Conrad III and the Second Crusade in the Byzantine Empire and Anatolia, 1147

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Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
University of St Andrews
August, 2007
Declarations

I, Jason Thomas Roche, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 90,000 words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.

I was admitted as a research student in October 2001 and as a candidate for the degree of PhD in September 2002; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St Andrews between 2001 and 2007.

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Abstract

This thesis aims to revise the established history of the passage of the Second Crusade through the Byzantine Empire and Anatolia in 1147. In particular, it seeks to readdress the ill-fated advance of the army nominally headed by King Conrad III Staufen of Germany towards Ikonion, the fledging Seljuk capital of Rûm.

The work consists of four mutually supportive parts. Part I serves to introduce the thesis, the historiographical trends of the current scholarship, and the Byzantine notion of the Latin ‘barbarian’, a stock, literary representation of the non-Greek other which distorts the Greek textual evidence.

Part II analyses the source portrayal of particular incidents as the army marched through the Byzantine Empire, provides analyses of those events based on new approaches to interpreting the sources and a consideration of the army’s logistical arrangements, and argues that the traditional historiography has been and continues to be subject to textual misrepresentation.

An understanding of the topology of Anatolia is required to appreciate why the army failed to reach Ikonion. Part III therefore consists of chapters devoted to the geography of Anatolia, the form, function and the population density of the typical twelfth-century town, the country’s changeable medieval geopolitical landscape, and the settlement patterns and the way of life of western Anatolia’s pastoral-nomadic warriors.

Part IV revisits the Latin, Syriac and Greek sources which constitute the written history of the crusade in Anatolia, analyses the concerns of the army’s executive decision makers within geopolitical, logistical, topographical and tactical frameworks, and offers a reconsideration of the established location of where the army ceased to advance on Ikonion, and a new version of the circumstances which led to the decision to retreat.
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Acknowledgements

I am indebted to a large number of people who helped me, directly or indirectly, with this present work. I must thank all the academic and administrative staff and postgraduates of the Department of Mediæval History. I am unable to mention everyone who kindly offered their advice, friendship, encouragement and support, but a special thank you is extended to Briony Aitchison for photocopying a final draft my thesis, and to Sally Crumplin, Rob Bartlett, Paul Magdalino, and, of course, my supervisor Hugh Kennedy who all read parts of my work and provided necessary information, criticism and corrections. I am also grateful to Chris Given-Wilson for his advice during the problematic last nine months which it took to submit.

Many individuals outwith the Department also provided much help during the course of my research. My brother, Michael, kindly read and offered his thoughts on part of the present work. Special thanks are due to Peter Kushner for taking the trouble to read and comment on the whole thesis thereby improving its style enormously. I owe a profound debt of gratitude to Peter Maxwell-Stuart, who not only taught me Latin and offered lucid suggestions for interpreting difficult or vague Latin prose, but also helped with Greek translations, provided invaluable comments on thesis style and content, was the provider of occasionally obscure bibliography, and was a constant companion and a source of wise counsel in matters academic and otherwise. Malcom Wagstaff and Stephen Mitchell were good enough to offer their expertise, Jonathan Phillips and John Haldon were generous with their time and knowledge whilst commenting on vital aspects of my work, and Professor Haldon, John France and John Pryor all kindly provided advance copies of important articles. I am also indebted to Alicia Simpson for her advice regarding the two drafts of Niketas Choniates’ Historia, and to Elizabeth and Michael Jeffreys for their translations of verse encomia.

Many institutions also helped with my research. The St Andrews University Library, the British Library, and the British Institute of Archaeology at Ankara (BIAA) held the vast majority of the primary and secondary sources employed herein. Their staff and those at other institutions were always helpful, and I express my gratitude to all. The Judith Matthews Scholarship, the Gilchrist Educational Trust, the Royal Historical Society, the BIAA, and the Institute of Historical Research provided grants to facilitate my research trips to Turkey, or the funds which enabled me to present my findings at numerous symposia. I am extremely grateful for their generous support. This thesis would have been infinitely poorer without the observations I was able to make in Turkey, or without the symposia feedback which I received from learned colleagues. All errors herein – of fact, translation, interpretation, and
language are my own, and are in spite of, and in no ways through, the best efforts of all of the above.

A last thank you is extended to Inci Turkoglu, Ebru Altan and the late Isin Demirkent for their Turkish hospitality, and to all those who provided assistance in retracing the routes of the Second Crusade.

To Angela, my new wife and best friend of the last thirteen years: this work could not have come to fruition without you, and the debt I owe cannot be reckoned, nor can the love I feel. I dedicate this thesis to you.
Note on names, translations and citations of primary sources

All primary sources used in this thesis are available in printed editions. Citations of Latin sources have been made throughout from the most recent edition of the works, some of which may have translated parallel texts in English, French or German. Unless stated otherwise, all translations are my own, rendered from the original Latin. Citations of Greek sources have been made throughout from the most recent editions in English, and the older Bonn editions in Greek with parallel Latin texts. In instances where the Greek sources refer directly to the Second Crusade, I have, for ease of reference, cited both the English and the Greek with parallel Latin versions. Again, all translations are my own rendered from the Latin. Citations of Syriac and Arabic sources have been made from the most recent edition of the works in English, and I have adopted the editors’ transliterations. Brief information is provided on each source when it is first mentioned in the main body of the text.

I have used common standard English forms for both medieval and modern non-Greek names when they exist (Regensburg, Danube, William, et cetera). For common words of Arabic origin such as ‘emir’ and ‘sultan’, I have avoided the use of diacritics and italics. Greek names are transliterated from the twelfth-century equivalent minus intrusive diacritics, with the exception of Constantinople (rather than Konstantinopolis), common standard English forms for well-known mountains and seas (Aegean, Taurus et cetera), and the familiar adjective Comnenian. If known, Greek twelfth-century names and their modern Turkish equivalents are given in the first instance, as such: Kedrea (modern Bayat). For ease of reference to further sources, I have employed the well-known Roman names for provinces in Asia Minor, rather than the often-changing Byzantine theme nomenclature.
Part I
1. Introduction

On Christmas Eve, 1144, ‘Imad ad-Din Zengi, the Muslim ruler of Aleppo and Mosul, seized the Christian-held city of Edessa in Mesopotamia. The settlers in the Levant subsequently appealed to the West for military help, resulting in a call for a crusade by Pope Eugenius III. The pontiff probably had in mind a limited and specific objective for the crusade when the bull Quantum praedecessores was issued on 1 December 1145 to King Louis VII of France and ‘the princes and all the faithful of God in Gaul’. It appears that, quite independently, Louis intended to undertake an expedition to the East, but the French nobles proved unwilling to support his intention at the Christmas Court of 1145, although it was agreed to discuss the matter further at the following Easter Court in Vézelay. Quantum praedecessores was reissued (with a few small changes) on 1 March 1146, and the pope commissioned Abbot Bernard of Clairvaux, the most influential spiritual leader of his time, to preach the crusade. At Vézelay, Bernard won the French court to the enterprise and subsequently began to promote the crusade extensively.¹

Recruitment for the movement was extremely successful, and its scope expanded into a series of military expeditions ostensibly planned and undertaken on behalf of Christendom between 1145 and 1149, and known collectively to history as the Second Crusade. The concurrent Christian campaigns against pagans in northeastern Europe and the Muslims of the Iberian Peninsula and the Holy Land produced diverse results and consequences. The effects ranged from startling Christian success in the West and the augmentation of Christianity in Spain and Portugal, to abject failure in the East and the subsequent consolidation of the so-called Levantine Muslim ‘counter crusade’.²

In 1147, no fewer than five expeditions left Western Europe for the ill-fated campaign in the Holy Land. A naval expedition led by Alfonso of Toulouse sailed from the South of

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France and probably arrived in Palestine in the spring of 1148. Around the same time, a second naval force consisting of Flemish, Anglo-Norman and German crusaders sailed along the north coast of Europe to Lisbon. After assisting Afonso Henriques, the King of Portugal, in the capture of Lisbon, the fleet attacked Faro and Tortosa, before presumably reaching the Holy Land in early 1148. A force led by Amadeus III of Savoy travelled down through Italy. After crossing from Brindisi to Durazzo, it joined up with the army of King Louis VII of France at Constantinople, the capital of the Byzantine Empire, late in 1147. Louis’ army had advanced through France and Germany to Regensburg. Travelling by the Danube, it passed through Hungary and Bulgaria, and thus, Byzantine territory. After suffering losses through starvation and Turkish attacks in Anatolia, the remnants of these combined forces arrived in the Levant early in 1148.

The German king, Conrad III of Staufen, led the fifth expedition. The army had preceded Louis’ crusade along the Danube and through the Balkans to Constantinople in 1147. Upon crossing the Bosphoros, the crusade marched from Nikaia (modern Iznik) towards Ikonion (modern Konya), the capital of the Seljuk sultan of Rūm. The advance failed and the crusaders were compelled to flee back to Nikaia under Turkish attack. Historiographical tradition holds crusader indiscipline directly responsible for the failure, although more recent scholars have attributed it to the sagacity of the Byzantines. This thesis proposes to challenge the conventional interpretations of the circumstances leading to the retreat, and this proposal is facilitated in part II by a continuous reappraisal of the principal Latin and Greek sources which sustain the older historiographical tradition. The analysis is underpinned by an appreciation of the logistical constraints of medieval agrarian society and the army’s provisioning arrangements. The examination is conducted within the context of the crusaders’ advance through the Balkans and their short stay outside Constantinople, with particular attention paid to the source portrayal of specific incidents en route. It will be maintained that the traditional historiography concerning the passage of the crusade through the empire’s European provinces and Constantinople has been and continues to be subject to textual misrepresentation, which in turn, has unduly influenced the history of the crusade in Anatolia.

To appreciate why the army failed to advance on Ikonion, it is essential not only to revise and reject the older historiography, but also to diverge from discussions within the prevalent

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3 Conrad is often termed Emperor (of the western Roman Empire) in contemporary sources although he was never actually anointed as such. As the emperor-elect, Conrad was the nominal leader of the crusade. In reality, the expedition consisted of the contingents of many German and non-German greater and lesser lords who would have considered themselves separate polities, and indeed, a council of princes was convened to agree on major strategical decisions. For clarity and expediency, however, Conrad is treated throughout the thesis as sole supreme chief of the various contingents which advanced with the king, and the army is most conveniently referred to as ‘German’.
customary arena of high politics between the Byzantine Empire and the Latin world to gain alternative perspectives founded on the tangible realities of provincial Anatolia. To this end, a topography of little known twelfth-century western Anatolia, concentrating on the country’s geography, the form, function and population of its provincial towns, and its geopolitical environment is offered in part III.⁴

In revisiting the plethora of contemporaneous Latin, Syriac and Greek sources, which constitute the history of the crusade in Anatolia, part IV will throw new light on the problems facing the crusaders within a neglected geopolitical, logistical, topographical and tactical framework.

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⁴ The topology offered here is based on extant primary and secondary documentary evidence. The conclusions of the logistics project jointly run by Princeton and Birmingham universities will shed further light on medieval Anatolia. See in the first instance www.medievallogistics.bham.ac.uk.
2. Historiography

The last monograph concerning the history of the Second Crusade was Bernard Kugler’s *Studien zur Geschichte des Zweiten Kreuzzugs*, which superseded earlier studies. His work has since been superseded in many respects, but it remains the authoritative study of the progress of the second crusaders through Byzantine and Turkish territory. His work as it affects the scope of this thesis remains unchallenged by modern historians. One of his principal arguments is that the crusaders displayed unusual levels of disorder, that is, they were entirely unrestrained and indisciplined resulting in gratuitous plunder and destruction in Europe and Asia Minor. This now conventional notion underpins his interpretation of why the crusaders were worsted by Turkish warriors in battle at Dorylaion (modern Eskişehir), a defeat which, according to Kugler, compelled the crusaders to retreat to Nikaia (modern Iznik).

On first reading, Kugler’s work demands great respect. He offers a useful critique of the main Latin and Greek sources, and makes extensive use of contemporary testimony. This thesis however aims to demonstrate that much of what Kugler accepts as unequivocal – particularly, Greek tales of unusual levels of crusader disorder in the European Byzantine provinces – should be considered as *topoi*, and thus treated with more caution than he generally allows. It is contended that we must not accept such portrayals at face value, and that we should therefore investigate alternative explanations.

In many ways, Kugler was a scholar of his day. He shows little awareness of the topography of Anatolia and military logistics, for example, both of which have been examined by a number of modern scholars. When one revisits the source evidence, a number of serious fallacious suppositions founded on a mishandling of the sources become apparent. This is evident in his treatment of the council of princes, for instance. Kugler maintained that a council was convened, and a subsequent decision made to retreat to Nikaia, only after, and solely because, the crusaders had been defeated in battle by Turkish forces. Source testimonies known to Kugler, which illuminate the council’s deliberations, demonstrate

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1 This section serves to introduce the major works and historiographical trends, which have influenced the scope of this thesis. It is in no way intended to be exhaustive.
2 Kugler, B., *Studien zur Geschichte des Zweiten Kreuzzugs* (Stuttgart, 1866). Kugler’s modifications and additions to his monograph found in his *Analekten zur Geschichte des Zweiten Kreuzzuges* (Tübingen, 1878) and *Neue Analekten* (Tübingen, 1883) have no bearing on this thesis.
3 Best exemplified by Kugler’s frequent (unfounded) assertions of crusader disorder in the days leading up to the decision to retreat. Kugler, *Studien*, pp.148-54.
5 For the purposes of this study, a set-piece battle is defined in Clausewitzian vocabulary as a premeditated or sudden engagement where opposing forces face each other on an open battlefield with the aim of destroying the enemy in a single decisive encounter.
alternative and mutually supportive explanations for the decision to retreat; these he omits. This mistreatment appears to stem from Kugler’s post-Clausewitzian perspective on proceedings. Clausewitz’s *Vom Kriege* had a profound impact on subsequent German military theorists and historians alike. These men were wedded to the notion that the complete overthrow of the enemy through battle was the most important act in war, and this seems to have influenced Kugler’s interpretation of the sources, as he does not allow for any other possibility than defeat in battle causing the retreat.

His contemporary, Wilhelm Bernhardi, recognised some of the problems with Kugler’s history. Indeed, although Bernhardi’s book, *Konrad III*, has not exercised as much influence on subsequent historiography, his treatment of Conrad’s advance is fuller and more accurate than that of Kugler. For example, he recognises that the descriptions in the sources of where the army turned back to Nikaia do not correspond with what we know of verdant Dorylaion, and uniquely up until now, Bernhardi offers an alternative location for the start of the retreat.

Whilst certainly not as brazen as Kugler, Bernhardi likewise has a tendency to treat the sources in a somewhat tendentious manner. When discussing the circumstances immediately leading up to the decision to retreat, for example, he cites Gerhoh of Reichersberg who includes material derived from eyewitness reports in his treatise *De Investigatione Antichristi*, composed around 1161. Bernhardi omits to mention that Gerhoh states twice that Turkish forces continually harassed the crusaders by before the decision was effected to retreat. This omission of incessant harassment also appears to stem from post-Clausewitzian military theory. Bernhardi does not consider that any martial activity other than a set-piece battle could influence the decision to retreat, and therefore he omits any evidence which does not support his presupposition. This becomes apparent again when Bernhardi cites the contemporary *Annales Palidenses* (also known as the Pöhlder Annals), which are derived from eyewitness reports, and the *Pantheon* of Gottfried of Viterbo, a poem completed in

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6 See my discussion below on the council of princes, pp.214-6.
Italy circa 1187 by a cleric with close ties to King Conrad’s House of Staufen, as evidence that the army was harassed during its retreat to Nikaia. Bernhardi is correct in his interpretation, but both these sources agree with Gerhoh that the army was also harassed before the decision was made to retreat, and this Bernhardi does not address.

Bernhardi’s work also reveals the shortcomings of its age in certain other areas. Like Kugler, Bernhardi did not have the advantage of modern works on military logistics and the topography of medieval Anatolia, both of which must be understood to ascertain the circumstances leading to Conrad’s retreat. For example, when Bernhardi states that Turkish territory was immediately beyond Nikaia, we now know this was not the case along the route Conrad traversed. Thus, there are problems with both Kugler and Bernhardi’s studies, and yet their interpretations of Conrad’s advance through Byzantine and Turkish territory remain largely unchallenged.

The next study to throw any light on Conrad’s crusade was Ferdinand Chalandon’s *Jean II Comnène (1118-1143) et Manuel I Comnène (1143-1180).* This is a work written very much from the Byzantine perspective, and thus it offers a valuable source critique of the Greek works employed in this thesis, as well as examining some of the more important Latin and Syriac sources. Chalandon’s thorough knowledge of the sources enables him to approach the history of the crusade from a wide perspective. For example, he sees the treaty drawn up between Manuel and the Seljuk sultan, Mas‘ūd, in the spring of 1147 as a culmination of negotiations begun in 1146, before either was aware of the impending crusade. He also provides a reasonable narrative of Conrad’s advance and, by proffering alternative interpretations, rejects much of what Kugler speciously construed as evidence of German disorder.

It can be contended, however, that Chalandon, like Kugler, does not fully appreciate that much of the Greek evidence employed in his analysis are *topoi.* Moreover, he does not offer a reinterpretation of the clashes between the Turks and crusaders, for which he points the

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14 Gottfried of Viterbo, ‘Pantheon’, ed. G. Pertz, *M. G. H., Scriptores,* 22 pp.107-307 (Hanover, 1872), pp.263-4. There are aspects of the Pantheon, which are unrelated to the crusade, that echo the Pöhlder Annals. With regard to the crusade, however, there are substantial textual differences which suggest that if Gottfried of Viterbo did have access to the Pöhlder Annals, he did not rely solely on them. On the Pantheon, see the editor’s introduction in Gottfried of Viterbo, ‘Pantheon’ and Wattenbach & Schmale, *Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen,* pp.77-9, 87-92.


18 Chalandon, *Jean II Comnène,* pp.xiv-xlvi.


21 For example, see Chalandon, *Jean II Comnène,* pp.273-6.
reader in the direction of Kugler and Bernhardi’s works.\textsuperscript{22} We are still left with what is essentially Kugler’s interpretation of these particular events. As Chalandon points out, contemporaries blamed the Byzantines, and in particular the emperor Manuel I Komnenos, for the circumstances which lead to the failure of the crusade. Perhaps the most damning of the charges they levelled at Manuel was that he acted in concert with the Seljuk Turks to cause the destruction of Conrad’s army. Chalandon’s defence of Manuel Komnenos has proven important for the subsequent historiography. He suggests that the Seljuks would hardly have needed encouraging to halt the crusader advance on Ikonion, the sultan’s capital, and he sheds light on the concerns that Manuel must have felt, upon the approach of the crusaders, for Constantinople, his imperial dignity, and Byzantine interest in northern Syria. Most importantly for a future historiographical trend, Chalandon suggests that, even if the charges of Byzantine treachery were true, perhaps the emperor could be excused for his actions.\textsuperscript{23}

Steven Runciman’s work follows the same apologist tradition. The second volume of his *History of the Crusades* provides a narrative of the crusade to the East, in which he seeks to absolve the Greeks of the charges levelled at the emperor and his subjects by embittered survivors of the expedition.\textsuperscript{24} For the most part, Runciman follows Chalandon and Kugler. It is clear, for instance, that his brief discussion of the division of Conrad’s army at Nikaia depends on Chalandon, and his assertion that the army was defeated in battle at Dorylaion on Kugler.\textsuperscript{25} It is when Runciman defends Manuel that he offers his own interpretations. For example, to counter the accusation that the Byzantines purposely provided inadequate supplies at exorbitant costs, he reasonably suggests that a lack of provisions and famine prices were the inevitable consequences of the appearance in any medieval country of two large armies requiring supplies. He goes further than Chalandon by stating that Manuel may actually have condoned Turkish attacks on the crusaders to maintain a truce with the Seljuks, which was important for his foreign policy towards Antioch.\textsuperscript{26}

In his efforts to defend Manuel, Runciman seeks to blame the crusaders for the failure of the advance on Ikonion, and he willingly incorporates into his narrative the prejudiced views of contemporaneous Greeks and Latins alike so long as they portray the Germans in a bad light. For example, his narrative of the passage of Conrad’s crusade in European territory simply repeats the accusations of German disorder found in John Kinnamos. As there is no

\textsuperscript{22} Chalandon, *Jean II Comnène*, p.285.
\textsuperscript{23} Chalandon, *Jean II Comnène*, pp.263-8, 286-8.
\textsuperscript{25} Runciman, *History*, 2, pp.267-8.
\textsuperscript{26} Runciman, *History*, 2, pp.266, 274-6.
attempt to question the sources, we are thus left with a damning portrayal of the crusaders, largely fashioned by a Byzantine historian with an agendum in the latter half of the twelfth century, and faithfully repeated by a Byzantinist with his own agendum some 800 years later.\footnote{Runciman, History, 2, pp.260-1.}

Much more rounded is Virginia Berry’s contribution to volume one of A History of the Crusades.\footnote{For above p.2, note 2 for the the full citation.} Berry discusses the origins of the crusade to the East, to Iberia and against the pagan Wends of northeast Europe.\footnote{Berry, ‘Second Crusade’, pp. 463-512.} With regard to Conrad’s crusade, she does not impose her perspective on proceedings, but provides a narrative account derived mainly from Bernhardi, Chalandon and Kugler. Her assessment of the advance through Byzantine and Turkish territory, for example, clearly derives from the latter.\footnote{Berry, ‘Second Crusade’, pp.484-6, 495-6.} She stresses Manuel’s concerns for his capital and Byzantine interests in Anatolia, although she does not aggressively seek to attribute the failure of the crusade to any one party.\footnote{Berry, ‘Second Crusade’, pp.484, 490-2, 502.}

The modern era of Second Crusade studies began with a seminal article by Giles Constable entitled ‘The Second Crusade as seen by Contemporaries’.\footnote{For above p.2, note 2 for the full citation.} Constable does not specifically seek to address Conrad’s passage through Byzantine and Turkish territory; rather, he examines the western sources with a view to illuminating the scope of the crusade, the role of the papacy, and contemporaneous explanations for the various outcomes of the expeditions against the perceived enemies of Christendom.\footnote{Constable, ‘The Second Crusade’, pp.213-79.} Since then, two edited collections of essays in English have opened up the Second Crusade to a wider audience. Whilst The Second Crusade and the Cistercians, edited by Michael Gervers, largely concentrates on the profound impact of Cistercian monks on the crusade movement, it is The Second Crusade: Scope and Consequences, edited by Jonathan Phillips and Martin Hoch, which is the true heir of Constable’s work.\footnote{See above p.2, note 1 for the full citation.} Constable and those who have followed him rightly focus on the interrelation of the various campaigns, and they largely agree that the Second Crusade became a concerted effort under Cistercian guidance to defeat the enemies of Christendom on diverse fronts. It was not within the scope of these valuable works to discuss Conrad’s advance, a topic which will be addressed in a third collection of articles on the Second Crusade.\footnote{Roche, J.T. & Møller Jensen, J., ed., The Second Crusade in Perspective (Turnhout, forthcoming, 2009).}
Between the burst of scholarly activity in the early 1950s, and up until the last decade or so, historians have offered little in the way of alternative interpretations which may affect the scope of this thesis. Hans Eberhard Mayer’s *The Crusades* is representative of the textbooks produced during this period.\(^3\) He provides a brief narrative derived from Kugler, Bernhardi and Chalandon on the origins of the Second Crusade and the attack on Damascus, for example. His narrative on Conrad’s advance in Anatolia is restricted to repeating Kugler’s assertion that the army was defeated in battle at Dorylaion.\(^4\)

A current historiographical development seeks to place the passage of the Second Crusade through Byzantine and Turkish territory within the strategical-political context of Byzantine relations with Latin Europe and the crusader states. Consequently, modern scholars have tended to agree with their medieval counterparts, and it is generally accepted that many of the adversities the crusaders encountered in Anatolia were the result of policies pursued by Manuel Komnenos with the aim of protecting Byzantine imperial interests. It is variously maintained that the crusade was a threat to imperial honour, Constantinople and Byzantine interests in Anatolia and the Levant, and therefore Manuel took measures to ensure the enterprise failed. Ralph-Johannes Lilie, for example, in his *Byzantium and the Crusader States, 1096-1204*, argues that Manuel was ultimately responsible for Seljuk attacks on the army of King Louis VII of France,\(^5\) but he does not ascribe the failings of Conrad’s crusade to Byzantine machinations; rather, he unquestioningly follows Kugler. Indeed, it is easy to trace in Lilie the historiographical notion of ‘unbridled’ indiscipline. As evidence of unusual levels of German disorder before the army reached Anatolia, he cites the aforementioned works of Chalandon, Runciman and Berry, none of whom questioned Kugler’s hypothesis.\(^6\) Kugler’s assertion that the crusaders’ indiscipline led to defeat in battle at Dorylaion, and that this alone compelled the army to retreat, is also uncontested, with Kugler cited as evidence.\(^7\)

Jonathan Phillips’ remit in his *Defenders of the Holy Land: Relations between the Latin East and West, 1119-1187* which, as the title suggests, illuminates the relations between Europe and the crusader states, permits a more detailed study of the current debates concerning the Second Crusade.\(^8\) He discusses, for example, the origins and aims of Louis VII’s decision to go on crusade, argues that the initial preliminary goal of the expedition was the recapture of Edessa, and analyses why the crusaders subsequently chose to attack

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\(^4\) Mayer, *Crusades*, pp.93–106.


\(^7\) Lilie, *Byzantium*, pp.157, 160.

\(^8\) Phillips, *Defenders*. 
Damascus rather than campaign in northern Syria.\textsuperscript{42} His treatment of Conrad’s advance on Ikonion is nevertheless very much within both Kugler’s and the current historiographical tradition. For example, he takes for granted the supposed defeat in battle at Dorylaion, and also maintains that Manuel encouraged Turkish attacks on the crusaders to protect imperial interests in northern Syria.\textsuperscript{43}

Michael Angold in his \textit{The Byzantine Empire 1025-1204: A Political History}, also treats the supposed German defeat in battle at Dorylaion as an axiom, and accepts that Manuel instigated the Turkish attacks against the crusaders.\textsuperscript{44} Unfortunately though, Angold does not question the Greek evidence he relies on heavily for his narrative of Byzantine policy towards the second crusaders, and this somewhat undermines his interpretations. For example, he employs the history of John Kinnamos to illustrate that Manuel treated Conrad with the hostility the king’s imperial pretensions apparently deserved, and in support of this, he quotes the letters supposedly passed between Manuel and Conrad and ‘reproduced’ by Kinnamos.\textsuperscript{45} There are many problems with unquestioningly following Kinnamos, not least in this case because the letters were almost certainly a construct of Kinnamos’ imagination.\textsuperscript{46}

Jonathan Harris in his \textit{Byzantium and the Crusades} also accepts Manuel’s harangues – derived from Kinnamos’ imagination – as faithful testimony of hostility between the emperor and Conrad outside Constantinople.\textsuperscript{47} Again, a too literal reading of the evidence here tends to weaken his arguments. This is apparent, for instance, when he follows Runciman’s example in merely repeating contemporary prejudiced allegations of German disorder in European imperial territory, and when he follows a number of others in accepting contemporaneous allegiations of Byzantine duplicity without seriously questioning the source testimonies.\textsuperscript{48}

This thesis does not aim to address the merits or otherwise of the suggested reasons why the Byzantines would wish to see the collapse of the crusade, nor does it seek to challenge conventional interpretations of allegedly perfidious Byzantine activity towards the army of King Louis VII of France. The aim is to offer alternative explanations, grounded on the tangible realities of twelfth-century provincial Byzantium, for the failure of the German army’s advance on Ikonion. Such an attempt inescapably challenges the traditional notion that the Byzantines were somehow responsible for the crusade’s collapse.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{42} Phillips, \textit{Defenders}, pp.73-99.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Phillips, \textit{Defenders}, pp.84, 88-94.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Angold, M., \textit{The Byzantine Empire 1025-1204, a Political History}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed. (Harlow, 1997), pp.196-9.
\item \textsuperscript{45} Angold, \textit{Byzantine Empire}, p.198.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Harris, J., \textit{Byzantium and the Crusades} (London, 2003).
\item \textsuperscript{48} Harris, \textit{Byzantium}, pp.95-6, 99-100.
\end{itemize}
Ebru Altan’s İkinci Haçlı Seferi (1147-1148), unfortunately does not challenge the traditional interpretations.\(^49\) One might have hoped that a Turkish perspective on the events in Anatolia would have uncovered new discoveries but, for the most part, Altan simply rehearses the work of Kugler and others representing the older historiographical tradition.\(^50\)

Conversely, John France’s *The Crusades and the Expansion of Catholic Christendom, 1000-1714*,\(^51\) follows Alan Forey in challenging the notion first championed by Constable and followed by Phillips and others that the Second Crusade was a planned simultaneous offensive against the enemies of Christendom on three fronts.\(^52\) France offers a synopsis of the scope of the crusade and provides a good rationale for why there may have been a lack of discipline in the German army, which led to the defeat at Dorylaion. Both these notions are ultimately derived from Kugler and the older historiography.

A recent article by Graham Loud entitled ‘Some Reflections on the Failure of the Second Crusade’ has gone some way to offering alternative explanations for Conrad’s failure to advance on Ikonion.\(^53\) Loud suggests that as the crusaders ‘set out across Asia Minor at the beginning of winter (sic)’,\(^54\) they would have found it difficult to obtain pasture and fodder, which would have exacerbated provisioning problems, his implication being that this contributed to the collapse of the crusade. Loud also argues that the losses to Conrad’s army in Anatolia were not as excessive as is conventionally held, and he points to evidence demonstrating that princely retinues reached the Holy Land. These are sound deductions to make and are analogous to conclusions reached independently in this thesis. Nevertheless, Loud’s investigation is narrow in scope and only skims the surface of the range of circumstances leading to the council’s decision to retreat.

Christopher Tyerman’s recent treatment of the Second Crusade is in a similar vein. His chapter on the crusade in *God’s War* is more detailed than that found in Loud’s article as it deals with planning and recruitment, the violence perpetrated against the Jews of the Rhineland, the expeditions to Iberia and against the Wends, and the choice of Damascus as the aim of the crusade to the East.\(^55\) But he too only offers cursory explanations for Conrad’s failure to reach Ikonion, although he correctly suggests that the army was harassed as it advanced towards its target, that it failed to adopt tactics to combat the Turks, and that the

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\(^50\) See, for example, Altan, *İkinci Haçlı Seferi*, pp.60-8.
\(^54\) Conrad crossed into Asia Minor at the end of September, which is actually the beginning of autumn in northwestern Turkey. Bernhardi, *Konrad*, p.620. I have found no evidence to suggest that the medieval Anatolian climate was markedly different from that of today.
crusaders’ logistical arrangements were flawed. The army’s march through Europe and his summation of the advance on Ikonion are derived from Berry and the older historiographical tradition, but it is impossible to discern how Tyerman reached his brief conclusions concerning the failed advance which are reached independently in this thesis. The primary and secondary sources he consulted do not alone prove all of his assertions.

To appreciate why Conrad failed to advance on Ikonion, it is essential to understand fully the nature of twelfth-century western Anatolia in three particular spheres that have received little attention from crusade historians, but which impacted upon the army’s progress: the geography of Anatolia; the form, function and population of the typical provincial town; and the twelfth-century geopolitical situation, including the rôle of the Türkmens. Detailed studies of Anatolia’s medieval geography are sorely lacking, although the work of Michael Hendy and the Tabula Imperii Byzantini series have contributed to our understanding.56 Through analysis of well-known crusade sources and modern observations, we can build on this existing work to recreate geographical images of twelfth-century western Anatolia. In an attempt to illuminate Byzantine urban development as it affects the scope of this thesis, I shall draw upon well-known printed sources and utilise the work of archaeologist Clive Foss and others which, by revealing the country’s much-neglected medieval monumental heritage, has revolutionised Anatolian archaeology.57 Michael Hendy, Speros Vryonis Jr., and Claude Cahen have addressed the confused geopolitical landscape of western Anatolia.58 Through

analysis of well known Latin and Greek sources, we can expand on their work to ascertain
the character of the country’s political geography on the eve of the Second Crusade.

Inextricably associated with the problems engendered by Anatolia’s geography,
geopolitical landscape and urban development are logistical and tactical considerations.
Medieval military logistics have received considerable attention in recent years, most
noticeably by John Haldon and Bernard Bachrach. Bachrach’s recent work on the First
Crusade is of little value, as he has made numerous erroneous assumptions which negate his
hypotheses. Haldon’s work on Byzantine logistics on the other hand, is invaluable and can
be employed to illuminate the logistical impracticality of the army’s advance on Ikonion.
John France’s well known monograph entitled *Victory in the East: A Military History of the
First Crusade* and his recently published article ‘Logistics and the Second Crusade’, also
facilitate discussion on the crusaders’ logistical considerations in 1147. France has also
focused on the crusaders’ tactical dilemmas when opposing a little known Turkish enemy, as

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59 Of Bachrach’s many studies the following are particularly useful: ‘Caballus et Caballarius in Medieval
Pre-Crusade Europe’, in J. Lynn, ed., Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the
Present (Boulder 1993), pp.57-78; Warfare and Military Organisation in Pre-Crusade Europe (Aldershot,
2002). Haldon has recently brought together most of his work on logistics in a published collection ‘Roads and
Communications in the Byzantine Empire: Wagons, Horses, and Supplies’, in J. H. Pryor, ed., Logistises of
Warfare in the age of the Crusades (Aldershot, 2006), pp.131-58. I am indebted to John Haldon for his kind
provision of an advance copy of this article. See his additional works in the bibliography.

60 Bachrach, B., ‘Some Observations on Administration and Logistics of the Siege of Nikaia’, War in History,
12, no.3 (2005), pp.249-77; Bachrach, B., ‘Crusader Logistics: from victory at Nicaea to resupply at Dorylaion’,
in Pryor, Logistics of Warfare, pp.43-62. Some important and related examples of Bachrach’s tendency to make
erroneous assumptions include the following. Based on population figures from the late Roman Empire of a low
of 18,000 to a high of 36,000 at the height of the Lascarid Empire in the thirteenth century, Bachrach suggests
that Nikaia’s population in 1097 was perhaps around 25,000. However, Anatolia underwent a period of great
urban dislocation in the wake of the battle of Mantzikert (1071) and Bachrach’s calculations take no account of
this. See my discussion of the geopolitics of Anatolia, chapter 10, and on the form and function of the typical
Anatolian town, chapter 9. His use of numbers is a major concern, since he accepts untrustworthy medieval
estimates as the basis of his hypotheses, and this leads to many more spurious assumptions. To demonstrate that
the Byzantines provisioned the crusaders, Bachrach presumes that the former used wheeled vehicles on
Anatolia’s Roman roads which were in a state of good repair, and on this basis he calculates the logistical
requirements to feed an army of a size based on the misleading medieval estimates. The Roman roads were
largely in a state of disrepair, and the Byzantines very rarely employed wheeled vehicles during this period. (On
these points, see the works by Haldon cited in this section). These facts necessarily bring Bachrach’s
calculations into question, as the Byzantines are likely to have employed pack animals. This is turn throws doubt
on Bachrach’s assumption that 40,000 crusaders invested Nikaia in 1097, since there may not have been enough
pack animals to convey provisions for an army of this size, if indeed it was even possible to supply such a large
force in Anatolia at this juncture. On these matters see below pp.166-70. Many of these problems concerning
Bachrach’s first article are repeated in the second cited study, which also includes his presumption that a straight
contemporary military route measuring approximately 95 kilometres existed between Malagina and Dorylaion
by way of modern Söğüt. On the contemporary military route between Nikaia and Dorylaion, see below pp.179-
86 and maps 3 and 4. He also assumes that both Malagina and Dorylaion remained inhabited and functional
aplektai or mustering stations/storehouses in 1097 when the opposite is true. On Malagina see Foss, ‘Byzantine
Malagina’, pp.161-83, and on Dorylaion see below pp.186-8.

indebted to John France for his kind provision of an advance copy of this article.
have earlier studies by Roger Smail and Christopher Marshall. Given known problems of battlefield eyewitness testimony, we can nevertheless employ such studies in conjunction with our original sources to reconstruct the clashes between the Turks and crusaders, which finally led to a decision by a council of princes to halt their advance on Ikonion and retreat to Nikaia.

The principal aim of this thesis is to investigate the circumstances leading to the decision to retreat. Notions that the crusaders were somehow unusually indisciplined and belligerent, and that this led to a defeat in a set-piece encounter on the plain of Dorylaion, stem from the older historiographical tradition as represented by Kugler and Bernhardi. Historians have recently sought to explain the failure in a wider strategical-political context, namely, the Byzantines’ conflict with the Latin world. Little of this historiography, however, takes any account of the tangible realities of twelfth-century provincial Byzantium and the concomitant predicaments facing the crusaders that led to the council’s deliberations and the decision to retreat. Moreover, the historiography has failed to challenge the source documents on which we are reliant for the history of the crusade, preferring instead to accept literal readings or cherry-pick data. A new study which revisits the sources first interpreted in the latter half of the nineteenth century, and which addresses the crusade from perspectives outwith the prevalent arena of high politics, may shed new light not only on the Second Crusade itself, but also on the remaining histories of the twelfth-century crusades in Anatolia and the Byzantines’ relationships with Latin world.

3. The Byzantine Notion of the Latin ‘Barbarian’

Byzantine perceptions of, and relations with, the Latins of Western Europe during the middle ages have been well documented; it is not the aim in this chapter to repeat previous discussions unnecessarily. It is essential, however, to address the significant contact which gave rise to animosity between the Byzantine elites and the western Latins, as historians have argued that the latter’s influence in the Byzantine world shaped the conception of the western European ‘barbarian’ as expressed by the Greek sources. This chapter will assert that, rather than Latin contact with the Byzantine world formulating a perception of European ‘barbarism’, the notion was in fact an existing *topos* which pertained to any non-Greek.

Jonathan Shepard has identified a number of instances in tenth-century Byzantine texts where shows of positive esteem are displayed for the ‘Franks’ of Christian Europe, although, he argues, contact between Byzantium and most of Western Europe in the ninth and tenth centuries was infrequent. There is evidence of increased contact by the middle years of the eleventh century, most notably in the form of pilgrims journeying to the Holy Land, although there is little evidence of mutual hostility surfacing at this point. However, whilst there may always have been ecclesiastical quarrels between the bishops of Rome and the *parvenu* Patriarch of Constantinople, these were to expand in scope and intensity during the course of the eleventh century.

The Normans and their appearance in the Mediterranean world were the cause of this increased hostility. Norman freebooters had been terrorising the Lombard duchies of Capua, Salerno and Benevento for some two decades before the raiders moved into Byzantine regions in Italy following the latter’s failure to recover Sicily from the Arabs in 1040. Argyros, the head of a leading family from the Byzantine Italian city of Bari, took this opportunity to seize control of the city for himself and he came to an understanding with the Normans. The Byzantines soon won Argyros over and then he subsequently drove the

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1 The Greek noun *Latinos* first appears as a generic appellation of westerners in a patriarchal decision of 1054. Even though archaic ethnonyms such as *Kelto* were still employed in the twelfth century, the notion of unified Latin peoples was by then firmly established, and the term *Latinos* was commonly employed to mean all those who wrote and read Latin and observed the Latin Catholic rite. Kazhdan, A., ‘Latins and Franks in Byzantium: Perception and Reality from the Eleventh to the Twelfth Century’, in A. Laiou & R. Mottahedeh, ed., *The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World* (Washington D.C., 2001), pp.83-100, especially pp.84-6.


3 Shepard, J., ‘Aspects of Byzantine Attitudes and Policy Towards the West in the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries’, *Byzantinische Forschungen*, 13 (1988), pp.67-118. Kazhdan has shown that the ethnonym ‘Frank’ was predominantly used by the Byzantines to specify individual peoples. It was initially applied to the Germanic tribes settled on the territory of ancient Gallia, and then to the population of Gallia in general. Kazhdan, ‘Latins and Franks in Byzantium’, p.89.
Normans out of Bari before being called to Constantinople in 1045 to become a trusted supporter of Emperor Constantine Monomachos.\textsuperscript{4} 

Argyros was a patron of the Latin churches during his six years in Constantinople, and he took part in debates with the Patriarch of Constantinople, Michael Keroularios, on various theological views seen as heretical by the Patriarch. According to Angold, Argyros’ appointment as the Duke of Italy in 1051 focused the Patriarch’s attention on the differences of rite within the Latin Church in Italy, as compared with those of the Orthodox Church in Constantinople. The Patriarch’s reaction to these differences led to ecclesiastic conflict between Constantinople and the Papacy, which was exacerbated by the Papal claim to universal supremacy. It was a sign of the times when a papal legate, Cardinal Humbert, and Michael Keroularios openly excommunicated each other in 1054.\textsuperscript{5} 

The schism of 1054 concerned points of theology, ritual and church discipline and largely passed by the eastern and western laymen alike. There had been schisms before 1054 over points of doctrine and practice, but these had not damaged the Byzantine perception of the Latin West. The idea of a unity of faith within a common brotherhood in Christ was weakened by the schism of 1054. Mutual trust during the later crusades was undermined from the outset.\textsuperscript{6} Leo of Ochrid was laying scurrilous charges against the practices of the Latin Church even before 1054, but more importantly, the schism gave rise to the Byzantine ‘anti-Latin’ treatise. Initially these treatises were confined to theological discussions on, for example, the use of leavened or unleavened bread in the Eucharist and were addressed to the clergy. But then polemicists sought to explain their theological differences with the West in terms of alleged moral and spiritual Latin weaknesses. By the end of the eleventh century, theological differences alone had begun to malign the West amongst the Byzantine elites.\textsuperscript{7} 

The rancorous Byzantine rhetoric which characterised the Greek narratives of the Second Crusade, and in particular that of John Kinnamos, was not inflamed by theological differences alone.\textsuperscript{8} A major effect of the schism was an alliance between the papacy and the Normans, sealed at the council of Melfi in 1059. Pope Nicholas invested Robert Guiscard with Apulia and Sicily, and bestowed upon him the papal banner. Guiscard soon began to

\textsuperscript{4} Angold, \textit{The Byzantine Empire}, pp.48-50.  
\textsuperscript{5} Angold, \textit{The Byzantine Empire}, pp.50-3.  
\textsuperscript{6} Angold, \textit{The Byzantine Empire}, p.53.  
\textsuperscript{8} Compare with Angold, M., \textit{Church and Society in Byzantium under the Comneni, 1081-1261} (Cambridge, 1995), pp.506-14.
capture the southern Italian Byzantine towns in earnest, and southern Italy was finally lost to the Byzantines in 1071 with the capitulation of Bari.  

Norman aggression did not stop the Byzantines admiring Norman military prowess. Norman mercenaries were regularly employed, and a number such as Hervé Frankopoulos, Robert Crépin and Roussel de Baileul held important Byzantine military posts both before and even after each had rebelled against his Byzantine paymasters, prior to Alexios I Komnenos gaining power in 1081.  

Norman or ‘Frankish’ mercenaries were employed during Alexios’ reign, and some continued to hold important posts. Constantine Hountzopoulos, Robert Guiscard’s brother, commanded the *tagma*, or contingent of the Franks, while Guido (Guy Hauteville), a son of Robert Guiscard, and a certain Roger were honoured with money, titles and significant marriage alliances.

Alexios Komnenos was understandably suspicious of Norman aggression, and therefore of the crusaders’ motives in 1099 and 1101. His reservations appeared well founded when his Norman enemy, Bohemond of Taranto, took the cross during the first expedition and attacks were made on imperial subjects and property. Alexios feared that the professed pious motivation behind the movement was merely a cloak concealing the true aim of the crusade leaders, which he believed was to seize Constantinople, or at least to establish lordships in former eastern Byzantine territories. Bohemond did indeed seize the former Byzantine town of Antioch, which was an imperial possession as late as 1084, and that was to prove a major cause of disagreement between Byzantium and the Latin world. His attacks on Byzantine possessions in Syria and Cilicia led to inevitable confrontation, and even resulted ultimately in Bohemond’s ‘crusade’ against Dyrrachium in 1107/8. Bohemond’s anti-Greek crusade propaganda, coupled with the continuing conflict over Antioch, maligned the Byzantines in the eyes of the Latin West where the Greeks were portrayed and perceived as perfidious and effeminate. The Byzantine perception of the westerner, in which no distinction was drawn between the Latins of the crusader states and those of southern Italy and Sicily, for example,

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9 Angold, *The Byzantine Empire*, pp.53-5.
11 Kazhdan argues that the meaning of the ethnonym ‘Frank’ appears to have changed eventually in Byzantine literature to apply to the Normans, and in particular, the Norman mercenaries of Italy. Kazhdan, ‘Latins and Franks in Byzantium’, pp.89-91.
became fixed in a hostile attitude founded on the belief that all Latins strove to harm the Greeks in some manner.\(^\text{14}\)

German imperial pretensions in Italy provided scope for further confrontation, although a mutual enemy in the form of the Kingdom of Sicily actually brought the successors to the eastern and western Roman empires together at the time of the Second Crusade. An alliance and apparent friendship lasted until at least 1160 and the death of Manuel I Komnenos’ German wife, Bertha-Eirene of Sulzbach, the adopted daughter of King Conrad III of Germany.\(^\text{15}\) The two empires then entered a period of approximately 20 years of cold war in which Manuel sought and gained alliances with the papacy, the Normans, France and the Lombard cities.\(^\text{16}\)

Manuel is well known to have favoured Latins and attracted them to Constantinople. As Paul Magdalino suggests, we need only look at the number of marriage alliances negotiated and concluded by Manuel with the ruling houses of Europe to appreciate this.\(^\text{17}\) Western influences permeated the capital during this period and, as in the late eleventh century, there is clear evidence of Latin influence in the Byzantine Empire during Manuel’s reign in the military sphere.\(^\text{18}\) We know, for example, that the Antiochene noble Baldwin fell commanding the right wing of the Byzantine army at the Battle of Myriokephalon in 1176.\(^\text{19}\)

Kazhdan, however, has argued that notable Latin military commanders are less discernible during Manuel’s reign, and indeed that of his father John II Komnenos, than in the second half of the eleventh century. He also maintains that we know little about any contemporary westerners of significance in the empire, unless we count such Hellenised families as the Rogerioi, Patraliphai and Raoul, and less still about the anonymous Latins occasionally mentioned in the sources.\(^\text{20}\)

This does not mean there were actually fewer westerners in the empire during Manuel’s reign; Kazhdan maintains the opposite was true. Military command was entrusted primarily


\(^{15}\) Bertha, who was known as Eirene to the Greeks, was Conrad’s sister-in-law at the time of the marriage negotiations with John II Komnenos’ fourth son, Manuel. However, upon Manuel’s unexpected accession to the imperial throne, Bertha was seemingly of a much less attractive status for elevation to the rank of Augusta or senior empress. Accordingly, it appears that Conrad may have adopted her as his daughter. For references to Bertha as Conrad’s daughter, see Otto of Freising, Continued by Rahewin, *Gesta Frederici seu Rectius Cronica*, ed. F. Scmale, trans. A Schmidt (Darmstadt, 1965), pp.168-80.


to Manuel’s extended kin, and therefore Latins largely disappeared from their traditional role as significant military leaders, although Latin mercenaries continued to be ordinary soldiers. Their greatest role during this period was as merchants, and the sources indicate that there was a great influx of westerners, particularly from the Italian maritime city states, into the empire during Manuel’s reign. In the militarised society of the Byzantine Empire, therefore, Latins had less social standing under Manuel than they had previously, although they continued to hold important posts in the diplomatic service where they acted as emissaries, interpreters and ideological advisers.

Manuel’s western sympathies, like the threat of the Normans, the conspicuous wealth of Italian merchants, the crusades, conflict over Antioch, and war with her Latin prince, challenged and threatened the Byzantines on many levels and caused anti-Latin hostility and resentment in Constantinople. These sentiments manifested themselves most clearly in the massacre of Latin merchants in the capital in 1182, two years after Manuel’s death. The Greek sources began to give voice to this hostility and resentment over a century earlier. According to Jonathan Shepard, Latins begin to be referred to in the Greek sources as ‘barbarians’ and ‘a race treacherous by nature’ by the latter half of the eleventh century. This, he believes, is directly attributable to a change in the state of affairs in the eastern Mediterranean, namely, the appearance of the Normans and the threat they posed in southern Italy and Sicily. By this hypothesis, the Latins had effectively become ‘barbarians’ because of their attacks on Byzantine sovereignty. It follows that subsequent Latin threats to, and attacks on, Byzantine sovereignty in the one hundred years or so prior to the Second Crusade, and in particular, the continued Norman aggression from southern Italy and Sicily, the perceived usurpation of, and conflict over Antioch, the martial activities of the Latin Antiochene prince, and the passage of western armies through Byzantine territories during the crusades, could only exacerbate the Byzantine perception of Latins as barbarians. Indeed, the sources become infused with references to Latins as barbarians in the Byzantine texts relating to such martial activity.

Anti-Latin sentiments are rarely expressed in the extant Greek sources from the first half of the twelfth century, and it is with Anna Komnene, writing around the time of the Second Crusade, that we first see the actual articulation of anti-Latin sentiments in a secular

23 Brand, Byzantium, pp.39-43.
context.\textsuperscript{25} It has been pointed out that Anna went beyond previous authors in delineating the ‘barbarians’ as those incapable of the correct pronunciation of the Greek language,\textsuperscript{26} and this appears to have played a role in Anna’s denunciation of the Italian, John Italos. Paul Magdalino has remarked that the condemnation of Italos should be seen within the same context as Anna’s anti-Latin demonising of the Normans Roussel of Baileul, Robert Guiscard, and his son, Bohemond of Taranto.\textsuperscript{27} Anna had particular reasons for vilifying these Norman warlords, who had all attacked Byzantine sovereignty. This was especially true of Bohemond, who had seized Antioch for himself during the course of the First Crusade in contravention of an oath to Anna’s father, Alexios I Komnenos. Perhaps her vituperation is particularly pertinent when we consider that Anna may have been writing the \textit{Alexiad} at the very time that another Norman, King Roger II of Sicily, was attacking imperial domains while her nephew, Manuel, was dealing with the Second Crusade.

It does, therefore, seem reasonable to suggest that the appearance and activities of the Normans in the eastern Mediterranean ushered in the Byzantine use of the term ‘barbarian’ as applied to western Europeans. However, the contemporary sources suggest this phenomenon cannot be ascribed solely to initial Norman aggression, or indeed, subsequent Latin martial activity. As Shepard admits, by the time of the First Crusade at the end of the eleventh century, western European and eastern ‘barbarians’ are grouped together in the Greek texts suggesting that it was something more than Norman aggression that effectively made the Latins ‘barbarian’.\textsuperscript{28} Anna Komnene portrays Latin barbarians on the First Crusade as impious, untrustworthy, irrational and volatile. Magdalino suggests Anna invokes the inherent unstable ‘nature of the Franks’ in order to defend her father’s failure to meet his obligations as overlord, and accompany the crusaders into Asia Minor or assist them at the siege of Antioch. He asks whether Anna’s portrayal of the Latin crusaders is born out of the empire’s experiences at the hands of the Normans before the First Crusade (as suggested by Shepard), or whether it is a response to encroaching Latin barbarians at the imperial court at the time of her writing.\textsuperscript{29} Either way, in addition to the barbarians being defined by their inability to pronounce Greek correctly, they also appear to be characterised as impious and capricious in the mid-twelfth century.

\textsuperscript{26} Compare with Niketas Choniates, \textit{O City of Byzantium}, p.116.
\textsuperscript{27} Magdalino, \textit{Empire}, pp.331, 385.
\textsuperscript{28} Shepard, ‘Aspects’, pp.96-7.
\textsuperscript{29} Magdalino, ‘The Pen of the Aunt’, pp.15-43.
Shepard actually goes on to argue that there were factors other than military aggression which made one a barbarian. He remarks that Anna Komnene characterises Latin barbarians as fickle and avaricious, which are attributes of ‘the Celtic nature’, as they are also the ‘natural characteristic of barbarians’ when she is referring to Cumans. When speaking of a Pecheneg breach of treaty, she remarks that, ‘In every respect all barbarians are inconstant and do not by nature keep treaties’. Shepard argues that Anna’s attribution of similar characteristics to western barbarians, and to those originating from the East, is not a literary device. He maintains that Anna’s portrayal of her father’s methods of courting the Cumans in 1091 and the crusaders in 1097 were the same, and he notes that Anna remarks that her father had discovered the Celts’ and the Cumans’ character through experience. It follows, Shepard argues, that as Alexios courted the largely nomadic Cumans and the western sedentary Europeans in a similar manner, they evidently did share common barbarian traits known to the emperor.30

This is a rather problematic interpretation. It is difficult to maintain that the emperor’s employment of various aspects of standard Byzantine ceremonial such as the giving of banquets, the use of flattery and the bestowing of gifts, for example, can be reasonably construed to infer that the Latin and Cuman ‘barbarian’ traits were the same. Byzantine ceremonial was integral to the process of government; administration and ritual went hand in hand. Ceremonial was designed to induce a psychological mood in the participants and observers which affirmed imperial authority and made statements on the observers’ and participants’ relations to the emperor and empire.31 In the two cases cited by Shepard, we can see how aspects of Byzantine ceremonial were also exercised for very practical reasons. Alexios exacted oaths from both the Cumans and the Latins and hastened their departure from imperial territory. To Shepard, this is further evidence that the Latin and Cuman traits must have been similar, as the emperor negotiated with each army in a comparable manner. An alternative interpretation is to see the Cuman and Latin participants making oaths to Alexios during part of the standard Byzantine ceremonial, thus reflecting the Byzantine perception of the barbarians’ relationship to the Emperor. That there were practical reasons for the emperor exacting these oaths should not detract from the fact that standard Byzantine ceremonial was employed to this end.

We should, therefore, see the methods employed by Alexios in 1091 and 1097 with the Cumans and Latins of the First Crusade respectively, not as an illustration of shared Cuman and Latin characteristics, but as examples of the use of aspects of Byzantine ceremonial

30 For the references to Anna Komnene see, Shepard, ‘Aspects’, pp.97-8.
employed with any foreign barbarian. The fact that in these two instances the foreigners happened to be large armies who constituted a threat was of little consequence when it came to the Byzantine use of ceremonial. Ceremonial was the way of dealing with foreigners when necessary, and so it is better to see Anna’s application of negative characteristic attributes to non-Byzantines as stereotypical. Non-Byzantines were barbarian; these same barbarians ipso facto shared negative attributes such as capriciousness and rapacity.

The foreign ‘other’ as barbarian was in fact a topos. The etymology of the Greek word barbaros derived from an adjective representing the sound of incomprehensible foreign languages. The actual notion of the barbarian was developed in fifth century BC Athens in response to the Persian wars. The conflict with Persia was conceptualised in Greek tragedy as a struggle between moderate, civilised Greek culture and irrational, alien violence and this provided the impetus behind the invention of the disorderly barbarian. In contrast to a civilised and disciplined Greek, the foreign other, the anti-Greek, the barbaros was materialistic, impulsive, emotional and violent.

The Byzantine Romaioi of the middle ages inherited their ancient Greek predecessors’ superior attitude toward the foreign other. They believed that the empire was at the apex of a complicated hierarchy of states which originally belonged to the Roman orbis but now formed part of the oikoumene, broadly understood to be all the civilised lands theoretically subject to the will of the emperor. The educated Romaioi consequently considered themselves as the bulwarks of civilisation, a notion expressed by the authors of the age who owed their language and models of writing to classical literature. Those literary conventions often underpinned the source portrayal of the foreign barbarian other, and frequently provided the way of interpreting and imparting the hierarchical world view – an orthodox notion of hierarchy which during the course of the eleventh century was largely surpassed by

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33 Hall, E., Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy (Oxford, 1989).
35 John Kinnamos, for example, alludes to the works of Herodotus (born c.484 BC) and Xenophon (born c.444 BC) and there are echoes of Thucydidies (born c.460 BC), Plutarch (born c.46 AD), Arrian (born c.86 AD) and Libanius (born c.314 AD) in his text who were all influenced by or followed Classical models. The historian Procopius, born during the latter years of the fifth century AD, seems to have furnished Kinnamos with his literary model. John Kinnamos, Deeds, p.7. The corpus of classical literature was gathered and transcribed in the ninth and tenth centuries. As Kazhdan states, ‘the process of assimilation and reflection’ began in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Kazhdan, A & Wharton Epstein, A., Change in Byzantine Culture in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries (Berkeley, 1985), p.136. Angold suggests the increased interest in classical literature reflected the re-emergence of cities as centres of learning. Mango, C., Byzantium: The Empire of the New Rome (London, 1994), p.237.
the classical vision of otherness. In the words of Paul Stephenson, ‘the barbarian was the universal anti-Greek against whom Hellenic culture was defined. The two identities were polarities and together were universal.’ Put very simply, the empire was civilised and pre-eminent, all non-Hellenes were uncivilised and hence barbarians who shared common barbaric traits.

Stereotypes usually cast certain traits as vices on to target groups, vices which are generally opposite to the virtues admired in the group creating the stereotype. The cardinal Hellenic virtues were defined in the fourth century BC and included wisdom/intelligence, manliness/courage, discipline/restraint and justice. Plato listed the opposing corresponding vices as stupidity, cowardice, lack of self-control and lawlessness. The classical Greek tragedians and the medieval Greek historians and encomiasts, who drew their literary models, motifs and language from classical literature, employed these stereotypes in the same manner. In the fifth century BC – as in the twelfth century – astute Greek military leaders outwitted barbarian brute strength; Greek prudence tempered their courage whereas arrogance precipitated the barbarians’ downfall; the Greeks exercised constraint over their passions but the barbarians exercised their passions with the abandonment of wild animals; the Greeks abided by their treaties while the barbarians were fickle; and all barbarians exhibited a lust for gold. The untamed barbarian was the polar opposite of the civilised Byzantine.

