THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RESISTANCE IN POST-CONFLICT SOUTH SUDAN

Graeme Young

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The Political Economy of Resistance in Post-Conflict South Sudan

Graeme Young
Thesis for MPhil in International Relations
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Abstract: Despite recent scholarly attention, the phenomenon of resistance in post-conflict environments remains largely under-conceptualized. This represents a major shortcoming in the theory and praxis of post-conflict peacebuilding and development. Seeking to address this problem, this study explores how, why and by whom the economic dimensions of contemporary peacebuilding and development projects are contested in their local applications, using South Sudan as a case study. A theoretical framework for analyzing resistance is proposed and subsequently employed to provide insights into activities that are cast as informal, illicit or illegitimate by dominant neoliberal orthodoxy. This is done in three distinct yet overlapping ways. First, the role that informal economic activity plays in the political economy of post-conflict South Sudan is examined. Informal economic activity is conceptualized as a form of resistance to the failings of the formal sphere, but also as a form of power where agency is absent and that is encouraged as a type of local neoliberalism. Second, the legitimate/illegitimate and licit/illicit dichotomies that define economic activity in post-conflict South Sudan are problematized through an exploration of current debates surrounding corruption and land tenure. These debates demonstrate how neoliberal economic orthodoxy breaks down and becomes redefined in its local contacts. Finally, the centre/periphery dynamics that define the political economy of South Sudan’s borderlands are conceptualized in terms of power and resistance, and resistance is shown to be fundamentally tied to power in ways that are characterized by subjectivity and hybridity. Resistance plays an important role in post-conflict environments. Addressing its economic dimensions must be a central task of contemporary peacebuilding and development projects.
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Chapter I: Introduction

i. Research Problem

Since the end of the Cold War, internationally led peacebuilding operations have come to prominence as a largely unquestioned, unproblematic tool for intervening in post-conflict spaces. Championed by a variety of states, intergovernmental organizations and civil society groups, these have broadly been characterized by a common set of values, assumptions, processes, discourses, methods, systems of knowledge and modes of organization.\(^1\) The promotion of neoliberal political, social and economic reforms, including democratization, marketization, the rule of law and human rights, is seen as central to the establishment of peace, development and security in societies that have recently emerged from conflict.\(^2\) Despite the apparent strength of this consensus, however, contemporary peace operations have frequently failed to achieve even their most modest objective—the establishment of a viable long-term peace—and have experienced a similar lack of success in the related goal of building liberal states and societies. In post-conflict contexts ranging from El Salvador to Kosovo and Sierra Leone to Timor Leste, the ‘liberal peace’ paradigm has been unable to meet the expectations of both practitioners and recipients, bringing into question its utility and appropriateness for addressing the complexities of post-conflict environments.\(^3\)

At the same time, a selection scholars and policymakers have developed an increasingly coherent and thorough critique of the assumptions, approaches and conceptual

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and practical failings that define these processes and hinder their success. Within this body of literature, it is perhaps possible to define three separate—if overlapping and internally diverse—schools of thought. Liberal criticisms of contemporary peace operations embrace the ultimate objective of establishing liberal democratic states and societies, but disagree on the best methods for realizing this goal. In doing so, they commonly focus on best practice and lessons learned from past experience, responding to policy failures by altering the order, scope or depth of reforms rather than meaningfully scrutinizing the presumed benefits of liberalization. Realist critiques, conversely, stress the importance of strategic considerations, assigning primacy to the interests of intervening actors as a means of avoiding the perceived shortcomings of poorly conceived peace operations. Critical approaches, finally, emphasize the myriad power relations that define peace operations and seek to problematize their underlying assumptions. In doing so, they attempt to move beyond the problem-solving methods that are seen to characterize dominant theory and praxis, exploring the tensions, inconsistencies and hierarchies that underlie neoliberal forms of global governance while seeking to define emancipatory alternatives. Although important disagreements differentiate these approaches, they nevertheless highlight several important shortcomings that define contemporary peacebuilding: that it neglects the root causes of conflict, many of which are actually exacerbated by liberal reforms; that it is tied

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to an understanding of liberal modernity that seeks to reinforce an unjust, unrepresentative and inherently unstable status quo in the international system; that it ignores the contextual specificities that define individual post-conflict environments, dehistoricizing and depoliticizing actors, events and processes in favour of universalized, teleological and inflexible understandings of progress; and that it silences alternative ontologies, epistemologies, understandings of peace and justice and forms of political, social and economic organization in favour of an unrepresentative, securitized and elite-centred orthodoxy.  

Despite the value that this diverse body of work has for theorizing peacebuilding and developing a thorough critique of its various failings, resistance to the discourses, processes and individual applications of peace operations remains theoretically under-conceptualized and empirically under-studied. A number of recent studies have focused on local perspectives on externally driven peacebuilding missions, making valuable contributions to the broader project of understanding local-international interactions and issues of context, ownership and hybridity. Few, however, have begun to incorporate resistance into more meaningful analyses of post-conflict contexts, and even these could benefit from further theorization of resistance and more case study work that examines its specific manifestations in a variety of circumstantially dependent settings.  

Using South Sudan as a case study, this dissertation addresses these shortcomings within the existing literature by locating resistance within the political economy of peacebuilding and development, particularly in relation the economic activities that are cast and informal, illicit and illegitimate within neoliberal orthodoxy. In doing so, this study makes a number of contributions to existing scholarship and policy debates. First, it addresses the virtual absence of scholarly literature on post-conflict South Sudan while adding a recent and so far neglected case study to the current literature on peacebuilding.

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10 Relevant studies will be explored in greater detail in the literature review provided in Chapter II of this dissertation.
Second, it builds on current trends within peacebuilding scholarship that seek to conceptualize and reinsert the phenomenon of resistance into post-conflict contexts. As critiques of contemporary peace operations commonly emphasize their failings and problematic nature in reference to global governance, understanding the various forms and methods of resistance that contest, subvert or present alternatives to specific applications of power is of significant scholarly and practical value. Finally, this study highlights the failings of neoliberal orthodoxy in addressing the economic dimensions of peacebuilding and reconstruction while stressing the need to reconsider informal, criminalized and delegitimized activities. Incorporating these into contemporary peace operations may violate many of the assumptions and principles that underpin dominant economic logic, but it is nevertheless essential for overcoming past failures and establishing a sustainable locally owned and contextually relevant peace.

ii. Aims of this Study

The purpose of this dissertation is to locate the dynamics of power and resistance within the informal, criminalized and delegitimized political economies of post-conflict South Sudan. Specifically, neoliberal economic orthodoxy is problematized, and resistance to its hegemonic, universalist and normalizing functions is analyzed through a variety of actors, actions, spaces, discourses and processes that operate beyond liberal assumptions about formal, licit and legitimate economic logic. The implications that these various resistances have for peacebuilding and development are explored, and the necessity of reconsidering economic orthodoxy in post-conflict situations is emphasized.

This study emphasizes the centrality of economic activity in resistance for a number of reasons. Economic factors have emerged as a major focus in the study of civil wars, bringing long neglected motives, actions, processes and methods of accumulation, extraction, production, distribution and subsistence into accounts of contemporary intra-state conflict.11 A number of studies have explored the implications of these for post-

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conflict peacebuilding processes, enquiring into how the economic dimensions of civil wars can be suppressed, transformed or co-opted by reconstruction efforts.\textsuperscript{12} This study builds upon this literature, highlighting the disconnect between neoliberal economic orthodoxy and the economic realities of (post-)conflict situations. By contextualizing power and resistance within these dynamics, particularly the informal, criminalized and delegitimized dimensions of economic activity, it is possible to understand the limitations and deficiencies that define the theory and praxis of contemporary peace operations in a more complete way while also examining potential alternatives.

These themes have important implications beyond the post-conflict contexts explored here. The extent to which the assumed benefits of ‘free’ markets, ‘free’ enterprise, ‘free’ trade, privatization and a minimal state are largely unquestioned in dominant policy discourse as a whole must be understood in terms of power and resistance.\textsuperscript{13} In this sense, the fiscal and monetary policies advocated by various actors—including powerful state governments, private sector organizations and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO)—do not refer to objective and universal economic laws derived from ideationally neutral positivist logic; instead, they represent dominant, value laden and contextually defined perspectives and interests that must be problematized and understood within broader processes that actualize global governance. Both globalization and development, the common ways in which neoliberal logics are internationally transmitted beyond their geographic core, are subject to important power


\textsuperscript{13} The dominance of these concepts is outlined in Harvey, David, \textit{A Brief History of Neoliberalism}, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
dynamics. For the former, the unregulated spread of predatory corporate capitalism into the peripheral spaces of the global market economy has resulted in exploitation, impoverishment and profound economic, political, social and environmental transformations. For the latter, the role that the international community plays in discursively producing, signifying, defining and externalizing underdeveloped spaces by privileging universalized systems of knowledge and understandings of modernity is emphasized in critical literature, as is the silencing of alternatives to a system that masks domination, power hierarchies and the pursuit of self-interest through neoliberal reforms and dependencies. An appropriate historicization of the concept of development reveals its postcolonial construction of foreign space as abnormal, ahistorical and yet saveable through the correction of its deficiencies, thereby justifying external intervention and governance. Economic orthodoxy is central to global manifestations of power; any understanding of resistance must take into account the interactions that define the various local applications of such dominant logic.

South Sudan has been chosen as a case study given the extent to which neoliberal logics have come to dominate its post-conflict economic system. Since gaining independence from Sudan on July 9, 2011 after two protracted civil wars (1955-1972 and 1983-2005), South Sudan has been engaged in major peacebuilding, statebuilding and development projects with significant international involvement. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), along with its military wing, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), have long embraced the security/peace/development nexus that dominates international discourse on peacebuilding, and its monopoly over the structures of government allows its leaders to adopt the neoliberal economic prescriptions of dominant


16 This claim will be explored in the literature review provided in Chapter II of this dissertation.

17 The SPLM and SPLA were, along with the Government of Sudan, the main actors in the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005). The SPLM now forms the government of the independent South Sudan, with the SPLA transformed into the state’s regular military.
international orthodoxy with virtually no official opposition. The liberal peace has historically experienced minimal success in Sub-Saharan Africa, with neoliberal policies frequently criticized as, *inter alia*, contextually inappropriate and antithetical to peace and development. This dissertation explores how the various manifestations of power involved in such post-conflict liberalizations are engaged with in their individual local contacts, and specifically what role resistance plays in activities that are outside of the boundaries of liberal conceptions of acceptable and desirable economic activity.

### iii. Research Questions

This study primarily addresses the following question: *how can the interaction of power and resistance be conceptualized outside of the neoliberal economic systems of post-conflict orthodoxy?* A number of related questions are also addressed: *how are informal, illicit and illegitimate economic activities understood within dominant peacebuilding and development narratives, and what shortcomings do such understandings possess? Can participation in a variety of activities within such spheres be understood as resistance? Furthermore, what internal debates about socioeconomic issues exist within various segments of South Sudanese society, and what ramifications do these have for conceptualizing resistance?*

In addition to these, each chapter focuses on a variety of more specific questions as a means of exploring individual aspects of the political economy of resistance in South Sudan. These are intended to address the broader themes of this study in more intricate detail, investigating individual forms of resistance that allow for an appreciation of the depth and breadth of the concept as a whole. As this study stresses the heterogeneity of resistance, it therefore aims to harmonize macro and micro phenomena by situating individual occurrences into a broader theoretical understanding of resistance. The questions with which it engages are meant to facilitate this end.

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iv. Methodological Approach

Methodological issues surrounding the study of resistance are highly contested. As this study stresses the conceptual malleability of resistance and seeks to locate its various manifestations within definable and concrete interactions with power, it also acknowledges the value of methodological diversity in the study of resistance. Qualitative research methods are employed here because of their descriptive and interpretive strengths, and particularly their epistemological and ontological underpinnings. This study rejects the focus on causal inference that guides much qualitative research and aims to circumscribe it within the strict boundaries of scientific enquiry, and instead emphasizes the centrality of individual narratives in understanding the subjectivity of phenomena and experience. In place of striving for objective empirical analysis, it questions the positivist assumption that it is possible to separate facts from values and subject from object, emphasizing the inseparability of the researcher’s positionality from his or her scholarly observations. In doing so, it seeks to move beyond problem-solving methods that legitimize power relations and fail to fundamentally question existing political, social and economic institutions and norms, stressing critical examination as key to emancipation. Individual perspectives and interpretation are central to understanding resistance; this study focuses on the multifarious narratives derived from these, aiming to reinsert those that are commonly overlooked into post-conflict economic orthodoxy.

This dissertation seeks to analyze resistance in the political economy of South Sudan by engaging with a variety of primary and secondary resources in which these forms of resistance can be identified and further theorized. This analysis therefore employs

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22 Despite the value of multiple approaches to the study of resistance, certain methods that are commonly employed—namely ethnographic approaches such as participant observation and semi-structured or unstructured interviews—are beyond the scope of this study. Although this could have potential ramifications for a systematic analysis of certain forms of ‘everyday’ resistance, it should not be seen as a shortcoming.
documentary research to conceptualize resistance—understood as a collection of diverse methods of co-option, manipulation, subversion, rearticulation, avoidance, refusal, non-participation and contestation—and identify its manifestations in a wide range of sources in order to locate its various sites of interaction with power. Publically available books, journals, reports, policy briefings, minutes from meetings, news and magazine articles, blogs and published interviews are all employed in this endeavour. In many of these sources, resistance is primarily identifiable in its absence; its lack of presence is conspicuous in the silencing of alternatives to dominant discourses. In others, resistance is present yet unidentified or not engaged with, and therefore must be acknowledged and reinscribed with meaning. This study seeks to conceptualize resistance in a way that allows for a meaningful analysis of its various forms while situating these within more general themes that are sensitive to context, complexity and nuance. Identifying the ways in which it is approached in relevant sources is central to understanding its existence in South Sudan and interactions with neoliberal economic orthodoxy.

Such an approach offers a number of important advantages. Primarily, it allows the researcher to study resistance in a variety of forms and spaces, significantly benefiting conceptual diversity and scope. Flexibility is necessary for understanding resistance while respecting difference and complexity, and is an important strength of the methods adopted in this study. This approach also allows for an appropriate contextualization of definable moments and actions within broader, more holistic trends, connecting individual occurrences of resistance with larger themes at the domestic, regional or global level. Rather than simply focusing on macro or micro phenomena, individual resistances can be observed in a number of different manifestations, and these can be situated within a theoretical framework that identifies common trends and unites seemingly unrelated discourses, processes, events and actions. This is not to imply that these methods are without their limitations; issues of access and availability are especially important, both for

Beyond mere practicality, it should be stressed that ethnographic approaches to studying resistance involve significant methodological difficulties in relation to observability, definition and the authoring of the identities and experiences of the subjective ‘other’. This is not intended to negate the value of such approaches; instead, it is to emphasize their limitations as a means of focusing their strengths where they are most relevant and effective. Ethnographic approaches to the study of resistance can provide valuable insights to the phenomenon as a whole; nevertheless, like all methodological approaches, they should not be treated as completely unproblematic. See Ortner, Sherry B., “Resistance and the Power of Ethnographic Refusal,” _Comparative Studies in Society and History_ 37 (1) 1995: 173-193.
the researcher and for those who may be excluded from discursive space. The problematic nature of representation and interpretation must also be noted, as a researcher’s attempts to (re)insert silenced or ignored voices, perspectives and ways of knowing into dominant narratives involves engaging with complex hierarchies and power relations that necessarily affect scholarly enquiry. Nevertheless, the methodological approach employed in this dissertation possesses the potential to allow for an appropriate understanding and study of resistance in the political economy of post-conflict South Sudan. Such an outcome, as suggested above, could provide a number of valuable contributions to existing scholarly literature and contemporary policy debates.

v. Dissertation Outline

This dissertation is organized as follows.23 After Chapter I introduces the project, Chapter II outlines its theoretical underpinnings by reviewing the relevant literature on power and resistance in post-conflict contexts. In doing so, it seeks to explore broader conceptualizations of resistance that could expand upon current understandings of its processes and dynamics in contemporary peacebuilding and development operations. The ways in which resistance has been considered in related fields of literature is also addressed as a means of benefiting theoretical breadth and depth. Studies of neoliberalism, African history and postcolonialism are all examined for these purposes. Important debates surrounding the theory of resistance are engaged with in order to situate the arguments presented in this dissertation within current scholarly literature, and notable themes and deficiencies are highlighted that will be explored in greater detail throughout this work. The themes addressed here also provide the theoretical grounding for the remainder of the study.

Each of the subsequent three chapters is aimed at investigating the variety of ways in which resistance becomes manifest in specific interactions beyond the sphere of economic activity that neoliberalism renders acceptable and desirable. Chapter III explores

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23 The concepts addressed in each of these chapters do not assume to provide an exhaustive record of resistance in South Sudan. Instead, this project aims to emphasize the heterogeneity of subjective resistances to individual, localizable applications of power. These concepts, furthermore, should not—and indeed cannot—be understood in isolation of one another; all are intricately interconnected, both conceptually and practically, by a variety of actors, processes and systems of production, exchange and accumulation. Any compartmentalization undertaken here is purely for the purposes of analytical simplicity.
the role of informal economic activities in post-conflict South Sudan, discussing the reasons behind, and implications of, the lack of participation in the official private sector that is championed in dominant peacebuilding and development narratives. The dominance of neoliberal economic orthodoxy is outlined and problematized, and particular emphasis is given to actions outside of its structures, functions and logics. The roles that power and resistance both play in shaping the informal sector are considered, while the ambiguous role that neoliberalism plays in informal economies, the interaction of structure and agency and the issue of intent are identified as key factors in understanding informal economic activities in terms of resistance.

Chapter IV scrutinizes unproblematised understandings of legitimate/illegitimate and licit/illicit economic activity that dominate post-conflict orthodoxy. These dichotomies are brought into question in two ways. First, the presence of corruption of South Sudan is outlined, and whether or not participation in corruption constitutes resistance is considered. The connection between corruption and coping strategies is emphasized, as is the relationship between corruption and neoliberalism as a means of critiquing arguments that present corruption as either a locally accepted form of action or the antithesis of functioning neoliberal economic logic. Second, debates surrounding land tenure in South Sudan are explored as an example of how economic processes that are considered legal and legitimate within neoliberal orthodoxy can encounter local resistance. The fact that a variety of actors can participate in both power and resistance is emphasized in order to undermine the overly simplistic equation of ‘the local’ with resistance and ‘the international’ with power. Understandings of legality and legitimacy are not apolitical or ahistorical, but are fundamentally tied to power and resistance and must be recognized as such.

These concepts are spatialized in Chapter V, which seeks to outline the political economy of power and resistance in South Sudan’s borderlands. This is done in three distinct ways. First, South Sudan is presented as an international borderland that is excluded from political and economic power. South Sudan’s current peacebuilding and development projects threaten to solidify this marginalized status while the country is simultaneously (re)integrated into the international system through informal and illicit networks. Second, the role that informal transborder trade plays in shaping the economic
realities of South Sudan’s national borderlands is highlighted. The relationship between informal transborder trade and neoliberalism is explored, and the interaction of structure and agency is identified as the key variable for understanding informal transborder trade as resistance. Finally, spaces where the South Sudanese state has little resonance are examined. These internal borderlands are defined by the interaction of state authority and local power structures, demonstrating how power and resistance are characterized by subjectivity and hybridity.

Chapter VI summarizes the arguments presented in this dissertation while offering conclusions and potential avenues for future research. A number of important issues and topics surrounding resistance, peace operations, neoliberalism and the political economy of South Sudan and (post-)conflict environments more generally remain unaddressed within existing literature, leaving considerable space for valuable scholarly endeavours. Some of the most important of these are outlined in an attempt to outline a future research agenda for the field while further considering the contributions of this dissertation to academic and policymaking communities. Again, this dissertation aims to reinsert resistance—encompassing a variety of actors and methods—into the largely unproblematic discourses and processes that define the political economy of peacebuilding in South Sudan. If successful, the themes that it addresses could have important implications for the theory and praxis of contemporary peace operations. However modest these may be, they nevertheless merit the full focus of critical scholarly enquiry.
Chapter II: Conceptualizing Resistance

Resistance is a theoretically rich and heterogeneous concept. The primary objective of this chapter is therefore to critically engage with relevant literature from a number of scholarly fields as a means of identifying ways in which resistance is conceptualized, studied and debated. In pursuit of this end, common understandings of resistance are highlighted, along with a number of tensions, inconsistencies and shortcomings that define the concept. Important debates surrounding issues such as intent, agency and, most importantly, the actors and methods involved are addressed, and a general framework for theorizing resistance is proposed. This section is primarily aimed at emphasizing the utility of understanding resistance in broad terms that gives special attention to diversity, nuance and definable interactions with varying manifestations of power. In this sense, there is significant value in exploring individual resistances—locatable moments, actions or physical, temporal and discursive spaces—in which power is contested, undermined or ignored. Power is a multifarious phenomenon and densely theorized concept; any understanding of resistance must be equally robust, flexible and sensitive to context and subjectivity.

