


**ART AND IDENTITY: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL
STUDY OF STEREOTYPICAL BELIEFS ABOUT WOMEN
ARTISTS AND WOMEN'S ART AND THE DISCURSIVE
IDENTITIES OF ARTS PROFESSIONALS AND
PROMOTERS OF WOMEN'S ART**

ANNE S.W.L. DUNNETT

**A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews**



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Art and Identity: A Social Psychological Study of
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Anne S.W.L. Dunnett

Doctor of Philosophy

October, 1998




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ABSTRACT

The thesis is a social psychological study of beliefs about women artists and women's art. It is argued that the work of women artists is systematically undervalued in society and it is also argued that people's beliefs about women artists, and their attitudes towards women's art, are stereotypical. People are shown to have stereotyped beliefs about women artists and it is argued that stereotypes comprise the cognitive component of people's attitudes towards women's art. An argument is then presented that the origins of stereotypes can be found in social identity and personal identity. The conclusion is drawn that people's social identities and personal identities influence their views on women artists and their attitudes towards women's art, as represented by the stereotypical belief component of those attitudes. The results of an analytic survey are then presented in support of this claim. The survey findings show that two social identity factors, feminism and gender, and one personal identity factor, sex-role categorisation, influence people's beliefs about women artists and women's art. Having established that people's views on women artists and their work are stereotypical, the thesis then moves on to consider what effect this has on the sense of self of a group of arts professionals. An argument is presented that, in order to accomplish this task, it is necessary to replace survey methodology with discourse analysis techniques. Analyses are then presented of a set of interviews with arts professionals and those involved in promoting women's art. The results of these analyses show that the subjects are able to employ discursive accounts in order to preserve a positive sense of identity in the face of possible challenges to their sense of self. In the final chapter, some concluding comments are offered on the advantages associated with adopting a mixed-methodology approach of this kind.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH TO WOMEN'S ART

1.1 Introduction

This thesis was inspired by a general interest in women as artists and in how they are viewed by others. The study which evolved has two facets. On the one hand, there are the beliefs about women artists and women's art held the public, by practising artists and by arts professionals, including administrators and educators. On the other hand, there is the effect which these beliefs have on the identity and sense of self of those involved in promoting women's art. While women artists and women's art have been the subject of academic study, the most significant contributory disciplines have been art history, sociology and, more recently, cultural studies. These disciplines have demonstrated that it is possible to name individual women who have made their mark across the wide spectrum comprising the diversity of arts and cultural forms. However, historical, sociological and cultural studies have had less success in explaining how women's art is understood by the general public and by the arts establishment. There have been studies of women artists and women's art which have drawn upon psychological perspectives such as psychoanalysis (Pollock, 1988; Wolff, 1981), however psychological studies which utilise contemporary innovations in social psychology are not readily identifiable. This is, perhaps, surprising given the potential for social psychology to contribute to an analysis of public responses to cultural forms and the artists who create them. The present thesis aims to fill this analytic gap, and begins with a commentary on women artists and women's art.

1.2 Women artists

In a review of the place of women in the arts, Wolff (1981) has argued that art and literature should be seen as historically and socially situated. Specific historical

periods and sets of social relations particular to them, she argues, foster the development of ideologies. This means, according to Wolff, that ideologies surrounding artistic production and the artist are in effect historically and socially constructed. Works of art, themselves, must then constitute manifestations of culture, or as Wolff describes them, 'repositories of cultural meaning'. Wolff's claim is that both cultural analysis and the sociological study of the arts have been effective in identifying sexism in society and how this has impacted upon cultural and artistic products and their reception.

The idea that art is intrinsically linked to social phenomena such as biased social relations is also presented by Greer (1979). Greer points to the apparent contradiction between the interest aroused by major exhibitions of women's art throughout the 20 century and the subsequent lack of response from the arts establishment. She cites, by way of illustration, the Exposition Retrospective d'Art Feminin held in Paris in 1906 which, at that time, appeared to enjoy considerable acclaim. However, Greer's view is that the arts establishment has been, and continues to be, reluctant to address art which deviates from normal practice and claims that women's art falls into this category. This reluctance is at least in part because there would be a need to direct resources into associated research and areas of scholarship without any guarantee of return commensurate with this investment. On the other hand, Greer comments on the fact that works of art can constitute 'small repositories of enormous value' and that this value is determined more by authenticity and rarity than by aesthetic criteria. However, in an artistic version of *Catch 22*, while the level of survival of women's 'portable paintings' certainly meets the criterion of rarity this, according to Greer, is in itself insufficient to guarantee high value status. Irrespective of authentication, women painters tend to be relatively unknown. Thus their work meets a necessary, but not sufficient, set of value criteria, in that it is rare, but held to be the output of minor artists.

Greer confirms, in spite of this, that there has been evidence of an interest, albeit a 'desultory' interest, in women artists and women's art since the influential writings

of Vasari in 1598. According to Greer, it is difficult to perceive any underlying rationale for the selection of those women artists whose work attracted his attention. In addition, Vasari's observations were judged by Greer as somewhat 'gallant' and without critical and evaluative substance. Vasari's treatment of women artists and their work was therefore markedly different from his treatment of male artists and their work. In Greer's opinion, Vasari's approach to the treatment of women artists and their work set a precedent which was upheld by art historians who followed. Classical references to women artists and their work are, therefore considered unreliable by Greer who suggests that 'inclusions and omissions are at least part a consequence of commentators' condescending attitudes.' For example, Mechteld toe Boecop, according to Greer, received scant recognition in Houbraken's early eighteenth century work which constituted an extensive study of Netherlandish painters and painters. This is somewhat surprising, as Mechteld toe Boecop was already well established as a 'paintress' when Houbraken was writing. However, that she was a 'paintress' who had earned her reputation from large scale religious works of art, normally the province of male artists, perhaps explains Hourbraken's reticence.

The idea that women artists and women's art have been unfairly regarded by the arts establishment is a theme developed by Pollock (1988), who suggests that art history, in common with most academic disciplines, contributes actively to the production and perpetuation of a gender hierarchy. In accord with Greer, Pollock adopts the position that women artists are either omitted from art history or are subject to particular forms of representation. Modernist art history, she argues, is 'ideologically predisposed' to towards a limited vision of what constitutes art and artistic merit. Pollock's resolution of the mistaken impression that there have been no women artists of note lies in the process of the historical recovery of women who were artists. Like Greer, Pollock is able to point to examples of women artists who were transiently recognised in their own milieu but whose reputations diminished with time. Berthe Morisot (1854-96) and Mary Cassatt (1844-1926),

for example, were considered important members of the Impressionist School. However their names are not widely known today.

Chadwick (1990) echoes some of Pollock's concerns that women's art is undervalued partly as a result of ideological considerations. Utilising post-structuralist analyses of discourse and power, Chadwick has suggested that part of the 'invisibility' of women artists stems from the fact that social power hierarchies are structured in such a way that it has been men who control the extent to which the contributions of women are seen or recognised. The difficulty this presents, Chadwick argues, is that if the situation of women artists is problematic for structural reasons, then so long as the relevant social structures remain in place, the problematic status of women artists and women's art will endure:

'As an academic discipline, art history has structured its study of cultural artefacts within particular categories, privileging some forms of production over others and continually returning the focus to certain kinds of objects and the individuals who produced them'

Chadwick, 1990

Chadwick, like Greer, identifies women artists, namely Marietta Robusti and Judith Leyster, whose treatment by arts historians demonstrates how male-oriented art history has contrived to render the work of women artists 'invisible'. Similar claims are made by Spender (1988) in respect of women's literature and by Chambers (1988) in respect of women's contributions to popular culture. Chambers suggests that one reason for the problematic status of women artists is that women's advances in popular culture are often perceived as threatening to the more established male-centred institutions.

Some art historians and cultural theorists, however, suggest that the position of women artists is not entirely static. Lippard (1976) claims that women are being offered more opportunities to work as artists, but that this has had little effect on their status in the arts establishment and in art histories. More recently, Isaak (1996) has suggested that the last decade has seen a variety of feminist and postmodernist critiques of art history and art criticism which has, in turn, caused

art critics to adopt more positive view towards women's art. However, she claims that despite this, there is still a sense in which women's art is regarded as marginal. Lucie-Smith (1994) has also suggested that in recent years, the position of women artists has improved. This, he notes, is in part a consequence of women artists concentrating on crafts such as weaving and stitching. As opposed to the high status fine arts, craft activities have always been perceived as appropriate for women because of their association with domestic skills rather than artistic genius.

What unites many of these disparate studies is the perception that women as artists suffer a form of institutional bias. Biases of this sort represent informal barriers in organisations which prevent members of minority groups, in this case women, from attaining higher levels of position or status. (Jeanquart-Barone and Sekaran, 1996) Of course, responsible bodies such as national arts councils have explicit policies which purport to circumvent such difficulties. However, Hutchison (1982) has argued that, in practice, implementation of arts council policies often results either in obvious biases or in more subtle forms of discrimination.

Institutional biases of the sort identified by Hutchieson (1982), when they apply to women, can be characterised as resulting from male-centred assumptions which lie at the heart of organisational structures. (Ramsay and Parker, 1992) This suggests that the bias against women artists reflected in the work of art historians may exist today as subtle forms of institutional prejudice. The fact that discrimination may arise in subtle or indirect ways is especially problematic for women artists, because social psychological studies of prejudice have shown that subtle prejudice can be more acceptable to people than blatant prejudice. For example, Vrugt and Nauta (1995) argue that in the Netherlands women, in common with ethnic minorities, experience subtle forms of prejudice. They cite the example of objections to positive discrimination for the admittance of women to prominent positions on the basis that affirmative action of this type would favour women over men in cases where men held better qualifications. In their study of helping behaviour, Vrugt and Nauta revealed that, unlike men, women occupying

subordinate roles received more help from male subjects than women in supervisory roles. Vrugt and Nauta concluded that men tend to have more positive attitudes towards women in 'traditional' gender roles than towards women in less 'traditional', supervisory positions. Moreover, these effects arose among subjects who had provided no evidence of stereotype bias in responses to an initial questionnaire. Vrugt and Nauta conclude that subtle prejudice may exist even in the absence of overt prejudice and may be more socially acceptable.

1.3 Rationale for the present thesis

A number of theorists have, then, suggested that women's artistic products can be viewed as systematically undervalued as a result of having been produced by women. They argue that the relatively low status of women artists should be understood as a form of social bias. A consequence of this viewpoint is that responses to women's artistic products can usefully be viewed as socially conditioned responses, rather than as 'neutral' aesthetic responses. If this is so, then the first task in providing a social psychology of women's art is to explain where people's views on women's art come from. This involves discovering whether there is a social psychological explanation which can shed light on the societal devaluation of women's art revealed by art theorists and historians. A second task is to investigate the consequences such devaluing views have for the sense of self or identity of arts professionals who are responsible for promoting such art.

In pursuing these two tasks, different research questions arise as attention is turned from one task to the other. As far as views on women's art is concerned, the question centres on discovering whether there are social psychological factors which might influence people's views on women artists and women's art. If responses to women's art are, as art historians and theorists argue, devaluing because they are socially conditioned, then there should be some evidence of this social conditioning in the perceptions of women's art of both the public and arts professionals. When attention turns to the second task, a further research question

arises: the issue of how arts professionals maintain a positive sense of self as promoters of women's art, given the perceived social devaluation of women's art. If women's art suffers from a devaluing of its product, then this poses the question of whether and how those with responsibility for the arts preserve a positive social identity. In particular, involvement with women's art poses a potential identity problem for arts administrators. On the one hand, as promoters of art, they can be expected to wish to avoid any appearance of prejudice against the art of women. On the other hand, if women's art is generally under-valued, thus representing a greater promotional difficulty than other forms of art, then they can be expected to display an awareness of the undesirability of promoting the art of women. This raises the question of whether such ambivalence occurs in the way mediators of art understand such forms of art and the sense of self they derive from working with such forms of art.

This thesis, then, explores how women's art is understood, by examining the way people's views on women's art are socially conditioned. To accomplish this, the exclusive focus of Chapters Two and Three is on social psychological theory.

Chapter Two presents reviews of recent research in the areas of stereotype theory and attitude theory. Social stereotypes, viewed as the cognitive component of attitudes, are depicted as an explanatory mechanism which accounts for views on women's art.

Chapter Three then presents a discussion of the origin of such stereotypes. Two sources of stereotypes are considered: those which are based on group-membership and those which are based on the individual. It will be seen that there is evidence to support the view that some stereotypical beliefs derive from, or are influenced by, membership of large scale social groups. However, it is also the case that other stereotypical beliefs are acquired through an individual's early socialisation experiences, and the example focused on here is sex-role categorisation. The argument will be that the cognitive component of attitudes,

stereotypical beliefs, can be understood in part as an outcome of the twin forces of social group stereotyping and gender stereotyping.

Chapter Four presents the application of these theoretical insights in the context of an empirical study of beliefs about women artists and women's art held by the public, by practising artists and by arts professionals including administrators and educators. The analysis in Chapter Four focuses on the question of whether the data can be explained by reference to a mixture of social group stereotypes and individualistic sex-role stereotyping. The data in Chapter Four are taken from a survey with a sample of 484 university students and a sample of 37 arts professionals

Chapter Five explores the question of whether stereotypical beliefs have an impact on the sense of self of those who are responsible for the dissemination of women's art. After a review of the discourse analytic approach to analysis of self and identity, interview data are presented which reveal that the arts professionals interviewed employ a number of discursive strategies in order to maintain a sense of self as unbiased. Data in Chapter Five are taken from some 20 in-depth interviews with arts professionals who have been involved in promoting women's arts.

Chapter Six pursues the issue of sense of self among arts professionals and arts promoters in contexts which involve 'identity problems' other than defending oneself against possible claims of prejudice. The first deals with apparently inconsistent identity claims. The second deals with re-negotiations of identity following the break-down of a group whose aim was to promote women's art. Data in Chapter Six are taken from some 18 in-depth interviews with former group members.

Chapter Seven provides a summary statement of the main findings in the thesis and draws together conclusions from the study as a whole. It also provides a critical

reflection on the perceived limitations of the present study and makes recommendations for future research.

1.4 Conclusion

This chapter began by describing a study of women as artists which has two facets: people's beliefs about women artists and women's art and the effect which these have on the sense of self of those involved in the arts professions. Theorists across a range of disciplines such as art history, sociology of art and cultural studies subscribe to the belief that women's art is undervalued in our society. It has been emphasised that social psychology can contribute to an understanding of where such beliefs come from. Accordingly, Chapters Two and Three now move on to discuss social psychological theories of stereotypical beliefs and their origins.

CHAPTER TWO

STEREOTYPES AND ATTITUDES: STEREOTYPICAL BELIEFS AND THEIR ROLE AS THE COGNITIVE COMPONENT OF ATTITUDES

2.1 Introduction

Chapter One acknowledged the potential of social psychology to contribute to an analysis of people's beliefs about women artists and women's art and the effect which these beliefs have on the identity and sense of self of those involved in promoting women's art. This chapter is oriented towards the first of these facets and provides a conceptual underpinning, derived from social psychology, which deals with the notion of beliefs in general. Section 2.2 begins this task by presenting reviews of recent research in stereotype theory. The argument is then presented, in section 2.3, establishing that stereotypical beliefs comprise the cognitive component of attitudes, and that both stereotype theory and attitude theory benefit from this. Thereafter, an exposition of attitudes and attitude theory is provided. A summary and conclusions are presented in section 2.4.

2.2 Stereotype theory

A central goal of social psychology is to explain and predict the ways in which people behave in interaction with one another. Stereotypes have been proposed as one important determinant of behaviour, and so have become a focus of attention for social psychologists. A relatively common understanding of 'stereotype' is a more or less shared belief about the characteristics or attributes of a group or category of people. The stereotyping process can be considered as one in which 'target' groups are identified by observable features such as skin colour, ethnicity, physical appearance, age or sex. Of course, other features such as religion, political affiliation or other social affiliations can sometimes be equally 'observable' by means of overt signs such as modes of dress. Stereotyping is a process in which

the stereotyping individual or group ascribes psychological characteristics to these overtly observable 'target' groups. The attributed characteristics are typically taken by those who research stereotypes to be trait terms. However it is also argued that stereotypes can include other sorts of features such as beliefs about others' attitudes (Judd, Ryan, and Park, 1991; Asuncion and Mackie, 1996). The model suggested is that a representation of a group, identified by means of a label such as 'woman' or 'black', becomes associated with specific traits or characteristics such as impulsiveness or laziness. Stereotypes sometimes derive from a pair of category representations such as 'male' and 'female', sometimes from multiple category representations, such as 'Asians', 'Blacks' and 'Whites' and sometimes from continuous variables such as age or physical attractiveness.

The use of stereotypes to explain behaviour can be traced back to Lippman (1922). In 'Public Opinion' he described stereotypes as selective, self-fulfilling and ethnocentric. He saw stereotypes as offering only a partial view of the world, in that they were usually incomplete and biased. He pictured them as 'blind spots' which prevented objective reasoning. He viewed their over-generalising process as unfortunate and yet necessary, since they made a complex world simple. Katz and Braly (1933) conducted a study of prejudice employing the notion of stereotypes. Using the checklist method, they studied the way students assigned 5 traits taken from a list of 48 to a number of social groups. They found high levels of agreement among students. They reported, for example, that 75% of students characterised Negroes as lazy. They viewed this sort of finding as evidence for erroneous 'public fictions' about other groups. Subsequent work on stereotypes tended to concentrate on this notion of error or bias in stereotyping. Thus, stereotype studies in the 1930s and 1940s also claimed to show that, as a picture of reality, stereotypes are almost completely misleading. This led to work which collected 'objective' accounts of social groups with the aim of disseminating such information in order to counter biased stereotypes. (Bogardus, 1950; Fishman, 1956).

In the 1950s, work on stereotypes as biases or errors, which cast the stereotype in a negative light, continued. This was in part because most stereotype research addressed questions relating to prejudice. In 1950, for example, Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson and Sanford argued, from a psychoanalytic perspective, that stereotyping is a particular form of error of thought which intolerant people are prone to make. However, around the same time, a number of theorists including Asch (1952) began to argue that insofar as behaviour is influenced by group membership, stereotyped views of people, which represent them in terms of group memberships, are likely to be valuable. More group-centred accounts of stereotypes were also produced by Fishman (1956) and Vinacke (1956) who argued that stereotypes are responses to intergroup relations. However, unlike Asch and Vinacke, Fishman argued that this was still an irrational response, in that individuals were succumbing to the powers of suggestion of the group. In some senses, Allport's *The Nature of Prejudice* (1954) represented a blend of the more positive view of stereotypes of Asch and Vinacke and more traditional, negative views, since Allport characterised the categorisation role of stereotypes as a necessary form of thought in the same way as Lippman. However Allport still considered stereotyping as problematic because of its tendency to over-exaggerate features of social groups. His explanation rested on ideas similar to those of Adorno, that normal people categorise via stereotypes 'usefully', but prejudiced people categorise 'irrationally'.

In the 1960s a more positive view of stereotypes was supported by a number of studies which, following Bogardus (1950) sought to compare 'objective' descriptions with stereotype content and reported that the mismatch between reality and stereotype was not as great as previously claimed. This led Triandis and Vassiliou (1967) to suggest that there is a 'kernel of truth' to stereotypes in that part of the stereotype deals with the world 'correctly'. This concern with a kernel of truth lessened in the 1970s. This was in part due to worries about the 'objectivity' of the objective measures of groups. It was also due to a switch in interest away from stereotype content to a concern with stereotype processes.

This concern with process came to be identified with what was termed the social cognition approach.

Social cognition has been defined as the study of how ordinary people think about people (Fiske and Taylor, 1984). Two dimensions of this approach are the study of categorisation and the study of schemata. Through categorisation, the content of experience can be ordered or 'made sense of'. An aspect of experience is dealt with by establishing the extent to which it can be subsumed within a category. These categorised experiences are organised through schemata, which represent the categorised information in a structured or hierarchical way. What separates out social cognition from other forms of cognition, according to Fiske & Taylor (1984), is that the objects of social cognition are social, and are often members of one's own or other groups. Social cognition also has a social origin in that it may be created or reinforced through social interaction. In addition, social cognition represents forms of thought which are assumed to be shared within a given group or society. However, although social cognition theory emphasises the uniquely social aspect of social stereotypes, its explanations of the origins of social stereotypes and of their structure and function remain firmly cognitive in tone.

The prime *motivation* for the use of stereotypes according to the social cognition tradition is the need to simplify a complex social environment. The social cognition account of the *origin* of such simplifying stereotypes is based on the suggestion of Hamilton and Gifford (1976) who argued that stereotypes are an outcome of 'illusory correlation', in which two stimuli which co-occur are erroneously inferred to be correlated. They presented subjects with statements about people who were described as belong either to group A or group B. Statements about group B people were less frequent, and therefore more distinctive. The statements either attributed socially desirable or undesirable actions to each person. Socially undesirable actions were less frequent, and thus also more distinctive. The ratio of desirable to undesirable actions was constant across groups A and B, and there was no correlation between group membership

and desirability. Hamilton and Gifford's finding was that subjects over-estimated the frequency of undesirable actions by minority (group B) members, in that the ratio of desirable to undesirable actions was estimated to be greater for group A than group B. The basic idea here is that relatively infrequent stimuli are more noticeable or distinctive than frequently occurring stimuli, and so are more readily 'encoded'. It follows that where a pair of such infrequent stimuli occur, both will be relatively easily encoded. Cognitively, we tend to pay particular attention to both stimuli and come to infer the existence of a link between them: thus constituting an example of illusory correlation..

The current status of the illusory correlation thesis is ambiguous. Research continues to demonstrate the occurrence of illusory correlations (for example Acorn, Hamilton and Sherman, 1988; Kim and Baron, 1988; Stroessner and Heuer, 1996). However, other research has shown that an illusory correlation may not arise if the minority group is the self (Pryor, 1986) or if the majority and minority group labels have pre-existing social meaning for the subjects (McArthur and Friedman, 1980). It has also been suggested that if the descriptions of majority and minority group members is of attitudes held by them, rather than behaviours performed by them, then the effect of the illusory correlation may change. In a modification of the original Hamilton and Gifford study, Spears, Van der Pligt and Eiser (1985) demonstrated that it is only when the minority attitude is the same as the subject's own attitude that the illusory correlation appears. In addition, the theoretical explanation for the effect in terms of stimuli being more noticeable or distinctive has also been challenged. Fiedler (1991), for example, has attempted to explain illusory correlation data in terms of information loss which arises from processing types of information which have different frequencies of occurrence. Moreover, Asuncion and Mackie (1996) have suggested that stereotype development may arise from affective factors rather than from mere infrequency of incidence itself, in a form of classical conditioning. Asuncion and Mackie note research which demonstrates that meeting new groups often induces negative

affect, and hypothesise that this could become associated with the group itself, rather than with the unfamiliarity of the group to the subject.

The status of stereotype *origin* is, therefore, not a settled issue within social cognition theory. In contrast, the social cognition theorist's understanding of the *structure* of stereotypes is more straightforward. Stangor and Lange (1994) provide an influential model for the structure of stereotypes by suggesting that stereotypes consist in 'associative networks' which are abstract knowledge representations in memory such that group or category labels are associated with the stereotypical characteristics of that group. Stangor and Lange associate, with this model, a process of 'activation' in which ascription of a category label occurs after the stereotyper has noted an observable feature such as skin colour. This 'activation' of the label then 'spreads' to other, associated characteristics. Stangor and Lange differentiate between availability and accessibility of stereotype characteristics. 'Availability' refers to a subject agreeing, if asked, that the stereotype characteristic belongs to the labelled group. 'Accessibility' refers to the strength of activation of the representation which the label names relative to other representations. 'Accessibility' also refers to how strongly the characteristic is associated to the labelled representation, relative to other characteristics. The use of the label depends on perceptual salience and perceiver variables. Perceiver variables include features such as recency and frequency of activation. Among these perceiver variables, Stangor and Lange show that there are individual differences for the accessibility of labels. They also argue that the perceived informativeness of the label affects whether it is activated. A further determinant is the complexity of the task at hand. As the task becomes more complex, stereotypes which are especially useful in its simplification are activated. Also, the nature of the task may 'demand' specific categorisations (Stangor, Lynch, Duan, and Glass, 1992).

Although this picture of the *structure* of stereotypes as associative networks has become influential, debate remains over the precise cognitive *processes* which

underlie such 'social cognitive' association networks. Three aspects of cognitive processing have generated particular research interest: the nature of the cognitive processes underlying stereotyping, the extent to which *stereotyping is automatic*, and the influence on stereotypes of *counter-stereotypical information*.

Underlying Processes. Macrae, Bodenhausen and Milne (1995) have suggested that social judgements often involve multiple categorisations. Nevertheless, stereotype theory suggests that stereotypes are used cognitively to simplify the social world. This means that there must be some cognitive process which facilitates selection of one of the multiple categories available as salient. Macrae et al (1995) argue that both excitatory and inhibitory cognitive processes are involved. Their experiment involved three experimental conditions. Subjects were presented with brief videotapes showing a Chinese woman: applying makeup, 'Woman' stereotype activated condition; using chopsticks, 'Chinese' stereotype activated condition; reading, the control condition. Subjects then performed a lexical decision task involving gender-stereotypical trait terms and Chinese stereotypical trait terms. The results showed that subjects in the 'Woman' stereotype activated condition recognised gender-stereotypical trait terms more quickly than did control subjects who in turn performed better than 'Chinese' stereotype activated subjects. Similarly, 'Chinese' stereotype activated subjects recognised Chinese stereotypical trait terms more quickly than did control subjects who in turn performed better than 'Woman' stereotype activated subjects. These results support the suggestion that both excitatory and inhibitory processes were in play, since the cross-stereotypical condition produced slower rates of recognition than either the homogenous stereotype condition or the control condition.

Macrae et al (1995) demonstrate, therefore, that the most basic cognitive processes associated with stereotyping are more complex than previous research had suggested. At the level of higher cognitive processes, a similar picture emerges. Biernat and Kbyrniewicz (1997) separate out two different consequences of stereotyping. These are that social stereotypes may lead to *assimilative*

judgements, or alternatively that they may lead to *contrastive* judgements. An example of this distinction can be drawn from consideration of gender stereotypes. The authors report that women are stereotypically expected to earn less than men. Accordingly, a given level of income may, in the case of women, be interpreted, via assimilation, as an index of lower financial success in comparison with men. On the other hand, the same level of income may be interpreted as an index of relatively high financial success in contrast with men earning the same level of income. Biernat and Kobrynowich suggest that whether assimilation or contrast occurs depends on whether the judgement rests on 'broad based' inferences about the target group or on assessment of the target's minimum standing on the attribute.

Hamilton and Sherman (1996) point to another way in which the cognitive processes involved in stereotyping are affected when the stereotype 'target' is a group, rather than an individual. They claim that while perceivers do tend to consider individuals more coherent as entities than they do groups, it is this perception of 'unity' or 'entitativity' which produces important effects on the stereotyping process, rather than the individual/group distinction per se. If, for example, perceptions of unity or entitativity are consistent in the case of individuals and groups then the outcomes of stereotypical information processing are also consistent. If, however, perceptions of unity or entitativity are inconsistent then the outcomes of information processing will also differ. Hamilton and Sherman suggest that perceivers do not expect groups to display the same unity as the personality of an individual. For example, spontaneous inferences involving illusory correlations are more likely to be made in judgements about individuals than about groups. It follows that the cognitive processes associated with stereotyping are influenced by the extent to which the stereotype target is seen to have high or low entitativity.

Another aspect of stereotypes which can influence underlying cognitive processes is whether the stereotype is positive or negative from one's own perspective. Steel

and Aronson (1995) have suggested that in situations where a negative stereotype is applicable, one faces what they term a stereotype threat. 'Stereotype threat' refers to situations where one is at risk of confirming that a negative stereotype applies to oneself. Where the stereotype involves a socially important property, such as intellectual ability, the threat consists in the fact that confirmation of the negative stereotype can be disruptive enough to impair intellectual performance. In one of their studies, Steel and Aronson (1995) asked Black and White college students to perform in a difficult verbal test. The test was performed in one of three conditions: the subjects were told that the test was diagnostic of ability, 'Diagnostic' condition; the subjects were told that the test was a laboratory tool for studying problem-solving, 'Non-diagnostic' condition; a third composite condition. The diagnostic condition represented a stereotype threat. The results showed that Black subjects performed significantly more poorly in the stereotype threat condition than in the non-stereotype threat condition. The authors conclude that the pressure represented by stereotype threat functioned as a form of evaluation anxiety which led to impaired performance.

Automatic Stereotyping. Bargh, Chen and Burrows (1996) note that research in social cognition has shown that some cognitive phenomena are automatic in nature. For example, attitudes may become activated automatically in the mere presence of the attitude object. Bargh et al suggest that behavioural responses to the social environment can be automatic in the same way. They demonstrated that subjects whose concept of rudeness was primed were more likely to behave in a rude fashion. Similarly, subjects whose concept of being elderly was primed walked more slowly away from the experimental laboratory than did control subjects. This implies that, for some stereotypes, both the perceptual phase of stereotyping (i.e. activation of stereotypes) and the behavioural phase are automatic.

The work of Bargh et al seems to point to a greater level of automaticity being involved in stereotypical thought than might have been supposed. Lepore and

Brown (1997), on the other hand, present data which seem to suggest that stereotypes are less prone to automatic triggering than previously supposed. In consequence, Lepore and Brown question the extent to which stereotype activation and resultant prejudice must necessarily be viewed as an automatic process. They distinguish between two types of 'automatic stereotype activation'. In the first, a stereotype trait (or characteristic) is primed directly and in the second the relevant category is primed. Take, for example, the case of gender stereotypes in which the category label 'woman' is stereotypically associated with the trait 'caring'. In the first type of stereotype activation, the 'caring' trait is directly primed. In the second type of stereotype activation, the category label 'woman' is directly primed.

The distinction between the two types of stereotype activation is important, Lepore and Brown (1997) claim, because it affects the extent to which automatic stereotyping may arise among prejudiced and non-prejudiced people. Previous research (Devine, 1989) appeared to demonstrate that both prejudiced and non-prejudiced people automatically activate the same, negative stereotype of Black people, but that non-prejudiced people then suppress the associated behavioural consequences. Lepore and Brown suggest instead that prejudiced and non-prejudiced people alike undergo automatic stereotype activation if a stereotype trait is primed, but that they differ if the stereotype category label itself is primed. In their study, subjects were primed with either negative trait words or category labels. They found that negative stereotype activation was similar across prejudiced and non-prejudiced subjects when negative trait words were used as primes. However, they also found that when category labels were used as primes, only prejudiced subjects displayed activation of the negative stereotype. The conclusion drawn was that the relationship between stereotypes, categories and prejudice is more flexible and less characterised by automaticity than supposed by earlier stereotype research. This finding offers some support for the previous findings derived by Fazio, Jackson, Dunton and Williams (1995) who also criticised Devine's claim that all people have racist stereotypes which are

automatically activated. Instead, Fazio et al suggest that only certain types of people match the 'automatic stereotype activation' description.

Counter-Stereotypical Information. According to Maurer, Park and Rothbart (1995), research in stereotyping and stereotype change has revealed that it is commonplace for perceivers to view groups in terms of the group's constituent subsets rather than as a whole, a process known as sub-typing. Sub-typing is a cognitive mechanism which allows for the preservation of stereotypes rather than the disconfirmation of stereotypes. When a counter stereotypical group member is encountered, sub-typing allows that counter-stereotypical example to be set aside as an exception to the stereotyping rule. Sub-grouping, as distinct from sub-typing, refers to a process in which members of a group are sub-divided into smaller meaningful sub-groups. For example, the group 'women' might be sub-divided into occupational sub-groups. When a counter stereotypical group member is encountered, sub-grouping results in a weakening or disconfirmation of the original stereotype. Maurer et al (1995) argue that either sub-typing or sub-grouping may arise in connection with stereotypical judgement. If sub-typing occurs, the consequence is that stereotyping is preserved. If sub-grouping occurs then the consequence is a greater perceived variability among members of the original group. Maurer et al, therefore, suggest that, in the presence of counter-stereotypical instances, a stereotype will be retained if the counter-stereotypical group can be viewed as a single set of exceptions. However, if a number of different subsets are perceived within the super-ordinate group then the presence among these of one counter-stereotypical sub-group may not result in stereotype-maintaining sub-typing. Instead, one is likely to perceive the super-ordinate group as relatively variable and to accept that this relative variability may encompass the counter-stereotypical examples, thus leading to a less stereotypical view of that super-ordinate group.

Maurer et al explain that the effect of counter-stereotypical information depends in part on informational *structure*: that is, the effect depends on whether the counter-

stereotypical instance is dealt with by means of sub-typing or subgrouping. However, other researchers have suggested that the efficacy of counter-stereotypical information may have more to do with informational *content*. Wilder, Simon and Faith (1996) discuss stereotype change in terms of Hewstone's (1989) attribution model and note that stereotypes are often unaffected by counter-stereotypical information. There are at least four reasons for this. One's own self-image is linked to beliefs about other groups. One may resist change in order to preserve 'public face' by avoiding appearing to have been wrong. The counter-stereotypical information may be attributed to 'unusual' causes. In the special case of unfavourable stereotypes, negative beliefs may be cognitively more difficult to change than positive beliefs. In a related vein, Huici, Ros, Carmona, Cano and Morales (1996) note that stereotype disconfirmation displays an asymmetry between positive and negative traits. Disconfirmation of positive traits is more readily generalised to groups as a whole than disconfirmation of negative traits. This asymmetry also applies to pre-existing attitudes. Negative attitudes are more powerful than positive attitudes in mediating information which disconfirms positive stereotypical traits. The authors conclude that disconfirmation and subsequent stereotype change is influenced by the valence of the disconfirming information and by the valence of existing attitudes.

What these studies of underlying processes, automaticity and counter-stereotypical information reveal is that even if social cognition theorists adopt a single model for stereotypes, such as Stangor and Lange's (1994) associative network model, there is still active debate about the cognitive processes associated with that model. The picture is made more complex because social judgements are not always stereotyped. For example, Fiske and Neuberg (1990) argue that there is a continuum of impression formation which varies from stereotyped judgements at one end to judgements about discrete behaviours of individuals at the other. Even when judgements *are* stereotypical, there is debate about just how 'shared' or consensual the stereotypes are. Ashmore and Del Boca (1981) argue that many important stereotypes are unique, individual beliefs, and more recently Stangor,

Sullivan and Ford (1991) suggest that individual stereotypes exist and may differ from the prevailing, consensual beliefs. In a similar vein, Asuncion and Mackie (1996) claim that the shared status of the stereotype is a variable feature of stereotypes which is only determined, for a given stereotype, by empirical study.

In summary, then, the social cognition account of the origin of stereotypes via illusory correlation turns out to be more complicated than early theorists predicted. However, social cognition research has provided a relatively clear model for stereotype structure. However, many of the cognitive processes associated with that model remain open to debate. This debate includes questions about underlying processes, automaticity and the effect of counter-stereotypical information. A common theme in this debate is the extent to which an individual's attitudes are involved in the stereotype under investigation. This raises the question of how to understand the relationship between stereotypes and attitudes which is discussed in the following section as a preliminary to a discussion of attitude theory.

2.3 Attitude theory

The preceding section discussed the fact that people formulate beliefs about others in a stereotypical fashion. Stereotypes were regarded as social phenomena which condition the way an individual will think about other people. To this extent, the notion of the stereotype is much narrower than that of the attitude, since attitude theory deals with beliefs about people *and* beliefs about other aspects of the social world such as objects and events. Attitude theory is also broader than stereotype theory in another sense. Within the context of social behaviour, it is necessary to provide an explanation of how stereotypical beliefs act on the subject as impulses or motivations to behave in one way or another in respect of the 'target' of the stereotyped beliefs. Standardly, the explanation offered of this within stereotype theory is that beliefs become associated with evaluations such as good or bad and favourable or unfavourable. Indeed, since many studies of stereotypes are studies of prejudice, it might be assumed that evaluation, as a motivational force, would be central to stereotype theory. However, with current stereotype research the focus is more on stereotype *processes* than stereotype *content* and the emphasis is on

cognitive components such as ‘informational structures’ rather than evaluative components. Attitude theory, on the other hand, regards the issue of evaluation as crucially important.

Recent research has acknowledged a close relationship between the concepts of stereotype and attitude which reflects the differences in scope of stereotype theory and attitude theory. Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson and Gaertner (1996) note, in terms of prejudiced attitudes, that stereotypes can be thought of as representing the cognitive component of attitudes towards other groups of people. Stangor and Lange (1994) note that it is a ‘commonly proposed assumption’ that stereotypes represent the cognitive component of attitudes. They also argue that, since stereotypes represent beliefs about social groups, they should predict prejudicial attitudes. Howitt, Billig, Cramer, Edwards, Kniveton, Potter and Radley (1989) suggest a similar linkage by suggesting that the negative evaluations in prejudicial attitudes are related to negative stereotypes. Dovidio et al (1996) even go so far as to claim that stereotypes and attitudes, although not identical, are not always conceptually completely distinct, in that, within some conceptual definitions, stereotypes and attitudes are seen to share important similarities. This drawing together of the two concepts is especially vivid in the work of Eagly and Mladinic (1989). They define an attitude as ‘a tendency to evaluate an entity with some degree of favour or disfavour’ and then claim:

‘Evaluation can be expressed in various types of responses ... often grouped into three classes - cognition, affect and behaviour. The cognitive class encompasses the thoughts that people have about an attitude object ... It is the cognitive class that is relevant to understanding stereotypes. When an attitude object is a social group, this cognitive class of responses is synonymous with the stereotype about that group.’

(Eagly and Mladinic, 1989)

The examination of social judgements in terms of stereotypes and attitudes therefore allows the researcher to consider people’s beliefs and to place them within an evaluative, attitudinal framework. This allows beliefs to be viewed as a

motivation for behaving in a given way. Stereotype theory thereby benefits from attitude theory in that it acquires an explicit evaluative, motivational component.