This notion was hardly fixed: imperial rhetoric often had to reflect political reality. When former barbarians settled in imperial territory and became subject to the will of the emperor, for example, writers explained their presence in the oikoumene by modifying the notion of the untamed barbarian. The foreigners no longer exhibited all the typical traits of the barbarian, but inhabited a semi-civilised world which was not entirely barbarian. Nor did the notion of the foreign barbarian preclude positive observations of the other. For example, like Michael Attaliates, John Zonoras and Anna Komnene before him, Niketas Choniates appears to have had respect for Latin military prowess. Kazhdan has identified several other instances when Choniates praises Latins, such as Frederick Barbarossa on the Third Crusade, Conrad of Montferrat, the Antiochene notable Baldwin who died bravely at Myriokephalon, Raymond of Poitiers, prince of Antioch, and Peter of Bracieux. Choniates also tells of a Venetian merchant who became his friend and helped him and his family, and he condemned

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37 Hall, Inventing the Barbarian, pp.121-33.
the undiscriminating Byzantine animosity towards Westerners.\textsuperscript{40} Nor was Niketas Choniates alone in his occasional praise of the Latins, for his brother Michael, Theodore Balsamon and Eustathios of Thessalonica all occasionally show esteem for individuals or respect for western institutions.\textsuperscript{41}

Nevertheless, whilst an author may have occasionally chosen to underplay or even omit references to odious Latin characteristics, the overall impression given by the Byzantine sources of the western other is a negative one. This impression was underpinned by classical learning and the classical vision of otherness that provided the language and motifs with which the literate élite and their patrons expressed and reflected their thoughts and concerns in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.\textsuperscript{42} As will become apparent, to ‘Manganeios Prodromos’, John Kinnamos and Niketas Choniates, the Latin barbarians were, amongst other things: treacherous, stupid, arrogant, aggressive, anarchic, belligerent and vainglorious. Many of these characteristics are stereotypical deprecating attributes which the Greek authors applied to other non-Latin barbarians, that is, non-Byzantines.\textsuperscript{43} The Latin barbarian stereotype was therefore shaped from a universal view of any non-Byzantine. Objectionable traits such as capriciousness, stupidity, and (with particular regard to menacing Latin warriors), belligerence, arrogance and vainglory, were overlaid on this perception. It was thus formulaic: a non-Byzantine was a barbarian, the barbarian axiomatically had the aforementioned negative characteristics. Ideological and theological differences, Norman aggression, conflict over Antioch, and the threat of the crusades did not make the Latin West barbaric, but they did propagate anti-Latin sentiment and augment the repeated use of the barbarian cliché in Byzantine literature. Hence, Byzantine authors readily perceived barbarian traits in the behaviour of western Europeans, which, in turn, constituted empirical ‘proof’ of the verity of the stereotype. This process perpetuated the disparaging Byzantine perception of the barbarian world, and thus tainted the evidence that the Greek sources have left to posterity.

\textsuperscript{40} Kazhdan, ‘Latins and Franks in Byzantium’, pp.87-9.


\textsuperscript{43} Kazhdan, ‘Latins and Franks in Byzantium’, p.88.
Part II
4. Sources

A dearth of narrative sources for the history of the Germans’ advance through the Balkans determines that the current historiography of Conrad’s expedition is dependent upon the Latin text of Odo of Deuil, and the Greek texts of John Kinnamos and Niketas Choniates. Each of these well-known and accessible texts has received a great deal of scholarly attention, not least from their respective editors. This chapter will establish new critical approaches to interpreting these important sources within the context of the Second Crusade, which in turn, bring into question the validity of the current historiography.

Largely absent from studies on the Second Crusade are two further essential Greek texts in the form of verse encomia composed by the so-called ‘Manganeios Prodromos’ concerning the passage through Constantinople in 1147 of the two armies nominally headed by Conrad III of Germany and Louis VII of France. This chapter will serve as an introduction to the abstruse encomia, which were court panegyrics that drew upon a corpus of imagery and motifs which are only very recently beginning to be deciphered and understood.

Our introduction to the Greek texts will conclude by asserting the relationship between the little known encomia and our Greek narrative sources. An appreciation of this relationship is fundamental to interpreting the Greek evidence. The narrative histories occasionally depended on the rhetorical tradition of contemporary Greek verse encomia, and indeed, as will become apparent in the following chapters, can be interpreted within a similar context.

John Kinnamos and Niketas Choniates

At various times in their careers both John Kinnamos and Niketas Choniates were imperial secretaries attached to the court and the emperor’s person. Choniates’ political and rhetorical

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1 Odo of Deuil, De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem, ed. & trans. V. Berry (New York, 1948); Ioannes Cinnamus, Rerum ab Ioanne et Alexio Comnenis Gestarum, ed. A. Meineke, Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae (Bonn, 1836); John Kinnamos, Deeds; Niketas Choniates, Nicetae Choniatae Historia, ed. J. L. van Dieten, 2 vols Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae (Berlin, 1975); Niketas Choniates, Historia, ed. I. Bekker, Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae (Bonn, 1835); Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium. All quotations concerning the crusade are the present author’s translations of the Bonn editions unless stated otherwise.

2 Elizabeth and Michael Jeffreys are editing his corpus. I am greatly indebted to both for providing English translations of poems 20 and 24.

3 Other printed Greek sources, which have had little influence of the history of the Germans’ advance through Byzantine territory, but are employed in this thesis are: ‘Epistola Manuelis ad Eugenium’, R. H. G. F., 15 pp.440-1, (Paris, 1878, repr. Farnborough, 1968); ‘Epistola Manuelis ad Ludovicum’, R. H. G. F., 16 pp.9-10, (Paris, 1878, repr. Farnborough, 1968). It has been contended that Manuel I Komnenos wrote two letters to Pope Eugenius III concerning the crusade of King Louis VII of France; for references see Magdalino, Empire, p.47, note 72; John Tzetzes, Ioannis Tzetzae Epistulae, ed. P. Leone (Leipzig, 1972), pp.87-8; John Tzetzes, Ioannis Tzetzae Historiae, ed. P. Leone (Naples, 1968), no.9, pp.611-2; Eustathios of Thessalonica, ed. V. Regel, Fontes Rerum Byzantinarum, Fasciculi 1 et 2: Rhetorum Saeculi XII Orationes Politicae, pp.1-30 (St Petersburg, 1892-1917; repr. Leipzig, 1982), pp.105-6; Michael the Rhetor, ed. V. Regel, Fontes Rerum
gifts in particular were recognised, and he rose to important posts within the central and provisional administration. Yet their histories do not extensively utilise imperial documents and indeed, largely depend upon various forms of eyewitness accounts such as living testimony, verse encomia and first-hand narratives of specific events, which may or may not have been officially issued for public consumption.  

Kinnamos and Choniates may have employed one or any combination of such accounts for their depiction of the crusade. Textual errors and omissions are, however, a reflection of the type of sources Kinnamos and Choniates utilised. The first-hand narratives the Greek historians employed usually concerned events from the front-line involving the emperor and the imperial army. Hence, there is relatively a great amount of detail in Choniates’ and Kinnamos’ narratives of the clashes between the imperial forces and crusaders in Europe. In contrast, there are substantial lacunae in their testimonies once the crusaders were safely across the Bosphoros and did not encounter imperial troops. A preoccupation of the verse encomia was to eulogise Manuel Komnenos, and by extension, his imperial subjects. The apparent technique employed, as exemplified in the poems of ‘Manganeios Prodromos’, was to inflate the emperor’s virtues by contrasting them with the stereotypical abhorrent traits of the Latin barbarian in order to present Manuel as saving Constantinople from the crusader threat. The encomiast discovered his material in instances where the Byzantines clashed with the crusaders in Europe and outside the Byzantine capital. Testimony derived from individuals living at the time when Kinnamos and Choniates wrote is restrictive in geographical scope and utility. The informant could only pass on what he or she either saw or heard at the time, or was told by others. Individual memory is also liable to be subject to

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Byzantinarum, Fasciculi 1 et 2: Rhetorum Saeculi XII Orationes Politicae, pp.131-182 (St Petersburg, 1892-1917; repr. Leipzig, 1982), p.173. I am indebted to Peter Maxwell-Stuart for his translations of John Tzetzes, Eustathios of Thessalonica and Michael the Rhetor. It has recently been suggested that Anna Komnene’s Alexiad, and in particular the vindication of Alexios’ handling of the First Crusade, should be read in light of later known events, and specifically, the perceived threat of the Second Crusade to the empire at the time of Anna’s writing. It should be noted, however, that whilst projecting previously known events and circumstances at the time of the Second Crusade on to Anna’s history of the First Crusade, historians have yet to demonstrate that Anna provides any new evidence for the events of 1147/8. The Alexiad might nevertheless prove an excellent source for exploring Byzantine attitudes and politics towards the West at the time of the Second Crusade. Anna Komnene, Alexiad; Thomas, R. D., ‘Anna Comnena’s Account of the First Crusade: History and Politics in the Reigns of the Emperors Alexius I and Manuel I Comnenus’, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 15 (1991), pp.269-312; Magdalino, ‘The Pen of the Aunt’, pp.15-43; Stephenson, ‘Anna Comnena’, pp.41-54.

5 Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, pp. xvi-xvii; John Kinnamos, Deeds, pp. 5-6; Magdalino, Empire, pp. 4-26 and 413-88.

6 Ioannes Cinnamus, Rerum, pp.67-83; John Kinnamos, Deeds, pp.58-68; Niketas Choniates, Historia, pp.81-8; Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, pp.36-8.

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distortions influenced by age or ill-health and collective and retrospective versions of the past. Such testimony is suspect unless its details can be confirmed from other sources.

In other words, Kinnamos’ and Choniates’ crusade narratives composed some 35 and 55 years after the event respectively provide relatively detailed descriptions probably based on forms of lost first-hand accounts of proceedings in Byzantine territory. Although their histories are constructed within the confines of Byzantine rhetorical conventions, which must always be considered, Kinnamos’ and Choniates’ use of such evidence lends evidential authority to their narration of events before the army entered Asia Minor. On the other hand, once the crusaders had crossed the Bosphoros, the perceived threat to Constantinople and contact between Manuel and Conrad and their respective forces receded along with the types and value of the sources the Greek historians could utilise. As Anatolia was on the periphery of their interests, Kinnamos and Choniates were very likely to have been somewhat dependent on potentially distorted oral testimony alone for their portrayal of many events in Asia Minor.7

Moreover, regardless of their occasional protestations to the contrary, the Byzantine historians of this period did not perceive their work as a means of objectively recording their accumulated evidence. They belong to a tradition of writing that treated the historical genre as a vehicle for imparting their individual and partial perception of the past.8 Within this convention of traditional historical and courtly literature, Byzantine historians produced complimentary micro-narratives of past and present sovereigns. Sincerity or absolute truths were not prerequisites for such narratives.9

We must therefore recognise that the Greek historians’ portrayal of the crusaders, and the army’s advance in the Balkans and Anatolia, were shaped by their sources and literary convention, and in particular, by the barbarian topos we discussed earlier.

**Greek Verse Encomia**

Essential to any interpretation of the Greek historians, and in particular, John Kinnamos, is recognition that the narrative histories were occasionally dependent on the rhetorical tradition of contemporary Greek verse encomia. At its most fundamental level, the production and presentation of an encomium, that is, a rhetorical court panegyric usually composed directly or indirectly in veneration of the emperor, involved a process whereby the encomiast

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9 See the introduction in John Kinnamos, *Deeds*, pp.8-9.
presented his poem in the theatre of a formal or informal court assembly as a gift to the venerated individual, either in the expectation of favours, or as an expression of gratitude for favours rendered previously.

It is often impossible to ascertain whether the emperor’s actions, policies, priorities, or his desired image of himself determined what was eulogised, or if the encomiasts chose to emphasise what would be pleasing for the emperor to hear, which in itself, may or may not have reflected the desires of the individual encomiast, or the groups with which he identified. What is clear is that the emperor’s person and concerns provided the subject matter for the encomia, and the encomiasts provided the means by which their own, and more importantly for our purposes, the concerns of the emperor were aired and made public. In fact, as Paul Magdalino has demonstrated, verse encomia can be considered as sanctioned imperial media and tools of imperial propaganda.\(^{10}\)

A malleable template provided the encomiasts with their essential fundamental themes and rhetorical methods of acclamation. The main preoccupation of the encomiasts was to extol the emperor’s competitive deeds which were divided into those of peace and war, and addressed under the headings of the four imperial virtues: bravery, justice, temperance and wise prudence. To acclaim the emperor’s virtues, a *synkrisis*, or a technique of comparing the current emperor with historical, biblical and mythical figures and previous emperors was most commonly employed.

Additional themes could augment this laudatory formula, which in the earliest extant encomia produced during the initial years of Manuel I Komnenos’ unusual and controversial elevation to the imperial throne four years before the Second Crusade, very often reflected the emperor’s inaugural propaganda. Manuel was the fourth and last-born son of the emperor John II Komnenos. The young Manuel had accompanied his father on campaign to Syria in 1142. During their return a year later, John seems to have died in suspicious circumstances whilst hunting. Manuel hastened back to Constantinople to secure control of the empire against Isaac, his one surviving brother. Not only was the young Manuel’s succession remarkable, it also departed from the conventional wisdom that the emperor should be a man of mature years, naturally imbued with the four imperial virtues. Manuel’s inaugural propaganda, therefore, became the propaganda of legitimisation. The emperor is portrayed as a vigorous youth, yet still imbued with the imperial virtues of an elder statesman, which legitimised his rule. This notion of an ‘old head on young shoulders’ provides one of many

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forms of contrast typical in the encomia. Such contrasts are employed in a process of rhetorical amplification whereby Manuel’s theoretical virtues of bravery, philanthropy and wisdom are magnified by what are, in effect, apologias for the emperor’s youth. In turn, the qualities of youth are thus themselves inflated by their obsequious comparison with imperial virtues. Accordingly, certain themes and motifs which augment the essential fundamental laudatory formula, and are common in all encomia, are stressed and repeated to unprecedented degrees in Manuel’s inaugural propaganda.

‘Manganeios Prodromos’

Amongst an impressive extant corpus of verse encomia, poems 20 and 24 concerning the Second Crusade, composed by ‘Manganeios Prodromos’, exhibit the full gamut of the encomiast rhetorical conventions.11 Employed in the service of the sebastokrator Andronikos (II) and his wife Eirene at the time of the crusade, his poems were thus written and performed by an eyewitness for eyewitnesses in Constantinople. Poem 20 was written within weeks of King Conrad III’s crossing the Bosphoros,12 and poem 24 may have been written only days after Louis VII and the French army commenced their march in Anatolia.13 Both were certainly written before news of the army’s retreat to Nikaia reached Constantinople. As such, they were exactly the type of contemporary source evidence that John Kinnamos and Niketas Choniates may have had to hand when composing their narrative histories, and are thus invaluable to the modern historian.

Encomia and the Narrative Histories

The evidence which can be gleaned from the contemporary encomia of ‘Manganeios Prodromos’ is occasionally echoed in the later crusade histories, tantalisingly suggesting that Kinnamos and Choniates used the encomiast’s poems as sources of evidence. It may be,
however, that all three writers had access to a similar, if not the same, first hand narrative of the events they describe. This in turn may or may not have provided the basis for an official imperial notice, that is, a Byzantine version of the modern press release. Editors of ‘Manganeios Prodromos’ suggest that such a bulletin was employed by all three Greek sources.\(^\text{14}\)

Nevertheless, it is ordinarily possible to detect significant traces of encomia in the later Byzantine histories, and corroborative echoes often exist because the Greek historians largely perceived past events and individuals through what has been called ‘a thick, bright haze of rhetorical hyperbole’ derived from contemporary encomia.\(^\text{15}\) This is particularly evident in Kinnamos, whose narrative can read like a historical representation of the information alluded to by Manuel’s encomiasts. In comparing the Second Crusade narratives, and in particular that of John Kinnamos, with the rhetorical techniques, themes and motifs found in the poems of ‘Manganeios Prodromos’, it becomes evident that the Byzantine histories of the Second Crusade may have been profoundly shaped by encomiastic literary tradition, and should be interpreted accordingly. As Paul Magdalino has pointed out, this tradition maligned foreigners ‘as foils for native imperial virtue’.\(^\text{16}\) We must therefore critically analyse the Greek sources, or risk the history of the Second Crusade succumbing to the distorting influence of Byzantine rhetorical conventions.

**Odo of Deuil**

Odo of Deuil’s *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem* is our most important source for both the crusade of Louis VII of France and Conrad III of Germany.\(^\text{17}\) As chaplain to the King of France, he was in an excellent position to record the trials and tribulations of Louis VII and his army. The principal aims of the *De Profectione* were to exalt the French king, whilst providing a logistical and topographical guide for future crusaders to the East. Although the *De Profectione* provides more information than what was principally


\(^{15}\) Compare with Magdalino, *Empire*, pp.20-2, 413.


intended, it is the narrow function of this source, dealing as it does with the problems besetting the French army, and in particular, the challenge of victualling, which makes it so useful for the purposes of this thesis.

The source is not without its problems. Although Odo finds things to admire in the Greeks of the Byzantine Empire, anti-Greek vitriol diffuses throughout the text, and it is well known that enmity existed between the Latin world and the empire before the advent of the Second Crusade. The antagonism and resentment shown towards the Byzantines evident in the De Profectione is not just born out of, for example, religious ideology, anti-Greek propaganda circulated in France after the First Crusade, and Byzantine intervention in Northern Syria. Whilst anti-Greek sentiment appears to have arisen within the French court before the army set out from France, Jonathan Phillips has recognised that Odo’s spleen may have been influenced by events on the crusade itself. Odo’s ambiguous estimation of Greek Orthodoxy, for example, ranging from outright condemnation to a grudging appreciation, may reflect hazy sentiments which were not necessarily predetermined before the French entered Byzantine territory. Indeed, whilst the Greeks were widely perceived as untrustworthy throughout the Latin world, it is now recognised that Odo’s more belligerent views as expressed in the De Profectione were not reflective of the whole of the French army, or for that matter, Western Europe at this juncture.

The crusading experience may well have helped shape Odo’s vitriolic portrayal of the Byzantines. In fact, the experience and Odo’s malevolence reciprocated: what we witness in the De Profectione is Odo’s latent anti-Greek sentiments finding various outlets. Odo intended to elucidate the problems the French army encountered, and in doing so, he attempted to reconcile the events and occurrences around him with a simple approach to cause and effect. His instincts told him that the Greeks were duplicitous, and this perception underpins his interpretation: Odo too readily deemed perceived Greek duplicity as responsible for many of the ills that the crusaders encountered, when actually the causes behind the troubles and problems can be found elsewhere.

Odo’s assertions and indeed those of his fellow crusaders concerning Greek perfidy must be questioned. The monk believed that, ‘The general opinion [of the Byzantines] is that what

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19 Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, p.12.
is done on account of the holy empire is not considered perjury’. 22 Whilst such a sentiment may have readily provided Odo with the grounds for his interpretation of events and occurrences on the Second Crusade, we must investigate alternative perspectives and answers which can actually be found in the tangible reality of twelfth-century provincial Byzantium, and the typical passage of large medieval armies. 23

It is important to recognise that there was greater scope to Odo’s apparent prejudice than merely anti-Greek sentiment. Whether we agree or not with Beate Schuster’s suggestion that the denigrating rhetoric towards the German crusaders evident in the De Profectione is born out of French pride, nascent nationalism or ancient enmity, it is true that the author displays a discriminatory bias against the Germans 24 and, indeed, other non-French speaking crusaders. This bias again finds outlets in occurrences and resultant passages in the De Profectione where Odo attempts to locate causes for the problems the French encountered.

As John France has pointed out, it is conventional to compare Conrad’s indisciplined army with Louis VII’s more ordered force. It is held that we can accept Odo’s evidence of excessive German disorder because he is forthcoming with examples of poor French discipline, the implication being that his account of German behaviour is therefore not biased but balanced, true, and accurate. 25 It is correct that Odo offers instances of both French and German indiscipline, but it is the nuances of many of those accounts which leave the impression the Germans conducted themselves significantly worse. The Germans who advanced ahead of the French army are portrayed as wanton despoilers, and this, Odo argues, subsequently caused the French to be provisioned inadequately. Accordingly, Odo maintains that the French were compelled to pillage because of the previous actions of German crusaders. We are thus left with an impression that the French army perpetrated justified acts of violence, whereas the Germans were merely an indisciplined rabble.

It cannot be contended that the German army did not ‘disturb everything as they proceeded’ (Alemanni praecedentes omnia perturbant). 26 Nor can it be argued that the

22 ‘Generalis est enim eorum sententia non imputari periurium quod fit propter sacrum imperium.’ Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, p.56.
23 History has judged that many of the adversities encountered by the army of King Louis VII of France as he traversed Anatolia during the Second Crusade were owing to the policies pursued by Manuel Komnenos, and in particular, his support of Seljuk attacks on Louis’ army to protect Byzantine interests. I have demonstrated elsewhere that there was very little Manuel or the Seljuk sultan Mas‘ūd could do about the autonomous Türkmen attacks on the French crusaders. Neither controlled the Türkmens, and there was very little either could do about the Türkmen presence in southwest Anatolia. I put this argument forward at the Leeds International Medieval Congress in 2004 in a paper entitled ‘Anatolia and the Second Crusade: Who Clashed with Louis VII?’, which will be published in due course.
25 For example, see, France, ‘Logistics’, pp.77-93.
26 Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, p.45.
advance of any medieval army with loose command hierarchies and loyalties did not commit acts of violence against the native inhabitants. Various levels of sanctioned and unsanctioned plunder were inevitable, especially when the ability to obtain provisions by peaceful means was removed. Odo chose to be blind to the potential rational reasons behind the apparent episodes of German disorder, yet willingly offered explanations for French unrest.

This important and previously unidentified disparity in Odo’s text may stem solely from blind prejudice. However, Odo may have intended to portray the Germans as wilful despoilers. This impression was a calculated subplot of the De Profectione, inextricably linked with Odo’s known schema of elucidating the French crusade’s logistical problems, and additionally, justifying subsequent French acts of violence in non-hostile territory. These aims were facilitated by Odo’s over-simple approach to cause and effect, underpinned by his prejudiced perception of the non-French encountered on crusade. In short, Odo actively sought to blame the non-French for French problems and disorder in an attempt to make cause and effect evident to his audience. In fact, on occasions, it appears that Odo manipulated data to suit his own prejudice and agenda, a manipulation which, of course, also influenced the audience’s response to those data.

The nuances in Odo’s text, combined with a literal reading of the Greek textual evidence constructed within the confines of Byzantine rhetorical conventions, have left modern historians with the impression that the German army was excessively indisciplined. This impression is subject to hyperbole. During the course of part II of this thesis, it will be maintained there are rational explanations for acts of disorder founded on the crusaders’ obligation to pillage the land in order to survive.
## 5. Preparations, the Army and its Provisioning Arrangements

### Preparations

Bernard of Clairvaux won the French nobility to the crusade at the Easter assembly at Vézelay in 1146. Cistercian preaching and recruitment for the crusade subsequently began in earnest, and in the autumn of that year Bernard shifted the focus of his personal attention to the county of Flanders, before reaching the Rhineland and German imperial lands of the western Roman Empire in October. At the Christmas court held at Speyer, Bernard formally recruited the emperor-elect, King Conrad III of Germany, to the crusade movement. Once Conrad had officially committed to the crusade, many of the higher German nobility followed, and between the end of December and the German assembly at Regensburg in February 1147, many great men had taken the cross.¹

At this juncture, there was a close relationship between the Byzantine Emperor, Manuel I Komnenos, and the German imperial House of Staufen. Manuel’s father, John II Komnenos, had made an alliance with the German King Lothar II against Roger II, the King of Sicily. John renewed it with Lothar’s successor, Conrad III of Staufen, with a proposed marriage alliance, which was sealed as late as 1146 with Manuel’s marriage to Conrad’s adopted daughter, Bertha-Eirene of Sulzbach.² It has been suggested that Conrad’s crusade must have temporarily dissolved this alliance, and indeed the passage through Byzantine territory of an army nominally headed by the German king could hardly have been within the terms of the alliance.³ However, it is inconceivable to suppose that communication, and perhaps even new negotiated terms for the alliance between the two allies to ease the passage of Conrad’s crusade through Byzantine territory did not take place before June⁴ – although this is not reflected in the extant records.⁵

Unfortunately to date we know very little of the activities undertaken in the Germans’ homelands to facilitate the expedition.⁶ A little more is known regarding some of the diplomatic contacts and arrangements made by the leading figures in the movement, for

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³ Lilie, *Byzantium*, p.149; Magdalino, *Empire*, p.48. For more on the alliance see below pp.89-90.


⁵ The Bishop of Würzburg was sent on an embassy to Manuel Komnenos in 1146, and a Byzantine ambassador was present at the court in Speyer later that year. The product of the negotiations is not known, but as Christopher Tyerman suggests, these representatives of Conrad and Manuel respectively almost certainly discussed the impending crusade. Tyerman, *God’s War*, p.286.

example, to establish peace before embarking on the crusade. We know, for instance, that Abbot Bernard assisted in ending the long-running dispute between Count Henry of Namur and Albero, archbishop of Trier, at Speyer in January 1147. At the Frankfurt diet held in March of that year, Henry the Lion swore to stop pushing his claims to the Bavarian lands of his father, Henry the Proud, so that peace could be maintained during the crusade. A general peace was proclaimed at the same assembly which enabled such men to turn their whole attention to the movement.

More is known regarding Louis VII of France’s diplomatic efforts to facilitate the passage of the crusade through theoretically non-hostile territory, which may reflect similar efforts made by the German king. For example, Louis held a great assembly at Étampes in February 1147 attended by Sicilian, German and Byzantine delegates. During the subsequent negotiations, the decision was made to advance through southern Germany and follow the classic overland pilgrim route via Hungary, the Balkans (Byzantine territory) and Constantinople. Louis wrote to the Hungarians and Germans requesting and subsequently receiving permission to pass through their lands and to receive markets.

We may infer that there was sustained diplomatic contact between the French and Germans. For example, at some unknown point, the German elite had decided to follow the pilgrims’ route to Constantinople, and their advance ahead of the French army on the same path was surely coordinated. It has long been recognised that such an arrangement would have been reached in order to ease competition for provisions. The French thus crossed many bridges constructed by the Germans, and Louis was well received at Regensburg where many of the French crusaders boarded ships to convey them down the River Danube. Can it be pure coincidence that Conrad had likewise boarded ship at Regensburg to travel down the Danube? Is it not more likely that some form of coordination had taken place to ensure that a substantial fleet was in Regensburg upon the arrival of the crusaders? The armies also cooperated in concealing Boris, an ally of the Byzantines and a claimant to the Hungarian throne, as they advanced through Hungarian territory. Bishop Otto of Freising, Conrad’s half-brother who accompanied the king on crusade, noted that ‘the Lorrainers from among

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9 See, for example, Chalandon, *Jean II Comnène*, pp.263-6; Berry, ‘The Second Crusade’, pp.469-70.
11 Kugler, *Studien*, p.111. This is the reason offered in a number of primary sources. For example, see, William of Tyre, *Willelmi Tyrensis archiepiscopi chronicon*, ed. R. B. C. Huygens, 2 vols (Turnhout, 1986), 2 XVI.19, p.741.
our people’ (ex nostris Lotharingos), French-speaking inhabitants of imperial territory, and including Stephen, the bishop of Metz, Henry, the Bishop of Toul, and Renald, the count of Monçon, advanced with Louis VII. If so, they marched ahead of Louis to join the German crusaders. Odo of Deuil tells us that they subsequently waited at Constantinople for the French king. All these examples demonstrate that the movement of the armies through Hungarian and Byzantine territory was to some extent coordinated.

**The Army**

There was clearly diplomatic contact between the French and German leaders to allow such men to adhere to either army, and counts and bishops did not travel alone. Odo of Deuil tells us they waited at Constantinople ‘with a numerous military force’ (cum copioso exercitu). Land-owning lay and secular aristocrats of all ranks had their mouvance, hosts of individuals who lived within their sphere of influence. Lesser lords, knights and other mounted warriors of various degrees of wealth and status also had their own troops. Such soldiers, in addition to the humble infantrymen who took the cross, may or may not have held a form of allegiance to a powerful crusader, and may or may not have attached themselves to the magnates’ military retinues. Many soldiers must have been poor, landless, and served for rations, money and lodging on a precarious basis. The hosts of various types of retainers used by the lay and secular nobles were similarly dependent upon provision from their lords, and their numbers must have been substantial. A single knight, for example, needed two or three servants just to keep him in the field.

It is well known that the crusade absorbed individuals and groups besides the mouvances of the wealthy, their familiae, and other warriors of various wealth and status. Although we know very little about them, the crusade attracted many non-combatants other than the clergy and the retainers of the rich and not so rich. There were individuals such as merchants and prostitutes, for example, who are usually referred to in military histories as camp followers. Odo of Deuil bemoaned the fact that those non-combatants on foot, that is, the poorer crusaders who accompanied the army, were armed only with the pilgrim’s staff and wallet rather than the sword and bow. Perhaps many of the poor pilgrims left their homes in Europe with little or no money to rendezvous with the contingents of the rich. Many did not have carts or pack animals to carry provisions, tents and cooking utensils.

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15 Odo of Deuil, *De Profectione*, p.50.
16 Odo of Deuil, *De Profectione*, p.50.
18 Odo of Deuil, *De Profectione*, p.94.
Those with the means to do so did embark on crusade with baggage, and in Europe this consisted of packhorses and two and four wheel horse- or mule-drawn carts and wagons.\textsuperscript{20} In addition to these beasts of burden and mounts for non-combatants, it is generally agreed that each mounted warrior required a minimum of three horses: a pack horse/mule to convey his war equipment and provisions; a riding horse; and at least one horse trained for combat. Many knights would have begun the crusade with a large number of warhorses, palfreys and pack animals, and undoubtedly the richer of the mounted warriors had strings of beasts. Squires, grooms and other such retainers who may have been required to fight also needed mounts.\textsuperscript{21}

The number of carts, wagons and beasts of burden required to convey valuables, equipment and provisions, and the number of riding mounts and warhorses accompanying the army depended upon many variables, ranging from the size of the baggage trains of the aristocratic mouvances and their familiae, through to the numbers of pack animals and horses belonging to individual pilgrims. In other words, the number of beasts depended upon the number and type of crusader. The narrative sources simply do not tell us this information. In the bulk of the texts the only indication we have of the combined numbers of warriors, retainers, camp followers and pilgrims is that they were an\textit{ inestimabili}\textsuperscript{22} or\textit{ innumerabili}\textsuperscript{23}\textit{ multitudine}, or made up an\textit{ innumerabilem exercitum}.\textsuperscript{24} The intention of such chroniclers was simply to relay to their audience an impression of the sheer size of the army. We do find numbers given in the sources such as the 650,000 that advanced from Constantinople as noted in the contemporary\textit{ Annales Magdeburgenses}.\textsuperscript{25} Whilst such numbers are obvious fantasy, they were intended to convey to their audience the same message as those chroniclers who stated that men went on crusade\textit{ inestimabili multitudine}. The well-known historian, William of Tyre, writing some 30 years later, noted that 70 thousand ‘wearing a cuirass’ (\textit{loricatorum}), as well as foot soldiers, women, children and ‘light-armed cavalry’ (\textit{equitibus levis armature}) accompanied Conrad.\textsuperscript{26} It is tempting to accept the more modest and realistic figures offered


\textsuperscript{26} William of Tyre, \textit{Willelmi Tyrensis archiepiscopi chronicon}, XVI.19, p.742. On William of Tyre, see Davis, R. H. C., ‘William of Tyre’, in Baker, \textit{Relations Between East and West}, pp.64-76; Edbury, P. & Rowe, L.,
in the texts, especially when such a usually authoritative source as William of Tyre writes that he gained this information from those who took part in the expedition, and indeed those on crusade may have believed that 70,000 mounted warriors accompanied the army.27

This does not mean that such high round numbers found in medieval texts should be taken as accurate. Most twelfth-century chroniclers, and their verbal sources of first-hand information, were innumerate. This is one reason numbers above ten are rarely found in chronicles before the thirteenth century, and why medieval scholars preferred to state, for example, that there was a ‘multitude’ of things rather than offer figures.28 Moreover, even if multiples of tens of thousands were comprehended, medieval scholars, and particularly those providing details of troop numbers, had a tendency to exaggerate their figures because round numbers were frequently used to denote broad orders of magnitude. The Papal Legate Daimbert wrote of the First Crusade, for example, that the strength of the combined armies at the siege of Nikaia in May/June 1097 was 300,000, yet by the battle of Ascalon on 12 August 1099, the army had been reduced to 20,000. Neither the upper or lower figure is to be taken as accurate, nor indeed, the proportion of losses.29 The numbers were used here to emphasise the severe rate of attrition endured by the crusaders fighting for their faith between contact with their Turkish enemy at Nikaia and the battle with the Egyptians at Ascalon over two years later. This may be an obvious example, but the point being made holds for most of the sources of this period: such numbers were not actual estimates to be taken literally. The symbolic use of numbers was recognised and expected by contemporaries, even if, or maybe because, the numbers themselves were not completely understood.

Medieval authors exploited their audiences’ expectation of the symbolic use of numbers in reverse, that is, they may have offered exact figures in an attempt to give their account a touch of verisimilitude. An example concerning the Second Crusade will serve to illustrate this point. Odo of Deuil stated he had heard from the Greeks, (presumably an inhabitant of Constantinople), that exactly 900,566 German crusaders had crossed the Bosphoros on Byzantine shipping.30 This number is impossible and it appears that Odo is attempting to add

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27 William was in Europe at the time of the Second Crusade. Edbury & Rowe, William of Tyre, p.15. Nevertheless, he states he received his information according to the ‘uniform assertions of men who took part in this expedition’, ‘constanter asserrunt qui in eadem expeditione presentes fuerunt’. William of Tyre, Willelmi Tyrensis archiepiscopi chronicon, XVI.19 p.742.


30 Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, p.50.
An attempt to reach accurate army sizes by using the contemporary figures given in the crusade sources is fraught with danger. There are too many potential pitfalls, and to try to form rational calculations from figures which were never intended to be accurate is clearly a flawed exercise. All we can assert with confidence is that a great many crusaders, perhaps as many as ten thousand or so, ranging in wealth and status from princes to the poorest of peasant pilgrims, advanced with their animals towards Constantinople under the nominal leadership of King Conrad III of Germany.

Provisioning Arrangements

Pilgrimage to the Holy Land, and in particular, armed pilgrimage was an expensive enterprise. It has been estimated that the average individual non-combatant would require the accumulated worth of a year’s income to see him through the pilgrimage.\(^{32}\) A well known approximation suggests that a fully armed individual mounted warrior would require approximately four times his yearly revenue to enable him to fulfil his personal martial duties.\(^{33}\) A more recent study proposes that wealthier arms bearers would in fact require seven times their annual income to embark on a two-year crusade at the end of the eleventh century.\(^{34}\) Many of those who went on crusade ultimately depended upon others. As masters of men and money, princes and lords thus required cash to maintain their status and support the subsistence, travel and equipment needs of their *mouvances*, *familiae* and any poorer crusaders they chose to maintain.

Much work has been done on the means by which the greatest of the leaders of the First Crusade, and indeed many of the lesser crusaders whose memory is saved in the textual record, sold claims and rights, lands and dues, and pawned territories to raise the gold and silver coin, bullion or treasure required to go on crusade.\(^{35}\) Many clearly knew that vast

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31 John Kinnamos wrote that Byzantine officials charged with counting the numbers of crusaders ferried across the Danube lost count at ninety myriads (900,000), a number evidently circulated in Constantinople and intended to portray the fantastic size of the army. It appears that Kinnamos obtained this information through distorted rumour. It is clear that the Byzantine officials were actually charged with counting the crusaders as they crossed the Bosporos, not the Danube. Ioannes Cinnamus, *Rerum*, p.69; John Kinnamos, *Deeds*, p.60; Odo of Deuil, *De Profectione*, p.50; Niketas Choniates, *Historia*, p.87; Niketas Choniates, *O City of Byzantium*, p.38; Helmold of Bosau, ‘Chronica Slavorum’, pp.116-17.


amounts of cash were required to reach the Latin East, and most surely would have known that the greatest and perhaps the most important expenditure would have been on procuring the necessities to maintain life during their passage through Europe and the Byzantine Empire.

Given that the monetary system of western Europe during this period was based on silver coin, it holds that crusaders must have raised and carried substantial amounts of silver coin and bullion, and to a lesser extent other forms of treasure, for the march to Constantinople and thence to the Latin East.36 Whilst cash may well have been in circulation during the advance to Constantinople, we do not actually know if the crusaders did manage to secure and transport the requisite amount of cash to Constantinople to sustain themselves and any dependants. Many must have done so, but we are unable to say whether they were the majority or not.37

Provisions could be acquired by a variety of means and sources, and depended upon a number of factors. In hostile territory, supply lines or a system of magazines would not suffice or survive, and armies were theoretically supplied by baggage train, but predominantly by troops seizing victuals from the land they passed through.38 Whilst often unavoidable, this latter form of provisioning in friendly territory was rarely tolerated or permitted. Other forms of obtaining supplies in non-hostile territory were required.

Supplying non-hostile and friendly troops via markets or along supply lines was a function of Byzantine fortified towns and seaports.39 The armies of the First Crusade were predominately provisioned by these means.40 There is plenty of evidence to demonstrate that this was the known intended means by which the Second Crusade was to be supplied in the non-hostile territory through the Balkans, and at Constantinople and in Anatolia. Hence, for example, Bernard of Clairvaux’s attempts to attract merchants to the crusade;41 evidence of such men and money exchangers in Louis’ army at Worms;42 Louis’ requests to the Germans and Hungarians for market privileges as his army passed through their lands;43 Manuel

37 This requires a separate study although the financing of the crusade will be addressed in Phillips, Extending the Frontiers.
39 Angeliki E. Laiou is the leading historian in this specific field. For a specific study with reference to the crusades see, ‘Byzantine Trade with Christians and Muslims and the Crusades’, in Laiou & Mottahehedeh, The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium, pp.157-78.
40 Laiou, ‘Byzantine Trade’, p.163.
42 Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, p.22.
43 Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, p.10
Komnenos’ letters to Louis and Pope Eugenius III, which promised amongst other things, the provisions of victuals in return for payment;\textsuperscript{44} and Manuel’s instructions for the provision of markets as the crusaders passed through imperial territory.\textsuperscript{45}

We therefore know how the army was to be provisioned, but as John France has rightly pointed out, to appreciate the methods of supply, we must understand the consequences of medieval governmental authority on logistical arrangements. Many monarchs may have enjoyed the prestige of kingship, but they could rarely command the powerful nobles, as duchies, counties and principalities were often separate polities. This individualistic notion of medieval leadership affected the logistical arrangements of the armies on the Second Crusade. No authority was in charge of overall supply; in other words, the crusaders provided for themselves. France suggests that the powerful may have made some provision for those immediately outside their own 	extit{mouvance}, but this was a matter of charity, and not logistical policy.\textsuperscript{46}

The logistical limitations imposed by the basic nature of medieval agrarian society must also be appreciated. Except for the very largest of cities and ports, towns received most, if not all their provisions from their immediate hinterland. The nature of the slow, unreliable and expensive rudimentary medieval communication network ensured it was ordinarily prohibitive to be provisioned otherwise. Although often impossible to quantify, the fertility or more specifically, the amount of agriculturally productive land surrounding a site was crudely proportional to the population of the town and its hinterland.\textsuperscript{47} It was a reciprocal process. A town with a population of 5000 inhabitants survived because the hinterland had been cultivated to accommodate and supply that number. In turn, the population of the town provided the appropriate demand for urban market produce, a farmed surplus to support a population of 5000. In an era with limited food preservation techniques, stores held only what was required to be sown for the next harvest (with perhaps an emergency surplus in case that harvest failed), and the appropriate amount of victuals needed to feed the population until that time.

Even with advance notice, when an army of unknowable size (which in the case of Conrad’s army might initially have numbered ten thousand or so) camped outside the walls of such towns and cities, expecting and demanding a suitable market, a town’s leaders, merchants and victuallers were faced with an often impossible task of providing an adequate

\textsuperscript{44} Manuel’s letters addressed to Eugenius and Louis were written in response to correspondence delivered some time in 1146. Whilst Louis’ and Eugenius’ letters are lost, Manuel’s letters nevertheless give some idea of their content. ‘Epistola Manuelis ad Ludovicum’, pp.9-10; ‘Epistola Manuelis ad Eugenium’, pp.440-1.
\textsuperscript{45} Niketas Choniates, 	extit{Historia}, p.81; Niketas Choniates, 	extit{O City of Byzantium}, p.36; Helmold of Bosau, ‘Chronica Slavorum’, pp. 115-16.
\textsuperscript{46} France, ‘Logistics’, pp.77-93.
\textsuperscript{47} This presumes that any state taxes in kind were collected and then sold locally.
The town’s stores, even immediately post harvest, simply did not have the surplus capacity to supply an army which had a population greater than the town itself. One thing is certain: there would be competition for the scarce resources.

The sources which specifically elucidate the progress of Conrad’s army through Europe do not largely concern themselves with logistical considerations. However, Odo of Deuil, who accompanied Louis VII travelling in the wake of Conrad’s army along much of the same route to Constantinople, was very much interested in logistical matters. Via analogy, we may apply the relevant evidence Odo provides to the circumstances of Conrad’s army. It was after all Odo’s avowed intention to record logistical considerations for fellow travellers to the Holy Land.

The competition for victuals and the contemporary notion of catering only for one’s own can be seen in Odo’s account of the French army’s provisioning problems at Worms, 29 June 1147. A disturbance broke out between the inhabitants and unknown pilgrims (peregrini), who were purchasing supplies. Whilst Odo blamed this on ‘the foolish arrogance of our people’ (nostri populi stultam superbiam), the disturbance arose from the competition for scarce, and thus expensive provisions. It was the poor (pauperes) pilgrims who called for an attack on Worms, although after peace was restored, Odo notes that the town’s victuallers once more ‘furnished us with supplies’ (necessaria ministrantur). But why were the poor elements of the army disgruntled with the victuallers at Worms? In Odo’s words, ‘Thus far, an unpleasant foreboding was being suffered by the people. It was experienced here first. Thereafter many of the mob separated from us by way of the Alps since everything was being bought at too high a price under pressure from a large number of people.’

Provisions were excessively and perhaps prohibitively expensive; there was simply too much competition. Many from the mob evidently considered it expedient to travel to Constantinople via a different route to Louis to ensure supplies could be obtained at reasonable prices. This was not the case at Worms. Odo, King Louis, and presumably the other noble elements were provisioned adequately; as Odo states, the victuallers ‘furnished us with supplies’. Here we

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48 Logistical modelling which would confirm the above is in its infancy. The current situation and the future directions that logistical modelling may take are addressed in Haldon, J., ed., *General Issues in the Study of Medieval Logistics: Sources, Problems and Methodologies* (Leiden, 2005). A number of recent studies have calculated the amount of provisions required for forces of different sizes, and in doing so, they demonstrate the severe logistical strain which must have been imposed on towns and cities. See Pryor, *Logistics of Warfare*, chapters 1, 2, 3, 8, 11.

49 Odo of Deuil, *De Profectione*, pp.28-30. Also see Berry’s introduction in *De Profectione*, pp.xvii-iii.

50 This was echoed in the sources for the First Crusade where demands for fair prices and goods ‘in fair weight and measure’ (in pondere et mensura aequitatis) were frequent. See, for example, Albert of Aachen (Aix), ‘Historia Hierosolymitanæ Expeditionæ’, R. H. C. Oe. 4 (Paris, 1879, repr. Franborough, 1967), pp.265-713, especially p.300.

51 ‘Hucusque de populo malum praesagium habebatur; hic primo expertum est. Exinde multæ de turba se per Alpes a nobis separaverunt, quia omnia praed multitudine carius emebantur’. Odo of Deuil, *De Profectione*, pp.22-4.
must follow Odo’s lead and distinguish between the king and the baronial contingents, and the poor pilgrims and soldiers. The ‘mob’ is not included in the ‘us’ with whom Odo includes himself. Odo was a member of the ruling elite; in these instances, he would consider the poor pilgrims and foot soldiers separate entities entirely. It is clear that at Worms, the powerful and wealthy obtained satisfactory provisions. We can only assume that the multitude obtained what provisions they could.

On the next occasion Odo provides details of the crusaders’ logistical activities, he again refers to those with the ability to acquire provisions satisfactorily. At Regensburg, a fleet ‘conveyed our baggage’ (sarcinas nostras…deportarunt) down the Danube. Some crusaders placed two and four wheeled carts on to the ships to convey them and their baggage as far as Bulgaria and the Byzantine border, and Odo explains that the carts were loaded with provisions to ensure the crusaders would have sufficient provisions for the advance through the Bulgarian wastelands.\textsuperscript{52} Cash and authority were certainly needed to obtain surplus provisions and space on board ship. When Conrad’s army preceded Louis from Regensburg via ship along the Danube to the Byzantine fortress of Brandiz (modern Braničevo) on the Bulgarian border, Conrad and presumably others with wealth and status boarded ships, whilst the ‘crowd’ (populum) advanced along the shore.\textsuperscript{53} This also appears to have been the arrangement during the advance along a similar route on the Third Crusade,\textsuperscript{54} and we may infer that it holds for Louis’ expedition. The poorer pilgrims and soldiers evidently had neither the money nor the authority to ensure they could convey provisions by ship to Bulgaria.

When considering the logistical arrangements of the crusaders, we should therefore bear in mind that a force was not a united entity administered and controlled by a central authority. Given the availability of supplies, the powerful catered for their mouvance and the rest presumably managed as best as they could. When Odo refers to logistical arrangements, he is speaking of the arrangements made by the noble contingents which made up the main fighting force, not the poor pilgrims. Hence, he states that provisions could and should be purchased at the towns en route to the Hungarian border, as the dividing land between the towns could not furnish a military force (exercitus) with supplies. When he writes that non-

\textsuperscript{52} Odo of Deuil, \textit{De Profectione}, p.24. We can assume the crusaders had brought their baggage on these carts from their home territories with perhaps the majority of their draft animals. We do not know if the mules or horses required to pull the carts walked alongside the Danube or were placed on the boats.

\textsuperscript{53} Odo of Deuil, \textit{De Profectione}, p.34.

Byzantine regions ‘sold us what we needed in sufficient quantities’ (necessaria competenter vendiderunt), he is referring to the princely retinues.55

Given Odo’s description of the landscape he witnessed en route to Hungary as wooded with a wealth of streams, springs and meadows, the poor could have foraged or stolen for some sustenance, even if the landscape was largely uncultivated. Odo’s and Otto of Freising’s similar descriptions of the Hungarian countryside suggest some sustenance could have been gained by foraging and plunder as the army advanced towards Bulgaria and Byzantine imperial territory.56

Foraging and various levels of sanctioned or unsanctioned plunder were predictable natural occurrences during the advance of a medieval army. One has only to look at the advance of the different armies of the First and Third Crusades en route to Constantinople to appreciate this.57 Greedy and violent men undoubtedly plundered gratuitously, but such incidents were ordinarily underpinned by much more than the desire for material wealth: logistical necessities had to be seized by force in the absence of suitable market infrastructures.58

The scale of plundering during the Second Crusade is impossible to quantify, as is the number of crusaders who advanced from Europe, although it is evident that many thousands marched with their animals. Given the nature of medieval agrarian society and the crusaders’ provisioning arrangements, the advance would inevitably have caused a severe logistical strain not only to the towns and cities they encountered, but also to the crusaders themselves.

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55 He may also be preparing the reader for the opposite scenario in the ‘perjurous’ Greek lands. Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, pp.30, 40.
57 France, Victory, chapter 4; Glasheen, C., ‘Provisioning the Hermit: from Cologne to Constantinople, 1096’, in Logistics of Warfare, pp.119-29; Eickhoff, Kreuzzug, p.57.
58 John Pryor has recently pointed out that the crusaders’ silver coins and bullion may have been of little use to Byzantine market producers and merchants given that their currency was essentially based on gold. He has reasonably asked whether this would have been a disincentive to sell provisions to the crusaders. Although there is plenty of evidence for both markets and money exchangers, who must have been dealing with the crusaders’ silver, Pryor nonetheless makes a valid observation. It would suggest that on occasion crusaders may not have been able to obtain provisions peacefully even if they ordinarily had the wealth to do so. Pryor, J., ‘Digest’, in Logistics of Warfare, pp.275-92. For the silver coin and bullion carried by the crusaders see, Murray, ‘Money and Logistics’, pp.232-4; Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, pp.40, 66, 72-6, 97, 132-4.
6. The Advance to Constantinople

The Advance to the Byzantine Border

A heterogeneous group mainly comprised of Franconians, Bavarians and Swabians set out from Nuremberg with Conrad in the middle of May 1147. Later that month the army gathered at Regensburg where Conrad and presumably many other nobles with their retinues embarked upon ships to descend the River Danube. The horses and the other crusaders, whom Odo described as the ‘crowd’ (populum), marched south. Around the same time Conrad entered into negotiations for a truce with King Géza II of Hungary to facilitate the peaceful passage of the crusaders through his territory and for the provision of markets. The negotiations continued as the crusaders progressed to Ardacker, which Conrad reached 29 May, and thence to Vienna where Conrad was joined by further crusaders. It is traditionally held that Géza paid tribute to Conrad to ensure that the crusaders passed peacefully through the Hungarian realm, although more recently historians have suggested that Conrad was bribed by Géza not to assist the Hungarian pretender Boris, in his claims to the Hungarian throne. Eitherway, Conrad’s advance was peaceful and the army subsequently reached Brandiz on the Bulgarian, that is, the Byzantine border around July 20, accompanied by a number of Hungarian crusaders.

At this point, the crusaders who had accompanied Conrad from Nuremberg had been marching for approximately two months. It is unclear how long the other disparate groups which joined the main army en route to Brandiz had been in transit. The physical condition of the army is unknown. The effort involved in marching for two months would have physically affected those who arrived at Brandiz; perhaps many of those without the facility to ride mounts were fatigued.

There is evidence to suggest that many of the crusaders may have been undernourished even at this relatively early juncture. We have seen that at Worms provisions were scarce and

3 German forces had been at war with King Géza a year earlier. See Otto of Freising, Gesta Frederici, pp.190-2, 196-8.
expensive for the French crusaders. According to Odo, some even considered it expedient to detach themselves from Louis’ force the better to obtain sustenance. Gerhoh of Rechersburg noted that markets could not adequately provision the Germans. Gerhoh also makes it clear that pilgrims followed the example of many of the first crusaders and depended upon God’s providence for sustenance. Lacking carts and horses to convey provisions, and ‘having too little, or no gold and silver’, they embarked on crusade ‘trusting in such holy work…and [hoping] that provisions would be bestowed [on them] by God.’ It is reasonable to suggest that charity and foraging provided some sustenance. However, as during the First Crusade, wealth was required to obtain necessities peacefully, and fifty years earlier many of the poor had died through malnutrition and disease before reaching Constantinople. Others, presumably because they did not have the means to pillage the land they passed through, simply deserted.

The extant sources for Conrad’s crusade do not specifically state the crusaders met with provisioning problems before reaching Byzantine territory, or encountered associated disturbances such as those at Worms. It is tempting to surmise that the army’s advance thus far was peaceful, although this impression may simply be an accident of textual production or survival. During the advance of both the ‘People’s Crusade’ in 1096, and Frederick Barbarossa’s crusade in 1189 along a similar route traversed by Conrad III, disturbances were frequent. For example, the crusaders in 1189 caused disturbances at Mauthausen when the inhabitants demanded a toll, and there was friction between the crusaders and inhabitants of Hungary over market provisions, even though the sources suggest supplies were plentiful. Fighting erupted in 1096 between the crusaders and the inhabitants of the Hungarian towns near the Byzantine frontier, and on another occasion, Hungarians massacred a large number because they had been pillaging.

When King Louis’ army reached Brandiz near the Bulgarian, that is, the Byzantine frontier, we know that at least Odo and those around him obtained supplies for the initial advance through the Bulgarian wastelands, even though Odo complains of a poor rate of

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8 Gerhoh of Rechersburg, ‘De Investigatione’, pp.374-5.
10 France, *Victory*, p.103.
11 There were, however, violent atrocities committed against the Rhineland Jews after the evangelist preacher Radulf had called upon the crusaders to ‘Avenge the crucified one upon his enemies who stand before you; then go to war against the Muslims’. See Tyerman, *God’s War*, pp.282-6.
monetary exchange.\textsuperscript{15} It is plausible to conclude that the richer and more powerful amongst Conrad’s force would have acquired satisfactory provisions at a poor rate of exchange at Brandiz.

No source mentions how those who may not have had the means to purchase supplies provisioned themselves for the journey through the inhabitable regions of Bulgaria. We do not even have to accept Gerhoh of Reichersberg’s statement that the poor left home with little or no money to realise that as many of the poorer crusaders entered Byzantine territory at Brandiz, they would not have had the means to purchase provisions. They must have been dependent upon foraging, charity, and for those who had the arms to do so, plundering the inhabitants wherever possible.\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{The Advance Through Byzantine Territory}

Manuel Komnenos was clearly considering the often-logistical necessity to pillage the land when he demanded oaths from the advancing German crusaders. Very little is known of the negotiations between the Germans and Manuel to facilitate the passage of the crusade through Byzantine territory. John Kinnamos merely states that on the border of Hungary in June 1147, Byzantine envoys required the German princes to swear an oath to pass peacefully through the imperial domain, and in return, they would receive Byzantine hospitality.\textsuperscript{17} Niketas Choniates refers to German envoys in Constantinople requesting a safe passage through imperial territory and the provision of markets. He writes that Manuel praised their pious intentions, and gave instructions for the preparation of the passage of the crusade and the provision of markets if they passed through the empire, adding that all the crusaders were required to do in return was to swear an oath that their passage would be God-loving and peaceful.\textsuperscript{18} All we can confidently conclude from these known negotiations is that Manuel promised markets in return for an assurance that the crusaders would pass peacefully through imperial territory, and that this was confirmed by oath by the leaders of the crusade.

It is well known, however, that the army’s advance was not peaceful. The conventional notion that the German army was in some way unusually indisposed and bellicose stems from Bernard Kugler and is dependent upon the texts of Odo of Deuil, John Kinnamos and

\textsuperscript{15} Odo of Deuil, \textit{De Profectione}, p.40. This may have been a false perception rather than reality. Although some crusaders carried gold, western European currency was based on silver coin, whereas Byzantine currency was in gold for high denominations and coins of very low silver content, and others of billon and copper for lower denominations. Perhaps the crusaders believed they received a poor rate of exchange when they received such unfamiliar coins in exchange for their silver coins. Compare with Murray, ‘Money and Logistics’, p.242.
\textsuperscript{16} Gerhoh of Reichersberg, \textit{De Investigatione}, pp.374-5.
\textsuperscript{18} Niketas Choniates, \textit{Historia}, p.81; Niketas Choniates, \textit{O City of Byzantium}, p.36.
Niketas Choniates. Kugler reads these texts uncritically and does not consider the passage of other crusades for comparative purposes. It is not surprising he concluded that the Germans were unusually indisciplined, the only conclusion an uncritical reading of the sources could reach. A literal reading of the two verse encomia composed by ‘Manganeios Prodromos’ and unknown to Kugler, would also support such a conclusion.

German disorder in imperial territory is not evident immediately. At Naissos (modern Niš) and Sardika (modern Sofia), we are told by John Kinnamos the crusaders were met by Byzantine representatives who ensured they received adequate provisions. This was in line with Manuel Komnenos’ instructions that the towns on the crusaders’ route provide markets. Conrad states in a letter to his regent, the Abbot Wibald of Corvey and Stavelot, that he was well received in imperial territory, thereby suggesting the advance was peaceful at this point, although this may not have been the case throughout the length of the marching column. If the orations of ‘Manganeios Prodromos’ are representative of the encomia produced at this time, there certainly does not appear to have been any incident which would facilitate the propagandistic aims and associated rhetorical techniques of the encomiast. Indeed, Niketas Choniates states that nothing noteworthy occurred. This was because the army had advanced thus far through largely inaccessible rugged country, and there was no opportunity for injurious acts to be committed against the Byzantines. But it is worth noting that the French army suffered from the raids of the native inhabitants in this largely unsettled mountainous region, as did the army of Frederick Barbarossa. Moreover, there were disturbances during the First Crusade at Naissos.

Odo of Deuil relates that after the crusaders had passed through largely deserted territory (which probably refers to the rugged country up to Sardika mentioned by Kinnamos), the land was well populated and fertile all the way to Constantinople. As the German crusade advanced through this landscape we begin to hear of disorder. According to Kinnamos, the ‘barbarians’ began to seize market provisions without payment, and put to the sword those who resisted. King Conrad was apparently heedless of what was happening, that is, he either paid no attention to those who advised him of the pillaging, or else ‘ascribed it to the

19 Kugler, Studien, pp.119-32.
20 Ioannes Cinnamus, Rerum, pp.69-71; John Kinnamos, Deeds, p.60.
21 Niketas Choniates, Historia, p.81; Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, p.36. Also see ‘Epistola Manuelis ad Ladovicum’, pp.9-10; ‘Epistola Manuelis ad Eugenium’, pp.440-1.
22 Conrad III, Die Urkunden, p.353.
23 Niketas Choniates, Historia, p.81; Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, p.36.
24 Ioannes Cinnamus, Rerum, p.70; John Kinnamos, Deeds, p.61.
26 Eickhoff, Kreuzzug, p.60.
28 Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, pp.24, 30-2, 40.
wantonness of the multitude’, a phrase which indicates that Kinnamos is anticipating the contents of a letter hypothetically written by Conrad to the Byzantine emperor, which the historian records later in his chronicle.  

Odo of Deuil supports the evidence for German acts of pillaging. Perhaps in an attempt to inflate perceived Greek treachery, Odo writes that he, King Louis and those around them received adequate supplies until they reached Byzantine territory. Immediately after this assertion, he complains that the French army were subsequently offered market provisions only via ropes suspended from Byzantine town walls. Odo’s observations on this arrangement reveal his approach in the *De Profectione*. Odo realised that the inhabitants may have elected to sell their provisions in such a manner through fear of a repetition of similar episodes of German plundering, as described by John Kinnamos, but this did not stop Odo’s allegations of Greek perfidy. Looking ahead to episodes of perceived treachery, he writes that this was the first time that ‘injustices began to take place and be noticed’, because Manuel Komnenos had promised suitable markets in the Byzantine provinces, yet the towns failed to meet his assurances. Thus, at the same time as Odo recognised that the pillaging activities of crusaders may have caused the Byzantines to sell their wares behind closed gates, he still states this was a perjurous wrong committed by the Byzantines; they had promised suitable markets, but had failed to deliver.

