The Syrian Uprising of March 2011 interrupted the deepening of an amicable relationship between Turkey and Syria. After the Cold War, Turkey’s Kemalist identity that enjoined distance from the Arab Middle East began to give way to a ‘neo-Ottoman’ identity, especially under the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which came to power in 2000. The AKP adopted a ‘zero problems’ policy with its neighbours, meant to facilitate the growing exports of the Anatolian Tigers and legitimised as a project to export a ‘liberal peace’ to its neighbourhood. Syria became the showcase of this strategy. In the 1990s Turkey and Syria had been embroiled in protracted conflict over Syria’s support for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) insurgency against Turkey, an attempt by Damascus to gain leverage over Turkey’s control of the Euphrates’ water distribution at Syria’s expense, with the roots of enmity going back to Syria’s historic rejection of Turkey’s annexation of Iskanderun/Hatay. Yet, in the 2000s, the two states turned trans-state interdependencies that had previously been sources of conflict into occasions of growing co-operation, in which borders were de-securitised, joint river water management initiated and trade and investment rapidly developed. Turkish discourse spoke of brothers artificially separated by the break up of the Ottoman Empire and of an ambition to create a security community between the two states. The two states aligned, together with Iran, in a regional ‘Trilateral bloc’ against the common threat from Kurdish irredentism and the destabilisation of Iraq after the 2003 US invasion. It is therefore all the more remarkable that in 2011 Turkey-Syria relations deteriorated so rapidly and so thoroughly; in a few short months after the outbreak of the Syrian Uprising, amity had turned into enmity.¹

I. Explaining the move to enmity

I.1 Negative tit for tat

Since Turkey was the main initiator of the deterioration in relations, an explanation requires understanding the Syria policy of the ruling AKP. The AKP was initially loath to see Asad fall, since Syria had become the showcase of its policy of engagement with the Arab World. Yet, the 2011 Syrian Uprising precipitated an escalating negative tit for tat between the two states at the leadership level. Then Prime Minister Erdoğan called on his ‘friends’ in Syria to implement far-reaching political reforms rather than repressing protestors and urged Asad to share power with the Muslim Brothers. When this advice was not taken, he took umbrage; the tone from Ankara became more hectoring and the reaction from Damascus more resentful. Asad claimed in interviews with the Turkish press that Syria’s relation with Turkey had always been marred by Erdoğan’s advocacy of the inclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria’s political process.

As the level of Syrian government violence against protestors increased and refugees from the fighting flooded into southern Turkey, the Turkish government increased the pressure on Asad: even as it was urging reforms on him, the AKP sought leverage over him by hosting opposition leaders, notably the Muslim Brotherhood, eventually sponsoring a potential alternative govern-

¹ Hinnebusch and Tür, *Turkey-Syria Relations*. 

Prof. Dr. Raymond Hinnebusch

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ment, the Syrian National Council (SNC). In June 2011, Turkey gave sanctuary to Syrian army defectors and helped them constitute themselves as the Free Syrian Army (FSA), an anti-Damascus armed force. The Syrian Ambassador in Ankara warned that Damascus could retaliate by resuming support for the PKK; indeed, Syria soon allowed the PKK-affiliated Syrian Kurdish party, the PYD, to take over much of the Kurdish inhabited Syrian border zone with Turkey. A pro-government Syrian newspaper also warned Turkey it would jeopardise its economic links to the Arab World that ran through Syria.\(^2\) In a key meeting between Asad and then-Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu in August 2011, the latter’s warnings of Western intervention if Asad did not abandon his ‘security solution’ to the uprising was met by counter threats that Syria, in reaction, unleash Hizbollah and a regional war.

Syrian-Turkish economic interdependence proved too thin to prevent the reversal of amity. Not only did both sides sacrifice the benefits of cooperation but also each resumed the use of trans-state interdependencies against the other. Turkey ended the High Level Strategic Council that had facilitated cooperation over issues, such as water and imposed economic sanctions on Syria that, in reprisal, ended the free trade arrangements that hadfavoured Turkey, ousting Turkish investors and obstructing Turkey’s transit links to the Gulf. The Syria-Turkey border, which had been opened during the rapprochement, allowing dense family and trade ties, was now re-militarised and the border areas suffered economic losses and an influx of refugees.\(^3\) Turkey collaborated with the Arab League in trying to get a UN resolution against Syria. Syria’s June 2012 downing of a Turkish reconnaissance plane was possibly a warning to Turkey that military intervention in Syria would be costly.

