibility of RICO and its Use on Street Gangs Engaging in Organized Crime in the United States,” \textit{Policing} 2, no 1 (2008): 82, 85.} The \textit{RICO Act} deals with the problem of gang leaders using low-level gang members to carry out particularly risky illegal activities in order to shield themselves from prosecution for crimes they have otherwise planned and organised.\footnote{Sawkar, “From the Mafia to Milking Cows,” 1133-1134; Wheatley, “The Flexibility of RICO and its Use on Street Gangs Engaging in Organized Crime in the United States,” 83.} The \textit{RICO Act} includes, “enhanced criminal penalties and civil sanctions for those who acquire or operate an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.”\footnote{Ibid, 84.} 'Racketeering', in turn, can be defined as the commission of multiple inter-related criminal offences (murder, robbery, assault, extortion, dealing in controlled substances) within a ten-year period.\footnote{Ibid, 85.} A gang (or any group) qualifies as an 'association in fact' on the basis of continuity, shared purpose and the presence of a decision-making mechanism, casting a rather wide net over even the most fragmented of gang landscapes.\footnote{Moore and Williams, \textit{The Almighty Black P Stone Nation}, 204-205; Wheatley, “The Flexibility of RICO and its Use on Street Gangs Engaging in Organized Crime in the United States,” 83.}

Chicago's El Rukns (Almighty P Stone Nation) were one of the first street organisations in the United States to face a major \textit{RICO} case. Following an October 1989 raid on the El Rukn headquarters ('The Fort'), 38 El Rukns of various ranks within the organisation's upper echelons faced a single indictment for 135 crimes committed over a 20 year period (including homicide which has no statutory limitation period). This represents one of the largest-ever street gang prosecutions in the United States.\footnote{Further information on the STEP Act can be found in: Astvasadoorian, “California's Two-Prong Attack against Gang Crime and Violence”; Alexander A Molina, “California's Anti-gang Street Terrorism Enforcement Act: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back,” \textit{Southwestern University Law Review} 22, no 2 (1993): 457-482; Strosnider, “Anti-gang Ordinances After \textit{City of Chicago v Morales},” 101, 109-110; Van Hofwegen, “Unjust and Ineffective”.} The \textit{RICO Act} would also heavily influence the development of the first significant piece of anti-gang legislation in the United States, California's \textit{Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act}, or \textit{STEP}.\footnote{Strosnider, “Anti-gang Ordinances After \textit{City of Chicago v Morales},” 107.} In spite of \textit{STEP}'s potential infringements upon civil liberties, particularly as a result of its extremely wide definition of the gang (far wider than even that found in the federal \textit{RICO Act}), it has inspired gang specific legislation in 46 states, including Illinois. In 1996 the federal government enacted its own small piece of gang-specific legislation with subsection 521 “Criminal Street Gangs” added to Title 18 (“Crimes and Criminal Procedure”) of the \textit{United States Code} (main body of federal criminal law).\footnote{Ibid, 85.}
In the state of Illinois (of which Chicago is its largest city) the most all-encompassing piece of anti-gang legislation is the *Illinois Street-gang Terrorism Omnibus Prevention Act*, also known as ISTOP, enacted in 1993. The language used in the preamble (specifically Section 5, subsections (b) and (c)) is incredibly evocative and seems to quite passionately recognise the impact of street gangs on the communities in which they operate:

(b) The General Assembly finds, however, that urban, suburban, and rural communities, neighborhoods and schools throughout the State are being terrorized and plundered by street-gangs. The General Assembly finds that there are now several hundred street-gangs operating in Illinois, and that while their terrorism is most widespread in urban areas, street-gangs are spreading into suburban and rural areas of Illinois.

(c) The General Assembly further finds that street-gangs are often controlled by criminally sophisticated adults who take advantage of our youth by intimidating and coercing them into membership by employing them as drug couriers and runners, and by using them to commit brutal crimes against persons and property to further the financial benefit to and dominance of the street-gang.  

ISTOP employs a definition of gang membership even wider than that employed in previous gang legislation, including California's *STEP Act*.  

It defines a 'street-gang' as a group of three or more individuals operating with some sort of hierarchy that engages in a pattern of criminal activity (two or more felony/property defacement offences within five years of each other) where at least one offence has occurred after the act's passage.

Though the strength of ISTOP’s preambulatory language is not matched by the strength of its actual reforms, it did create a civil cause of action against street gangs. This allows prosecutors to file civil suits against gang members and to seek monetary damages. More crucially it provides for court orders preventing defendants from associating with one another in public. Those who continue to associate in violation of a court order can be arrested and charged with a criminal misdemeanour, at which point a thorough search (of the person/vehicle/house) can be conducted with the hope of finding evidence capable of leading to more serious criminal charges. Other state anti-gang legislation is less innovative. The 2009 *Illinois Public Act 096 0829* also known as the 'gang gun law' increases penalties for the unlawful possession of firearms by gang members, while a gang-specific RICO Act (*The Illinois Street Gang and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Law*), enacted during 2012’s gang violence spike, further stiffens penalties for gang related offences.

At a local level, city ordinances remain the most common way of dealing with Chicago's gang problem. The most noteworthy and controversial is the Chicago Gang

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481 Public Act 096-0829, 720 ILCS 5/24-1.8.
Congregation Ordinance enacted in 1992, replaced in 2000 by a revised ordinance of the same name. The original ordinance attracted considerable attention after it was ruled unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in the 1999 case of The City of Chicago v Morales.483 The Supreme Court struck down the ordinance after finding it too vague to adequately curtail police discretion.484 The court also considered (but remained undecided on) the matter of whether the ordinance provided adequate notice to citizens of what was and was not prohibited behaviour.485 The original ordinance allowed police to arrest groups of two or more persons gathered in public for no apparent purpose where one of the group was reasonably believed by police to be a gang member if the group failed to disperse when requested.486 This essentially gave the police the discretion of determining who was and was not a gang member (often by appearance), effectively penalising gang membership which was not a criminal offence in and of itself.487 The ordinance also, by extension, punished non-gang individuals for association with someone who might reasonably be believed to be a gang member, a rather confusing prospect given the inability of a citizen to read the mind of enforcing police officers. Unsurprisingly, the law was applied almost exclusively in low income/ethnic minority neighbourhoods and its lack of clarity meant it was unclear with whom and under what circumstances it was possible for residents to freely converse or gather in public without fear of dispersal or arrest.488

If the purpose of gang violence reduction or gang elimination efforts is to make all Chicago neighbourhoods places where residents can realise and express their rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, it is easy to see how this ordinance could be seen as counter-productive, presenting a serious unjustifiable infringement on residents' liberty. Further, the replacement ordinance does little to remedy the problematic vagueness of the original. By limiting its application to police-identified 'hotspots' need not be publicly disclosed, the ordinance is likely to apply only in the same low-income/ethnic minority neighbourhoods targeted by the initial ordinance.489 The replacement ordinance is less vague perhaps, but there remains significant room for police discretion and potential abuse. The ordinance replaces 'objectionable loitering' with 'gang loitering' defining the latter as:

... remaining in any one place under circumstances that would warrant a reasonable person to believe that the purpose or effect of that behavior is to enable a criminal street-gang to establish control over identifiable areas, to intimidate others from entering those areas, or to conceal illegal activities.490

The absence of a mens rea requirement (intent) leaves individuals not engaged in any crime open to punishment based on the perceptions of a vaguely defined 'reasonable

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483 Ibid, 102-103.
486 Ibid, 102.
489 Strosnider, “Anti-gang Ordinances After City of Chicago v Morales,” 137, 141.
person'. This quasi-criminalisation of general shadiness carries serious racial and class implications within Chicago's highly segregated urban landscape.

**Intervention Approaches to Gang Violence Reduction in Chicago**

Chicago was the first city to implement a juvenile court and one of the first to develop a gang crimes unit. Thus, it should come as little surprise that Chicago has long been host to pioneering gang intervention efforts also. Though designed to deal with juvenile delinquency more broadly, the first major gang intervention programme in the United States was the Chicago Area Project (CAP) of the mid-1930s. Since the emergence of the supergangs in the 1960s, gang intervention efforts have proliferated throughout inner-city Chicago. The neighbourhoods with the highest levels of violence also often host the highest concentrations of gang intervention programmes. This section will focus specifically on the pioneering work done by the Chicago Area Project in the 1930s, the lessons to be learned from the Youth Manpower Project and the limited success of the much hyped CeaseFire-Chicago programme, covering three of the most well known (and best resourced) community intervention initiatives to have been carried out in the city. It argues that the basic building blocks of intervention programmes have remained largely unchanged since the development of the Chicago Area Project. CAP's extensive use of outreach workers, emphasis on encouraging young people to develop 'pro-social' (mainstream) attitudes, provision of alternatives to gang involvement in the form of recreation/education/training/employment, academic/ 'theory-based' design, and integration of evaluation thinking (even if only on an ad-hoc basis) have all been incorporated in whole or in part by subsequent gang intervention efforts. Unfortunately, these subsequent intervention efforts have also inherited CAP's very limited efficacy. There have been few major gang intervention programme 'successes' (in terms of substantial falls in gang violence or gang participation rates) but, even more disconcertingly, previous programme evaluations indicate Chicago-based intervention efforts are batting below average in terms of delivering results when compared to those found in other major American cities.

Contemporaneously, making direct comparisons of efficacy between intervention programmes is very difficult. The Chicago Area Project was the first to embed evaluation within its operational principles, however Shaw and McKay delivered neither robust continuous evaluation of CAP nor an operational evaluation framework. This inconsistency in evaluative practice was unfortunately inherited by evaluators looking to determine the efficacy of subsequent gang intervention efforts. Until the 1990s, most intervention programmes lacked a comprehensive evaluation protocol. Independent evaluation by social scientists, while not uncommon, was neither regularised nor routinised, seemingly dependent upon academic interests and budget constraints. In today's operational climate, evaluation has become a far more integral part of programme operations, especially as most programmes are reliant upon government (municipal, state and federal) or charitable foundation funding for survival with funders expecting (or demanding) to know the social return on investment.

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491 Ibid, 136.
Yet, evaluation continues to lack standardisation. Programmes are evaluated, quite rightly, in terms of their ability to meet their own self-defined and funder-defined objectives, but these specific objectives and definitions of 'success' vary from organisation to organisation. Furthermore, with the presence of one or more gang intervention programme in almost all gang-affected neighbourhoods, even where programmes attempt quasi-experimental or experimental evaluation using common measurement tools the data, and thus the results, is often cloudy at best because finding clean 'project' and 'comparison' sites is exceptionally difficult.\textsuperscript{493} Though qualitative evaluation measures might be clearer in terms of determining specific programme impacts, here too differing programme objectives increase incomparability. It is therefore most appropriate to consider efficacy on a programme by programme basis. This work hones in on only a few key gang violence reduction efforts which utilise intervention approaches, but the extent to which these approaches are shared across a broader range of Chicago-based intervention programmes can be seen in the chart provided as 'Appendix A: Common Elements of the Intervention Approach to Reducing Gang Violence' at the end of this volume.

The Chicago Area Project

The Chicago Area Project is widely recognised as the first community development and gang intervention effort in the United States.\textsuperscript{494} Gradually established over the course of the early 1930s, CAP was designed by prominent University of Chicago sociologist Clifford Shaw with the support of his Chicago School compatriots Ernest Burgess and Henry D McKay. Its initial goal was the reduction and prevention of juvenile delinquency.\textsuperscript{495} Despite its influence on later institutionally-directed gang intervention programmes CAP under Shaw strongly resisted institutionalisation, deliberately remaining, “a loose organization constantly in flux, amorphous in form, and unconventional in method”\textsuperscript{496} - essentially a living laboratory for the era's pre-eminent urban sociologists. Shaw and his colleagues used CAP to learn more about the role of 'urban ecology' in the concentration of delinquency (social disorganisation theory) and the capacity of communities to develop their own solutions to the problem of juvenile delinquency.\textsuperscript{497} Throughout his leadership, Shaw insisted that CAP was, “not a blueprint for reform, but simply a conceptual framework meant to encourage and facilitate indigenous social invention.”\textsuperscript{498} The existence of the Chicago Area Project as an organisational entity was more an 'administrative convenience' meant to facilitate

\textsuperscript{493} Skogan, Harnett, Bump and Dubois, \textit{Evaluation of CeaseFire-Chicago}, 7-40.
\textsuperscript{495} Steven Schlossman and Michael Sedalk, \textit{The Chicago Area Project Revisited} (Santa Monica: RAND, 1983), 1.
\textsuperscript{498} Schlossman and Sedalk, \textit{The Chicago Area Project Revisited}, 60.
fundraising for the local projects than anything else.\textsuperscript{499} CAP also openly challenged the then-dominance of the psychological/psychiatric approach to the 'treatment' of delinquency and advocated for social/community approaches.\textsuperscript{500}

In the years following Shaw's 1957 death, the Chicago Area Project would drift away from its focus on juvenile delinquency in order to devote greater attention to community organisation.\textsuperscript{501} It has also become far more institutionalised than it was under Shaw (in arguable defiance of its founding principles).\textsuperscript{502} Yet, CAP's early experimental years provided a blueprint for future gang intervention efforts widely used today. Academic design, community organisation/leadership and the use of outreach workers (specifically those of backgrounds similar to the young people the programme sought to reach) remain hallmarks of gang intervention eighty years after Shaw and McKay first set about exploring whether the South Side might be able to transform itself. The ethnic gangs responsible for much of the delinquency in project areas were of the same kind as those identified by Thrasher in 1927,\textsuperscript{503} and thus far less lethal than he gangs which emerged in the 1960s, questioning the logic of applying the same tactics to these far more lethal groups. Tackling petty theft, vandalism and 'lewdness'\textsuperscript{504} arguably requires a radically different strategy than tackling frequent fatal and near-fatal shootings.