This perceived contravention then allows Odo to excuse French plundering. He argues that because the Byzantines could not provision the French army adequately, the crusaders were compelled to ‘plunder and pillage’ (*praedis et rapinis*) to ‘search out and collect the things they needed’ (*necessaria conquirebant*).  

Immediately after this statement Odo suggests that many people believed the towns were compelled to sell provisions in the described manner through fear of the type of pillaging which had previously been committed by the preceding German army. The combined evidence of Odo and Kinnamos attests that the Germans did commit acts of pillage in Byzantine territory en route to Constantinople, and Odo is likely to be correct in assuming that it was for this reason the Greek agricultural producers and merchants took measures to protect themselves behind their town walls when selling the crusaders their market wares. We

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30 Niketas Choniates stated the German crusaders were provisioned in this manner in Anatolia before they advanced towards Ikonion. However, it is very likely that Choniates is confusing the means by which the Germans were provisioned in Anatolia, with the means by which the crusaders were supplied in the Balkans. See Roche, ‘Niketas Choniates’ (forthcoming, 2007).
must remember that Louis’ army followed in the wake of Conrad’s force, and this would have been the second occasion in quick succession that an army of many thousands had encamped outside the walls of towns and cities expecting a suitable market. Surplus provisions would have been exceptionally scarce, and crusaders would have been compelled to seize the provisions forcefully from those outside the town walls.

Odo’s over-simple approach to explicating the French logistical problems and violence in non-hostile territory, however, rarely permits him to advance a comprehensive rational justification for the actions of the non-French encountered on crusade. He does not suggest, for example, that competition for scarce provisions may have flared up into French violence (as it did at Worms) and acts of pillaging, and that this is why the Greeks took refuge from the French behind their town walls; he is keen instead to impress that Greek duplicity explains Greek behaviour. He therefore stresses that the French committed justified acts of pillaging.

Odo then bolsters his argument by adding that some people believed the plundering activities of the preceding Germans compelled the Byzantines to sell their wares from behind the safety of locked gates. Tellingly, he is unwilling to offer a rationale for why the Germans may have been obliged to pillage. Soldiers may have plundered for mere greed, but in the absence of satisfactory markets, this was the predominant way pre-modern armies were provisioned. Odo clearly demonstrates that he was aware of this necessity. However, since he does not offer this explanation for why the Germans may have been compelled to plunder, he leaves his audience with the impression that the Germans were merely wanton pillagers. In the *De Profectione*, German boorishness is offered as an explanation for a great deal of German behaviour. It should be noted that even John Kinnamos, whose anti-Latin views are well known, associates the German violence with procuring provisions.34

**Philippopolis**

The *De Profectione* gives the impression that Odo is keen to emphasise acts of non-French disorder during the advance towards the Byzantine capital. For example, he goes into detail concerning the violence that erupted at Philippopolis (modern Plovdiv), which witnessed the German crusaders burning settlements outside the town walls. We have only Odo’s testimony that this was instigated due to a foolish misunderstanding by angry drunken crusaders, who presumed that a snake charmer entertaining in a tavern planned to poison them.35 It is

instructive to compare Odo’s account of the episode at Worms (which was discussed above)\textsuperscript{36} with his lengthy description of the violence at Philippopolis. At Worms, he brushes over the disorder perpetrated by French crusaders.\textsuperscript{37} There is no need for Odo to locate a minor incident sparked off by a handful of drunken crusaders from a host of many thousands to explain why violence erupted at Worms, for he was fully aware that the crusaders might have caused the disturbance when violently securing scarce provisions. The Germans are not allowed a rational explanation for their apparent actions, and even if Odo included this tale simply for dramatic effect, we are left with the impression that senseless vandals perpetrated the violence at Philippopolis.

The disorder does not appear to have provided contemporary encomiasts with enough material for them to apply the full gamut of stereotypical anti-Latin rhetorical disdain for imperial propaganda. If it was widely believed that the disruption was owing simply to the aggressive idiocy of western Europeans, it is likely there would be an echo of it in contemporary verse encomia, and perhaps accordingly, the later histories. As we will see, the encomiasts, as represented by ‘Manganeios Prodromos’, and the Greek historians, particularly John Kinnamos, take every opportunity to disparage the perceived objectionable traits of the Latin barbarian, which include the notion that they were inherently violent and stupid. Instead, ‘Manganeios Prodromos’, who portrays the crusader army as a hostile force bent on conquering Byzantine territory, simply takes the opportunity provided by the clash to deride a ‘proud’, ‘arrogant’, ‘boastful’ King Conrad, who lacked ‘calculation’ and was too ‘confident in his weight of numbers’. Because of stereotypical Latin arrogance, which led the crusaders to discount any threat from the native Byzantines, the inhabitants of Philippopolis apparently worsted the crusaders. The crusader defeat evoked an encomiastic theme which played on the emperor’s name, that is, the emperor’s eponymic comparison with Christ Emmanuel. The comparison was employed to legitimise the pious emperor’s unexpected, yet divine succession to the imperial throne.\textsuperscript{38} Accordingly, God, Manuel ‘named for Christ, but for one syllable’ and his Byzantine troops brought down ‘the pride of the haughty’ and ‘unexpectedly broke his [Conrad’s] boldness’.\textsuperscript{39} Unlike Odo’s depiction of mass German disorder, ‘Manganeios’ does not portray the incident as a major disturbance, or put another way, news of a major disturbance does not appear to have reached our Greek authors in Constantinople. We find no echo of it in John Kinnamos. Even Niketas Choniates, who like Kinnamos, is known for his anti-Latin sentiments, gives no impression that the disorder was

\textsuperscript{36}See above pp.44-5.
\textsuperscript{37}Odo of Deuil, \textit{De Profectione}, pp.22-3.
\textsuperscript{38}On this see Magdalino, \textit{Empire}, pp.434, 449.
\textsuperscript{39}‘Manganeios Prodromos’, poem 20, pp.6-8.
of the magnitude portrayed by Odo. He suggests whilst lacing his narrative with allusions to Homeric verse and other encomiastic themes that the perpetrated violence at Philippopolis was associated with the forceful seizure of provisions.\footnote{Niketas Choniates, \textit{Historia}, pp.83-4; Niketas Choniates, \textit{O City of Byzantium}, p.37; Magdalino, \textit{Empire}, p.431.}

It can be contended that the differences between Odo’s relatively brusque treatment of French disorder at Worms, his lengthy representation of the violence at Philippopolis, and the brief depiction given in the Greek texts of the trouble at the latter town are symptomatic of Odo’s approach. In seeking to explain the French logistical problems and subsequent French disorder in Byzantine territory, Odo appears to manipulate the data to facilitate his agenda. He is keen to stress, if not exaggerate, German disorder by dwelling on German indiscipline. Our Greek sources certainly do not suggest evidence of a major disturbance at Philippopolis reached Constantinople, and if we believe Niketas Choniates, the unrest was caused by crusaders forcefully seizing provisions, not drunken acts of stupidity.

**Philippopolis to Adrianople**

There is further evidence of Odo’s approach. Immediately after his tale of drunken German folly at Philippopolis, Odo continues his narrative, stating that the ‘Germans were unbearable even to our men’ (\textit{Nostris etiam erant importabiles Alemanni}) at some unspecified location apparently beyond Philippopolis. He describes a clash over obtaining market provisions between Germans and a number of French crusaders, who had advanced ahead of the French king. It would be reasonable to assume the clash occurred at the market owing to the competition to procure scarce provisions. Odo does not offer any explanation. Indeed, he does not need to offer an explanation. The fact that the Germans are unbearable provides him and his audience with a rationale, and a further timely example of gratuitous German indiscipline.\footnote{Odo of Deuil, \textit{De Profectione}, pp.42-4.}

‘Thus’, he writes, ‘the Germans disturbed everything as they preceded, and the Greeks for that reason began to run away from our peaceful king, who was following close after’. He writes that nonetheless Louis obtained provisions through the assistance of a leading Byzantine representative who travelled with the king. Odo then provides evidence of the individualistic manner of the crusaders’ logistical arrangements. He states that Louis would share his provisions with some of the rich and the poor. Odo tells us those around the king subsequently advanced in peace because he was less needy than others. ‘But many armed groups used to precede and follow him, searching out a good supply [of things] for
themselves, either from a market if they were able [to do so], or from acts of pillage, because they were able [to do] this'.

Odo maintains that the Byzantines were not inclined or able to provide markets for the entire army because of the previous self-seeking behaviour of the German crusaders. He confirms that individual contingents of French crusaders, like the contingents of any other pre-modern army, plundered if they were not able to obtain adequate market provisions. Whilst Odo does not reproach the Greeks here for offering inadequate markets, neither does he offer an explanation for their failure beyond his apparent innate prejudice: the self-regarding Germans ‘disturbed everything as they preceded’, and thus, the Greeks could not provide suitable markets because they fled in fear from the French crusaders. He does not allow that the Greeks would have an unachievable task in trying to provision the second of two large armies encamped outside their gates, or that the preceding Germans may have been compelled to plunder for exactly the same reasons as the French.

At some point, probably before the army reached Adrianople (modern Edirne), the next major centre of habitation en route to Constantinople, a Byzantine force under the command of a certain Prosouch was charged with shadowing the crusader army and keeping the soldiers to the main path, thus curtailing their foraging and plundering activities. It appears that similar Byzantine forces were charged with the same responsibilities during the First and Third Crusades. According to Kinnamos, Prosouch followed the crusaders ‘restraining the multitude’s disorderly sallies’ for food, and many suffered badly from hunger as they advanced through the Balkans. The exertions of the march, the policing action of Prosouch and, no doubt, the stiff competition for scarce provisions were clearly affecting the physical condition of the crusaders as they advanced towards Constantinople.

Adrianople
The Greek sources next tell us of an incident which is absent from our Latin texts. We hear of the murder of King Conrad’s relative, who was recuperating from illness in a monastery near

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42 ‘Sic Alemani praecedentes omnia perturbant, et ideo Graeci subsequenter nostrum pacificum fugiebant... multae vero illum praecedebant acies et sequebantur, vel de foro si poterant, vel de praedis quia hoc poterant sibi abundantiam conquirentes’. Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, p.44.
43 Choniates states that the crusaders and the Byzantine force met before Philippopolis, whilst Kinnamos suggests it was as the crusaders reached Adrianople. The fact that both Odo of Deuil and ‘Manganeios Prodromos’ relate that the crusaders clashed with the inhabitants of Philippopolis, rather than with a force sent to shadow their movements, suggests that Kinnamos is the more accurate of the two Greek historians on this matter. Niketas Choniates, Historia, p.81; Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, p.36; Ioannes Cinnamus, Rerum, p.70; John Kinnamos, Deeds, p.61; Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, pp.40-2; ‘Manganeios Prodromos’, 20.89.
44 Glasheen, ‘Provisioning the Hermit’, pp.119-29; Eickhoff, Kreuzzug, p.69.
Adrianople, by what Choniates calls ‘ruthless’ Romans, and Kinnamos designates as ‘foot soldiers’. As a consequence of the murder, Conrad’s nephew, Frederick of Swabia, ‘an ungovernable warlike man’ according to Kinnamos, and ‘a warlike man by nature…seething with rage’ according to Choniates, appears to have turned back from the advance towards Constantinople to seek revenge. Frederick subsequently set fire to the monastery where his fellow crusader had perished and killed the supposed perpetrators. Consequently, Kinnamos states Prosouch ‘made great slaughter of the barbarians’ and from then on the ‘Germans abandoned their prior boasting, having been taught the Romans’ might.

The supposed martial prowess of Byzantine troops, or rather, the ‘Romans’ might’, and by extension, that of the emperor Manuel Komnenos, is a familiar theme of the encomiasts which was maintained throughout Manuel’s reign. The encomiast ‘Manganeios Prodromos’ writes that ‘the corpses lying slaughtered nearby, made him [Conrad] understand, too late, that he would be joining battle with men of great exploits’. Such men were ‘supported by the breaker of boldness, God’s own arm, his son and Word, supporting their arms by his strength’.

Niketas Choniates merely states there was some conflict and suggests that Frederick of Swabia returned to Adrianople to seek vengeance. This may be an instance where Choniates seeks to contradict imperial propaganda and the concomitant image of the emperor both represented in verse encomia. He might have chosen to omit the apparent Byzantine success against the crusaders, and preferred to stress the apparent ‘sinful’ acts of Byzantines against those Latin barbarians who appeared to Choniates at the beginning of the thirteenth century to have received God’s favour to the detriment of the Greeks. Choniates is known to have admired Frederick of Swabia, better known to history as Frederick Barbarossa, and here the Greek historian certainly attempts to offer a reason for Frederick’s actions beyond attributing them to the stereotypical traits of the Latin barbarian as usually expressed in contemporary Greek rhetoric. To Choniates, ‘ruthless’ Romans murdered a sick man in a monastery, and accordingly, the nobleman Barbarossa returned to avenge his death.

47 The Byzantines professed to be Rhomaioi, that is, descendents of Romans.
48 Niketas Choniates, Historia, p.84; Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, p.37; Ioannes Cinnamus, Rerum, p.71; John Kinnamos, Deeds, p.61.
50 Niketas Choniates, Historia, p.85; Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, p.37.
51 Ioannes Cinnamus, Rerum, pp.71-2; John Kinnamos, Deeds, p.61.
52 Compare with Magdalino, Empire, p.467.
54 Compare with Magdalino, Empire, pp.478-83.
55 On Choniates’ perception of divine providence, see Magdalino, Empire, pp.14-5, 18-20.
56 Magdalino, Empire, pp.13-14.
Conversely, it is implicit in Kinnamos and ‘Manganeios’ that the barbarian Barbarossa is worsted by the Byzantines because, regardless of what Choniates might have thought, they are both martially and spiritually superior to the indisciplined, arrogant crusaders. Should we follow Bernard Kugler and accept a literal reading of the Greek texts, and therefore their implicit evidence of excessive German disorder successfully counted by Byzantine military discipline? It should be noted that the Greek perception of the Latin West, and the rhetorical *topoi* employed to both describe and explain occurrences ensure that clashes between the ‘barbarians’ and ‘Romans are unlikely to be portrayed in any other manner. We should not necessarily expect the panegyrist ‘Manganeios Prodromos’ to offer the modern scholar rational explanations for why Barbarossa returned to Adrianople, or indeed why he was seemingly worsted. John Kinnamos likewise had no need to offer an explanation: the Byzantine reader understood that Barbarossa was an undisciplined belligerent barbarian, and that as such, his actions were only to be expected.

It is worth repeating that this incident, which was discussed at length in the Greek texts, does not appear in any of the Latin sources. The Latin texts admittedly provide little detail of this part of the crusaders’ advance. The flash-flood on the plain of Choirobacchoi (near modern Bahşayiş in Thrace), however, received considerable attention in a number of excellent Latin sources. This suggests that, unlike the flash-flood, the confrontation at Adrianople was not considered a significant incident worthy of recording or repeating by the Latin sources.

On the other hand, the fact that the incident did receive attention in the Greek texts demonstrates that news of it reached the Byzantine capital. The repetition in the later histories of a dramatic event which would be worthy of encomiastic attention may be a reflection of lost encomia produced at that time, and accessible as sources of evidence to Kinnamos and Choniates. Encomiasts used a process of rhetorical amplification to magnify the significance of events and occurrences the better to reflect the achievements of those being eulogised. The disturbance at Adrianople possibly provided the encomiasts with dramatic material to enable them to weave a suitable panegyric which would exaggerate events to inflate the skill and expertise of Manuel and his generals in defeating the barbarians.

We do not know if the Greek historians actually did utilise contemporary encomia as sources for their portrayal of events at Adrianople, although there are certainly echoes of the

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59 Compare with Magdalino, *Empire*, p.421.
encomiastic tradition in Kinnamos’ narrative. But if Kinnamos and Choniates did use encomia as sources for interpreting this event, they would understandably have perceived it as a significant occurrence if the encomiasts had employed a process of rhetorical amplification to magnify the Byzantines’ success in defeating the intrinsically violent Barbarossa.

Caution must be exercised before accepting Greek portrayals of crusader activities which might be subject to encomiastic exaggeration but are absent in our Latin texts. Moreover, the crusaders are almost inevitably depicted as bellicose, supercilious barbarians, which manifestly could distort the Greek sources. A case in point is Kinnamos’ statement that even after Barbarossa’s defeat near Adrianople, the crusaders were no less ‘arrogant’ when they appear to have wantonly slaughtered cattle and the farmers who resisted them.\(^{60}\) This incident is interesting because the narrative shows how Byzantine rhetoric can conceal fundamental realities regarding the passage of large medieval armies. We know it was often imperative for an army to live off the land they traversed (and Byzantine armies were no exception\(^{61}\), but Kinnamos ascribes the crusaders’ pillaging here to the Latins’ stereotypical traits.

**Adrianople to Choirobacchoi**

Sometime after the crusaders had advanced from Adrianople, a Byzantine representative by the name of Andronicos Opos was sent by Manuel Komnenos to remind Conrad of his oath, and to advise the German army to advance into Asia Minor via the ferry crossing at Abydos (modern Çanakkale). At a council convened to discuss the emperor’s proposal, it was agreed between the princes to continue on the road to Constantinople.\(^{62}\) According to Kinnamos, Manuel then dispatched a certain Basil Tzikandyles to reinforce Prosouch with instructions to engage the advancing Germans should they commence unjust violence. Prosouch and Tzikandyles apparently ‘perceived the excessive physical size’ of the fully armoured Germans, although they also noted that the crusaders practised great disorder on the march, and thought that they would be easily overcome by Romans who engaged them with military science. This they duly reported to Manuel. The emperor remained cautious because of the barbarians’ ostensible purpose of travelling to the Holy Land, and he shrank from attacking them until the Germans attempted unjust aggression.

Kinnamos peppers his narrative with encomiastic rhetoric. Perhaps the most obvious example is the reference to the physical size of the fully armoured Germans, an observation


we find in ‘Manganeios’ who writes that the Germans were ‘iron-clad giants’.63 Less obvious are the key encomiastic themes Kinnamos employs. The notion that the emperor’s acts of violence against unjust aggression (such as crusader pillaging) constituted ‘just war’ was part of the celebration of Comnenian militarism. This became highly developed in the encomia which were produced during the reigns of the Komnenoi who, of course, were members of the military aristocracy. The celebration eulogised the martial efficacy of the imperial subjects and, by extension, that of the emperor himself.64 In Kinnamos’ narration, Comnenian military science, an encomiastic phrase seemingly employed to accentuate the martial skill of the emperor and his generals, would easily overcome the excessively large barbarians who practised great disorder on the march. Again, in contrast, a pious, temperate and judicious emperor, that is, an emperor imbued with fundamental imperial virtues celebrated in contemporary encomia, was disinclined to engage them – even though they were indisciplined – because of their ostensible purpose of marching to the Holy Land.

**Choirobacchoi**

The rhetoric of the encomiasts is evident in the historians’ descriptions of the flash-flood on the plain of Choirobacchoi, which the crusaders reached on 7 September 1147 after ‘much toil and the difficulty of the routes [they were taking]’.65 A night storm caused the plain’s rivers to rise rapidly. The resulting deluge struck the crusader camp leading to the loss of many people, beasts and baggage.66 ‘Manganeios’ tells of the flood with apparent glee. He compares Conrad to Pharaoh and the flood to the Red Sea. The divine flood, which ‘Manganeios’ portrays as halting Conrad’s plans to attack the Byzantine forces sent to shadow his army’s movements, is actually presented as surpassing the biblical model. In 1147, he says, water appeared where there was once only dry land. ‘Thus the plans of the godless were scattered by Him who easily changes everything to His will’. The flash flood, which ‘Manganeios’ states had not happened since antiquity, enraged the ‘wild boars’ (read ‘crusaders’), who were less rational than the biblical Gadarene swine. In contrast, ‘Manganeios’ compares a youthful Manuel to the ‘white-haired intelligence’ of Daniel, ‘first

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64 Compare with Magdalino, *Empire*, pp.419-21, 467.


of the elders to whom the Lord of all gave the power’ and he praises the emperor’s ‘natural ideas of the good’ when he elucidates how Christ and the Virgin had come to Manuel’s aid.67

John Kinnamos likewise gives the impression that the flood was a disaster beyond description and his portrayal of the deluge shares several details with those provided by ‘Manganeios’. Most importantly, Kinnamos also states that the flood was an act of divine retribution. Such interpretations are not especially common in Kinnamos, and perhaps reflect his employment of encomiast material with its heavy use of biblical themes.68

Niketas Choniates’ description of the flood is also similar to that given by ‘Manganeios’. Choniates states that those who witnessed the event concluded God’s wrath had fallen on the German camp, which again, may or may not be an echo of contemporary encomia. Unlike ‘Manganeios’ and Kinnamos, Choniates does not suggest why God may have intervened in the crusaders’ advance, and in fact points out the flood was an annual event, rather than a unique act of providence. This act of apparent censorship of Byzantine opinions and imagery, which prevailed in the mid-twelfth century, may be a reflection of Choniates’ interpretation of divine providence, and an attempt to alter the received rhetorical representation. The flash-flood was an annual occurrence and was not an act of divine intervention on behalf of Manuel and His people, because the barbarians had become God’s chosen subjects. Conrad was nevertheless still a barbarian. Choniates employs the rhetorical barbarian topos when he states the king thereafter set aside his innate petty arrogance and peacefully continued his advance to Constantinople.69

**Choirobacchoi to Constantinople**

The Greek sources do not offer any further evidence concerning the remaining advance to the capital, and once again we are dependent upon Odo of Deuil’s testimony. The bias in Odo’s portrayal of French and non-French conduct is perhaps best demonstrated in his account of the fate of a number of French crusaders at some unspecified location en route to Constantinople. A small group had advanced ahead of the main contingents towards the Byzantine capital to procure supplies and arms, which suggests they were not far from the city. They suffered considerable losses to men and material at the hands of Byzantine forces, and Odo suggests such instances were common when any group separated from the main army.70 The Byzantine forces charged with stopping the plundering and foraging activities of

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70 Odo of Deuil, *De Profectione*, p.54.
crusaders were presumably committing such martial acts against foragers who diverged from the main route to Constantinople in a bid to obtain provisions by force.\textsuperscript{71}

Odo simply blames the losses on the natural treachery of the Greeks; the French are in no way culpable. On the other hand, German crusaders who separated from the main force – presumably to seize provisions – are killed simply because they ‘were lagging behind drunk’ (\textit{remanentes ebrii}), and ‘they do not have self-control’ (\textit{non habent temperantiam}), although Odo believed ‘they found an abundance everywhere’ (\textit{ubique inveniunt opulentiam}).\textsuperscript{72} Later in his narrative, Odo also briefly states that insolent French crusaders caused disturbances whilst drunk.\textsuperscript{73} The bias and the resultant implication are nonetheless obvious here. Innocent French crusaders attempting to procure provisions are killed and wounded through Greek treachery; the inconsiderate drunken Germans, who caused the French their provisioning problems, are killed because they lack self-control. Odo does not allow that German crusaders may have been compelled to plunder as they advanced even in the midst of apparent plenty. Historical convention holds it was these unusually indisciplined and belligerent German crusaders who approached Constantinople in early September 1147.

\textsuperscript{72} Odo of Deuil, \textit{De Profectione}, p.46.
\textsuperscript{73} Odo of Deuil, \textit{De Profectione}, p.66.
7. The Army at Constantinople

The narratives of Odo of Deuil and John Kinnamos now dominate the historiography. The Greek historian writes that after the ‘disaster’ at Choirobacchoi, a benevolent Manuel sent a noble embassy to the German king to offer his condolences and invite him to an assembly in Constantinople. Conrad, however, was still unwilling to abandon his pride, and demanded that the emperor meet him as he approached the capital. According to Kinnamos, Manuel thus observed that Conrad’s pretension was limitless, and seemingly broke off discussions without meeting the king.¹

Odo of Deuil reports something very similar. He writes that whilst Conrad was outside Constantinople, Manuel sent messengers to the king asking him for an audience. Conrad was apparently too fearful for his safety to enter the city, and likewise Manuel to venture outside the city walls. Thus, we are told that neither modified their customary scornful contempt (fastus) for each other, and again it appears that the monarchs never met. This portrayal of the relations between Conrad and Manuel is the direct opposite to that represented in other Latin texts,² and given the similarity between Odo’s and Kinnamos’ accounts, it suggests Odo received his information from the Greek inhabitants of Constantinople.³

Arnold of Lübeck’s Chronica Slavorum, composed by 1210 and predominantly reliant on oral testimony, supports the impression of initially tense relations between Manuel and Conrad as the latter approached Constantinople.⁴ Arnold suggests that by refusing Conrad an audience, Manuel failed to accord the German king due reverence, which in turn angered Conrad. A compromise was eventually reached where the two met on horseback somewhere outside Constantinople to ensure the two could sit as equals.⁵ There is obviously an element of confusion as to whether Manuel had an audience with Conrad during the king’s advance to Anatolia.

Kugler believes the monarchs did not meet at this point, and interprets the apparent standoff before Constantinople as evidence of hostility between Conrad and Manuel which occurred owing to the skirmishes between Germans and Greeks.⁶ The clashes between the two forces undoubtedly engendered some hostile feelings in both the crusaders and native

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¹ Ioannes Cinnamus, Rerum, p.74; John Kinnamos, Deeds, p.63.
⁶ Kugler, Studien, pp.122-3.
inhabitants. If we were to follow Kugler’s example and base our interpretations solely on a literal reading of the sources, we could conclude only that relations between Conrad and Manuel must have been overtly hostile. This might have caused the monarchs to avoid meeting for fear of their mutual safety, as suggested by Odo of Deuil. But we must question Odo’s statement if, as can be presumed, he obtained his information from an inhabitant of Constantinople.\textsuperscript{7} The Greek sources suggest many inhabitants perceived the Germans as a hostile enemy force encamped outside their capital and would have nothing explicitly positive to say of their presence. Moreover, it is very unlikely that a meeting between the monarchs outside the city’s gates would have been well known by Constantinople’s general populace. Such a conference would have been conducted with minimum disclosure, otherwise it would expose that the emperor deigned to meet a pretender to the imperial title on equal terms, rather than at the imperial court, which the king’s perceived subordinate status required by Byzantine protocol.\textsuperscript{8}\textsuperscript{8}

It may also have been integral to Odo’s narrative to depict both Conrad and Manuel as disdaining co-operation. Immediately before Odo tells of Conrad and Manuel’s apparent scorn for each other at Constantinople, he provides one more unsupported example of German disorder outside the city where Conrad allegedly destroyed the park and palace complex of Philopation.\textsuperscript{9} Directly after this example, we hear of the monarchs’ scorn, and then immediately after this Odo writes that Louis, ‘whose custom has been always to season royal majesty with humility’,\textsuperscript{10} asked Conrad to wait for him before the German king crossed the Bosphoros, so that the armies could advance together. Conrad refused because his only interest was in marching eastwards.\textsuperscript{11} In fact, as we will see, it is possible to offer rational explanations for both the perpetrated violence at the Philopation, and for Conrad’s crossing of the Bosphoros ahead of the French king. But the reader is confronted with an example of German unrest, then immediately of German/Greek non-cooperation, then directly after of German self-interest. Odo provides timely examples of German unrest and self-interest which sustain his representation of German/Greek non-cooperation – all of which are portrayed as causing French logistical difficulties. We must query Odo’s evidence of hostility between Conrad and Manuel as it too conveniently bolsters his agenda.

There is also a problem with a literal acceptance of Kinnamos’ testimony. Putting his stereotypical portrayal of an arrogant Latin barbarian aside, an image of his imperial

\textsuperscript{7} See above pp.40-1.
\textsuperscript{8} See below.
\textsuperscript{9} See below pp.69-70.
\textsuperscript{10} ‘\textit{cui semper mos fuit regiam maiestatem humilitate condire’}. Odo of Deuil, \textit{De Profectione}, pp.48-9.
Byzantine majesty deigning to meet a supposedly hostile pretender to the imperial title outside the capital is not something which would be likely to be recorded in contemporary Greek sources. Nor, as mentioned above, would it have been well publicised and thus remembered by the capital’s populace.\(^{12}\) Hence, John Kinnamos tells us of Manuel’s audience with Louis VII in Constantinople where the king sat on a lowly throne, but apparently knows nothing of the meeting between the two which took place over the Bosphoros.\(^{13}\) In the later encomia of Euthymios Malakes, Louis’ audience with Manuel falls into a pattern where Euthymios celebrates Byzantine ceremonial during which visiting potentates enjoyed the privilege of sitting on a lowly chair beneath the raised throne of his imperial majesty.\(^{14}\) The palatial court was therefore the official and proper place for Manuel to receive visiting dignitaries. An interpretation which holds that the apparent standoff between Manuel and Conrad was just owing to mutual hostility takes no account of Byzantine court ceremonial.\(^{15}\)

It is very unlikely that Conrad, the emperor-elect of the western Roman Empire, would wish to participate in the standard Byzantine ceremonial in Constantinople with the emperor of the eastern Roman Empire. The court ceremonial was designed to induce a psychological mood in the participants and observers by making verbal and visual statements about imperial authority, as well as the observers’ and participants’ connections to the emperor and the empire. The ultimate intention was to leave the parties in no doubt as to their relationship, in which the Byzantine emperor was peerless.\(^{16}\) Byzantine ceremonial was not only intended to illustrate the inferior status of visitors to the court, it was often employed to confirm that status during an oath-taking ceremony, as when most of the leaders on the First Crusade swore a bond of vassalage to Manuel’s grandfather, Alexios Komnenos.\(^{17}\) Manuel intended to protect his interests in existing and former Byzantine territory by exacting similar oaths from the French on the Second Crusade.\(^{18}\) Whilst evidence of diplomatic contact between the Germans and Manuel concerning the crusade is very poor, some form of vassalage to the Byzantine emperor may have been initially mooted in lost documents and embassies of unknown purpose. Either way, it would seem unlikely that the emperor-elect and indeed the rest of the German princes were not aware of the significance of Byzantine ceremonial.

\(^{12}\) See above. Also compare with Magdalino, _Empire_, pp.461-2.
\(^{13}\) See below p.65.
\(^{14}\) Magdalino, _Empire_, p.459.
\(^{15}\) Note: Odo of Deuil specifically mentions the chairs, but not that they were at different heights. Odo of Deuil, _De Profectione_, p.58.
\(^{16}\) On Byzantine ceremonial, see Magdalino, _Empire_, pp.237-48.
\(^{17}\) Lilie, _Byzantium_, chapter 1.
\(^{18}\) See, for example, Lilie, _Byzantium_, p.150.
King Louis was treated to various ceremonial procedures, including the receipt of precious gifts, sumptuous banquets and tours of the city. As noted above, Manuel also had an audience with Louis where the king’s perceived subordinate status was confirmed by his positioning on a lowly seat below the raised chair of the emperor.\footnote{Odo of Deuil, \textit{De Profectione}, p.66; Ioannes Cinnamus, \textit{Rerum}, pp.82-3; John Kinnamos, \textit{Deeds}, p.69.} Odo of Deuil perceived such ceremonial as simply a masquerade to obscure perfidious Greek intent.\footnote{Odo of Deuil, \textit{De Profectione}, p.66-8.} It was actually standard Byzantine ceremonial employed for visiting dignitaries. John Kinnamos states that during this meeting, Louis pledged an oath to be the emperor’s friend and ally as long as the king lived, and then Louis crossed the Bosphoros.\footnote{Ioannes Cinnamus, \textit{Rerum}, p.82; John Kinnamos, \textit{Deeds}, p.69.} The diplomatic dialogue between Manuel and Louis was not finalised when the king set foot in Asia Minor. The ceremonial had not settled the king’s and his barons’ relationship to the emperor. Manuel subsequently recalled Louis to his palace, but the king refused to return, stating he would only join the emperor in conference either on the Asiatic side of the Bosphoros, or on the water itself, so that negotiations were conducted on an equal footing. A requirement that the French barons perform homage to the emperor in return for (amongst other things) guides, markets and a fair rate of exchange in Anatolia was among the stipulations demanded at that time by an imperial messenger.\footnote{This was first mooted by Manuel in his letter to Pope Eugenius III: ‘Epistola Manuelis ad Eugenium’, pp.440-1.} The leaders of the army were divided on whether they should perform homage to the emperor. A number of distinguished French crusaders, including the king’s brother, Robert, count of Dreux and Perche, successfully took measures to ensure they did not become enmeshed in Byzantine ceremonial.\footnote{Odo of Deuil, \textit{De Profectione}, p.78.} Manuel did not agree to Louis’ conditions for a further meeting, although it was eventually agreed that they would meet again at a Byzantine castle on the north coast of the Gulf of Nikomedia (modern Izmit).\footnote{Odo simply states that they met at a castle by the sea. The surviving remains of strong points from this period are congregated on the north-shore of the Gulf of Izmit. Among the most important, were the castles of Ritzion (mod. Darica), where Manuel met his wife in 1160 as he was travelling eastward on the main highway used by the crusaders, and Niketiaton (mod. Eskihisar), probably built by Manuel and situated very close to a location which Alexios I Komnenos found suitable to keep an eye on the First Crusade. See photographs II.1 and II.2. On Ritzion and Niketiaton also see Foss, \textit{Nicomedia}, pp.49-58.} Only then did Manuel receive homage from the French barons.\footnote{Odo of Deuil, \textit{De Profectione}, p.76-82.}

We are solely dependent upon Odo of Deuil for knowledge of these negotiations. Many of the barons did not want to participate in Byzantine ceremonial, including swearing oaths of homage. There is not a comparable source to the \textit{De Profectione} which may illuminate the negotiations between the Germans and Manuel, but it is inconceivable to presume there were not at least negotiations between the two related imperial houses. The apparent standoff
between Louis and Manuel was over the terms of the relationship between the emperor, the
king, and the leaders of the French army. The standoff between the Germans and Manuel
may have been based on similar concerns. Putting aside the actual and potential allegiances
of the other great men on crusade, King Conrad of Staufen was the emperor-elect of the
western Roman Empire, whom contemporaries addressed as ‘emperor’. He referred to
himself as emperor in letters to Manuel Komnenos, in which he even addressed the emperor
as king (not emperor) of the Greeks.26 Again, in a charter issued whilst on crusade, he refers
to himself as emperor,27 and of course, he was an equal partner with Manuel in an alliance
against Roger II of Sicily, sealed by marriage between the two imperial houses.28 Conrad
clearly had imperial pretensions, and surely the king would not have accepted standard
Byzantine ceremonial designed to confirm his perceived subordinate status in the world
political order. If Conrad intended to meet Manuel, would he not take measures to ensure he
met his imperial brother on a level negotiating plain, that is, outside the walls of
Constantinople? The count of Dreux and Perche may have been able to escape establishing a
relationship with the emperor, but Conrad, ally and relation of Manuel, would certainly wish
to convene a meeting, although clearly an assembly where one party was deemed equal to the
other, as Arnold of Lübeck suggests.29

Many excellent Latin sources believed Manuel did indeed have an audience with Conrad at
this point, and that far from being hostile, their relations were amiable.30 Perhaps the textual
representation of cordial interaction is a reflection of the warm relationship which clearly
existed between Manuel and Conrad after the crusade had ended, which is when the sources
were composed.31 However, in vilifying the crusaders’ perceived stereotypical avarice and
unwieldy belligerence, the combined testimony of ‘Manganeios Prodromos’ and John
Kinnamos supports Latin evidence that Manuel presented Conrad with rich gifts.32 It is also
possible to glean other examples of amiable relations and cooperation. Generous offers of
sound advice, agreements reached to ferry the army across the Bosphoros, and the provision
of Byzantine guides, do not suggest that relations between the two were overtly hostile, and

27 Hiestand, R., ‘‘Kaiser’’ Konrad III., der zweite Kreuzzug und ein verlorenes Diplom für den Berg Thabor’,
Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters, 35 (1979), pp.82-126.
28 On the Byzantine/German alliance before the crusade see Magdalino, Empire, pp.38-40, 42-3; Lilie,
Byzantium, pp.148, 151-2.
30 For example, see ‘Annales Herbi polenses’, p.5; ‘Annales Pa lidenses’, p.82; ‘Casus Monasterii
Petris husensis’, p.674; ‘Annales Magdeburgenses’, p.188; William of Tyre, Wilhelmi Tyrensis
31 The warm relationship is reflected in the political/dynastic alliances. See below pp.89-90.
32 Ioannes Cinnamus, Rerum, pp.81-2; John Kinnamos, Deeds, p.68; ‘Manganeios Prodromos, 20.440-8, 469;
24.192-3.
that this led to an apparent stand-off near Constantinople. The episode suggests rather that
the apparent disagreement near Constantinople was more to do with finalising diplomatic
negotiations between proud noble inheritors of the imperial title of Old Rome, neither of
whom could afford to be seen as deferring to the other.

Whilst this may provide an answer for why Manuel did not have an audience with Conrad
in the emperor’s capital, it is still unclear whether the monarchs met at this point. Conrad and
Manuel would not have had to meet in person to communicate. But given the problems with
Odo and Kinnamos’ evidence, it is reasonable to believe the unanimity in our
contemporaneous Latin texts which state the monarchs did meet. We can assume there would
be some echo of the assembly in the sources if it was held in the capital. The meeting
therefore probably took place on relatively neutral ground outside the city as suggested by
Arnold of Lübeck, and as portrayed by Odo during the second meeting between Manuel and
Louis.

There were many things for the monarchs to discuss. Their alliance against Roger of Sicily,
and Roger’s attack on imperial territory at the very time the crusade was in progress surely
figured. Conrad wished to confer on the various routes across Anatolia and the provision of
guides. Manuel in turn would have his own concerns, not least for imperial territory, and
more immediately, the well-known Byzantine concerns for their capital. Manuel had
prepared for receiving the army at Constantinople, including strengthening the garrison.
The emperor also made repairs to the city walls. Poem 24 from the corpus of ‘Manganeios
Prodromos’ is a panegyric delivered in the persona of the capital eulogising the emperor’s
success in driving off the armies of the Second Crusade, which, as has already been noted,
‘Manganeios’ portrays as a hostile invading force. He writes that the ‘wild beasts’, a
frequently employed encomiastic motif of animal imagery intended to emphasise the
uncultivated barbarism of the western Latin, ‘had heard that my teeth had fallen out, and
came to hunt and devour me. But, like Christ Emmanuel, the young Manuel showed that I,
the old woman, am young, with all my teeth. And the wild beast is afraid of my teeth’s fresh

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33 For example, see ‘Annales Herbipolenses’, pp.4-5; ‘Annales Palidenses’, pp.82-3.
34 Compare with Magdalino, Empire, pp.48-9.
36 On Roger’s attack see Otto of Freising, Gesta Frederici, pp.198-200; Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, p.82;
Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, pp.43-5; John Kinnamos, Deeds, p.76.
37 For example, see ‘Annales Herbipolenses’, pp.4-5; Annales Palidenses, pp.82-3.
38 On Byzantine concerns and the threat of the crusade, see Magdalino, Empire, pp.46-51; Magdalino, P.,
Consequences (Paris, 2005), pp.41-54; compare with Laiou, A., ‘Byzantium and the Crusades in the Twelfth
Century: Why was the Fourth Crusade Late in Coming?’, in Laiou, Urbs Capta, pp.17-40, especially pp.28-35.
39 Ioannes Cinnamus, Rerum, p.72; John Kinnamos, Deeds, p.62; Niketas Choniates, Historia, p.85; Niketas
Choniates, O City of Byzantium, p.36.
40 Paul Stephenson maintains that the frequent evocation of animal imagery as applied to the non-Byzantine
intimated their lack of humanity, indeed their barbarity. Stephenson, ‘Anna Comnena’, pp.41-54.
growth’. This apparent allusion to the repair of the city’s fortifications finds a corroborative echo in Choniates, who confirms Manuel did indeed repair the walls and battlements, that is, the city’s ‘teeth’, upon approach of the crusaders. Odo of Deuil, who stated that part of the city walls collapsed in front of the crusaders, betrays the embellishment of Manuel’s achievements inherent in the encomia of this period.

The apparent threat of the crusade to Byzantine security is amply demonstrated in Greek texts. A letter and accompanying political verse commentary written by the contemporary John Tzetzes concerning the oracle ‘an ox will bellow and a bull will wail’, shows that the approach of the German army was associated with the prophesied destruction of Constantinople. ‘Manganeios Prodromos’ describes the crusaders as ‘more numerous than the stars or sand on the sea-shore, like a nest of ants.’ An encomium composed in 1152-3 by Michael the Rhetor describes the numbers of crusaders as comparable to sand on the seashore, and says that the ‘myriad host’ was drawn up for battle and violently sweeping everything before it, like a river in flood. An encomium delivered in 1174 by Eustathios of Thessalonica seems to censure encomiasts who would describe the crusaders as ‘like leaves and flowers in the Spring-time’, or ‘like numbers of stars’, or ‘like sand being poured out’ and, ‘by the rhetorical rule relating to hyperbole, acquit himself of showing off to the crowd’. Eustathios prefers to describe the crusaders ‘boiling up from the west’ and attacking the Byzantines without provocation.

‘Manganeios’ actually describes Conrad of Germany’s crusade as a ruse. The king’s real intention was to conquer both the city and Byzantine territories, and impose the western faith and thus a Latin patriarch in Constantinople. ‘Manganeios’ announces that Conrad exhibits the hypocrisy of a fox and wears ‘on the outside a sheep’s fleece but concealing within a destructive wolf’. He is thus a chameleon who secretly hides his designs for ‘barbarian ambushes’. (Witness the continued use of pejorative animal imagery). ‘Manganeios’ insists that Conrad’s army marched against ‘our new Jerusalem’, Conrad, ‘this Sennacherib and new Doeg’, ‘this second Rabshakeh, worse than the first’. Conrad was like Cyrus and ‘not yet

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41 ‘Manganeios Prodromos’, 24.8-12.
42 Niketas Choniates, Historia, p.85; Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, p.36.
43 Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, p.68.
44 John Tzetzes, Ioannis Tzetzae Epistulae, pp.87-8; John Tzetzes, Ioannis Tzetze historiae, no.9, pp.611-12. On such prophecies, see Magdalino, ‘Prophecies’, pp.41-54.
46 Michael the Rhetor, p.173.
47 Eustathios of Thessalonica, pp.105-6.
49 Sennacherib was a King of Assyria who attacked Judea, Hezekiah 1.44. Doeg was the chief of Saul’s herdsmen responsible for the murder of 85 priests, Samuel 1.21-22.
50 Rabshakeh was Sennacherib’s messenger to Hezekiah and the Jews, Kings 2.18-19, Isaiah 36-37.
sated with bloodshed and sought to be excessively intoxicated with it’. ‘Manganeios’ hoped that Conrad would:

‘share in the condemnation of Cyrus which Tomyris the Scythian queen adjudged, justly throwing his head into a skin which had been filled with blood, crying “Take your fill of blood Cyrus”, correctly aiming at the insatiable blood letter this saying, just like an arrow.’

Witness the encomiastic technique of synkrisis or comparison with, in this case, despised mythical and biblical figures to form the picture familiar to the Byzantines of belligerent, bloodthirsty barbarians bent on conquering Constantinople.\(^5\)

This notion is repeated in John Kinnamos, who likewise states that the crusade was merely a façade for Conrad’s real intention, which was to take possession of Byzantine territory.\(^5\)

There is also an echo of the encomia in Niketas Choniates here. Particularly noticeable is his use of animal imagery. He writes that Manuel was suspicious of the crusaders’ intentions in case they were ‘wolves coming in sheep’s’ clothing’, which is clearly the same metaphor as that employed by ‘Manganeios’. Manuel had apparently described the crusaders as men ‘desirous of murder’, who also had fire in their eyes and exulted in the spilling of blood, which again, is reminiscent of ‘Manganeios’’ reference to the murderous Cyrus. Whilst narrating within the confines of Byzantine rhetorical convention, Choniates states that the crusaders’ declaration that the purpose of their expedition was to reach Jerusalem was not false. It seems that again Choniates is offering a corrective to the received understanding in the capital, namely, that Conrad’s aim was not to conquer Byzantium as contemporary authors seemed to believe, or at least, would have their audience believe, but was in fact to march to the Holy Land.\(^5\)

Conrad reached the palace and park complex called the Philopation, opposite the palace of Blachernae\(^5\) and close to Constantinople’s Golden Gate, around 9 September 1147.\(^5\) As has been noted, according to Odo of Deuil, the German crusaders or rather King Conrad himself supposedly committed acts of disorder whilst at the Philopation. Odo tells us that Conrad burst into the area, seized all the ‘delights’ (delicias) for his own uses and destroyed practically everything.\(^5\) Kugler, rightly pointing out that Odo goes too far in attributing direct blame to Conrad for this behaviour, nonetheless saw this as further evidence of German indiscipline.\(^5\)

\(^{51}\) ‘Manganeios Prodromos’, 20.16-36. On the encomiasts use of synkrisis see Magdalino, Empire, pp.447-9, 452.

\(^{52}\) Ioannes Cinnamus, Rerum, p.67; John Kinnamos, Deeds, p.58.

\(^{53}\) Niketas Choniates, Historia, p.81-2; Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, pp.36-7.

\(^{54}\) See photographs II.3 and II.4. On Constantinople’s fortifications, including those incorporating the Palace of Blachernae and the adjacent Theodosian walls, see Foss, Byzantine Fortifications, pp.41-73.


\(^{56}\) Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, p.48.

\(^{57}\) Kugler, Studien, p.124.
There is no record of this apparent episode of excessive disorder in the extant encomia, and indeed none of our Greek sources report this disturbance. It is remarkable that such a fracas committed by Latin barbarians immediately outside the walls of Constantinople, and in full view of the palace of Blachernae, the favoured palace of the Komnenoi, received little or no attention in contemporary Greek literature. When we consider that the French army subsequently camped in the same area, and although Odo does not mention it, we know Louis lodged in the Philopation – which suggests there was limited rather than extensive plunder and damage – it appears that Odo is exaggerating the extent of the disturbance.58

Odo possibly offers this seemingly embellished episode as an illustration of the uncooperative and disorderly nature of the German crusaders. Although the disturbance was not deemed worthy of recording in contemporaneous Greek texts, that does not mean some form of at least low-level plundering and attendant destruction did not take place. Rather than simply accepting Odo’s impression of wanton German thuggery, or conversely, rejecting his unsupported testimony because it appears conveniently to concur with his intended schema, it is more informative to ask why the Germans may have plundered the Philopation.

Evidence of widespread malnutrition is prevalent throughout the sources concerning Conrad’s advance in Anatolia. More immediately however, Gerhoh of Reichersberg records that many of the crusaders were suffering from hunger long before they reached Constantinople.59 ‘Manganeios Prodromos’ delights in the suffering of those starving crusaders who were unable to advance to Nikaia with the army.60 The very valuable and detailed Pöhlder Annals suggest Conrad wished to divide his forces at Nikaia partly because the foot soldiers were already fatigued with hunger.61

This was the condition of the army as it reached the Philopation and the area outside the palace of Blachernae. The grounds of the hunting park were rich and fertile. The adjacent land outside the palace was cultivated and may have contained harvestable crops in September. Given the crusaders’ provisioning arrangements, some evidence of hungry crusaders pillaging is to be expected. Of course, such activity was counter to the known agreement made between the crusaders and Manuel, in which the army leaders swore to pass peacefully through Byzantine territory in return for adequate markets.62

None of our sources refer to the official Byzantine provisioning measures for the German army at Constantinople, and we must have recourse to Odo of Deuil to discover if indeed the

58 Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, p.66. Also see Ioannes Cinnamus, Rerum, p.83; John Kinnamos, Deeds, p.69.
62 Ioannes Cinnamus, Rerum, pp.68-9; John Kinnamos, Deeds, pp.59-60; Niketas Choniates, Historia, p.81; Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, p.36.
crusaders received adequate provisions outside the capital. Odo writes that before Louis arrived at Constantinople on 4 October 1147,63 contingents from Lorraine which had arrived outside the city with the German army, but were awaiting the arrival of the French king, were compelled by the withdrawal of their market to cross the Bosphorus. It was agreed that once the contingents crossed into Asia Minor, they would again receive a suitable forum whilst they were waiting for King Louis.64

It appears that a number of French crusaders who had advanced ahead of the French king remained encamped outside the city after the Lorrainers had crossed, and according to Odo of Deuil, a contingent of Patzinaks (Pechenegs) and Cumans, Byzantine mercenaries originally from nomadic tribes of the Russian steppe, attacked the remaining crusaders to force them to cross the Bosphorus. We have only Odo’s testimony for this apparently major skirmish, and he was very unlikely to attribute the blame for any friction between the French and Byzantines to his fellow French crusaders. Perhaps it is telling that those remaining soldiers who clashed with the Byzantine mercenaries did not have a market until Manuel instructed them to lodge under the walls of the palace of Blachernae where peace was restored and they once again received supplies.65 Put another way, there was conflict between the French and Byzantine mercenaries until the crusaders once again obtained a market. It is reasonable to presume that it was Byzantine policing troops, similar to, or indeed the same as those who had shadowed and curtailed the foraging and plundering activities of the crusaders en route to Constantinople, who skirmished with French crusaders while the French were endeavouring to acquire supplies in the absence of a market.

Odo states that upon the arrival of the French king at Constantinople, the ‘multitude’ was not permitted to enter the city owing to its indiscipline. Nonetheless, Odo writes that while the army camped outside the walls of the Blachernae, a supply ship provided them (by which Odo means himself, Louis and those directly connected to the king) with an ample market and a satisfactory rate of monetary exchange. The rate of exchange became very poor once the army advanced beyond the capital.66 Manuel, perhaps fearing a conjunction of the French with the Sicilian fleet which was at that time threatening the Greek islands and mainland, withdrew part of the market in a successful effort to compel the French to cross the Bosphorus where they were followed by supply ships and money exchangers. Upon the resumption of the market, the tables of the money exchangers appeared to Odo to be gleaming with gold and groaning under the weight of the silver vessels which they had

63 Bernhardi, Konrad, p.640.
64 Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, pp.50-2.
65 Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, pp.52-4, 58.
66 Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, p.66.
This inflamed the greed of a ‘certain Fleming’, who had advanced with the French army. He seized the treasure and this incited others to copy his example. The money exchangers and supply ships fled back to Constantinople with a number of unfortunate French crusaders who were on board obtaining provisions. Louis VII had the Fleming hanged, restored the wealth to the money exchangers, and sent envoys to Manuel to request the release of the French crusaders caught on board ship, the return of their possessions which the Greeks had plundered, and the restoration of the market.

Primitive greed may well have caused the disturbance by the condemned Fleming, but such an explanation is perfectly consistent with Odo’s occasionally overt agenda of attributing provisioning problems to the actions of non-French crusaders. This does not mean we should reject his evidence out of hand, but rather, that we should seek to offer alternative explanations for why such an event took place. The instances of crusader plundering en route to Constantinople may have been due to the acts of desperate men obtaining the sinews of war. Without the means to obtain scarce provisions at famine prices peacefully, armies have always seized provisions by force. Is it not possible that this act of apparent Fleming greed was initiated through the fretful need to obtain and/or replenish much needed wealth? As previously discussed, it is currently impossible to discern if the majority of the crusaders left their homes in 1147 with the requisite cash they needed to purchase provisions and pay for any other expenses en route to Constantinople. Many on the German crusade left home trusting only in providence. Perhaps some occasionally received provisions or cash as gifts or charity from fellow crusaders or others they encountered, and foraging would have been available en route. Warriors may have taken service for pay with a greater lord as they advanced to Constantinople, but there is little evidence of this on the Second Crusade. There were opportunities for both the French and German crusaders to plunder and pillage, but there is no indication in any of the sources that valuable booty was obtained in this manner. There is certainly no evidence that they seized and sacked towns and cities as they advanced towards the Byzantine capital, depredations which could have contributed to an individual’s wealth. Neither is there evidence of the French exacting forms of tribute from the towns or cities they encountered, or of their receiving valuable gifts from local rulers to help oil the peaceful passage of the army. Nor does there appear to have been a form of collective or corporate financing on which destitute crusaders could have drawn. Given the rudimentary

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67 This suggests that silver was attractive to Byzantine money changers, although essentially the state currency was based on gold. Hendy, M., *Coinage and Money in the Byzantine Empire, 1081-1261* (Washington, 1969), pp.14-22.
69 See above p.42.
70 Gerhoh of Reichersberg, ‘De Investigatione’, pp.374-5.
communication infrastructure and systems of finance and credit, it must have usually been prohibitive for the vast majority of crusaders to receive transfers of cash from their homelands en route. The crusaders therefore arrived at Constantinople with only the remainder of the cash they left home with.

There is evidence of French nobles leaving Europe and crossing into Anatolia with movable forms of wealth, including gold and silver. But even Odo of Deuil, the king’s chaplain, complains on a number of occasions that food prices were excessively high and that the monetary exchange rate Louis’ army received was extremely bad. Manuel Komnenos may have promised suitable markets and a fair rate of exchange, but it appears local free-market forces were in action which rendered poor exchange rates. Profligate amounts of ready cash could have caused temporary inflation, but there is no evidence to suggest that many crusaders held hordes of coin and bullion at Constantinople. Odo’s complaints betray the fact that the army did not have plentiful cash. As we have seen, even those crusaders who were wealthy enough to set out from Europe with baggage containing silver vessels, either for personal use or as treasure to be exchanged at some point, were compelled to exchange such property in order to receive provisions outside Constantinople, although money exchangers were willing to change coin. An indication of the rate that which crusaders exhausted coin and bullion associated predominantly with acquiring the necessities to sustain life for themselves and their dependants en route to Anatolia is reflected in King Louis’ urgent requests for monies. Letters sent to France from the gates of Hungary (de portis Hungariae) and Constantinople before the French army entered Asia Minor suggest that the king was running dangerously low on cash. The fundamental necessity of obtaining provisions may have clearly compelled a crusader to seize the wealth by which to procure them. If so, we cannot ascribe the Fleming’s apparent act of greed and the subsequent disorder simply to the covetousness of an individual non-French crusader.

The French envoys sent to negotiate with Manuel after this incident succeeded in the restoration of a market on the Asiatic coast of the Bosphoros. Odo of Deuil described it as scanty and because of this the crusaders were compelled to consume the provisions they had stored. To Odo this was further evidence of Greek treachery. He relates that Manuel purposely held up further negotiations with Louis, and indeed hindered the crossing of a

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71 Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, p.99, 104.
72 See, for example, Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, pp.40, 66, 97, 132-4.
73 See, for example, Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, p.29.
number of French crusaders. The French were consequently delayed and compelled to eat their scarce provisions. In fact, the remaining crusaders were soon ferried across the Bosphorus in a ship hired by the French. Moreover, Odo admits elsewhere that Louis refused to return to the capital to continue the negotiations; the French king held up the talks. Odo nonetheless typically stresses that because of Manuel’s provision of a scant market and the treacherous delays of the Greeks, French crusaders were compelled to replenish their provisions for their advance towards Nikomedia by a series of raids. When Odo’s anti-Greek prejudice and his schema for explicating French provisioning difficulties and their associated episodes of plundering are taken into consideration, problems with the provision of supplies outside Constantinople and the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus clearly caused French disorder.

Unlike most of the towns and cities of the Byzantine Empire, Constantinople did not necessarily receive its sustenance – grain, fruit and vegetables and so on – solely from its immediate hinterland. The crusaders could take advantage of the large-scale market infrastructures, and through state and private initiative draw upon an autumn-harvested agricultural surplus. Given that the German army was the first to camp outside the capital’s walls, it is reasonable to assume that a greater surplus was available to them than to the French army.

Nonetheless, we can be sure many of the Germans were equally as destitute as most of the French must have been, even more so after the disaster at Choirobacchoi. Conrad exacted tribute from King Géza II of Hungary, which may have been distributed amongst his followers, and he received wealthy gifts from Manuel Komnenos at Constantinople. Such gifts may have provoked the jealousy of the king’s vassals. Even an enemy of the Staufen, Welf VI, brother of the dispossessed former Welf Duke of Bavaria, Henry X, called the Proud, apparently deigned to accept necessities from the king which were initially given to Conrad by the emperor. Such evidence implies that very few crusaders received gifts other

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76 Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, pp.74-82.
79 See above p.47.
80 Ioannes Cinnamus, Rerum, pp.81-2; John Kinnamos, Deeds, p.68; ‘Manganeios Prodromos, 20.440-8, 469; 24.192-3.
81 ‘Annales Palidenses’, p.82.
82 On the troubled relationship between the Welfs and the Staufens, see Hechberger, W., Staufer und Welfen 1125-1190 (Cologne, 1996).
83 ‘Historia Welforum Weingartensis’, p.468.
than the mightiest amongst them.\textsuperscript{84} It also suggests the distribution of wealth obtained by the most powerful on the German crusade was not shared ubiquitously and certainly not (unsurprisingly) allocated in a democratic manner. Perhaps only the \textit{mouvance} of the king could indirectly benefit from the gifts their lord received.

Most of the Germans camped outside Constantinople with only the remainder of the cash with which they left home. It holds that the German crusaders, like their French counterparts, were compelled to commit acts of violence to obtain supplies if these could not be gained by peaceful means. This enables us to make sense of Odo’s statement that the Germans burst into the Philopation and seized everything they needed. We can explain the disorder at the Philopation exactly as we have interpreted the French acts of disorder.