In order to address these themes, this chapter provides a concise overview and analysis of a number of key debates that dominate the literature surrounding the concept of resistance. It particularly focuses on the diversity of actors, methods and targets that can be involved in resistance, the interaction of structure and agency and issues surrounding intent as defining aspects of resistance, and concludes by outlining a theoretical framework for conceptualizing resistance that highlights and synthesizes these themes.

As the very nature of resistance is both multi-disciplinary and ubiquitous, it would be impossible to address every author or work that has referred to it as an analytical or explanatory tool within the space afforded here. Thus, key theoretical texts that are directly relevant to understanding resistance in the political economy of South Sudan are given primacy in this literature review. This focus is intended to benefit concision without compromising breadth and depth, as the issues and themes engaged with here inform the theoretical approach employed throughout the remainder of this study.
i. International Relations, Political Economy and Resistance

Common understandings of resistance often emphasize open contestations of power, frequently in the form of violent revolutions or other popular movements. These are largely coherent with many of the theoretical frameworks that traditionally dominate the field of International Relations—for example, realism and Marxism—and possess the advantage of facilitating analysis by virtue of their scale and public nature. An overview of current scholarly literature, however, reveals that the concept of resistance is much more varied than such understandings may imply. This section reviews the works of four theorists whose writings on resistance dominate relevant scholarship—Antonio Gramsci, Karl Polanyi, Michel Foucault and James C. Scott—as well as the ways in which their respective theories have been interpreted and employed by other authors who seek to apply them beyond their original contexts. This, indeed, is a common practice, as the works of these four theorists shape much of the literature discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter; this study itself engages in a similar effort. As a result, the intricacies of these theories deserve to be outlined and analyzed in considerable detail, and their implications for conceptualizing resistance should not be underestimated.

Antonio Gramsci’s work provides an appropriate starting point for theorizing power and resistance. This must be understood within the context of how it engages with its Marxist roots, as while Gramsci adopts the broad theoretical tenets of Marxist analysis, he does so by employing a historical materialist approach that seeks to move beyond economic determinism while also reversing traditional Marxist emphases on a society’s economic base over its ideological superstructure and the importance of political society over civil society. Central to Gramsci’s approach is his understanding of hegemony. In societies in which hegemony is absent and different classes and interests compete for political dominance, Gramsci understands change as taking place within a ‘passive revolution’ that lacks popular support but is brought about through decisive individual action (‘caesarism’) or the formation of strategic coalitions (‘trasformismo’). In those where hegemony is present, conversely, it operates through various ‘historic blocs’—comprising the collection of historically situated ideologies, institutions and material forces that dominate society—that connect political and civil society. For Gramsci, civil society is central to the hegemony of the dominant classes as it provides the space in which certain
ideologies and forms of behaviour that support their norms, values and interests can be disseminated. This constitutes a form of ‘common sense’ into which the working classes are co-opted as a means of ensuring their support for a system in which they are marginalized. Contradicting both Marxist and liberal approaches, Gramsci therefore (re)politicizes civil society as the space in which intellectual and moral domination takes place. Consent is more significant than coercion in this regard as hegemony is exercised through such seemingly neutral channels as education, religion, the media and other cultural spheres that define and produce universalized norms in order to justify and legitimize the status quo. Although the threat of force is constantly present in these societies, it is only selectively applied where hegemony breaks down; power’s basis in consent largely eliminates the necessity of overt oppression, with subservience primarily enforced intellectually and morally rather than through physical means.\(^\text{24}\)

Gramsci thus understands resistance in terms of the counter-hegemonic historic blocs that contest the prevailing ‘common sense’ and transform dominant relations of power. For Gramsci, open revolution directed against the state—referred to as a ‘war of movement’—would likely experience limited success in instances in which hegemony is exercised through civil society. Gaining control of the state would lack broad legitimacy and fail to engage with the primary manifestations of power. The importance of an ideological confrontation of the existing historic bloc by alternative social realities that reflect the interests of the working classes—termed a ‘war of position’—is therefore stressed as essential to the success of any attempts to engage with the status quo. This entails a transformation of both the dominant structures within a society as well as the consciousness of those within them. In this sense, a new historic bloc must be defined and emerge within the existing historic bloc in a way that allows the former to replace the latter. Intellectuals play an important role in this process, as does the Communist Party, which Gramsci views, following Machiavelli, as a ‘modern prince’ that is able to uncover

and embody the interests of the subordinate classes through constant engagement and dialogue, thus facilitating the establishment of a counter-hegemonic historic bloc that will not merely reverse existing hierarchies and hegemonic forces, but abolish them altogether. This would also involve the incorporation of political society into civil society, which is more sensitive to changing context than the historically situated institutions of the state. Thus, Gramsci re-envisions the Marxist objective of a stateless, classless society as one that is also constantly evolving and flexible in a way that responds to the interests of its members.\textsuperscript{25}

A number of authors have sought to apply Gramsci’s work to the field of International Relations. Robert Cox and Stephen Gill are particularly important here, both for building on Gramsci’s theories by applying them to the international system and for outlining a detailed research agenda with its own ontological and epistemological framework. These authors claim that such a project has a number of benefits: it conceptualizes global hegemony in both normative and material terms while acknowledging the role that structural and behavioural factors play in maintaining and altering these; it is able to explain structural changes within the international system and relate these to the actions of specific agents, thus moving beyond the conflict between structure and agency that pervades the social sciences; its focus on historicism is flexible and sensitive to context rather than theoretically rigid; and it provides for revolutionary alternatives to the dominant international political economy, emphasizing the possibility of emancipatory transformation through concerted action.\textsuperscript{26} Such efforts, however, have been criticized as either pseudo-Marxist or lacking the strengths of traditional Marxist accounts, and thus possessing the failures accompanying each; inappropriate for understanding the complex realities of the contemporary international system, particularly in relation to the constitution of current international structures; or inaccurate for over-emphasizing the power of transnational capital in a way that provides too little room for transformation.\textsuperscript{27} Others, furthermore, claim that Neo-Gramscian approaches to International Relations

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{27} These are outlined and addressed in Bieler, Andreas and Adam David Morton, “A Critical Theory Route to Hegemony, World Order and Historical Change: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Relations,” \textit{Capital & Class} 28 (82) 2004: 85-114.
commonly ignore the significant debates surrounding interpretations of Gramsci’s work, failing to engage with its contested complexities and ambiguities; problematically internationalize his theories, removing his analysis from its original context in which the state is central; and over-estimate the explanatory power of Gramsci’s work for understanding contemporary global social realities. While responses to these criticisms have been presented by proponents of Neo-Gramscian analysis, debates surrounding the ability of Gramsci’s work to provide insights into the contemporary international system must be taken into account in any attempt to adopt it within more general studies of power and resistance.

An alternative understanding of resistance can be discerned from Karl Polanyi’s writings on economic history. Most significant is his concept of the ‘double movement’, which frames the historical dynamics of the emergence of both the ‘self-regulating market’ and the forces, mechanisms and initiatives that have responded to it. The liberal market, for Polanyi, is not natural, self-governing or the result of laissez-faire, but rather had to be constructed from the late 18th century along with the commodification of land, money and labour. According to Polanyi, this involved the separation of economic systems from the societies in which they were traditionally embedded, as the social networks that formerly provided the basis for production and distribution were replaced by economic logics governed by abstract market forces. Thus, the rise of the self-regulating market involved a reversal of the usual relationship between society and the economy, transforming the social embeddedness of economics into the economic embeddedness of social relations. This removal of the economy from its social roots, along with the fictitious commodification of individual and social goods that it entailed, had such disastrous consequences that it threatened the core human and organizational dimensions of society.

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Importantly, for Polanyi, the expansion of the self-regulating market inspired parallel attempts and measures to limit its spread as a means of protecting both individual wellbeing and existing social systems. These ‘countermovements’ were spontaneous, ideologically diverse and in response to unrelated causes and interests; what united them was the fact that they primarily sought to address concerns related to professional status, personal safety and security, the type of life one is able to lead and the ability to situate oneself within a stable social environment. Thus, although Polanyi acknowledges the important role that economic factors played in shaping their objectives, these were secondary to, and indeed inseparable from, common social considerations. By influencing legislation and reforms while maintaining or creating new social systems that could mitigate the effects of the self-regulating market, such efforts were ultimately able to prevent the realization of the liberal ideal of complete market hegemony. It is in the context of this double movement—the liberal push to disembed the economy from society and the collection of initiatives that emerged in response to this—that one can conceptualize the role of power and resistance in Polanyi’s work. In this sense, liberal attempts to construct laissez-faire markets are shown to involve a high degree of intervention and planning, contradicting the teleological and natural pretences of the liberal market while undermining the pervasive claim that any failures that result from marketization should be addressed through further economic liberalization. Resistance, in contrast, can be located within the countermovements that emerge in response to market forces and subvert their hegemonic, homogenizing and beneficial claims. Both the processes and logics of liberal economics are challenged by these forces as not only is the self-regulating market limited by efforts to curtail its social effects, but the assumption that strict economic rationality guides individual action and governs society is also challenged by emphasizing human agency and the contextual factors that shape it. The preservation of society thus becomes a site of resistance to the totalizing functions of the liberal market, with collective action as the primary method of transformation.\(^{31}\)

Michel Foucault’s theories have been employed to understand resistance more generally. Central to Foucault’s understanding of resistance is his understanding of power. For Foucault, the issue of power is fundamentally tied to the production of reified systems.
of knowledge with scientific pretences, the objectification of individual or collective subjects and the processes through which individuals undergo self-subjectivation. These are related to, respectively, the emergence of disciplines surrounding life, labour and language that evolve based on historical context; the definition and division of subjects along with the historical development of prisons, medicine, psychiatry and sexuality; and the processes of self-formation that are related to these. Power, for Foucault, is therefore productive rather than simply negative, and can be understood through various actions upon other actions that seek to influence the scope or circumstances in which certain actions can take place. Power employs both violence and consent, and is fundamentally tied to his understandings of knowledge and discourse. Foucault suggests that a number of points are central for understanding power relations: the differentiations that legitimize power and the systems that enshrine these; the objectives of specific applications of power; the means by which power is exercised; the institutions through which power operates; and the rationalizations that characterize individual manifestations of power.

Foucault’s work also explores these themes within the context of neoliberalism. In this regard, his concepts of biopower—the production and subjectivation of human bodies for the purposes of discipline and regulation—and governmentality—the rationalities and technologies that governments employ to promote traits within a population that facilitate governance—are central. Foucault locates the roots of contemporary neoliberalism in 18th century critiques of sovereign authority over economic activity, tracing its development through German ordoliberalism and the Chicago School. The problem of total market knowledge was central to these claims; given the supposed impossibility of centralized state control over the complexities of a system dominated by rational economic actors, new technologies of power had to be employed to influence the characteristics of populations and regulate individual behaviour. Thus, for Foucault, although economic liberalism minimizes the direct role of the state in the market, it simultaneously involves the production of the economic subject—homo oeconomicus—that is governed by the rationalities of the market and will act to serve its functions. Juridical structures and civil

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34 Foucault (1982).
35 Ibid.
society both play an important role in this government of action. These theories, however, remain somewhat underdeveloped and even ambiguous: a number of authors have employed Foucault’s work to critique contemporary neoliberalism, exploring its implications and addressing any perceived shortcomings in the process; others, however, reject such a project, claiming, for example, that Foucault viewed economic liberalism as coherent with his anti-humanism, and therefore endorsed it for the brief period during which his related Collège de France lectures took place.

Despite this understanding of power as totalizing and universal, Foucault also theorizes space in which resistance to power can take place. It is perhaps possible to divide the development of Foucault’s understanding of resistance into three distinct phases. First, Foucault’s early work focuses on the transgression and contestation of the limits imposed by established dichotomies that inform dominant discourse and action. The negation of these is seen as the immediate objective of resistance, while discussion of alternatives or specific methods is limited. The second phase of Foucault’s understanding of resistance is characterized by a renewed emphasis on Marxism and revolutionary action. This phase involves a critique of the social institutions that seek to define and normalize human subjects, along with the ideologies that legitimize these. Here, Foucault highlights the importance of ‘subjugated knowledges’—the experiences of those who have been the subjects of specific applications of power—for revealing hidden technologies of power. Intellectuals also have an important role in exposing these power relations, providing a genealogy of their historical evolution and critiquing them in a way that provides space for the knowledges that they silence. The destabilization caused by these processes is intended to allow for open contestations to existing institutions of power, specifically those relating to education, psychiatry and justice, and ultimately expanding to engage with other local

applications of power. The methods and movements involved in these must be specific to individual interactions, and thus cannot be more broadly theorized. Finally, Foucault came to stress resistance as reflecting the diffuse and productive nature of power, existing in various forms wherever power is present. In this regard, Foucault’s early emphasis on a ‘tactical reversal’—the exploitation of the mechanisms and internal tensions that define systems of power as a means of resistance—later shifted to a focus on the ‘aesthetics of existence’, ‘self-care’ and ‘technologies of the self’ that involve multiple forms of individual subjectivity and critical agency. For Foucault, these continuous (re)constructions of the self are able to provide alternatives to existing power relations based on discipline and regulation through subjectivation. According to Foucault, the processes involved in desubjectivation cannot be universalized; as it seeks to break down precisely what limits human action and bring all dominant discourses and knowledges into question, it is necessarily non-prescriptive. The radical redefinition of the self that it entails, however, moves beyond earlier understandings of resistance as merely a critique of power, emphasizing the importance of the individual in the process.

These approaches to Foucault’s work, however, have been criticized, as some claim that Foucault fails to adequately outline how resistance to his theories of power can be undertaken. Such criticisms regard current scholarly emphasis on Foucauldian technologies of the self as misguided, suggesting that these have an ambiguous relationship to his understanding of technologies of power and cannot be understood in terms of resistance. Contrary to these claims, however, Foucault’s work seems to provide a theoretical basis for understanding resistance as it theorizes power and outlines ways in which its manifestations can be contested. Although the methods involved in this may be diverse, they are united by a number of commonalities that Foucault himself identifies: they exist transnationally; they target specific exercises of power; they focus on immediate manifestations of power and short-term contestations; they concern individual rights and oppose the constraints and definitions involved in individualization; they target knowledges.

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claims and the power relationships that are connected to these; and they centre on the issue of individual identity, rejecting abstract, universalist claims based on ideological or scientistic discourses and enforced through administration or state violence.\textsuperscript{42} Two important considerations nevertheless need to be stressed. First, according to Foucault, freedom must necessarily be present for power to operate, as the ability of a subject to undertake a variety of actions is a precondition for these actions to be influenced. Thus power and freedom are not oppositional, but are rather mutually present and socially ubiquitous.\textsuperscript{43} Second, these forms of resistance are not necessarily emancipatory; indeed, resistance is often co-opted in a way that masks domination. This can be overcome if the means of co-option are themselves co-opted by resistance, but such a process can often be difficult to discern.\textsuperscript{44}

Finally, the work of James C. Scott is also relevant here. In notable contrast to the theories discussed above, Scott’s work is rooted in an anthropological analysis of everyday forms of resistance that seeks to move beyond the common scholarly focus on the rare historical moments in which peasant communities openly and violently contest the authority of the state and the rigid international system. Scott thus concentrates his analysis on actions that may not constitute outright confrontation—including obstructionism, deception, subversion, evasion, mimicry, insincere consent and deference, feigned ignorance, verbal critique, petty theft, vandalism and sabotage—but nevertheless resist the application of power. These forms of everyday resistance often depart from the public and large-scale objectives that characterize formal and open defiance, and are frequently concerned with personal short-term gain in a way that is both spontaneous and independent of other actions. Self-preservation, subsistence and access to basic resources are all emphasized here, as are, importantly, political economy issues, including social hierarchies and oppressive and exploitative patron-client relationships, dominant systems of labour and production and other local manifestations of class relations.\textsuperscript{45} Political economy transformations are also central to Scott’s work, including ‘development’, colonialism,\textsuperscript{46}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{42}Foucault (1982).
\textsuperscript{43}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{44}Hoy, 81-87.
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state formation and top-down social engineering, all of which engender resistance from those who wish to escape or mitigate their ill effects.\textsuperscript{46}

Scott’s arguments also involve a differentiation of what he refers to as ‘hidden’ and ‘public transcripts’, or contrasting discourses that are employed in different ways depending on context, purpose and audience. According to Scott, public transcripts refer to the dominant discursive system that is used formally and openly in the application of power. This is defined by elites and aims to normalize and legitimize their authority while justifying or ignoring the negative consequences of their privilege. Claims that those at the top of the hierarchies it supports represent the interests of those at the bottom are usually central to this discourse, and although the resonance of this is always incomplete, it is not completely lacking in popular support. The performative aspects of power are thus central in the assertion of its (unrealized) hegemony. This public transcript interacts with subordinate discourses in four distinct ways. First, the oppressed can invoke these dominant public discourses, and even co-opt them for their own purposes. Second, away from their oppressors, subordinated groups often employ a hidden transcript in which they openly discuss their dissatisfaction with the status quo. Anger, revenge and direct refutations of dominant discourse all characterize these. Importantly, it is not merely through the hidden transcripts of the subordinate that the official public transcript breaks down; indeed, those who exercise power also construct a concealed discourse that involves the modes, logics and aims of their domination that cannot be revealed publically. The third form of interaction takes place within the space that exists between public and hidden transcripts, as hidden transcripts are partially articulated publically but referred to in ways that mask their subversive nature. Scott locates much of the culture of the oppressed within this space, including folk stories, traditional songs and rituals, along with jokes, euphemisms and rumors that subvert the assumptions of power. Finally, the division between public and hidden transcripts can, at times, break down when the latter is articulated openly in the presence of power, often resulting in either an attempt to silence it

or, in the absence of this, continuing instances in which the oppressed ‘speak truth to power’.\(^{47}\)

According to Scott, domination therefore exists in three primary forms: material, which involves control of land, labour, capital and goods; status, which involves social marginalization and exclusion as well as direct derision as a means of belittlement; and ideological, which serves to justify the privilege of some groups at the expense of others. Each is resisted both publically and through what Scott terms ‘infrapolitics’, the forms of resistance that are commonly unrecognized as such. Publically, material domination can be resisted through collective action involving petitions, demonstrations, boycotts, strikes, land seizures and revolution; status domination through either conforming to the standards and practices that are seen to display privilege or directly attacking symbols of power; and ideological domination through counter-ideologies that challenge the legitimacy of claims to rule while emphasizing inclusion, equality or revolution. The infrapolitics of subordinate groups also constitute resistance to these, with material domination resisted through everyday forms of resistance or direct resistance by anonymous participants; status domination through hidden transcripts; and ideological domination through the creation of subordinate culture.\(^{48}\)

Scott’s arguments thus represent an important critique of Gramsci’s claim that the consciousness of the oppressed is dominated by a form of hegemony that renders them unable to recognize the revolutionary potential of their actions; instead, Scott contends that hegemony involves little ideational permeation, with action constrained by power to a far more significant extent than thought. For Scott, Gramsci’s formulation must therefore be reversed, as hegemony can be, and indeed is, most easily resisted in ideological terms, even while the scope of action of the oppressed is limited.\(^{49}\) Scott’s work similarly represents a rejection of accounts that neglect human agency in favour of structural factors, emphasizing the range of action and potential for self-definition—even if shaped, importantly, by economic and other circumstances—that all subjects of analysis possess. Also important here is the extent to which Scott’s understanding of resistance focuses on

\(^{48}\) Ibid.
\(^{49}\) Scott (1985), 314-318.
the issue of intent, specifically to either reject the demands of a certain individual or group or to advance counterclaims that contradict the status quo. For Scott, what unites a broad range of seemingly disparate actions that are classified as resistance is therefore their original meanings rather than actual outcomes. Although there are, as he acknowledges, both practical problems associated with uncovering the initial intention of an action as well as conceptual challenges in separating the aim of resistance from other short-term gains that the same action may entail, he also insists that traditional distinctions between organized and individual behaviour, political and self-interested actions, revolutionary and non-revolutionary implications and actions against or within the systems of domination that characterize approaches to resistance are conceptually inadequate. For Scott, understanding resistance in such a way severely limits conceptual scope while ignoring the complexities that characterize its multiple dimensions.

