WORLD WAR II MYTHOLOGIES AND THE PREWAR RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ

Tara Michelle Beeny

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of MPhil
at the
University of St Andrews

2015

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World War II Mythologies
and the
Prewar Reconstruction of Iraq

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Master of Philosophy in International Relations.
26 September 2014
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For my mother,
who taught me to love books,

and my father
who taught me to love words.
ABSTRACT

This dissertation interrogates the positionality of postconflict reconstruction efforts in Iraq within the broader discourse of the liberal peace and liberal reconstruction. It examines how U.S. policymakers planned and articulated the reconstruction of Iraq in relationship to historical examples, specifically the cases of West Germany and Japan. It questions how U.S. policymakers understood and utilized the examples of post-World War II reconstruction and the effect those examples had on the policymaking process.

This dissertation traces the role historical memory plays in the formation and articulation of foreign policy by examining the use of historical analogies in planning the political, economic, and civil reconstruction of Iraq. It finds that the largest factor contributing to miscalculation in the invasion and occupation of Iraq was not conservative hawkishness, or liberal ineffectiveness, but rather a common mythology shared by many members of the U.S. foreign policy community, including the Bush administration, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the most prominent Washington think tanks.

This common mythology asserts that U.S. and Allied postwar reconstruction efforts in West Germany and Japan were unequivocal successes that led directly to the liberal democracies and neoliberal economies found today in Germany and Japan. This conventional wisdom shapes which policies appeared viable to U.S. policymakers, and resulted in undeserved optimism during the postwar planning for Iraq. This dissertation concludes that the lessons of postconflict reconstruction in Iraq remain contested. Lackluster results in Iraq have not caused U.S. policymakers to re-evaluate their understanding of the U.S. role in postconflict reconstruction. Rather, the case of Iraq is being absorbed into the existing conventional wisdom, with believers in postconflict reconstruction claiming Iraq was simply planned poorly, or was not met with the kind of resources and commitment that could have led to success.
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INTRODUCTION

March 2013 saw the ten-year anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and launched a collective spate of reflection and commentary within the American political establishment. What lessons have been learned from the invasion and the subsequent ill-fated attempts at postconflict reconstruction? Are they the right lessons? Have they actually been “learned”? This discussion occurred across the pages of international and national newspapers, while *Foreign Policy* magazine and the Foreign Policy Initiative (among others) conducted roundtable debates devoted to exploring the motivations and effects of the American misadventure in Iraq. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the American Enterprise Institute, the Center for Global Development, the Center for National Policy, and Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, among other policy think tanks and research institutions, released position papers, policy briefs, and editorial pieces debating all aspects of the subject.

This debate occurs amongst discussions about American foreign and domestic policy, but also across the borders of the concept of the liberal peace, or liberal reconstruction. As Mac Ginty and Richmond note, the liberal peace has, “become the de facto central organising framework for peace interventions and reconstruction efforts in the aftermath of contemporary civil wars.” To say as much is not to make the normative argument that postconflict reconstruction must, or even should, proceed along these lines; it is to note that state actors, nongovernmental organizations, and international institutions from the United Nations to the World Bank, have adopted procedures and best practices that conform, broadly speaking, to some combination of good-governance and neoliberal economics. These twin pillars of political and economic reconstruction tend to incorporate democratic governance (generally in the Western tradition), with an emphasis on human rights, the rule of law, and support for civil society. Economically, the agenda privileges market capitalism, and free and open trade relations. The tale of how this consensus arose is too long to recap here, but arguably its origins

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1 It should be noted that similar soul-searching occurred in the United Kingdom, where Chatham House, *The Economist*, and *The New Statesman* all issued special reports and editions evaluating the fallout ten years after the invasion. *The Huffington Post* and *The Independent* both devoted extensive coverage to a public debate held at Goldsmiths, University of London.

can be traced at least to 1914, if not well before, as the examples of the U.S. Civil War and the Boer War were followed by the first international reconstruction efforts following the First World War.

Supporters of the liberal peace look to it as the best framework for melding mediation and development, and thus alleviating the underdevelopment and political marginalization that may spark and fuel violence and interstate war. Detractors of the liberal peace consider it little more than window dressing for neo-colonial or neo-imperial aspirations by the Global North. They critique the ineffectiveness of a Western-centric (and state-centric) approach that relies too heavily on institutions, privileging form over function, to the detriment of human life. Other theorists attempt to bridge the gap between liberal peace advocates and their Critical and post-modern critics, attempting to reform rather than replace the current model of liberal reconstruction. As Williams has argued, "simple denunciations or weary acceptation of “reality” are simply not good enough.”

In the United States, an international relations discourse dominated by rationalism and positivism often utilizes empirical case studies as part of this debate. These scholars attempt to draw conclusions from historical examples, working to isolate variables that contribute to—or detract from—the success of reconstruction missions. A reoccurring debate within the literature on postconflict reconstruction centres on how certain cases can or should be classified. Should cases of international trusteeship or administration fall in the same category as unilateral or multilateral projects conducted by individual nations or “coalitions of the willing”? Should past colonial projects be considered in the same category as post-Cold War nation building? Although the debate is not surprising, failure to agree which cases are relevant makes subsequent discussion disjointed. In the more than ten years since the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, many authors have grappled with the problem of how to understand Iraq in this broader and longer context of U.S. and international postconflict reconstruction efforts across the world.

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Iraq as Exception: Liberal Proponents

Some supporters of liberal reconstruction are resistant to viewing U.S. operations in Iraq as part of the larger history of liberal reconstruction. If Iraq is an exception, then the broader course of liberal reconstruction can continue unsullied. Samuels and von Einsiedel isolate Iraq on the basis of the coalition—or lack thereof—that undertook its reconstruction. They draw a distinction between unilateral and multilateral reconstruction projects, arguing “the lesson from Iraq, at least in relation to state-building, may well be that such interventions are so exceptionally difficult and politically sensitive that only a body with broad international and local legitimacy stands a good chance of success.” By classifying Iraq as a unilateral, rather than multilateral endeavour, Samuels and von Einsiedel can argue for salvaging the course of liberal reconstruction as a legitimate and useful exercise, if only it is undertaken in a multilateral manner with broad international support.

Other proponents of the liberal peace draw lessons from the Iraq experience in an effort to improve liberal reconstruction efforts. Bellin points to historical, contextual, and operational characteristics that distinguish reconstruction in Iraq from international efforts elsewhere. Critiquing the comparison between reconstruction efforts in Iraq and postwar reconstruction in West Germany and Japan, Bellin concludes the cases of Bosnia and Haiti are more comparable, and argues for extended—rather than brief—interventions. Rathmell’s analysis of Iraq’s reconstruction under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) can be read in a similar vein; he uses the case of Iraq to suggest improvements to the project of liberal reconstruction. Still others have focused on the importance of intention and motive, seeking to distinguish operations in Iraq from previous military interventions in an effort to salvage the project of the liberal peace by removing the ethical baggage of the Iraq intervention. Glaser’s effort to “Iraq-proof” a doctrine of just military intervention is a prime example of this strain of the discourse.

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Iraq as Example: Liberal Detractors

Critics of liberal reconstruction are keen to view the case of Iraq as an example, rather than exception, to the course of post-conflict reconstruction. Detractors of the liberal peace argue the case of Iraq harbours marked similarities to other historical case studies, and view it as yet another example of the damaging effects of liberal peace ideology. Jacoby fiercely stakes out this position, arguing the aim of reconstruction is to repress genuine democratic mobilization and advance the aims of hegemonic and imperial ambition. Lachler concurs, albeit less colourfully, noting, “What we see at work in Iraqi reconstruction as in other interventions in conflict, post-conflict, or non-conflict settings is the reproduction and expansion of a hegemonic international order.”

This view is not limited to post-structuralist and critical opponents of the liberal peace, however. Quinn and Cox, Mac Ginty and Richmond, and Williams are sagely aware of the problems of the liberal peace. They note the liberal peace’s vulnerability to charges of imperialism; the oftentimes non-democratic nature of the liberal market economy; the tensions between “benign hegemony”, empire, and imperialism. However, these historically minded advocates of the liberal peace still ascribe some merit to aspects of U.S. interventions, however problematic, arguing the current version of liberal reconstruction is preferable to the alternatives of dissolving states or perpetual war.

The positionality of Iraq with respect to the history of postconflict reconstruction remains contested. Proponents of the liberal peace have not managed to successfully articulate a version of that school of thought that can adequately defend against charges of neo-imperialism or self-serving hegemony. Detractors of the liberal peace have a strong case in citing Iraq as an exemplary model of the end result of neoliberal intervention, but their critiques have little constructive guidance to impart to policymakers seeking solutions to very present challenges. This is not a new dilemma, but rather one original to the cause of liberalism. To oversimplify: Locke may have argued that all men must be free, and Kant may have hoped that freedom

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would bring peace, but Mill would always maintain that freed men will not always choose peace, and that freedom could never be imposed. As Walzer argues, “[A community] cannot be set free, as [an individual] cannot be made virtuous, by any external force.” To paraphrase Lachler, what is at stake in arguments about the exceptionality or exemplarity of Iraq is nothing less than the rationale and genealogy of the postconflict peacebuilding agenda as a whole.

This project examines the positionality of postconflict reconstruction in Iraq through the discourse of the U.S. policy elite in advance of the 2003 invasion. Many authors have examined the intentions and ideologies of various individuals and entities within the Bush administration, and journalistic accounts chronicling the lead-up to the invasion and the subsequent occupation are valuable sources. However, a comprehensive analysis of discourse within and without the administration has not occurred. Although the pre-invasion discourse of U.S. policymakers is replete with reference to historical cases of liberal reconstruction, the way policymakers compared their efforts in Iraq to the broader history of the liberal peace has not been examined.

**Research Questions**

In an effort to understand the positionality of postconflict reconstruction efforts in Iraq, this project examines how key voices in the American political sphere planned and articulated the reconstruction of Iraq in relationship to historical examples. More specifically, how did the U.S. discourse of postconflict reconstruction prior to the 2003 invasion utilize the cases of West Germany and Japan? Do understandings of post-World War II reconstruction in the U.S. discourse prior to the 2003 Iraq invasion reflect the original goals of those projects? These questions speak to issues of the liberal peace, as well as liberal reconstruction, but also to the

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formation and articulation of foreign policy goals, and the importance of institutional and cultural memory in foreign policy making.

**Historical Analogy: Legitimation or Conceptualisation**

*How did the U.S. discourse of postconflict reconstruction prior to the 2003 Iraq invasion utilize the cases of West Germany and Japan?*

Political leaders often use historical analogy in policy articulation, but is this a way of making sense of the challenges they face, or merely a rhetorical tool of policy legitimation? Yuen Foong Khong’s *Analogies at War* argues the answer is both: in the case of the U.S. intervention in Vietnam, American policy makers used historical analogy to make sense of the conflict, and as evidence for their preferred policies.17 In the case of Iraq, if historical analogy served primarily a tool of policy legitimation, the use of historical analogies may be present in documents directed at the public, but absent from the administration’s internal debates. Conversely, employment of historical analogy as a means of understanding new policy challenges should evidence similarities in historical reasoning across an administration’s public and private discourse.

**Debating Intention: Memory and Mythology**

*Do understandings of post-World War II reconstruction in the U.S. discourse prior to the 2003 Iraq invasion reflect the original goals of those projects?*

Some authors have explicitly (or implicitly) analysed reconstruction cases on the basis of intention. In U.S. postconflict reconstruction discourse from 2003, Dobbins et al. discard projects in the Philippines, Korea, Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, Lebanon, Grenada, and Panama from their analysis of U.S. postconflict reconstruction on the basis of intention: the Philippines because the project “was intended to span several generations,” and the later cases because of “more limited objectives.”18 Fukuyama notes, “the logic of this argument is not

18 James Dobbins et al., *America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2003), 27.
clear,” \textsuperscript{19} while Jason Brownlee and Greg Grandin both critique this tendency at length. Grandin argues analytic comparisons of state reconstruction that focus unduly on West Germany and Japan “consistently ignore the one place where the United States has projected its influence for more than two centuries,” i.e. Latin America. \textsuperscript{20} Brownlee notes, “If the leading studies of nation-building have selected an unrepresentative sample, the lessons they draw may be commensurately skewed.” \textsuperscript{21}

Authors arguing in favour of multilateral postconflict reconstruction and against unilateral policies have divided cases similarly. This is arguably an attempt to draw a distinction between “intervention” and “reconstruction” with the former being an exercise in (often unilateral) realist power projection, and the latter an (often multilateral) attempt to create a liberal, democratic regime in the Western model. This distinction is a result of the gradual evolution and melding of theories of peacebuilding, development, and humanitarian intervention. \textsuperscript{22} Earlier practice aimed at intervention, with an eventual, possibly long-term, by-product of democratic governance. Today, reconstruction aims at more immediate democratic results. \textsuperscript{23} Because the goals of interventions (or reconstructions) have changed with time, distinguishing and evaluating case studies on the basis of intention can only be valuable if grounded in accurate historical analysis. The U.S. literature from prior to the invasion of Iraq ignores critical nuance from the cases of West Germany and Japan, not only in terms of what policymakers in the postwar period intended to achieve, but also what their policies accomplished. Rather, the U.S. literature from this period seems to suffer from reading Cold War justifications and later historical developments back onto policies enacted in the postwar era. Re-examining the cases of West Germany and Japan brings necessary variance back into the postconflict reconstruction debate, and highlights the danger of distinguishing and evaluating cases on the basis of poorly understood intentions.

\textsuperscript{19} Fukuyama, “Introduction: Nation-Building and the Failure of Institutional Memory,” 2.
\textsuperscript{22} Williams, Liberalism and War, 126-130; Roger Mac Ginty and Andrew Williams, Conflict and Development (New York; Routledge, 2009), 122-131.
Theoretical Approach

The collective pantheon of international relations theories endows scholars with a plethora of choices when it comes to ontological, epistemological and methodological approaches. I have drawn on the work of several constructivist and post-structural theorists who have worked to articulate a middle ground between the politically conscious critiques of critical theory and post-structuralism, and the linguistically focused and intersubjective views of some strains of constructivism. This project draws from the nexus of poststructuralist, critical, and constructivist thought, particularly the work of thinkers such as Thierry Balzaq, Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, and Karin M. Fierke. I ascribe to the general constructivist maxim that any reality worth speaking of is necessarily socially constructed, and also that the observer is necessarily part and parcel of their own social constructions. However, I hope to avoid the rationalist and positivist pitfalls that underlie much of Alexander Wendt’s constructivist articulations, thereby avoiding essentialism, and preserving the emphasis on agency and causality that is so crucial to critical research in the social sciences. Fierke terms this approach “consistent constructivism”, while Jackson describes his approach as “transactional social constructionist” in the post-structural vein. Some may question the efficacy or intellectual stability of this approach, and I hope to address those concerns in the following pages.

During the 1980s, discussions of ontology and epistemology in the discipline of international relations centred around the “Third Debate”, wherein post-positivists contested the dominance and utility of rationalist and realist thought, and challenged the failure of positivist theory to adequately predict or explain change and historical contingency. As a result of these critiques, constructivism became more enmeshed in the theoretical topography of international relations discourse, particularly following Wendt’s work attempting to bridge rationalist and constructivist paradigms. Fierke notes Wendt’s attempt tacks very near to positivism and rationalism by (1) insisting on a distinction between the ideational and material, (2) pursuing

causal explanations and (3) emphasizing the role of action rather than language. While Wendt’s theorization rejects immutable manifestations of identity, and thus permits states to construct and alter the rules of the system on a social basis, these forces are shaped by putatively exogenous systemic anarchy. The assumption of anarchy foregrounds Wendt’s causal argument, and thus infringes on claims he might make to preserving agency. Wendt’s articulation is focused on action and deed, ignoring the medium of language through which social actions are articulated and understood.

Preserving the Intersubjective

The attempt by some constructivists to distinguish between the “ideational” and the “material” tracks closely to positivist orthodoxy and is inconsistent with the intersubjective foundations of constructivism. Just as rationalism and realism can be criticized for privileging putatively exogenous interests in a material sense, so too some iterations of constructivism have privileged putatively exogenous interests in an ideational one. Neither approach holds true to the intersubjective basis of constructivism, wherein “Intersubjectivity is a dialogical relationship in so far as meaning and practices arise out of interaction.”

Replacing a relationship between material factors and outcomes with a causal relationship between ideational factors and outcomes is not consistent with intersubjectivity. Such an approach robs actors of their historical context and thus draws a distorted view of agency. Wendt’s acceptance of the state as a unitary actor is emblematic of this issue, for if states behave as unitary actors it becomes difficult to understand the actions of individuals within their own historical context. This project attempts to contextualize actors within the U.S. foreign policy establishment within their own discourse. By viewing discourse and policy outcomes as part and parcel of one another, I hope to avoid essentialism of either intention or identity, and preserve the role of agency in policy making.

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30 Fierke, “Critical Methodology and Constructivism,” 117.
Foregrounding Ontology

Some delineate the divide between rationalism and reflectivism at primarily an epistemological and methodological (rather than ontological) level. Kurki and Wight explain that concerns about knowing are the drivers in the ultimate decision about what can be known, thus, “The explanatory theorist reduces the ontological complexity of the social world to those aspects of it that can be observed and measured. Thus the ontology adopted by this approach is shaped by epistemological and methodological concerns.” It is perhaps true that the explanatory, rationalist, and/or positivist theorist follows this method, but it is far from certain that theorists hoping to contextualize actors in a social context have necessarily arrived at their decision in the same way.

A social ontology should necessitate a social epistemology and methodology, and vice versa. However, it is conceivable that a purposefully positivist ontology could chose to adopt a social epistemology. This, some would argue, is precisely what Wendt has done. Just as Weber’s ideas of Erklären and Verstehen have framed much of the “Third Debate” about positivism and post-positivism, so too Wittgenstein’s work has been used to frame the subsequent “linguistic turn” in international relations specifically and social science more generally. As Fierke notes, “a constructivist epistemology, as a product of the linguistic turn, builds on the notion that we cannot get behind our language to compare it which that which it describes (Wittgenstein 1958). Language is bound up in the world rather than a mirror of it.” In Fierke’s understanding, the epistemological construction is decidedly a product of a specific ontological understanding; the latter necessarily precedes the former. By pairing a social ontology with a social constructivist epistemology, I hope to retain intellectual consistency in my analysis of U.S. discourse surrounding Iraq reconstruction, and thus avoid the positivist assumptions of other strains of constructivism.

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32 Kurki and Wight, “International Relations and Social Science,” 20.
33 Fierke, “Constructivism,” 194.
Possibilities of Language – Impossibilities of Determining Intention

Wittgenstein argues we cannot get behind our language; that, in fact, there is no way of knowing, or understanding, or even speaking about that which we cannot articulate. Fierke’s consistent constructivism challenges the idea that language is merely a set of labels for objective reality or the subjective intentions of individual actors. Instead, “An approach to language as rule-based requires that we ‘look and see’ how language is put to use by social actors as they construct their world.” Jackson similarly argues that he cannot and is not trying to speak about the intention of actors, because he could never do so. Intentions cannot be determined, because they cannot be separated from the language used to articulate them. In a world that is explicitly ontologically constructed, it follows that our epistemology and methodology need to follow from our understanding of the world. One cannot argue for a socially constructed world, and then speak to tangible and essentialist identity, motives, or intention. This project will thus speak to rules rather than causes, to articulated positions rather than intention.

Methodological Approach

Having laid the ontological basis for an understanding of the world, it is important to speak now to epistemological considerations. As noted above, this follows necessarily from an ontological understanding, such that the so-called ‘Fourth Debate’ is as much between rationalists and reflexivists as it is over the boundaries between constructivism and critical theory. Two clear examples of this process are Emmanuel Adler’s efforts to distinguish constructivism from its poststructuralist companions, and David Campbell’s articulation of poststructuralism against constructivism. These debates have challenged weaknesses in Wendt’s brand of constructivism, pointing to an inherent positivism that remains responsible for the reification of realist practice and the consolidation of existing power structures.

34 Fierke, “Constructivism,” 197.
35 Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy, 46 and 251.
37 Campbell, “Epilogue,” 207-228.
Subsequent challenges involve attempts to delineate the boundaries between a positivist constructivism and a more critical (and politically conscious) post-structuralism.\textsuperscript{39}

Jackson has taken this line of critique even further in his analysis of post-World War II reconstruction. Realist and rationalist perspectives rely heavily on exogenously specified interests, but as Wendt has noted, this makes it difficult (if not impossible) for such theoretical lenses to account for or predict change. The end of the Cold War is the clearest example of this predictive failure, but the critique applies to other rationalist projects in which interests are either assumed as given, or extrapolated from material or systemic factors. Certain veins of constructivism have also encountered this problem; those who focus on identity, or norms, inevitably identify interests that are produced exogenously. As Jackson notes, a focus on putatively exogenous interests—be they material or ideational—may ignore much of the dynamism and ambiguity of social reality and “account for social stability in terms that are ultimately non-social—and therefore deny that social action can alter interests.”\textsuperscript{40} Such theorization is not only determinist, and thus ignores agency, but it also eliminates social aspects of causality.

**The Unimportance of “Belief”**

Jackson proposes a “meso” explanation that focuses not on the decisions or interests of individual actors, but rather on how the development and deployment of rhetorical strategies created social dynamics that resulted in the formulation of certain policies. Jackson notes:

> The object of explanation here is not individual decisions or behaviours; my account is (deliberately) unable to definitively explain why Konrad Adenauer or Dean Acheson as individuals oriented their activities toward 'the West' as opposed to adopting some very different social goal. Such as biographical or psychological explanation, although interesting in its own right, is not strictly necessary to an explanation of social arrangements that focuses on concatenations of social practice. Concentrating on the

\textsuperscript{39} For an excellent (and entertaining) example of this continuing debate, see the four back-to-back reviews conducted by Colin Wight and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson in *Cooperation and Conflict* 43 (2008) 341-360.

\textsuperscript{40} Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy, 246.
motives of individuals is a very different analytical exercise that concentrating on the social conditions of possibility that make social action possible.\textsuperscript{41} By focusing on social concatenations rather than material or ideal interests, Jackson also avoids rationalist and realist critiques that would question the objective “truth” of statements or articulations by policymakers. Such an account is neither concerned with, nor reliant on whether policymakers truly “believe” their rhetoric. The importance of the articulation is that it exists as such; that it has been related to a specific audience for a specific policy purpose.

