An Army in Exile: Louis XIV and the Irish Forces of James II in France, 1691-1698

Guy Rowlands
AN ARMY IN EXILE: LOUIS XIV AND THE IRISH FORCES
OF JAMES II IN FRANCE, 1691 – 1698

Guy Rowlands

At the height of the Second World War Winston Churchill is known to have exclaimed with exasperation about Charles de Gaulle that the biggest cross he had to bear was the cross of Lorraine. One might easily forgive Louis XIV if he had uttered the same remark about the cross of Saint George – the military banner of the Jacobite exile – during the 1690s. Apart from the vexations caused to French diplomacy during the Nine Years War by James’s asylum in France at Saint-Germain-en-Laye, the single largest problem facing Louis and his guest was the control and administration of the Irish regiments and Scottish companies which also found refuge in France after the defeat of King James’s forces in the British Isles.

In recent years historians have begun to pay far more attention not only to the ideology of sovereignty but also to its associated symbols and practices. Nevertheless, armies have not figured highly in this investigation even though they were the ultimate expression of power. This was not simply the case with rulers in control of their territories. Indeed, it is critical to stress that continued possession of an army was a powerful symbol of sovereign status for an exiled ruler, something appreciated not only by James II but also by other exiled princes. Charles Forman, warning Walpole’s government in the late 1720s of the continued menace of Irish troops in Bourbon pay, put matters in a clear perspective:

“As long as there is a Body of Irish Roman Catholick Troops Abroad the Chevalier [James III] will always make some Figure in Europe by the Credit they give him; and be consider’d as a Prince that has a brave and well-disciplined Army of Veterans at his Service, tho’ he wants that Opportunity to employ them at present, which he expects Time and Fortune will favour him with.”

Meanwhile, though, these forces were dependent upon the host state for survival.

All this notwithstanding, in all the serious work done on both the “Wild Geese” and the Jacobite exile in the last 150 years, since John O’Callaghan published an incomplete history of the military diaspora, almost nobody has explored the myriad political, military and social difficulties thrown up by these soldiers. Yet this is perhaps unsurprising. The source material is scattered, fragmentary in the extreme, and can only be harvested over many years of research. The single most important source for the history
of the Jacobite military diaspora is the massive series of ministerial correspondence generated in the French War Ministry during the ancien régime, and which is now kept at the château de Vincennes, but this is on the whole poorly indexed and organised around specific military campaigns or on a purely chronological basis. Trying to search for correspondence related purely to the Jacobites among these papers is a dispiriting task, but by serendipitously accumulating information over several years while working on other projects concerning French history it has proven possible to attempt a reinterpretation of the Jacobite armed forces. Much of this essay is consequently based upon material unearthed in the French archives, though the Carte manuscripts in the Bodleian Library at Oxford also proved highly informative.

Space does not permit an examination of the three Scottish companies which served in France after 1691, nor a discussion of the three original regiments of the Irish Brigade – 5,500 men – who were sent over to France in an exchange of troops between Louis and James in mid–1690, and who passed into Louis XIV’s direct service. Saint–Germain had relatively little to do with these regiments. Instead, the principal focus of this essay will be the regiments which were set up on James’s arrival in France in the aftermath of the Treaty of Limerick – October 1691 – and which for ease of description will be referred to as the Jacobite forces. While a caveat should be entered at this point to the effect that further research is being undertaken on this subject by the author, this essay will seek to provide some provisional ideas about the degree of help France actually gave the Jacobite military exiles; why the French government treated them in the way they did; how James II himself viewed and assisted his loyal military subjects; and how they in turn viewed him and his son.

By the 1680s the era of the great condottieri was over. Military enterprisers who raised – on their own account, or by direct commission of a ruler – large numbers of troops were no longer strutting the European stage. Instead, mercenary activity tended – generally speaking – to be conducted at two extreme levels: first, third–rank princes were beginning to hire out significant portions of their small standing armies to larger states; and second, individuals were raising one or two regiments for service to a foreign sovereign. When hiring foreign troops Louis XIV would advance funds to the contractors in question to meet the costs of recruiting and equipping the men; or, the French government took existing units off other rulers willing to lend them out, sometimes in return for a subsidy to the other government. But the Jacobite army of James II does not easily fit this model.

In the aftermath of his overthrow, James II first escaped to France in late December 1688 and then in early 1689 sailed to Ireland to take up the struggle to regain his thrones. However, he ended up fighting the Irish war at a crippling disadvantage, partly of his own making. The remodelling and catholicisation of the Irish army under the earl of Tyrconnell in 1687–88 had drafted in as officers many military neophytes, often urban commoners or the scions of Catholic gentry ruined during the civil war. They were in large part ignorant of military affairs and professional duties, the pay system was ramshackle, and much of the army’s equipment dilapidated. In October 1688 James had called 2,500 men to England – almost half the Irish army – to shore up his position against the imminent Dutch attack. With the collapse of his position on Salisbury Plain in November, and the subsequent demobilisation of a sizable part of his forces, James lost all these men. It is true many ultimately made it back across the Saint George’s Channel, but any fleeting sense of esprit de corps evaporated and the Irish army continued to suffer from a chronic shortage of experienced and disciplined officers. What was worse, the prospect for continuing the struggle against William III in Ireland was also to be gravely handicapped by a backward logistical infrastructure which could not be properly supported from France. Throughout the years 1689–91 James’s cavalry was in a reasonable condition, but his infantry was chronically under–armed, and fresh levies of troops could not be brought to combat–readiness in time to prove a real match for hardened Dutch, German and Danish troops in King William’s army. In spite of a number of actions in which the Jacobites got the better of their opponents, this much became painfully evident at the battle of the Boyne in July 1690. The Jacobite cause in Scotland had been lost from August 1689. Now, after the catastrophe of the Boyne, the war effort in Ireland limped on, loosely directed by James from the comfort of Saint–Germain, until the Treaty of Limerick was signed on 13 October 1691.