According to John Kinnamos, whilst at the Philopation, King Conrad observed that the walls of Constantinople were impregnable, and resolved to cross the bridge over the Golden Horn, and set up camp in the suburb of Pikridion (modern Hasköy).\textsuperscript{85} Kinnamos does not offer an opinion why Conrad made this move. We may infer that, given his apparent perception that Conrad headed a hostile army, Kinnamos believed Conrad viewed the walls and rejected a frontal assault.\textsuperscript{86} Such a notion appears to have circulated in Constantinople at the time – perhaps by the encomiasts. In poem 20, ‘Manganeios Prodromos’ states that Conrad observed the walls from Pikridion\textsuperscript{87} and that he was passionate for his previous purpose, namely, the seizure of the city. Thus, ‘he was inwardly convulsed, roaring like a wild beast’, but Manuel,

\begin{quote}
‘foreshadowing in ways which imitate Christ, the face of the Lord, the prototype, you whose name is like Christ’s and are naturally meek, refusing to stain your hands with blood, you acquiesced in the swelling of a wild impulse and endured the beast’s savagery though your heart too was boiling courageously: for you were a disciple of the Lord of Peace’.\textsuperscript{88}
\end{quote}

Witness the encomiastic motifs and themes we have seen already, namely, the crusaders as beasts and Manuel’s eponymic association with Christ Emmanuel. The encomiasts frequently make this comparison and, in doing so, endeavour to create an image of the emperor as the ideal Christian ruler, comparable to the prototype, and thus divinely ordained to rule. This ideal promoted comparisons with biblical paradigms of kingship, notably those of David and Solomon. ‘Manganeios’ proclaims that, unlike the inherently unrestrained and belligerent western Barbarian, Manuel is naturally meek. He is therefore comparable to the peaceful

\textsuperscript{84} Note: Odo of Deuil states that only the French barons received imperial gifts, Odo of Deuil, \textit{De Profectione}, p.82.
\textsuperscript{85} See photograph II.5.
\textsuperscript{87} ‘Manganeios’ also describes how the crusaders were supposedly ‘astounded at the unexpected sight’ of a spectacular show of banners on the city’s walls, ‘Manganeios Prodromos’, 24.14-50.
\textsuperscript{88} ‘Manganeios Prodromos’, 20.310-19.
David, youngest of the sons of Jesse, whom God also endowed with kingly power. Indeed, throughout Manuel’s inaugural propaganda, he becomes a symbol of Davidic virtue par excellence and so worthy of his elevation to the imperial throne.\textsuperscript{89} We see that the propaganda of legitimisation continues with an apologia for the emperor’s youth. ‘Manganeios’ declares that even though Manuel is boiling courageously with youthful aggression, in stark contrast to the barbarian King Conrad, the emperor is in command of his passions, thus emphasising his temperate Davidic virtues and the legitimacy of his rule in spite of his youth, courage, and the fact he was the last born son of his father.\textsuperscript{90}

But ‘Manganeios’ continues, since Conrad, ‘the secret wolf, was unable to hide the madness of his nature, [he] rushed openly against the fold to sacrifice the sheep and their shepherds and to rend every lamb with his teeth’. ‘Manganeios’ presents Conrad as not only intent on besieging Constantinople, but as openly attacking the city. Manuel therefore set his ‘guard-dogs against him to defeat the wolf, and the king is shattered and lowers his pride’, and, ‘he who before was inflexible crossed to Damalis totally subdued, like a wolf among hounds, the Scythian dogs who had met him’.\textsuperscript{91} We again see the pejorative use of animal imagery to illustrate the wild, uncultivated barbarism of the Latin crusader. By his very reckless nature Conrad rushed to attack the ‘Scythian dogs’, that is, the Byzantine mercenaries who were also non-Greek orthodox Christian, and likewise, barbarian animals. Conrad’s assault on the city and the mercenaries failed, and the army was compelled to cross over the Bosphorus to the suburb of Damalis (modern Üsküdar).\textsuperscript{92}

History, of course, does not agree that Conrad attempted to besiege Constantinople or to attack the city, nor should the poems of ‘Manganeios’ be accepted as evidence that he did so. In order to illustrate Manuel’s legitimacy to rule, the encomiast employs rhetorical amplification that embroiders the skirmish into a major Comnenian success against the intrinsically violent barbarians. ‘For’, ‘Manganeios’ applauds, ‘in just one engagement you destroy the innumerable army with your tiny detachment, and with a small number of archers you show that great man as a cowardly, trembling runaway…Such are the triumphs of the imperial maiden and the stratagems of the emperor’.\textsuperscript{93} In contemporary encomia, the imperial maiden is the capital herself, although ‘Manganeios’ continues by stating that the triumph of removing the crusaders from outside the city’s walls belongs to the virtuous Manuel personally and not to the city.\textsuperscript{94}

\textsuperscript{89} Compare with Magdalino, Empire, pp.416, 436, 447-8. Also see ‘Manganeios Prodromos’, 20.355-77.
\textsuperscript{90} Compare with Magdalino, Empire, pp.434-7.
\textsuperscript{91} ‘Manganeios Prodromos’, 20.323-36.
\textsuperscript{92} See photograph II.6.
\textsuperscript{93} ‘Manganeios Prodromos’, 20.330-43.
\textsuperscript{94} ‘Manganeios Prodromos’, 20.349.
The rest of poem 20 and virtually the whole of poem 24 is a eulogy of Manuel’s virtues, and this, in turn, provides us with an illustration of the emperor’s inaugural propaganda. An important aspect of the remaining rhetoric, which became commonplace during Manuel’s reign, is a *synkrisis* of Manuel with his father John II, and his grandfather, Alexios I. Through the process of rhetorical amplification, Manuel’s early dealings with Antioch and the Second Crusade were presented as surpassing his father’s efforts in Cilicia and northern Syria, and his grandfather’s handling of the First Crusade. In poem 24, for example, ‘Manganeios’ declares to Manuel that:

‘you yourself supplied your ancestors’ deficiencies, and became the culmination of your father’s and grandfather’s glory. Of those previous Emperors, the roots of your might, one defeated the Latins by engaging them here, the other later, after an expedition against Antiochos’ city. But they, in wreathing their crowns of victory, both your grandfather and your father left them half-finished.’

Manuel, however,

‘defeated the great Kings here, and as for the dragon ruler of Antioch, you made him scrabble around like a little puppy at your Majesty’s crimson-shod feet…For their half-finished victories against the Latins have been completely rounded out by your total victory; and to their crowns and glories you have added a much more brilliant crown and glory’.

The process of rhetorical amplification, which is endemic in the verse encomia, is plainly evident here. Alexios’ defeat of the Latins actually entailed negotiating the relatively peaceful passage of the First Crusade through Constantinople. John’s victories relate to the impressive but largely ineffectual expeditions against Antioch in 1137 and 1142. The outcomes of these events are themselves exaggerated the better to inflate both Manuel’s portrayed defeat of the besieging ‘Kings’ (shorthand in the encomia for the Second Crusade) – which as we shall see actually appears to have been little more than a skirmish probably over the provision of markets – and also the success of the combined expedition by land and sea to Antioch in 1144, which culminated a year later in Manuel’s receipt in Constantinople of the homage of Raymond of Poitiers, the ‘dragon’ Prince of Antioch.

The rhetorical comparison of the barbarians to a violent uncontrollable force of nature is another important feature of the encomia. ‘Manganeios’ writes of ‘the wild uprising and attack of the sea, rushings, tossings, boilings and all other kinds of violence, gales, waves, rough seas and storm. Currents of rivers flowing in and wind-blown swell’. He continues: ‘What great fusions of waves and combinations of winds, what boilings and tossings of the Keltic sea (the French army), what a mighty rush and whirlpool of the river Rhine (the

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96 Manganeios Prodromos’, 24.244-66.
97 Manganeios Prodromos’, poem 24, notes on p.18.
Germans), what great seasonal storms and what savage weather! The violent force of nature motif served many purposes. It was clearly employed to represent the inherent Byzantine perception of the aggressive and disorderly nature notionally intrinsic to the Latin barbarian. Importantly, the poems of ‘Manganeios’ demonstrate that during the first years of Manuel’s reign, the barbarian topos and the wild and ungovernable force of nature which was the Second Crusade were important themes in the emperor’s inaugural propaganda. This is clear in an explicit statement of the known propaganda purposes underlying this poem and others composed during Manuel’s early reign. ‘Manganeios’ proclaims: ‘So just, Emperor, is your holding of the empire, and so worthy the entrusting to you of the helm of power, that, sitting on high above the empire like a precise steersman above the stern, you may deal masterfully with the attacks of the winds, and steer your city and save her like a ship’ from the barbarian storm.

In poem 24 of the corpus of ‘Manganeios’, a relatively lengthy continuous eulogy of Manuel’s merits to rule is magnified by a technique that contrasts his galaxy of imperial virtues which supposedly compelled the Germans to cross the Bosphoros – thus saving the capital – with some of the conventional negative traits of the Latin barbarians. ‘Manganeios’ writes:

‘Hail to your wisdom, hail to your forbearance, and your patience and your persistence, and your unsurprised and steadfast heart, and your firm intellect and brave thoughts! How did you bear the enemies’ insolence? How did you refuse to kill the murderers in revenge? Finally you won the crown for patience; but they proved ridiculous in their brutality. You became a new David, patient and meek…You saw, kings, the Emperor, celestial light of New Rome…a second Solomon, son of the meek David, and – the most unexpected – you saw a young man’s wisdom as he recompensed his enemies with benefactions. If you have similar virtue, boast of it; but if you have just pride, haughtiness and vanity, then your conceit and lofty words are in vain. Don’t raise your brows vainly, don’t show pride, elder Rome. See, you have realised from your very experience of events how different your power is from that of New Rome. So be restrained, don’t make vain boasts.

Manuel’s propaganda of legitimisation is again countering the convention that the emperor should be a man of mature years. Once more he is described as naturally in control of his passions, just as the ideal emperor should be. This notion was an enduringly influential imperial idealisation which appears to have been employed in Manuel’s inaugural propaganda explicitly and implicitly to contrast a calm and contained, though youthful and

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100 Magdalino, Empire, p.450.
102 ‘Manganeios Prodromos’, 24.78-104.
103 Compare with Magdalino, Empire, p.416.
spirited emperor with the Second Crusade, or rather, the perceived stereotypical bestial and uncontrollable forces of nature which were the inherently arrogant and bellicose Latin barbarians of Byzantine rhetoric. Manuel’s propagandists exemplified by ‘Manganeios Prodromos’ are saying, look, whilst the emperor is young and brave he is gentle. More than that he his wise and patient; he is truly a new David and Solomon. The emperor’s theoretical intelligence frequently drew comparisons with the wisdom of Solomon (and occasionally that of Daniel).\textsuperscript{104} As Manuel was the ideal Christian ruler and the earthly embodiment of Christ divinely ordained to succeed his father, his propagandists are claiming that manifestly the emperor was worthy of his controversial and unusual elevation to the imperial throne. How could it be otherwise they asked? See how he also saved the city from the brutal folly of the western barbarians who are worse than the most vilified biblical and mythical figures. See how he taught Old Rome the might of New Rome. See how his stratagems defeat the barbarian menace, and his accomplishments far excel his imperial forefathers’ victories over the Latins.

As previously noted, there is no firm evidence that Conrad and the Latin army ever intended to assault the capital of the king’s ally and relative. The Byzantine perception of the innate negative traits of the barbarian provided the encomiasts with a canon of \textit{topoi} to draw a contrast between a composed, benign and intelligent Davidic Manuel to legitimise the youthful emperor’s elevation to the imperial throne. If the encomiasts were prepared to exaggerate the triumphs of previous Komnenoi against the Latin barbarians the better to reflect Manuel’s imperial virtue and the right to rule, it can be contended, and indeed it is likely, that the seemingly disorderly conduct of the perceived stereotypical barbarians was likewise inflated to enhance the propagandistic image of Manuel’s handling of the kings. In consequence, we must not attribute too much authority to the representation of the crusaders in the encomia, or for that matter, sources which may be dependent upon the encomiastic tradition.

John Kinnamos was heavily dependent upon this tradition. Importantly, Kinnamos appears to be at pains to compare and contrast the stereotypical objectionable traits of the Latin barbarian with imperial encomiastic virtues. Kinnamos tells of a purported letter written by Conrad to Manuel whilst the king encamped at Pikridion. Part of the letter has Conrad attributing the inevitable small-scale plunder and destruction caused by his army as it advanced towards Constantinople to ‘the impulse of the disorderly mob’, recklessly hastening onwards. Kinnamos depicts Manuel calmly haranguing Conrad in reply, stating that the perpetually uncontrollable manner of the crusaders had been noted. Manuel supposedly

\textsuperscript{104} Magdalino, \textit{Empire}, p.447.
writes that although he had intended to treat the crusaders benignly, considering Conrad could not control his mob which was allowed to exercise its passions at will, he will follow Conrad’s example and not look for ways to ‘suppress the impulse of our mob’. Kinnamos thus presents a similar image to that portrayed in contemporary encomia, exemplified by the panegyrics of ‘Manganeios’. The encomiast may write that Conrad was ‘inwardly convulsed, roaring like a wild beast’ whilst at Pikridion, but Kinnamos, ‘Manganeios’ and their respective audiences knew that such animal imagery was a frequently employed and instantly recognisable motif which denoted the uncultured, reckless, aggressive and indisciplined barbarians, or an impulsive disorderly mob, as Kinnamos prefers here. In contrast, Manuel is in control of his passions and initially intended to treat the crusaders with kindness – just as ‘Manganeios’ declares that a temperate and benevolent Manuel initially received the crusaders in the manner of David.

Kinnamos suggests that even though Manuel knew his army had fewer soldiers than the crusaders, it was nonetheless superior in military science, and thus he planned as follows. Manuel commanded imperial soldiers to confront the crusaders in battle array at Pikridion, and as soon as the crusaders observed this, they were seized ‘by great eagerness and disorder’ and rushed at the Byzantines. Kinnamos writes that as the crusaders attacked, ‘naturally the Romans skilfully resisted’ and slew large numbers. Conrad ‘so far warlike and puffed up with pride’ remained in camp, apparently unaware of what had befallen his army. Manuel then seemingly wished to mock Conrad’s previous arrogance. He wrote a further letter comparing the crusader army to an uncontrollable horse, and he advised the king that military commanders must not allow their soldiers to act according to their natural impulses. Manuel again told Conrad that he wanted to treat the king benevolently, but asked him to consider what had now happened because of the ‘disorderliness of the mob. For I learn that a minute army of Romans which encountered an immense number of Germans manhandled them.’ Manuel makes it clear that this is because a Byzantine army is superior to any foreign force.

The skirmish and letters certainly relate to the clash described by ‘Manganeios Prodromos’ at Pikridion, and indeed Kinnamos again appears to be relying heavily here on the encomiastic tradition. Once more Kinnamos stresses that Manuel is kindly in the manner of David. In ‘Manganeios’, Conrad rushes at the Byzantines just like the wild impetuous and disorderly rhetorical animal he is, but is destroyed by a small detachment of soldiers and the strategy of the emperor. Kinnamos likewise contrasts the perceived uncontrollable, natural

105 Ioannes Cinnamus, Rerum, pp.76-7; John Kinnamos, Deeds, pp.64-5.
106 Ioannes Cinnamus, Rerum, p.77; John Kinnamos, Deeds, p.65.
107 Ioannes Cinnamus, Rerum, p.78; John Kinnamos, Deeds, p.66.
belligerence of the western beast with the orderly and methodical Roman ‘science of war’. As previously noted, the phrase ‘military science’ is an encomiastic slogan seemingly employed to accentuate the martial skill of the emperor and his generals.

According to Kinnamos, Conrad did not pay any attention to Manuel’s latest harangue, and in fact demanded that the emperor provide imperial vessels worthy of the king’s status to transfer him across the Bosphoros. So Manuel, angered by the ‘braggart’, wrote to Conrad a further time, advising him that someone with intelligence would perceive that his large army was naturally inferior to the excellence and skill of a Byzantine force. Manuel compared the crusader army to a weak sparrow or a flock of sheep which would suffer from the attack of a single lion. Kinnamos then has a considered Manuel continuing to lecture Conrad on the German’s rightful subordinate place in the world political order, as the events which Kinnamos portrayed suitably demonstrated. In the following sentences of the letter, Manuel appears to shift subject matter abruptly on a number of occasions. First, he tells Conrad that he will never board the imperial galley, but that he must return from whence he came. In the next two sentences, Manuel states that he cannot be blamed for taking vengeance against those who have committed wrongful acts. In the penultimate sentence, there is another abrupt change of subject when Manuel declares that, owing to the previous Byzantine subjugation of the neighbouring lands, the empire will claim any territory the crusaders may conquer – although he still writes that the Romans will possess these without difficulty. The last sentence of the letter sees another sharp deviation from the previous subject matter when Manuel tells Conrad that even though the Byzantine populace has demanded an attack on the king, he has refused, although Conrad’s arrogance may compel an attack.¹⁰⁹

This letter reads almost like a checklist of the encomiasts’ ‘prescribed identikit model’.¹¹⁰ There are the frequently employed encomiastic motifs of martial skill, bestial barbarians, the emperor as lion (rather than a wolf, which denoted the crusaders) and Old Rome’s subordination to New Rome.¹¹¹ Similar to encomiastic tradition, Kinnamos also jumps between subject matter that can appear contradictory. Conrad is informed he will not reach Asia Minor on the imperial galley, but will succeed only in retracing his steps; yet Manuel demands that any conquered territory in Anatolia be subject to Byzantine rule. This appears to betray that Kinnamos, and perhaps the contemporary encomiasts, were actually aware that the crusade was not a pretext for subjugating the Empire. Moreover, his statement that Manuel will nevertheless easily recover this territory is very much in line with the

¹¹¹ Magdalino, Empire, p.447.
Another abrupt shift analogous to the techniques evident in verse encomia is Manuel’s statement that he cannot be blamed for seeking vengeance. This again corresponds with the encomiasts’ eulogy of Comnenian militarism and the notion of just war perpetrated against unprovoked aggressors. The last sentence sees another jump and another contradiction. Even though Manuel commits justified acts of violence, he also refuses to shed the blood of the crusaders despite provocation. The notion of bloodless victories, and Manuel’s patience and naturally ability to control his passions, even when provoked by a typically arrogant barbarian, are all frequently employed encomiastic motifs used in the celebration of Manuel’s imperial virtues which justified his controversial elevation to the throne. Encomiastic conventions greatly influenced the composition of Manuel’s last letter to Conrad that is ‘reproduced’ by Kinnamos.

According to both the history of John Kinnamos and the encomia, as exemplified by the poems of ‘Manganeios Prodromos’, a previously obstinate Conrad was compelled to cross to the suburb of Damalis on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus because of the crusaders’ seeming defeat in the skirmish at Pikridion. Corresponding with the known propaganda purposes of ‘Manganeios’ orations, the removal of the barbarian threat from the gates of the Queen of Cities was presented as an astute tactical success engineered by Comnenian military science.

To Kinnamos, and hence Bernard Kugler who does not question the Greek source, Manuel intended this to be the outcome of Byzantine hostility. Whilst it is implicit in Kinnamos, Kugler states clearly that Manuel’s first reply to Conrad’s letter sent to the king at Pikridion, and his posting of imperial soldiers opposite the crusaders, were intended to provoke the belligerent and undisciplined Germans into attacking the Byzantines. The crusaders duly endorsed the emperor’s tactics, and rushed in disorder at the imperial troops just as Manuel anticipated. In line with the emperor’s plan, they were soundly beaten by the martial skill of the Byzantines, and forced to cross the Bosphoros.

We cannot accept Kugler’s literal reading of John Kinnamos. The outcome of battle was always uncertain, and it would have been an unusual Comnenian tactic to attack larger non-hostile forces encamped outside Constantinople to coerce them to cross the Bosphoros.

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112 Compare with Magdalino, *Empire*, pp.418, 421, 450.
114 Compare with Magdalino, *Empire*, p.450.
117 Note: Odo states that Byzantine mercenaries attacked a number of French crusaders to compel them to cross the Bosphoros. However, the narrative’s context betrays that the clash was the result of French aggression after the withdrawal of a market, see above p.71.
The somewhat more passive and less provocative tactic of withdrawing markets was the preferred method.\textsuperscript{118} Odo of Deuil even says as much.\textsuperscript{119} But we are not dependent solely upon John Kinnamos for our interpretation of this event. The two Greek sources which refer to the actual clash differ in one critical aspect. ‘Manganeios’ implies that the Byzantine troops attacked the crusaders after the latter led an open assault against the city.\textsuperscript{120} As previously maintained, there is no other evidence for such an attack. Kinnamos suggests that the zealous and disorderly crusaders were provoked to attack the imperial troops simply by the latter’s presence, and furthermore that an astute Manuel employed a tactic to exploit the Germans’ inherent barbarism.\textsuperscript{121} Kinnamos therefore does not agree with the contemporary encomia, and his testimony is questionable if it conflicts with the only other source which refers to this episode. Moreover, Kinnamos’ version is consistent with the barbarian *topos* and the encomiastic motif of Comnenian martial skill; it should not be taken literally. Neither explanation for why the clash occurred is satisfactory.

The fact that no other sources indicate there was a skirmish at Pikridion suggests that the survivors of the crusade were either unaware of the clash, or perhaps they deemed it unworthy of recording unlike, for example, the disaster on the plain of Choirobacchoi. The omission from the Latin texts, and the fact that we are aware of this skirmish only from the Greek sources, suggests that whilst the clash was not perceived as a major event by the crusaders, it nonetheless provided the encomiasts with suitably dramatic subject matter to perform their art and eulogise the emperor. We know that ‘Manganeios Prodromos’ uses a process of rhetorical amplification to embroider the clash to represent a major Comnenian success. It holds that ‘Manganeios’ is likely to have exaggerated the scale of the disorder the better to reflect on the emperor’s legitimacy to rule. If so, texts which depend upon the encomiastic tradition and encomia as sources of information are also likely to be subject to hyperbolical distortion.

In consequence, the textual evidence which states that the crusaders’ defeat in the clash at Pikridion compelled Conrad and the army to cross the Bosphoros is problematic. Conrad may have crossed the Bosphoros with little more incentive than the reason the French and German armies advanced to Constantinople separately, namely, the problems associated with provisioning two large armies. Conrad’s advance would theoretically alleviate two problems. It would eliminate the difficulty of obtaining adequate supplies for the combined forces at Constantinople and in Anatolia, and it would resolve the impossibility of transporting two

\textsuperscript{118} See, for example, Odo of Deuil, *De Profectione*, pp.50-2.  
\textsuperscript{119} Odo of Deuil, *De Profectione*, p.78.  
\textsuperscript{120} ‘Manganeios Prodromos’, 20.323-36.  
large armies simultaneously across the Bosphoros.\textsuperscript{122} There is also little doubt that Conrad was eager to advance on Ikonion.\textsuperscript{123} Both are perfectly rational reasons why the army may have crossed into Asia Minor of its own free will. Given Manuel’s fears for his capital, there is also the possibility that the emperor withdrew the German market to expedite the departure of the army before the arrival of the French crusaders or, as would be perceived in this scenario, barbarian reinforcements.

Such a tactic may have resulted in the disorder witnessed at Pikridion. We may only conjecture why the Byzantines and crusaders clashed at the latter’s camp. Other episodes of crusader disorder in the Balkans and outside Constantinople can plausibly be ascribed to provisioning difficulties, and this suggests that crusader violence erupted and was militarily countered at Pikridion for similar reasons. If a Byzantine force was in place to police groups of crusaders who could not or would not provision themselves peacefully, the history of the crusades marching through Byzantine territory demonstrates that policing forces were under instructions to halt the crusaders’ violence.\textsuperscript{124} This should not be interpreted as mutual hostility between Conrad and Manuel, but rather as the acts of desperate crusaders clashing with imperial soldiers who had been charged with curtailing the former’s pillaging.

There was nothing unusual in the removal of markets – if indeed this did occur at Pikridion. The removal was used as a negotiating tool by the Byzantine emperors. On at least two occasions, Manuel Komnenos withdrew the market from French crusaders outside Constantinople, and reinstated it only when the crusaders crossed the Bosphoros.\textsuperscript{125} During the First Crusade, this became a familiar tactic employed by Alexios Komnenos. On at least two occasions, for example, Alexios withdrew the market from Godfrey de Bouillon to facilitate his negotiations with the crusade leader in Constantinople in 1096-7.\textsuperscript{126}

Any of these reasons may explain why Conrad crossed the Bosphoros, but whether it was Conrad’s decision to expedite the march on Ikonion, Manuel’s removal of markets, or indeed, a significant crusader defeat in arms against imperial soldiers, his crossing should not be

\textsuperscript{122} Niketas Choniates believed that every form of available vessel was used simply to transport the German army across the Bosphoros. Niketas Choniates, \textit{Historia}, p.87; Niketas Choniates, \textit{O City of Byzantium}, p.38


\textsuperscript{125} Odo of Deuil, \textit{De Profectione}, pp.50-2, 72-6.

\textsuperscript{126} The withdrawal of food supplies resulted in crusader disorder in 1097, as it did 50 years later. Albert of Aachen, ‘Historia’, pp.305-11.
interpreted as the act of non-cooperation Odo of Deuil maintained it was.\textsuperscript{127} Moreover, none of these reasons for crossing should be interpreted as overt hostility between Conrad and Manuel, nor as evidence of excessive German belligerence and disorder. To do so would be to continue to follow Kugler’s example and take a literal reading of the Greek sources, and in particular, of John Kinnamos.

The skirmishes and letters ‘reproduced’ in Kinnamos are seen as evidence of poor diplomatic relations between Conrad and Manuel.\textsuperscript{128} There are, however, a number of aspects of Kinnamos’ testimony outwith the obvious influence of Byzantine rhetorical conventions which must be considered. Byzantine contemporaries of the crusade appear to have presumed (incorrectly) that the army’s intentions in Byzantine territory were hostile, and this may have unduly influenced Kinnamos’ later narrative. At the time Kinnamos wrote his chronicle, the Komnenoi and Conrad’s House of Staufen had been effectively conducting a cold war for over two decades.\textsuperscript{129} Kinnamos’ history may merely reflect the current state of hostilities in the early 1180s, just as his favourable depiction of the French (despite evidence to the contrary in 1147) mirrors the good relations between Manuel and King Louis VII of France following the recent betrothal of Manuel’s son to the French king’s daughter around the time of Kinnamos’ writing.\textsuperscript{130} If we follow convention and interpret Kinnamos’ testimony irrespective of Byzantine rhetorical practice, we should view his history as a reflection of the contemporaneous perceptions of the relations between Conrad and Manuel in 1147, even though the source may not necessarily reflect their actual relations as projected, for example, in most of the Latin texts.

There are, however, further considerations which must be made before accepting Kinnamos’ testimony at face value. ‘Manganeios Prodromos’ wrote that Conrad’s ‘conceit and lofty words are in vain’, and thus gives the impression that Conrad – not surprisingly – was in communication with Manuel.\textsuperscript{131} But in the words of Kinnamos’ editor, ‘not one of the letters quoted by Kinnamos can be considered anything but a confection of his own’. The conception of the pseudo-speech and imaginary letter ultimately derives from Thucydides, and was a rhetorical technique employed to set forth one party’s position in a dispute.\textsuperscript{132} The imperial harangue was composed in such a manner that it was not intended to deceive the reader or listener.\textsuperscript{133}

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{127} Odo of Deuil, \textit{De Profectione}, p.48-9.
\item \textsuperscript{128} For example, Kugler, \textit{Studien}, pp.124-31; Angold, \textit{Byzantine Empire}, pp.195, 198.
\item \textsuperscript{129} Magdalino, \textit{Empire}, pp.62-8, 83-95, 98-108.
\item \textsuperscript{130} John Kinnamos, \textit{Deeds}, p.4.
\item \textsuperscript{131} ‘Manganeios Prodromos’, 24.100.
\item \textsuperscript{132} See Charles Brand’s comments in John Kinnamos, \textit{Deeds}, p.7.
\item \textsuperscript{133} Chalandon, \textit{Jean II Comnène}, p.xxviii.
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Kinnamos adapts Thucydides’ notion of the imaginary speech to suit his own purpose of portraying the emperor’s handling of the crusade in the most favourable light. Whilst Kinnamos’ flattering portrayal of the emperor and his subjects is certainly not unique, indeed he was writing within rhetorical conventions which expected such a portrayal,\textsuperscript{134} it was very much in Kinnamos’ interests to ingratiate himself with the Komnenoi. At his time of writing (circa 1180-2), he was attempting to regain imperial favour and a governmental place in the regency regime of Alexios Komnenos, the \textit{protosebastos} for Manuel’s son and successor, the young Alexios II. One of Kinnamos’ editors maintains that the eulogistic passages to be found in his text are central to the book’s very purpose, namely, to curry favour with the regent and the emperor.\textsuperscript{135} The Byzantine historians treated the historical genre as a vehicle for imparting their individual and partial perception of the past.\textsuperscript{136} Kinnamos’ portrayal of events and explanation of occurrences therefore, whilst not necessarily untrue, are not objective either. Manuel Komnenos (and by extension his imperial subjects) is depicted in a wholly positive fashion, succeeding over alien invaders, with little attempt made by the author at critical interpretation. This was facilitated by the ‘reproduction’ of fictional letters sent between Manuel and Conrad which suitably illuminated the Komnenoi’s imperial superiority over the House of Staufen.

Even before further Byzantine rhetorical conventions are taken into consideration, there are clearly problems in accepting a literal reading of Kinnamos’ text. Not least amongst these is the fact that whilst Kinnamos’ narrative repeats the clashes near Adrianople and outside Constantinople, as reported by ‘Manganeios Prodromos’, they are not recounted in our contemporary Latin sources. With appropriate evidence we might provide an explanation for the clashes and the apparent crusader defeats in terms of say, logistical necessity and manpower and tactics. To the Greek authors imbued with the notion of Latin barbarism, both the reason the crusaders clashed with the Byzantines and the reason they were seemingly defeated lay with unrestrained western belligerence and superciliousness. To the Byzantines, such barbaric traits inevitably led the crusaders to disregard the prowess of the smaller imperial forces, which, in contrast to the Latin mode of warfare, were able to combat the errant and impetuous crusaders by martial science rather than brute force. By nature the Latin barbarian was an indisciplined braggart, and just as naturally, these traits led to and easily explain both why the crusaders fought and indeed why they were defeated.

We have seen that the crusaders’ portrayed invasion and attack on Constantinople provided appropriate drama for the eulogistic tools of the encomiasts, and that the Byzantine

\textsuperscript{135} See Brand’s comments in John Kinnamos, \textit{Deeds}, pp.5, 9.
perception of the Latin barbarian provided the encomiasts with a canon of *topoi* to contrast with imperial virtue. Through the repetition of certain themes and motifs central to Manuel’s inaugural propaganda and the use of techniques such as *synkrisis* and rhetorical amplification, the crusade and crusaders are employed as foils to legitimise the emperor’s right to rule. In consequence, there are implications for the current historiography which is based predominantly on the well-known history of John Kinnamos. There is parity between the accounts of Kinnamos and ‘Manganeios’ which may suggest both had access to a common fund of perhaps official information to compose their works.\(^{137}\) However, the Greek historians also employed contemporary encomia as sources for their narratives, and John Kinnamos was more inclined than Niketas Choniates to reproduce encomiastic techniques, motifs and versions of events as found in the encomia.\(^{138}\) We cannot know for certain whether Kinnamos actually did employ contemporary encomia to compose his history of the crusade, let alone if he had access to the panegyrics of ‘Manganeios’. But the significant influence of encomiastic motifs and themes found in Kinnamos’ history demonstrates that Kinnamos relied heavily on encomiastic tradition – whether contemporary encomia as sources of information, or the rhetoric of the encomiasts which allowed him to pursue his own agenda of regaining imperial favour and a governmental place with the Komnenoi. He himself had been an encomiast and therefore was not only imbued with encomiastic techniques and vocabulary, but also understood how they could be made to work most effectively. If Kinnamos employed an encomiastic tradition which has been shown to make use of rhetorical amplification for imperial propaganda, his portrayal of crusader belligerence, disorder and poor relations with the emperor, which form the basis of the current historiography, is likely to have been subject to hyperbolical distortion. His history of the crusade must therefore be interpreted with similar reservations to those we would use in the interpretation of verse encomia.

To highlight this issue is not a direct criticism of Kinnamos’ approach to the Second Crusade. Given his intended audience, perhaps his testimony should be considered an official, sanctioned perception and conventional representation of the events and occurrences of thirty five years earlier. The influence of the Byzantine rhetorical conventions must, however, be taken into account. When we also consider the lack of supporting evidence for the clashes and hostilities Kinnamos reports, evidence to the contrary in our less accessible sources, and his personal reasons for extolling the emperor, it is clear historians must exercise extreme caution before employing his evidence of German arrogance, belligerence and

\(^{137}\) See above pp.31-2.

indiscipline. This is not to argue that the German army was not bellicose, or did not commit acts of disorder, any more than it is to say that Manuel did not have praiseworthy virtues. Nonetheless, we must not be tempted, as some have been, to accept faithfully Kinnamos’ portrayal of hostile proceedings.\footnote{139 For example, Angold, Byzantine Empire, pp.195-8; Lilie, Byzantium, p.152; Harris, Byzantium, pp.95-6, 99-100.}

There is no comparable evidence in Niketas Choniates of hostility between Manuel, Conrad and their respective forces at Constantinople, although interestingly there is evidence of the encomiastic tradition in his narrative, too. This may be a consequence of Choniates’ experience as an encomiast, or perhaps his use of encomia as sources of information which he employs rather more selectively than the uncritical Kinnamos. If the crusaders were responsible for the hostilities at Pikridion, Choniates’ omission of the conflict may betray his own agenda.\footnote{140 Niketas Choniates, Historia, p.87; Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, p.38.} His interpretation of the skirmish near Adrianople and the flood on the plain of Choirobacchoi were perhaps influenced by his interpretation of divine providence which witnessed God’s transferral of His favour from the Byzantines to the western barbarians. Does Choniates’ omission of the skirmish at Pikridion reflect that his original sources held the crusaders responsible for the clash, and he chose therefore to omit it from his narrative? Either way, Choniates’ subjective interpretation of divine providence provides us with another perspective on events, and it seems that his description of the clash at Adrianople and the flood at Choirobacchi were intended to act as a corrective to the partial evidence of contemporary encomia.

One important act of revision to received interpretations in Constantinople raises an interesting question. Choniates stated that the crusade was not a pretext to conquer Byzantine territory.\footnote{141 Niketas Choniates, Historia, p.81-2; Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, pp.36-7.} Kinnamos’ last imaginary letter written by Manuel to Conrad seems to betray that Kinnamos, and perhaps contemporary encomiasts knew that the seizure of Byzantine territory was not an aim of the crusade, as later events were to prove. Manuel’s preparations for receiving the crusade at Constantinople, and the circulation of prophecies of the destruction of the city, clearly demonstrate that the crusade was perceived as a threat. To those inherently predisposed to the notion of Latin barbarism, the German and French disorder on crusade would only have reinforced preconceived fears that the armies’ intentions were hostile, notions which are portrayed in contemporary encomia.\footnote{142 ‘Manganeios Prodromos’, 24.53-4; Michael the Rhetor, p.173; Eustathios of Thessalonica, pp.105-6.}

\footnote{139 For example, Angold, Byzantine Empire, pp.195-8; Lilie, Byzantium, p.152; Harris, Byzantium, pp.95-6, 99-100.} \footnote{140 Niketas Choniates, Historia, p.87; Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, p.38.} \footnote{141 Niketas Choniates, Historia, p.81-2; Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, pp.36-7.} \footnote{142 ‘Manganeios Prodromos’, 24.53-4; Michael the Rhetor, p.173; Eustathios of Thessalonica, pp.105-6.}
Kinnamos and ‘Manganeios’ the better to reflect on imperial virtue. When this is taken into consideration, it becomes difficult to discern whether their portrayal of the crusader threat reflected actual or embellished concerns. Did ‘Manganeios Prodromos’ and Kinnamos’ statements that the crusade was a barbarian act of war reflect common perceptions, or were they the product of rhetorical amplification and, ultimately, sanctioned Comnenian propaganda in 1147 and 1180-2 respectively?143

One thing does seem sure. Whilst Manuel’s propagandists wished to foster an impression of hostile crusader intent, the emperor’s behaviour reveals something quite different. The strengthening of the existing dynastic bonds between the Komnenoi and the Staufen, as reflected in the marriage of Conrad’s ally and relative, Henry ‘Jasormigott’ of Babenberg, the Duke of Bavaria, to Manuel’s niece Theodora in 1148,144 the apparent confirmation of the earlier alliance by the so-called ‘Treaty of Thessalonica’;145 Conrad’s suggestion of bringing the dynasties even closer by a marriage between his son and heir, Henry, with one of Manuel’s female relatives, and upon Henry’s death in 1151 offering himself as a suitor to draw the dynasties closer still,146 do not suggest that either monarch considered the clashes between their respective forces as actually constituting war between the imperial Houses, or indeed that either found events during the passage of the crusade as causes for war. Conrad’s letters to Abbot Wibald written whilst on crusade are a reflection of the relationship between the two during this period. Conrad calls Manuel his ‘brother’ (frater noster Grecorum imperator), writes that Manuel received him honourably (honorifice) and says that when Manuel acted as Conrad’s personal physician in February 1148,147 the emperor ‘showed us on that occasion such honour as we never heard that he had displayed to our predecessor’ (tantum illic nobis honoris exhibens, quantum nullumquam predecessori nostro exhibitum esse audivimus).148 Given their alliance before the Second Crusade,149 the evidence suggests that the two rulers considered themselves allies and not enemies before, during and after the

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143 Of course, the imperial propaganda machine may not have sanctioned Manganeios’ encomia. Manganeios occasionally had cause to complain that the emperor took no notice of his poems on Manuel’s supposed military victories. See Jeffreys, M., “‘Rhetorical’ Texts”, in Jeffrey, Rhetoric, pp.87-100, especially p.94.
144 See, for example, ‘Annales Palidenses’, p.83.
149 See above p.36.
This, of course, is in stark contrast to ‘Manganeios’ and Kinnamos’ testimonies, even if perhaps the alliance was rooted in Realpolitik rather than purely the Staufen’s familial bonds with the Komnenoi.

In addition to John Kinnamos and Niketas Choniates, Odo of Deuil has similarly influenced the historiography. Odo’s dual purpose in writing his history was to display his gratitude and admiration for his sovereign, and more importantly for his portrayal of the Byzantines and the German crusaders, to provide a guide to future French pilgrims of the (predominantly) logistical difficulties encountered on route to the East. We can deduce that this latter aim colours his interpretation of events. Odo has a tendency to oversimplify the immediate relation between cause and effect, which he expounds through a seemingly innate prejudice against both Germans and Greeks. Rather than taking into account the many factors which, for example, may have influenced the Byzantine decision to sell the armies market wares via ropes suspended from the town walls, caused Byzantine soldiers to repress the necessary pillaging activities of perhaps desperate crusaders, or caused crusaders to plunder Philippopolis or the park and palace complex of Philopation, Odo is too inclined to ascribe such conduct to Greek perfidy or German disorder which he portrays as causing the French provisioning problems.

Manuel Komnenos promised the crusaders markets,\textsuperscript{150} and issued a proclamation stating that the towns along the crusaders’ route should provide suitable fora.\textsuperscript{151} This should not be interpreted to mean that the towns had the necessary resources, and that the markets could adequately provision a crusade of unknowable size. Nor does the potential provision of adequate markets mean all those crusaders with movable forms of wealth could obtain supplies peacefully – never mind many of those largely ignored in the sources who must have been destitute when they arrived at Constantinople. The sources demonstrate that many did not obtain satisfactory provisions.\textsuperscript{152} None of this should necessarily be ascribed to Greek perfidy, but to the almost inevitable consequence of the passage of large armies advancing through medieval agrarian societies.

The episodes of French disorder were grounded in the essential need to obtain provisions which would have been extremely scarce because of the preceding march of the German crusade. In not allowing the Germans the very same fundamental need to obtain, by forceful means if necessary, the provisions to survive, Odo – perhaps purposely – left the impression that the Germans were wanton despoilers. Violent and greedy men were undoubtedly

\textsuperscript{150} See, for example, Odo of Deuil, \textit{De Profectione}, p.28.
\textsuperscript{151} Niketas Choniates, \textit{Historia}, p.81; Niketas Choniates, \textit{O City of Byzantium}, p.36; Helmold of Bosau, \textit{‘Chronica Slavorum’}, pp. 115-16.
\textsuperscript{152} See, for example, Gerhoh of Reichersberg, \textit{‘De Investigatione’}, pp.374-5; ‘Manganeios Prodromos’, 24.145-55; ‘Annales Palidenses’, pp.82-3.
attracted to the crusade, but that does not mean all episodes of German disorder were merely gratuitous as Odo portrays them. Moreover, the king’s chaplain occasionally appears to have manipulated his data to emphasise German indiscipline and the treachery of the Greeks to accentuate French logistical difficulties which, in turn, provided him with a justification for French acts of pillaging.

Both the French and the German armies clearly did plunder, pillage and slay inhabitants, but it must be stressed this was not unusual. It would be unusual if such behaviour were not recorded in the sources concerning the passage of large medieval armies with loose command hierarchies and individualistic notions of loyalty. Disorderly conduct may have been inherently worse in a crusader force which included large numbers of non-combatants as well as armed volunteers with no allegiances to regulate their behaviour. Such incidents were underpinned by much more than intrinsic aggression and the desire for material wealth. Fundamental logistical necessities, the sinews of war, were invaluable as booty. Whether this was in the form of horses, pack animals, food on the hoof, other forms of edible consumables, or indeed the wealth needed to purchase such supplies, an army marches on its stomach, and food and the means to convey it must be obtained at all costs. If individuals did not have the ability to purchase the available basic supplies to survive, owing either to the restrictive nature of agrarian society, or the individualistic character of the crusaders’ provisioning arrangements, they obtained them by other means; from time immemorial, this meant foraging and pillaging. In the case of the German crusade, this essential requirement was exacerbated by the destruction of the German camp during the flash flood at Choirobacchoi.

The passage of massive armies inevitably caused a severe logistical strain on the towns and cities encountered, which ultimately resulted in violence. Again, there was nothing unusual in this. As Pryor has recently pointed out, all crusader forces resorted to forage and plunder, and it is actually surprising that there are not more accounts of such activity in the sources. The paucity of such accounts may well be because this fundamental means of obtaining supplies was unexceptional, and thus not deemed worthy of recording until it proved noteworthy, as for example, when large numbers were killed, extraordinary types and amounts of booty were acquired, or an author recorded such conduct to further his agenda.

There was also nothing exceptional in foragers and pillagers encountering hostile resistance to their conduct. A dedicated Byzantine force was charged with curtailing such

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Evidence of mutual hostile activity between the crusaders and Byzantines is entirely to be expected.

In summary, ever since Kugler, it has been traditionally held that the German crusaders were somehow unusually indisciplined and belligerent. A consideration of the means by which the bulk of the crusaders and the Byzantines initially assumed the army would be provisioned has established that there was actually nothing unusually belligerent or indisciplined in the Germans’ conduct. The crusaders would have considered their pillaging activities entirely normal, even if they were unacceptable to the Byzantines. Critical analysis of the sources has established that we must exercise extreme caution before accepting their testimonies. We must clearly question Kugler’s literal reading of the texts, and hence the conventional interpretation of the Germans’ conduct. We must also recognise that the sources’ portrayal of Byzantine/crusader relations, which are inextricably linked with the behaviour of Conrad and the German army, are subject to literary distortions. A construing of poor Staufen/Komnenoi relations founded on these texts must evidently be problematic.

Kugler believed that the crusaders’ behaviour, as portrayed in the distorted texts, alienated Conrad from Manuel and that the emperor refused to meet him, a reasonable conclusion for Kugler to reach since he based it predominantly on an uncritical reading of the sources. But the apparent mutual hostility between the two outside Constantinople had perhaps more to do with the emperor-elect’s wish to not become embroiled in Byzantine court ceremonial, which would seek to establish the king’s subordinate status in the world political order. It is certainly reasonable to suggest that neither Manuel nor Conrad could be seen to defer publicly to a perceived pretender to the imperial title of Old Rome. Such deference would have witnessed the king publicly entering Constantinople or the emperor leaving the confines of his capital. This is perhaps why there is no Greek record of Manuel’s meetings with either Louis VII or Conrad III outside Constantinople at this point when we know for certain that he met the King of France at a castle on the north shore of the Gulf of Nikomedia, and other evidence suggests he may have met Conrad in similar circumstances. We hear, for example, of the German king being magnificently received by the emperor who lavished gifts upon him and the army. Conrad conferred with Manuel on routes across Anatolia and the

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provision of guides, and the emperor was generous in his offers of sound advice.\textsuperscript{156} Some form of agreement was clearly reached if the army was ferried across the Bosphoros by Byzantine boats,\textsuperscript{157} and the emperor appointed guides to lead the army.\textsuperscript{158}

Although the sources for the Second Crusade are subject to distortion, the Latin West was nonetheless still generally perceived as a threat to Constantinople’s security. Perhaps the apparent Byzantine niceties were merely devices to expedite the speedy departure of the crusaders to the relative safety of the Asiatic side of the Bosphoros, an action which would also relieve the undoubted logistical strain on the city’s markets. Even so, the product of Conrad’s and Manuel’s negotiations do not suggest that relations between the two were overtly hostile, but rather, that the allied and related imperial dynasties of the Staufen and Komnenoi had concluded discussions to facilitate the crusade’s success in Anatolia where Manuel could do little to influence the subsequent course of events.

\textsuperscript{157} For example, see ‘Annales Herbipolenses’, pp.4-5; ‘Annales Palidenses’, pp.82-3.
Part III
8. Geography of Anatolia

It is essential to a study of the crusades that the historian gain an appreciation not only of the landscape the crusaders encountered, but also the broader geographical picture of western Anatolia. This will better enable us to interpret the source topographical evidence and understand the army’s logistical considerations which were to have an effect on the history of the crusade. To discover the nature of Anatolia’s varied topographies, we must first outline Turkey’s modern geography by drawing on recent surveys. This will provide us with a geographical template upon which to impose evidence from a wide range of sources, including my own personal observations, which in turn will enable us to recreate images of medieval western Anatolia’s settlement patterns, patterns of land use and, ultimately, the topography of the terrain the crusaders encountered.

Geography of Turkey

The Turkish landscape is divided into three topographies. Mountain ranges which expand more or less parallel with the coasts separate the mostly arid and often barren terrain of the central plateau from the predominantly fertile and relatively populated coastal plains. The continuous northern Pontic ranges are 30-40 kilometres wide, are narrower and higher in the east than the west, and are separated by valleys linked by rivers that flow through transverse gorges. The southern ranges are less continuous, and consist principally of the Taurus and Anti-Taurus Mountain ranges which are between 50 and 100 kilometres wide. In the southwest, there is a high plateau and there are smaller ranges which run roughly parallel to each other and are separated by deep narrow valleys which run down to the Mediterranean. The mountains are mostly arid, calcareous formations, and increase in height in a southwest-northeast direction towards Armenia. At the Aegean end of the peninsula, broad flat valleys running roughly in a west-east direction separate a series of block-like mountains. Between the mountain ranges lies the plateau at a height of 1,000-2,000 metres and occupying the centre of the peninsula. The plateau consists of mostly dried-out lake basins which receive water from the surrounding hills and mountains on a seasonal basis. The basins are separated by rolling hills, except in the southeast where there is a number of largely volcanic mountains. The high altitude of the plateau, coupled with the sheltering action of the northern

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1 For ease of reference to the cited sources, the brief section entitled ‘Geography of Turkey’ will depart from the convention laid down in ‘Notes on names, translations and citations’. Modern Turkish nomenclature solely is employed, except for the names of well-known seas and mountains. For the most comprehensive map detailing relief, hydrology and settlements see TAVO AI 2 Türkei: Relief, Gewässer und Siedlungen (Westteil). This brief section is predominantly based on Hendy, Studies, pp.26-32. See pages 27, 29, 30 and 31 in Hendy for diagrammatic maps detailing Turkey’s physical structure, average temperatures, mean annual precipitation, and modern land-use and natural vegetation respectively. Also see Belke & Mersich, Phrygien; Belke, Galatien; Wagstaff, J., The Evolution of Middle Eastern Landscapes: An outline to A.D.1840 (London, 1985).
and southern mountain ranges, creates extremes of seasonal temperature, and reflects a typical steppe climate.\(^2\)

By contrast, the low altitude of the coastal plains, coupled with the moderating action of the seas and trapping action of the mountains’ seaward slopes, produces a classically Mediterranean climate,\(^3\) although there are coastal variations. The Black Sea shapes Turkey’s northern shore and narrow coastal plain, and the northern mountain ranges allow the flow of a number of major rivers into the Black Sea, namely, the Sakarya, Kızılırmak and Yesıllırmak. The Black Sea is connected to the Aegean, and subsequently the Mediterranean, by way of the Bosphoros. To the west of the Bosphoros, the Simav Çayı is the largest of the rivers in the northwest of the country. Further south, the west to east axis of the northern and southern mountain ranges, and the tendency for the mountains to increase in height west to east, ensures that a number of major rivers flow in the west of Turkey. Chief amongst these are the Gediz and the Büyük Menderes, and, although smaller, the still considerable Kuşuk Menderes and Bakır rivers, all making their way through the Aegean littoral to the sea. The Göksu and Aksu rivers run into the Mediterranean on the southern shore of Turkey. With the exception of the rivers Ceyhan and Seyhan, few major rivers flow on this southern flank of the peninsula because of the more or less continuous nature of the mountain ranges which frequently descend directly into the sea. Most of the above-mentioned rivers have their own fertile alluvial plains, and some rivers combine to create larger ones. Backed by the Taurus Mountains, the Köprü and Aksu rivers help shape the Antalya Plain, which rises inland in three great steps. More than 300 kilometres to the east, the Taurus mountain range also backs on to the Cilician Plain which is watered by the Ceyhan and Seyhan rivers, territory separated from a higher inland basin by a series of low hills.

The contrast in terrain and climate between the coastal plains and river valleys and the central plateau is reflected in their patterns of vegetation and land-use. Much of the plateau is treeless, with a great deal of scrub, although it does support both pastoral and – thanks mainly to modern land exploitation techniques – arable economies, particularly in its basins of traditionally fertile land around places such as Konya. The fertile river valleys and arable coastal plains are typically mixed, with vineyards, orchards, olive groves and market gardening. Woodlands and forests are characteristic of the vegetation found on the plateau.

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\(^2\) Mean daily temperatures in July exceed 20 degrees celsius, but in January, they fall to below freezing. The total amount of precipitation varies from year to year, but it is less than 400 mm in most areas and can fall as snow and lie for more than ten days of the year.

\(^3\) For example, on the Black Sea Coast, mean daily temperatures in January are above freezing, and those in July are 22 degrees celsius. Precipitation exceeds 600 mm and rises to more than 1,500 mm in the East because of the mountain backing.
perimeter, the coastal mountains, and other areas of transitional terrain between high and low land which otherwise consists of bare rock and land incapable of supporting agriculture.

The amalgamation of the moderate climates and fertility of the lowland coastal plains and river valleys, which are dependent upon the physical structure of the peninsula, ensures that the population density of lowland Turkey is greater than that of the high ground; yet, the total territorial mass of the coastal plains and river valleys is significantly less. Even without the work done by Hendy and the TAVO cartographers, the difference in population densities is apparent to the modern observer.

Twelfth-Century Topography

The brief survey of Turkey’s geography given above is ultimately derived from current measurement techniques and modern observations of the largely unchanging geographical features such as mountains, plains and river valleys, and those features more susceptible to change, namely, patterns of land-use and vegetation. The challenge of reconstructing the twelfth-century geography of Anatolia is a difficult proposition, as comparable contemporary surveys were not conducted. Indeed, there are no contemporary Turkish, Persian or Arabic sources which throw appreciable light on its geography. Medieval Greek texts occasionally illuminate provincial life, but depictions of Anatolia’s landscape are hard to find. We can, nevertheless, draw on various modern scholarly works and a number of primary sources to reconstruct the country’s twelfth-century topography.

Settlement Patterns

Michael Hendy has demonstrated that prior to the Byzantine loss of the greater part of Anatolia to Turkish invaders after the Battle of Mantzikert (1071), the largest concentration of centres of habitation was in the central western lowland coastal plain and river valleys which enjoyed a Mediterranean climate. To the east of this area, there was another dense concentration, although it covered a smaller area than the first. This was located roughly in the southwest of Phrygia, and generally extended from the 500-metre contour line in the

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4 Hendy, Studies, p.28; TAVO AVIII 2 Vorderer Orient: Bevölkerungsverteilung; TAVO AVIII 3 Vorderer Orient: Bevölkerungsdichte.
5 See Magdalino, Empire, pp.123-32.
6 This discussion on settlement patterns is based on Hendy, Studies, pp.27, 31, 90-100. For a map detailing Turkey’s relief, see TAVO AI 2. For a simplified map of Turkey’s relief and twelfth-century nomenclature, see below, map no.2.
7 See below, map no.6.
8 Byzantine province/theme boundaries and nomenclature often changed with succeeding regimes. For ease of reference to further sources, and unless stated otherwise, the familiar Roman nomenclature for provinces will be used throughout this thesis as per TAVO BVI 2 Östlicher Mittelmeerraum und Mesopotamien: Das Christentum bis zum Konzil von Nikaia (325 n.Chr.).
west to approximately the 1000-metre line eastwards towards the central plateau. The geographical location is reflected in a climate which is predominantly Mediterranean, although the climate begins to resemble, and eventually merges with that of the plateau at the easternmost highest attitudes. In the north of the country, a narrow concentration of centres of habitation existed along the length of the Sea of Marmara and included the cities of Nikomedia and Nikaia in Bithynia. It was delineated in the west by the Rhyndakos River (modern Simav Çayı) and in the east by the Sangarios (modern Sakarya), and was within the 500-metre contour line which benefitted from a Mediterranean climate. Further east, there was a concentration between 500 metres and 1000 metres around an inland basin. This is best described in historical and territorial terms as consisting of the late Roman and early Byzantine provinces of Galatia Salutaris and northeastern Phrygia Salutaris through which the headwaters of the Sangarios and its tributary the Tembros (modern Pursuk Çayı) flow. It is less open to the coastal Mediterranean climate and more open to the steppe climate of the plateau, although temperatures are not as harsh as further inland. In the south of western Anatolia there were two small concentrations of settlements, both enjoying Mediterranean climates. The first was in Pamphylia and included the areas around the Kestros and Eurymedon Rivers (modern Aksu and Köprü respectively), and the second was to be found in Isauria which had a high proportion of land over 1000 metres (the Taurus) relative to that below the 500-metre contour line.

Hendy concluded that the overwhelming majority of centres of habitation were concentrated in the lowland western coastal plains and river valleys, and on higher ground up to an altitude of approximately 1000 metres. The only concentration on the western central plateau was where a river valley and its alluvial basin facilitated settlement in a climate not open to the full rigours of the plateau. Therefore, before the greater part of Anatolia was lost to the Byzantines, the highest densities of centres of habitation reflect those which can be found today. It is clear that these are broadly determined by physical structure and its most important concomitant phenomena, fertility and climate.

As we will see below, Byzantine settlement patterns altered after 1071, and by the accession of Alexios I Komnenos a decade later, virtually the whole of central and western Asia Minor was under the control of Turkish chieftains. Although Alexios recovered the western coastal plains and river valleys before his death in 1118, the plateau was permanently lost. At the time of the Second Crusade, there is no evidence to suggest that a sedentary population existed between the plateau’s northwestern rim at the ruins of Dorylaion and

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9 See TAVO BVI 4 Östlicher Mittelmeerraum und Mesopotamien: Spätromische Zeit (337-527 n. Chr).
10 See below chapter 10.
Kedrea (modern Bayat),\textsuperscript{11} which was en route to the Seljuk capital, Ikonion (King Conrad’s stated objective).\textsuperscript{12} Thus, even in occasional pockets of fertility blessed by the advantage of a natural watercourse and which had once supported a Byzantine population before 1071, such as that at Nakoleia (modern Seyitgazi)\textsuperscript{13} beyond Dorylaion, the land often remained empty and uncultivated.

As Hendy’s study on settlement patterns before 1071 shows, the western central plateau did not have high concentrations of centres of habitation, regardless of the turmoil which enveloped Anatolia after Mantzikert. This suggests that the climate and fertility on the plateau did not facilitate the widespread cultivation of arable land\textsuperscript{14} and, given that the lowland plains and river valleys supported high densities of populations, the opposite was true on land below an altitude of 1000 metres.

**Agriculture and Pastoralism**

In keeping with most agrarian medieval societies, the patterns of high-density Byzantine settlements imply that they were located within naturally verdant regions which enabled the towns to be sustained from the agricultural produce of their immediate hinterland. Likewise, those regions with a low-density of settlements were presumably unable to provide the sustenance through agriculture needed to accommodate comparable populations. A number of disparate sources confirm these inferences. For example, the *Book of the Eparch*, compiled around 895 reveals that Nikomedia in Bithynia was a centre of a prosperous district and the natural market for the villages and farms around it.\textsuperscript{15} Evidence suggests that the coastal plains and river valleys were exploited for cereals throughout the Byzantine periods. We know, for example, that the Aegean coastal towns such as Ephesos (modern Selçuk) and Smyrna (modern Izmir) exported cereals and served their immediate hinterland,\textsuperscript{16} as well as the Maiandros (modern Büyük Menderes) and Hermos (modern Gediz) river valleys.\textsuperscript{17} A British Admiralty intelligence report of 1919 made before the widespread introduction of modern agricultural techniques, remarked that these same areas were renowned for their arable land.

The western coastal plains from the southern shore of the Sea of Marmara and along the whole length of the Aegean littoral were clearly fertile and produced the fruit, vegetables and

\textsuperscript{11} Belke & Mersich, *Phrygien*, pp.297-9. For the route beyond Dorylaion see below, map no.5.
\textsuperscript{12} See photograph no. III.1.
\textsuperscript{13} For Nakoleia see Belke & Mersich, *Phrygien*, pp.334-6.
\textsuperscript{14} Even if a scanty pattern of rainfall characterised by a spring maximum could allow the cultivation of winter cereals on some upland areas. Geyer, B., ‘Physical Factors in the Evolution of the Landscape and Land Use’, in Laiou, Economic History, pp.31-45.
\textsuperscript{15} Foss, *Nikomedia*, p.19.
\textsuperscript{16} See photographs III.2 and III.3.
\textsuperscript{17} Hendy, *Studies*, pp.48-9.
cereals common to the Mediterranean, and the fertility of the coastal plains was extended eastwards along the Hermos and Maiandros river valleys. The higher ground in the West above the plains and valleys was also productive, although the report noted it was less fertile than the lowland in the early twentieth century.\textsuperscript{18} I myself made similar observations in 2004.