Today the involvement of individual academics and academic research centres in the design, development and evaluation of gang violence reduction efforts is something that can almost be taken for granted. In the early 2000s CeaseFire-Chicago would make one of its major selling points the fact that it was 'theory driven', even though its true originality lay in its epidemiological theoretical approach (breaking away from the social science approaches which had traditionally dominated the field).\textsuperscript{505} The Chicago Area Project was also very much grounded in the major theoretical developments of its time. The social disorganisation theory of urban sociology (as interpreted by Shaw and McKay and developed by the Chicago School) that underpins CAP argues individual criminological behaviour (delinquency) is conditioned by one's urban social environment, with poverty and residential instability correlated with higher rates of delinquency.\textsuperscript{506} Though later gang intervention programmes would be underpinned by a range of social theories, Shaw and McKay's interpretation of social disorganisation would go on to directly influence the Comprehensive Gang Model developed by Spergel used in the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project on Chicago's West Side during the 1990s.\textsuperscript{507}

\textsuperscript{499} Martin, “A New Attack on Delinquency,” 503.
\textsuperscript{500} Schlossman and Sedalk, \textit{The Chicago Area Project Revisited}, v.
\textsuperscript{502} Bennett, \textit{Oral History and Delinquency}, 178.
\textsuperscript{503} Thrasher, \textit{The Gang}.
\textsuperscript{504} Schlossman and Sedalk, \textit{The Chicago Area Project Revisited}, vi-vii, 25.
\textsuperscript{505} Skogan, Harnett, Bump and Dubois, \textit{Evaluation of CeaseFire-Chicago}, iii.
\textsuperscript{507} Spergel, \textit{Reducing Youth Gang Violence}, 27.
CAP also highlighted the importance of formal social scientific evaluation for community programmes, although (as alluded to previously) it failed to live up to its own evaluatory ambitions. During the first ten years of CAP's life, most of the data it collected about its efficacy (qualitative and quantitative) received limited dissemination through annual reports and site documentation. "Methods, Accomplishments and Problems of the Chicago Area Project", the first major social scientific evaluation of the Chicago Area Project was delivered in 1944 but never formally published. It revealed that two of the three programme areas had enjoyed statistically significant declines in rates of juvenile delinquency, but Shaw was cautious about ascribing these 'successes' to the programme specifically. By the time this report was delivered, he already doubted whether it would ever be possible to statistically prove that any given community intervention could alone be responsible for a decline in delinquency.

Solomon Kobrin, who shared Shaw's skepticism around the ability of statistics to illustrate programme efficacy, nevertheless provided the first independent and scholarly assessment of CAP in 1959. He argued the programme was successful in terms of demonstrating the validity of the theoretical principle of community organisation, but paid little attention to its capacity to reduce juvenile delinquency. In the 1980s CAP's early years would be revisited by a team of researchers from RAND led by Steven Schlossman. Their large-scale archival research project was carried out on behalf of the National Institute of Education. Yet, these later evaluations were unable to demonstrate any more effectively than earlier work that CAP was responsible for the remarkable decline in delinquency rates observed in the Russell Square project area, while warning that, "until scholars and policy analysts develop more imaginative means to assess performance in the field, it is premature to generalize that 'nothing works'."

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510 Ibid, 111-118.

511 "Conclusive statistical proof to sustain any conclusion regarding the effectiveness of this work in reducing the volume of delinquency is difficult to secure for many reasons. Trends in rates of delinquents for small areas are affected by variations in the definition of what constituted delinquent behavior, changes in the composition of the population, and changes in the administrative procedures in law enforcement agencies. We know from our experiences in the inner city areas that there is no fixed volume of delinquency. We know that there are a large number of unofficial cases of unlawful behavior, and the extent to which these unofficial cases become apprehended and dealt with as official delinquents depends upon a wide variety of influences and pressures which vary from one community to another." (Clifford Shaw qtd in Helen L Witmer and Edith Tufts, The Effectiveness of Delinquency Prevention Programs (Washington: United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Social Security Administration, Children's Bureau, 1954), 16.


513 Schlossman and Sedalk, The Chicago Area Project Revisited; Schlossman et al, Delinquency Prevention in South Chicago.

514 Aside from very brief mentions of the near west side project in The Chicago Area Project Revisited, where Schlossman and Sedalk quote from Shaw himself, it is only the South Chicago (Russell Square) project area that is discussed in both of these evaluation reports.

515 Schlossman and Sedalk, The Chicago Area Project Revisited, xvii.
The Chicago Area Project was not the first delinquency prevention and reduction effort to make use of outreach workers, however it was the first to employ outreach workers whose backgrounds mirrored the communities in which they worked.\textsuperscript{516} As early outreach workers were often religious leaders or missionaries.\textsuperscript{517} Unlike previous outreach efforts, CAP workers were also encouraged to engage with young people on their own terms, meeting them in the locations in which they naturally gathered and speaking with them in the local dialect. These 'curbstone counsellors' were to serve as, “knowledgeable older brothers and close friends to children who were already in trouble with the law, or who were committing delinquent acts that would invariably lead them into legal difficulties.”\textsuperscript{518} Out of necessity, in the early days of the project the ranks of indigenous outreach workers were complemented by dedicated and passionate older youth from outside the community (often college students studying related subjects). However a great deal of effort was put into the recruitment of area natives who were strongly believed to be most effective in these outreach roles.\textsuperscript{519} Unlike traditional social work efforts, curbstone counsellors were not to force attitudinal and behavioural change upon young people. Instead they were expected to serve as models of 'legitimate' behaviour with the hope that, as rapport developed naturally, youth would 'reform' on their own.\textsuperscript{520}

His is not a militant campaign of reform, but a gradual one of altering standards and changing goals through casual conversation and day-to-day contact. Often the employed leader does nothing but hang around with the teenagers for weeks at a time – idling around street corners, drifting to the candy store with them, or to the movies on Saturday nights. As he becomes a trusted ally of the young gang, he is able to suggest more creative excursions: baseball practice as an organized team, basketball at St. Michael's gym, woodworking in its craft shop. Growing in the esteem of the boy gang that he has associated with almost daily, the leader is eventually privileged to make suggestions that at first would have ostracized him or drawn derisive jeers. He is able to guide their behaviour into more legitimate channels. Gradually, going to school, respecting park property, buying fruit instead of stealing it, become as much the thing to do as were their opposites several months before.\textsuperscript{521}

The curbstone counsellor philosophy was, and remains, grounded in the idea that sometimes all a young person needs is an opportunity to talk to someone with the


\textsuperscript{518} Schlossman and Sedalk, \textit{The Chicago Area Project Revisited}, x.

\textsuperscript{519} Martin, “A New Attack on Delinquency,” 505; Steven Schlossman et al, \textit{Delinquency Prevention in South Chicago: A Fifty Year Assessment of the Chicago Area Project} (Santa Monica: RAND, 1984), 14.


\textsuperscript{521} Chicago Area Project, “Russell Square,” unpublished manuscript, nd (c 1945), p 13, quoted in Schlossman and Sedalk, \textit{The Chicago Area Project Revisited}, 64.
wisdom of experience (but not the sense of superiority that often accompanies it)\textsuperscript{522} and to feel as though if things go wrong there will be someone there to advocate on their behalf.\textsuperscript{523}

Outreach workers modelled on CAP's curbstone counsellors became an integral component of gang intervention initiatives across the United States, including in New York. However, “few incorporated a similar respect for the community and for individual delinquents, and fewer still implemented its policy of community empowerment.”\textsuperscript{524} In a development Shaw likely would have found distressing, by the 1950s there was an increasing professionalisation of outreach work with colleges and universities the recruiting grounds for a new breed of outreach worker.\textsuperscript{525} Although professionalised outreach workers were perhaps no more comfortable with middle class norms or expectations than their young charges, they lacked the ability to ingratiate themselves in the same way as a someone resident in or whose life was intimately tied to the community.

With the emergence of supergangs in the 1960s, some skeptics began to assert that the soft approach taken by outreach workers might actually be contributing to the problem.\textsuperscript{526} There was no concrete evidence outreach workers were responsible for the increasing the coherence and lethality of Chicago's gangs, but there was also little evidence that they were successful in redirecting the energies of gang-involved and at-risk youth to more positive pursuits. Consequentially outreach work fell out of favour with programme designers and funders\textsuperscript{527} even if outreach workers never disappeared completely. In Chicago they would rise to prominence once again as part of the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project in the 1990s and CeaseFire-Chicago in the 2000s, something that further illustrates the tendency to rehash past strategies in the absence of clear evidence of success.

The Youth Manpower Project

The Youth Manpower Project, administered by the Woodlawn Organisation (TWO) with the support of a $1 million grant from the federal Office of Economic opportunity in 1968 remains quite probably the least effective intervention programme in the history of gang violence reduction.\textsuperscript{528} While the programme itself was highly controversial, its direct objectives were not particularly radical or innovative. The Youth Manpower Project sought to provide job readiness training, employment, educational opportunities and conflict mediation to the two gangs responsible for the increase in

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{522} Schlossman and Sedalk, \textit{The Chicago Area Project Revisited}, 61.
\item \textsuperscript{523} Ibid, xi.
\item \textsuperscript{525} Spergel, \textit{Reducing Youth Gang Violence}, 7.
\item \textsuperscript{526} Ibid, 9.
\item \textsuperscript{527} Varano and Wolff, “Street Outreach as an Intervention Modality for At-risk and Gang-involved Youth,” 85-86.
\item \textsuperscript{528} Moore and Williams, \textit{The Almighty Black P Stone Nation}, 59; Spergel, \textit{The Youth Gang Problem}, 251.
\end{itemize}
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lethal gang-related violence in the Woodlawn neighbourhood on the South Side. That the Youth Manpower Project's self-help philosophy extended community ownership principles to the gangs identified as most problematic in Woodlawn (Blackstone Rangers and Devil's Disciples) courted considerable controversy even before programme operations began. The programme's philosophy argued the skills needed to bring about change already existed within the gang. However, while the group may have had strong latent organisational, management and entrepreneurship skills, the gang leadership who took assumed leadership roles in the Youth Manpower Project lacked the formal job training, job search and community relations skills needed for the programme to function properly. The Youth Manpower Project did not receive support from the municipal government and faced open opposition from the Chicago Police Department who feared the programme would strengthen the local celebrity and perceived credibility of the gangs involved.

Three job training and educational centres were established in Woodlawn, two run by the Stones, one by the Disciples. The Xerox Corporation helped design the curriculum and the Chicago Urban League agreed to assist with helping those completing the program find jobs. Gang leaders, including Jeff Fort, were added to the programme payroll as assistant project directors and centre chiefs, positions which included annual salaries of $5,000-$6,500 for recruiting participants (younger gang members and affiliates) and managing the 'instructors' pulled from the middle ranks of the gang leadership. Gang members who agreed to participate in the programme received $45 weekly, plus assistance to cover the cost of travel to and from the local training and education centres.

By and large the gang-involved program staff had limited experience of formal education and little, if any, formal employment experience. They also lacked the formal teaching and administrative experience that would have allowed them to jump into their new roles more easily. With only three professional staff allocated to the project by TWO it is easy to see how the programme quickly spiralled beyond administrative control. There was an insufficient number of administrative staff at TWO to be able to adequately train its 'non-traditional' hires, thus they were not supported in translating their informally-developed skills into the more structured setting of a government-backed programme. This administrative under-staffing also left the programme, which sought to involve 600 gang-involved youth in total, open to exploitation by the gangs.

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529 Spergel, Reducing Youth Gang Violence, 12.
531 Jacobs, Stateville, 140-141; Spergel, Reducing Youth Gang Violence, 12.
533 Jacobs, Stateville, 141.
534 Jacobs, Stateville, 58; Moore and Williams, The Almighty Black P Stone Nation, 58; Spergel, Reducing Youth Gang Violence, 10.
536 Rev Arthur M Brazier, co-founder of the Woodlawn Organization, would himself admit that with hindsight it was clear the programme granted the gangs too much control too quickly and that gang-led teaching/training should have developed over time with professionals initially taking the lead, presumably to allow for greater skills development at the grassroots level. (Moore and Williams, The Almighty Black P Stone Nation, 58.)
it was developed to help. Furthermore, there is little indication that the Youth Manpower Project was able to train or transition more than a few gang-involved youth for/into formal employment.  

Without consistent or sufficient administrative oversight or clear accountability measures, the gangs had something approaching free reign over programme resources (time, space and, most problematically, finances). Local education authorities and the police claimed the Stones and Disciples encouraged young gang members to drop out of formal education in favour of joining the Youth Manpower Project so as to exact a 'cut' from their participation fee. It has also been claimed the training and education centres were used to plan/organise gang activities and became sites of narcotics dealing and use, illegal gambling and weapons storage. Allegations of fraud and gross financial mismanagement that emerged during the programme's operation prompted a full-blown Senate investigation. Accusations abounded of cheque forgery, gang leaders demanding kick-backs from participants and payments going to individuals who failed to attend. Rev Arthur M Brazier, co-founder and President of the Woodlawn Organization, had hired an external accounting firm to audit the project, understanding the heightened importance of financial controls on such a controversial programme, but the firm failed to ensure these controls were implemented consistently and were themselves sufficient to prevent fraud. Although the Youth Manpower Project failed to meet its objectives, this failure cannot reasonably be read as an indictment of the groups' ownership of their own transformation process or even the inability of gangs to change more broadly. The shocking lack of administrative oversight and accountability, including financial accountability (to the point that the Youth Manpower Project might best be read as a case study in organisational worst practice) means that the programme's philosophy was never truly given a fair airing.

CeaseFire-Chicago/Cure Violence

CeaseFire-Chicago (herein referred to as CeaseFire) launched in 1999 with two project sites (West Garfield Park and West Humboldt Park). Both commenced operations in early 2000. It would quickly expand over the course of the 2000s, peaking with 22 project sites in 2007 at which point funding from the state of Illinois was abruptly cut leading to the closure of most programme sites and forcing structural re-organisation by the Chicago Project for Violence Prevention (CPVP), housed within the University of Illinois at Chicago's School of Public Health, which was responsible for administering the programme. Operating with limited foundational funding and small government grants from this point forward, CeaseFire has moved away from programme operation and now focuses on developing the national and international

538 Ibid, 14.
539 Ibid, 13.
540 Jacobs, Stateville, 141.
541 Jacobs, Stateville, 141; Moore and Williams, The Almighty Black P Stone Nation, 103.
543 Moore and Williams, The Almighty Black P Stone Nation, 103.
export potential of its violence reduction model.\textsuperscript{545} This restructuring included a rebranding with CeaseFire-Chicago was rechristened Cure Violence in 2012.