French reactions to the mismanagement of the war in Ireland and James’s defeat there often revealed themselves in open contempt: the French War Minister Louvois, and his son and successor after July 1691 Barbezieux, were believed to despise most of the Jacobites including the exiled king himself. Certainly the French government did not give the Jacobites the attention they felt they deserved. Secretary of State Middleton told his colleague Caryll that the French often needed reminding of Saint–Germain’s interests and requests because “they are sometimes apt to forget.” Reliable sources testify to the despair felt even by Louis himself at his cousin’s manifest incompetence, though he remained James’s strongest supporter. Furthermore, Louis XIV’s determination to
provide considerable financial assistance to James, at the expense of his own subjects, did nothing to quell resentment from needy French courtiers at the king’s waste of scarce resources on an already apparently hopeless cause.4

French distaste for the Jacobites was replicated by the feelings many exiles had for the man they had followed to the Continent. It is true that the Irish regiments always stressed the political and religious nature of their motivation, rather than the venal side of mercenary service, but this seems to me to include a certain amount of propaganda and special pleading.5 As early as 1691 Jacobites still in Britain had lost confidence in James and turned to Versailles for assistance and guidance, while James himself was well aware – over a year later – that his own popularity was still on the floor, though he took some comfort from the loathing felt by the British for William.6 Part of the problem was that the strength of Jacobite unity and James’s service were sapped by inter-British ethnic tensions. Nathalie Genet-Rouffiac has estimated that about 60 per cent of the exiles after 1691 were Irish, 35 per cent English, and only 5 per cent Scots. English volunteers headed for French elite cavalry formations rather than James’s units, and British deserters enlisted in French regiments rather than Irish ones.7 In turn, the Irish were both suspicious of the other ethnic groups and resentful of James’s disguised but very English disdain for them. Their sentiments were only enhanced by first-hand experience of James in Ireland. Viscount Clare, whose sons served in both the Jacobite army and the Irish Brigade, informed Louvois of his feelings towards his sovereign in no uncertain terms:

“Leaving aside the respect I owe him, he would do best to go and pass the remainder of his days praying to God in a cloister than think of commanding armies or governing a state.”

He was not alone in these views.8 In 1696 Colonel Richard Talbot, bastard son of Tyrconnell and head of one of the Irish Brigade regiments, was dismissed by Louis XIV and imprisoned in the Bastille for over a year, first, for publicly slandering James as an ingrate, and then denying it to both Queen Mary Beatrice and Mme. de Maintenon. Louis’s wife.9

II

For the first three years of the second Stuart exile, Saint-Germain had no troops to speak of on French soil which were recognisably and clearly its own. This was partly due to the indifference of the French War Ministry about the potential for setting up Anglo-Scots regiments. But all this was to change after October 1691. The Treaty of Limerick sealing the defeat of James’s cause in Ireland allowed all those Irish troops who so wished to leave for service in France. From mid-summer, spurred on by Patrick Sarsfield and King James, the French had been planning for a major exodus from the Emerald Isle, expecting somewhere in the region of 12 to 15,000 Irishmen to descend upon them.9 Louis’s decision to accept the Irish army on his soil and into his pay was due to four pressures: 1) a personal moral obligation to James; 2) James’s persistent requests; 3) the French need for further manpower, even though their logistical system was close to stagnation; and 4) the imperative of securing the Irish before another, hostile Catholic power took them in.

The evacuation of Ireland took place between October and New Year’s Eve, after the Irish officers made strenuous efforts and persuaded around three-quarters of the army to follow them to France.10 My own assessment based on French sources indicates that around 15,000 men, and certainly no more than 4,000 women and children, arrived in Brittany that winter, not the usually quoted figure of 16 to 19,000 men.11 How they were organised and who exercised political and administrative control over them was an acutely sensitive subject. During the negotiations over this matter between Saint-Germain and Versailles, James demanded that these men all serve in the same corps and under the command of his general officers; all the officers would have James’s commissions and they and the men would be subject to James’s disciplinary code. Each infantry regiment should have 16 companies consisting of one captain, two subalterns, and 58 other ranks; each cavalry regiment the same number of officers and 45 other ranks. The French counter-proposal, which won out, was a rude awakening for James: the French saw the situation more as an augmentation of Louis’s troops than the offering of sanctuary to an army. James would be allowed to issue the commissions, and the Irish judicial system would remain autonomous; but all the officers and men would also swear an oath to serve the king of France against anyone else except the king of England. Each regiment would consist of 14 companies, each comprised of 100 men, a division of the men which offered almost 50 per cent fewer captaincies and which would place a far greater burden on the officers. Louis would be the master of the troops’ destiny and they might be sent anywhere he pleased, either in a corps or as detached regiments. Dependent as he was, James had no choice but to agree. James would enjoy a military administration commensurate with the size of his forces, to include a Secretary-at-War, a Judge Advocate General, a Provost Marshal General and his assistants, a Chaplain General and assistant
priests, and an establishment of physicians and surgeons. Right up to 1698 James continued to expedite all commissions for his regiments and companies, even appointing men then enjoying the hospitality of the Tower of London, something Louis would have been loath to do in the French army. James was also responsible independently for dismissing officers from his regiments, and worked through their colonels to secure replacements. In 1696 he suspended one colonel, Gordon O'Neill, and only a few months later restored him to command after granting him an audience at Saint-Germain. The task facing James, his senior officers and French military advisers in organizing these forces at the end of 1691 was daunting. Barbezieux, the new French War Minister, was uneasy about the mass immigration and anxious to keep them fully informed, so in early December he sent Andrew Lee, inspector-general of the Irish Brigade, to join several French generals at Brest in order to examine the troops as they arrived from Ireland and to prepare the ground for James, who arrived on the 19th and stayed for three months. Accompanying the king was Sir Richard Nagle, Secretary of State for Ireland and James’s Secretary-at-War since 1689. To assist them, Louis loaned his cousin three experienced officers from the elite Gardes Françaises to teach the Irish the principles of French drill and discipline. The aim was to effect a rapid transformation of the Irish army in readiness for an invasion of England in the summer of 1692, but this was no easy task. The exodus from Ireland had sown only abject chaos in the debris of James’s army: existing companies and regiments were split up and embarked upon different vessels at different times for different sailings. As it was, many of the regiments existed in little more than name only and many had been hastily formed only that summer. There was little consistent identification with particular colonels or corps. Moreover, upon disembarkation at Brest it was obvious that many of the Irish troops were in a pitiful state, dressed only in rags, with at least 1,500 sick. The French provided them with shoes, hats, stockings and shirts, and hastily grouped them into companies 100–strong which became the basis for the subsequent composition of the new regiments.

By Easter King James’s army consisted of seven two-battalion infantry regiments, one single-battalion infantry regiment, two single-battalion-sized regiments of dismounted dragoons, two regiments of cavalry, and two companies of Life Guards, a paper strength of 12,160 men not including officers or supernumeraries, plus the three Scottish companies. By all accounts the officers were wasting no time in training the men in battlecraft, and were using the off-reckonings from their pay to ensure the men were fit to serve and properly equipped. Morale, from a rock-bottom level in January, had been considerably raised; the officers were now angry at their fate rather than dejected. Regimental administration was beginning to work, and James employed Frenchmen as majors of four regiments to ensure they were properly managed.

With 7,000 French troops also waiting on the Channel coast, James’s army seemed poised to threaten William III’s hold on England. Unfortunately all the work was to no avail. The defeat of Tourville’s French fleet at Barfleur–La Hogue off the Normandy coast put paid to all hopes of an immediate invasion of England. In the second week of June Louis unilaterally decided to order the dispersal of the Jacobite regiments and under the terms of the agreement between the two sovereigns presented James’s officers with their marching orders to join the various French armies. From this moment on, all the disadvantages inherent in the arrangements imposed by Louis upon James became apparent. Things, in short, began to go pear-shaped.