Attitude theory also benefits from interaction with stereotype theory. Firstly, given the claim here, that the cognitive component of attitudes can be regarded as a set of stereotypical beliefs, the findings on stereotype structure and stereotyping processes reported in section 2.2 will also apply to the cognitive component of attitudes. Secondly, attitude theory's traditional account of attitude origin and attitude change can be improved upon. In section 2.2 it was demonstrated that the illusory correlation account of stereotype origin is questionable. However, in Chapter Three it will be shown that social identity theory and gender schema theory offer two powerful models for the social origin of stereotypical beliefs. If the cognitive component of attitudes is regarded as a set of stereotypical beliefs, then the findings on the social origins of stereotypical beliefs set out in Chapter Three can also be applied to the cognitive component of attitudes. This social orientation is a valuable addition to attitude theory since attitude theorists have tended to focus on the processes of attitude development and attitude change largely in terms of asocial cognitive processes such as: classical conditioning (Kuykendall and Keating, 1990), information processing (McGuire, 1989), and persuasion (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986).

Thus the benefits to be derived from examining social judgements by viewing them as the joint outcome of stereotypes and attitudes are twofold. The attitudinal theoretical component brings an explicit element of evaluation which many accounts of stereotypes lack. The stereotype theoretical component brings a clearer understanding of belief structures and processes and also brings an explicitly social view of the origins of attitude judgements which many accounts of attitudes lack.

An example of this joint stereotyping/attitude approach is the study carried out by Smith, Fazio, and Cejka (1996) on how people respond to individuals and objects

which can be categorised or stereotyped in multiple ways. Earlier research (Roskos-Ewoldsen and Fazio, 1992) has confirmed that when people have highly accessible attitudes towards specific individuals or objects these individuals and objects become a focus for attention when they are present in a visual field. The accessibility of attitudes, in turn, depends on the relative strength of associated evaluations of the individual or object which, having been retained in the memory, are then activated. Smith et al suggest that just as visual fields may contain multiple individuals or objects, multiple potential categorisations of individuals and objects exist in the memory. They demonstrate that categories towards which people have highly accessible attitudes are preferentially applied to multiply categorisable objects. Smith et al (1996) point out that although accessible attitudes of this sort are often extreme attitudes, accessibility and extremity of attitudes need not always co-occur.

A basic definition of 'attitude' is that an attitude is an evaluation of something about which an individual has some knowledge. The utility, for social psychology, of the attitude construct is that attitudes are aspects of an individual's makeup which predict and explain behaviour. It is, therefore, somewhat embarrassing for attitude theory that early attitude research demonstrated that there is little or no relation between verbal expressions of attitude and behaviour. A classic experiment demonstrating the lack of relationship between expression of attitude and behaviour was conducted by LaPiere (1934) who wrote to 251 restaurants and hotels, asking 'Will you accept members of the Chinese race as guests in your establishment'. 92% of the 128 responses were negative. Having said that, LaPiere and a 'personable and charming' young Chinese couple had travelled the country six months previously and actually received courteous treatment at all but one of these establishments. Faced with an actual couple who defied their stereotypes, the proprietors had apparently laid aside their racist attitudes. Similarly, Kutner, Wilkins and Yarrow (1952) carried out a study in which two white men entered a restaurant and were then joined by an African-American woman. In the 11 restaurants visited, the woman was never refused admission.

Later, all 11 restaurants received a letter asking for table reservations for a mixed race group. 17 days later, none had replied. Telephone requests were then made and only five restaurants reluctantly gave reservations. Subsequently, Wicker (1969) reviewed several dozen attitude studies and found a general trend showing only a weak link between attitude and behaviour.

According to attitude theory, then, attitudes can be thought of as relatively stable phenomena which cause behaviour and so can be used to predict behaviour. However, early research has drawn a simple attitude-behaviour link into question. For example, even prior to Wicker's 1969 study, Triandis (1967) had suggested that attitude studies which fail to predict behaviour usually obtain measures only on the affective dimension. As a consequence, attitude theorists have begun to revise their conceptions of how attitudes function. Brewer and Crano (1994) and Crano (1997) have suggested that the attitude-behaviour relationship is mediated by self-interest or vested interest. However, a more common amendment has been the suggestion that behaviour does not map exactly onto expressed attitude because attitudes are more complex than initially supposed.

Two influential but competing re-statements of attitude theory are Hovland's 3 Factor model (Hovland, Janis and Kelley, 1953) and Fishbein and Ajzen's theory of reasoned action (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; 1980). In Hovland's model, an attitude represents an element of psychological make-up which is directed towards, or is about, some thing. The attitude has affective, cognitive and behavioural components. The general idea of this model is that attitudes influence intentions and thereby cause behaviour. Each of these three components of the attitude - affect, cognition and propensity towards behaviour - represent different forms of response, either overt or covert, to stimuli previously encoded as an attitudinal object which can be measured by separate dependent variables.

The affect component comprises feelings, moods, emotions or even responses of the affective nervous system to the attitudinal object. Where an attitude towards

an object is positive, the behaviour is positive. Where an attitude towards an object is negative, the behaviour is negative. For example, positive attitudes might induce feelings of hope while negative attitudes might induce feelings of despair. Overt affect might be measured through verbal statements of like or dislike while covert affect might be measured by physiological measures which reflect affective states such as heart rate or pupil dilation.

The cognition component comprises linkages between the attitudinal object and possible properties or characteristics. For example, if the attitudinal object is 'Mercedes' then possible properties or characteristics might include 'elegant' and 'sophisticated' or 'noisy' and pollution-creating'. Where an attitude towards an object is positive, the cognition is positive. For example, if the object of the positive attitude is a Mercedes car, then the cognition might be that Mercedes cars are elegant and sophisticated. Where an attitude towards an object is negative, the cognition is negative. For example, if the object of the negative attitude is a Mercedes car, then the cognition might be that Mercedes cars are noisy and pollution creating. As in the case of the affect component, overt cognition might be measured through verbal statements, although in the case of the cognition component these statements would be statements of belief. Covert cognition might be measured by psychological assessments using perceptual response measures such as reaction times.

The behavioural component comprises either expressed intentions to behave towards or the actual behaviour towards an attitudinal object. Where an attitude towards an object is positive, either the expressed intention to behave or actual behaviour is positive. Where an attitude towards an object is negative, either the expressed intention to behave or actual behaviour is negative. For example positive attitudes might be associated with behaviour which fosters or supports the object while negative attitudes might be associated with behaviour likely to hinder or oppose that object. Thus, if the attitudinal object is performance art then a positive attitude might mean either stating the intention to attend or even attending

a performance art presentation while a negative attitude might mean either indicating the intention not to attend or actually avoiding attending a performance art presentation. Overt intention to behave and actual behaviour might be measured by direct questioning and observation. Covert intentions to behave might be measured by physiological measures which reflect action orientations such as states of arousal.

This emphasis on the three attitudinal components has been adopted, albeit with caveats, by Eagly and Chaiken (1993). They argue that the notion of evaluation, which is common to all three components, is separable from the more restricted idea of affect. This allows for a situation in which someone could evaluate an attitudinal object positively without experiencing positive affective responses. Their caution in respect of the tri-partite nature of attitudes stems from research on inter-correlations among affect, cognition and behaviour measures. Ostrom (1969) found that correlations between different measures of any single component were higher than correlations among the three components. Later, Breckler (1984) examined correlations among clusters of beliefs and affective states and argued that if there really are three components to an attitude, then measures of these three separate components ought not to correlate too highly. In a study of responses to the actual presence of a live snake, he found that there was a reasonable statistical fit of data measuring affect, cognition and behaviour to the three component model, although he went on to argue that the three component model did not adequately account for a sufficient amount of variance in his findings. Partly in response to this, Eagly and Chaiken (1993) reject the three-component view as a viable model for attitudes. However, they nevertheless claim that it is important for the attitude theorist to continue to attend to the distinctions among what they describe as the 'three classes of evaluative response'. Their use of 'class' rather than 'component' emphasises their move away from the stronger claim that attitudes have three distinct components towards the weaker claim that:

'... the assumption that these responses can be divided into three classes implies ... the testable hypothesis that correlations between responses in the same class are higher than correlations between responses in different classes'.

(Eagly and Chaiken, 1993)

That there will be some overlap between classes is guaranteed by the fact that cognitive, affective and behavioural responses share a common underlying evaluative component. However, the differences are sufficiently great, Eagly and Chaiken argue, to mean that the uni-dimensional model offered by theorists such as Fishbein should be rejected.

The Fishbein and Ajzen (1975; 1980) response to the attitude-behaviour gap and the ambiguous results returned by research which does emphasise the three component view of attitudes is quite different. They claim that:

'On closer examination, we see that the multi-component view of attitude cannot provide an adequate explanation of the low attitude-behaviour relation. ... Whether our measures are based on statements concerning beliefs, feelings, intentions or behaviours, the results will be much the same. It follows that separate assessment of all three components is unlikely to lead to improved behavioural prediction.'

(Fishbein and Ajzen, 1980)

Rather than contrast different modes or forms of evaluation, Fishbein and Ajzen emphasise the difference between general and specific attitudes and behaviours. Ajzen and Fishbein note that most attitude studies use relatively specific indices of behaviour but relatively general indices of attitude. They argue that there is no direct relationship between someone's general attitude towards some issue and their performance of any specific behaviour.

These ideas form the basis of Fishbein and Ajzen's theory of reasoned action (1975; 1980). Fishbein and Ajzen describe the theory in the following terms. An attitude just is the index of the degree to which a person likes or dislikes an object. This is determined by the person's salient beliefs about the object. For example, a person might have general beliefs about 'the church' but will also have specific beliefs about 'attending the church'. These latter, specific beliefs are more salient to the question of whether that person will actually attend church. This example

highlights the emphasis Fishbein and Ajzen place on the relationship between specific attitudes leading to specific behaviours.

Fishbein and Ajzen stress that it is crucial, for accurate prediction of behaviour, that belief expressions match attitude to a given behaviour in terms of four characteristics: action, target, context and time. Suppose a subject has a generally positive attitude towards new cars. In terms of the theory of reasoned action, this knowledge has little predictive value in relation to the question: will the subject buy a new Audi car from Appleyard Motors within the next six weeks. This is because the crucial information in terms of action (*buying* a car), target (an *Audi* car), context (buying a car at a *specific dealer*) and time (buying a car within the *next six weeks*) cannot be derived from the general attitude.

Once a specific belief has been established, two further items of information are required for attitude measurement: belief strength and belief evaluation. What the theory of reasoned action advocates is a multiplication of the strength of each belief by the evaluation placed on the expected outcome contained within the belief. Suppose someone believes that buying an Audi car means owning a safe, elegant yet costly car, then those beliefs, together with associated strengths and evaluations, could be set out in the following way:

| Belief | Belief Strength (0 - +3) | Evaluation (-3 - +3) | Row Total (Strength x Evaluation) |
|---|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------|--|
| safety | +2 | +3 | +6 |
| elegance | +3 | +1 | +3 |
| costly | +3 | -1 | -3 |
| Total of strength x evaluation | | | +6 |

Once this multiplication is performed for each one of the salient beliefs associated with the intention to behave in a given way, the likelihood that the person will behave in accordance with his or her attitude can be derived by taking the sum of all of the strength x evaluation indexes pertaining to the relevant beliefs. In this sense the theory of reasoned action is an expectancy-*value* theory. It stresses the

importance, not only of the expectancies represented by the subject's either strongly or weakly held beliefs about the consequences of a specific behaviour, but also of the evaluations which that subject places on those expected outcomes. In the theory of reasoned action, it is assumed that predictive power is further increased by focusing on *modal* beliefs (those which are most commonly held among all subjects).

The theory of reasoned action also takes into account the importance of subjective norms. 'Subjective norm' refers to the subject's perception of how significant others would view behaviour consistent with the subject's attitude together with a motivation to comply with those views. Moreover, in a fashion analogous to measurement of the individual's attitude, assessment of a person's subjective norms must match the intention to behave in a given way in action, target, context and time. Thus, for example, the intention to take a holiday abroad this summer would be correlated with subjective norms such as 'My husband and children think that I should take a foreign holiday this summer'. The inclusion of consideration of subjective norms indicates another way in which early attitude studies might have generated the attitude-behaviour mismatch. It might be the case in those earlier studies that attitude measures reflected something true about subjects' attitudes, but that the intention to behave which those subjects formed was determined in a large part, not by their attitudes, but by their subjective norms.

So, the theory of reasoned action demonstrates on two counts why earlier attitude studies displayed the attitude-behaviour gap which Wicker identified. Firstly, beliefs and attitudes must correspond in the manner described, in that they agree in action, target, context and time elements. Secondly, the impact on behaviour of social norms must also be taken into account as described above.

Although Fishbein and Ajzen are able to point to a number of studies which support the theory of reasoned action, other researchers have been more critical of its success. The theory has tended to make use of bipolar evaluative scales

(Fishbein and Ajzen, 1980). However it has argued that attitudes should often be understood, not in terms of a uni-dimensional, bipolar model, but in terms of a multi-dimensional, uni-polar model. Studies of political liberalism and conservatism have shown that the sorts of characteristics which liberals associate with their political standpoint differ in kind from those employed by conservatives. Thus liberals might endorse such notions as individual freedom, tolerance and social equality, while conservatives endorse social stability, the maintenance of religious values and individual initiative. The difficulty this poses for the theory of reasoned action is that liberals and conservatives might not demonstrate opposite evaluations of the same characteristics. Rather, they display a form of indifference to the characteristics deemed important by members of the other group. Liberals and conservatives appear to operate on quite separate dimensions and with specific characteristics each of which was evaluated in a uni-polar and positive way.

The importance of polarity itself has also been questioned. Stangor and Lange's model of stereotypes described in section 2.2, portrays the link between stereotype label and stereotype characteristics in associative terms. Fazio (1986; 1989) has suggested that the structure of attitudes might also be made up of associations. If attitude beliefs cluster in associated networks of nodes, there may be no sense in the idea that the consequent attitude can be thought of in terms of a good/bad polarity.

Moreover, Eiser (1986) has argued that the theory of reasoned action's emphasis on modal beliefs which *on average* predict intentions, may be problematic. He points to the fact that while some modal beliefs may be commonly held by all subjects within a study, these may be outweighed by personally salient beliefs. And the difficulty is just that these personally salient beliefs will differ from one person to the next. Thus, for example, voting behaviour might be well predicted by a modal belief about whether the next government will draw the U.K. closer to European union. It might be less well predicted by non-modal beliefs about whether that government will withdraw the U.K. from the Common Agricultural

policy. However, such beliefs will be highly personally salient for voters who earn their living from agriculture and thus very important in predicting the voting behaviour of farmers. For example, Van der Pligt, Eiser and Spears (1987) report that in the context of expected consequences of nuclear power developments, personally salient beliefs are better predictors of attitude than personally non-salient beliefs. This becomes even more complex because people with different attitudes will find different aspects of an attitude object to be salient (Budd, 1986). Moreover, salience also arises in the transition from attitude to behaviour. Recent research (Posavac, Sanbonmatsu and Fazio, 1997) has drawn attention to the fact that the attitude-behaviour link is determined in part by the range of decision or action options from which the eventual attitude-driven action may be drawn. Posavac et al suggest that whether a behaviour turns out to be attitude consistent depends, in part, on the salience of that action among the possible alternatives.

Differential salience among attitudes and behavioural options therefore represents a complicating factor in the attitude-behaviour link and another feature which affects this linkage is the question of attitude strength. Eagly and Chaiken (1993) suggest that strong attitudes, defined as those which are resistant to change and are persistent over time, are those which are most likely to be predictive of behaviour. This definition has received empirical support. Zuwerink and Devine (1996), for example, have demonstrated that, in connection with attitudes to allowing gay people to enter the military, those whose attitudes were high in personal importance proved more resistant to counter-attitudinal persuasive arguments. However, Bassili (1996) points out that measures of attitude strength in recent research have displayed a wide variety of understandings of the attitude strength construct, and have included measurement of such different features as accessibility, affective-cognitive consistency, importance and intensity. On the other hand, in an attempt to cope with the diversity of possible definitions of 'attitude strength', Pomerantz, Chaiken and Tordesillas (1995) have argued, on the basis of factor analytic studies, that the different aspects of attitude strength can be represented by two factors: Embeddedness (the extent to which an attitude

displays linkage with the individual's value system) and Commitment (the extent to which the individual feels committed to upholding position implied by the attitude).

Another criticism of the theory of reasoned action stems from Bentler and Speckart's consideration of past behaviour (1979). They devised a test of the theory by looking at students' usage of alcohol, marijuana and 'hard drugs'. They gathered information across a span of time and discovered that past behaviour had an influence not only on intentions to behave in a certain way, but on behaviour itself. Moreover, attitudes also seemed to have a direct effect on behaviour without being mediated by intention. In a similar vein, Fredericks and Dossett (1983) found direct links between past behaviour and subsequent behaviour. It is partly in response to findings about the importance of past behaviour that Ajzen modified the original theory of reasoned action to account for previous experience and controllability. The newer theory allows for the fact that people are aware of differing levels of subjective ease associated with performing different actions. The new theory, the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1985), nevertheless retains many of the features of the original theory. Behavioural prediction has been shown to be improved (Madden, Ellen and Ajzen, 1992; McCaul, Sandgren, O'Neill and Hinsz, 1993), although Bagozzi and Yi (1989) have found evidence that non-volitional impulses could affect behaviour unmediated by intention.

It seems then, that neither the Eagly and Chaiken (1993) three-component approach to attitudes nor Fishbein and Ajzen's theory of reasoned action (1975; 1980) represent complete explanations of the findings of current attitude research. In particular, issues involving polarity, modality, salience and attitude strength measurement are still to be completely resolved. However (with the possible exception of Fazio's model) it does seem that there is a clear distinction to be drawn between beliefs, on the one hand, and evaluations of those beliefs on the other although their precise inter-relationship is not yet fully determined.

The complexity of relationship between cognitive beliefs and evaluations has recently been emphasised by Wilson, Hodges and LaFleur (1995). They point to previous research (for example Johnson, MacArthur and Wright 1991, Wilson and Craft, 1993) which demonstrates that when people start thinking about their attitudes, sometimes those attitudes change. Wilson et al (1995) suggest that this is because they review the original attitude on the basis of what they currently remember about the attitude object and they may not remember everything which determined their original attitude. As a consequence, when they begin to concentrate on what they *do* remember about the attitude object, attitude change can occur. Wilson et al (1995) also suggest that attitude change is more likely to occur when remembered information is judged to be pertinent or relevant, and that this is more likely to occur when attitudes are analysed rather than in cases of simple information recall. In their study demonstrating this effect, Wilson et al showed that when people were asked to think about why they felt the way they did about a target person this led to attitude change, with the direction of change determined by how positive or negative the thoughts accessible in memory actually were. They conclude that their findings support Miller and Tesser (1986, 1989) who distinguished between the cognitive and affective components of attitudes and suggested that thinking about reasons leads to bias in favour of cognition over affect. So attitudes can be thought of as a mix of cognitive and evaluative elements, although the precise relationship between those elements may depend on the context in which consideration of the attitude becomes an issue.

2.4 Summary and conclusions

The goal set out at the start of this chapter was to identify a social psychological perspective from which the social status of women artists and women's art might fruitfully be viewed. The suggestion was that an understanding of this status could be informed by an understanding of people's beliefs about women artists and their work. In pursuit of such understanding, the present chapter set out to describe how contemporary social psychology accounts for beliefs. It has been argued that some beliefs can be construed as stereotypes. According to contemporary

stereotype theory, stereotypical beliefs can be viewed as mental 'short-cuts' in which the mere identification of someone in terms of a group categorisation label is enough to 'trigger off' a set of associations which ascribe to the stereotype target a set of traits and predicted behaviours. The actual processes involved in stereotyping are, however, more complex than earlier theorists predicted. It is now acknowledged that these processes may include excitation and inhibition at basic levels, as well as assimilation and contrastive effects, together with estimations of entitativity, at higher processing levels. There is also debate as to how 'automatic' such processes are, and about the extent to which stereotypes are open to revision by counter-stereotypical information.

Contemporary theory has also begun to establish a close linkage between stereotypes and attitudes. Early attitude theory considered attitudes to be a combination of cognitive and evaluative elements. However 'attitude-behaviour mismatch' findings encouraged theorists to produce a more complex picture of the attitude concept. The three-component view isolated affective, cognitive and behavioural elements, which may be regarded as generating related but not identical predictions. The uni-dimensional expectancy-value model typified by the theory of reasoned action proposed that attitude studies must match levels of generality of attitude and predicted behaviour to ensure predictability. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975; 1980) also noted that attitude influences on actual behaviour are mediated by social norms. Recent studies have questioned the theoretical relevance of polarity and modality and have suggested that attitude measurement and behavioural predictions are also affected by attitude strength and past behaviour. Despite these theoretical difficulties, the claim that attitudes involve belief and evaluation components is still retained in contemporary attitude theory. This has led to an interest in the extent to which attitudes and stereotypes are related, since stereotypes just are beliefs about groups of people.

In the context of the present study, this indicates that people can be assumed to have developed stereotypical beliefs about women which may influence their

attitudes towards women artists and their work. To address the question of where these stereotypical beliefs come from, it is necessary to have a prior understanding of why people, in general, hold the stereotypical beliefs which they do. The question of where stereotypical beliefs come from is pursued in Chapter Three.

CHAPTER THREE

ORIGINS OF THE STEREOTYPICAL BELIEF COMPONENT OF ATTITUDES: GROUP AND INDIVIDUAL SOURCES

3.1 Introduction

In the preceding chapter, it was argued that stereotypical beliefs can be thought of as the cognitive component of attitudes. It follows that an explanation of attitudes can be advanced in part by understanding how relevant stereotypical beliefs arise. The social cognition programme, addressed in Chapter Two, has suggested that the origin of stereotypes can, to some extent, be thought of in purely cognitive terms, notably in the cognitive processes which make up the illusory correlation. However Chapter Two also demonstrated that recent research on stereotypes has shown that some stereotypes have a shared, collective aspect while others are associated with individual makeup. In following this train of thought, the present chapter explores two different routes through which people may come to acquire stereotypical beliefs about the social world. The first route traces the influence of social groups upon the individual and demonstrates how some stereotypes can be seen as the outcome of acquiring a group-based social identity. The second route examines how people may have a particular stereotyped view of the world which results from a more individualistic property of the self: sex role stereotyping.

3.2 Stereotypes, Social Groups and Social Identity

It can be argued that individual human beings are socially constituted as a consequence of the social groups to which they belong. Individuals appear unique partly because each individual possesses a unique biography of group memberships. Social groups can be characterised in a variety of ways that highlight their similarities to and differences from other groups. Membership size, group practices, beliefs and many other features may be compared. However it is more useful to limit the number of significant dimensions thereby providing the basis for a taxonomy of groups. In practice, social psychologists have tended to

focus more on group size, group 'atmosphere', task structure and leadership structure than on other dimensions (Hogg, 1992). One consequence of this tradition in social psychology is that the study of group phenomena is dispersed among relatively independent research topic areas that do not often communicate readily with one another.

Hogg (1992) points out that research into cohesiveness, conformity, obedience, leadership, prejudice, inter-group conflict, social identity, categorisation processes, and stereotyping all deal with group processes, but there is only minimal integration across these studies. In general, researchers often see themselves as, for example, social cognition, inter-group relations, or small group processes researchers rather than researchers whose study area is 'the group' per se. Nevertheless, the influence of groups upon individual psychology is now a well-established finding in social psychology and this finding owes much to experimental research in small group functions.

In order to study social groups and their influence it is important to distinguish groups from mere aggregates of individuals. There are many definitions of 'social group' with each definition tending to reflect a particular emphasis. Johnson and Johnson (1987), for example, identify a number of emphases which they build into their own definition:

'a group is two or more individuals in face to face interaction each aware of his or her membership in the group, each aware of the others who belong to the group and each aware of their positive interdependence as they strive to achieve mutual goals'

Johnson and Johnson (1987)

This type of characterisation is generally reserved for small face to face, short lived, interactive, task orientated groups. 'Group processes' from this perspective are sometimes equated to 'interpersonal processes among more than two people'.

Baron and Byrne (1991) have suggested that groups consist of two or more individuals who share common goals, whose fates are interdependent, who have a

stable relationship, and who recognise the group's existence. Baron and Byrne claim that groups exert influence on their members by means such as roles, status, norms, and cohesiveness. However, Myers (1993) points out that the distinction between simple collective behaviour and group behaviour among interacting individuals sometimes blurs. People who are merely in each other's presence do sometimes influence one another. Triplett (1889) had shown that the mere presence of others boosts performance on physical tasks. Subsequently, Allport (1920) and Travis (1925) demonstrated that the presence of others improves the performance of people not only on motor tasks but also on cognitive tasks such as simple multiplication problems. This became known as the social-facilitation effect. However, it should be noted that other studies conducted about the same time revealed that the presence of others could have a disruptive or social-inhibition effect. Dashiell (1935) and Pessin (1933) discovered that in that the presence of others efficiency diminishes in tasks such as learning nonsense syllables, completing a maze, and performing complex multiplication problems.

Zajonc, (1965) attempted to explain the phenomenon of social facilitation by appeal to arousal theory. His suggestion was that, since arousal enhances whatever response tendency is dominant, increased arousal enhances performance on easy tasks for which the most likely 'dominant' response is the correct one. Thus, people solve easy anagrams fastest when they are anxious. On complex tasks (for which the correct answer is not dominant) increased arousal promotes incorrect responding. Thus on harder anagrams people perform less well when anxious. A variant of the arousal model is 'distraction-conflict' theory which suggests that such arousal stems from a conflict between paying attention to others and paying attention to the task at hand. The distraction-conflict approach seemed to make sense of confusing results and was borne out by later experiments (Hunt and Hillery, 1973; Michaels, Blommel, Brocato, Linkous and Rowe, 1982). However, the distraction-conflict approach does not answer the question of what it is about the presence of others which causes arousal. One argument is that the presence of others engenders evaluation apprehension.

Evaluation apprehension is grounded in subjects' expectations about the potential evaluation of their work. To demonstrate the effects of this form of apprehension, Cottrell and associates (Cottrell, Wack, Sekerak and Rittle, 1968) added a third condition to Zajonc and Sales's (1966) nonsense syllable study. They blindfolded observers in this 'mere presence' condition and discovered that 'mere presence' did not boost well practised responses. Other experiments confirmed Cottrell's conclusion that the enhancement of dominant responses is strongest when people think they are being evaluated. Evaluation apprehension also helps explain other experimental findings such as: people perform best when their co-actor is slightly superior (Seta, 1982); arousal may lessen when a high-status group is 'diluted' by the addition of people whose opinions are not rated highly (Seta and Seta, 1992); people who worry most about others' evaluations are the ones most affected by their presence (Gastorf, Suls and Sanders, 1980; Geen and Gange, 1983); social facilitation effects are greatest when the other co-actors are unfamiliar and hard to 'keep an eye on' (Guerin and Innes, 1982).

Although groups are more efficient in performing certain types of tasks such as additive and compensatory tasks, individuals are more efficient in performing disjunctive tasks. In some cases where groups might prove relatively efficient, their output is hindered by social loafing - the tendency of some members to 'take it easy' and let others do most of the work. Latane, Williams and Harkins (1979) asked groups of subjects perform a simple task, the task being to shout or to clap as loudly as they could. The subjects performed singly, or in pairs, or in groups of up to six members. They were also blindfolded and wore earphones which played shouting or clapping sounds and were, because of this, unable to determine the contribution of others. The findings indicate that as group size increases, individual effort decreases. The noise generated by six people shouting or clapping together was less than three times that produced by a single person alone.

There is evidence that this 'social loafing' also occurs in cognitive tasks. In one study (Weldon and Gargano, 1988) subjects were asked to evaluate types of jobs. In one condition, subjects were told they were the only evaluator. In another, they were told they were one of 16 judges. Comparisons of cognitive effort expended, as measured by amount of information used, showed that 'solo' subjects worked significantly harder. Latane (1981) has argued that this effect can be seen in part as an aspect of social impact. In social loafing studies, Latane identifies the experimenter's instructions as the major source of social influence. If the subject thinks that he or she alone is the receiver of instructions, then he or she takes the full impact of these instructions. However, if the subject thinks that others are involved, then the effect of the instructions on him or her is 'diffused' throughout the 'group'. So subjects' efforts are influenced by the degree of impact on the subject of the researchers instructions, and this impact is lessened when subjects believe they are in a group. To support this notion Latane suggests the following. In cases of social impact, there is a negative power function where as group size continues to increase, the rate of decrease of influence on an individual diminishes. This is a 'negatively accelerating' power function in that influence will decrease as the number of the majority increases, but in a diminishing fashion:

Other researchers have tried to apply the same sorts of explanations for loafing as have been used to explain facilitation and inhibition. Thus Harkins and Jackson (1985) and Williams, Harkins and Latane (1981) have suggested that when people do not feel as though their individual work is under scrutiny, evaluation apprehension is lessened. Jackson and Harkins (1985) have also suggested that people may employ an exchange or equity principle in group working. If, on the basis of previous interactions, the subject thinks that others are going to loaf then the subject will reduce his or her effort to match the effort of others. Alternatively, people may not merely loaf in order to approximate to others' relative contributions, as might be suggested by exchange theory. Instead, in accord with equity theory, they will perform a relatively sophisticated calculation of how much

effort they should put into the group performance given the sort of outcome they expect to receive, relative to others' inputs and outcomes.

Williams, Harkins and Latane (1981) point out that making an individual's efforts identifiable is one important way to reduce loafing. Zaccaro (1984) has argued that increasing group members' commitment to success reduces loafing and that this effect can be amplified by group size. So, in conditions of high success motivation, the larger the group size, the more a person may contribute. Szmanski and Harkins (1987) have also suggested that enabling group members to evaluate their own contributions, or the contributions of their own group relative to other groups, decreases loafing. More recently, White, Kjelgaard and Harkins (1995) have argued that self-evaluation is related to whether a task has clearly specified goals. They suggest that the existence of goals offers the opportunity for task performers to evaluate themselves against a 'desired' standard of performance, although evaluation by others is still an important effect if the goal set is regarded as too stringent.

What these studies of task performance show, then, is that the aggregation of individuals, whether into a small group structure or some looser form of collectivity, is a social phenomenon which has psychological impact on the task-related behaviour of individuals involved. Moreover, other small groups studies show that such psychological effects of group membership are not restricted to task behaviour. It is an obvious social fact that within our society, many key decisions are made, not by individuals, but by groups of people. A well established finding is that as a result of their deliberations, such groups often demonstrate 'group polarisation': a tendency to shift toward more extreme views.

This discovery stems from Stoner (1961), who carried out a study of group decision-making. He asked college students to play the role of advisers to imaginary persons supposedly facing decisions between two alternatives. The first alternative, while less attractive carried low levels of risk while the second

alternative was more attractive but carried more risk. For example, subjects might be asked to consider a character who had to choose between a low-paying but secure job and a higher-paying but uncertain job. The procedure was that subjects initially made decisions on an individual basis and then met in small groups to discuss the problem until unanimous decision was reached. Stoner's finding was that, in a large number of cases, the group decisions tended to be slightly more risky than the decisions made by the members individually. This shift towards a more risky decision state came to be called the 'risky shift'.

A number of subsequent studies seem to verify the 'risky shift' phenomenon. However, Knox and Safford (1976), among others, seemed to demonstrate a group shift towards caution. Therefore, the suggestion was made that the 'risky shift' is merely an example of a more general phenomenon: the shift towards polarisation. It appears that group discussion tends to make individuals more extreme in their views - to enhance or strengthen their initial standpoint. So, if a person is mildly in favour of a course of action, he or she will be more strongly in favour of the action after discussion with the group. In much the same way, if he or she is against the action at the outset: he or she will be more strongly against it after discussion. Moreover, this polarisation effect occurs in situations other than group estimates involving risk. Moscovici and Zavalloni (1969) demonstrated that the polarisation effect also occurred with a different judgement dimension - the expression of attitudes. French secondary school students were asked to express attitudes towards President De Gaulle and towards America. The statements were such as: 'De Gaulle is too old to successfully carry out his difficult job' and 'American economic aid is always used to exert political pressure'. Having reached an opinion individually, they then discussed the issues and formed a consensus. Moscovici and Zavalloni's findings were that initially favourable responses to De Gaulle became more favourable while initially negative attitudes towards Americans became more negative through discussion. Additionally, a more extreme judgement also held when the individuals were tested separately post-

consensus. Thus it appears that, just as with risk-related decision-making, formation of attitudes seems to be affected by group membership.

This brief survey of the empirical evidence on small groups demonstrates that being in the presence of, or being a member of, small groups has a psychological impact on people. This provides a first indication that being a member of a group may influence people's beliefs. However, as far as stereotypical beliefs are concerned, the full impact of group membership is only seen when the individual is considered as a member of a group in relation to or in contrast with other groups to which the individual does not belong. To pursue this theme, consideration is now given to the importance of inter-group interactions in the formation and maintenance of stereotypes.

The social psychology of inter-group interaction, and its impact on stereotype formation, can be traced back to the 'Robber's Cave' study (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood and Sherif, 1961). In this study, twenty-two eleven and twelve year old boys, randomly allocated to one or other of two groups, were taken to a remote Boy Scout campsite to participate in a 3 week summer camp session. For the first week of the session, the researchers prevented contact between the two groups and members of each group took part in co-operative activities with the aim of boosting group cohesion. At the beginning of the second week, contact between the groups was initiated by camp staff and a number of inter-group competitions such as baseball games and treasure hunts was then arranged. During this second-week phase, the staff noted that members of the two groups began to insult and tease members of the other group and to express negative stereotypical views of the other group. Sherif et al (1961) explained this outcome in terms of competition. They suggested that group members' inter-group attitudes and behaviour reflected the real, objective interests of their group in comparison with the other group. The perceived threat to one group's interests represented by the other group engendered a negative perception of that other group. In this way, inter-group competition engendered prejudicial stereotypes. Sherif also

demonstrated that the adverse effects of group competition effects could be altered. He engineered a third phase of his study in which the two groups were required to co-operate together and demonstrated that inter-group cooperation reduced negative stereotyping of one group's members by the other group.

Sherif's view of this 'Robber's Cave' experiment was that inter-group competition over real goals strengthens relations within groups and disrupts them between groups. Thus the creation of group-based stereotypes is explained in terms of goal-based competition. However, Turner (1981) questions whether the competition which produces these stereotyping effects is itself produced by conflict over extrinsic goal states or interests. Some research findings, he argues, seem to show that mere competitiveness, per se, is enough to produce these effects, even where there are no real goals to be attained. Moreover, he also suggests that inter-group co-operation may not, of itself, reduce hostility to out-group members. Sherif et al suggested that super-ordinate goals, engendering inter-group co-operation, should decrease out-group hostility. However, in the study by Sherif et al study, the presence of super-ordinate goals was accompanied by large amounts of social interaction between the two groups which possibly blurred group boundaries. This, Turner suggests, allows for the possibility that if inter-group co-operation is not accompanied with a certain level of social interaction, the hostility will remain.

More importantly, a set of experiments carried out in the 1960s and 1970s (Tajfel, 1981) seem to suggest that stereotyping apparently arises in the absence of either competition or co-operation. In an early study (Tajfel and Wilkes, 1963), it was shown that when subjects are presented with perceptual stimuli and encouraged to think of them in terms of categories, they tended to accentuate the differences between categories. The study required subjects to report the length of lines, each of which differed in length from the other by a constant ratio. In a 'Classified' condition, the four shorter lines were labelled 'A' and the four longer lines, 'B'. The results showed that this labelling caused subjects to accentuate differences between

'A' and 'B' by exaggerating the difference in length between the longest of the 'A' lines and the shortest of the 'B' lines. In subsequent discussions of categorisation, Tajfel suggested that this form of distortion also operated when social categories were being used and that the accentuation of inter-group differences effect and the intra-group similarities effect underlay many of the features of stereotypes. Thus, Tajfel's early perspective was that social categorisation naturally involves accentuation effects which distort perception. A variety of later studies seemed to support this idea. Wilder (1986), for example, reported that when assigned arbitrarily to two groups, subjects reported that they expected in-group members' opinions to be more like their own than the opinion of out-group members. Similarly, Doise (1978) had revealed that children accentuate male/female differences and intra-category similarities to a greater extent if they expect to be asked to provide descriptions of both groups rather than a description of just one group.

In his early work, then, Tajfel had already begun to develop an explanatory framework, built around the social cognition of categorisation, which might explain the development of group-based stereotypes in terms of group-based categorisations. Tajfel's explanatory model was extended once he turned his attention to the occurrence of stereotype-induced discrimination favouring the 'in-group'. The evidence for this discrimination comes from Tajfel's 'minimal group' studies. In one of these studies, Tajfel and colleagues (Tajfel, Flament, Billig and Bundy, 1971) brought groups of schoolboys together to a lecture room and told them they would be conducting a study of visual judgement. Four hundred and nine slides, consisting of large numbers of dots, were then flashed on a screen briefly, and subject wrote down estimates of the number of dots that appeared on each screen. The boys were told that some people consistently overestimate and some underestimate the number of dots. Each boy was then taken to a separate room and told that he belonged either to the group of over-estimators or under-estimators, the boys in fact being randomly allocated. They were allocated identity codes to preserve anonymity. The boys were then asked to assign monetary

rewards or penalties to the other participants. They were each given a booklet of eighteen allocation matrices. Their task was to examine the pairs of payoffs and allocate a number of points to each of the two people identified by code number and group label. The decision maker never made decisions about himself and he had no way of knowing the identity of the others referred to. It seems clear that the fairest rule would be to allocate twelve and eleven repeatedly and when allocating points to pairs of people who both came from the same group as himself, that is what subjects did. However, where the pairs were made up of people from the two different groups, the fairness rule was abandoned. Consistently, boys assigned more points to the member of their own in-group. Indeed, using a variant of this matrix, Tajfel and his colleagues were able to show that subjects were willing to dis-benefit one of their own in-group members, in an absolute sense, if thereby they were able to relatively benefit him in comparison with the out-group member (Brown, 1986). Moreover, Billig and Tajfel (1973) showed that even group membership was not required if subjects could be persuaded merely that they are in some way similar to the people they are assessing. Subsequently, Howard and Rothbart (1980) demonstrated that this preferential treatment was not restricted to immediate judgements. In a study of stereotype recall, they showed that the subjects from two randomized groups were equally accurate in remembering favourable statements about in-group and out-group members. However they were more accurate in remembering unfavourable statements about out-group members than in-group members.