Asad and Erdoğan, formerly praised by the media in the neighbouring countries, were now demonised in the rival capitals: Asad was the dictator with blood on his hands; Erdoğan was the “Turkish-Ottoman-Wahhabi Sectarian enemy that rules in Istanbul.”\(^4\) If the interaction of Asad and Erdoğan had been crucial to generating amity in the 1990s, this very personalisation of the relation meant that when the leaders fell out over the uprising, the deterioration of relations was exaggerated.

\section*{I.2 Identity over security?}

With renewed Turkey-Syria hostility, the relation of the two states was sharply resecuritised and mutual threat perceptions re-emerged. This is readily understood in Syria’s case since Ankara’s support for the uprising threatened regime survival. But, in realist terms, a much weakened Syria did not present a threat to Turkey despite several incidents, including Syria’s downing of the Turkish aircraft and some cross border shelling. Such minor threats hardly seem to justify Turkey’s sacrifice of cooperation with Syria against the PKK, traditionally seen as the major threat to Turkey’s security. Moreover, Turkey’s support for anti-Asad insurgents was certain to destabilise its neighbour, with no assurance that the fall of the Asad regime would not unleash even greater turbulence in Turkey’s neighbourhood. As such, Erdoğan’s choices seem incongruent with the ‘defensive realism’ of traditional Turkish foreign policy.

Rather, Turkey’s response to the Syrian Uprising was a function of the way the change in Turkey’s identity under the AKP reshaped the government’s conceptions of Turkey’s interests and of the threats to them. The AKP’s ‘neo-Ottoman’ ambition to restore Turkish leadership in the Arab world, deeply rooted in its conception of Turkey’s

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\(^2\) "al-Watan", various issues May, June 2011.
\(^3\) Tür, “The Political Economy of Turkish-Syrian Relations”.
\(^4\) "al-Manar", 28 April 2012.
identity, was decisive in driving Turkey’s policy. Discourse by then-Prime Minister Erdoğan and then Foreign Minister Davutoğlu had proposed a new multinational regional order grouping Turks, Arabs and Kurds under an Islamic banner that would overcome the mutilation of the region by the post WWI settlement. This was initially pursued via a policy of ‘zero problems’ with neighbours that was driven less by security fears than by the ambition to export a liberal peace to the region, largely through economic integration.

The outbreak of the ‘Arab Spring’ presented Turkey with a challenge to this policy, particularly after its opposition to the Western intervention in Libya was attributed to Turkish economic interests there. But the AKP appeared to learn from the damage done to its image that economic integration alone could not secure its role in the region, and its bid for regional leadership depended on standing against repressive dictatorships. The uprising, indeed, was also an opportunity since the embrace of democratic norms by the Arab masses allowed Ankara to promote its Islamic-compatible version of democracy as a regional model. Polls showed that Arab opinion had come to view the Turkish model with favour and Muslim Brotherhood avatars akin to the AKP scored electoral successes across the region. With the acclaim won by Prime Minister Erdoğan in his September 2011 visit to Egypt and Tunisia, where Muslim Brotherhood governments had come to power, Turkey started positioning itself as the big brother of the emerging Arab democracies. This soft power was expected to serve its bid for regional hegemony.

As such, Turkey’s turn against Asad was arguably consistent with its interests, as they had been re-interpreted through the AKP’s identity lens. The Syrian regime’s use of violence against unarmed protestors would have been seen as incompatible with the liberal peace Turkey wanted to export to its neighbourhood. Once the Asad regime declined Turkish advice to accommodate the Syrian opposition, Ankara may have calculated that it had to choose between the regime and its opponents, and Turkey’s democratic norms were a factor in this choice.