The Admiralty report also noted that cereals were not extensively grown on the plateau because the extent of cultivable soil was small and natural irrigation rare. Other produce was occasionally cultivated in pockets of fertility, but generally the lack of rainfall and extremes of temperature (a product of the landscape’s physical structure) precluded cultivation. Indeed, its expansion would have been hindered by the lack of cultivable ground.\textsuperscript{19} The central plateau has therefore been exploited throughout history predominantly for pasturage. Evidence suggests that as early as the third century B.C., Gauls who settled in what became known as Galatia were pastoralists rather than agriculturalists. In the late Roman and early Byzantine periods, Kappadokia was well known for its horses, as was Lykandos, which was also suitable for stock raising. Later, we know the Byzantines exploited Paphlagonia, Phrygia and Galatia for sheep rearing.\textsuperscript{20} As will become evident in the following chapters, Türkmen tribes from beyond the western edge of the empire invaded the peninsula. The tribes easily transferred their pastoral nomadic existence from their eastern homelands to the higher pastures of western Anatolia after the partial territorial recovery by the Komnenoi. Thus, pastoralism was common to the highlands owing to the relative infertility of the soil. It is clear to the modern observer that even with present-day land exploitation techniques, little of the plateau is given over to the type of agriculture practised in the naturally fertile lowland river valleys and coastal plains.\textsuperscript{21}

The conclusions which can be drawn from the preceding sections on Turkey’s geography and Anatolia’s topography are clear. As the altitude decreases from the plateau in a westward direction, fertility increases, although the western hills are still not as verdant as the western and southernmost alluvial plains and river valleys. There is a direct correlation between those regions which historically attracted high-density populations and those which could be extensively exploited for agriculture. In both cases, these are the lowland coastal plains and river valleys. The higher land west of the plateau was also clearly populated and cultivated, but to a lesser extent than the lowlands, reflecting the lower fertility of the soil. On the

\textsuperscript{18} Admiralty (Naval Staff, Intelligence Division), C.B. 847B: \textit{A Handbook of Asia Minor 2, Western Asia Minor} (London: 1919), pp.101-11.
\textsuperscript{19} Admiralty, \textit{Asia Minor 2}, pp.111-12.
\textsuperscript{20} Hendy, \textit{Studies}, pp.54-5.
\textsuperscript{21} Also see TAVO AX 2 \textit{Türkei: Landnutzung (Westteil)}. 100
plateau itself, population and cultivation were and still are less than those found on the lower ground. The predominantly arid nature of the plateau largely, although not exclusively, precludes agricultural development, encouraging pastoralism where possible.

**Crusade Sources Which Throw Light on the Medieval Geography of Anatolia**

We must now turn to crusade sources to obtain specific contemporary descriptions of the geography of Anatolia. En route to Dorylaion in 1097, the armies of the First Crusade defeated Turkish forces in battle and, according to the *Gesta Francorum*, thereafter continued their march southeast on to the plateau through ‘wastelands, and waterless and uninhabitable terrain’ towards Ikonion.\(^{22}\) William of Tyre confirms that after the crusaders’ victory, they left the green pastures where they had defeated the Turks and journeyed south, ‘descending into a parched region lacking water’ where the army suffered greatly through thirst and heat.\(^{23}\) The sources do not suggest the crusaders encountered habitable terrain again until they neared the former Byzantine town of Antioch-in-Pisidia (near modern Yalvaç). This was described as ‘full of good and delicious things to eat’ in the *Gesta Francorum*,\(^{24}\) and a ‘fertile region with ample resources’ by William of Tyre.\(^{25}\)

During the crusading expedition of 1101, contingents led by the Lombards journeyed from Nikomedia (modern Izmit) in fertile Bithynia, due east to Ankyra (modern Ankara), then northeast to Gangra (modern Çankiri), and then east again towards Amaseia (modern Amasya). As Albert of Aachen informs us, the crusaders were apparently led from the road near Amasia through pathless wastelands and arid places. A decision was made to retreat, but the army was still compelled to ‘advance through very rough mountainous areas, into emptiness and uninhabitable places of horror, finding nothing, neither a human being nor a farm animal’.\(^{26}\)

In the spring of 1190, the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick Barbarossa followed the principal imperial campaign route\(^ {27}\) in the est of the peninsula.\(^ {28}\) The route passes through occasionally steep but mostly undulating country which is sparsely populated away from watercourses, and is currently given over to a mixture of agriculture on the low hills and


\(^{26}\) *in solitudines, et loca inhabitabilia et horroris, per Montana asperrima incedebant, ubi nichil repertientes, non hominem, non pecudem*. Albert of Aachen, ‘Historia’, pp.564-6, especially p.566.

\(^{27}\) For a schematic representation of the Byzantine military campaign routes, see below, map no.7.

plains, and pastoralism and woodland on higher ground. Upon reaching the ruins of Hierapolis (modern Pammukale), and then progressing through ‘a very pleasant valley, rich in liquorice, cardamom, myrtle, fig trees and other kinds of plants’, the army reached nearby Laodikeia (near modern Denizli) which lies at the head of the Maiandros Valley. At that time Laodikeia was in Byzantine hands and was seemingly able to provide a good market. The provision of a market was essential because, thereafter, the army continued east onto the plateau via a series of expansive yet deserted plains as far as modern day Dinar.

From here, they advanced eastwards again to the former Byzantine towns of Sozopolis (modern Uluborlu) and Philomelion (modern Akşehir). Sozopolis was continually disputed between the Seljuks and Byzantines during this period, and suffered a similar fate to that of other towns in disputed regions, in that by 1190 it lay desolate. Barbarossa encountered Türkmens inhabiting the region around Philomelion and, according to Niketas Choniates, Turks occupied the town when Barbarossa set fire to it.

Given that the former Byzantine towns were once provisioned at least partly from their immediate hinterland, there must have been pockets of fertile land along this route, and indeed this is confirmed by the sources and my own observations. The general impression given of the greater part of the plateau beyond Philomelion is that of a barren, hostile landscape which caused much suffering amongst the crusaders. The author of the Historia de Expeditione Frederici, described it as ‘a land of terror whose water is strongly impregnated with salt, foreign to all vegetation and use by human beings.’ It was only as the crusaders approached Ikonion that the sources again depict an inhabitable land, describing, for example, ‘a royal park and garden, with a great abundance of grass and water’ in its fertile alluvial basin.

A pattern emerges in the crusade texts. Upon leaving the fertile land of Bithynia, the First Crusade suffered from want of food, fodder and water between Dorylaion and Ikonion. Dorylaion, situated on the northwestern edge of the central plateau, did and still does

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29 See photograph III.4.


31 See photographs III.5 and III.6.


33 For example, see photograph III.7.

34 ‘in terram horroris et salsuginis, omni viriditate et humana commoditate alienam’. Anonymous (‘Ansbert’), ‘Historia de Expeditione’, p.76.

35 ‘hortum et viridarium regium multum habundantiam graminis et aquarum invenimus’. Anonymous (‘Ansbert’), ‘Historia de Expeditione’, p.84.
represent the limit of the comparatively fertile, cultivated and populated terrain which is characteristic of the coastal plains and river valleys of Asia Minor. As in the twelfth century, a modern traveller embarking on routes from Dorylaion southeast towards Ikonion soon passes through the steppe-like topography of the plateau. The various contingents in 1101 departed from the fertile, cultivated and highly populated region of Bithynia and proceeded due east. The landscape subjected them to serious physical hardship between Gangra and Amasia, and this semi-arid terrain still contrasts sharply with Bithynia. Frederick Barbarossa’s army encountered significant hunger and thirst owing to the barren terrain only once he started to advance east beyond Laodikeia and enter the plateau en route to Ikonion. Today, as in the twelfth century, the often steppe-like terrain east of Laodikeia presents a distinct contrast with the verdant river valleys to its west and beyond to the Aegean coastal plain.

Contemporaries were aware of the geographical differences. Odo of Deuil, for example, describes three paths from Nikaia,36 which traverse Anatolia en route to the Holy Land, and that are ‘unequal in length and unlike in character’ (quantitate disparis et qualitate dissimiles). He tells us that the first route,

‘Which bears to the left is shorter. If there were no obstacles, it could be travelled in three weeks; but after twelve days it arrives before Iconium, the seat of the sultan, a very noble city, and five days after passing the Turks, at the territory of the Franks.’37

This is evidently the route via Dorylaion taken by the First Crusade and described above by William of Tyre and the author of the Gesta Francorum. It is also the route Louis VII initially intended to traverse.38 Secondly, a route ‘bearing right is more settled and abundant; but in following the bending coastline it delays travellers thrice over since it has rivers and torrents which are to be feared in winter, like the snow and the Turks [on the first route].’39 This path, clearly passing through some populated and cultivated terrain providing an ‘abundance’ for an army,40 is the route which proceeds west from Nikaia via Lopadion (modern Uluabat near

36 The text reads ‘Nicomedia’. Odo is in error here. The three routes he describes are from Nikaia, which the crusaders reached after Nikomedia.
38 Hence Odo’s statement that Louis did not accept Byzantine advice to advance into Anatolia via Sestos (mod. Eceabat) and the Hellespont (Dardenelles), as ‘the king was unwilling to undertake something he was told the Franks had never done’; ‘Rex autem noluit incipere quod Francos audiebat numquam fecisset’, Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, p.58. For the precedent of the First Crusade and its influence on Louis, see Bull, M., ‘The Capetian Monarchy and the Early Crusade Movement: Hugh of Vermandois and Louis VII’, Nottingham Medieval Studies 40 (1996), pp.25-46.
40 See photographs III.8 and III.9 for modern images of the typical cultivated land on this route.
Karacabey) and Akhyraous (near modern Pamukça), before dropping down to the fertile Aegean littoral at Adramyttion (Edremit). The route then follows the verdant coastline southwards until it cuts inland from the coastal plain by way of the fertile Hermos and Maiandros valleys. The third alternative or the ‘middle’ route, continues Odo, ‘is tempered by the advantages and costly delays of the other two. It is longer but safer than the shorter route, and shorter and safer, but poorer, than the longer route.’ The French army subsequently embarked on this route from Nikaia. From Nikaia they marched west to ‘Lupar’ (Lopadion) and then to ‘Esseron’ (probably Akhyraous), and we know they aimed to pass through Philadelphia (Alaşehir) on a route not always furnished with supplies. It is likely that Odo is referring here to the main imperial campaign route in the west of the peninsula traversed by Frederick Barbarossa during the Third Crusade. As it does not cut directly across the plateau into Turkish territory via Dorylaion, it is longer than the first route, but was theoretically safer because it remained within the periphery of Byzantine territory.

Further, because it does not follow the bending coastline cut with swollen rivers by the winter rain, it is both shorter and safer than the second route described by Odo. However, Odo believed that the middle or third route was ‘poorer’ than the coastal route and ‘was not full of supplies’, thus indicating that this route was not as densely populated and cultivated as the coastal plains and river valleys – a point borne out by our preceding discussions on settlement patterns and land use, and my own observations.

Conrad III was aware of the topographical differences between the low-lying plains and valleys of western Anatolia, and the rising ground towards the plateau. Whilst Conrad was at Esseron, Odo has him counselling Louis VII in the following manner:

‘Well now, two roads are open to you, one of these is shorter but bereft [of supplies], the other is longer and well supplied with resources…Therefore, I counsel you to keep to the coastal route and preserve the strength of your knights for the service of God, even though that service be somewhat delayed.’

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41 See photographs III.10 and III.11.
42 See photograph III.12.
43 See below, map no.7.
44 ‘Media vero partis utriusque commodis et dispendiis temperatur, breviori longior sed tutior, longiori brevior et tutior sed pauperior.’ Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, p.88.
45 Probably because Louis encountered the sight of, and heard tales from, the survivors of Conrad’s army at Nikaia after it had succumbed to the barren, unpopulated and hostile route through Dorylaion, the French king changed his initial choice of direction over the plateau and marched westwards from Nikaia to Esseron with the remnants of the German princely contingents.
46 Philadelphia, located in the fertile Gediz valley, was one of the places where the crusaders may have been able to locate supplies. See photograph III.13.
47 Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, pp.89, 97, 103.
48 See below, map no.8.
49 ‘Ecce vobis proponitur duplex via, una brevior sed egena, altera longior opulenta…Unde vobis consulo quattinus maritime retineatis et robus vestrae militiae ad Dei servitium, licet tardius veniat, conserveitis.’ Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, p.104.
The first route from Esseron is evidently the imperial campaign route which, Odo tells us, Louis first chose to advance upon after rejecting the route through Dorylaion. As Odo has already indicated, and as Conrad was clearly informed, the coastal path was highly populated and cultivated in comparison with the imperial route over the rising ground in the west of the peninsula. The French king subsequently again chose to change direction, and elected not to take the shorter route via Philadelphia, but determined to advance west from Esseron and straight to the coast and known cultivated lands. Louis VII obtained markets along the Aegean coast, and the crusaders do not appear to have suffered from want of provisions on this section of march. This is indicative of a highly cultivated landscape supporting relatively flourishing towns and populations, and producing an agricultural surplus upon which the crusaders were able to draw.

The foregoing allows us to make sense of a seemingly ambiguous statement by Odo of Deuil. He writes that king Louis was advised by Byzantine emissaries to take ‘more swiftly and advantageously’ the Sestos route (now abandoned) across the Hellespont and on to the Anatolian peninsula. John Kinnamos confirms that Byzantine emissaries had likewise attempted to divert the German crusaders to Abydos (modern Çanakkale, on the Asiatic side) and the route via the Hellespont. Modern historians believe that Manuel Komnenos instructed his agents to persuade the crusaders to take this route in an effort to divert the perceived crusader threat away from Constantinople. This is a reasonable supposition to make based on the hypothesis that Manuel’s dealings with the crusaders were founded on a policy of protecting Constantinople at all costs – even the cost of two large Latin armies being present in the most densely populated and cultivated regions of Byzantine Anatolia. An alternative interpretation can be offered, however, grounded in the tangible realities of twelfth-century provincial Anatolia. A military commander’s logistical predicaments along the two routes to the East would be widely different. As opposed to the fertile, cultivated, populated and safe route via the Aegean littoral and the river valleys of western Asia Minor, the route from Constantinople to Nikaia and beyond Dorylaion was barren and in hostile hands. The military commander Manuel Komnenos certainly knew that a large army would be in a much better position to advance safely, and with adequate provisions, along the coast and river valleys. He also knew that both Conrad and Louis intended to follow the route of

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50 Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, p.90.
52 Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, p.58.
53 See photograph III.14.
54 Ioannes Cinnamus, Rerum, p.72; John Kinnamos, Deeds, pp.61-2.
55 See, for example, Lilie, Byzantium, p.154.
56 See below chapter 17.
the First Crusade via Constantinople and Dorylaion, hence the advice of his embassies which attempted to divert the crusaders. Is it not possible the emperor was acting in good faith by suggesting the crusaders traverse Anatolia through safe, cultivated and populated terrain – even though this would have meant the presence of two large Latin armies in Byzantine territory? This would explain Odo’s statement that the French army was advised to ‘more swiftly and advantageously’ take the Sestos/Abydos route across the Hellespont and into the peninsula. Even at Constantinople, Manuel attempted to dissuade Conrad and presumably Louis from taking the unpopulated, barren and hostile route from Dorylaion, or at least advance with a smaller army, so that it would not encounter provisioning problems.\(^57\)

The foregoing sustains the evidence that the physical structure of twelfth-century Anatolia, which is little different from that of modern day Turkey, determines settlement patterns and patterns of land use. We have seen that the combination of the relatively temperate climates and fertility of the lowland coastal plains and river valleys have traditionally supported relatively high levels of arable land with greater densities of populations than those of the high-ground and the central plateau. In contrast to the lowlands, the plateau, whilst clearly containing sometimes extensive pockets of fecundity capable of supporting major centres of Byzantine habitation, was predominantly barren, devoid of population, and capable of being exploited only by pastoralists. Whilst this generalisation holds for the geographical situation both before and after the Battle of Mantzikert, in the decades after 1071, and certainly until the arrival of the Second Crusade, swathes of previously cultivated and inhabited land remained without a sedentary population, and were thus fallow.

It is evident from crusade sources that once the armies left the fertile and populated lowland regions in western Anatolia and proceeded across the central plateau, they began to endure serious physical hardship after particular points of ingress on to the plateau, owing to the inhospitable terrain and the consequent problems of supply. At those particular points, the obvious differences between the nature of the landscape on the plateau and the lowlands, evident in our twelfth-century sources, is still apparent today as witnessed by the present writer.\(^58\) Crucially, we can now broadly situate the source descriptions of fertile or barren terrain on the reconstructed topographies. Moreover, we now have an appreciation of settlement patterns and patterns of land use which have dictated armies’ logistical considerations throughout history. It is clear that an army might have encountered logistical difficulties in the barren, sparsely populated terrain of the plateau, in contrast to the occupied

\(^{57}\) ‘Annales Herbipolenses’, p.4.

\(^{58}\) This was also pointed out by Michael Hendy, \textit{Studies}, p.43.
lowland regions with access to markets and food plundered from gardens, fields and storehouses.

Upon crossing the Bosphoros in the autumn of 1147, the crusaders disembarked in Byzantine Bithynia, a fertile, western lowland region, historically capable of supporting a dense population, and with what is in effect a Mediterranean-like climate below the 500-metre line. An October/November sowing facilitated a May/June harvest of wheat, barley and millet. Various types of fruit and vegetables were also harvestable throughout the year. In theory, the army should have had no problem with provisioning in Bithynia or if necessary, with stockpiling victuals for its advance beyond Bithynia and then into northwest Phrygia and across the plateau – a summation often assumed, but until now unproven. We must, however, look further than the conclusions which can be drawn solely from a study of the geography of Anatolia. The ability of the Second Crusade to procure adequate quantities of provisions was determined by the amount of cultivated land in Bithynia, which in turn was dependent upon many factors addressed in Part III, including its urban centres. We must now turn to a study of Anatolia’s urban history to appreciate better the crusaders’ logistical considerations.

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60 Loud, for example, suggests that the crusaders encountered provisioning problems because they ‘set out across Asia Minor at the beginning of winter (sic)’, the implication being that had they set out in summer or autumn, provisions would have been adequate. Such things are often cited as the only logistical predicaments which the crusaders had to consider. Loud, ‘Some Reflections’, p.3.
9. The Twelfth-Century Anatolian Town

In a medieval agrarian society such as that of provincial Anatolia, the amount of cultivated hinterland surrounding any given town, and hence the amount of agricultural produce which theoretically could be obtained by an army around harvest time, was roughly proportional to the population of the urban centre. In turn, the number of inhabitants was often dependent upon a town’s form and function. If we address these aspects of west Anatolia’s urban history up to the end of the twelfth century, we may gain an insight into such a town’s capacity to sustain a crusading army via markets and/or pillaging.

We will first consider the contemporaneous documentary evidence which might provide valuable insights into the form, function and population of the archetypal west Anatolian town. Can contemporary terminology employed in narrative works provide us with accurate information, or are there, for example, official state documents which might be more useful? After reflecting upon the value of a philological approach to the aims of this chapter, we will assess the value of archaeological data. Archaeologists have until recently tended to overlook the medieval period, choosing instead to concentrate on unearthing the ruins of antiquity. Clive Foss’s seminal work has done much to address this neglect.\(^1\) Archaeological surveys in Lycia and Pamphylia, for example, have discovered remains of medieval civic and ecclesiastical buildings. Others have uncovered evidence of the proliferation of domiciles at famous ancient towns such as Ephesos and Sardis (near modern Salihi). Foss’s work on Byzantine fortifications, however, has had the greatest impact. Reliable narrative sources provided him with the year of construction for named strongpoints. Following surface surveys at such sites, he was then able to attribute types of mortar, varieties of masonry and methods of construction, defence and decoration to a particular limited period. The previously unknown construction chronology of other fortifications could then be ascertained via analogy and historical probability. Through Foss’s work, the construction date of a large number of previously obscure walls and towers in a great part of western Anatolia has been established. More recently, the work of archaeologists such as Harrison and Christie have built on Foss’s work whilst breaking new ground through excavations and other techniques. Excavations in progress at Amorion (near modern Emirdağ), for example, are discovering vital information on the town’s history, such as its patterns of settlement throughout the Byzantine Age.

Archaeological studies of Anatolia’s medieval heritage are, nevertheless, still in their infancy, and yet the country is peppered with unstudied pre-modern remains which are disappearing under the twin threat of modern development and natural erosion. We may

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\(^1\) See above p.13, note 57.
never know the size and form of twelfth-century Chalcedon, for example, which is buried under modern Kadiköy on the Asiatic coast of the Bosphoros. On the other hand, our knowledge of a medieval town such as Dorylaion, situated on the northwestern edge of the Anatolian plateau three kilometres outside the modern city of Eskişehir, may be greatly enhanced by a coordinated programme of excavations and field surveys. One looks forward to the future results from the British Institute of Archaeology at Ankara, which is now driving archaeological research in Turkey, and which promises to improve our understanding of the country in the middle ages.

This chapter will bring together the results of some of the latest field research as well as employ a range of narrative sources which provide some indication of the construction dates of various sites. The aim is to trace the slow development of the typical Anatolian urban form and aspect from the late fourth century, through the mid-seventh to mid-eighth centuries, and through to a period of urban recovery until the latter part of the twelfth century. The choice of periods separated by some 800 years is not arbitrary: the physical character (and function) of the typical town began to change in the late fourth century, and the form it obtained during seventh and eighth centuries continued to be the one retained (with inconsequential variations to the general pattern) during the intermediate periods of Byzantine recovery.

Following on from a discussion on the protracted pattern of urban development which presupposes, and indeed confirms demographic growth (although urban development cannot be explained in purely demographic terms), a discussion of Byzantine demography over a similar period would be superfluous. The present discussion is concerned with achieving typical figures for twelfth-century urban populations living near the Byzantine/Turkish frontier. Unfortunately, this is another neglected field of study. Neither twelfth-century population figures, nor detailed modern population estimates, exist for west Anatolian towns during our period. We must therefore first consider the exiguous and problematic nature of both contemporaneous documentary and archaeological evidence, which theoretically could shed some light on this matter, before offering figures garnered from the necessary manipulation of Ottoman statistics.

In doing so, this chapter will offer the reader a concise study of the typical west Anatolian town’s form, function and population, and accordingly, previously unobserved insights into the ability of the crusaders to procure the provisions they needed in Bithynia and for their advance towards Ikonion.

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Urban Development

Greek hagiographies, literary works and historians of the Byzantine age concerned themselves primarily with the court, church, army and the frontier. They therefore provide little in the way of detailed specific information on any particular fortress, town or city they may mention. Such a place may be called a *kastron* or *polis*. A *kastron* was technically a castle; a *polis* was a city, equivalent to the Latin *urbs*. But we cannot glean from this vocabulary if the place in question was a castle or a flourishing city: the official and unofficial *kastron* and *polis* civic and military forms and functions, and contemporaneous traditional assumptions concerning their physical character and civic and military responsibilities, blurred and changed over time reflecting an inconsistent lexis. Islamic literary geographical descriptions can be uniform and they tend to refer to Asia Minor during the Byzantine periods as a country of fortresses rather than cities. This is important because, to Arab observers at least, most ‘cities’ appeared to be little more than castles, regardless of the terms used in Greek narrative sources.

Because of such problems and contradictions in the narratives historians working over three decades ago turned to official documents such as the *Notitiae Episcopatuum* when attempting to reconstruct Byzantine urban history. The *Notitiae Episcopatuum* are lists of metropolitanates, bishoprics and archbishoprics which were composed for purposes of protocol and used in courts and synods. The council of Chalcedon in 451 decreed that every city or *polis* would be the seat of a bishop, and consequently the concept of a *polis* became associated with a bishop’s presence. As the number of sees on the lists remained near constant, accordingly, it was argued, so must have the number of cities. It is now accepted that the terminology in the lists represents an idiosyncrasy of church language and does not actually tell us anything about the size and nature of a settlement. When archaeological evidence is used in conjunction with written sources, one frequently notices that the seat of a bishop, that is, a supposed *city/polis* identified in the *Notitiae Episcopatuum*, was little more than rubble, and often at best, a hill-top fortress.

A purely philological approach to discovering the form and function of medieval centres of habitation is clearly flawed. We must turn to archaeology for our answers. Ankyra, for

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example, was a theme capital and the literary record reflects its commercial and military importance during the Byzantine age. Clive Foss has revealed that it contracted around the mid-seventh century to a ‘fortress-town’ occupying a site not much larger than its small citadel at 350 x 150 metres. The recent series of archaeological excavations at Amorion suggest that whilst its antique/late Roman site was extensive (known as the ‘lower city’), the main seventh/eighth-century site contracted to the ‘upper city’ and was comparable in size, form and function to Ankyra. In spite of this, it is clear from the textual record that Amorion remained a place of considerable commercial and military importance throughout the middle ages.

Fig. 1 Amorion (taken from Lightfoot, ‘Domestic Architecture’, p.310)

There is relatively little archaeological knowledge about most of other places within western Anatolia’s interior, but the transformation and contraction of Ankyra’s and Amorion’s urban forms during this period were paralleled further west. The studies cited here, which utilise both written and archaeological evidence, indicate there are many more examples of formerly major urban centres which underwent a similar transformation and contraction. The centralisation of state power during the course of the later fourth, fifth and sixth centuries was followed by urban and rural devastation caused by constant warfare during the period of Persian wars in the first decades of the seventh century and the Arab

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7 Foss, ‘Late Antique and Byzantine Ankara’, pp.27-87.
9 See Belke, Galatien, pp.122-5.
conquests of the mid-seventh to the mid-eighth centuries. The subsequent demographic decline was exacerbated by forced migration and natural disaster. In consequence, most of the places which in Classical Antiquity were recognisably urban centres first began to lose their classical structures, and then to contract to become medieval fortresses with a military existence, if they did not disappear altogether. This was a process of contraction and disappearance which was often repeated in the countryside.\(^{10}\)

There is little evidence of major building activity other than the construction and repair of religious structures, or (re)fortification as a defence against Arab incursions. Foss states that the reconstructed defences at Sardis are a good example of the building work typifying this period. The remaining wall which surrounded the acropolis is now inaccessible without a long, uphill hike, although its defensive function is evident to see from the plain of the ancient city.\(^{11}\) Archaeology has revealed that new fortresses were built during this period. Examples include Malagina which was situated in a verdant region of the same name near the lower Sangarios River (approximately modern Geyve to modern Osmaneli)\(^ {12}\) and a simple fortified refuge near modern Kütahya.\(^ {13}\) Any evidence of urban expansion at this time is exiguous, and it appears that contemporary Islamic geographers’ descriptions were accurate. Byzantine Anatolia generally consisted of cities and towns which appeared to be little more than fortresses.\(^ {14}\)

The rate of transformation of centres of habitation from the urban *poleis* of antiquity to the Byzantine *kastra* should not be overstated and neither should the abandonment of sites. The initial deterioration of classical structures was gradual. Most places had already begun to transform and exhibit archaeological and topographical features of the middle Byzantine *kastron* as early as the fourth and fifth centuries, but particularly in the sixth.\(^ {15}\) The extensive excavations at Amorion and other sites indicate that whilst the main area of occupation contracted to a fortress-citadel during the seventh and eighth centuries, discrete settlements resembling villages continued to be inhabited within the old Roman walls.\(^ {16}\) It is also argued


\(^{11}\) See photograph III.15; Foss, *Byzantine and Turkish Sardis*, pp.57-9.


\(^{13}\) Foss, ‘Survey of Medieval Castles in Anatolia’, pp.95-8.

\(^{14}\) Foss, ‘Late Antique and Byzantine Ankara’, pp.27-87.


that one result of the Arab incursions was a growth in importance of fortified towns such as Gangra (modern Çankiri), which provided refuge for the surrounding population.\textsuperscript{17} Nevertheless, the archaeological record appears to agree with Haldon’s suggestion that by the ninth century generally small but distinct communities continued to consider themselves as ‘citizens’ of the polis within whose walls their communities lived, and that the kastron, which retained the name of the ancient polis, provided a refuge in the case of attack.\textsuperscript{18}

The anonymous Persian author of the geographical treatise \textit{Hadud al-`Alam} summarised the general situation in the tenth century. ‘In the days of old’ he writes, ‘cities were numerous in Rum, but now they have become few. Most of the districts are prosperous and pleasant and have an extremely strong fortress on account of the raids which the fighters of the faith direct upon them. To each village appertains a castle where in times of flight they may take shelter.’\textsuperscript{19} Foss has shown that the military nature of centres of habitation, firmly established during the seventh and eighth centuries, generally continued as the form of settlement when they were newly built, expanded upon with demographic growth, and refortified from the ninth century under the Macedonian dynasty (867-1025) through to the twelfth.\textsuperscript{20}

The Turkish incursions into Anatolia, however, particularly those in the wake of the Battle of Mantzikert (1071) when the greater part of the country fell into Turkish hands, coupled with the resultant Byzantine internal anarchy and civil strife, understandably appear to have provoked a hiatus in urban development.\textsuperscript{21} Foss maintains that the break in development at Sardis, as evinced by the archaeological record, is a microcosm of the rest of western Anatolia.\textsuperscript{22} Successive Komnenoi (1081-1185) recovered part of Anatolia, and concerned themselves with the founding and rebuilding of defensive structures and the re-colonisation of those areas which they had returned to Byzantine hegemony. The literary record shows that following his accession to the imperial throne in 1081, Alexios I Komnenos attempted to stabilise the geopolitical situation near his capital by constructing fortresses such as Kibotos

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Good examples are Ankyra, which expanded beyond its citadels walls, and Attaleia (modern Antalya) which was refortified. Foss, ‘Late Antique and Byzantine Ankara’, pp.27-87; Foss, \textit{Byzantine Fortifications}, pp.142-4; Foss, ‘The Cities of Pamphylia’, pp.1-62; Foss, ‘Archaeology’, pp.469-486. For an explanation of the slow urban recovery during this period see Angold, M., ‘The Shaping of the Medieval Byzantine City’, \textit{Byzantinische Forschungen}, 10 (1985), pp.1-37.
\item See below chapter 10. Note that the vast majority of archaeological evidence for Turkish building activity is from the thirteenth century. Evidently, the Turks were not concerned with, or unable to implement, a building programme at those possessions they temporarily possessed after Mantzikert.
\item Foss, \textit{Byzantine and Turkish Sardis}, pp.66-76.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
(modern Hersek) in Bithynia. After the Turks had been pushed back from the western coastal plains and river valleys and on to the central plateau in the wake of the First Crusade, Alexios began the reconstruction and repopulation of Aegean coastal towns, including the fortress town of Adramyttion which the Turks had razed to the ground. Anna Komnene informs us that the fortresses of Korykos (modern Kizkalesi) and Seleukeia (modern Silifke) in Cilicia were rebuilt and refortified as early as 1099. Foss has shown that fortresses were also rebuilt or expanded by the Komnenoi at Telmessos, Xanthos, Patara, Myra and Limyra on the Lycian coast. The year after his accession in 1119, John II Komnenos retook and refortified Phygian Laodikeia (near modern Denizli). Narrative sources corroborated by archaeological evidence demonstrate that he also built the fortresses of Lopadion in 1130 and Akhyraous around 1140. This evidence also confirms that Manuel Komnenos carried out a significant amount of construction work. For example, he rebuilt the walls of Attaleia (modern Antalya) in Pamphylia. A fortress was built and garrisoned around 1145 at Malagina in Bithynia, although there is evidence of a defensive construction from the seventh century. The fort of Pithekas (modern Küplü?) in Bithynia was rebuilt and garrisoned around the same time. Also in Bithynia (on the coast), Manuel constructed a fort named Pylai on a much older site. Other examples include the fortified refuges he built near the Lydian fortified towns of Pergamon (modern Bergama), Adramyttion and Chliara (near modern Soma), which themselves received new walls between 1162 and 1173. Manuel also rebuilt the fortresses of Dorylaion and Choma, also known as Soublaion (modern Homa), in 1175/6.

23 Anna Komnene, Alexiad, pp.203-4.
24 See below pp.134-38.
26 Anna Komnene, Alexiad, p.363.
28 Anna Komnene, Alexiad, p.453; John Kinnamos, Deeds, p. 38. For the archaeology, see Foss, ‘Defenses’, pp. 159-61. Also see photograph III.10.
30 Foss, ‘The Cities of Pamphylia’, p.50. Also see photograph III.16.
31 The fortress is also occasionally referred to in the sources as Metabole. John Kinnamos, Deeds, p.37; Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, p.31; Foss, Byzantine Malagina, pp.161-83.
33 John Kinnamos, Deeds, p.56; Ramsey, Historical Geography, p.187.
34 Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, p.85. For the archaeology, see Foss, Byzantine Fortifications, p.147; Foss, ‘Defenses’, pp.166-70; Foss, ‘Archaeology’, pp.469-86.
36 John Kinnamos, Deeds, p.223; Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, p.100; Bar Hebraeus, Political History, p.306; Michael the Syrian, Chronicle, p.369.
Construction work was not restricted to fortifications during this later period and some scholars have argued that the textual record suggests larger urban centres existed in the eleventh and twelfth centuries than in the preceding centuries.\textsuperscript{37} We know that ecclesiastical sources, contemporary histories and occasional mentions in hagiographies actually tell us little about the physical size of a place. There is, however, some archaeological evidence that Ankyra expanded beyond its citadel’s walls in the final centuries of Byzantine rule.\textsuperscript{38} Foss has shown that considerable building activity took place at Ephesos on the Aegean coast in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries both within and outside its fortified walls.\textsuperscript{39} The archaeological record shows that Sardis thrived after the Arab invasions and before Mantzikert, and distinct settlements flourished again amongst the remains of antiquity at the end of the twelfth century.\textsuperscript{40} Foss has revealed that in Lycia at Lebissos, a cathedral was rebuilt, other parts of the town were occupied, and settlements around Myra on the coast received new chapels and walls. Invariably however, buildings were on a much smaller scale than their antique predecessors.\textsuperscript{41}

Newly built and rebuilt civic, ecclesiastical and military structures rarely compared in size with their late Roman equivalents. The newly built and reoccupied fortified towns, for example, were larger than the many simple fortresses which peppered the countryside, but not always a great deal larger. The ancient Bithynian town of Nikomedia is a good illustration of this. Described by Ibn Khūrdaḫbih around 845 as ‘now ruined’,\textsuperscript{42} its location on a major route to Constantinople nevertheless ensured its continued importance and the Byzantines soon recovered the town after Mantzikert. Odo of Deuil described Nikomedia in the winter of 1147 as set amongst thorns and brambles and still ‘with lofty ruins testifying her ancient glory’.\textsuperscript{43} The populated part of the city had contracted from the coastal plain (with its ‘lofty ruins’) to its fortress-citadel during the seventh and eighth centuries. The fortress-city occupied an area of only about 1000 metres by 500 metres on the hilltop over looking the vast expanse of the ancient city, even following rebuilding work in the twelfth century.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{37} For example, Kazhdan & Wharton-Epstein, \textit{Byzantine Culture}, pp.36-9.
\textsuperscript{38} Foss, ‘Late Antique and Byzantine Ankara’, pp.27-87.
\textsuperscript{39} Foss, \textit{Ephesus}, pp.116-17. Also see photograph III.17.
\textsuperscript{40} Foss, \textit{Byzantine and Turkish Sardis}, pp.70-6.
\textsuperscript{41} Foss, ‘Lycia’, pp.1-37.
\textsuperscript{43} ‘ruinis sublimibus antiquam sui gloriam…probat’, Odo of Deuil, \textit{De Profectione}, p.88.
\textsuperscript{44} Foss, \textit{Nicomedia}, pp.1-41. Also see photograph III.18. Compare with the fortress of Lopadion with walls at 475 metres by 150 metres: Foss, \textit{Byzantine Fortifications}, pp.145-6.
The Aegean coastal cities which were brought back within the imperial domain at the very end of the eleventh century gave the following impression to Odo of Deuil: ‘we came upon many ruined cities, and others which the Greeks had built up from the ancient level above the sea, fortifying them with walls and towers.’\textsuperscript{45} One of these ruined cities was Pergamon. Manuel Komnenos rebuilt its defensive walls between 1162 and 1173 to surround the ancient acropolis and enclose the settlements built on the slope of the citadel. The walls are visible to the modern observer.\textsuperscript{46} This construction work can be viewed as typically representative of the greater extent of development undertaken at any one existing site during this later period. Pergamon’s form can be taken as the archetype which Byzantine towns in the twelfth century had continued to acquire since the eighth century even with the growth and recovery accomplished under the Macedonian and Comnenian dynasties. Indeed, Pergamon’s development was entirely typical. It had retracted to a heavily walled fortress on the acropolis by the ninth century, and then it slowly recovered to occupy the slope of the hill. Manuel’s walls enclosed individual settlements of crudely built houses centred on a small number of churches by the end of the twelfth century. There is some archaeological evidence of very limited industrial activity, and parts of the expanded town were set amidst the ruins of the monumental buildings of antiquity.\textsuperscript{47} As John Haldon maintains, such sites, together with numerous smaller garrison forts and outposts generally situated on rocky outcrops and

\textsuperscript{45} ‘multas urbes destructas invenimus et alias quas ab antiqua latitudine supra mare Graeci restruxerant, munientes eas muris et turribus.’ Odo of Deuil, \textit{De Profectione}, p.106.
\textsuperscript{46} See photograph III.19.
\textsuperscript{47} Foss, ‘Archaeology’, pp.469-486; also see photograph III.20.
prominences typified the Anatolian provincial countryside well into the Seljuk period and beyond.\textsuperscript{48}

Archaeology then, occasionally supporting, but often acting as a corrective to the written sources, demonstrates that the typical Byzantine town in the twelfth century had slowly expanded with demographic growth beyond the limits to which it had contracted during the seventh and eighth centuries. It is nevertheless clear that such settlements did not resemble cities in any modern sense of the word. They began to lose this form and function by the late fourth century, and by the ninth, the typical urban centre of habitation no longer consisted of the monumental public buildings and permanent houses of the once flourishing classical city situated in a plain. The twelfth-century inhabitants of such centres generally continued to reside well within the remaining walls of the classical polis, but in villages situated within the circumference of the walls, which were perhaps separated by cultivated land, largely self-sufficient, and often situated on the hill topped by the citadel of antiquity which afforded them protection – a phenomenon which was to continue until the end of our period. Clive Foss sums up the typical urban development: ‘The medieval city developed with different considerations, in which security was paramount…The transformation took place in the Dark Ages [mid-seventh to mid-eighth centuries]: succeeding centuries brought no major change.’\textsuperscript{49} The evidence for Lycia, Pamphylia, and indeed most of Asia Minor ‘reveals the same picture of late antique prosperity, Dark Age catastrophe, and very limited Byzantine recovery’.\textsuperscript{50} This deduction is repeated in the works cited in this chapter.

The ancient fortified town of Nikaia may have been an important exception to the established pattern of contraction and expansion mainly because it was regarded as Constantinople’s Bithynian bulwark against invasion from the plateau.\textsuperscript{51} Although very little relevant archaeological work has been completed inside its great circuit of walls, studies of the impressive ancient fortifications, which dwarf the modern village in height and circumference,\textsuperscript{52} indicate that many repairs and improvements were made during the eighth and ninth centuries. Repairs to the existing fortifications were also carried out after the earthquake of 1065 and the crusaders’ siege of 1097. The archaeological record proves that the ancient walls were maintained, reflecting Nikaia’s significant defensive role. It is impossible to demonstrate that Nikaia’s occupied area retracted to a citadel before slowly

\textsuperscript{48} Haldon, \textit{Warfare}, pp.250-1.

\textsuperscript{49} Foss, ‘Lycia’, p.30.

\textsuperscript{50} Foss, ‘The Cities of Pamphylia’, p.50.

\textsuperscript{51} On Nikaia’s defences, see Foss, \textit{Byzantine Fortifications}, chapter 2. Also see Foss, C., \textit{Nicaea: A Byzantine Capital and Its Praises} (Brookline, 1996). A very small number of other significant towns also retained their ancient circuits of walls, but the sites have been continually occupied and it is impossible to trace their development. Foss, ‘The Cities of Pamphylia’, p.49.

\textsuperscript{52} See photographs III.21, III.22 and III.23.
expanding during the periods of Byzantine recovery until at least further archaeological excavations are undertaken in and around the modern village. One might conclude on the existing archaeological evidence that throughout the Byzantine Age the ancient city of Nikaia resembled a classical *polis* in form and its inhabitants continued to occupy the same expansive area they had dwelt in since antiquity.

![Fig. 3 Nikaia (taken from Foss, Byzantine Fortifications, p.310)](image)

It is unwise to treat Nikaia in isolation, however, even given the town’s strategic importance. This would be to ignore 800 years of urban history and the analogous evidence presented here. It is safe to assume that during the twelfth century, the bulk of Nikaia’s monumental buildings were at least dilapidated, and that the city’s inhabitants actually resided in a small number of disparate villages located well within the circumference of the ancient fortifications. Perhaps the major difference between Nikaia and, say, the other great town of eastern Bithynia, Nikomedia, was that a greater number of garrison troops resided in Nikaia to help defend her extensive walls, the town’s inhabitants and, ultimately, Constantinople.

**Urban Populations**

Having established the form and defensive function of the archetypal west Anatolian town, this chapter is concerned with achieving typical figures for twelfth-century urban populations residing near the Byzantine/Turkish frontier. The figures offered here are conjectural. Although not quantifiable, the towns on the Aegean littoral were more likely to have thrived than those towns in the western river valleys and continually disputed border areas subject to Turkish incursions throughout the late eleventh and twelfth centuries. The Turkish raids must
have affected urban population numbers and indeed short-term demographic trends in the worst affected areas.

We lack satisfactory Byzantine urban density figures and almost nothing can be gained from the sources with certainty: twelfth-century tax registers or official population figures, for example, have not survived. Various references in the narrative sources to ‘populous’ or ‘large cities’, or even expressions such as a ‘city with a numerous population’ or with ‘a multitude of inhabitants’, may well indicate a town’s importance and illuminate the impression it elicited, but do not help in determining the size of its population.\footnote{Charanis, ‘Observations’, pp.1-19.}

Nevertheless, it has been suggested that we can still gain some indication of urban populations from our written sources.\footnote{Vryonis, Decline, pp.28-30; Charanis, ‘Observations’, pp.1-19.} A certain Abu Salim was responsible for the ransoming of 15,000 souls captured by Turks at Melitene (modern Malatya).\footnote{Michael the Syrian, Chronicle, p.146.} The Seljuk Sultan, Kaykhusraw, apparently emptied the Byzantine towns of Karia (modern Geise?) and Tantalos (near the modern Dandul-su) of 5,000 people and transplanted them to the town of Philomelion at the end of the twelfth century.\footnote{Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, pp.272-3.} Combining such figures with the temporary vocabulary used for towns, Vryonis concluded that a large city had a population of around 35,000, while towns varied between 10,000 and 35,000 inhabitants.\footnote{Vryonis, Decline, p.29.} Interpreting a town’s size from medieval nomenclature is a flawed exercise. Moreover, it is generally accepted that people of the high middle ages were largely innumerate and may have had ulterior motives for exaggerating numbers.\footnote{See above pp.40-1.} We may conclude that high round figures, similar to those given in the above examples, should be treated with extreme caution, and at best be regarded as impressionistic rather than accurate.\footnote{Murray, Reason and Society, pp.141-212; Hanley, War and Combat, pp.72-6.}

This statement is best illustrated with a discussion on how archaeological evidence can be used in conjunction with documentary sources to ascertain the latter’s accuracy. The excavations at Amorion, for example, suggest certain corrections should be made to conclusions drawn from documentary evidence alone. Arab sources indicate that Amorion was one of the largest and most important towns in Asia Minor in the ninth and tenth centuries, being ‘the eye and foundation of Christianity’,\footnote{Quoted in Grégoire, H. & Canard, M., Byzance et les Arabes, I: La dynastie d’Amorium (820-867), trans. A. Vasiliev (Brussels, 1959), p.294.} ‘whose towers number forty-four’.\footnote{Ibn Khûrûdâdhbih, Kitâb al-Masâlik, p.79.} Another Arab source notes that 30,000 inhabitants were slaughtered during the Arab assault on Amorion in the mid-ninth century, whilst a Byzantine source suggests the Arabs

55 Michael the Syrian, Chronicle, p.146.
56 Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, pp.272-3.
57 Vryonis, Decline, p.29.
58 See above pp.40-1.
encountered 70,000 people during this attack.\textsuperscript{62} It has been concluded from such figures that the normal population of Amorion must have been in the region of 30-40,000.\textsuperscript{63}

The excavators at Amorion have explicitly expressed their reservations regarding the supposed number of towers and doubt that 30,000 people could have inhabited the town.\textsuperscript{64} It is important to discern potential ulterior motives for distorting the evidence, in this particular case, the population of Amorion in 838, when faced with such conflicting data. The most obvious reason for Arab exaggeration here was to enhance the status of the victory at Amorion, the home town of the contemporary Byzantine Emperor Theophilos. The Byzantine source Theophanes Continuatus wrote during the Macedonian dynasty which forced Theophilos from the throne. Theophanes shows a tendency to paint a black picture of the preceding Amorion dynasty, a tendency which is perhaps illustrated by his exaggerating the loss of Byzantine inhabitants.\textsuperscript{65} We should also observe that towns and regions of the same name are not always distinguished in the sources. Those captured or slaughtered may have been inhabitants of villages far outside the boundaries of the town’s walls, but still have occupied an area of the same name.

Gleaning population figures from such evidence is clearly problematic. A notion of how a town’s population may have appeared in 1391 can be gained from the following passage written by Manuel II Palaiologos whilst he traversed the region south of Sinope: ‘To be sure,’ he wrote, ‘you can see many cities here, but they lack what constitutes the true splendour of a city and without which they could not really be termed cities, that is, human beings.’\textsuperscript{66} As Bryer points out, this passage implies that the medieval inheritance of a city’s ancient walls provides little indication of a town’s population.\textsuperscript{67} This concurs with the archaeological evidence discussed above: a town’s inhabitants generally resided in a small number of distinct villages situated well within the circumference of the ancient walls. Sardis provides a good example of this urban disarticulation. The town covered approximately 10 hectares circa 1200. Foss has shown however that below the inhabited citadel, individual settlements


\textsuperscript{65} Brandes, ‘Byzantine Cities’, pp.38-41.


\textsuperscript{67} Especially when we consider that habitations could spread outwith the fortified walls. Bryer, A., ‘The Structure of the Late Byzantine Town: Dioikismos and the Mesoï’, in A. Bryer & H. Lowry, H., ed., \textit{Continuity and Change in Late Byzantine and Early Ottoman Society} (Birmingham, 1986), pp.263-79.
occupied areas only around the ancient gymnasium, the Temple of Artemis and an area known as Pactolus North.\(^{68}\)

![Fig. 4 Sardis (taken from Foss, *Byzantine and Turkish Sardis*, p.180)](image)

Sardis was typical in that many habitations were constructed from non-permanent materials, thus leaving few remains. Other archaeological evidence such as the remains of water cisterns or coin finds indicate which areas were inhabited, although the evidence is too exiguous to offer credible population figures.\(^{69}\)

Modern calculations of the numbers of individuals within a city, or rather, the density per hectare are lacking for the twelfth century. Ottoman figures have been employed to calculate that Constantinople had around 40 inhabitants per hectare in 1477, and that Trebizond (modern Trabzon) rose from 35 to almost 60 per hectare between 1438 and circa 1486. As Bryer noted, these figures reveal depressed fifteenth-century populations living within an area of walls grossly disproportionate to the population.\(^{70}\) By comparison with ten crusader cities in the Levant and many western Mediterranean post-plague cities, the population densities of Constantinople and Trebizond – major urban centres at the given dates – support the picture given by Manuel II Palaiologos of under-occupied cities south of Sinope.\(^{71}\)

A survey of Anatolian urban centres based on the number of sixteenth-century tax-payers distinguishes between small towns of no more than 400 tax-payers, medium towns of no more than 1,000 tax-payers – perhaps 3,000-4,000 people – and large cities containing in excess of 3,500 tax-payers, or approximately, 10,500-14,000 inhabitants. Most administrative

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68 See Foss, *Byzantine and Turkish Sardis*, pp.72-76.
71 The cities in the Levant have been estimated at 130 per hectare, and in fifteen western Mediterranean cities between 81-125 per hectare. Russel, ‘Late Ancient and Medieval Populations’, pp.60-3, 101, tables 66 and 100.
units contained at least one medium sized town, usually its capital, but most of the settlements were classed as small towns. Amongst the larger towns were Ankara (5,344 taxpayers in 1571-2) and Konya (3,762 tax-payers in 1584), both important urban centres in the late sixteenth century.\(^72\) These figures may provide some indication of the possible population of the largest of the Byzantine towns. As they concern the latter half of the sixteenth century however, which witnessed a considerable population increase, it is doubtful whether one can press too hard a suggestion that the very largest towns of the mid-twelfth century were comparable to those of the sixteenth century. An attempt to read back from the Ottoman evidence into the Byzantine period must surely emphasise the small size of most urban centres. Harvey recons on figures of between 1000-2,000 inhabitants, but in most cases only several hundred.\(^73\)

We are compelled to accept such deductions owing to deficient twelfth-century data. Neither contemporary documentary evidence nor archaeology can currently offer exact figures, although the latter can be employed to demonstrate the unreliability of numbers and vocabulary relating to town populations as given in the narrative sources. Fortunately, the requisite manipulation of the above later Ottoman figures does appear to correlate with our reconstructed image of the typical twelfth-century Anatolian fortified town. By employing literary sources and archaeological evidence, we know that the twelfth-century urban form and function were essentially inherited from the eighth century, regardless of the recession and rebuilding in the decades after Mantzikert. Towns may have expanded beyond the limits to which they had initially contracted and the Komnenoi may have built many new structures, but it is hard to envisage them as peaceful centres of thriving civil populations demanding and sustaining an extensive agricultural hinterland. Such Anatolian towns and cities still existed in the late Roman period, and were to appear again with the peace of Ottoman rule, but during the geopolitical troubles of the eleventh and twelfth centuries as discussed in the following chapter, populations were continually threatened and a town’s function was predominantly defensive; facts which are reflected in the low number of inhabitants.

We know that the typical town the crusaders encountered and expected to be provisioned by in 1147 resembled a fortress consisting of a small number of disparate villages settled well within the walls of antiquity. Importantly, the individual settlements may have been largely self-sufficient in foods cultivated within the ancient walls. Even the present writer witnessed a proliferation of market gardens situated on the edges of the modern village of Iznik, formerly known as Nikaia, and one of the two towns in Bithynia encountered by the


\(^{73}\) Harvey, *Economic Expansion*, p.199.
crusaders. If such gardens existed during the time of the crusades, they might have effectively negated the possibility of the crusaders forcibly stripping a town’s cultivated hinterland for provisions. The crusaders could have obtained provisions without a siege only via markets set up outside the town. But this model may not be accurate because some or all of a town’s produce may have been cultivated in farms and villages outside the walls. If so, the crusaders had the opportunity to obtain supplies which the producers were willing to relinquish, and also to seize provisions which had not been previously harvested and stored somewhere beyond the pillagers’ grasp.

We must remember, however, that the amount of cultivated land surrounding any given town was roughly proportional to the town’s population plus those people who actually tilled the land. The sum of the inhabitants in a typical west Anatolian frontier town, built and maintained with defence in mind, may not have numbered more than 2,000, plus an unknown number of garrison troops. Assuming that an army of ten thousand souls advanced into Anatolia in 1147, a town would have had to provision a body of people consisting of approximately five times the number of inhabitants in the town. The supply and demand for agricultural produce of an urban centre with a fraction of the population of the transient force encamped outside its walls could not usually furnish it with adequate quantities of victuals, as the town’s hinterland was not cultivated to meet this demand. The self-sufficient nature of medieval agrarian society ensured provisions for the crusaders were at a premium in the vicinity of the two eastern Bithynian fortified towns of Nikomedia and Nikaia.

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74 See above pp.43-4.
75 This figure is employed for illustrative purposes only. The problems associated with determining the size of the army in 1147 are discussed above. See above pp.39-41.
10. Changeable Political Landscape

Bithynia was a fertile region historically capable of supporting a large population. One may reasonably contend that, given its proximity to the very largest of markets, namely, Constantinople, the Bithynian hinterland was probably cultivated to an extent beyond that which its own towns demanded.¹ Nikomedia, for example, had served as the trading centre for its surrounding farms and villages,² and undoubtedly there was much subsistence farming. Foods were retained at such settlements in all instances and provisions should have been obtainable by the crusaders. However, one reason the Anatolian towns remained, in effect, sparsely populated fortresses in the middle of the twelfth century was because of the preceding century of geopolitical turmoil, and the resultant political insecurity ultimately determined how the countryside was exploited by its inhabitants to suit their own preferred modes of existence.

Geopolitical maps of twelfth-century western Anatolia are often depicted with fixed and settled territories and boundaries neatly divided between the Byzantines and the Seljuk Turks.³ The geopolitical situation was in fact unstable; boundaries shifted and with them sedentary populations and effective political administrations. This chapter intends to trace the chaotic and changing geopolitical landscape which exposes both Byzantine and Seljuk political and military weakness, an aim best achieved within a narrative framework which challenges the common assumption that the Seljuk Turks of Baghdad oversaw the Turkish conquest of Anatolia.⁴ To develop this reassessment, the Turkish incursions into Anatolia in the middle of the eleventh century will be addressed. Particular attention is paid to the major movements of peoples in the decade after the Battle of Mantzikert in 1071 and the years immediately after the passage of the First Crusade in 1097, with subsequent discussion on the fragile and limited ensuing Comnenian recovery. By gaining an insight into the unstable political topography, which is concealed by maps depicting fixed and settled frontiers, we can begin to appreciate the relative geopolitical strength of the crusaders’ friends and enemies.

² Foss, Nikomedia, p.19.
³ For two recent examples see Harris, Byzantium, p.97; Nicolle, D., Historical Atlas of the Islamic World (New York, 2003), p.113.
Anatolia and the Turkish Incursions before 1081

In illuminating the disordered geopolitical character of western Anatolia, it is first important to address the unstructured nature of the initial Turkish incursions which influenced the subsequent political landscape. The Islamised Seljuk leader Tughrul-Beğ and his successors, Alp-Arslan and Malik-Shāh, diverted Türkmen warriors, only nominally subject to Seljuk authority, from sustained aggression in Iraq, Iran and Syria towards the Christian lands of Armenia, Georgia and Anatolia. As Cahen has pointed out, Tughrul-Beğ could do little more to control the westward incursions of the Türkmens, but their movements caused the Seljuk family a potential problem. The Seljuk Turks considered themselves the natural leaders of the Türkmen tribes, a notion founded on their common Oğuz tribal origins. During their westward migrations there was a danger the Türkmens would become habituated to autonomy and perhaps accept fugitives from Seljukid authority. Whilst Tughrul-Beğ did not intend to annex territory in Rûm, the Seljuks had to be present amongst the Türkmens if they were to control them. An example of this was the Turkish sack of Theodosiopolis (Erzurum) in 1048/9 by İbrahim İnal, the half-brother of Tughrul-Beğ. Raids then began to increase in frequency and apparent severity. Tughrul-Beğ himself conducted a raid further south in 1054, capturing Arjish and besieging Mantzikert. A year later he made his celebrated unopposed entry into Baghdad where Buyid authority had collapsed, and received the title of Sultan from the Caliph al-Qa‘im.

Tughrul-Beğ’s nephew and successor, Alp-Arslan, continued the policy of employing the Türkmen warriors, and personally led campaigns in Armenia and Georgia. Cahen suggests that the Türkmen war-bands ‘perhaps most closely in touch’ with Seljuk authority preferred to operate along the Syro-Mesopotamian frontier or, put another way, the Byzantine/Muslim border. Other Türkmen war-bands, operating outwith Seljuk influence, or indeed fleeing from

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6 On the Türkmens, see below, chapter 11.

7 For this early period of Seljuk history, see Cahen, ‘The Turkish Invasion’, pp.135-44.

8 For example, see Vryonis, Decline, p.171.

9 Anatolia was known to the Turks as Rûm. Of course, attacking Byzantine possessions would give Tughrul-Beğ prestige if he could go on to annex former Muslim territory recently conquered by the Byzantines. Cahen, ‘The Turkish Invasion’, p.144; Cahen, Formation of Turkey, p.2.
Seljuk authority, began pushing ever deeper into Byzantine territory, reaching and sacking Kappadokian Kaisareia (modern Kayseri) on the Anatolian central plateau in 1067.\textsuperscript{10}

The short reign of the Byzantine Emperor Romanos IV Diogenes (1068-1071) witnessed Turkish raiders penetrating the approaches of the fertile and relatively highly populated valleys in western Anatolia, reaching as far as Chonae (modern Honas). Romanos led punitive expeditions to his eastern frontier, but achieved little against a nomadic enemy with no fixed base and who dispersed upon the arrival of imperial armies. The emperor decided to re-establish his authority in the East and finally put a stop to the Türkmen incursions. To this end, he led a massive expedition towards the Seljuk garrisons at Khliat and Mantzikert which resulted in a Byzantine defeat and the capture of the emperor at the battle of Mantzikert in 1071.\textsuperscript{11}

The defeat at the battle of Mantzikert ushered in a period of Byzantine civil war and, with the resulting breakdown of administrative authority and the creation of a power-vacuum, Turks, Normans and Armenians attempted to found their own separate states.\textsuperscript{12} The Norman mercenary leader, Roussel of Bailleul, was ultimately unsuccessful, whereas independent Armenian princes took over and secured possessions in Kappadokia, Cilicia and elsewhere. Alp-Arslan’s reign witnessed Türkmen raids on a massive scale although the sultan, like his uncle Tughrul-Beğ before him, almost certainly had no intention of carving out territories within western Rüm. Cahen suggests that Alp-Arslan would have favoured a strong independent Byzantium able to combat independent Türkmens who posed a threat to Seljuk power.\textsuperscript{13} Nevertheless, autonomous tribes took advantage of the lack of resistance to their presence immediately after 1071 and pushed deep into Asia Minor, occupying the peninsula’s roads and passes. Many Byzantine strongpoints were bypassed, but remained isolated fortress islands in a sea of independent Türkmen tribes – although they were soon to fall.