Thus it appears that prejudice is associated with people seeing themselves as belonging to different groups. However, this appeal to group categorisation to explain the group biases observed in the minimal group studies does not, of itself, explain the systematic favouring of 'in-group' members rather than out-group members. Tajfel and his colleagues' preliminary explanation (Tajfel, Flament, Billig and Bundy, 1971) was that the boys viewed the experiments in terms of a 'norm' of competition. This has many similarities with Wilder's suggestion (1986) that subjects are following a norm-based script of social interaction. However, Tajfel

later rejected the idea of norms as unhelpful, since the same appeal to norms might have been made if cases arose in which bias in favour of the out-group was displayed, such as appeals to a 'norm' of generosity.

Eventually, Tajfel formulated a new theory of stereotypes and inter-group relations which sought to build on his early notion of group categorisation and also explained, in a non-circular fashion, group biases revealed in minimal and real group settings. The approach which Tajfel (1972), and later Tajfel and Turner (1986) developed was termed 'social identity theory'. Tajfel defined a social identity as 'the individual's knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance to him of the group membership' (Tajfel, 1972). In part, the lessons of earlier studies of categorisation were retained. When people are placed in a position of categorising themselves, they tend to exhibit accentuation effects. That is, they exaggerate similarities between themselves and other members of the group in which they have included themselves, and exaggerate differences between that group and other groups. However, Tajfel also took it to be axiomatic that people are predisposed to evaluate themselves positively. From this it follows that, having identified oneself with a group, one seeks to evaluate that group positively. This leads to the process of forming a 'frame of reference' by means of which one's own group can be compared with other, relevant groups (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell, 1987). The essential function of such comparison, in terms of the social identity theory, is to allow for bolstering self esteem by distinguishing evaluatively between the in-group and the out-group so that the in-group is viewed in a relatively positive light. So from this perspective the explanation of in-group favouritism rests on two complementary processes: social categorisation and esteem-enhancing social comparison. Turner (1981) argues that the categorisation process creates a stereotypical accentuation of similarities between self and other in-group members and a perceived exaggeration of the differences between groups. The social comparison process, due to its underlying motive to favour self through the medium of in-group favouritism, selects the specific dimensions on which

accentuation occurs. These will be dimensions on which the in-group is placed more favourably than the out-group. The social comparison process is also responsible for amplifying the relative superiority or favourability of the in-group over the out-group - or maximising the evaluatively positive distinctiveness of the in-group.

In more recent developments (Hogg, 1992; Turner and Oakes, 1989; Oakes, Haslam and Turner, 1994) social identity theory has been developed into self-categorisation theory. However, social identity theory and self-categorisation theory differ from one another at the levels of both theory and prediction. For example, self-categorisation theory treats maximisation of inter-group differences and intra-group similarities as related phenomena, and incorporates both in a ratio termed the 'meta-contrast ratio'. Self-categorisation theory also introduces a greater reliance on the idea that adoption of a social identity via self-categorisation introduces a depersonalisation effect which produces group behaviour. At the level of prediction, Ellemers, Spear and Doojse (1997), for example, suggest that the two theories differ in predictions associated with low-status groups. Self categorisation theory, with its emphasis on depersonalisation, suggests that members of such groups are likely to retain their group membership. They may deal with problems of low status by social creativity: adopting other forms of social comparison that are more esteem enhancing. Social identity theory, on the other hand, with its emphasis on esteem, would predict that members of low status groups will seek, wherever possible, to become socially mobile. However, despite such differences, Hogg (1992) suggests that self-categorisation theory should be thought of as 'differing from social identity theory more in emphasis than in content'. Accordingly, for the rest of this chapter reference will be made solely to social identity theory, although much of what is said in relation to that theory is equally applicable to self-categorisation theory.

In terms of social identity theory, it is now possible to explain the in-group favouritism which emerges from the minimal group studies. In the relatively

abstract and empty context of these experiments subjects construct meaning by employing the social categorisations provided by the experimenters to locate self with respect to others. The categorisation process renders each group perceptually distinct from the other as well as reducing the perceived variation between individuals within each group. To this extent, categorisation generates a stereotyped view of both the in-group and the out-group, and a distribution of individuals is transformed into two distinct groups. Within the minimal group paradigm, social comparison occurs when the subjects use the booklets provided to make point (or money) allocations, since this is the only readily available dimension of inter-group comparison. The outcome is the maximisation of inter-group differences in favour of the in-group. Positive distinctiveness is thus achieved. Tajfel (1972) took pains to point out that the social identity theory explanation of in-group favouritism in minimal group studies meant that discrimination is not an automatic consequence of categorisation. Discrimination, if it arises, follows from categorisation and comparison. It follows that discrimination is a feature not only of viewing oneself as a member of a given group, but of developing some notion of what it means to belong to that group, relative to belonging to some other group. The accentuation of differences is biased in favour of the in-group because individuals are deriving their social identity (in the transient context of the experiment) from the social category which embraces the self. Self-definition activates a need to achieve or maintain a positive self-evaluation and this can be accomplished by favouring the in-group (and hence the self) over the out-group: that is, by engaging in in-group favouring social comparisons.

In recent research, this notion of in-group favouritism has itself been shown to be a complex phenomenon. Cadinu and Rothbart (1996) separate out two distinct notions. The first involves formation of a positive self-image, which is then generalised to the in-group (self-anchoring). The second is a process of differentiation in which people infer that out-group characteristics will be different from in-group characteristics. Cadinu and Rothbart demonstrated that when people are given information about one group and then asked to make judgements

about another group, differences arise based on group membership. They identify two cases. The first comprises 'in-group' judges: those subjects who were asked to make a judgement about a group to which they were assigned, based on favourable information about the group to which they were not assigned. The second comprises 'out-group' judges: those subjects who were asked to make a judgement about a group to which they were not assigned, based on favourable information about the group to which they were assigned. In-group judges tended to use self-anchoring as a means of making judgements about the group for which no information was given, and ignored information which was provided about the out-group. Out-group judges, on the other hand, tended to employ differentiation processes. They made judgements about the in-group, based on information which they had received about the out-group, which assumed a difference would exist between the two groups.

Social identity theory suggests, then, that cognitive processes of social categorisation are inextricably linked with evaluative processes of social comparison. According to Hogg and Abrams (1988), this mixture of cognitive and evaluative processes is also the underlying basis for stereotyping. Stereotypes, in the social identity view, serve in-group functions of rationalising the in-group's treatment of the out-group. Furthermore, in-group members are expected to employ negative stereotypes of the out-group in an attempt to differentiate their group from other groups, that is, by making comparative social judgements that benefit the in-group relative to the out-group. In this sense, the evaluative aspect of stereotypes can be seen as a motivational force which influences social judgements. This inter-weaving of 'pure' cognitive stereotypical elements and the motivational aspect of self esteem has recently been empirically verified. Doojse, Spears and Koomen (1995) point out that stereotype research has tended to overlook the distinction between judging a particular information sample and then generalising from that sample to the target group as a whole. They suggest that this generalisation phase is affected, in part, by one's understanding of the variability of the information sample. They also suggest that this cognitive effect

interacts with the motivational, self esteem protective aspects of stereotypes. To this extent, they suggest that the motivational and cognitive aspects of stereotype theory should be regarded as complementary, rather than as competitive. In a study of seventy-two university students, the authors demonstrated that subjects generalised from sample information, if that information was in-group favourable, both when the sample was described as homogenous and when the sample was described as heterogenous. However, generalisation of in-group unfavourable information only occurred if the sample was described as homogenous. When the sample was described as heterogenous, subjects displayed a weaker tendency to generalise from the in-group unfavourable sample information. Doojse et al (1995) conclude that the motivational aspects of stereotypes interact with cognitive aspects of the stereotyping process.

The view of stereotyping based on social identity suggests that an individual may subscribe to certain stereotypes, not necessarily to justify some *personal* conduct or social position, but as a way of defending the actions of others with whom he or she shares a social identification. Thus people could possess stereotypes of groups whom they personally have never encountered, but whom other members of their group had encountered. Additionally, social identity theory's emphasis on competition between groups helps to explain why two disadvantaged groups would promulgate negative stereotypes of one another. Although neither group could be said to occupy a privileged position in need of defence or justification, both groups may make psychological gains by comparing themselves favourably to another group similar in status. Hogg and Abrams (1988) argue that social identity theory's account of the psychological benefits which accrue from group-based stereotyping also helps to explain why stereotype contents are uniform in character. The shared-ness of stereotypes is due to social conformity with group norms. In other words, social identity theory states that stereotypes are consensual because all members of the social group are expected to follow them so as to establish collective justifications for inter-group behaviour.

If social identity theory is correct, where two social categorisations cut across each other, discrimination may be reduced. For example, Deschamps and Doise (1978) found that that two simple categorisations, male/female and youth/adult, led to stereotypical attributions of traits. However, they also found that when these two categorisations were present together, stereotypical discrimination was reduced. When one categorisation was crossed with or intersected by the other, the perception of *differences* arising out of the male/female categorisation tended to be balanced by a perception of *similarities* arising out of the youth/adult categorisation. Somewhat more deterministically, Deschamps (1984) concludes that 'crossed category membership can thus effectively neutralise the differentiation (arising between groups)'. This phenomenon could be attributable to a conflict between incompatible structures or more simply to altered salience. When a person has to focus on two separate dimensions of categorisation the amount of processing distinctly relevant to each is likely to be diminished. Similar effects are reported by Brown (1986) and Hagendoorn and Henke (1991).

While minimal group studies deal with groups which, by definition and intention, do not possess many of the qualities of social categories in the real world, similar effects have been noted among real-life groups. For example, Judd, Park, Ryan, Bauer and Kraus (1995) refer to two established findings in stereotype research: perceived out-group homogeneity and ethnocentrism. They point out that these findings are based, in the main, on laboratory studies of 'safe' groups as opposed to groups that have a long history of conflict and whose group loyalties are strong. In their questionnaire study, the authors had predicted that they would find perceived out-group homogeneity and ethnocentrism effects to be accentuated when matters of group conflict and strong loyalties were salient. However, they discovered, in looking at White American and African American groups that while the accentuated stereotypical effects were noted in African American responses, they were not present in White American responses. The authors' conclusions were that the stereotypical effects arose from socialisation effects, and they conjectured

differential socialisation patterns explained the disparity in findings across the two groups.

Real world groups also differ from minimal groups in that there are often status, power and prestige differences between groups which can be perceived to be legitimate, stable and immutable to varying degrees. These and a range of other factors must have some impact on the form and content of inter-group behaviour and should therefore be theoretically incorporated to furnish an adequate explanation of inter-group behaviour. This is precisely what the social identity theory does in its macro-social emphasis (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Taylor and McKirnan 1984). Social identity theory treats categorisation and social comparison as psychological processes which provide the parameters within which socio-historical factors or, more accurately, subjective understanding of those factors operate. Tajfel distinguished between inter-group comparisons which occur in a fixed, consensually legitimate and stable framework and inter-group comparisons which arise when there is dissent: a distinction between secure and insecure comparisons (Tajfel 1974). When groups agree about each other's status there is little pressure to alter the status quo. However, when groups disagree about each other's status there is pressure for change. It follows that whether people strive to maintain or to change their social identity, this is influenced by the extent to which they perceive the existing inter-group framework as legitimate.

Social identity theorists suggest that in the case of low status groups, people may attempt to alter their social status by leaving the group to which they currently belong (Ellemers, 1993). Adoption of a social mobility strategy by leaving the group will be determined in part by the extent to which such people have a social mobility belief system: the belief that inter-group boundaries are permeable and that it is possible to move between groups. In some cases, boundary permeability depends on whether a group can exert pressure on their members in order to prevent them from leaving. For example, people seeking to leave a social group, if unsuccessful, may face marginalisation by other group members (Breakwell 1979).

In other cases, boundary permeability is reduced because group membership is externally designated by attributes such as age or gender.

It has been pointed out that a mobility strategy may improve one's personal position but it leaves one's group's position unchanged, and this, therefore, involves a degree of dis-identification with the original group (Milner 1981). However, the precise relationship between social mobility, boundary permeability and dis-identification is not simple. The alternative to social mobility is to adopt a strategy of social creativity which re-defines inter-group relations along different dimensions to improve in-group esteem. Jackson, Sullivan, Harnish and Hodge (1996) demonstrate that choice of social mobility over social creativity does not always depend on the extent to which subjects believe that group boundaries are 'permeable'. Jackson et al (1996) conjecture that choosing to remain within a low status group may be due to the fact that boundary permeability implies temporary, rather than permanent, group membership. Consequently, the pressure to escape membership of low status but boundary-permeable groups is lessened. Karasawa (1995) has argued that the impact of belonging to a low status group is also mediated by the group member's level of identification with the group. In a similar fashion, Ellemers, Spears and Doojse (1997) show that low identifiers tend to view their own group as less homogenous than do high identifiers.

There is also evidence to suggest that real-world group categorisations may have more generalised effects, independent of questions of status and mobility. Kunda, Sinclair and Griffin (1997) note that the content of stereotypes is reliant on traits. They point out, however, that traits merely represent summary statements of behaviour and thereby mask various possible behavioural manifestations of the trait. They also suggest that any given trait may imply different forms of behaviour when applied to different groups. This means that the same trait may form part of different stereotypes and that fundamentally the stereotype 'drives' the trait. For example, 'aggression' may be a trait common to the stereotypes of courtroom lawyers and professional boxers. However, the trait 'aggression' driven by the

stereotype 'courtroom lawyer' as opposed to the stereotype 'professional boxer' sets up different expectations for behaviour. Kunda et al's (1997) claim is that stereotype-driven construal of traits is best explained by a parallel-constraint-satisfaction model of impression formation as opposed to other models more commonly used by psychologists.

Earlier models of impression formation see cognitive processes as working serially. By contrast, the parallel-constraint-satisfaction model of impression formation pictures cognitive processes working simultaneously and constraining each other. The earlier models were based on a notion that all associations are excitatory. The parallel-constraint-satisfaction model is based on a notion that associations can be inhibitory as well as excitatory. The parallel-constraint-satisfaction model therefore assumes that while any given trait has a whole range of associations only certain of these are activated on any one occasion. Thus the meaning of the trait varies from one occasion to another. This occurs because the sub-set of associations activated on any given occasion is influenced by matters such as context, prior activation and priming of related concepts. Kunda et al (1997) tested the hypothesis that stereotypes affect the meaning of traits by asking subjects to describe behaviours that would exemplify specific traits in named occupational groups such as 'car salesmen' and 'actors'. They concluded that stereotypes do influence the meaning of traits to a certain extent and that this stereotypical 'reading' of a trait persists even if extra information is provided which apparently undermines the stereotype.

Ruttenberg, Zea and Sigelman (1996) have also questioned the extent to which findings from the minimal group paradigm extend to real world group interaction. They argue that if there is a link between in-group esteem and bias towards the out-group, then prejudice should be stronger among those whose in-groups demonstrate high collective self-esteem than for those with low collective self-esteem. However, in a study comparing the views of Jewish and Arab students, Ruttenberg et al (1996) discovered that Arab students displayed low levels of

collective self-esteem and yet also displayed high levels of prejudice against the out-group. Other authors have pointed out that out-group bias can be mediated by other effects. Among these are the questions of whether encounters with out-groups are collective rather than individual, and whether the encounter involves conflict or not (Abrams, 1985; Oakes, 1987). Chiasson, Charbonneau and Proulx (1996) have also shown that perceived similarity between self and an out-group individual also moderates out-group bias.

In summary, what the study of the social psychology of groups reveals is that group membership influences both behaviour and judgement. When group membership is combined with inter-group interaction, the outcome is often the formation of stereotypes which can give rise to biased judgements which favour the in-group. One important explanation of this effect, social identity theory, derives from Tajfel's work on categorisation and comparison. When people think of themselves as members of an in-group (relative to an out-group) they tend to accentuate inter-group differences and minimise intra-group similarities. At the same time, they tend to compare the two groups along a dimension or dimensions in such a way that the in-group is seen in a more favourable light than the out-group. Although early findings were based on laboratory experiments such as the minimal group paradigm, later studies have demonstrated that similar effects arise among real-world groups, although it appears that a range of other factors play an important role in deciding whether out-group bias will arise. So according to social identity theory's account of stereotypes, stereotyped thought can largely be understood as a natural phenomenon which arises out of the categorisation processes associated with the formation of social groups, taken together with the axiomatic assumption that we are motivated to seek self-esteem enhancement. People think of themselves in terms of group memberships, and strive to preserve self-esteem by positively evaluating their own groups at the expense of others (although this may be mediated by other factors). What this means is that under normal circumstances people adopt stereotyped ways of thinking which, on the one hand, allow them to preserve a positive view of their fellow group members and,

on the other hand, allow them to maintain a relatively negative view of the members of other, relevant groups.

So, from the perspective of social identity theory, membership of social groups may affect the stereotypical beliefs which people have about women in general and women artists in particular. However, stereotypes which result from group membership are not the only stereotyping influences which may affect an individual's beliefs. Social identity theory claims that the self is made up of two parts: a social identity and a personal identity. Social identities derive from group memberships as described in this section. Personal identity derives from one's unique history of socialisation (Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Simon, Pantaleo and Mummendey, 1995; Reid and Deaux, 1996). In terms of understanding how people view women artists and their work, it seems likely that any aspect of personal identity which is associated with stereotypical views of women is likely to represent a further explanatory factor. For this reason, the following section explains the way in which people may be said to possess a personal identity-based, stereotyped view of gender, irrespective of their social group memberships.

3.3 Gender and the Gender Schema

In order to analyse the idea of a personal identity-based, stereotyped view of gender, this section begins with a series of inter-related definitions of terms and concepts associated with gender. It then moves on to consider gender, identity and the role of society. Two perspectives on measuring masculinity and femininity are then discussed: Bem (1974; 1981b) and Spence and Helmreich (1974; 1981). The conclusion drawn is that within a study of beliefs about women artists and their work, Bem's Sex Role Inventory represents an appropriate tool for measuring whether people are sex-typed. The claim will then be made that the sex-typed individual has a personal identity-based, stereotyped view of gender.

Definitions of terms. Cook (1985) considers sex and gender by isolating concepts most closely related to physiological structure. 'Sex' or 'gender' is that physical

aspect of an individual which is determined by chromosomal makeup. The labels 'male' or 'female' which are ascribed at birth are usually in accord with this chromosomal property. Related to these labels is a person's sense of 'gender-identity': the sense of self as a gendered (male or female) person. In contrast with the narrower notions of 'male' and 'female', masculinity and femininity are stereotyped constructs which derive from society's views about the traits and attributes which are characteristic of males and females. Sex-typing is a social process through which individuals come to acquire, and learn to value, the property of being either 'masculine' or 'feminine'. If an individual acquires masculine or feminine characteristics which are stereotypically associated with his or her gender, then that person is described as sex-typed. The set of gender-stereotypical characteristics which the individual thereby acquires is sometimes referred to as a 'sex-role'. For this reason, the stereotypical characteristics of masculinity and femininity which are associated with being male and female are sometimes referred to as 'sex-role stereotypes'. If the individual does not acquire masculine or feminine characteristics which are stereotypically associated with his or her gender, then that person is described as non-sex-typed*. It follows from this that 'gender-identity' can be read either in the narrow sense, as referring to sense of self as male or female, or in a broader sense, as referring to one's sex-role stereotypical identity in terms of being masculine or feminine. (*It should also be noted that if an individual acquires masculine or feminine characteristics which are not stereotypically associated with his or her gender, then that person is described as cross-sex-typed.)

Archer and Lloyd (1985) have analysed the *content* of gender stereotypes and identify two sets of characteristics which have been stereotypically associated with masculinity and femininity. Masculinity characteristics, sometimes termed 'instrumental/agentive', include goal orientation, assertive activity, self-development and separations from others. Femininity characteristics, sometimes termed 'expressive/communal', include sensitivity, emotionality, selflessness, and interrelationships. These 'positive' characteristics are widely considered to be typical and/or desirable for the relevant sex to possess. 'Negative' characteristics have also been identified. For masculinity, these negative characteristics include

being emotionally inexpressive and unskilled in interactions with others, while for femininity they include being passive and dependent. In Chapter Two it was noted that stereotypes may involve beliefs about behaviours, occupations and physical appearance as well as traits. Deaux and Lewis (1984) suggest that the content of stereotypes comprises four independent components: traits, behaviours, physical characteristics and occupations. Irrespective of the independent status of these components, in social life people extend knowledge about one component to the other three, with knowledge about physical appearance being especially important (Brannon, 1996).

Within studies of gender, stereotyping influences are sometimes referred to as 'gender schemata', most notably in the work of Bem (1974; 1981b). Following Bartlett (1932), and more recently Fiske and Taylor (1984), a schema can be described as representing organised knowledge based on cultural experience rather than on an abstract relation between cause and effect. A schema functions as an anticipatory structure: a readiness to search for and to assimilate incoming information in schema-relevant terms. Schematic processing, like stereotypical processing, is therefore highly selective. Schema theory construes perception as a constructive process: what is perceived is a product of the interaction between the incoming information and the perceiver's pre-existing schema. The readiness with which an individual evokes one schema rather than another is referred to the 'cognitive availability' of the schema. As with stereotype theory, the emphasis in schema theory is on the active construction of reality, rather than mere passive observation of it (Fiske and Taylor, 1984).

Fiske and Taylor (1984) identify four major types of schemata: person schemata (the person's view of others in terms of psychological properties such as traits and goals), self schemata (the information one believes oneself to have about one's own psychology), role schemata (beliefs about the appropriate norms and behaviour for people in differing broad social categories based on features such as sex and age) and event schemata (a person's understanding of a given social event, based on

experiencing the sequencing of events in similar social events in the past). Fiske and Taylor (1984) suggest that the third of these, role schemata, have 'clear affective and behavioural consequences'. In this respect, they argue, role schemata 'explain much of the way social stereotypes function.' More recently, Fiske (1995) has suggested that role schemata just are stereotypes. Accordingly, in this study of stereotypical beliefs about women artists and their work, no distinction is made here between gender schemata and sex-role stereotypes.

Gender, identity and the role of society. Eagly (1983) has emphasised the distinction between gender identity as a physiological phenomenon and sex-role identity as a social phenomenon by arguing that sex-role identity has a purely social origin, resulting from the segregation of women and men into different occupations and social roles. She claims that there are few actual sex differences and yet there is a large difference between the masculine and feminine stereotypes. She explains this apparent contradiction by locating the source of sex-role stereotypes in social life (Eagly, 1983; Eagly and Steffen, 1984; Eagly and Kite, 1987). Hinde (1987) even suggests that there may be advantages to both sexes in having a social organisation which exaggerates the perceived differences between the sexes.

On the other hand, it has been also argued that even in the case of sex-role stereotypes, not all stereotype differences between what is held to be masculine and feminine are merely cultural manifestations. For example, a study of gender-related stereotyping in thirty nations reports considerable cross-cultural uniformity in the assignment of traits by gender (Williams and Best, 1982). This occurs irrespective of differences in societal structures. Moreover, Hewstone and Antaki (1988) argue that men and women must be expected to have differing cognitive models of society because differences in social behaviour may reflect in part sex differences in biological propensities. Williams and Best (1982) suggest that it may be most accurate to suppose that, within each society's socialisation practices, values and myths will interact with environmental and other more objective factors: for example, societies with a female deity tend to have a more favourable female

stereotype than those without. This suggests that, even if there is some objective, non-social 'kernel' to sex-role stereotypes, much of their nature is still determined at the purely social level.

Although there is some debate about the extent to which sex-role stereotypes, or gender schemata, are purely social phenomena, it seems reasonable to suppose that there are social influences which at least partly determine the way we think about the gender of ourselves and others. One of the most influential accounts of gender schematic processing is that offered by Bem (1981b). Bem, in common with other researchers (e.g. Banaji and Prentice, 1994) has speculated that the prevalence of gender-based schematic processing may be partly explained by the fact that sex has evolved to be a basic category of perception for our species and that the gender schema thereby has a biologically based priority over other schemata. Thus social and biological factors render the gender schema 'cognitively available'. However, since not everyone becomes equally sex typed, individual differences presumably derive from the extent to which one's particular socialisation history has stressed the functional importance of the gender dichotomy.

Measuring masculinity and femininity. A number of methods have been devised for measuring the influence of societal constructs on gender identity. Among these, Bem's Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) and Spence and Helmreich's Personal Attributes Questionnaire (PAQ) have proved particularly influential (Bem, 1974; Spence, Helmreich and Stapp, 1974). The first stage of construction of the Bem Sex-Role Inventory BSRI (Bem 1974) incorporated an investigation of sex-role stereotypes which largely confirmed the pattern of beliefs described by Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson, and Rosencrantz (1972). The BSRI comprises two scales: one which measures masculinity and one which measures femininity. If a male subject scores high on masculinity and low on femininity then he is described as sex-typed. Similarly, if a female subject scores low on masculinity and high on femininity then she is likewise described as sex-typed. If a subject scores high or low on both scales, then he or she is described as androgynous or undifferentiated.

Thus, measurement on the two BSRI scales produces four distinct categories: masculine, feminine, androgynous and undifferentiated. Bem conceives of sex-typing as a particular pattern of schematic thought which endows the individual with a stereotyped way of thinking about the world: if an individual is relatively strongly sex-typed, then he or she is prone to understanding the social world in a gender-schematic way as comprising two sorts of people, the masculine and the feminine:

It is important to note that gender schema theory is a theory of process, not content It is the process of partitioning the world into two equivalence classes on the basis of the gender schema, not the contents of the equivalence classes, that is central to the theory. Accordingly, sex-typed individuals are seen as differing from other individuals not primarily in terms of how much masculinity or femininity they poses, but in terms of whether or not their self concepts and behaviours are organised on the basis of gender.'
Bem, 1981b

In 1974, Spence, Helmreich and Stapp developed the PAQ, based on a set of adjectives stereotypically associated with men and women. It was assumed that adjectives representing consistent stereotypes about sex differences would also be adjectives that could indicate actual differences between the sexes. Spence and Helmreich (1979) depicted such adjectives as identifying personality traits which could then be used to study the nature of masculinity and femininity. According to Spence and Helmreich (1985), the best way to conceptualise gender-oriented influences on the self is to conceive of gender identity, understood in terms of sense of self as masculine or feminine, as a basic property of personality which is akin to, though not identical with, gender identity understood in terms of sense of self as physiologically male or female'

'I proposed, however, that masculinity and femininity, as they refer to an individual's self-concept, be retained and re-conceptualised as gender identity: a basic phenomenological sense of one's maleness or femaleness that parallels awareness and acceptance of one's biological sex and is established early in life'
Spence, 1985

Spence and Helmreich (Spence and Helmreich, 1981; Spence, 1985) have pointed out that according to Bem, sex-typing is a single continuum from very strong sex-

typing through very weak sex-typing to none at all. But, they argue, Bem also says that Masculinity and Femininity are orthogonal dimensions. So their complaint is that the very same BSRI scores are thus supposed to do two incompatible jobs: place an individual on a single, sex typing continuum, and place an individual on two separate, 'masculinity' and 'femininity' dimensions. Moreover, they argue, assessment of empirical evidence suggests that the BSRI and other similar instruments measure primarily self-images of instrumental and expressive personality traits and that these trait clusters show little or no relationship to global self-images of masculinity and femininity or to uni-dimensional constructs such as the tendency to utilise gender schemata.

Bem's response (Bem, 1981) is that Spence and Helmreich's (1981) critique is based on a misunderstanding. According to Bem, the BSRI is only meant to identify masculine men and feminine women, i.e. people who are strongly sex-typed, and androgynous and undifferentiated people, i.e. people who are not strongly sex-typed. Bem (1981b) argues that there is nothing inherently contradictory in using a measurement which comprises two separate scales to measure an underlying uni-dimensional construct. Bem denies that the BSRI merely 'taps' instrumental and expressive traits and claims instead that the BSRI 'taps different things for different people'. For non sex-typed individuals the BSRI may well tap instrumental and expressive traits while for sex-typed individuals the BSRI taps gender-schematic responses. Thus, when non sex-typed individuals describe themselves as, for example, dominant or nurturant, this need not imply gender schematic concepts of masculinity or femininity. However, when sex-typed individuals describe themselves as dominant or nurturant it does imply gender schematising. According to Bem, the only function of the BSRI within research on gender schema theory: is to identify sex typed individuals. Once sex-typed individuals have been identified, it is then possible to test the theory that sex typed individuals are more likely than non sex-typed individuals to engage in gender schematic processing. Fundamental to Bem's arguments is the assertion that the BSRI does not measure gender schematic processing. Rather, it is a tool for

identifying people who should, according to the theory, be engaged in gender schematic processing.

As further evidence against gender schema theory, Spence and Helmreich (1981) refer to the finding that sex typed individuals have not consistently been found to have more traditional attitudes about the roles of men and women than non sex typed individuals. But Bem (1981b) claims that Spence and Helmreich fail to appreciate that salient social attitudes are more a function of social psychological variables than of personality variables.

Spence and Helmreich were not the only theorists to raised concerns about the BSRI. Leaper (1995) has suggested that 'masculine' and 'feminine' may not have the same connotations as the personality traits that are stereotypically associated with them. He notes that self-reportage on masculinity/femininity scales revealed that men acknowledge their possession of 'feminine/socio-emotional traits' and women similarly acknowledge 'masculine/instrumental traits'. Additionally, he claims that within-gender variation in self reportage may be more marked than across-gender variation. Furthermore, he points out that there is considerable inconsistency in connotations of masculine and feminine with psychological meanings possibly conflicting with physical and sociological meanings. For example, people who express a liking for a gentle man may not express a liking for 'a feminine man' and people who like an assertive man may not express a liking for 'a masculine man'. Leaper's (1995) study attempted to discover whether people would react differently to the terms 'masculinity' and 'femininity' than they would to personality attributes typically associated with each of these. In the study, male and female college undergraduate students were asked to rate their liking of hypothetical women and men on the basis of descriptors which included both instrumental and socio-emotional adjectives. The expectation was that subjects would rate characters described as masculine differently than those described with instrumental traits and that, similarly, subjects would rate 'feminine' characters differently than those identified by socio-emotional traits.

Leaper's (1995) study used Byrne's 7 point liking scale and subjects were asked to rate 45 male and 45 female targets each described by a single adjective. The adjectives drawn from the BSRI and the PAQ were instrumental, socio-emotional and neutral. One of the key findings was that both men and women considered 'a masculine woman' and 'a feminine man' the least liked of the hypothetical characters. Both men and women demonstrated a preference for hypothetical women described by instrumental adjectives. There was little difference in the ratings for male characters. Women subjects demonstrated more of a preference for non-traditional targets than men and Leaper points out that research evidence from other studies suggests that women are more likely to prefer and/or accept androgynous individuals than men are. Additionally, 'an affectionate man' and 'an independent woman' were among the characters most liked by women and least liked by men subjects. On the other hand 'a feminine woman' was highly rated by men but not by women. Leaper claims that the findings support the notion among laypersons that the terms 'feminine' and 'masculine' are not always equated with socio-emotional and instrumental terms respectively. Instead, subjects' interpretations of these terms may reflect social constructions of gender. The study therefore points to an important distinction between gender-stereotype labels and the characteristics with which they are usually taken to be associated. However, Leaper (1995) does point out that Bem herself has observed that gender-schema theory implies that behavioural traits should be described as human attributes rather than as feminine or masculine attributes.

At the more basic level of cognitive processing, Rubble and Stagnor (1986) have argued that it remains unclear as to how schemata actually function in social information processing. They do, however, suggest that their review of literature on developmental and social-psychological gender schematic processing provides one firm conclusion: people's responses to information are affected by the information's relation to gender. They also agree that when information is 'gender relevant' (either in terms of consistency or inconsistency) it is both processed and remembered more readily than information which is not 'gender relevant'- and that

this not only supports a fundamental proposition of schema theories but also the results of studies on gender schematic processing.

What the foregoing suggests, then, is that gender schematic or sex-role stereotypical processes are an important determinant of the way people think. Opinion is divided about how best to conceptualise the influence of gender on individuals. Spence and Helreich have argued for a stable personality trait which is akin to gender identity understood as sense of self as male or female. Bem, on the other hand, has proposed the view that people employ stereotypical modes of thought when considering gender related issues. Partly in response to this latter debate, Bem has amended her original standpoint by taking into account the importance of the non-sex-typed individual, whether androgynous or undifferentiated. However, these changes aside, Bem's analysis of the impact of gender stereotypical thought seems as well supported by available evidence as those of her critics. Moreover Bem argues that gender stereotypes represent, at least in part, a means of predicting social attitudes, although this stereotypical effect may be mediated by group-membership stereotypical effects (Bem, 1981). Spence, on the other hand, admits that the gender-identity construct measured by the PAQ is less likely to be predictably related to attitudes and behaviours.

For these reasons, the suggestion here is that within a study of beliefs about women artists and their work, Bem's Sex Role Inventory represents an appropriate tool for measuring whether people are sex-typed. According to Frable (1989), the Bem Sex Role Inventory measures a facet of the individual's gender psychology. Moreover, in their influential paper on the structure of stereotypes, Stangor and Lange (1994) identify Bem's gender-schema as an example of an individualistic influence on stereotypical thought. It is therefore also suggested that the sex-typed individual, on the basis of personal identity, holds stereotyped beliefs about gender.

3.4 Summary and Conclusion

The previous chapters have made the case for understanding people's beliefs about women artists and women's art in terms of social psychology. It has been argued that these beliefs arise out of stereotypes which have two sources: social identity and personal identity. The idea that some stereotypes have an origin in social identity was traced back to early studies in small group effects. These studies demonstrated that when people act within a group their actions are influenced by the group. It was then suggested that, when the broader notion of inter-group interaction is considered, people can be seen to display group-based categorisations of the self- and others which influence how they view themselves and others. In particular, the social identity perspective highlights the way that individuals develop stereotypical ways of thinking about in-group and out-group members. It was noted, however, that the actual processes associated with in-group favouritism and generalisation from samples to whole groups are more complex than early versions of social identity theory allowed for. Moreover, the move from laboratory-based studies to real-world groups involved consideration of a number of complicating factors such as the influence of power and status, real world knowledge and real-world expectations of group membership permanence or non-permanence. The general conclusion drawn, however, was that at least some forms of stereotypical thinking are rooted in social group membership.

Social identity theory assumes that our understanding of stereotypes includes both social identity and personal identity. In the present context it was noted that aspects of personal identity which influence thinking about gender-related issues are likely to be particularly important. Although there is debate between Bem and Spence and Helmreich over how best to characterise gender influences on thought and action, it was concluded that Bem's gender-schema approach was an appropriate perspective to adopt in the present study. Bem's argument is that sex-typed individuals view the social world in gender stereotypical terms.

There are, therefore, two distinct sources of stereotypical beliefs: social identity and personal identity. What this means is that an understanding of people's beliefs about women artists and their work requires an analysis of the extent to which those beliefs are influenced by social identity and personal identity. It is this task which is pursued in Chapter Four.

CHAPTER FOUR

A SURVEY OF STEREOTYPICAL BELIEFS ABOUT WOMEN ARTISTS AND WOMEN'S ART

4.1 Introduction

Chapters Two and Three have focused exclusively on social psychological theories. Chapter Two argued that stereotypes and attitudes are related, in that stereotypical beliefs just are the cognitive component of attitudes. However, it was mentioned that attitudes, as distinct from stereotypes, apply not only to groups of people but also to other social phenomena. It was then argued, in Chapter Three, that stereotypical beliefs have two sources: social identity and personal identity. The contents of Chapters Two and Three, taken together, act as a foundation for the present chapter whose task is to examine these theoretical insights against empirical data generated by a survey of beliefs about women artists and women's art. The prediction here is that people's views on women artists, and the belief component of their attitudes towards women's art, are influenced by stereotypical beliefs about women. Specifically, it is predicted that the origins of these stereotypical beliefs will be seen to lie both in social identity and in personal identity.

In order to test this prediction, it is necessary to gather views on women artists and women's art whilst manipulating social identity and personal identity variables. The analytic survey is suited to this purpose. Analytic surveys, according to Oppenheim (1992), 'mimic' the laboratory experiment in that they find associations and explanations, are oriented towards hypotheses and utilise 'independent' and 'dependent' variables. The survey discussed here looks for associations among social and personal identity and beliefs about women artists and women's art. It encapsulates the hypothesis that social and personal identity causally influence these beliefs in a stereotypical fashion. Within this survey, three stereotyping factors: gender, feminism and sex-role categorisation, represent the independent

variables while belief statements about women artists and women's art represent the dependent variables.

4.2 The Survey Instrument

Development. The survey instrument (see Appendix I), designed around general themes associated with women artists and women's art, was developed over a number of stages. These general themes, and their associated sub-themes, were derived, in part, from the observations of the art theorists and art historians discussed in Chapter One and from the content of semi-structured, exploratory discussions with six arts professionals. For example, the general theme of 'inclusion' incorporates three distinct sub-themes: collectivity, exclusivity and generality. Discussions with arts professionals had revealed that some people view women's art as something which should attempt to speak to or include all women in a 'collective' sense. However, some other arts professionals had expressed fears that the collective feature of women's art might prevent women artists from including non-gender topics in their art and that such 'exclusivity' might marginalise women's art. A further issue which was raised during these discussions was whether some art forms are especially suited to promoting women's issues or whether women's issues can be explored across all art forms in a 'general' sense.

A set of belief statements was then formulated under each of the general themes and a pilot survey instrument, which included demographic questions, was developed and circulated to a further twelve arts professionals for completion and comment. Revisions to the pilot survey instrument resulted in a second draft of the survey instrument. This version of the survey instrument was then pilot tested on a group of seventy participants at a women's arts conference. The pilot study phase concluded with the derivation of five multi-statement, uni-dimensional scales. A reliability measure was calculated for each of the five scales using Cronbach's Alpha as recommended by De Vauss (1986). The values of Alpha for the five scales in the pilot phase were all at the recommended level of $\text{Alpha} \geq 0.7$ (De

Vauss, 1986). (Values of Cronbach's Alpha for the actual survey samples are provided in Appendix II.)

Final Version. The final version of the survey instrument comprises twenty-nine belief statements about women artists and women's art. Following Kidder and Judd (1986) and Oppenheim (1992), these statements are accompanied by a standard rating scale with five categories, for example:

| | | | | |
|---|-------|------------------|----------|----------------------|
| Women's art should deal exclusively with women's issues | | | | |
| Strongly agree | Agree | Cannot decide | Disagree | Strongly disagree |
| | | | | |

In addition to the twenty-nine belief statements, the survey instrument contains two questions (3i and 6b) intended to allow self-categorisation in terms of the feminism and gender independent variables.

