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Cold War: Originally the term was employed in the fourteenth century to describe the long-lasting struggle between Muslims and Christians for politi-
cal dominance in the Iberian Peninsula. After World War II, the term "Cold War" denoted the ideological conflict and hostility between the Soviet bloc, led by the Soviet Union, and the West under the leadership of the United States. Although protracted, this fight was dubbed "cold" mainly on the account that its participants conducted it in Europe without recourse to "hot warfare," or actual fighting. Mutual nuclear deterrence made this situation possible. Both the superpowers accumulated enough nuclear warheads to destroy the world many times over, and both the White House and the Kremlin were ready to use these weapons of mass destruction to maintain their spheres of influence in Europe, "freezing" the Cold War division of the continent until 1989. On other continents, "hot" hostilities between these two camps tended to erupt periodically, but usually were fought by Third World proxies. Invariably, Soviet-supported guerrillas attacked official governments with sympathies to the United States and vice versa. The only examples of conflicts that involved United States and Soviet troops include the Vietnam War (1965–1975) and the Afghanistan War (1979–1989), respectively. The Korean War (1950–1953) was the only instance when UN troops were deployed. United States soldiers also constituted part of these troops, the vast majority of whom were drawn from among the South Korean population.

The legitimizing premise of the Cold War was solely ideological, involving a conflict between two Western ideologies that vied for dominance over the entire world. The Kremlin aimed at spreading communism all over the globe with enforced classlessness, collectivism, centrally planned economies, and the vision of the final disappearance (withering) of the nation-state. Western critics debunked this theory pointing out that under the guise of communism the Soviet Union continued the imperial project commenced during the times of the Russian Empire. To communism the West opposed democracy, individualism, market-oriented (capitalist) economy, and collaboration of nation-states. Soviet propaganda denounced this alternative as carried out at the cost of the exploited worker and in the imperial interest of the United States. The West’s final victory indicated that economically the Soviet system was less viable, and less attuned to the needs of the average man. Both the systems mostly benefited the elites, but in the West a much larger and diversified elite emerged than in the tiny inner cores of the communist parties in the Soviet bloc. Moreover, the volume of generated wealth per capita and the quality of living enjoyed by an average person in the West was comparable to that accorded to communist elites in the Soviet bloc.

From the vantage of geopolitics the Cold War was a continuation of World War II by different means, because after 1945, no peace conference (promised by the Allies in the Potsdam Protocol) was organized to legalize the effects of the World War II. In the light of international law, such legalization occurred only in 1990, with the signing of the Two-plus-Four Treaty (involving the two Germanys and four Allies) by the wartime Allies (France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States).

The Cold War division of Europe was grounded in the splitting of Germany into West and East Germany although the Potsdam Protocol stipulated that after the termination of the Allied occupation Germany should be reconstituted as a single state. Another foundation of the Iron Curtain that cut the conti-
ent into Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe and United States-protected West-
ern Europe was the unprecedented territorial shifting of Poland 300 kilometers
toward the westward. In agreement with the secret Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact (1939) the
Kremlin retained one-third of prewar Poland’s territory east of the River Bug
(Curzon line), while, on the other hand, in 1945, it “indemnified” Warsaw with
the Oder-Neisse line (with the exclusion of the northeastern half of East Prussia made into the Soviet Kaliningrad Oblast).

Poland was the most staunchly anti-Soviet and anti-communist state in
Central Europe, but this arrangement made it into Moscow’s unwilling captive. In the absence of binding international regulations, only the Soviet Union was powerful enough to ensure Polish rule on Poland’s share of the former German territories. Similarly East Germany was not a viable state
without the Soviet propping.

After World War II, the Western-Soviet alliance rapidly unraveled. The
symbolical commencement of the Cold War is the Soviet blockade of West
Berlin (1948–1949). From the vantage of ideology, however, we can observe
that the Cold War had actually begun in 1917, with the ascent of the Bolshe-
viks to power, and their proclamation of worldwide challenge to capitalism
and democracy. Some saw the end of the Cold War during the second half of
the 1950s, in the wake of de-Stalinization. Their hopes were dashed by the
Cuban missile crisis (1962) when the Kremlin attempted to install nuclear
missiles on Cuba mere 150 kilometers away from the United States; Another
period of relaxation in the Cold War tension was called détente (the French
word for “slackening”). It lasted from the 1972 summit meeting at Moscow
between Richard Nixon and the Soviet First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev to the
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1979). Almost all of the Polish adult popula-
tion organized in the anti-communist Trades Union Solidarity; under the
Kremlin’s pressure Warsaw imposed martial law in Poland (1981). This trig-
gered another bout of the Cold War in Europe, which lasted until Mikhail
Gorbachev’s rise to power in 1985.

Faced with the daunting economic problems, Gorbachev sought to
disengage the thinly spread Soviet forces and resources from abroad in an effort
to restructure the Soviet Union to make it a viable state. A dedicated reform-
er, Gorbachev introduced the policies of glasnost and perestroika to the
USSR. The West applauded his efforts, but the attempted dual economic and
political reform necessitated abandoning the Kremlin’s control over the Soviet
bloc and precipitated the break-up of the Soviet Union (1991). Unexpectedly,
the West “won” the Cold War, symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall, though political pundits had predicted that would last much longer.

With the Cold War over, it was possible to legalize the decisions of the
Potsdam Protocol in the light of international law, Germany reunited, and
Poland’s western border was fully recognized. Both these momentous events
became the cornerstone of lasting peace and of the post-Cold War order in
Europe. With the terror of nuclear deterrence over, “hot” local wars erupted
following the breakup of Yugoslavia and in some of the post-Soviet states.
East-West is the traditional Eurocentric (Western) us-then categorization of the world. The West refers to “our better, more civilized and more developed” culture or civilization, while the East denotes the “inferior world” of the others, which they pitted themselves against all other peoples, disparagingly labeled as “barbarians.” In the late Middle Ages and early Modern times, this value-laden categorization was replicated in the image of “civilized Europe” as opposed to “barbarian Asia and Africa,” which sometimes was clothed less judgmentally into the opposition between the Occident and the Orient. However, the category of “the Orient” reserved for the others with the tradition of literacy, excluded most of Africa.