The sources do not allow us to ascertain exactly when or how the towns of Anatolia fell into Turkish hands. There is little evidence to suggest that the nomadic Türkmens had the knowledge or the inclination to besiege Byzantine strongpoints in a conventional military sense. However, their presence hindered trade and cultivation and the inhabitants of many strongpoints eventually deserted the towns to escape starvation, slaughter and enslavement.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{10} Cahen, \textit{Formation of Turkey}, p.3; Cahen, ‘The Turkish Invasion’, p.147.
\textsuperscript{12} On this brief period of history following Mantzikert until the accession of Alexios I Komnenos in 1081, see in particular Vryonis, \textit{Decline}, pp.103-13; Cahen, \textit{Formation of Turkey}, pp.7-9; Cahen, \textit{Pre-Ottoman Turkey}, pp.72-83. Haldon, \textit{Byzantine Wars}, chapter 6; Magdalino, ‘The Medieval Empire’, pp.184-7.
\textsuperscript{13} Cahen, \textit{Formation of Turkey}, p.7.
\textsuperscript{14} For more on this see below, pp.144-6.
It is, moreover, generally accepted that Byzantine control over most of Anatolia was finally lost because imperial contenders, and more specifically Nikephoros Melissenos, willingly used Turkish military force and ceded disputed key possessions to the Turks during the contenders’ bids for imperial power. Turkish forces henceforth garrisoned important strongpoints and they simply appear to have remained in them whilst contenders exhausted their military effectiveness. The Byzantine thematic militias, that is, seasonally recruited troops of the provinces, had all but disappeared before 1071 and the capacity to muster significant numbers of indigenous soldiers and non-Byzantine mercenaries essentially disappeared immediately after Mantzikert. Those troops that were mustered were employed to fight on behalf of the imperial contenders, rather than face the Türkmen invasions. This weakness expedited the eventual collapse in the empire’s eastern frontier and defensive capabilities. The Türkmen were henceforth allowed to penetrate westwards with impunity, free from both Byzantine and Seljuk authority. During these years the sons of Kutlumuş (a cousin of the first Great Seljuk sultan, Tughrul-Beg), came out in open revolt against Tughrul’s successor, Alp-Arslan. They arrived in Anatolia among autonomous Türkmen as fugitives from the young new Great Seljuk sultan, Malik-Shāh. The sultan attempted to capture the two surviving sons, Mansūr and Süleyman, with Byzantine assistance and a Turkish army. He succeeded in killing Mansūr, but not before the brothers had probably attracted Türkmen war-bands to the Seljuk name.

With towns and villages unprepared for rapid Turkish incursions, and with landowners looking to maintain or create positions at the imperial court rather than preserving their own estates, the central plateau was soon overrun. Turkish ravages subsequently reached from the southwest Anatolian coast to Nikaia in the northwest. Nikaia was entered in 1080 and became the capital of the last surviving son of Kutlumuş, the Seljuk fugitive Süleyman, who assumed nominal leadership of the western and southern Türkmen immigrants. At Nikaia, Süleyman effectively created the nucleus of an independent Seljuk sultanate in the Asiatic hinterland of Constantinople, a process of migration and settlement clearly not directed from Baghdad.

Around the time of Alexios Komnenos’ accession to the imperial throne in 1081, virtually the whole of central and western Asia Minor was under the control of Turkish chieftains. All

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16 Haldon, Warfare, pp.85-92. The rebel Nikephoros Botaniates was able to gather only 300 troops for his march on Constantinople circa 1077. Vryonis, Decline, p.105.
17 Whittow, M., ‘How the East was Lost: the Background to the Komnenian Reconquista’, in Mullet & Smythe, Alexios I Komnenos, pp.55-67.
that was deemed to be under imperial control in 1081 was most of the coast of the Black Sea in the north, a few isolated fortresses including Choma-Soublaion near the source of the Maiandros River, Attaleia on the Pamphylian coast, parts of Paphlagonia and perhaps a few other fortified towns.  

All that remained under Byzantine control near the capital was Nikomedia. Alexios attempted to remove the Turks from Nikomedia’s environs, but was forced to conclude a treaty with Süleyman, setting the boundary at the Drakon River (Yalakdere).  

**Political Geography Before the First Crusade**

The decade or so of geopolitical chaos before the arrival of the First Crusade in Anatolia was indicative of Byzantine weakness, the unstructured Turkish incursions, and the resultant autonomous political predilection of the invaders. Historians have generally accepted Anna Komnene’s statement that the death of Süleyman in 1085-6, whilst he was on an expedition to the East, allowed emirs to establish themselves independently in those regions where they had previously been installed by the newly established Seljuk sultan. Apart from the implication in Anna’s remark, the sources do not allow us to ascertain if those who did establish emirates were loyal to the sultan, or indeed if Süleyman did initially install them in such regions. Nevertheless, the scant evidence does suggest that several autonomous Turkish emirates existed after 1086, although some may have been founded earlier. Tzachas (Çaka) created a dominion based in Smyrna, which included a number of large offshore islands. Tangripermes and Marakes ruled Ephesos and neighbouring unspecified towns. Elkhanes occupied Apollonia and Kyzikos on the Propontis coast. Nikaia itself was retained by Abu’l-Qāsim who, according to Anna Komnene, had been placed in Nikaia as governor by Süleyman before the Seljuk undertook his fateful expedition east in 1085-6. Poulchases

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18 As evinced by Alexios’ mustering forces from these regions against the Norman, Robert Guiscard. Anna Komnene, *Alexiad*, p.125.  
21 It is unclear why Süleyman undertook this expedition towards the Great Seljuk heartland and a clash with Tutush, who held Syria as an appanage for his brother, Malik-Shāh, the Great Seljuk sultan in the East. After Süleyman was killed, his sons, including his heir, Kilic-Arslan, were sent to Malik-Shāh as hostages. Anna Komnene, *Alexiad*, pp.198-210. Cahen suggests that Süleyman’s expedition was intended to maintain relations with the Türkmen of the East because his newly found power in the West was at too much risk. Cahen, *Formation of Turkey*, p.9.  
22 For example, see Shepard, J., ‘Father’ or ‘Scorpion’? Style and substance in Alexios’s diplomacy’, in Mullet & Smythe, *Alexios I Komnenos*, pp. 68-132.  
Hasan Buldacı, the brother of Abu'l-Qāsim, controlled parts of Kappadokia. The other major Turkish power in Anatolia was that of the Danişmends. Danişmend, a Türkmen chief whose relationship to the Seljuk Turks is obscure, fashioned a territory in the north, and the two dynasties subsequently became rivals in Rûm. The victors were eventually the Seljuks, but at this point the Danişmends held Ankyra, Kaisareia and Sebasteia (modern Sivas), and thus controlled the main northern westward routes through Anatolia.

Around this time the Great Seljuk sultan in the East, Malik-Shāh, sent forces under Pouzanus (Bursuq) to besiege Nikaia, ravage Bithynia, and bring the independent sedentary western emirs and the pastoral nomadic Türkmen tribes within his power. According to Anna Komnene, the besiegers were forced to withdraw after three months when Byzantine assistance arrived to bring relief to Nikaia. In 1092, Bursuq returned to besiege Nikaia again, but was forced to withdraw following the assassination of Malik-Shāh. However, this was not before Abu'l-Qāsim was murdered; his brother, Hasan Buldacı, subsequently occupied Nikaia. Upon the death of Malik-Shāh, Kılıç Arslan, the son of Süleyman, escaped his custodians and arrived to occupy Nikaia.

Why did not the Byzantines, Danişmend Turks, or the independent western emirates which may have been formed by 1086 challenge the fugitive Seljuks for Nikaia during this brief chaotic period? It was perhaps symptomatic of the political and military weakness of the various authorities in Anatolia at this point that the only force which appears to have seriously attempted to seize Nikaia, and therefore presumably believed it was capable of doing so, was a force sent westwards from the Great Seljuk sultan in the East. There is no evidence of Türkmen tribes’ attempting to relieve Bursuq’s sieges. Whether the Türkmen were aware of a form of connection and political affinity to the Seljuks of Rûm born out of

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27 Vryonis, *Decline*, p.115.
29 Anna Komnene, *Alexiad*, pp.206-10; Matthew of Edessa, *Armenia and the Crusades, Tenth to Twelfth Centuries: The Chronicle of Matthew of Edessa*, trans. A.E. Dostourian (Lanham, 1993), pp.157-8; Cahen, *Formation of Turkey*, p.10. Note that there is some confusion here in Cahen’s text. After mentioning Çaka’s threat to Constantinople around 1092, Cahen tells us that to combat this, Alexios resorted to trickery: ‘he made peace with Kılıç Arslan, and led him to fear the ambitions of Buldaci…Kılıç Arslan invited Buldaci to a banquet where he was killed’. According to Anna, it was Çaka who was murdered at Arslan’s banquet, and given the context of this episode in Cahen’s text, it appears that the name of Buldaci has incorrectly been substituted for Çaka. However, it should also be noted that there is room for confusion in interpreting Anna’s evidence. She tells us that around the time the First Crusade was progressing through Anatolia 1097-8, Çaka was continually harassing Byzantine possessions by sea and hence Alexios dispatched forces to deal with him. There are two reasonable explanations for this apparent error; the Çaka Anna refers to at the time of the First Crusade may have been a relative of that Çaka who was murdered by Kılıç Arslan. Alternatively, Shepard suggests Anna may have purposely, although misleadingly, named Çaka and the threat he posed to Byzantium within the context of the First Crusade to justify Alexios’ decision to commit troops to recovering the Aegean littoral and islands rather than committing this force to aid the First Crusade at Antioch. Anna Komnene, *Alexiad*, pp.274-5, 345-7; Shepard, “‘Father’ or ‘Scorpion’”, pp. 68-132, note 99.
30 Byzantine forces had appeared before Nikaia, but this seems to have been part of Alexios’ attempts to stop Turkish raiding. Anna Komnene, *Alexiad*, pp.201-4.
their common Oğuz migrations is impossible to determine, and notions of tribal autonomy or loyalties to the new ruling house in western Anatolia are often hard to ascertain. Many seemingly independent tribes may nevertheless have had close ties to the fugitive branch of the Seljuks and they may have deemed that the chief amongst that dynasty was accordingly their chief. It is not always possible to specify which groups these may have been, and in which regions they might have settled, or in fact at what times they might have been allied to the Seljuks. Cahen argues that although official, public and widely recognised authority was bestowed on the Seljuk name when Tughrul-Beg received the title of ‘Sultan’ in 1055 (which augmented the dynasty’s legitimate control over the Türkmen tribes), the Türkmen themselves do not appear to have recognised the Seljuks as anything other than warrior chiefs. Lured by the promise of booty and the prospect of fulfilling the obligations of jihād, they were willing to follow the Seljuks in martial activities, but did not consider themselves obliged to do so or deem that the Seljuks could dictate tribal activities. During the two sieges of Nikaia around 1085/6 and 1092, any affinity with the supposed ruling house was not close enough to compel a nomadic ‘Seljuk’, or rather a Türkmen chief, to bring relief to Nikaia. Seljuk power was newly acquired and its notional dominance over lands surrounded by potential enemies was therefore very fragile.

Notwithstanding the weak and fractured nature of Turkish power at this point, it was not until the 1090s that Alexios Komnenos was free to turn some of his attention to the recovery of Anatolia. Without serious opposition from the sedentary or nomadic Turks, a number of Aegean islands, as well as Crete and Cyprus, may have been recaptured in 1092. Gains were also made a year later on the coastal plain of Mysia with the recapture of Kyzikos, Apollonia and Poimanenon. Whilst Alexios regained control of the coast of Bithynia opposite his capital, and recovered Nikomedia after it was briefly lost in the 1080s, he was still attempting to secure the Bithynian hinterland in 1095. It is indicative of the absence of Byzantine authority in Anatolia that the Asiatic region nearest to Constantinople was under constant Turkish pressure on the eve of the First Crusade. Indeed, as far as our sources allow us to ascertain (and for this period of Anatolian geopolitical history we are predominantly

31 Cahen points out that from the very beginning of Seljuk power, the Caliph had recognised Seljuk authority with the title of ‘clients of the commander of the faithful’. Cahen, ‘The Turkish Invasion’, p.141.
32 Cahen, ‘The Turkish Invasion’, p.141.
33 Cahen has pointed out that ‘nothing would have been more foreign’ to the Turks of Anatolia ‘than any concept of Turkish solidarity’. Cahen, ‘The Turkish Invasion’, p.136.
34 Alexios had, however, been able to recover Sinope and other strong points in its vicinity some years previously: See Anna Komnene, Alexiad, p.200.
36 Anna Komnene, Alexiad, pp.210-11.
dependent upon Anna Komnene), the recovery of the islands and the Mysian and Bithynian coasts nearest the capital appears to be the extent of the Byzantine reconquest of western Anatolia by 1097.\(^{38}\) In addition, the Byzantines were presumably still in control of most of those places along the Black Sea coast, along with other parts of Paphlagonia and a few other isolated strong points such as Attaleia that remained Byzantine possessions at the time of Alexios’ accession. This was the full extent of Byzantine authority in Anatolia.

**The Passage of the First Crusade**

Alexios Komnenos began the recovery of western Anatolia in earnest in the northwest, and was greatly assisted in this endeavour by the passing of the armies of the First Crusade through Anatolia in 1097-1098, an expedition which exposed the fragility of the Seljuk presence.\(^{39}\) Part of the crusader army reached Nikaia on 6 May 1097, and began to besiege the former Byzantine city. The then Seljuk Sultan, Kılıc Arslan, who had resided in Nikaia since 1092, marched back from campaigning in the East to bring relief to the besieged. The Türkmens constituted the core of Seljuk armies\(^{40}\) and Kılıc Arslan arrived in the vicinity of his capital shortly before 16 May with his force of predominantly nomadic warriors. His initial attack precipitated what appears to have been a major battle resulting in great losses on each side. Kılıc Arslan was driven off and the crusaders continued their siege of Nikaia, which eventually fell on 19 June.\(^{41}\) Around a week later the first crusading contingents left Nikaia and began a march which resulted in an action famously known as the ‘Battle of Dorylaion’ against the remnants of Kılıc Arslan’s army. Danışmend allies from central and northern Anatolia may have reinforced Kılıc Arslan’s Türkmens and we can assume garrison soldiers also accompanied him. Casualties were once more heavy on both sides, and again Kılıc Arslan was defeated.\(^{42}\)

\(^{38}\) The dependence on one source is not ideal. However, Anna was always keen to emphasise her father’s military achievements and, as Margaret Mullett has pointed out, contemporary Byzantine rhetoric enjoined upon its practitioners the omission of unsuccessful imperial policies or campaigns from their narratives. We can be therefore be confident that Alexios was not successful in recovering any further territory before the advent of the First Crusade. If Anna had been aware of further territorial gains, she would have recorded them. Mullett, ‘1098’, p.251.

\(^{39}\) John France addresses the progress of the First Crusade through Anatolia in some detail. France, *Victory*, ch.6.


It was these two defeats resulting in the death of so many warriors previously available to Kılıc Arslan, the lack of central control over the greatly diminished and undoubtedly scattered remaining Seljuk and Türkmen forces, coupled with the loss of Kılıc Arslan’s capital Nikaia, which enabled the first crusaders to push on to the Anatolian central plateau and successfully traverse it without serious opposition from Turkish forces. After the battle of Dorylaion there was not and, with the disruption to Seljuk authority in western Anatolia, could not seriously be, a rapid and organised effective armed resistance which might have seriously hindered the crusaders’ progress. Nomadic Türkmen tribes certainly continued to occupy many of Anatolia’s fertile plains, but evidently without the numbers or inclination to worry the crusaders. Moreover, as Vryonis maintains, Turkish forces in Anatolia at this juncture were not particularly numerous, and many of the Türkmens who might have formed an army to inhibit the First Crusade were killed or scattered at Nikaia and Dorylaion.

The fragile Seljuk presence, epitomised by the lack of an effective field army, also goes some way to explaining why Nikaia was the only settlement in Turkish hands which offered effective resistance to the progress of the crusaders. As previously mentioned, Nikaia became the capital of an independent sultanate some time after 1080, a sultanate formed by fugitive Seljuk Turks who had fled from the Great Seljuk dynasty that ruled over Syria, Mesopotamia and Persia. An effective garrison must have remained within Nikaia’s walls, as its robust resistance to the crusaders’ siege in 1097 testifies. Moreover, Nikaia’s stout walls mirrored the strong resistance and it was unlikely to capitulate easily. It is testament to its strength that after 1097, and up until the fourteenth century, Nikaia was the effective bulwark against Turkish aggression aimed at Bithynia and Constantinople from the northwest of the Anatolia plateau.

The remaining inhabited cities of Anatolia the crusaders came across, and which, according to the anonymous author of *Gesta Francorum*, welcomed the advancing army – an act John France has interpreted as its inhabitants ejecting their Turkish garrisons, thus allowing the easy progress of the army – were not cities in our modern perception of the word. Rather, they were little more than occupied citadels or at most large, but sparsely populated fortresses. The number of troops involved in garrisoning such forts during this period is unknown, but Vryonis suggests there were many strongpoints theoretically situated in Turkish lands, but without garrisons owing to the low numbers of Turks in Anatolia.

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44 Vryonis, *Decline*, p.181.
45 See photographs III.21, III.22 and III.23.
46 See above pp.117-8.
Indeed, it is often impossible to determine whether those towns and strongpoints which do not appear to have remained within Byzantine jurisdiction in the decades after 1071 were actually fully or partly settled by Turks, merely garrisoned by Turkish forces, or in fact devoid of inhabitants, as Ikonion appears to have been before 1101.  

The crusaders did not meet Turkish opposition again until they arrived near Herakleia (modern Ereğli). Hill’s translation of the *Gesta Francorum* reads that the crusaders encountered ‘a large Turkish garrison’ waiting in ambush, although perhaps the best translation of ‘*Turcorum nimia congregatio*’ is ‘a very large congregation of Turks’, meaning a body of people with a common community or brotherhood, perhaps a tribe. There is no suggestion of the inhabitants of Herakleia ejecting a Turkish garrison, and since there is no evidence that ‘*congregatio*’ can be translated as ‘garrison’, almost certainly the Turks the crusaders encountered at Herakleia were nomadic Türkmens. The *Gesta* also mention that crusaders marched on Tarsus in southeast Anatolia, that is, the opposite extremity to Nikaia. Tarsus evidently did have a garrison, but the *Gesta* make it clear the Turks fled in the night; again, there is no evidence that its inhabitants ejected the soldiers meant to defend it. Further east, nearby Adana and Mopsuestia, which the *Gesta* call Athena and Manustra (modern Misis) respectively, surrendered quickly, again with no mention of a Turkish garrison. We can presume that if the strongpoints the crusaders encountered after Dorylaion were subject to the Seljuks of Rūm, the garrison troops were either killed or scattered in the fields of Nikaia and Dorylaion. Alternatively, with the destruction of the field army, the remaining garrison troops may have fled upon news of the defeats or the approach of the crusaders. There is certainly no evidence of the town’s Christian inhabitants ejecting the Turkish garrison troops as suggested by John France. The *Gesta* actually gives the impression the towns had been bereft of troops and welcomed their co-religionists as protectors, which is plausible given the upheaval in the political geography of Asia Minor since Mantzikert. With fortresses lacking effective garrisons and no field army which might potentially bring relief to the besieged, it is little wonder the recently acquired Turkish strongpoints did not, indeed could not, attempt to stop a numerically superior crusading army.

49 On Ikonion, see Belke, *Galatien*, pp.176-8.
51 Anonymous, *Gesta Francorum*, p.24. The fact that Tarsus was the only town which appears to have had a garrison along the crusaders’ route can be explained. Firstly, there is no evidence to suggest it was in Seljuk, that is, Kilic Arslan’s hands. Thus, the Turks who held Tarsus may have had no political affinity with the defeated sultan, and would not have been called upon at Nikaia or Dorylaion. Secondly, given its location at the opposite end of Anatolia to Nikaia and Dorylaion, the garrison was probably unaware of the Turkish defeats and, even if in Seljuk hands, had not been called upon to replenish troops. Moreover, it is probable that Kilic Arslan would have fled east at some point across the Anatolian plateau. It is certainly unlikely he would have sent messages to a Turkish enemy in the southeast of Anatolia to advise the garrison to flee from the approaching crusaders.
Comnenian Recovery in the Wake of the First Crusade

The tenuous Seljuk claim to be nominal heads of the Turks of western Anatolia, and their army of Seljuk garrison troops and nomadic Türkmens, were considerably weakened and rendered temporarily impotent in the wake of ‘Dorylaion’. Western Anatolia was again witnessing an upheaval in its political geography and was ripe for recovery by Alexios Komnenos. According to Anna Komnene, whilst the First Crusade was besieging Antioch in northern Syria in 1098, Alexios sent combined land and sea forces to the Aegean littoral. They succeeded in reclaiming Smyrna and Ephesus by force, and presumably removed all the Turks inhabiting the coastal plains and offshore islands at least as far south as Ephesus. Anna implies that Smyrna and the Seljuks at Nikaia were allies at this point: the daughter of ‘Çaka’ (who held Smyrna) was in Nikaia at the conclusion of the crusader siege and she accompanied the Byzantine force to be used as evidence that Nikaia had fallen. Anna states that Smyrna opened her gates to the Byzantine forces because the city had already heard of

53 However, as the misfortunes which befell the crusading expedition of 1101 demonstrate, the Turks of Anatolia regrouped in the years immediately after 1097, and certainly exercised some form of control over the majority of the Anatolian plateau. On the expedition of 1101, see Cate, J., ‘The Crusade of 1101’, in Setton, History of the Crusades, pp.343-67.
54 Anna Komnene, Alexiad, pp.345-7.
55 The crusaders arrived at Antioch about 20 October 1097 and the siege lasted nine months. France, Victory, chapters 7-9.
56 Shepard maintains that the chronology of this campaign, the details of which we know primarily through Anna Komnene, cannot be reconstructed precisely. As the campaign consisted of land and sea forces, Shepard ascribes a summer season to the campaign, that is, the summer of 1097 and very soon after Nikaia was recovered for the Byzantines on 19 June 1097. Additionally, Shepard states that if the combined Byzantine force succeeded in retaking Smyrna, and presumably the rest of the Aegean littoral at least as far as Ephesus, ‘it is highly unlikely that this operation…could all have been carried out in the early spring of 1098, in time for Alexios to advance from Constantinople as far as Philomelion in June.’ The campaign must therefore have been carried out in the summer of 1097. One of three things is being implied here. First, one could construe that Alexios waited for the conclusion of the Aegean campaign of 1097 before striking out for Philomelion in 1098. Second, Alexios accompanied the Aegean campaign along the Aegean littoral, and thus if the campaign was carried out in the spring of 1098, he would not have had time to be at Philomelion in June that year with a second force; the Aegean campaign must therefore have been undertaken the previous year. But Anna Komnene, always ready to impress upon her reader the successful military exploits of her father, makes no mention of Alexios on the Aegean campaign. Indeed, she specifically states that the land force was led by John Doukas, and that while John was still on this campaign, Alexios arrived at Philomelion. This renders the second argument for a summer campaign in 1097 tenuous at best. Third, Anna states that Alexios arrived at Philomelion around the same time that John was at nearby Polybotos (mod. Bolvadin). Shepard may therefore be implying that John must have begun campaigning nearly a year earlier to enable him to clear the Aegean littoral and western river valleys of Turks in time to meet Alexios near Philomelion. This would mean that John’s force was not only maintained over winter, but continued campaigning for nigh on a year, which would have been unprecedented during this period of Byzantine history in Anatolia.

Anna makes it clear that only Ephesus put up stiff resistance to John’s force. Other strongpoints fell easily as the Turks fled eastwards. If we are to believe Anna, our only source which provides detail of John’s campaign, the expedition was carried out whilst the First Crusade was at Antioch, that is, late October 1097 to approximately July 1098. It is thus probable that news of John’s quick and resounding success in driving the Turks from the Aegean littoral and river valleys and on to the plateau in the first half of 1098 soon reached Constantinople. A force under Alexios, mustered and waiting to help John or meet him near Philomelion, then advanced across the plateau with little opposition from the Turkish forces, and arrived at Philomelion in June 1098. Anna Komnene, Alexiad, pp.342-53; Shepard, ‘Father’ or ‘Scorpion’, pp.68-132.
the Seljuk loss of Nikaia. It presumably abandoned all hope of relief from a Seljuk army.\textsuperscript{57} Indeed, there is no evidence to suggest that a Seljuk force came to the aid of Smyrna, or for that matter, any of the other places.

It is very unlikely that Kilic Arslan merely allowed the Byzantines to remove the Turks;\textsuperscript{58} there was not a Seljuk army or in fact any other Turkish force in western Anatolia willing to assist Smyrna or capable of doing so. There is no reason to interpret this event differently from what Anna, our only source, tells us. Smyrna, and we can assume many of the other Aegean towns which the Turks may have garrisoned at this juncture, opened her gates on terms to the Byzantines because all hope of relief had vanished. This is a more credible explanation for the relative ease with which the Byzantines recovered Smyrna and elsewhere than supposing that the spectre of crusading ‘bogeymen’ posed an unknown martial quality to the Turks.\textsuperscript{59}

The Turks subsequently fled along the Maiandros Valley until they reached Polybotos (modern Bolvadin) on the southwest edge of the plateau. There is no indication that Turks garrisoned the towns along the Maiandros, but if they did, we can assume that they too escaped towards the plateau with the survivors from the Aegean coast, effectively returning the Maiandros Valley to imperial rule. John Doukas pursued them via the Hermos Valley, as

\textsuperscript{57} Anna Komnene, \textit{Alexiad}, pp.345-7.

\textsuperscript{58} As suggested by Cahen. Cahen, \textit{Formation of Turkey}, p.13.

\textsuperscript{59} Shepard, ‘“Father” or “Scorpion”’, pp.87-8, 124-5. Shepard suggests that as far as the Turks in Smyrna and elsewhere were aware, the crusader ‘bogeymen’ may have formed the left wing of an elaborate pincer-movement trapping the Turks of western Anatolia, and therefore they chose to capitulate. To this end, the Byzantines guided the First Crusade over the central plateau and towards Antioch-in-Psidia (mod. Yalvaç). However, the crusaders were at Antioch when John Doukas was campaigning on the Aegean coast. Also, if the spectre of crusader ‘bogeymen’ was to instill fear into the Turks whilst giving the impression of carrying out an pincer movement with Doukas’ forces, it would make much more sense for the crusaders to be guided along the imperial campaign route in the west of the peninsula. This would have formed a much more effective and therefore realistic pincer movement than the route the crusaders actually took, and would also have brought the crusaders within striking distance of those very Turks in Smyrna and elsewhere they were supposed to terrify.

Shepard’s interpretation here stems primarily from Anna’s statement that the Byzantine general Boutoumites advised the Turks of Nikaia to hand the besieged city over to the Byzantines. Boutoumites pledged an amnesty in return. Otherwise, he advised, if the city fell to the crusader ‘bogeymen’, the town’s inhabitants might be massacred. This of course may have been true, but we must exercise caution here. If a town was taken by force during this period, the defenders were wholly aware they ran the risk of massacre. This was not something that was potentially new to the Turks of Nikaia and neither for that matter were western warriors. Latin mercenaries had fought against and alongside Turkish forces as Byzantine mercenaries since the mid-eleventh century. Although the crusaders did win victories outside Nikaia, and the size of the western expedition was unprecedented, Anna herself suggests that the besieged at Nikaia were hopeful that relief would come. It was only when the hope of relief was shattered, and the Turks of Nikaia had been promised not only amnesty, which was often enough for a besieged people to capitulate, but also gifts, titles and pensions, and perhaps even territory, that they surrendered Nikaia to the Byzantines, rather than run the risk of massacre. These are the actions of people faced with a simple choice, namely, to surrender with wealth and prestige to the Byzantines or die at the hands of the crusaders. Anna Komnene, \textit{Alexiad}, pp.330-40. On the western imperial campaign routes, see below, map no.7. On western contingents in Byzantine service, see Lilie, R. J., \textit{Handel und Politik zwischen dem byzantinischen Reich und den italienischen Kommunen Venedig, Pisa, und Genua in der Epoche der Komnenen und der Angeloi (1081-1204)} (Amsterdam, 1984), chapters 6-11.
Anna tells us that the Byzantines seized Sardis and Philadelphia (modern Aleşehir) by surprise en route to Laodikeia. There is no indication that there were Turks at Laodikeia; we are told merely that the inhabitants came out to greet the Byzantine force. We can assume that if Turks were occupying the whole of the Hermos Valley at the time of the First Crusade, they subsequently fled to the plateau, with the loss of towns such as Sardis and Philadelphia. Perhaps the Byzantines were greeted along the Hermos Valley just as they had been welcomed at Laodikeia and in a similar fashion to the way some places received the First Crusade on the plateau. This is probably indicative of Alexios’ frenzied recovery of the coastal plains and river valleys in the wake of the First Crusade.

After passing Choma-Soublaion, which appears to have remained in imperial hands, the Byzantine force took Lampe, and then defeated the Turks outside Polybotos. There is no indication that a Byzantine garrison was left in the town. Meanwhile, Alexios Komnenos himself had arrived at Philomelion in June 1098, apparently sacking many Turkish towns en route. Neither Anna nor Ekkehard of Aura informs us which towns Alexios may have come across, and thus we cannot be certain which route he took to reach Philomelion. If, as has been reasonably suggested, Alexios took the principal Byzantine military route towards Philomelion by the way of the ruins of Dorylaion, and if he sacked towns en route, it appears that the former Byzantine towns along this road, namely, Nakoleia, Santabaris (probably modern Bardakçı), Hebraike (probably modern Hanköy), Kedrea (modern Bayat) and Polybotos were inhabited by Turks at this point. We must question Anna’s evidence here because if these towns were inhabited, the population may have consisted mainly of Greeks. It seems unlikely Alexios would choose to sack such towns, unless Anna is implying that Alexios destroyed the Turkish garrisons. Moreover, it remains uncertain whether these towns actually were occupied in 1098. If they were, and Alexios did lay them waste along with their environs, the evidence allows us to postulate that only Kedrea and Polybotos were again inhabited in the twelfth century on the likely route taken by Alexios.

Notwithstanding this element of confusion, Alexios did not encounter any opposition from the defeated and scattered Turkish forces of western Anatolia en route to Philomelion.

60 See photograph III.24.
61 See photograph III.13.
62 Thus, not via the Maiandros Valley: France, Victory, p.300.
64 France, Victory, p.300.
65 See below, maps 3 & 5.
66 Vryonis, Decline, pp.179-81.
67 On Nakoleia, Santabaris, Hebraike, Kedrea and Polybotos respectively, see Belke & Mersich, Phrygien, pp.344-6, 372-3, 268, 297-9, 363-4.
although there is no evidence to suggest that Byzantine rule was once again imposed on the
greater part of the plateau, as it had been on the verdant coastal plains and river valleys.
Without the presence of well defended and regularly administered centres of habitation,
Byzantine rule could not be imposed. The crusade and Alexios’ incursions into non-
Byzantine territory, such as the one in 1098, and a second near the end of his reign in 1116,
may have scattered Türkmen tribes, acquired booty, increased prestige and morale, and
imposed imperial will by the emperor’s very presence and force of arms, but the effects were
transitory.\footnote{Anna Komnene, \textit{Alexiad}, pp.479-91.}

The First Crusade’s defeat of the Turkish forces at Nikaia and Dorylaion had nonetheless
caused another period of political turmoil in a country already in a state of geopolitical flux.
The chaos evidently allowed Alexios to recover the greater part of the western coastal plains
and river valleys, scatter the Türkmen tribes and push the sedentary Turks on to the central
plateau. Some entered the town of Ikonion by 1101, which eventually became the new Seljuk
capital of Rûm. Doubtless others may have entered a number of the remaining plateau towns
bereft of Byzantine authority around the same time, if indeed they were not in them already.
Unfortunately, we cannot always be certain whether such towns were occupied at all during
this chaotic period. The dearth of source evidence is reflected in the fact we cannot even
attest to Alexios’ recovery of the entire western Anatolian coastline during his reign.\footnote{As
Mullett has pointed out, the reconquest of the western and southern seaboard has often been inferred rather
than proven. Mullett, ‘1098’, pp.246-7.}

We can be certain that, although Turks continued to raid, the sedentary Turks were removed from
the Aegean littoral as far south as the region around Ephesos. Parts of the Lycian coast
became regularly administered, and a Byzantine administration remained in Attaleia on the
Pamphylian coastal littoral. In addition, Alexios had recovered a number of islands and the
Mysian and Bithynian coastlines nearest the capital before the arrival of the First Crusade.
The Byzantines were presumably still in control of most of those places which remained
Byzantine at Alexios’ accession.

Alexios’ son and successor, John II Komnenos (1118-43), made territorial gains in the
north and southeast of Anatolia. John also made his appearance in the West during attempts
to stop recurrent Turkish raids and scatter the Türkmens, consolidate the Byzantine hold on
tenuous claims, and expand the boundaries of the empire. An effective, settled Byzantine
administration, and with it, hopes of creating thriving populations in these areas, however,
were not realised.\footnote{Vryonis, \textit{Decline}, pp.118-120; Cahen, \textit{Formation of Turkey}, pp.18-20.}The gains made by Alexios in the west of the peninsula were the only
regions on which the Komnenoi were able to impose their rule by an effective, continuous
presence in the intervening years between Alexios’ death in 1118 and the arrival of the Second Crusade at Constantinople in 1147.

The early military actions of John’s son and successor, Manuel I Komnenos, are symptomatic of the geopolitical reality in the West on the eve of the Second Crusade. Circa 1145, the new emperor drove the Türkmen tribes from Malagina in Bithynia, before reconstructing a fortress there by the lower Sangarios to curb Türkmen movements along the main route from the central plateau to Constantinople.71 The same actions were carried out a year later at Pithekas, which is to be found in the middle or upper reaches of the Karasu valley.72 The last stronghold which may have been occupied at the time of the Second Crusade on this particular route through Bithynia to the central plateau, and hence the limit of Byzantine hegemony, was Armenokastron (near modern Pazaryeri) located by a tributary of the Karasu River.73 Before 1146, effective Byzantine dominion did not even include the whole of eastern Bithynia, the Asiatic region nearest to Constantinople.

Manuel conducted a campaign against Ikonion that year74 which, according to Niketas Choniates, caused the Türkmens inhabiting (presumably the upper reaches of) the Maiandros Valley to flee.75 He subsequently advanced eastward encountering and defeating Turks near Akroinos (modern Afyon Karahisar or Afyon), and setting fire to the Seljuk town of Philomelion before advancing to the very walls of Ikonion. The fact that Manuel, like his predecessors, was able to defeat Turkish forces in non-Byzantine territory on the very edge of the plateau does not mean these regions were brought back permanently within the imperial domain. Effective administrations, and with them flourishing populations, could not be maintained,76 and Byzantine military and political weakness ensured that the results were ephemeral, regardless of how weak the emperor’s Turkish enemies may have been.

We can conclude that after the battle of Mantzikert, the western Anatolian powers retained a precarious hold on their respective, frequently altering domains. The complete change in the geopolitical landscape was not the result of a planned concerted effort on behalf of Seljuk authority in Baghdad, but rather the extemporal result of nomadic Türkmen incursions which

71 Kinnamos, Deeds, p.36; Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, p.31; Foss, ‘Byzantine Malagina’, pp.61-83; Foss, Byzantine Fortifications, pp.145-50.
72 Kinnamos, Deeds, p.38; Belke & Mersich, Phrygien, pp.141-2.
73 Anna Komnene, Alexiad, pp.478-80; Belke & Mersich, Phrygien, pp.141-2.
74 Kinnamos, Deeds, pp.39-56; Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, pp.31-2.
75 The sources give the impression this campaign commenced from Lopadion and progressed through Lydia before, according to Niketas Choniates, appearing ‘before the cities of Phrygia and before those along the Maiandros Valley’. This itinerary suggests Manuel advanced along the western imperial campaign route which reached the Maiandros Valley only near its head. Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, p.31. On the western imperial campaign routes, see below, map no.7.
76 Hendy concluded that the territory effectively recovered by the Byzantine Empire (and its Christian offshoots) in Anatolia remained more or less constant, and essentially consisted of the western and southern lands lying below an altitude of 500 metres. Hendy, Studies, p.122.
took advantage of Byzantine weakness. The Seljuks of Rûm, the nominal leading family of the Turks of western Anatolia and their followers, were initially fugitives fleeing from the Great Seljuks of the East, and they, along with other powerful families, installed themselves in towns lacking Byzantine administrations. This process of Turkish westward migration and settlement was therefore largely in spite of the efforts of Tughrul-Beğ and his successors in Baghdad. The absence of effective resistance to the passage of the First Crusade after the ‘Battle of Dorylaion’ and the subsequent Alexian recovery were symptomatic of the disparate policies of the Turkish invaders and their subsequent fragile grasp on newly inhabited towns and territories.

Reconstructions of the resultant geopolitical map appear to accept, at least tacitly, that any town regained by the Komnenoi after Mantzikert not only remained Byzantine but formed part of a tangible and fixed eastern frontier which is usually depicted in map form at its potential static maximum.\footnote{For example, see Harris, Byzantium, p.97; Nicolle, Historical Atlas, p.113.} The situation was clearly more fluid than this and Michael Hendy has done much to rectify the notion of a fixed frontier. Hendy combined and converted various sources into a traditional territorial map form indicating those regions over which the Byzantines were actually exercising imperial authority on a regular basis in the twelfth century.\footnote{See below, map no.8; Hendy, Studies, pp.108-31. Also see Kennedy, H., ed., An Historical Atlas of Islam 2nd rev. ed. (Leiden, 2002), p.46 map b.} These were the western lowland river valleys and coastal plains which Alexios Komnenos brought back within the imperial domain. A great part of Caria, south of the Maiandros River, the hinterlands of Pamphylia, and most of Phrygia, Pisidia and Lycia, all regions once inhabited by sedentary populations, were permanently lost to the Byzantines. The Seljuk possessions in western Anatolia remained located in the disparate fertile regions near the southwest edge of the plateau, as they had since the Turks were removed from the coastal littorals and river valleys.

The country the crusaders marched through in the autumn of 1147 was not neatly split between Byzantine and Seljuk domains. Boundaries shifted, but importantly, neither the Greeks nor the Turks were evidently strong enough to reclaim all the lands they had lost after 1071 and 1097 respectively; vast territories remained without sedentary populations and effective administrations. Moreover, neither the Greeks nor the Turks were able to stop incursions into the other’s nominal territory, whether those incursions took the form of recurrent Turkish raids into Byzantine domains or major Byzantine expeditions against the Seljuks. It is clear neither power had alleviated the instability which facilitated the Türkmen incursions into Anatolia after 1071. Crucially, the Türkmens, either tribal descendants of the first invaders or subsequent migrants, continued to take advantage of this Byzantine and
Seljuk weakness throughout the twelfth century. In doing so, they created autonomous domains in areas the crusaders encountered and in which the established patterns of land use were altered. As we will see, this Türkmen presence in northwest Anatolia was to have a profound impact on the crusaders’ logistical capabilities and it raises an interesting question as to who attacked the crusaders. So we must now turn to a study of the rôle of this little known Turkic people in the fragile twelfth-century geopolitical landscape.
11. The Türkmens

Crusade histories tend to blur any distinction that may have existed between Seljuk Turks, the sedentary ruling Turkish family and their followers in south and western Anatolia, and the tribes of pastoral nomads or rather transhumants who came to be known as Türkmens or Turcomans. The Turkish inhabitants of western Anatolia are simply deemed to be sedentary ‘Turks’ or ‘Seljuks’, which imbues in the reader a sense of a single, united Turkish polity with its seat of power in Ikonion.\(^1\) This is rather remiss, as Türkmen tribes took advantage of the unstable geopolitical landscape engendered by Seljuk and Byzantine weakness to establish themselves in those regions outside the effective control of either power. Significantly, those on crusade in 1147 attempted to provision themselves in eastern Bithynia, an area which was subject to a Türkmen presence only a few years earlier. Moreover, the army subsequently advanced through northwest Phrygia which was inhabited throughout the twelfth century by tribes of Türkmens who altered the patterns of land use in such areas to suit their own pastoral-nomadic existence in which the pursuits of jihād, plunder and pasture were central.

But who were the Türkmens and what do we know of their way of life? It will help initially to define the Türkmens and suggest how we can recognise them in the sources.\(^2\) A number of texts will then reveal the impact of the Türkmen incursions in western Anatolia, whilst other Greek sources and toponymical studies will identify those areas in which the Türkmens settled in the West. Analysis of the Greek sources which consider the twelfth-century treaties concluded by the Seljuk sultan, and which also relate to the coincidental raiding activity of the Türkmens, will demonstrate it is injudicious to deem that all of the Turks of western Anatolia were Seljuk Turks. Following this discussion we can propose how the Türkmen existence may have affected the progress of the crusade in Anatolia.

Consisting of nomads seeking pasture for their herds and flocks and warriors for the faith, that is, ghazis, the Türkmens constituted the overwhelming majority of pastoral nomads who migrated to Asia Minor.\(^3\) Sharaf al-Zamān Marwāzī, writing circa 1120, defined the Türkmens as emanating from the Oğuz tribes of peoples who first settled in Anatolia and who adopted Islam. Aksarāyī, one of the earliest Anatolian historians, writing around 1310,

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referred to those who lived on the Byzantine-Seljuk frontier as Türkmens. Other contemporary writers, such as Bar Hebraeus, knew them as Uдж Türkmen or Türkmen of the marches. From these references we may infer that the name Türkmens was a generic appellation applied to the Oğuz tribes of (at least superficially) Islamicised Turks who lived on the western borders of the Islamic world during our period. The Türkmens themselves have left no written record for this period of their history in Anatolia. The contemporary and near contemporary historiography of the eastern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern worlds, whilst certainly understanding the nature and rôle of the Türkmen pastoral-nomadic existence, provide little information about the Türkmen migrations or where the various Oğuz tribes – Kızık, Çepni, Kınık and so on – initially settled in Anatolia. We do know that the Anatolian Seljuk Turks, themselves of Oğuz origin, migrated westward with the Türkmen tribes and became the notional ruling sedentary family in the west of the peninsula.

Cahen and Vryonis have done much to highlight the essential differences between the sedentary Seljuk Turks with their established institutions and the Türkmens with their movable society. However, when Turks are referred to in the Latin, Greek and Syriac sources, it is difficult to distinguish whether they were regular Seljuk troops, that is, Turkish warriors with a close affinity to the ruling house (and who may have lived a pastoral nomadic or transhumant existence exactly like the Türkmens), or if they were those Turks who became known to contemporaries and historians alike as Türkmens. It is reasonable to suggest that in Anatolia, the clearest distinction we can make between regular Seljuk troops and irregular Türkmen warriors is between those who garrisoned the former Byzantine possessions, and those who continued to practise pastoral nomadism or transhumance in the twelfth century. The former were loyal to the Seljuk dynasty and had relinquished their nomadic lifestyle, whereas the latter continued to live a typically pastoral-nomadic warrior way of life, that is, a Türkmen existence.

To raid in the pursuit of booty and to fulfil the obligations of the jihâd were major aspects of the Türkmen existence. In contemporary Islamic law, which called for perpetual Holy War, the acquisition of booty whilst engaged in jihâd was both desirable and honourable.

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5 Bar Hebraeus, Political History, p.360.
6 For references to recent works which have attempted to address these points, see İnalçık, ‘Yürtüks’, pp.107-8, especially notes 43 & 49.
8 No extant Islamic sources record the history of the Turks in Asia Minor before 1150. The later written histories of the Seljuks, found only in Arabic and Persian sources, tend to fall into a number of types, namely, dynastic and ‘universal’ histories, and local and town chronicles. The general nature of the former two categories, and conversely, the narrow scope of the two latter types, means that specific details regarding the Türkmen are uncommon; Hillenbrand, C., ‘Some Reflections on Seljuq Historiography’, in A Eastmond, ed., Eastern Approaches to Byzantium (Aldershot, 2001), pp.73-88.
Indeed, a fundamental concern of the Türkmen beğs was to provide a form of livelihood in the form of plunder for their Türkmen ghazis (warriors pursuing Holy War). İnalçık argues that the promise of booty combined with becoming a ghazi were the primary motivations for joining Türkmen war bands. Many raids appear to have been particularly violent. Before Mantzikert, massacres accompanied the Turkish sacking of Kaisareia, Neokaisareia (modern Niksar), Amorion, Ikonion and Chonae, for example. Such activity became more widespread in the reign of Michael VII Doukas (1071-1078) when there was little stopping the Türkmen tribes from penetrating far into Anatolia. The effects of their presence are clearly brought out in the following passage:

‘At the beginning of the year 528 of the Armenian era [1079-80], a severe famine occurred throughout all the lands of the venerators of the cross, lands which are located on this side of the Mediterranean Sea; for the bloodthirsty and ferocious Turkish nation spread over the whole country to such an extent that not one area remained untouched, rather all the Christians were subjected to the sword and enslavement. The cultivation of the land was interrupted, there was a shortage of food, the cultivators and labourers decreased due to the sword and enslavement, and so famine spread throughout the whole land. Many areas became depopulated, the Oriental peoples [Armenian and Syrian Christians] began to decline, and the country of the Romans became desolate; neither food nor security was to be found anywhere.’

Famine owing to a lack of cultivation was a direct result of the depopulation of the countryside induced by the Turkish raids. Evidence suggests this was widespread throughout Anatolia. For example, Michael Attaliates implies that the first period of Turkish incursions after Mantzikert drove many of the inhabitants to the islands and the protection of Constantinople. According to Anna Komnene, the incursions and subsequent devastation caused the Greek population largely to abandon the towns of the Aegean and Mediterranean littorals from Attaleia to Smyrna. A little further up the coast from Smyrna, Adramyttion was reduced to rubble and required rebuilding and repopulating under Alexios Komnenos. Fulcher of Chartres, a veteran of the First Crusade, described parts of ‘Romania’ as a country ‘laid waste and depopulated by the Turks’. The pilgrim Saewulf described the former

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9 İnalçık, H., ‘The Rise of the Turcoman Maritime Principalities in Anatolia’, in İnalçık, Middle East, pp.309-341. The ghaza or Holy War element of the Türkmen raids must not be overstated. The Türkmens were certainly willing to raid for Christian paymasters and their banditry was frequently directed at Muslim targets, as evinced by the heavily fortified Seljuk khans of the thirteenth century. Moreover, the Türkmens were not averse from engaging in commercial exchanges with their Christian neighbours between one raid and the next. Magdalino, Empire, pp.124, 131; Cahen, Formation of Turkey, p.125.
10 Vryonis, Decline, p.171.
14 ‘a Turcis vastatam et depopulatam’, Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana, p.201.
important naval and military town of Strobilos on the Halicarnissus Peninsula as ‘entirely
devastated by Turks’ after he was detained there by contrary winds in 1103.\textsuperscript{15} John II
Komnenos had to rebuild the fort of Lopadion in 1130, which had been a target of a least one
particularly devastating raid seventeen years earlier.\textsuperscript{16}

We must question the source testimonies, as some chroniclers may have had a particular
agendum. Anna Komnene, for example, might have chosen to exaggerate the level of
destruction the better to portray her father’s achievement in resettling devastated areas.
Others such as Fulcher of Chartres, Saewulf and Odo of Deuil were evidently informed the
Turks had caused the devastation and depopulation of the countryside which they witnessed
on their travels.\textsuperscript{17} On occasions, however, they might have observed the results of much more
ancient causes for the decrepitude.\textsuperscript{18} Nonetheless, a common thread running through the
sources is that the Turkish presence could disrupt, waste and depopulate a region.

The territory around Ikonion provides an excellent illustration of this. Ikonion was the
capital of Byzantine Lykaonia and surrounded by a cultivable hinterland. William of Tyre
described this hinterland as ‘unoccupied’ (\textit{vacuam}) during the First Crusade, where the
crusaders did not tarry but ‘fled the barrenness of the region’ which afforded them no food.\textsuperscript{19}
By 1147, it had become ‘a pleasant region overflowing with advantages’.\textsuperscript{20} What had changed? William believed that in 1097 the Turks ‘despoiled’ (\textit{expoliatis}) their towns and
‘laid waste the entire region’ before fleeing upon the approach of the crusaders.\textsuperscript{21} The Turks
and the Byzantines are known to have employed scorched-earth policies in some frontier
zones.\textsuperscript{22} Nevertheless, it is unlikely that fleeing Turks caused the despoliation William
described. The Ikonion hinterland had become a wasteland by 1097 because it was on the
Byzantine/Turkish frontier from at least 1069 when it was probably first attacked by Turkish
forces, until the Byzantines fled from the city in 1084.\textsuperscript{23} Again, there is the possibility that the
actual towns in this region may have appeared ravaged owing to the effects of prolonged
warfare and demographic decline. Alternatively, the Turks may indeed have caused much of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{15} ‘\textit{a Turchis omnino devastatum}’, Saewulf, \textit{Relatio de Peregrinatione ad Hierosolymam et Terram Sanctam}, ed.
\item \textsuperscript{16} See photograph III.10; Anna Komnene, \textit{Alexiad}, p.453; John Kinnamos, \textit{Deeds}, p. 38.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Odo of Deuil informed his audience that the Turks ‘have destroyed’ (\textit{destruxerunt}) part of ‘Romania’, Odo of
\item \textsuperscript{18} See above p.112.
\item \textsuperscript{19} ‘\textit{regionis sterilitatem fugientes}’, William of Tyre, \textit{Willelmi Tyrensis archiepiscopi chronicon}, III.19(18),
p.221; Also see Fulcher of Chartres, \textit{Historia Hierosolymitana}, p.201; Anonymous, \textit{Gesta Francorum}, p.23;
Baudric of Dol, ‘\textit{Historia Ierosolimitana}’, \textit{R. H. C.}, Oc. 4, p.37; Anonymous, ‘\textit{Anonymi Rhenani Historia et
Gesta Ducis Gotfridi}’, \textit{R. H. C.}, Oc. 5, p.475.
\item \textsuperscript{20} ‘\textit{in regionem optimam et commoditatis reddundatam}’, that is, a fertile region where abundant provisions
could be located. William of Tyre, \textit{Willelmi Tyrensis archiepiscopi chronicon}, XVI.20, p.744.
\item \textsuperscript{21} ‘\textit{vastata regione universa}’, William of Tyre, \textit{Willelmi Tyrensis archiepiscopi chronicon}, III.19(18), p.221.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Vryonis, \textit{Decline}, pp.147-8.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Michael Attaliates, \textit{Historia}, p.136; Belke, \textit{Galatien}, pp.176-8.
\end{itemize}
the destruction, but this was not as they fled the towns. There is no evidence to suggest that sedentary Turks occupied Ikonion or any of the other towns near the southwest edge of the plateau in 1097. It is very likely these towns had remained empty since being vacated by the Byzantines in the wake of Mantzikert. Only some time after the Seljuk Turks had lost their fledging capital at Nikaia, were subsequently beaten in battle en route to Dorylaion, and the First Crusade had marched across the full length of Anatolia, was Ikonion, for example, once again occupied.\footnote{It appears to have been occupied by 1101 when garrison troops clashed with the crusading army led by William of Nevers; Belke, \textit{Galatien}, p.177.} The entire region would indeed have lacked a sedentary population and cultivation, but this was owing to Turkish military activity conducted over a decade before the First Crusade. If we are to believe William of Tyre, within two generations Ikonion’s hinterland was once again a verdant region where provisions could be located.\footnote{William of Tyre, \textit{Willelmi Tyrensis archiepiscopi chronicon}, XVI.20, p.744.} By 1147, Ikonion had become the second capital of the Seljuk Empire of Rûm.

We must recognise that fertile land remained fallow without a sedentary population to cultivate fields and gardens. For example, coastal Pamphylia was a region identified by Michael Hendy as traditionally capable of supporting a large population.\footnote{See below, map no.6, concentration number 10.} As we saw in the previous chapter, however, the only town inhabited on the Pamphylian coast in 1148 was Attaleia. But even here, the town’s fertile hinterland remained uncultivated. The town’s inhabitants were compelled to receive provisions by ship from Constantinople because, as William of Tyre noted, the land was ‘useless to the townspeople, for their enemies have got them in a stranglehold from every direction’. It was this presence that hindered cultivation.\footnote{‘civibus suis in utilem, nam angustiantibus eos undique hostibus’, William of Tyre, \textit{Willelmi Tyrensis archiepiscopi chronicon}, XVI.26 pp.752-4; Odo of Deuil, \textit{De Profectione}, p.128.} These ‘enemies’ who had caused the land to remain fallow by their continual presence were not Seljuk Turks: in the mid twelfth century, Seljuk territory was still largely restricted to the towns on the southwestern edge of the Anatolian plateau. Tribes of Türkmen inhabited the Pamphylian hinterland at this point. The testimony of William of Tyre and the archaeological record suggested to Clive Foss that Attaleia was in effect, ‘an island in a Turkish sea, the countryside overrun by tribes.’\footnote{Foss, \textit{The Cities of Pamphylia}, p.50.} According to Vryonis, Attaleia was just one of many towns surrounded by Türkmen tribes in the twelfth century.\footnote{Vryonis, \textit{Decline}, pp.187-8.} As Vryonis and others have shown, in the chaos after 1071 and 1097, many of the Türkmen ceased to be truly nomadic, that is, they did not return eastwards after the summer raiding season but began to migrate between pastures. Put another way, Türkmen tribes took the opportunity to exploit the lack of effective sustained resistance to their presence by permanently occupying the deserted rural areas their
initial presence had affected. These territories were often situated between those lands under Byzantine domain – generally the coastal plains and river valleys of west and south Anatolia – and that territory regularly administered by the Seljuk sultanate – namely, the Anatolian plateau.30

The patterns of land use were henceforth altered in such areas. Much of the land must have remained uncultivated in the decades after 1071 following the dispersal of a great part of the population, but clearly the Türkmen existence precluded renewed agricultural development. As William of Tyre noted at Attaleia, it became too dangerous to cultivate the fields because farmers faced the risk of death or enslavement at the hands of the Türkmens. Even as late as 1162 in Lydia, which was brought back within the imperial domain before the end of the eleventh century and was located far from Anatolia’s Turkish inhabitants, Manuel Komnenos built a series of fortified refuges near the towns of Pergamon, Adramyttion and Chliara so that rural inhabitants might flee to safety upon the approach of a Türkmen warband. Niketas Choniates specifically states that the Greek population began to swell and the land become arable only after Manuel had taken these measures against the Türkmen threat.31 In the frontier regions such as Pamphylia, the Greek population was compelled to remain behind the safety of its walls. Accordingly, the land was given over to pasture, as the Türkmens were pastoralists and largely unconcerned with cultivating the land they occupied.

Hot dry summers prevented the development of extensive meadowlands except in a few moist areas adjacent to rivers and a small number of upland plains. As the scanty and sparse vegetation on the lowland pastures is renewed only once during winter and spring, and renewed at higher altitudes only once in summer, the pasture was sought by migration.32 Türkmen transhumance witnessed the tribes seasonally migrating en masse with their tents and livestock between higher, cooler summer pastures in valleys (yayla) towards the Anatolian plateau, and lower, warmer winter quarters towards the coastal plains and river valleys (kişla) of western and southern Anatolia.33 Öğuz toponyms provide us with our earliest evidence of the regions in which the Türkmens practised transhumance. Place names of Öğuz origin are found predominantly in the transitional land of Paphlagonia, Phrygia and Lycia.34 The survival of the toponyms yayla and kişla and their derivatives between the

31 Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, p.85.
33 The terms yayla and kişla were also employed to denote summer and winter camps respectively.
34 Hendy, Studies, p.115.
Pisidian lakes (the *yayla*) and the Pamphylian plain (the *kişla*) confirms a Türkmen presence in these regions and reveals patterns of early transhumance which are similar to those of the modern partly settled *yürük*. The *yürük* of the modern period migrate in October from their summer *yayla* in Pisidia down to their winter Pamphylian *kişla* – a distance of some 150 kilometres – before returning to their summer pastures in the following May; much as the Türkmens almost certainly did in the twelfth century. Similar patterns have been revealed around Ikonion, Dorylaion and elsewhere.

The heaviest concentration of Türkmens in the northwest of Anatolia was in Phrygia by the Bathys (modern Sarisu) and Tembros rivers in the Dorylaion plain. Turkish forces attacked Byzantine troops separated from the army of Manuel Komnenos around Kotyaeion (modern Kütahya) and the Tembros River as the army returned from Cilicia in April 1159. Later that year, Manuel marched to Dorylaion, dispersing the Türkmens and their flocks, although they soon returned upon the withdrawal of the Byzantine army. Works by John Kinnamos and Niketas Choniates, as well as verse encomia by Euthymios Malakes and Eustathios of Thessaloniki, and a letter written by Manuel Komnenos to Pope Alexander III, relate that the emperor attempted to drive the Türkmens permanently from the plain with the reconstruction of Dorylaion in 1175. At that time, Dorylaion had lain ruined for around one hundred years and was inhabited by two thousand Türkmens and their flocks.

It appears the plain of Dorylaion was the Türkmen *yayla*. Following a natural route of communication by the Karasu valley, the Türkmens migrated seasonally to lowland Bithynia and winter *kişla*. Accordingly, the Komnenoi made determined efforts to bring the main path between northwest Phrygia and lowland Bithynia back within the Byzantine domain. These efforts witnessed the building and refortifying of Philokrene (modern Bayramoğlu), Ritzion (modern Darница), Niketiaton (modern Eskihisar), Dacibyza (modern Gebze) and the town of Nikomedia along the main Bithynian coastal route from Constantinople. With the exception of Nikomedia, neither archaeology nor documentary evidence can determine exactly which of these castles were built and functional in 1147. Archaeology has proven that

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35 The name *yürük* derives from an Ottoman administrative term employed to denote a Türkmen population of various origins, as opposed to the Türkmens outwith their control. In time, the term *yürük* was appropriated by the *yürük* themselves. Whilst in modern Turkey, there still exist clans who identify themselves as Türkmen as opposed to *yürük*, the term *yürük* is now commonly recognised as generally denoting Turkey’s transhumant population.


37 Vryonis, *Decline*, p.188.


39 See photograph II.1.

40 See photograph II.2.
their development matched that appertaining to the rest of western Anatolia during this period, that is, they were small in size and military in function. The same can be said of the Bithynian fortresses of Malagina and Pithekas, rebuilt and re-garrisoned by Manuel Komnenos circa 1145, and situated beyond Nikaia, the second town in eastern Bithynia. It is reasonable to presume that the emperor had first succeeded in clearing the Türkmen from coastal Bithynia near his capital before rebuilding Malagina and Pithekas. The resultant increased security is reflected in the existence of a rural population in 1147. According to Odo of Deuil, French crusaders raided the hills above the coastline for supplies. Nevertheless, as Speros Vryonis plausibly believed, Manuel Komnenos’ rebuilding of Malagina and Pithekas (both areas of lowland winter kişla) and the Phrygian fortress of Dorylaion in 1175 was intended to remove the Türkmen from these former Byzantine regions. Given that the Türkmen still inhabited the plain of Dorylaion in 1175, we can presume they still migrated along the Karasu Valley as far as Pithekas (or perhaps Armenokastron) in 1147. The peaceful grazing of Türkmen animals around Byzantine strongpoints was certainly endured elsewhere in Anatolia.