Unlike most gang programmes designed by social scientists, CeaseFire was grounded in epidemiological theory. Seeing parallels between the spread of gun violence and the AIDS, tuberculosis and cholera epidemics on which he had previously worked, physician and epidemiologist Gary Slutkin founded CPVP with the aim of bringing a public health\textsuperscript{546} approach to the field of violence reduction.\textsuperscript{547} The epidemiological theory of violence reduction treats gun violence as a contagious disease\textsuperscript{548} and argues that in order to stop its spread it is necessary to reduce opportunities for transmission. In operational terms this means:

(1) detecting and interrupting ongoing and potentially new infectious events; (2) determining who are most likely to cause further infectious events from the infected population and then reducing their likelihood of developing disease and/or subsequently transmitting; and (3) changing the underlying social and behavioral norms, or environmental conditions, that directly relate to the spread of the infection.\textsuperscript{549}

Initially, CPVP focused on building community partnerships in an effort to 'stabilise' violence in the north and west of the city.\textsuperscript{550} However in the wake of the 'miracle' reductions in gun violence delivered by Boston's Operation Ceasefire\textsuperscript{551} interest in and support for community-based gun violence programmes grew, providing a favourable funding climate in which to grow CPVP operations and test the limits of its epidemiological theory. CeaseFire-Chicago was the result of this growth.\textsuperscript{552}

In order to 'stop the shooting' CeaseFire was determined to work with the communities most deeply affected by gun violence and those within them who were at highest risk of contagion and transmission (potential shooters/victims). This often meant working with gang members in gang controlled neighbourhoods. Still, it is important to

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{545} Papachristos, “Too Big to Fail,” 1056; Skogan, Harnett, Bump and Dubois, \textit{Evaluation of CeaseFire-Chicago}, 2-19.
\bibitem{546} Skogan, Harnett, Bump and Dubois, \textit{Evaluation of CeaseFire-Chicago}, iii.
\bibitem{549} Slutkin, “Violence is a Contagious Disease,” 108.
\bibitem{552} Though after this dramatic drop, homicides (including gang-related homicides) began to increase. (Howell, “Lessons Learned from Gang Program Evaluations, 57)
\end{thebibliography}
stress that although CeaseFire worked with gang members in gang-affected neighbourhoods it saw and presented itself as a gun violence intervention programme rather than a gang violence intervention programme more specifically. It made no attempt to dismantle the city's gangs, it simply wanted them (and others around them) to stop shooting.553 As a result its outreach programmes were open to all 'high risk' individuals regardless of gang allegiance or membership status. In spite of the potential for innovation created by its epidemiological underpinning, in practice CeaseFire operated much like an amalgam of existing best practice in gang intervention. Its operations focused on community mobilisation, coalition-building, education and outreach, all hallmarks of the Chicago Area Project.554 Arguably, the most innovative aspects of the CeaseFire programme – the use of 'violence interrupters' and the strength of its data-sharing relationship with the police555 represented advances in outreach and coalition-building rather than new and original strategies for violence reduction.

Outreach workers were not initially a part of CeaseFire's operations, however after their introduction in 2001 they quickly became integral to its work. Outreach workers took on responsibility for coalition building, partnership management, client screening, coordinating community education campaigns, organising public outreach events (vigils, marches), participating in evaluation exercises and general 'brand' promotion. This was alongside managing a caseload of approximately 15 high-need 'clients' (high-risk individuals in need of assistance and willing to engage with the program).556 Prior to the introduction of outreach workers, it was believed the programme could achieve its objectives though the development of strong partnerships with pre-existing community groups.557 However, as this extensive list of outreach worker responsibilities illustrates, this way of working would have placed an exceptional demand on partner time and resources. Local partnerships would remain very important in the CeaseFire model as site operations were run through community host partners, including (typically) the administration of outreach workers, but the outreach workers themselves were invaluable in increasing the operating capacity of the CeaseFire programme.

Again taking its cue from CAP, CeaseFire recruited outreach workers from the communities in which it worked, specifically those with histories of violence or gang membership who had since turned their lives around. This served three purposes. Firstly, the status of these individuals and the respect they engendered within the local

553 At the same time, it is because of the strong correlation between gangs and gun violence that CeaseFire-Chicago can fairly be considered alongside the likes of the Chicago Area Project or The Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project.
557 Skogan, Harnett, Bump and Dubois, Evaluation of CeaseFire-Chicago, 4-1.
community offered the best opportunity to reach those most likely to engage in violence. Secondly, it provided programme clients with a ‘role model’ for change. Thirdly, the depth of connection between outreach workers and the local community helped CeaseFire keep an ear to the ground allowing it to keep track of feuds and other developments likely to lead to violence. Yet, the same things that made someone an ideal outreach worker candidate also rendered him (outreach workers were overwhelmingly male) a risky hire.

Rather than ignoring this reality, as the Youth Manpower Project had largely done when employing active gang members, the CPVP put in place a number of risk mitigation controls and support systems to help ensure staff could handle the demands of the role and avoid becoming a liability to the CeaseFire programme. Thorough background checks were conducted and the CPD was given a veto on the hiring panels used to make appointments. All outreach workers approved by hiring panels were drug tested and accepting the position also meant agreeing to further on-the-job tests (though positive tests did not always yield consistent consequences). Recognising the lack of formal qualifications and work experience often held by outreach workers (they were still expected to have the equivalent of a high school diploma), substantial training and professional development was offered and made mandatory. The presence of supervisors at each site (from various backgrounds, many with previous community development/gang intervention experience) provided immediate accountability as well as support and mentorship.

This system of checks and balances worked remarkably well, although there were a few incidents that required CeaseFire to take tough action. Despite outreach workers' proximity and connection to the streets, from 2001 until 2007 fewer than a dozen outreach workers were arrested, almost all on drug possession offences (a fair number of these cases were quickly dismissed as 'bad cases'). The most visible case involving a CeaseFire outreach worker arose as the programme was coming up for funding renewal in 2007. The individual in question was charged with the possession of an illegal firearm and cannabis production. While one can only speculate on the impact this might have had (if any) on the failure of the programme to secure its funding renewal, negative publicity at such a critical time certainly did not help CeaseFire's case.

In 2004 a funding injection led to the development of the 'violence interrupter' initiative. The interrupters, are the most recognisable aspect of the Ceasefire programme, having been the subject of the critically acclaimed and internationally distributed documentary The Interrupters (Steve James, 2011) and a New York Times Sunday Magazine feature by Alex Kotlowitz. Interrupters, generally former gang

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558 Ibid, 4-17 - 4-18.
559 Ibid, 4-4.
560 Ibid, 3-2 - 3-6; 4-3.
561 Ibid, ES-7-8.
562 Ibid, ES-13, 2-3, 4-6 – 4-7.
564 Ibid, 3-17.
leaders and influentials, are expected to be able to reach and command the respect of those hardcore gang members beyond the reach of most outreach workers.\textsuperscript{566} Interrupters, retained in small numbers amidst CeaseFire's transformation into Cure Violence, are the bridge between the programme's epidemiological theory and traditional gang outreach work. They are charged with stopping the 'transmission' of violence when and where it is most likely to occur, essentially the human equivalent of a condom in an HIV prevention effort. Interrupters, while expected to contribute to public education and awareness efforts, did not share the same administrative burden as outreach workers and could focus their energies more directly on defusing conflicts. This included speaking with family and friends of gun violence victims in order to mitigate the potential of retaliation, mediating gang conflicts and interpersonal disputes ('beefs') before they escalated into violence, and providing immediate alternatives to violence (ex. Taking a walk to calm down or having a chat indoors) for disagreements on the brink of boiling over.\textsuperscript{567}

However, for the interrupters themselves, their positions were very precarious. They operated on 900 hour temporary worker contracts with mandatory 30 day lay-offs between contracts.\textsuperscript{568} The persistence of this arrangement until at least 2007 speaks volumes to the fact that the organisational structures of even the most outwardly 'progressive' intervention programmes often contain an embedded and unacknowledged privileging of skills and values associated with the (often white) middle-classes over 'street' skills and values needed to exact change. That 41\% of interrupters surveyed as part of the evaluation process reported being happy with this contractual engagement (although a staggering 39\% were not)\textsuperscript{569} does not imbue it with fairness. There is little doubt that academic and administrative staff would not have accepted similar contractual conditions (and were never asked to) in spite of the fact that their skills were really no more specialist or valued than those of the interrupters within the context of the programme.

This entrenchment of intertwined class and racial inequality within the administration of traditional gang violence reduction programmes further strengthens the need for the type of gang-led violence transformation approach to be outlined in the next chapter. In ensuring high-level government officials/representatives, similar in function to diplomats, are not in charge but equal partners in peace-building such glaring inequalities can be reduced. Violence transformation only works if all parties understand and respect the equal value of one another's time & commitment as well as the reality is that all sets of resources and skills are equally essential to ensuring the process works. Equal footing within the violence transformation process will not eradicate inequality in condition or opportunity more broadly, or even among process participants as they exist beyond the negotiating table. However, forced equal footing for the purposes of working towards a common goal may help to change high-level

\textsuperscript{566} Skogan, Harnett, Bump and Dubois, \textit{Evaluation of CeaseFire-Chicago}, ES-12, 5-1.
\textsuperscript{567} Ransford, Kane and Slutkin, “Cure Violence,” 236; Varano and Wolff, “Street Outreach as an Intervention Modality for At-Risk Youth,” 86.
\textsuperscript{568} Skogan, Harnett, Bump and Dubois, \textit{Evaluation of CeaseFire-Chicago}, 3-9, 3-11.
\textsuperscript{569} Ibid, 3-9, 3-11.
government attitudes about the health of American 'meritocracy', an essential first step to encouraging politicians and policy-makers alike to begin to tackle American inequality in a new and more effective way, something that offers the greatest likelihood of eradicating gang violence more broadly.\textsuperscript{570}

Having considered the 'innovations' offered by CeaseFire, it is now possible to ask whether the programme worked. Unfortunately, as has been the case with previous gang violence intervention efforts, it is unclear the extent to which observed decreases were the direct result of CeaseFire's efforts. The final report of the extensive and comprehensive independent evaluation of CeaseFire led by Wesley G Skogan (and carried out with the financial support of the National Institute of Justice) is cautiously optimistic about the programme's success. Though there was variation across sites, most experienced a decline in shootings and of the seven sites subjected to close hotspot analysis there were declines in violence across the board with these declines definitely or quite probably the result of programme efforts in four hotspot areas.\textsuperscript{571} Declines in reciprocal and gang-related killings in four programme areas studied were also reported.\textsuperscript{572} Yet the results of additional independent studies based on the same data sets were more mixed. So Young Kim found that while CeaseFire project areas saw a statistically significant decline in shootings, its impact on killings were unclear as some project areas CeaseFire outperformed comparison areas while other were very much outperformed.\textsuperscript{573} Richard Block found that the program definitely had a positive effect on shooting density in three of seven areas tested, quite probably had an impact in a fourth area and possibly had some impact in two additional areas, yet acknowledged problems in statistical clarity made it difficult to be more positive about the programme's results.\textsuperscript{574} The independent evaluation provided by Andrew V Papachristos was the least positive, arguing that the programme's impact on disrupting the networks of gang violence key to its spread was not discernible, with noticeable changes in only two of the eight areas considered in depth.\textsuperscript{575} Obscuring the data used across these evaluations was the fact that Project Safe Neighbourhoods (PSN) was active in a number of project and comparison sites combined with the fact that not all project


\textsuperscript{572} Ibid, 7-38.


\textsuperscript{576} Skogan, Harnett, Bump and Dubois, \textit{Evaluation of CeaseFire-Chicago}, 7-40.
sites operated with equal (or comparable) resources.\(^{577}\) Furthermore hanging above the programme was the unexplained national drop in violence levels which affected Chicago from the late 1990s forwards.\(^{578}\) In sum, it does appear as though CeaseFire was able to achieve some reductions in the levels of gang violence in its project areas, however evaluation results question the extent to which the programme has been the revolutionary success of its self-presentation. In other words, its successes were as limited as its innovations, reinforcing the need for a new approach.

**Integrated Approaches**

In the late 1980s Chicago's homicide rate was significantly lower than it had been a decade before, yet the emergence of the so-called 'crack epidemic' in low income communities across the country increased hostility towards street gangs. In the early 1990s the number of homicides in Chicago returned to levels seen in the 1970s, marking a substantial increase from violence levels experienced during the late 1980s. This was a phenomenon seen in other large cities as well, with gang violence in New York and Los Angeles reaching to heights previously unseen. Though there is no definitive proof that these increases were directly connected to the crack epidemic, the believed connection meant pressure to crack down on gangs reached fever pitch during this period.\(^{579}\)

Irving Spergel was leading the development of the Juvenile Gang Suppression and Intervention Research and Development Program sponsored by the OJJDP at the time (1987 through 1991). With mounting evidence that single strategy approaches to gang violence were roundly ineffective, Spergel and his team set about designing a new model for violence reduction. In particular they sought to bring together the most effective parts of previous suppression, prevention and intervention approaches, theoretically eliminating those strategies which proved ineffective in isolation. The final result was the Comprehensive Community-wide Gang Program Model, now known as the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Model or Spergel Model.\(^{580}\) This model would be tested in cities across the United States, starting with the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project (GVRP) in Chicago.

The Spergel Model remains the most widely recognised integrated approach to violence reduction to date but it is not the only one. Modelled after Operation Ceasefire in Boston, Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), was rolled out nationally during the early 2000s with Chicago a key programme city. If the GVRP was ultimately an intervention-leaning effort, PSN was a suppression-leaning effort, though no less comprehensive or integrated in scope or aims.\(^{581}\) The purpose of this section is to illustrate how these two programmes, supposedly on the cutting edge of gang violence reduction theory and research, have been neither particularly ground-breaking nor effective, at least not on

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\(^{577}\) Ibid, 8-16.

\(^{578}\) Ibid, ES-18.


\(^{581}\) Chicago’s Project Safe Neighborhoods operation also greatly informed the development of the City of Chicago’s official Violence Reduction Strategy launched in 2009.
the scale needed to really transform Chicago's gang violence problem.

**The Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project (GVRP)**

The impetus for the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project came in the form of a $1 million grant from the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority (ICJIA) to the Chicago Police Department which earmarked $500,000 for the development of a pilot gang violence reduction project in the city's Hispanic/Latino communities. Spergel was invited to submit a concept paper based on the Comprehensive Community-wide Gang Program Model and his concept was selected to form the basis of what eventually became the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project (GVRP). As the name suggests, the GVRP operated in the almost exclusively Hispanic/Latino Little Village neighbourhood on the West Side. Although the programme was administered by the CPD, and as such policing was more deeply embedded in the programme structure than with traditional intervention-focused efforts, its administrators failed to demonstrate a clear and consistent commitment to the programme. Staffing changes, changes to the CPD's organisational structure and the intensive investment of time, energy and resources required by the transition to the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) which occurred during the same period all played a role here. It is believed by Spergel that it is this lack of commitment which ultimately resulted in the programme being brought to a close in spite of early positive results. CPD ambivalence also meant that Spergel and colleagues, already responsible for programme design and under contract for programme evaluation, were charged with overseeing its implementation, even taking direct responsibility for administering GVRP's outreach component. Though necessary for programme survival, it did mean that the project lacked the semi-independent evaluation initially hoped.

The programme model employed by the GVRP, grounded in social disorganisation theory comprised five key components: (1) social intervention; (2) community mobilization; (3) provision of social opportunities; (4) suppression (socialised control); and (5) organisational change and development. Components (1), (2), (3) and (5) had long been integrated as key elements of intervention programmes, with the only major change being the integration of (4) suppression, which the programme did not actually take any responsibility for, instead leaving this 'part' to be carried out independently by the CPD's gang unit. While not an entirely new concept, had the GVRP been able to fully develop its organisational change and development strategy, it could potentially have changed the relationship between the CPD, community groups and gang members, re-humanising gang members in the eyes of local police and community leaders. Unfortunately this component was never fully

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584 Spergel, Reducing Youth Gang Violence, 327-341.
586 Spergel, Reducing Youth Gang Violence, 27.
587 Ibid, 29.
588 RAT Judy, “On the Question of Nigga Authenticity,” in That's the Joint!: The Hip-hop Studies
The GVRP set a very modest bar for 'success' – reductions in violence within the project area, or at least increases in levels of violence smaller than those experienced in comparison areas.