Colonialism and the projection of European superiority. Interestingly, in the eighteenth and nineteenth century the concept of the West was extended to embrace the British colonies, consisting mostly of white settlers (Northern America, Australia, and New Zealand). This attribution displaced the former Spanish and Portuguese colonies in Latin America, which gained independence at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Their Creoles (mixed European-indigenous-Black) crossed the ideological threshold of “racial purity” so enviously guarded in the British colonies, where the perceived skin color determined one’s social position. The top-notch rank was exclusively reserved for white Europeans. This situation also pushed the Russian Empire outside the boundaries of the West, although Russian imperialism drew heavily on the Western colonial model: Russia was never regarded as completely part of Europe (the Occident) or Asia (the Orient). Nineteenth century ideologues of racism perceived the Russians as an “impure mixture” of Slavs and Asiatic Mongols. Being a “pure” Slav did not help much either, because spurious etymological similarity of their self-ethnonym with the word “slave,” Westerners believed Slavs to be descendants of slaves and, thus, inferior.

In terms of European geopolitics, by the eighteenth century, the North-South opposition was more pronounced; e.g., the war involving Muscovy (Russia), Denmark, Sweden, Poland-Lithuania, Brandenburg-Prussia and Saxony, among others, became known as the “Great Northern War” not “Eastern” or “East-Western War.” The militarily and economically successful states of Scandinavia and Central Europe, along with the United Kingdom and France, belonged to the “superior North” pitted against the “inferior South” associated with Spain, Portugal, the southern section of the Apennine Peninsula and the Ottoman Empire. Russia only then entering the European politics, it was not included in this scheme, thus, still relegated to the non-European Orient.

The Russian Empire “moved” into Europe through the radical westward shift of its borders in the wake of the partition of Poland-Lithuania at the close of the eighteenth century. Between 1813 and 1815, Russian armies allied with Napoleon’s Western European enemies pushed as far west as Paris.
and defeated imperial France. After the Napoleonic Wars, the East-West axis replaced the North-South one in European geopolitics. Subsequently the category of “the East” coincided with that of the Orient associated with Russia and the Ottoman Empire and its successor states in the Balkans. The eastern half of Austria-Hungary was also subsumed in this category. By extension, after World War I, the nation-states that emerged in the area from the Balkans to the Baltic Sea, between Germany and Russia, were usually perceived as part of the East. Other categorizations cast them as a separate entity of Central Europe, or as a deficient part of (Western) Europe visible in the disparaging sobriquet of “New Europe” for this region. When Bolshevik Russia transformed itself into the Soviet Union the pejorative label of “the East” stuck to it, leaving Central Europe and the Balkans as an anomaly, or a buffer zone between the West and the East.

World War II, having degenerated into the Cold War, split the globe between the United States-led West and the Soviet-dominated East. By the 1950s, French statesmen and scholars disagreed with this bipolar vision of the world and proposed the triple world scheme, in which the West was the “First World,” the Soviet bloc and other communist states in Europe and Asia—the “Second World,” while the colonies and postcolonial states were lumped together into the “Third World.” The logic of the Cold War being global, the Third World states had no choice but to align with the communist or capitalist bloc. The Nonaligned Movement emerged during the 1960s, and allowed a degree of reassertion for the separate existence of the Third World. However, the concepts of the “First and Second Worlds” never gained wide currency. In their stead the categories of “the West” and “the East” denoted the United States and Soviet enemy blocs, respectively. Hence, after 1945, the traditionally Eurocentric East-West divide was projected global-wide. In the last two decades of the Cold War the concept of the “Third World” waned too and became synonymous with the category of “developing or underdeveloped states.” Staunch political alliance with the United States or rapidly increasing prosperity made Japan, South Korea, South Africa, Singapore, and Hong Kong into part of the West.

After the collapse of the Soviet bloc and following the end of the Cold War, new global categorization schemes were proposed. Initially, a tendency emerged that grouped the world’s states into democratic and non-democratic ones. In 1993, American political scientist Samuel P Huntington proposed that the world consists of some ten distinctive civilizations classified as such on the basis of religion, ethnicity, history, geography, or convenience. The dynamics of the bipolar world still alive, he concluded that it is still “us”—the West against “them”—the Rest. Unfortunately, this diagnosis materialized at the beginning of the twenty-first century when the United States-led West seems to have found the replacement enemy for the defunct Soviet Union in the form of the amorphous (hence, even more unpredictable and dangerous) Islamic world.

When it comes to economic development since the end of the Cold War the rhetoric of globalization has ruled supreme. However, with few exceptions, this process seems to be benefiting the rich West and putting the poor states at an even greater disadvantage. Critics say that the term “globalization”
is a new euphemism for "(economic) colonization"; the dynamics between the erstwhile colonizers and the colonized replaced by a similar one between the globalizers and the globalized. This situation prompted the United Nations to introduce the developmental categories of the rich North and the poor South, which are *not* geographically determined, but correlated with the general level of prosperity in a state. On top of that the older opposition of the West versus the East still appears in Western intellectual discourse as a political shorthand currency for denoting us (rich North) and the rest (poor South).

T. Kamusella
Ethnic Cleansing: The process or policy of eliminating unwanted ethnic or religious groups by deportation, forcible displacement, mass murder, or by threats of such acts, with the intent of creating a territory inhabited by people of a homogeneous or pure ethnicity, religion, culture, and history. The term entered English usage in 1992, in the context of the post-Yugoslav wars, es-
Especially in Bosnia. The term had emerged earlier in the Serbo-Croatian press reports on the goals of this warfare. Warring parties sought to "cleanse" areas that were perceived to belong to ethnic nation-states from populations perceived as not belonging to the ethnic nation who claimed such domains. The word "ethnic" made it from obscure scholarly works into mainstream usage during the 1940s and 1950s. Earlier, the noun "cleansing" or adjective "cleansed" or "clean" were employed to denote what we now recognize as an act of ethnic cleansing. The earliest such usages of these terms of which the author is aware occurred in the name of the Polish organization entitled The Organization for Cleansing Poznań from Jews and Germans, established in 1918, in the city of Poznań. This organization postulated the removal of the targeted populations from the city and its vicinity. Similarly, in the Third Reich the areas where Jews had already been exterminated were dubbed as "Judenrein," or cleansed of Jews.