There were two particular reasons why the Byzantines took measures to deter the Türkmen presence from Bithynia and northwest Phrygia. First, as we have already seen, the Türkmen hindered cultivation. The initial Türkmen incursions had rendered much of the Anatolian countryside waste and depopulated, and it was in their best interests for the land to remain fallow and without a sedentary population. This was a troublesome impediment to the Byzantine emperors who implemented a policy of transferring populations to deserted areas for reasons of state, namely, military and fiscal. Serbs were settled near Nikomedia in 1123, for example, to provide military service of one form or another and to cultivate the land thus exploiting it for tax purposes.

The second specific reason that measures were taken to displace the Türkmen was that they continued to raid throughout this period. Indeed, Speros Vryonis argues that Türkmen war bands undertook the majority of Turkish raids on Byzantine territory with only fitful

42 Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, p.78. Note that Odo refers to the hills above the Bithynian coast here as ‘montana’. However, these certainly are not mountains in any geographical sense, but rather, hills of various sizes.
43 Vryonis, ‘Nomadization’, pp.52-3.
44 Armenokastron may have been occupied in the twelfth century. See Anna Komnene, Alexiad, pp.478-80; Belke & Mersich, Phrygien, pp.141-2.
45 Vryonis, ‘Nomadization’, p.54.
interest being taken by the Seljuks and their followers. The autonomous actions of the Türkmens, which witnessed them occasionally rebelling against the Seljuks, and entering into the employment of Greek rebels in the late eleventh and late twelfth centuries, as well as acting as mercenary soldiers for Alexios I, John II and Manuel I Komnenos against the sultans, are clearly evinced in the known events and details surrounding the treaties ratified by Ikonion. A treaty was concluded between the Byzantines and the Seljuks in 1158. Nevertheless, a year later, Turkish forces attacked imperial troops around Kotyaeion. A Byzantine army returned to the region in a punitive raid against the Türkmens before heading back to Constantinople late 1159. In 1160-1, in southwest Phrygia, the imperial army entered a region inhabited by Türkmens, whom Manuel dispersed before marching back to his capital. According to Kinnamos, the Turks soon returned to attack Laodikeia and seize Phaselis (near modern Tekirova) on the Lycian coast. In consequence, Manuel made extensive preparations for war until he received declarations of peace from the Seljuk sultan, Kilic Arslan II. The sequence of events here is revealing. The sources imply that Manuel’s expeditions in 1159 and 1160-1 were against the Seljuk sultanate. However, Manuel directed his campaigns against regions inhabited by tribes of Türkmens and he intended to remove them from near Byzantine domains. Manuel returned to Constantinople once this had been accomplished. One might suggest that Manuel attacked the Türkmens as he considered them Seljuk Turks. Indeed, the Greek authors evidently presumed the Turks formed a single united polity. An indication that Manuel and Kilic Arslan saw the Türkmens as a political entity distinct from the ruling family in Ikonion is provided in the detail of the new treaty concluded between Manuel and Kilic Arslan in 1161. Among the various assurances and promises exacted from the sultan in his capacity as the head of the most powerful Turkish family in south and western Anatolia was an agreement ‘that no Turk would set foot on their land [Byzantine territory] with his permission’. Is Kilic Arslan promising he would not sanction Turkish incursions into Byzantine territory, as well as tacitly assuring Manuel that those who might and did make raids would be doing so without the sultan’s permission? If such raids were taking place, it suggests that those who were making them were outside Seljuk authority.

Kinnamos affirms this hypothesis. In 1162, Manuel formally received Kilic Arslan II at Constantinople and the sultan confirmed the agreements of the year before with additional

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47 Vryonis has compiled a list of towns in Anatolia which he claims were plundered and/or destroyed and the inhabitants massacred or enslaved by the Türkmens during this period. Vryonis, Decline, pp.166-7.


49 Vryonis, Decline, p.189.


51 Kinnamos, Deeds, p.152.
The terms of the agreement included Manuel’s stipulation that Kilic Arslan would not ‘allow those who lie beyond his authority, but who are clever at living by thefts and customarily are called Turcomans, to do any harm whatsoever to the Romans’ land and remain unpunished.’ This provision illuminates three important points. First, it shows that whilst the Greek historians may not have always distinguished between Seljuks and Türkmen, Manuel and Kilic Arslan were certainly aware of the reality on the ground and made provision for this in their treaties. Second, the stipulation acknowledges that some of the Turcomans or Türkmen were not subject to Seljuk authority, and that they conducted harmful raids on Byzantine lands for plunder. Third, it is clear that whilst the two rulers acknowledged the independent actions of the Türkmen, Manuel nevertheless desired to hold the nominal ruling family of the Turks of western Anatolia ultimately responsible for policing all Turkish behaviour.

After the defeat of the Byzantine army by Kilic Arslan II at Myriokephalon in 1176, peace was again concluded between Constantinople and Ikonion. Upon Manuel’s subsequent return through Türkmen lands towards his capital, Turkish warriors attacked the rear of his remaining force in direct violation of the new treaty. Choniates suggested that Kilic Arslan allowed this to happen as he regretted letting Manuel return to Constantinople so freely, and this may be true. Michael the Syrian identified the attackers simply as Turcomans or Türkmen, and not Seljuks or Türkmen who might have been subject to the Seljuks. Moreover, Manuel Komnenos asked the emirs who accompanied him towards Constantinople to ‘stop the audacity of the Turcomans’, and he also asked why he was being attacked after exchanging vows of peace with the sultan. The emirs simply replied that the Türkmen were independent of Ikonion. We do not necessarily have to accept Michael the Syrian’s testimony, but it is evidence that some contemporaries knew Türkmen tribes undertook martial action without Seljuk consent and, indeed, in direct violation of their authority. It is clear the Seljuks did not control all the Türkmen.

This can be witnessed again at the end of the twelfth century. The Holy Roman Emperor, Frederick Barbarossa, had nurtured friendly relations with the sultan of Ikonion before and during the Third Crusade in 1189-90. Agreements were reached whereby the crusaders were allowed to pass freely through the Seljuks’ realm. However, in southern Phrygia, yet another

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53 The Seljuk breach of such treaties is one reason Manuel would threaten Ikonion with war. Manuel may also have believed that the destruction of the Seljuks would give him a free hand to rid himself of the Türkmen and their raiding activities.
Türkmen region, Barbarossa and his army were subject to Turkish harassment. According to Choniates, the sultan proclaimed he had nothing to do with the attacks. We do not have to accept Choniates’ evidence, but the very inclusion of this statement indicates that Türkmen martial action could be independent of Seljuk authority, and Bar Hebraeus, for example, states specifically that Barbarossa encountered Türkmen warriors.

Autonomous actions typified the Türkmen existence. We indicated in the previous chapter that their migrations into Anatolia were largely self-determined, and we know that in the twelfth century they migrated on a seasonal basis between regions outside the control of both Constantinople and Ikonion, such as eastern Bithynia and northwest Phrygia which the crusaders were to enter in the autumn of 1147. From these areas, the Türkmens carried out independent raids, paying little heed to Seljuk treaties. This pursuit of booty and the obligations of jihād understandably brought them into conflict with Anatolia’s sedentary population and Christian armies traversing Türkmen regions. In the thirteenth century, Seljuk khans were heavily fortified as a defence against Türkmen bandits. Türkmen beğs eventually facilitated the break up of the Seljuk empire, and Anatolia subsequently witnessed the proliferation of a number of competing autonomous Türkmen princes until the greatest of them, the Türkmen Osman, eventually founded the Ottoman dynasty which was ultimately to unite the peninsula under a single polity. The Türkmen history in Anatolia is peppered with such examples, and it is clear that not all the Türkmens considered themselves subject to Seljuk rule.

We have seen that the Türkmen incursions initially devastated and depopulated regions, although we must be careful not to overstate the destructive and disruptive effect of their subsequent way of life. Local relations between the sedentary population and transhumant Türkmens may have been amiable in certain localities. It is probable that Türkmen tribes conducted some trade with Byzantine towns and villages. Moreover, town life continued to exist and general trends even suggest population growth in the least affected areas. Nevertheless, the existence of pastoral-nomadic warriors who migrated on a seasonal basis between rural locations which were lost by the Byzantines and sedentary Turks after 1071 and 1097 respectively, precluded cultivation of fertile lands such as the hinterland of Attaleia

60 Michael Choniates refers to Turks attending the annual trade fair at Chonae. However, we do not know if they were transhumant or sedentary Turks. Given Chonae’s location near Ikonion, perhaps they were inhabitants of the Seljuk capital. Magdalino, Empire, pp.124, 131; Cahen, Formation of Turkey, p.125.
which had previously flourished to varying degrees throughout history. We have already noted that the Türkmen threat caused parts of Lydia to lie fallow and be under-populated even as late as 1162. The lack of a permanent, relatively extensive eastern Bithynian population outside the fortified towns of Nikomedia and Nikaia results from the fact that eastern Bithynia was essentially a frontier zone for much of the twelfth century, as evidenced by the obvious concerns of the Komnenoi to protect the routes so near their capital. But their efforts should not be taken to mean that normal agrarian society had returned to eastern Bithynia in the twelfth century. Nikomedia, for example, received provisions by ship from Constantinople during this period. The collapse of imperial authority in its hinterland meant that sufficient supplies to cater for the town could not be produced safely in its fertile fields.

We must remember that as kısla, parts of Bithynia were subject to the Türkmen presence in the years after Mantzikert, until at least 1145. Similarly, the plain of Dorylaion in Phrygia was a Türkmen yayla and inhabited by the Türkmens on a seasonal basis throughout the twelfth century. Much of both Bithynia and Phrygia must have remained fallow on the eve of the Second Crusade.

The Türkmen existence in northwest Anatolia is neglected in crusade histories. But the crusaders advanced through regions inhabited by Türkmen tribes, which raises important questions addressed in part IV of this thesis. If the Türkmen way of life precluded extensive cultivation, might the crusaders have had serious logistical difficulties? How could a large army hope to obtain all the necessary provisions from regions which lay fallow? Moreover, might autonomous Türkmens – rather than Ikonion’s Seljuk Turks and their followers – have attacked the crusade as it advanced through Türkmen territory?

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62 See above pp.147-8; also see Cheynet, J., ‘L’Époque Byzantine’, in Geyer & Lefort, La Bithynie, pp.311-50.
63 Foss, Nicomedia, pp.20-1.
Part IV
12. Sources

The twelfth century was not a period that witnessed the prolific production of Persian, Arabic or Turkic sources in Anatolia or in the traditional Muslim heartlands to the East which were concerned with events on the western marches of the Turkish world.\(^1\) Conversely, there are dozens of contemporary and near contemporary Latin texts and a smaller number of Syriac and Greek sources which refer to the passage of Conrad III through Anatolia. These texts are derived from survivors of the crusade who were mostly members of the noble retinues which advanced ahead of the throng of poorer crusaders in Anatolia. There is little evidence to suggest that the lowly and poorly armed crusaders survived the expedition. The survivors were nevertheless aware of the fate of those less fortunate than themselves, and this indicates that all groups, the atrophic and the relatively strong, or rather, the poor and relatively rich, were at times in reasonably close contact during their advance to Ikonion. Whilst the sources are therefore concerned predominantly with the experiences of the noble retinues, they also shed some light on the problems the humble crusaders encountered.

Many of the extant texts are of questionable authority. The briefer annals, for example, recount merely the exceptional proceedings which are repeated in many other works of this type. Often it is clear from the source content or literary style that an author had access to another text. Such sources of information are not addressed below, as it is frequently impossible to identify the degrees of separation between the author and the original sources of information. There is, however, a significant number of detailed annals and chronicles, which are not only contemporaneous with the events they relate, but are derived from eyewitness testimony. There are other important contemporary and near contemporary texts whose sources of information we cannot identify. Some are far removed geographically from other known written sources. Others provide considerable, plausible and non-contradictory unique testimony. It suggests that in both cases the authors had access to first-hand material.\(^2\)

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\(^2\) The Greek sources for the Second Crusade have already been introduced, see pp.35-41. The crucial Latin and Syriac sources are all printed and they have received critical attention from their respective editors in the editions cited throughout this thesis. It is superfluous to repeat their discussions. Additionally, for the Annales Herbipolenses, see Wattenbach & Schmale, Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen, pp.148-51; Kugler, Studien, pp. 31-4. Also see Kugler Studien, pp.13-20 for John of Salisbury, Historia Pontificalis. Gerhoh of Reiersberg occasionally relied on the Annales Herbipolenses. However, there is sufficient additional testimony to demonstrate he also conversed with at least one eyewitness: see Kugler, Studien, pp.34-6. For Casus Monasterii
This valuable source evidence is not free from textual inaccuracies and occasional overt subjectivity: the well-known anti-Greek bias prevalent throughout Latin crusade sources is evident, for example. Nevertheless, what remains recorded are the proceedings and circumstances which impinged on the different survivors’ memories, their retrospective interpretation of them, and often what was deemed noteworthy by the recorder of those memories. It is possible to identify common significant threads through the independent sources and we can confer great authority on such corroborative evidence. Independent source unanimity suggests shared common experiences and consistent observations. The evidence therefore facilitates the reliable reconstruction of the proceedings which ultimately led to Conrad’s failure to advance on Ikonion.
13. The Advance to Nikaia

Conrad, accompanied by the guides he requested, joined the army at Chalcedon or Damalis on the Bithynian coast of the Bosphoros in the middle of September 1147.1 Byzantine scribes2 charged with counting the numbers of crusaders who had crossed to Anatolia apparently lost count after the fantastic figure of 900,000.3 We discussed in Chapter 5 why we should not have faith in such figures, as they are often devices intended only to provide an impression of the remarkable size of the force. Nevertheless, the sources suggest that, regardless of the crusader deaths through hunger, disease, the disaster at Choirobacchoi and at the hands of Byzantine forces, Conrad was still accompanied nimia multitudine.4

Bernard Kugler portrayed the crusader multitude as torn apart by indiscipline as it entered Anatolia, but nonetheless rashly demanding to advance upon Ikonion and its Turkish enemy.5 It is clear, however, that many crusaders were neither eager to advance nor capable of doing so. Gerhoh of Reichersberg tells of crusader hunger even before the army reached Constantinople,6 and it has been contended that German disorder resulted from the need to obtain food. Odo of Deuil described how the French were compelled to raid for provisions near the Asiatic coast because of inadequate market provisions.7 William of Newburgh, who wrote in the 1190s, also gives the impression that crusaders plundered in Asia Minor even though markets were provided.8 Despite this, those (presumably) without the wealth or arms to obtain supplies were suffering. ‘Manganeios Prodromos’ relates that many were starving and begging for food upon arriving on the Asiatic coast.9 This hardly supports Kugler’s image of a rash and impetuous host.

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1 ‘Romoaldi Annales’, p.424; Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, p.50; Ioannes Cinnamus, Rerum, p.80; John Kinnamos, Deeds, p.67; Helmolod of Bosau, ‘Chronica Slavorum’, p.117; ‘Annales Palidenses’, p.82; William of Tyre, Willelmi Tyrensis archiepiscopi chronicon, XVI.19, pp.741-2; Conrad III, Die Urkunden, p.354; ‘Annales Herbipolenses’, pp.4-5; Otto of Freising, Gesta, pp.218-22; Bernhardi, Konrad, p.614. Conrad arrived outside the Palace of Blachernae on 9 September, 1147. There is no indication that he spent a lengthy time negotiating outside the walls of Constantinople, and therefore the army presumably crossed the Bosphoros within a week or two of its arrival at the city.
2 Niketas Choniates, Historia, p.87; Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, p.38. Also see Helmolod of Bosau, ‘Chronica Slavorum’, pp.116-17.
3 Ioannes Cinnamus, Rerum, p.69; John Kinnamos, Deeds, p.60.
5 Kugler, Studien, pp.148-52.
6 See above p.70.
7 See above p.74. The armies of the Fourth Crusade successfully pillaged this area over a short period of time in 1203. See Madden, T., ‘Food and the Fourth Crusade: a New Approach to the “Diversion Question”’, in Pryor, Logistics of Warfare, pp.209-28. Alexios I Komnenos had returned this area to Byzantine hegemony around a century earlier, and the peasant population was evidently flourishing by the beginning of the thirteenth century.
8 William of Newburgh, History, p.95. Note that William does not differentiate between the French and German armies.
9 ‘Manganeios Prodromos’, 24.145-55. Also see above p.70.
Notwithstanding the lack of evidence to support his assertions, Kugler describes an impatient King Conrad, disillusioned with the whole crusading enterprise owing to the poor behaviour of his army and its treatment at the hands of Byzantine troops, determined to march swiftly across Anatolia at all costs. There is little doubt Conrad decided to take the shortest route to Ikonion, and given the outcome of that fateful decision as analysed below, his choice of route was clearly improvident. We may note that Kugler ascribes Conrad’s decision to the king’s impetuosity even though he and his supposedly disorderly army had just begun their advance in Anatolia. This is an important observation. Kugler’s interpretation of the rash, indisciplined crusaders’ advance in the Byzantine European provinces and at Constantinople determines his assessment of Conrad’s decision here, and indeed it underpins the rest of Kugler’s history of the army’s advance to Nikaia and beyond.

The land route from Chalcedon to Nikaia went via Nikomedia. Measuring at approximately 85 kilometres, the coastline path ran parallel to the northern Bithynian coastline of the Sea of Marmara and continued on the same littoral until the Gulf of Nikomedia. The modern road follows a very similar, predominantly flat path with the nearby hills of various heights visible to the north of the road. Lowland Bithynia was fertile and although very sparsely populated before Nikomedia, there is evidence that a rural population had returned to this area. The crusaders could therefore have acquired some provisions from the peasants’ stores and fields in the autumnal month of October. Nevertheless, as this region was a volatile frontier zone for much of the twelfth century, the French army was supplied by ship on the Asiatic coast of the Bosphoros rather than from Bithynian markets and merchants. This arrangement failed to succour the French crusaders satisfactorily and they were compelled to raid for provisions. Odo of Deuil claimed that the French army then ceased receiving supplies (presumably from Constantinople) within a few days of advancing to Nikomedia. If so, and we must always treat Odo’s examples of Greek and German injurious actions towards the French with caution, the search and acquisition for food amongst this fertile, yet sparsely inhabited and lightly cultivated region must have been

10 Kugler, Studien, pp.148-52.
12 See below, chapter 17.
13 William of Tyre confirms the army traversed this path, William of Tyre, Willelmi Tyrensis archiepiscopi chronicon, XVI.20, pp.743-4.
15 Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, p.78.
16 Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, p.72.
17 Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, p.78; William of Newburgh, History, p.95.
18 Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, p.82.
a constant problem. Presumably the German army had similar concerns as those of the French. Water and pasture were likely to be available in fertile Bithynia, but victuals for the people and grain for the horses were at a premium as they advanced towards Nikomedia, the first town with an available market.

Niketas Choniates states that as the army approached the Byzantine Anatolian towns, the inhabitants sold provisions and relinquished their wares via a rope suspended from the town walls. Others are said to have cheated the crusaders at the scales, whilst some mixed lime with barley to concoct a fatal mixture. Choniates writes, `whether this was commanded by the emperor, as was rumoured, I have not ascertained’. He nonetheless suggests that Manuel Komnenos minted debased coinage which was exchanged with the crusaders, presumably to pay for their market needs.\(^\text{19}\) Historians have tended not to accept the rumour recalled by Choniates that the crusaders were poisoned with lime,\(^\text{20}\) although Arnold of Lübeck and Michael the Syrian (whose chronicle was based largely on oral testimony and contemporary works and was finished by 1195), levelled similar charges at the Byzantines, and thus they were widely circulated.\(^\text{21}\) Ferdinand Chalandon has reasonably suggested that surviving embittered crusaders created the story to explain the numbers of people who had succumbed to disease.\(^\text{22}\) Historians have nevertheless accepted most of Choniates’ rumours, and from his statements that the army was cheated at the scales and provisioned via ropes from town walls in Anatolia, and that Manuel debased his coinage, scholars have concluded that the Byzantine towns failed to supply Conrad’s army adequately and sold provisions at exorbitant prices.\(^\text{23}\)

The only contemporary corroboratory evidence for the rumours recalled by Choniates regarding Conrad’s provisioning in Anatolia comes from Odo of Deuil. Odo complains of a poor exchange rate in Byzantine territory, and presumably the German army received similar rates of exchange.\(^\text{24}\) If monetary transactions were performed using weights and measures, one might construe that the crusaders could have been exploited when changing one currency for another. This would go some way to sustaining Choniates’ report that the crusaders were cheated at the scales. There is, however, the possibility that Choniates is referring to scales which measured short-weights of food which were then exchanged for exorbitant prices, although this accusation is conspicuously absent in the *De Profectione*. Odo would surely have informed his audience if he believed the Byzantines specifically cheated at the scales rather than merely offering a poor rate of exchange.

\(^\text{20}\) There are exceptions. See Angold, *Empire*, p.199.
\(^\text{22}\) Chalandon, *Jean II Comnène*, p.286.
\(^\text{23}\) For example, Phillips, *Defenders*, p.83.
\(^\text{24}\) For example, Odo of Deuil, *De Profectione*, pp.40, 66.
Odo also maintained that the French were provisioned via ropes suspended from walls in some of the imperial lands to the west of the capital.\(^{25}\) There is no Latin evidence that Conrad was provisioned in this manner in Anatolia. During his advance to Ikonion, he received no provisions whatsoever beyond Nikaia. We may tentatively suggest that Conrad was supplied at Nikomedia and Nikaia in a manner similar to the way Louis VII was provisioned in Europe. It is actually more likely that Choniates’ dependence on distorted oral information has muddied his testimony. It is well known that Choniates’ crusade narrative is profoundly confused.\(^{26}\) The present writer has suggested elsewhere there is a possibility that Choniates’ verbal source(s) incorrectly recalled (some 55 years after the events described) that it was Conrad’s army in Anatolia, rather than Louis VII’s army in Europe, which was provisioned via ropes suspended from town walls.\(^{27}\) An erroneous recollection is probably responsible for the rumour that the Germans received substandard coinage to pay for provisions in Anatolia. Numismatics have revealed that Manuel did debase his coinage, and Choniates (or his sources of rumour) was evidently aware of this. However, Manuel issued the substandard currency much later in his reign and thus Choniates is wrong in suggesting that Conrad’s forces received a debased coinage in 1147/8.\(^{28}\)

Whether the crusaders were supplied outside Nikomedia by ship from the capital, and/or by ropes suspended from Nikomedia’s walls, or indeed via an open and fair market subject to the availability of adequate amounts of provisions at affordable rates, the German princes had to decide which route to take to Nikaia.\(^{29}\) Can we ascertain which path was chosen? A Roman road between the two Bithynian towns had led through the heavily wooded hills around Mount Sophon, but it had fallen into disuse by the sixth century. This was the approximately 60-kilometre path cleared by a large party of crusaders in 1097 to facilitate the armies’ advance on Nikaia. No further use of it is recorded during the Byzantine period, although it became a major highway once again under Ottoman rule.\(^{30}\) When the Byzantines travelled to Nikaia from Constantinople, they preferred to embark at the capital, or perhaps at Dacibyza,

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\(^{25}\) Odo of Deuil, *De Profectione*, p.40.


\(^{27}\) Roche, ‘Niketas Choniates’, (forthcoming).


\(^{30}\) See below, map no. 4, route B4.
and alight at one of three disembarkation points, each of which was connected by road to Nikomedia. The medieval and modern road from the first disembarkation point at Pylai (modern Yalova), a town situated on the south coast of the Sea of Marmara, leads to Nikaia via modern Orhangazi and the north coast of the Lake of Nikaia (modern Iznik Göl). The route was and still is predominantly used for small commerce and by individual groups of travellers. Armies and the movers of heavy goods preferred the shorter sea link between Dacibyza and the second and third disembarkation points at Kibotos and Praintos (near modern Karamüsel) on the southern shore of the Nikomedian Gulf. The route from Kibotos to Nikaia, measuring at around 47 kilometres, rises gradually in a southwards direction through fertile land until it reaches the fortress of Xerigordos (now known as Çoban Kale), set amidst mountainous and heavily wooded transitional lands. The road then descends towards modern Yalakdere and follows an occasionally narrow southwards route by the River Drakon. From here, the path traverses an undulating fertile terrain, scattered with many villages, before dropping steeply to Georges Fort (modern Boyalica) and then turning eastwards to Nikaia on the heavily cultivated north shore of the Nikaian Lake. We do not know if either Xerigordos or Georges Fort was inhabited at the time of the Second Crusade. The route from Praintos may have led in two directions and the favoured path used during our period is not clear. The first alternative climbed southeastwards through steep fertile hills, now heavily covered in olive bushes, to modern Sanaiye and then on to Nikaia. The second alternative led southwestwards from Praintos through similarly steep and fertile terrain, before gradually descending among verdant hills and cultivated fields to modern Yalakdere, and joining the same route to Nikaia as that from coastal Kibotos.\(^{31}\)

The crusaders did not have the luxury of sailing across the Marmara and disembarking at Pylai, Kibotos or Praintos. Their guides presumably knew that once they advanced from Nikomedia on a sometimes narrow coastal path around the eastern point of the gulf to Eribolos, once a small town consisting of a port and a fortress in the hills at modern Ihsaniye (which may or may not have been occupied in 1147), they were faced with two alternatives. They could continue southwards through the mountains via the little used route around Mount Sophon, or march westwards along a straight, predominantly flat route, which these days is often hemmed in by wooded hills on the south shore of the gulf, to Praintos or Kibotos, and then advance on their respective routes to Nikaia. From a vantage point on a tower at Nikomedia, a route directly southwards would have appeared ominous. The bulk of Mount Sophon and the adjacent hills pose a seemingly intractable obstacle and the path may

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\(^{31}\) See photograph IV.1.
have been unknown to the Byzantine guides through lack of use.\textsuperscript{32} The guides presumably knew the commonly used routes via Praintos or Kibotos, but both alternative paths were not as direct to Nikaia as the Mount Sophon route. Perhaps Latin scouts were charged with observing the practicalities of the shorter route and even the advantages of the longer choices. The crusaders’ rate of march reveals they were certainly delayed for some reason. The army took approximately a month to march from Chalcedon to Nikaia.\textsuperscript{33} The path from Chalcedon to Nikaia via Mount Sophon was approximately 145 kilometres long and the path via Kibotos, for example, was 180 kilometres.\textsuperscript{34} The time and distances equate to a rate of march of approximately 4.8 kilometres and 6 kilometres per day respectively, including rest days. The average rate of march of a combined army of horse and foot was 22 kilometres a day.\textsuperscript{35} Something clearly delayed the army’s advance, but what it was, and which route the crusade advanced on is difficult even to conjecture owing to the scant nature of the source evidence.

\textsuperscript{32} See photograph IV.2.
\textsuperscript{33} The army departed Nikaia 15 October 1147. Bernhardi, \textit{Konrad}, p.629.
\textsuperscript{34} These are very rough calculations and approximations employed purely for illustrative purposes. It is assumed the army departed from Nikaia 30 days after advancing from Chalcedon. The Würzburg annalist noted that the army remained for only three days at Nikaia. ‘Annales Herbipolenses’, p.5.
\textsuperscript{35} Haldon, \textit{Warfare}, p.165.
14. The Army at Nikaia

The very slow rates of march to Nikaia contradict Kugler’s conjecture that a reckless army, led by an impetuous leader, was determined to advance quickly on Ikonion at all costs.¹ As noted earlier, Kugler’s suppositions are underpinned by his interpretation of crusader behaviour as excessively indisciplined in Europe and outside Constantinople, and he finds what he takes to be further evidence of crusader disorder at Nikaia. Upon reaching the city, Conrad’s half-brother, Bishop Otto of Freising, separated from the main force and, evidently accompanied by a great many foot soldiers, elected to traverse an alternative route towards the East.² Kugler supposes this was because the Bishop was unable to endure the poor conduct of his comrades, but there is ample evidence which demonstrates why such a decision was reached.³ Conrad was determined to advance from Nikaia on the shortest route across the Anatolian plateau to Ikonion.⁴ King Louis VII of France and presumably Conrad knew that the First Crusade had embarked upon a similar route.⁵ That expedition suffered from a want of victuals on the Anatolian plateau, a scorched and waterless terrain during the month of October.⁶ As we have already seen, some contemporaries were au fait with the geography of Anatolia. Odo of Deuil, for example, described three routes which could be embarked upon from Nikaia. The ‘left’ route which Conrad advanced upon is described as the shortest; a route ‘bearing right’ via the Aegean littoral was the longest, but an abundance of supplies could be obtained; the ‘middle’ route via Lopadion, Akhyraous and Philadelphia was longer than the shortest route, but not as well supplied as the coast road.⁷ In other words, Odo was aware that whilst the route Conrad embarked upon was the shortest of the three to Ikonion, it would prove the hardest on which to locate provisions. The Pöhlder annalist mentions that Manuel Komnenos advised Conrad that he could indeed embark on one of

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¹ Kugler, Studien, pp.148-52.
³ Kugler, Studien, p.150.
⁷ Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, pp.88-90. Also see above pp.103-4.
three different routes to the East, and the king deliberately chose the ‘desert route’ (*iter deserti*), that is, the shortest path to Ikonion.\(^8\)

According to the anonymous Würzburg annalist, who had met survivors of the crusade, Conrad asked the emperor to show him the shortest route to Turkish territory. Manuel counselled as follows: ‘The road you must take to the land of the Saracens is very remote, difficult beyond measure because of the emptiness and dangers, and it is the more burdensome because of the size of the army which must be led in waterless places.’\(^9\) Manuel’s counsel continued:

‘No land of the Saracens is closer to you than Iconium. Both I and my father of divine memory have often led an army to plunder this region, and have often brought it back unsuccessful; because even if we tried to overcome the difficulty of the journey and the dangers of the place by military strength and by ingenuity, yet [these] could never provide us with the resources which we needed owing to the excessive length of the journey…I think it better you abandon your anger for the time being, and choose to withdraw from an inexpedient plan rather than fail en route from hunger, thirst and serious starvation because you went ahead inadvisedly, or sustain the raids and attack of a really formidable enemy with bodies which are flagging because of the magnitude of the task, and (God forbid), suffer the extreme penalty, death. But if you wish to persist in your intention, take my advice. Choose a few thousand men from the whole army, and hurry to fight for Jerusalem against those who daily employ brigandage against the Christians; tell the rest to turn back to their native soil.’\(^10\)

The Würzburg annalist clearly has Manuel attempting to dissuade Conrad from his intended route and, failing that, advising the king to separate his forces, as it would be impossible to provision the whole of his army adequately on the march to Ikonion. Conrad was evidently aware the army might encounter provisioning problems on its march from Nikaia, although he did not heed the proffered advice at Constantinople.

The king was also au courant with the landscape he elected to traverse, and we must presume that he and his Byzantine guides were aware they would advance through a fertile

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8 ‘Annales Palidenses’, pp.82-3.
9 ‘Via qua ad terram Sarracenorum ire debetis, remotissima est, solitudine et periculis ultra modum difficilis, et eo difficilior, quanto in locis ardentibus ducenda multitudo exercitus est gravior.’ ‘Annales Herbipolenses’, p.4.
10 ‘Nulla vero terra Sarracenorum vobis vicinior est Yconio. Ad hanc regionem expugnandum tam ego quam pater meas dive memorie exercitum sepe duximus, sepe inacti reduximus; quia etsi difficultatem itineris et pericula locorum viribus et ingenio temptavimus, numquam tamen sumptus qui necessari erant, ob nimiam longitudinem vitae poterant sufficere…meius esse considero, ut animositatem vestram interin cedatis, eligentes ab inutili proposito potius animum retrahere, quam inconsultius procedendo fame siti et inedia gravi in via deficere, vel etiam fatiscensibus membris ob magnitudinem laboris, gravissimorum hostium incursus et impetum, extremum vite suppltium passuri quod absit, sustinere. Quod si vobis voluntas est in proposito persistere, agite meo consilio, et electis de omni exercitu paucis milibus, Iherosolimam ad dimicandum contra eos qui cotidiana in christianos exercent latrocinia properate; reliquos retro ad natale solum reverti precipite.’ ‘Annales Herbipolenses’, p.4.
landscape where water and animal fodder were perennially available as far as Dorylaion. On the king’s intended route to Dorylaion, the soldiers at Malagina, Pithekas and Armenokastron, built and garrisoned to check the presence of Türkmen tribes, may have had gardens and perhaps even cultivated cereal crops. Given the presence of the Türkmens, however, it is more likely these frontier garrisons were supplied directly from Constantinople. Either way, the army could not have relied on these strongpoints for provision. It is unclear if villagers had returned to the Sangarios and Karasu Valleys by 1147, but if they had, some agricultural produce may have been obtainable. The Türkmens could have supplemented their pastoral nomadic existence with agriculture before they were driven beyond Pithekas. The crusaders may therefore have been able to procure some sustenance beyond Nikaia, although the provisions would not have satisfactorily sustained an army of many thousands.

For their advance through the arid and deserted landscape beyond the plain of Dorylaion, the crusade leaders must have hoped to obtain and load up with water and green fodder alongside the rivers Bathys and Tembros, and repeat the process again at the verdant locations of deserted former Byzantine towns such as Nakoleia, situated approximately three days’ march beyond Dorylaion.

Conrad was aware that his intended route beyond Nikaia lacked a large sedentary population and cultivation, and therefore the prospect of obtaining adequate provisions other than by securing water and green fodder for the animals in Bithynia, Dorylaion and at disparate pockets of fertility on the plateau. The king knew the army was inescapably dependent upon baggage supplies alone for a twenty-day march to Ikonion. Indeed, the crusaders were advised by their guides to load a baggage train at Nikaia to last them until the army reached the Seljuk capital. It therefore seems likely that a consideration of the army’s supply requirements influenced the decision to divide the forces at Nikaia. This is a much more plausible reason for the division than supposing that a perturbed Bishop Otto of Freising caused the split by seeking solace away from a riotous rabble (whose actual indiscipline may well have been exaggerated in the texts). The very fact that Otto probably

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12 Conrad III, Die Urkunden, p.354.
13 William of Tyre’s suggestion that the Byzantine guides instructed the crusaders to load a baggage train whilst they were in Turkish territory is erroneous. William of Tyre, Willelmi Tyrensis archiepiscopi chronicon, XVI.20 p.744. See Conrad III, Die Urkunden, p.354; Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, p.90. The first former Byzantine town beyond Nikaia which was occupied by Turks in the twelfth century was Kedrea. The Byzantine guides seemingly did not consider it capable of supporting the army’s provisioning needs. On Kedrea, see Belke & Mersich, Phrygien, pp.297-9.

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did embark on one of the two routes from Nikaia which offered better opportunities to obtain provisions supports this proposition.\textsuperscript{14}

In this likely scenario, the princes accepted at Nikaia that it was not feasible to provision the whole army on the shortest route to the lands of their enemy, and thus divided their forces. But why might they have deemed it impossible to victual all the crusaders adequately at and around Nikaia? The inhabitants of the region enjoyed the same climate and harvesting cycles as coastal Bithynia. Wheat, fruit, vegetables and other crops may therefore have been procurable in the immediate vicinity’s fields and town and peasant stores. We may presume that, when necessary, Nikaia’s population of around 2,000 inhabitants and an unknown number of garrison troops had their provisioning needs supplemented with grain and other essential edibles from Constantinople, given the town’s communications with the capital and its strategic importance as the Byzantine bulwark against Turkish aggression. We can be reasonably sure that some provisions were available for those crusaders with the various means to procure them.

Only two months previously, however, Manuel Komnenos had advised the German princes to advance into Asia Minor via the ferry crossing at Sestos/Abydos.\textsuperscript{15} Had Manuel’s sound advice been taken, the army would have marched from Abydos south along the Aegean littoral, where, in line with Manuel’s instructions, preparations would have been made to provision it.\textsuperscript{16} Instead, the army advanced to Nikaia. The Byzantines could not reckon on the psychological draw the route of the First Crusade and Charlemagne’s legendary route to Jerusalem had on the crusaders in 1147.\textsuperscript{17} Nikaia was therefore unlikely to have been suitably prepared for the crusaders’ arrival in the middle of October. A lengthy and complicated process involving forward liaison between central and local fiscal administrations provided the means by which Byzantine armies of usually fewer than 10,000 soldiers were supplied through taxation in kind and compulsory exactions.\textsuperscript{18} It should be noted, however, that Nikaia had probably not provisioned an army since 1116.\textsuperscript{19} Its hinterland had not been cultivated to supply a transient force for three decades. The administrations at Nikaia and Constantinople

\textsuperscript{14} Gerhoh of Reichersberg, Odo of Deuil and the Würzburg Annalist all confirm that King Louis VII of France traversed the same path as Otto near Laodikeia. To reach Laodikeia from Nikaia, Otto must have marched westwards to Lopadion and then southwest to Akhyraous. From here, he may have traversed either the imperial campaign route south of Akhyraous or proceeded west from Akhyraous to the Aegean littoral. Gerhoh of Reichersberg, ‘De Investigatione’, p.376; Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, pp.112-14; ‘Annales Herbiopolenses’, p.5. On the fate of Otto’s contingent, see also ‘Casus Monasterii Petrishusensis’, p.674. I propose to establish Otto’s route in a future study. For the imperial campaign routes, see below, map no.7.

\textsuperscript{15} Ioannes Cinnamus, Rerum, p.72; John Kinnamos, Deeds, pp.61-2.

\textsuperscript{16} Niketas Choniates, Historia, p.81; Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, p.36; Helmold of Bosau, ‘Chronica Slavorum’, pp. 115-16.

\textsuperscript{17} Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, p.58; Bull, ‘The Capetian Monarchy’, pp.25-46.

\textsuperscript{18} Haldon, Warfare, pp.104-6, 139-48.

\textsuperscript{19} The last time an imperial army had advanced by way of Nikaia. See below pp.183-4.
would have been unable to carry out the appropriate agricultural and logistical activities needed to stockpile provisions for the crusaders at Nikaia given less than two months’ notice. This supposition also holds for the logistical arrangements at Nikomedia, Malagina, Pithekas and Armenokastron. Moreover, at the very time the Germans were encamped outside Nikaia, food producers and merchants were involved in provisioning the French outside Constantinople. This was of a greater and more immediate concern to the Byzantine administration than facilitating the supply of the German army in the Byzantine/Turkish marches. It is therefore little wonder there is no evidence of provisions being delivered to the Germans at Nikaia.

The army was thus dependent upon Nikaia and its hinterland alone for its logistical arrangements. The crusaders’ baggage and supply trains consisted of pack horses/mules and two- and four-wheel horse/mule drawn carts and wagons before the army crossed the Bosphoros. The references to carts and wagons all but disappear from the sources when the army was in Anatolia, although when the Pöhlder and Würzburg annalists refer to ‘iumenta’ (‘the baggage or pack animals’), they could of course be referring to beasts which pulled vehicles. Such usage is uncommon though and Odo of Deuil’s employment of the word ‘summarii’ in reference to the baggage animals in Anatolia suggests that the animals did not pull vehicles. It is a reasonable inference that the animals operated alone and not as part of a cart or wagon team.

It appears, then, that the armies progressed in Anatolia without vehicles, and in fact this is entirely to be expected. The prevalent use of pack animals only to convey baggage was normal practice in twelfth-century Anatolia, owing to the poor state of the roads which were also commonly ridged and often stepped to ensure a sound footing for men and beasts. Odo of Deuil complained that the carts and wagons hindered the progress of the pack animals on the poor roads in Europe, thus intimating to future pilgrims that pack animals were the preferred method of transporting baggage. We can presume the German army encountered similar problems on the same route. The armies may not have needed much convincing to

20 Bernhardi, Konrad, pp.640-1.
22 We can repudiate the non-contemporary source which mentions wagons in Anatolia. William of Tyre, Willelmi Tyrensis archiepiscopi chronicon, XVI.20, p.774.
24 Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, pp. 24, 116, 126. Summarius refers to a pack-horse and is connected to the words saga and sella which both mean saddle. A summarius was also a packman or the groom of a pack-horse. The Pöhlder and Würzburg annalists evidently preferred to employ the noun iumentum when referring to pack animals.
surrender the use of their carts and wagons given the problems with such vehicles in Europe, and it is likely the leaders of the crusade were advised during Manuel’s conferences with the French and German kings to advance in Anatolia with baggage carried only by animals.

The crusaders’ beasts of burden would have consisted of animals they brought with them from Europe and others they procured en route to the Bosphoros. Could the wealthier crusaders have obtained a great many more beasts in Anatolia? Mule breeding may have been widespread in Bithynia, given that much of it was pastureland. Extensive breeding was unlikely, however, as Turkish raiders would seek to purloin such beasts, and it is worth noting that even the imperial metata were unable to provide all the animals for the imperial baggage train of over 1,000 horses and mules in the ninth and tenth centuries. It is very unlikely that many thousands of pack animals could have been acquired in 1147 unless plans had been made well in advance. It is telling that Odo refers to ‘turba sacinaria’, literally, ‘the mob employed in carrying packs’, in addition to the pack animals in Anatolia.

The Byzantinist John Haldon has very recently offered sets of hypothetical calculations which can be employed to illustrate the victualling and livestock requirements for medieval armies. His calculations take account of many variables including generally accepted rates of march, absolute amounts of food required for man and beast per day, the proportional relationship between types of required food, the weight of the said provisions, the load carrying capacities of the individual elements in an army, and the proportion of remounts to ridden horses and baggage animals to humans. The calculations are for an active cavalry force only and assume a ratio of one spare horse to four mounted warriors. It is unclear how many people went on crusade or the numbers of animals accompanying individual crusaders; natural wastage and the disaster at Choirobacchoi would have affected both, but presumably opportunities arose en route to Nikaiia to redress animal losses.

We must, however, agree on constants for illustrative purposes. Discounting pack animals, a western mounted warrior typically had a minimum of one riding horse in addition to one

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29 Medieval military logistics have received a great deal of attention in recent years, although the focus has predominantly centred on daily rations for man and beast and their individual load bearing capacities. There are so many variables and the data are so fragmentary, that historians have yet to reach a consensus. For antiquity, see in particular Engels, D., Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army (Berkeley, 1978), pp.123-9; Roth, J., The Logistics of the Roman Army at War (264 B.C.-A.D. 235) (Leiden, 1999), pp.14-44. For the medieval period see the various works by Bernard Bachrach and John Haldon cited in my bibliography; also see Pryor, J., ‘Introduction: Modelling Bohemond’s March to Thessaloniké’, in Pryor, Logistics of Warfare, pp.1-24. For the early modern period, see Perjés, C., ‘Army Provisioning, Logistics, and Strategy in the Second Half of the 17th Century’, Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 16 (1970), pp.1-51.
30 Haldon, ‘Roads and Communications’, pp.131-58. Haldon offers two sets of figures in his latest article. I have employed Haldon’s own numbers rather than the alternative calculations which use Roth’s numbers for Roman armies. Also see Haldon, ‘Organisation and Support’, pp.111-51; Haldon, Warfare, chapter 5 and appendices.
31 See above pp.39-41.
warhorse, and the wealthier crusaders were undoubtedly accompanied by strings of such beasts. It is therefore reasonable to presume a ratio of one horseman to two horses, rather than Haldon’s ratio for Byzantine cavalry of 4:5. The approximate number of animals required to convey adequate provisions for an active fighting force given a set number of days and humans can now be ascertained. The calculations do not include the need to carry water or green and dry fodder for the animals, as these would have been available to the crusaders as far as Dorylaion and thereafter at disparate pockets of fertile land. Individuals without beasts could theoretically carry their own supplies (1.3 kilograms per day) to last twenty days and their provision is not allowed for in the calculations. Coincidently, twenty is the number of days Conrad believed it took to reach Ikonion. Many crusaders without riding mounts may have had pack animals to convey food and equipment. They must also be omitted from our calculations for ease of computation and illustration.

For illustrative purposes only, it is assumed that there was an actual fighting force of 12,000 souls, made up of 8,000 infantry carrying their own individual supplies, and 4,000 horsemen each accompanied by one additional horse.

Employing the present writer’s equation:

\[ D = \frac{H \times L}{A + B} \]

where:

- \( D \) = The number of days
- \( A \) = The daily sum in kilograms of the men’s provisions, (assuming 1.3 kg/person/day)
- \( B \) = The daily sum in kilograms of the horses’ carried rations, (assuming 2.2 kg/horse/day)
- \( H \) = The number of unridden mounts
- \( L \) = The standard load carried by an unridden mount, (68 kg)

Assuming provisions were carried on the 4,000 horses not being ridden, each horse could carry some 68 kilograms (standard load carried by an unridden remount). When we multiply this figure by 4,000 (horses), we get a total of 272,000 kg \([HxL]\). 4,000 men x 1.3 kilograms of unmilled grain per day (standard ration) + 8,000 horses x 2.2 kilograms of unmilled grain per day (standard ration) = 22,800 kg per day \([A+B]\).

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32 See above p.39.
Both men and horses could be provisioned for up to 12 days from the supplies carried by the
unridden mounts alone. At the same time, each rider could carry a day’s supplies for himself
and one mount, thereby extending this initial period up to 13 days at the outside.

We can now calculate how many additional pack animals would initially be required to
extend this period by employing the following equation:

\[
N = \frac{(A+B)Y}{X - (ZxY)}
\]

where:

- \(N\) = The number of pack animals required
- \(A\) = The daily sum in kilograms of the all the men’s provisions, (assuming 1.3
  kg/person/day)
- \(B\) = The daily sum in kilograms of all the horses’ carried rations, (assuming 2.2 kg
  /horse/day)
- \(X\) = The standard load in kilograms carried by a pack animal, (96 kg)
- \(Z\) = The standard daily ration in kilograms of the animals carrying provisions, (assuming 2.2
  kg/mule/day)
- \(Y\) = The duration of the expedition in days.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Days</th>
<th>Total of weight of provisions in kg</th>
<th>Load minus ration per day</th>
<th>Number of mules required at the outset</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>22,800</td>
<td>(96 - (2.2 \times 1))</td>
<td>243 to convey 1 day’s provisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22,800</td>
<td></td>
<td>22,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>22,800</td>
<td>(96 - (2.2 \times 2))</td>
<td>497 to convey 2 days’ provisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45,600</td>
<td></td>
<td>22,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>22,800</td>
<td>(96 - (2.2 \times 4))</td>
<td>1046 to convey 4 days’ provisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>91,200</td>
<td></td>
<td>22,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>22,800</td>
<td>(96 - (2.2 \times 7))</td>
<td>1980 to convey 7 days’ provisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>159,600</td>
<td></td>
<td>22,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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35 Note: I have modified the following formula given in Haldon: \(N=(a+b+c+d)\) multiplied by \(y\), divided by \((x-z)\), multiplied by \(y\), where: \(N\) = the number of pack animals required, \(a\) = the sum of the soldiers’ provisions in kg, \(b\) = the sum of the horses’ rations in kg, \(c\) = the sum of the rations of the pack-mules, \(d\) = the sum of the rations of the remounts which also carry provisions; \(x\) = the average load carried, \(z\) = the standard ration of the animals carrying the provisions, and \(y\) = the duration of the expedition in days. Haldon, ‘Roads and Communications’, pp.131-58.
Therefore, with additional provisions initially carried on approximately 2000 mules, a quite realistic figure, 4,000 horsemen and 8,000 horses could *theoretically* convey enough provisions from Nikaia to last the 20-day march to Ikonion. Theory, however, is belied by practical considerations.

This model is, of course, largely artificial. Beasts would be compelled to convey water and green fodder beyond Dorylaion, for example. The crusaders probably hoped to transport water and fodder from Dorylaion, Nakoleia and elsewhere on the beasts which had previously shed their loads. Pack animals would have become food as provisions were exhausted. Mounted warriors would have loathed to use their warhorses as pack animals and additional mules would be required to convey the horsemen’s arms and other equipment. An unknown number of attendants and other camp followers accompanied horsemen and their baggage train, and in reality the army consisted of indefinite numbers of foot soldiers and others on foot who may have had their own animals. The calculations cannot allow for such unknown variables: they must adhere to only one combination of circumstances under a constant set of conditions, neither of which will have prevailed on crusade.

Nevertheless, there is clearly a relationship between the length of time a cavalry force of any given number can stay in the field to the proportion of horses and mules available to convey provisions. This relationship would have been a crucial consideration. The number of beasts available to carry provisions in proportion to the number of cavalrymen, or for that matter, any horseman, would set very clear limits on the size of a force operating in territory where supplies could not be sourced en route. The German princes would have considered it impossible for the whole army to advance to Ikonion if, for what ever reason, there simply were not enough beasts at Nikaia to convey twenty days’ worth of supplies for the army’s horsemen.

Even with an appropriate proportion of beasts to men, it is questionable whether an army of many thousands could have procured at Nikaia all the required provisions they required to last twenty days. Crusade logistics were subject to the limitations inherent in medieval agrarian society and the individualistic nature of the crusaders’ provisioning arrangements. Moreover, the Nikaian hinterland, like the rest of eastern Bithynia, was not densely populated and extensively cultivated, owing to the Türkmen presence in the years before the Second Crusade. The hinterland thus largely lay fallow which negated extensive food markets and the possibility of large scale plundering for provisions.

Even so, Bithynia, with perhaps some assistance from Constantinople, had somehow already sustained the crusaders with food for approximately one month. In the manner of locusts, if an army was dependent upon a single region for supply, it devoured and stripped...
bare the agricultural produce of that area at a rate in direct proportion to the size of the force and the availability of provisions. A soldier’s diet was therefore largely dependent upon regional agricultural variations. Fresh, dried and salted meat would also supplement his diet. There is no way of knowing if all the food in Asia Minor was palatable or unpalatable to a western European soldier raised on food and drink which were probably rather different from those encountered during his campaigns abroad. Haldon has nonetheless argued that soldiers could subsist on bread and water alone for a campaigning season, as ancient strains of wheat and barley had considerably higher protein content than modern strains.

We can offer an illustration of the army’s provisioning requirements (in weight) for one month by recourse to Haldon’s figures, and so presume that 1.3 kilograms of unmilled wheat, milled in the field and baked in field ovens or camp fires into simple loaves, or double-baked into hard-tack, could provide enough nutrition to sustain a soldier for one day in normal circumstances.\(^\text{36}\) Once again, for illustrative purposes, let us consider our model army of 4,000 cavalrymen, each accompanied by a spare mount, 8,000 infantrymen, and 2,000 pack animals (although the figure of 2000 may actually be too low in proportion to the numbers in the army, as it was usual for a western mounted warrior to commence a campaign with at least one pack animal in addition to his two horses).\(^\text{37}\)

12,000 humans accompanied by 8,000 horses and 2,000 pack animals required 12,000 x 1.3 kg + 10,000 animals (pack animals required the same amount of hard fodder [unmilled grain] per day as horses) x 2.2 kg per day = 37,600 kg per day. If we multiply this sum by 30 days, we have an idea of how much unmilled grain was needed to sustain such an army for one month, i.e., 37,000 x 30 = 1,128,000 kilograms.

One cannot envisage a fighting force being content with bread or gruel alone for 50 days and in reality the army would have had recourse to other foodstuffs. Nevertheless, Haldon has argued that the weight of a soldier’s daily rations was 1.3 kilograms irrespective of food type. When we consider that 1.3 kilograms of unmilled wheat could provide a great deal more nutrition over a longer period than the equivalent weight in meat or vegetables, the above figures offer some idea of the minimum weight of food needed for a month, and hence the alarming amount of foodstuffs required to sustain such a force. It is simple to extrapolate from the figure of 1,128,000 kilograms that for the 20 day march to Ikonion, the army would have needed to locate a further 752,000 kilograms of unmilled grain from a region already stripped of over one million kilograms of harvested wheat, barley and millet. It is thus easy to


\(^{37}\) See above p.39.
appreciate why the Germans princes may well have deemed it impossible to provision the whole army for a further 20 days at Nikaia.

These calculations corroborate the source testimony and help demonstrate why the princes divided their forces at Nikaia. There were not enough beasts available to convey all the necessary provisions to Ikonion, and/or there simply were not enough provisions procurable at Nikaia. We have seen that Manuel Komnenos advised the crusaders to march along the relatively highly populated and cultivated regions of western Anatolia rather than advance directly on to the Anatolian plateau via Constantinople and Dorylaion.\textsuperscript{38} The emperor also counselled Conrad to divide his forces should he insist on marching on this road because the necessary supplies could not be obtained en route.\textsuperscript{39} The reliability of the emperor’s advice is self-evident, and the princes elected to follow his counsel whilst at Nikaia.

According to the Pöhlder Annals, Conrad, who may have been speaking for the rest of the German princes, wished to send the footsoldiers (\textit{pedites}) on an alternative path to the East and advance on the desert route with only the mounted warriors. The king had observed that those on foot were already ‘fatigued by hunger’ and were not experienced soldiers. This plan apparently caused unrest amongst the infantry. They threatened to withdraw their loyalty to the king, who subsequently endeavoured to appease them.\textsuperscript{40} Kugler interpreted this episode as further evidence of the army’s unruly nature. He suggested that after this incident the footsoldiers slowed down their rate of march from Nikaia to Ikonion (for some unspecified reason), and that the mounted warriors advancing in front of those on foot eventually separated from the mass of the army.\textsuperscript{41} Kugler found evidence for the separation of horse and foot in Conrad’s letter to Abbot Wibald of Corvey and Stavelot, written in Constantinople in February 1148,\textsuperscript{42} but he omitted the actual reasons those on foot lagged behind the mounted warriors (as furnished by Conrad himself). The king explained that:

‘with ten days’ journey completed already and the same amount still remaining to us, provisions for almost everyone, especially for the horses, had failed. At the same time, the Turks did not cease to attack and slaughter the mass of infantry which was unable to follow the army.’\textsuperscript{43}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{39}‘Annales Herbipolenses’, p.4.
\textsuperscript{40}‘Annales Palidenses’, pp.82-3.
\textsuperscript{41}Kugler, \textit{Studien}, pp.149-51.
\textsuperscript{42}Conrad III, \textit{Die Urkunden}, pp.354-5. Kugler also suggested the \textit{De Profectione} proves the army separated. Odo of Deuil does indicate that the marching column became stretched out and that many of the weak were unable to follow those hastening on. However, this was actually as the army was retreating and not during the advance to Ikonion. Odo of Deuil, \textit{De Profectione}, pp.90-8.
\textsuperscript{43}‘decem dierum itinere jam peracto, totidem adhunc nobis residuo, victualia omnibus fere, equitaturis maxime, defecerant: cum Turci peditre vulgus, quod exercitum sequi nequibat, invadere et caedere non cessabant’. Conrad III, \textit{Die Urkunden}, p.354.
\end{footnotesize}
Conrad himself indicates that the reasons ‘the mass of infantry’ (the translation of *pedestre vulgus* presumably employed by Kugler) was ‘unable to follow the army’ (*exercitum sequi nequibat*) was because provisions were scarce and the Turks were harassing the advancing column. Moreover, the Latin phrase *pedestre vulgus* can be translated differently. *Pedestris* means ‘going on foot’ or ‘consisting of footsoldiers’. *Vulgus* refers to the members of a particular category of people or animals and is usually translated as ‘mob’. *Exercitus* in Medieval Latin usage refers to the whole of a military force, infantry and cavalry included. It seems nonsense to suggest that the infantry were unable to follow the army, since they were actually part of it. The implication is that the *pedestre vulgus* was a group of people and/or animals who advanced on foot, but were distinct from the *exercitus*. The best translation of the phrase is therefore ‘unarmed mob’ which is employed in the thesis hereafter.

There are clearly problems with Kugler’s suggestion that the footsoldiers purposely separated from the cavalry, and indeed the rebellious infanterymen may not have actually advanced from Nikaia with the king. The Würzburg annalist states that all the footsoldiers (*pedites universi*) followed Otto of Freising and formed a contingent which contemporaries estimated to be between 14,000 and 30,000 strong.\(^{44}\) There is no need to accept notoriously poor medieval estimates of army sizes, nor the Würzburg annalist’s suggestion that all the footsoldiers accompanied Otto of Freising, to recognise that a considerable number of infantrymen separated from the main force and escorted the Bishop.\(^{45}\)

Conrad desired such a separation of horse and foot and a division duly occurred at Nikaia. He would surely have taken the opportunity to ensure that any enfeebled, inexperienced and potentially disruptive elements in the army did not accompany him into the deserts of hostile territory. An agreement whereby the disgruntled elements of the army followed the king’s half-brother would thus have suited all parties. Given that only the Pöhlder annalist mentions a rebellion, any disruption it potentially caused was certainly not widespread nor excessive and was therefore probably stifled at Nikaia. There is certainly no evidence to suggest that a revolt caused the footsoldiers to separate from the mounted warriors, and so Kugler errs here in inferring further evidence of crusader disorder on the march.

The history of the crusade’s advance in Bithynia is admittedly patchy. Which route the army traversed between Nikomedia and Nikaia, and why it took around a month to get to Nikaia are unknowns. There is also an element of uncertainty concerning Niketas Choniates’

\(^{44}\) ‘Annales Herbipolenses’, p.5; ‘Casus Monasterii Petrishusensis’, p.674; ‘Annales Palidenses’, p.84; Odo of Deuil, *De Profectione*, p.50 n.28, p.88 n.3. Also see Gerhoh of Reichersberg, *De Investigatione*, p.376.

\(^{45}\) There is certainly no evidence to suggest Conrad was accompanied from Nikaia by considerable numbers of footsoldiers.
testimony. However, his recorded rumours definitely do not find reasonable substantiation. Manuel Komnenos did not issue a debased currency in 1147/8 to exchange with the crusaders, Choniates confuses the manner in which the French army was provisioned in Europe with the way the German army was supplied in Anatolia, and his accusations that the crusaders were cheated at the scales is tenuous at best. It is clearly unsound to conclude from a simple reading of Choniates’ rumours that the towns failed to provision the Germans adequately or offered provisions only at exorbitant prices.