The programme focused on inter-agency collaboration and coalition building as key to success, with outreach workers focusing on community mobilisation and direct work with high-risk clients (limited to a total of 100 individuals identified as having a very high risk of becoming shooters or victims). Outreach workers were drawn largely from the community's ex-gang population and monitored closely. Their safety and security was considered high priority and all outreach workers were provided with medical/life insurance and bulletproof vests (things many CeaseFire outreach workers would later go without). Behavioural codes of conduct were adhered to closely. Workers were prohibited from engaging in risky behaviours likely to jeopardise their safety and the programme's reputation including romantic relationships with gang-affiliated persons and/or allowing gang members to stay over in their places of residence or use their vehicles (presumably extending to gang-affiliated relations as well).

The strictness of these behavioural controls (perhaps a step too far in limiting employee freedoms) meant turnover was higher than programme operators had expected. There was also concern over the over-identification of some project workers with their gang-affiliated clients. Together this made the outreach component difficult to manage. At the same time, managing the ever-changing priorities (and neglect) of the programme by its CPD administrators (not to mention those of the community partners the GVRP relied upon) proved a constant challenge. Although the programme has been rated 'effective' by the OJJDP Model Programs Guide, it was unable to achieve reductions in either gang-related or overall violence although it fared better than many of the project comparison sites in some evaluatory categories. More positively, there was an increase in the number of community residents who perceived the safety of their neighbourhoods to have increased between the programme's start and end dates. Where these mixed results might be claimed a tentative (and highly limited) success, Spargel has been very cautious about overestimating the programme's effect on changing crime rates. In sum, the programme cannot conclusively be determined to be a categorical failure or a success, however it is fair to say that its impact was really very underwhelming. The programme did face administrative challenges, yet this is not a problem unique to the GVRP alone. Many programmes face similar administrative challenges, but are nevertheless expected to deliver positive results. Thus, although the scale of poor administration on the Youth Manpower Project meant implementation did

590 Ibid, 81, 83-84.
591 Ibid, 104-110.
not adequately test programme values, the same cannot be said here. At least in Chicago, the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Model illustrated itself only as effective as traditional gang violence intervention or suppression efforts and inadequate in dealing with the scale of Chicago's gang problem even within a single neighbourhood.

Project Safe Neighborhoods

As was the case with CeaseFire, Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) emerged in the wake of the success of Operation Ceasefire in Boston. PSN Chicago is part of a national Project Safe Neighborhoods initiative. In keeping with other PSN efforts nation-wide, and the original Operation Ceasefire model, it utilises a focused deterrence/‘pulling levers’ approach to violence reduction. PSN works by simultaneously increasing the ‘opportunity cost’ of engaging in violence and bolstering community-support for anti-violence norms. It focuses on four specific interventions which are together expected to yield significant declines in the homicide rate, gun homicide specifically: (1) increase in federal (as opposed to state-level) prosecutions for those with past felony convictions found carrying or using weapons; (2) increase in the length of sentences associated with federal prosecutions; (3) gun recovery and other supply-side policing measures; and (4) the use of offender notification meetings to encourage deterrence and reinforce desired messages about anti-violence social norms. Offender notification meetings are three pronged, beginning with a presentation by law enforcement which details increased arrests and convictions as a result of program efforts. This is followed by a brief presentation from an ex-offender who had turned his life around (highlighting the possibility for change). The sessions end with short presentations by social service agencies and community groups able to provide individuals with tangible information on the support available should they choose to change. Overall, the programme does lean towards a suppression approach, but it remains heavily involved in providing community outreach education programmes, conducting school presentations and working with ex-offenders.

The most extensive evaluation of the programme, conducted by Andrew V Papachristos, Tracey L Meares & Jeffrey Fagan and published in 2007 as “Attention Felons: Evaluating Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago,” in the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, presented generally positive results. The evaluation found that during the first two-years of the programme, homicides in the 'treatment area' dropped by approximately 35% overall and for every 100 guns recovered one could expect a beat-level decline in the log homicide rate of approximately 18%. Offender notification meetings appeared to make a particularly significant contribution to project success, with each 1% increase in offender attendance associated with an approximate

599 Ibid, 224, 258.
13% decrease in beat-level log homicide rates. This particular innovation was quickly incorporated into violence reduction efforts as near and far as Cincinnati and Glasgow.

Still, it is difficult to determine which aspects of these meetings were most effective. If it is the first part of the meeting responsible for driving change, this lends support to a deterrence-focused approach. If it is the latter two, this would lend support for incentivisation. Knowing if one approach is particularly effective (or if both together were crucial) can help better tailor the programme to play to its strengths. At the same time, as was the case with CeaseFire, evaluators highlighted the difficulty in ascertaining the precise extent to which the PSN initiative was responsible for the reductions found given the presence of other violence reduction initiatives (including CeaseFire) in project areas. In sum, though Project Safe Neighborhood likely achieved reductions in levels of violence, like CeaseFire before it, the limits of its impact on gang structure fail to guard against future 'eruptions' whether they last a weekend or a summer. Ensuring those involved are punished is important, but for those whose lives have been lost, this type of approach might be seen as perhaps too little, too late.

Conclusion

Since the emergence of Chicago's supergangs in the early 1960s millions of public dollars (and millions more provided by charitable foundations) have been funnelled into dozens of gang violence reduction initiatives. Yet, street gangs remain as embedded within the fabric of inner-city Chicago as they were in the late 1960s or the early 1990s. Furthermore, in spite of the tremendous financial investment made in gang violence reduction, it remains possible to argue that we are no closer to finding a solution to the problem of gang violence in the city today than we were not just fifty but eighty years ago when comparatively docile informal ethnic youth groups were the pressing urban concern. This chapter has surveyed: Chicago Police Department's specialised gang operations; anti-gang legislation covering Chicago; the pioneering Chicago Area Project of the 1930s; the Youth Manpower Project; The Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project (GVRP); CeaseFire-Chicago; and Project Safe Neighborhoods (in order of launch date). While not an exhaustive list, it does cover the major landmark programmes across the suppression-intervention spectrum including key comprehensive/integrated initiatives. Not one of these programmes has been able to demonstrate its ability to generate deep, sustainable reductions in gang violence. This does not mean that there have been no successes. Project Safe Neighborhoods, for example, was able to yield limited reductions in levels of violence within project sites while CeaseFire appears to have reduced the intensity of violence in at least some of its project sites.

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600 Ibid, 256.
601 Community Initiative to Reduce Violence. The Violence Must Stop (Glasgow: Violence Reduction Unit, nd); Robin S Engel et al, Implementation of the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV): Year 1 Report (Cincinnati: University of Cincinnati Policing Institute, 2008).
603 With the caveat that Papachristos was also responsible for an independent evaluation of the CeaseFire data. (Papachristos, “The Impact of CeaseFire on Gang Homicide Networks”.)
project areas' most troubled 'hotspots'.

The average annual number of homicides in the city have, since 2004, stabilised at about half the level seen during the 1970s and early 1990s. But, as no specific effort (or even a collection of efforts) can claim to be responsible in whole or even in part for this dramatic decline, this indicates patterns of gang violence in the city have been less affected by changes in violence reduction efforts than those who conduct this work, funders and the public at large (especially inner-city residents) would hope. In looking at the breadth of previous (and ongoing) approaches to gang violence reduction in Chicago, three inter-related problems emerge: (1) There has been a tremendous lack of radical innovation in the gang violence reduction field in spite of consistent under-performance and more general inefficacy because; (2) gangs largely continue to be treated as essentially similar to early ethnic street gangs, a problem which itself is the result of; (3) a failure to recognise the effect of the persistent stability and depth of the racial divide in the post civil-rights era on the intractability of gang violence and the depoliticisation of 'race-related' issues including gang violence.

As has been highlighted throughout this chapter, the basic building blocks of both the suppression and intervention approaches to gang violence reduction were established long before Chicago's supergangs were born. The use of the criminal justice system to control and/or 'reform' socio-economically marginalised young people whose behaviour (carried out individually or as part of a group) deviates from/mainstream social norms dates back to at least the 19th century when the juvenile justice system first emerged in Chicago. Specialised police gang units and legislation may have increased the investigative, arrest, detention and sentencing powers of the criminal justice system, but they have not fundamentally challenged how gang violence is to be dealt with. Whether an individual responsible for carrying out a gang killing is arrested by a the gang unit or beat officers, or whether he is tried under specialty legislation, ordinary criminal law (in the case of insufficient proof of gang motivation for example) or juvenile law, that person will still be punished with a lengthy prison/juvenile detention sentence. Simultaneously, there has been little investigation into the specific efficacy of police gang units or anti-gang legislation, even in the face of growing concerns over the extent to which this legislation (to be enforced by these specialised police units) infringes upon the civil rights and liberties of those it was theoretically designed to protect. Still, it is clear that even with an average of 400-500 homicides per year and thousands of non-fatal shootings the problem remains beyond the control of law enforcement and the criminal justice system more broadly.

Intervention programmes may speak of their innovation loudly and frequently, but they remain closely modelled on the principles and strategies first employed by the Chicago Area Project during its most experimental years (1930s), something that

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607 There were 2,185 shootings in Chicago in 2013. (“Chicago Shooting Victims,” *Chicago Tribune Online*, accessed 1 August 2014, <http://crime.chicagotribune.com/chicago/shootings>.)
extends equally to Spergel's 'comprehensive' GVRP. As detailed in Appendix A, the Youth Manpower Project, CeaseFire, GVRP and even Project Safe Neighborhoods share(d) CAP's commitment to community partnership and coalition building as well as a desire to highlight or provide alternatives to gang life. Furthermore all of the intervention/integrated programmes discussed have been subject to some form of social scientific evaluation. Outreach workers, modelled after CAP's 'curbstone counsellors', were integral to the operations of CeaseFire and the GVRP as they have been in other programs left unexplored. CeaseFire and GVRP are and were, again like CAP, designed by academics to test theoretical assumptions about how violence operates in the urban environment. Also common is an inability to demonstrate how reductions in violence experienced by programme areas (with the exception of a small number of CeaseFire sites) were the direct result of programme efforts.

That these efforts have been unable to yield the expected or desired social transformations for which they were designed is highly problematic. Yet it is also unsurprising given the CAP approach upon which they are directly or indirectly modelled was also unable to demonstrate significant success across its project sites in dealing with much lower level violent behaviour (and general delinquency). Project Safe Neighborhoods as a suppression-leaning integrated approach utilising a combination of focused deterrence/suppression and offender notification meetings arguably shows the greatest amount of promise, but it too shies away from making direct claims supporting its responsibility for observed reductions in violence. In the face of such underwhelming performance across the board, what is truly shocking is that there has not been a serious challenge to the logic of existing intervention, suppression and integrated approaches. More shocking still is the amount of self-congratulation for (at best) mediocrity that occurs within the violence prevention field as a whole. Though violence increased in the GVRP project area over the duration of the project and did not even consistently manage smaller levels of increase than comparison areas, it was nevertheless rated 'effective' by the National Gang Centre. CeaseFire also received an 'effective' rating in spite of its inability to consistently demonstrate any tangible responsibility for decreasing levels of violence. In order to begin to really transform Chicago's gang landscape we need to rethink how gang violence is approached from the ground up, something only possible once we begin to: (1) recognise and take seriously the differences between today's gang landscape and that of the 1930s; (2) understand how the history of race in America has come to frame our understanding of gangs, gang members, and the victims of gang violence (the subject of the previous chapter); and (3) realise the bold statement persistent and endemic gang violence makes about the state of the American social contract.

608 Richard Block, “Impact of CeaseFire on Geographical Crime Patterns,” B-34.
As argued in chapter 2 and at the beginning of this chapter, the lack of precedent for the rise of African American supergangs meant that based on superficial similarities at the time of their emergence, they were presumed to be essentially the same as the ethnic gangs studied by Thrasher and which Shaw and McKay's Chicago Area Project attempted to 'treat'. However, unlike these earlier ethnic gangs, which tended to disappear as previously marginalised ethnic groups became assimilated within mainstream American 'whiteness', the inequalities faced by low-income African Americans were more deeply historically entrenched. There will be no organic 'evaporation' of Chicago's African American supergangs. The intertwined and invisible reproductive structures of class and racial inequality in the post-civil rights era have proven thus-far to be largely insurmountable barriers to the type of mass social mobility-based assimilation undergone by white immigrant groups responsible for the dissipation of Chicago's early ethnic gangs. To begin to respond appropriately to the city's supergangs, their intractability (and that of the urban conditions which feed their perpetuation) needs to be recognised as does the endangered state of the American social contract between low-income African Americans (including gang members) and the American government.

The lack of high level and direct state response to Chicago's persistently high levels of gang violence represents a failure on the part of the American government to protect the rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness of those living in the city's most socio-economically marginalised neighbourhoods in an immediate sense (including those of gang members themselves). However, the historic exclusion of African Americans from the political realm (and thus full membership in the social contract) has helped to create a self-reproducing environment of racially-underpinned class inequality in which much of the African American population continues to experience their universal and inalienable rights in ways more restricted than the 'white' majority.

What would an approach to gang violence reduction that recognises the political dimensions and racial underpinnings of Chicago's gang landscape look like? As the next chapter will argue, such an approach treats gang violence with the political seriousness and political urgency it deserves. It involves the federal government directly (as opposed to its various agencies, departments or offices) and recognises gangs as politically significant agents of violence, bringing gangs and government together for the common purpose of developing a working and enforceable agreement to end violence. In exchange for non-violence, the government will leverage its resources to support gangs in their group transition to non-violence in the ways gangs themselves identify as most beneficial (within the parameters of the law). Though a small start, it is hoped that the violence transformation process could also help transform the relationship between the government of the United States and its most marginalised

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613 Given continuing high levels of Hispanic/Latino immigration into Chicago (and the United States more generally), it remains to be seen whether this population will, once numbers have stabilised, begin to assimilate as other immigrant groups have done, or if a new racial division rivaling the black/white divide in terms of depth of entrenchment will emerge. (Rob Paral, “Latinos of the New Chicago,” in The New Chicago: A Social and Cultural Analysis, ed. John P. Koval et al (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006), 105-114.)
inner-city residents in a way similar to the changes in the relationship between the Northern Irish government and the Catholic population during its conflict transformation process.
Chapter 4
Violence Transformation: A New Way Forward?