**Jackson’s “Rhetorical Commonplaces”**

Jackson argues policy articulations are constrained by prior articulations and the reasonable expectations of the audience. Thus, “public officials cannot simply say anything that they like in defense of a policy” because “each set of speakers, audience, and issues is characterized by a group of rhetorical commonplaces on which speakers can draw with any hope of having the audience follow their arguments, let alone be moved to action by them.” Jackson is interested not only in how the rhetorical commonplace of ‘Western Civilization’ was created, but also how it became part of the postwar public discourse in the United States and Germany. With respect to the discourse surrounding postconflict reconstruction in Iraq prior to the 2003 invasion, I am interested only in how the rhetorical commonplace of post-World War II reconstruction success became part of the discourse and how it was used. The question of how such a commonplace came about is no doubt important, and rooted firmly in American historiography of the postwar and Cold War periods. Unfortunately, due to time constraints, such an investigation could not be attempted for this project.

**Critiques of the “Cultural Approach”**

This method of analyzing and describing discourse and memory is not without its critiques. Blydenburg, in his review of Jan-Werner’s Memory and Power in Post-War Europe argues that certain elements of the “cultural approach” (or, for my purposes, the constructivist approach) are equally culpable of the essentialism found in positivist social science approaches.\textsuperscript{42} Blydenburg argues that by holding culture, discourse, or memory as an independent variable

\textsuperscript{41} Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy, 251.

subject to study, the authors have infringed upon the assumptions of individual agency and responsibility that they sought to preserve. Thus, “the culture made me do it” (or in this case, the discourse) unwittingly maintains aspects of positivist determinism that constructivism seeks to avoid.

Colin Wight’s review of Jackson’s *Civilizing the Enemy* makes a similar critique, arguing Jackson has unwittingly reintroduced not only an essentialist definition of civilization, but also a focus on motive and intention. Jackson’s escape is that he has attempted to define his concepts in the terms that his actors understand them. Thus, for Jackson, Adenauer, Schumaker, Marshall, and Dulles carry with them largely similar, but still unique, articulations of what ‘Western Civilization’ is, and what it means to function as part of it. That they use the same language does not necessitate that they mean the same thing, and Jackson is careful not to conflate those two positions. Jackson argues the issue of belief or intention is not one that can be answered, but as policy debates are never starkly separated positions that speak only in opposition to each other, it need not be. As Jackson notes, purely oppositional positions cannot engage in dialogue, as they have nothing whatsoever in common. By focusing on the common touchstones of the debate, or the “rhetorical commonplaces” which various viewpoints touch upon, we can better understand the way in which all participants viewed the world, and thus how policy evolved in reaction to their perception of the problem they faced. This sort of analysis better encapsulates the vagaries of the policymaking process, as well as the underlying worldview such a process reflects. Whether actors “truly believe” in the discourse and rhetorical commonplaces they are deploying is beside the point; by the very act of deploying them they are speaking not only to the previous discourse of their opponents, but also to the audience that is consuming and responding to their speech. Actors operating in a different social reality, supported by a different worldview, would necessarily deploy different rhetorical strategies.

Blydenburg also critiques the political change agenda of such an epistemological approach. His critique of the concept of memory is equally applicable to Jackson’s conception of discourse and rhetorical commonplaces; therefore I shall quote it in full:

44 Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy*, 46.
No stand is taken on the authenticity of memory: Memory does not have to be the result of direct experience or observation, it does not have to be contemporary, and it can be entirely fabricated. If there is no way—even in theory—of establishing whether a memory is anchored in fact, because all facts are the product of culture, there is no basis for judging a memory to be false; memory is merely an instrument of those who control the means to its production. This point of view, de facto, legitimizes the power of those who have the means to create “memory” in the same way that the empirical movement has legitimized policy by polling. By this argument historians are only interpreting observers. Who then should have power? The intellectuals who write essays about memory?45

Blydenburg’s point is well taken. If discourse and memory can be fabricated and ahistorical, is there merit to Jackson’s recontextualization of policymaking during and after World War II? Similar questions can be raised about a project that aims to contextualize policymaking in advance of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Fortunately, Fierke provides us with a response to this critique:

Description, while not inherently critical, becomes so if it makes us look again, in a fresh way, at that which we assume about the world because it has become overly familiar. Taking seriously the criteria for describing contexts, such as the end of the Cold War, or the conflict in Bosnia, opens up the prospect of challenging realist accounts of these changes. In this way, new spaces are opened for thinking about the past and the present and, therefore, how we construct the future.46

Analyzing the discourse of postconflict planning for the U.S. invasion of Iraq provides nuance that enhances our understanding of policy creation, articulation, and legitimation. Examining the positionality of Iraq from the perspective of those planning the invasion and subsequent reconstruction will deliver important conclusions about Iraq’s exceptionality or exemplarity in terms of historical memory and future ‘lessons learned’.

45 Blydenburg, “Memory and Power,” 852.


*Empirical Source Material*

Three distinct sources of material were examined over the course of this project: internal U.S. federal documentation, public statements by government officials, and publications by key U.S. think tanks and research institutions. Each category of source material possesses different strengths and weaknesses, which will be noted throughout and are discussed generally below.

Internal U.S. federal documentation was drawn primarily from the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Since the end of the Bush administration, many of the documents relevant to the planning and conduct of the invasion of Iraq have been made public under the Freedom of Information Act or other declassification procedures. Furthermore, with the establishment of The George W. Bush Presidential Library and the release of Donald Rumsfeld’s autobiography *Known and Unknown* more documents, including many of the internal “snowflake” memos, are available online.\(^47\)

Internal documents made public through formal declassification procedures or leaking present a valuable window into the inner discourse shaping the Bush administration’s decisions with respect to the invasion and reconstruction of Iraq. However, it is important to recognize that these documents represent at best an incomplete version of events, and at worst a decidedly slanted one. The documents released in connection with Rumsfeld’s memoir are open to critiques of being selected to support his particular narrative of events. Equally, the Obama administration’s declassifications could be tinged with political motivation. Released in isolation and removed of much of their context, some will dispute their authenticity or completeness. Internal documents are valuable, but in themselves they are insufficient to construct a complete picture of U.S. establishment’s discourse during the period in question.

To supplement these gaps, the public statements of government officials were also reviewed, including key speeches by senior officials, and relevant statements and press releases from the Public Affairs offices of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the White House. Given the rigorous and collective nature of government clearance and messaging, formal public declarations by government officials can be assumed to broadly represent the

collective position of a majority of actors within the bureaucracy. As public declarations can often seem both an appeal to the lowest common denominator, and an attempt to be seen saying something without really saying much of anything, it would be difficult to determine much useful information from public declarations alone. However, when combined with private documentation and broader discourse from outside the administration, public declarations present important data points in a larger representation of elite discourse. Moreover, a comparison of historical analogies present in internal and external documents helps determine if the use of the rhetorical commonplace of post-World War II reconstruction success is merely a rhetorical tool of policy legitimization.

The third category of documents consulted during this research is publications by key U.S. think tanks and research institutes, including contract research organizations and academic foreign policy think tanks. In an effort to provide a holistic analysis of the American political establishment, the largest and most influential institutions from across the political spectrum were selected. The target institutions are listed below.\(^{48}\)

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<th>Name of Institution</th>
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<th>Ideological Affiliation</th>
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<tr>
<td>American Enterprise Institute</td>
<td>Academic-diversified</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Washington Institute for Near East Policy</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
<td>Center-Right</td>
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<td>RAND Corporation</td>
<td>Contract Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>Center for Strategic and International Studies</td>
<td>Academic-diversified</td>
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<tr>
<td>Council on Foreign Relations</td>
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<td>James Baker Institute</td>
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<td>Stimson Center</td>
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<td>New American Foundation</td>
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<td>Carnegie Endowment for International Peace</td>
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<td>Center for American Progress</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States Institute of Peace</td>
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\(^{48}\) The ideological affiliations listed above are largely representative of common perceptions within the United States, though individual analysts often express views significantly “right” or “left” of their institution. Moreover, the centre of the U.S. political establishment is decidedly more conservative than that of its British or European counterparts, so while the products of Carnegie or the U.S. Institute of Peace are often decidedly “progressive” by American terms, they may barely count as centrist in British or continental fora. Institution type and ideological classification adopted from James G. McGann, “Think Tanks and Policy Advice in the U.S.,” (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2005), 6-13.
A Note on Terminology

Throughout this dissertation I have endeavoured to maintain a distinction between 1) the German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik), centred in East Berlin from 1949 to 1990, and popularly known as East Germany, 2) the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesrepublik Deutschland), established in Bonn in 1949, and popularly known as West Germany, and 3) the unified Federal Republic of Germany, which has existed since reunification in 1990. Many sources confuse the issue, often referring to the U.S. and/or Allied reconstruction of “Germany” when they really mean the portions of Western Germany under U.S. and/or Allied control after 1945. I attempted to maintain this distinction clearly in my analysis. The terminology used by a source has been retained in quotes.

This dissertation follows on the work of earlier authors, and intentionally uses the term ‘state reconstruction’. The term was chosen over other, perhaps more familiar, terms such as ‘nation building’ or ‘state building’ for several reasons. ‘Nation building’ and ‘state building’ are distinct terms, with the former referring to the construction of cultural, linguistic, or ethnic entities, and the latter more narrowly focusing on the construction of political structures. Both terms are at times used interchangeably, and both tend toward the linguistic assumption that new structures must be constructed within the subject state as a result of the failure, or absence, of effective organizing institutions. Even if unintentionally, such terms encourage policymakers to ignore pre-existing social, economic, and political structures, which are often informal, and may be poorly understood by external actors.

Another difficulty lies in the propensity of various authors to use different terms, as well as to define those terms differently. RAND utilizes the term ‘nation-building’ as the use of “military force to underpin a process of democratization”. CEIP’s definition follows this closely; Pei and Kasper defined ‘nation-building’ as “the promotion or imposition of democratic institutions desired by American policy makers”. Their chosen cases also require the aim of “regime change or regime survival”, the “deployment of large numbers of U.S. ground troops”, and the role of “American military and civilian personnel in the political administration” of

50 Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building, 26-27.
the state in question. The RAND definition requires democratization as a goal, whereas CEIP requires it for a successful outcome. Licklider eschews the question of democratization entirely. Instead he defines state-building as “the construction of political institutions and a viable political order”, but notes that in the post-Cold War period, state-building commonly blends with peacekeeping. Conversely, Mac Ginty prefers to maintain a distinction between broad terms such as development and peacebuilding, and more specified terms such as postwar recovery, rehabilitation, rebuilding, and reconstruction.

Challenges with the terms ‘state building’ and ‘nation building’ have been noted above, but terms which assume undeveloped or absent state structures are particularly unsuitable with respect to Iraq. Political, economic, and cultural structures linked the region of what would become Iraq to the Ottoman Empire for 400 years prior to the end of World War I. Following the war, the 1920 Treaty of Sevres divided the Ottoman Empire, and the modern borders of Iraq were drawn into a mandate under British control. Iraq became independent from Britain in 1932, and reformed as a republic following the liquidation of the monarchy in 1958. Under the Ba’ath party, and later Saddam Hussein, Iraq entered a period of centralized rule, wherein organizing ties of influence and patronage extended deep into Iraq’s society. Fukuyama claims of Iraq, that “after the United States-led invasion, no state infrastructure existed to provide security or to distribute state services.” This assertion is flawed. Similar to other states in the region, the levers of power in Iraq gradually formed what Trip has termed a ‘dual’ or ‘shadow-state’. Although this shadow structure was not clearly visible to U.S. policymakers, it remained in place despite Saddam’s removal from power. U.S. planners may have felt they were working with a blank slate, but prior structures and informal connections continued to shape civil, economic, and political relations in Iraq.

More utilitarian or functional terms, such as ‘postwar’, or ‘postconflict reconstruction’ call to mind the nuts and bolts of refurbishment or reconstruction of infrastructural damage caused

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53 Mac Ginty, “The pre-war reconstruction of post-war Iraq,” 604.
by internal conflict, or inter-state war. These terms are often held synonymous with ‘development’, and fail to encompass the less tangible aspects of economic, social, and political recovery in the wake of conflict. Such terms also assume a clear distinction between a period of conflict, and a subsequent ‘postconflict’ phase. In practice, the aftermath of conflict can be every bit as destabilizing and uncertain as the earlier conflict, and the effects of war or inter-communal violence can take many generations to subside. Similarly, the terms peacemaking, peacekeeping, or peacebuilding, assume at a minimum the cessation of hostilities, and some will on the part of internal actors to forge a more peaceful and lasting political order. It would stretch the bounds of credulity to argue that Iraq has ever been at ‘peace’ since the U.S. invasion in 2003, as the civilian death rate did not fall below 10,000 per year until 2009, and only reached ‘lows’ of less than 4,200 per year in 2010 and 2011.\textsuperscript{57} As of June 2014, the death rate had increased to 7,819. Given current instability and violence, it is reasonable to expect that number to climb to for some time.

Historical Overview of Reconstruction Planning

Two widely voiced explanations for the failure of the invasion, occupation, and reconstruction of Iraq are hubris and incompetence. Both explanations hold that the Bush administration’s neoconservative ideologues, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning Douglas Feith, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz exercised extensive control over the war planning process, and were ultimately especially unsuited to do so. These charges are particularly salient when examining the administration’s procedures for determining how many troops would be sent to Iraq, or the administration’s assumptions about allied states’ reactions after the fall of Saddam’s regime. However, as Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor note in their history of the invasion and occupation of Iraq, “Many critics have assailed the administration for lapses in its planning. But it is striking how much of the United States postwar strategy was the product of careful deliberation.”58

The path of postconflict planning for postwar Iraq is tortuous and fractal, marred by a lack of bureaucratic coherence and a dearth of technical and regional expertise among key planners. Moreover, the process was hindered at every stage by critical intelligence failures, the assumption that success would result in eager assistance from allies, allocation of an insufficient number of troops, disjointed policy planning, and persistent misreading of historical analogy. This chapter will address each of these themes in turn, while providing an overview of the planning process for the reconstruction of postwar Iraq.

Intelligence Failures

In early 2002, the Central Intelligence Agency was ascendant. The CIA had not predicted the September attack on the World Trade Center one year prior, but in the aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan the agency won back the administration’s confidence. The CIA’s contact with Afghanistan’s power players extended back to the 1970s and ‘80s, when it had closely supported the mujahideen in guerrilla operations against the Soviet military. Utilizing long established networks and contacts, the CIA’s role in the early years of the conflict in

58 Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II: 578. Their assessment is seconded by Rathmell, “Planning post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq,” 1017.
Afghanistan was widely seen as successful. As commander of the U.S. military’s Central Command, General Tommy R. Franks was impressed by the utility of Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA operatives in the early stages of the conflict in Afghanistan, and both he and Rumsfeld were confident SOF and the CIA could play a similar role in Iraq. Instead, following the Iraq invasion the Agency was once again in disgrace over critical intelligence failures.

Much of the failure of U.S. intelligence came from Ahmed Chalabi, the leader of an Iraqi opposition group called the Iraqi National Congress (INC). Experts at State viewed him as opportunistic and untrustworthy, while the CIA saw him as an unscrupulous scoundrel, and subsequently had him blacklisted. No information he provided was supposed to be considered in intelligence assessments. However, Richard N. Perle, the neoconservative chairman of the Defense Policy Board and a close ally of Wolfowitz, viewed Chalabi’s presence as essential. Perle, along with Wolfowitz and Cheney, kept Chalabi involved in the planning process, even allowing him unescorted access through the Pentagon following the September attack. Chalabi’s presence proved toxic to the planning process, raising false expectations of the ease with which Saddam’s regime would collapse, as well as the enthusiasm with which U.S. soldiers would be welcomed into Iraq.

Other intelligence failures resulted from the lack of human intelligence in Iraq. The Agency relied overmuch on satellite and signals intelligence, causing it to miss critical information in the lead up to the invasion. Famously, the CIA confirmed with confidence that Saddam’s regime was probably in possession of WMD and large stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, when in fact no such stockpiles existed. In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War the CIA grew reliant on U.N. inspectors for reporting on Iraq’s WMD capabilities. When Saddam ejected the U.N. inspectors in 1998, the CIA no longer had access to U.N. intelligence, and no longer had spies or contacts within Iraq. CIA analysts turned to satellite surveillance, regime

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defectors, and extrapolation to produce their reports, resulting in increasing speculation and decreasing accuracy.  

The CIA also failed to report the creation of Fedayeen safe houses in Iraqi towns, or the stockpiling of weapons and ammunition across the country. When the U.S. military entered Iraq, it considered the derelict Iraqi Republican Guard units the greatest threat, and proceeded to bypass large swaths of the country in the drive to Baghdad. Months in advance of the invasion, CIA operatives predicted that southern tribes would help seize key points of infrastructure along the invasion route, and suggested to Lieutenant General David McKiernan that small American flags be distributed in advance of the invasion. The agency wanted to capture the appreciation of grateful Iraqis on film and broadcast it throughout the region as a propaganda coup. McKiernan rejected the proposal, but CIA operatives remained optimistic.

**Assumption of Assistance**

Part of the “hubris” explanation for the Iraq War lies in the foundations of the Bush administration’s “pre-emption” doctrine, which “held that while the United States might act unilaterally, the success of its military operation would attract allies to share the postwar burden.” In the lead up to the invasion, allies had yet to materialize, but the Bush administration felt that quickly toppling the regime would show how grateful the “liberated” Iraqis were, making other states willing (and even eager) to contribute to reconstruction. This premise pervaded the prewar planning process, and reinforced Rumsfeld’s parallel mission to produce results while expending less U.S. blood and treasure.

By April 12, 2003 fighting had largely subsided in Baghdad. On April 15, President Bush called his advisors together to consider a plan for how allied forces would be deployed during Phase IV. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had optimistically titled their plan *Iraq Phase IV: Gaining Coalition Commitment*. The plan anticipated three foreign divisions: one led by the United Kingdom, one by Poland, and one joint “Muslim force” led by Saudi Arabia and other Persian

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64 Phillips relates a similar overly optimistic anecdote in which Chalabi convinced the Pentagon that Iraqis would welcome the coalition forces “with flowers”. Phillips, *Losing Iraq*, 7; Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II*, 157.

The next day, Franks flew to Baghdad to inform the military that U.S. forces should prepare to begin withdraw from Iraq in sixty days. The president would soon announce the end of hostilities with his “Mission Accomplished” speech, a now infamous piece of political theatre staged aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln, and Franks wanted the commanders prepared. “I wanted our troopers to work up their transportation plans, work up a process whereby they could begin redeployment in as little as sixty days,” Franks said. The idea was “to have the old man declare the end of major combat operation on the first of May because it opened the bank, so to speak, for us to go after additional international forces.” By showing allies how quickly the war had been won and convincing them that Iraq was stable, the administration could quickly swap combat troops for European constabularies and reduce the burden on U.S. forces.

However, the manner in which the Bush administration pushed for the war alienated many states, and the dissolution of law and order in the aftermath of an invasion that proceeded with too few troops made allies even more reluctant to send their forces into harm’s way. As the only significant military partner in the invasion and occupation of Iraq, British troops based their operations on previous experience in Northern Ireland and the Balkans. This ostensible advantage subsequently turned to “humiliation”, as British troops failed to combat Iran’s influence in Basra, and were subsequently withdrawn in 2008, after being the target of 90% of attacks in Basra the previous year. The British contribution was largely a fig leaf designed to cover embarrassing U.S. unilateralism; as Alex Danchev has argued, British troops were “not exactly mercenaries. But the Hessian option was more nearly a reality in Iraq than in Vietnam.” Eventual contributions included the British in the south, an inconsistent Polish

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66 Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 524.
67 Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 527.
68 Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 527.
division, and some Spanish troops hampered by strict rules of engagement. Ukraine contributed an additional brigade, but it was unable to defend itself and was forced to retreat. Despite Rumsfeld’s dream of reforming the Pentagon by forcing it to fight a tighter, leaner, quicker war, the diplomatic results of “shock and awe” were not as anticipated. Instead, the troop numbers detailed by the Pentagon were barely sufficient to win the war, and entirely inadequate to secure the peace.

**Insufficient Troops**

The debate over troop numbers related to generational changes within the U.S. military command. Generals such as Frederick M. Franks (no relation to CENTCOM Commander Tommy R. Franks) and Colin Powell had served at lower levels of the military during Vietnam, only to enter leadership roles during the age of Desert Storm and the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo. Franks and Powell were both cautious of military engagement in absence of critical U.S. interests, and it was Franks who would advise General McKiernan to push for more troops in advance of the invasion. During his tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Powell was a key voice arguing for judicial use of American military force, often coming into conflict with more interventionist members of the Clinton administration. Much of Powell’s restraint came from his understanding of the Vietnam experience, in which civilian leaders had launched a military process without the requisite political commitment, leaving U.S. forces embroiled in a fight without sufficient resources or support. During Desert Storm and the crises in Bosnia and Kosovo, Powell insisted the civilian leadership articulate clear policy goals and plans in advance of military action. Powell retired from the Army in September 1993, just weeks before the Battle of Mogadishu, in which a group of U.S. Army Rangers and Special Operations Forces attacked targets in Somalia only to find themselves cut off and surrounded by militia men loyal to Mohamed Farrah Aidid. The clashes resulted in 18 U.S. military deaths and 80 wounded, along with between 1,500 and 3,000 Somali casualties, and it was precisely the sort of poorly planned and inadequately justified operation that Powell would have resisted.

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73 Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II*, 540-541.
74 Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II*, 97.
In contrast to Powell’s doctrine of overwhelming force, conservatives attempted to develop new military doctrines focusing on speed, mobility, and technological advancement. When Rumsfeld entered the Pentagon as Secretary of Defense he promised to oversee a revolution in military affairs, as articulated in George W. Bush’s speech at the Citadel in September 1999. Bush promised to review and overhaul the military, noting U.S. forces in the future “must be agile, lethal, readily deployable, and require a minimum of logistical support.” The goal of creating a faster, more lethal, technologically advanced military shaped the debate about requisite troop levels for the Iraq invasion. Rumsfeld and his allies in the Bush administration continued to push the military to do more with less, and to do it faster than ever before.