Two 'open' questions (3h, 4e), three 'Yes/No format' questions (3i, 6d, 6e), three 'conditional' questions (1fi, 1fii, 2e1-3) and two 'multi-choice' format questions (2a, 4c) are also included in the survey instrument with a view to future research.

Structure. The statements and questions within the final version of the survey instrument are arranged in six sections. Of these, Sections 1-5 represent general themes, each of which may have one or more sub-themes (see Appendix III). Section 6 provides demographic information.

Section 1 deals with the general theme of **inclusion**, which encompasses three sub-themes:

collectivity (1b 'Women artists should support other women artists'; 1d 'All women have the potential to be artists')

exclusivity (1c 'Women's art should deal exclusively with women's issues'; 1f 'Women's arts events marginalise the possible contributions of women's cultural/artistic products to mainstream arts')

generality (1e 'Some art forms are potentially more effective than others in making statements about women')

Section 2 deals with the general theme of **usefulness** which encompasses three sub-themes, each represented by a multi-statement, uni-dimensional scale:

Scale 1 'Women's art is, and should be, educational' (mean of responses to 2b 'Women's art should perform an educational function for women' and 2c 'Women's art should perform an educational function for men' and 2g 'Women's art can help men to understand women')

Scale 2, 'Women's Art includes Social Comment' (mean of responses to 2d 'So far as art is concerned, only women's art can raise women's consciousness' and 2f 'Women's art is only truly relevant if it contains social comment')

Scale 3 'Creativity helps women to feel good about themselves' (mean of responses to 2h 'Being creative helps a woman feel good about herself' and 2i 'Being creative, with other women, helps a woman feel good about herself').

Section 3 deals with the general theme of possible **social influences** which encompasses two further sub-themes both of which are represented by multi-statement, uni-dimensional scales:

Scale 4 'Art is Non-gendered' (mean of responses to 3a 'Women's art can comment of the world of men as well as on the world of women' and 3b 'Men's art can comment of the world of women as well as on the world of men')

Scale 5 'Women's Interpretation of Art is Influenced by Demographic Factors' (mean of responses to 3d 'A woman's age affects the way she interprets the social and political content of women's art' and 3e 'A woman's social class affects the way she interprets the social and political content of women's art')

and 3f 'A woman's ethnicity affects the way she interprets the social and political content of women's art').

Section 4, deals with the general theme **prejudice**, with no sub-themes. This incorporates three statements: 4a 'Women's art and men's art should be judged on the basis of the same aesthetic criteria'; 4b 'The "public" applies different standards when evaluating the art of women and the art of men if the sex of the artist is known in advance'; 1a 'It is more difficult for a woman to receive recognition as an artist that it is for a man'.

Section 5 deals with the general theme of **financial and business policy**, with no sub-themes. This incorporates four statements: 5a 'In general, women artists and women's arts events receive adequate funding and support from bodies such as the Arts Council and local authorities'; 5b 'Women artists should adopt a more businesslike approach to attracting sponsorship'; 5c 'Women's art and women's arts events represent a 'bad risk' for sponsors' and 5d 'Women's art should benefit from positive discrimination as regards funding'.

Subjects. The survey instrument was administered to two different samples. The first sample comprised 507 first year psychology students of whom 34% were male and 66% female. The average age of the student sample was 22.01 years, with a standard deviation of 6.98 years. The size of the student standard deviation is explained by a relatively long 'tail' of mature students. The second sample comprised 37 arts professionals involved in the production and/or dissemination of women's art, of whom 38% were male and 62% were female. The average age of the arts professionals sample was 36.23 years, with a standard deviation of 10.40 years.

The purpose in selecting two samples was to explore the extent to which the reasoning of Chapters One and Two applies to two different populations. The student sample represents the 'general public': those who have little known

connection with, or specialist knowledge of, women's art but who might nevertheless constitute potential 'consumers' of women's art. The arts professionals sample is made up of those who are employed in the arts. It should, however, be emphasised that the distinction between 'student' and 'arts professional' does not constitute another explanatory, independent variable since there is a range of differences, demographic and experiential, separating out the two populations.

Administration. For reasons of practicality, administrative arrangements for the distribution and collection of the survey instrument differed for each sample. The student sample received copies of the survey instrument in groups of approximately 35. Student subjects were seated in a classroom and the survey instrument was then distributed and collected after completion. The arts professionals were solicited initially by telephone and asked if they would be willing to complete and return a copy of the survey instrument. It was only after their agreement to co-operate had been confirmed that a survey instrument along with a pre-paid return envelope was mailed to them. These procedures proved effective in that both samples had a response rate of 100%.

In Chapter Three, section 3.2, it was made clear that 'group-membership-induced' stereotyping influences judgement only when such membership becomes salient. In order to manipulate the salience of gender and feminism group membership categories, administration of the survey instrument to student subjects was preceded by a short introductory talk about women, the arts and feminism. Subjects were informed that the survey instrument was designed to examine beliefs about women artists and women's art and that the researcher was interested in their views as men and women and as people who might or might not have feminist sympathies. For the arts professionals subjects, a similar social identity priming process was carried out during the telephone conversation which invited each subject to complete the survey instrument.

The five-category rating scale used for the survey instrument statements included a 'Cannot decide' option. It was intended that subjects use this category as an intermediate between agreeing or disagreeing, rather than as a means of avoiding expressing an opinion at all. In consequence, following De Vauss (1986) the introductory comments made before administration of the survey instrument emphasised that subjects should try to express a belief in regard to all statements, and that the 'Cannot decide' response category should be seen as falling somewhere in between 'Agree' and 'Disagree'.

4.3 Method of Analysis and Presentation

The sex-role. Values for the sex-role categorisation 'independent' variable were retrieved by means of the Bem Sex-Role Inventory (BSRI; see Appendix IV) in the following way. Each subject's responses to each one of the sixty statements in the BSRI were included in an SPSS data file. Following the procedure outlined in Bem (1981) these responses were then used to produce masculinity and femininity raw scores for each subject via SPSS's COMPUTE command. The masculinity and femininity raw scores were then used as the basis for categorising subjects into one of four categories - feminine, masculine, androgynous or undifferentiated by means of the 'median split method'. This method requires that, for each group of subject, the median score for masculinity and the median score for femininity are calculated from all subjects' raw scores for masculinity and femininity. Thereafter, the levels of each subject's raw scores, once calculated, are compared with the median scores for masculinity and femininity of the 'normative sample' to determine how that particular subject should be categorised.

Table 1: Sex-role categories

| Masculinity Score | | | |
|--------------------------|---------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| | | Below Median | Above Median |
| Femininity | Below Median | undifferentiated (lo-lo) | masculine (lo fem-hi masc) |
| Score | Above Median | feminine (hi fem-lo masc) | androgynous (hi-hi) |

In line with Bem's suggestion about the normative sample from which median scores for masculinity and femininity are calculated for purposes of categorisation, this study adopted the median scores for masculinity and femininity representative of each one of the two samples comprising the current data set. Because the student sample and the arts professionals sample differed on a variety of parameters such as age and occupational status, median scores for femininity and masculinity were calculated for the student sample and the arts professionals sample separately.

The median femininity score for the arts professionals sample was 4.58 and the median masculinity score was 4.70. The median femininity score for the student sample was 4.75 and the median masculinity score was 4.35. The SPSS COMPUTE-IF command was used to categorise individual subjects by comparing the subject's own median scores with the median scores for the relevant sample, student or arts professionals. A transformation was then carried out on the sex-role category independent variable. Bem's categorisation classifies subjects into four categories: masculine, feminine, androgynous and undifferentiated. For the purposes of this analysis the original sex-role categories were re-coded to form a three-value variable with the values 'masculine', 'feminine', 'androgynous/undifferentiated'.

Design. The independent variables were operationalised in the following way. Values for the sex-role categorisation independent variable (masculine, feminine,

androgynous/ undifferentiated) were derived as described above. Values for the feminism and gender independent variables (feminist, non-feminist and male, female) were derived from responses to survey statements 3i and 6b respectively. This produced a 3x2x2 factorial design. The dependent variables were derived in the following way. Each survey instrument statement whose response format ranged from 'Strongly agree' to 'Strongly disagree' was coded using a coding scheme in which 1 was equivalent to 'Strongly agree', 2 to 'Agree', 3 to 'Cannot decide', 4 to 'Disagree' and 5 to 'Strongly disagree'. The five multi-statement, uni-dimensional scales were coded by calculating, for each subject, the mean score for all of the survey instrument statements included in that scale.

Analysis. Two preliminary decisions were made about the method of analysis for the survey data prior to its being carried out. The first was associated with the level of measurement of subject's responses to the 'Strongly agree ... Strongly disagree' format survey instrument statements, both when these are analysed as single statements and when analysed as components of multi-statement scales. A number of authors (Kerlinger, 1973; Howell, 1987; Greene and D'Oliveira, 1982) argue that survey data collected by rating scales of the sort employed here may be regarded as interval data. Accordingly, the decision was made to analyse the response data using parametric techniques.

The second decision centred on choice of statistical test. The study aims to explain variation in subjects' responses to the dependent variable statements by reference to the three independent variables. Accordingly, since the data were regarded as parametric, the three-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) model was chosen. The ANOVA model allows the researcher to examine the effects of several different independent variables, independently and in interaction. It does this by estimating how much observed differences in dependent variable scores are due to the independent variables and how much due to extraneous variables. To achieve this the ANOVA test calculates what proportion of total variance in scores is due to

the independent variables and what proportion due to the extraneous variables (the 'error' variance).

ANOVA functions by analysing variance and is therefore sensitive to unequal cell sizes (Kerlinger 1973; Ferguson 1981). Consequently, the method of ANOVA selected is the one which is recommended for unequal cell size designs: the 'classic experimental' or 'least-squares' approach (Coolican, 1994). This form of ANOVA makes use of weighted means which reflect the frequency of responses in each cell of the ANOVA table. These weighted means are based on arrangements of scores and frequencies of the sort presented in Table 2.

Table 2: Example of weighted means

| | Feminist | | Non-feminist | |
|-----------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Feminine | 2.60 (10) | 2.58 (53) | 2.78 (9) | 3.04 (53) |
| Masculine | 2.76 (21) | 2.55 (30) | 2.82 (50) | 3.49 (41) |
| And/Und | 2.50 (30) | 2.73 (66) | 3.12 (43) | 2.91 (78) |

Table 2 shows mean scores for student responses to statement 1a, with the frequency of subjects for each cell recorded in brackets underneath the response score. Weighted averages for combinations of cells are calculated by multiplying each cell response score by the cell frequency count, adding these products together and then dividing by the total frequencies. For example, the weighted mean score for feminine feminists, irrespective of gender, is: $((2.60 \times 10) + (2.58 \times 53))/63 = 2.58$. Similarly, the weighted mean score for men, irrespective of both gender and sex-role category, is:

$$((2.60 \times 10) + (2.76 \times 21) + (2.50 \times 30) + (2.78 \times 9) + (2.82 \times 50) + (3.12 \times 43))/163 = 2.82.$$

Description of interactions reported is accomplished by the discussion of simple effects, which were calculated following Howell (1987). Between subjects mean squares were calculated (by performing the relevant one-way ANOVA using the SPSS SELECT CASES and ONEWAY commands) and then divided by the original interaction error mean squares to produce the desired F ratio. According to Howell (1987) and Coolican (1994), this process avoids the possibility of inflating Type I errors which arises if multiple tests are performed.

The results are presented according to the thematic structure of the survey instrument, as described in section 4.2 (see also Appendix III), and are therefore set out in the following order, with arts professionals responses following student responses in each case:

Inclusion (collectivity, exclusivity, generality)

Usefulness (Scale 1 'Women's art is, and should be, educational', Scale 2, 'Women's Art includes Social Comment', Scale 3 'Creativity helps women to feel good about themselves')

Social influences (Scale 4 'Art is Non-gendered', Scale 5 'Women's Interpretation of Art is Influenced by Demographic Factors')

Prejudice

Financial and business policy.

4.4 Hypothesis

The hypothesis towards which the following results are directed can be expressed in the following way:

Hypothesis. Social identity and personal identity will influence stereotypical beliefs in that different levels of the feminism, gender and sex-role categorisation independent variables will be associated with different levels of response to the survey instrument statements.

This hypothesis is intended to be non-directional, in that it predicts differences between feminists and non-feminists, men and women, and among subjects from

different sex-role categories, but does not suggest a 'direction' for those differences. This non-directional nature is intended to reflect two key facts. Firstly, the survey addresses unknown terrain, in that no existing studies of attitudes to women's art which examine the differential effects of these three variables were found. In this sense, the present study is expressly designed as an exploratory exercise. Secondly, the point of encompassing different themes within a domain such as stereotypical beliefs about women artists and women's art is specifically to allow for the fact that the influence of independent variables, such as whether one is feminist, gender and sex-role categorisation, might have different effects as attention switches from one theme to the next.

Although the hypothesis underlying the survey research is non-directional, it is possible to identify at least two general directional influences which may be relevant to subsequent discussion of results. Firstly, the directional effect of being feminist can be explained by looking at responses to the question at 3h 'How would you define feminism?'. Descriptions of feminism offered in response to this open-ended question suggest that subjects see feminism as synonymous with: a counter to the oppression of women; a challenge to existing social structures; women's collective support for one another; a means of providing education and raising consciousness. This indicates that directional predictions might be made as follows. Feminist subjects will hold a stereotyped view of women which makes these subjects more likely to agree with statements which refer to women being disadvantaged by existing social structures, with statements that such structures should be challenged, statements which imply that women should display solidarity and statements which emphasise the educational and consciousness raising roles of women's art. Secondly, men and women can be expected to display group categorisation effects and in-group favouritism and out-group hostility. That is, where survey instrument statements refer to comparisons between men and women, men and women can be expected to respond in a manner which both highlights the gender distinction and favours the in-group.

The effect of the third stereotyping force, sex-role categorisation, is hard to predict in a directional sense. It is assumed here that a person's sex-role self-categorisation will have some kind of influence on how he or she thinks about gender-related matters. However, there is nothing in the theory of sex-role categorisation to suggest that people who self-categorise as 'feminine' will, for example, be more sympathetic to women than 'masculine' people, or will express a greater sense of 'solidarity' with women. Accordingly, the sex-role categorisation component of the hypothesis must remain firmly non-directional.


In summary, then, the survey sets out to discover if stereotyped thinking, arising from whether someone is feminist or not and from that person's gender and sex-role categorisation, has an impact on different facets of his or her beliefs about women artists and women's art. In this instance, the *nature* of the impact is, therefore, less important than the question of *whether it actually exists*. Thus, the hypothesis which underlies the survey research as a whole is non-directional. That said, in discussing the pattern of results obtained as the survey moves from one theme to the next, attempts will be made to make sense of the direction of findings in regard to considerations about feminism, gender and sex-role categorisation already introduced.

4.5 Inclusion: Results and Discussion

Student sample: responses to Collectivity

Section 1 of the survey instrument, comprising statements 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e and 1f, deals with the general theme of 'inclusion'. Inclusion incorporates three sub-themes, the first of these being 'collectivity' (statement 1b 'Women artists should support other women artists' and 1d 'All women have the potential to be artists'). The responses of the student sample to statement 1b are presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Student sample: responses to statement 1b 'Women artists should support other women artists'



A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is shown in Table 3.


Table 3: Student sample: breakdown of responses to statement 1b by feminism, gender and sex-role category

| | Feminist | | Non-feminist | |
|-----------|----------|-------|--------------|-------|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Feminine | 2.40 | 2.26 | 2.56 | 2.60 |
| Masculine | 2.43 | 2.20 | 2.76 | 2.71 |
| And/Und | 2.27 | 2.41 | 2.35 | 2.55 |

The ANOVA test showed a main effect for feminism with $F(1,471) = 10.02$, $p < .01$. The weighted mean score for feminists was 2.32 and for non-feminists was 2.59. This means that within the student sample, feminists were more likely to agree with statement 1b than non-feminists. There were no significant interaction effects among responses to statement 1b.

The student sample responses to statement 1d, which also falls under the sub-theme collectivity are shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Student sample: responses to statement 1d 'All women have the potential to be artists'



A breakdown of the student sample responses in terms of the three independent variables is shown in Table 4.

Table 4: Student sample: breakdown of responses to statement 1d by feminism, gender and sex-role category


| | Feminist | | Non-feminist | |
|-----------|----------|-------|--------------|-------|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Feminine | 3.30 | 3.30 | 3.11 | 3.51 |
| Masculine | 3.14 | 2.87 | 3.10 | 3.12 |
| And/Und | 3.03 | 2.94 | 3.42 | 3.21 |

The ANOVA test showed significant main effects for feminism and sex-role categorisation with $F(1,471) = 4.31, p < .05$ and $F(2,471) = 3.52, p < .05$ respectively. The weighted mean score for feminists = 3.07 and for non-feminists = 3.26. This means that feminists were more likely to agree with statement 1d than non-feminists. The weighted mean scores for the sex-role categories were: 'feminine' = 3.38, 'androgynous/ undifferentiated' = 3.14 and 'masculine' = 3.06. This means that masculine subjects were more likely to agree with statement 1d than either feminine or androgynous/ undifferentiated subjects. There were no significant interactions.

Arts professionals sample: responses to Collectivity

The responses of the arts professionals sample are similar to the responses of the student sample. Arts professionals sample responses to statement 1b are presented in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Arts professionals sample: responses to statement 1b ‘Women artists should support other women artists’




A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is shown in Table 5.

Table 5: Arts professionals sample: breakdown of responses to statement 1b by feminism, gender and sex-role category

| | Feminist | | Non-feminist | |
|-----------|----------|-------|--------------|-------|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Feminine | 2.00 | 2.00 | 2.00 | 4.00 |
| Masculine | 2.00 | 2.29 | 2.00 | 3.00 |
| And/Und | 2.00 | 2.00 | 2.00 | 4.00 |


The ANOVA test showed that within the arts professionals sample responses there were no main effects. There was, however, a two-way interaction between feminism and gender, with $F(1,21)=7.62, p < .01$. Tests of the simple effects showed that non-feminist men were more likely to agree with statement 1b than non-feminist women ($F(1,21) = 10.82, p < .01$). These data are shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Arts professionals sample: responses to statement 1b by feminism and gender



The other statement dealing with the collectivity hypothesis is statement 1d ('All women have the potential to be artists'). The arts professionals sample responses to this statement are shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Arts professionals sample: responses to statement 1d 'All women have the potential to be artists'



A breakdown of the arts professionals sample responses in terms of the three independent variables is shown in Table 6.

Table 6: Arts professionals sample: breakdown of responses to statement 1d by feminism, gender and sex-role category

| | Feminist | | Non-feminist | |
|-----------|----------|-------|--------------|-------|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Feminine | 3.00 | 2.67 | 3.00 | 4.00 |
| Masculine | 1.00 | 2.57 | 5.00 | 2.00 |
| And/Und | 2.75 | 2.60 | 2.50 | 4.00 |

The ANOVA test showed that there were no main effects among these data. However, there was a three-way interaction among sex-role category, feminism and gender, with $F(2,21) = 3.60, p < .05$. Tests of the simple effects showed that there was only one significant simple effect: feminist masculine men agreed more with statement 1d than non-feminist masculine men. These data are shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7.

Figure 6: Arts professionals sample: responses to statement 1d, by gender and sex-role category (feminists only)





Figure 7: Arts professionals sample: responses to statement 1d, by gender and sex-role category (non-feminists only)




Student sample: responses to Exclusivity

The second sub-theme incorporated within the 'inclusion' general theme is 'exclusivity' (statement 1c 'Women's art should deal exclusively with women's issues' and statement 1f 'Women's arts events 'marginalise' the possible

contribution of women's cultural/artistic products to mainstream arts'). The responses of the student sample to statement 1c are presented in Figure 8.

Figure 8: Student sample: responses to statement 1c 'Women's art should deal exclusively with women's issues'



A breakdown of student sample responses in terms of the three independent variables is shown in Table 7.


Table 7: Student sample: breakdown of responses to statement 1c by feminism, gender and sex-role category

| | Feminist | | Non-feminist | |
|-----------|----------|-------|--------------|-------|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Feminine | 4.30 | 4.36 | 4.00 | 4.32 |
| Masculine | 4.19 | 4.27 | 4.34 | 4.39 |
| And/Und | 4.40 | 4.24 | 4.37 | 4.39 |

The ANOVA test showed no significant main effects or interactions among the student sample responses to statement 1c.

The other statement within the survey instrument associated with exclusivity is statement 1f. The student sample responses to this statement are presented in Figure 9.

Figure 9: Student sample: responses to statement 1f 'Women's arts events 'marginalise' the possible contribution of women's cultural/artistic products to mainstream arts'




A breakdown of the student sample responses in terms of the three independent variables is shown in Table 8:

Table 8: Student sample: breakdown of responses to statement 1f by feminism, gender and sex-role category

| | Feminist | | Non-feminist | |
|-----------|----------|-------|--------------|-------|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Feminine | 3.10 | 2.75 | 2.89 | 3.02 |
| Masculine | 3.19 | 2.93 | 3.00 | 3.22 |
| And/Und | 3.07 | 2.98 | 2.84 | 3.06 |

The ANOVA test showed that there were no main effects in the student sample responses to statement 1f. However, there was a two-way interaction between feminism and gender ($F(1,471) = 5.34, p < .05$). A test of the simple effects showed that feminist women are more likely to agree with statement 1f than non-feminist women ($F(1,471) = 4.82, p < .05$). The weighted mean score for feminist women = 2.89 and for non-feminist women 3.09. These data are presented in Figure 10.


Figure 10: Student sample: responses to statement 1f ‘Women’s arts events ‘marginalise’ the possible contribution of women’s cultural/artistic products to mainstream arts’ by feminism and gender



Arts professionals sample: responses to Exclusivity

The responses from the arts professionals sample shows a similar pattern to that found with the student sample in respect of exclusivity. Arts professionals sample responses to statement 1c are shown in Figure 11.

Figure 11: Arts professionals sample: responses to statement 1c ‘Women’s art should deal exclusively with women’s issues’



A breakdown of the arts professionals sample responses in terms of the three independent variables is shown in Table 9.


Table 9: Arts professionals sample: breakdown of responses to statement 1c, by feminism, gender and sex-role category

| | Feminist | | Non-feminist | |
|-----------|----------|-------|--------------|-------|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Feminine | 4.67 | 4.67 | 5.00 | 5.00 |
| Masculine | 5.00 | 4.57 | 5.00 | 4.00 |
| And/Und | 4.50 | 4.60 | 5.00 | 5.00 |

The ANOVA test showed that there were neither main effects nor interaction effects among the arts professionals sample responses.

The arts professionals sample responses to statement 1f, which also falls under the sub-theme 'exclusivity' are presented in Figure 12.

Figure 12: Arts professionals sample: responses to statement 1f 'Women's arts events 'marginalise' the possible contribution of women's cultural/artistic products to mainstream arts'



A breakdown of the arts professionals sample responses in terms of the three independent variables is shown in Table 10.

A breakdown of the arts professionals sample responses in terms of the three independent variables is shown in Table 11.

Table 10: Arts professionals sample: breakdown of responses to statement 1f by feminism, gender and sex-role category


| | Feminist | | Non-feminist | |
|-----------|----------|-------|--------------|-------|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Feminine | 2.67 | 3.50 | 3.00 | 2.00 |
| Masculine | 2.00 | 2.86 | 2.00 | 4.00 |
| And/Und | 2.75 | 3.20 | 3.00 | 2.00 |

The ANOVA test showed that there were neither interaction nor main effects among this data.

Student sample: responses to Generality

The final sub-theme within the general theme of 'inclusion' is 'generality' (statement 1e 'Some art forms are potentially more effective than others in making statements about women'). The student responses to statement 1e are shown in Figure 13.

Figure 13: Student sample: responses to statement 1e 'Some art forms are potentially more effective than others in making statements about women'




A breakdown of the student responses in terms of the three independent variables is shown in Table 11.

Table 11: Student sample: breakdown of responses to statement 1e by feminism, gender and sex-role category

| | Feminist | | Non-feminist | |
|-----------|----------|-------|--------------|-------|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Feminine | 2.80 | 2.30 | 2.22 | 2.57 |
| Masculine | 2.43 | 2.17 | 2.54 | 2.76 |
| And/Und | 2.47 | 2.48 | 2.33 | 2.44 |


The ANOVA test showed no main effects among responses to statement 1e. However, it did reveal two significant two-way interactions among the responses. The first interaction was between feminism and gender with $F(1,471) = 4.84$, $p < .05$. A test of the simple effects showed that feminist women were more likely to agree with statement 1e than non-feminist women ($F(1,471) = 5.26$, $p < .05$). The weighted mean score for feminist women was 2.35 and for non-feminist women was 2.56. These data are presented in summarised form in Figure 14.

Figure 14: Student sample: responses to statement 1e by feminism and gender



The second interaction was between sex-role categorisation and feminism with $F(2,471) = 3.93$, $p < .05$. A test of the simple effects associated with this interaction showed that feminist masculine subjects agree with statement 1e more than non-feminist masculine subjects ($F(1,471) = 7.11$, $p < .01$). The weighted mean score for feminist masculine subjects was 2.28 and for non-feminist masculine subjects 2.64. These data are presented in summarised form in Figure 15.


Figure 15: Student sample: breakdown of responses to statement 1e by feminism and sex-role category



Arts professionals sample: responses to Generality

The findings of the student sample are partly replicated in the responses of the arts professionals sample to statement 1e which are shown in Figure 16.

Figure 16: Arts professionals sample: responses to statement 1e ‘Some art forms are potentially more effective than others in making statements about women’



A breakdown of the arts professionals sample responses in terms of the three independent variables is shown in Table 12.


hypothesis formulated in Section 4.4. The two social identity variables (classism and gender) and the personal identity variable (sex-role categorization) were seen to have an effect on subjects' beliefs as measured by their responses to the survey statements. Although the hypothesis is non-directional, it is possible to explore in more detail what was revealed about subjects' beliefs by their responses to statements in each of the sub-themes.

Table 12: Arts professionals sample: breakdown of responses to statement 1e by feminism, gender and sex-role category

| | Feminist | | Non-feminist | |
|-----------|----------|-------|--------------|-------|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Feminine | 3.00 | 3.50 | 2.00 | 1.00 |
| Masculine | 4.00 | 3.57 | 5.00 | 2.00 |
| And/Und | 3.50 | 3.80 | 3.00 | 2.00 |

The ANOVA test showed that there was an interaction effect between gender and feminism, with $F(1,21) = 4.36, p < .05$. Tests of the simple effects showed that there were two significant simple effects. Feminist women are more likely to agree with statement 1e than non-feminist women ($F(1,21) = 12.00, p < .01$) and feminist women are more likely to agree with statement 1e than feminist men ($F(1,21) = 5.31, p < .05$). These data are shown in Figure 17.

Figure 17: Arts professionals sample: responses to statement 1e by feminism and gender



'Inclusion': Summary and Discussion

Taken together, the data relating to the general theme of 'inclusion' confirm the hypothesis formulated in Section 4.4. The two social identity variables (feminism and gender) and the personal identity variable (sex-role categorisation) were seen to have an effect on subjects' beliefs as measured by their responses to the survey statements. Although the hypothesis is non-directional, it is possible to explore in more detail what was revealed about subjects' beliefs by their responses to statements in each of the sub-themes.

Collectivity. Among both students and arts professionals, there was some evidence that feminists agreed more than non-feminists with the statement 'Women artists should support other women artists'. Reflecting on subjects' definitions of 'feminism' which were discussed in Section 4.4, it is not surprising that feminists would look favourably at women as artists engaging in mutual support. Among the arts professionals, it was women non-feminists who most strongly disagreed with the statement. This interaction effect may show that for non-feminist women, any suggestion that women should be mutually supportive in a feminist sense would be particularly undesirable, since it would attribute to the in-group a self-stereotype threatening feature.

There was also evidence from both samples that feminists were more likely than non-feminists to agree with the statement 'All women have the potential to be artists'. The definitions produced by subjects of 'feminism', which were described in Section 4.4, included the idea that feminists adopt a challenging view of existing social relations. In the present case, this may mean that 'feminism' could be construed as reactive to traditionally held elitist views of the arts and the artist. There was also an effect related to sex-role categorisation in both samples. Irrespective of gender, masculine student subjects were more likely to agree with the statement than feminine or androgynous/undifferentiated subjects. One interpretation of this is that, for people whose beliefs are stereotypically masculine, being an artist does not necessarily connote being a man in comparison with other occupations which are traditional male preserves such as science or engineering. A second interpretation is that, for people whose beliefs are stereotypically masculine, being an artist does not connote being in a 'proper' occupation whereas being an artist would be a suitable 'pastime' for women. The sex-role categorisation influence on art professionals was more complex in that it interacted with both gender and feminism. The effect of feminism described above occurred only among masculine men; *feminist* masculine men agreed with the statement more strongly than *non-feminist*, masculine men. This presents several questions.

The first is the issue of why, in line with the student responses, masculine arts professionals do not display a higher level of agreement with the statement than feminine or androgynous/undifferentiated arts professionals. The answer may lie in the fact that for arts professionals the Arts do represent a high status profession and so even masculine art professionals will be likely to view being an artist as a legitimate occupational role. To the extent that arts professionals constitute a group, this response may even be seen as a form of positive bias towards the in-group. The second question is why the bias towards agreement with the statement among feminists should arise only among masculine men. One possible explanation is that non-feminist, masculine males may typify an extreme combination of beliefs: being masculine men, they are, in Bem's terms 'sex-typed' in that they believe social roles to be highly determined by gender; being non-feminists, they are relatively unwilling to see traditional gender roles challenged; being men, they are prone to seeing high status occupations such as (from their perspective as arts professionals) the arts as the occupational preserve of men. This combination of several identity aspects may be thought of as a 'double categorisation effect'. This is related to the claim made by Deschamps (1984), discussed in Chapter Three, that pairs of in-group categorisations which imply similarities with and differences from the self may cancel one another out. Here the suggestion is that pairs of identity effects may operate interactively to magnify the relevant stereotyping influences.

Exclusivity. Taken together, the data relating to the theme of 'exclusivity' tend to offer little support for the hypothesis. Only the student subjects showed any influence of social identity and personal identity in their responses, and this influence was restricted to responses to statement 1f. Here, non-feminist women were more likely to agree than feminist women that 'Women's arts events 'marginalise' the possible contribution of women's cultural/artistic products to mainstream arts'. In line with what was said earlier about subjects' definitions of feminism as including the notion of challenging social structures, one interpretation of this finding is that feminist subjects view the role of women's art as involving

engagement with mainstream social structures with the view of introducing change to those structures.


Generality. Taken together, the data relating to the theme of 'generality' offer support for the hypothesis. Among the students and the arts professionals, there was evidence that feminist women agreed more than non-feminist women with the statement that 'Some art forms are potentially more effective than others in making statements about women'. In addition, among the students, feminist masculine subjects were more likely to agree with the statement than non-feminist masculine subjects. Among the arts professionals, feminist women were more likely to agree than feminist men. One interpretation of this is that feminists have stereotyped views about certain forms of art. For example, certain forms of art are explicitly feminist, such as feminist performance art and feminist literature, and feminists may see such art as especially important in terms of making statements about women. If this interpretation is correct, it explains why agreement is particularly strong among feminist women. Since feminist art may, for some feminists, be perceived as the preserve of feminist women, the in-group favouritism effect (which encourages subjects to view feminist art as especially important or worthy) will be strongest among people who are both feminist and women. This can be seen as another example of the 'double categorisation effect'. This effect may also explain the difference within the arts professionals' responses between feminist women and feminist men. If the interpretation of the results in terms of feminist bias towards feminist arts is correct, it also helps to explain why non-feminist masculine subjects are particularly unlikely to agree with statement 1e. As pointed out in Chapter One, Chambers (1986) has suggested that women's advances in popular culture are perceived as threatening by male-oriented institutions.

4.6 Usefulness: Results and Discussion

Student sample: responses to Scale 1 'Women's Art is, and should be, Educational'

Section 2 of the survey instrument comprises three multi-statement, uni-dimensional scales and deals with the general theme of 'usefulness'. This general theme incorporates three sub-themes: 'education', 'social comment' and 'creativity' and each sub-theme is represented by one of the three scales. The first of the multi-statement, uni-dimensional scales is Scale 1 'Women's art is, and should be, educational', which comprises mean responses to statements 2b, 2c and 2g. The student sample responses captured in this scale are presented in Figure 18

Figure 18: Student sample: mean responses to statements comprising Scale 1 'Women's art is, and should be, educational'



A breakdown of the student sample responses in terms of the three independent variables is shown in Table 13:

Table 13: Student sample: breakdown of mean responses to statements comprising Scale 1, by feminism, gender and sex-role category


| | Feminist | | Non-feminist | |
|-----------|----------|-------|--------------|-------|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Feminine | 2.27 | 2.55 | 2.70 | 2.84 |
| Masculine | 2.67 | 2.50 | 2.75 | 2.91 |
| And/Und | 2.61 | 2.61 | 2.99 | 2.82 |

The ANOVA test shows there was a main effect for feminism, with $F(1,472) = 15.68, p < .01$. The mean score for feminists was 2.57, and for non-feminists 2.85, which signifies that feminists were more likely to agree that women's art can have an educational function than non-feminists. There were no interaction effects among these data.

Arts professionals sample: responses to Scale 1 'Women's Art is, and should be, Educational'

The arts professionals sample responses, as captured by Scale 1, also show the influence of feminism, although this is moderated by gender. The responses of the arts professionals sample represented by Scale 1 values are presented in Figure 19.

Figure 19: Arts professionals sample: mean responses to statements comprising Scale 1 'Women's art is, and should be, educational'




A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is shown in Table 14.

Table 14: Arts professionals sample: breakdown of mean responses to statements comprising Scale 1, by feminism, gender and sex-role category

| | Feminist | | Non-feminist | |
|-----------|----------|-------|--------------|-------|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Feminine | 2.78 | 2.89 | 2.00 | 5.00 |
| Masculine | 2.33 | 3.14 | 2.00 | 2.00 |
| And/Und | 3.08 | 2.60 | 2.00 | 3.50 |

There were no main effects among this data. The ANOVA test showed that there was an interaction between feminism and gender, with $F(1,21) = 4.16, p < .05$. A test of simple effects showed that feminist women were more likely to agree that women's art is, and should be, educational than feminist men ($F(1,21) = 5.41, p < .05$). These data are shown in Figure 20.

Figure 20: Arts professionals sample: mean responses to statements comprising Scale 1, by feminism and gender




Student sample: responses to Scale 2 'Women's art raises consciousness and includes social comment'

The second sub-theme incorporated within the 'usefulness' theme is Scale 2 'Women's art includes social comment', which comprises mean responses to statements 2d and 2f. The student sample mean responses as captured by this scale are presented in Figure 21.

The ANOVA test showed that there were no main effects. However, there was one significant two-way interaction in these data, between feminism and gender categorisation, with $F(1,40) = 4.16, p < .05$. A test of the simple effects associated with this interaction showed that there was one significant simple effect. Feminist, masculine subjects agreed more than non-feminist masculine subjects ($F(1,20) = 7.48, p < .01$) that women's art includes social comment. These data are shown in Figure 22.

Figure 21: Student sample: mean responses to statements comprising Scale 2 'Women's Art includes Social Comment'




A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is shown in Table 15.

Table 15: Student sample: breakdown of mean responses to statements comprising Scale 2, by feminism, gender and sex-role category

| | Feminist | | Non-feminist | |
|-----------|----------|-------|--------------|-------|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Feminine | 3.90 | 3.97 | 3.67 | 3.88 |
| Masculine | 3.83 | 3.72 | 3.99 | 4.07 |
| And/Und | 3.87 | 3.79 | 3.75 | 3.95 |

The ANOVA test showed that there were no main effects. However, there was one significant two-way interaction in these data, between feminism and sex-role categorisation, with $F(2,470) = 4.86, p < .05$. A test of the simple effects associated with this interaction showed that there was one significant simple effect. Feminist masculine subjects agreed more than non-feminist masculine subjects ($F(1,470) = 7.48, p < .01$) that women's art includes social comment. These data are shown in Figure 22


Figure 22: Student sample: mean responses to statements comprising Scale 2 by feminism and sex-role category



Arts professionals sample: responses to Scale 2 'Women's art raises consciousness and includes social comment'

The arts professionals sample responses which are summarised by means of Scale 2 are presented in Figure 23.

Figure 23: Arts professionals sample mean responses to statements comprising Scale 2 'Women's Art includes Social Comment'



A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is shown in Table 16.


A test of the simple effects in this interaction showed that again there were two significant simple effects. Non-feminist androgynous/undifferentiated subjects were more likely to agree than either non-feminist masculine subjects or non-feminist feminine subjects ($F(1,21) = 4.73, p < .05$). In addition, feminist feminine subjects were more likely to agree than non-feminist feminine subjects. These data are shown in Figure 24.

Table 16: Arts professionals sample: breakdown of mean responses to statements comprising Scale 2 by feminism, gender and sex-role category

| | Feminist | | Non-feminist | |
|-----------|----------|-------|--------------|-------|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Feminine | 3.33 | 4.33 | 5.00 | 5.00 |
| Masculine | 4.50 | 4.36 | 4.50 | 4.00 |
| And/Und | 3.88 | 4.40 | 4.00 | 3.00 |


The ANOVA test showed that there were no main effects. However, there were two significant two-way interaction effects. The first was between feminism and gender, with $F(1,32) = 6.04, p < .05$. A test of the simple effects within this interaction showed that there were two significant simple effects. Feminist men show a greater level of agreement than non-feminist men ($F(1,21) = 4.61, p < .05$). They also showed a great level of agreement than feminist women ($F(1,21) = 9.15$). These data are shown in Figure 24.

Figure 24: Arts professionals sample: mean responses to statements comprising Scale 2 by feminism and gender



There was also an interaction effect between feminism and sex-role category, with $F(2,21) = 6.33, p < .01$. A test of the simple effects in this interaction showed that again there were two significant simple effects. Non-feminist androgynous/undifferentiated subjects were more likely to agree than either non-feminist masculine subjects or non-feminist feminine subjects ($F(2,21) = 4.73, p < .05$). In addition, feminist feminine subjects were more likely to agree than non-feminist feminine subjects. These data are shown in Figure 25.