Ethnic cleansings have taken place since times immemorial. Examples include: (1) the removal of the Jews from Palestine to Babylon in the sixth century BCE; (2) from the fourth to the tenth century CE the Germanic, Slavic, Turkic and Finno-Ugric ethnic groups that moved between Central Asia, Western Europe and northern Africa continually displaced one another; (3) in the eighth century, the Byzantine army resettled the members of the Paulician religious sect from Armenia to the Balkans; (4) intermittent expulsions of Jews from Western and Central Europe commenced in the twelfth century; (5) between 1609–1614, the Moriscos (Muslims converted to Catholicism) were expelled from Spain; (6) following the Thirty Years War, Protestants were often removed from Catholic realms and Catholics from areas controlled by Protestant rulers; (7) in the mid-eighteenth century, French-speaking Acadians were removed from the British colony of Canada; (8) between the 1820s and 1880s, indigenous Americans were forcefully relocated from their lands to reservations in the West; (9) in the mid-nineteenth century, British settlers exterminated all the Aborigens living in Tasmania; (10) in 1907, the German army almost exterminated all the Herero ethnic group in South West Africa.

Although all these instances involve ethnically or religiously differentiated groups, their removal or extermination was either the result of imperial policy (empires, by definition, are multi-ethnic), occurred in areas not controlled by any state, or stemmed from the quest for religious homogeneity (religions tend to disregard ethnic boundaries). Hence, it is incorrect to subsume these instances under the rubric of ethnic cleansing, which entails the existence of or endeavor for the creation of a homogenous ethnic nation-state. Only such a state needs to be "cleansed" of all those persons and groups who do not conform or decline to assimilate with a given ethnicity that constitutes the basis for the commonality of an ethnic nation living in this state. Due to the logic of ethnic nationalism the ethnic nation, which strives for founding its own ethnic nation-state, or to whom such a state already belongs, becomes involved in ethnic cleansing so as to "purify" its state from "foreign" (that is, ethnically incongruous) elements.

Ethnicity is an arbitrary and ascriptive label, which can be adopted by an individual who identifies with a group, or forced on the individual by a group. The group self-defined as a nation, and recognized as such by other nations,
defines which pre-selected elements of broadly defined cultural reality constitute the ethnicity of the thus formed nation. Obviously, the elites are instrumental in defining this ethnic core of the ethnic nation. Eventually, these mental categories are the passive object of this process. In the Third Reich, Germans of Jewish ancestry whose grandparents had converted to Protestantism or Catholicism and spoke no other language but German, were denied commonality with other European Jews, and the German nation and exterminated together with other European Jews in the Holocaust. The 1923, Lausanne Treaty that provided for exchange of the Greek-speaking Muslims from Greece to Turkey and Turkish-speaking Orthodox Christians from Turkey to Greece.

Italy in 1860, and Germany in 1971, were established as ethnic nation-states in stark opposition to the model of the civic nation-state widespread in Western Europe and the Americas. In the civic nation-state, citizenship equals or replaces ethnicity as the basis for one's commonality with the civic nation. But even in ideologically civic nation-states ethnicity has played a role too. For example, until the 1960s, Afro-Americans and Native Americans were excluded from the United States' civic nation. In France, during the nineteenth and twentieth century, languages other than French and non-standard dialects were suppressed and liquidated, while their speakers were treated as second-class citizens.) In the last three decades of the nineteenth century most of the ethnic states that started emerging at the beginning of this century in the Balkans gained or confirmed their independence. Another wave of ethnic nation-states arrived in Central Europe and the Middle East after World War I. These states disregarded any existing state borders in pursuit of national territories that would "truly" reflect the settlement extent of their ethnically defined nations. On the other hand, they wished to remove from their territories persons labeled as belonging to other nations. Inevitably, ethno-nationally induced and legitimized conflicts flared up among the neighboring ethnic nation-states. Invariably, instances of ethnic cleansing followed.

The twentieth century was the age of ethnic cleansing. In the Boer War (1899–1902) the British troops displaced and kept in concentration camps one-third of the Afrikaners. In the course of the Balkan Wars (1912–1913) mainly Muslims/Turks were expelled from this area but the Balkan nation-states involved in mutual ethnic cleansing too. In 1915, the Ottoman Empire exterminated Anatolian Armenians and expelled most of them to Mesopotamia. These examples still belonging more to the pre-national era, the first clear-cut instance of ethnic cleansing occurred after 1918, when Germans, Germanophone Jews, and other German-speakers chose to flee or leave the new Central European nation-states of Poland, Czechoslovakia or Hungary.

The administrative division of the Soviet Union was organized on the ethno-national principle, which spread the model of ethnic nation-state throughout Eurasia. During World War II Berlin and Moscow perpetrated many acts of ethnic cleansing including, respectively, the Holocaust, forced resettlement of entire "enemy nations" (for instance, of Chechens and Crimean Tatars) or parts of nations (for example, Poles or Estonians). Between 1945 and 1950, ethnic cleansings coded as "population transfers" involved over 30 million
people in Central Europe alone. The forced resettlement of over 10 million people in the wake of splitting British India into India and Pakistan (1948) was of similar magnitude. Further ethnic cleansing occurred invariably when new ethnic nation-states emerged in Eurasia, recently, after the breakups of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

Curiously, the usually civic nation-states of Africa have not been immune to the phenomenon of ethnic cleansing as demonstrated by the genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda (1994). This has to do with the general failure of these multiethnic states in the credible replacement of ethnicity with citizenship and civic values as the basis for nation- and nation-state-building.

Methods employed to carry out an ethnic cleansing can be ranked according to the degree of their lethality: genocide, unilateral expulsion, multilateral and negotiated population transfer or exchange under pressure, forced emigration, and forced assimilation. Significantly, depending on circumstances these instruments of ethnic cleansing may be applied against a section of or the entire ethnic group or nation.

T. Kamusella

**Ethnic Group:** During the 1960s and 1950s, “ethnic group” replaced the term “tribe,” which was tainted with the association of primitivism and split human societies into two worlds, namely, that of the “modern West” and of the “backward Rest,” to be studied by sociologists and anthropologists, respectively. The former was composed of “societies” while the latter of “tribes.” “Ethnic group” bridged this conceptual gap allowing for comparisons of “Western societies” and “tribes” as entities of the same rank and without any a priori preconception that one of them is somehow “better” than the other.

Taken as the defining quality of the ethnic group, ethnicity is said to be comprised of a variety of elements that include: a collective name (ethnonym), a common myth of descent, a shared history, a distinctive shared culture, an association with specific territory, a sense of solidarity, legitimizing symbolisms (mythomoteur), and the group’s capacity for biological (endogamic) self-reproduction. This static approach presents the ethnic group as a clear-cut entity that does not change or interact with other ethnic groups.