ii. **Peacebuilding and Resistance**

Many of these themes have been addressed in recent works on contemporary peacebuilding operations. In this regard, Oliver Richmond’s work is of particular relevance for a number of reasons. Importantly, its genealogy of peace suggests that contemporary liberal understandings are informed by several distinct yet overlapping discursive systems that are highly contradictory and inconsistent, and that these disguise forms of domination that undermine the success of efforts to promote lasting peace in post-conflict situations. Such a historicization allows the liberal peace paradigm, which dominates current peacebuilding theory and practice, to be considered in terms of its commonly ignored or unquestioned discursive and conceptual roots, revealing the problematic nature of its theoretical, methodological, epistemological, ontological and ideational underpinnings. According to Richmond, although peace operations balance the methods, interests and ownership of international and local actors to varying degrees in different post-conflict situations, they have nevertheless come to centre on the concept of peace-as-governance, which focuses on (re)building and restructuring the state, refashioning society and regulating individual action in accordance with liberal understandings of how each of these should operate. Peacebuilding, he argues, has been co-opted into the means and ends of
statebuilding, including its focus on power, constitutionalism, institutionalism and civil society, resulting in a virtual peace with minimal popular support or resonance.\textsuperscript{50}

Richmond’s problematization of liberal peacebuilding in terms of the Foucauldian concepts of governmentality and biopower is central to these arguments, as it casts the promotion of post-conflict orthodoxy as a radical attempt to define and construct foreign societies and individuals in terms of liberal knowledges, interests and forms of control. Power in contemporary peace operations must therefore be understood in terms of the regulation of human life and behaviour through the production of governable subjectivities and the promotion of liberal forms of action and organization. Such an understanding provides suitable conceptual space in which resistance can be theorized, which Richmond explores in the context of emancipatory forms of peacebuilding. Following Foucault, subjugated knowledges, epistemologies, ontologies and perspectives that are marginalized by power, but nevertheless remain able to reformulate political realities through the empowerment of disparate and silenced critical agencies, are seen as central to a form of resistance that is located at the ‘local-local’ level that exists beyond the scope of liberal conceptions of society and politics. The everyday forms of resistance that these involve—referred to by Richmond as, following Scott, the ‘infrapolitics of peacebuilding’—fundamentally undermine, and expose the weaknesses of, the local applications of power that characterize peacebuilding. These conceptual and practical disjunctures, Richmond argues, suggest the existence of a ‘post-liberal peace’ focused on Foucauldian technologies of the self, empathy and the everyday, and characterized by hybridity, ‘local-local’ ownership, broad-based plurality and a respect for context, subjectivity, consensus and individual understandings of justice, welfare, rights and political organization.\textsuperscript{51}

The interaction between various dynamics of power and resistance in contemporary peace operations has also been explored by Roger Mac Ginty. Seeking to move beyond


approaches that focus on ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’ methods and either fail to critically analyze the effects of liberal internationalism or romanticize indigeneity. Mac Ginty emphasizes the essential complexity and heterogeneity of perspectives in (post-)conflict situations, suggesting that any reference to discrete, homogeneous and static categories is conceptually problematic. In doing so, he outlines a conceptual model of local/liberal hybridization in internationally driven peacebuilding programs, claiming that individual aspects of peace are shaped by the varying interactions of four constantly changing factors: the ability of international actors to ensure compliance; the incentivizing powers of international actors that encourage co-operation; the ability of local actors to resist, subvert or co-opt international efforts for their own ends; and the ability of local actors to provide viable, contextually relevant alternatives to externally designed and enforced programs.

Mac Ginty’s work also questions common assumptions that frame local responses to peace operations within the opposing categories of compliance and resistance, arguing that non-participation is a distinct phenomenon and deserves to be analyzed as such. In doing so, it outlines a typology of non-participation, which is conceptualized in both voluntary and involuntary terms. Voluntary non-participation can be based on principle, a tactical choice in order to realize a larger strategic goal, a rational choice based on the belief that the benefits of participation will be minimal or a simple lack of interest. Involuntary non-participation, conversely, can be the result of suppression and purposeful attempts to limit the influence of certain groups, deeply ingrained norms against participation, a lack of security, individual incapacity or a personal retreat into the private realm based on the desire for normalcy.

Despite the utility that these works have for conceptualizing resistance in contemporary peace operations, their arguments should be compared to those that approach such issues from a perspective that is more grounded in critical political economy. Of particular importance here is Mark Duffield’s argument that development, as underwritten by the logic of the ‘New Wars’ thesis, is part of a broader project of global governance that

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seeks to transform foreign societies and peoples as a means of ensuring global stability. According to Duffield, the increasing interconnectedness of the global core of liberal states, and the marginalization of peripheral states from the traditional international economy that this entails, is paralleled by the growth of transborder economic activity that exists beyond the self-defined spheres of liberalism, yet is fundamentally linked to its processes and logics. Rather than representing a regressive form of modernity or development, this should be seen as a reflexive, resistant form of globalization and modernization defined by new political complexes with their own (illiberal) forms of regulation and authority. There is a considerable degree of ambivalence in this plurality of reactive, creative modernities, and although they fail to conform to external expectations or policy objectives, they nevertheless represent a real form of development in spaces that are simultaneously excluded from and incorporated into the contours of globalization. Cast against the supposed chaos and regression that is seen to characterize these forms of reflexive modernity, the logics of aid have been redirected towards the promotion of liberally defined order and stability. This securitization of development, Duffield suggests, is largely defined by its recent shift in focus from states to individuals, involving the biopolitical governance of human life within liberally defined boundaries of acceptable action in a way that ossifies the global ‘life-chance divide’ that development, at least rhetorically, seeks to mitigate.55

The work of Michael Pugh similarly locates resistance in activities that violate the tenets of neoliberal globalization. Stressing the extent to which the Washington Consensus of neoliberal economic prescriptions has come to dominate the rationale of peacebuilding, Pugh argues that local forms of economic organization and welfare are ignored in accordance with the logics of liberal teleology and market determinism. Orthodox debates, in this sense, take place within a liberally defined problem-solving paradigm that fails to question issues of structural violence, the objectivist and neutralist pretenses of economic theory and the assumed benefits of deregulation, the privatization of state assets, reduced

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government revenues and expenditures, foreign direct investment (FDI) and the promotion of entrepreneurship. The externally driven market reforms that these entail are framed within a form of disciplinary governance that overlooks the possibility of viable, locally constructed modes of production and distribution, with ‘curing strangeness’ as a key objective for normalization and partial integration into the unequal global capitalist system.\textsuperscript{56} Locating resistance within these dynamics, Pugh references the functional and disruptive role of local agencies that become manifest in the informal and illicit activities that thrive in the absence of essential employment and welfare programs. These can be understood, he claims, in terms of a postcolonial hybridity that arises from the ambivalence of international/local interaction; as international actors disavow their governing functions, they create a lack of stability in which the subaltern is given space for agency and resistance.\textsuperscript{57}

Beyond these, a number of recent studies have explored the perspectives and experiences of the subjects of peace operations. These not only address issues of legitimacy for international interventions, but also serve to highlight the disconnect between the expectations and desires of local and international actors regarding the means and ends of such missions. While some of these works do not explicitly explore the concept of resistance, the responses that they outline can nevertheless be employed to understand the various ways in which resistance becomes manifest in peace operations, including threats and outright violence, protests and demonstrations, manipulation, avoidance, obstructionism, press campaigns, minor acts such as vandalism, various attempts to influence public discourse and the creation or maintenance of alternative social systems. These can be employed by a number of groups, including state governments, ‘spoilers’ who seek to undermine a peace process, political or economic entrepreneurs, local communities and civil society groups representing disparate and sometimes competing interests. Similarly, they can surround a wide range of issues, varying from the presence of the international community—resulting from its perceived oppressive or


\textsuperscript{57} Pugh (2011); and Pugh (2012).
neocolonial nature, aloofness, arrogance, lack of local knowledge and sensitivity and disengagement from the population, often symbolized by a noticeable physical and material divide that separates internationals and locals—to land disputes, the implementation of justice, mandated political and economic reforms, the social and economic impact of peace missions and issues of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR).\textsuperscript{58}

Despite the important differences outlined here, it therefore seems possible to identify a number of commonalities that characterize these works. Principally, the critical approach to peacebuilding employed by each allows for a valuable problematization of the role that power plays in defining, normalizing and seeking to govern the externalized illiberal other. The incompleteness of such efforts, however, is also highlighted, providing space in which resistance can be located. These works conceptualize resistance in a variety of ways, encompassing a diverse collection of actors and actions. Taken in combination, they provide a firm foundation on which to base an understanding of resistance in post-conflict situations. They must, nevertheless, be considered in comparison to works that have theorized resistance in a variety of related fields, as such an undertaking can only benefit the conceptual depth and fortitude of this nascent body of literature.

\textit{iii. Neoliberalism and Resistance}

The body of literature that can be broadly categorized as ‘anti-globalization’\textsuperscript{59} is particularly useful for understanding resistance in post-conflict situations as it assigns primacy to economic issues while theorizing space for resistance to contemporary forms of neoliberal internationalism. Much of this work is dominated by theoretical approaches that seek to define emancipatory alternatives to dominant political and economic logic,


\textsuperscript{59} The common term ‘anti-globalization’ is perhaps insufficient, as not only does it encompass an extremely wide range of interests that can be unrelated and even contradictory, but the perspectives that it usually refers to often only oppose neoliberal globalization rather than transnational integration as a whole. Other terms such as ‘alter-globalization’ and ‘the global justice movement’ have been proposed to address this problem. ‘Anti-globalization’ is nevertheless employed here because of its common usage.
including neo-Gramscian analyses that aim to outline the contours of existing counter-hegemonic forces that can contest and provide alternatives to the cultural hegemony of the transnational capitalist class;\textsuperscript{60} critical theory approaches that attempt to problematize the assumptions that define globalization and highlight the historical, social and political situatedness of its theories and knowledges for the purposes of transformation;\textsuperscript{61} postcolonial theories that aim to (re)politicize and (re)historicize neoliberal globalization, emphasizing the inseparability of economic and cultural domination while acknowledging the importance of individual agencies for providing alternatives to the fundamental incompleteness of its universalist logics;\textsuperscript{62} and feminist analyses that frame globalization in a gendered context and reveal the relationship that its functions have for perpetuating and spreading oppressive patriarchal hierarchies.\textsuperscript{63} These and other approaches commonly focus on identifying various movements and moments that contest the international spread of neoliberalism in its different manifestations, including the practices of multinational corporations (MNCs), government policies and international organizations and agreements. In doing so, they highlight the transnational local-global linkages that connect these seemingly disparate contestations, concentrating on a broad range of diverse civil society groups, activists, indigenous communities and labour movements that oppose, in whole or in part, the political, economic, social and cultural transformations involved in neoliberal globalization, and the extent to which these actors are able to use the products and effects of globalization—increased interconnectedness, ease of travel, access to information and communication and technological advances—to their advantage. Advocacy campaigns, conferences, reform efforts, boycotts, protests, rallies, demonstrations and violent confrontations are all, in various ways, advanced as methods of resistance, commonly framed in terms democracy, justice and rights. Resistance, in this sense, is a form of broad-


based ‘globalization-from-below’ that is sensitive to cultural diversity and a variety of social, economic and environmental issues, contesting neoliberal ‘globalization-from-above’ by providing alternatives to its failings.64

Importantly, some authors have questioned the efficacy of framing these resistances as a counter to the hegemony of neoliberalism, highlighting the practical and conceptual difficulties involved in understanding them as representative of global agency and an alternative international system. Their transformative potential has been challenged, both in terms forming a common consensus and influencing dominant discourses.65 Nevertheless, ‘anti-globalization’ literature provides valuable insights into a number of themes that are relevant for understanding the political economy of resistance in contemporary peace operations. First, in focusing on specific movements and moments of resistance and conceptualizing these within a broader theoretical framework, it supplies a research agenda that is largely appropriate for studying contestations surrounding global neoliberalism more generally. The neoliberal reforms involved in current peacebuilding projects should be contextualized within these broader dynamics. Second, it moves beyond the teleology and economic determinism that characterizes much of the analysis of neoliberalism, emphasizing contingency, circumstance and human action while acknowledging the relationship between economics and social, political, cultural and identity issues. Third, it explores the interaction between structure and agency by highlighting how each is able to constitute the other. The extent to which collective values, interests and perspectives are shaped by existing socioeconomic realities, institutions and discourses is essential for understanding the interaction of power and resistance, as is the possibility that these can be transformed through various forms of human action. The

methods involved range from direct and open confrontation to subversion, refusal and non-compliance, each framed in terms of a specific objective for challenging neoliberal globalization and, in many cases, proposing viable alternatives based on popular ownership and subjective understandings of rights and justice. Finally, even the critiques of this literature have significant value as they represent the inherent difficulties in relating different actors and methods in a unified understanding of resistance. This emphasizes the need to move beyond the dichotomization of power and resistance into two opposing homogeneous categories, and instead attempt to identify the various actors, interests, causes and objectives that define individual resistances. Each of these is directly applicable to the themes explored in this study.

iv. African History, Postcolonialism and Resistance

Resistance is also a highly debated topic in scholarly studies of African history, and engaging with this literature can provide an appropriate historicization of the processes, actors, discourses and dynamics that are relevant to this study. Early studies of resistance in Africa focused on direct resistance to colonialism, either through violent revolutions or nationalist struggles for independence. Questions of continuity between different movements, understanding collaboration and the role of ideology were all important here. A Marxist focus on class also emerged as central to this analysis, shifting an emphasis to the injustices of the global capitalist system as the primary cause and target of resistance. Such approaches, however, became subject to criticism as overly focused on elites and too Eurocentric, thus ignoring the agencies of African actors and the diversities that defined these, and as a result, subsequent endeavours came to eschew top-down histories in favour of those that give centrality to various African perspectives and experiences. Thus, more contemporary accounts have broadened the concept of resistance beyond the overt actions of ‘freedom fighters’ and ‘revolutionaries’, incorporating and adding nuance to rigid categories by analyzing internal divisions amongst those who resist and the various goals and individual motives that shape specific actions. More traditional understandings of resistance have been replaced by new narratives on African conflict, including those that emphasize understandings of ‘New Wars’, ‘warlords’, ‘greed and grievance’ or ‘new barbarism’; youth grievances and internal social factors; debates about the interpretation of
the causes, rationalities and nature of violence; the role of culture and discourse over ideology; and the importance of identity and multiple power relations. In doing so, many of these works have employed the theories of power and resistance outlined above as a means of understanding similar themes in a variety of African contexts. The appropriateness of this may be debateable considering the extent to which these theories emphasize context and were originally formulated in reference to radically different political, historical, cultural and socioeconomic factors; indeed, dominant approaches to resistance in African history as a whole have been criticized as conceptually problematic due to their perceived inability to take into account complex social realities.

The field of postcolonial studies can perhaps provide important insights into overcoming this conceptual and contextual impasse. The foundational text of this body of literature, Edward Said’s *Orientalism*, outlines an understanding of power that is exercised through the discursive production and definition of the foreign other in a way that externalizes it from a similarly constructed ‘self’. Domination, in this sense, has important ontological and epistemological dimensions, as power is fundamentally tied to knowledge claims that are legitimized within common discursive structures. Said’s work thus engages with both Foucault’s understanding of power and Gramsci’s emphasis on cultural hegemony through civil society, highlighting the importance of each in shaping the representations that define power. Textual analysis is central for uncovering the assumptions and hierarchies that underlie these (re)productions. In this regard, Said significantly rejects Foucault’s devaluation of the importance of the author, instead emphasizing the relationship between an individual text and the discursive system that it simultaneously references and reworks. Subsequent postcolonial studies have sought to address the depiction of the colonized as passive recipients in the process of identity


68 Allina-Pisano.

formation, highlighting their agency while attempting to (re)insert their experiences into dominant discourses and histories.\textsuperscript{70} Perhaps most significant in this regard is Homi Bhabha’s notion that dominant epistemologies, self/other identity dichotomies and systems of domination are inherently unstable, ambivalent and hybridized in their contacts with the foreign other.\textsuperscript{71} Applications of these theories to African contexts, however, remain limited, and important questions surround their explanatory and analytical efficacy in such an endeavour. Nevertheless, existing works that emphasize discursivity, intertextuality and the production of subjectivities reveal the power linkages that connect the colonial past with the postcolonial present. In doing so, they also open up space in which resistance can be situated through the contestation of dominant discourses and identities, emphasizing the centrality of culture, narratives and self-authorship in this process.\textsuperscript{72}

v. \textit{Towards a Conceptual Model}

This overview of the relevant literature provides a basis on which an appropriate general framework for conceptualizing resistance can be presented. Primarily, resistance will be conceptualized in this study as \textit{any attempt to affect power, whether in its specific applications or more generally, so as to mitigate, redirect or otherwise influence its effects, by an individual or collection or actors for a specific, identifiable political or non-political purpose}. Considered in terms of its central themes, the framework employed in this study can be outlined as follows:

1. \textit{Actors}: Both individuals and groups can participate in resistance. Although much of the relevant literature, for obvious reasons, focuses on acts of resistance by the oppressed or marginalized, a more useful understanding of resistance must recognize that any individual, regardless of his or her status or position, who contests power, along with any group, regardless of its influence or motives, that does the same, is participating in resistance. It is also important to note that identity is a malleable and

\textsuperscript{70} An overview of these themes can be found in Childs, Peter and Patrick Williams, \textit{An Introduction to Post-Colonial Theory}, Harlow: Longman, 1997.
\textsuperscript{71} Bhabha, Homi K., \textit{The Location of Culture}, London: Routledge, 1994; and Childs and Williams, 122-156.
subjective concept, and one can indeed possess multiple identities simultaneously regardless of how contradictory these may seem. Although this perhaps complicates clear categorization, it does not significantly detract from the merits of such a process. This study therefore incorporates the following typology:

a. **International Actors**: those who represent foreign governments, international government organizations (IGOs), IFIs, private corporations and global civil society groups, who resist official orthodoxy.

b. **National Actors**: those who dominate the social, economic, political and cultural aspects of the domestic sphere while being based in that country. These include high-ranking members of the state apparatus, encompassing government leaders and legislative, judicial and military officials; private sector members, specifically prominent business leaders; civil society representatives, including cultural figures, respected intellectuals and academics, religious leaders and members of large non-governmental organizations (NGOs); and those who fall outside of such categories but maintain national importance, particularly traditional/ethnic leaders or powerful members of non-state military groups.

c. **Community Actors**: local actors who lack national authority or recognition, but nevertheless represent and/or possess the ability to influence a certain group. Community actors can be local government officials, whether elected representatives, unelected bureaucrats or those in charge of important public goods, industries or services; business leaders who dominate local economies; prominent civil society actors, including those who head non-profit organizations within a community, local religious authorities, political activists or organizers and other respected community figures; members of traditional hierarchies with political and/or religious authority; leaders of non-state groups that have *de facto* authority in a certain area; or ranking military officers or their non-state counterparts.

d. **Everyday Actors**: individual actors who lack any access to the various mechanisms of power, and indeed may be victims of oppression or marginalization by those who dominate these. Many of these may be members
of groups that are commonly disenfranchised based on socioeconomic status, racial/ethnic/tribal identity, political or religious affiliation, gender, sexuality, (perceived or actual) physical or mental ability and individual life history. Exclusion from power, however, is not simply a by-product of discrimination, as many others who fall outside of these categories are similarly without influence. This category is extremely diverse and is perhaps most appropriately conceptualized as involving any individual who cannot be considered a member of the three categories that preceded it.