The first three chapters look backwards, explaining how we have arrived at this point in time when after fifty years of endemic gang violence in Chicago the problem has continued to escape recognition as serious and endemic civil disorder and a significant ongoing threat to state stability because of the extent to which it undermines the state's ability to live up to its founding principles. How this misrecognition affects response, allowing for heavy investment in what are, ultimately, largely ineffective and inadequate violence reduction measures, has also been explored. The first chapter of this work highlights how the academic polarisation of political and 'non-political' violence (including gang violence) has reinforced a broad societal de-politicisation of gang violence and its presentation as a community social problem and criminal justice issue. Chapter 2 turns its attentions to the historical roots of this division, examining how the historic politicisation of sectarian and national difference in Ireland (later Northern Ireland) has contrasted with the exclusion of African Americans from the political realm and the under-politicisation of racial inequality. It is acknowledged that the current gang violence problem is equally shared between Chicago's highly segregated low-income black and Latino/Hispanic inner-city communities. However, it is also argued that the pervasiveness and depth of racialised inequality has imbued African American supergangs and their affiliated descendants with a durability not found among earlier white 'ethnic' gangs, leading in turn to the apparent intractability of the city's gang violence problem.

As the Latino/Hispanic population of Chicago has expanded rapidly since the 1970s with no sign of slowdown, it is impossible to say whether long-term assimilation will weaken the strength and size of these gangs as was the case with the earlier ethnic gangs. Much more certain is the reality that after fifty years of endemic gang violence, we cannot afford to wait to find out. As argued in the previous chapter, today's response to gang violence in Chicago remains rooted in suppression and intervention strategies designed to deal with the comparatively transient and docile ethnic gangs of the 1920s/1930s. Innovation has been limited to intensification, variation or combination, yet these efforts have not been able to account for fluctuations in levels of gang (or general) violence or demonstrate themselves more than very limitedly effective. It is clear that truly radical innovation is needed and now is the time to turn our attentions to the future and the question of 'where do we go from here?'

This chapter argues a flexible strategy is needed that combines a recognition of the significance and severity of the political threat with an understanding of the history of racially-biased socio-economic inequality in Chicago. Politicising the gang violence issue and response, though difficult and controversial, offers our best opportunity for bringing Chicago's half century of (un)civil conflict to a close. It allows for a recognition of the political statement made by the persistence of gang violence and illuminates the role political decision making has played in generating conditions conducive to gang development and the promulgation of ineffective/inadequate violence reduction measures.

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response. What might a political solution to endemic gang violence in Chicago look like in practice? Part of the answer for Chicago's future might be found in looking at Northern Ireland's past, with the long-view of the Northern Irish peace process offering a loose model to adapt and build from. The 'violence transformation' process as this adapted model will be referred to herein, centres around the development and implementation of an agreement between the highest level of the federal government and the gangs (sets/factions) most responsible for the scale and perpetuation of Chicago's gang violence problem.

Chicago's street gangs may not share the same overt political ambitions as Sinn Féin, but this does not mean that they cannot be persuaded/incentivised to renounce violence permanently and begin a process of disarmament. While power-sharing and the creation of new political bodies may hold no sway, some of the social rebalancing incentives that helped persuade the Provisional republican movement to end their campaign of violence may be surprisingly relevant here. Policing reforms, language rights (particularly for Latino/Hispanic gangs) and the possibility of limited prisoner release may prove as enticing in Chicago as they were in Northern Ireland. Though impossible to predict specific outcomes, what is more certain is that in order to succeed violence transformation requires genuine and sustained commitment on the part of the federal government. It also requires co-operation between the government and the 'influentials' of Chicago's highly fragmented gang landscape.

Before moving forward, it is important to recognise that in building off from the long-view of the Northern Irish peace process, many of the central principles of 'conflict...
transformation' are embedded in the violence transformation approach.\textsuperscript{616} Most significantly, there is the shared commitment to, “engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and, if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict.”\textsuperscript{617} Alongside the violence transformation process and following the achievement of any formal agreement, attention must be devoted to fostering a renewed sense of shared humanity within American society that is capable of lessening the marginalisation of low income inner-city Americans long presented as a burden and criminal threat. One of the most obvious, and perhaps simplest, ways to begin this process of change is to encourage (or demand) media sensitivity in the portrayal of homicide victims. The demonisation of gang members in the media and public debate has facilitated their dehumanisation,\textsuperscript{618} with their deaths (not forgetting many are juveniles) roundly ignored or even passively justified as ‘what they deserve’ for having found themselves caught up in gang life. These negative stereotypes are often extended to young African American men from inner-city neighbourhoods more broadly. Even in the absence of evidence of gang involvement, true innocence is always somehow suspect. This devaluing of human life on the basis of race, socio-economic status and, most controversially, gender, is wholly unacceptable.\textsuperscript{619}

Simultaneously, there needs to be a ramping up of the national debate over American inequality and the way it has eroded the fabric of American society. This is a difficult challenge, not least of all because of the influence of 'big money' on American electoral politics.\textsuperscript{620} Still, policies focused on lessening the impact of inequality offer the best potential for side-stepping past and ongoing racially-charged animosity towards...


\textsuperscript{617} Hugh Miall, “Conflict Transformation: A Multi-dimensional Task” (Berlin: Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, 2001), 3.


anti-poverty initiatives by casting a wide enough net so as to ensure the working classes and 'middle America' also see an improvement in their economic circumstances. The intense skepticism many Americans have over perceived government expansion (framed as the socialist or communist threat) might seem to mean some will be entirely beyond reach when it comes to gathering support for this type of policy making, but that need not necessarily be the case. Co-ordinated national provision will actually lower government spending in some areas, reducing the overall size of government and creating a stronger economy.

Just as the model of the Northern Irish peace process cannot be applied wholesale to gang violence in Chicago, the violence transformation model outlined here cannot be directly applied to gang violence elsewhere in the United States. Given the intensive investment of political and financial resources this approach requires it simply would not be prudent to attempt this type of high-level/high-touch violence transformation in cities where gang violence is neither as entrenched nor as lethal (for example Portland, Oregon or Denver, Colorado). This is not to say a new approach that looks beyond traditional suppression/intervention efforts is not needed in these places as well, but as is the case for Chicago, the optimal approach is sensitive to local circumstances and their relationship to national historical, social, political and economic forces. Just as NATO troops in Afghanistan had to recognise the differences between fighting in urban Kabul and rural Kandahar province, new approaches to gang violence reduction need to balance an understanding of the national 'big picture' with local realities, constraints and opportunities. This being said, it is hoped that in moving beyond the traditional suppression/intervention approaches to gang violence, the violence transformation process might help to inspire more innovative thinking around how gang violence might best be reduced or eliminated in different local circumstances. At the same time, the violence transformation process is not readily transferable to cities where the gang violence problem (regardless of its intensity) is closely related to transnational gang networks involved in large-scale drug smuggling (ex. Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and the 18th Street Gang). Even if the roots of the gang problem are similar, transnational networks do need to be handled internationally in co-ordination and co-operation with relevant international partners such as Mexico and El Salvador.

Stage 1: Strategisation

Initiating communications with key gang influentials will undoubtedly cause a tremendous amount of political controversy and backlash. Thus, it is important to ensure communication is launched in as warm a political climate as possible. Simultaneously, given the political risks to be faced by whichever government accepts the challenge of recognising and dealing with gang violence as a significant threat to American political principles and civil order, it is also essential the highest calibre intelligence be made available to it. The intelligence gathered the Chicago Police Department has gathered over the last half century will undoubtedly be useful. However, as a local police department, it simply does not have the resources needed to bring its intelligence gathering and analysis capacity to a level where the American president can relatively safely stake his career on its ongoing validity. Thus, the strategisation process requires concurrent investment in intelligence gathering and political prioritisation. This will not be realised overnight, and indeed it may be the longest stage in the process. British involvement in intelligence gathering in Northern Ireland dates back to the early 1970s, even if establishing Northern Ireland as a national political priority was, at the time (before the Provisional IRA began its mainland campaign), an uphill battle. It took much of the decade before the fruits of intelligence operations really began to have a substantial impact, and it should be expected that the process would take a similar length of time in Chicago.

Stage 1A: Intelligence Gathering

As alluded to in chapter 3, improvements in British intelligence were crucial to the development and maintenance of the stalemate between the Provisional IRA and the British security services, in turn increasing the pressure on both parties to revisit and, ultimately, pursue a political resolution to the conflict. Extrapolating from the Northern Irish experience to provide insight into how states in general can respond to terrorism more effectively, Richard English argues, “intelligence is the most vital element in successful counter-terrorism [emphasis original].” He continues:

Investment in the process of acquiring such intelligence is, arguably, the crucial foundation upon which other, interlinked aspects of response can then be built. Without such high-quality intelligence, it is likely that all aspects of state response (legal, military, propagandist) will stumble ineffectively. But, armed with such intelligence, the state can win some tactical victories, and some effective counter-terrorist strategies can be adopted.

The same might be readily said for gang-specific intelligence. Without a thorough, nuanced and, most importantly, evolving picture of the gang landscape, state response within a violence transformation context risks being inappropriately and/or inefficiently targeted.

624 Bamford, “The Role and Effectiveness of Intelligence in Northern Ireland,” 581; Gillespe, The A-Z of the Northern Irish Conflict, 130.
625 Bamford, “The Role and Effectiveness of Intelligence in Northern Ireland”; English, Terrorism, 133; Sarma, “Informers and the Battle Against Republican Terrorism”.
626 English, Terrorism, 131.
627 Ibid, 132.
The gang landscape in Chicago is ever-changing, with sets and factions falling in and out with one another on almost a daily basis. Without the presence of a clear hierarchy, it can also be difficult to identify who wields enough influence to persuade loosely controlled (or completely uncontrolled) 'front-line' gang members to lay down their arms, or even resist retaliation. Targeting the wrong individuals undermines the whole process by illustrating a lack of federal understanding of the situation on the ground and may make it even more difficult to earn the support of, and trust from, the gang influentials needed for the process to work.

In order for the government to even begin to map out its strategy for reaching out to Chicago's gangs, strong ongoing intelligence is needed in five areas:

1. **Cartography**
   - Which low level groups sets/factions/crews 'run' which blocks? Who do they see as their main allies and rivals within/outside of their block?
   - What supergangs, if any, do these groups claim to 'rep'? How has this influenced their relationship with surrounding crews?
   - How much mobility do specific gang members have? Which areas are off limits or generally avoided?

2. **Networks of Violence**
   - Who are the most violent sets/factions/crews? How has this evolved over the last 2, 5 and 10 years respectively?
   - What key networks of sets, crews and clicks are currently responsible for the greatest numbers of assaults, homicides and shootings? How has this evolved over the last 2 and 5 years? How did these networks of retaliation (or feuds) originate and how have they been sustained?

3. **Operating Conditions**
   - What are the greatest challenges and opportunities facing Chicago's street gangs?
   - How have they previously adapted to their operating environment (demolition of high-rise projects in the 1990s and 2000s; mass arrests of gang leadership)?
   - How 'warm' is the current business climate and how does each group generate its income?

4. **Networks of Influence**
   - In an environment lacking in traditional vertical leadership, who are the most influential gang members? How have they fostered alliances and rivalries between their crew and others? How accessible are they (in prison, on parole, on the streets)?
   - How are kinship networks distributed across the gang landscape and how have they affected alliance patterns? For example, are there older influentials who serve as a role model to siblings, cousins or psychological kin in other groups?

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- Who outside the gang influences the influentials and how do they feel about the individual's involvement in gang activity? (parents, grandparents, siblings, teachers/coaches/mentors)

5. Community Politics

- Where are traditional gang violence reduction efforts most active? What form do they take? How are they funded?
- What community organisations present the strongest claims to neighbourhood or block representation? Are there organic (non-institutionalised) community leaders who also wield a considerable amount of local power?

Intelligence in the first four areas is needed to craft a communications strategy, identifying who needs to be reached and through whom contact might best be initiated. The fifth, on the other hand, is important for understanding who in the community needs to be 'won over' by (but kept on the perimeter of) the process. Trust in the government and its institutions is low amongst African Americans and weakens the farther down the socio-economic hierarchy one moves, meaning it is easier to mobilise against a government initiative than in support of it. Without ensuring that formal and informal community leaders are on board, there is always the risk that the community will reject the process resulting in a loss of its legitimacy and ultimate collapse. At the same time, these community leaders need not be formally included in the negotiation and agreement process. Doing so risks entrenchment in community politics tailored to the (comparatively) politically articulate agendas of community groups, marginalising the gangs around whom the process really needs to be centred.

Currently the collection of intelligence directly related to gangs is handled by a complex web of federal, state and local agencies, though it is the Chicago Police Department which is most actively engaged in the gathering and analysis of intelligence related to the involvement of gangs in violent crime. At the state level, the Illinois Department of Corrections maintains an Investigations and Intelligence Division focused on eliminating and preventing gang activity within the prison system. Federally, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is responsible for the collection of drugs-related intelligence covering the narcotics trafficking/distribution element of gang 'business' operations. However, it lacks insight into gang violence especially the type of low-level interpersonal violence between gang members most common in Chicago. More relevantly, the FBI operates the National Gang Intelligence Centre (NGIC) first established in 2005. As it currently stands, the NGIC focuses primarily on national and regional gang networks as opposed to the gang networks of particular cities. Rather than direct intelligence gathering, the focus is on intelligence integration so law enforcement agencies are able to work with the most comprehensive intelligence available. At the same time, these intelligence gathering agencies do not operate in isolation. In Chicago, the Joint Task Force on Gangs led by the FBI includes CPD and other federal & state intelligence agencies. However, going forward, there needs to be an even higher degree

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632 Siegel and Welsh, *Juvenile Delinquency*, 349.
of coordination and capacity building, particularly in intelligence collection, capable of transcending the municipal/state/federal divide.

Stage 1B: Political Prioritisation

While political prioritisation can help mobilise the resources needed to expand intelligence operations, it can also help create a warmer socio-political climate in which to pitch violence transformation (even if the temperature is only increased by a few degrees). Political prioritisation involves three steps. The first is to establish gang violence as not simply a federal priority, but a presidential priority also. Given the popularity of the 'tough on crime' political stance, this may be the simplest and least controversial step in the entire process. However it needs to be clear that what is not needed is another 'war' rhetorically akin to the 'war on drugs' or militarily similar to the 'war on terror'. Past political commitment to tackling the street gang problem has typically been limited to increased financial investment in the types of gang programs that have, at least in Chicago, proven largely ineffective. Depending on political circumstances, it may be necessary at this point in the process, to give in partially to this expectation and ramp up national funding for traditional gang violence intervention and suppression efforts temporarily (alongside violence transformation in Chicago), even if the results are likely to be less than miraculous. It is also not sufficient to simply announce gang violence as a priority just once, for then it will quickly be forgotten. Regular statements expressing disappointment in the persistence of gang violence and offering condolences to the families of gang violence victims have an important role to play. More controversially, and also without precedent, this must include a recognition of the tragedy gang member deaths. The message must be clear: All gang violence deaths are unnecessary, tragic and realistically preventable.