III

Much of the basic administrative work was done within the regiments themselves, or by Saint-Germain. James personally took decisions about the allocation of horses in his Life Guard companies, he organised the distribution of recruits among his regiments, and he actively supervised courts martial. Nagle shifted officers around within the Jacobite regiments. Sometimes he and James had to settle precedence disputes and order officers to desist from interfering in each other’s commands. James personally disciplined errant colonels, and Nagle organised some of the financial borrowing senior officers needed to sustain their regiments. Yet, from the moment the Irish exiles landed, Saint-Germain was also engaged in a process of direct administrative cooperation with the French War Ministry. Barbezieux issued route directions and passes for moving troops, sometimes at the instigation of Nagle; and granted leave passes for the Jacobite officers. Saint-Germain appointed Dominick Sheldon as inspector-general of its forces, and on occasion James reviewed his own regiments personally, but French inspectors also examined them. Because both Saint-Germain and Versailles were involved with the Jacobite military administration, Barbezieux kept in close personal touch both by letter and in private audience with some Jacobite officers. He could thereby ascertain the current state of the Jacobite regiments and build up ties of loyalty to Louis XIV among James’s subjects. Fidelity depended to a certain extent on prospects and the satisfaction of ambition, and though on matters of reglemental patronage James had full autonomy, his
general officers were not recognised as such in the field unless they also held French commissions. Only Louis could promote Jacobite colonels to brigadier or to general rank, and by doing so he sent a powerful signal to these men that it was in their interest to cooperate with him to the full. In this matter he did not always accede to James’s requests.24

Clearly, then, good relations with the French ministries were vital if Saint-Germain were to preserve something of a meaningful Jacobite state. Nagle remained James’s Secretary-at-War until his death in April 1699, but correspondence with Versailles seems to have been handled mainly by the two Secretaries of State at Saint-Germain, with Melfort and then Middleton as the principal channels of communication to the French government. There were regular face-to-face meetings between Barbezieux and the Jacobite Secretaries, and James himself gave the French War Minister audiences. If relations were generally harmonious – except when Melfort became unsupportable to Versailles in 1693–94 – Middleton for one was somewhat frightened of crossing either Barbezieux or the French Foreign Minister Croissy.25 What could smooth these formal dealings, of course, were informal contacts which could in turn benefit the Jacobite army.

Saint-Germain’s greatest supporter at Versailles was the comte de Lauzan, described by the earl of Ailesbury as “this shuttlecock” who enjoyed apartments in both royal courts, and who continued to act as a conduit between Saint-Germain and the French Ministry of the Marine throughout the 1690s.26 Other leading French courtiers were also close to Saint-Germain, most notably the La Tour d’Auvergne family and the prince de Conti, who were cousins of Mary Beatrice through the Mazarinette connection. Sadly, none of these people were close to Louis XIV by this time. What Saint-Germain needed was the active assistance of Louis’s most trusted commanders, and three of them were very forthcoming. The maréchal de Tourville, after his defeat at La Hogue, remained on good terms with Saint-Germain, and the comte de Tessé, a leading diplomat and second-in-command of the army of Italy, corresponded regularly with James himself about the state of the Jacobite regiments. Most important of all was another of Mary Beatrice’s cousins, the duc de Vendôme, who commanded armies in strategically vital theatres after 1695. He took a keen paternal interest in the Irish troops, valued their bravery, and even made patronage recommendations regarding them.27 However, James’s greatest lobbying assets were his two bastards: James Fitzjames, duke of Berwick, and Henry Fitzjames, Grand Prior of England whom he promoted to duke of Albemarle in January 1696. These brothers were fully plugged into social life at Versailles at the highest level, and in 1693 Berwick was promoted by Louis to lieutenant-general, aged only 23, a reflection of his considerable skill and judgment forged in adversity. Middleton was close to Berwick and exploited this link to Louis’s advisers.28

None of this, however, was any use if the fundamentals of Jacobite military administration were deeply flawed – and they were. Because the Irish officers often had little or no private income on which to draw, or were perhaps encumbered with debts, the issue of pay and conditions was particularly problematic. During the second half of Louis XIV’s “personal rule” no explicit profits were allowed to the officers of foreign regiments, but instead generous pay and extra allowances were built in, which the senior officers of the regiment might spend as they pleased, or as their own sovereign desired. It was particularly important that foreign regiments were paid more than native French units.29 Captain John Gallagher outlined the problem he and other foreign officers faced. Not only could they not draw easily upon private sources of finance to support their units, but:

“What wee have wee cannot soe well manage as the French doe being strangers both to the country, language, and to the service [of France].”

All this cut no ice with Versailles when it came to the Jacobite army.

In the winter of 1691–92 James had requested that Louis pay his troops at elevated rates compared to their French counterparts, so an infantry captain would enjoy 1,800 livres a year, a lieutenant 1,200, and a footsoldier 144. Instead Louis shot back with a devastating decision: captains would get 912, lieutenants 365, and ordinary footsoldiers just 91 livres, the same rates as French infantry companies. It is true that Louis offered more than the usual level of bonuses for captains who had full complements of men, which foreign regiments on higher basic pay did not get at all. He also supplied, at least periodically, the Jacobite regiments with clothing and equipment which normally had to be met from regimental funds; and the Irish soldiers did not have to pay the normal 3d per day towards the costs of Les Invalides, even though single Irishmen enjoyed the same entitlements to admission. In the end James’s Life Guards, as gentlemen, were indeed paid at the same bountiful rates as Louis’s Gardes du corps, and the soldiers of the King’s Foot Guards Regiment did get an extra sol per day, but all other regiments saw the men get the same as their French comrades – only 5 sous, from which one was deducted as off-reckonings to pay for clothing etc. With regard to
the company officers Louis did not budge from his original position. Tessé was depressed by this treatment of France’s allies, remarking,

“As for me I do not believe that foreigners who own nothing but their sword can live in France on the French pay rates…”28