Figure 25: Arts professionals sample: mean responses to statements comprising Scale 2 by feminism and sex-role category



Student sample: responses to Scale 3 'Creativity helps women to feel good about themselves'

Within the general theme of usefulness, the final sub-theme is represented by Scale 3 'Creativity helps women to feel good about themselves'. Scale 3 comprises the mean of responses to statements 2h and 2i. The student mean responses captured by this scale are presented in Figure 26.

Figure 26: Student sample: mean responses to statements comprising Scale 3 'Creativity helps women to feel good about themselves'




A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is shown in Table 17.

Table 17: Student sample: breakdown of mean responses to statements comprising Scale 3 by feminism, gender and sex-role category

| | Feminist | | Non-feminist | |
|-----------|----------|-------|--------------|-------|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Feminine | 2.10 | 2.17 | 1.83 | 2.44 |
| Masculine | 2.36 | 2.03 | 2.39 | 2.33 |
| And/Und | 2.20 | 2.18 | 2.40 | 2.22 |

The ANOVA test showed a main effect for feminism ($F(1,470) = 5.87, p < .05$). The weighted mean value for feminists was 2.17 and for non-feminists was 2.33. This meant that feminists were more likely to agree that creativity is a positive aspect of women's art than non-feminists. There was also a significant interaction between gender and sex-role categorisation with $F(2,470) = 3.44, p < .05$. A test of the simple effects showed that there were two significant simple effects. Feminine men were more likely to agree that creativity is a positive aspect of women's art than masculine or androgynous/undifferentiated men ($F(2,470) = 3.69, p < .05$). Feminine men were also more likely to agree than feminine women ($F(1,470) = 4.28, p < .05$). These data are presented in Figure 27:


Figure 27: Student sample: mean responses to statements comprising Scale 3 by gender and sex-role category



Arts professionals sample: responses to Scale 3 'Creativity helps women to feel good about themselves'

The arts professionals sample responses which are summarised by means of Scale 3 are presented in Figure 28.

Figure 28: Arts professionals sample: mean responses to statements comprising Scale 3 'Creativity helps women to feel good about themselves'



A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is shown in Table 18.

Table 18: Arts professionals sample: breakdown of mean responses to statements comprising Scale 3, by feminism, gender and sex-role category

| | Feminist | | Non-feminist | |
|-----------|----------|-------|--------------|-------|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Feminine | 1.50 | 2.17 | 2.00 | 3.00 |
| Masculine | 2.50 | 2.21 | 3.00 | 3.00 |
| And/Und | 2.00 | 1.80 | 1.50 | 3.00 |

The ANOVA test showed that there were neither interaction effects nor main effects among these data.

'Usefulness': Summary and Discussion

Taken together, the data relating to the general theme of 'usefulness' confirm the hypothesis formulated in Section 4.4. Once again, the two social identity variables (feminism and gender) and the personal identity variable (sex-role categorisation) were seen to have an effect on subjects' beliefs as measured by their responses to the survey statements. As before, it is useful to note some of the directional trends in subjects' responses to statements encapsulating this theme even though the hypothesis itself is explicitly non-directional.

Scale 1 'Women's art is, and should be, educational'. The student sample's responses showed that feminists were more likely to agree with the statements captured by the scale than were non-feminists. Given the emphasis on education and consciousness-raising which appeared in subjects' own definitions of feminism, this result is not surprising. This distinction between feminists and non-feminists which arose in the student sample does not recur in the arts professional sample. This may be because arts professionals, unlike subjects from the student sample, view the arts and education as synonymous in that the function of the arts is seen as implicitly educational. This interpretation would be consistent with the finding from the arts professional sample that feminist women are more likely to agree with the scale statements than are feminist men. If an educational role for art is viewed as a positive feature by the arts professionals, then the higher level of agreement represented by the responses of feminist women arts professionals can be interpreted as another example of the double in-group categorisation effect which was discussed earlier in relation to the 'generality' sub-theme.

Scale 2 'Women's art raises consciousness and includes social comment'. Among the student subjects, feminist masculine subjects agreed with the statements comprising Scale 2 more than non-feminist masculine subjects. The feminists' preference for viewing art as including social comment is predictable from the subjects' own definitions of feminism as including criticism of existing social structures. Non-feminist masculine subjects are especially different in this regard. This may be explained on the basis of the 'double categorisation effect', using the same argument which was applied in relation to non-feminist masculine subjects in connection with the 'collectivity' sub-theme.

Among arts professionals, several interactions were noted. Feminist men were more likely to agree with the items that make up Scale 2 than non-feminist men. Similarly, feminist feminine subjects were more likely to agree with Scale 2 than non-feminist feminine subjects. The differences between feminist men and non-

feminist men and between feminist feminine subjects and non-feminist feminine subjects are compatible with the explanations offered for the student responses. By definition, feminists have a preference for viewing art as including social comment. In addition, feminist men were more likely to agree with Scale 2 than feminist women, a difference which has a less obvious explanation. However, given the feminists' basic preference for social comment, it may be that feminist women have a broader view of the possible roles of women's art than feminist men and react against the idea that women's art *must* contain social comment.

A further finding was that non-feminist androgynous/undifferentiated subjects agreed with Scale 2 more than either non-feminist masculine subjects or non-feminist feminine subjects. One possible interpretation for this finding is that it is another example of the 'double in-group categorisation effect'. Non-feminists are less willing than feminists to ascribe a consciousness-raising and social commenting role to women's art. This effect is amplified in those cases where subjects are sex-typed in that they adhere to traditional stereotypes of maleness and femaleness.


Scale 3 'Creativity helps women to feel good about themselves'. One difference noted in the student responses is that feminists are more likely to agree with Scale 3 than non-feminists. One possible interpretation of this result is that feminists, more so than non-feminists, problematise the position of women and thus value creativity, in that it allows women to develop through self-expression. Student responses also showed that feminine men were more likely to agree with Scale 2 than masculine men or androgynous/undifferentiated men. A possible interpretation of this result is that femininity, as discussed in Chapter Three, is stereotypically associated with expressiveness (Spence and Helmreich, 1981), and so masculine and androgynous/undifferentiated men might be less inclined to value creativity positively.

4.7 Social Influences: Results and Discussion

Student sample: responses to Scale 4 'Art is Non-gendered'

Section 3 of the survey instrument comprises two multi-statement, uni-dimensional scales and deals with the general theme of 'social influences'. This general theme incorporates two sub-themes: 'gender' and demography. Each of these sub-themes is represented by one of the multi-statement, uni-dimensional scales. The first of these is Scale 4 'Art is Non-gendered', which comprises mean responses to statements 3a and 3b. The student sample responses associated with this scale are presented in Figure 29.

Figure 29: Student sample mean responses to statements comprising Scale 4 'Art is Non-gendered'



A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is shown in Table 19.


Table 19: Student sample: breakdown of mean responses to statements comprising Scale 4 by feminism, gender and sex-role category

| | Feminist | | Non-feminist | |
|-----------|----------|-------|--------------|-------|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Feminine | 1.75 | 1.78 | 2.17 | 2.01 |
| Masculine | 1.95 | 1.80 | 1.86 | 1.76 |
| And/Und | 1.80 | 1.96 | 1.94 | 1.97 |

The ANOVA test showed no significant main effects. However, there was a significant interaction between feminism and sex-role categorisation with $F(2,471)$

= 3.22, $p < .5$. A test of the simple effects associated with this interaction showed that there were two significant simple effects. Non-feminist masculine subjects are more likely to agree that art is Non-gendered than either non-feminist feminine or non-feminist androgynous/ undifferentiated subjects ($F(2,471) = 3.56, p < .05$). In addition, feminist feminine subjects are more likely to agree than non-feminist feminine subjects. These data are presented in Figure 30.

Figure 30: Student sample: mean responses to statements comprising Scale 4 by feminism and sex-role category




What this shows is that Hypothesis 1 is in part confirmed. The student sample responses support the claim that beliefs about women's art are influenced by stereotyped thinking in that feminism and sex-role category show up as influences.

Arts professionals: responses to Scale 4 'Art is Non-gendered'

The arts professionals sample responses which are summarised by means of Scale 4 are presented in Figure 31.

Figure 31: Arts professionals sample: mean responses to statements comprising Scale 4 'Art is Non-gendered'



A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is shown in Table 20.

Table 20: Arts professionals sample: breakdown of mean responses to statements comprising Scale 4 by feminism, gender and sex-role category


| | Feminist | | Non-feminist | |
|-----------|----------|-------|--------------|-------|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Feminine | 1.33 | 1.42 | 1.00 | 2.50 |
| Masculine | 1.00 | 1.93 | 2.00 | 2.00 |
| And/Und | 1.63 | 2.10 | 1.50 | 3.00 |

The ANOVA test showed that there was a main effect for gender, the mean score for men being 1.46 and that for women being 1.90, with $F(1,21) = 6.90$, $p < .05$. This means that men were more likely to agree that art is non-gendered than women. There were no interaction effects. Taken together, the student sample responses and arts professionals sample responses support the claim that beliefs about women's art are influenced by stereotyped thinking in that, across both populations, feminism, gender and sex-role category show up as influences.

Student sample: responses to Scale 5 'Women's interpretation of art is influenced by demographic factors'

Within the theme of 'social influences', the last sub-theme explored is represented by Scale 5 'Women's interpretation of art is influenced by demographic factors', which comprises mean responses to statements 3d, 3e and 3f. The responses of the student sample as captured by this scale are presented in Figure 32.

Figure 32: Student sample mean responses to statements comprising Scale 5 'Women's interpretation of art is influenced by demographic factors'



A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is shown in Table 21.

Table 21: Student sample: breakdown of mean responses to statements comprising Scale 5 by feminism, gender and sex-role category


| | Feminist | | Non-feminist | |
|-----------|----------|-------|--------------|-------|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Feminine | 2.40 | 2.64 | 2.44 | 2.53 |
| Masculine | 2.52 | 2.69 | 2.44 | 2.63 |
| And/Und | 2.44 | 2.59 | 2.40 | 2.61 |

The ANOVA test showed a main effect for the gender variable, with $F(1,472) = 6.57, p < .01$. The weighted mean response for men was 2.44 and for women, 2.61. This suggests that men were more likely than women to agree that women's interpretation of art is influenced by demographic factors. There were no interaction effects.

Arts professionals sample: responses to Scale 5 'Women's interpretation of art is influenced by demographic factors'

The arts professionals sample responses which are summarised by means of Scale 5 are presented in Figure 33.

Figure 33: Arts professionals sample: mean responses to statements comprising Scale 5 'Women's interpretation of art is influenced by demographic factors'



A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is shown in Table 22.

Table 22: Arts professionals sample: breakdown of mean responses to statements comprising Scale 5 by feminism, gender and sex-role category

| | Feminist | | Non-feminist | |
|-----------|----------|-------|--------------|-------|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Feminine | 1.89 | 3.11 | 2.00 | 1.00 |
| Masculine | 2.00 | 2.19 | 5.00 | 2.67 |
| And/Und | 2.17 | 2.13 | 2.33 | 4.00 |

The ANOVA test showed no main effects. However, it did show a significant three-way interaction with $F(2,21) = 5.99, p < .01$. Tests of the simple effects associated with this interaction showed that there were nine significant simple effects. These fall into three groups of effects.

Firstly, non-feminist, masculine men disagreed with the claim that women's interpretations of art are influenced by demographic factors more than feminist, masculine men ($F(1,21) = 4.40, p < .05$), more than non-feminist, masculine women ($F(1,21) = 6.61, p < .05$) and more than non-feminist feminine or androgynous/undifferentiated men ($F(2,21) = 7.11, p < .01$).

Secondly, feminist, feminine women disagreed more than non-feminist, feminine women ($F(1,21) = 9.27, p < .01$), more than feminist, feminine men ($F(1,21) = 7.25, p < .05$) and more than feminist masculine or androgynous/undifferentiated women ($F(2,21) = 4.34, p < .05$).

Thirdly, non-feminist, androgynous/undifferentiated women disagreed more than feminist, androgynous/undifferentiated women ($F(1,21) = 7.05, p < .05$) and more than non-feminist, androgynous/undifferentiated men ($F(1,21) = 4.49, p < .05$).

These data are shown in Figure 34 and Figure 35.

Figure 34: Arts professionals sample: breakdown of mean responses to statements comprising Scale 5 by gender and sex-role category (feminists only)





Figure 35: Arts professionals sample: breakdown of mean responses to statements comprising Scale 5 by gender and sex-role category (non-feminists only)



'Social influences': Summary and Discussion

Taken together, the responses of the student and arts professionals to the statements comprising Scale 4 and Scale 5 which constituted the general theme of 'social influences' again offer support for the hypothesis that the subjects hold stereotypical beliefs which are influenced by social identity (feminism and gender) and personal identity (sex-role categorisation). As with responses to the first and second general themes, it is possible to move beyond the firmly non-directional nature of the hypothesis to consider the specific detail of some of the responses connected with the 'social influences' theme.

Scale 4 'Art is Non-gendered'. Student sample responses associated with this scale showed that non-feminist masculine subjects were more likely to agree that art is non-gendered, in that women's art can comment on the world of men and vice versa, than either non-feminist feminine subjects or non-feminist androgynous/undifferentiated subjects. A second finding from the student data is that feminist feminine subjects are more likely to agree with Scale 4 than non-feminist feminine subjects. One possible interpretation of this interaction result is that masculine subjects and feminist subjects share an agreement with Scale 4 but may have different reasons for doing so. Masculine subjects may agree with the scale because they see little relationship between gender and art. A similar suggestion was made in relation to the sub-theme of collectivity, where it was

suggested that masculine subjects may view some occupations, such as engineering and science, as 'gendered' and other occupations as 'non-gendered'. Feminists may agree with the scale because they are concerned about placing women's art in a 'ghetto'. It was, for example, pointed out earlier in connection with the 'exclusivity' theme that feminist women may express particular concerns with marginalisation of women artists. If these interpretations are correct, then masculine subjects and feminist subjects have a tendency to agree with Scale 4 but for opposing reasons. Some support for this interpretation is offered by the fact that feminist masculine subjects are not more likely to agree with Scale 4 than non-feminist masculine subjects while, on the other hand, feminist feminine subjects *are* more likely to agree with Scale 4 than non-feminist feminine subjects. The opposing viewpoints of masculinity and feminism seem to cancel one another out. The arts professionals data show an interestingly related finding in that men are more likely than women to view art as non-gendered.

Scale 5 'Women's interpretation of art is influenced by demographic factors'

The student data present only the finding that men are more likely than women to agree that women's interpretation of art is affected by demographic variables. One interpretation of this finding is that women are less willing to see themselves as people whose views could be influenced by 'external' factors. The picture formed by the arts professionals' data is more complex. This is not surprising, since arts professionals are likely to have developed, as a result of their jobs, relatively sophisticated views on how people interpret art. This may explain the fact that the arts professionals' responses constitute a three-way interaction among feminism, gender and sex-role categorisation with a large number of significant simple effects. Three groups seem to stand out as people who especially disagree with the statements comprising Scale 5: non-feminist masculine men, feminist feminine women and non-feminist androgynous/ undifferentiated women.

In earlier discussions, non-feminist masculine men have been depicted as viewing women's art from a traditionalist, sex-typed viewpoint. This suggests that non-

feminist masculine men tend to hold to a very traditional understanding of the role and place of women in society. This understanding may be interpreted here as meaning that non-feminist masculine men are, because of the double categorisation effect of being masculine and sex-typed, relatively unwilling to view women as engaged in the thoughtful and complex socio-political debate represented by balancing demographic factors such as age and class with one's interpretation of art.

Feminist, feminine women represent a mixture of beliefs in that they may be expected to support notions such as an unwillingness to adhere to standard, accepted views on societal structures while, at the same time, having a relatively traditional, sex-typed view of the role which it is appropriate for women to adopt in society. One interpretation of the results, seen from this perspective, is that feminist, feminine women are not willing to acknowledge that women need necessarily be affected in the way they think by social demographic variables such as age or class. At the same time the fact that these women are sex-typed may, in a double categorisation effect similar to that seen with non-feminist masculine males, interact with their feminism. Being sex-typed in that they are feminine women, they may share some of the same stereotypical beliefs about women's appropriate social roles as masculine men. This would mean that there would be twin forces acting upon feminist, feminine women encouraging them to disagree with Scale 5.

Non-feminist androgynous/undifferentiated women represent a 'mirror image' of feminist, feminine women, in that they are neither feminist nor sex-typed. Nevertheless, the pattern of their agreements in respect of Scale 5 is similar to that of the feminist, feminine women. One possible interpretation of this result is that non-feminist androgynous/undifferentiated women disagree with Scale 5 for different reasons than do feminist feminine women. Being non-feminist, they are in some respects like the non-feminist masculine men who also disagreed with Scale 5 and so it may be that part of their disagreement stems from their unwillingness to


view women in a socially challenging role of reflecting on social and political issues in art. They are also, being androgynous/undifferentiated, non-sex-typed people and it may be that such people not only do not view gender as a relevant means of understanding the world but, in addition, do not view any demographic variable in this light. This might explain why androgynous/undifferentiated people might fail to see the relevance of age, class and ethnicity to a consideration of women's art. If correct, this interpretation would, then, represent yet another example of the 'double categorisation effect' mentioned above.

4.8 Prejudice: Results and Discussion

Student sample: responses to statement 4a

Section 4 of the survey instrument comprising statements 4a and 4b, together with statement 1a, deals with the general theme of 'prejudice'. The student responses to statement 4a 'Women's art and men's art should be judged on the basis of the same criteria' are presented in Figure 36.

Figure 36: Student sample: responses to statement 4a 'Women's art and men's art should be judged on the basis of the same criteria'



A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is shown in Table 23.

Table 23: Student sample: breakdown of responses to statement 4a by feminism, gender and sex-role category


| | Feminist | | Non-feminist | |
|-----------|----------|-------|--------------|-------|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Feminine | 2.10 | 2.06 | 2.11 | 2.30 |
| Masculine | 2.29 | 2.27 | 1.94 | 2.20 |
| And/Und | 2.13 | 2.05 | 1.93 | 2.01 |

The ANOVA test showed that there were no effects among this data, in that neither gender, nor sex-role categorisation, nor whether a subject was feminist had any effect on responses to this statement.

Arts professionals sample: responses to statement 4a

When attention is turned to the arts professionals sample, the same result is obtained. The responses from the arts professionals sample to statement 4a are presented in Figure 37.

Figure 37: Arts professionals sample: responses to statement 4a 'Women's art and men's art should be judged on the basis of the same criteria'



A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is shown in Table 24.

Table 24: Arts professionals sample: breakdown of responses to statement 4a by feminism, gender and sex-role category


| | Feminist | | Non-feminist | |
|-----------|----------|-------|--------------|-------|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Feminine | 1.67 | 1.83 | 2.00 | 1.00 |
| Masculine | 1.00 | 1.43 | 1.00 | 2.00 |
| And/Und | 1.50 | 1.80 | 1.00 | 2.00 |

The ANOVA test showed that there were neither main effects nor interaction effects among these data.

Student sample: responses to statement 4b

The general theme of 'prejudice' also incorporated statement 4b 'The public applies different standards when evaluating the art of women and the art of men if the sex of the artist is known in advance'. Student responses to this statement are presented in Figure 38.

Figure 38: Student sample: responses to statement 4b 'The public applies different standards when evaluating the art of women and the art of men if the sex of the artist is known in advance'



A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is shown in Table 25.

A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is shown in Table 26.

Table 25: Student sample: breakdown of responses to statement 4b by feminism, gender and sex-role category


| | Feminist | | Non-feminist | |
|-----------|----------|-------|--------------|-------|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Feminine | 2.40 | 2.49 | 2.56 | 2.73 |
| Masculine | 2.81 | 2.87 | 2.84 | 2.90 |
| And/Und | 2.63 | 2.52 | 2.72 | 2.78 |

The ANOVA test showed a main effect for feminism, with $F(1,471) = 3.17, p < .05$. The mean score for feminists was 2.60, and for non-feminists 2.78. There were no interaction effects among responses to statement 4b. This means that, among the student sample responses, feminists were more likely to agree than non-feminists that the public applies different standards when evaluating the art of women than they do when evaluating the art of men.

Arts professionals sample: statement 4b

A similar pattern of results can be observed among the arts professionals sample responses to statement 4b. Responses from the arts professionals sample to statement 4b are presented in Figure 39.

Figure 39 Arts professionals sample: responses to statement 4b 'The public applies different standards when evaluating the art of women and the art of men if the sex of the artist is known in advance'



A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is

A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is shown in Table 26.

Table 26: Arts professionals sample: breakdown of responses to statement 4b by feminism, gender and sex-role category


| | Feminist | | Non-feminist | |
|-----------|----------|-------|--------------|-------|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Feminine | 2.00 | 2.50 | 3.00 | 3.00 |
| Masculine | 2.00 | 2.14 | 4.00 | 3.00 |
| And/Und | 2.75 | 2.40 | 3.00 | 5.00 |

The ANOVA test showed that there was a main effect for feminism. The feminists' mean score was 2.35 and that of the non-feminists 3.43, with $F(1,21) = 9.18, p < .01$. As was the case with the student sample, this means that feminists were more likely to agree than non-feminists that the public applies different standards when evaluating the art of women than they do when evaluating the art of men.

Student sample: responses to statement 1a

The last statement incorporated within the 'prejudice' theme is statement 1a 'It is more difficult for a woman to receive recognition as an artist than it is for a man'. Responses from the student sample to statement 1a are presented in Figure 40.

Figure 40: Student sample: responses to statement 1a 'It is more difficult for a woman to receive recognition as an artist than it is for a man'



A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is shown in Table 27.

Table 27: Student sample: breakdown of responses to statement 1a by feminism, gender and sex-role category

| | Feminist | | Non-feminist | |
|-----------|----------|-------|--------------|-------|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Feminine | 2.60 | 2.58 | 2.78 | 3.04 |
| Masculine | 2.76 | 2.55 | 2.82 | 3.49 |
| And/Und | 2.50 | 2.73 | 3.12 | 2.91 |

Among the student sample responses there was a significant three-way interaction of feminism, gender and sex-role categorisation ($F(2,469) = 4.47, p < .01$). Simple effects tests on the mean scores of participants showed the following pattern. Non-feminist masculine women disagreed more than non-feminist feminine or androgynous/ undifferentiated women ($F(2,469) = 4.94, p < .01$). They disagreed more than non-feminist masculine men ($F(1,469) = 10.34, p < .01$). They also disagreed more than feminist masculine women ($F(1,469) = 16.06, p < .01$).

In addition, feminist feminine women agreed more than non-feminist feminine women ($F(1,469) = 6.01, p < .05$) while feminist androgynous/undifferentiated men agreed more than non-feminist androgynous/undifferentiated men ($F(1,469) = 7.24, p < .01$). These data are presented in Figure 41 and Figure 42.

Figure 41: Student sample: responses to statement 1a by gender and sex-role category (feminists only)






Figure 42: Student sample: responses to statement 1a by gender and sex-role (non-feminists only)



Art professional sample: responses to statement 1a

The arts professionals sample responses to statement 1a are presented in Figure 43.

Figure 43: Arts professionals sample: responses to statement 1a 'It is more difficult for a woman to receive recognition as an artist than it is for a man'



A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is shown in Table 28.

Table 28: Arts professionals sample: breakdown of responses to statement 1a by feminism, gender and sex-role category

| | Feminist | | Non-feminist | |
|-----------|----------|-------|--------------|-------|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Feminine | 1.33 | 2.17 | 2.00 | 2.00 |
| Masculine | 2.00 | 1.86 | 4.00 | 1.00 |
| And/Und | 2.00 | 2.60 | 2.00 | 4.00 |

The ANOVA test showed no main effects but did show a three-way interaction, with $F(2,21) = 4.02, p < .05$. Simple effects tests on the mean scores of participants showed the following pattern. Non-feminist androgynous/ undifferentiated women disagreed more than non-feminist feminine and masculine women ($F(2,21) = 5.12, p < .05$). They also disagreed more than non-feminist androgynous/undifferentiated men ($F(1,21) = 5.87, p < .05$).

In addition, non-feminist masculine men disagreed more than non-feminist masculine women ($F(1,21) = 9.89, p < .01$) and also more than feminist masculine men ($F(1,21) = 4.40, p < .05$).

These data are shown in Figure 44 and Figure 45.



Figure 44: Arts professionals sample: responses to statement 1a by feminism, gender and sex-role category (feminists only)

Figure 45: Arts professionals sample: responses to statement 1a by feminism, gender and sex-role category (non-feminists only)



'Prejudice': Summary and Discussion

Taken together, the data associated with the general theme of 'prejudice' show the expected level of support for the hypothesis. Neither students nor arts professionals are willing to express 'prejudiced' views of women's art. Accordingly, their responses to statement 4a show no variance. However, responses to statement 4b and statement 1a do show the effect of the social identity variables (feminism and gender) and the personal identity variable (sex-role categorisation) which was predicted in the hypothesis. In keeping with the discussions of earlier themes, this result, which supports the non-directional hypothesis, is now explored in more detail by looking at the different ways in which the independent variables have influenced subjects' responses.

4a 'Women's art and men's art should be judged on the basis of the same criteria'. The student responses and the arts professionals responses to this question show no effect of either social identity or personal identity variables. The reason for this lies in the fact that only five per cent of the student sample was willing to disagree with the statement that the work of men and women artists should be assessed in the same way. This is not a surprising result, since it is unlikely that subjects would be willing to describe themselves overtly as adopting a position on women's art which might be construed as prejudicial.

Statement 4b 'The public applies different standards when evaluating the art of women and the art of men if the sex of the artist is known in advance'. The responses of both students and arts professionals demonstrate a clear effect due to the feminism variable. In both cases, feminists are more likely than non-feminists to express the belief that the public applies different standards to the art of women in comparison with men's art. Given earlier discussions of the definition of 'feminism' offered by the subjects themselves, this result is unsurprising. Feminists are those who believe that women suffer from prejudice in contemporary society. Accordingly, one likely interpretation of this result is that feminists believe, more than non-feminists, that people apply prejudiced standards to women's art.

Statement 1a: 'It is more difficult for a woman to receive recognition as an artist than it is for a man'.

Among the student responses, there were several instances of feminist subjects (e.g. feminist feminine women and feminist androgynous/undifferentiated men) being relatively likely to agree with statement 1a. In addition, non-feminist masculine women were, relatively unlikely to agree with statement 1a. One possible interpretation of this result is that non-feminist masculine women represent another case of the double categorisation effect. On the one hand, being non-feminist means that they are less likely to agree that women in general suffer from prejudice. On the other hand, being masculine, and therefore cross-sex-typed, they may hold beliefs which differ from traditional beliefs about women's place in society. This would explain why they disagree with statement 1a more than feminist masculine women and more than non-feminist feminine or androgynous/undifferentiated women. However, they also disagree with statement 1a more than non-feminist masculine men. This is a more puzzling phenomenon since these men might be expected to represent the group least sympathetic to statement 1a. A possible explanation for the observed responses may be that non-feminist, masculine women are even more extreme in their disagreement with statement 1a than non-feminist, masculine men because they perceive the content of the statement to imply some form of threat to their self-image. By agreeing with

statement 1a they would be implicitly accepting that they belong to a group which is subject to widespread prejudice.


The responses among the arts professionals to statement 1a are in some ways similar and in some ways dissimilar to the student responses. Among the arts professionals, it is the non-feminist *androgynous/undifferentiated* women who are relatively unlikely to agree with statement 1a whereas in the student sample the greatest disagreement was noted among non-feminist *masculine* women. The arts professionals' response may, then, to some extent be interpreted in the same way. Being non-feminists, these subjects are relatively unsympathetic to the notion that women suffer from general social prejudice. Although these subjects are androgynous/undifferentiated rather than masculine, they do share a similarity with their student sample counterparts in that like the masculine subjects, they are not sex-typed, that is they do not adhere to traditional views on gender appropriate behaviour in society. To this extent non-feminist androgynous/undifferentiated women represent a different, though related, double categorisation effect.

Another finding from the arts professionals' responses is that non-feminist masculine men were relatively likely to disagree with statement 1a. This is in line with earlier discussion of non-feminist masculine men in which it was pointed out that they represent a group which is both traditionalist in viewpoint and committed to standard societal expectations about women in society. Among the student sample, non-feminist masculine women disagreed even more strongly than the non-feminist masculine men. It was suggested that this might be due to a perceived threat to self image on the part of these women. The same effect did not arise among the arts professionals. This may indicate a difference between the two samples, in that the arts professionals who are non-feminist masculine women may, on the one hand, have a more mature and settled self image and may, on the other hand, have greater life experience of prejudice against women than their counterparts in the student sample.

4.9 Business and Finance: Results and Discussion

Section 5 of the survey instrument turns to the fourth general theme found in beliefs about women's art, Business and Finance, as it affects women's art.. This general theme is explored by means of four separate statements: 5a, 5b, 5c and 5d. Section 5 was aimed solely at the arts professionals sample because the survey instrument items in Section 5 target issues germane to professional knowledge based on experience. For this reason, presentation and analysis of data applies to responses from the arts professionals sample only. The first three statements, 5a, 5b and 5c, yielded neither significant main effects nor interactions. Accordingly, only the results for statement 5d are presented here. The responses of the arts professionals sample to statement 5d are presented in Figure 46.

Figure 46: Arts professionals sample: mean responses to statement 5d 'Women's art should benefit from positive discrimination as regards funding'




A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is shown in Figure 47.

Figure 47: Arts professionals sample: breakdown of mean responses to statement 5d by feminism, gender and sex-role category

| | Feminist | | Non-feminist | |
|-----------|----------|-------|--------------|-------|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Feminine | 2.00 | 3.40 | 2.00 | 5.00 |
| Masculine | 2.00 | 3.14 | 4.00 | 4.00 |
| And/Und | 3.25 | 2.40 | 4.00 | 3.00 |

The ANOVA test showed that there was a main effect for feminism, with the feminist weighted mean = 2.88 and the non-feminist weighted mean = 3.71 ($F(1,20) = 4.53, p < .05$). This means that feminists were more likely to agree with statement 5d than non-feminists. There was also a significant interaction effect between gender and sex-role category ($F(2,20) = 4.58, p < .05$). A test of the simple effects associated with this interaction showed that there was one significant simple effect. Feminine men are more likely to agree with statement 5d than feminine women ($F(1,20) = 4.38, p < .05$). These data are shown in Figure 48.

Figure 48: Arts professionals sample: mean responses to statement 5d, by gender and sex-role category



'Business and finance': Summary and discussion

The arts professionals' responses to the statements comprising the 'business and finance' general theme show only a limited level of support for the hypothesis. Responses to statements 5a, 5b and 5c show no effect of the feminism, gender and sex-role categorisation variables. One possible interpretation of these results is that, as arts professionals, the subjects have such strong views on matters of finance that the social identity and personal identity variables have no effect upon them. In respect of statement 5d, there is a pattern of influences on those responses which can be attributed to the stereotyping effects of feminism, gender and sex-role categorisation. Feminists agree more than non-feminists that women's art should receive positive discrimination in funding. This result is in accord with the sorts of definitions of 'feminism' in terms of social change which the subjects themselves provided. The interaction effect is slightly more puzzling in that feminine men agree with statement 5d more than feminine women. One

possible interpretation is that feminine women, being sex-typed, have a very traditional view of women's role in society which makes them especially unwilling to support the idea of special help for women artists and that this unwillingness shows up most in comparison with feminine men.

4.10 Summary and Conclusions

This chapter set out to apply the theoretical insights of Chapters Two and Three to the empirical study of people's beliefs about women artists and women's art. The claim was made that people's views on women artists, and the belief component of their attitudes towards women's art, are influenced by stereotypical beliefs about women. Specifically, it was predicted that the origins of these stereotypical beliefs lie in social identity and in personal identity. To test this prediction required a method which would allow for the gathering of views on women artists and women's art whilst manipulating social identity and personal identity variables and it was argued that the analytic survey represents such a method.

The empirical study utilised a specially prepared survey instrument which contained a number of statements about women artists and women's art. It also contained two items which allowed subjects to be self-categorised in terms of whether or not they were feminists and in terms of their gender. In addition, the BSRI was used to classify subjects by sex-role categorisation. Two samples were selected: a student sample and an arts professionals sample. Their responses to the survey instrument statements were used to test the hypothesis that social identity and personal identity influence stereotypical beliefs in that feminism, gender and sex-role categorisation are associated with differences in response to the survey instrument statements.

The results of the analytic survey confirmed this hypothesis. In all five of the survey's general thematic areas, some influence of these social identity (feminism and gender) and personal identity (sex-role orientation) variables was noted. This demonstrates that people's views of women artists and the cognitive component of

their attitudes towards women's art consist, in part, in stereotypical beliefs. These stereotypical beliefs arise from social and personal identity and so confirmation of the hypothesis reveals that people's beliefs about women artists and their attitudes towards women's art are influenced by their social and personal identities.

Although the hypothesis was not intended to be directional, it nevertheless proved useful to examine the detail of how these three independent variables influenced subjects' responses. Certain combinations of social and personal identity seemed to have particularly noticeable effects on subjects' responses. For example, in a number of cases, non-feminist, masculine men had views which were in opposition to those of others. In addition, the combination of whether someone was a feminist or not and that person's gender seemed to have a strong effect on his or her responses, as did the combination of whether someone was a feminist or not and that person's sex-role orientation. In a number of cases, a 'double categorisation effect' seemed to be in operation in which the stereotyping influences of one aspect of social identity were magnified by the stereotyping influences of the other aspect of social identity or by sex-role categorisation. This bears interesting parallels with some of the theoretical issues of cross-category stereotyping discussed in Chapter Three.

One of the themes in the survey instrument was 'prejudice'. The statements which comprised this theme, 41, 4b and 1a, asked subjects to respond to statements about whether standards for judging women's art ought to be different from those used to judge men's art (statement 4a), whether they actually are different (statement 4b) and whether it is more difficult for women artists to receive recognition (statement 1a). Although the subjects' responses to these questions showed some variability due to the influence of social and personal identity, it is noteworthy that there was a very obvious trend in the responses as a whole. Among students, only 5% or subjects admitted, in response to statement 4a, to a belief that the standards for judging women's art *should* differ from those used for judging men's art. Among the arts professionals, no-one admitted to this belief. However, in

response to statement 4b, 52% of student subjects and 78% of arts professional subjects agreed that 'the public' did, *in fact*, apply different standards. Moreover, in response to statement 1a, 45% of student subjects and 78% of arts professional subjects agreed that it is more difficult for women artists to receive recognition. This demonstrates that although almost all subjects denied that prejudicial standards should be applied to women artists and their work, well over half of all subjects believed that different standards are in fact applied and that women artists suffered a lack of recognition.

Several conclusions may now be drawn from the analytic survey.

Firstly, people hold stereotypical beliefs which influence their views of women artists and their attitudes towards women's art (insofar as those stereotypical beliefs constitute the cognitive component of such attitudes). These stereotyping effects are related to aspects of social and personal identity and may be especially strong if 'double categorisation effects' arise.

Secondly, people report a widespread belief that women artists are disadvantaged in society and are assessed by means of standards which are not applied to men artists.

Thirdly, people seem reluctant to admit that they, themselves, subscribe to the notion that women artists should be treated differently from men artists.

These conclusions raise a further interesting question. If people's views on women artists and the cognitive component of their attitudes to women's art are in part caused merely by aspects of social identity and personal identity, then public views on women artists and their work seem prey to social forces which are independent of questions of actual artistic worth or merit. Moreover, there is a widespread belief that the effect of these social forces is that women artists are disadvantaged. This raises the question of how people responsible for maintaining and supporting

women artists and their work deal with these issues. In particular, it introduces the possibility that arts professionals who have such responsibilities may, themselves, have views on women's art which are socially conditioned and may even be prejudicial.

It is unlikely that survey methodology will contribute usefully to an exploration of this further question. In the first place, subjects' responses to statement 4a show that people are unlikely to express a willingness to apply overtly different standards to women artists from those they would apply to men. Moreover, Wetherell and Potter (1992) have argued that many forms of prejudicial expression are specifically designed to avoid being seen as overtly prejudicial. It seems, then, that if this further research question - how do arts professionals deal with the disadvantaged status of women artists and their own possible prejudices - is to be addressed, then a switch in methodology is called for. In discussing the similar difficulty of analysing racial prejudice, Wetherell and Potter (1992) have advocated the use of discourse analysis.

The following chapter pursues the question of how arts professionals view themselves in relation to women's arts, given the twin difficulties of the disadvantaged status of such art and their own possible prejudices. In line with Wetherell and Potter's suggestions, the methodology used to explore these issues is the discourse analysis approach. Accordingly, Chapter Five begins with a discussion of the relative merits of traditional social identity theory approaches to analysing identity and argues for the value of the discourse analysis approach. A brief outline of discourse analysis is then offered. Following this, a number of extracts from interviews with arts professionals are analysed with the aim of exploring the extent to which arts professionals are able to deal with the problematic status of women's art and their own beliefs which might potentially be construed as prejudiced against women artists.

CHAPTER FIVE

DEFENDING IDENTITIES: BIAS AGAINST WOMEN'S ART AND ARTS PROFESSIONALS' SENSE OF SELF

5.1 Introduction

In Chapter Four it was shown that public attitudes towards women's art are socially constructed phenomena which depend in part on memberships of social groups and also on more individualistic features such as sex-role categorisation. One consequence of this, it was argued, is that women's art is perceived to suffer from a generalised prejudice in comparison with men's art. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the consequences of this 'generalised prejudice' for those whose occupational role includes a commitment to support women artists and promote women's art. To this end, themes which arose during a series of interviews with male and female arts professionals will be explored by the analytic method known as 'discourse analysis'. The goal of this analysis is to illuminate how those employed as arts professionals construct 'versions' of themselves in discourse which avoid potentially damaging associations between their own occupational activities and the apparently low status of women in the world of art and artistic production.

The motivation for adoption of the discourse analytic method is as follows. If indeed, the occupational role of arts professionals is seen to be endangered those interviewed about women artists and women's art will attend to two apparently contradictory issues in arriving at a sense of self as arts professionals. As members of the arts establishment, might they be perceived as biased against women artists and women's art? On the other hand, as promoters of women's art, does this signify involvement with a low status group? These kinds of issues are representative of the kinds of issues which have presented difficulties for traditional approaches to social identity theory.