From the vantage of analyzing social and inter-group relations as dynamic processes, the ethnic group constitutes itself only in relation to other ethnic groups. In 1969, the Norwegian scholar Frederik Barth introduced the concept of “ethnic boundary,” which exists “in the head” of a member of an ethnic group who identifies himself or herself as a member of his or her ethnic group in contrast to other groups, through remembering and expressing the elements that constitute this group’s specific ethnicity. This explains the durability of ethnic groups even in view of the fact that individuals tend to leave one ethnic group for another. Individuals cross ethnic borders by exchanging one ethnicity for the ethnicity of a chosen, new group.

Currently, in social sciences, the concept “ethnic group” possesses two basic meanings. The broader one treats all the human groups founded on a specific ethnicity as ethnic groups. The other contrasts the ethnic group vis-à-vis the nation. In the latter view, the difference between nation and ethnic group is constituted by several factors: (1) The nation has its nationalism that
forms the basis of the nation's political program in search of national autonomy or separate national statehood. The ethnic group does not have such a program. (2) Nationalism allows the nation to formulate its interests at the level of the whole nation. A common ethnicity gives the ethnic group a sociocultural coherence but does not restrain various subgroups from expressing their own interests sometimes in conflict with the interests of other subgroups and even of the whole ethnic group. (3) In the case of the nation, the ethnic group's ethnic boundary is reinforced with the political boundary delimited by the nation's nationalism, and, eventually, by the geographic border of the nation-state itself. (4) Nationalism and the institutions of the nation-state determine the continuation of national ethnicity. The reproduction of the ethnic group's ethnicity depends on the extent "traditional" and non-institutional structures. (5) The nation's ethnicity can be defined by ethnic elements and citizenship to a varying degree. By definition, the ethnic group has no recourse to defining its ethnicity via citizenship.

Ethnic minorities, this is ethnic groups and stateless nations, fare better in the civic nation-states that adopted the policy of multiculturalism (Canada, the United States, Australia, South Africa, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Russia). In this model the ethnic or ethno-national preoccupations and character of various native and immigrant groups are defined as the civic nation-state's "cultural richness." Simultaneously, they are subsumed in the commonality of citizenship. Despite their various ethnicities, citizenship determines the nationality of all citizens vis-à-vis the nation-state. On the basis of various ethnicities some concessions are granted in the public or administrative sphere, but, generally, ethnicity is considered a private matter that should not intrude on the mainstream politics of the civic nation-state. Obviously, this cannot be so in ethnic nation-states, where an ethnicity of a group of citizens that varies from the national standard poses an ideological danger to the state and its ethnically defined nation. Allowing unrestrained expression of their ethnic difference, minorities would undermine the legitimizing force of the ethnic nation-state's nationalism and its nation's dominant position.

The broader meaning of the concept "ethnic group" can become a potent category of comparative analysis in the future development of social sciences. Leaving aside the politically discriminatory distinction between the nation and the ethnic group, it may allow for fruitful comparison of variegated human groups steeped in ethnicity, be they non-national ethnic groups, nations in their ethnic or civic guise, stateless nations and ethnic and national minorities. Globalization necessitates this objective and non-judgmental approach to the problematic of ethnic groups. The Global State System, perhaps, will not accommodate more than 200 states; so, not more than the corresponding number of nations can count on securing and maintaining their own nation-states. But going only by the guideline of already classified ethnolects (languages that constitute or are part of an ethnic group's ethnicity), 4–7,000 extant ethnic groups can be identified. With the increasing ideologization of ethnicity at the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first century, facilitated by the growth of global transportation, communication, and media interconnectedness, many of these will turn their ethnicity into an instrument of political struggle, especial-
ly when the interests and economic sustenance of the ethnic group's members are endangered by the host nation-state or by international companies.

T. Kamusella
Europe: Etymology of “Europe” remains obscure, but common wisdom holds that it comes either from the Phoenician or Sumerian word for “sun” or “evening” or “twilight” (which, coincidentally, are also the meaning of the term “Occident,” or “West”). The current usage stems from the Greek “Euripus,” or “West.” The current usage stems from the Greek “Europe,” or “West.”

The Romans took over the Greeks’ mental categorization of the known world and its inhabitants. The most significant division was that between the Romans (lumped together with the Greeks) and the barbarians. Geographic entities remained ideologically neutral as the Roman Empire extended in Europe, Asia, and Africa. The renewed ideologization of geography came with the rise of Christianity on the ruins of the Roman Empire.

In Antiquity, Europe was perceived as separated from Africa by the Mediterranean Sea and from Asia by the River Don, the Sea of Azov, the Black Sea, and the Bosporus Strait. Some perceived the region between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea as the European-Asian boundary. The border between Asia and Africa was set on either the Nile River or the Red Sea. The first extant map of Europe, dating to the early twelfth century, schematically depicts the continent with the lands of the Slavs and the Magyars in the east. The successor states of Charlemagne’s Roman-Frankish Empire dominate the map’s center. Soon Europe was identified with Western Christendom that paid allegiance to the Pope at Rome, wrote in Latin, and used the Latin alphabet for noting vernaculars. The idea of the Respublica Christiana (Christian Commonwealth) was born.

Due to the reforms of Peter the Great, Muscovy was transformed into the Russian Empire that dynamically expanded eastward and southward. This empire could not be disregarded in European politics any more. The pro-European aspirations at premium in St Petersburg, in 1730, Philip Johan von Strahlenberg, a Swedish officer in the Russian service, proposed that the Europe’s eastern boundary should be moved from the Don to the Ural Mountains and the Ural River. In a century, this would become the accepted view. In the nineteenth century, with Russia’s expansion to the Pacific and Northern America, it became obvious that Europe is not a continent, but one of Eurasia’s significant peninsulas or subcontinents on par with India or Indochina. The perceived geographic uniqueness of Europe and the idea of “civilizational supremacy” of Europe (construed as the West) continued unabated. This posed Russia with the question whether it were part of Europe.

In the nineteenth century, Western Europe accepted Russia as a power, but the popular image portrayed it as part of “wild and autocratic Asia.” Famously, in the first half of the nineteenth century, the Austrian Chancellor Clemens Metternich opined that the East (as a synonym for Asia) extends eastward of Vienna. This introduced into the popular thinking the division between the West (Europe) and the East (Asia), construing the line extending from Danzig (Gdańsk) via Vienna to Trieste. After 1945, this mental divide
was reinforced by the descent of the Iron Curtain that ran along the western reaches of the Soviet bloc.