The Turkish government also miscalculated that the Asad regime could not survive long, hence that sacrificing relations with it would not have long-term costs, and therefore decided to pro-actively sponsor a friendly opposition that could replace it. Were the Muslim Brotherhood to have come to power in Damascus, the AKP could expect to enjoy special influence there, crowning the status achieved in Tunis and Cairo until mid-2013. Once Turkey burned its bridges with Asad, the ‘zero problems’ policy could not be restored without regime change. Thus, if Syria was the showcase of Turkey’s previous hegemonic formula based on economic integration, it was now the test case of the new version based on export of democratisation.

Nevertheless, this benign vision was soon distorted. As Asad moved to rally his sectarian constituency by demonising the Syrian opposition as Islamic terrorists and used violence against the mostly Sunni opposition, the AKP’s discourse against Asad positioned Ankara as a defender of Sunni Muslims; Turkey’s bid for regional hegemony was increasingly framed in terms of the Sunni Islamic identity Turkey shared with the Arab World. This was all the more so as Turkey’s main competition in Syria and for regional hegemony was Iran, at the head of a Shia-dominated ‘resistance axis’ in which Syria was the weakest link. While Turkey deployed its Sunni Islamist identity instrumentally it contributed to a dangerous sectarianisation of the region.

5 Mutfi, “Arab Reactions to Turkey’s Regional Engagement”.
6 Altunışık, “Turkey’s Soft Power”.
7 Aras, “The Syrian Uprising”.
I.3 Power balancing and regional realignment

Turkey’s Syria policy was reinforced by shifts in the regional power balance, the context within which policy makers calculate the threats that, in turn, shape their alignments. The ‘Trilateral Front’ that Turkey, Iran and Syria had constructed against shared threats from the US invasion of Iraq, notably Kurdish separatism, was undermined as the US withdrew from Iraq. Tehran geographically connected, via a friendly Shia-led Iraq, the parts of the so-called ‘Shiite Crescent’ linking it to Syria and Hezbollah. To Ankara, this threatened the balance of power in the region. But it was the Syrian Uprising that precipitated a reshuffle in regional alignments. Once the Turkish government, as well as Saudi Arabia and the GCC, began supporting the opposition to the Asad regime, not only politically but also with arms, funding and a safe haven in Turkey, the Syrian regime became dependent on support from Iran, Iraq and Hezbollah for its survival. The debilitation of the Asad regime put Iran on the defensive against the newly assertive Sunni powers, since Asad’s fall would sever Iran’s connection to Hizbollah and cripple the Iran-led ‘resistance axis’ to the advantage of the Sunni bloc led by Saudi Arabia. The Syrian Uprising therefore precipitated a major realignment of regional alliances as the Trilateral Front gave way to intense Turkish-Iranian rivalry over Syria, and moved Ankara into cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the GCC. This realignment overlapped with the region-wide Shia-Sunni cleavage, with sectarian discourse an instrument in the inter-bloc power struggle.

Turkey’s relations with the West were also an element in its policy toward the Syrian crisis. At the outset of the Syrian Uprising, Turkey tried to demonstrate its value as a regional interlocutor for the West, owing to the assumed leverage over Asad that would allow Ankara to steer him toward peaceful political change. Turkey initially resisted Western-proposed sanctions that would hurt Syrian and Turkish businesses, having experienced economic loss when the West imposed sanctions on Iraq. Turkey was also initially against international intervention, except as a last resort, but were Asad to be toppled by such intervention, as in Libya, Turkey wanted to ensure a place at the diplomatic table and a say in Syria’s post-Asad settlement. Washington, for its part, had reverted, under Obama, to a more prudent offshore balancing policy in MENA that was more reliant on regional allies, and it viewed Turkey as a key ally in dealing with the Syria crisis. During his visit to New York in September 2011, Erdoğan declared that Turkey would coordinate sanctions against Syria with the US and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared that the US was looking to Turkey and the Arab League to manage regime change in Syria.