2. **Methods**: This study employs a broad definition of resistance that incorporates a diverse range of methods. The methods involved in resistance are fundamentally tied to both the actor(s) that is/are employing them and nature of power that is being resisted. Many of these involve employing the strategies or systems of power that are themselves being resisted, demonstrating the conceptual and practical interconnectedness of power and resistance that is essential to understanding both concepts. The categories outlined here incorporate a wide spectrum of actions, ranging from the employment of language to the threat or use of force, and commonly overlap with each other as many methods can be employed individually or collectively and undertaken in a direct or indirect way. A number of methods are often adopted together, both within and between categories. The typology of methods used in this study can be outlined as follows:

a. **Direct Collective Resistance**: methods undertaken by groups that can be seen as public expressions of resistance. These include attempts to transform dominant discourses to accommodate the interests and experiences of either a marginalized group or the public as a whole; efforts to influence legislation or other government decision-making processes; the creation or maintenance of alternative political or social structures, systems and institutions; using popular movements, political organizations or civil society groups to challenge and attempt to change the existing order; public advocacy campaigns; the production and distribution of literature and politicized artistic or material products; strikes, protests, demonstrations, rallies, boycotts and petitions; land
seizures, redistribution efforts and the appropriation or occupation of property; rioting, looting and the destruction of property; and open revolution.

b. Direct Individual Resistance: methods undertaken by individuals that are similarly overt. These include conscious transformations and assertions of self-identity; activism, either as a participant or organizer; the public employment of counter-discourses, whether through verbal, written or artistic critique; and the use of violence, either independently or by forming or joining an armed group.

c. Indirect Collective Resistance: methods undertaken by groups that are clandestine and covert, where the participants or even the acts themselves are intended to remain undetected. These include the use of counter-discourses, shared narratives, folk stories, songs, jokes, rumors, euphemisms and metaphors; the creation or protection of a culture based on the identity of the oppressed; organized obstructionism, subversion, workplace hindrance, theft, sabotage, vandalism; and carrying out acts of violence while concealing one’s identity, commonly in the form of guerilla activity or terrorism.

d. Indirect Individual Resistance: methods undertaken by individuals that are similarly hidden and/or disguised. These include deception, mimicry, insincerity, feigned consent or ignorance, intentional negligence in one’s work; theft; acts of sabotage or vandalism; and acts of violence that are not intended to be public.

3. Target(s) of Resistance: The target of resistance is power, either broadly conceived or in its specific manifestations, and the individuals, groups, institutions, structures and systems that uphold, legitimize, transmit or represent it. Acknowledging power in general terms and in its individual manifestations is important, as resistance can be directed at either an unjust system as a whole or its individual components. Indeed, distinguishing between these is often conceptually problematic, and they must be understood as conceptually inseparable. A typology of the targets of resistance is presented here, although it is important to note that these aspects of power may be difficult, or even impossible, to distinguish from each other, and the target of a
specific act of resistance may fall into many or even all of these categories. Nevertheless, these can be understood as:

a. **Political**: governance, in all of its aspects, from exercising international influence and running the affairs of the state to regulating human behaviour.

b. **Social**: the conventional norms and hierarchies that govern group organization.

c. **Economic**: material domination, exploitation and inequalities.

d. **Cultural**: the traditions, beliefs and practices that define a collective identity, and the material and artistic products that shape and are shaped by these.

e. **Coercive**: the threat or use of force that upholds or enforces power.

f. **Discursive**: the unproblematicized systems of knowledge or discourses that justify and legitimize power.

4. **Structure and Agency**: The interaction of structure and agency is a key variable in whether or not a certain action can be understood as a form of resistance. As the ability to direct and limit action is a defining element of power, an action that can otherwise be understood as a form of resistance must be understood in terms of power if the individual engaging in it is being forced to do so by external circumstances. Agency is necessary for resistance to occur. Without agency, resistance, regardless of any other factors, cannot be present.

5. **Intent**: The issue of intent involves two separate considerations: whether or not the intent of a person’s actions, regardless of their consequences, can sufficiently constitute resistance, and whether or not the consequences of a person’s actions, regardless of their intent, can do the same. Agency is central in the case of the former, as a person’s conscious decision to resist must be assigned due significance independently of the success of any actions inspired by this decision. The role of agency in the latter, however, is more difficult to discern. This is primarily because of the fundamental complexity of the nature of intent. For example, actions that are commonly seen to fall into this category, such as theft or violence against an official, can be understood in two ways: in terms of their immediate benefits (or even non-rational causes), that is, the procurement of stolen goods or preventing what is seen as an abuse of authority; and in terms of what can be seen as their broader targets, such as established systems of economic distribution or political oppression. This
second interpretation is especially significant for understanding resistance, as abstract concepts are commonly experienced in terms of these individual manifestations rather than as the sum of their parts, and are hence resisted as such. This is not to imply, of course, that all such actions can be understood in such a way, nor is it to justify those that can; instead, it is to acknowledge the complexities of understanding resistance as a phenomenon that is subject to the intricacies of human behaviour.

As in most conceptual models, specificity has largely been sacrificed here as a means of maximizing breadth, flexibility and generalizability. This understanding of resistance is intended to be adaptable regardless of time or place; it will, and indeed should, emphasize different aspects of resistance in different contexts, and in some contexts a number of the actors, methods and targets that it identifies may be fundamentally different or even absent altogether. This is because resistance is itself a diverse, heterogeneous concept that has a wide variety of manifestations, and although the extent to which these manifestations are subject to change must be stressed, it is nevertheless possible to identify several commonalities that characterize resistance in its entirety. This is related to a more central epistemological consideration, which follows from the fact that as this study stresses the importance of context and contingency, as well as the centrality of subjective experience, in its analysis, it fundamentally questions the value of explanations that refer to universalized, depoliticized and dehistoricized theoretical frameworks. Indeed, it must be acknowledged that no act of resistance exists independently of these considerations, as each must necessarily be rooted in a particular set of circumstances from which it cannot be separated. This framework has been constructed in a way that adjusts to these circumstances without detaching an act of resistance from what identifies it with the concept of resistance more generally. It is therefore constructed in a way that is intended to avoid such epistemological dangers, and its ability to do so is central to its success.

The remainder of this study will explore the themes discussed in this chapter in its analysis of the political economy of resistance in South Sudan. By addressing the ways in which resistance interacts with power outside of the spheres of post-conflict neoliberal
economic orthodoxy, it will test the strength of the conceptual framework presented here in terms of both flexible applicability and analytical capability. The informalized, criminalized and delegitimized economic spheres present in post-conflict South Sudan, it will be shown, can, and indeed must, be conceptualized in terms of the understanding of resistance presented in this paper. Recognizing this reality has important implications for that country’s peacebuilding and development projects that cannot be ignored for understanding post-conflict contexts more generally.
Chapter III: Neoliberalism and Informal Economies

As resistance is such a diverse and heterogeneous concept, the complexity of its economic dimensions must be emphasized. Of central importance here is activity that takes place beyond the space defined and legitimized by neoliberal economic orthodoxy, and that is commonly labelled ‘informal’ as it is unregulated, untaxed and outside of the official legal structures of the state. Exactly how resistance becomes manifest in the informal economic sphere, however, deserves further scholarly analysis. A proper consideration of the key issues involved raises a number of important questions: is it possible to define a hegemonic discourse about economic growth in contemporary post-conflict reconstruction projects? If so, what role is informal activity seen to play in post-conflict environments and how, why and by whom is this defined and contested? And is involvement in informal economic activities a form of resistance?

This chapter problematizes the neoliberal economic logic that defines dominant understandings of peacebuilding and development, both in South Sudan and in post-conflict contexts more generally. Of particular importance is the role that informal economic activities play, and are seen to play, within neoliberal peacebuilding and development projects, along with how an unproblematized neoliberal logic masks complex dynamics of power and resistance. In analyzing these themes, this chapter critiques the reductionism inherent in neoliberal accounts of post-conflict reconstruction and argues that peacebuilding and development projects must incorporate approaches to the informal sector that adequately reflect and engage with their power and resistance dynamics, as doing so is essential for establishing a long-term peace that complements local economic realities while confronting their adverse effects.

Neoliberalism is conceptualized as a form of power that dominates post-conflict environments. The relationship between resistance and informal economies, however, is more ambiguous. Participation in the informal sector can be understood as a form of resistance for those who elect to enter it as a means of resisting particular applications of power, specifically existing political, social and economic systems that are ineffective, unjust or exclusionary. Not all participation in the informal sector, however, can be understood in terms of resistance, particularly for those who do not enter it voluntarily. The informal sector therefore has a dual nature, as while it exists as a space in which
unfavourable economic realities can be contested, it is also a space of power that can replicate the abuses of neoliberalism. Informal economies, like their formal counterparts, are complex and heterogeneous, and must not be understood in universal terms. Their effects on peacebuilding and development are not essentially positive or negative; instead, the various actors, processes and relationships that constitute the informal sector must be considered in a way that is flexible and sensitive to context.

The remainder of this chapter is divided into three sections. The first outlines the neoliberal orthodoxy that characterizes contemporary approaches to peacebuilding and development. The extent to which peacebuilding and development have become conceptually linked, and to which economic liberalization has become a central aspect of each, is emphasized. It is argued that marketization has questionable benefits for post-conflict environments and can indeed exacerbate many of the issues that it is intended to ameliorate.

The second section conceptualizes informal economic activity, both in post-conflict contexts and more generally. Different theoretical approaches to the informal sector are explored as a means of unpacking the concept of informality in scholarly and policy literature. Of particular interest is the extent to which participation in the informal sector can be understood in terms of resistance. The dual nature of the informal sector as a space of power and a space of resistance is emphasized as a means of problematizing the neoliberal equation of informality with resistance. Participating in the informal sector can serve as a form of resistance to unsatisfactory economic conditions, but it must also be understood in terms of power where it reproduces the hierarchies and forms of exclusion inherent in neoliberalism.

The third section explores the informal sector in South Sudan. It particularly highlights the limited local resonance of neoliberal economic orthodoxy. The conceptual model of resistance presented in the previous chapter is explored here as a means of demonstrating how the role of neoliberalism in the informal sector complicates attempts to identify the actors, methods and targets involved in resistance. The interaction of structure and agency, along with the issue of intent, are also emphasized as central to understanding informal economic activities as resistance.
i. **Neoliberalism and the Economics of Peacebuilding**

Understanding power and resistance in the informal sector necessitates situating informal economic activities within the broader economic dimensions of post-conflict environments. Post-conflict situations should not be seen as ‘normal’ development contexts—insofar as ‘normal’ development contexts exist—as although they are defined by many of the problems that affect other underdeveloped spaces, a number of their primary characteristics are unique and must be regarded as such. State revenues are often low or non-existent, and are generally inadequate to meet actual or necessary expenditures. Macroeconomic shocks, including inflation and high interest rates, are commonplace, as are reduced levels of official foreign investment and trade. Conflict may have resulted in the large-scale destruction of personal and public assets, including infrastructure, disrupted value chains and limited access to credit and financial services. Levels of demand, output or employment are often reduced. Regulation is frequently absent, and accompanied by changes in property rights, land tenure and rule of law mechanisms. Finally, new forms of economic organization defined by strategies of accumulation, dispossession and distribution that reflect particular conflict realities regularly persist, complicating the return to pre-conflict ‘normalcy’. Factors that are ostensibly non-economic also shape post-conflict economic realities. Pre-existing social and political structures, hierarchies and modes of organization often undergo dramatic transformations. The post-conflict state frequently enjoys low levels of legitimacy, stability or capacity, and has to contend with—or even perpetuates—the threat or reality of continued violence, problems surrounding the reintegration of former combatants, low levels of public welfare, limited access to basic services and various educational, nutritional and other public health issues. The deep public divisions and antagonisms caused by conflict—along with the fragmentation or destruction of communities, problems with social cohesion and transformed group and personal relationships—are all commonly still present after the official end of hostilities.73

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Contemporary peacebuilding and development initiatives commonly acknowledge and seek to address many of these issues. The United Nations (UN) explicitly highlights the relationship between peace and development in a number of its documents, and ties these to an extensive list of rights, reforms and norms that range from democracy and good governance to issues of public welfare, social justice and environmental sustainability. Local ownership, flexibility and adapting to specific contexts are all seen as essential to post-conflict reconstruction. The UN views private sector partnerships as a means of complementing its peacebuilding and development goals, emphasizing the ability of businesses to produce and provide necessary products and services, generate income and investment, create employment, develop human capacity, facilitate entrepreneurship, promote local enterprise and business linkages, establish and enforce commercial standards and practices, develop and transfer technologies, build physical and institutional infrastructure and undertake socially beneficial collective action.74

The World Bank similarly focuses on the importance of economic growth in post-conflict environments and the related issues of employment, security and justice as a means of escaping the ‘conflict trap’ of persistent poverty and recurrent conflict. Also like the UN, the World Bank advocates flexibility and context-specific approaches, demonstrating, it is sometimes argued, a movement beyond past efforts to promote neoliberal economic reforms in indebted countries through large-scale fiscal and monetary reform, privatization, deregulation and a limitation of the economic functions of the state in favour of the market. Despite these claims, however, the approaches to peacebuilding and development advocated by the World Bank must still be understood within a fundamentally market-oriented framework; although reforms address broader social issues and are designed to be sensitive to the various challenges presented by post-conflict

environments, they nevertheless centre on private sector-led growth that, along with other early programs and interventions designed to respond to extreme and immediate crises, is merely contextually adapted.\textsuperscript{75}

This faith in the potential of markets represents a more general consensus in peacebuilding and development communities. A broad range of policy documents—including those authored by state agencies, policy institutes, NGOs and other civil society interest groups—similarly focus on the role of private sector development in post-conflict reconstruction. These documents commonly advocate the roles that local entrepreneurship, skills training, employment, small and medium enterprises (SMEs), access to financial services, market expansion, regional and international trade, the international investment climate, fiscal discipline and government policies that favour these can play in securing peace and economic growth. While some documents importantly state that the simultaneous pursuit of such reforms and peace may involve certain trade-offs that sacrifice marketization in favour of peacebuilding, the solutions that are advanced are still effectively market-based.\textsuperscript{76} Even academic literature tends to stress many of the same themes and approaches, as despite the existence of a considerable amount of critical scholarship that questions peacebuilding and development orthodoxy, economic liberalization is still widely regarded as a key component of post-conflict reconstruction.\textsuperscript{77}


Two notable features of current approaches to post-conflict reconstruction thus deserve emphasis: first, that peacebuilding and development have come to be seen as fundamentally interconnected; and second, that the form of development that is meant to secure peace is universally understood within a neoliberal economic paradigm, with the ‘free’ market ascribed a significant degree of benevolence and ability to address the underlying causes of conflict. What these two realities entail is not merely the securitization of development, but also the marketization of peace where peace becomes a product of the universal logic of the market, and is thus governed by—and indeed dependent upon—the supposedly neutral, benevolent and just interactions of capital, labour, the means of production and utility maximizing rational individuals governed by enlightened self-interest. Claims that a broad consensus surrounding a ‘liberal peace’ has emerged can thus be understood in political economy terms as well, as while it is possible to identify a certain degree of variation in the specific approaches and policy prescriptions that major actors advocate, existing debates largely take place within the dominant discourse rather than questioning the fundamental assumptions upon which the discourse itself is based.

This liberal paradigm is highly problematic for a number of reasons. Marketization commonly threatens the establishment of peace as it can exacerbate existing tensions within a society while failing to improve, or even worsening, levels of poverty and inequality that contributed to the original outbreak of conflict. Indeed, market forces may have played an important role in the conflict itself, and emphasizing the importance of business interests, trade and entrepreneurship in post-conflict environments ignores the intricate ways in which each of these may have shaped and been shaped by conflict, giving them a peacebuilding role that is at best ambiguous. The political economy of a specific extent that seemingly any non-market processes are subject to criticism. Recent debates about the effectiveness of aid are an excellent example of this phenomenon, with some commentators arguing that the best way to promote long-term growth and poverty reduction is through trade, FDI, macroeconomic reforms and microfinance. See, for example: Easterly, William Russell, *The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest have done so Much Ill and so Little Good*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007; and Moyo, Dambisa, *Dead Aid: Why Aid is not Working and How there is Another Way for Africa*, London: Allen Lane, 2009.

78 Duffield (2001a); Paris (2004); Paris (1997); Pugh (2005); Pugh (2006); Pugh (2011); and Pugh, Cooper and Turner eds.

post-conflict situation is not a blank slate, and it must be considered in its proper historical, political and socioeconomic circumstances if peacebuilding and development projects are to achieve any degree of success. Even when the potential shortcomings of economic liberalization in post-conflict situations are acknowledged by scholars or practitioners, the common response is to alter the nature of market reforms rather than fundamentally question their supposed universal benefits. Neoliberal economic systems, structures and logics are seen as both natural and universally desirable; any problems are attributed to post-conflict societies that are being reformed rather than the prescriptions for reform themselves, with the assumption that a society may merely not be ‘ready’ to take advantage of the benefits of marketization without succumbing to its own pathologies.

At a more conceptual level, framing development within the objectives of security can compromise development goals while raising questions about what and whom security and development are for. The equation of peace and liberalism involves a discursive separation of liberalism and violence, assigning liberalism a teleological universalism while othering violence as illegitimate, irrational and taking place entirely outside of physical and conceptual liberal space. This is highly problematic, as not only has conflict played an integral role in the emergence of liberal market economies, but it also ignores the role that liberalism plays in establishing and legitimizing the systems, structures, processes and discourses that normalize violence internationally. Furthermore, although a number of economic approaches to peacebuilding and development ostensibly eschew top-down planning in favour of identifying and complementing local initiatives, they must be understood within the broader dynamics of global neoliberalism and its fundamental power relations. Producing liberal economic subjects, societies and discourses within a flawed international order that masks its own failings and injustices is central to initiatives from large-scale state privatizations to small-scale microfinance.

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80 Fetherston.
Such inconsistencies, hierarchies and shortcomings must be recognized in any peacebuilding and development projects. The failure to do so would only undermine the success of viable post-conflict reconstruction.

**ii. Informal Economies**

It is within this neoliberal framework that the role of informal economies in post-conflict reconstruction must be considered. Analyzing this, however, presents a number of notable difficulties, particularly because few studies have specifically addressed the nature of informal economies in post-conflict contexts or explored the implications they could have for peacebuilding and development. Where the importance of informal economies is highlighted in existing literature, it is often done so in a superficial and rather ambiguous way, as they are commonly seen as—often simultaneously—the undesirable consequences of the economic dimensions of conflict that must be engaged with in a way that reincorporates them into the formal sector; the economic spaces that are able to provide for basic needs when formal systems and structures break down; consisting of activities that involve, contrary to those that are formal and desirable, predation, exploitation and common linkages to illicit activity; harmful to growth due to their detrimental effects on formal competitiveness, the rule of law, government revenue and the social contract; and mutated versions of the private sector where entrepreneurship, ingenuity, efficiency and production are able to thrive, thus giving them significant potential to positively impact post-conflict reconstruction. Addressing the under-conceptualization of informal economies in post-conflict contexts requires engagement with the significant body of literature surrounding informal economies more generally. Doing so demonstrates the extent to which understandings of informal economies are commonly informed by a variety of discourses that often possess divergent theoretical underpinnings. Engagement with this literature also allows for neoliberal approaches to informal economic activities to

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be explored and problematized, and for different assumptions about how power and resistance become manifest in the informal sector to be considered.

Such an undertaking reveals a conceptual division of informal economies into four general categories of analysis.\(^{85}\) Traditional approaches, which constitute the first category, follow from how the informal sector was understood when it first emerged as a modern scholarly concept in the early 1970s. While neoclassical economics and modernization theory suggested that economically underdeveloped states would necessarily follow the same path to development as their wealthy capitalist equivalents, and that the ‘modern’ economies that emerged in the process would absorb the impoverished, unemployed masses that remained from the pre-capitalist period, the first studies to conceptualize the informal sector revealed the extent to which traditional approaches misunderstood its nature and underestimated its persistence. The concept that the industrialization of the formal sector would increase the demand for labour and thus minimize informal employment, however, was maintained, even as the International Labour Organization (ILO), which played an instrumental role in the original conceptualization of the informal sector, came to focus on the failures of market liberalization as a central aspect of the survival and growth of the informal sector.\(^{86}\) This approach generally considers the relationship between the informal and formal sectors to be dualistic, understanding the two as separate spheres with the informal economy able to provide for the basic needs of those who have been excluded from the formal economy.\(^{87}\)

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\(^{87}\) Carr and Chen; Habib-Mintz; and Yusuff.
A second conceptual approach in the literature is neoliberal analysis of the informal sector, most importantly presented in Hernando de Soto’s *The Other Path*. Significantly, de Soto frames informal economic activities and the struggle to formalize them as a widespread form of resistance to the inefficient and exclusionary policies of an overly bureaucratic state. Through his analysis of informal economic activity in Peru—specifically, informal housing, trade and urban transportation—de Soto claims that the failures of the country’s legal system, which reflect broader failures in governance, have caused mainly rational actors to weigh the respective costs of formality and informality and engage in the latter despite its undesirability. The economic effects of this, he argues, are significant, and include reduced productivity, lower investments, inefficient taxation, higher costs for basic utilities, low technological development and problems forming macroeconomic policy. De Soto thus claims that the solution to the problems he outlines, and indeed the main desire of those who operate in the informal sector, is reforming the legal system in a way that reduces the costs of formality and facilitates entry into the formal economy for those who are commonly excluded from it. Such changes, de Soto suggests, would significantly improve economic performance and efficiency, as they would allow people to benefit from the ‘good laws’ that provide protections for property rights, contracts and extracontractual liabilities. The concept that informal economies are sites of creativity and entrepreneurship that must be incorporated into formal markets has since been adopted by major development actors, including the IMF and the World Bank, and entered popular and policy discourse.