With gang violence on the national agenda, even a small spike in gang violence in Chicago can pave the way for the declaration of a state of emergency at the municipal and state levels allowing for greater federal involvement in local affairs than normally acceptable. Though declaring a national state of emergency would not be without international precedent, it would be more logical here to declare a local state of emergency as a national state of emergency runs the unnecessary and unbearable risk of diluting the resources and attention available to (and needed for) violence transformation in Chicago. A national state of emergency would encourage cities across the country to demand considerable resources to tackle local gang violence (a 'me too' situation), regardless of whether it is of a scale comparable to Chicago or not. A local state of emergency is important because it represents an admission at the local and state level that Chicago's gang violence problem is beyond local and state control necessitating concerted federal action beyond the normal boundaries for federal action.

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635 Trinidad and Tobago declared a state of emergency in 2001 to deal with levels of violent crime that had escalated beyond local control. (Dave Ramsaran, “The ‘Myth’ of Development: The Case of Trinidad and Tobago,” in Caribbean Sovereignty, Development and Democracy in an Age of Globalization, ed. Linden Lewis (New York: Routledge, 2013), 130.)
Unlike the transitions between stages 2, 3 4 and 5, intelligence gathering and political prioritisation carry on throughout the violence transformation process.

Stage 2: Informal Communication

A period of informal, indirect and/or covert talks is needed to build trust, establish priorities and define the parameters of formal talks should both sides agree to work together in common cause.\(^{636}\) This stage is important because direct communication carries tremendous risk on both sides. Politicians may find their careers quickly ended, or support lost irrevocably, should they engage in 'reckless' negotiation with gangs. Gang influentials might very well end up paying with their lives as cultural prohibitions around 'snitching' (providing actionable information to the police) are ruthlessly enforced. Those found to be communicating with law enforcement, government officials or even unidentified 'official looking' persons will have an exceptionally difficult time convincing others that they are not co-operating with the police.\(^{637}\)

Taking this into consideration, informal communications are quite probably best conducted, at least initially, through trusted third party intermediaries - 'external catalysts'. In the world of chemistry, a catalyst is, “a substance that changes the rate of a desired reaction, regardless of the fate of the catalyst itself.”\(^{638}\) External catalysts in violence transformation may operate in an environment of even greater uncertainty than chemical catalysts, for human behaviour remains less predictable than chemical behaviour.\(^{639}\) However, external and chemical catalysts alike share a genuine and selfless interest in creating change. In absorbing some of the 'heat' from the federal government and gang influentials working up to formal negotiations, they would assume considerable personal risk. All parties would need to take responsibility for doing whatever they can to ensure the safety of these individuals.\(^{640}\) As trust is built, and it becomes possible for parties to communicate in a more direct (though still informal) fashion, external catalysts may continue to be involved, facilitating and/or providing cover for secret meetings.


Though their role has historically been overshadowed by the leaders who 'sign-up' to peace, these peacemakers are no less vital to the process. In a Northern Irish context, back-channel communication is often traced back only so far as the secret talks between Provisional republicans and other parties facilitated by Fr Alec Reid in the mid-1980s. Yet, as early as 1973 there existed a back-channel for communication between the Provisional republican movement and the British government in the form of Derry chip shop owner Brendan Duddy. In his memoirs of the Northern Irish peace process, Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair’s former Chief of Staff and lead negotiator, writes:

Duddy worked selflessly and at great risk to himself over many years to bring about a peaceful settlement in Northern Ireland and credit for his achievements is long overdue. In 1991 it was on his initiative that a meeting between Martin McGuinness [chief Sinn Féin negotiator during the peace process] and Michael Oatley [then MI6] took place which reactivated the ‘Link’ [between the Provisionals and the British government] and helped lead eventually to the peace process. It was through him that the opening contacts leading up to the first IRA ceasefire in 1994 took place.

Fr Reid, on the other hand, helped establish a direct line of communication between Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams and the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) (probably as early as 1986) and provided the cover for these secret meetings. Secret contact between Adams and the Irish government dated back to conversations with Irish Taoiseach Charles Haughey in 1981. Though the Adams-Haughey line of communication had been inactive during Haughey’s term out of office, Reid was also responsible for its reactivation shortly following Haughey’s re-election as Taoiseach in late 1986. Most notably, Reid was instrumental in facilitating covert talks between Adams (Sinn Féin) and John Hume of the SDLP. Although initial talks in 1988 failed, they were reopened and made public in 1993, bringing the still embryonic peace process out from the shadows. Writes Ed Moloney:

To say that Father Alec Reid is the unrecognised inspiration of the Irish peace process would be an understatement. Long known as a confidant of the Sinn Fein [sic] leader, Reid is accorded in most accounts the role of message carrier for Adams ensuring the odyssey to peace, but the full story reveals him to be a much more substantial figure, who initiated, devised and nurtured many of the ideological innovations that made Gerry Adams’ journey possible... Reid persisted at times when others in the British and Irish governments were close to giving up...

641 For example, although it was John Hume and David Trimble who were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1998, it is undeniable that without the risks taken on by Fr Alec Reid and Brendan Duddy before him the peace process, as least as we now understand it, may never have come to fruition.


643 Powell, *Great Hatred, Little Room*, kindle loc 1229.


645 Ibid, 262.

646 Ibid, 225.
In a Chicago context, it is highly improbable that the gangs themselves would think to open communication as there exists no precedent for such a move. Further, given the lack of interest in communicating with gangs the federal government has thus far displayed it would be difficult for a gang influential or intermediary to gain access to the corridors of federal power needed to get the process moving. Therefore, responsibility for initiating informal contact can reasonably be expected to lie with the federal government.

Given the lack of trust between gang members and government officials, it is imperative that the government should choose an external catalyst carefully. This person should (ideally) not be a government official but someone in whom the upper echelons of the federal government can be comfortable investing their trust. This person should have an understanding of the conditions of life in the inner-city and, to facilitate trust with prospective gang contacts, would ideally share the same racial background as those who need to be brought on board (ex. African American for the Stones, Gangster Disciples, Vice Lords; Latino/Hispanic for the Latin Kings or Spanish Cobras). A relatively high public profile may also help engender trust by turning a totally unknown 'threat' into a recognisable one. There is no easy answer as to who should be approached to act (at least for the purposes of first contact) as external catalysts for gang influencers. It will vary in each case depending on the available intelligence. However this person must have a deep (preferably non-familial) relationship of trust with the target influential, with mentors, teachers, or even ex-gang leadership possible candidates where there is a strong enough relationship.

It is impossible to predict exactly what the outcomes of these early talks will be, however in order to be able to progress to formal negotiations a number of conditions and parameters need to first be set. Firstly, the structure (inclusions/exclusions; format) of formal talks needs to be determined. As of 2012 there were an estimated 600 plus gang factions in Chicago, and thus a single high-level negotiation would be like trying to wrangle simultaneous consensus among three United Nations General Assemblies. Negotiation with each gang individually or even block by block is equally impractical given the resource intensive nature of negotiation. Strong intelligence is able to reveal the most violent groups up-to-the-minute (and within very recent history); active feuds/rivalries; and enduring networks of friendly/alliance relations. Traditional supergang affiliation may now mean very little, but kinship ties likely hold greater sway. Identifying these networks and targeting the most violent groups within them may offer a strong starting point to open formal negotiations. Other decisions around formal negotiation location (outside of the city may be best for security purposes), mediator identity, whether/when to publicise the talks and time-scales are essential. What is non-negotiable is the need for an absolute ceasefire (to be monitored by the state and an agreed upon third party) from gangs participating in formal negotiations. As this is a serious demand, not least because it is likely that not all of a particular crew's rivals will be included within the negotiation process at this stage, it is essential that the benefits to be gained by maintaining an absolute ceasefire be perceived to outweigh the risks.

Stage 3: Talking with 'Street Terrorists'? - Formal Communications

Once formal talks are underway or have been made public, opening up the negotiation process to include a broader range of gangs may become possible and advisable, with the fundamental requirement that engagement with the talks (and sharing in the benefits of non-violence) is dependent upon commitment to the same ceasefire conditions accepted by those already engaged in the process. As the number of gangs involved grows, splitting the group into smaller working groups (possibly along geographic lines – West Side, North Side, South Side), with group-nominated leaders taking responsibility for engaging in cross working-group negotiations may become the most effective means of working. Plenary sessions where working group developments could be shared would also be important so as to maintain trust in and commitment to the process by ensuring no group felt as though they were left on the outside looking in, lacking the same information and opportunities as the others. Geographically-based working groups also have a specific advantage in that if it proves impossible to develop a single city-wide agreement, agreements reached by geographical working groups may emerge as an implementation-ready alternative. This would also allow greater flexibility in terms of incentivisation. If public transport is a deal-breaker issue for gangs on the West Side and garbage collection is critical on the South Side, under such an arrangement lower levels of government would not be responsible for making the same levels of public transport and waste management improvement city-wide. Additionally, although the involvement of greater numbers of groups would present certain logistical problems, that these groups are all on active ceasefire means lower levels of violence across the city, saving lives and making a clear statement in support of a political solution.

The formal negotiation process itself is likely to be the most politically controversial stage of the process. When it comes to dealing with violent non-state groups, the idea that the state should engage in a process of negotiation and agreement is one that has consistently proven highly unpalatable. The most common argument against engaging in negotiation is that it legitimises fundamentally illegitimate violence (the state holding a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence) and undermines the rule of law. Simultaneously, there is also a sense of injustice that accompanies perception that 'bad guys' are being rewarded for 'poor behaviour', thereby gaining unfair advantages over those who played by the rules of the game all along. A third common argument against negotiating with terrorists is that it encourages others to adopt (or increase) violence as a bargaining tactic. This position has been supported by numerous scholars concerned with the study of terrorism, most prominently Paul

Wilkinson, who writes:

> The idea that such criminals should be accepted as legitimate interlocutors for their professed aims would surely cause general revulsion and in my view is totally unacceptable. There is only one appropriate response to those guilty of such a grave violation of human rights and that is to bring them to justice.\(^{653}\)

The unpopularity of negotiation has meant that most world leaders have rejected it outright giving rise to the now common refrain ‘we will not negotiate with terrorists.’\(^{654}\) Yet, as Audrey Cronin has pointed out, “virtually all democratic governments facing terrorist campaigns have been forced to negotiate at some point, and many have even made concessions, although of course there are differences in degree.”\(^{655}\) Though Margaret Thatcher and John Major refused to communicate with 'terrorists' (meaning the Provisional IRA specifically) the historical record has revealed both Prime Ministers did engage in contact with the group (albeit infrequently, informally and secretly).\(^{656}\) At the time, the decision to admit Sinn Féin into all party talks, even after the group had accepted the Mitchell Principles was highly controversial, yet now the Northern Irish peace process is often heralded as a great example of the possibilities of negotiation.\(^{657}\)

If negotiation, or even communication, is so unpopular, why is it that governments continue to take the political risk? Cronin identifies five tactical benefits of talking to terrorists covering both communication and negotiation: (1) potential for temporary pause in violence; (2) provision/confirmation of important intelligence about structure and networks; (3) an understanding of the real motivations of violent groups away from the ‘heat of the moment’ and/or publicity machines;\(^{658}\) (4) possible division of groups into factions making a 'divide and conquer' strategy possible; (5) demonstration to passive supporters of the openness of political avenues to address grievances.\(^{659}\)

Not all of these benefits can be accrued (or even constitute benefits) within a Chicago-specific context. Most significantly, the last thing Chicago needs is greater fragmentation of the gang landscape. Divide and conquer only works so long as the divisions are not so numerous as to create anarchy, which is more or less the situation in urban Chicago. Street gangs traditionally lack publicity machines and rarely engage in


\(^{657}\) Neumann, “Negotiating with Terrorists,” 128; Toros, “‘We Don't Negotiate with Terrorists!’,” 408.

\(^{658}\) (2) and (3) are also highlighted by Louise Richardson as upsides of negotiation. (Richardson, “Britain and the IRA,” 91.)

\(^{659}\) Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends*, 36-38.
political posturing, preferring to keep their business activities under the radar. However, it is possible to see gang-context equivalents of the other benefits listed. The ceasefire requirement should, theoretically, allow law enforcement and gang intelligence to focus on those groups outside of the loop and those who break the agreed upon ceasefire. As with negotiation processes involving terrorist groups, those involving gangs can also be reasonably expected to yield significant intelligence gains.

Chicago's supergangs and their fragmented affiliates have traditionally lacked the political coherence and articulacy of groups engaged in more overtly political violence, both facilitating and a consequence of their broader de-politicisation. However, the negotiation process creates a space for gangs to reflect upon their motivations together and in isolation, perhaps for the first time. In identifying and discussing common priorities and concerns, gang sets and factions will have the opportunity to increase their political articulacy, decreasing their political isolation and social isolation by extension. Finally, talks also send a clear message to communities besieged by gang violence and long ignored by the federal government that they too are noticed and valued.

For groups engaged in violence the benefits are often more tangible. For gangs in particular, entry into high-level negotiation can be seen to produce four key benefits: (1) recognition; (2) the opportunity to be heard and taken seriously; (3) gains in the quality of life for the broader membership; and (4) the ability to address and take action on some of the major inequalities that have conditioned their current circumstances. There will be those who, in focusing on the hyper-capitalist and hyper-consumerist stereotypes of gang organisations, argue such benefits will be lost on gang members. However, there exists no evidence indicating that gang members are any less rational than those engaged in conventional political violence or any other typical member of the general public. Indeed gang members have often displayed an acute awareness of the role of politically-determined social and economic policy in maintaining/deepening the racial and class-based inequalities that facilitate their social marginalisation as well as the relationship between this marginalisation and the perpetuation of gang violence.

Stage 4: Agreement

As high-level governmental negotiations with street gangs have never before been attempted, the incentives these groups might advocate for in exchange for a durable and enforceable commitment to permanent non-violence cannot be predicted with any degree of certainty. As alluded to above, it may be that these groups decide to focus on securing pardons for gang members serving long-term sentences for non-violent offences. They may press for state referendum on the issue of marijuana legalisation in the hope this would provide an opportunity to start a legitimate enterprise capable of capitalising on existing expertise. Keeping in mind that a large number of gang members are also parents, other groups might demand drastic educational reform to ensure their children and/or younger siblings have an opportunity to overcome the


661 Williams, Blue Rage, Black Redemption, 217-218.
circumstances of their birth. Some things classified for present purposes as 'incentives' could be as simple as a guarantee of regular household waste pick-up and the refurbishment of local housing projects. Ideally, in order to both facilitate community approval and encourage gangs to remain committed to the agreement long enough for non-violence to become normalised, there should be a mix of private (for the benefit of signatory groups and their members) and public (for the benefit of the community/all) benefits. To offer these groups the opportunity to become meaningful agents of positive political change and valued members of the political community is to take on a risk, but it also offers a wonderful opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of the broader social changes needed to tackle gang violence on a national scale.