However, once the AKP government finally lost patience with Asad, it sought to enlist its Western allies in regime change, even pressing a reluctant US to intervene, in a manner that “turned the accustomed dynamics” of Turkish-American relations “upside down”. Turkey not only urged the ‘international community’ to impose sanctions on Syria, but also proposed a no-fly zone and a safe haven for Syrian refugees. It soon became openly critical of the UN Security Council for its inaction as it became clear that Russia and China were unwilling to allow a UN-endorsed military intervention. When Syria downed a Turkish Air Force jet in summer 2012, Ankara’s immediate reaction was to call on NATO for support, with

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8 Oktav, “The Iran-Turkey-Syria Quasi-Alliance”.
9 Altunışık, “Explaining the Transformation of Turkish-Syrian Relations”.
10 Akbaba and Özdamar, “Ethnicity, Religion and Foreign Policy”.
11 Today’s Zaman, 21 September 2011; Hürriyet 20 November 2011.
12 Aydintaşbaş, “Kızılay’dan humus’a insani yardım koridoru”.
Davutoğlu declaring that, “[a]ny attack against Turkey’s borders is an attack against NATO”.  

II. The consequences of the move to enmity: overreach and blowback

II.1 Turkey, Asad and Sunni Jihadism

As the Syrian Uprising turned into protracted civil war, the AKP government became increasingly frustrated by the unexpected tenacity of the Asad regime and the reluctance of the West to move against him. According to Seymour Hersh’s intelligence sources, Turkey and the US reached a secret agreement in early 2012 for the CIA to ship arms from Libyan arsenals into Syria. The American decision to end the programme, after arms fell into jihadist hands, angered Turkey. In a highly disputed article, Hersh claimed that Turkey helped the Syrian al-Qaida avatar, Jabhat al-Nusra, to stage a chemical weapons attack in Syria in the hope of provoking a US response against Asad.

Whether or not Turkey was involved, Erdoğan was publically dissatisfied when Russian diplomacy headed off this attack. It soon became public knowledge that Turkey was helping jihadist groups in Syria, including those linked to al-Qaida, because they were the most effective fighters against Asad. Turkey’s role in the creation of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, ISIS, became a major issue when the latter shocked the world by seizing the major Iraqi city of Mosul. In Syria, Turkey had provided ISIS with weapons and training, allowed free movement across its borders by jihadists, gave them control of two critical crossing points, permitted recruitment in Turkey, and allowed ISIS to sell Syrian crude oil via Turkey, with USD 100 million estimated hidden in Turkish banks. The AKP seemed to regard ISIS as protecting Sunni interests in Syria and Iraq against anti-Sunni regimes. Under growing pressure from Washington, Turkey shut down the two ISIS-controlled border crossings, but resisted doing anything more and continued its backing of two other Syrian jihadist organisations, Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham.

Turkey’s support for ISIS had, however, the unintended consequence of greatly strengthened the threat of Kurdish separatism, long regarded as Turkey’s main national security threat. Earlier, in order to head off the potential for the PKK to take advantage of the turmoil on the Syrian border, the AKP government had struck an alliance with the KDP-run Kurdish regional government in Iraq and in 2012, also entered peace negotiations with the PKK. However, the PKK’s stature among Kurds was greatly increased in the wake of the Mosul crisis, when its fighters rescued the beleaguered KDP peshmerga from an ISIS attempt to penetrate Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan. The ISIS threat seemed to be healing the intra-Kurdish cleavages that the AKP had been manipulating to contain Kurdish separatism. This explains Turkey’s refusal to allow Kurdish fighters to cross from Turkey to defend the Syrian Kurdish town of Kobane from an ISIS assault: Ankara calculated that saving the town from ISIS would strengthen the PKK affiliated PYD that ruled Kobane, while if the town fell, the PKK would lose prestige. Erdoğan also tried to use the siege of Kobane to force the PYD to join the opposition against Asad as a condition for allowing relief into Kobane.

In parallel, Turkey refrained from signing the 2014 Jeddah agreement creating the anti-ISIS coalition, using the excuse of Turkish hostages taken by ISIS. Davutoğlu declared that, as a matter of principal, Turkey

13 Sabah, 4 July 2012.
14 Seymour Hersh, “The Red Line and the Rat Line”.
15 Middle East Briefing, “Washington Worried”, Idiz, “Is the Islamic State Holding Turkey Hostage?”.
16 Cook, “Fiddling while Kobane Burns,” Zaman, “Turkey’s Leaders see Kobane as Opportunity”.
Turkey’s support for the anti-ISIS coalition was contingent on the Syrian regime being made a principal target. Turkey demanded a buffer zone inside Syria for refugees protected by a no-fly zone; the real aim of the latter was to prevent the Asad regime from using its airpower advantage against the armed Syrian opposition. Further, if coalition airstrikes could be turned against Asad, the Turkish sponsored opposition could expand into Asad-controlled territory. While the West feared that destruction of the Asad regime would open the door to jihadists such as ISIS, Turkey believed it would bring a friendly Sunni government to power. While the Turkish military lacked the capability for prolonged operations inside Syria on its own, as part of a US or NATO-led operation, Turkish troops would be better positioned to head off Kurdish separatist threats, notably to prevent a cross-border combination between the PKK and PYD.\textsuperscript{19}