General Tommy Franks, CENTCOM commander in advance of the invasion of Iraq, took different lessons from his prior military experience. Like Colin Powell and Frederick Franks, Tommy Franks had served in Vietnam, but unlike Powell he had not been involved with the conflict in the Balkans. Instead, Franks’s experience in Afghanistan convinced him of the effectiveness of small numbers of highly mobile forces, and he questioned the necessity of large numbers of military police and non-combat troops in postconflict situations. His view of Clinton-style nation building was less nuanced than Powell’s, and decidedly more negative.

The literature assigns blame liberally for the administration’s failure to commit sufficient numbers of troops to the conflict. Washington Post reporter, Rajiv Chandrasekaran, considers Rumsfeld and Cheney ultimately responsible for the troop level miscalculation, with Feith playing a supporting role in the collective delusion. In their military-centric account, Gordon and Trainor place much of the blame on Rumsfeld, painting a narrative in which he simply bulldozed resistance to his policies. Phillips finds National Security Advisor Condooleezza Rice culpable for the disaster, arguing she cared more for preserving her relationship with the president than about securing the best policy, and that her actions helped sideline Colin Powell. Gordon and Trainor criticize Rice and Powell as well, noting the former’s ineffectiveness at managing bureaucratic infighting, and criticizing the latter for his reticence.

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79 Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 60.
80 Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 28.
81 Phillips, Losing Iraq, 64.
Gordon and Trainor insist, “the nation would have been better served if Powell had objected when the secretary of defense moved to seize control of postwar planning.”

Overlooked in both narratives is Franks, commander of CENTCOM and intimately involved with the planning process. Franks had worked closely with General Anthony Zinni in 1998, when the latter drew up the first plans for a post-Saddam Iraq in the wake of the Gulf War. Zinni’s plan, OPLAN 1003-98, called for over 400,000 troops, more than twice the number eventually allocated to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Zinni later noted, “If I had to point to one person who was deeply involved in 1003-98 it was Tommy Franks. He was the major contributor to the force levels and the planning and everything else. He was more involved in it than just about anybody else. That was his life. He and his planning staff seemed to be committed to the plan.” Despite this prior experience, Franks consented to draw up three new plans in the face of Rumsfeld’s efforts to decrease the troop commitment. Generated Start would begin with 145,000 troops in theatre, and build to a total of 250,000 troops as reinforcements arrived over the course of the war. Running Start would build to a similar level after beginning with only 18,000 troops. In August 2002, under continual pressure from Rumsfeld, Franks drew up a Hybrid plan, sometimes referred to as the 5-11-16-125 Plan, which would begin hostilities with 20,000 troops and increase to approximately 200,000.

Somehow, between November 2001 and December 2002 Franks reversed his opinion. Franks insisted he concurred fully with the Rumsfeld’s ultimate decision, but Secretary of the Army Tom White argued Rumsfeld had eventually beaten Franks into submission. “Rumsfeld just ground Franks down,” White explained, “If you grind away at the military guys long enough, they will finally say, ‘Screw it, I’ll do the best I can with what I have.’ The nature of Rumsfeld is that you just get tired of arguing with him.” Franks’s reversal was not as high profile as Powell’s reticence or Rice’s mismanagement of the national security apparatus, but it was of crucial importance to the planning process. Officers lower in the chain of command voiced

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82 Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II*, 577.
87 Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II*, 529.
concerns about sufficient troop levels late into the planning stages, but they were reluctant to force the issue. As Lieutenant Colonel Steven W. Peterson later explained:

No officer in the headquarters was prepared to argue for actions that would siphon resources from the war fighting effort, when the fighting had not yet begun. To do so, would have been contrary to a career of schooling that makes fighting the determining activity of war. No matter how often post-war issues were raised, they never took on an equivalent importance to war fighting considerations in the eyes of the planners or commanders. Who could blame them? The business of the military is war and war is fighting. The war was not yet started, let alone finished, when these issues were being raised. Only a fool would propose hurting the war fighting effort to address post-war conditions that might or might not occur.88

**Fractal Planning**

Planning for the post-conflict stage, or Phase IV, of the Iraq invasion did not begin in earnest until well after initial planning for the invasion itself. Pentagon plans for a post-Saddam Iraq existed as early as 1998, and it was from these contingencies that Tommy Franks drew up his initial proposals for Rumsfeld.89 Franks began his planning in late November 2001, but as late as August 2002 he considered the Phase IV plans to be the responsibility of Colin Powell’s State Department,90 while Powell himself argued he had not heard enough about post-invasion plans.91 Following a classified war game held in December 2002, then Lieutenant General John Abizaid, Franks’s deputy, and Senator Joseph Biden raised concerns about the absence of post conflict planning.92

By early October 2002 the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had drafted a rough Phase IV plan calling for a military headquarters staffed by technical and regional experts from across the U.S. government. The headquarters would collaborate closely with the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, and eventually be supplanted by an interim civilian administration. As CENTCOM would still

90 Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II*, 78.
91 Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II*, 81.
be embroiled in Afghanistan following the war, the JCS hoped to shift responsibility for postwar Iraq to a new chain of command. They were overruled; during Rumsfeld’s review of the JCS plan he eliminated all references to the State Department, placed Defense in the lead, and ensured the new headquarters would report to his office via CENTCOM and Franks. Rumsfeld’s plan was approved by Rice and President Bush, granting Defense primary responsibility for reconstruction of an occupied state for the first time since World War II. With State eliminated from the equation and other agencies sidelined, Defense was given a huge responsibility, without the benefit of experience from State planners who had operated in the Balkans and Afghanistan.

With Rumsfeld’s plan approved, Phase IV planning stalled until December, when Dick Meyers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, became anxious about the impending war. The JCS chief planner Lieutenant General George Casey appointed Brigadier General Steve Hawkins to head a new joint task force, JTF-4, and instructed him to begin organizing the Combined Joint Task Force-Iraq (CJTF-I), which would form the military headquarters called for by Rumsfeld’s plan. Hawkins, commander of the Ohio’s division of the Army Corps of Engineers, had no experience with Iraq or the Middle East, but he and Casey had served together in Bosnia.

With no budget and only a cobbled together staff, Hawkins shipped from Virginia to CENTCOM’s headquarters in Tampa, before eventually landing in Doha at General McKiernan’s Third Army headquarters. Once there, Hawkins was subordinated to McKiernan’s planning staff, where Major General Albert Whitley and Kevin Benson had begun to flesh out the Phase IV plan Eclipse II, named after the plan for reconstructing Germany in the wake of World War II.

It soon became clear that deep contradictions existed in the plan’s objectives. The plan assumed Iraq’s institutions would survive the invasion, and that other states and U.S. government agencies would provide funds and staff to undertake reconstruction. Moreover, as Peterson noted later, many of the objectives required to prosecute the war ran directly counter to long-term objectives of securing the peace. Peterson notes, “Over a month before

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93 Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II*, 160-162.
95 Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II*, 165.
the war began, the Phase IV planning group concluded that the campaign would produce conditions at odds with meeting strategic objectives. Infrastructure and communication mechanisms central to the regime’s command and control ability were slated for destruction, but those same mechanisms would prove crucial to stability and reconstruction in the aftermath of regime collapse. Planners drafted contingencies that allotted more resources and manpower to confront infiltration by foreign fighters, looting, and criminal activity among other concerns, but the military command was already fighting to claw more men and supplies from the Pentagon hierarchy. Peterson’s superiors (Major General James “Spider” Marks and Lieutenant General David McKiernan) vetoed the proposed modifications.

On January 20, 2003 the Bush Administration passed National Security Presidential Directive 24, formally acknowledging what was already true, Rumsfeld’s Department of Defense would be running the postwar show in Iraq. Rumsfeld’s aide, Douglas Feith, had already brought in retired general Jay Garner to begin organizing the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), the civilian arm of McKiernan’s Phase IV plan. Tasked with providing emergency assistance, establishing public services, and reconstituting the Iraqi military, Garner and his team organized in the Pentagon, but only deployed to the Persian Gulf in early March. Brought into the game in the final innings, Garner did not hear of the Department of State’s Future of Iraq Project until the February 20 during a predeployment drill at the National Defense University in Washington. Thomas Warrick, an international lawyer and human rights expert, had been working on the Future of Iraq Project (FOI) for more than a year, and Garner quickly added him to ORHA’s team. One week later Rumsfeld demanded that Garner fire Warrick; Vice President Cheney’s office wanted a place for Chalabi in post-war Iraq, and Warrick (like most from State) regarded Chalabi with suspicion. With key State

97 Peterson, “Central but Inadequate,” 10.
100 Chandrasekaran, *Imperial Life in the Emerald City*, 38.
102 Chandrasekaran, *Imperial Life in the Emerald City*, 40-42; Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II*, 182. Woodward’s account shades this incident slightly differently, framing the disagreement as one between Powell and Rumsfeld with no mention of Cheney. In Woodward’s account, Rumsfeld objected to Warrick (and sanctions expert Meghan O’Sullivan) because “the work had to be done by those who were truly committed”. Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, 283-284. Phillips argues Warrick was equally responsible for the bureaucratic tensions, as he “begrudgingly shared information with other agencies,” and had publicly spoken out against the Department of Defense. Phillips, *Losing Iraq*, 126. In any event Warrick was eliminated from the Pentagon planning circles, while
department staff barred by Rumsfeld from participating in ORHA’s efforts, Garner never saw
the FOI reports, or any of the other previous planning done by government officials.
Ultimately Garner managed reconstruction policy for less than a month before being replaced
by L. Paul Bremer and the newly instituted Coalition Provision Authority (CPA) on May 11,
2003.

The Fate of State’s Pre-War Planning

By involving a large number of exiles in prewar planning efforts for a postwar peace, the U.S.
Department of State reprised a role played in the 1940s.\textsuperscript{103} In the prior performance, State
dominated the planning efforts,\textsuperscript{104} but in the case of Iraq is unclear the information gathered
by State officials had much impact outside their own department. Chandrasekaran terms the
FOI reports “Washington’s best attempt to prepare for the post-Saddam era”, but his account
of the post-war situation in Iraq details bureaucratic infighting between the White House and
the Departments of Defense and State, and concludes the FOI reports were never passed to
post-conflict planners in the Pentagon, ORHA, or the CPA.\textsuperscript{105} Gordon and Trainor argue the
FOI reports were “of uneven quality” and “far short of a viable plan”.\textsuperscript{106} Their interviews with
members of Jay Garner’s senior staff, including the CIA’s David Kay and U.S. Army colonel
Paul Hughes, are revealing.\textsuperscript{107} Kay termed the study “unimplementable”, arguing, “It was a
series of essays to describe what the future could be. It was not a plan to hand to a task force
and say ‘go implement.’ If it had been carried out it would not have made a difference.”\textsuperscript{108}
Hughes said of the FOI project, “While it produced some useful background information it
had no chance of really influencing the post-Saddam phase of the war.”\textsuperscript{109}

David L. Phillips, a former Department of State contractor who was closely involved with the
FOI Democratic Principles planning group has defended the project, asserting:

\textsuperscript{103} Williams, Liberalism and War, 141.
\textsuperscript{104} See Williams, Failed Imagination? 79-108.
\textsuperscript{105} Chandrasekaran, \textit{Imperial Life in the Emerald City}, 40-42.
\textsuperscript{106} Gordon and Trainor, \textit{Cobra II}, 182.
\textsuperscript{107} David Kay was a CIA security expert who led the search for weapons of mass destruction following the invasion
of Iraq. Kay served briefly as a member of Jay Garner’s ORHA, but resigned over a failure to address post-conflict
collaborating concerns. See Gordon and Trainor, \textit{Cobra II}, 181. Colonel Paul Hughes was an Army officer stationed at
National Defense University prior to his recruitment to ORHA. See Gordon and Trainor, \textit{Cobra II}, 172.
\textsuperscript{108} David Kay, quoted in Gordon and Trainor, \textit{Cobra II}, 182-183.
\textsuperscript{109} Paul Hughes, quoted in Gordon and Trainor, \textit{Cobra II}, 183.
The Future of Iraq Project was no silver bullet for Iraq’s problems. To be sure, its reports were not definitive blueprints. Pentagon officials thought the endeavor was too theoretical and academic. But their outright dismissal—and even undermining—of the project was a serious mistake. No formal directive was issued terminating the Future of Iraq Project; it just ceased to function after the White House assigned postwar responsibility to the OSD in January 2003.\footnote{Phillips, Losing Iraq, 8.}

Following my review of the FOI project reports, Gordon and Trainor’s assessment of the project’s potential is most accurate. However, as will be discussed below, the FOI reports do articulate several policy suggestions ultimately contravened to disastrous effect by Bremer’s CPA or Rumsfeld’s Pentagon. Some study of the State Department’s work could only have been beneficial.

Despite Chandrasekaran’s statement that Jay Garner and ORHA were never able to consult State’s FOI project, subsequent reporting indicates the project reached U.S. officials in Iraq in some capacity. In a post-invasion article reviewing the prescient predictions of the FOI project, The New York Times reports optimistically, “Many of the Iraqi ministers are graduates of the working groups, and have brought that experience with them,” further noting that newly arrived CPA staffers received CD-ROM versions of the 13-volume study. The article closes with a quote from an unnamed senior official stationed in Baghdad, “It’s our bible coming out here.”\footnote{Eric Schmitt and Joel Brinkley, “THE STRUGGE FOR IRAQ: PLANNING; State Dept. Study Foresaw Trouble Plaging Iraq,” The New York Times, 18 October 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/19/world/struggle-for-iraq-planning-state-dept-study-foresaw-trouble-now-plaguing-iraq.html.} This squares with Hughes’ assertion that the study was conveyed to U.S. administrators in Iraq, though how closely it was studied remains unclear. Phillips asserts that the Bush administration eventually adopted many of the proposals first articulated by the FOI Project, but admits the policy corrections came too late; “by then, the well was poisoned. What would have been hard had been made even harder.”\footnote{Phillips, Losing Iraq, 6.}
Planning and World War II Mythologies

As would become clear later, State and Defense were drawing from a decidedly different repertoire of historical analogy in their efforts to make sense of post-war Iraq. State looked to prior experience in the Balkans, East Timor, and most recently Afghanistan, whereas Defense’s most recent involvement in reconstruction dated to the aftermath of World War II and the reconstruction of West Germany and Japan. Many in the Department of Defense saw little in the case of the Balkans or Afghanistan that was worthy of emulation, and inappropriate parallels to the World War II cases marred much of the Department’s planning activities.

These analogies were not unique to the Bush administration. In December 1998, the Clinton administration gave the go ahead for Operation Desert Fox, a military exercise carrying the appellation of World War II German general, Erwin Rommel. The Desert Fox appellation parallels later U.S. rhetoric comparing Saddam Hussein with Adolf Hitler, and the scope and consequences of that rhetorical analogy have been discussed at length elsewhere. Lieutenant General Gregory S. Newbold recalled the tension in the Pentagon in the days following the events of September 11, 2001, “We truly thought another attack might be imminent and that Al Qaeda was the cause of this Pearl Harbour-style attack.” Newbold’s phrasing illustrates the comparisons already being drawn in Washington between the new “global war on terror” and the type of existential fight the United States had faced during World War II.

Department of Defense planning for the invasion and occupation of Iraq drew philosophically and practically from the World War II experience. Operation Cobra was the July 1944 drive from Normandy to liberate France. Conducted by General Omar Bradley’s First Army, and joined by General George Patton’s Third Army, the plan called for a quick break through the German defences and a race for the Seine River. In March 2003, McKiernan and his senior planners designed a fast attack plan to cross the deserts of Iraq and capture Baghdad. They

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113 For discussion of the continuities (and discontinuities) between the Bush and Clinton administrations see Williams, Failed Imaginators? Conclusion, 284-309; for more examples of these historical analogies see Williams, Liberalism and War, 125-150, 209-210.
115 Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 17.
named their plan Cobra II. McKiernan’s Phase IV plan, produced with the help of Major General Albert Whitley and Kevin Benson, was called Eclipse II, named after the plan for reconstructing Germany in the wake of World War II. McKiernan’s plans strove to replicate the historical success of the attack into Germany, but instead built upon a mass of erroneous assumptions. Iraq’s society did not maintain cohesion in the post-war period as Germany’s had, nor was Iraq’s infrastructure (already floundering after decades of war and sanctions) so easily rebuilt.

Perle noted in the lead up to the invasion that U.S. plans for post-war Iraq were not without historical precedent. Predicting a warm welcome for U.S. troops, Perle anticipated quick construction of a new regime. With respect to Iraq’s former army, secret police, and intelligence services, he advocated “a process akin to de-Nazification after World War II, in which we will attempt to identify and root out people who cannot be allowed to remain in authority.” Throughout the planning process Feith conducted postwar planning with utmost secrecy. When Garner was brought in to launch ORHA he was told no plans existed and to start from scratch. Not until ten days after he arrived in Baghdad did Garner realize that Feith’s office had drawn up extensive plans for de-Ba’athification, reconstruction of Iraq’s Army, and the installation of Chalabi at the head of Iraq’s transitional government. Feith’s concept for de-Ba’athification was connected principally to Allied de-Nazification policies in World War II. As will be discussed in later chapters, the flawed historical mythologies underpinning U.S. policy were directly responsible for policy failures in Iraq.

**The Past as Prologue**

In his post-mortem of the Phase IV planning process, Peterson argues the failure of post-war policy in Iraq “was not so much one of omission, as it was of ineffectiveness.” He concludes, “our fundamental theories are all, in reality, theories of warfare, not war. This causes us to give primacy to war fighting considerations in planning and lose sight of the fact that a war is not necessarily won by brilliant military operations.” Military operations suffered from
intelligence failures, optimistic assumptions, insufficient resources, disjointed policy planning, and persistent misreading of historical analogy. The reconstruction operations that followed were crippled from birth. Subordinated to the warfare planning, postconflict preparations suffered additionally from minimal staff continuity from one stage to the next; the wheel was constantly being reinvented, and there was almost no exchange of information between—or even within—departments.122

Even if the planning process had been handled differently, the U.S. ultimately invaded with too few troops, forcing the invasion to proceed in a rushed and incomplete fashion. The U.S. military advanced toward Baghdad leaving fighters behind it who later became insurgents. There were too few troops to be spared to secure buildings, infrastructure, prisoners, or weapons caches. Insufficient troop levels placed coalition forces in danger, requiring extensive usage of air power and emergency air attacks into cities, which resulted in more civilian deaths and destroyed more of Iraq’s already fragile infrastructure—infrastructure that would later have to be rebuilt while fighting a growing insurgency. Given how poor the administration’s plans were, it is not clear more forces would have enabled success. But given insufficient troop levels, the quality of its plans mattered little.

122 Gordon and Trainor describe a Pentagon so secretive that NSC staff were forced to infiltrate defense planning circles and smuggle information back to the White House and State. Frank Miller, the senior NSC defense aide, explained: “I would put on my uniform and go to the Pentagon as though I was visiting friends. I’d then pick up the material we were looking for and spirit it back to the White House.” Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 169-170.
Political Reconstruction

Four issues occupied U.S. officials in their prewar planning for Iraq’s political reconstruction: (1) the type of interim administration that would govern Iraq in advance of a more permanent democratic regime; (2) the role of Iraq’s exiles; (3) disputes over federal models for the new administration; and (4) the timeline and steps required for the development of Iraq’s new constitution and the administration of democratic elections. This chapter will discuss the four elements in succession, although all are naturally intertwined and self-constitutive. It is important to avoid undue reliance on arguments of path-dependency, but it is equally naïve to imagine that each decision made within the U.S. context was devoid of future repercussions.

The American policy of pursuing political change in Iraq through regime change was not—as is often maintained—an idiosyncratic product of George W. Bush’s presidency. In May 1991, shortly after the conclusion of the Gulf War, President George H. W. Bush ordered the CIA to “create the conditions for removal of Saddam Hussein from power.” Bush’s signing of the covert “lethal finding” allotted $100 million to the effort, and effectively instituted a U.S. policy of regime change. In October 1998, the Clinton administration formalized the policy, signing into law H.R. 4655, or the “Iraq Liberation Act of 1998”, which stated:

It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime.

Clinton’s signing statement elaborated U.S. aims, including the desire for “a democratically supported regime”, and a “pluralistic, participatory political system.” Noting that such a system “will not happen under the current Iraq leadership”, Clinton pledged to utilize funding

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from the recently passed Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, which granted the United States authority to provide support to “Iraqi democratic opposition organizations” before, during, and after Iraq’s transition to democracy. In the Iraq Liberation Act itself, Congress articulated several criteria for appropriate organizations, mandating that:

the President shall consider only organizations that:

1. include a broad spectrum of Iraqi individuals, groups, or both, opposed to the Saddam Hussein regime; and
2. are committed to democratic values, to respect for human rights, to peaceful relations with Iraq’s neighbors, to maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity, and to fostering cooperation among democratic opponents of the Saddam Hussein regime.¹²⁷

The act of Congress mandated the policy of regime change, but the question of which elements of the Iraqi opposition would gain U.S. support remained unanswered. This gap in policy articulation proved divisive. As government agencies moved forward in the planning process, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency developed strikingly different views on the role of Iraqi exiles in a post-Saddam Iraq.

**Interim Administration: “Who will govern Iraq?”**

In January 2001 U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell queried State’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs on the origins of U.S. regime-change policy in Iraq. On January 23 he received a response, pointing to the Iraq Liberation Act and subsequent statements by President Clinton and senior members of the Department of State.¹²⁸ The memo was circumspect on the U.S. role in promoting regime change in Iraq, noting “we expect the Iraqi people themselves to be the source of regime change.”¹²⁹ This position soon changed. As elements of the U.S. government moved forward with the prewar reconstruction of Iraq, several proposals emerged about the form of administration that should govern Iraq in the immediate aftermath of regime change. Government agencies utilized different historical analogies to support their

arguments, with the Department of Defense looking to postwar France, while the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency focused on postwar Germany and Japan. U.S. proposals were marred by unsound historical analogies, but errors were not limited to the federal bureaucracy or the Bush Administration. Rather, these historical analogies were echoed in the concurrent policy discourse produced by academics in Washington think tanks.