The two remaining categories of literature provide valuable insights into the shortcomings of neoliberal analyses of informal economic activity. Structuralist approaches, which constitute the third body of literature, frame the informal economy within the subordination of labour by capital that has historically characterized capitalist development. Structuralism stresses that market-based globalization both produces informality and depends on it to function. In contrast to dualistic and legalistic

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88 de Soto, Hernando, *The Other Path: The Economic Answer to Terrorism*, New York: Basic Books, 2002. When de Soto’s book was originally published in 1989, it had the subtitle *The Invisible Revolution in the Third World*. The reference to terrorism in the new subtitle interestingly reflects the convergence of security and development discourses that have become prevalent in contemporary discourse.

interpretations of the relationship between the formal and informal economies, structuralist approaches acknowledge the extent to which the informal sphere exists in a subordinate role to its formal counterpart, and contextualize both within the broader contours of the global economic system.90

The final body of literature emphasizes the importance of the social networks that shape informal economies, highlighting a number of factors that are commonly ignored in traditional economic analysis, including personal relationships, ethnicity, religion, gender and class. The concept of social capital is central here, as trust, group cohesion and shared values play significant roles in defining and regulating informal economic activities.91 Economic actors are thus reframed as contextualized subjective individuals whose actions are shaped by specific circumstances and identities. This represents a notable departure from the objectivization of *homo oeconomicus* as the ahistorical, apolitical, asocial and entirely rational actor that exists in standard economic theory, and undermines the belief that it is possible to identify immutable universal truths about human behaviour.

All four conceptual categories have their limitations. Much of the theoretical and empirical work that exists on informal economies specifically addresses the informal sector in Latin America, and the appropriateness of decontextualizing and dehistoricizing existing studies as a means of providing insights into the entirety of Sub-Saharan Africa must be questioned.92 Furthermore, none of the conceptual categories sufficiently problematizes the ‘informal economy’ concept itself, which highlights additional shortcomings. First, there is a significant danger in analyzing the informal economy as a homogeneous entity when the term itself encapsulates a wide variety of economic activities and actors. Failing to differentiate between, for example, street traders, domestic workers and casual labourers, as well as informal employers, the self-employed and employees, is conceptually problematic. Second, while much of the literature on informal economies understands engagement in informal activities in terms of desperation or, alternatively, the opportunity cost calculations of rational economic actors, the reality is much more complex as individuals either choose to enter or are forced into informal work for a variety of reasons.

92 This argument can also be found in Yusuff. Also see: Carr and Chen; Habib-Mintz; and Yusuff.
depending on individual circumstance. Finally, even analysis that recognizes the shortcomings of dominant approaches to the informal sector is often inadequate. Referring to ‘informality’ as a unique phenomenon establishes a false dichotomy that ignores ‘formal’/‘informal’ linkages and interdependencies as well as the way these relate to larger regional or global commodity chains, trade and investment systems and liberalization programs.

Furthermore, none of the four conceptual approaches to informal economies specifically addresses post-conflict contexts. As post-conflict situations should not be seen as ‘normal’ economic environments, the issue of what roles the informal sector can play in them must be explored. The relationship between informal economic activities and peacebuilding and development is of particular importance. Such an analysis must emphasize context, nuance and diversity, and must constantly problematize existing assumptions in order to critically engage with their limitations while providing space for existing alternatives.

Employing a framework of resistance to conceptualize informal economic activities can help to remedy several of these shortcomings. It is particularly useful for highlighting three points that are neglected in the existing literature: that both power and resistance are present in the informal sector, that the informal sector is fundamentally tied to the neoliberal global economic system and that the absence of the hierarchies and inequalities that define neoliberalism is a necessary condition for understanding informal economic activity as an entirely resistant phenomenon.

The neoliberal view that participation in the informal sector represents a form of resistance to the misuse of state power by rational actors is especially relevant here. On closer analysis the neoliberal understanding of informal economic activity as resistance is inadequate as both power and resistance are present in the informal sector and influence participation within it. It is indeed true that many individuals may make the conscious decision to subvert the laws of the state by undertaking unregulated, extralegal economic activity. It is also necessary, however, to account for those who are forced into the informal sector because they lack alternatives to meet their basic needs. For these people, the

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94 Many of these points are presented in Carr and Chen.
informal sector can represent a sphere of power rather than a sphere of resistance, where action is constrained by a socioeconomic system in which they are marginalized and without the protections, however limited, afforded by formal employment. Informal economies therefore have a dual nature: while some actors undertake indirect individual resistance against what they regard as an unjust and exclusionary political or socioeconomic system, informal economies represent, for others, extensions of this injustice and exclusion. Those who are forced into informal economic activities can still undertake acts of individual or collective resistance, but their participation in the informal sector should not be understood as resistance in itself. This ambiguity has important ramifications, as it demonstrates the extent to which power and resistance are relative and fluid concepts, and how they can be mutually present in the same phenomena. Like their formal counterparts, informal economies possess their own dynamics of power and resistance. Using either power or resistance to understand informal economies as a whole is misguided, and theories that attempt to do so must be rejected.

Power and resistance are similarly ambiguous when one considers the question of international linkages. Here, the relationship between neoliberalism and informal economies is one of simultaneous incorporation and exclusion; while the informal sector must be understood within the broader contours of the global economy and its ideational underpinnings, and particularly the processes through which certain spaces or people benefit or are disenfranchised, the same neoliberal orthodoxy that underwrites this system is presented as a solution to its negative effects. Informal economies do not exist separately from the global economic system; they are a fundamental part of it, and the idea that they can be incorporated into the formal sphere ignores their existing subordinate relationship to it. It is therefore possible to identify a key feature of power and resistance in the informal sector: neoliberalism—insofar as it shapes the global economic system and the hierarchies and forms of exclusion of define it—can be understood as defining the form of power that is being resisted by informal economic activity and, for many of those who participate in the informal sector to overcome unfavourable economic conditions, the method employed to resist the effects of this power. Resistance may involve adopting or co-opting a form of neoliberalism for local purposes, or seeking to alter the way in which a specific area is integrated into the global economy rather than challenging the nature of the global
Adopting neoliberalism as a form of resistance also involves replicating the power dynamics inherent in neoliberalism, specifically the hierarchies and distributional disparities that it entails, but it constitutes resistance nonetheless.

When actors are able to resist political and socioeconomic exclusion without replicating the economic arrangements that perpetuate them, however, their actions cannot be understood in terms of neoliberalism. Informal economic activities are not inherently a form of local neoliberalism, and it is possible to voluntarily engage in them without enforcing hierarchies or perpetuating exclusion. Informal economic activities that are inclusive, co-operative, broad-based, popularly owned and sensitive to the needs and desires of the community resist both unsatisfactory economic realities and the neoliberal orthodoxy that defines peacebuilding and development. These activities can be quite diverse; what unites them is their fundamental lack of the power dynamics that define neoliberalism.

What is important to emphasize, therefore, is that the dynamics of power and resistance in informal economic activities are complex, variant and ambiguous, and that they cannot be divorced from their contextual specificities to be considered in universal terms. The remainder of this chapter will explore how power and resistance shape the informal sector in post-conflict South Sudan. The neoliberal orthodoxy that dominates the country’s peacebuilding and development projects, it will be argued, has limited local resonance. Participation in the informal sector can, in some instances, be understood in terms of resistance. Nevertheless, neoliberal approaches to informal economic activity must ultimately be rejected in favour of a view that more accurately reflects the power and resistance dynamics that shape the informal sector.

### iii. Neoliberalism, Informal Economies and Resistance in South Sudan

A broad consensus has emerged amongst international and powerful domestic actors regarding the centrality of private sector-led growth in South Sudan’s peacebuilding and development programs. Major international actors involved in post-conflict South Sudan—including, amongst others, the UN, the World Bank and the African Development Bank (AfDB)—explicitly highlight the relationship between inclusive economic growth and the establishment of peace. A number of objectives are commonly identified in this
regard: private sector development (PSD) that is particularly focused on promoting entrepreneurship and SMEs; the availability of productive and decent formal employment; fiscal ‘responsibility’ in the form of reducing expenditures—especially those on government salaries and operating costs—and increasing revenues to enhance macroeconomic stability; building physical and institutional infrastructure, including laws and regulations that are conducive to a business environment that coheres with international standards; improving access to credit and markets for buying and selling goods; and undertaking policies that specifically target women, youth, the poor or ex-combatants and attempt to improve their socioeconomic wellbeing. South Sudan, it is often claimed, possesses significant potential for growth led by a diverse and competitive private sector, particularly one that can take advantage of the country’s natural resource wealth, agricultural capacity and large labour force that is not engaged in formal economic activity. This logic is central to the peace/development nexus promoted by the international community, and is adopted virtually without question.95

The government of South Sudan (GoSS) similarly claims to focus on peace through development with broad-based economic growth that maximizes poverty reduction and improves a wide variety of non-economic development indicators. In doing so, it endorses a similar conception of the state and its relationship with the private sector, envisioning the state’s economic role as limited to creating an ‘enabling environment’ for businesses by providing and maintaining peace and security, the rule of law, macroeconomic stability, effective and efficient regulation and essential infrastructure. The government’s market-based strategy also involves encouraging investment—particularly FDI—and removing what the government has identified as the three primary constraints to growth: a lack of security, poor physical infrastructure for transportation and multiple taxation systems. State intervention in the economy is rejected in favour of market-based initiatives that have been

“proven to work”, and beyond providing a limited number of public goods to improve market function, the GoSS regards its economic role as minimal.96

Neoliberalism therefore dominates international and national approaches to the political economy of post-conflict South Sudan. This dominance also affects understandings of the country’s informal sector. Although reliable statistics do not exist, it is generally acknowledged that the vast majority of economic activity in South Sudan can be classified as informal; the World Bank estimates that 80% of all workers in South Sudan, including up to 80% of SMEs, operate in the informal sector,97 and the AfDB claims that only 10% of the country’s population has formal employment.98 Anecdotal evidence suggests that informal economic activity has increased since the end of the conflict, particularly in urban areas—such as Juba, the capital—that have absorbed large-scale migration.99 Despite the size and importance of the informal sector in South Sudan, however, major documents by both international organizations and the GoSS itself commonly fail to acknowledge even the existence of the informal economy, let alone consider its importance for peacebuilding and development.100 When informality is recognized, it is often in strictly rural terms: the AfDB and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), for example, refer to the importance of establishing markets—particularly for agricultural goods—seemingly ex nihilo,101 while popular analysis often suggests that the “ancient barter economy” in the country’s rural areas prevented a humanitarian disaster when the GoSS shut down oil production from January 2012 to April 2013 in a dispute with the Republic of Sudan.102 The UN only mentions the

98 Kameir.
100 See, for example, Bennett et al.; “Medium-Term Capacity Development Strategy”; “South Sudan”; “GOSS Growth Strategy 2010-2012”; and “Juba Compact between the Government of South Sudan and Development Partners”.
102 “South Sudan: A New Country Rises from the Ruins,” The Economist, 4-10 May 2013, 46-47.
growth of parallel food markets as a “major concern” that leads to inflation and food shortages.\footnote{103}

The work of the World Bank, however, represents a notable departure from this widespread silence about informality, and thus dominates the literature on informal economic activity in post-conflict South Sudan. Importantly, the World Bank highlights the dual nature of the informal sector as detrimental to economic efficiency, growth and workers’ rights, and, simultaneously, as possessing the potential to provide alternative post-conflict livelihoods that should be harnessed as a driving force for development. Central to this duality is the notion that informal businesses are excluded from the benefits of formality due to poorly designed, overly complex and burdensome regulation that imposes unmanageably high costs and effectively limits locally driven economic growth.\footnote{104} Reforming the country’s legal system, reducing taxes and fees, limiting regulation and reducing the economic role of the state are therefore seen as the key to encouraging involvement in the formal economy while reducing informal activities.\footnote{105} Framing the informal sector in such a way, the World Bank effectively adopts a neoliberal approach to informal economic activities, suggesting that they are, following de Soto, dynamic, creative and rational responses to economically damaging state intervention, and while they may have negative effects in their existing form, these can be addressed through formalization. The World Bank assigns primacy to the informal sector in South Sudan’s market-based peacebuilding/development nexus, and frames that sector in terms of a resistant yet flawed and incomplete local neoliberalism. With South Sudan’s informal sector generally neglected and under-theorized elsewhere, the World Bank’s dominant view remains, at least amongst major international actors, largely uncontested.

\footnote{103} Quoted from United Nations Secretary-General, “Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan,” UN Document S/2012/486, 26 June 2012, 20.
\footnote{104} Defending this claim, the World Bank details the difficulties involved in establishing a business in Juba, which requires, on average, 250.2% of national per capita income for start-up capital; 5,936% of national per capita income for obtaining construction permits and necessary utilities; registering a property for 14.9% of its total value; paying, for a medium-size company, 25.5% of commercial profits in tax; spending 26% of the value of a claim to solve a commercial dispute; and serious costs, obstacles, delays and uncertainties surrounding obtaining credit, protecting investors, importing and exporting and closing a business. As a result of these limitations, the World Bank ranks Juba 159\textsuperscript{th} on a list of 183 business environments internationally. See “Doing Business in Juba 2011”.
\footnote{105} Ibid; “Southern Sudan - Enabling the State: Estimating the Non Oil Revenue Potential of State and Local Governments,” The World Bank Public Sector Reform and Capacity Building Unit Africa Region Repoq No. 54795 SD, 10 June 2010; and Lamb, 49-61.
Importantly, however, the local hegemony of the World Bank’s neoliberal orthodoxy is much more limited, and commonly disconnected from popular opinion. Although information on public opinion in South Sudan is scarce, existing studies indicate that a large portion of the country’s population believes that the government should play a much more significant economic role than both international actors and the GoSS itself suggest. Stable and decent employment is a primary concern for much of the country’s population, a large number of whom believe that the public sector should be the first source of employment for citizens who desire jobs. Indeed, many support a significant expansion of public sector administration and expenditures as a means of guaranteeing basic livelihoods and fulfilling a democratic social contract. Even in agricultural work, which is widely considered to be the main alternative to government employment, government intervention is still seen as essential for promoting self-reliance. While the role that private businesses and the informal sector can play in the pursuit of broader development goals is commonly acknowledged, these are seen as supplying limited employment and having a more minor economic role than neoliberal orthodoxy suggests.\(^{106}\) Some also complain that the informal sector is, like its formal counterpart, largely dominated by foreigners rather than the South Sudanese themselves, suggesting that it represents a sphere of marginalization and powerlessness rather than economic opportunity.\(^{107}\) While negative views of neoliberalism and the informal sector are by no means universal,\(^{108}\) what is essential here is the extent to which neoliberal orthodoxy lacks the same hegemony at the local level that it possesses both nationally and internationally. The desires of the public, while diverse, commonly diverge from the realities and objectives of South Sudan’s peacebuilding and development projects, as reflected in the growing disillusionment with the government’s development strategy and the increasingly


\(^{107}\) Mathieng, Bol, “Correcting the Economic Mess in South Sudan,” South Sudan Nation, 31 December 2012.

widespread sense that the country’s post-conflict economic growth has been inadequate and unequal.\textsuperscript{109}

Neoliberal understandings of informal economies in South Sudan suffer from a number of other flaws. Informal agricultural or pastoral activity is highly tied to meeting basic needs and cannot be understood in the same terms as urban informal enterprises, as although such activities do indeed involve their own forms of production and exchange that are often disconnected from the formal sector, they do not represent a similar response to overly burdensome government regulation.\textsuperscript{110} While certain urban informal activities can be quite profitable by national standards,\textsuperscript{111} they must also be considered in relation to the problems outlined for informal economic activities more generally, including the barriers to entry and competition based on dominant social networks and access to capital; the role that hierarchies and inequalities play in influencing and shaping participation in informal activities; and the national and global structural problems that contribute to informality by perpetuating socioeconomic exclusion. Existing peacebuilding and development programs exacerbate these problems, not only because much of South Sudan’s formal sector is dominated by foreign businesses—particularly from Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia—who serve the needs of the international community in urban centres and do not reinvest their profits in South Sudan,\textsuperscript{112} but also because advancing policies based on an unproblematized understanding of informal economic activities tends to portray further economic liberalization as a panacea when it is anything but.

Neoliberalism thus provides an inadequate theoretical framework for understanding the informal sector in South Sudan. This conclusion has important implications for conceptualizing informal economic activity in the country in terms of power and resistance. Following the framework of resistance employed in this study, three important points deserve particular emphasis: the role of neoliberalism in the informal sector, the interaction of structure and agency and the question of intent.

\textsuperscript{109} Cook and Moro.
\textsuperscript{111} “Southern Sudan - Enabling the State: Estimating the Non Oil Revenue Potential of State and Local Governments”.
\textsuperscript{112} Lamb, 49-61.
First, the role that neoliberalism plays in informal economic activities means that the actors, methods and targets involved in resistance in this regard cannot be easily defined. This is primarily because neoliberalism can simultaneously constitute power and resistance in the informal sector. Power at the international and national levels can be understood in terms of a hegemonic, unproblematic neoliberal economic orthodoxy that simultaneously others informality—thereby denying its own relation to it—and understands it as an incomplete local form of neoliberalism that must be incorporated into the global economic system. The externalization of the informal sector as a quasi-liberal space and its governance and normalization through the local reproduction of neoliberalism is a central aspect of the governmentality and biopower that defines reconstruction efforts more generally. According to neoliberal logic, those who participate in informal activities have aspirations that cohere with the structures and norms of the global economic system, and thus resist anything—namely, the state—that deviates from the universal logics of benign economic rationalism. As this chapter has suggested, however, the neoliberal understanding of informal economic activity as resistance is highly problematic, particularly given the broader structural realities that shape and define the informal sector. Claims that a form of local neoliberalism can constitute resistance must recognize that neoliberalism has its own inherent forms of domination and exclusion.

In instances where participation in the informal sector can be understood in terms of resistance there is therefore a tension between neoliberalism as economic orthodoxy and neoliberalism as a response to the inadequacies of the current economic system. The reality that neoliberalism can constitute both power and resistance is best understood in terms of postcolonial mimicry and local/liberal hybridity: local actors are able to adopt, co-opt and even reshape external models for their own purposes, and when they do so with a form of power such as neoliberalism, it constitutes resistance even if oppressive and exclusionary power structures are reproduced. If an individual undertakes resistance by reproducing neoliberalism, however, he or she is simultaneously engaging in a form of power that may constrain the actions of others. Specifically, by participating in the informal sector in a way that adopts or enforces the abuses of neoliberalism, an individual becomes involved in a space of power that can limit the agency and socioeconomic wellbeing of those who are
forced into it by broader structural factors. What serves as a form of resistance for one person may therefore act as a form of power for another.

Informal economic activities that do not reproduce these power structures, conversely, can be understood in terms of a Polanyian double movement that seeks to restore the social embeddedness of the market that economic liberalization disrupts. Separating resistant informal activities from those that replicate neoliberal power dynamics, however, is conceptually difficult, and again, universal claims about informal activities must be avoided. The complex power and resistance dynamics that define informal economies must be emphasized; neither power nor resistance is sufficient for conceptualizing the informal sector on its own, and should not be considered as such.

The second point relates to the interaction of structure and agency, and specifically the tension between understanding the informal sector as a space in which people are forced into due to external circumstances and understanding it as a space that people voluntarily enter in pursuit of a specific goal that undermines, contradicts or conflicts with power. These two understandings, however, should not be seen as mutually exclusive; indeed, the duality of power and resistance that they represent is a key quality of the informal sector. While some individuals may choose to participate in informal economic activities as a means of resistance, others may be forced into doing so as a result of external circumstances. The informal sector as a whole thus cannot be understood in terms of resistance, as the absence of agency and the limitation of an individual’s scope of action more accurately represents a form of power that forces those without viable alternatives to engage in informal economic activities. Agency is the central variable for understanding participation in the informal sector as resistance. Where agency is present, so is resistance. Where agency is limited, resistance is as well. Although, as Scott suggests, certain forms of resistance are possible even when action is severely limited by power, participation in the informal sector itself, in this regard, cannot be understood in terms of resistance.