The conditions of the agreement to be imposed by the state are likely far simpler to predict, bearing at least some similarity to the demands made upon the Provisional IRA by the British government in exchange for allowing the former to participate in the devolved power-sharing regional governance institutions established in the Good Friday Agreement. The first, and most obvious, is an agreement to render the ceasefires established in advance of the negotiation process permanent. The second is to agree to independently-supervised disarmament. Though this latter condition does technically infringe upon the constitutionally-protected right to bear arms, given that participation in the agreement is voluntary, and that there is tremendous symbolic and practical value in disarmament, it is a compromise worth insisting upon. There are already numerous restrictions in place with regards to firearms ownership in Chicago. For example, semi-automatic firearms/assault weapons are banned in Chicago and it was not until June of this year (2014) that retail gun shops were once again permitted within city limits (the ban was ruled unconstitutional in 2012).

Reaching agreement is not a certainty, and the whole process is full of risk. Where an agreement is reached, it is essential that it be presented to the wider community to ensure that its conditions are acceptable to those most directly affected by the city's gang violence. Ideally, this will take the form of a city-wide referendum, as limiting the referendum to high violence neighbourhoods would likely be both another source of major political discomfort and logistically very difficult to manage. Public approval of the agreement can strengthen the position of the agencies (including local law enforcement) responsible for its implementation and monitoring. Though it would be wholly inappropriate for the government to engage in (or be seen to engage in) referendum campaigning, if informal community leaders have been 'kept abreast' of developments in the negotiation process and made to feel valued by it, it can be hoped that they will organically mobilise in support of an agreement. The final step of the process, presuming success at referendum, is to open the agreement to new signatories. This can bring in some of those active gangs who may have initially rejected or been otherwise left outside the negotiation process. New signatories should be eligible to reap the full benefits of the agreement under the same conditions as the original parties after a mandatory probationary ceasefire period (for example 60 or 90 days).

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Stage 5: Implementation & Monitoring

In Northern Ireland the implementation process faced as many (if not more) setbacks than the initial negotiation. Though the regional governance institutions established under the Good Friday Agreement now appear stable, there were many points during the implementation process where it appeared as though the whole settlement might collapse at any moment. It would be foolish to think that the implementation and monitoring of the conditions of agreement within a violence transformation context would be smooth sailing. As at every stage, there are many risks, both those identified here and those as yet unanticipated. One of the greatest risks presented by the government side is that of a change in federal leadership. A major regime change where election success has involved a commitment to dismantle the process could lead to the abandonment of promises made not just to Chicago's street gangs, but to the city as a whole (by virtue of the agreement's public acceptance). The destruction of the agreement at this point would also destroy the goodwill generated in Chicago. Where trust between the government, gang members and low income communities is hard won, if broken it would be all but impossible to regain.

From the gang side of the equation it is almost a given that the ceasefire will be broken by some (if not most) groups at some point. The fragmentary, anarchic nature of the gang violence landscape means that even the most well-intentioned and committed group may be unable to stop an undisciplined young member from firing upon a rival in the heat of the moment. It is therefore important to ensure that the punishment for breach of the ceasefire is both firm and fair, so as to encourage greater self-control on the part of agreement signatories and to make signatories immediately and forcefully aware of what life is like outside of the agreement. Thus, where a breach of the ceasefire is found (and verified independently), the group in violation should face the immediate suspension of all support and benefits provided by the agreement for a pre-determined and mutually agreed upon length of time (a 'quarantine period'). If the group is able to demonstrate a renewed commitment to non-violence (maintenance of reinstated ceasefire) during this quarantine period, they should be brought back into the fold. However, during the quarantine period, the group should be subjected to the same (if not greater) intense targeted police suppression tactics (based on continuous high-quality intelligence) faced by groups not party to the agreement.

With a ceasefire among many of the city's most violent factions, sets and crews in place, it is expected that resultant significant reductions in violence will render remaining gang violence far more manageable. Concurrently, improvements in intelligence gathering strategy and federal intelligence support will increase the capacity of local law enforcement to target their action more effectively, something likely to lessen animosity between the police and low income black and Latino/Hispanic

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663 Blair, A Journey, 152-199; Powell, Great Hatred Little Room.
664 Strict conditionality is an element of the violence reduction strategies used in Cincinnati, Ohio and Glasgow, Scotland that has shown great, but currently under-assessed, potential for commitment maintenance. (Engel et al, Implementation of the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV), 4-6; Community Initiative to Reduce Violence, The Violence Must Stop; Violence Reduction Unit, Community Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV): First Year Report (Glasgow: Violence Reduction Unit, 2009), 10.)
communities. With gangs no longer as actively engaged in violence as they once were, and violent, antagonistic version of gang culture less pervasive in the city's low-income neighbourhoods, some existing community intervention efforts may even be able to turn their attentions elsewhere.

Conclusion

Though gang violence in Chicago is largely confined to the city's most socio-economically marginalised neighbourhoods, its scale and persistence render it a problem of national import. This chapter argues that as an issue of national political significance, gang violence in Chicago requires a federally-driven political approach. Modelling itself after the Northern Irish peace process, which delivered a political resolution to the seemingly insoluble Troubles, the violence transformation process proposed here argues that generating lasting peace through negotiation and agreement is the way forward. Negotiation involving Sinn Féin as the political representatives of the Provisional republican movement (and thus the Provisional IRA) was controversial, as are negotiations involving violent non-state groups around the world. Yet, without risking unpopularity agreement and a lasting (though imperfect) peace in Northern Ireland would never have been secured.

For the violence transformation process to work it requires not only high-level political commitment and prioritisation, but high-quality intelligence and a willingness to begin the process of shifting the way the public understands racial and socio-economic inequality in America, particularly as it relates to inner city residents. Within the violence transformation process, external catalysts are invaluable in moving from strategy to action, facilitating the development of initial conversations between the government and those who wield influence within the city's most violent sets/factions. Where the maintenance of ceasefire is a precondition to participation in formal negotiation, the act of reaching the negotiating table alone would help provide the significant reductions in violence needed for law enforcement to come to better grips with the gang problem. However, more significantly, and more beneficially at a societal level, participation in negotiation offers groups who frequently justify their illicit activities on the basis of social exclusion and the absence of real and meaningful opportunities for social mobility inclusion, respect, recognition and the opportunity to address both their immediate violence and its root causes.

With groups engaged in violence themselves driving the process as equal partners with the federal government, and incentives for a permanent acceptance of non-violence identified and negotiated by the groups themselves, it is expected that commitment to the process and its outcomes will remain high. Simultaneously, it is also understood that agreements are often violated. This is why enforcing the agreement and ensuring that both the government and signatory gangs fulfil their obligations is

665 Opportunities which make use of their skills, talents and drive while providing financial security (if not prosperity) and a measure of dignity and respect – a far cry from the precarious service industry and construction labour work often presented as 'alternatives' to gang involvement by well-meaning intervention programmes. (Katherine S Newman, No Shame in My Game: The Working Poor in the Inner City (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), 94-95.)
essential. Again, lowered general violence provides the opportunity for law enforcement to clamp down heavily (and in a targeted fashion) on these groups in violation of their ceasefire so as to encourage re-engagement with the agreement. Firm but fair penalties for breach will ensure groups are rewarded for genuine commitment to change even in the case of occasional roadblocks. The violence transformation process as here outlined may be radical & risky and it carries no guarantee of success, but so too was the peace process in Northern Ireland. Creating peace requires taking risks, the only question is whether these are risks worth taking? Over the last half century, many thousands of lives have already been unnecessarily lost to gang violence in Chicago. This is far too many. Peace is not only worth the risk but long overdue.
Conclusion

There has been no contemporary American president as engaged in the issues of gang violence and the Troubles in Northern Ireland as William Jefferson (Bill) Clinton (1992-2000). Clinton responded to the persistence of violent conflict in Northern Ireland by taking the controversial step of appointing a Special Envoy (formally known as the Special Envoy of the President and Secretary of State for Northern Ireland) to provide diplomatic support to the peace process in Northern Ireland in 1995. In doing so, the president demonstrated his willingness to draw the ire of one of America's most trusted international allies for a chance at peace.666 On 19 February 1997 Clinton launched his 'Anti-Gang and Youth Violence Strategy' in Boston, a city that recently experienced a seemingly miraculous decline in levels of gang violence. The strategy pledged: $200,000 for 1,000 local and state 'Anti-Gang Prosecution Initiatives'; Brady checks preventing violent juvenile offenders from purchasing handguns; funding to establish 1,000 new after school programs; prosecution of juveniles as adults for violent federal offences; safety locks on hand guns; tools for prosecutors to guard against witness intimidation; $75 million in funding for an 'Anti-Truancy, School Violence, and Crime Intervention Initiative'; $50 million for 'youth violence courts' and probation-focused anti-violence initiatives; support for pilot programs at the state level requiring juveniles to be drug tested before receiving a driver's license; improvements to the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP).667 That the President responded to a domestic issue with substantial financial investment in a diversity of programmes and initiatives while an international crisis generated a diplomatic response is to be expected. However when one considers that during the whole of Clinton's presidency (1993-2000) the Northern Irish conflict claimed a total of 283 lives while gang violence in the city of Chicago was responsible for 293 violent deaths in 1994 alone,668 it is possible to question where a peace process was most needed.

The central argument of this thesis has been that for the last half century, the scale, intensity and persistence of gang violence in the city of Chicago has constituted an under-appreciated and largely unrecognised public order challenge and a threat to the liberal democratic principles upon which the United States was founded. Its purpose has been to explain the source of this misrecognition, shed light on its implications for response and re-imagine a future governmental response that treats the city's gang violence as the political problem that it truly is. The first two chapters of this work function, in separate ways, to provide an answer to the question of how gang violence in Chicago has failed to establish itself as an issue of major political significance in spite of the way in which it pervasively infringes upon the fundamental and inalienable rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness accorded all Americans.

Chapter 1 exposes and explores the rigid conceptual binary in the literature on

666 Mary-Alice Clancy, Peace Without Consensus: Power Sharing Politics in Northern Ireland (Surrey: Ashgate, 2010), 77.
group violence that divides and distinguishes 'political violence' from other forms of group violence. The political violence scholarship has focused on those acts of group violence ascribed explicit political motivation, with 'political motivation' referring to an aspiration to change existing systems of local, national or international governance in some way. Political violence scholars have traditionally focused on insurgency, terrorism, guerilla war/campaigns, civil war and ethnic conflict. Those forms of group violence lying outside of these areas of focus and excluded from this ever-shifting definition have consequentially come to be classed as 'non-political' violence. Non-political violence, including gang violence, is not only denied political motivation but also political meaning and significance. This artificial binary is highly problematic, for the absence of clear political motivation expressed articulately using politically-loaded terminology does not mean that certain forms of group violence are void of political underpinning or implication, as is most certainly the case with gang violence. The prevailing image of the contemporary street gang member (or gangsta) may be one focused on hyper-consumerism and status obsession. However, the racialised backdrop of urban poverty and marginalisation against which these caricatures sit is real and has been sustained by decades of unempathetic social and economic policy.

The second chapter of this work examines the historic origins of differential labelling and response to political violence and gang (particularly African American 'supergang') violence in Chicago. Using Northern Ireland and its Troubles as a comparative case study, it argues that the historically-rooted and repetitively reinforced politicisation of the sectarian division in Irish/Northern Irish society created a climate so politically charged that the Provisional IRA could not escape ascription as 'political violence' at the time of its emergence. On the other hand, the historic exclusion of African Americans from formal politics and public life limited the politicisation of racial difference. Though race frequently found its way onto the political agenda, it was generally used as a proxy for other issues, most notably state rights and liberties. Heavy oppression (especially under slavery) worked to discourage informal political protest and small relative gains (emancipation, person-hood, citizenship, voting rights) served to keep hope alive, although political and legal equality for most African Americans was a long time coming. Developed as a response to the oppressive nature of Jim Crow segregation in the south, the civil rights movement that emerged in the mid-1950s was the first (and remains the only) mass political mobilisation of African Americans. Yet its initial focus on securing legal inequality for southern blacks made it ill equipped to tackle the pervasive de facto segregation that limited the opportunities and life chances of African Americans in the north, particularly the millions of southerners who had migrated to northern industrial centres during the Great Migration only to find their situation little improved.

From the restrictive racial covenants (1920s-1940s) locking blacks out of predominately white middle/upper-income neighbourhoods to the 1960s triple-shifting of inner-city public schools when adjusting school boundaries would have lessened the burdens of overcrowding, Chicago was long an exemplar of northern de facto segregation. Its urban segregation was left largely untouched by civil rights reforms, for where segregation is not legally enforced it cannot readily be legally destroyed. Though the middle and even upper-income neighbourhoods in the city are more diverse now
than ever before, Chicago's low income neighbourhoods have remained as segregated as they were during the 'radical' 1960s and 'conservative' 1950s. Divorced geographically and ideologically from the civil rights movement at its peak, the African American supergang alliances that formed during the early 1960s lacked a clear link with the racial politics of the era during the crucial early phase in which classifications are made. This, along with the absence of any tradition of violent African American political contestation or clear political rhetoric/ambition, paved the way for the classification of these groups as delinquent youth groups essentially similar to the white 'ethnic' gangs of the 1920s/1930s. Though by the mid-late 1960s these groups would reveal themselves to be more durable, lethal and politically-minded (at least for a time) than their predecessors, the label stuck. That similar groups were emerging in Latino/Hispanic communities at the same time likely contributed to the belief that as these minorities came to be better integrated into mainstream American society the gangs would largely disappear as had been the case with the earlier white ethnic gangs.669 However, this belief was mistaken, for the history of American racial politics prevented the ready assimilation of African Americans. Where German, Polish, Irish and even Italian immigrants (who all contributed to the city's gang problem in the first half of the twentieth century) were, over the course of generations, able to attain a sense of 'whiteness' this simply was not possible for African Americans in the same way and on the same scale. In Chicago intractable racial and economic inequality facilitated intractable gang violence.