It would be surprising to discover Louis XIV was comfortable about the idea of a brother sovereign residing on his territory in possession of an army that was placed beyond the French War Ministry’s remit; but, on reflection, it does not seem that the arrangements Louis made for the Irish troops stemmed from a real fear of James or even from a host sovereign’s sense of amour propre. There were other factors, of more practical and immediate significance, at work. Much of the justification for penalising the Irish was articulated in racially-prejudiced terms, but Louis’s government could be forgiven for offering poor terms having seen the miserable performance of the same men in Ireland. His generals and advisers did not believe that many Irish captains were capable of running companies, hence the decision to keep the number of such units down and to comprise each one of 100 men, not the 58 James had wanted. Louis and his ministers certainly appreciated the disadvantages under which the Jacobite regiments were operating, but given the apparent Irish propensity to disorder and a poor professional track-record they felt it vital to keep a very tight hold on the feckless officers if colossal waste were to be avoided. Therefore, to compensate for French pay rates, from December 1692 Louis put the senior Jacobite officers on his pension lists, from which there was always the threat of removal: in the foot and dismounted dragoons the lieutenant-colonels received 450 livres a year and the majors 300 livres; the colonels appear to have got between 1,000 and 2,000 livres. Lower ranking officers got French pensions if their actions merited them or they had sufficient connections, and some officers got one-off gratifications at various times.29 Had they instead been given elevated basic pay rates which were enjoyed by other foreign regiments and by the Irish Brigade, they would have been required to make their own arrangements for clothing and equipment. The Jacobite regimental commanders would consequently have had discretionary power over a far larger pool of money, thereby putting them even further beyond French control. This was a situation Versailles was not willing to permit.

There was, though, another consideration in the apparent meanness of the French fisc. The most fortunate of James’s subjects were given commissions of one sort or another.30 However, for most of those officers who failed to get any commission at all the outlook was exceptionally grim, and there were a great many of them. The colossal number of supernumerary officers in the Jacobite army could not be supported unless the men and the officers holding established posts therefore accepted the lower wage levels.31 This was symptomatic of the dismal career opportunities available to those who had gone to France: there were too many candidates for too few officer commissions. There was space for 160 gentlemen to serve in James’s Life Guards on decent pay, from where they might be plucked for vacant subaltern posts; and Saint-Germain was able to place some supernumerary officers in the elite French Gendarmerie heavy cavalry.32 But otherwise they had to carry the musket as volunteers in other Jacobite or French regiments, for in the first five years of the exile the French government would not grant men the status of half-pay officers, or “reformadoes” as they were known in contemporary English. James himself felt compelled to offer this status and to give a 4 sous per day wage top-up to 60 gentlemen volunteers in each regiment, or about 600 men in total! In August 1692 Louis agreed to give half-pay to thirty redundant colonels and lieutenant-colonels, but only in December 1696 did the French government finally agree to support reformadoes properly. The figures tell the story well. The King’s Foot Guards was manned by 67 officers in 1692, a number which rose to 85 in 1695, but by the end of 1697 to an astonishing 242, the majority reformadoes who had previously been mere volunteers. Over the same period the number of other ranks had fallen from 1,600 on paper to 1,100. Four other foot regiments and both cavalry regiments exhibited the same pressure of demand by destitute officers for refuge. Most reformadoes or subalterns lingered pathetically on where they were, in the era after 1695 often holding on to half-pay posts or positions in the Life Guards as a desperate retirement billet.33

“To the haves shall more be given” was very much a guiding maxim of Jacobite career structures.34 This was, perversely, unavoidable. The fortunes of battle could favour the brave and effective officer, but obviously the well-connected had a distinct advantage in the promotion stakes; indeed the existence of pre-pubescent boy officers strongly testifies to cronyism gone mad at a time when those with positions were anxious to safeguard the interests of their heirs be they ever so young.35 Though the Jacobite regiments and companies do not appear to have been bought and sold, as French regiments were, only those men with connections or some additional sources of support could really contemplate running a company successfully, never mind a regiment. Some officers were still able to draw small sums from their families remaining in Ireland, but most officers were from truly impoverished gentry stock. Of the senior officers, viscounts
Galmoy and Kilmallock and the earl of Clancarty lost their Irish estates after the Boyne, and the O'Brien viscounts Clare were hopelessly mired in unrelievable debt, but most of their colleagues had previously enjoyed little private income anyway. Some Saint-Germain courtiers took the enterprising step of investing directly in the Jacobite privates operating from French ports, and made respectable sums from the misfortunes of British merchants; but two could play at that game – in 1691 Captain Bourck of the Limerick regiment tried to bring across a nest-egg in the shape of 2,400lbs of wool worth 3,720 livres, but the ship in which he was travelling to France was boarded illegally by an English privateer and his investment seized.  

If they wished to, people at Saint-Germain could throw their weight behind the interests of the Jacobite regiments. The king and queen in particular were uninterested in their lobbying of Versailles for Irish military interests, even beyond the 1698 disbundments, and Jacobite ministers presented Irish officers at the French court. But because of the demands on their purse, James and Mary Beatrice felt constrained in the amount of concrete assistance they could offer. Louis XIV’s pension to James was 600,000 livres per annum, or c. £50,000, but successive papes were decidedly tight-fisted with material assistance. James had an additional, prerogative source of funding assigned to him by Louis, the right to draw the royal 1/10th in admiralty rights on all prizes and captives taken by Jacobite corsairs operating from French ports with James’s letters of marque. The sums involved were useful, but they were, in the overall scheme of things, small: at maximum perhaps 70,000 livres a year. It is difficult to estimate exactly how much of James’s income of c.700,000 livres went to assist the Jacobite regiments, but about 100,000 livres would not be an unreasonable guesstimate.

Saint-Germain, of course, had other calls on its money. The king and queen felt a strong sense of responsibility towards deprived non-juring clergymen in Britain, and James wanted several thousand livres to be put into missionary work across the Channel. Both were genuinely concerned about the poor and indigent exiles in France, often indeed the families of Irish officers and the demobilised troops after 1697, and Mary Beatrice sold many of her jewels to help them. But neither the Jacobite regiments nor the dictates of conscience produced the greatest drain on James’s meagre resources. Edward Gregg has convincingly argued that James II’s first priority in exile was to establish a formal court, “as a public declaration of royal status retained […] to demonstrate to other European princes the Stuarts’ continued determination to be recognised by their royal counterparts.”

It would be surprising if Edward Corp’s forthcoming book does not bear this view out; though it should be stressed that the continued possession of a dozen regiments in exile also gave Saint-Germain a sovereign profile many exiled courts in history have lacked. Nevertheless, James’s household, not his soldiers, were his first priority, and the reasons are quite understandable – it was vital to secure foreign support for his cause and for any invasion attempt on Britain; and it was equally vital both to employ propaganda to shore up support in England and to provide an impressive welcome in France for the politically ambivalent should they be passing through the Paris region in peacetime. To achieve these effects, Jacobites at Saint-Germain who did not hold household office were given pensions from the king’s budget to reward loyalty and keep up a sense of “magnificence”, but as Dr Corp has stressed, the sums involved in salaries and court pensions came to between one-half and 2/3rds of James’s income and were unsustainable by mid-1695, forcing major retrenchments over the coming years.