As of the beginning of the 1950s, the name “Europe” was used elliptically for denoting the six members of the European Communities: Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany. This narrowest of usages excluded the rest of Western European states. The situation changed in the years 1981–1995, when the European Union (EU) extended to coincide with entire Western Europe (significantly excluding Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland) and Greece. Now, in the popular political and journalistic usage, Europe is synonymous with the EU.

It also seems that the larger and growing EU of the future may not be as homogenous as one may hope. Since the 2004 expansion the old divide between the West and the former Soviet bloc has been replicated in the opposition of Old versus New Europe. In the context of globalization, the EU may not be able to face increasing economic and political competition, which could push it into a closer alliance with the United States and Canada. Would then such a pan-Western or Euro-Atlantic alliance remain “European” or would it be transformed into an altogether different entity?

Western critics of extending EU membership to post-communist, post-Soviet, and post-Yugoslav states utilize the concept of a “return to Europe” also, arguing that decades (or longer) may transpire before these states will approach “Western (Western European) standards” in terms of the economic and democratic progress which would make them eligible for accession into the EU. In these critics’ eyes, any “return to Europe” of states separated from Western Europe for forty years by the Iron Curtain is next to impossible. Some Central European intellectuals and politicians criticize this negative stance, arguing that their states and societies do not need to “return to Europe” because they have always been in Europe.

T. Kamusella
Languages: Estimates of the number of extant languages in the world today vary widely from 3,000 to 8,000, which has to do with the Western concept of "language" currently accepted throughout the globe. Before the rise of modernity (the concept and pattern of which originated in the West), the question of which language one spoke (or, more rarely, wrote) was of no significance to the vast majority, who were socially and spatially immobile and overwhelmingly illiterate. What mattered was successful communication. The rise of popular literacy in the nineteenth and twentieth century elevated the written form of an idiom (usually used by the elite) to the rank of a language. Other idioms were disparaged as "dialects." Subsequently, such dialects within the boundaries of a single state were anachronistically subordinated to the recognized (state) language as its dialects. Later, these dialects were slated for gradual disappearance when the educational system and mass media replaced them with the "real" (recognized written) language.

Presenting the basic axioms of linguistics, Leonard Bloomfield proposed that dialects are those language forms that are mutually comprehensible, while languages are not mutually comprehensible (1926). As comprehensibility is a quite subjective criterion, his argument did not hold. It became obvious that politics determines a language and which dialect belongs to a given language. Therefore, Chinese dialects, as mutually incomprehensible as German and French, are classified as part of the Chinese language. Speakers of low German in northern Germany and of Alemannic spoken in Bavaria and western Austria cannot successfully communicate with each other but, nevertheless, their dialects are subsumed in the umbrella of German. Although a low German speaker has no problem understanding Dutch, neither of them believe that they speak the same language. On the other hand, though Moldo-
van and Romanian are nearly the same (much more similar than British and English), they remain two separate languages. Only script makes the Tajik language (written in Cyrillic) different from Iran’s Persian (Farsi) noted in Arabic characters. As in the Moldovan–Romanian case, there is not even difference in script between Persian and Afghanistan’s Dari. These examples amply prove that linguistics is not an exact science.

The 2000 edition of *Ethnologue*, the most renowned catalog of the world’s languages, recorded 6,809 languages including 41,791 alternate names and dialect names. But when a language does not enjoy a specific written form, there is hardly any check on linguists and local users who may classify and re-classify such a language as a dialect, part of a different language or even as two different languages. Imagination, political expedience and social needs rule supreme in this process of language creation and re-creation.

In the field of written language, according to Wycliffe Bible Translators International, in 2003, “adequate translations” of the Bible were available in 405 languages, of the New Testament in 1,034 languages, and fragments of the Scriptures into 883 languages others. The Christian Holy Writ is available in approximately 2,200 written languages. This sounds optimistic when one remembers that the Unicode international character set for computers supports only 650 languages. In 2003, the Library of Congress in Washington DC contained holdings in about 500 languages, but so far the United Nations has endorsed translations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into only slightly over 300 languages.

In 2002, there were 191 member states of the United Nations, and in the same year, James Minahan’s *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations* (2002) recorded over 300 such nations; as well, the same language sometimes enjoys official status in several states. Modernity introduced and conflated the thresholds of writing and nationhood. This number corresponds well with the extent 400 translations of the Bible into different languages and with 650 languages supported by the Unicode international character set, or with around 500 languages of the holdings in the Library of Congress. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been translated into approximately 300 languages. Apart from the extent states, approximately 100–150 stateless national movements are determined to develop their languages enough that they could serve the needs of modern politics and administration. All told, the number of significant (and, invariably, written) languages is around 300.

Solely oral language forms are considered to be languages, which amounts to an emulation of the above-presented system of written and politically endowed languages. While writing and political decisions reify a language, making it into a countable and discrete entity, outside this pale classification of languages is necessarily fluid. Anthropologists estimate that 5–6,000 ethnic groups inhabit the Earth, which closely corresponds to *Ethnologue*’s estimate of 6,809 languages (the surfeit of 800 languages over the number of ethnic groups is caused by the preservation of extinct or ritual languages, and invention of artificial languages, while many ethnic groups disappeared during the last two centuries). By definition, an ethnic group is a world to itself with its own language and customs. From the sociolinguistic perspective each ethnic group is a distinctive speech community complete
with its own language. In practice, this language is an ethnolect because it constitutes one of the markers that the group uses to produce and maintain its specific ethnicity.

The term “language,” not unlike that of “nation,” is arbitrary and ascriptive. In the world of nation-states, politicians and intellectual elites decide what a (written) language is or should be. They also impose such a decision, though in a less systematic manner, in relation to (oral) languages spoken by ethnic groups. These groups neither enjoy their own nation-states nor aspire to transform themselves into nations, but reside on the territory of a given nation-state and by default have to partake in the national, the world’s landmasses (except inhabitable Antarctica) neatly divided among the extant nation-states. The most famous cases of such socio-linguistic engineering among oral-culture ethnic groups include creation and standardization of languages by missionaries for the sake of spreading the Christian Holy Word, and by the Soviet authorities who, similarly, wished to spread the knowledge of Marxism-Leninism to each inhabitant of the Soviet Union. Nowadays, the West continues to decide what counts as language and what does not. The ISO-639 registration authorities, namely: the Library of Congress, Washington DC, USA, and the International Information Center for Terminology, Vienna, Austria are responsible for conferring internationally recognized alphanumerical codes on languages. Such a code is the utmost recognition a language can receive today. If the code is denied to an aspiring language, it remains dialect or, even worse, its existence is not acknowledged.