Self-descriptions which ascribe negative characteristics such as bias or prejudice to oneself are problematic for social identity theory because, as recent studies in stereotyping have revealed, expressions of prejudice may be subtle, rather than overt (Vrugt and Nauta, 1995). These studies have also revealed that forms of prejudice such as sexism may include benevolent as well as hostile elements (Glick and Fiske, 1996). Indeed, Wetherell and Potter (1992) have argued that in many cultures forms of subtle or ambivalent sexism are a normal means of expressing prejudiced views while attending to issues of impression management. Wetherell and Potter argue that many expressions of prejudice are carefully designed to avoid imputations of bias against the person making the prejudiced statement. Because of this they conclude that the most accurate way to examine subtle or ambivalent forms of prejudice is by a careful analysis of the forms of talk which are used in making the prejudiced claims.

Association with low status groups represents a second difficulty for social identity theory. It is not clear, on the basis of social identity theory, why people associated with a low status group should accept this low status view of their own group. Condor (1990), criticises social identity theorists for taking the consensuality of stereotypes to be an 'a priori assumption' without saying why different groups should subscribe to the same stereotypes. In particular, Widiger and Settle (1987) point out that social identity theory does not account for the phenomenon of negative self-stereotyping. Evaluations of women by women show that women themselves endorse negative stereotypes of women such as 'irrational' or 'passive'. (Spears and Manstead, 1989). Evidence such as this of the derogation of the in-group, and related findings on out-group favouritism, have led Hinkle and Brown (1990) to suggest that the phenomenon of out-group favouritism represents a theoretical difficulty for social identity theory.

Phenomena such as negative stereotyping of the in-group have, nevertheless, been discussed within the terms of social identity theory. For example, Tajfel (1982), Tajfel and Turner (1986) and Hogg and Turner (1987) have suggested that at

times stereotypes of the in-group will reflect that group's position in society whether positive or negative. Thus social identity theorists attempt to resolve the ambiguity between the hypothesis of in-group justification and out-group favouritism of disadvantaged groups; they appeal to the perceived 'legitimacy' and 'stability' of the system or on the extent to which group members are able to conceive of 'cognitive alternatives' to the current state of affairs. When negative images of the in-group are seen as both legitimate and unlikely to change, disadvantaged groups may internalise harmful stereotypes of themselves. When these stereotypes, however, are perceived as unfair or open to change, in-group favouritism will prevail once again and negative stereotyping of the in-group will disappear (Tajfel and Turner, 1986).

Critics, however, might argue that the appeal to perceptions of legitimacy or stability of social systems fails to explain why individuals do not re-assess their notions of legitimacy (in a socially creative way), or seek to challenge social stability, rather than accept the status quo. This acceptance is difficult to square with the centrality of group membership enhancing self esteem which lay at the heart of social identity theory in its original form. The need for active debate with such conceptions of legitimacy and stability is underlined by Jost and Banaji (1994). They suggest that the traits on which subordinate groups positively differentiate themselves may actually serve to reinforce the status quo, by creating stereotypes whereby these subordinate groups (less advantaged groups) are seen by themselves and others as accommodating or content (easygoing) or not particularly concerned with achievement. Perceptions concerning the stability and legitimacy of the status quo or the extent to which it is undisputedly or widely accepted as valid may reflect what Jost and Banaji term 'system justification'. In this mode of stereotyped thought, justification of the status quo frequently outweighs the individual's defence of group interests. In cases of this nature, negative stereotyping of the in-group seems to function as a means of justifying an unequal state of affairs, even at the expense of personal or group interest (Sidanius and Pratto, 1993).

Jost and Banaji argue that, from an ideological perspective, because the ideas of the dominant tend to become the ideas of the dominated, stereotypes may be advanced even by those who stand to lose by them, in order to preserve an apparent 'justness' of their situation. This form of stereotyping, it is argued, may override motives to justify the positions or actions of the self or group, thus leading to negative stereotyping of the self or in-group and to the high degree of consensuality of stereotypes. People make sense of existing states of affairs by assigning attributes to the self and others that are consonant with the roles or positions occupied by individuals and groups. Stereotypes serve a system-justification function for those who subscribe to them to the extent that prevailing systems of social arrangements are justified and reproduced.

Critics might argue that this suggestion lacks a proper analysis of what it is about 'dominant' ideologies that *makes* them dominant. To suggest that a stereotype which imparts low esteem to a group is *dominant* within a culture because it is *accepted* by all members of that culture, including the low-esteem group itself is insufficient by way of explanation. Even if the dominance of the prevailing ideology *is* being taken to explain acceptance the acceptance of a low self-esteem stereotype this *cannot*, in turn, explain the dominance of the prevailing ideology.

One possible means of resolving debates such as those described is to accept the discourse analytic approach to self and identity, and to view self-categorisations as elements of discourse which people selectively draw upon in portraying themselves. The discourse analytic approach deals with the problem of self-acceptance of low-esteem stereotypes by explicitly addressing the issue of argumentation. Billig (1987; 1991), for example, explicitly advocates considering human interaction in terms of argument. His claim is that theories such as social identity theory have over-estimated the power of stereotypes by concentrating solely on the generalisation of thought which they provide. Billig suggests that alongside any social generalisation, it is possible to discover discrete

particularisation which challenges or modifies the claim made by means of the generalisation. This means, in the case of stereotypes, that when researchers find stereotypes to be in use, the researchers will also tend to find that subjects will make exceptions to the stereotype's general rule by formulating particular cases which stand outside that rule.

Social interaction involving stereotypes can, therefore, be thought of in terms of debate, where the general consequences of the stereotype are opposed by specific instances of particularisation which seek to challenge, or make exception to, that generalisation. Central to this debate is what Billig (1987) terms 'witcraft'. 'Witcraft' is a perspective which regards everyday talk as specifically designed to address matters of generality versus particularisation. Billig is careful to point out that not all forms of communication involve witcraft, and not all attributions of stereotyped thinking are unsound. However, Billig also claims that when situations are perceived by participants to be 'difficult', 'problematic' or 'open to argument', the processes of ordinary talk which he identifies as witcraft will come into play.

It follows that, when pursuing the question of how arts professionals view themselves in relation to women's arts, there is good reason for adopting a discourse analytic perspective. A review of stereotyped ways of thinking, such as the survey of stereotypical beliefs about women's art presented in Chapter Four, is useful in those cases where categorisations are explicitly manipulated by experimental means. However, such a process is unlikely to illuminate cases where such stereotypical attributions are likely to be seen as 'problematic' or 'difficult' for the targets of such stereotypes. And it can be predicted that the sense of self which arts professionals will display will address the problematic issues of bias and low status. The work of Wetherell and Potter (1992) and Billig (1991) suggests that in cases of this type, people are likely to display sophisticated conceptualisations of themselves which negotiate these problems through the formation of carefully designed accounts. These accounts display the sorts of

distinction-drawing and exception-making which Billig refers to as 'particularisation'.

A central claim of discourse analysis is that when people use language to characterise their social world, they do so in a constructive fashion. Before exploring the way in which the arts professionals constructively develop a sense of self, it is useful to begin by reviewing the theoretical and methodological features which characterise the discourse analytic approach

5.2 Discourse Analysis

There are different approaches within the discourse analytic tradition (Fairclough, 1992). At one extreme, are the attempts to analyse discourse in terms of broad socio-political factors (e.g. Parker, 1992). The antecedents of this approach can be traced back to Foucault's (1972) post-structuralist claims that language must be viewed as a historical force through which ideologies are developed and maintained. For discourse analysts, this means that the analyst must study the derivation of 'discourses', linked sets of statements which create or construct social phenomena. The analytic goal is to understand the way in which these systems of statements are inter-related. Thus, for example, Foucault (1977) offers an analysis of political power relations by studying the way in which texts on crime and punishment reflect wider features of the interaction between the individual and the state.

At the other extreme, some discourse analysts display a conceptual lineage which can be traced back to the work of the ethnomethodologists. According to the ethnomethodologist, our mundane world is made up of everyday activities (getting up for breakfast, meeting work colleagues, going to the theatre) which we understand largely in terms of the common-sense social setting within which they take place. By 'making sense' of everyday events, an ethnomethodologist means the process by which normal people assign a specific character to these events. That is, the sort of common sense understanding which people would be hard pressed to see as anything other than 'the obvious' meaning of what is going on.

The idea here is that in this sort of 'making sense out of everyday life' the knowledge which people bring to bear on the context is so 'obvious' that, for participants, it is practically invisible. An important point is that, for the ethnomethodologist, this 'making sense' is a constructive activity in that people work together to construct an understanding of the social setting they co-inhabit. Moreover, 'making sense' requires that people have methods which they apply to achieve this construction. The focus of ethnomethodology, then, is on studying the methods which people utilise so that their social actions come to seem normal and sensible to them.

Garfinkel (1967) suggests that to study people's methods for making sense of the social world requires paying attention to the accounts which they offer of the world as seen from their own point of view. Here the concern is not with 'true' or 'false' accounts, but rather with the sorts of accounts which are offered - the 'accounting practices'. Garfinkel's idea is that if the analyst studies the sorts of accounts which people offer of their actions (in providing explanations, or defences, or examples, or instructions) then this provides an understanding of the 'commonplace' knowledge which these people are relying on in making sense of their own activities. An example of this approach is Wieder's (1974) study of people who had been convicted of crimes involving drugs. These people were living in a 'halfway house' facility which aimed to rehabilitate them into normal society. Wieder conducted interviews with these residents, during the course of which, he discovered that the residents lived by what they called 'the code'. In order to be a 'regular guy', a resident had to live by the code and this code motivated a whole range of behaviours likely to deter rehabilitation. These behaviours included: avoidance of 'coping out' or confessing to anything; helping other residents avoid detection; avoiding 'messing' with other residents' criminal activities; refusing to trust staff, and remaining loyal to other residents.

Wieder (1974) noted that this code was known to staff as well as to inmates, and that the staff relied upon the code in explaining residents' behaviours. Staff used

the code as a form of 'folk knowledge' which could explain the events and actions they observed. So, for example, a sulky refusal to take part in group discussion could be portrayed as perfectly understandable because it exhibited aspects of the code. So staff were able to 'tell the code' as a means of explaining how they saw the residents' actions as reasonable. Staff also classified and categorised residents' activities in a way that appeared, to the staff, perfectly understandable. This classifying activity too relied upon the use of elements of the residents' own code. Wieder is at pains to point out that this code was not something (like a prison's rule book) which existed independently of the daily life of the residents. Rather, their daily life involved constant discussion about what was going on, and this discussion involved elements of the code, and so 'telling the code' was both an activity which the residents engaged in and a means whereby they, and the staff, could represent and understand their activities. What Weider's 'telling the code' study illuminates is that, as people make sense of their everyday world, they provide accounts which demonstrate the unproblematic status of their own and others' beliefs and actions. According to ethnomethodologists, these accounts are not to be viewed as a more or less reliable way of getting at 'the facts', but rather as a topic for investigation in their own right. This is because the accounts, in part, constitute the social activities which they purport to describe, or explain or defend.

More recently, the attention given to people's own understandings of their social world by studying discursive activities had been taken up by discourse analysts who have a special interest in conversational structures. This form of discourse analysis, usually termed 'conversation analysis', focuses on the fact that conversations normally have a highly patterned structure. Conversation is structured so that a conversational turn from one person is followed by a turn from another. Only about five per cent of conversation involves turn overlap, and yet the pauses between turns are typically around half a second. According to conversation analysts this is explained by the fact that there is a set of turn-taking rules which people implicitly follow in conversations. Firstly, people unconsciously recognise what constitutes an appropriately sizeable unit of conversation. The

boundaries of units of this sort are implicitly recognised as 'transition relevant places': points in the conversation at which a changeover from one speaker to another would pass un-remarked by participants. These are often 'marked' by vocal changes, and by verbal or nonverbal 'closure tokens'. Coping with transitions from one speaker to the next is also aided by the fact that participants jointly construct and monitor a localised conversational context. One simple example of this is the so-called 'adjacency pair', examples of which are, question-answer, request-granting (or rejection) and offer-acceptance (Schegloff and Sacks, 1973). One important aspect of adjacency pair constructions is that people normally have a preference for one possible response over another, so that one response can be termed the preferred response, and the other the dispreferred response. Thus when someone issues a request, usually the preferred response would constitute a granting of that request.

When a dispreferred response is uttered, this is usually marked in some way. There may, for example, be a delay in replying, or indications of hesitancy or a relatively complex response where a simple response such as 'No' would have achieved the same rejection. What has just been described is an example of how ordinary people routinely perform what conversation analysts describe as 'conversational work'. There is a point in uttering a hesitant, complexly structured refusal of a request. It allows the recipient of the request to demonstrate to the person who made the request that the refusal is not being made in an unthinking, rude way for which there are no good grounds. Thus, for conversation analysts, it is often as important to note the extra conversational work which is accomplished in uttering a refusal as it is to note the refusal itself. Perhaps the clearest indication of this is represented by cases where people offer accounts. In these cases, the person may well be seen to accomplish an excuse, or a mitigation, or an apology while in the act of uttering the refusal itself. For conversation analysts, what is important about this extra conversational work is that it allow the analyst to 'read off' from the participant's conversational contribution the 'orientation' which that person takes to the conversation's preceding turn. For example, a conversational participant

may perform conversational work which transforms the answer to a question into an explanation or justification. The analyst can then 'read off', from the response, that the participant has oriented to the preceding conversational turn as an accusation, even if the preceding turn had the apparent form of a question. A number of examples of just this sort of conversational work are presented by Drew (1985) in his study of courtroom conversations. In one example, Drew offers an extract from a cross-examination of Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) officers about why they failed to quell a riot. In the cross examination the RUC officers can be seen to provide accounts, apparently spontaneously, of why action against the rioters was unnecessary:

| | |
|---------|--|
| Counsel | You saw this newspaper shop being petrol bombed on the front of Divis Street? |
| Witness | Yes. |
| Counsel | How many petrol bombs were thrown into it? |
| Witness | Only a couple. I felt that the window was already broken and that there was part of it burning and this was a rekindling of the flames |

(Drew, 1985)

In this example, the legal counsel does not accuse the officer of failing to respond appropriately to prevent the bombing, he merely asks the officer how many petrol bombs were thrown. However, the officer's response demonstrates that he orients to the counsel's question as though the counsel had issued an accusation. It is this orientation which leads him to proffer his account of why action on his part was not necessary. By introducing the idea that the property was already damaged, and that the bombs merely 'rekindled' existing fires, he avoids tackling issues such as whether the rioters were the sort of people who should be arrested. It is in this sense that the conversation analyst's interpretations claim to be the participants' interpretation of, and the participants' orientation towards, what was said before.

Lying somewhere between the extremes of Foucauldian analysis and conversation analysis is the approach to discourse which focuses on identifying 'repertoires' or 'variable accounts'. An essential aspect of this approach is that deployment of discourse mechanisms and practices should be understood as having specific goals. According to this approach, when people provide accounts, they can be seen to be

performing particular social actions. In part, this line of thought derives from the work of Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) on speech act theory. Their view was that analyses of language which treat language as essentially a mechanism for describing the world are flawed. Instead, they argued, language should be viewed as a means of accomplishing various social acts such as issuing warnings, uttering threats and paying compliments. Some discourse analysts have adopted this view of language as performative of social acts, but depart from speech act theory by saying, firstly, that the range of actions which people routinely deploy in uttering apparently simple accounts is far greater than speech act theory allows for. Secondly, these analysts also claim that many of the actions performed via account construction, such as blaming, explaining, mitigating and justifying, are not identifiable in terms of special linguistic constructions. Rather, the action a person performs in generating an account is only fully understood by examining the way that account is constructed in relation to the local discursive context in which that account is produced. One means of accomplishing this analysis is to study the similarities and variability which can be observed within a number of different accounts of the same or similar sets of beliefs, actions or events.

Gilbert and Mulkay (1984), for example, studied a group of biochemists by interviewing them and by examining their letters to one another. Gilbert and Mulkay discovered that the biochemists, in giving accounts of what they and others were doing while developing competing biochemical theories, used particular discursive strategies. Gilbert and Mulkay called these discursive strategies 'interpretative repertoires'. One crucial finding was that the biochemists, in informal settings, used two different kinds of repertoire. In accounting for their own work, the biochemists' own view would be portrayed, by means of the 'empiricist repertoire' as connected directly to the evidence. The competing view - the 'false' view - would be portrayed, by means of the 'contingent repertoire', as arising out of contingent factors such as the competitor's flawed personality.

Gilbert and Mulkey noted that the 'contingent' account of a competitor's work is a requirement for the use of 'empiricist' accounts of one's own work: If one's own 'correct' view can be taken to derive un-problematically from the facts, it is difficult to explaining how one's competitors could make the mistake of rejecting such an obviously correct explanation. The answer lies in the asymmetry of contingent and empiricist accounts. The contingent repertoire not only allowed the user of that discursive mechanism to portray competitors' views as false, but also to provide an account for mistaken views, grounded in contingent features such as flaws in the competitor's personality. The Gilbert and Mulkey example demonstrates that, by attending to similarities and variability in accounts, the analyst is able to establish that apparently simple accounts are actually used to perform complex tasks, such as establishing one's own view as correct while providing an undermining for a competitor's view. According to discourse analysts, these actions need not be considered to be deliberate attempts to mislead or confuse. Rather, the discursive mechanisms which people deploy in achieving sophisticated social actions through discourse are considered as everyday aspects of language use which people acquire through normal socialisation and deploy in almost all contexts of social interaction.

This flexibility in the use of discursive mechanisms has now been displayed in a wide variety of settings. Discursive mechanisms are even used in cases where the 'social phenomenon' under discussion is a publicly observable physical locale - the sort of phenomenon which might seem the paradigm case of an objective fact not open to discursive construction. For example, in a recent paper, Macnaghten (1993) describes discursive practices revealed by a public inquiry examining proposals for a landfill site. Much of the debate during the inquiry took place between council officials and the developers who wanted to turn the proposed site into a landfill area. Macnaghten found that although there was disagreement in what each party wanted for the site, the councillors and developers tended to agree in using a particular type of discourse which appealed to nature. In fact, Macnaghten identifies a number different discursive 'versions' or 'constructions' of nature. These include: nature as 'wilderness', nature as 'passive visual harmony'

and nature as the 'harmony of activities'. Macnaghten reveals that both council officials and developers appealed to these notions in providing accounts of what would be the consequences of allowing the landfill operation.

For example, Macnaghten shows that the councillors use the 'wilderness' discourse to argue that nature involves wilderness and that because the landfill site would prevent wilderness, it is inconsistent with nature, and so the development should not go ahead. Macnaghten then shows that the developers are able to use the same 'wilderness' discourse to argue that nature is wilderness, but that wilderness has already been prevented in the area proposed for the site. On this basis, the developers conclude that the landfill site proposal should therefore go ahead, since the area proposed for use as a landfill site can no longer be categorised as 'nature'. What Macnaghten concludes from his study is that the availability of these discourses demonstrates the way participants were able to construct different versions of 'nature' to suit different points in the debate.

What 'repertoire' or 'variable account' forms of discursive analyses reveal, then, is that even so-called 'hard science' facts are open to discursive re-formulation, and even publicly observable 'objective' facts such as physical locales are susceptible to social construction through discourse. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that social groups, and the identities which stem from membership of them, are likewise open to discursive negotiation. In one set of interviews Potter and Wetherell (1988) questioned onlookers of riots which occurred during demonstrations by anti-apartheid campaigners protesting about the 1981 Springbok rugby tour of New Zealand. Onlookers, as subjects, had the task of accounting for the violence and conflict they observed. Potter and Wetherell draw from these accounts a number of different versions of 'the self' which subjects drew on. Potter and Wetherell isolate three of these versions: the idea of 'the ordinary person' (applicable to the police) the idea of the 'genuine' demonstrator and the idea of the demonstrator whose motives are 'not genuine': an example of a New Zealander's accounting device which Potter and Wetherell call 'the stirrer'.

The work of Widdicombe (1993) provides another example of the discursive opportunities offered by social identification. In her study of how young people accounted for the way they became 'gothic', the wearing of black clothes, leather jackets, dramatic eye makeup and long black hair, Widdicombe revealed that her subjects were able to manipulate discourse terms relating to identity to achieve specific effects. She interviewed a number of people at rock concerts, asking them how they came to belong to this specific 'subculture'. Her interest was in the dilemma which questions about identity posed for such individuals. It would, for example, be relatively straightforward for her subjects to construe their own social identity in terms of the social groups which their clothing seems to make salient - the goths. But simple identification with goths as a group is potentially problematic: in being thought of as the sort of person who merely copies a trend. Widdicombe isolated three aspects of the accounts given by her subjects which address this potential problem for the account givers, and shows that the accounts people offered of themselves as goths were designed to avoid any inference that they became gothic to copy others.

Widdicombe (1993) noted that these accounts were carefully designed to avoid the problematic inference of copying by 'negotiating' the existence of similar others. Subjects achieved this by emphasising that their own dressing as gothic occurred before meeting others who dressed in that way, and indeed their own choice of dress arose in ignorance of the existence of others who did likewise. What this suggests is that in providing accounts of oneself, an individual can be seen to use such accounts to construct a social identity. Moreover, as Widdicombe shows, these accounts can be tailored to resolve difficulties which individuals may perceive in their account of self. In the Widdicombe example, the problem for the subjects is to maintain a sense of individuality and to avoid been seen as 'part of the herd'. The subjects' discursive solution was to establish by means of their accounts differences, as well as similarities, between self and relevant others. This shows that, from the discourse analytic perspective, there is a sense in which people can

self-ascribe categorisations while, at the same time, avoid all of the implications which go with those categorisations. To this extent, the categorisations employed in depicting the self are not fixed external phenomena, but rather are account-generated constructions.

What most of forms of discourse analysis agree upon, then, is the idea that discourse cannot be regarded as a neutral medium which merely reflects an objective reality. Instead, discourse is regarded as a topic for analysis in its own right, with the assumption that features of the social world, as understood by actors within that world, are socially constructed phenomena. People draw selectively from a range of discursive resources in order to provide a 'version' of the social phenomenon under discussion. Further, the discourse analyst claims that, as social actors, we only have access to social phenomena in terms of such 'versions'. For us, the social world is constructed by our discursive practices (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). In considering questions of self-hood and identity, the discourse analyst examines the ways in which people develop constructive accounts of their own identities in order to negotiate whatever identity problems may arise in the local discursive context.

In common with Widdicombe's goths, arts professionals have an identity problem. They are associated with a form of art which is under-valued and against which they may be suspected of bias. The question of how the arts professionals make use of discursive resources in responding to this identity problem is explored in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 which follow.

Section 5.3 addresses a problem acknowledged by the arts profession: the lack of proper representation of women in the arts. Of course, one potential explanation for this state of affairs is to assume that women's art is perceived, by those whose responsibility it is to support the arts, as inferior to men's art. The difficulty in adopting this explanation, for those working in the arts, is that the arts profession is presented as essentially biased. In section 5.3 which follows, arts professionals

comment on their working relationship with women artists and women's art. It can be seen that in so doing they avoid any appearance that they, as arts professionals, view women's art as lacking in merit. Instead, the lack of success of women's art is seen to arise out of a number of objective or societal features or out of personal features of women artists themselves.

In Section 5.4, the focus of attention switches to the idea of women only arts events. If women artists are perceived to suffer from a pervasive public prejudice, then one possible resolution of this might be forms of positive discrimination such as arts events in which only women could take part. The various responses of the arts professionals to this idea are presented. It is shown that these responses are carefully crafted to avoid imputations of personal prejudice. Among men, this is seen in the way they formulate *rejections* of the idea that women's arts events should be staged. Among women, it is seen in the way they formulate *acceptance* of the idea that women's art events should be staged.

5.3 Women Artists and Women's Art

The current section presents data taken from a series of interviews with men and women who are employed within the arts profession. The interview protocol and its rationale are presented in Appendix V. During these interviews, the arts professionals were asked whether they 'had a position' on women's arts. The question which subject's responses pose is: do arts professionals attend to matters of identity when they talk about women's art? That is, when subjects talk about women artists, do they frame their replies in such a way that they can be seen to orient to the interviewer's questions in a given way. Specifically, do the subjects hear the question as a potential accusation of bias against women artists in that they spontaneously generate accounts which can be seen to defuse potential accusations of bias.

One feature of the following extracts which is especially worthy of note is the gendered status of the accounts on offer. Male arts professionals are seen to

provide accounts which differ markedly in from those offered by female arts professionals. This is, perhaps, not surprising. When dealing with the issue of whether women artists are subjects of biased treatment by the arts establishment, male arts professionals are faced with a doubly problematic issue. They have to deal with the question of whether they may be perceived as biased against women artists because they, as arts professionals are part of the arts establishment. Additionally, they have to deal with the possible perception of themselves as biased against women artists because they are men. As the extracts show, this double jeopardy causes the male arts professionals to provide carefully constructed accounts in response to the question of whether they 'have a position' on women artists.

When male arts professionals were asked the question: 'Do you have a position in relation to women artists?', they tended to produce one or other of two responses, both explicitly oriented to the question of whether the subject himself is in any way prejudiced against women artists. The first sort of response explicitly sets out a non-prejudicial approach to women. The second sort of account includes an explicit admission of some sort of gender prejudice or imbalance.

Male arts professionals: 'non-prejudice' accounts

The first sort of account is typified by an expression of non-prejudice which is supplemented by a description of specific example of provision made for a woman artist. This non-prejudiced practice is depicted as occurring in an unplanned fashion, rather than as the result of a specific position or policy.

Bob (A position) within my work here there are women artists who I work with from time to time one is the person who is writing our community musical and another is on our staff and is the development worker for the centre so I don't have a position in relation to

Int. In relation to women artists

Bob Well, I mean, I don't see any difference between women artists and men artists everyone ought to get the same opportunities

Tim We don't have views as such other than that we use them a lot both in

terms of actually on the acting side we have used them and we have also used women extensively for designers, lighting designers and directors over the last few years although we don't I suppose have a set policy it is something that I think is inherent we are kind of very open we basically go for the best people and they often happen to be women

Jon It is difficult to define a position in respect of women artists in particular I like to think that women artists are part of the spectrum of artists whether musical or visual arts or whatever and so in a way I try not to discriminate between the two at the moment this exhibition up here is by a woman and in fact most of our visual arts exhibitions here are female but that is not by any means a particular policy it is just how it happens

All three extracts display a similar form. Each of the extracts contains an expression of non-discrimination against women artists. In each case, this is amplified by a listing of the involvement of women within the subject's own workplace. Bob points out that 'There are women artists who I work with from time to time' and Tim emphasises 'actually on the acting side we have used them and we have also used women extensively for designers, lighting designers and directors'. Similarly, Jon states that 'At the moment this exhibition up here is by a woman and in fact most of our visual arts exhibitions here are female'. This carefully described lack of discrimination is depicted as a following naturally from the nature of the art and artists with which the subject has been involved, rather than from explicit policy or personal viewpoint.

What these accounts share, then, is a commonly held interpretation of the question, by subjects, in terms of whether as arts professional they are biased against women. Subjects also adopt a common means of resolving this perceived threat to identity. They demonstrate that they themselves are unbiased, a fact which can be 'read off' from their explicitly specified support for women artists.

Male arts professionals: 'prejudice' accounts

The following accounts can be contrasted with the more complex responses produced by male subjects who *do* express some form of discriminatory practice or

viewpoint. The accounts also orient to the question in such a way that the subject can be seen to interpret it as a question about bias against women artists. In these cases, however, the subject admits to some form of bias, but this admission is carefully formulated by setting the description of bias within the context of an explicitly un-biased general position or policy. So whereas male professionals who describe themselves as unbiased describe themselves as acting without the need for specific policies, those who admit to some type of bias explicitly contrast this with a more general un-biased policy which they describe themselves as adhering to.

Rob Yes in the sense I have views on women artists yes definitely the centre has an ethos statement you may or may not know which really demands we programme a broad range and that we get all the community involved and that we get everything as much as we can involved in the arts and we're supposed to pile everything in so you know we tend to kind of look at ethnic minorities and involve women as far as possible but I think I'm aware that we don't have as high an input of women's groups as we should have I think I'm aware that there's a question mark over this centre's attitudes to women as a whole

Ken Professional first I think you are as good as your last venture in terms of this here we have now particularly in the administration more female members of staff than male that has not been absolutely deliberate in terms of positive discrimination although I think that there has been a tendency towards that I think that is very healthy I think it has been very good that we now have young women in the staff here beginning to come into quite important and influential positions and I think that has been a good thing and I think we should have more of that I mean somebody for example recently said well the next job that comes up it would be good if it was a man it would balance out the fact that there are a lot of women here I don't disagree with that but if pushed I think I would feel and now I suppose I am veering from the professional into the personal as well but I think it is both I would say anyway I would rather it was a woman I feel as though that is a good thing to have and I think it has brought a different way of working this is said against a background of course where the senior management here the people the four directors three artistic directors and me are all men so I think it is against that background that I am saying this

Dan do I have a position in relation to women artists I suppose I put my position as this that as far as I possibly can I don't recognise any sectors of discrimination whatever the basis of the person might be whether they are male or female whether they are black or white whether they

are homosexual or heterosexual as far as I am concerned I try and offer that service now I recognise and I try to be honest about this that particularly from my age grouping there are certain in-built prejudices but my attitude to prejudices is that you don't pretend that they don't exist you confront them and challenge them within yourself so I suspect that built into me and it comes out occasionally through signals like words or perhaps slightly patronising attitudes that I have got an in-built attitude of my age and culture I am conscious of that and I fight it

In each of these cases, the subject ends his reply by admitting some form of discriminatory practice or viewpoint. However, in these cases, the reply is prefaced by an extended description of how that discriminatory reply should be seen against a positive institutional or personal policy of *non-discrimination*. For example, Rob begins his response to the question with 'Yes in the sense I have views on women artists. Yes definitely. The centre has an ethos statement'. Ken makes a somewhat more tentative start in identifying a policy: 'That has not been absolutely deliberate in terms of positive discrimination although I think that there has been a tendency towards that'. However, he then provides a relatively extended positive evaluation of that tentatively stated policy: 'I think that is very healthy. I think it has been very good I feel as though that is a good thing to have'. Dan also provides an explicit policy statement which emphasises his non-discriminatory stance: 'I suppose I put my position as this that as far as I possibly can I don't recognise any sectors of discrimination'.

Once again, subjects can be seen to interpret the question asked as involving some form of implication of biased practice. However, in these cases, the potential threat to the subjects' own identities as unbiased arts professionals is dealt with in a different way. By providing an admission of some sort of gender bias or imbalance which is embedded within an explicitly non-biased policy statement, they are able to present themselves as people who are in general un-biased, even if in particular contexts their practice might appear to suggest otherwise.

Female arts professionals: historical and structural accounts

For female arts professionals, the question: 'Do you have a position in relation to women artists?' can be seen to carry different implications than was the case for male arts professionals. Most importantly, there can be no implication for female professionals that they are prejudiced against women artists because they are men. This result of this is that women's responses take on a quite different character from the responses of the men. None of the women interprets this question as associated with direct bias or prejudice, in that none of them offers explicit formulations of either un-biased or biased activities or policies. However, a number of the women subjects still orient to the question as requiring an explanation for the low status of women artists and women's art. These responses comprise two sorts of accounts. The low status of women artists and women's art is seen to derive either from generalised historical and social biases, as is shown below, or from psychological difficulties among women artists themselves, as is shown in the next sub-section.

In the 'generalised historical and social biases' responses, women subjects can be seen to regard the question as in some way requiring explanation for the low status of women artists. As was the case with the male subjects, the female arts professionals attempt to address this issue in such a way that they, themselves, are not responsible for the low status of women artists. Instead, this low status is depicted as the outcome of large scale social pressures.

Sue Basically a questioning (position) where are they what happened to them over the centuries my other particular position in life as it were if you could say something like that would be actually black issues and historical issues in general and I would love to think that all three were compatible but the whole point is as far as I am concerned women's issues women's rights and women's positions have over the centuries been abused and misused and in that process women have become marginalised inclusive of women artists.

Kay I find that quite a difficult statement if someone was to ask me do I see myself as a feminist I would say yes certainly I think it is a historical fact I don't think it is opinion that women artists and women's art has

been defined and written over the centuries and been excluded women's cultural and artistic products that is what I am saying

Mae Well I think well we'll start with women artists in general artists right across the arts I felt that things are improving in terms of their credibility but I think they're probably not improving this is my own opinion in terms of their availability as it were for instance opportunities to show what they can do and there's still a great deal of suspicion when women artists can get together collectively as a group or as a people sort of class like oh this is feminist theatre which is feminist art and somehow or other we have less credibility

Pat I have to say that (a position in relation to women artists) is not foremost in my thinking about the arts but having said that I have come to believe that women artists are not to the fore because they are women artists as opposed to anything to do with their art it's difficult to generalise I suppose but I would say that given the quality of a woman's work would equal that of a male counterpart she would probably have to struggle a great deal harder to have her work exhibited and taken seriously

In each of these responses, the subject can be seen to treat the question as one which calls for an explanation of the way in which women artists and women's art are treated by the arts establishment. The form of account which this generates allows the subject to demonstrate that bias against women's art arises because, as Sue states, 'women's positions have over the centuries been abused and misused' and because, according to Kay, 'women artists and women's art has been defined and written over the centuries and been excluded'. In a similar vein, Mae refers to lack of availability of opportunities for women artists compounded by 'a great deal of suspicion when women artists can get together' while Pat casts the problem with women's art as: '(a woman) would probably have to struggle a great deal harder (than a man)'. As was the case with the male arts professionals, these responses provide the subject with a means of tackling the thorny issue of the low status of women artists and women's art. In addition, the nature of the responses establish that as practising arts professionals, they themselves need not be regarded as biased against women artists.

Female arts professionals: psychological accounts

A second form of accounting is provided by some of the other women arts professionals. Here again, the women demonstrate an interpretation of the question as touching on the low status of women artists and women's art. Once more, the explanatory accounts provided allow subjects to display that the cause of this low status is not associated with their own practices as arts professionals.

Pam I don't (have a position in relation to women artists) I haven't in the past identified artists by their sexuality by their gender I think I am becoming increasingly aware of the professional limitations of being a female artist not particularly me at the moment because I don't feel I am in the midst of I am not really interested in the gallery and the scrabbling for exhibitions any of these things at the moment so perhaps I am not immediately responsive to it but I see it in other people's lives and I see it in the activities of female friends who are working artists when I start to see that maybe their activities are curbed by gender

Int. could you elaborate

Pam well I am a particular sort of woman and I think that my lack of immediate concern with my own gender in terms of my profession is indicative of my own personality which is quite strong and I have never felt limited by my gender but I have friends who are perhaps more conventionally female or are different kinds of women from me and are givers and receivers of different kinds of gender messages and because they don't behave in the way perhaps I behave they are often on the receiving end of different forms of put-down restriction limitation just because they are women

Bet Well taking women artists and my position of thought I feel that women artists are definitely under-represented and they have a number of constraints put on them at a disadvantage in relation to males artists there's also I think great difficulty with women actually getting into and surviving in the commercial sector it is very much a man's world generally men have been better for whatever reasons social psychological to make something I suppose make their egos visible sell themselves as a personality because if you think about a well known contemporary Scottish arts there are very few women that would be considered household names you're continually seeing people interviewed and especially on television and it's exclusively a male predominance I think that is largely due to women not selling themselves or having the support to do so also career and job opportunities are more difficult for women especially if they are considering having a family

In these responses, the women provide an explanation for women artists' lack of success in terms of the psychological properties of women who are artists. Pam contrasts her own 'strong' personality with that of others: 'I have friends who are perhaps more conventionally female or are different kinds of women from me and are givers and receivers of different kinds of gender messages'. Bet explains women artists' lack success by saying that 'I think that is largely due to women not selling themselves'. In Bet's case, this account is accompanied by a structural account of the sort seen in the preceding section. So, just as with the other women's historical and structural accounts, this appeal to women artists' own weaknesses allows the subject to provide an explanation for women artists lack of success which avoids any imputation of blame to themselves as practising arts professionals.

5.4 Women's Arts Events

If women artists are perceived to suffer from biased treatment by the arts administrative establishment, then one possible response might lie in forms of positive discrimination such as arts events exclusively for women. Accordingly, another question asked of the subjects was 'What is your position in relation to women's arts events'. This question is also seen to pose potential problems for arts professionals in terms of their ability to present themselves as unbiased practitioners. When a subject rejects the idea of women's only arts events, this rejection of positive discrimination in favour of women might be interpreted as prejudice against women's art. It follows that subjects who respond negatively might be expected to treat a negative reply as an accountable issue. However, once again a gender difference is discernible in subjects' replies. Women do not appear to regard this rejection of positive discrimination in favour of women artists as an accountable issue, whereas men do.

Female professionals reject women's arts events

Where women subjects reject women's arts events, they provide replies which display relatively simple structures with no specific accounting for the rejection of

such events. The simple structure of women's rejections can be seen in the following responses.

Deb we have never done (women's arts events) we have never presented anything that was specifically for women

Int. have you had for example a play or a production which had an entire cast of women

Deb no

Gil no I don't (have a position in relation to women's arts event)

Int. could you expand on that

Gil well why do women want to be exclusive like that is it because they think they have been so badly done by before I don't think that having women only events is going to change anything like that

Male professionals reject women's arts events

When male subjects reject women's arts events, their rejections are usually carefully designed and are more elaborate. A possible reason for the nature of these responses is that men treat rejection of women's arts events as accountable in a way that women do not. That is, men face the two-fold difficulty which was first seen in relation to their responses to women artists: their replies might be interpretable as doubly prejudiced against women artists because they are both arts professionals and men.

The male subjects can be seen to address two distinct issues in structuring their negative responses. The first is a demonstration of some sort of support for such events. The second is to provide an account of why, nevertheless, such events are undesirable. Male subjects, as demonstrated in the extracts which follow, can be seen to adopt a particular approach to these issues which has three components. The first is a neutral or even positive evaluation of women's arts. The second is a statement of personal involvement or support which outlines prior occasions on which the subject has been involved in supporting women's art. The third is a rejection of women's arts events, where women's events are compared with other forms of 'minority' interest which are depicted as problematic in some way. For example they remove the minority from the 'mainstream' or leave the minority in a 'sideline', 'ghetto' or 'special interest' domain.

By drawing upon these three components to develop a response to the question 'What is your position in relation to women's arts events', male subjects are able to reject such events while demonstrating that this is not associated with any personal bias on their part against women artists.