Unfortunately, as far as this author can tell, very few courtiers and recipients of court pensions at Saint-Germain were Irish, were serving soldiers or were members of their families. The carve-up of household offices and pensions was all but over by 1691, and all those who had held offices on the Irish establishment certainly lost them after the Boyne, so the first real chance the Irish had to get their hands on any of the money was at the establishment of the Prince of Wales’s household in 1695. But here again they came off the worst of all three nations, and the fact they were largely serving officers away from court had nothing, according to James, to do with his decisions. The parasitic nature of the English and Scottish courtiers in exile, devouring half the king’s budget while Irish officers and men sweated, killed and died in James’s name, produced bitter resentment.

IV

This, then, was the infrastructure and degree of support upon which the Jacobite regiments could lean. It is now worth considering how this actually affected the officers and men. Essentially, one needs to reconsider the disorder of the Jacobite army on the Continent in a more sympathetic way given the failings of administration and of the complications of the political situation.

What one cannot take away from the Irish troops is their courage. Vendôme called them “the butchers of the army”, and Vauban – France’s fortifications genius – held them in great esteem. Contemporaries puzzled over why they had been unable to stand
up to the Williamite forces in Ireland, but were more than a match for the Allies on the Continent. The answer is really quite simple. Better pay, food and equipment raised morale, and they had now received reasonably decent training in order to channel their aggression in a more focussed way. Some colonels did an admirable job, and some regiments could be found, even in difficult circumstances, to be in a good state. However, this should not obscure the truth that, compared with Louis XIV’s forces, there was considerable maladministration and organisational chaos in the Jacobite regiments. By the end of 1695 this had produced a major deterioration in their condition.

The colonels enjoyed a great deal of power, relatively unchecked by Saint-Germain, and even when Barbezieux succeeded in subjecting the Jacobite regiments to full French scrutiny in June 1696 his inspectors found it very difficult to penetrate their workings, not least because of linguistic barriers. By November 1695 the marquis de Larray, an experienced French general, had examined the Jacobite regiments in his vicinity in south-east France and found a litany of incompetence. His views on the maladministration by the officers are worth quoting:

“...there is so little order among the Irish, Monseigneur, that they always find themselves owing money to the treasurers and endeavour to merchants and to all those who have the facility to lend to them, which has often caused great disorders, the officers having used the wages of their soldiers for their own pleasure or for paying private debts [...]”

The majors, in charge of regimental accounting, apparently had no idea how to manage the French system of off-reckoning the officers’ and soldiers’ pay against annual expenses. The captains had fraudulently managed to draw money on the basis of promissory notes from the military treasurers,

“in such a manner that the subsistence of the soldiers has been consumed, as well as that of the subaltern officers [...]”

This was an appalling state of affairs, not really seen in the French army for around 20 years. Larray’s response was to urge on the War Ministry a programme of education for the officers. To this end he drew up a memorandum for the majors of the regiments on how to run financial matters, but given the failure to address the underlying resource problem, plus surviving circumstantial evidence, it is safe to conclude that there was no real improvement in matters before the regiments were disbanded in 1698.

There was a particular problem among the officers of both the Irish Brigade and the Jacobite army with the concept of self-discipline. This was a direct legacy of Tyrconnell’s purge of the Irish army in the 1680s and the sheer ignorance of many of its subalterns who formed the cadre of James’s forces after the Glorious Revolution. There were murders, duels, a deliberate failure by the officers in his own Life Guards to report a homicide to James, vicious assaults, imprisonments, gool-breaks, officers going on the run, and officers simply absenting themselves from their units without permission. Intendant Le Bret was furious when the Irish ran amok in the occupied principality of Orange in January 1694. This happened, he felt:

“...because not only is there no or very little subordination among the officers, but even because one does not find there all that which there should be between the officers and the men.”

What was unusual was the number of colonels and lieutenant-colonels who ended up on the wrong side of the disciplinary process. By contrast, whatever the deficiencies of the French officer corps by this time, the trouble they caused was simply not on the same scale proportionally.

With insufficient resources at their disposal, chaotic accounting and a propensity to indecency, it is hardly surprising that there was considerable day-to-day fraud in the Jacobite regiments. Officers sought especially to pad the muster rolls by presenting false-soldiers at reviews. They also used and trafficked in false routemarch itineraries to gain extra rations and pay. The stakes were far higher for Jacobite officers than for their French counterparts. If they did achieve a full complement of men in their company captains would receive a bonus worth another 50 percent of their combined salary and allowances. If, however, they did not hit the target they would risk penury over the medium term. Padding the muster rolls was hazardous, but if one were to be ruined anyway by failing to have a full company, then it was worth risking prison and dismissal for fraud. Saint-Germain, fearing the possibility the French government would demobilise some of the Jacobite battalions if it discovered the true state of their composition, had every incentive to cover up the rates of desertion. Moreover, false mustering was a lot easier when no French commissaries or inspectors spoke Irish. French officers, and officers in other foreign regiments in Louis’s service, simply did not have the same incentives to break the king’s ordinances. As if this culture of command and organisational set-up were not bad enough for James’s cause, in 1695 several Irish regiments were crippled due to the theft of over 100,000 livres - the equivalent of the pay of a whole battalion for seven months. At least four regiments were brought to the verge of abject ruin as a result of this caper.
Where there was rampant administrative disorder there too could be found desertion, which was widespread among the Jacobites throughout the Nine Years War, not just at times when France faced monetary problems. By 1695 the Spanish army of Lombardy included an entire regiment of Irishmen who had deserted from the French army of Italy, and the following year Duke Victor Amadeus II of Savoy formed a distinct battalion in the Chablis regiment from erstwhile troops of James II. Desertion was only encouraged by the presence of families among the Irish. Larray, commenting again on his inspection tour, informed Barbezieux:

“What has succeeded in ruining the Irish troops is the large number of women and children they have, who, Monseigneur, are always calling after me, and would willingly slit my throat, imagining that it is I who does not want them to be given subsistance. Many of these miserable wretches make their husbands desert to go and seek their bread among the enemy.”

Prone to sickness in hot climates, the Jacobite regiments were worn down by disease and poverty, desertion, and their employment as cannon-fodder in some French armies.

Losing men was bad enough, but failing to replace them only made matters worse. The Jacobite regiments relied for replenishment upon a regular stream of Anglophone or Irish deserters from the Allied armies, but there were real difficulties in obtaining the manpower. Some supernumerary officers were used as full-time recruiters, and James stationed them in Lille and Arras to await deserters, but there was nothing at all dependable about such a system, and recruiting officers often had meagre catches. Moreover, French deployment of the regiments compounded matters. By late summer 1695 the general-in-chief of the army of Italy noted with alarm that all Jacobite battalions under his command were below 50 per cent of their paper strength. The Limerick Regiment was down to 500 men out of a theoretical complement of 1,600. Whatever caused such drops in effectives, the failure to make good the losses stemmed in this case from a breakdown in recruitment, hardly surprising when they were 500 miles from the Flanders frontier where most British and Irish deserters crossed from the Allies. The officers undertaking the work of recruitment in Flanders kept the best men for their own units, and the fresh levies they released for other regiments still had to be marched across France: many could be expected to desert en route to their new regiment. Louis XIV’s decision to send Jacobite regiments to Catalonia and northern Italy therefore only worsened the position for these units, making recruitment sluggish. Fraud was often the only option left to Irish officers because the pay and manpower problem was so dire.