Nation(alism): (Latin natio, derived from nascor, “I am born”) Presently, the term “nation” is the most accepted unit of social-political organization. Ideally, it should correspond to the nation-state, the basic unit of the political organization of the world from the turn of the twentieth century.

For a stateless nation to win its own nation-state in the world already tightly divided among the extant nation-states, it would have to seize a piece of a territory in the possession of one or more established nation-states. After the break-up of the Soviet Union and of the multinational federation of Yugoslavia, it has been next to impossible for aspiring stateless nations to achieve fully independent nation-state status. Such a feat came true only in the case of the Eritreans after the long and bloody war with Ethiopia (1993) and of the Slovaks and the Czechs (1993) because the mono-national Czechoslovakia of the postulated Czechoslovaks had never materialized.

Within the broader framework of nation building, the homogeneity of the nation can be achieved through employing either the civic or the ethnic. In the first case, it is the state that makes its population into a nation, granting the inhabitants with citizenship. In ethnic nationalism, one’s nationality is identified with a specific ethnicity defined through culture, language, religion, history, traditional way of life, tradition, and mythology.

Usually, the extant nation-states profess nationalisms that are mixtures of the ethnic and the civic to a varying degree. However, broadly speaking, ethnic nation-states predominate in Eurasia while civic ones elsewhere. Comparing the civic and ethnic modes of nation building, we can say that in the absence of their own nation-states, stateless nations have no choice but to ground their claims to status as a nation in ethnicity. Conversely, there are no civic stateless nations unless in the wartime conditions when their nation-states find themselves under a foreign occupation. Occupation, however, rarely results in internationally recognized liquidation of a state, let alone of the nation associated with it.

Ernest Gellner (1983) defines nationalism as a political principle that holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent. These “units” are the nation-state and the nation, respectively. This ideal may be reached in two ways: (1) The state may turn its population into citizens. In this model of civic nationalism, citizenship equals nationality and citizenship equals the nation. Thus, the state is transformed into a nation-state. (2) In the scope of ethnic nationalism, a group of activists may establish a national movement grounded in ethnicity delimited by faith, language, tradition, or way of life. The nation-builders claim those sharing (or perceived to share) a specific ethnicity to be a nation. Should the targeted population espouse this view they do become such a nation. The problem with Gellner’s formulation is that it refuses to treat nationalism as an ideology.

The popular conclusion is that it is impossible to label nationalism as an ideology because representatives of the whole political spectrum (leftists, centrists, and conservatives) all espouse national tenets. This approach reifies ideology as something unique and pristine that cannot be merged with anything
else, let alone another ideology. But some present-day ideologies are such mixtures containing two or more ideologies and principles (for example, social democracy, liberal conservatism, Christian democracy or National Socialism).

Nationalism has attained the status of the sole “infrastructural” ideology of the modern world thanks to its simplicity, the malleability of its principles, and the popular appeal connected to the biologically determined human desire to live in a group. The envisaged objective of spreading nationalism to every corner of the globe took two centuries and now seems to have been completed. At least civic nationalists perceive the situation in this manner. From the ethnic point of view of making nations there is no end.

The roots of nationalism are European—Western. But this ideology proved potent and malleable enough to become the first global ideology. Its universality is attested to by the use of its tenets for the political and social organization of the whole world at the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first century. For the time being, nationalism seems to be the first and only form of global order accepted by virtually all the actors of international relations and most political groupings.


T. Kamusella
North-South (The Rich North and the Poor South): Coincided during the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, these terms refer to a categorization of the world’s states. These momentous events changed the shape of global politics overnight. The bipolar world of the Cold War became non-polar or multi-polar before it became obvious that what had emerged was a monopolar world with the United States as the sole remaining superpower.

The Cold War was fought with the weapon of economy. The Soviet bloc collapsed because it was outdone by the West in the race of providing for armaments and for population. In the 1980s, the Soviet Union was spending over 40 percent of its budget on the military, which left pitifully little not only for its own citizens, but for planned projection of Soviet/communist power worldwide. At the same time, the United States army received less than eight per cent from the federal budget, which left Washington with ample elbowroom to project its power over the globe and to effectively contain the Soviet bloc. When the Soviet bloc broke up the customarily inefficient economies of post-Soviet and post-communist states declined even more, being so much geared to the military, isolated from the world market and traditionally full of disregard for the needs of the average consumer.

The former categorization of the globe’s states into the “First World” (or the West), “Second World” (or the Soviet bloc together with other communist states in Europe and Asia) and “Third World” (or the postcolonial and usually underdeveloped states) ceased to make sense. From the political point of view the Second World disappeared with the breakup of the Soviet Union—the superpower that headed and dominated the Soviet bloc. When one analyzes the fate of economy in the post-Soviet and post-communist states, it is obvious that the Second World or the Soviet bloc as an economic entity disappeared too. Poor economic performance relegated all the post-Soviet states but Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (together with the rich urban enclaves of Moscow and St. Petersburg) to the group of the developing or underdeveloped states. In a singularly unique and unprecedented systemic transition almost all the former European member states of the Soviet bloc have made it into the club of the rich Western states grouped in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

Recognizing the dramatically changed political, economic and social realities in the post-Cold War world, the UN proposed that the overall quality of life should become the yardstick with which one should categorize the extant states. The main contention is that one-fifth of the earth’s over six billion inhabitants live in the prosperous states, which garner four-fifths of the globe’s total income. This leaves the less fortunate four-fifths of the planet’s population living in the developing states with one-fifth of the world’s income. The astounding disparity in prosperity forms the global divide between rich and poor.

In the language of journalism these findings were translated into the economic chasm between the rich North and the poor South. In this manner the old pre-nineteenth century Western European categorization of the European states was evoked. In this old scheme the militarily and economically astute states where agricultural and industrial revolutions commenced (France, the
Netherlands, Northern Italian states, Prussia, the United Kingdom, the western sections of the Holy Roman Empire) were identified as “the North.” Opposed to it was the poor and under-performing “South” that consisted of the eastern half of the Habsburg realms, the Ottoman Empire, Portugal, the southern half of the Apennine Peninsula and Spain. During the nineteenth and twentieth century, the novel East-West division replaced the erstwhile North-South one.