The Rodman Memo

The first evidence of prewar planning for the political reconstruction of Iraq is a May 2002 memo from Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter W. Rodman to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Entitled “Support for Iraqi Opposition”, the memo articulated the type of interim administration that should oversee post-war Iraq. Rodman dismissed an international commission as inadequate, instead arguing the Iraqi opposition should have a role in regime change in order promote regional legitimacy, and as a way of “making sure the wrong people don’t fill the vacuum”. Rodman referenced the historical precedent of postwar France, noting the Allies initially planned a military government for France, but reconsidered when Charles de Gaulle “was greeted by millions of cheering Frenchmen.” Rodman cautioned, “had FDR and Churchill stuck to their plan, the Communists would have been the only significant political force in the country.” Rodman argued Iraq’s domestic opposition similarly contained many “undesirable” elements, among them communists, Sunni fundamentalists, and radical Shia. Only by pre-empting those groups with a U.S. supported opposition could the U.S. “avoid a chaotic post-Saddam free-for-all.”

Rodman’s memo was welcomed by Rumsfeld, and upon the Secretary’s request a reworked version was delivered on July 1, 2002 to senior National Security Council members, including Cheney, Powell, Rice, and CIA Director George Tenet. The memo sparked action within other government agencies, and subsequent reports by the Department of State and the CIA specifically addressed the proposals laid out in Rodman’s memo, namely, what sort of institution would govern Iraq after a U.S. invasion, and what the role of Iraq’s exiled opposition would be.

Prevarication at State; CIA Caution

Early on, the State Department declined to take a position on the type of interim administration that would oversee postwar Iraq. In October 2001, the Department launched its Future of Iraq project (FOI), bringing Iraqi exiles together with international experts in a series of working groups to begin planning for a post-Saddam Iraq. On July 8, 2002, shortly after Rodman’s memo was delivered to senior NSC officials, an internal State Department cable describing the FOI project went from Secretary Powell’s office to key embassy posts. The cable stressed the FOI working groups were “not an attempt to select an Iraqi government in exile,” but rather to engage “free Iraqis” in initial planning stages for post-Saddam Iraq (here, the term “free Iraqis” perhaps unwittingly echoes the idea of De Gaulle’s Free French).\(^{132}\) For the State Department, the role of exiles was one of “preliminary planning” and priority setting, with the possible side-benefit of uniting Iraqi exiles through a process of practical engagement. Beyond reiterating U.S. support for a broad-based, “democratic, representative government”, the cable made no further mention of the shape a future government of Iraq would take.\(^{133}\) Indeed, it emphasized the working group was, “not to write a new constitution for Iraq—that will have to be done after regime change when all Iraqis can have a voice.”\(^{134}\) However, the committee charged with discussing political questions of transition, the Democratic Principles and Procedures Working group, did not meet until the fall of 2002. By that point, initiatives originating from the Department of Defense superseded State’s deliberations.

As State pushed forward with the FOI working groups, the Central Intelligence Agency produced its own report in response to Rodman’s memo. The August 7 CIA report analysed the postwar occupations of West Germany and Japan in an effort to outline policy proposals for Iraq. The Agency’s analysis was decidedly cautious, arguing that although “In both Germany and Japan, the US occupation started with sweeping goals for political, social, and economic change” such aspirations were “rapidly scaled back”.\(^{135}\) The CIA pointed to postwar Germany and Japan for examples of ‘indirect administration’, and noted that the United States

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\(^{133}\) Department of State, “Future of Iraq Expert Working Groups,” Section 1.2.

\(^{134}\) Department of State, “Future of Iraq Expert Working Groups,” Section 3.5.6.

relied heavily on existing local authorities in both cases.136 Highlighting the benefits of retaining elements of the civilian bureaucracy, the report recommended “a rapid transfer of power to local and governate level authorities”, but cautioned this might encourage corruption, or require leaving some members of the ancien régime in place.137

**Rodman’s Response: Leveraging the Opposition**

While the Future of Iraq Project crawled along over at Foggy Bottom, Feith’s Office of Policy Planning in the Pentagon powered ahead with its plans for a transitional government headed by members of Iraq’s exiled opposition. In an internal memo delivered to Secretary Rumsfeld on August 15, 2002, Rodman struck back against the proposals from State and the CIA. While the State report has yet to be released to the public, from Rodman’s memo we know State proposed a “Transitional Civil Authority” to govern post-Saddam Iraq under the supervision of the Untied States. State was concerned Iraq’s exiles were too divided to adequately govern the country, and that U.S. interests were better served by more direct administrative control.138

In response to CIA arguments that only a robust U.S. administration could hope to fill the power vacuum in a post-Saddam Iraq, Rodman argued that without the Iraqi opposition, U.S. efforts would lack domestic and regional legitimacy. In an apparent paradox, Rodman drew parallels with Afghanistan’s Bonn process, and argued that although Iraq’s opposition was less capable than the Afghan equivalent of forming a provisional government, it would be essential for unifying Iraq’s moderate political elements, and for preventing “bad guys” from filling the space left by Saddam.139 Rodman proposed the United States use its “considerable leverage” to “accelerate the process of unifying the opposition” (emphasis original).140

Rodman’s memos exhibit a puerile understanding of de Gaulle, France, and the postwar planning process. Roosevelt and de Gaulle’s relationship was characterized by suspicion and mutual dislike,141 not the geniality with which the Pentagon received Chalabi. Rodman’s memo

137 Ibid., 4.
140 Ibid., 2-3.
141 Williams, *Failed Imagination* 144-146.
also overlooked the stark differences between the military capabilities of the Free French, and
the unarmed and unorganized state of Iraq’s exiles. Rodman overlooked the importance of
regime legitimacy, most notably that exiles entirely empowered by an external actor would
likely lose domestic and regional credibility by virtue of their cooperation with U.S. forces.
This concern arose in Washington policy circles that fall, as when former Pentagon official
turned National Defense University employee, Alina Romanowski, participated in a three-day
expert panel at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. In an articulation steeped in
Millian logic, Romanowski cautioned, “We must face the possibility that whatever government
we foster or impose may be considered illegitimate from the start and may survive only as long
as we are prepared to exercise the force necessary to suppress opposition.”

Mission Creep At State: In Search of the Technocrats

During the autumn of 2002, the Department of State’s Future of Iraq planning grew beyond
the initial parameters outlined in the July cable. From State Department briefings prepared on
November 1, 2002 and May 12, 2003, we know that two working groups were established to
discuss issues of governance and political reform, one called “Democratic Principles” and the
other “Local Government”. Subsequent reports from the proceedings of the meeting group
appear in the final reports from both committees. State’s plans for an interim administration
slowly gathered detail, and the Democratic Principles and Procedures report proposed a more
technocratic vision of the Transitional Authority, aiming for “professionalism and individual
capability” rather than “political or sectarian and confessional representation”.

Although later reports maintain the Department of State opposed the increasing influence of
Ahmad Chalabi and the INC, parts of the FOI reports shed light on how the INC came to
have such a powerful role within governmental organizations planning the pre-war
reconstruction of Iraq. Phillips claims “The INC envisioned the Democratic Principles

142 Ricks, Fiasco, 65-66.
next-after-saddam.
144 Department of State, Briefing, “Future of Iraq Project,” 01 November 2002,
146 See for example, Kiriakou, The Reluctant Spy, 152-153; Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City, 32;
Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 20, 123.

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Working Group as a vehicle to formalize plans for a government-in-exile with Chalabi at its head,” and Chalabi worked hard to place INC supporters in key positions within the working group.  

As the influence of Chalabi and the INC spread, it grew increasingly difficult for State to shape the agenda of the FOI working groups, while proposals from the Pentagon began to control the internal discourse of the Bush Administration as well.

**Federalism**

As visions of a post-Saddam Iraq began to gather steam, the question of whether to establish a centralized or devolved government emerged. The CIA report recommended a federal solution. Pointing to the German experience, the Agency argued “The success of the Federal Republic and the US occupation of Germany was due at least in part to confronting a set of issues that had undermined previous German regimes”, namely “regional particularism, ethnic strife, and a lack of a clear identity.” The report argued that U.S. efforts to rebalance a strong federal system of government were key to the success of postwar reconstruction efforts, and suggested, “The German model of strong, US backed federal structure...could provide a useful model for Iraq.” State’s FOI Project made similar recommendations. Iraqi working group participants said the United States should commit to Iraq the same way it had committed to West Germany and Japan after World War II, but a briefing notes the “military government idea did not go down well.”

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The Department of State’s position was more restrained. The Democratic Principles group met first in September, and again in October 2002. Contrary to the limitations placed on the group’s deliberations by the earlier July cable, the working group began detailed discussions of “political transition to an Iraq based on democracy and federalism” utilizing principles articulated by Chalabi’s INC.\textsuperscript{152} The proposal of a federal model appears to have come at the instigation of Iraqi working group participants rather than U.S. policy makers. Phillips explains that Iraqi exiles and Kurds favoured a federal model for a reconstructed Iraq. “Iraq’s problems always arose because of abuses by the central government”, Phillips notes, “therefore, decentralizing authority was the best way to harmonize competing claims between Iraq’s factions.”\textsuperscript{153}

State’s report ultimately accepted federalism as a way forward, but cautioned against redistricting or discussion of federal demarcations during the transitional period, as such discussion would be divisive and suffer from a lack of popular legitimacy. The report notes:

due to the issue of federalism, redistricting Iraq during the interim or transitional period would by its very nature be difficult; in addition, as federalism is—to an extent—a highly debated issue (that is, a politically charged one), attempting to change Iraqi administrative divisions along particular lines (ethnic or administrative) during the transitional period would be destabilizing and would, due to the lack of a popular referendum on the matter, be illegitimate (or at least imposed).\textsuperscript{154}

The challenges encountered in the State Department FOI working group were echoed in think tank reports from the same period. In early 2003, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) argued against an understanding of federalism based on “ethnic enclaves”, instead urging policy planners “to encourage territorial/provincial lines within a unified, federal framework.” Academic scholars put forward similar arguments. Writing in advance of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Professor Charles Tripp articulated the dangers of seeing federalism as an inherent solution to the political challenges facing a post-Saddam Iraq. His analysis is worth quoting at length:

\textsuperscript{152} Department of State, Briefing, “Future of Iraq Project,” 01 November 2002, Slide 11.
\textsuperscript{153} Phillips, Losing Iraq, 5.
The vexed question of federalism in a future Iraq...has been proposed as a ‘solution’ to the social fragmentation of Iraq on the one hand and to the tendency to central dictatorship on the other. Yet in the territorial divisions most usually suggested - Kurdish northeast, Sunni Arab northwest and Shia south - crude divisions of the population have been imposed which fail to capture the complexity of what it means to be Sunni, Shia or Arab in Iraq. Only in the Kurdish region does this proposal meet with general approval and correspond to a certain historical and political reality. The demographics and allegiances of the other regions of Iraq are considerably less receptive to such a proposal. For some, it indicates a divisive attempt to reduce still further the terrain of national politics; for others, it suggests that only those associated with a certain kind of exclusivist identity politics, whether defined in sectarian or tribal terms, will be recognised as legitimate political players, creating considerable fear and anxiety among those who are excluded by reason of social origins or ideological choice.\(^{155}\)

As Tripp warned, further discussion of federalism within the FOI working group proved divisive. While Iraq’s exiles agreed in principal that Saddam Hussein-era centralization of the Iraqi state was negative, proposals for a remedy were often contradictory. While Kurdish exiles maintained a federal system was the only safeguard for the rights of Iraq’s Kurds, the Assyrian and Turkmen populations favoured some centralization of power, lest they find themselves a minority within a largely independent Kurdish federated zone. Other Iraqi nationalists worried about the economic viability of an Iraqi state if oil-rich regions in the north and the south were allowed to spin off into fiscal independence.\(^{156}\) Mired in mistrust, the working group failed to achieve agreement.

**Constitutional Chickens or Electoral Eggs**

As planning progressed two questions arose: how to draft and adopt a new constitution; and second, how and when to hold democratic elections. Two differing points of view emerged from within the American elite. One advocated a bottom-up approach, begun initially with local level elections and indirect occupation rule, and expanding to national elections for a

\(^{155}\) Tripp, “After Saddam,” 27.

From the Bottom, Up

The Department of State reports contain the first articulation of a proposed timeline for the promulgation of a new constitution and democratic elections in Iraq. Based on the tendentious assumption that Iraq was capable of conducting elections within 18 months, the working group recommended the Transitional Authority “set a time limit on its mandate of a period not less than 24 months and not more than 36 months.”157 In support of a bottom up path to democratization, the Local Governance working group recommended local elections be held within the first six to nine months, and not more than twelve months following regime change.158 Participants anticipated that local elections “will set the process for grassroots democracy that will provide administrative training for local officials and to the bureaucracy to run future national elections.”159

Despite prior assertions that the FOI working groups were not to select a new government of Iraq or to draw up a new constitution, the Democratic Principles Working Group report laid out detailed recommendations for key constitutional provisions. The report called for a two-phased establishment of a Transitional Authority, to be selected at a conference of Iraqi exiles and then to adopt the “basic laws” laid out later in the working group report. The report cautions:

Due to the fact that Iraqis may be sensitive to the term “interim constitution” as a result of its abuses since 1958, one proposal would be to label this interim constitution as the “Basic Laws of Iraq”, rather than refer to the term constitution in the title.160

Washington think tanks also supported a staged, bottom-up approach to democratization in Iraq. The joint 2003 report from CFR and the James Baker Institute tracks closely to State’s proposals. The report recommends a three stage political transformation, wherein a U.S.- or coalition-led interim administration works with Iraqi technical advisors to “establish Iraqi advisory committees throughout Baghdad and [the] provinces.”\(^{161}\) This technical administration would give way to a “U.N. supervised Iraqi interim administration” within two years. The interim administration, in turn, would organize the local and parliamentary elections that would lead to a sovereign Iraqi government.\(^{162}\) CSIS’s report from the same period makes similar arguments, proposing that Iraq’s constitution and legal codes were workable for the initial 18-month period of interim government.\(^{163}\) During this period, CSIS analysts proposed developing a “national dialogue process” under U.N. auspices, which would “involve a graduated selection of delegates from throughout Iraq and the diaspora, starting at the grassroots level in all of Iraq’s 18 provinces”.\(^{164}\) This group would develop agendas and timetables for the transfer of sovereignty and the dissolution of the interim administration, and work to organize elections, revise and draft a new constitution, and establish a truth and reconciliation process, among other goals.

**From the Top, Down**

Department of Defense made no explicit reference to constitutional proposals or a timeline for elections, but proposals from within Feith’s Office of Policy Planning played a key role in the initial operations of Bremer’s CPA. The August CIA report makes no overt recommendation on the subject of constitutional promulgation or electoral policy. However, its references to postwar reconstruction in West Germany and Japan imply that strict U.S. control of political reconstruction should be expected. The report notes that in West Germany, the U.S. occupation authorities “did impose controls on the political process” by rejecting socialist constitutional provisions and selecting politicians for particular administrative positions. In the case of Japan, the report highlights the U.S. role in maintaining an extensive censorship system to oversee Japan’s public sphere, and explains, “occupation authorities took full control of

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writing a new constitution after Japanese officials produced a draft that offered few changes to Japan’s prewar political structure.”165 These anecdotes lent support to the idea of a broad U.S. role in Iraq’s political reconstruction, and encouraged extensive U.S. involvement in the constitutional drafting process.

Some Washington think tanks adopted positions similar to proposals from Defense and the CIA. In late 2002, a report from senior Brookings Institution analysts appeared in the academic journal *Survival*. Most of the article addressed diplomatic and military aspects of the regime change policy, but the final three pages briefly discussed postwar planning. In parallel with top-down democratization advanced by the Pentagon, Brookings analysts made a case for U.S. sponsorship of the interim administration, and even suggested exiled Iraqis prepare a new constitution in advance of the invasion:

> [The United States] should articulate a clear vision of a unified democratic Iraq that will ensure fair representation for all ethnic and religious groups; autonomy for the Iraqi Kurds; respect for the rule of law and protection of civil rights, including women’s rights. The US should also now encourage Iraqis in exile to draw up a new constitution. And it should train a cadre of Iraqi professionals who can work with the US army to lay the groundwork for a functioning interim administration.166

Other voices were more cautious. At the October conference at the Washington Institute, Alina Romanowski called attention to the historical examples of West Germany and Japan, calling them “the most demanding U.S. military occupations” in history. Despite caution about the effect of U.S. collaboration on the perceived legitimacy of Iraq’s exiles, she concluded that success following World War II had resulted from the U.S.’s dominant role in reconstruction. Romanowski noted, “To a large extent, the U.S. military and others created new constitutions and political institutions for both [West Germany and Japan],” and claimed “this model greatly facilitated each country’s redevelopment and reintegration into the community of nations.”

However, Romanowski cautioned that postwar Iraq would not be as economically or socially weakened as West Germany and Japan were, nor “as open to international management.”

The Council on Foreign Relations had similar misgivings, arguing:

it will be important to resist the temptation, advanced in various quarters, to establish a provisional government in advance of hostilities or to impose a post-conflict government, especially one dominated by exiled Iraqi opposition leaders. Such a government would lack internal legitimacy and could further destabilize the situation inside the country.

**Political Reconstruction: A question of agency**

Some of the limitation inherent in policymakers’ search for appropriate historical ‘lessons learned’ lies in inherent misunderstanding (merely ‘disagreement’ is perhaps too kind) of what U.S. reconstruction efforts in West Germany and Japan attempted, as well as what those efforts ultimately achieved. For the Department of Defense, the military's direct control of state reconstruction in Iraq was key, as was the ability to install a friendly exiled government. At the Department of State, the FOI working groups maintained that postwar reconstruction efforts in West Germany and Japan should be examples for future policy for Iraq, but State cautioned against military occupation, instead arguing for the establishment of a technocratic interim administration. The CIA characterized the occupations of West Germany and Japan as “administration through local officials”, and encouraged similar “indirect administration” in Iraq. The Department of State’s historian, Marc J. Susser, termed the occupation of Japan “unilateral rule” by a military government transitioning to civilian administration, but the occupation of Germany was termed “shared allied rule”. In a distinction without difference, the report notes of the Japan experience:

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167 Baram, “What Next after Saddam?”
The U.S. role during the occupation was one of supervision rather than direct administration. There were no "military governors." Rather, the U.S. appointed "military government officers," who were called "civil affairs officers" after July 1949.\footnote{Department of State, "Occupation and Postwar Government: Precedents and Options," 1.}


Outside the federal government, elites were similarly divided as to whether the post-World War II occupations were direct, indirect, or something else entirely. The New America Foundation’s James Pinkerton authored the Newsday piece “Iraq Is No Stage for MacArthur-Japan Sequel”, claiming that the proposed model of occupation rule by a military official with “near-dictatorial power” would spark resentment and resistance from Iraq and the region.\footnote{James Pinkerton, “Iraq Is No Stage for MacArthur-Japan Sequel,” Newsday, 15 October 2002, http://newamerica.net/node/6701.} Analysts from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) characterized the U.S. occupation of Japan as one of “direct rule”, and that of West Germany as a case of “multilateral administration”.\footnote{Pei and Kasper, "Lessons from the Past," 3.}

Despite disagreement and confusion, U.S. think tanks produced at least one prescient, if quiet, critique of this conventional wisdom. An analyst from the centrist Stimson Center, William J. Durch, challenged the underlying assumptions of the Bush Administration’s planning, questioning proposals for a “MacArthur-like military occupation” of Iraq. His critique is worth quoting at length:

\begin{quote}
... 
\end{quote}
[The Administration] seems to forget that, after long years of war initiated by Japan, after the firebombing of Tokyo and the nuclear incineration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Emperor Hirohito ordered national cooperation with the occupation, and it happened, because the emperor ruled a nation and was revered above political and military leaders. Iraq has attacked its neighbors, been pushed back, and been contained for over a decade but not pounded into surrender; it has no emperor-equivalent; and its 23 million Sunni, Shia, Kurdish, and Arab Iraqis have little experience of freedom and perhaps even less love for one another. Political, inter-communal, and criminal violence—the secondary explosions ignited by invasion and regime change—could substantially postpone or derail hoped-for political and economic transitions.\textsuperscript{177}

Despite significant disagreements over how West Germany and Japan were administered or reconstructed, all members of the U.S. foreign policy establishment drew direct links between U.S. and Allied policies, and the resulting emergence of liberal democracy in the occupied states. The CIA report noted, “Allowing the Germans to craft institutions that matched their political and historical traditions facilitated Germany’s successful democratization,”\textsuperscript{178} while Susser termed the post-World War II case studies of Japan and West Germany as unqualified, “success stories.”\textsuperscript{179} For RAND, the example of West Germany underscored the lessons that “democracy can be transferred” and “military forces can underpin democratic transformation,” while in Japan, key lessons dictated that, “democracy can be exported to non-Western societies.”\textsuperscript{180}

The ideas of transportation and exportation of democracy are problematic, particularly given the German experience with Weimar era democracy, and Japan’s history of democratic constitutionalism that began with the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution in 1889, and continued with a period of reforms during the era of “Taisho Democracy” from 1912-1926. While it is far from my intention to assert that Weimar democracy and Taisho democracy were


\textsuperscript{178} Central Intelligence Agency, “The Postwar Occupations of Germany and Japan,” 2.

\textsuperscript{179} Department of State, “Occupation and Postwar Government: Precedents and Options,” 1.

\textsuperscript{180} Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building, 14.
without flaws, it is rather inchoate to claim that post-war occupation was either country’s first experience with democratic principles.

The Japanese case lends itself more easily to the argument that democratization was a key goal of U.S. reconstruction planners. The Potsdam Declaration called for the removal of “all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people,” and the establishment of “a peacefully inclined and responsible government,” in accordance with “the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.” However, apart from the adoption of the constitution, in which U.S. involvement was quite extensive, the influence exerted by the U.S. administration upon the Japanese political system was at best minimal and at worst ineffective. In one clear example of U.S. efforts to influence the Japanese political system, U.S. administrators intervened in the internal elections of Japan’s leftist party in an attempt to encourage the formation of a center-left coalition. The effort backfired, leading to the rise of a conservative ruling party following the 1949 election. Insofar as U.S. policies affected democratization efforts in Japan, they are more likely to have hindered than supported them. As Moore has argued:

We can acknowledge that Japan is democratic today without agreeing that this happy condition is solely the legacy of the Occupation; too many other forces have operated in Japanese society both before and after the Occupation for us to accept this view without careful qualification.