The interaction of structure and agency is related to the third point, which surrounds the question of intent; namely, whether or not an individual’s actions or decisions can be understood in terms of resistance even if they were not conceived as such, or, more specifically, whether or not all participation in resistant informal activity can be understood as resistance regardless of individual intent. As the framework employed in this
study emphasizes the difficulty, and perhaps impossibility, of distinguishing between the immediate targets of an action and the larger structures, systems or realities that they represent, the very act of voluntarily participating in informal activities must be understood in the context of resisting the broader socioeconomic injustices or forms of exclusion that make informal activities viable or preferable to formal alternatives. Again, the presence of agency is central here, as where participation in informal activities is governed by power-based structural factors rather than conscious decision-making, resistance cannot be said to be present.

Contemporary approaches to peacebuilding and development must be reconsidered given such an understanding of the dynamics of power and resistance in informal economic activities. As argued above, the merging of peacebuilding and development in post-conflict environments, and the marketization of the peacebuilding/development nexus that this entails, leaves assumed relationships between peace, ‘free’ markets and liberalism more generally unproblematised, and thus has significant practical and conceptual flaws. Informal economic activities must be considered within this context, and the power and resistance dynamics that define them must be properly understood. As the political economy of South Sudan’s peacebuilding and development processes demonstrates, the failure to properly engage with the complexities of informal economic activities and neoliberal economic orthodoxy as a whole can result in a post-conflict economic program that is disconnected from the heterogeneous desires of, and realities experienced by, the local population.

iv. Conclusions

This chapter has highlighted the power and resistance dynamics that characterize informal economies, both in South Sudan and more generally. The role that neoliberalism plays in defining the dual nature of the informal sector as a space of power and resistance has been emphasized, suggesting that neoliberal understandings of informal economic activity are inadequate. Like its formal counterpart, the informal sector is an internally diverse and heterogeneous sphere containing a wide variety of actors, activities, logics, strategies and relationships; power and resistance permeate every aspect of informal activities, but each, on its own, is insufficient for understanding the informal sector as a
whole. Neoliberal approaches that seek to simultaneously externalize and incorporate the informal sector into a broader attempt to restructure post-conflict states and societies in coherence with neoliberal orthodoxy deny their own problematic forms of power and their inherent forms of domination, exploitation and exclusion. Resistance, as suggested by the framework employed in this study, can exist in a wide variety of forms, encompassing a diverse set of actors, methods, targets and rationales. It is only when the hierarchies and forms of exclusion inherent in neoliberalism are absent—and agency is present—that it becomes possible to understand informal economic activities exclusively in terms of resistance.

These power/resistance dynamics have significant implications for understanding contemporary peacebuilding and development projects in South Sudan. The neoliberal orthodoxy that dominates the country’s post-conflict economic realities at both the international and national levels has limited local resonance, and championing informal economies as a form of local neoliberalism that, when formalized, can play a central role in market-driven growth replicates many of the problems that characterize neoliberalism in post-conflict contexts more generally. A more appropriate approach to South Sudan’s post-conflict political economy must respond to local economic realities in a way that is sensitive to the various interactions of power and resistance that define them. Contextually relevant methods of supporting economic structures, systems and modes of production, organization and exchange must be formulated, and should be evaluated based on whether or not they are inclusive, broad-based and popularly owned; minimize existing or potential power hierarchies and inequalities; and respond to the needs and desires of local populations, giving primacy to these over the interests of international and national actors. Informal economic activities, to the extent that they cohere with the objective of promoting inclusive, equal and responsive local political economies, should be encouraged; where they fail to complement such an objective, conversely, they should be engaged with in a way that minimizes their negative effects while maximizing their positive ones. Such a strategy possesses the virtue of taking the power and resistance dynamics that characterize individual informal activities, organizations and relationships into account, and thus, for the reasons explored in this chapter, represents a viable approach to the political economy of peacebuilding and development.
Chapter IV: Legitimacy and Legality

Informal economic activity, although viewed as less desirable than its formal counterpart, is often seen as potentially coherent with the logics and processes of neoliberalism. Other activities, conversely, are delegitimized, criminalized and externalized, and cast as irregular, unjust and undesirable strategies of accumulation and distribution. The political economy of post-conflict spaces is thus often conceptualized in terms of the twin dichotomies of legitimate/illegitimate and licit/illicit economic activity, with the former in each emphasized as central to the success of peacebuilding and development initiatives and the latter seen as detrimental to such an objective.

These divisions, however, deserve to be problematized, and also conceptualized in terms of power and resistance. Doing so raises a number of important questions: what logics can be seen to define criminalized and delegitimized activities, and how are these related to both neoliberalism and global economic realities? Does participating in criminalized and delegitimized activities constitute resistance? And how are legitimate/illegitimate and licit/illicit dichotomies conceptualized, debated and addressed in South Sudan? This chapter will explore dominant understandings of economic legality and legitimacy within the context of power and resistance, highlighting the tensions, inconsistencies and instabilities that characterize common legitimate/illegitimate and licit/illicit dichotomies while analyzing the logics that govern the political economy of post-conflict environments. In doing so, it will demonstrate that understandings of legitimacy and legality are commonly contested, and should not be seen as neutral or apolitical. They are also frequently incompatible with each other, as many actions, practices and modes of distribution and exchange that are illegal may be seen by some as legitimate, whereas, conversely, many that are seen by some as illegitimate may nevertheless be legal.

This chapter specifically explores debates surrounding corruption and land tenure in South Sudan as a means of considering how the logics, processes and actions that define economic legality and legitimacy are resisted. Corruption is analyzed as an example of economic activity that is commonly understood as illegal and illegitimate, but that is nevertheless widely engaged in. Issues surrounding land tenure are conversely analyzed as a means of exploring how economic activities that are seen as legal and legitimate in
neoliberal orthodoxy may have detrimental effects that inspire local resistance. Conceptualizing contestations of legitimacy and legality in terms of power and resistance allows for an appropriate understanding of the hierarchies and forms of domination that are commonly neglected by legitimate/illegitimate and licit/illicit dichotomies, along with the various ways in which these are countered and transformed. Such an undertaking can provide valuable insights into the political economy of post-conflict South Sudan, and should thus be central to any peacebuilding and development projects in the country.

The remainder of this chapter is divided into two sections. The first explores the issue of corruption in South Sudan. Central here is the question of whether or not participating in illicit economic activities can be seen as a form of resistance, specifically to flawed or inadequate legal activities. The implications that the relationship between poverty and supposedly deviant behaviour has for understanding resistance is particularly highlighted. This chapter seeks to move beyond narratives that frame corruption as either the antithesis of neoliberalism or as enjoying local legitimacy as an alternative to foreign legal and normative arrangements. It therefore also explores the logics of illicit and illegal economic activities and demonstrates the extent to which these are tied to the neoliberal orthodoxy that informs peacebuilding and development.

The second section focuses on debates surrounding land tenure. A number of deals in which land in South Sudan has been acquired by foreign firms or investors are analyzed in order to explore how and why local communities engage in resistance. The various roles that different actors can play in resistance are outlined in order to complicate the overly simplistic equation of power with international actors and resistance with local actors. Examining existing debates about economic activity in South Sudan in terms of power and resistance is essential for understanding how, by whom and for what purposes the concepts of legality and legitimacy are defined and contested in post-conflict spaces.

i. Corruption

Issues of legitimacy and legality are of central importance to the political economy of post-conflict South Sudan. Much of this becomes manifest in debates about what is commonly referred to as ‘corruption’, often conceptualized broadly to include any
economic activities that can be viewed as illegitimate and/or illegal.\(^{113}\) Corruption is widely identified as a significant threat to the country’s political and economic viability, with a number of international organizations, domestic leaders and everyday actors stressing the importance of combating corruption through a variety of means.\(^ {114}\) This view of corruption largely coheres with peacebuilding and development orthodoxy, in which criminalized and delegitimized activities are commonly seen as harmful for several reasons: because they undermine state-building, institutional strength, the rule of law and the establishment of a social contract based on trust and legitimacy; because they deplete the (often already limited) resources of the state and the formal economy; because they benefit ‘spoilers’ whose economic or political interests may conflict with the establishment of peace; and because, most fundamentally, they ostensibly violate and undermine the foundations of democratic governance and market-based economics, both of which are seen as central to the establishment of peace and economic growth.\(^ {115}\)

South Sudan has experienced a number of prominent corruption scandals since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, including the ‘dura saga’

\(^{113}\) Strict definitions of corruption are sometimes limited to the abuse of public office for private gain. This chapter, however, employs a broader definition that also includes neopatrimonialism or clientelism, the use of public goods to secure political support, and illicit rent-seeking, the pursuit of favourable market distortions. This definition has been chosen as it more appropriately fits with popular understandings of corruption.


in which over US $2 billion was lost in a plan to construct grain stores around the country, and government audits that suggest questionable financial practices, unauthorized expenditures, payroll irregularities, dubious contracts, accounting errors and money that is simply unaccounted for. A total of US $4 billion of public money has been stolen by corrupt officials since 2005, roughly equivalent to one third of the total value of oil receipts—which account for 98% of government revenue—between the signing of the CPA and independence in 2011. Although the GoSS has undertaken steps to eliminate corruption, its efforts are often seen as inadequate or insincere. President Salva Kiir Mayardit’s offer of amnesty to 75 officials suspected of theft was criticized by some as ineffective and unjust. The South Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission (SSACC), established by the Interim Constitution in 2005, is frequently seen as too impotent to combat corruption, and the Ministry of Justice is similarly criticized for failing to prosecute corrupt officials based on the evidence provided by the SSACC. These shortcomings were exacerbated in 2013 as the budget of the SSACC was reduced by almost 40% despite claims from its members that such a move would significantly undermine the ability of the organization to pursue its mandate.

118 Holland, Hereward, “South Sudan Official have Stolen $4 Billion: President,” Reuters, 4 June 2012.
119 Ibid; and “South Sudan: Kiir, Civil Society Differ Over Missing $4 Bill,” Africa News, 14 June 2012.
Understanding corruption in South Sudan in terms of power and resistance raises two key issues. First, it is important to consider whether or not participation in corruption constitutes a form of resistance. Following the framework of resistance employed in this study, it is possible to understand such actions as indirect collective resistance in cases where the beneficiary is a specific group, including, for example, the favourable allocation of public funds for patronage purposes or the obtainment of a market advantage due to political connections. Alternatively, participation in corruption can serve as a form of indirect individual resistance when the parties involved have purely personal interests, including the theft of public funds by an official for personal enrichment or the use of a family connection to secure employment. Corruption can involve a wide variety of international, national, community and everyday actors, including foreign firms and investors, government officials, business leaders and the clients who benefit from systems of patronage. The target of resistance is an economic status quo that is, from the perspective of the participant, in some way unsatisfactory, as well as the normative and legal structures that uphold it.

As with the informal sphere, however, conceptualizing all participation corruption as resistance is too simplistic, specifically because it ignores the power dynamics that can govern such activities. These power dynamics are related to the complex interactions of structure and agency, particularly the reality that some individuals are forced into what are seen as illegitimate or illegal activities by poverty or a lack of alternatives for guaranteeing or advancing their socioeconomic status. Indeed, even those in South Sudan who claim that corruption is harmful to development and broader national interests commonly suggest that it is a response to poverty, as those who engage in it lack other forms of access to power or any realistic means of improving their socioeconomic situations. In these instances, participation in corruption is more accurately understood as the effect of a form of power that is economically hierarchical and exclusionary. In many cases, the processes, relationships and activities can be equally characterized by hierarchical power arrangements that, while possibly providing certain benefits, are not conducive to emancipation.

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122 Cook, 49-53.
The presence of power undermines the potential of theorizing corruption in terms of Gramscian counter-hegemony or a Polanyian double movement, and again highlights the importance of understanding how power and resistance become manifest in specific contexts rather than in universal terms. The individual interactions of structure and agency are also necessary for identifying intent, as while it may be difficult, or even impossible, to separate resistance to a particular socioeconomic reality from resistance to the broader systems and structures that such a reality represents, intent cannot be said to be present where agency is limited.

The second issue that is relevant for understanding corruption in South Sudan in terms of power and resistance concerns the concept that such activities possess a form of local legitimacy outside of the boundaries of neoliberalism. The notion that corruption is both harmful and undesirable enjoys a broad consensus amongst a variety of international, national, community and everyday actors, although there is a noticeable disconnect between such an opinion and the reality that corruption is, by all accounts, endemic in South Sudan. Thus, while corruption in itself may not be considered legitimate in public discourse, corrupt activities and arrangements are still common in private practice. Again, the significance of structural factors, specifically poverty, must be emphasized here as key to any explanation of the causes and perpetuation of corruption.

It is also important to refrain from equating corruption with a resistant local political economy that exists independently of neoliberalism. Indeed, corruption—like criminalized, delegitimized economic activities more generally—is fundamentally tied to the logics and processes of neoliberalism and plays an ambiguous role in peacebuilding and development. In some instances, corruption can promote peacebuilding and development by providing a key incentive for cooperation and stability.\textsuperscript{123} Concepts such as corruption lack universality while norms and understandings of legitimacy are commonly contested in post-conflict environments, emphasizing the importance of rejecting dehistoricized, depoliticized legitimate/illegitimate and licit/illicit dichotomies in favour of flexible, context-specific approaches that negotiate the unique political and

\textsuperscript{123} Cheng, Christine and Dominik Zaum eds., \textit{Corruption and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Selling the Peace?} Abingdon: Routledge, 2011.
economic dynamics of a post-conflict situation and adapt to existing realities in a way that seeks to preserve peace and economic stability.¹²⁴

Additionally, peacebuilding and development can similarly promote economic arrangements that their own neoliberal logics render illicit and illegitimate. Economic and political liberalization can facilitate corruption through power-sharing agreements that distribute political power, influence and state assets, along with democratic transitions that may involve the allocation of resources to guarantee support; through the privatization of state assets and the promotion of open access to markets, both of which can be manipulated for political and economic gain and can also favour those who have engaged in activities that are otherwise seen as illicit or illegitimate; and through rent-seeking surrounding the distribution of donor funds.¹²⁵ Peacebuilding can thus establish or enforce an environment in which corruption is normalized, institutionalized and rationalized through logical political or economic calculations.¹²⁶ Beyond peacebuilding and development, recent economic liberalization efforts have played a central role in promoting the development of a criminalized political economy in Sub-Saharan Africa, as actors are able to manipulate the reduction of the size of the state, the privatization of state assets and access to foreign aid, capital and (licit or illicit) markets for personal political power or economic gain.¹²⁷ Corruption, like other criminalized, delegitimized economic activities, therefore not only possesses its own logics and functions, but is also intricately connected to liberalization itself.¹²⁸

Thus, while it may be inaccurate to argue that corruption merely reflects uncontested local economic realities that represent viable alternatives to the failures of neoliberalism, it is similarly insufficient to claim that corruption is universally damaging, illogical, unpopular and disconnected from liberalization itself, or indeed that any

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¹²⁸ Many of the themes explored in this paragraph can also be found in Cheng and Zaum eds.
consensus exists surrounding the concepts of legitimacy and legality in the first place.\textsuperscript{129} The relationship between illicit and illegitimate economic activities and neoliberalism complicates understandings of power and resistance. Insofar as neoliberalism is fundamentally tied to the activities, processes and arrangements that it externalizes—or others in postcolonial terms—and casts outside of the scope of legal, legitimate behaviour, it must be seen as engendering the very forms of resistance that counters its own power. Resistance to neoliberalism, at least in terms of illicit and illegitimate economic activity, is inherent in neoliberalism itself. The liberal peace masks internal contradictions and inconsistencies that make it fundamentally unstable in both conceptual and practical terms.\textsuperscript{130} The problematic way in which concepts of economic legality and legitimacy are constructed must be seen as a key factor in this instability, and cannot be ignored in either South Sudan or post-conflict environments more generally.

\textit{ii. Land Tenure}

Dominant understandings of legitimacy and legality are contested not only by the economic activities, processes and arrangements that are delegitimized and criminalized in orthodox approaches, but also by resistance to those that are conversely regarded as legitimate and legal. Such is the case with the issue of land tenure in South Sudan, and particularly the role that foreign firms and investors play in the mass privatization of land. Between 2007 and 2010, a total of 26,400 square kilometres of land in South Sudan was leased or sold to foreign investors for the purpose of developing the country’s agricultural, forestry and biofuel sectors. An additional 31,000 square kilometres of land have been acquired for the purposes of tourism and conservation or obtained by domestic investors, bringing the total to 56,400 square kilometres—or 9\% of South Sudan’s total territory—in 28 separate deals.\textsuperscript{131}

It is possible to conceptualize these deals as a form of neoliberal power that is disconnected from the needs and interests of local communities in South Sudan. The


\textsuperscript{130} Richmond (2005).

relevant local parties were only consulted in nine of the 28 deals, and as many as 11 involved the possible or definite displacement of inhabitants or restrictions on their access to agricultural, pastoral or forested lands that contributed to their livelihoods.\textsuperscript{132} For instance, when Al Ain National Wildlife, an Emirati firm, acquired the rights to 16,800 square kilometres in Boma National Park, Jonglei State for 30 years from July 2008, local communities were not consulted despite the fact that the project could involve the displacement of up to 15,000 people.\textsuperscript{133}

Domestic investors tend to consult with local communities more than foreign investors, largely because foreign firms and individuals are more frequently able to exert political influence that allows them to bypass such negotiations.\textsuperscript{134} When Concord Agriculture, a subsidiary of Citadel Capital, an Egyptian private equity firm, leased 1,050 square kilometres of community-owned land in Unity State for 25 years in 2009, the company negotiated its lease (the terms of which are not public) directly with the government of Unity State. The deal was apparently facilitated by the close personal relationships that the founder and chairman of Citadel Capital, Ahmed Heikal, enjoyed with many high-ranking SPLM officials.\textsuperscript{135} Similarly, in 2009, Jarch Management Group, Ltd, an American organization registered in the Virgin Islands, leased 4,000 square kilometres from Leac for Agriculture and Investment Company Limited, a company registered in Juba that is owned by the son Paulino Matip Nhial, then serving as the deputy commander-in-chief of the SPLA. Jarch Management did not consult with local communities despite the potential displacements it project could entail.\textsuperscript{136}

Some deals even involved bypassing the relevant domestic authorities. When the GoSS Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry negotiated the sale of controlling shares in the Equatoria Teak Company and the Central Equatoria Teak Company, both involved in forestry in South Sudan, to the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC), a developmental finance institution controlled by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, and the Finnish Fund for Development Cooperation

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{133} Deng, The Oakland Institute, 33-36.
\textsuperscript{134} Deng, Norwegian People’s Aid.
\textsuperscript{135} Deng, The Oakland Institute, 36-41.
\textsuperscript{136} “U.S. Firm to Invest in Agriculture in South Sudan,” \textit{Sudan Tribune}, 2 January 2009; and Deng, Norwegian People’s Aid.
(Finnfund), majority owned by the government of Finland, in 2007, it did not consult either the state governments of Central Equatoria and Western Equatoria or the local communities that would be affected by such a deal. The CDC and Finnfund ultimately sold their interests in both companies to anonymous investors without informing the government.137

The promised benefits of land deals often fail to materialize. Whereas domestic initiatives are commonly centred on community projects or involve small-scale individual investments, foreign ones are usually much larger and more centralized, averaging, for example, 1,750 square kilometres of land compared to just 96.2 square kilometres in their domestic counterparts. Foreign projects also commonly employ large-scale mechanized industrial methods that, while possibly improving productivity, minimize local employment and can undermine long-term sustainability.138 The Central Equatoria Teak Company never began its operations, and while the Equatoria Teak Company became operational, its benefits to the local population were minimal as it only created approximately 600 of a promised 6,000 jobs for local residents, paid the majority of its local workers the equivalent of about US $2 per day and, after only three years, shut down production. Poor working conditions and physical abuse were also reported. Equatoria Teak ultimately paid only US $79,000 of the US $100,000 that it owed to local communities, while Central Equatoria Teak did not pay any of the US $200,000 that it initially pledged.139 Projects by both Al Ain National Wildlife and Concord Agriculture also generated limited local employment while neglecting promised, but not legally binding, social initiatives.140

Many land deals have encountered significant local resistance. Local residents responded to a March 2008 agreement in which Nile Trading and Development, Inc, an American firm, leased 6,000 square kilometres of land (with an option on up to 10,000 square kilometres) from an organization called the Mukaya Payam Cooperative for approximately US $25,000 by protesting the deal and lobbying the GoSS for its

137 Ibid, 27-33.
139 Deng, The Oakland Institute, 27-33.
140 Ibid, 33-41.
cancellation, effectively halting the project.\footnote{Ibid, 20-27; and Wudu, Waakhe Simon, “Mokaya Payam Leaders Reject 600,000Ha Land Lease,” Gurtong Trust, 15 August 2011.} The residents of Mukaya Payam were certainly undertaking a form of direct collective resistance when they protested and petitioned the GoSS, as were, in a different way, those who refused to be displaced as a part of Al Ain National Wildlife’s project in Boma National Park.\footnote{Deng, The Oakland Institute, 33-36.} In both instances, the deals that were being resisted represent the broader failures and abuses involved in the country’s land tenure system. The mass privatization of land in post-conflict South Sudan is an integral aspect of the country’s neoliberal economic reforms, which thus represent the ultimate structural target of local resistance.