Throughout the first half of this thesis, the importance of language and perception are themes which often re-emerge. How we perceive and describe things often matters more than reality in terms of conditioning response. Otherwise put, the label affixed to group violence has tended to matter more than the scale of atrocity committed. Although the intensity of gang violence in Chicago has routinely surpassed that experienced during many of the most violent years of the Troubles, serious consideration of the situation in Chicago as civil conflict has been essentially non-existent.670 A change in label from 'gang rivalry' to 'low-intensity civil conflict and disorder' necessitates a change in response. Furthermore, to recognise the existence of civil conflict in a 'modern city' such as Chicago is to challenge our preconceptions of urban life in America. It demands government accountability for the failure to intervene sooner and for exacerbating the problem with decades of ill-thought socio-economic policy and response efforts. Indeed the degree to which labels are clung to means that it is easier for the United States to expend tremendous amounts of energy and resources to investigating and mitigating the small-scale threat posed by low-capacity 'terrorist' groups (ex. The Black Panther Party) than to recognise the political dimension of gang violence. As scholars, we must accept some responsibility for how the labels and classifications we develop and rely upon to make sense of the world are used to justify inclusion/exclusion and action/reaction/inaction in society at large.

To support and/or reinforce the binary between political violence and 'non-


670 Beyond the anomalous radical grass-roots spokesperson making an emotional appeal.
political violence is to be partly (though unintentionally) responsible for the continued political under-reaction to gang violence. The distinction between political and gang violence has been particularly rigid within the field of terrorism studies, with terrorists themselves and scholars of their violence both keen to put as much conceptual distance as possible between terrorist groups and gangs. However, it is important to be clear about the message this emphasis on distinction sends both explicitly and implicitly. One of the core tenants of the terrorism studies field is that the power of terrorist violence lies not just in the number of lives a particular attack claims, but in its ability to leave a psychological impact far in excess of any physical destruction. Indiscriminate attacks are seen to inspire a particularly intense amount of fear, playing upon the idea that anyone – young/old; rich/poor; black/white - could instantly become a victim of terrorist violence. This fear has often put considerable pressure on governments to respond immediately and in dramatic fashion. At the more docile end of the spectrum it can lead to hastily crafting measures such as emergency legislation which infringe upon civil rights (ex. the Prevention of Terrorism Act (1974) passed in the United Kingdom after a series of Provisional IRA pub bombings in England), but this fear can also lead countries to war, as it did in the United States in the wake of 9/11.

By and large gang violence is far more discriminate than terrorist violence. Its victims tend to be young, African American males between age 16 and 24. Their deaths tend, individually and collectively, to prompt little response beyond (perhaps) a brief mention in the local newspaper. All young black men in Chicago's inner-city live in constant fear that they will be the next obituary. Yet the appreciable terror they experience has consistently been deemed insignificant in comparison with that created by the most recent low-casualty terrorist attack. The cruel reality of the strict classifications of 'terrorism' and 'gang violence' is that the differential response they generate communicates the clear message that any life is more valuable than the lives of the most socio-economically disadvantaged young African Americans.

The second half of this thesis focuses on response, looking at where things have gone wrong and in which direction future efforts need to develop. Chapter 3 chronicles the history of gang violence reduction efforts in Chicago while the final substantive chapter offers the 'violence transformation' model as a new way forward. Building on the discussion of differential response developed in earlier chapters, chapter 3 argues that in classifying Chicago's early street gangs as simply the next iteration of the delinquent white ethnic youth groups studied by Thrasher and his Chicago School colleagues, gang violence remained coded as a community social problem/’crime’ issue. This helped to frame gang violence in such a way that it was only natural to apply the same basic strategies used against these earlier groups to the 'next generation' gangs.

671 Magee, Gangsters or Guerillas?.
672 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 32, 36, 40.
Gang violence reduction has traditionally taken one of two approaches, suppression or intervention, though since the 1990s a small number have attempted to cut a new line in the middle by integrating elements of both.

Suppression works through criminalisation and is carried out by law enforcement and the criminal justice system. The police launch 'crack-downs' and raids in an attempt to stop and/or prevent gang activity while the criminal justice system works to ensure gang members are kept 'out of action' through lengthy prison sentences and/or strict parole conditions. Though often traced only so far back as the first police gang units in the late 1960s, the use of suppression strategies to reduce gang activity (including violence) in Chicago date at least as far back as the 1899 establishment of the first juvenile court in America. The origins of the intervention approach lie in the Chicago Area Project of the 1930s, established by urban sociologist Clifford Shaw (with Henry D McKay) to test social disorganisation theory and the potential for community self-mobilisation around the issue of juvenile delinquency. Where suppression generally extracts young 'delinquents' (or 'offenders' as they are now termed) from the community in which they reside, intervention efforts believe reintegration into the community and mainstream society is the key to lasting violence reduction. Thus, intervention approaches have tended to focus on fostering attitudinal change alongside behavioural change. Nearly all of the major features of gang intervention programmes in Chicago are derived from the methods of the Chicago Area Project: outreach work; coalition building; academic design (and evaluation); and the provision of 'alternatives' to gang involvement (job training, educational/employment opportunities).

In spite of their clear links to CAP and/or other previous responses, nearly all new gang violence reduction efforts attempt to bill themselves as innovative, likely in an attempt to secure programme funding. In practice however, these innovations have been quite limited, generally representing mere tweaks on existing strategies. For example, while CeaseFire introduced what could be considered an innovative epidemiological theory explaining the spread of violence, the programme itself was essentially an outreach programme with a coalition building aspect. The introduction of violence interrupters in 2004 represented something marginally more original as previously outreach workers did not make it their mission to intervene directly in conflict, but it was not radical innovation in the sense that it marked a major leap forwards in the way we think about how to go about gang violence reduction. At the same time, since the introduction of the first gang law in California in 1987 (the STEP Act), many states have rushed to adopt their own gang-specific legislation. However the main function of this legislation has largely been the extension of penalties for the pre-existing criminal offences long used to hold gang members legally accountable for their actions rather than the introduction of entirely new offences. Integrated approaches have fared only marginally better in terms of innovation. Outreach workers remained central to the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project and Project Safe Neighbourhoods expends a great deal of energy securing convictions and delivering community education initiatives. If any of these approaches had been able to deliver significant demonstrable reductions in gang violence in Chicago, this lack of innovation would not

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675 Spergel, Reducing Youth Gang Violence, 15.
be an issue. However this has not been the case. Chapter 3 surveys CPD gang units, anti-gang laws, the Youth Manpower Project, the GVRP, CeaseFire and Project Safe Neighborhoods, but not a single one of these efforts has been able to demonstrate their ability to deliver major lasting reductions in violence.

Aside from the brief quadrupling of the CPD's gang-specific operations in 1982, there has been little correlation between major changes in the CPD's gang violence operations and the city's homicide rates (with gang violence known to be major driver of homicide rates). Determining any clear relationship between gang-specific legislation and gang violence levels has proven to be exceptionally difficult. Administrative management and oversight of the Youth Manpower Project, which ran for less than a year (1968), was so poor that it is impossible to comment upon the validity of the programme's underlying experimental theory. Some CeaseFire and Project Safe Neighborhoods' programme areas have seen modest reductions in violence, however the academic evaluations of these programmes have generally been reluctant to assert that these reductions are the direct result of programme efforts.676 Violence actually increased in Little Village during the three-year lifespan of the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project. Furthermore the GVRP's programme evaluation revealed that it was unable to consistently yield lower levels of increase in violence than all comparison areas.677 Not a single one of these efforts, nor all efforts in combination, can explain the drastic reductions in overall violence levels in the city starting in the late-1990s and continuing through the mid-2000s when violence (homicide in particular) levelled off at around half of what it was in the early 1990s. In some ways the failure of existing gang violence reduction approaches to yield the reductions needed to restore civil order in Chicago is unsurprising. The Chicago Area Project, the model for contemporary intervention efforts, was itself unable to demonstrate success in reducing delinquency beyond a single project area and even within this area (Russell Square), programme management (Shaw) and subsequent independent evaluators have been reluctant to attribute declines to programme activity specifically.678

Given the inefficacy and inadequacy of previous approaches, it is clear that a radical new approach to the problem of gang violence in Chicago is needed. The violence transformation model developed in chapter 4 offers a way forward rooted in the idea that the groups responsible for the perpetuation of endemic violence need to be at the heart of its resolution. Modelled after the Northern Irish peace process which succeeded by including Sinn Féin (closely linked to the Provisional IRA) as an equal partner in peacebuilding, the violence transformation process argues a strictly enforced and incentivised non-violence agreement between the federal government and Chicago gangs offers the greatest potential for peace. The violence transformation model is incredibly risky. It demands major and unprecedented political sacrifices from the

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676 With Richard Block’s independent evaluation of hot spot data in which he claims reliably attributes decreases in shooting density in some project areas to CeaseFire program efforts the most notable exception. (Block, “Impact of CeaseFire on Geographical Crime Patterns,” B-34.)
highest echelons of the federal government while carrying a significant risk of failure. But it is clear that continuing to invest heavily and exclusively in traditional intervention and suppression initiatives will not generate the reductions in violence needed to say with any confidence during our lifetime that Chicago is a safe city where all residents are equally free to express their American rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. The American state was built to defend and protect these three universal and inalienable human rights. To date structures of government have failed to prevent a tyranny of the majority from de-politicising and hyper-criminalising gang violence while at the same time constructing and reinforcing the conditions of life in the inner city known to facilitate of gang development. Continuing to ignore or underplay the political significance of gang violence in Chicago will only serve to further distance the state from its founding principles. Is this the legacy that future American governments truly want to leave?

Taking a chance on peace in inner-city Chicago requires embracing risk, not just accepting it. It is to believe against the odds that it is possible that in fifty years time students of Chicago's public schools will be reading about the deaths of students like Derrion Albert, Hadiya Pendleton, Terrance Green, Aaron Rushing and Victor Vega in their history books as opposed to reliving these tragedies endlessly among their own classmates. To accept the challenge of bringing about an end to gang violence is to simultaneously look backwards to the Declaration of Independence while looking into a future beyond the results of the next Gallup poll or election.

Reflecting upon the American experience of World War II, Franklin D Roosevelt's undelivered final presidential address warns, “Today we have learned in the agony of war that great power involves great responsibility... We, as Americans, do not choose to deny our responsibility.” It is the unfortunate and unjustifiable reality that successive governments have largely denied their responsibility to Chicagoans, but it is not too late to change. There is no doubt that the journey to peace will be difficult, but transforming conflict and building peace have never come easily anywhere. Nevertheless there are few who would deny that this is a journey not worth making. It may very well be true that a total elimination of gang violence in Chicago is impossible, but a lasting peace where violence is rare, exceptional and immediately condemned by those who were once shooters is well within reach. There will be those who remain skeptical about the potential for peace. However it is impossible to ignore the glimmers

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679 Cronin, Why Terrorism Ends, 36.
680 Levy, Civil War on Race Street, 189-190.
of hope that cut through the shadows of doubt. What if Gerry Adams, Bertie Ahern, Tony Blair, John Hume, David Trimble, Fr Alec Reid and scores of others had simply accepted the supposed impossibility of peace in Northern Ireland? Chicago is ready for this kind of change, the only question now is whether there is a federal government brave enough to deliver.
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Appendix A: Common Elements of the Intervention Approach to Reducing Gang Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention Project</th>
<th>Pro-social Orientation</th>
<th>Community or Gang Leadership</th>
<th>Community Partnership and Coalition Building</th>
<th>Outreach Workers</th>
<th>'Alternatives' (Employment, Training, Education)</th>
<th>Academic Design / 'Theory-based'</th>
<th>Academic Evaluation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chicago Area Project (CAP) (1930s-present)²</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Chicago YMCA Detached Worker Program (1960-1965)³</td>
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<td>Chicago Youth Development Project (1961-1966)⁴</td>
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<td>Youth Manpower Project (1968)⁵</td>
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<td>Broader Urban Involvement &amp; Leadership Development (BUILD) (1969-present)⁶</td>
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<tr>
<td>CeaseFire-Chicago/Cure Violence (2004-Present)⁷</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crossfire Gang Outreach (2009-present)⁸</td>
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**Integrated Approaches**

| Project Safe Neighbourhoods Chicago (2001-present)¹⁰ | X | X | X | X | X | X | |

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¹ To be classed as 'Academic Evaluation' a given intervention programme has had to undergo some form of quantitative or qualitative evaluation by scholars working within an academic research community. The label 'Academic Evaluation' in no way denotes that such evaluation was rigorous, thorough, or, in the case of long-term programmes, a regular occurrence. Programme evaluation continues to be fragmentary across the board.


⁶ Crossfire is a gang outreach program located within Willow Creek Community Church, an evangelical mega-church in the south Chicago suburbs and thus operates with a rather different ideology than that underpinning other major intervention efforts in the city.


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Appendix B: Violence Transformation Process Model

1. Groundwork

Intelligence Gathering
- Most violent groups
- Key feuds/disputes
- Operating conditions (business concerns, etc.)
- Distribution of kinship networks
- "Influentials"
- Social networks (involved/non-involved) of influential
- Shape of non-violent community politics

Political Prioritisation
- Establishment of gang violence as a presidential priority
- Commitment of federal resources – not a ‘war’ on gangs’
- Re-framing of gang violence in the city of Chicago as a national emergency

Paradigm Shift
Alongside and throughout the process, it is essential that the federal government take a lead role in changing the way the gang problem is conceived of and presented to the public. This will also involve politically re-framing inner-city urban issues and matters of American inequality on a grand scale such as that found during the New Deal and War on Poverty.
- Re-humanisation of victims of gang violence regardless of race, age, gender, class, neighbourhood of residence or (as the last stage of the process) gang affiliation – break down difference between 'deserving' and 'undeserving' victims
  - Work with the media to change the representations of victims of colour
- Highlight the effect of inequality on the nation as a whole
  - Introduction of inequality (rather than poverty) reduction efforts
  - Ensure benefits extend to the poor (urban and rural/black and white), working class and lower-middle class to give measures a sense of universalism.

2. Informal Communications

1. Initiation of discreet informal and indirect communications with key gang influentials through 'external catalysts'.
2. Establish full ceasefire must be in place for formal communications to be a possibility.
3. Determine parameters of negotiations: Who is to be included/excluded?; How will negotiations move through the city? (sector, neighbourhood); Parallel negotiations? Acceptable mediators?

3. Formal Communications

1. Maintenance of ceasefire throughout proceedings, breach of ceasefire will lead to exclusion, quarantine, and re-entry after time-frame specified at beginning of proceedings.
2. Establishment of key priorities and needs common to all groups to be able to move forward with a permanent ceasefire/cessation of community violence.
3. Agreement on basic incentives for non-violence, conditions and enforcement mechanisms.
4. Drafting of language of agreement.

4. Agreement

1. Formal acceptance of agreement by parties involved in negotiations.
2. Opportunity for all 'significant' gangs to sign on to the agreement.
3. Presentation of agreement to Chicago residents for referendum.
4. Acceptance of agreement formally.

5. Implementation & Monitoring

Implementation
- Timely implementation of all agreed measures
- 'Decommissioning' and destruction of weapons in a process supervised by agreed upon neutral third party.

Enforcement
- Breach of agreement by gang immediately results in suspension of all benefits
- Groups in breach face targeted suppression measures.