V

The continued existence of James II’s army after the Irish exodus to France has too often been misunderstood or virtually ignored. There are aspects of this subject upon which this essay has barely touched, but what it has sought to highlight is a sense of how problematic the exiled army was for both Saint-Germain and Versailles, and for relations between them. The Jacobite regiments were the possession of the sovereign king of Great Britain, they were paid by the French fisc, and they were, as a result, controlled by neither James II nor Louis XIV. Control depends as much upon the maintenance of goodwill and order through favourable treatment as it does upon coercion and an appeal to loyalty. Indeed, Louis XIV’s formidable military machine had been constructed on the principle that the interests of the officers had to be satisfied and safe-guarded if they were to provide the French state with forces fit to implement the master’s wishes. In the case of the Jacobite army, this principle well and truly lapsed. The army was fundamentally damaged from the moment it was reorganised in Brittany by the penal financial settlement imposed on it, and by James’s sense of priorities. Once it was clear in June 1692 that an invasion of England could not be attempted Louis XIV only compounded the problems by deploying the Jacobite regiments in a scattered manner, most of them far from Flanders. As a result, the regiments descended into a downward spiral of poverty, demoralisation, fraud and desertion which in time reached grand proportions.

By early 1696 most Jacobite regiments were too dilapidated, and/or too far away from the English Channel, for Louis XIV to contemplate using them as the basis of an invasion force for England that year. Several of James’s colonels were present with him in the Boulogne ready to go over with the French force under the command of the exiled king himself and the comte d’Harcourt, but they left their regiments behind. Given the fact Ailesbury personally warned Louis in May 1693 that any attempt to restore James using French forces, rather than British or Irish, would be fatal for the latter’s support, the mobilisation of French troops alone for the 1696 expedition says much about the effective disablement of much of James’s military machine by this time. By the end of that year Middleton and James could see the writing on the wall, that the peace which was being negotiated at Ryswick would bring about the dissolution of the Jacobite army.
Fundamentally, though, were the Jacobite army to have been ever so well-organised and disciplined, it could only have survived a peace treaty ending the Nine Years War had James II been restored to the British thrones. Given that contemporaries held retention of foreign or mercenary forces to reflect French political concern for the country in question, it was wholly unacceptable to allow James to keep his regiments on French soil once Louis had recognised William III and peace was secured. Indeed, William's government applied strong pressure on Louis XIV to disband the Jacobite regiments, and in the spring of 1698 the British had their way.⁵⁹

A few days before the disbandments occurred, Louis warned James and Mary Beatrice of what was to come, but told them that, out of consideration for the exiled Stuarts, he was keeping on some 6,000 men – the cream of the Irish Brigade and the Jacobite army – who were regrouped under their own officers into one cavalry and five infantry regiments and incorporated fully into the French army. They fought well in the War of the Spanish Succession, and eventually in 1702 they received the pay and conditions which allowed for decent administration. Many of the Irish officers continued to see James III as their real sovereign, a strong reflection of the way it was possible in early modern Europe to have allegiances to more than one sovereign.⁶⁰ But after the spring of 1698 there was no longer even symbolic equality between the exiled Stuarts and the Bourbon kings. Saint-Germain, the court by which James II placed so much store for the maintenance of his image and dignity, was now no longer the hub of a state in exile. It had become merely a household and a centre for international intrigue.

APPENDIX ONE

THE JACOBITE ARMY, 1692–1698:
THE REGIMENTS AND THEIR COLONELS

CAVALRY UNITS

2 Troops of Irish Life Guards:
   1st Troop – James Fitzjames, duke of Berwick
   2nd Troop – Patrick Sarsfield, earl of Lucan
   August 1693 – Donough MacCarthy, earl of Clancarty
   [But imprisoned in England until November 1694]

The King's Regiment of Horse:
   Colonel-lieutenant for King James – Dominick Sheldon

The Queen's Regiment of Horse:
   Colonel-lieutenant for Queen Mary – Piers Butler, viscount Galmoy, earl of Newcastle

DISMOUNTED DRAGOON REGIMENTS

The King's Regiment of Dismounted Dragoons:
   [Richard Belling briefly in January–February 1692]
   Thomas Maxwell
   November 1693 – Dominick Sarsfield, 4th viscount Kilmallock

The Queen's Regiment of Dismounted Dragoons:
   Francis O'Carroll
   November 1693 – Charles O'Brien, 5th viscount Clare
   April 1696 – Oliver O'Gara

FOOT REGIMENTS

The King's Regiment of Foot Guards:
   William Dorrington
   [But imprisoned in England 1694–95]

The Queen's Regiment of Foot:
   Francis Wauchop
   October 1693 – Sir Edward Scott
   January 1694 – Simon Luttrel

The Foot Regiment of the Marine:
   Henry Fitzjames, Lord Grand Prior of England and duke of Albemarle
   Colonel-lieutenant for Albemarle – Nicholas FitzGerald

The Foot Regiment of Limerick:
   Richard Talbot
   August 1694 – Sir John FitzGerald

The Foot Regiment of Charlemont:
   Gordon O'Neill
The Foot Regiment of Dublin:
Simon Luttrell
January 1694 → John Power, 9th Lord Power

The Foot Regiment of Athlone:
Sir Maurice Eustace
November 1693 → Walter Bourke

The Foot Regiment of Clancarty:
Donough MacCarthy, earl of Clancarty
August 1693 → Roger MacElligott
[But imprisoned in England until 1697]
[ill.-Col. in this period Edward Scott]

APPENDIX TWO

THE JACOBITE ARMY, 1692–1698:
ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

Regimental Structure of the Jacobite Army – Foot Units:

James’s Proposal
16 Regiments –
each to have 16 companies;
each company to have 58 men + officers

Louis’s Counter-proposal
10 Regiments –
each to have 14 companies;
each company to have 100 men + officers

[Louis’s counter-proposal for the infantry was modified somewhat once the reorganisation was under way in Britain; all foot regiments were composed of two battalions, except for Clancarty which had only one battalion of 7 companies.]