In the case of West Germany, the U.S. tendency to ascribe a direct relationship to occupation policy and democratization glosses over much of the tension between the U.S. military government and domestic German actors. The evolution of political institutions in West Germany was resisted by U.S. occupation authorities, in part due to fears that premature political development could delay reunification, but also out of concern that political reconstruction would result in the type of political centralization that had empowered the Nazi regime. U.S. occupation forces were primarily focused on the elimination of Nazi ideology, as

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evidenced by JCS 1067, or *Directive to Commander-in-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany*, which was enacted by President Truman on May 16, 1945.\footnote{Excerpts from the JCS 1067 are quoted from the revision referred to as JCS 1067/6, which was signed by President Truman on 16 May 1945; United States Department of State, *Foreign relations of the United States: diplomatic papers, 1945*. Vol. III, European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany, 484.} This document served as the basis for American occupation and reconstruction policy until mid-1947, when a more lenient directive succeeded it, JCS 1779.\footnote{Tølllefsen, Trond Ove, “The American occupation of Germany: A representative case of nation-building?” Masters Thesis prepared for the Department of Archaeology, Conservation and Historical Studies, University of Oslo (Autumn 2006), 40.} The lessons of ideological and civil reconstruction will be discussed later, but with respect to political reconstruction JCS 1067 called only for the “eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis,” (emphasis mine)\footnote{Tølllefsen, “The American occupation of Germany,” 40.} seemingly far from an urgent priority. As Tølllefsen points out:

Apart from the ban on political activity and organisations, the last half sentence of this paragraph is the only mention of democratisation in the whole document. In comparison, JCS 1067 included six pages instructing the MG Commander on various aspects of denazification and eight pages on Economic and Financial control of the American zone.\footnote{Tølllefsen, “The American occupation of Germany,” 63-64.}

During the occupation period, U.S. policy often aimed at preventing—rather than promoting—German political activity. The U.S. initially banned political activity in its zone, and not until the Soviet authorities reauthorized political activity in their zone did the U.S. and Britain move to loosen their political restrictions.\footnote{Tølllefsen, “The American occupation of Germany,” 40.} Subsequent U.S. policies facilitated the rehabilitation of Weimar era politicians, but at the expense of the suppression of the grass-roots anti-fascist (Antifa) movement that was deemed too homologous to socialist and communist mobilization occurring in the Soviet sphere. The British were slower to reauthorize political activity in their zone (September, as opposed to August 1945), but their decision to allow zone wide, rather than merely local forms of political organization explains the later dominance of British zone politicians such as Kurt Schumacher (SPD) and Konrad Adenauer (CDU). As Tølllefsen notes:
One could even argue that American efforts actually held back restoration of democracy in the American zone, effectively turning the American zone, as well as the smaller French zone, into a political backwater, subordinates to the growing power of the national parties in the British and Soviet zone of occupation.¹⁸⁹

Due to disagreements between the Allied occupation powers, agreement to proceed with the creation of a West German government was not achieved until spring of 1948.¹⁹⁰ Negotiations on the parameters of that government continued throughout 1948, as Germans resented the extensive Allied restrictions over what was ostensibly to be a sovereign government. As Gimbel has shown, Germans felt “the Allies wanted merely to authorize Germans to participate, but not to determine policy or proclaim objectives of their own”; “the Germans were being asked not to make a constitution, but to create an administrative apparatus for the convenience of the Allies.”¹⁹¹

The use of postwar Germany as an example of successful federalism by State and the CIA is also curious. The August CIA report claims federalism was successful because it allowed Germany’s regions to “express their distinct identities without undermining central authority”. This analysis ignores the initial goal of U.S. policy, which as Tølleføn has argued, “was to weaken state power, not to strengthen it.”¹⁹² JCS 1067 noted “The principal Allied objective is to prevent Germany from ever again becoming a threat to the peace of the world,” and U.S. policymakers felt much of the German threat arose from the political and economic centralization that occurred under the Nazi regime. The most extreme articulation of this view came from U.S. Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau, who argued for the complete dismantling of German industry and the reconstruction of an agrarian state. More moderate policies eventually won out, but the federal reconstruction of West Germany was intended to weaken, rather than strengthen, state power, and certainly never intended to reinforce central authority. In both West Germany and Japan, the primary goal of U.S. occupation was not democratization, but rather to achieve extensive ideological transformation of the defeated regimes and the populations that had supported them.

¹⁹¹ Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany, 212.
Economic Reconstruction

On September 8, 2003, President George W. Bush delivered a speech discussing current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and outlined an imminent request for more resources to support ongoing operations. Amidst his discussion of Iraq, Bush called upon the historical example of post-World War II reconstruction efforts in West Germany and Japan:

America has done this kind of work before. Following World War II, we lifted up the defeated nations of Japan and Germany, and stood with them as they built representative governments. We committed years and resources to this cause. And that effort has been repaid many times over in three generations of friendship and peace.

America today accepts the challenge of helping Iraq in the same spirit – for their sake, and for our own.  

This use of historical analogy was more than merely a rhetorical flourish. American officials had contemplated historical precedents since at least October 2001, when FOI project was launched. The construction of a new political regime was foremost on the minds of American planners, but details of economic planning enter the conversation slowly. The early Rodman memos originating from the Pentagon make no mention of economic reconstruction. Thus, an internal Department of State cable from July 8, 2002 is the first available articulation of U.S. government goals for the economic reconstruction of Iraq. The cable outlines the planned establishment of fifteen working groups, including one focused on Economy and Infrastructure and another on Oil and Energy.

With respect to economic reconstruction in Iraq, the pre-invasion discourse exhibited three main characteristics. First, most elements of the U.S. foreign policy establishment looked to Iraq’s oil as a quick means to finance economic recovery. Despite frequent reference to post-World War II reconstruction efforts, the focus on oil overwhelmed evidence that economic

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194 Department of State, Briefing, “Future of Iraq Project.” Released only in part, the briefing details the “Project History” of the Future of Iraq Project on page six, noting “State Department planning on the transition began” in October 2001.
195 Department of State, “Future of Iraq Expert Working Groups.”
recovery can take large amounts of time, and require extensive initiative from domestic forces. Second, the use of post-World War II examples to plan the reconstruction of Iraq’s infrastructure rewrote much of the Allied experience in West Germany and Japan, and resulted in overly optimistic estimations. Third, U.S. policy planners tended to mythologize the role played by the Marshall Plan, misattributing the contemporary neo-liberal economic success of Germany and Japan to the direct result of U.S. and Allied reconstruction policies in the wake of World War II. Despite significant differences, the experiences of reconstruction in West Germany and Japan are often conflated, and an understanding of the domestic forces that ultimately fuelled Germany and Japan’s economic recovery is noticeably absent from U.S. analysis. Although these three themes are necessarily constitutive of one another, this chapter will address them in succession.

**Role of Oil**

Following the invasion and occupation of Iraq, some analysts and commentators argued control of Iraq’s oil, or the stabilization of the world oil market, were key incentives driving the war. This view is presented by Atif Kubursi, Daniel Yergin, Michael Klare, and Ian Rutledge among others, though elements of their analysis have been qualified by writers such as Raymond Hinnebusch and Doug Stokes. Popularity, the argument that control of Middle Eastern oil was a key motivator for U.S. policymakers has been articulated most clearly in the American sphere by Rachel Maddow’s MSNBC documentary *Why We Did It*. However, in my analysis of the U.S. government’s internal documents and external statements from the period, along with the reports of various Washington think tanks, I have found no evidence to support the assertion that American policymakers saw oil as a prime incentive for war. This does not mean such evidence does not exist, only that we must wait for abler hands, the passage of time, or both, to bring it to light.

Most U.S. policymakers rather looked to Iraq’s oil as a quick means to finance economic recovery. State’s FOI working group for Oil and Energy was tasked with developing plans to

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reconstruct Iraq’s oilfields, along with proposals to evaluate potential foreign investors, and a procedure for phasing out domestic energy subsidies.\textsuperscript{198} The Iraqi members of the working group recalled Iraq’s experience with reconstruction in the aftermath of the first Gulf War, and were optimistic about a quick refurbishment of the oil industry’s infrastructure.\textsuperscript{199} Citing a strong nationalist ownership of Iraq’s oil sector, the working groups anticipated that coalition assistance would only be required for initial security provision, and for recruiting potential investors. The rest the Iraqis could handle themselves. However, the State briefer noted doubts about Iraqi optimism, questioning the premise of assured investment by international oil companies (IOCs):

Energy experts believed that current Iraqi opposition, if put into power, could not provide an environment to attract international oil investment into Iraq. IOC’s [sic] would look at a chaotic internal political environment and could decide to invest elsewhere.\textsuperscript{200}

This brief statement reflects the prescience of which the State reports were occasionally capable. Ultimately, the “energy experts” were shown to be correct. While Iraq was able to convince some smaller international companies to sign on to develop fields, the larger, more advanced IOCs saw little incentive to invest in a politically unstable environment. Many of the biggest IOCs signed contracts with the Kurdish Regional Government, but passed on auctions offered by Baghdad.

The CIA report analyzing the postwar occupations of West Germany and Japan was short on economic recommendations for Iraq’s reconstruction. At its most explicit, the report mentioned the potential utility of Iraq’s “wealth of natural resources” or oil, and pointed to Iraq’s rationing system and the Oil-for-Food Program as potential examples for postwar frameworks.\textsuperscript{201} State’s FOI reports also included helpful analysis of the Oil-for-Food Program. The Oil-for-Food Program report outlines the history of the program, including details of its establishment, connection to Iraqi state entities, and role in the lives of the Iraqi population.

\textsuperscript{198} Department of State, “Future of Iraq Expert Working Groups,” 5.
\textsuperscript{199} Department of State, “The Future of Iraq Project, Overview,” 12 May 2003, Slide 19.
\textsuperscript{201} Central Intelligence Agency, “The Postwar Occupations of Germany and Japan,” ii.
The report’s critical analysis articulates the strengths and weaknesses of the program’s administration, and closes with several recommendations for the interim government, including a suggestion that the program continue for a maximum of three years during a transitional period.

In the Autumn 2002 issue of *Survival*, Brookings’ analysts Philip Gordon and Michael O’Hanlon, this time joined by Martin Indyk, turned briefly to the concerns of post-conflict reconstruction. The authors cautioned that, “The United States has not traditionally proven very good at making long-term commitments to regional reconstruction,” but they, too, reinforce the broader mythology of post-World War II reconstruction, noting, “America did it with enormous success in Europe and Japan after the Second World War, and in Korea and Taiwan to a lesser degree in the 1950s, but is now wont to use its powerful military forces and then leave the reconstruction job to others.” Granting short shrift to economic concerns, the report noted cursorily that, “Iraq also has considerable economic resources, a consequence of its abundant oil reserves, which would make a large-scale donor effort unnecessary.” RAND concurred, claiming “Iraq’s oil means that the country will not remain dependent on international aid in the medium term.”

The New America Foundation’s contribution to the debate surrounding Iraq’s oil is particularly striking. Steve Clemons, the New America Foundation’s Executive Vice President and Co-Director of the American Strategy Project penned an opinion piece in early April 2003. Clemons encouraged the U.S. to review the example of post-World War II reconstruction in Japan, where the U.S. redistributed the holdings of aristocratic landowners to Japanese farmers, thus “linking Japan’s most lucrative resource to millions of citizens.” Clemons encouraged the U.S. to pursue a similar policy in Iraq, by creating an oil investment fund in the style of the Alaska Permanent Fund. Like the Alaskan example, Clemons proposed the Iraq Permanent Fund be invested in “a diverse set of international equities”, with the dividends dispersed to individual Iraqi households. Clemons’s plan for “spreading capital broadly among

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204 J. Dobbins et al., *America’s Role in Nation-Building*, 166.
new stakeholders” is emblematic of the neoliberal free-market approach to development and reconstruction, and it quickly drew the attention of members of the U.S. Senate. Two senators hailing from oil states, Mary Landrieu (D-LA) and Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), drafted legislation encouraging the Bush administration to adopt Cleamons’s policy as a way to discourage corruption and encourage economic development. 206 Secretary of State Colin Powell was said to be especially supportive of the proposal. 207

Other members of Washington’s think tanks were more pessimistic about using Iraq’s oil wealth to finance its economic reconstruction. The Stimson Center argued the immediate needs of humanitarian relief, governance, and security would require more funding than could be subsidized from Iraq’s oil profits. 208 The 2003 CSIS report expressed concerns about Iraq’s “enormous” foreign debt burden and the continuing effects of international sanctions. The report cautioned that “while Iraq has extensive oil wealth, it will not be able to cover all its own post-conflict needs”, further nothing it would be years before oil profits could contribute to Iraq’s reconstruction. 209 The CFR report was both prescient and cautious. Calling the idea of using Iraq’s supposed oil wealth to finance its postwar reconstruction “wishful thinking”, the report explained:

Notwithstanding the value of Iraq’s vast oil reserves, there are severe limits on them both as a source of funding for post-conflict reconstruction efforts and as the key driver of future development. Put simply, we do not anticipate a bonanza.210

The report’s addendum, “Oil and Iraq: Opportunities and Challenges” provided further elaboration, stressing the dilapidated state of an Iraqi oil infrastructure held together with “band-aids”.211 The CFR working group estimated Iraq’s current oil output at 2.6 to 2.8

211 Ibid., 16.
million barrels per day, and dropping at a rate of approximately 100,000 bpd/year.\textsuperscript{212} The report maintained recovery and reconstruction of Iraq’s oil infrastructure would cost $5 billion over as many as three years, with an additional $20 billion required to bring electricity production to pre-1990 levels.\textsuperscript{213} CFR’s assessment contrasted sharply with that of USAID, which anticipated electricity could be restored to preconflict levels within 18 months.\textsuperscript{214}

\section*{Infrastructure}

Virtually all sectors of the American political establishment anticipated that Iraq’s infrastructure would survive the invasion in a functional state. Part of the assessment was based on the apparent speed with which Iraq had rebuilt following the first Gulf War, but the optimism also resulted from an underestimation of the debilitating effects of many years of sanctions and conflict.\textsuperscript{215}

The State Department was the first to begin planning for the economic reconstruction of Iraq. The FOI project’s Economy and Infrastructure working group was established to, “plan how the post-Saddam government can use economic, legal and financial incentives to rebuild the Iraqi economy, create jobs, restore infrastructure, promote international trade and investment, and restore the Iraqi economy to sound, modern free-market principles.” State stressed that, “Job creation will be an essential priority in shaping Iraqis, [sic] attitudes towards a post-Saddam Iraqi government.”\textsuperscript{216} In line with Gordon and Trainor’s assessment, the reports of the Economy and Infrastructure working group are of decidedly “uneven” quality, despite meeting three times, in October and December of 2002, and again in January 2003.\textsuperscript{217} The working group members produced 18 reports, 12 of which reflected the consensus of all participants.

\begin{enumerate}
\item The consensus\textsuperscript{212} \textit{Ibid.}, 15, 18.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, 18.
\item Department of State, “Future of Iraq Expert Working Groups,” page 3, section B.5.(8).
\item Department of State, Briefing, “Future of Iraq Project,” 01 November 2002, 34.
\end{enumerate}
documents are the most useful, while those produced by individuals tend to be naively optimistic, ideological, and polemical.

One promising initiative that emerged from the working groups deliberations was the proposal for an Iraq Development and Reconstruction Council (IDRC). The report on the IDRC includes plans for a temporary technocratic institution designed to assist a transitional Iraqi government in the post-war reconstruction and economic development of Iraq. The IDRC was to be staffed by “qualified Iraqi experts from inside and outside Iraq” assisted by other “experienced technocrats whom may or may not be Iraqis.”219 Something very like State’s IDRC—the Iraq Reconstruction and Development Council (IRDC)—was established by the Pentagon in advance of the U.S. invasion, but it failed to live up to its potential. The IRDC reported first to Garner and later to Bremer and the CPA, but was disbanded in June 2004, a victim of interagency competition, bureaucratic inefficiency, and American dismissiveness toward native Iraqis. Isam al-Khafaji, a professor of political economy at the University of Amsterdam and a member of the FOI Democratic Principles working group resigned from the IRDC in late July 2003, citing American arrogance, indecision, and the growing chaos in Iraq as key factors in his decision to resign.220

USAID’s pre-invasion report “Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq” was issued in February 2003. The report anticipated that Iraq’s infrastructure would be completely rebuilt within 18 months.221 Some Washington analysts took USAID at their word. Upon review of the USAID report, Michael Knights from the Washington Institute concluded the lessons of destructive Clinton-era attacks on Iraq had revolutionized the military’s targeting strategies. If USAID expected to complete reconstruction on such a short timeline, Knights reasoned, U.S. military targeting for the upcoming invasions must “represent an unprecedented attempt to move seamlessly from war to reconstruction.”222 The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) asserted that although reconstruction in Iraq would face challenges, there was cause for optimism. USIP analysts

222 Knights, “Infrastructure Targeting and Postwar Iraq.”
explained “The country’s infrastructure, though already worn from neglect and additionally damaged by war, remains serviceable,” and noted that Iraq was “a sophisticated country”, rather than “a struggling developing nation on the brink of disintegration”.  

Analysts from the Stimson Center were uncertain about Iraq’s reconstruction challenges. William Durch explained, “Iraq’s infrastructure has not been destroyed by a generation of civil wars as in Afghanistan or Angola”, but he noted the effects of the invasion were unpredictable, and would depend on both coalition and regime actions. The CFR was decidedly more pessimistic; it characterized Iraq’s infrastructure problems as “severe”, and noted, “Even without a war, Iraq’s infrastructure is likely to be damaged and billions of dollars will be required to rehabilitate it.”

**Neoliberal Market Emphasis**

State’s early FOI reports exhibited a powerful neoliberal flavour. The products of the November meeting include consensus reports on “Economic Policy” and “Transforming Iraq’s Military Industrial Complex,” along with an individual paper on “Military Industrial Corporation”. The Economic Policy report is thick with flowery and ideological platitudes, but lacks any usable material of substance, while the paper on Military Industrial Cooperation is so disjointed and meandering as to be nearly incoherent. The two-page consensus document on Iraq’s military industrial complex (MIC) is the most respectable of the three, helpfully detailing the role of the MIC in Iraq’s social, political, and economic fabric, noting the MIC “extends Saddam’s power and control over an otherwise unemployable, educated cadre who would be dangerous to his state if not kept busy.” In a prescient recommendation, the report suggested MIC programs not tied to WMD development should continue to function under the interim government until budget reviews and personnel screening and retraining can be accomplished.

The reports from the December meetings are of slightly higher quality. However, individual reports submitted on a new currency and banking structure were marred by verbose rambling.

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223 Jennings, Ray Salvatore, “The Road Ahead: Lessons in Nation Building from Japan, Germany, and Afghanistan for Postwar Iraq,” Peaceworks No. 49, United States Institute of Peace (April 2003), 11.
and apparent ideological bias. Characteristic of this trend, the currency report encouraged policy planners to reject “failed political ‘command and control’ philosophies like socialism or milder ‘welfare and warfare systems’ supported by high taxes.” The author argued such policies “bring out the ethical worst in people,” and concluded that choosing “market-based participatory communal institutions that bring out the ethical best in people,” was only “pragmatic common sense.” The consensus paper on establishing a new currency for Iraq includes recommendations on interim government policies with respect to monetary policy, state revenue projections, inflation, the convoluted history of Iraq's foreign exchange rate and import policy, the price structure, public investment, and governmental budget. The paper's contribution is marred by an ideological and largely subsidiary discussion on what images to use on the new Iraqi currency, noting that “the dominant ugly picture of the dictator”, in addition to the currency's low value, would ensure Iraqi support for a new currency. A later footnote indicates that this paper, along with several of the other individually authored papers submitted to the working group, was authored by Mr. Rubar Sandi, an American businessman who immigrated to the United States from Iraqi Kurdistan in the 1970s. Now the leader of The Sandi Group (TSG), a large private international finance, investment and management firm based in Washington, D.C., Sandi was involved in several post-war reconstruction contracts in Iraq, including serving as a sub-contractor to the U.S. giant, DynCorp. TSG has since been a party to several legal challenges over its contracting policies, including a whistleblower lawsuit wherein TSG settled, and suit which was dismissed under a three-year state of limitations.

In October 2002 the Stimson Center made its contribution to the debate, issuing a series of brief essays authored by its regional and technical experts. Several authors critiqued the Bush administration’s failure to articulate concrete proposals for a post-conflict Iraq, justifying the

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hesitancy of the American public and European allies in absence of a clear policy. On the issue of economic policy however, little was said, with only two pages urging the Bush Administration to prepare plans on foreign investment guidelines, trade agreements, and export controls for a post-war Iraq. The New America Foundation’s proposal for an Iraq Permanent Fund also merits special mention, for it is a decidedly creative interpretation of history that can draw on the redistributionist example of land reform in Japan, as justification for the decidedly neoliberal proposal of encouraging economic development via direct payments to individual citizens. Even the May 2003 report by the center-left CEIP supported the conventional economic wisdom. Authors Pei and Kasper noted that Japan and West Germany “faced little difficulty in using U.S. aid to rebuild their economies,” arguing that “in West Germany, the generous aid provided under the Marshall Plan was a critical factor in revitalizing the economy.”

A RAND report from the same period is similarly approving of Allied economic reconstruction, noting “British and U.S. economic policies quickly moved toward creating an economic environment favourable for business.”

**Economic Reconstruction: At whose hands?**

In a recent interview, Jim Miklaszewski, the NBC Pentagon correspondent for the past twenty years, explained his experience with the inner workings of Douglas Feith’s Office of Policy Planning in the Pentagon:

Doug Feith...told me that they had a Marshall Plan all set to go in terms of rebuilding Iraq. And he pointed to this stack of huge three-ring binders, all of them black. There must have been about 10 of them stacked up on top of a cabinet. And I asked to see them, and he said, “No, you can’t. It’s classified.” And I said, “Well, O.K., I understand that, I guess.” But I raised it to somebody else within the next couple of weeks. I said, “Well, Doug Feith showed me the Marshall Plan for Iraq.” And this

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232 See, for example, Holt, “A Tale of Two Speeches,” 1-5.
235 Dobbins, et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building, 41.
person laughed, and he said, “Mik, that was the Marshall Plan.” It was a copy of the original Marshall Plan, not a plan for Iraq.236 This scene could be taken for little more than a gimmick, showboating on the part of a policy hack hoping to overawe a convenient reporter. However, the episode closely parallels President Bush’s remarks comparing U.S. efforts in Iraq to policies that “lifted up the defeated nations of Japan and Germany.”237 Additionally, former USAID chief Andrew Natsios and former Bush cabinet member Jack Kamp are also on record comparing post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Iraq to the post-World War II Marshall Plan.238 These episodes are evidence of both the rhetorical and cognitive links that U.S. policy makers made between their planning for Iraq, and the U.S. post-World War II reconstruction experiences. The divergences, however, between post-World War II policy and Iraq policy are staggering. The harsh neo-liberal structural adjustments, along with the jarring string of privatizations that accompanied the CPA’s economic reforms could not have less in common with the command economy style policies of U.S. reconstruction in Germany, or the Keynesian-style policies that characterized U.S. efforts in Japan.239

The reports compiled by Susser are especially good examples of this historical mythology. Susser’s explanation of the post-World War II occupations argues that U.S. policy insisted “on ‘just and reasonable’ treatment of civilians and prompt rehabilitation of the civilian economy.” The report does not address the Marshall Plan specifically, though it does touch on the 1947 zonal economic merger that paved the way for the launch of the European Recovery Program (ERP), and the unification of the French, British, and U.S. administered zones as the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949.240 Susser frames the subsequent economic success of West Germany as entirely the result of prescient U.S. occupation policy.