Obviously, it is not geography that determines which state belongs to the North or South nowadays. The litmus test is economic performance underwritten by a state’s membership in the North’s or North-controlled organizations such as the exclusive clubs of G-7 (today, G-8 after the Russian Federation was allowed to join the political part of the deliberations at this group’s meetings. The economic leg of the talks is still reserved for the former G-7) and OECD, or the more welcoming WTO (World Trade Organization). However, the vast majority of the states belonging to the rich North are located in the Northern Hemisphere. The exceptions located in the Southern Hemisphere are few including, among others: Argentina, Australia, Chile, New Zealand and South Africa. States categorized as belonging to the poor South much more many, paradoxically, the majority of them are located in the Northern Hemisphere. Let us enumerate the most notable ones: China, Egypt, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia or Ukraine. The paradox is explained by the fact that the vast majority of the globe’s landmasses are located in the Northern Hemisphere.

T. Kamusella
Stateless Nation is a nation without its own nation-state. State is much older than nation. The first states emerged five millennia ago in Mesopotamia and Egypt, having been made and unmade throughout history. Only in the twentieth century did all the inhabited territory of the Earth get tightly divided among states. Nation emerged in an evolutionary manner in England during the sixteenth century. This model entailed the state that made its population into a nation. The result of this process was the nation-state. The codification of this standard in nation- and nation-state-building came with the American and French Revolutions. They produced the model civic nation-state. Its ethnic counterpart came into being when the ethnically construed national movements founded the Italian and German nation-states in 1860 and 1871, respectively. Italian and German nationalists, however, legitimized the creation of their nation-states referring to the tradition of statehood conveniently provided by the medieval Kingdom of Italy and the Holy Roman Empire. Italian national activist Giuseppe Mazzini concluded this discourse on legitimate and illegitimate national claims in his 1857 map of the ideal Europe of nation-states. He established that there was place enough only for eleven “true nations,” this is, for those with their states or some established tradition of statehood. Hence, his map included Poland but not Ireland or Slovakia. In the popular view, at that time, Ireland was seen to be as much an inalienable part of the United Kingdom as Slovakia (Upper Hungary) was of Hungary.

The utmost recognition for stateless nations came after World War I. The West European powers led by the United States recognized the right to self-determination as the principle of creating and maintaining international order (predominantly in Europe). On this basis, the non-national empires of Austria-Hungary and the Ottomans were replaced with a plethora of states granted to ethnic nations, this is, stateless ones and without history. This process was repeated in the wake of the 1991 break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Again, stateless nations gained their own nation-states, though in other parts of the globe a different model of nation-state-building has predominated to this day. In the wake of decolonization postcolonial states were burdened with the task of shaping their nations on a civic basis.

In today’s world, tightly divided into nation-states, is a clear tendency to deny legitimacy to stateless nations. Founding any new nation-state for such a nation means curtailing the territorial size and legitimacy of an already existing nation-state or even several of them. This would entail undermining
the post-1945 global state system earmarked for nation-states only and grounded in the principle of the inviolability of borders, that is, borders that cannot be changed through a unilateral action.

If the treatment of ethnic minorities is upgraded to that of national minorities, by default, many ethnic groups would become de facto nations even without the necessity of applying the label of nation to itself. Thus, the dilemma of stateless nations is still around. What is the way out of it? Perhaps, it requires making the ethnic foundations of Eurasian nation-states more civic, espousing multiculturalism and some collective rights for minorities, and regionalization/federalization. This last method would allow granting the most aspiring stateless nations with their own ersatz nation-states without the necessity of destroying the existing nation-states. Last but not least, an overlaying supra-state structure (such as that of the European Union) may also make it possible to create new separate nation-states in a peaceful manner that would be beneficial to the stateless nation in the quest for its statehood and not harmful to nations already enjoying their nation-states.

T. Kamusella

State System, Global: At the beginning of the twenty-first century, all the inhabited landmass of the world is divided among the almost two hundred extant states. These states are organized according to the tenets of the nation-state model. The relations among the states are regulated by the set of agreed-upon principles. First, each state is sovereign. Second, to be such, a state must declare itself a nation-state and the vast majority of other states must recognize the nascent state’s existence and its national declaration. Third, the recognized state’s established borders are inviolable and cannot be altered through a unilateral action. Fourth, agreed-upon international law regulates the day-to-day relations among the states. Fifth, there is no authority higher than the state that would control the behavior of the states in their relations with one another.

Since all the extant states share the same model of political and social organization, the dynamics of their behavior is very similar. This homogeneity allows for a high degree of compatibility among the states construed as the only full actors of international relations. In turn, the maintenance of durable mutual contacts by each state with almost all the other ones is possible, thanks to the observance of the basic rules that regulate international relations. The resultant high degree of interrelatedness makes these states and the relations among them into a system. Despite the lack of any supra-state authority, this system is not chaotic but self-regulating because almost all the states are committed to maintaining the existence of the system. The violators are isolated or their misbehavior is corrected through a collective action undertaken by other states. This is a viable course of action because at any given time most states are intent on preserving this system rather than destroying it or replacing it with another model of interstate relations. At most, the states tend to wish to add some minor modification to the system in order to ensure its smooth running. This is usually executed through introducing a new agreed-on principle of international law.
The contemporary, largely homogeneous political organization of the world is a very recent phenomenon, though social scientists tend to view it in a stationary manner as timeless. The fundamental categories of analysis and the basic subjects of research in sociology and political science are society and state, respectively. But though many kinds of society can be distinguished, the default society on which the sociologist would focus is the nation. In a similar fashion (but less pronounced), the political scientist does not research any kind of polity. The field of political science is the nation-state because, virtually, no other models of state obtain nowadays. This situation leaves different kinds of statehood organization to the scrutiny of historians, while the sociologist’s lack of attention to non-national modes of social organization places this problematic in the court of anthropology.

Historically, international relations has been marked by anarchy, this is, the absence of authoritative institutions and norms above independent and sovereign nation-states. However, during the last two centuries, there has emerged an increasing number of implicit principles that regulate the establishment of nation-states and their behavior within the framework of the global state system. This system has spread worldwide. Even uninhabited Antarctica was provisionally parcelled among seven nation-states. Moreover, the UN Convention on the Law and the Sea (1982) allows coastal nation-states to exercise full sovereignty over a territorial sea up to twelve nautical miles and limited jurisdiction in an exclusive economic zone up to 200 nautical miles. The development of the unclaimed seabed is to be regulated by an international organization.

Hence, the anarchy of international relations has been gradually put in order. Even a quasi supra-state institution has emerged in the form of the Security Council and United Nations Assembly. The community of recognized nation-states that are not permanent members of this Council dominates the latter. Both these groups of states (with the seniority resting with the former) decide whether to include a state in the global state system.