Dan no I can't think of any positioning on (women's arts events) I remember for instance here at the New Theatre a few years ago now that is substantially a women's play Dina had one of the actresses staying with me during its run so no I don't sense that to be honest let me turn it the other way if it is a question of a sort of overt feminist performance which I haven't seen much of I do have a sort of residual irritation as I do about gay performances as I do about any performance that is ideological my worry is that people who are involved in those areas risk creating a ghetto for themselves

Jon D we have from time to time had women's evenings here and I think that in some ways that can be a good thing because in some sectors of art women are under-represented for example we had something called a celebration of women week which was a folk event which was very successful and it was a whole series of female performers but again I wouldn't want to ghettoise them by just having women's events because I think that is counter productive

Int. how do you categorise the difference between those whose concern it is to promote women's art as opposed to the arts in general

Jon D I don't know it is difficult to say it without sounding patronising but with any group who are promoting what they feel to be a minority whether it is ethnic minorities or women or disabled they can tend to take a more aggressive stance than the others and sometimes that can be counter-productive for people who are trying not to discriminate

Jon T women's arts events I am quite happy that the organisations I work with should host them perhaps I should just go back to in the late seventies when I was working with a company which was hosting or hosted the first lesbian and gay pride festival in London and quite a lot of the company were involved in radical politics of a sexual nature women's or gay lesbian as it's now become and my position was always that it's for that organisation and for specific events aimed only at women it was not appropriate the general arts organisations should promote exclusive events but that organisations with a clear aim to raise consciousness or to develop specialist arts should handle the promotion of those events I think it's very confusing for a general arts organisation like this to promote one area rather than another

Jim right I suppose I would have to say as a general statement I don't like exclusivity generally in a way that I am not a great fan of for instance lesbian and gay film festivals because I think lesbian and gay films should form part of the mainstream of films now obviously there is an argument to say well until they do form it there is always going to be a need for those festivals and I can see the same argument applying to women's arts events I can't see it from our point of view because I generally believe that as a company we do embrace all kinds and sectors of society as well but I can see an argument where there are I am changing tack slightly but when I was in television at Granada there was a massive frustration that there were no women television directors I think there were probably two in the whole company and I often used to talk to women researchers and producers of which there were many but they never quite made that final step up to directors

The first three responses all show the same format. All three subjects begin their replies with an initially neutral evaluation. Dan claims 'No I can't think of any positioning on (women's arts events)'. Jon D. states 'We have from time to time had women's evenings here and I think that in some ways that can be a good thing' while Jon T. states 'Women's arts events I am quite happy that the organisations I work with should host them'. In each case, these neutral or even positive evaluations are followed by an account of personal support for women artists: 'I remember ... one of the actresses staying with me during its run' (Dan), 'For example we had something ... it was a whole series of female performers' (Jon D), 'Perhaps I should just go back ... women's or gay lesbian as it's now become' (Jon T.).

Having established certain facts about their own views and experiences, the three subjects then provide their final, negative evaluation in which women's art events are likened to problematic minorities. Thus Dan complains 'I do have a sort of residual irritation as I do about gay performances people who are involved in those areas risk creating a ghetto' In a similar vein, Jon D. suggests 'whether it is ethnic minorities or women or disabled, they can tend to take a more aggressive stance than the others and sometimes that can be counter-productive'. Similarly, Jon T argues that as far as women's, lesbian and gay events are concerned, it is

'not appropriate the general arts organisations should promote exclusive events' because 'I think it's very confusing for a general arts organisation like this to promote one area rather than another'

Jim's reply is similar to those of Dan, Jon T. and Jon D. in that it contains the same three structural elements, although on this occasion they appear in a different order. Jim begins with a rejection of women's arts events in which a comparison is drawn between women's arts events and lesbian and gay minorities which are characterised as problematic in that they 'should form part of the mainstream of films'. This is followed by a more positive evaluation: 'Now obviously there is an argument ... applying to women's events'. His reply concludes with a story of personal support for women: 'when I was in television ... I often used to talk to women researchers and producers'.

These three components - statement of positive evaluation, story of personal involvement and rejection by association with problematic minorities - therefore seem to comprise a distinctive form of response by means of which male subjects can reject women's arts events without giving the appearance of prejudice. Moreover, other male subjects can be seen to provide replies which contain at least two of these three elements.

Ken I personally I am answering all these questions as honestly as I can which may mean I am not answering them very well because I am not being regimented about my answers but I feel my instant reacting to (women's arts events) which is very instinctive is to turn off really that that's the kind of sidelining and kind of specialisation and making it separate in a way which isn't particularly helpful and will probably turn a lot of people off men and women I am not making a particular distinction there but I think because it does make a distinction it probably wouldn't engage people in art like sport arguably and there is a bigger question in sport if you watch the Olympics you think why are men and women running separately my son said why don't black people and white people run separately and I am sure he would not have asked that question unless he saw men and women and it leads to all sorts of things and in the arts that doesn't tend to happen I wouldn't be particularly in favour of introducing that

Len well I think (women's arts events) have played a very important role and may continue to do so in some areas but I don't think that a policy for women in the arts would be based around women's arts events my very first experience in arts administration was working with a four week festival of feminist art called living women which was ten years back now and you see I think that even ten years ago that still had a kind of breaking new ground kind of raising people's awareness function I think that I would feel that I would think much more carefully about involvement in an event like that at the time it seemed to be enough to say this is women artists let's go for it I think that has changed yes they have played a role they may still play a role but I think it has got to be very carefully thought through about what they are aiming to do are they still genuinely expanding opportunities and still raising consciousness in a positive way

Ken's reply begins with a negative evaluation: 'my instant reacting ..is to turn off really'. He then produces a version of the problematic minority comparison. In this version, the problematic status ('the kind of sidelining ... isn't particularly helpful') is likened to that of men and women in sport which is also depicted as potentially problematic or questionable ('there is a bigger question in sport ... you think 'why are men and women are running separately'). The problematic aspect of gender separation in sport is highlighted by contrasting gender divisions with racial distinctions where exclusivity is prohibited. Len's reply begins with an initial positive evaluation: '(women's arts event) have played an important role. This is followed by a rejection of women's arts events, although in this case the problematic minority comparison is absent. This rejection is followed, in turn, by a personal support story: 'My very first experience ... raising people's awareness function'.

So, overall, the suggestion here is that a number of the male arts professionals orient to the question 'What is your position on women's arts events?' as though their replies carry implications about bias against women's art. Specifically, in comparison with the women subjects, the men seem to regard their rejection of positively discriminatory women's only arts events as accountable. They deal with this by utilising a form of account in which rejection is accompanied by an, in

principle, acceptance of such events. They may supplement this ambiguity by providing a description of some event in the past in which they can be seen to have been personally supportive of women artists. In addition, male arts professionals may also provide explain their rejection by comparing women's arts events with other minority events which are, in some respect or another, problematic. By providing this detailed accounting work, male subjects are able to demonstrate that, contrary to what might have been inferred, their rejection of women's arts events is not an indication of bias against women artists on their part.

It was shown earlier that women arts professionals do not treat the rejection of women's arts events as an accountable issue, whereas male arts professionals do. One explanation suggested for this difference between male and female subjects is that, when men reject such events, they may regard such rejection as doubly problematic, in that they may be seen as prejudiced against women's art because they are arts professionals *and* because they are men. If there is something to this notion, then it might be predicted that an analogous effect will surface among those women and men who accept the idea of women's arts events. For in accepting the idea of women-only arts events, arts professionals might be accused of negatively discriminating against men artists. If this is indeed the case, it might be predicted that male arts professionals who support women's arts events, because they are in a similar position to women arts professionals who reject such events, will not regard such support as an accountable issue. That is, their support cannot be interpreted as negative discrimination against men artists on the grounds of bias against the opposite sex. However, female arts professionals who express support for women's arts events, because they are in a position analogous to that of male arts professionals who reject such events (in that they might be construed as showing prejudice towards the opposite sex), may be expected to regard their support for such events as an accountable issue. In fact, the evidence from the interviews suggests that some effect of this sort does indeed occur. Men who express support for women's arts events do not regard this as an accountable issue, while women who express such support do.

Male professionals accept women's arts events

In the extracts which follow, male arts professionals can be seen to provide relatively simple responses when asked 'What is your position in regard to women's arts events'.

Jim well I think we touched on that earlier I really had an input in the programming here because I personally would bring them much more to the fore it so happens that in the coming Spring season we have one event in the studio run by a female touring artists group and we have another event which is in the next season which is again run by an all women theatre

Bob women only arts events I wouldn't see any problem although we have never had any women only arts events well no that is not true there is our group called women together a well woman project and I know they had some anger workshops in the arts centre where they used percussion instruments so that was women only and oh I am forgetting there was also a women's voice workshop and that was for women only so these things happen there is no difficulty with them being able to happen

These replies display the same sort of simplicity which female arts professionals displayed when responding negatively to the same question. One interesting difference is that both Jim and Bob include short descriptions of actual instances of supporting women artists. In this respect, these responses are similar to the 'non-prejudice' replies in connection with women artists which were described earlier.

Female professionals accept women's arts events

When female arts professionals respond to the 'women's arts events' question, their replies can be seen to involve more elaborate accounts than the positive replies of the men. The female arts professional's replies show a complexity of accounting which is similar to replies from male subjects expressing rejection of the idea of women's arts events.

One type of account that can be seen to accompany female subject's acceptances of women's arts events makes use of the notions of comfort or support. In these accounts, women's arts events are seen as necessary because they allow women to provide a type of support among themselves which redresses the problematic status of women working in the arts. The following extracts show the way this type of account is used to frame the subject's acceptance of women's arts events.

- Ivy I can imagine that (women's arts events) would be valuable within certain communities where you have women who do find it inhibiting to get involved in a discussion for example about art or issues or whatever if they are in a mixed group I mean there will obviously be certain exhibitions plays etc which deal with subjects such as rape for example where women might be more comfortable to discuss the issues raised by the artworks in an all women's group
- Pat from a community point of view I believe there's a role (for women's arts events) because it I suppose there's a certain amount of security for a woman attending a woman only event they would feel safer if it's about dipping your toe in the water to see whether that's something that you want to get involved in or are you talking about women that haven't been engaged in the arts before
- Jan again through my job and through the district council's equal opportunities policies we always run a programme of women's events for international women's week and I'm responsible for the women's arts events and section of that programme and it's something I feel very committed to it's often a case of it's women's arts events but really the aim of promoting women's arts events is to enable women to be comfortable and to come to an activity and which they can directly relate to as women

These three extracts demonstrate that women subjects treat support for women's arts events as an accountable issue. In each case, the positive evaluation of women's arts events is accompanied by an explanation, couched in terms of comfort or support, which shows that they provide help and security for those taking part. Thus, Ivy describes certain communities where women might feel inhibited and contrasts these with women only events where 'women might be more comfortable to discuss the issues raised by the artworks'. In a similar fashion, Pat suggests 'there's a certain amount of security for a woman attending a

woman only event. They would feel safer'. Jan echoes this theme by arguing that 'really the aim of promoting women's arts events is to enable women to be comfortable'.

A second form of account which female subjects offer to demonstrate the necessity of women's arts events is a mirror image to the 'ghetto-ising' account offered by male subjects in rejection of women's arts events. In the male subject's accounts, removal from the artistic mainstream is portrayed as a problematic consequence of adopting women's arts events. In the female subject's responses, women's arts events are seen as a solution to the pre-existing and problematic status of women's art.

Kit I think it goes back to the women artists the need to highlight women's position in the art world as a whole and I think there should be more of it and more women should get together I think women are very easily left to sort of feel that that is their place and that they are quite happy with them maybe their expression is sort of dormant and this would provide a great opportunity to put a lot of women to express themselves and maybe bring about a change or open a few more doors because I think that women tend to be very isolated

Sue again I feel that because women in general have been so marginalised I feel that within the position of women women artists have been marginalised to such a degree that there is a need for women's arts events then of course you have the counter argument that well why not men's arts events then you have to go through the whole baggage of explaining that even in theory been open all these years they have been dominated or marginalised and all this type of thing by the men so yes you need women's things

Pam I don't know that much about (women's arts events) because as I say I have not had my consciousness particularly raised and I have not wanted to either but I have just recently become aware of the limitations as I say and I can see a political argument for women only events in as much as they draw attention to the plight of women trying to get their work exhibited I don't think it should be an aesthetic limitation if that's the only way they can get to show their work is by having this theme behind them or if it's a thing that supports the way they work then well and good I haven't as yet become involved in that but I am thinking about it seriously

Once again, female arts professionals who support women's arts events can be seen to regard such support as an accountable issue. In these cases, the account offered is a 'solution-to-existing-problems' account which pictures such events as a remedy for existing problems. Kit claims that women's arts events might resolve the difficulty that 'women are very easily left to sort of feel that that is their place and that they are quite happy with them. Maybe their expression is sort of dormant'. Sue argues that 'women artists have been marginalised to such a degree that there is a need for women's arts events', while Pam suggests 'I can see a political argument for women only events in as much as they draw attention to the plight of women trying to get their work exhibited'.

A number of female subjects' responses to the question about women's arts events make use of both the comfort or support account and the solution-to-problems account.

Kay So it is events specifically put on for women yes I think there is definitely a place for that because in all areas of life I think that women can feel that it is quite difficult to be confident in a situation with a lot of people who are supposedly artists or in a kind of mixed audience certainly the kind of work we are doing here at arts in newtown it is about bringing in people who don't have that precious or who do actually have that precious idea about arts in that they feel excluded that the arts is something quite elitist and quite difficult and only certain people usually men can become involved

Bee well I suppose they have a very important place as far as I am concerned they have an important place in terms of encouraging women who might not normally go along to a mixed event because they don't feel confident enough to do that or because it doesn't interest them it is probably quite relevant that there are events there specifically for women run by women and participated in by and for women I think that is important in terms of the ladder of confidence and enabling and facilitating and I think with the same token it does come in for criticism in terms of men saying that they have a reputation for either being sexually motivated events and it does create a bit of a closed shop attitude and that in some respects needs to be overcome so that people understand exactly why an arts event is happening for women only and I think that message is not put across strongly enough

Bet I have mixed feelings about that actually I think that women should be given more opportunities and there should be various ways in which art galleries or local authorities should take more positive action to facilitate women artists if for example a woman isn't able to a woman artist aren't able to actually produce enough work to fill a gallery space because they're mums or they are working part time whatever there should be more of an opportunity for small group exhibitions and that should be encouraged I think the problem is with women's arts events is that it can give the wrong impression to people coming along to it the public can often view that as being feminist or somehow exclusive and perhaps positive discrimination isn't the answer in all cases I think it's also on the other hand it can be very beneficial to participants because they are meeting and working with women who are perhaps from very similar backgrounds facing similar problems or have done in the past and there can be a lot of interchange and advice and I think that's very important

Kay initially explains her support for women's arts events in terms of comfort or support: 'women can feel that it is quite difficult to be confident' and then expands on this by arguing that such events encourage those who have 'that precious idea about arts in that they feel excluded, that the arts is something quite elitist'. Bee describes the role of women's arts events firstly as a means of redressing the problem of women's exclusion, by 'encouraging women who might not normally go along to a mixed event'. She then argues that they would help those who are not 'confident enough to do that' and claims that such events are 'important in terms of the ladder of confidence'. Bet depicts women artists as prevented from normal artistic output ('because they're mums or they are working part time whatever') a problem which is resolved by providing 'more of an opportunity for small group exhibitions'. She concludes by suggesting, in comfort or support terms, that 'it can be very beneficial to participants because they are meeting and working with women who are perhaps from very similar backgrounds facing similar problems or have done in the past and there can be a lot of interchange and advice'.

The question posed earlier was whether arts professionals attend to matters of identity when they talk about women's art. It was surmised, in addition, that, as

arts professionals, subjects might orient to questions about women artists and women's art events as a potential accusation of bias in their professional practice. The answer to this question appears to be a qualified 'yes'. In talking about women artists and women's arts events, the subjects can be seen to tailor their responses so that potential claims of bias cannot be levelled against them.

The qualification of this 'yes' answer rests in the fact that there also appears to be a gender effect in the accounting practices of the subjects. Men interpreted the question about women artists as a question about their own practices and whether those practices were discriminatory. In their replies, men subjects showed that they regarded admissions of discriminatory events as accountable affairs, but did not treat expressions of non-discrimination as similarly accountable. Women did not interpret the same question in terms of their own discriminatory or non-discriminatory practices. But women did display an orientation to the question which revealed that they understood it to be addressing the wider question of the status of women artists. In their replies, they provided carefully crafted accounts which located the explanation of women artists' problematic status within either socio-historical contexts or within psychological properties of women artists. The outcome of these accounts is that potential implications of bias in the arts administrative process itself were diffused.

A similar gender disparity arose in connection with women's arts events being viewed as accountable. For men, it is an accountable issue when they offer a negative evaluation of women's arts events. It is not a similarly accountable issue when they express support for women's arts events. For women, it is an accountable issue when they express support for such events but it is not an accountable issue when they reject such events. The suggestion here has been that men's rejection accounts are specifically designed to avoid imputation of negative bias against women artists. Women's acceptance accounts, on the other hand, are specifically designed to avoid imputation of positive bias towards women artists.

So it appears from these interviews with arts professionals that they do perceive a relationship between their own identities as arts professionals and the way they are perceived to deal with women's art. In their accounting practices, they address the perceived low levels of support which the arts establishment provides for women artists. However, they are careful to ensure that these accounts are such that explanations for low levels of support do not endanger their own identities as arts professionals.

5.5 Summary and Conclusions

This chapter began with a discussion of how arts professionals' sense of self might be empirically explored. It was argued that, in cases where social identity is related to issues of low status and bias, discourse analysis represents a valuable analytic perspective from which to make sense of identity. A review of different approaches to discourse analytic research was offered, with a particular emphasis on the study of accounts. The analysis of interview data which followed showed that the arts professionals interviewed displayed a number of accounting practices in making out a sense of self. By carefully constructing the accounts which they offered in response to questions about women's art and women artists, they were able to offer answers which demonstrated that, whatever the general status of women in the arts may be, they themselves were not biased or prejudiced towards women's arts. In this sense, their accounts can be seen as masterpieces in discursive constructions of identity.

The accounts which the subjects offered varied depending on whether the subject was male or female. This appeared first in connection with women artists. Men interpreted the question about women artists as a question relating to their own practices and whether those practices were discriminatory. In their replies, they showed that they regarded admissions of discriminatory events as accountable affairs, but did not treat expressions of non-discrimination as similarly accountable. Women did not interpret the same question in terms of their own discriminatory or non-discriminatory practices. But they did display an orientation to the question

which revealed that they understood it to be addressing the wider question of women artists' status. In their replies, they provided carefully crafted accounts which located the explanation of women artists' problematic status within either socio-historical contexts or within psychological properties of women artists. The outcome of these accounts is that potential implications of bias in the arts profession were diffused.

A similar gender disparity arose in connection with women's arts events as accountable. For men, it is an accountable issue when they offer a negative evaluation of women's arts events. It is not a similarly accountable issue when they express support for women's arts events. For women, it is an accountable issue when they express support for such events but it is not an accountable issue when they reject such events. The suggestion here has been that men's rejection accounts are specifically designed to avoid imputation of negative bias against women artists. Women's acceptance accounts, on the other hand, are specifically designed to avoid imputation of positive bias towards women artists.

In summary, then, it appears from these interviews with arts professionals that they do perceive a relationship between their own identities as arts professionals and the way they are perceived to deal with women's art. In their accounting practices, they address the perceived low levels of support which the arts establishment provides for women artists. They are careful, however, to ensure that these accounts are so designed that explanations for such low levels of support do not endanger their own identities as arts professionals.

The preceding analyses have dealt with issues of identity which centre on a single categorisation: the subject's role as arts professional. However, one of the strengths of the discourse analytic perspective is that it offers a method of dealing with multiple, overlapping categorisations. According to discourse analysts, one of the features of accounting practice is that people not only provide 'versions' of particular categorisations, they may also, if the local context requires it, provide re-

formulations of such categorisations which blur or remove apparently clear distinctions between one category and another. In Chapter Six which follows, the arts professionals can be seen to perform exactly this sort of re-negotiation in order to meet a particular goal: the presentation of self as arts professional and as a creative or artistic person. In the second part of Chapter Six, this sort of category re-formulation account is also seen in the different context of women artists explaining their role in the breaking-up of a women's arts group.

CHAPTER SIX

NEGOTIATING AN IDENTITY: CREATIVITY IN ADMINISTRATION AND DEALING WITH A GROUP SPLIT

6.1 Introduction

In the preceding chapter, it was demonstrated that subjects are able to deploy discursive procedures in order to maintain an unbiased version of their identity as arts professionals. Although the empirical approach taken was the fine grain analysis of episodes of discourse, the results of Chapter Five are, in a sense, sympathetic to both discourse analytic and self-categorisation approaches to identity. The subjects display a unified version of self, characterised as 'arts professional' and then attend to potential difficulties related to esteem which the categorisation might be seen to apply. However, one of the main arguments in favour of the discursive approach to identity (Antaki, Condor and Levine, 1996; Wetherell and Potter, 1992) is that the nature of identity is not always as unitary, within a given context, as social identity theorists and self-categorisation theorists might suggest. Accordingly, it is interesting to note cases where the discursive evidence suggests that people adopt a notion of identity which is more fluid or dependent on the immediate local context than might be easily encapsulated within either social identity theory or self-categorisation theory.

In the present chapter, the theme, 'fluid or context dependent identity' is pursued by analysing two data sets. The first data set, analysed in section 6.2, comprises the responses of arts professionals to the interview item which asked arts professionals if they saw themselves primarily as artists or as administrators. The second data set, analysed in Section 6.3 derives from interviews with subjects who originally were members of the same formally constituted women's organisation. The organisation had very recently suffered a major schism the result of which was that members re-distributed themselves across two organisations: Women in Action and Women into the Future. To reflect this change in the circumstances

surrounding the interview component of the research, an additional question was added to the interview protocol (see Appendix V), in which members of the two organisations were asked to discuss issues relevant to the break-up of the original organisation and the formation of the two new organisations.

Thus, partly by design and partly as a result of circumstances, the interview period of the study provided an opportunity to explore one of the issues related to identity which marks out a clear theoretical difference between the social identity or self-categorisation approach and the discourse analytic approach. This is the question of whether people do display through accounts a fluid sense of self. A 'fluid' sense of self draws on categorisations of self and identity which are context-dependent and flexibly constructed to suit local goals. The 'fluid' sense of self can, therefore, be distinguished from the determinate sort of categorisation which is the mainstay of social identity theory and self-categorisation theory. The question is answered in section 6.2 where data taken from interviews in which subjects provide accounts of themselves is presented. Section 6.3 which follows presents data taken from the second set of interviews in which subjects present versions of the 'out-group' and of themselves in relation to that 'out-group' in providing explanations for the split in the Women in Action group.

6.2 The Creative Administrator

The data in the following extracts are taken from subjects' responses to the question 'Do you see yourself primarily as a practising artist or as an administrator'. Now it might be supposed that the question refers to two broad types of people and that subjects would have little difficulty in categorising themselves as belonging to one or other type. This is, for example, one of the central assumptions of self-categorisation theory: that people classify themselves according to relatively clear categories within specific contexts. The picture would seem even clearer because all of the subjects identified themselves at the start of the interview as being employed in an administrative role. Moreover, as the first

set of examples shows, some responses fit this 'simple categorisation' model relatively well:

- Pat primarily I see myself as an administrator facilitator if you like
- Rob primarily as an administrator
- Fay I am an administrator I would love to be an artist but I don't have the wherewithal or the time to do it I am definitely an administrator

However, in other cases, subjects can be seen to offer replies in which, although the response is apparently similar, the subject provides a blurring of the 'artist/administrator' categorisation. This discursive work turns on the way the subject orients to the question. A number of the subjects demonstrate through their responses that they view the 'administrator' label as in some way implying 'non-creative person'. This is perhaps not surprising, since a common stereotype of the administrator is of a boring person who spends his or her working life in a succession of dull and mundane 'office' chores. In their responses to the artist/administrator dichotomy question, the subjects show that they are aware of this possible interpretation of the 'administrator' label by spontaneously introducing into their answers accounts of themselves which demonstrate that they are, in fact, creative people.

To achieve this, the subjects deploy one of several different discourse strategies. The first takes the form of an 'I am an administrator ...but' account, in which the subject accepts categorisation as an administrator (or accepts non-categorisation as an artist), but then proceeds to offer extra information to undermine the potential inference that he or she is not a creative person. The second strategy focuses on an 'Administration is creative' account and is employed by some subjects to argue that the subject, in virtue of his or her job as an administrator, is a creative person. The third strategy involves a 'Too busy to be an artist' account in which the subject explains that although he or she is an administrator, he or she is still in principle artistic but is currently too busy to take part in artistically creative work.

'I am an administrator ... but' accounts

Examples of this first form of account are shown below. The common theme in these accounts is that each subject begins by accepting the artist/administrator distinction but then augments this with a self-description which emphasises creativity.

Jon T these days professionally entirely as an administrator although I am still involved from time to time in usually the amateur or semi-professional theatre companies as director devisor

Jon C I am an administrator primarily although I do also perform I am a singer and a choral conductor so I perform quite often

Sam I wouldn't consider myself to be an artist but I wouldn't necessarily exclude a creative consciousness

Ivy I see my job as having a creative side to it in terms of how I would put together exhibitions and present them but I don't practise as an artist

In all four replies, the subject accepts the 'administrator' label either explicitly or implicitly by rejecting the 'artist' label. However, the subject accompanies this with the inclusion of further information which functions to moderate the artist/administrator distinction on offer. Jon T. and Jon C. accept the 'administrator' categorisation but supplement this with the extra description of themselves as involved in artistic work at vaguely specified times ('from time to time' and 'quite often'). Sam suggests that not being an artist does not preclude 'a creative consciousness'. Ivy claims that her administrative job has 'a creative side'. What these examples demonstrate is that the subjects orient to the category 'administrator' in a specific way: being classed as an administrator might be taken to be the same thing as being classed as non-creative or not involved in artistic work. Having interpreted the question in this sense, each subject amends his or her own self-categorisation by including extra information about creativity or artistic interests. In this way, each subject is able to display that the two categories of

'artist' and 'administrator' are not as sharply defined as might have been thought in that being an administrator is consistent with being a creative or artistic person.

'Administration is creative' accounts

Other subjects challenge the artist/administrator distinction by means of a more complex form of account. Here, subjects offer a reformulation of the artist/administrator distinction which undermines the assumption that the two categories are either mutually exclusive or comprehensive in the following ways:

The subject offers some challenge to or reformulation of the artist/administrator distinction which is employed in the original question.

The subject formulates a 'creative administration' account in which a description of the subject's administrative tasks is used to demonstrate that administration involves creativity.

The subject uses this account to provide a picture of himself or herself as a creative person.

Una it's interesting because I think I originally thought of myself as an artist and its hard to get rid of that I mean I thought of myself originally as an actress and I still think I can do that and I still do sometimes but now I suppose I'm a mixture it's quite a nice job from that point of view because I create projects and carry them through so I have a creative part but I also have to administer

Bee well I am not really a practising artist in the sense of a visual artist or a performance artist my role is neither an administrator or a manager in the same context it's quite a difficult scenario my post is creative in as much as a lot of the work that we do is laid down in a plan through the leisure plan and also we have an arts policy and that arts policy has to be translated into creative outlet my role is obviously to administer the success of the arts policy as best I can, to manage the team that do that but I see my role as being creative an ideas person as well as management and administration

Una's response to the question is to challenge the apparent mutual exclusivity involved in the artist/administrator distinction. She describes herself as belonging

to both categories simultaneously ('I suppose I'm a mixture'). This perspective is supported by Una's 'creative administration' description of her administrative job as including the requirement to 'create projects'. She then concludes by suggesting that it follows from this description that she has 'a creative part'.

Bee's response is to deny that she is an artist, but to limit this denial to certain senses of the word ('not really a practising artist in the sense of a visual artist ...'). She then also denies that she is 'an administrator or a manager' and suggests that 'it's quite a difficult scenario'. Having challenged the apparent simplicity of the artist/administrator distinction, she then offers a 'creative administration' description of her job, claiming that her 'post is creative' and that it involves translating policy 'into creative outlet'. Her eventual conclusion is that she is 'being creative as an ideas person'. What both of these formulations provide for the subjects, then, is the ability to question the exclusive or comprehensive nature of the 'artist/administrator' distinction by claiming, on the basis of a description of job or post, to be both.

The following extracts show more extended versions of the same type of account.

Ken I don't think artist in the discipline in the artistic discipline sense that you paint you play music you act or you write or things like that I think creative might be a more appropriate word in that I think it is vital that people who organise or plan I suppose administrate is the way they approach that creative in the smaller artistic or narrow artistic sense in that they know if they are running a music centre how the music works and why it is important instruments are played in a certain way or why it is important that things are recorded in the acoustics and they understand the technical aspects of the discipline or how an actor needs time to learn lines or whatever it may be and creative as well in the more general sense in making connections between the wider aspects of life why theatre in the first place what its role is in the community how it relates to education how it relates to philosophy and ideas how a society should be run should a theatre be subsidised is it a priority for a district or regional council to have arts as part of its remit should it do that at arms length these kinds of questions I think are one which are creative and philosophical questions that I think you have to be able to address very freely and in a free-wheeling sort of way if you are going to be able to make a go of it really as an arts organiser arts manager or leisure manager or whatever you want to call it so I think while it is not

purely artistic it is creative in understanding the discipline you are working with and creative in relating that to the public sphere if you like

Len I see myself as a creative administrator I think my job is to try and bridge the administrative systems that are absolutely necessary to institutional survival and indeed sometimes personal survival and the modes and working of creative artists in whatever sphere whether it is visual or theatre or what have you are always trying to mediate that gap cover for the institutional requirements yet leave room for creative talent and development perhaps you can't do that unless you have a little bit of the artist somewhere inside yourself in order to keep questioning and brokering that the relationship between the sort of administrative and authority structures when fundamentally the arts are un-authoritarian and anarchic

Jim this job here all the jobs I have done I have always been fired by the knowledge that my best skills lay administratively but my interest also very much lies in the art if you like as well I see them both as going together it's that old cliché administrators always say this that administration can be creative too and within (name of a theatre company) I suppose because of the nature of this company we tend to work very much as a collaborative team so I have got much more of a creative input here and I suppose I act as a kind of producer in some ways for the shows so I have quite a large influence on the work we do in all areas of it in terms of our casting for example in terms of the plays we choose obviously the theatre director has the final say in the choosing but I am very much involved partly through my interest and partly because I think I should be as well as part of my job

Kay I would say that I am an arts administrator as well in a local authority setup however it doesn't really give much of an indication as to what I see my job as or I see myself actually doing I find that my work as a manager is very like the demands on any manager within the public sector and that's one whole other aspect of my work the arts bit can be quite a dilemma on occasion because you are not delivering a straightforward service like environmental health where they keep the streets clean and people know exactly what it is they want and what to expect and it's not straightforward a local authority job in the sense that you are responsible to the tax payers and that's it and because any one working as an administrator or arts manager has a responsibility to arts and artists and that can be quite a dilemma as you often find yourself in a position of people not actually wanting your product or not seeing it as something of a majority interest and it is forever juggling the issues or the ethics almost of what you are doing with public money are you just serving straight demands or are you somehow taking a patronising role and saying this is good for people or it is not so it is quite a difficult

one there is a lot of ethical issues there involved so I don't see myself straightforwardly as a manager or an artist but somehow as a combination of them all

Ken begins his response by providing a reformulation of the 'artist' category'. There is 'a sense' in which Ken could be said not to be an artist. He then contrasts this 'narrow artistic sense' with what he describes as being 'creative'. So just as with Una and Lynn, Ken's begins his response by providing a re-working of the meaning of the categories contained in the initial question. He then uses the 'creative administration' account to demonstrate that his administrative job has creative elements.. The creative administrator has to 'know how the music works' and know 'how an actor needs time to learn lines'. In addition, the administrator is creative in 'making connections between the wider aspects of life'. He then uses this account to support his claim that the administrator must be 'free-wheeling' and 'creative in understanding ... and relating that to the public sphere'.

Len begins his response with a direct challenge to the idea that the artist/administrator distinction is a genuine dichotomy by describing himself as a 'creative administrator'. He then develops a 'creative administration' account by means of the extended 'bridge' metaphor which ends with the claim that the administrator has to 'cover for the institutional requirement yet leave room for creative talent'. Len then uses this 'creative administration' account to draw the conclusion that for someone to accomplish this, 'you have a little bit of the artist somewhere inside yourself'. Thus, like Ken, Len is able to use his job description to draw a conclusion about being a creative person.

Jim also begins with a critique of the supposed distinction between artist and administrator. He claims that he sees them as 'both going together' and that 'administration can be creative'. He then moves on to provide a 'creative administration' account of his job, claiming that the theatre company works 'as a collaborative team' and that he has an influence on casting and choosing plays.

This description provides an explanatory backdrop to his claim that 'I have got much more of a creative input here'.

In the final example, Kay begins with a caveat about the artist/administrator distinction. She describes herself as an arts administrator but notes that this term 'does not give much of an indication as to what I see my job as'. She then provides a 'creative administration' account of her job in which she points out that arts administration is 'not delivering a straightforward service'. Instead, she argues, the arts administrator has 'a responsibility to arts and artists' and says that she finds herself 'saying this is good for people' which involves 'ethical issues'. She then uses this account to conclude that she is neither a manager nor an artist but 'somehow a combination of them all'.

'Too busy to be an artist' accounts

The third and final form of accounts which people deploy in answering the question of whether they are artists or administrators involves acceptance of the 'administrator' label. To this extent, it is similar to the earlier 'Yes I am an administrator ... but' account. However, unlike either of the earlier accounts, in the 'too busy to be an artist' account, the subject does not claim currently to be in some way artistic or creative. Instead, she provides a description of her current administrative job to demonstrate that while she is, in principle, an artist, in practice her administrative workload is so heavy that it prevents her from performing any artistic work.

Bet Fundamentally as an administrator and manager given the nature of the job here now which has changed so dramatically in the time that I've been here going from what was at least on paper fairly mundane administrative post to becoming what is for all intents and purposes a managing director there is a lot more responsibility and a lot more involved in the job it also requires in the region of sixty to seventy hours a week work and it just simply doesn't allow the opportunity of any of my own artistic activities to take place before I moved to Edinburgh I was involved in a band and also a dance ensemble which was my way of keeping in with those sorts of activities and it was very very satisfying and I hope eventually I'd be in a position to spare the

time to take up some more activities again but at the moment I am primarily a manager

Eva I would like to see myself as a practising artist but obviously more of my time is taken up doing administration so that tends to stay within the mind and override you when you are trying to do your own work and it has deadlines and obviously becomes a priority but I still think of myself as an artist designer and again the problems that occur with that with trying to do your own work eating into your time it's all sort of having to switch from one side of the brain using your design artist of the brain and then back to management administration side and to suddenly cut from one to the other is quite a difficult thing to do

Jet Doing this job is actually divided an awful lot of life's time than I thought I would have expected to do all the work when I was teaching I thought I didn't do a great deal of my own work I left college and went straight into being a lecturer but since I have come back the two and a half years I have been doing this job it has been a lot heavier job that I would have expected it at first but I have got very involved in it and I don't don't get a lot of time of my own I still see myself as a practising artist but I think that part of the creative side of me is put into creating exhibition and things like that as well and organising things I don't see it as being a completely separate activity

Bet begins her description of her administrative job by claiming that it has 'changed so dramatically' from a mundane job to a job with 'a lot more responsibility' which requires 'sixty to seventy hours a week'. She then uses this description to conclude that the job 'simply doesn't allow' her to carry out artistic activities. Thus, although she describes herself as having been 'involved in a band and a dance ensemble' she admits that she is 'at the moment' primarily a manager. By depicting her job as responsible and time-consuming, she is thereby able to admit that she is an administrator while, at the same time, suggesting that it is only the requirements of her job which prevent her from being involved in artistic work.

Eva begins her response by explicitly claiming to be a practising artist. However she then goes on to describe her job as involving 'more and more time ... taken up with administration'. The effect of this, she says, is that administration may 'stay within the mind and override you' when attempting to perform artistic work.

Because administration eats into time, she finds herself trying to 'switch from one side of the ... and then back' which she describes as a 'difficult thing to do'.

Like Bet and Eva, Jet pictures her administrative job as onerous, being both time consuming and 'a lot heavier job than I would have expected'. The consequence Jet draws is that because of the nature of her job she does not 'get a lot of time of my own'. Interestingly, Jet concludes her response by briefly adopting a 'creative administration' account. She claims that her 'creative side' is involved in creating exhibitions and that she therefore does not see a clear distinction between administration and creativity.

So what these analyses demonstrate is that the subjects are able to deal in a constructive manner with questions which directly address their identities as arts administrators. The question posed to them offered an explicit choice between being an artist and being an administrator. In response, the subjects generate replies which make use of either the 'I am an administrator ... but' account or the 'creative administrator' account or the 'too busy to be an artist account'. Theoretically, this means that, for the subjects, self-categorisation labels such as 'administrator' are not entities with fixed properties. Rather, they are flexible components of talk which allow the individual to perform discursive work in order to tailor the categorisation to suit his or her context-specific needs.

The conclusion drawn in the discussion will be that the analyses provided demonstrate that social categorisation are not the objective, fixed entities which social identity theory and self-categorisation theory might suggest. Before entering that discussion, however, it is worthwhile examining the nature of the flexibility of social categorisations more fully. The preceding analysis showed that two apparently inconsistent self-categorisations such as 'artist' and 'administrator' can be adapted to allow for a consistent formulation of self which contains elements of both categories. This, however, is not the only way in which people can demonstrate the flexibility of their social categories. Potter and Wetherell (1992)

have demonstrated that a similar flexibility can occur when people develop characterisations of other groups. In the analyses which appear in the following section, there is evidence of flexibility in the way two groups of people characterise one another. The characterisations arise in the context of asking people to explain a group split.

6.3 Explaining a group split

When the present study was envisaged, a number of those involved either as potential questionnaire subjects or as potential interview subjects belonged to a women's arts organisation. This organisation, Women in Action, whose aim was to promote women artists and women's art, had secured funding from a number of public bodies to present a series of high profile women's arts events at a major international arts festival. However, at a certain point in the group history, disagreements among group members arose which resulted in bifurcation of the group. Thus, during data collection phase of the study, the Women in Action group fragmented into two smaller groups, Women in Action and Women into the Future, which were, to some extent, competitors as advocates for women's arts. As a result, at the time of interview each subject belonged to one or other of a pair of competing women's art groups: Women in Action or Women into the Future. In response to this unforeseen development, it was decided to approach a number of those involved in order to gain from them accounts of how they saw the group split. The group-split data provided the opportunity to explore the extent to which discursive flexibility arose in contexts where people were providing characterisations of another group and of themselves in relation to that group.