However, Turkey’s stand isolated it, with Washington, Europe, Moscow and Tehran agreeing that the priority was confronting ISIS. US and European anger at Erdoğan’s refusal to help prevent a feared massacre in Kobane led them to combine to punish Turkey by defeating its bid for a UN Security Council seat.\textsuperscript{20}

\section*{II.2 From domestic constraints to domestic blowback}

Turkish domestic politics had no direct role in driving the deterioration of relations with Syria, as few Turkish actors could see gains for their domestic standing from exploiting it. Indeed, as Erdoğan appeared helpless to resolve the Syrian crisis and with his ‘zero problems’ policy in tatters, he faced increasing criticism in the press, particularly as the PYD used the situation to establish itself on the Syrian border with Turkey. Right-wing nationalists also attacked Erdoğan’s ‘Kurdish opening’ to Turkey’s Kurds, in part driven by his need to deal with the rising Syrian Kurdish threat, as a national betrayal.

The one force that benefitted from the Syrian conflict was Turkey’s National Intelligence Organisation (M.I.T.) under Erdoğan loyalist Hakan Fidan, a zealous backer of the radical Islamist opposition in Syria. Erdoğan’s need for his main former rival, the traditionally Kemalist military, increased as the security situation with Syria deteriorated, leading him to seek improved relations with the generals;\textsuperscript{21} but the military was not noticeably keen for intervention and was angered by the Kurdish opening. While Erdoğan assumed his democratisation mission gave him a right to intervene in Syria, the other main standard bearer of Kemalism, the opposition Republican People’s Party, believed Turkey should, as Atatürk had warned, refrain from becoming embroiled in the conflicts of the Middle East and from violating the sovereignty of a neigh-

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\textsuperscript{17} Taştekin, “Turkey Faces Dilemma”.  \\
\textsuperscript{18} Candar, “Frenemies”.  \\
\textsuperscript{19} Tol, “Turkey’s Tough Choice”; Idiz, “Asad, not Islamic State in Ankara’s crosshairs”; Idiz, “Erdoğan Confronts”, Candar, “Frenemies”.  \\
\textsuperscript{20} Middle East Briefing, “Joint Chiefs,” 2014.  \\
\textsuperscript{21} Abramowitz, “Turkey’s Unending Syria Problem”.  \\
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bouring state. For other critics, Turkey’s rush to take sides in Syria had forfeited any chance to act as potential mediator in the conflict.

As for public opinion, it was too ambivalent and divided to be a driver of policy towards Syria. To be sure, many Turks were inflamed at the Syrian regime’s brutal repression of protestors and the AKP used the killing of some Turkish citizens by Syrian cross-border shelling to elicit an overwhelming parliamentary endorsement of a military rebuff to any future incidents. Turkish opinion did not, however, favour anything more than strictly defensive and limited intervention in the Syrian conflict; indeed, the opposition of both ‘expert’ and public opinion, even among the AKP’s constituency, to direct involvement in the conflict, except via diplomacy, was a constraint on Erdoğan’s options.\(^\text{22}\) Secularists and Turkey’s Alevi minority were alarmed at Erdoğan’s flirtation with Sunni Islamists in Syria and were more likely to support Asad. Turks became increasingly alarmed at the costs of the growing Syrian refugee presence, especially in the border provinces: whereas in 2010 these provinces had benefited from more than 2.3 million Syrian tourists, now they hosted 1.6 million Syrian refugees and over two-thirds of residents of these provinces believed that Syrians’ willingness to work for lower wages was costing Turkish jobs.\(^\text{23}\) But none of this prevented Erdoğan from increasing his majority in parliament and winning a presidential election: the costs of his policy had not resulted in a fall in electoral support that might have reversed the AKP’s course.