Regimental Structure of the Jacobite Army – Dismounted Dragoons:

James’s Proposal
4 Regiments –
each to have 6 companies;
each company to have 50 men + officers

Louis’s Counter-proposal
2 Regiments –
each to have 6 companies;
each company to have 100 men + officers

Regimental Structure of the Jacobite Army – Cavalry Units:

James’s Proposal
4 Regiments –
each to have 6 companies;
each company to have 50 men + officers

Louis’s Counter-proposal
2 Regiments –
each to have 12 companies;
each company to have 50 men + officers

Annual Pay for the Jacobite Foot Personnel in livres:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Rank</th>
<th>James’s Proposal</th>
<th>Louis’s Dictate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regimental Officers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>602:5s + 1,514:15s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant-Colonel</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>1,277:10s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>912:10s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensign</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>x2 365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sous-lieutenant</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>273:15s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeants</td>
<td>x2 324</td>
<td>x3 182:10s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporals</td>
<td>x3 216</td>
<td>x7 127:15s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anspessade</td>
<td>[Lance-Corporal]</td>
<td>x10 109:10s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drummers etc</td>
<td>x3 216</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldiers</td>
<td>x50 144</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pikemen x20 100:7s:6d</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Musketeers x60 91:5s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(inc 2 drummers)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Captain to get bonus pay of 2 livres per day when his company fully complete at 100 NCOs and men: theoretically = 730 livres p.a.

Captain and Subalterns Posts in the Jacobite Foot Regiments:

James’s Proposal
256 captains
512 subalterns

Louis’s Counter-proposal
140 captains
640 subalterns

[James was, ironically, offering fewer total established officer positions in his companies (768 total, compared to Louis offering 780). However, the way in which they would have been divided between companies meant that under James’s proposal they would have had considerably less of a burden of command, while there would have been 82 percent more captains enjoying the higher rates of pay, even under Louis’s ungenerous pay offer.]

Exchange Rates:

£1 sterling = 13 livres: 7 sous (Daniel Arthur’s rate, November 1691)
[French and English currencies calibrated in a similar way:
£1 = 20 shillings, 1 shilling = 12 pence / 1 livre = 20 sous, 1 sol = 12 deniers]
Notes

The author would like to acknowledge, with gratitude, the financial assistance of the British Academy and Exeter College, Oxford, during the researching and preparation of this essay. He would also like to thank Dr Edward Corp for several stimulating conversations on the subject and for his help with a number of references and sources.

10 SHAT A1065: Louis to d’Usson and chevalier de Tessé, 31 Aug. 1691; d’Usson and chevalier de Tessé to Louis, 14 Oct. 1691.
12 Lavallée, iii 318: Louis to Maintenon, Dec. 1691; SHAT A1368, no. 59: Notes on Irish regiments, 18 July 1771; A’Con III, no. 74: estimates of men, women and children, [11 Jan. 1692]; no number: état of regiments arriving from Cork, n.d. [date] [Jan. 1692]. There seems to be almost no basis for Guy Chaussinand–Nogaret’s claim, which has been invested with the status of authority but which is derivative, that there were 19,000 men: "Une élite insulaire au service de l’Europe: les

13 SHAT A’1065: “Capitulation” proposed by James, n.d. [autumn 1691]; draft of Louis’s conditions, n.d.


17 SHAT A’1241. nos. 38, 39, 49: Belfonds to Barbezieux, 3, 8 and 14 May 1692; A’Con III, no. 85: Rivot to Barbezieux, 21 Feb. 1692; BNFF FF 22,762, ff. 67r, 69v; SHAT A’3684, no. 59: Notes on Irish regiments, 18 July 1771.

18 Berwick, *Mémoires*, i 73; Bibliotheque Maz[arine Ms.] 2299: Barbezieux to Belfonds, 9 and 12 June 1692.


Manchester to Blathwayt, 23 July 1700.

26 Bib. Maz. 2299: Barbezieux to Fumeron, 15 Apr. 1692; SHAT A1094, no. 22bis: Catatin to Louvois, 24 June 1691.

27 BL Add. Mss. 37, 662 f. 28r: Gallagher to Browne, 3 Feb. 1691.


29 BNF FF 22,758, ff. 40v, 41r, 46v, 50r, 70v, 89r: Pensions list, c.1697–98; FF 22,762, f. 73r: Bodl. Carte MSS. 208 f. 156v–v: Middleton to Pontchartrain, 2 Apr. 1697; SHAT A1430(ii), f. 11r: Barbezieux to Sheldon, 2 Apr. 1698; on French fears of Irish disorder, see A1065: to maréchal d'Estreës, 8 Dec. 1691.

30 BL Add. Mss. 37, 662 f. 133r: Rowe to Browne, 25 May 1691.

31 AN T28112* Lissee, no. 23: Memorandum, [c.1775–89].

32 SHAT A1170, no. 36: Melfort to Barbezieux, 3 Aug. 1692; Xb1: service records of Fitzgerard infaunitie, 6 June 1705; Xb96: service record of officers of Sparer allemande infanterie, 17 Oct. 1705; BL Add Mss. 37, 662 f. 210v: Mrs Gordon Crollis to Browne, 22 July 1691; Bodl. Carte MSS. 256 f. 36r: Middleton to Barbezieux, 5 July 1694.


34 BNF FF 22,762, f. 74v.


38 Bodl. Carte MSS. 181 f. 599r: Caryll to viscount Clare, 24 Apr. 1695; Carte MSS. 208 f. 187r: Middleton to Chamillart, 28 July 1701; AN G7365: Melfort to Pontchartrain, 16 Sep. 1692; NLS 14,266, ff. 39r, 40v, 41v, 76v, 114v.


42 Genet-Rouffiac claims that Irish officers were "presque tous familiament representés" at Saint-Germain ("Un épisode", p. 230; also, p. 287), yet there is little evidence that any but a handful could draw on financial resources deriving from the holding of office at the Stuart court to subsidise their military activity.

43 e.g. viscount Galmy: see Rouffiac, "Un épisode", p. 250.


45 AN AFIV 1598 Plaq. 21, no. 5: Memorandum, 1806; SHAT A1423, no. 85: Vauban to Barbezieux, 18 Oct. 1697; E. Fief, Histoire des troupes étrangères au service de France, etc... (2 vols, Paris, 1854), i 239–40; SHAT M[émoires et R[éconnaissances] 947: "Regiment de Dillon. Memoire contemporané... par le Cher, Gaydon", 10 June 1738; Ailesbury, Memoirs, pp. 267–8. The Gaydon manuscript is missing at the SHAT but Mr Eoghan O hAnnraíchín kindly provided me with a partial

46 BNF FF 22,762, f. 89v; SHAT A’1241, no. 82: Bellefonds to Barbezieux, 4 June 1692; A’1324, no. 179: from Huxelles, 13 Dec. 1695; A’1332, no. 197: from Larray, 22 May 1695; NLS 14,266, f. 98v.