Other deals, meanwhile, have not encountered local resistance. Of course, even in cases where overt resistance is difficult to discern, it is possible that local actors are, following Scott, undertaking forms of everyday resistance that have not been documented. But the absence of sufficient evidence limits the potential for empirical claims. The fact that local actors may not resist unpopular socioeconomic realities suggests that it is more appropriate to understand power as producing the potential for, rather than the reality of, resistance. The disconnect between widespread dissatisfaction with the effects of power and the absence of resistance implies that Scott’s critique of Gramsci—that power can limit action while having little ability to influence thought—has a certain degree of validity.\footnote{Scott (1985), 314-318.} In other instances, as in the case of Concord Agriculture, local residents expressed their willingness to wait for promised benefits despite the fact that few had materialized. This suggests that they not only had faith that their agreement would be honoured, but also that, more fundamentally, the deal itself was not viewed in an entirely negative way. Importantly, however, they also expressed confidence in their ability to terminate the deal if promised benefits were not delivered.\footnote{Deng, The Oakland Institute, 36-41.} This further stresses the importance of understanding power as merely establishing the potential for resistance; whether or not this potential is translated into the reality of resistance can only be discerned through the analysis of individual manifestations of power. Resistance is often present where power can be found, but it is also often absent. Agency is necessary for the potential for resistance inherent in power to be realized, as resistance does not merely
occur because power is present, but because individual agents respond to the presence of power.

Furthermore, while it is possible to understand resistance to certain land deals as contestations of supposedly legitimate and legal economic activity, it is also important to recognize the diverse roles that different international, national, community and everyday actors played in each. The CDC and Finnfund, both majority owned by foreign governments, agreed their contracts with the GoSS Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, leading to opposition from state governments and local groups before these interests were ultimately sold without the consent or knowledge of the GoSS.\textsuperscript{145} Local residents refused repeated relocation requests in a project led by Al Ain National Wildlife despite the accession of the GoSS and some community leaders.\textsuperscript{146} Concord Agriculture reached a generous agreement with Unity State, possibly facilitated by personal connections,\textsuperscript{147} and Jarch Management acquired a lease from a private company with close ties to the SPLA.\textsuperscript{148}

In 2010, a South Sudanese civil society group known as the Agency for Independent Media revealed the Mukaya Payam Cooperative to be a fictitious entity comprised of three relatives from Mukaya Payam who entered into the lease with Nile Trading and Development without the consent or prior knowledge of other members of the community. In fact, as Mukaya Payam is only one of five payams in Lainya County, which in total only covers 3,450 square kilometres, the Mukaya Payam Cooperative leased not only their own community’s land without any official authority or consent, but the lands of other communities as well. Community and everyday actors eventually gained the support of the GoSS against a collection of American firms and individual local actors derided as urban ‘intellectuals’, while two civil society organizations, one domestic (the Agency for Independent Media) and one international (the Oakland Institute, an American organization), played instrumental roles in publicizing the deal and encouraging local opposition.\textsuperscript{149}

Power and resistance can thus become manifest in a variety of ways in debates about economic legitimacy and legality, and it is important not to attribute either power or

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid, 27-33.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid, 33-36.
\textsuperscript{147} Deng, 36-41; and Wudu.
\textsuperscript{148} “U.S. Firm to Invest in Agriculture in South Sudan.”
\textsuperscript{149} Deng, 20-27; and Wudu.
resistance exclusively to specific actors. Different international, national, community and everyday actors can exercise power, while others of all types can participate in resistance. The reality that any actor can participate in power or resistance highlights the importance of individual agency, as while agency must always be considered in relation to the influence of structural circumstances, it nevertheless allows for significant variance in personal perspective and action.

Standard dichotomizations of legitimate/illegitimate and licit/illicit economic activity therefore fail to capture the diverse actors and perspectives that characterize local economic realities in South Sudan. To understand why these dichotomies remain largely unproblematic in peacebuilding and development orthodoxy, it is necessary to consider in whose interests they are defined and what discourses, processes and norms they reflect. The critique that peacebuilding entails a form of Foucauldian biopower and governmentality is particularly relevant, as defining certain behaviours and modes of organization as acceptable and desirable—and, in doing so, separating these from what are similarly defined as unacceptable and undesirable—without taking local context into account represents a form of disciplinary normalization that seeks to render foreign economic activities coherent with liberal processes and logics. Concepts of legitimacy and legality are not apolitical, value-neutral, objective or universal, but instead reflect a decontextualized understanding of, in this case, neoliberal economic activities, processes, systems and modes of organization that are laden with their own assumptions, discourses and histories. The dynamics of power and resistance are central for understanding how dominant concepts of legitimacy and legality—and the broader ideational systems and global economic realities they embody—can become destabilized in their local contacts, and must thus play a central role in any analysis of the political economy of a post-conflict environment.

iii. Conclusions

This chapter has sought to problematize dominant understandings of legitimacy and legality by exploring them in the context of the political economy of post-conflict South Sudan, specifically by analyzing how common legitimate/illegitimate and licit/illicit

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150 Richmond (2011); Pugh (2011); and Pugh (2004).
dichotomies that frame economic action break down in their local contacts. In doing so, it has challenged the notion that criminalized and delegitimized activities represent a form of pathologized illiberalism, instead suggesting that these must be understood in terms of their contextual logics and their complex relation to the processes, systems, structures and effects of economic liberalization. It has also argued that understandings of economic legitimacy and legality are contested in South Sudan in two important ways: first, by the prevalence of criminalized and delegitimized activities, processes and relationships, such as corruption, and the rationalization of these in relation to the country’s post-conflict political, social and economic realities that are tied to neoliberalism; and second, by opposition to activities that are conversely seen as legitimate and legal within neoliberal economic orthodoxy. Analyzing these contestations in terms of power and resistance reveals the hierarchies and forms of domination that underlie unproblematized understandings of economic legitimacy and legality, as well as how and why these are destabilized, questioned and negotiated in different local contexts.

More generally, the arguments presented in this chapter demonstrate the extent to which power and resistance dynamics dominate post-conflict contexts, and also how universal generalizations and assumptions must be replaced with contextually rooted individual perspectives and agencies if the complexities of post-conflict environments are to be fully appreciated. Insofar as an appropriate understanding of power and resistance is able to identify the failures and instabilities of dominant orthodoxy as well as local opposition and alternatives, it can have potentially emancipatory implications for contemporary peacebuilding and development projects that cannot be ignored. The disconnect between neoliberal economic orthodoxy and contextual realities, logics and perspectives has had, as this chapter has demonstrated, significant implications for post-conflict South Sudan. These realities cannot be understood independently of the complex dynamics of power and resistance, and must therefore be taken into account if a long-term, broad-based and locally owned peace is to be realized.
Chapter V: Borderlands

The economic activities that neoliberal orthodoxy renders informal, illicit and illegitimate can also be conceptualized in spatial terms. Geographic spaces that are seen as irregular, incomprehensible or ungovernable are othered or otherwise neglected by neoliberalism, contrasting the unproblematized sphere of neoliberalism with a variety of physical borderlands that exist at the margins of political and economic power. These borderlands play a central role in shaping the political economy of (post-)conflict environments, and should thus be a primary focus of any peacebuilding and development initiative. Academic and policy literature tend to minimize or mischaracterize the role that borderlands play in post-conflict environments, instead treating states as largely homogeneous entities with unifying, undifferentiated political economy landscapes that, to the extent that they deviate from the prescripts of neoliberalism, possess pathologies that are solvable through a universalized set of reforms. With respect to South Sudan, this literature needs to examine the impact of economic activity in borderlands on the country’s post-conflict transition. Resistance is a crucial variable in understanding the political economy of borderlands, as it provides for a useful conceptualization of the centre/periphery dynamics of borderlands while highlighting the hierarchies, forms of exclusion and contestations that characterize them. Such a conceptualization allows for an appropriate consideration of the extent to which the political economy of borderlands can contribute to—as well as hinder—peacebuilding and development, as while resistance can be emancipatory, it is also characterized by subjectivity, hybridity and a fundamental connection to power that limits its value in the establishment of peace and the promotion of broad-based economic growth.

This chapter explores the centrality of South Sudan’s borderlands as sites of power and resistance. Borderlands are conceptualized broadly to include national, internal and global marginalized spaces, highlighting the multiple ways that peripheralization can be understood in South Sudan. Understanding the economic dimensions of borderlands in terms of resistance is necessary for two reasons. First, studying the economic activities, processes and relationships that exist in areas where state authority is limited allows for the underlying logics that connect a broad range of actions, actors and spaces to be identified. The political economy of borderlands cannot be understood independently of resistance to
external political and economic power. Second, focusing on resistance as a key aspect of the economic characteristics of borderlands emphasizes the necessity of taking subjective local realities into account in the implementation of peacebuilding and development initiatives. Borderlands are spaces of significant diversity, complexity and transformation, and illustrate the heterogeneity that can characterize a post-conflict situation. Engaging with them—and their resistance dynamics—must be central to any peacebuilding and development project.

This chapter is divided into three sections, with each exploring a different dimension of the concept of borderlands. 151 The first section focuses on areas that are marginalized in the international system, arguing that South Sudan has long existed as an international borderland. Current peacebuilding and development projects threaten to perpetuate this marginalization by (re)integrating the country into an international system where it lacks access to political and economic power. Informal and illicit networks exist that allow South Sudan, like all international borderlands, to partially counteract the effects of exclusion and subordination. While these informal and illicit networks have important power dimensions that are fundamentally connected to neoliberalism, they should also be seen as representative of a political economy of resistance that emerges because of the marginalization of international borderlands.

The second section focuses on spaces that surround national borders, and demonstrates that informal transborder trade shapes the political economy of South Sudan’s national borderlands in fundamental ways. Efforts by the state to exert its authority over these spaces clash with the persistence of informal transborder trade, a process that is defined by the interaction of power and resistance. Informal transborder trade must not be entirely equated with resistance, however, as it also contains its own forms of power that are tied to neoliberalism. The interaction of structure and agency is examined as a key determinant for whether or not participation in informal transborder trade can be understood in terms of power or resistance, and it is argued that where agency is present, participation in informal transborder trade can be understood as a form of resistance even if it reproduces the power dynamics inherent in neoliberalism. Where

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151 A similar typology of borderlands to the one employed in this chapter is presented in Goodhand, Jonathan, “War, Peace and the Places in Between: Why Borderlands are Central,” in Pugh, Cooper and Turner eds., 229-232.
agency is absent, informal transborder trade represents a form of power as those who engage in it lack viable alternatives for economic wellbeing. This duality of power and resistance is a key element of informal transborder trade.

The third section examines internal spaces where the power of the state has minimal resonance. The political economy of South Sudan’s internal borderlands is explored with a particular emphasis on how their economic realities have been shaped by the country’s conflicts and economic transformations. Changes to the political economy of rural areas, such as the commoditization of cattle-raiding and human life with respect to land tenure claims, are framed in terms of the interaction of external economic realities with local power structures as a means of demonstrating the subjectivity of power and resistance when both can be undertaken by the same actors or present in the same phenomena. The interaction of local power structures and external economic realities also illustrates the hybridity that results from the interaction of power and resistance. The political economy of South Sudan’s internal borderlands thus demonstrates how power and resistance can be both perceptively dependent and mutually influential.

i. **International Borderlands**

Many international spaces are excluded by or marginalized from the global centres of political and economic power. This marginalization takes many forms. ‘Rogue states’ are commonly denoted as those that do not comply with international norms, even when these norms have little relevance to, or conflict with, local realities and interests. ‘Failed’ states are understood as those whose traditional structures of central governance are seen to have broken down, despite the fact that alternative social, political and economic realities may emerge in the absence of other authority. Other states occupy a position of self-perpetuating underdevelopment, lacking the resources for economic growth through formal channels of acquisition, production and exchange. These marginalized spaces effectively constitute international borderlands, and are cast as irregular, undesirable and potentially ungovernable by the actors that dominate the international system. They are also viewed within the context of the security/development nexus, which profoundly shapes efforts external efforts of engagement and regulation.
South Sudan has long existed as an international borderland. Throughout the expansion of Ottoman Egypt in the 19th century, the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1899-1956) and the existence of the unified Republic of Sudan (1956-2011), the region was marginalized in political, social and economic terms, and subjected to several ambitions projects to (ostensibly) facilitate governance and development. Most of these, however, were divorced from local realities and ultimately failed in their implementation. Contemporary peacebuilding and development initiatives generally represent attempts to normalize and stabilize international borderlands while (re)incorporating them into the global economic and political system in a way that coheres with externally defined liberal logics, and their implementation in South Sudan must be historically contextualized in relation to past efforts to regulate the territory and render it controllable through the imposition of external power. The formal (re)integration current peacebuilding and development projects seek to accomplish threatens to limit South Sudan’s access to political and economic power, perpetuating its historical peripheralization. The country’s current peripheralization becomes manifest in several ways, most notably the lack of access to capital and other financial instruments, international trade regimes that favour those who implement them and predatory investment that results in the acquisition of the country’s assets by foreign firms and investors for little compensation. Each of these harms formal production and exchange in South Sudan and contributes to the erosion of the country’s economic autonomy. Each is also fundamentally linked to the neoliberal structures and logics that dominate the international system, demonstrating the deep impact that neoliberal forms of power can have on shaping the political economy of post-conflict South Sudan.

While it is true that international borderlands are largely excluded from the formal economic structures and processes that dominate the international system, however, they are simultaneously (re)incorporated into the global economy through reflexive informal and illicit networks with international linkages. Economic liberalization plays a key role in

fostering this duality of marginalization and integration. The informal and illicit networks that emerge in international borderlands are central to the global economy, and commonly possess significant social and political dimensions that can challenge—or even form a fundamental part of—state power. As outlined in Chapters III and IV of this study, this simultaneous exclusion and (re)integration primarily takes place through the informal, criminalized or delegitimized economic activities that dominate the political economy of South Sudan. These activities—from informal production and exchange to corruption and, as will be discussed in the subsequent section of this chapter, informal transborder trade—have deep international linkages, particularly given the extent to which they are tied to the broader processes, logics and structures that define neoliberalism. They also have important power dimensions and should not be universally equated with resistance. Nevertheless, the networks that they involve can undermine the state while resisting—if being facilitated by and ultimately taking part in—the formal structures, processes and norms that marginalize spaces and peoples in the global economy.

Contemporary peacebuilding and development projects that are disconnected from local needs and interests are thus maintaining South Sudan as an international borderland where informal and illicit economic activities resist, to some extent, the political and economic marginalization of the country by acting outside of—but in ways that are still fundamentally connected to—neoliberal forms of power. The simultaneous exclusion and (re)integration that this involves is a definitive aspect of the centre/periphery dynamics of borderlands, as efforts to impose centralized authority in peripheralized spaces conflicts with local economic realities. These local economic realities have important power dimensions, but they still constitute resistance to the political and economic power that dominates the international system.

ii. National Borderlands

The second relevant way that borderlands can be conceptualized is in terms of the spaces surrounding national borders that are subject to both the imposition of state

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154 Duffield (2001a).
authority and regional dynamics that can undermine the efforts of central governance. National borderlands have emerged as an important focus of study within a variety of academic disciplines.\textsuperscript{156} Much of this literature stresses how borders are historically constructed phenomena that are neither static nor apolitical. Power plays an important role in the formation of borders, as the emergence of states and their efforts to define and incorporate territory within governable limits involves the peripheralization and normalization of areas that are beyond a centralized core. The creation of artificial borders and the incorporation of surrounding regions within a centralized state, however, can be fundamentally incomplete as borderlands are able to maintain their ties with adjacent territories and continue to be shaped by cross-border dynamics. The interaction between the centralizing efforts of the state and transborder ties define borderlands as spaces of transformation, hybridity and contestation, where various political, social and economic realities, along with forms of identity, overlap, interact and become redefined.\textsuperscript{157}

South Sudan possesses a number of distinct national borderlands, each of which has been shaped by its own particular geography and political, economic and socio-cultural history. Territories bordering Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic all possess significant transborder ties and are marked by livelihoods that are often more interconnected with—and similar to—regions outside of the country than others within it.\textsuperscript{158} While information on how South Sudan’s national borderlands have evolved is somewhat minimal due to the limitations of the historical record, it is evident that they have played, and continue play, a central role in shaping conflict in the country and influencing its post-independence statebuilding process.\textsuperscript{159}

This centre/periphery tension has important economic dimensions. The very existence of borders encourages transborder trade, both formal and informal, through the


\textsuperscript{157} Ibid.


creation and reification of economic difference. Customs duties, systems of taxation, export arrangements, prices, market access, legal frameworks and levels of development can vary significantly across international borders, greatly affecting the economic calculations involved in the production and distribution of goods.\textsuperscript{160} Informal transborder trade plays a major role in the political economy of South Sudan. The country’s independence and the definition of its borders has had a significant impact on its national borderlands by separating formerly fluid and interdependent communities—particularly along the newly established South Sudan-Sudan border—altering ownership claims to land and natural resources, placing barriers on migration and influencing the development of areas surrounding borders that gain new economic significance.\textsuperscript{161}

The GoSS’s attempts to assert its authority in its national borderlands has caused it to confront informal transborder trade through increased regulation and efforts to monopolize economic activity, particularly in the area surrounding the South Sudan-Uganda border where the dominance of the South Sudanese state and military acts as an impediment to small-scale Ugandan traders.\textsuperscript{162} This represents a major disconnect between the centralizing efforts of the state and the political economy of its borderlands. Since the signing of the CPA, South Sudan has emerged as the primary destination for exports from Uganda. Much of this trade—perhaps the majority in certain years—passes through informal channels, which overlap with their formal counterparts both in terms of the people and methods employed as well as the goods involved. This informal transborder trade contributes to the livelihoods to those who might otherwise have limited opportunity to sell or purchase goods, thus fundamentally tying them to the economic dynamics of the borderlands they inhabit.\textsuperscript{163}


\textsuperscript{161} Johnson (2010).

\textsuperscript{162} Schomerus, Mareike and Kristof Titeca, “Deals and Dealings: Inconclusive Peace and Treacherous Trade along the South Sudan-Uganda Border,” \textit{Africa Spectrum} 47 (2-3) 2012: 5-31.

Informal transborder trade is not universally benign, however, and commonly entails important internal hierarchies, particularly as certain groups or individuals can come to control access and monopolize profits. Ugandan traders are often seen to dominate informal transborder trade in South Sudan, provoking xenophobia and a widespread sense of injustice.\textsuperscript{164} Nor is this trade always centred on the exchange of licit goods. Practices such as illegal arms trafficking also play a role in informal transborder trade, and can contribute to the perpetuation of regional conflicts. As the respective governments of South Sudan and the Republic of Sudan are accused of seeking to undermine each other through the clandestine support of rebel movements, the illegal trade of arms—and the distinct possibility that state or quasi-state actors play a major role in this trade—represents a major threat to regional stability.\textsuperscript{165} The area surrounding the South Sudan-Sudan border is a key borderland in which both states seek to impose their authority. Informal transborder trade takes places along the newly established and somewhat arbitrary border between the two states, but the form of power that it interacts with is much more militarized than elsewhere as ongoing ‘internal’ conflicts in the region demonstrate.\textsuperscript{166}

Informal transborder trade is often seen to play an ambiguous role in peacebuilding and development, with academic and policy literature oscillating between viewing it as a problem to be solved through liberal reforms and as representative of popular resistance to the failures of the state and the market.\textsuperscript{167} Costly and inefficient channels for formal trade, poor border infrastructure, the lack of access to finance, low market information, corruption and insecurity at formal border crossings and limited levels of education and business training are all seen as primary contributing factors to informal transborder trade,


\textsuperscript{166} “Khartoum Plans to Fight Strongly Food Smuggling to South Sudan,” Sudan Tribune, 23 April 2012; “Khartoum Seizes Trucks Smuggling Food to South Sudan,” Sudan Tribune, 26 April 2012; and Johnson (2010).

which is commonly understood as a form of local neoliberalism that is engaged in by rational actors as a response to illiberal trading systems. These problems are viewed as solvable through further economic liberalization both in South Sudan and elsewhere, as is the existence of informal transborder trade itself. Such an approach, however, is problematic, as liberalization has historically contributed to the expansion of informal transborder trade by facilitating access to global networks of production and exchange. Economic liberalization is therefore fundamentally tied to informal transborder trade, and should not be viewed as a means of eradicating it.