236 Morris, “The Certainty of Donald Rumsfeld (Part 1).”
237 Bush, George W., “President Bush’s Address to the Nation,” 8 September 2003.
When it comes to the Marshall Plan, the CIA’s analysis tracks closely with the U.S. establishment’s broader consensus. The report argues Germany was able to prosper because of “the government’s use of Marshall Plan funds to provide economic advantage to membership in the federal system.”\(^{241}\) The CIA report highlights the extensive planning that occurred prior to the occupations of Germany and Japan, but repeatedly notes that early U.S. and Allied goals for extensive political, social, and economic changes were ultimately scaled back and cancelled in the face of unanticipated challenges. The report cautions that “The seven-year occupation only laid the groundwork for success—it took a generation change reinforced by the continuing presence of US troops to solidify the gains.”\(^{242}\) The CIA report is the only official articulation of this point. In this respect, the CIA report gives a better historical account of the postwar experience, explicitly noting that Germany and Japan were “not unqualified successes.”\(^{243}\) The report explains that Morgenthau’s Plan to eliminate Germany’s industrial capacity was quickly scrapped, but it fails to explain the financial and practical reasons that plans to eliminate Germany’s industrial capacity were ultimately overturned. The analysis grants too much influence to the beginning of the Cold War, and not enough to collective action challenges faced by allied occupation administrators.

This understanding of U.S. policy in postwar West Germany and Japan is erroneous for two reasons. First, it ignores evidence of the initial goals of the occupations, as well as the convoluted path U.S. policy took with respect to reconstruction of the economic power of its former adversaries. U.S. occupation policy in both West Germany and Japan was initially charged with deconstructing the economic foundation that had supported the military might of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. In Japan, “economic reconstruction was only prescribed as a means of preventing economic crisis and chaos.”\(^{244}\) In West Germany, JCS 1067, which guided American policy from the end of the war until currency reform in 1948, was specifically targeted at weakening the German economy.\(^{245}\) JCS 1067 mandated that the occupying commanders, “take no steps (a) looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany, or (b) designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy.” In particular, American forces were

\(^{242}\) Central Intelligence Agency, “The Postwar Occupations of Germany and Japan: Implications for Iraq.” i.
instructed to keep the German standard of living only at levels “necessary to prevent starvation or widespread disease,” but on no account should it be higher than any of the neighbouring states. The strictures of the JCS 1067 were later elaborated on by The Level of Industry Plan (March 1946), in which the Allied Control Council agreed to reduce Germany’s standard of living to the 1932 level, while cutting industrial capacity to 50-55 percent of the 1938 level.

The resistance to full economic reconstruction of Germany continued throughout 1947 and 1948. In March 1947, as the details of Marshall’s plan for European reconstruction began to congeal, President Truman’s reparations advisor, Edwin Pauley warned Truman that following Marshall’s proposals:

would restore Germany to the same dominant position of industrial power which it held before the war...I cannot avoid looking into the future and contemplating the Germany which this plan would produce—a Germany not merely as powerful industrially as the Germany of Hitler, but more powerful because of the incredible advances of science.

Jackson has shown the policy of dismantling German industry reached its peak in 1947, but continued until at least 1949. The policy was advocated by Morgenthau, and supported by Roosevelt, his successor Truman, and other key officials in the U.S. government. Internationally, the policy of dismantling was supported by Britain, condoned by the Soviet Union, and ardently defended by France. The Soviet Union insisted upon dismantling as part of its reparations allotment, and professed understandable concern over a military or economic resurgence in Germany. France opposed the economic recovery of Germany for the same reasons, in addition to fears that domestic outcry over a German revival would bring down the French government.

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246 FRUS 1945 III: 494.
249 Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy, 176, 188, 209; Gimbel claims the dismantling policy did not entirely end until 1951, Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany, 185.
Second, this analysis is representative of an American tradition echoed in President Bush’s September speech, where the subsequent development of Germany and Japan into liberal, democratic, free-market Western allies is attributed directly to postwar U.S. policy. Such an understanding ignores the devastating effects of initial U.S. reconstruction policy. Due to the import-export constraints imposed by U.S. policies, a massive food crisis erupted in the American zone by the winter of 1946-47, and the economy, such as it was, remained mainly barter and black market-based. Not until 1948, when the new Deutschmark was introduced and price and state economic controls removed, did the German economy finally begin to recover.\textsuperscript{251} Scholarship questioning the efficacy of the Marshall Plan is even more challenging to the conventional understanding of West Germany’s reconstruction. Initial funds were made available for France, Italy, and Austria by November of 1947,\textsuperscript{252} but not for occupied Germany. The ERP, which would form the bulk of the economic policy later known as the Marshall Plan, was not extended to Germany until the Six-Power Conference in London in spring of 1948, and the question of the Ruhr was not settled until late December of that year.\textsuperscript{253} Milward has observed that Marshall aid was low in relation to the gross domestic produce of the target countries, and in any event Germany received much less aid per capita than any other major recipient.\textsuperscript{254} What aid was allocated to Germany arrived late, hampered by bureaucratic conflicts, confusion, and red tape.\textsuperscript{255} Alan Milward argues that European integration, generally considered the most significant result of the ERP, occurred despite the Marshall Plan, rather than because of it.\textsuperscript{256} The shift within the United States towards rehabilitation rather than dismantling of the German economy was late in coming, and more the result of domestic forces and the desire among members of the War Department and the U.S. government to


\textsuperscript{252} Yergin, “Shattered Peace,” 131-132.


\textsuperscript{254} Alan S. Milward, \textit{The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-1951} (London: Methuen, 1984), 95-96; Abelshauser, “American Aid and West Germany Economic Recovery,” 389. Abelshauser notes that “While France received a total per capita aid of $21.7 in the second year of the Marshall Plan, Austria $36.2 and the Netherlands $45, the West Germans received only $12 in per capita aid, including GAROA aid.”

\textsuperscript{255} Abelshauser, “American Aid and West German Economic Recovery,” 387.

\textsuperscript{256} Alan S. Milward, \textit{The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-1951} (London: Methuen, 1984), 466-475.
limit the financial expense involved in administering occupied Germany. The economic rehabilitation of West Germany was the result of complex forces, chief among them the proposals and demands of German politicians. The mythology of the Marshall Plan present in the prewar planning for the reconstruction of Iraq overemphasises U.S. control of postwar developments, and credits U.S. policy with achievements that are better seen as the result of German aspirations, time, or perhaps even chance. As Stern notes, “[the Marshall Plan] has transcended reality and become a myth.”

The Japanese economic recovery is perhaps more easily linked to postwar planning efforts, but even here true economic recovery did not begin until 1950 and 1951, with extensive U.S. spending in support of the war effort in Korea. This observation is seemingly analogous to the state of the U.S. economy in the 1920s and 1930s, which failed to grow in absence of wartime spending, despite President Roosevelt’s extensive New Deal policies. What is remarkable about the Japanese case is the decidedly Keynesian shape of U.S. reconstruction efforts. Early on, General Douglas MacArthur issued a statement to the Japanese government detailing the requirements of economic liberalization in occupied Japan. His statement called for “the democratization of Japanese economic institutions to the end that monopolistic industrial controls be revised through the development of methods which tend to insure a wide distribution of income and ownership of the means of production and trade,” as well as for “encouragement of the unionization of labor” and “full employment in useful work of everyone.” Such policies offer a sharp contradiction to Allied conventions in Germany, where labour organizations were often suspected of harbouring socialist or communist sympathisers, and thus discouraged.

Ultimately, it is difficult to determine if the economic recoveries in West Germany and Japan occurred as a result of Allied and U.S. policies, or if it was rather an evolution that took place independent from (or perhaps even in spite of) those efforts. The prevalent American mythology of post-World War II reconstruction conflates subsequent results with initial

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259 Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building, 69.
intentions, overemphasising the effect of U.S. political and economic contributions, while
discounting powerful domestic forces in Germany and Japan that forged the liberal, free-
market democracies we are familiar with today.
Civil Reconstruction

American pre-war reconstruction planning for civil revival and transitional justice in Iraq drew heavily from the historical memory of similar U.S. policies enacted in West Germany and Japan following World War II. However, as other scholars have noted, these policies were at best inefficient, and many ultimately failed to achieve their objectives.

Transitional Justice and Reconciliation

The FOI Transitional Justice working group was organized “to draft laws to bring Saddam Hussein and his top associates to justice.” This working group was the first to meet, convening early in July 2002, and meeting three more times over the course of 2002 and early 2003. Its fourth and final meeting occurred from 23 March 23 to April 4, shortly after the launch of the U.S. invasion. At a September meeting, Dr. Mohammed al-Jabiri proposed Saddam Hussein be tried for war crimes and crimes against humanity “under international law and Iraqi laws from the pre-Saddam period in Iraq.” By the next session of the working group disagreement had emerged within the ranks. Moniem Al-Khatab, a prominent Iraqi lawyer, claimed the Iraqi Military Penal Code and the international covenants and treaties that Iraqi remained a signatory to would provide sufficient basis for the trials to be held in Iraq. Dr. Rakiah Al-Kayass explained:

We believe that only an Iraqi court, established under Iraqi law, will have legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqi people. We have studied the lessons of the International Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda and we are confident that Iraqis can deal with these crimes themselves, with the necessary technical assistance from the international community.

A subsequent press release from the meeting notes that Iraqi legal experts prepared a 600 page report including proposals for the reform of Iraq’s legal system, and draft laws to replace those used by Saddam Hussein’s regime. The State Department cable from July of 2002 detailed

262 Department of State, “The Future of Iraq Project, Overview,” 34.
preliminary thoughts on the reconstruction of Iraq’s educational system. The cable identified an Education working group tasked with “teaching values of pluralism, tolerance, civic responsibility, and rule of law” as well as a curricula overhaul that replace “materials that incite hatred and exclusiveness” with those that “promote tolerance of diversity.”265 The Education working group met November 25-26, 2002.266 The CIA report also stressed that educational reform “would be a requirement in any political transformation of Iraq.”267

The Transitional Justice working group intended “to draft an amnesty decree and a truth-and-reconciliation process for the rest of Iraqi society”, as well as spearheading an investigation and documentation effort of violations of human rights that occurred under Saddam’s rule.268 The July 2002 cable contained specific guidance to U.S. missions in Pretoria, Buenos Aires, and Santiago. The embassy in Pretoria was instructed to “suggest that South Africa’s experience in developing a process to promote truth and reconciliation would be particularly welcome in the working group on Transitional Justice”.269 Embassies in Buenos Aires and Santiago were ordered to convey that “free Iraqis have impressed upon United States officials that post-Saddam Iraq would benefit from learning about Argentina’s and Chile’s experiences in making the transition from a military regime to democracy.”270 State’s priorities were seconded by elements of Washington’s think-tank community. The Washington Institute’s report termed the establishment of a truth and reconciliation “absolutely essential”271 Conversely, the CSIS report intentionally avoided detailing proposals for a process of transitional justice in Iraq despite the Bush Administration’s preference for a South African-style Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The CSIS report stressed “any reconciliation process must be Iraqi-driven, not imposed from the outside”.272 In particular, CSIS encouraged a United Nations-appointed neutral arbiter (“ideally an Iraqi”) to oversee a “national dialogue process” aimed at encouraging both diaspora Iraqis and those who had remained in Iraq to

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negotiate the parameters of a reconciliation commission or a general amnesty.\textsuperscript{273} CEIP, too, advocated the United States “step back as much as possible”, and allow Iraqis to take control of the process of justice and reconciliation. CEIP analysts were concerned that allowing the U.S. to impose a system of justice, “may keep Iraqis from coming to grips with the past and healing divisions”.\textsuperscript{274} The scholars cautioned that if the United States found itself too involved with the process of transitional justice, “Washington will find itself perpetually tested and judged for even-handedness on a whole array of local issues for which there is no good, or even fair, answer.”\textsuperscript{275} The policies articulated by CSIS and CEIP were thus entirely opposed to the legal drafting and decision making then occurring in the FOI working group.

**De-Ba’athification**

In its formulation of U.S. policy to reconstruction the civic and political ideology of the new Iraqi state, the U.S. Department of State turned to the historical examples of state reconstruction in West Germany and Japan. The report from the FOI project’s Democratic Principles working group noted, "The examples of the de-Nazification of members of the Nazi Party following the end of the Second World War and the lustration laws implemented in the former Eastern European countries may prove helpful for purposes of de-Ba’athification."\textsuperscript{276} However, State saw “de-ideologization” as the most critical part of the proposed de-Ba’athification program, drawing a distinction between the Ba’ath Party’s influence on Iraqi culture, and the influence wielded by Saddam Hussein’s regime. The report noted that “De-ideologization, while less measurable, is arguably the most important and the most difficult of the tasks of the de-Ba’athification program”.\textsuperscript{277} Members of the working group underscored this distinction, and the report notes, “Some members of the working group object to the use of the term “de-Ba’athification.” They suggest instead replacing the terms “Ba’ath” and “de-Ba’athification,” with “Saddam”, “Saddamism” and “de-Saddamification”, wherever these appear in the report.”\textsuperscript{278} Members of the working group disagreed about how members of Saddam Hussein’s regime should be treated by a reconstructed Iraqi state, with proposals

\textsuperscript{276} Department of State, “The Future of Iraq Project, Democratic Principles and Procedures Working Group,” 45.
\textsuperscript{277} Department of State, “The Future of Iraq Project, Democratic Principles and Procedures Working Group,” 63.
favouring anything from amnesty to disbanding the entire structure of the Ba’ath Party and the security services.\textsuperscript{279}

The CIA’s analysis touched briefly on the issue of post-invasion purges, noting “The United States began the occupations of Germany and Japan with the goal of finding, removing from public life, and punishing war criminals.” However, the report cautions that U.S. goals were limited by “the need to rely on local institutions and leaders” and concludes, “In the end, few German and Japanese were permanently barred from public life.”\textsuperscript{280} In February 2003, the Department of State’s historian added his own historical analogies into the mix. Recalling the lessons of post-World War II reconstruction efforts, Susser pointed to the purges that paved the way for democracy in West Germany and Japan. Building chiefly upon historical examples, Susser concludes with several “key factors” of occupation and post-war government, including that “old ideologies must be discredited” and occupation authorities must “weed out the most fanatic supporters of the ousted regime.”\textsuperscript{281}

The U.S. foreign policy community was divided as to the wisdom or efficacy of stringent purges of Iraq’s institutions. Several institutions, among them the Pentagon and USIP, proposed strong U.S. action on the subject. Building upon the examples of civil reconstruction in West Germany, USIP analysts stressed, “Above all, Clay was to preside over the denazification of the German psyche.”\textsuperscript{282} USIP’s rhetoric was particularly strident, encouraging “prompt and thorough political decontamination and de-Ba’athification of Iraq” by urging the United States to “purge Ba’athists from high-ranking civil and military positions.”\textsuperscript{283}

Other institutes, among them Brookings, the CFR, CSIS, CEIP and the Washington Institute took a more cautious approach, preferring the U.S. retain the expertise of all but a few senior bureaucrats. Although the term “de-Ba’athification” has figured prominently in subsequent critiques of U.S. state reconstruction policy in Iraq, the term itself did not occur until later in

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{279} Phillips, Losing Iraq, 84.
\item\textsuperscript{280} The CIA report cites the numbers of purged officials at less than 20,000 in Germany, and only about 200,000 in Japan, many of whom were rehabilitated after the end of the occupation. See Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Intelligence Analysis, “The Postwar Occupations of Germany and Japan: Implications for Iraq,” 4.
\item\textsuperscript{281} Department of State, “Occupation and Postwar Government: Precedents and Options,” 1-2, 9.
\item\textsuperscript{282} Jennings, “The Road Ahead,” 13.
\item\textsuperscript{283} Jennings, “The Road Ahead,” 6-7.
\end{itemize}
the process of public debate. The term does not appear in early Brookings reports from 2002, and press releases from the September 2002 and January 2003 meetings of State’s Transitional Justice working group make no mention of the term. The term’s earliest appearance in U.S. foreign policy discourse occurs in the January 2003 CSIS report, which anticipated that “senior Ba’ath party functionaries and members of the security forces will presumably be removed from the police force as part of a de-Ba’athification process,” but the term may have been in use previously. The final FOI working group report from March 2003 contains entire sections devoted to “De-Ba’athification.”

Both Brookings and CFR sought (unsuccessfully) to encourage U.S. policy to focus on Saddam Hussein’s political role in Iraq, rather than the role of the moribund Ba’ath party. The Autumn 2002 Survival article authored by three Brookings analysts details proposals for the reconstruction of Iraq, but makes no mention of a purge of officials from Saddam’s regime, or of any process of “de-Ba’athification.” A subsequent report from Brookings’ analyst Daniel L. Byman argues, ‘Saddamisation’ rather than ‘Ba’athisation’ is the more accurate term for the political ill facing post-invasion Iraq, thus advocating a policy more in line with proposals from State. The CFR report from January 2003 utilizes the term “de-Saddamization”, and is mostly concerned with the removal of a thin layer of politically compromised officials at the most senior levels of Iraq’s bureaucracies and military.

Other voices that argued for a minimal purge of Iraq’s institutions did so for practical reasons. CSIS argued for a minimalist and structured approach to de-Ba’athification, and proposed that the U.N. supervised transitional authority “should emphasize maximum use of the existing Iraqi civil service at the local and national levels.” The report was optimistic about democratic transformation in Iraq, noting, “In contrast to Afghanistan, Iraq is far from a failed state. It has a centralized government with a functioning bureaucracy; indeed, it would be counterproductive if the existing Iraqi administration were purged too radically.” CEIP was

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more blunt, warning “a thorough de-Ba’athification would eviscerate the existing Iraqi state, at least for the short term.”

The Washington Institute held a similarly pessimistic view of the de-Ba’athification process. Jeffrey White argued in spring 2003 that, “complicity in the crimes of the regime is not limited to senior officials, but reaches deep into the extended apparatus of the government”. White encouraged intelligence services and the military to begin documenting the role of senior Iraqi officials in human rights abuses, enabling later legal action. White cautioned, “finding untainted (or even merely compliant) individuals to assume these roles could prove a difficult, error-prone, and protracted task.” CEIP analysts cautioned of the challenges the U.S. would face, and used examples from World War II reconstruction efforts to drive home their point:

In both Germany and Japan, the United States curtailed the purge of the militaristic old regime’s loyalists and left most civil servants and business elites untouched. In Japan, for example, out of 2.5 million cases investigated, only 40,000—fewer than 2 percent—of the politicians, bureaucrats, and businesspeople with ties to the old regime were purged from power. After the occupation, many of these disgraced elements of the old regime regained their political rights; in the first post-occupation Diet election, they accounted for 42 percent of the winning candidates.

This emphasis of the limits of U.S. occupation and reconstruction power came too late in the policy debate.

**Resurrection of a Failed Model**

In the cases of West Germany and Japan, the primary goal of U.S. occupation was to achieve extensive ideological transformation of the defeated regimes and the populations that had supported them. In the German context, this meant the elimination of Nazi ideology. JCS 1067 instructed the occupation forces in the ideological transformation deemed necessary for German reconstruction, asserting, “The principal Allied objective is to prevent Germany from

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ever again becoming a threat to the peace of the world”. To do so, the document charged occupation authorities with “the elimination of Nazism and militarism in all their forms,” and “the immediate apprehension of war criminals for punishment.”

Nazi militarism was understood as the ideological force that had corrupted the German political sphere, and only with the purging of key Nazi sympathisers could the “eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis,” occur.

Some of the most detailed directives in the JCS 1067 concern the subject of de-Nazification, but it is important not to overstate the success of the Allied policy. Although the demilitarisation procedures succeeded in completely dismantling and disarming the German Wehrmacht and the population at large, it is not clear that the denazification procedures were equally successful.

The policy proved to be not only overly ambitious, but also extremely difficult to administer. Efforts to classify degree of Nazi affiliation were obscure and subjective, leading to oftentimes arbitrary enforcement of the regulations. While only one tenth of the adult German population had claimed membership in the Nazi party, the removal of low level party members and affiliates elicited serious practical and ethical problems at a time when Germany was struggling to rebuild its infrastructure and recover economically. As Tony Judt explained, it very quickly became clear “that Germany (and Austria) could not be returned to civil administration and local self-government...if the purging of responsible Nazis was undertaken in a sustained and consistent manner.”

The Congressional committee investigating Allied denazification policy concluded in its final report that, “It seems reasonably clear now that the American denazification policy went too far and tried to include too many. Its categorization was too broad and too rapidly applied.” Congressional pressure on the military government during the fall of 1947 forced a closure of the denazification programme by May 1948, as it was determined that the programme was hindering more crucial efforts at
economic recovery. Denazification was a dead letter by the early 1950s, a conclusion Judt maintained “would have been all but unthinkable in 1945.”