47 SHAT A’1332, no. 212: Larray to Barbezieux, 12 Nov. 1695.


51 SHAT A’1242 (i), ff. 235r, 334r: Barbezieux to Melfort, 21 and 30 Jan. 1694; A’1342, f. 94r: to Galmoy, 7 Apr. 1696; A’1440, no. 1004: to Le Vayer, 7 Jan. 1698; Bodl. Carte MSS. 208 f. 162v: Middleton to Clancarty, 31 July 1697.


53 Bodl. Carte MSS. 208 f. 78r: Middleton to Torcy, 11 May, ff. 81r, 82r: to Pontchartrain, 18 and 25 May 1695; f. 81v: to Barbezieux, 22 May 1695.


55 SHAT A’1095, no. 146: Vins to Louvois, 15 July 1691; A’1324, no. 146: Huxelles to Barbezieux, 20 Nov. 1695; A’1379, no. 65: from Catinat, 1 May 1696; Bodl. Carte MSS. 208 f. 282r: from Middleton, 24 Apr. 1696.


57 SHAT A’1332, no. 197: Larray to Barbezieux, 22 May 1695; A’1329, no. 143: Catinat to Louis, 13 Aug. 1695; A’1326, f. 327r: Barbezieux to Catinat, 23 Aug. 1695.


ROYAL STUART PAPERS

I Mary Queen of Scots: the Last Days, John Paul
II The Gunpowder Plot, Francis Edwards
III The Trial and Execution of Mary Queen of Scots in Contemporary Literature, D.W. Thomson Vessey
IV The Non-Juring Bishops, J.R. Porter
V Lucius Cary, Viscount Falkland: Cavalier and Catalyst, John Tanner
VII Mary Queen of Scots and the Historians, Antonia Fraser
VIII A Flower of Purpose: A Memoir of Princess Elizabeth Stuart (1635-50), Susan Cole
IX Mary and Ridolfi: Design for Destruction, Francis Edwards
X The Poems of Mary Queen of Scots, Caroline Bingham
XI Elizabeth Cary, Lady Falkland (1586/3-1639), David Lunn
XII The Triumph of Time: Greene and Shakespeare on Mary Queen of Scots?, Margaret Hotine
XIII Shakespeare’s Lament for Mary Queen of Scots?, Margaret Hotine
XIV Hereditary Monarchy in England, Patrick Morrah
XV The Cardinal of Norfolk: Philip Thomas Howard OP, Brocard Sewell O’Carm
XVI Sir Troilus Turberville: Captain-Lieutenant of the King’s Life Guard (1597-1645), Michael Foster
XVII The Stuart Papers at Windsor, by Marion F. Gain
XVIII Princess over the Water: A Memoir of Louise Marie Stuart (1692-1712), Susan Cole
XIX Relations between Mary Queen of Scots and her Son, King James VI of Scotland, Caroline Bingham
XX Major-General Sir John Digby: Peerless Champion and Mirrour of Perfect Chivalrie, Michael Foster
XXI The Influence of the Later Stuarts and their Supporters on French Royalism 1789-1840, Philip Mansel
XXII Montrose and Charles I: A Matter of Consistency, A.R. Williams
XXIII Sacredness of Majesty: The English Benedictines and the Cult of King James II, Geoffrey Scott
XXIV Royal Attributes: The Dress of Two Royal Cousins 1542-1587, Valerie Cummings
XXV The Royal Hospital of St Bartholomew, Smithfield: Royalist, Non-Juring, Tory High Church and Jacobite, Janet Foster, Richard Sharp and John A.H. Wylie
XXVI Red Queen vs. White: An Introduction to Schiller’s Maria Stuart, Gloria Talbot Vessey

XXVII Lord Cornbury, Bolingbroke and a Plan to Restore the Stuarts, 1731-1735, Eveline Cruckshanks
XXVIII The Role of Jacobitism in the Modern World Robert F.J. Parsons
XXIX Politics and Patronage under Elizabeth I and the Early Stuarts, Roger Lockyer
XXX Mary Queen of Scots a Hundred Years Ago: almost a Saint or still a Sinner?, Francis Edwards
XXXI Unpopular Front: Jews, Radicals and Americans in the Jacobite World-View, Frank McLean
XXXII Jacobitism and British Foreign Policy under the first two Georges, Jeremy Black
XXXIII Factionalism among the Exiles in France: the Case of Chevalier Ramsay and Bishop Atterbury, Pauline McLean
XXXIV The Forty-five Re-examined, Jeremy Black
XXXV Deceptis Custodibus, or Liberty Lost – Liberty Regained, Gernot O. Gührler
XXXVI Edward, Lord Griffin: The Story of a Jacobite, Anthony Fitzroy Griffin
XXXVII Religious Politics under Charles I and James II, Murray G.H. Pittock
XXXVIII Charles II’s Foreign Policy, John Miller
XXXIX So Sweet a Star as Harry: A Consideration of Henry Frederick, Prince of Wales, 1594-1612, Susan Cole
XL Mary of Modena, Queen Consort of James II & VII, Janet Southorn
XLI Jacobitism and Liturgy in the Eighteenth-Century English Catholic Church: An Unlikely Marriage, Bennett Zon
XLII A Lover of the Sea and Skillful in Shipping: King Charles and his Navy, J.D. Davies
XLIII Catholicism and the late Stuart Army: the Tangier Episode, J.C. Riley
XLIV Lord Rochester and the Hearthmoney Scandal of 1683, Ross Brodie
XLV The Ogilvethorpes: A Jacobite Family 1689-1760, Eveline Cruckshanks
XLVI The Glory of 1688, Ronald Hutton
XLVII The Cult of Charles II, Katharine Gibson
XLVIII The Social Composition of the Jacobite Army in Scotland in the Forty Five, Murray G.H. Pittock
XLIX Manchester and the ‘45: A Study of Jacobitism in Context, Roger Turner
L Religion and Royal Succession: The Rage of Party, Eveline Cruckshanks

30
LI  James II and Toleration: The Years in Exile at Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Edward Corp
LII  Charles I’s Coronation Visit to Scotland in 1633, Christian, Lady Hesketh
LIII Jacobite Imagery in Wales: Evidence of Political Activity?, Stephanie Jones
LIV Jacobite Glass: Its Place in History, Geoffrey B. Seddon
LV  A Digest of the Jacobite Clubs, F. Peter Lole
LVI ‘To Overthrow all the Kingdom’: The Later Political Career of George Villiers, Second Duke of Buckingham, Alan Hobson
LVII ‘Our Church’: Nonjurors, High Churchmen and the Church of England, Richard Sharp
LVIII King Charles I: A Renaissance Collector?, Arthur MacGregor
LIX  James III in Bologna: An Illustrated Story, Maurizio Ascario
LX  An Army in Exile: Louis XIV and the Irish Forces of James II in France, 1691-1698, Guy Rowlands