At the same time, informal transborder trade is both incorporated into and disavowed by neoliberalism. On the one hand, it is seen as a local form of neoliberalism that emerges in response to illiberal economic realities; on the other, it is viewed as an undesirable effect of these realities that can be eradicated through liberalizing economic reforms. The partial othering of informal transborder trade is a sign of the extent to which it is conceptually tied to conflict and criminality, suggesting that it is seen to present a threat to security/development nexus that dominates South Sudan and other post-conflict environments. This duality of incorporation and disavowal has important implications for understanding informal transborder trade in terms of power and resistance. Specifically, a notable tension exists between understanding neoliberalism as a form of international power and as the underlying logic of the methods adopted to resist that power. Neoliberalism defines the international system in which South Sudan is politically and economically marginalized as well as the economic orthodoxy adhered to by the international actors involved in South Sudan’s peacebuilding and development projects. It can also be seen to define informal transborder trade where voluntary participation in such activity establishes or perpetuates socioeconomic hierarchies and inequalities. Informal transborder trade can therefore replicate the power dynamics inherent in neoliberalism, thereby complicating the extent to which it can be understood as a form of local resistance.

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169 Ibid; and Yoshino et al.
It is possible to view informal transborder trade as a form of indirect individual or collective resistance to what is perceived as a form of unjust or exclusionary political and economic power. Everyday actors dominate this form of resistance, but a variety of international, national and community actors can be involved in it as well. When the power dynamics of neoliberalism are not replicated, the engagement in informal transborder trade in a way that reflects popular interests represents, in Polanyian terms, an attempt to restore the social embeddedness of a market that no longer functions in a way that benefits local communities. When the power dynamics of neoliberalism are replicated, conversely, informal transborder trade is not related to larger social goals or conducive to broad-based emancipation. Because it contests existing socioeconomic realities, however, it still represents a form of resistance for those who engage in it voluntarily, even if it serves as a form of power for others.

The central variable for understanding informal transborder trade in terms of power or resistance surrounds the interaction of structure and agency. Informal transborder trade involves both voluntary and non-voluntary participation, as while some may engage in informality in a conscious effort to circumvent the inefficiencies of the state or overcome unfavourable socioeconomic conditions, others can be forced into informality as a result of necessity when no other options are available. Resistance requires agency; where agency is absent, resistance cannot be said to exist. Similarly, limiting agency is a key component of power. Those who are forced into informality can therefore not be seen as engaging in resistance. Where agency is present, however, participation in informal transborder trade represents a form of resistance regardless of intent as resistance is an inherent quality of voluntary participation itself. Such resistance can be connected with power, making the dual nature of informal transborder trade a defining feature of South Sudan’s national borderlands.

iii. Internal Borderlands

Finally, states also possess internal borderlands in areas where central authority has limited resonance. The physical geography of a space can affect its governability, as can local lifestyle patterns, cultures and histories. Alternative power structures that circumvent or actively resist centralization can exist in rural communities or develop in urban
environments.\textsuperscript{172} Internal borderlands exist in a number of forms: where ethnic identities mix, where colonial boundaries meet, where development has established economic difference and where private non-state actors exercise political authority.\textsuperscript{173} The boundaries that exist within states can have the same economic effects as national borders, and thus become entrenched as those who benefit from their existence may resist attempts to eliminate them through the imposition of state power.\textsuperscript{174}

South Sudan also possesses a number of internal borderlands where state authority has limited resonance. Both the First and Second Sudanese Civil War involved significant internal divisions with complex and shifting objectives, logics, loyalties, animosities and patterns of violence, complicating overly simplistic narratives that frame each in terms of a popular struggle for independence against an oppressive regime that was universally viewed as illegitimate. Many of the dichotomies that are commonly employed to frame the conflicts—including North/South, black/Arab and Christian/Muslim—are thus inappropriate as they reduce both to the contestation of two monolithic and diametrically opposed groups, failing to account for the multiple and fluid identities that characterized divisions and the heterogeneity of participants. Despite independence, therefore, South Sudan must not be viewed as a homogeneous or internally coherent entity; the state itself lacks universal legitimacy and hegemony within its own territorial limits, and has been forced to contend with the continuation of violence, much of which has significant regional and ethnic dimensions, since the official end of the most recent civil war in 2005.\textsuperscript{175}

Even where the authority of the state is not undermined by violence, the government must contend with local power structures.\textsuperscript{176} The domination of the state by the SPLM/A is another major hindrance to the state’s internal hegemony since, as the

\textsuperscript{172} Goodhand, 229-232; Scott (1998); and Scott (2009).
\textsuperscript{173} This typology of internal borderlands is provided in Jackson, Stephen, “Potential Difference: Internal Borderlands in Africa,” in Pugh, Cooper and Turner. eds., 266-283.
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid.
SPLM/A is a former guerrilla force that came to power in a deeply divisive civil war and is particularly associated with the Dinka, one of the country’s major ethnic groups, it does not enjoy universal support or legitimacy. Accusations of widespread abuses of power and the perpetration of violence further limit the government’s popularity, while rising crime rates in urban areas have raised concerns about the state’s ability to maintain its monopoly on violence. The South Sudanese state must therefore be conceptualized not as a unified territorial entity in which the government exercises complete authority, but rather as a space where state control is confined to strategic centres of power and interspersed with areas where this power has little or no resonance. South Sudan’s internal conflicts can be understood in terms of the government’s attempts to impose state authority beyond existing centres of power and the resistance that this engenders.

South Sudan’s internal borderlands have important economic dimensions. During the Second Sudanese Civil War, the SPLM/A sometimes interfered with local trade patterns or violently took them over, leading to local resistance in the form of efforts to evade monopolization and widespread violent confrontation. The conflict also involved the commoditization and monetization of rural livelihoods, which had a significant impact on ‘traditional’ practices such as cattle-raiding by creating incentives for profit and establishing linkages to broader trade networks. Land tenure claims have been similarly transformed, with the emergence of assertions of ownership based on wartime experiences reflecting the commoditization of human life. These changes are widely seen to reflect the encroachment of an urban monetary economy that is associated with the corrupt practices of the government and the army. The perceived failures and abuses of the

180 Walraet, Anne, “Governance, Violence and the Struggle for Economic Regulation in South Sudan: The Case of Budi County (Eastern Equatoria),” *Afrika Focus* 21 (2) 2008: 53-70.
monetary economy have reified local power structures, while also forcing those who participate in it to adapt to established social relations.\textsuperscript{182}

South Sudan’s internal borderlands therefore possess unique economic characteristics that have been shaped by centre/periphery interactions as external forces influence and are contested by local economic realities. Power and resistance structure these interactions, with local power structures representing a sphere in which direct collective resistance can take place. The targets of resistance here are the external influences associated with the state and the urban monetary economy that are transforming local economic realities. Insofar as these local structures reflect popular interests, their maintenance serves as a Polanyian double movement that seeks to prevent the disentangling of society and the economy, and also a form of Gramscian counter-hegemony that contests existing systems of power while a providing viable social, political and economic alternatives. Beyond such a simplistic equation of ‘the local’ with resistance, however, it is also important to recognize that what constitutes power for some can serve as a form of resistance for others. While local power structures seek to resist the imposition of external political economies as a means of maintaining a social and political status quo, they also act as a form of power themselves. For those who are dissatisfied with the status quo, embracing these external political economies—such as the commoditization of cattle-raiding or alternative land tenure claims—may serve as an effective form of resistance.\textsuperscript{183} Power and resistance are thus not mutually exclusive, and indeed may be practiced by the same actors or present in the same phenomena. In these instances, what constitutes power and resistance is purely based on perspective.

The fact that local socioeconomic realities are both influenced by and able to influence external political economies demonstrates the extent to which the centre/periphery dynamics of South Sudan’s internal borderlands are characterized by hybridity. Power and resistance are neither static nor monolithic; the interaction between the two is one of constant redefinition, reaction and transformation. This relationship defines the dynamism and persistence of the country’s borderlands, and demonstrates the

\textsuperscript{182} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{183} Ibid; and Walraet.
inherent limitations of peacebuilding and development initiatives that are narrowly focused on the expansion of centralized authority.

iv. Conclusions

This chapter has argued that resistance plays a significant role in the political economy of South Sudan’s borderlands. In doing so, it has conceptualized the country’s borderlands in three distinct ways. First, South Sudan has historically existed as an international borderland at the margins of political and economic power. Current peacebuilding and development initiatives threaten to perpetuate this marginalization by (re)integrating the country into an international system in which its access to power remains minimal. Informal and illicit networks are able to counter this official exclusion by (re)linking the country to the global economy in a way that is fundamentally connected to neoliberal logics and processes. Second, South Sudan possesses national borderlands where the authority of the state contests with regional dynamics that transcend national boundaries. Informal transborder trade is a key feature of the political economy of South Sudan’s national borderlands, and while it can possess its own power dimensions that are tied to neoliberalism, engagement in informal transborder trade still constitutes a form of resistance to the economic and political power of the state. Finally, the country contains a variety of internal borderlands where the state has little resonance. The political economy of these spaces has been profoundly shaped by conflict and constantly transformed by interactions with external economic realities. Subjectivity and hybridity define these interactions and are thus key features of the political economy of the country’s internal borderlands.

All three forms of borderlands addressed in this chapter are defined by centre/periphery tensions that must be understood in terms of power and resistance, where attempts to normalize and incorporate externalized spaces are met with entrenched social, political and economic forces. It is essential that South Sudan’s peacebuilding and development projects take the power and resistance dynamics that define the country’s borderlands into account. Local realities, needs and interests must be engaged with in South Sudan’s borderlands, and the hierarchies, inequalities and injustices that shape these spaces must be addressed in a way that emphasizes local ownership, popular support and
emancipation. Insofar as the resistant dynamics of the country’s borderlands contribute to such an objective, they should play a central role in peacebuilding and development. Informal transborder trade and traditional social, political and economic structures are especially relevant here, but given the extent to which each involves its own forms of power, neither should be viewed as entirely conducive to peace or equitable development. Their resistance dynamics, however, provide a valuable alternative to the hierarchies and forms of exclusion and exploitation that characterize neoliberal power. These dynamics may not cohere with existing orthodoxy, but they are nevertheless a defining feature of South Sudan’s political economy and must play a central role in the country’s post-conflict reconstruction.
Chapter VI: Conclusions and Potential Avenues for Future Research

This study has addressed the under-conceptualization of resistance in contemporary peacebuilding and development projects by exploring how post-conflict economic orthodoxy is contested in South Sudan. A framework of resistance emphasizing a diversity of actors, methods and targets, the interaction of structure and agency and the difficulties surrounding the issue of intent has been proposed and subsequently applied to economic activities that are cast as informal, illicit and illegitimate by the neoliberal economic logic that dominates the country’s post-conflict environment. This framework has provided a number of valuable insights into such economic activities, demonstrating the necessity of understanding the resistance as a central feature of the political economy of South Sudan.

Informal economic activity possesses a certain degree of ambivalence within the neoliberal logic that informs South Sudan’s post-conflict economic orthodoxy. While neoliberal approaches often view the informal sector as a form of local neoliberalism that exists as a result of the costs and inefficiencies involved in formality, they also present the informal sector as a problem to be solved through further economic liberalization. This simultaneous incorporation and disavowal of informality by neoliberalism demonstrates a denial of the extent to which neoliberalism is tied to power and possesses its own forms of domination, exploitation and exclusion. While informal economic activity serves for some as a means of resisting the failures of the formal sector, it exists for others as a sphere of power in which the hierarchies and forms of exclusion that define neoliberalism are replicated and unregulated. The presence of agency is essential for understanding participation in the informal sector as resistance. Where agency is absent, so is resistance. Where agency can be identified, however, resistance can be said to be present as well, regardless of whether or not this resistance is tied to the very form of neoliberal power that produces it.

Other economic activities occupy a less ambivalent role in neoliberal orthodoxy, and are instead criminalized or delegitimized altogether. The dichotomization of licit/illicit and legitimate/illegitimate economic activity, however, has limited local resonance in South Sudan. Debates surrounding corruption and land tenure in South Sudan demonstrate the extent to which orthodox understandings of legitimacy and legality are commonly resisted. Corruption, which is seen as illegal and illegitimate in neoliberal orthodoxy, is
fundamentally tied to both poverty and neoliberalism itself, and therefore cannot be understood as the antithesis of neoliberalism or as enjoying local legitimacy. Neoliberal understandings of legality and legitimacy are also contested by a variety of actors in South Sudan, as demonstrated by the widespread resistance that the acquisition of land by foreign firms and investors inspired in the country. Understandings of legitimacy and legality are neither neutral nor apolitical, and their definition is a key quality of economic and political power. They are also not static or uncontested, and the ways in which they are resisted and redefined is a dominant feature of the political economy of South Sudan.

Power and resistance also define South Sudan’s borderlands. Informal and illicit networks are able to partially (re)integrate South Sudan into the international system at the same time that the country is excluded from formal access to political and economic power. Informal transborder trade ties South Sudan’s national borderlands to adjacent territories in a way that undermines the centralizing efforts of the state. Finally, the authority of the South Sudanese state competes with local social, political and economic realities in internal spaces where state power is limited. The centre/periphery dynamics that shape each aspect of the country’s borderlands are defined by the interaction of power and resistance in a way that is both subjective and hybrid. Resistance has a transformative effect on the political economy of South Sudan’s borderlands, even if it cannot be universally defined.

These arguments can be generalized into a number of key findings, which are highlighted in the next section of this chapter. The final section outlines several avenues for potentially valuable future research that follow from this study.

i. **Key Findings**

This study has a number of key findings. The framework of resistance it has employed emphasizes themes that are commonly neglected in the standard theory and praxis of peacebuilding and development. Resistance must be conceptualized broadly to incorporate a diverse set of actors, methods and targets so as to capture the phenomenon its full breadth, depth and complexity. The actors, methods and targets involved in resistance are extremely variable. International, national, community and everyday actors can all participate in resistance, but as all can also participate in power, analyses that equate
resistance with ‘the local’ and power with ‘the international’ must be rejected as too simplistic. The methods of resistance are similarly diverse, and can be categorized based on their directness and whether they are undertaken individually or collectively. Beyond traditional understandings of resistance as a form of overt violence or concerted action, resistance can also be ideational or discursive, as described by both Gramsci and Foucault, or, following Scott, focused on everyday activities that contest the hegemony of power over individual life. No action is inherently resistant, but rather becomes a method of resistance based on the agency of the actors involved. Power thus produces the potential for, rather than the reality of, resistance, and possesses co-optive abilities that, following Gramsci and Foucault, can influence compliance. The production of this potential is a key feature of power, and this potential can only become realized by the agency of those who seek to target power in any of its manifestations. These manifestations can take on many forms, and intent is often difficult to discern, but resistance emerges in response to definable, circumstantially dependent applications of power. Those who engage in resistance may have little in common, and may indeed engage in very different actions for very different purposes, but they are nevertheless united by their conscious contestation of power.

Another central finding is that resistance is fundamentally tied to power. Both power and resistance can be mutually present in the same phenomena when what constitutes power for some actors can constitute resistance for others. Resistance is therefore largely a matter of perspective and can often not be understood in universal terms. Furthermore, the interaction of power and resistance frequently results in the hybridization of the two where both become redefined and, at times, difficult to distinguish from each other. These ties to power mean that that resistance is not necessarily emancipatory; indeed, in many cases, a form of resistance by some actors may inhibit emancipation for others. Power and resistance are therefore neither static nor discreet entities; each is informed and shaped by the other and the two may be conceptually inseparable beyond subjective positionality. When resistance contests power, it may take on many of the attributes of power itself. Recognizing when this occurs requires careful analysis of specific interactions of power and resistance, as has been undertaken in this
study. Such a task is often difficult, but must nevertheless be undertaken as a part of any peacebuilding and development initiative.

This study has also provided important insights on post-conflict South Sudan. The neoliberal orthodoxy that dominates the country’s current peacebuilding and development projects is disconnected from its economic realities and the needs and interests of a large portion of its population. Activities that are cast as informal, illicit or illegitimate by neoliberalism play a major role in the political economy of the country, and insofar as these are externalized, misunderstood or ignored, the country’s prospects for long-term peace and inclusive economic development will remain limited. South Sudan’s complex economic realities can serve as an asset rather than a liability for its future, but this would require significant changes to the country’s current direction. South Sudan must be able to forge a post-conflict political economy that is broad-based and locally owned, and one that minimizes hierarchical and exclusionary power arrangements. The outcome of such a process may not cohere with certain external expectations, but will likely improve the country’s prospects for development and stability.

More broadly, the introduction of neoliberal reforms in post-conflict environments must be seen as both conceptually and practically problematic. The securitization of development and the marketization of peace, both of which have become defining features of post-conflict economic intervention, possess the potential to undermine the establishment of long-term peace by failing to address the root causes of conflict or local needs, interests, perspectives and subjective political economy realities. The extent to which neoliberal logics and processes dominate post-conflict economic orthodoxy emphasizes the importance of continuing to problematize the underlying assumptions of neoliberalism while analyzing its local contacts. Studying resistance, both in general theoretical terms and in its specific manifestations, provides the opportunity to explore alternatives to the failures of neoliberal post-conflict economic orthodoxy that are locally relevant. The value of this task, both for South Sudan and for post-conflict environments more generally, must not be underestimated.
ii. *Future Research*

The findings of this project provide several avenues for valuable future research. Most fundamentally, conceptualizing resistance in post-conflict environments would greatly benefit from further case study work. Whether the arguments presented in this study are merely applicable to South Sudan or more generalizable is an important question, and one that can only be addressed through the rigorous scholarly analysis of other post-conflict contexts. The framework of resistance employed in this study builds upon several theoretically and empirically diverse bodies of literature, particularly the study of resistance and critical analyses of peacebuilding, neoliberalism, African history and postcolonialism. The flexibility of this framework, or indeed any similar theoretical approach to resistance, should be explored through its repeated application to a diverse set of contexts. Subjectivity is a defining aspect of resistance. Case study analysis therefore must be a central component of any future research agenda.

Informal, criminalized and delegitimized economic activities also deserve further scholarly attention. Existing studies commonly lack detailed primary accounts of the nature of these systems of production, accumulation and exchange, emphasizing the potential for future qualitative analysis to provide necessary insight into their emergence, survival, transformations, structures and organizations, their local, regional and transnational linkages, and their social, cultural and political implications. Quantitative studies would be valuable as well insofar as key economic data could further the understanding of the scale of informal, illicit and illegitimate activities as well as the trends that define them. Research that particularly focuses on post-conflict environments and the ramifications that these activities have for peacebuilding and development would be especially relevant. This relates to the more general objective of continuing to problematize and uncover viable alternatives to neoliberalism, which, despite the volume of existing critical literature, continues to dominate economic orthodoxy in post-conflict environments and beyond. As this study has argued, these alternatives may be fundamentally tied to existing forms of resistance, again emphasizing the necessity of studying resistance wherever and however it becomes manifest.

Similarly, more empirical work on South Sudan needs to be undertaken. The existing literature surrounding the country’s post-conflict peacebuilding and development
initiatives is, at the time of writing, largely limited to official policy documents or other non-academic studies. While this notable absence of scholarly literature enhances the value of this project, it presents a major obstacle for critical analysis to develop or have any impact on the country’s future. Studying the political economy of the country while problematizing dominant approaches and uncovering broad-based, locally owned, contextually relevant and emancipatory alternatives to these must continue if the problems outlined in this study are to be addressed. The success of peacebuilding and development in South Sudan is by no means guaranteed. Relevant scholarly research possesses the potential to contribute to the country’s growth and stability, but can only do so if the right questions are asked.
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