Efforts at ideological transformation were similarly prominent in the reconstruction of Japan, where policy objectives were primarily embodied in the Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945. As the first term of Japanese surrender, and thus the primary requirement for Japan’s reconstruction and the end of the military occupation, the Potsdam Declaration declared:

There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

By taking aim at Japanese militarism, the U.S. approach to Japanese reconstruction differed markedly from its approach to Germany. Demilitarization in Japan focused on “dissolving militaristic, ultranationalist, and secret patriotic societies,” as well as “preparing directives for the removal and exclusion from public office of exponents of militaristic nationalism and influential members of the secret societies.” This difference was due to the prominence of certain “old Japan hands” from the State Department in the post-war planning process for Japan. Individuals such as Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew and head of SWNCC’s Subcommittee on the Far East Eugene Doorman asserted that the militarism of World War II was an “aberration” in Japanese history, making the only major objective of the occupation “to eliminate military control of Japan and free the moderate and liberal forces that were believed to exist in Japanese society.” For this reason, U.S. authorities administered Japan largely through the Japanese civilian bureaucracy, and political purges were of a smaller magnitude. While denazification efforts affected 2.5 percent of the German population, similar purges in

301 Later documents such as the SWNCC 150 and National Security Council document 13/2 (October 1948) revised some elements of American occupation and reconstruction policies, but the changes were almost wholly situated in the economic domain.
303 Kades, “The American Role in Revising Japan’s Constitution,” 220.
Japan affected only .29 percent of the population.\textsuperscript{305} Although U.S. reconstruction and re-education policies in Japan are commonly asserted to be of crucial importance to the Japanese shift from militant nationalism to peaceful democratization, it is unclear from the historical analysis what effect, if any, the U.S. policies may have had.\textsuperscript{306} Furthermore, later Japanese governmental review of the purges in 1951 resulted in uniform rehabilitation of purged individuals and the immediate release of those still in prison.\textsuperscript{307} Upon review, it appears that innate Japanese democratic principals, which existed prior to the militarism of the 1930s and 40s, may be more responsible than Allied reconstruction policies for the peaceful trajectory of Japanese development in the postwar period.

\textsuperscript{305} Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building, 60.
\textsuperscript{306} Licklider, “The American Way of State Building: Germany, Japan, Somalia and Panama,” 90.
\textsuperscript{307} Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building, 61.
CONCLUSIONS

This project has sought to informed understandings of the liberal peace and liberal reconstruction, by examining the positionality of prewar planning for Iraq’s reconstruction from the perspective of U.S. policymakers in advance of the 2003 U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq. By examining documentary evidence from within the administration, as well as public documents produced by Washington’s foreign policy think tanks, I have sought to understand how U.S. policymakers understood their current project in Iraq, in light of past examples of intervention and reconstruction. By examining the process of policy articulation from the perspective of its architects, this project hopes to contribute to our understanding the formation and articulation of foreign policy goals, along with the importance of institutional and cultural memory in foreign policymaking.

The Rhetoric of History

This project has sought to understand how the U.S. discourse of post-conflict reconstruction prior to the 2003 invasion utilized the cases of West Germany and Japan. The rhetorical link between Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Nazi Germany’s Adolf Hitler had been promoted through the rhetoric of U.S. officials since at least 1990, when Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was framed by President George H. W. Bush as analogous to Germany’s aggression across Europe during World War II. In deploying U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia, Bush maintained, “if history teaches us anything, it is that we must resist aggression or it will destroy our freedoms. Appeasement does not work. As was the case in the 1930s, we see in Saddam Hussein an aggressive dictator threatening his neighbors.” In 1991, Bush asserted “Saddam Hussein is literally trying to wipe a country off the face of the earth”, and in 1992, he characterized Saddam Hussein’s actions as “a threat to decency and humanity”, claiming that “Saddam Hussein’s unprovoked invasion, his ruthless, systematic rape of a peaceful neighbor, violated

everything the community of nations holds dear.” Timothy W. Luke terms this phenomenon a “retro-war”: the tendency of American officials to frame emerging conflicts in the guise of old ones. Luke explains, “World War II remains deeply entrenched, symbolically and rhetorically, as the Western world’s vision of a “just war.” Thus:

Whenever and wherever a small, weak nation is threatened by a larger, stronger nation, or a militaristic authoritarian dictator challenges a relatively peaceful neighboring society, the discursive work-ups of World War II can be flexibly deployed to interpret, explain, and legitimate elite and mass responses in readily accessible and virtually uncontestable rhetorical terms.

Building on research from psychology, Dodge understands this tendency as the Bush administration’s conception of conflict with Iraq through a “diabolical enemy image schema”, wherein one society can be viewed as “morally superior, acting with unquestionable motives” while the other possesses “all the traits of an ideal-type enemy”. Berman has argued the phenomenon “has to be seen not only as the rhetoric of the moment but as part of the tradition, perhaps distinctively American, of focusing on the personal responsibility of the adversary leader.” While elements of this schema emerged over the course of the earlier Bush and Clinton administrations, the post-9/11 Bush Administration expanded this link, building an analogy that compared the current U.S. conflict with Iraq with the historical conflict with Nazi Germany during the Second World War. This rhetorical link relies on pathos rather than logos, for while the use of chemical weapons against civilians lends itself to memories of genocidal gas chambers, the U.S. conflict with Germany lacked a similarly powerful beginning. Following the 2001 terrorist attacks in New York, pundits and government officials drew comparisons between Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York.

On August 26, 2002, Vice President Dick Cheney delivered a speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, utilizing rhetoric which drew implicit parallels between Pearl Harbor, 9/11, Saddam Hussein, and Adolf Hitler. Cheney stated Saddam Hussein sought weapons of mass destruction “for the purpose of inflicting death on a massive scale”, and may “seek domination of the entire Middle East.” Cheney followed this description of Saddam Hussein with a segue into the history of World War II, noting the United States would “profit...from a review of our own history”, and from questioning how Pearl Harbor, along with “the tragedies that rate among the worst in human history” might have been prevented. Cheney’s line questioning “how we might have prevented Pearl Harbor” is shortly thereafter paralleled with a hypothetical, questioning “If the United States could have pre-empted 9/11.” In this way Cheney created a rhetorical link between Adolf Hitler’s war of aggression across Europe and the prospect of Saddam Hussein’s domination of the Middle East; between the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center; between the Holocaust and the spectre of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. That this lesson in history conflates historical actors, events, and spurious accusations was lost on Cheney’s audience; the transcript notes his comments were met with applause.

On January 30, 2002 U.S. President George W. Bush’s delivered a now infamous State of the Union speech, containing a new articulation of the “Axis of Evil”, and drawing powerful parallels between the evolving conflict with Iraq, and historical conflicts with Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and Mussolini’s Italy. Bush stated, “This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens, leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children,” His 2003 State of the Union address was even more explicit, warning that armed with weapons of mass destruction Saddam Hussein “could resume his ambitions of conquest” and “create deadly havoc” in the Middle East.

On February 14, 2003, Rumsfeld delivered a speech in New York entitled “Beyond Nation Building”. Standing on the deck of the USS Intrepid (a former naval aircraft carrier now turned...
museum), Rumsfeld drew parallels between the Japanese “suicide bombers” who attacked the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor and the suicide bombers who “struck again”, against the World Trade Center towers in New York. Rumsfeld then recounted U.S. reconstruction efforts following World War II, and claimed Japan’s contemporary prosperity as the direct result of U.S. postwar policy:

After Pearl Harbor our country fought back and defeated those who attacked it...And when the hostilities ended after World War II we helped the Japanese people rebuild from the rubble of war and establish institutions of democracy. Today Japan is of course a staunch friend and a steadfast U.S. ally.

Rumsfeld emphasized that for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, “The objective is not to engage in what some call nationbuilding,” as nationbuilding can distort domestic economies and create “dependency”. Rumsfeld discounted the examples of East Timor and Kosovo, asking instead “what lessons our experience in Afghanistan might offer for the possibility of a post-Saddam Iraq.” Laying out a vision wherein “Iraqis can form a government in their own unique way”, Rumsfeld pointed to two respects in which Iraq’s reconstruction had advantages over the Afghan experience. First, Rumsfeld noted the advantage of time, as the Pentagon’s Post War Planning Office and General Franks have “been working hard on this for many months”. Second, he highlighted Iraq’s resources, noting Iraq’s “solid infrastructure” and oil, which would “give free Iraq the means to get on its feet”.

This penchant for historical analogy did not end with the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Bob Woodward relates a conversation between Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and President George W. Bush during an official visit to Japan in October 2003. Bush told Koizumi:

If we hadn’t gotten it right in 1945 and helped build a democratically prosperous Japan, our conversation—between a Japanese prime minister and a president of the

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318 Rumsfeld, “Beyond Nation Building.”
United States—could never take place. One day, a president of Iraq and a president of the United States are going to be sitting there trying to solve some problem and they’re going to say they’re glad we created a democratic and prosperous Iraq.319

It could be argued these statements are merely rhetorical flourishes: that policy makers call upon the examples of World War II in order to illustrate their points, or to appeal to a patriotic audience. If public speeches were the only medium where such analogies could be found this view would have merit, but as has been shown previously, these analogies are present throughout internal government memos and classified reports. Dodge has meticulously laid out how this ‘diabolical enemy-image’ was constructed and articulated by key members of the Bush administration, including the Bush, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Feith, and Bremer.320 The thinking of policy architects is important to understanding their planning on Iraq, but the broader point is the extent to which use of these historical analogies was replicated by other segments of the U.S. government, and by the broader U.S. foreign policy community represented by the most prominent Washington think tanks. That similar historical analogies were used by broad swaths of the U.S. foreign policy community, even by ostensibly ideologically opposed research institutions, is striking.

**Dominated by Conventional Wisdom**

The second question this dissertation sought to answer, was whether U.S. policymakers accurately understood the original goals and ‘lessons’ of post-World War II reconstruction? The conclusion reached is decidedly negative. The largest factor contributing to the misinformation and miscalculation surrounding Iraq is not right-wing hawkishness, or left-wing ineffectiveness, but rather a common mythology that is neither liberal, nor conservative, but altogether American. The narrative of American exceptionalism that takes the success of post-World War II reconstruction as unequivocal underscores which actions and policies appear feasible to U.S. policymakers. CEIP calls the cases of West Germany and Japan, “unambiguous successes,” while RAND asserts “the cases of Germany and Japan set a standard for postconflict nation-building that has not since been matched.”321 RAND’s James Dobbins maintained in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion that reconstruction efforts in West Germany and Japan

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“were more unambiguously successful than even the best-managed of the post-Cold War missions.” Despite a rather grim consensus surrounding the remaining attempts at post-conflict reconstruction, it is the seemingly shining examples of West Germany and Japan that underpin numerous assessments about what sort of transformation is possible. To be sure, subsequent analyses have underscored the extent to which West Germany and Japan present unique (and perhaps irreplicable) examples of postwar reconstruction, but even those analyses accept the conventional wisdom that Allied reconstruction efforts in West Germany and Japan were not only undoubtedly ‘successful,’ but also absolutely necessary. Bellin even claims the examples of West Germany and Japan prove the added value of military occupation for democratization, arguing such intervention “was essential to steering both countries onto a democratic track.”

CEIP and USIP, supposed bastions of liberal U.S. policy, endorse many of the same ideas about the postwar experience that Feith and Rumsfeld articulated from inside the Pentagon. And although the Department of State's Future of Iraq project was more detailed and nuanced—with properly footnoted diplomatic caveats—State’s operatives ascribed to the same sense of history as their military counterparts. Their analysis was representative of an American tradition where the subsequent development of Germany and Japan into liberal, democratic, free-market Western allies is attributed directly to postwar U.S. policy. This mythology misremembers the initial, less enlightened, goals of the occupation, instead conflating subsequent results with initial intentions. It overemphasises the effect of U.S. political and economic contributions, while discounting the powerful domestic forces in Germany and Japan that forged the liberal, free-market democracies we are familiar with today.

Despite significant differences in case selection and methodology, the U.S. literature on reconstruction achieves consensus in the unequivocal success of post-World War II reconstruction efforts in West Germany and Japan. In fact, aside from a negative assessment of mid-90s efforts in Haiti, and an understandable hesitance toward any decision on the situation

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324 Bellin, "The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective," 607.
in Afghanistan, a unanimous consensus on the success of reconstruction efforts in West Germany and Japan is the only salient point upon which the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the CIA, and the relevant Washington think tanks agree. This historical mythology is present in equal parts among liberals and conservatives; it is truly a bipartisan (mis)understanding of history. The preceding critique of this historiography has tried to open space in the discourse to question what happens to the conventional analysis when the results of reconstruction experiences in Japan and West Germany are re-examined. Absent West Germany and Japan, the cohort of successfully reconstructed nations includes only Panama and Grenada. Although Pei and his co-authors term U.S. efforts in Panama a success, Brownlee notes that they “do not explain why America’s brief nation-building effort in Panama in 1989 ostensibly bestowed a more democratic legacy than its lengthy involvement from 1903 to 1936”. Under these conditions, Pei and Kasper’s conclusions become ever more questionable, and their ratio for success in American nation-building efforts would plunge from a tepid 26%, to a more dismal 13%. With odds like these, how could anyone advocate for invasion and reconstruction at all?

Although Japan and Germany have become successful liberal democracies, it is not enough to ask what the target state has become. More important is to ask what effect U.S. occupation policy had on that development, and here the answers are much less clear cut. If it cannot be clearly shown that U.S. policy was successful—if, indeed, we can locate no clear examples where “nation building” has succeeded—then it is unclear there is much of a case to make for the success of postwar reconstruction in the future. Some things are beyond the powers of occupying armies, and constructing stable, peaceful, democratic states from the remnants of postconflict society may well be one of them. As Brownlee maintains, “If the conditions in Germany and Japan are any indication, nation-building success has hinged less on what occurs within Washington and more on the prior experiences of the target societies.”

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Although ‘lessons learned’ from West Germany and Japan dominated the prewar Iraq reconstruction discourse, three exceptions are worthy of mention. First, the Brookings Institution spent much of the lead-up to the invasion fixated on the example of Panama, utilizing it in a Survival article, Congressional testimony, and three op-eds. Michael O’Hanlon and retired colonel James Reed noted the incongruence between Panama and Iraq, explaining “Iraq is five times the size of Panama, with a population almost 10 times as great and a military nearly 100 times as large”, and yet they concluded, “Despite differences in scale, urban combat in Baghdad, as in Panama, will likely present similar challenges...But on balance, U.S. forces could take control of Baghdad almost as quickly as they did Panama City.”328 It is not clear where the Brookings analysts drew their Panamanian inspiration, or why they ultimately ignored the plethora of distinctions between Panama and Iraq. Writing concurrently about Panama, USIP cites Roy Licklider’s 1999 piece in Small Wars and Insurgencies; Brookings provides no such reference. However, Reed had previously written on the U.S. military’s experience in Panama. In a 1993 post-mortem of the Gulf War with clear parallels to Peterson’s subsequent post-mortem of the Iraq invasion, Reed published an article in the U.S. Army War College’s journal Parameters. Arguing that “war termination should perhaps be assigned a higher priority” in U.S. military planning, Reed utilized “The chaotic aftermath of the 1989 US invasion of Panama” as an example of what the U.S. military must work to avoid.329 Over the space of ten years, Reed entirely reversed his assessment.

Second, the analysis of the Washington Institute also diverged from the conventional narrative of post-World War II, but its analysis of the post-World War I British experience in Iraq proved both logical and prescient. However, even within that analysis, elements of the conventional narrative remain. In the Washington Institute’s comprehensive report, Peter Sluglett notes that while the prospect of reconstruction in Iraq is “obviously daunting”, hope can be gleaned from the success of “an even more ambitious enterprise”, namely, the post-war reconstruction of West Germany and Japan.330

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Finally, in my examination of discourse produced by members of the U.S. government and foreign policy elites in Washington think tanks, I encountered only one example of clear divergence from the common narrative promoting the reconstruction in West Germany and Japan as examples for post-invasion policy in Iraq. In December 2002, an eleven-page draft memo by CSIS expert Anthony H. Cordesman circulated through Washington, and by the end of the month was posted to CSIS’s website. Cordesman’s memo is a blunt force attack on the “ignorance, indifference…and ethnocentricity” that characterized Washington’s planning for the invasion and reconstruction of Iraq.331 He explicitly takes aim at the historical mythologies overtaking the planning process, noting “A little self-honesty about our past mistakes in nation building and occupation would help; especially when we perpetuate the myth we did so splendidly in Germany and Japan.” Cordesman argues “things eventually worked out in Germany and Japan” due to processes the U.S. adopted “only under duress”.332

It is useful to ask—with the added benefit of hindsight—how Cordesman’s critiques could have been so prescient. Unusually for the vitriolic world of Washington’s foreign policy circles, Cordesman receives grudging respect from each side of D.C.’s political fringe. Conservative political commentator Charles Krauthammer has praised Cordesman as “a hardheaded realist,”333 while Alexander Cockburn, editor of the leftist magazine Counterpunch, admitted that, despite Cordesman’s extensive credentials as a government yes-man, he is “a pretty smart fellow.”334 Cockburn concludes Cordesman’s memo was merely an effort to ensure he had placed an “I told you so” on record, but it is equally possible to see elements of past Republican policy in Cordesman’s pessimism. Cordesman is perhaps one of the last remaining examples of what Republican-style internationalism looked like under presidents Regan and Bush, or at least what it looked like in Europe and Asia. His concerns were not substantially different than those expressed quietly—and less publicly—by former Secretary of State Colin Powell.

The Loyal “Opposition”

The role of D.C. area thinktanks in shaping the pre-war Iraq reconstruction discourse is difficult to determine. We know that Bremer read RAND’s 2003 report America’s Role in Nation-Building, and found it compelling enough to forward along to Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Feith. Bremer’s key take-aways from the RAND report appear to have been the need for a significant number of troops during the post-invasion phase, extensive economic assistance, “keeping a close eye on Iranian objectives and activities”, and “the need to stress to all concerned that this will be a long process.” Bremer highlighted Dobbins et al.’s conclusion that “No effort at democratization has taken hold in less than five years”. No record of Rumsfeld’s response to Bremer’s memo is available. It is also difficult to determine to what extent Washington’s think tanks were cognisant of analysis emanating from rival (or allied) institutions. USIP senior fellow Ray Salvatore Jennings referenced an op-ed by CEIP’s Pei and Kasper, but not the report that op-ed was based upon. Brookings’s summer contribution to Survival referenced the CSIS report and several pieces from The Washington Institute’s Policywatch series, but none of the other preceding reports from the think tank community. Of the more comprehensive reports produced by CFR, the Baker Institute, RAND, and CSIS, only the RAND report contains citations or references of any kind. It lists CSIS, the Washington Institute, and CFR/Baker reports in its bibliography, but makes no specific reference to them in footnotes.

Flawed Analysis

Although much attention has been given to the miscalculations of senior government officials during the prewar reconstruction of Iraq, their liberal counterparts were scarcely more prescient. A few examples from the Brookings Institution merit mention. Brookings analyst Susan Rice (Ambassador to the United Nations and later National Security Advisor under Barack Obama) is on the record saying of Colin Powell’s now infamous speech at the United Nations, "I think he has proved that Iraq has these weapons and is hiding them, and I don't think many informed people doubted that.” Her comments represent a critical

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336 Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building, 17.
miscalculation, but the limitations and failures of the Brookings analysts extend beyond Rice’s acceptance of administration claims about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Senior Brookings Fellow Michael E. O’Hanlon drastically misread the internal dynamics of the Bush Administration, arguing that Powell’s UN speech showed he had “carried the day on what may be the most important national security debate of the Bush presidency.” We now know Powell’s presentation at the UN was a symbol of his increasing lack of traction within the Oval Office, and Powell has himself described the event as “a blot”, which tarnished his reputation. “I'm the one who presented it on behalf of the United States to the world,” he told ABC’s Barbara Walters in an interview following his departure from the administration, “[It] will always be a part of my record. It was painful. It's painful now.” In his commentary on the speech, O’Hanlon rhetorically asked, “how do we know that these are not all tactics, designed to provide multilateral camouflage for an administration plan for a largely unilateral war?” It is now clear that Powell’s speech was precisely that sort of tactic, but O’Hanlon somehow concluded that “despite the continued flow of military supplies to the Persian Gulf,” such a scenario was “highly improbable.”

Disagreements

There were sharp divisions among the U.S. policy elite about how lengthy the commitment to Iraq’s reconstruction should be. However, these differences do not track clearly along ideological lines. Whether due to unfounded optimism, or “misplaced complacency”, as former Coalition Forces engineer Richard H. Brown has termed it, staffers in the Pentagon and members of the Defense Policy Board proposed relatively short reconstruction timeframes. USAID’s pre-invasion report “Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq” from February 2003 famously anticipated that Iraq’s infrastructure would be completely rebuilt within eighteen months. Members of the think-tank community supported proposals for short timeframes, but for more cynical reasons. Centrist institutes such as CFR and the Baker Institute resisted

proposals for a long-term U.S. commitment in Iraq. The CFR report noted “The continued public discussion of a U.S. military government along the lines of post-war Japan or Germany is unhelpful...such comparisons suggest a long-term U.S. occupation of Iraq that will neither advance U.S. interest nor garner outside support.” Members of the Washington Institute echoed these concerns. Deputy Director Patrick Clawson argued the postwar occupation of Iraq should end “as quickly as possible” (maximum one year) so as to avoid “engendering a nationalistic revolt” within Iraq. Similarly, analysts from CEIP argued for a shorter occupation, cautioning that an extended presence in Iraq would be both detrimental and wasteful. “The United States should not try to prolong the occupation,” CEIP analysts argued, “A long occupation would...be a costly and futile undertaking. It would also be politically dangerous for the United States.”

Other think tank analysts argued the U.S. should brace for a long-term commitment to Iraq, stretching anywhere from several years to several generations. CSIS maintained a commitment of one year was insufficient, while RAND explained “No effort at democratization has taken hold in less than five years.” In an attempt to temper the optimism of the Pentagon’s planners on the Defense Policy Board, Brookings’s Michael E. O’Hanlon noted in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee that U.S. involvement in Iraq, “would not be a short-term commitment.” O’Hanlon pointed to the occupations of West Germany and Japan as highlights of the “enormous success” made possible by “long-term U.S. commitments to regional reconstruction.” USIP went further, cautioning that, “The Untied States should brace for a long-term commitment in Iraq—perhaps even longer than the seven years required for the occupations in Japan and Germany." The CIA argued “The Germany model offer [sic] better parallels for Iraq,” but maintained “implementation would require a large, extended...
US military presence.”\textsuperscript{351} The CIA report later cautioned success in Iraq “could require a US role lasting a generation.”\textsuperscript{352}

\textbf{Untimely Timing}

To analyze the effect of the think tank community’s proposals it is important to understand their timing with respect to the ongoing policy planning process. Those organizations that may have had an effect on the prewar reconstruction planning were those that contributed to the conversation by early 2003. We only have proof that RAND’s contribution was recognized by the administration, but it seems certain that any contributions later than February 2003 arrived too late to reasonably affect internal governmental planning processes.