Yet, as the conflict and Turkey’s policy drove the rise of jihadism in Syria, Turkey experienced classic ‘blowback’ that threatened its secular state, sectarian peace and moderate democratic version of Islam. The sectarian polarisation fostered by the Syrian conflict jumped the border, notably in Hatay province, where the resident Alawi Arab population felt threatened by incoming Syrian Sunni Islamists, and where a bombing in the city of Reyhanlı turned opinion against the Syrian presence. Secularists feared the combination of the Syria crisis and AKP’s Sunni ‘sectarian’ policy was inflaming Turkish political Islamism. Indeed, in 2014, the rise of ISIS put the long dormant issue of the Caliphate back on the agendas of some Turkish Islamist groups;\(^\text{24}\) interlinked with ISIS’s own cross-border networks, Turkish Islamist groups recruited Turks to fight in Syria and 7-10% of ISIS militants – some 5,000 fighters – were said to be Turks. Erdoğan’s refusal to help save Kobane from the ISIS also angered Turkish Kurds, setting off riots and a military deployment in the southeast reminiscent of the 1990s insurgency, and putting the PKK-Turkish peace talks at risk. Turks divided almost evenly between those considering the biggest threat to Turkey to be the PKK (44%) and those choosing ISIS (42%).\(^\text{25}\) Erdoğan’s Syria policy had played a major role in the rise of both threats.

### III. Conclusion

The move from amity to enmity in Turkey-Syria relations began when mutually beneficial interdependencies, growing trade and widening cooperation unexpectedly collapsed under the pressure of the Syrian Uprising. Turkey, reacting to the repression of protestors by the Syrian regime, sacrificed its alliance with Damascus to promote an opposition counter-elite. Turkey was driven by its ambition for regional hegemony through export of an Islamic brand of democratisation: regime change in authoritarian regimes would bring kindred Islamic

\(^{22}\) EDAM, “Turks Give Little Support”.
\(^{23}\) All4Syria, “Poll Shows How Turks View Syrians”, 27 Oct 2014; Dogan, “Outsized Ambitions”.
\(^{24}\) Tremblay, “Turks Increasingly Sympathetic”.
\(^{25}\) Dalogu, “Turkey Trapped”.
parties to power across the Arab world, including Damascus, advancing Turkish ‘neo-Ottoman’ hegemony in the region. However, in choosing to pursue a coercive export of democratisation to Syria, the AKP helped replicate the outcome of the American project in Iraq – another failed state and a further unleashing of sectarian war.

Contiguous failed states in Iraq and Syria provided the vacuum for the rise of ISIS and the inadvertent empowerment of Kurdish irredentism, which, together, became formidable security threats to Turkey. Moreover, Turkey’s reach for regional hegemony encountered setbacks as a result of its support for radical Islamism in Syria: large pro-Turkish majorities in Arab public opinion fell considerably, especially in Syria, where only 21% of Syrians came to believe Turkey was a model for them.26 ‘Zero problems’ had, critics charged, changed into zero friends, leaving Turkey isolated. Moreover, economic interests, the original driver of the ‘zero problems’ policy, had been sacrificed, with annual losses from the severance of relations with Syria estimated at USD 7-8 billion, and exports to the Gulf through Syria and Iraq paralysed by the twin crises in these states.

These outcomes are attributed by Turkish analysts to the AKP’s “failure to grasp the intricacies of the Syrian crisis,” or its inability to reconcile an ‘idealist’ foreign policy with Turkish national interests.27 The personalisation of relations at the highest level and the instrumental use of sectarianism on both sides also contributed to sub-optimal outcomes. The limits of Turkey’s ‘zero problems’ policy and its lack of sufficient military and economic, as well as soft power, to manage its neighbourhood independent of the West were sharply exposed.28 Turkey’s regional version of ‘liberal imperialism’, like its global US counterpart, resulted in ‘overreach’ and uncontrollable ‘blowback’. Yet, far from leading to more cautious policies, Erdoğan, driven by his “obsessive hatred for Asad”,29 held to his project of regime change in Syria, seeking to leverage his reluctant US ally into promoting the outcome Turkey could not, by itself, realise.

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