The data presented below represents responses to the question 'How do you explain the split'. This question invited subjects to account for the schism in Women in Action. In their responses, the subjects provide explanations of this occurrence. These responses are grounded in characterisations of members of the group to which they *do not* belong and characterisations of their *own* group in relation to that *other* group. The out-group characterisations which Women in

Action Members and Women into the Future members provide are quite different, and yet the fundamental explanation for the split, blaming members of the other group, is the same in both cases. In providing these explanations, the subjects demonstrate the flexible way in which different accounts of others can be used in the performance of the same social action: establishing blame.

A simple 'gloss' on the explanations presented below would be that all of the subjects offer the same response. This apparent 'same' response could be described as the following. The split occurred because one sub-group within the original Women in Action group wanted to appoint a full time administrator rather than run the group's activities via a committee and the other sub-group did not. In consequence, those who did want to appoint a full-time administrator left Women in Action and forming a competing group called Women into the Future. However, analyses of the accounts provided demonstrates that this apparent similarity masks a more fundamental distinction between two quite different forms of explanation. The remaining Women in Action members mention the issue of a full-time administrator but deny it was the cause of the split. Instead, they locate the problem as a difficulty in the relationship between young and old members of the original Women in Action. The Women into the Future members, on the other hand, claim that the full-time administrator issue was the cause of the split and describe the difference between the two sub-groups as a difference between busy professional working women and women with impractical plans.

Women in Action Members

The first pair of extracts is derived from interviews with members of the Women in Action group.

Kim a lot of it seemed to centre around the issue of an administrator or not an administrator I think that was in a lot of words a red herring or you know it was just something a convenient hanger to hang on the more basic or fundamental differences between the two groups that eventually became Women in Action Women into the Future so once problems started to arise differences started to occur a meeting was

called the first major meeting of the three that happened to try and thrash out these differences and come to some kind of agreement between these two seemingly opposed factions I think to put it simplistically the women who actually came along to Women into the Future tend to be older tended to be in professional academic jobs and on the opposite side the women tended to be younger obviously all generalisation tended to be students tended to have a more so called radical approach to the structure of the organisation and what I term the grownups on the other side grownups particularly I think it was either in the first or the second meeting one of these women who actually went over to Women into the Future actually referred to us as the girls you know during the course of a debate well if the girls would just tell us exactly what it is they want you know we were put down as children these were the grownups who knew what they were what they were doing

Pat I remember at one of the meetings you know the women were talking about getting a co-ordinator and the older women seemed to be dominating it all the time and almost patronising the younger women's views the younger women seemed to be Women in Action I felt really patronised and they were talking about how we should get a co-ordinator who would deal with all the bureaucracy which is fair enough but then I remember I pointed out how good it would be for us a younger woman to learn how to do these things and I was completely patronised and I felt really degraded in way one of those women spoke back to me I mean it was like oh dear you can learn to do that yourself you can go in and see she just spoke to me as if I was a child and reinforced a lot of things that I was fighting against

Kim begins her reply by referring to the issue of whether Women in Action should have appointed a full-time administrator. She describes this as only the apparent cause of the split: 'it seemed to centre around the issue ... that was ... a red herring ... a convenient hanger'. She then introduces what she views as the real cause of the split, which was 'more basic or fundamental differences' between two groups. She then offers a characterisation of these two groups in terms of a young/old distinction and in terms of occupation. Having established this distinction, Kim then provides an adult/child reformulation of it: 'what I term the grownups on the other side'. The point of this reformulation is to highlight the way in which 'the grownups' treated the other group members as children: 'one of these women ... actually referred to us as girls'. Kim then concludes her account by pointing out that they were 'put down' by 'the grownups'.

Pat's response to the question about the split is similar in content to that offered by Kim. She begins by referring to the issue of the full-time administrator appointment and later points out that this was not a genuine cause of the split: 'they were talking about ... a co-ordinator ... which is fair enough'. She then draws a young/old distinction between the protagonists in the debate. As was the case in Kim's account, the older women are depicted as not treating the younger women as adults: 'the older women seemed to be dominating .. and patronising the younger women's views'. She explains that as a result of the discussion she felt patronised and degraded and concludes by introducing the same adult/child reformulation which Kim employed: 'she spoke to me as if I was a child' and points out that this was what she was fighting against.

What this account achieves for Kim and Pat, then, is to establish that the *apparent* cause of the split, debate over whether to employ a full-time administrator, was not the *actual* cause. Instead, problems arose because the older women treated the younger women as children in a patronising way. In this way, both Kim and Pat employ the same characterisation of the older women as patronising to explain the eventual split.

Women into the Future members

The following extracts are responses made by members of Women into the Future to the same question about why the split occurred. In these responses, the subjects refer to the full-time administrator appointment issue. However, in these responses, this is identified as the real cause of the split. Each subject then offers a characterisation of the members of the two groups to supplement this causal account. The reason the split occurred was that those who objected to the appointment were not professional working women and therefore had impractical ideas about matters of organisation.

Liz I would say it's political it took the form of a disagreement about organisation but I think in fact that comes down to a political split a

disagreement about the best way of organising ourselves whether the crunch came over whether we should have or even apply to have a paid up administrator in the organisation and the people and the women who were lining up some of those saying yes we should turned out to be the ones who actually went off to break away and form a separate organisation Women into the Future and the ones who said they didn't want a paid administrator remained in Women in Action in part I think it has to do with the difference between the sorts of women who are working in the performing arts would be clear that they would like an administrator because they never knew from one month to the next where they would be going to be even if they were going to be in the country it would therefore be a lot more difficult for them to organise a voluntary rota to keep the organisation going also I think the women who wanted a full time administrator there were a good number of us who as well as being the performers were in full-time jobs already like myself and who felt that it wasn't feasible to keep the organisation we planned to become going on this voluntary basis

Joe there came the point where we had a major disagreement as to how best to achieve the aim there were those of us who wanted someone to be actually doing the work that was going to be paid and recognised et cetera setting up projects which would enable other women to work and it seemed to me that those of us who were actively working and involved in setting up projects were the ones who felt we did not have the time to run an umbrella organisation as well we wanted an umbrella organisation which would support we would input into such an organisation but we didn't actually want to be going to meetings and really I think that where we diverged practically was that the ones who stayed as Women in Action felt that it should be democratic to the point where at every single individual who was involved in any way in any of the projects should be a member of the management committee and I personally felt that this was totally impractical

Zoe I think, you see, a lot of it was an age thing as well a lot of the split was most of the women who went to Women into the Future were older more experienced professionals I myself felt in the middle I felt halfway in the middle of both groups which became apparent to me when I moved to Women into the Future that most of the people in Women in Action had masses of enthusiasm time most of them were unemployed just out of art school full of enthusiasm very political very political I mean they didn't want men to be allowed to come to the meetings or attend lot of things the things that were happening which I didn't particularly agree with but the enthusiasm was there Women into the Future I found was much more it was supposed to reflect women who were already working in the arts but professional so there were huge arguments at the stage where we were all arguing about whether there

should be a committee whether there shouldn't be a committee whether everybody should be allowed all along to make decisions and at the time it seemed to me that what Women in Action wanted was absolutely unworkable that nothing you could get done if everything was just going to be open and discussed for ever and ever

Liz suggests that the 'crunch' in relation to the split occurred over the question of the full-time administrator. She explains that the debate involved 'the difference between the sorts of women' and describes those who were 'working' as needing an administrator for practical reasons. She concludes by suggesting that the alternative of organising 'a voluntary rota' was not a feasible option. Joe's response follows a similar pattern. She begins by identifying a major disagreement about whether there should be someone employed as an administrator ('someone to be actually doing the work that was going to be paid'). She then identifies those who 'were actively working' as the people who did not want the alternative of 'an umbrella organisation'. She then characterises those who remained within Women in Action after the split as those who thought that 'every single individual ... should be a member of the management committee' and concludes that this was an 'impractical' idea. Zoe begins her response with an extended description of the differences between the two groups of protagonists in which the Women into the Future members are described as 'more experienced professionals' while their opponents are described as 'unemployed just out of art school'. She then introduces the issue of the debate about whether the group should be organised by a committee and concludes that her opponents' idea of having a committee which included everyone was 'absolutely unworkable'.

The value of this form of explanatory account for Liz, Joe and Zoe is that it allows them to offer an explanation of the split. As with Kim and Pat, the blame for the split is laid at the door of the opponents. However, whereas Kim and Pat blame the Women into the Future members (because of their patronising attitudes), Liz, Joe and Zoe blame those who remained in Women in Action, because of their unrealistic and impractical suggestions. It follows, then, that both groups can be seen to employ the same strategy in providing an explanation of the split. A

negative characterisation of the opposing group is offered which is such that it can be seen to be 'obvious' that the split must take place.

The suggestion made earlier was that people flexibly deploy characterisations of other groups, and of their own group in relation to another group, in order to achieve specific goals within the local discursive context. The explanations offered by the Women in Action Members and the Women into the Future members shows that this is exactly what takes place. Some of the theoretical consequences of this finding are discussed below.

6.4 Summary and Discussion

The goal of this chapter was to extend the analysis which was presented in Chapter Five. In that chapter, it was demonstrated that people deploy flexible accounting practices in order to preserve a positive 'version' of the self. These accounting practices allow the individual to deal with local discursive contexts in which they might otherwise appear to be biased or prejudiced. The present chapter sought to explore whether similar accounting practices are used when the local discursive context is more complex. The first data set demonstrated the way individuals deal with multi-category contexts by re-negotiating the group category boundaries 'artist' and 'administrator' so that they could, in some senses, be seen to be both administrators and artistically creative. The second data set demonstrated the way people provide specific interpretations of the two categories 'Women in Action' and 'Women into the Future' in accomplishing a blaming of the opposing group.

The outcome of the preceding sections is, then, that there is empirical evidence in support of the view that people construct their social identities through the use of flexible discursive practices. This claim need not be taken to imply that empirical evidence which supports self-categorisation theory is wrong. Nothing said earlier involves denial of the commonplace fact that some categorisations can become, or be made to become (e.g. through experimental manipulation), salient. But sometimes the notion of 'salience' is insufficient to explain the way in which people

use categorisations in talk. It is, therefore, worthwhile examining briefly the differences and similarities between the social identity theory perspective on identity adopted in Chapter Four and the discourse analysis perspective adopted in Chapters Five and Six.

In social identity theory, the categories people use in developing a sense of self based on group identity are assumed to be objective, external features of the social world. For example, in Chapter Four it was assumed that whether one belonged to the group 'feminists' or the group 'women' was an objective property which allowed people to be characterised as belonging to one group or another. In part, this relied upon the idea that by adopting specific procedures, these categorisations would be made salient to the subjects and that they would characterise themselves in terms of feminism and gender. Many everyday social settings seem to achieve the same effect: being in a church, for example, may be likely to make someone's membership of a religious group salient just as being at a political rally might make membership of a political group salient. However, it was noted in Chapter Four with reference to the 'double categorisation effect' that group memberships seem to 'interact' with one another. And this chapter has demonstrated that the meaning of a particular category seems to be fluid and flexible. This suggests that categorisation is not always a simple affair. And so it may be that the simple notion of salience 'triggering off' an identity will not cover all possible situations. In a specific context, many social categorisations may be (more or less) cognitively available, but the categorisation, or categorisations, which end up being chosen may not be predictable merely on the basis of salience.

Indeed, examination of how people talk about characterisations, as revealed by the analyses of the arts professionals' interviews provided in this chapter, shows that people expend a lot of effort in a conversation negotiating which identities are relevant. Moreover, they also expend effort in providing very specific meanings for the categories being used: meanings which help them to establish a specific point in the local conversational context. So what the empirical analysis of

discourse demonstrates is that, when issues of self-categorisation arise, usually these are managed by discursive techniques which need not rely on estimations of the salience of social categories. Instead, self and other categorisations are accomplished by quite ordinary, everyday techniques of interaction in which explicit debate about salience or otherwise of identity is absent.

The fact that people may use self-categorisations flexibly is sometimes taken (for example Wetherell and Potter, 1992) to be a major criticism of the social identity approach. However, in the normal experimental context, in which salience of identity is explicitly manipulated, the notion that one or other identity has become salient is unproblematic. In Chapter Four, for example, it appears unproblematic to claim that the procedure of asking people to answer questions taking into account whether they are men or women and whether they are feminist or not was a procedure which made those identities salient. On the other hand, there do seem to be specific contexts in which people seem able to re-negotiate the boundaries between multiple potential categorisations and to re-negotiate the range of possible meanings which attach to those categorisations. One example of this is that subjects in the present study were able to describe themselves as in some ways being both administrators and creative artists. Another example was the way in which people spontaneously developed group categorisations of opponents in accomplishing blame for the Women in Action split.

What this suggests is that in a conversational context, where an identity is clear and unproblematic, it may be possible to think of people as being generally influenced and thinking of themselves in terms of that identity. However, there may be other conversational contexts where this is less true, especially those contexts in which people perceive a threat to their identities such as the arts professionals' concern to avoid appearing prejudiced or responsible for a group split. In these sorts of contexts, it seems likely that people will adopt a more sophisticated outlook on their characterisations of self and others. And the consequence of this more sophisticated approach may well be that they adopt a more creative and flexible

approach to the social categories which are cognitively available to them within that context.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The thesis began, in Chapter One, by pointing out that there have been few social psychological studies of women artists and women's art. It was suggested that, nevertheless, social psychology can make a valuable contribution to an analysis of public responses to cultural forms and the artists who create them. The need for such an analysis was highlighted by a review of recent writings on women's art. This revealed a widespread belief among art historians and cultural theorists that women's art is systematically undervalued in our society. Two specific research questions were then identified. The first was: if people believe that women artists and their work are valued less than male artists and their work, where do these beliefs come from? The second was: what effect do these public beliefs have on the sense of self or identity of those whose job includes support for, and the promotion of women artists and women's art?

The claim was made that social psychology represents a discipline which can provide an answer to these questions and that the arguments would be based on solid theoretical foundations. It was argued that beliefs such as those which people hold about women artists and their work can be construed as stereotypical beliefs and that the origin of such beliefs could be explained by exploring the origins of stereotypical beliefs. It was also argued that the existence of such stereotypical beliefs implies consequences for the arts professional's identity and may even be understood as a threat to the arts professional's sense of self.

Chapters Two, Three and Four focused on the issue of stereotypical beliefs and their origins. Chapter Two provided a review of current theoretical approaches to the stereotype and to an associated theoretical construct, the attitude. Stereotypical beliefs were described as mental 'short-cuts' which function by allowing the perceiver to characterise the stereotype target in terms of a set of traits and predicted behaviours merely as a result of attributing a category label to

that target. The review of literature demonstrated that contemporary understanding of the stereotype process reveals it to be more complex than had previously been supposed.

The discussion in Chapter Two then moved on to a consideration of attitude theory. It was pointed out that both the three-component view of attitudes and uni-dimensional expectancy-value models of attitudes, typified by the theory of reasoned action, agree in separating out evaluative and cognitive aspects of attitudes. The argument was then put forward that the cognitive component of attitudes can be understood as stereotypical beliefs. It was concluded that people's beliefs about women artists, and the cognitive component of their attitudes towards women's art, could both be regarded as stereotypical beliefs. This meant that the original research question, concerning the origin of people's beliefs about women artists and their work, could be recast within a more general question: the question of where stereotypical beliefs, in general, come from.

Chapter Three then presented a discussion of the origins of stereotypical beliefs. The suggestion was made that stereotypical beliefs derive either from the influence of social groups upon the individual, especially via the acquisition of a group-based social identity, or from the particular stereotyped view of the world which a person acquires through the development of a personal identity. Early studies of the effects of group membership were shown to have demonstrated that individuals' actions and judgements are affected by such membership. Attention was then turned to the issue of inter-group interaction and it was seen that such interactions encourage the formation of group-based categorisations of the self and of others. The development of social identity theory was identified as a milestone in providing a theoretical account of how group membership, within inter-group situations, can engender stereotypical ways of thinking about members of the in-group and members of the out-group. Some time was spent detailing recent empirical evidence that early social identity accounts of in-group favouritism and generalisation from samples to whole groups require to be enhanced. However, the general conclusion drawn was that membership of social groups, and the social

identities which come with such membership, represent one important source of stereotypical beliefs.

It was then pointed out that social identity theory (and its later variant, self-categorisation theory) emphasise the importance of distinguishing between social and personal identity. This was taken to mean that a complete account of the origins of people's stereotypical beliefs about women artists and women's art required an understanding of the contribution made by personal identity. Since the subject under discussion is women artists and women's art, it was assumed that aspects of personal identity which influence thinking about gender-related issues would be particularly important. After an acknowledgement of the debate between Bem and Spence and Helmreich, the conclusion drawn was that Bem's gender-schema approach was an appropriate perspective to adopt in the present study. In particular, Bem's claim that people view the world differently depending on their sex-role categorisation was taken as an important determinant of stereotypical beliefs associated with gender.

By the end of Chapter Three, the conclusion could be drawn that there are two distinct sources of stereotypical beliefs: social identity and personal identity, with the latter being construed, in the present context, as sex-role categorisation. Having already identified people's beliefs about women artists and the cognitive component of their attitudes to women's art as stereotypical beliefs, the theoretical prediction was formulated that the origin of people's beliefs about women artists and their attitudes towards women's art would be seen to be associated with social identity and personal identity. It was this prediction which was pursued in Chapter Four.

Chapter Four set out to test the relationship between identity and belief by formulating the hypothesis that social and personal identity influence people's beliefs about women artists and women's art in a stereotypical fashion. The method selected for testing this hypothesis was the analytic survey, and three stereotyping factors or independent variables were identified: 'whether someone is feminist or not', 'their gender' and 'their sex-role categorisation'. Sex role

categorisation was 'measured' using the Bem Sex Role Inventory, while gender and feminism were 'measured' via a specially designed survey instrument which comprised statements about women artists and their work with which subjects expressed agreement or disagreement.

The results of the analytic survey showed that a wide variety of beliefs about women artists and women's art, held both by the 'general' public and by arts professionals, were associated with subjects' social and personal identities, as operationalised by the measures of feminism, gender and sex-role categorisation. To this extent, these beliefs can be construed as stereotypical beliefs whose origins lie in social and personal identity. Accordingly, the conclusion drawn in Chapter Four was that the hypothesis stated at the start of the chapter was supported by the evidence. In the context of beliefs about women artists and women's art, people appear to have stereotyped views and attitudes which arise from social and personal identity.

In addition to this confirmation of the hypothesis, the survey data showed that stereotyping effects of this sort can have an additive effect, in that the influence of one salient social identity may be compounded or increased by the influence of the other salient social identity or by sex-role categorisation. This 'double category effect' was seen to be an important determinant in a number of the responses subjects made to the survey instrument statements. In addition most subjects denied that they employed different standards when considering the art of men and the art of women. However, more than half of the subjects expressed the belief that other people did employ different standards. Moreover, well over half of the subjects expressed the belief that women artists were disadvantaged, relative to men artists. This finding, which is consistent with the opinions of the art theorists which were discussed in Chapter One, led into consideration of the second of the research questions originally identified in Chapter One: the question of what effect such beliefs might have on those whose job includes the support of women artists and the promotion of women's art. It was this question which formed the central theme of Chapter Five.

In Chapter Five, it was argued that in order to assess how arts professionals deal with the undervalued status of women artists and women's art, a switch in methodologies was required. The results of the analytic survey in Chapter Four show that people are unwilling to express explicitly prejudiced views about women artists, even if they do believe that other people hold such views. Moreover, social psychological studies of prejudice have discovered that modern expressions of prejudice often have a subtle or disguised form. Accordingly, it was decided that in order to understand how arts professionals make sense of themselves as people who have responsibility for the support of women artists and the promotion of women's art, direct questioning by means of the survey technique would be insufficient. In particular, one area of interest was to explore precisely how arts professionals negotiate the seemingly incompatible requirements of sharing the public's beliefs about women artists and women's art while, at the same time, avoiding to appear prejudiced. It was argued in Chapter Five that the methodology most suited to this task is discourse analysis. One important aspect of the discourse analysis approach is the claim that when people use language to characterise their social world, they do so in a constructive fashion. The position taken in Chapter Five was that this notion captures exactly the sort of identity-construction task in which arts professionals might be expected to engage.

Chapter Five presented a number of analyses of interviews with arts professionals. These revealed that arts professionals did indeed adopt a variety of discourse strategies in order to display a specific sort of 'unbiased' identity. The analyses showed that men and women relied upon different forms of account. In talking about their role in supporting women artists and women's art, men displayed a concern with whether their own practices might be considered to be discriminatory. They treated admissions of discriminatory events 'accountable' in a way in which they did not regard expressions of non-discrimination. Women displayed an orientation to the same issue which showed that they understood it in terms of the wider question about the status of women artists. In providing accounts of the low-status nature of women's art, they referred to socio-historical contexts and psychological properties of women artists as 'explanations' for this

status. What these accounts managed to achieve for the subjects was that both men and women were able to deal with the problematic status of women's art without seeming personally prejudiced against women artists. Similar accounting practices were seen in the arts professionals' responses to questions about women's arts events. The conclusion drawn was that the arts professionals did recognise a relationship between the way they are perceived to deal with women's art and their own sense of self as arts professionals.

By the end of Chapter Five, then, the original research questions outlined in Chapter One had been answered. Firstly, people's beliefs about women artists and women's art stem, in a stereotypical fashion, from social and personal identity. This helps to explain why women's art is undervalued as art theorists claim. This explanation is also supported by the results of the analytic survey in Chapter Four. Secondly, arts professionals displayed a concern that they themselves may be appear to be prejudiced against women's art. They were shown to construct accounts in discourse which deal with this potential threat to their identities. However, these accounts dealt only with a single categorisation: the subject's role as an arts professional. But it has been pointed out that discourse analysis also reveals the way people provide 'versions' of a particular categorisation to suit a local conversational context. At other times, they may provide 'reformulations' of such categorisations which blur or remove apparently clear distinctions between one category and another. This raises the further question of whether the arts professionals' accounts demonstrate this flexibility in the use of categorisations. The question is particularly important since, in a sense, it marks a boundary point between traditional social identity theory and discourse analysis approaches to identity.

The analyses of Chapter Six revealed that the arts professionals were adept at performing this sort of category 'reformulation' in order to preserve a positive sense of self as more than merely an administrator. Their accounts showed that the apparently clear distinction between being 'an administrator' and being 'a creative artist' was not, in fact, a simple one. In addition, a second set of interviews revealed that some of the arts professionals were able flexibly to re-negotiate the

categories 'Women in Action' and 'Women into the Future' in accomplishing a blaming of the opposing group. The subjects were able to create pictures of the typical member of the opposing group from which the inference could easily be drawn that it was the opposing group which caused the break-up of the original group.

A number of conclusions can be drawn from these findings. The study represents a successful attempt to bridge the analytical gap between stereotypes and attitudes. By treating stereotypical beliefs as the cognitive component of attitudes, it proves possible simultaneously to study people's stereotypes of social groups and the attitudes which are associated with those stereotypes. In addition, the study demonstrates that, at least in part, stereotypes and attitudes have common social origins. Moreover, the study also identifies two aspects of social life which appear to function as the origin of stereotypes and attitudes: social identity and personal identity. To this extent, the study has sought to form some theoretical linkage between the social cognition of stereotypes and attitudes and the social psychology of self and identity.

The study has also attempted to forge new theoretical links within the social psychology of identity by outlining a perspective from which traditional social identity theory and discourse analyses of identity can be viewed as compatible. The suggestion here has been that in 'simple' cases of salient social identity, the traditional social identity theory approach is appropriate, whereas in cases where self-categorisation boundaries are fluid or flexible, discourse analytic methods may be more fruitful to the researcher. Moreover, within the confines of traditional social identity theory, the study has demonstrated that social identity and personal identity, as represented by sex-role categorisation, jointly act upon subjects' beliefs via the 'double category effect'. At the same time, the study represents an empirical confirmation of Bem's view that the stereotypical outcome of sex-role categorisation is moderated by the stereotyping effects of belonging to different social groups.

At the more applied level, the study also offers an informed view of the current status of women artists and women's art. It is clear from Chapter Four that people's views on these matters are influenced by stereotypes. It is also clear that a large portion of the general public and of arts professionals feel that one consequence of this stereotyping process is that women's art is undervalued. This represents an empirical support for the claims made by arts theorists which were discussed in Chapter One. Unfortunately, the finding that social and personal identity can be regarded as the origin of such stereotypical views leaves a somewhat gloomy prospect for women artists and women's art. If the social roots of society's under-valuation of women artists and women's art run as deep as the most basic influences on identity, it means that the task of changing society's view of women artists and their work is a daunting one. The need for a fundamental re-think of women's role in the artistic world is highlighted by the discourse analytic evidence presented here that arts professionals themselves employ sophisticated discursive strategies to avoid appearing prejudiced when they are critical of women artists and their work. The conclusion to be drawn from the data is that a fundamental change is required in the way in which society, both men and women, think about women's place in the Arts.

A more positive note may be struck by considering the extent to which the present study highlights avenues for future research in this area. To the extent that the study represents a successful application of the theories and methods of social psychology to the issue of women's art, this opens up new vistas on scientific research in this area. For example, one approach which is likely to be fruitful is the study of how social and personal identity influence not only beliefs about women artists and women's art but also evaluations of that art. The present study has focused entirely on the cognitive component of attitudes towards women's art, but it would be valuable to discover the extent to which the findings here apply to the evaluative component of attitudes. It would also be useful, in the future, to adopt a more interactive approach to the twin methodologies represented by Chapter Four and by Chapters Five and Six. In particular, it may be that discourse analyses offer valuable means of teasing out the complex relationships which are represented in certain of the three-way interactions which were noted in Chapter

Four. In addition, the social identity and personal identity origins of stereotypical beliefs which were considered in Chapter Four were restricted to three: feminism, gender and sex-role categorisation. Future research might benefit from a more extensive list of possible contributory factors to the formation of stereotypical beliefs.

What this means is that, to some extent, the current position of women artists and their work within the arts world is uncertain. Women artists seem to suffer from stereotype induced views and attitudes which undervalue their work. On the other hand, the picture is brighter in that there is now a clear perspective on how research in this area might fruitfully be conducted in the future, with the hope that where better understanding occurs, fairer and more equitable treatment will follow.

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APPENDIX I

SURVEY INSTRUMENT

WOMEN ARTISTS, WOMEN'S CULTURAL/ARTISTIC PRODUCTS AND WOMEN'S ARTS EVENTS

For multiple choice items, place a cross or tick under your selection e.g.

| | | | | |
|-------------------|-----------|------------------|----------|----------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Cannot Decide | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| | ...X..... | | | |

For other items, separate instructions will be given.

Section 1

- (a) It is more difficult for a woman to receive recognition as an artist than it is for a man.

| | | | | |
|-------------------|-------|------------------|----------|----------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Cannot Decide | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| | | | | |

- (b) Women artists should support other women artists.

| | | | | |
|-------------------|-------|------------------|----------|----------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Cannot Decide | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| | | | | |

- (c) Women's art should deal exclusively with women's issues.

| | | | | |
|-------------------|-------|------------------|----------|----------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Cannot Decide | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| | | | | |

- (d) All women have the potential to be artists.

| | | | | |
|-------------------|-------|------------------|----------|----------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Cannot Decide | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| | | | | |

- (e) Some art forms are *potentially* more effective than others in making statements about women

| | | | | |
|-------------------|-------|------------------|----------|----------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Cannot Decide | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| | | | | |

(f) Women's arts events 'marginalise' the possible contribution of women's cultural/artistic products to mainstream arts.

| | | | | |
|----------------|-------|---------------|----------|-------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Cannot Decide | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| | | | | |

If your response to the above item is 'strongly agree' or 'agree' do you consider this 'marginalisation' to have negative consequences for:

| | | |
|----|------------------------------------|----------|
| i | women's cultural/artistic products | Yes..... |
| | | No |
| ii | mainstream arts | Yes..... |
| | | No |

Section 2

(a) Women's art should be:

- i revolutionary.....
- ii innovative
- iii neutral
- iv other

(Please tick **only 1** item. If you tick 'other', please qualify below.)

.....

(b) Women's art should perform an educational function for women.

| | | | | |
|----------------|-------|---------------|----------|-------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Cannot Decide | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| | | | | |

(c) Women's art should perform an educational function for men.

| | | | | |
|----------------|-------|---------------|----------|-------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Cannot Decide | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| | | | | |

(d) So far as art is concerned, only *women's art* can raise women's consciousness.

| | | | | |
|----------------|-------|---------------|----------|-------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Cannot Decide | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| | | | | |

(e) Women's art will always be more than mere entertainment.

| | | | | |
|----------------|-------|---------------|----------|-------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Cannot Decide | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| | | | | |

If your response to the above item is 'strongly agree' or 'agree' please list what you consider to be the 3 most effective art forms.

1
2
3

(f) Women's art is only truly relevant to women if it contains 'social comment'.

| | | | | |
|----------------|-------|---------------|----------|-------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Cannot Decide | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| | | | | |

(g) Women's art can help men to understand women.

| | | | | |
|----------------|-------|---------------|----------|-------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Cannot Decide | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| | | | | |

(h) Being creative helps a woman to feel good about herself.

| | | | | |
|----------------|-------|---------------|----------|-------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Cannot Decide | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| | | | | |

(i) Being creative with other women, helps a woman to feel good about herself.

| | | | | |
|----------------|-------|---------------|----------|-------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Cannot Decide | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| | | | | |

- (j) Being creative helps women to feel good about themselves only if they themselves are satisfied with the outcome/product.

| | | | | |
|----------------|-------|---------------|----------|-------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Cannot Decide | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| | | | | |

Section 3

- (a) Women's art can comment on the world of *men* as well as on the world of *women*.

| | | | | |
|----------------|-------|---------------|----------|-------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Cannot Decide | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| | | | | |

- (b) Men's art can comment on the world of *women* as well as on the world of *men*.

| | | | | |
|----------------|-------|---------------|----------|-------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Cannot Decide | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| | | | | |

- (c) Women interpret art differently from men.

| | | | | |
|----------------|-------|---------------|----------|-------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Cannot Decide | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| | | | | |

- (d) A woman's age affects the way she interprets the social and political content of women's art.

| | | | | |
|----------------|-------|---------------|----------|-------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Cannot Decide | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| | | | | |

- (e) A woman's social class affects the way she interprets the social and political content of women's art.

| | | | | |
|----------------|-------|---------------|----------|-------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Cannot Decide | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| | | | | |

(f) A woman's ethnicity affects the way she interprets the social and political content of women's art.

| | | | | |
|----------------|-------|---------------|----------|-------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Cannot Decide | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| | | | | |

(g) A woman's sexual orientation affects the way she interprets women's art.

| | | | | |
|----------------|-------|---------------|----------|-------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Cannot Decide | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| | | | | |

(h) How would you define feminism?

.....
.....
.....
.....

(i) Do you regard yourself, according to your own definition as a feminist?
yes.....

no.....

(Please tick yes or no)

Section 4

(a) Women's art and men's art should be judged on the basis of the same aesthetic criteria.

| | | | | |
|----------------|-------|---------------|----------|-------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Cannot Decide | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| | | | | |

(b) The public applies different standards when evaluating the art of women and the art of men if the sex of the artist is known in advance.

| | | | | |
|----------------|-------|---------------|----------|-------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Cannot Decide | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| | | | | |

- (c) i Women's art should be evaluated by means of both aesthetic criteria and social/political criteria.
- ii Women's art should be evaluated by means of aesthetic criteria alone.
- ii Women's art should be evaluated by means of social/political criteria alone.
- iv It is unnecessary to evaluate women's art at all

(Please tick **only 1** item)

- (d) It is difficult to define 'Women's Art'

| | | | | |
|-------------------|-------|------------------|----------|----------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Cannot Decide | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| | | | | |

- (e) How would you define 'Women's Art'?

.....

.....

.....

.....

Section 5

- (a) In general women artists and women's arts events receive adequate funding and support from bodies such as the Arts Council and local authorities.

| | | | | |
|-------------------|-------|------------------|----------|----------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Cannot Decide | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| | | | | |

- (b) Women artists should adopt a more 'businesslike' approach to attracting sponsorship.

| | | | | |
|-------------------|-------|------------------|----------|----------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Cannot Decide | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| | | | | |

- (c) Women's art and women's arts events represent a 'bad risk' for sponsors.

| | | | | |
|-------------------|-------|------------------|----------|----------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Cannot Decide | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| | | | | |

(d) Women's art should benefit from positive discrimination as regards funding.

| Strongly Agree | Agree | Cannot Decide | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
|----------------|-------|---------------|----------|-------------------|
| | | | | |

Section 6

- (a) Age
- (b) Sex
- (c) Occupation

- (d) I am a member of Women 2000 yes..... no.....
- (e) I am a member of Women in Profile yes..... no.....

This is the end of the questionnaire.

I should like to take this opportunity to thank you very much for your help.

APPENDIX II

VALUES OF CRONBACH'S ALPHA FOR FIVE MULTI-ITEM SCALES, DERIVED FROM THE STUDENT SAMPLE AND THE ARTS PROFESSIONALS SAMPLE

Cronbach's Alpha for the five sub-scales used within survey instrument

| Scale Number | Scale Name | Scale Items | 'Student' Alpha | 'Arts Professional' Alpha |
|--------------|--|-------------|-----------------|---------------------------|
| 1 | Women's Art is Educational | 2b, 2c, 2g | 0.75 | 0.84 |
| 2 | Women's Art includes Social Comment | 2d, 2f* | 0.52 | 0.61 |
| 3 | Creativity and Feeling Good | 2h, 2i* | 0.74 | 0.76 |
| 4 | Art is Non-gendered | 3a, 3b | 0.84 | 0.83 |
| 5 | Women's Interpretation of Art is Influenced by Demographic Factors | 3d, 3e, 3f* | 0.77 | 0.88 |

* denotes scales from which items originally intended for inclusion were dropped following recommendations in the SPSS RELIABILITY output. Scale 2 was originally intended to include Statement 2e, Scale 3 to include Statement 2j and Scale 5 to include Statement 3c.

APPENDIX III

Thematic Structure of Survey Instrument

| Chapter Section | Quest. Section | Section Theme | Sub-theme | Quest. Item |
|-----------------|----------------|----------------------|----------------|-------------|
| 4.5 | 1 | Inclusion | Collectivity | 1b, 1d |
| 4.5 | 1 | Inclusion | Exclusivity | 1c, 1f |
| 4.5 | 1 | Inclusion | Generality | 1e |
| 4.6 | 2 | Usefulness | Education | Scale 1 |
| 4.6 | 2 | Usefulness | Social Comment | Scale 2 |
| 4.6 | 2 | Usefulness | Creativity | Scale 3 |
| 4.7 | 3 | Social Influences | Gender | Scale 4 |
| 4.7 | 3 | Social Influences | Demography | Scale 5 |
| 4.8 | 4 | Prejudice | ----- | 4a, 4b, 1a |
| 4.9 | 5 | Business and Finance | ----- | 5a-5d |

APPENDIX IV

THE BEM SEX ROLE INVENTORY

BEM INVENTORY

Developed by Sandra L. Bem, Ph.D.

Name _____ Age _____ Sex _____

Phone No. or Address _____

Date _____ 19 ____ . _____

If a student: School _____ Yr. in School _____

If not a student: Occupation _____

DIRECTIONS

On the opposite side of this sheet, you will find listed a number of personality characteristics. We would like you to use those characteristics to describe yourself, that is, we would like you to indicate, on a scale from 1 to 7, how true of you each of these characteristics is. Please do not leave any characteristic unmarked.

Example: sly

Write a 1 if it is never or almost never true that you are sly.

Write a 2 if it is usually not true that you are sly.

Write a 3 if it is sometimes but infrequently true that you are sly.

Write a 4 if it is occasionally true that you are sly.

Write a 5 if it is often true that you are sly.

Write a 6 if it is usually true that you are sly.

Write a 7 if it is always or almost always true that you are sly.


Thus, if you feel it is sometimes but infrequently true that you are "sly," never or almost never true that you are "malicious," always or almost always true that you are "irresponsible," and often true that you are "carefree," then you would rate these characteristics as follows:

| | |
|-----------|---|
| Sly | 3 |
| malicious | 1 |

| | |
|---------------|---|
| Irresponsible | 7 |
| Carefree | 5 |




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| | |
|-------------------------------|--|
| Defend my own beliefs | |
| Affectionate | |
| Conscientious | |
| Independent | |
| Sympathetic | |
| Moody | |
| Assertive | |
| Sensitive to needs of others | |
| Reliable | |
| Strong personality | |
| Understanding | |
| Jealous | |
| Forceful | |
| Compassionate | |
| Honest | |
| Have leadership abilities | |
| Eager to soothe hurt feelings | |
| Secretive | |
| Willing to take risks | |
| Warm | |

| | |
|-------------------------|--|
| Adaptable | |
| Dominant | |
| Tender | |
| Conceited | |
| Willing to take a stand | |
| Love children | |
| Tactful | |
| Aggressive | |
| Gentle | |
| Conventional | |
| Self-reliant | |
| Yielding | |
| Helpful | |
| Athletic | |
| Cheerful | |
| Unsystematic | |
| Analytical | |
| Shy | |
| Inefficient | |
| Make decisions easily | |

| | |
|---------------------------|--|
| Flatterable | |
| Theatrical | |
| Self-sufficient | |
| Loyal | |
| Happy | |
| Individualistic | |
| Soft-spoken | |
| Unpredictable | |
| Masculine | |
| Gullible | |
| Solemn | |
| Competitive | |
| Childlike | |
| Likable | |
| Ambitious | |
| Do not use harsh language | |
| Sincere | |
| Act as a leader | |
| Feminine | |
| Friendly | |



APPENDIX V

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

**Can you tell me about how you come to be working in your present post?
(Warmup)**

Do you have a position in relation to women artists?

What is your position in relation to women's arts events?

Do you see yourself primarily as an artist or an administrator?

How do you explain the split between Women into the Future and Women in Action? (Only applies to relevant group members.)