The conservative leaning American Enterprise Institute (AEI) was the first Washington think tank to begin discussion and analysis of a post-Saddam Iraq. On January 29, 2002, AEI hosted the first of several public fora to provide for discussion and analysis of “how to deal with Iraq as part of the war against terrorism.”\textsuperscript{353} A monthly AEI conference series titled “Planning for a Post-Saddam Iraq” began on October 3, 2002 and continued into 2005.\textsuperscript{354} The AEI events brought key members of the INC to Washington for presentations, debates, and a chance to shape policymakers’ understanding of the challenges facing a post-conflict Iraq. These events and briefings were key to shaping the policy debate, and granted Iraqi exiles from the INC a prime forum to address D.C. policymakers. Despite devoting unparalleled resources to Iraq-themed policy events, AEI did not issue any comprehensive analysis or reports on the subject of postconflict reconstruction until planning for the ‘surge’ began in 2006 and 2007. The Stimson Center issued a brief report in October of 2002, but had no subsequent input into the evolving policy discussion. Instead, centrist think tanks were the first to enter the fray, with CFR/Baker and CSIS releasing extensive reports in January 2003, and RAND’s report following in March. All of these reports were under development since at least late 2002.

\textsuperscript{351} Central Intelligence Agency, “The Postwar Occupations of Germany and Japan: Implications for Iraq,” ii.
\textsuperscript{352} Central Intelligence Agency, “The Postwar Occupations of Germany and Japan: Implications for Iraq,” 2.
The ostensibly more liberal voices of the American establishment were unable to adequately articulate policy alternatives in the lead-up to the Iraq invasion; their British counterparts did not fare much better. Rosemary Hollis and Alex Danchev have explored how Prime Minister Tony Blair’s support for intervention outflanked the Conservative party, and robbed Parliament of any practical expression of opposition. On the American side, Democratic opposition was strong in the House, and but muted in the Senate; 40% of Democratic representatives and 58% of Democratic senators eventually voted to authorise the use of force in Iraq. Outside Congress, CEIP’s analysts entered the conversation with an op-ed in The Christian Science Monitor in mid-January 2003, but their first official reports did not appear until late March, too late to seriously affect the policy debate. USIP did not enter the conversation until April, after the launch of the invasion and too late to affect government planning. While Brookings staffers wrote prolifically in their opposition to the war, the Institute’s earliest contribution on postconflict planning did not appear until the summer of 2003.

One particularly glaring example of this trend comes from a speech given by Senior Brookings Fellow Roberta Cohen in late March 2003, nearly a week after the U.S. invasion commenced. Cohen criticized the placement of Garner’s ORHA within the Pentagon chain of command, a reality that had existed since at least January 20, 2003, when President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive #24. Cohen argued such an institutional arrangement made it difficult for non-governmental and international organizations to cooperate with U.S. reconstruction efforts, as many organizations refused to operate under military authority, and others were denied access or information due to the classified nature of military operations. Cohen’s critiques were salient and prescient, but they came far too late to affect policy.

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356 In the U.S. Congress, 82 of 209 democratic representatives and 29 of 50 democratic senators supported the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002. Six republican representatives and one republican senator opposed the resolution.
By failing to enter the conversation earlier, the more progressive elements of the American establishment effectively ceded the discursive ground to their more conservative opponents. Hoping to stave off the administration’s push for war, the left-leaning think tanks failed to prepare for it. This limitation may be insurmountable: after all, how can one expect or encourage opponents of the invasion to develop plans for conducting it? Such a position would go against the inclinations of USIP, CEIP, and Brookings staffers, but also the mission statements of their respective institutions. Some suggestion for future policy conflicts may be found in the path taken by the more centrist contributors to the conversation. Both the CSIS and CFR-Baker reports profess to take no position on whether or not the United States should go to war in Iraq, but still manage to conduct serious and nuanced analysis into the subject of postconflict reconstruction in the event that such an invasion occurs. In the introductory paragraph of its report’s Executive Summary, CSIS notes sagely:

If the United States goes to war with Iraq, winning the peace will be critical. This report takes no position on whether there should be a war. But, the success of any U.S.-led effort to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and drive Saddam Hussein from power will be judged more by the commitment to rebuilding Iraq after a conflict than by the military phase of the war itself.360

The CFR report similarly disavows its own contribution to the postconflict planning debate.361 Perhaps adopting a similar tactic would enable more progressive institutions, or those with more regional or technical experience, to enter the policy debate earlier, thereby increasing the effectiveness of their contributions and advancing their analysis beyond the level of cynical Monday morning quarterbacking.362

A Contested Narrative: Iraq and the Islamic State

This dissertation began with an overview of a theoretical debate in which scholars have grappled with the positionality of the 2003 U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq within a broader discourse of intervention, postconflict reconstruction, and the liberal peace. Among

361 The CFR report notes “The United States and other nations are approaching a fateful decision on whether or not to go to war with Iraq. This report takes no position on that overarching question.” See Leslie H. Gelb’s Forward in, Djerejian et al., “Guiding Principles for U.S. Post-Conflict Policy in Iraq,” v.
362 Maybe I need to remove this analogy because it is too American? Leaving for now.
the most important conclusions of this work is the extent to which the lessons of postconflict reconstruction in Iraq remain contested. Lacklustre results in Iraq and Afghanistan have not caused U.S. policymakers to re-evaluate their understanding of the U.S. role in postconflict reconstruction. Rather, the case of Iraq is being absorbed into the existing conventional wisdom, with believers in postconflict reconstruction claiming Iraq was simply planned poorly, or was not met with the kind of resources and commitment that could have led to success.

The Blame Game

With barely a year passed since the tenth anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, popular understanding has coalesced around where blame should lie for the planning, selling, and mishandling of an unsanctioned war and its disastrous aftermath. With few exceptions, this blame has been placed squarely on the shoulders of key members of the Bush administration, most notably Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Vice President Dick Cheney, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning Douglas Feith, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice is portrayed as at worst complicit in Rumsfeld’s bureaucratic power games, or, more charitably, as simply an inefficient manager incapable of reigning in the more experienced Secretary of Defense. Secretary of State Colin Powell is blamed largely for his failure to organize the Department of State into any coherent form of opposition, with his reputation most clearly tarnished by his infamous speech in support of the administration’s disingenuous intelligence on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities.

The successive release of tell-all documentaries regarding the preparation and execution of the war in Iraq continue to circle around the guilt of key decision makers. No End in Sight (2007), Hubris: Selling the Iraq War (2013), and the most recent addition, award-winning filmmaker Errol Morris’ The Unknown Known (2014), which attempts to delve into the mind of Donald

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361 See, for example, Paul Pillar, “Rice and the Toughness Fallacy,” The National Interest, 10 March 2014, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/paul-pillar/rice-the-toughness-fallacy-10022. Pillar argues, “As national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice had one of the most egregious failures that anyone holding that position could have: the absence of any policy process leading to a foreign policy decision as major as launching an offensive war.” In the third installment of a recent four-part profile of Donald Rumsfeld, journalist Mark Danner argues of Rice that, “...by all accounts, not just Rumsfeld’s, she was hopelessly weak and out of her depth as a manager...” See Mark Danner, “Rumsfeld: Why We Live in His Ruins,” The New York Review of Books, 06 February 2014, https://www.markdanner.com/articles/rumsfeld-why-we-live-in-his-ruins.
Along with PBS Frontline’s prolific documentation of the war, many journalists, filmmakers, and authors have delved into the memories and memoranda of key decision makers in an attempt to reveal where ultimate responsibility lies for actions that plunged the United States into strategic and tactical defeat.

This thesis suggests that the policy failings underpinning the invasion and reconstruction of Iraq go far beyond merely the more conservative and hawkish elements of the Bush administration. While Mark Danner and Errol Morris have recorded unsettling anecdotes of the Bush Administration’s failings, members of Washington’s liberal establishment must be held in equal sanction. As Frank Rich has recently noted, the liberal media’s participation in the domestic “selling” of the Iraq War merits serious examination among the American establishment. Many key liberal thinkers and politicians were initially supportive of the administration’s policies, and there has been little to no consequence for their miscalculation. The numbers of leading policy wonks who have retracted their previous statements are few, and the number of apologies issued even fewer.

The pernicious tendency on the part of America’s elite to refrain from conceding the defeat of U.S. forces in Iraq is one of the clearest dangers of failing to understand Iraq’s relationship to the rest of history’s examples of state reconstruction. It is not surprising that architects of the invasion and its aftermath would hold to a different version of history, as Rumsfeld, Feith, and Cheney have recently been wont to do. Cheney has recently asserted “things were in good shape in Iraq” in advance of the U.S. withdrawal. In a recent Wall Street Journal op-ed, Bremer blamed the current dissolution of order in Iraq on President Obama’s decision to withdraw U.S. troops, and called for the U.S. to make “a clear commitment to help restabilize Iraq”. Wolfowitz recently appeared on NBC’s “Meet the Press”, where he argued the current situation in Iraq could have been avoided if the U.S. had remained committed to Iraq just as it

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“stuck with South Korea for 60 years.” Meanwhile, Weekly Standard editor Bill Kristol appeared on ABC’s “This Week” to discuss the situation in Iraq, and Kristol and Frederick Kagan teamed up for an op-ed, “What to Do in Iraq,” wherein they argue for a return of U.S. troops to Iraq by claiming “Now is not the time to re-litigate either the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 or the decision to withdraw from it in 2011.” Blair and Feith have also placed their own calls for intervention.  

It is revealing that even the war’s most virulent critics often stop short of naming the Iraq conflict an out-and-out defeat. Mark Danner, author of a recent evisceration of the Bush administration’s leadership, terms the war a “disaster”, “a catastrophe”, a “self-made quagmire,” but limits himself to claiming the war brought the United States to the “brink” or “verge of military defeat”, until the 2007 ‘surge’ aimed at “averting a complete debacle”. Frank Rich, a virulent critic of the entire enterprise, terms the Iraq War a “wrong turn”, a “massive blunder”, a “debacle”, and a “fiasco” that “continues to pile up collateral damage and defeats daily”, but these appellations stop short of asserting defeat or loss. This avoidance on the part of the war’s most ardent critics to deliver the ultimate criticism is surprising, and it reveals the extent to which the memory of the Iraq War remains contested.

The contested nature of the memory of the Iraq War has parallels with the U.S. memory of its experience in Vietnam, wherein two contradictory lessons have emerged: that interventions in absence of critical national interest are destined to fail, and that overwhelming force could have resulted in success. Gardner and Young have noted, “treating the Iraq War as a mismanaged effort with tragic consequences is stunningly like the conservative revisionist

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372 Danner, “Rumsfeld: Why We Live in His Ruins.”
373 Rich, “Iraq Everlasting.”
argument about Vietnam.” At times this argument is even explicit. There is room for commentators such as Dan O’Shea, a former U.S. Navy SEAL with experience working on hostage rescue operations in Iraq, to claim that U.S. postwar policy in Iraq needed to take more from the German experience (commitment) and less from the Vietnam experience (cut-and-run). O’Shea argues:

But as history has taught us, successful postwar nation building takes decades — as it did in Germany, Japan, and South Korea — and often requires the continuous presence of US troops for just as long. In post-World War II Germany and Japan, and in South Korea following the 1953 armistice, the US established military bases that exist to this day. Today, Germany is the strongest economy in Europe, and Japan and Korea have long driven industry and innovation in Asia. The price of freedom and long-term stability in the world is an enduring commitment to political, economic, and military obligations. This history lesson was lost on our current national security team.

O’Shea’s conclusion raises questions about whether American collective memory will ever resolve the challenge of the Iraq War. “Vietnam-era vets often echoed a common refrain: “We were winning the war where I served and when I left,” O’Shea observes, “America’s generation of Iraqi combat veterans feels much the same way.” O’Shea is not alone in his assessment. Bruce Thorton, writing for Frontpage Magazine, urges his audience to remember “that Japan’s and Germany’s democracies were built only after the occupying Allies had left both countries in ruins and millions dead”, yet bemoans the inconstant state of an American democracy “unsuited for the consistent, coherent, long-term foreign policy and intervention abroad required to nurture liberal democracy in other countries.” His arguments seems to be that if only Americans were more committed to the cause of freedom, American foreign policy and the effort to rebuild Iraq would have had more staying power, and thus achieved success. Similar views are echoed in Foreign Policy, where Kori Schake bemoans the lack of a Marshall

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Plan for Iraq, and even in Reuters, where a Special Report suggests the Obama administration “was not bold enough”, presenting the idea that had more attention been paid and more effort expended, the current situation in Iraq could have been avoided. Khong argues, “the final tragedy of Vietnam is that it has produced no common, unifying lesson that can be applied to future problems.”

The discourse surrounding the Iraq War is following the same path. Some voices are rising to the top to question the lines of this debate, and confront a seemingly wilful misunderstanding of history, but as yet they are few. British historian Tony Judt once claimed the failure to confront failure in Iraq came from the “strange death” of America’s liberals. More recently, Stephen Walt has argued that too much liberalism is to blame. Grandin lays blame at the feet of a “coalition made up of neoconservatives, Christian evangelicals, free marketers, and nationalists” which coalesced to lead the Republican Party under Reagan and the two presidents Bush. However, Grandin concedes the Democrats under Clinton and Obama are either unable, or unwilling, to articulate an alternative vision.

Recently retired as a lieutenant general in the U.S. Army, Daniel Bolger is now attempting to address this deficiency in the American discourse. His book (to be published on November 11, 2014) is unceremoniously titled Why We Lost. Making a case for fighting limited incursions rather than extensive occupations, Bolger’s book bills itself as the first After Action Report on the failures of U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Iraq. Bolger’s arguments for an AAR are valuable, but they also reinforce the strain of American foreign policy that imagines the answers required for the future are necessarily knowable from the past, as if

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380 Khong, Analogies at War, 259.
383 Grandin, Empire’s Workshop, 5.
384 Grandin, Empire’s Workshop, 246.
accumulation of ‘lessons learned’ is the only obstacle to successful postwar policy. As Williams has argued, “There is never an exact historical analogy that can be drawn, even if that is the best we have.”

**Myths and ‘Lessons Learned’**

Myths of victory and policy prescience have been allowed to masquerade as apolitical ‘lessons learned’, permitting U.S. policymakers to recycle failed historical initiatives in pursuit of contemporary objectives. This tendency was not limited to the case of the Iraq War. The occupation of Panama in 1989 was modelled upon the U.S. experience in Japan. So too, lessons from South Korea informed the U.S. experience in Vietnam, and ‘lessons learned’ from Vietnam in turn shaped U.S. policy in Central America under President Reagan. Micolle Flournoy, the former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy has praised the Department of Defense’s ability to collect ‘lessons learned’ from its operations, while critiquing the capacity of the remainder of the U.S. government (especially the Department of State) to do so. It is no surprise historical lessons were sought for the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, but the inability of the United States to successfully analyze and critique such lessons should be disconcerting. Flournoy’s argument rests on the assumption that the lessons which are learned are always the right ones, and that having been ‘learned’ they will necessarily be available and applicable to future policy challenges.

In practice, the lessons resuscitated from past conflicts and interventions have done more harm than good, as the more optimistic—and generally triumphalist—narratives exhibit more staying power than their cautionary and cynical cousins. This is part and parcel of what Tony Judt has called “voluntary amnesia”, or what E.P. Thompson termed “the enormous condescension of posterity.” The losers, and in many cases one’s own limitations, are forgotten. Just as Edward Peterson and Ray Moore’s cautionary accounts of state reconstruction in West Germany and Japan were subsumed into broader narratives of U.S. success, so too James Reed’s take on the Gulf War and Steven Peterson’s account of postwar efforts in Iraq have been gradually

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marginalized within a discourse that prefers revising success to dwelling upon past failures. British Prime Minister Tony Blair once said of the conflict in Kosovo, “Success is the only exit strategy I am prepared to consider.”

The American political establishment seems caught in the same bind, and this paucity of reflexivity continues into the present.

The mythologized “Marshall Plan” has become the rhetorical commonplace for a postconflict success story, but the nuances and limits of that supposed ‘success’ are lost on the U.S. foreign policy elite. Patrick Christy, a Senior Policy Analyst at the conservative Foreign Policy Initiative recently penned an article for U.S. News and World Report arguing the postwar experience of the Marshall Plan should now be extended to new areas of U.S. strategic interest, including Africa.

Ukraine has asked donors to fund its own “Marshall Plan”, while the President of Honduras, Juan Orlando Hernández, and Foreign Minister Mireya Aguero, in turn requested the United States fund a “mini-Marshall Plan” for Central America to address the issues causing increased migration north towards the United States.

Meanwhile, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction has calculated “by the end of 2014, the United States will have committed more funds to reconstruct Afghanistan, in inflation-adjusted terms, than it spent on 16 European countries after World War II under the Marshall Plan.”

While U.S. policymakers may be surprised at the lack of results in return for their investment, the previous discussion has shown why this surprise is unwarranted.

Brownlee concludes with a continuation of Karl Deutsch’s metaphor, namely that “the U.S. has been more effective at refurbishing and strengthening an existing state than at laying a new foundation: it has done best where it has attempted less.” It is difficult to examine the cases of West Germany and Japan and to conclude that the United States attempted little in their rebuilding. Rather, much was expected of U.S. reconstruction efforts, and the initial intentions

393 Quoted in Danchev, “I’m with you,” 52.
of MacArthur and Clay were far from limited. A better observation is that those initial intentions were tempered by the reality they encountered, that U.S. and Allied postwar policy was marred by incoherence and inconsistency—and that Germany and Japan recovered from the aftermath of war despite this. The key lesson is not that state reconstruction projects have been more successful where the U.S. has attempted less. The key lesson is that reconstruction projects have been more successful where there was less to be done.

**History: Codas and the Pendulum**

Andrew Williams writes that the formation of a New World Order requires a coda, or a moment when “the relationship of past to present is thrown, temporarily at least, into sharp focus by a settling of accounts...a redrawing of the map and a building of a new tabula rasa upon which new hopes and aspirations can be erected.” On this basis, Williams concludes the post-9/11 international order is as much continuous with previous NWOs as not. Williams notes that President George H. W. Bush was cognisant of a sense of unfinishedness following the First Gulf War, wherein “it hasn’t been a clean end; there was no surrender on the battleship Missouri. This is what’s missing to make this akin to WWII, to separate Kuwait from Korea and Vietnam.” This question of codas speaks to the idea of a historical consensus, precisely the sort of consensus that marks U.S. thinking about postwar efforts in West Germany and Japan. It also tracks nicely with Khong’s discussion of historical analogy:

> the power of historical analogies is in part a function of how deeply ingrained they have become in the official and public mindset. When their lessons become part of the unspoken and spoken lore, when there is only one consensual interpretation, their premises and their relevance become matters of dogma that few will see fit to question. At that point, analogies step beyond their roles as heuristic devices for discovering facts and explanations and assume the roles of explanations and facts themselves.

One difficulty may be that while the memory of the post-World War II experience has achieved a modest consensus, the memory of subsequent conflicts in Vietnam (and now Iraq) seems

fated to continual contestation. In an attempt to bring the lessons of the Vietnam War to bear on Iraq, Gardner and Young claim, “history is too important to be left to the manipulations of Washington think-tank theorists and their sponsors.” The problem facing Gardner and Young’s account is that history cannot be quarantined, and academics have proven no better than the masses at achieving unanimity. History is constantly evolving and being reinterpreted; its lessons are neither static nor uncontested. The idea that one can ‘learn from history’, to which Gardner and Young dedicate their edited volume, presupposes an uncontested and static version of the human experience. But such a version of history, at least for the military adventures of the postwar world, does not appear to exist. This then is precisely the conundrum Blydenburg identified: memory “does not have to be the result of direct experience or observation, it does not have to be contemporary, and it can be entirely fabricated.”

The 2003 U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq seems destined to follow the path trod previously by the war in Vietnam—namely that multiple historical memories will arise to explain it. Williams has noted it is yet too early to pass final judgement on the curious mix of pre-emption, unilateralism, and neoliberal ideology known as the Bush Doctrine. So too, the jury is still out on the Obama Doctrine, often rendered privately as “Don’t do stupid shit.” It has recently been charged that the current destabilization of Iraq is due to Obama’s cautious approach to the ongoing Syrian civil war. Most recently, Hillary Clinton (former Secretary of State and presumed 2016 presidential candidate) has argued for a more nuanced lesson from the Bush years, claiming “your stupid may not be mine, and vice versa.” Expressing support for a more proactive policy, she argued, “I think we’ve learned about the limits of our power to spread freedom and democracy. That’s one of the big lessons out of Iraq. But we’ve also learned about the importance of our power, our influence, and our values appropriately deployed and explained.” After establishing an essentialised dichotomy between the pre-emptive policies of George W. Bush, and the cautious policies of Barack Obama, Clinton argued, “I think part of the challenge is that our government too often has a tendency to swing between these extremes. The pendulum swings back and then the pendulum swings the other

403 Blydenburg, “Memory and Power,” 852.
404 Williams, Failed Imagination? 284.
way. Clinton clearly sees herself as occupying the middle ground, but to what end? This dissertation has shown the danger an unnuanced consensus view of history can be to policymaking, but what effect might an irrevocably contested history have? Can policymaking born out of the ‘lessons’ of Vietnam and Iraq have a greater chance of success than those of the Second World War?

It would be easy to leave this conclusion overly pessimistic: to end with the admonishment that if even history is ultimately contestable, then historically-minded policy has little productive to say about anything. But this attempt to revise our understanding of history is not a new endeavour. Gimbel’s cautionary revision of Western ‘success’ in postwar Germany came as early as 1968, to be followed by Yergin (1978), and Moore’s addition on Japan (1979). Their efforts were followed by Milward (1984) and Kades (1989), with Abelshauser (1991), Khong (1992), and Reed (1993) representing the historical revisionism (or neo-revisionism) of the 1990s. Jackson’s critical account of West Germany’s reconstruction came in 2006, and Grandin’s volume on reconstruction in Latin America was issued in 2010. Now Bolger will bring his narrative of Iraq to the table in 2014, and thus the process will continue. These authors encourage humility where there has been too much hubris, granting us the critical description that “makes us look again” at that which has become overly familiar.407

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