The question remains how a global system is going to fare in future. It can get fortified, should all or the vast majority of the nation-states adopt democracy, market economies, and human rights observance as virtually universal elements of such a system. Alternatively, the development of continent-wide supra-state political-economic blocs may diversify the homogeneity of the global state system. In this scenario, the world’s richest nation-states would band together in blocs, leaving other nation-states beyond the North-South poverty barrier unable to spawn such supra-state structures and to stand up to the rich. In a third scenario, US political scientist Samuel P. Huntington opines, in the wake of the bloody unmaking of Yugoslavia, a new world order “civilization” could replace the nation and the nation-state as the main unit of social and political organization of the globe.

T. Kamusella
**Umma:** (Ancient Arabic *lumiya*, “confederacy of related ethnic groups;” or Arabic *umm*, “mother,” borrowed from Hebrew or Aramaic) The term “*umma*” (sometimes spelled “*ummah*”), meaning nation or community, occurs sixty-four times in the Koran. Islamic authorities reject derivations suggested from other languages, however, since they consider the beginning of all the Arabic language to be revealed in the scripture of the Koran.

In the Koran, *umma* denotes a variety of meanings, for instance, an ethnic group (the Arabs, Franks or Slavs), a religious group (the Muslims, Christians or Zoroastrians), a moral community (good or bad people as a group), the followers of a prophet (Abraham or Muhammad), a subgroup of believers or followers, a group related to Muhammad by lineage rather than by religion, and even a period of time. However, in the *hadith* literature (reports on the Prophet’s words and deeds compiled during the ninth, tenth, and eleventh century), *umma* is given its usual meaning of the single universal Islamic community embracing all the lands in which Muslim rule is established and the Islamic law prevails.

The early Islamic legal tradition gave rise to the principle of the unity of the *umma* and saw it as the ultimate source of political authority. As such this concept legitimized the institution of the caliphate. The caliph (*khalifa*) meaning the “viceregent, the deputy or successor [to the Muhammad],” was thus the sole religious and political leader of all the Muslims and their lands. In Islamic political thought the inhabited world is divided between the “land of Islam” (*dar al-Islam*) and “the land of war” (*dar al-harb*) dominated by unbelievers; the *umma* ideally coincided with the geographically defined meaning of the former term. But with the geographical extension and political fragmentation of the land of Islam, the insistence on the unity of the *umma* and the corresponding unity of the caliphate became largely symbolic. Also non-Muslims were tolerated in *dar al-Islam* if they were “people of the book” (*ahl al-kitab*). The *dhimmis* (in *sharia* “those who are in the covenant of protection extended by the *umma*”) include Jews, Christians and Sabaeans though the category was often extended to cover Zoroastrians or even Hindus. The Western colonial domination limited the extent of lands where Muslim rulers reigned and brought many immigrant Muslim minorities to non-Islamic states. Hence, the more geographically defined concept of *dar al-Islam* was decisively divorced from the increasingly universalistic and non-spatially determined concept of the *umma*.

This disconnection was sealed during the early 1920s, first, by the breakup of the Ottoman Empire (which functioned as imperfect though nevertheless political embodiment of *dar al-Islam*), and secondly in 1924, by the abolition of the caliphate. A year later, what remained from the empire had been overhauled into the ethnic Turkish nation-state. This radical departure from the Islamic legitimization of statehood in favor of the Western national one brought an unprecedented trauma to Muslim leaders and masses. From the Islamic point of view, this was the lowest point in the entire history of *dar al-Islam*. 
The beginning of the twentieth century was characterized by an ideological struggle over the “rightful” political ownership of the concept of umma. The Ottoman sultan (literally “authority” or “government,” or in the Seljuk and Ottoman usage “supreme political and military head of Islam” as opposed to an increasingly religious caliph) Abdulhamid II’s (reigned 1876–1909) attempts at redeeming Islamic unity by reviving the idea of umma were extremely popular among Muslims from Morocco to India. Equally popular was the call by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–1897, born in Persia domiciled from London and Cairo to India) for Islamic solidarity for the reinvigoration of the umma. Their thought constituted the foundation of Pan-Islamism. On the other hand, the Syrian Ottoman thinker Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1854–1902) revived the Koranic understanding of the umma as an ethnic group. He employed the term watad (literally “homeland” or “place of birth” coined at the end of the eighteenth century in emulation of the French “patrie” or “fatherland”) when he spoke of what united Muslim with non-Muslim Arabs. In 1907, the political Umma Party (Hizb al-Ummah) was established in Egypt. In this instance the term umma meant the “Arabic-speaking nation of Egyptians’ irrespective of their religion. These events became the underpinning of Pan-Arabism (Arab nationalism) enthroned in the adoption of umma to designate the Western term “nation” in the Arabic language. (In Turkish and Persian “nation” is rendered millet and milli, respectively. In the Koran millah meant “religion,” and in the Ottoman Empire the inhabitants were divided into millets or religio-political communities).

Paradoxically, in the twentieth century, the concept of umma and its variegated legal and intellectual connotations have legitimized both of the most significant movements in the Islamic world: Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism. Respectively, the Arab League (established in 1945) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (established in 1971) lead these movements. Many conferences organized to discuss the political situation of the Muslim umma after the abolition of the caliphate failed to achieve any significant results. This led to the popularity of secular Arab nationalism during World War II. Thereafter, in the wake of decolonization, Muslim eyes perceived dar al-Islam as promising liberation from the unbelievers’ (kafir) oppression. Since the 1960s, Arab nationalists have spoken in favor of complete separation of religious and national identities. But this has not brought about the unification of all the Arabs in a common ethnolinguistic nation-state, neither has it led to progress and an equally shared prosperity. These failures of Pan-Arabism in contrast with the achievements of the West have resulted in Pan-Islamists gaining the upper hand especially after the foundation of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1979).

The Indo-Pakistani Pan-Islamist Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938) asserted that the Islamic umma is the model for human unity, and that nationalism can coexist with humanism as long as Muslims believe in tawhid (the unity of God). Other Pan-Islamic authorities reject this view and assert that Islam and nationalism are mutually incompatible. However, neither the Islamic Republic of Iran nor any other Islamic state, or any group of states has attempted to unify the umma in a single polity. In practice, this means that all the Islamic states define themselves as nation-states regardless of the official rhetoric.
a consequence, in the twentieth century and in the beginning of the twenty-first century the idea of the Islamic *umma* continues to conflict with the international model of the nation-state.