Our lack of knowledge stems from textual paucity. The scarcity of detailed records determines that the written history of the crusade in Europe is based mainly on John Kinnamos, Odo of Deuil, and to a lesser extent, Niketas Choniates. We have surmised that Bernard Kugler imposes his interpretation of crusader disorder in Europe, which is based on this refutable source evidence, on proceedings in Asia Minor. In fact, Bishop Otto of Freising did not split from the main force at Nikaia because he could not tolerate his uncontrollable fellow crusaders. An executive decision was made to divide the army owing to the known potential victualling problems, a predicament amply demonstrated by logistical calculations. Whether this decision was reached upon recognition that there was an incongruous ratio of beasts to men or that sufficient provisions to last the whole army a further 20 days could not be obtained at Nikaia is unclear. Notwithstanding this uncertainty, the crusaders’ individual logistical arrangements were subject to the limitations of medieval agrarian society and their provisioning problems were exacerbated by their previous month’s stay in a region which had been subject to the Türkmen presence. The princes were compelled to divide their forces at Nikaia, and they resolved to advance to Ikonion without their enfeebled and inexperienced footsoldiers. This resolution evidently caused some unrest amongst the infantry, although this potentially disruptive element was probably persuaded to accompany Bishop Otto of Freising. There is certainly little evidence to suggest that significant numbers of infantry accompanied Conrad, or that footsoldiers purposely separated from the mounted contingents whilst marching towards Ikonion in the manner Kugler alleges.
15. The Failure of the Advance on Ikonion

It is conventionally held that during the advance to Ikonion, the crusaders were defeated in battle by Turkish forces at Dorylaion, and accordingly forced to turn around and flee back to Nikaia. The locating of the defeat and subsequent retreat at Dorylaion stems solely from Kugler’s interpretations of just two sources, John Kinnamos and Niketas Choniates, and their very brief references to the crusade in Asia Minor.\(^1\) Niketas Choniates states only that ‘around (the River) Bathys, [a tributary of the River Tembros (modern Porsuk), which it joins at Dorylaion] led by a certain Pamplanes, they (the Turks) slew large numbers through battle and were victorious.’\(^2\) John Kinnamos agrees in part here with Choniates. He recounts that ‘nothing unpleasant happened to them (Conrad’s army) as far as Melangia and Dorylaion. Then a Turk by the name of Mamplanes, with a small army, attacked the vanguard to test the enemy’s strength and fighting formation.’\(^3\) Kinnamos then goes on to describe very briefly the ensuing clash.

His description of the engagement is imbued with the Byzantine perception of the bellicose and tumultuous Latin barbarian. A contemporary Byzantine reader or listener to Kinnamos would not have been surprised to learn what happened to the ‘barbarian’ Conrad, the ‘arrogant’, ‘boastful’ and ‘undisciplined’ ‘wild beast’ from the West when the mounted warriors of the crusader vanguard were confronted by a ‘small force’ of Turkish troops. ‘When the Turks first appeared before them’, Kinnamos relates, ‘the Germans rushed at them, without order, in fury and confusion.’ The Turks feigned retreat as the crusader cavalry charged only then to turn around and attack the exhausted crusader knights. ‘This same thing which happened frequently struck immeasurable terror into the Germans. Then it was possible to see those who were recently warlike braggarts, who attacked their enemies like wild animals, frightened and ignoble and incapable of either doing or planning anything.’\(^4\)

To Kinnamos and Kugler who unquestioningly followed him, the apparent unruly conduct of the German crusaders, as epitomised in their pugnacious, disorderly charge at their Turkish enemy, was self-evidently the reason behind the crusader losses and the decision by their council to retreat. Kugler certainly does not offer any alternative explanations for the decision and is happy to accept Kinnamos’ depiction and Choniates’ brief statement that the Turks ‘slew large numbers through battle and were victorious.’\(^5\) In effect, Kugler simply paraphrases John Kinnamos’ depiction of events. Kugler maintains that the crusader cavalry

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\(^3\) Ioannes Cinnamus, *Rerum*, p.81; John Kinnamos, *Deeds*, p.68.


aggressively charged upon the appearance of a small, mounted Turkish reconnaissance force. The Turks subsequently split ranks to avoid the impact of the charge before circling to attack the mounted knights who had expended their energy in a fruitless chase. The crusaders attempted a number of ineffective charges at that time, but with similar results and massive losses, until the Turks closed in on the ‘ponderous mass of the remaining pilgrims’. It is contended elsewhere in this thesis that Kinnamos is describing typical Turkish harassing tactics against an advancing column. Kugler, however, interpreted the clashes as a battle, and inferred that crusader indiscipline resulted in excessive fatalities at Dorylaion and that the losses in manpower compelled the army to retreat to Nikaia.

There is a number of fundamental flaws in Kugler’s approach here. The major flaw lies with his undue dependence on John Kinnamos and Niketas Choniates. Neither stated that the crusaders turned back at Dorylaion, and a projected rate of march indicates that the crusaders are likely to have progressed three days beyond the former city. The Latin and Syriac texts’ depiction of where the crusaders reached is of an arid desert, whereas analyses of the Greek texts relating to the ambitious reconstruction of Dorylaion in 1175 confirm that the Dorylaion plain was a verdant and inhabitable region in the twelfth century. Kugler clearly misconstrued the geographical evidence in the Greek texts, and his reliance on the Greek sources also undermines his approach in one further important area. We have already seen that the Byzantine rhetors explained various events within the constraints of their conception of the Latin barbarian and attendant self-sustaining rhetorical conventions, and that Kugler accepted as true the topos of barbarian indiscipline, an acquiescence which underpins his interpretation of events. The Byzantines’ portrayal of the proceedings in Anatolia and their descriptions of the clashes between the crusaders and their Turkish enemy are once again inferred as evidence of crusader indiscipline. There was, however, nothing unusual in the crusaders’ behaviour during the clashes.

The last major flaw in Kugler’s approach is his post-Clausewitzian perspective. We stated above how Clausewitz’s Vom Kriege and its concentration on the importance of battle had a profound impact on nineteenth-century German military historians. Kugler’s focus on the limited amount of information contained in the Greek texts betrays the undue influence of a post-Clausewitzian military philosophy. He employs a rather tendentious approach to the Latin source evidence to conform to an hypothesis which claims that the only reason Conrad

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7 See below pp.223-4.
8 See below pp.191-7.
9 See below pp.188-90.
10 See below pp.186-8.
11 See below chapter 18.
12 See above p.6.
ceased to advance on Ikonion was owing to a defeat in battle caused by poor discipline, an interpretation which does not allow for any other events or circumstances causing the retreat.

Kugler argued that Conrad’s letter to Abbot Wibald and the king’s brief depiction of the crusaders’ suffering corroborates Kinnamos’ testimony and sufficiently demonstrates that the army was defeated in a set piece action. Patently it does not, for Kugler omitted that Conrad describes Turkish attacks on those on foot who could not maintain the same marching rate as the leading contingents, whereas Kinnamos stated that the small Turkish force attacked the mounted crusader vanguard. Kugler subsequently cites Conrad again to maintain that considerable losses in his perceived set-piece action caused the king to retreat. Conrad writes of those on foot:

We were grieving for the plight of our people who were perishing as much from natural causes as the arrows of the enemy. [So], at the request of our princes and barons, we led the army back to the sea from that uninhabited land so that it might recover.

Crusader losses were therefore a significant factor in the decision to retreat. We know that Conrad also refers to a lack of provisions and he clearly states he retreated from the plateau’s uninhabited land back towards Nikaia and the sea in order that the army might recover. That is, Conrad wished to retreat to a verdant country to obtain the necessities to sustain life. Kugler also omitted this evidence perhaps because of his battle-orientated explanation for the retreat.

Kugler readily found support for his presupposition in the Greek histories of John Kinnamos and Niketas Choniates. Choniates noted that the crusaders were defeated in battle, and Kinnamos describes the clashes between the Turks and crusaders, which Kugler interpreted as a set-piece encounter; the Greek sources were all the confirmation Kugler needed to support his battle hypothesis. But imposing a contemporary perspective on the historical events of any age, manipulating the evidence, and failing to recognise distorting rhetorical conventions cannot produce satisfactory written history. The axiom that crusader indiscipline in battle with Turkish forces at Dorylaion ultimately caused the army to fall back on Nikaia

13 We have already seen that Conrad merely recounts that ‘the Turks did not cease to attack and slaughter the unarmed mob which was unable to follow the army’, ‘Turci pedestre vulgus, quod exercitum sequi nequiebat, invadere et caedere non cessabant’. Conrad III, Die Urkunden, p.354.
14 Kugler, Studien, p.154.
15 ‘Nos vicem populi deficientis, et tam morte sua quam sagittis hostium percuntis, dolentes, rogatu principum omnium et baronum, ad mare de terra illa deserta exercitum, ut refocillaretur, reduximus’. Conrad III, Die Urkunden, p.354. The phrase morte sua, ‘by their own death’, has been translated as ‘by natural causes’ in the light of the contrast between that and ‘the arrows of the enemy’. Since it is scarcely likely that the unarmed mob committed suicide, the implication seems to be that they died because of something which was inflicting them, as opposed to dying from a cause inflicted by other people. I would like to thank Peter Maxwell-Stuart for this suggestion.
16 Compare with Smail, Crusading Warfare, p.14-15.
must be addressed. The next three chapters of this thesis will redress Kugler’s flawed methodology and his subsequent interpretation on which the conventional history of Conrad’s advance on Ikonion is based.
16. Retreat from Dorylaion?

A number of specific questions must be answered to redress the conventional interpretation that the crusaders turned around at Dorylaion and fled back to Nikaia. First, which route did the crusaders take to Dorylaion? Second, what did the plain of Dorylaion look like in the twelfth century? Third, how does this depiction compare with the contemporary and near contemporary topographical evidence gleaned from our crusade sources? Last, how many days did it take the crusaders to reach Dorylaion? Only by answering these questions can we determine if Kugler’s interpretation of the geographical information contained in the Greek texts is correct.

The Route from Nikaia to Dorylaion

Conrad III wished to advance by the shortest, quickest route to his stated objective, the Seljuk capital, Ikonion.1 Contemporary allegations suggesting the army was purposely guided away from this road because of ‘typical’ Greek perfidy have long been recognised as dubious.2 Nevertheless, the route taken by the crusaders from Nikaia has not come down to us, and neither have the names of any strongpoints the crusaders encountered. It is therefore essential to assess each potential route’s suitability and consider contemporary military usage to establish upon which path the Second Crusade was led.

From Nikaia, three routes to Dorylaion have been identified which were possibly in use during the Middle Ages.3 Each route will be discussed in turn by reference to John France’s discussion of the road taken by the First Crusade from Nikaia to Dorylaion.4 This will provide the framework for re-analysis of the routes which Byzantine armies traversed between Nikaia and Dorylaion during the eleventh and twelfth centuries.

Historians of the First Crusade have suggested all three routes mainly in an effort to reconcile an approximate crusader rate of march between Nikaia and Dorylaion with Anna Komnene’s statement that Turkish forces gave battle to the armies of the First Crusade ‘on the plain of Dorylaion’.5 Hagenmeyer6 maintained that the First Crusade marched east from Nikaia to Lefke (near modern Osmaneli),7 which is by the confluence of the lower Sangarios

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3 See below, maps 3 & 4.
7 It should be noted that Lefke is not actually at Osmaneli. The bridge of Lefke is approximately 3 kilometres northwest of Osmaneli by the confluence of the rivers. See, French, D., *Roman Roads and Milestones of Asia*
River (modern Sakarya) and its western tributary, the River Gallos (modern Göksu), in the southeastern extremity of the verdant region of Malagina. A road undoubtedly existed between these two points during the Middle Ages, and Nikaia to Lefke (ancient Leukai) on the Roman road is measured at approximately 22 kilometres. Byzantine ceramics dating from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries have been found at the remains of the Karadin fortress 13 kilometres east from Nikaia. This may indicate that the armies of 1097 and indeed those of 1147 passed an occupied Karadin. The road eastwards divided at Karadin; one route ran in a northwest direction to Mekece in Malagina, and the second in a southwest direction to Lefke. This latter route gently ascends to an altitude of 400 metres and, upon crossing the watershed, has a long gradual descent until it reaches Lefke. The forces of the First Crusade proved the excellence and ease of this stretch of route by marching from Nikaia to Lefke within a day.

From Lefke, the crusaders then followed a southern tributary of the Sangarios, the Karasu River, by means of modern Bilecik and Bozüyük. This has long been recognised as the main Roman road between Nikaia, Malagina and Dorylaion. Hagenmeyer maintained it was around the site of Bozüyük that the Battle of Dorylaion (1097) took place, and which, according to John France, is just conceivable given speculative rates of march. According to Hagenmeyer, the crusaders then continued in a southeast direction until they reached Dorylaion and ultimately the Anatolian plateau.

Runciman argued that the crusaders did not continue south at Bilecik, as Hagenmeyer maintained, but rather exited the Karasu valley soon after Bilecik in a southeast direction through modern Söğüt. The existence of a route through Söğüt is testified by the remains of Roman and Byzantine ruins and evidence that the path was used during the Ottoman period. This winding route traverses tree-covered, hilly terrain not particularly suited to a marching

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8 A fortress by the name of Malagina was situated in this region: see above p.112.
11 Foss, ‘Byzantine Malagina’, Fig.2; Lefort, ‘Les Grandes Routes’, Fig.1; Giros, ‘Les Fortifications’, pp.209-24.
12 The anonymous author of the Gesta Francorum stated that the crusaders marched in a day from Nikaia to a bridge where the armies concentrated: Anonymous, Gesta Francorum, p.18. Anna Komnene states that the bridge was at Leukai (Lefke): Anna Komnene, Alexiad, p.341.
13 See photograph IV.3.
15 France, Victory, p.172
army, until it reaches Söğüt. From Söğüt, the route continues in a general southeast direction via the modern village of Keskin. It then enters the Dorylaion plain approximately 10 kilometres from where the city of Dorylaion once stood. Runciman suggested that the battle of Dorylaion took place at this point. France has correctly rejected Runciman’s conclusions based predominantly on his own speculative rates of march, arguing that the crusaders could not have marched that far in three days from Nikaia. Nor does there appear to have been a Byzantine garrisoned strongpoint along this stretch of road to draw an army that way for strategical reasons. Indeed, owing to this route’s access to the Dorylaion plain, an area which was inhabited by Türkmens for the greater part of this period, the path was probably outside effective Byzantine control, and certainly there is no evidence of an army traversing this alternative route during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. It is thus reasonable to eliminate this section of route as one which could have been used during the First, and indeed, the Second Crusade, as obviously there was a more suitable alternative.

France in turn, rejecting Anna Komnene’s evidence that the crusade marched east from Nikaia to Lefke, suggests that the crusaders took the third route which exits Nikaia by what is now known as the Yenişehir Gate. Like the modern road, the path soon had cause to ascend the very steep and tree covered 835 metre high Avdan Dağ for around 10 kilometres in an extremely winding fashion, often clinging to the mountain side. The subsequent descent through verdant hills is gentler until it reaches the very fertile plain of modern Yenişehir. As France is aware, there is evidence of a Roman road from Yenişehir towards Dorylaion and, unknown to him, evidence of a similar, or possibly the same route used during the Ottoman period, which ran in a southeast direction via the modern village of Akbıyık. The route climbed the Ahl Dağ at approximately 1000 metres, before continuing in roughly the same direction to the modern town of Pazaryeri (medieval Armenokastron), and thence into a broad valley some three to five kilometres above Bozüyük. The modern highway number E90 from Bursa meets the modern road number 650 from Bilecik here, and France maintains that it was

18 Much of this terrain is typical tree-covered transitional land, although now cleared in parts and given over to agriculture. See photograph IV.4.
20 France, Victory, p.172.
21 See above p.147.
22 Ramsey’s statement that Alexios I Komnenos marched to ‘Sugut’ in 1116 is incorrect, see Belke & Mersich, Phrygien, p.142; Ramsey, W. M., The Historical Geography of Asia Minor, Royal Geographical Society, Supplemetary Papers IV (London, 1890), p.209.
24 Anna Komnene, Alexiad, p.341.
25 David French orally advised France of the existence of this Roman road.
at this junction of roads and valleys that the battle of Dorylaion took place. Given France’s suggested distance from Nikaia to Dorylaion, we must presume he believes the crusaders subsequently followed the route of the major modern road and motorway between Bozüyük and Dorylaion. This route from Nikaia to Dorylaion would not have been initially easy, but is no longer than the established route suggested by Hagenmeyer. As France maintains that Lefke to Bozüyük on Hagenmeyer’s route is a little over 50 kilometres, and as he accepts Hagenmeyer’s argument that the crusaders could just conceivably reach Bozüyük in two days from Lefke, naturally, he argues, they could have reached Bozüyük on the alternative route he himself has proposed, which he states was not any lengthier.

Whilst a Roman and Ottoman route exited south from Nikaia via modern Yenişehir to Dorylaion, there is no evidence that this route was utilised by armies during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Nor was there a Byzantine strongpoint along this stretch of road which may have drawn an army that way for strategical reasons. Such evidence effectively negates France’s hypothesis. A main reason France rejected Hagenmeyer’s suggested route in favour of a route south from Nikaia, which had no precedent as a military road, is because the approach to the Anatolian plateau via Yenişehir is open and more suitable for a marching army. Hagenmeyer’s suggested route by Lefke and then south via the Karasu valley, on the other hand, passes through a region which would form a perfect ambush site, and hence France argues the crusaders chose the route through Yenişehir. His argument, however, ignores the fact that there was an important Byzantine military route between Malagina and Dorylaion and the northwestern Anatolian plateau which would have been known to the crusaders’ Byzantine guides. The Arab geographers al-Idrīsī and Ibn Khūr妲dhhbih noted two routes between Malagina and Dorylaion. Ibn Khūr妲dhhbih’s manual of roads included the invasion routes to Constantinople, and records that Malagina was a location of imperial stables as well as of baggage and provisions. This suggests Malagina was a Byzantine mustering station, and this is confirmed in the tenth century de Ceremoniis of Constantine Porphyrogenitus. Malagina was the first aplekton where the forces from Thrace and the

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27 See photograph IV.6.
28 France, Victory, pp.171-4 France suggests this was 115 kilometres, evidently based on the approximate distance of the main route between İzmir and Eskişehir shown on modern maps. Unlike the major modern route, the medieval route passed by Armenokastron (mod. Pazarıyeri) and modern İnönü, as discussed below. Moreover, the distances covered by man and beast before the widespread introduction of modern construction techniques are not necessarily the same as those covered by the motor vehicle. The most recent research suggests the distance between Nikaia and Dorylaion was in fact approximately 151 kilometres. Lefort, ‘Les Grandes Routes’, p.471.
29 One of the routes is likely to be through Söğüt. The other is very likely to be the route now under discussion. al-Idrīsī, Géographie d’Édrisi Traduite et Accompagnée de Notes, trans. P. Jaubert, 2 vols (Paris, 1836-40), 2 (1840), p.306; Ibn Khūr妲dhhbih, Kitāb al-Masālik, pp.74, 85-6.
Opsician theme would muster. The subsequent *aplekton* was at Dorylaion where the emperor would gather further troops.\(^{30}\)

It is clear that imperial forces continued to muster at Malagina in the eleventh and twelfth centuries before heading to Dorylaion. Michael Attaliates, for example, relates that the emperor Romanus IV mustered a small force at Malagina before marching to Dorylaion in response to a revolt by the Norman commander Crispin in 1069.\(^{31}\)

In 1113, Alexios Komnenos marched from Nikaia to intercept Turkish raiders returning from Mysia. The Turks were heading in the direction of Akrokus (modern Eğrigöz) and hence east towards Kotyaion (modern Kütahya) and the northwestern plateau from where they had initially descended.\(^{32}\) ‘The emperor’, writes Anna Komnene, ‘guessing the path by which the enemy would go, chose a different route by Nikaia, Malagina and the so-called Basilika’. In other words, Alexios expected to intercept the returning raiders as they headed back towards Kotyaion and the northwest plateau. As Anna puts it, the emperor then ‘went on to Akrokus, hurrying to a position from which he could attack the Turks from the front’.\(^{33}\)

The path Alexios initially embarked upon was the well-established Roman route from Nikaia to the plateau, that is, east to Malagina and then south via the Karasu Valley.\(^{34}\) As Ramsey pointed out, Basilika is likely to be near the southeastern spur of Mount Olympus, perhaps above modern İnönü.\(^{35}\) This location would certainly fit in with Ibn Khūrdādhbih’s description of the military route between Kotyaion and Nikaia; the itinerary was via Dorylaion, an unidentified castle and village, then ‘Basilikain’, ‘Malajina’ and the Lake of Nikaia.\(^{36}\)

In 1116, the imperial army marched from Nikaia to Dorylaion via Pithekas and Armenokastron.\(^{37}\) We are fairly sure that Pithekas lies in the middle or upper reaches of the Karasu valley\(^{38}\) and Armenokastron has been placed east of modern Pazaryeri, near the

\(^{30}\) Huxley, G., ‘A list of Aplekta’, *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*, 16 (1975), pp.87-93.


\(^{33}\) Anna Komnene, *Alexiad*, p.455.

\(^{34}\) The route to Kotyaion from Nikaia is the same as the route to Dorylaion until İnönü. See: Belke & Mersich, *Phrygien*, pp.140-3, 146.

\(^{35}\) Ramsey, *Historical Geography*, p.208.


\(^{37}\) Anna Komnene, *Alexiad*, pp.478-80. Anna states that Alexios marched from Nikaia to Dorylaion by way of Pithekas, Armenokastron and Leukai. As will become evident, and as has been recognised by others, Anna’s itinerary is incorrect. If Alexios followed this itinerary, it would mean he diverted his march from Armenokastron northwards to Lefke before returning south to Dorylaion. Anna may actually be suggesting that troops simply mustered at Lefke in Malagina, before marching with Alexios, or joining him at Armenokastron. This confusion evidently caused Ramsey to place Pithekas and Armenokastron between Nikaia and Lefke. Ramsey, *Historical Geography*, p.201; Belke & Mersich, *Phrygien*, p.142.

\(^{38}\) Giros has very recently placed Pithekas at Köprühisar by drawing on Ottoman evidence. Unknown to Giros, the *Tabula Imperii Byzantini* series placed Pithekas on the middle or upper reaches of the Karasu. The
Karasu valley, and perhaps some 30 kilometres south of the Söğüt turnoff below Bilecik. From Armenokastron, Alexios advanced to Dorylaion and hence on to the plateau to Santabarbis where contingents continued to Polybotus and Amorion via Kedrea.

The fact that the fortresses of Malagina and Pithekas were refortified and regarrisoned just before the Second Crusade, thus effectively bringing the well established route back within the Byzantine domain, would have influenced a guide’s decision to lead Conrad of Germany from Nikaia, east to Malagina, and south to Pithekas. We may add that John Kinnamos specifically states that Conrad marched between Malagina and Dorylaion. Although Kinnamos wrote his history some 35 years after the crusade, and, as we have seen, there are problems with his testimony, he may have had access to some form of contemporary source based on a Byzantine guide’s account. One could also contend that as the standard military route between Nikaia and Dorylaion was evidently via Malagina, Kinnamos’ assertions are merely a reflection of contemporary military practice. Manuel Komnenos, for example, mustered at Malagina in 1175 before marching to Dorylaion, dispersing the Türkmens, and rebuilding a strong point there.

It is clear that eleventh- and twelfth-century imperial forces advancing from Nikaia to the Anatolian plateau mustered at Malagina before marching by Lefke and then south via the Karasu valley to Dorylaion. This was the way Byzantine guides led armies during this period reflecting serious logistical and topographical considerations. Upon the end of Byzantine hegemony in Asia Minor and its replacement by Ottoman rule, this route was still

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40 Anna Komnene, Alexiad, pp.479-91.
42 Iaonnes Cinnamus, Rerum, p.81; John Kinnamos, Deeds, p.68.
44 The same conclusion as reached in specialist studies, see Lefort, ‘Les Fortifications’, pp.209-24; John Kinnamos, Deeds p.38; Anna Komnene, Alexiad, p.479; Belke & Mersich, Phrygien, pp.141-2.
45 Hagenmeyer was correct in stating the First Crusade advanced along this route. Hagenmeyer, Chronologie, pp.85, 169.
used by military forces, thus confirming its long history as a military road under both the Romans and Byzantines.46

This natural route of communication along a verdant valley narrows after the Malagina district and is occasionally very narrow, although an army could still move freely before the modern small town of Vezirhan.47 After Vezirhan, the Karasu River enters a gorge which narrows further into a steep defile below Bilecik.48 For this reason the existence of a route between Malagina and Dorylaion by way of the Karasu valley has been disputed.49 As John France points out, the defile below Bilecik forms a perfect ambush site and it is unlikely an army would choose to enter the defile in times of hostility.50 It is also improbable that an army or any other travellers would enter the restrictive defile at times of peace if an alternative path could be found. Armies wishing to avoid the gorge and defile must therefore have followed a route similar to the modern highway no.650. Indeed, antique remains and the vestiges of an old road have been observed very near this stretch of highway at modern Gülübe, and the remains of a Temple of Zeus near Bilecik suggests that a route has existed this way since the Roman period.51 This road leaves the valley floor after Vezirhan and initially climbs steeply through scrub and tree covered hills. It then circumvents the gorge and defile for approximately 17 kilometres, passing modern Bilecik where Byzantine ceramics have been found,52 before descending steeply before the modern village of Küplü. Here the Karasu enters a valley which is still very narrow, but easily wide enough for an army to traverse. The route then continues to ascend steadily through a narrow valley with heavily wooded slopes – perhaps where Pithekas is to be found. The modern road continues southwards beside the Karasu, although the medieval route ran in a southwest direction towards Armenokastron. Hereafter, the medieval path rejoined the upper reaches of the Karasu and the modern road and the narrow valley opens out after the large modern town of Bozüyük.

The exact path between Bozüyük and Dorylaion is not described in contemporary sources. It is clear from sixteenth-century accounts of Ottoman military campaigns that an army heading to Dorylaion crossed a plain in a general southeastern direction until it reached the

47 On this route see below and Lefort, ‘Les Grandes’, pp.467-8; Belke & Mersich, Phrygien, pp.141-2; and below, map no.3.
48 See photograph VI.3.
49 Belke & Mersich, Phrygien, p.141.
50 France, Victory, p.173.
River Bathys at modern Inönü. The army then followed the river to Dorylaion. A British naval intelligence report dated from 1919, that is, a time before the widespread introduction of modern agricultural and construction techniques in Turkey, describes this route from Bozüyük to Dorylaion. Just as a modern road does, the route in 1919 (and surely the path during the Byzantine period) crossed the northwest fringe of a plain before gradually ascending a valley until, at the summit, the view opened on to a broad, well-cultivated valley running east to west. The road then descended gradually to the valley floor and the place where the modern town of Inönü now stands, before following the course of the Bathys in a general eastwards direction until Dorylaion.

The whole road from Nikaia to Dorylaion via Malagina, the Karasu Valley and modern Inönü is well suited for a marching army. The path has a gradual ascent with no lengthy steep sections and it follows natural routes of communication by watercourses. The medieval route was thus well-watered and provided pasture and fuel all year round.

**Dorylaion in the Twelfth Century**

By the time of the Second Crusade, Dorylaion, situated between the rivers Bathys and Tembros, was little more than rubble, having been virtually razed to the ground by the Turks soon after the Battle of Mantzikert. The hinterland was thus fallow at this point owing to the prolonged absence of a permanent sedentary population. The relatively lengthy entry for Dorylaion in the *Tabula Imperii Byzantini*, however, indicates that on account of its position in the communication infrastructure of northwest Anatolia, its favourable location between the two rivers, the wide plain surrounding the city (which provided outstanding pasture for the imperial stables), and its famous thermal springs, the city was once a place of great importance. Moreover, Dorylaion was the second *aplekton* in the Byzantine mustering system, which naturally, would need to be located in such a verdant area in order to provide an army with adequate water and provisions.

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55 There is a second, major modern route between Bozüyük and Dorylaion which runs within view of the Bathys watercourse and the medieval route. John France evidently believes the First Crusade took this road between Bozüyük and Dorylaion, although it is difficult to see why a military force in the Middle Ages would freely make the choice of crossing this occasionally harsh landscape, rather than marching adjacent to the Bathys River along a similar, verdant path to what is now a second modern road and railway track.
58 Huxley, ‘*Aplekta*’, pp.87-93.
Given the presence of the two rivers and abundant pasture, it is not surprising that the heaviest concentration of Türkmens in the northwest of Anatolia was by the Bathys and Tembros rivers in the Dorylaion plain.\(^{59}\) The verdant strips of land by the rivers and the road here were clearly ideal for a pastoral nomadic existence. An oration by Euthymios Malakes relates that during Dorylaion’s reconstruction in 1175, ‘the Romans lived luxuriously on the Persian produce and luxuriated in the good things of the barbarians and drove their herds and flocks.’\(^{60}\) The Türkmens were supplementing their pastoral nomadic existence with some agriculture in the plain. As Andrew Stone has pointed out, this detail of the Byzantine army being able to forage for its subsistence whilst Dorylaion was being rebuilt supplements Choniates’ account which frequently mentions foraging expeditions.\(^{61}\) Choniates also relates that the Türkmens endeavoured to stop the Byzantines foraging and ultimately the reconstruction of Dorylaion, as they ‘knew that they would be in danger should they be forced to abandon the fertile plains of Dorylaion on which herds of goats and cattle grazed, romping in verdant meadows.’\(^{62}\) The Byzantines possibly gathered necessities from Greek-speaking inhabitants of the plain. A second oration by Euthymios Malakes delivered on Epiphany 1176 suggests that Byzantine villagers were paying tribute to the Turks the previous year.\(^{63}\) The sources which refer to Manuel’s ambitious reconstruction of Dorylaion in 1175 clearly illustrate what the plain of Dorylaion could offer a sedentary population. Eustathios’ 1176 Lenten oration, whilst recalling the glorious past of the city, also refers to the ‘great wealth’ which was generated there, ‘some from the earth, and some from wayfaring and freight; for the place was such a confluence of streams of great wealth’.\(^{64}\) It is worth quoting Kinnamos at length here as he clearly illustrates why Byzantine inhabitants may have resided in the plain despite the Türkmen presence:

‘This Dorylaion was once as great a city as any in Asia and worthy of much note. A gentle breeze blows over the land, and plains extend around it, extremely smooth and exhibiting an extraordinary beauty, so rich and fertile that they yield abundant grass and produce splendid grain. A river, fair to see and sweet to taste, sends its course through the midst. Such a multitude of fish swims in it that, while fished in abundance by the people there, there is no lack.’\(^{65}\)

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\(^{59}\) See above p.147.

\(^{60}\) Quoted in Stone, ‘Dorylaion Revisited’, p.196.


\(^{62}\) Niketas Choniates, Historia, pp. 227-228; Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, pp. 99-100.

\(^{63}\) According to the oration, the ‘Romans…as it were hidden under the ground’ after Dorylaion was destroyed sometime after 1071 were, ‘now raised again’ to help repopulate Dorylaion. Euthymios goes on to say that now the Turkish wealth ‘is gone, which those present on the plains of Dorylaion would bring forth as their due’. Quoted in Stone, ‘Dorylaion Revisited’, p.188.

\(^{64}\) Quoted in Stone, ‘Dorylaion Revisited’, p.187.

Clearly what is meant in these twelfth-century Greek sources as the plain of Dorylaion, namely, the region around the rivers Bathys and Tembros where the ruined city and road were situated, was a perennially verdant and inhabitable region in the twelfth century. It was certainly attractive to Türkmen tribes who appear to have practised some agriculture in the ‘rich and fertile’ meadows that yielded ‘abundant grass’ and produced ‘splendid grain’ and which may have contained Greek-speaking villages despite the Türkmen presence.

The Second Crusade Sources and the Terrain Encountered by the Crusaders

The predominantly lush and fertile topography of the major route from Nikaia to Dorylaion and of Dorylaion itself contrasts sharply with the grim image presented in the sources of the terrain the crusaders encountered when the decision was made to retreat. It is to these sources we must now turn. I have refrained from translating pertinent Latin words and phrases as ‘desert’, and have chosen to offer stock, alternative translations for them, in order, as far as possible, not to bias the evidence.

The Syriac fragment attributed to the Jerusalemite Mar Simon, an eyewitness to some events in the Levant, states that the crusaders were treacherously sent on their way from Constantinople ‘by roads that led to barren and uninhabited regions.’ The Würzburg annalist records that after leaving Nikaia the army ‘made its way towards Iconium’, and ‘entered a very extensive emptiness. They found nothing which seemed suitable to be used as food.’ Gerhoh of Reichersburg affirms that ‘while the army was walking towards Iconium, it was overwhelmed by effort, hunger and thirst in the wilderness.’ The Latin term ‘in deserto’ is translated here as ‘in the wilderness’, although we do not know precisely what Gerhoh and his contemporaries had in mind when they used desertum. We should note, however, that he refers to a lack of water in deserto, and so perhaps the desertum Gerhoh perceived was the ‘extensive emptiness’ and the ‘barren and uninhabited regions’, which the Würzburg annalist and the aforementioned Syriac source say the crusaders were guided into.

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66 British Naval Intelligence reports confirm it was fertile in the early twentieth century, too. Admiralty, Asia Minor 1, pp.91-3, 227; Admiralty, Asia Minor 2, pp.112-13.
67 Vryonis, Decline, pp.147-48. Incidentally, all this implies that the region had not suffered for some time from the devastating border warfare and scorched earth policies which appear to have been employed occasionally by both Turks and Byzantines in some frontier regions. Dorylaion had probably not been the site of border warfare since it was lost to the Byzantines soon after Mantzikert.
68 This section is largely reproduced in Roche, J. T., ‘Conrad III and the Second Crusade: Retreat from Dorylaion?’, Crusades 5 (2006), pp.85-97.
71 ‘Exercitus nuncque versus Iconium gradiens labore, fame ac siti in deserto confectus.’ Gerhoh of Reichersberg, De Investigatione’, p.375.
A later, anonymous Syriac chronicle composed before 1240 declares that ‘the emperor caused them to go by a bad road and sent with them guides to lead them to a desert where neither water nor any needful thing was to be found…they found no house nor villages where they could buy, not even water, they wandered in a dry desert and knew not where to go’.72

The anonymous Notae Pisanae, an addendum to Bernard Maragone’s contemporary Annales Pisani, states that the army entered ‘the territory of the Turks which consisted entirely of wastelands (deserta), and [the army] was unable to find provisions.’73 Helmold of Bosau’s Chronica Slavorum, based mainly on oral testimony and written around 1167-68,74 Gerhoh of Reichersburg,75 the very valuable and detailed Pöhlder annals,76 and the chronicle of Casus Monasterii Petrishusensis composed in 1156, all independently describe the terrain the crusaders ultimately advanced into as a ‘wilderness’ (again translating ‘desertum’ as ‘wilderness’ here).77

Helmold of Bosau and Michael the Syrian stress that the army was unable to find food and water in this terrain.78 The Würzburg annalist verifies that the crusaders ‘entered the wilderness next to Iconium. Nor was it enough that for so many days up until that point they had found nothing they wanted to eat; still more, they lacked the sources of water, which up to this point had been their only life-support.’79 The Historia Pontificalis of John of Salisbury, who was known to many of the surviving crusaders, and the Chronicon of William of Tyre, both describe this environment as ‘uninhabited land’ (desertis locis and loca deserta respectively).80 It should be noted, however, that the modern English translations of Helmold of Bosau and John of Salisbury render desertum and desertis locis respectively as ‘desert’.81

References to the lack of water in some of these sources again suggests that when the

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73 ‘la terra del Turchi, qui habebat tota deserta, ke nulla victualia habere potuit.’ ‘Notae Pisanae’, p.266. Desert could also be translated as ‘unfrequented places’.
74 ‘transducti in desertum maximum.’ Helmold of Bosau, ‘Chronica Slavorum’, p.117.
75 ‘iter per desertum quoddam versus Iconium ingressus est; ingressus est per desertum.’ Gerhoh of Reichersberg, ‘De Investigatione’, p.375.
76 ‘arrripuit iter deserti.’ ‘Annales Palidenses’, pp.82-83.
77 ‘Nam cum per desertum pergerent et escas non inveniret, multi fame perierunt, alii inedia laborantes a paganis aut perempti, aut in captivitatem redacti disperierunt.’ Casus Monasterii Petrishusensis, p.226.
78 Michael the Syrian, Chronicle, p.276; Michael’s factual detail here is copied in Bar Hebraeus, Political History, p.274; Helmold of Bosau, ‘Chronica Slavorum’, p.117.
79 ‘desertum Yconio vicinum intraverunt. Nec satis erat, nichil rerum quibus vesci liberet per tot iam dies repertumuisse; quin etiam, que solum ad vitae solutum huicusque invenit fuerunt, defecerunt aquae.’ ‘Annales Heribopolenses’, pp.5.
80 ‘primo in desertis locis inedia macerati sunt ut plurimi perierint, deinde confecti a paganis.’ John of Salisbury, Historia Pontificalis, p.54; ‘quibus per loca deserta gratia compendii eos transire oportebat.’ William of Tyre, Willelmi Tyrensis archiepiscopi chronicom, XVI.20, p.744.
chroniclers used *desertum* or *loca deserta*, they had in mind a terrain akin to that described in the Syriac sources, and this image of a barren desert would most certainly correspond to the description given in the Pöhlder annals of the landscape the crusaders ultimately reached. The chronicler states that the crusaders ‘having traversed through a terrifying wasteland, without paths, came upon a place of dread and vast emptiness’ (the Latin ‘eremus’ is here translated as ‘wasteland’, although it could be translated as ‘desert’ or ‘wilderness’).\(^8^2\) Michael Hendy’s partial modern translation of this text reads that the crusaders initially crossed a ‘desert’ before they entered the ‘wilderness’. Hendy may be aware of the wider context of his source; he is certainly au fait with Anatolia’s geography, and thus he translates *desertum* as ‘desert’.\(^8^3\)

Both the context and this terrain are clearly brought out in Arnold of Lübeck’s *Chronica Slavorum*. Arnold wrote that the army’s guide ‘proceeded into a region which was uninhabited (*terram desertam*) and very arid, and where, it is said, King Conrad halted with his army’.\(^8^4\) The Pöhlder annalist provides further details of the same situation, that is, when the march ceased to continue. He writes: ‘not only men but also the beasts of burden were worn out by the barrenness of the land and could not stay there any longer, because although the animals might have recovered, water could not be found, so they turned back’.\(^8^5\) William of Tyre provides additional details of the same circumstances when he writes that the crusaders ‘were wavering’ (‘fluctuarent’) partly because ‘the army had located itself in a barren emptiness, far from cultivated soil.’ \(^8^6\) It is clear that Arnold of Lübeck, the Pöhlder annalist, and William of Tyre are describing the same terrain, that is, ‘uninhabited and very arid’ and ‘a barren emptiness’ when they write of the place Conrad had halted before the decision was made by council to retreat.\(^8^7\) The king himself explained to Abbot Wibald that ‘at the request of our princes and barons we led the army back to the sea from that uninhabited land in order that it might recover.’\(^8^8\)

\(^8^2\) *per horribilem eremum, avia secuti, locum horroris et vaste solitudinis incidenter.* ‘Annales Palidenses’, p.83.

\(^8^3\) Hendy, *Studies*, p.40.

\(^8^4\) *progressus venit in terram desertam et aridam nimis, ubi dicitur Conradus rex stetisse cum exercitu suo*. Arnold of Lübeck, *Chronica Slavorum*, p.122.

\(^8^5\) *amplus subsistere nequiverunt consumpti a sterilitate terre non solum homines sed et iumenta, quippe quibus refocillandis nec aqua potuit inventiri, reflexere viam.* ‘Annales Palidenses’, p.83.


\(^8^7\) Commenced 26 October 1147. Bernhardi, *Konrad*, pp.634-5.

\(^8^8\) ‘rogatu principum omnium et baronum, ad mare de terra illa deserta exercitum, ut refocillaretur, reduximus.’ Conrad III, *Die Urkunden*, p.354.
geography, translated this as ‘that desert land’. Indeed, the image of a desert as in a vast, empty, barren terrain like Anatolia’s plateau beyond Dorylaion, a predominantly scorched and waterless landscape during the month of October, certainly corresponds to the descriptions given in the sources of the environment the crusaders eventually reached in October 1147 before the decision was made and effected to fall back on Nikaia.

The Rate of March to Dorylaion

A consideration of how many days it would have taken the crusaders to reach Dorylaion supports the inference that the army advanced beyond the plain. As previously mentioned, we are reliant on the source evidence provided by survivors of the advance on Ikonion, and those survivors were amongst the princely retinues who advanced with Conrad. We are unable to assess how far the poor elements of the army who became detached from the leading contingents had advanced on any given day, although they never appear to have been separated by a considerable distance.

The approximate distance achieved on any given day is dependent upon the rate of march, which in turn depends upon a number of variables including climatic conditions, discipline, enemy presence, rest and feeding delays, the nature of the terrain and track traversed, the size and type of baggage train and perhaps supply train, and the physical condition of men and beasts. There is insufficient evidence to suggest that extremes of climate or poor discipline affected Conrad’s rate of march. The princely retinues’ physical condition and an enemy presence did not unduly influence the advance until Dorylaion and need not concern our deliberations at this point. The army would have spread out either side of the ancient road, and although the old Roman roads were generally in a state of disrepair at this juncture, there is little to suggest that the route was considered difficult to traverse. As we know the topography of the crusaders’ route, and that the baggage and supplies were conveyed by pack animals, we can plausibly reconstruct the approximate distances and camping locations of the army’s surviving element each day by reference to generally accepted rates of march and a consideration of the foraging and security requirements of an encamped force.

Among the most important sources for the crusade in Anatolia are the king’s letters to Abbot Wibald of Corvey and Stavelot and the chronicle of Odo of Deuil. Both sources agree that Conrad had completed ten days of marching once leaving Nikaia before the decision was made and effected to fall back on Nikaia.

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90 Admiralty, Asia Minor 3, p.54.
91 There is only one non-contemporary, and therefore, perhaps questionable source which suggests the roads were difficult to traverse. William of Tyre, Wilhelmi Tyrensis archiepiscopi chronicon, XVI.22, p.746.
made to retreat on the eleventh day, and this time-frame is affirmed by the Pöhlder annals, which in turn are supported by the contemporary Annales Magdeburgenses. The annalists agree that Conrad returned to the relative safety of Nikaia seventeen or eighteen days after he had first set out from there. The main reason it took less time to retreat to Nikaia, that is, seven or eight days compared with the ten days spent advancing towards Ikonion, is that Conrad and the rest of the army’s surviving noble element abandoned the weak whilst fleeing back to Nikaia.

A combined force of horse and foot must ordinarily rest for at least one day in six (or the equivalent) if its horses and pack animals are to have adequate respite; otherwise, they become completely exhausted and are ultimately rendered useless. The sources attest to the army’s fatigue, however, and the crusaders’ advance from Nikaia was not delayed for any reason including rest days and foraging. Presumably water and pasturage for the animals were obtained largely whilst the army was stationary at night given Conrad’s desire to reach Ikonion quickly.

Nesbitt has calculated that Conrad’s army progressed at rates in excess of 22 kilometres per day between Ardacker and Fischa in Europe, but we must be careful not to apply these figures arbitrarily to Conrad’s rate of march in Anatolia. The sources suggest that by the time the crusading host left Nikaia, it was appreciably smaller that when it progressed through Europe because of the clashes with the Byzantines, the flash flood on the plains at Choirobacchoi, starvation, and the division of the army at Nikaia. Nevertheless, the texts still give the impression that Conrad was accompanied from Nikaia by a sizeable combined force, and Nesbitt’s calculations of Conrad’s rate of march in Europe do provide some indication of the rates his force was capable of making. If we consider that his army was smaller in Anatolia than in Europe, the relatively healthy noble contingents could presumably move at

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92 Conrad III, *Die Urkunden*, pp.354-355; Odo of Deuil, *De Profectione*, p.90. An echo of the ten day time-frame is given in the anonymous Syriac chronicle which suggests that the crusaders marched for ten days from Constantinople rather than from Nikaia. See Tritton, ‘The First and Second Crusades’, p.298.

93 The Magdeburg annalist suggests that the army was away from Nikaia for eighteen days, rather than the seventeen days implied by the Pöhlder annalist. ‘Annales Palidenses’, pp.82-3; ‘Annales Magdeburgenses’, p.188.

94 Many sources confirm that Conrad abandoned a large part of the army. See, for example, William of Tyre, *Willelmi Tyrensis archiepiscopi chronicon*, pp.744-6; Odo of Deuil, *De Profectione*, pp.90-7.

quicker rates than this. By comparison, the large combined forces of Peter the Hermit and Godfrey of Bouillon in the First Crusade, and those of Frederick Barbarossa in the Third, were easily capable of achieving 29 kilometres per day in optimal conditions in Europe. Large combined forces in Asia Minor are known to have moved at rates from between 11 and 13 kilometres per day to between 29 and 32.

The large armies of horse and foot on the First Crusade reached Lefke from Nikaia within a day. The size of the disparate forces that marched east from Nikaia is unknown, but the combined army which congregated at Lefke in 1097 has been estimated at over 50,000 strong, indicating that a number of contingents were of considerable size and perhaps some were comparable to Conrad’s host. The army which advanced from Nikaia on October 15, 1147, was analogous to the forces of the First Crusade in a number of ways. The armies in 1097 did not transport siege equipment from Nikaia and were largely dependent on baggage supplies. There is no evidence that Conrad’s army transported siege equipment and we know his army was dependent on baggage supplies from Nikaia onwards. This suggests that both armies had extensive baggage trains. Again, similar to the First Crusade, Conrad’s force did not experience overt ill-discipline, or an enemy presence (until it was near Dorylaion), or excessive rest and feeding delays. The physical condition of men and beasts were also comparable before Dorylaion. It can therefore be safely assumed that, like the First Crusade, Conrad’s force also traversed the 22 kilometres to Lefke on Day One of leaving Nikaia. Possibly the armies of the First and Second Crusade could have continued beyond Lefke if they were capable of marching at rates of 29 kilometres per day. Lefke, however, was a natural location to pitch camp; there was enough space in the wide expanse of this part of the Sangarios valley to accommodate the army securely, and water and fodder were available in a region which had once held the imperial stables.

The Byzantine guides would have led the army along the southern tributary of the Sangarios River, the Karasu, towards modern Bilecik after leaving Lefke. The route as far as modern Bayıköy, measuring at approximately 11 kilometres from Lefke, remains wide, well watered and fertile. The path then begins to meander by the river in the verdant valley which becomes narrow for approximately five kilometres before opening out and accommodating

99 Anonymous, Gesta Francorum, p.18; Anna Komnene, Alexiad, p.341.
100 France, Victory, p.142.
101 Bernhardi, Konrad, p.629.
the modern small town of Vezirhan. After Vezirhan, the medieval road, like its modern successor, leaves the valley floor and climbs a brief but steep and narrow winding path for approximately one kilometre until the route levels out and continues to modern Gülübe. The narrow stretches of this route may have increased the length of the army’s marching column, and hence perhaps lessened the average rate of march per day for the whole force. A considerable baggage train would ordinarily increase the column further, and the need to cross watercourses would also reduce the distance marched. However, there is no evidence to imply that the noble contingents did not cover more or less the same distance each day, and it may safely be suggested that any reduction in the rate of march had a negligible effect.

A combined force moves over even terrain such as that between Lefke and Vezirhan at approximately 4.5 kilometres per hour. If the army set out from Lefke, say, an hour after sunrise, it would have reached Vezirhan by early afternoon. As Conrad was eager to reach İkonion as quickly as possible, he would have used the remaining day light hours to push on towards Gülübe. If the last contingents did not leave Vezirhan until mid-afternoon, and progressed at a rate of only two kilometres per hour up the brief ascent towards Gülübe, they could still continue marching for another hour or so before sunset, covering, let us say, another five kilometres before encamping securely in the grasslands above the Karasu Valley. This gives a total distance marched on Day Two of approximately 22 kilometres over even terrain with only one brief, albeit narrow and winding steep ascent.

Day Three of the crusaders’ outward journey from Nikaia witnessed them traversing the road which circumvents the gorge and defile below the modern town of Bilecik. From the point where the crusaders were likely to have camped the previous evening – perhaps six kilometres from Vezirhan – the roads then leads for approximately 11 kilometres along an undulating tree and bush covered terrain before descending briefly and steeply for around one kilometre to the Karasu valley floor immediately after Bilecik. A combined force moves at a rate of approximately four kilometres per hour on uneven terrain and the army probably reached Bilecik by the early afternoon. With ample day light remaining Conrad would again have ordered the advance and descended to the valley floor. The valley is narrow here, however, and Conrad’s guides would surely have advised the king to continue for approximately six kilometres until the army reached an open verdant area by the Karasu

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103 On these matters see Engels, Alexander, pp.154-6; Haldon, Warfare, pp.164-5.
104 Mid-October sunrise was approximately 6 am in northwest Anatolia. See United States Naval Observatory, Astronomical Applications Department, sun and moon data for 18 October 1800: [http://aa.usno.navy.mil/data/docs/RS_OneDay.html](http://aa.usno.navy.mil/data/docs/RS_OneDay.html). The year 1800 is the earliest date for which the US navy has compiled the necessary data.
105 Mid-October sunset was approximately 5.15pm in northwest Anatolia. See [http://aa.usno.navy.mil/data/docs/RS_OneDay.html](http://aa.usno.navy.mil/data/docs/RS_OneDay.html).
around the site of modern Küplü. This equals a total day’s march of 18 kilometres over a mixture of even and undulating terrain with only one brief but narrow and steep descent.

Conrad had a choice of progressing along two slightly different routes towards modern Bozüyük on Day Four. The modern road continues southwards beside the Karasu. There would have been plenty of water and fodder along this direct stretch, but it is very narrow and winding in parts, which may have slowed down an army. This is one reason imperial forces marched from Küplü in a southwest direction towards Armenokastron by way of modern Sükraniye and Ahmetter; it is a much more open route and better suited for a marching army. Most likely Conrad’s guides advised the crusaders to load up with water at Küplü and led the army on the standard imperial route by way of Armenokastron where plenty of fodder could have been located. The crusaders therefore probably made camp on their fourth night around Armenokastron.

From Armenokastron, the path leads in a southeast direction through a verdant plain until it meets the Karasu where the valley becomes narrow at modern Karaköy. The crusaders may have decided to encamp by the water and pasture upon rejoining the Karasu, although it is too narrow here for an army to camp securely. Conrad probably followed the river as far modern Bozüyük. This would equal a march of approximately 18 kilometres over a mixture of even and gradually ascending terrain, and on a path which is only briefly narrow. The valley opens up at Bozüyük into a verdant region ideally suited for an army to encamp. An Ottoman army progressed from Armenokastron within a day and encamped here in the sixteenth century.

Conrad may have wished to continue beyond Bozüyük if there was plenty of daylight left. The route across the northwestern fringe of the undulating plain between Bozüyük and the next natural water course on Conrad’s route, the River Bathys at modern Inönü (measuring at approximately 16 kilometres from Bozüyük), is wide open. The hills between the two points are in general very low, albeit mainly with a gradual incline, and well suited for a marching army. A combined force could easily reach the Bathys from Bozüyük in half a day, given adequate rest and supplies. The terrain immediately beyond Bozüyük, though, becomes steppe-like in character away from watercourses and presumably Conrad’s guides informed

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106 An army would have to cross a number of watercourses en route to Bozüyük, including the Karasu. As previously mentioned, however, there is no evidence suggesting that the need to cross watercourses or the narrow stretches on this route delayed each day’s progress unduly. For detailed descriptions of this stretch of route in the sixteenth century, see Lefort, ‘Les Miniatures’, p.104; Grélois, ‘Hans Dernschwam’, pp.127-33.

107 The existence of a Turkish settlement at Bozüyük may have influenced a decision to camp there. See Lefort, ‘Les Miniatures’, p.104.

108 For a description of this stretch of route in the sixteenth century, see Lefort, ‘Les Miniatures’, p.104. For a more recent description of this route, see Admiralty, *Asia Minor* 2, pp.318-19.
him of this. There is no source evidence suggesting that heavy autumn rains had provided impetus for plant regrowth. The grasslands between Bozüyük and the Bathys were presumably burnt off after a typically dry and hot summer here. If Conrad had already marched 18 kilometres from Armenokastron to Bozüyük, where water and pasture were locatable, he would have been extremely foolhardy to continue that same day to the Bathys: the army would have found itself pitching camp before sunset in an area with no water or fodder for the sake of losing an hour or two’s marching time. We can therefore be fairly certain that Conrad made camp at Bozüyük at the end of Day Five.

If we accept the present writer’s approximate camp locations, it would mean that the crusaders had progressed thus far through verdant land along a mixture of narrow and open, flat and undulating terrain for five days since leaving Nikaia. This is reflected in the average rate of march per day, which equates to 20 kilometres, and equates approximately to the average rates of march throughout recorded history for most combined forces accompanied by a baggage train.

Conrad would have struck camp for the Bathys the next morning, and reached the river around the site of modern Inönü before noon on Day Six from Nikaia. Given his desire to reach Ikonion quickly, and that the route from Inönü to Dorylaion traverses the open, verdant terrain by the Bathys until it reaches Dorylaion, Conrad presumably continued towards the ruins of the former city. Even if the last noble contingents did not set off from Inönü until the early afternoon, they could continue marching along an open and predominantly flat and dry route for perhaps another two or three hours, say a further eight to ten kilometres. This equates to a day’s march of approximately 24-6 kilometres in conditions well suited for the passage of large armies. A march of around 25 kilometres is only slightly more than the comparable armies in 1097 attained from Lefke to Nikaia, and is a little less than the highest rates achieved by the armies of the First Crusade in Europe and premodern armies in Asia

109 Admiralty, Asia Minor 3, p.54. I have found no evidence suggesting that the twelfth-century Anatolian climate was markedly different from that of today. For the three summer months leading up to the beginning of autumn in October, the average daily temperature is 28 degrees celsius with only 13 mm of water for Eskişehir (medieval Dorylaion). In October, the average temperature drops to 19 degrees celsius and the rainfall increases dramatically to 28 mm. There is no source evidence suggesting that Conrad encountered extreme heat or heavy rainfall. The temperature had presumably dropped with the onset of autumn, but the rains had not begun or at least were not considered exceptional. See http://uk.weather.com/weather/climatology/TUXX0040.

110 Haldon, Warfare, p.165.

111 The Byzantine emperor Nikephoros II Phokas considered a march of around 24 kilometres to be tiring for both men and horses. Phokas, however, is referring to the mountainous and broken terrain of the Taurus and Anti-Taurus mountain ranges. McGeer, Sowing the Dragon’s Teeth, pp.340-1. As Haldon has pointed out, horses can easily progress at rates both quicker and further than this. Phokas must be referring to horses that are carrying more than their rider. Haldon, ‘Organisation and Support’, pp.111-51.
Minor. A marching distance of around 25 kilometres, whilst undoubtedly tiring, is feasible and indeed likely given Conrad’s haste.

Day Seven from Nikaia probably witnessed the princely retinues advancing for around another 25 kilometres and reaching the plain of Dorylaion between the Bathys and Tembros rivers. This stretch of route is still wide, flat, and perfect for a marching army and Conrad is likely to have pushed on to take advantage of the abundant pasture and water. The princes probably intended to halt here awhile to rest their horses and beasts of burden and load up with water and fodder for their advance towards Nakoleia. Maintaining a typically standard, absolute average daily rate of progress of 22 kilometres per day, Conrad could have marched the 151 kilometres to Dorylaion in seven days. 112

The approximate distances marched per day are conjectural owing to the scant nature of the source evidence. Nevertheless, the same evidence provides us with topographical information regarding the terrifyingly remote and barren terrain the crusaders were confronted with when the decision was made to retreat. Stock translations were applied to the pertinent Latin words and phrases which created this image of a grim terrain so as not to prejudice the evidence. But it is inescapable that those modern scholars who have translated a small number of the texts into English, have translated desertum and loca deserta, for example, as ‘desert’, and it does appear that the terrain the chroniclers had in mind when they used such words was indeed a desert-like environment, as in a vast, desolate and barren landscape.

If the descriptions of this terrain were confined to only one or two texts, or even if they were far removed in time and space from the events they relate, one could reasonably reject them as being the result of an individual’s embellished lament of the hardships endured on crusade, or as the product of expressed grievances snowballing beyond recognition. However, the texts are relatively numerous, largely contemporaneous with the Second Crusade, and originate from as far afield as England, Italy and Syria, which lessens the likelihood that they originate from a few initial sources. Regardless of any source partiality and textual inaccuracies which may be evident in the texts, the accounts of the surviving crusaders were quickly disseminated throughout the crusading world and they all told a similar story: whilst marching in Anatolia, they ultimately advanced into an immense, empty and arid desert environment reminiscent of the landscape beyond Dorylaion in the month of October.

The depiction of a desert topography contrasts sharply with the image of the route through Dorylaion as discussed above and as reflected in the Greek sources relating to the rebuilding

of the city in 1175. Even allowing for a certain amount of hyperbole owing to the panegyritical
nature of the Greek texts, it is clear that what is meant in them as the plain of Dorylaion,
namely, the region between the rivers Bathys and Tembros and the course of the Byzantine
road, was a perennially fertile and habitable region in the twelfth century. The Dorylaion as
understood by twelfth-century learned Byzantines – including John Kinnamos and Niketas
Choniates – evidently was not the same place as that where the crusaders ceased to advance.

The two hypotheses offered in this chapter therefore complement each other. The crusade
sources prove the army’s advance was arrested somewhere other than Dorylaion, and a
projection of the daily camp locations, based on accepted rates of march and the security and
foraging requirements of an encamped force, demonstrates that the noble contingents
probably reached Dorylaion in seven days, although the sources show they advanced for a
total of ten days before turning back to Nikaia. Importantly, a day’s march beyond the former
Byzantine aplekton would have found the advanced contingents entering the very same arid
landscape which the sources say they encountered. The conventional notion that Conrad III
turned back on the plain of Dorylaion, based on an erroneous reading of the geographical data
found in the Greek histories of John Kinnamos and Niketas Choniates, is no longer tenable.
17. Reasons for the Army’s Retreat

The older Second Crusade historiography maintains that German indiscipline led to devastating losses in battle with Turkish forces and the defeat compelled the crusaders to retreat. More recently, scholars have largely agreed with their medieval counterparts in holding the Byzantines partly responsible for the crusaders’ privations. We must, however, attempt to reconstruct the developments which transpired over the last few days of the advance to determine the reasons the army turned back to Nikaia on October 26, 1147.¹ It is essential to discover: first, what the sources reveal about the physical condition of the army as it advanced beyond Dorylaion; second, the various decisive events which occurred immediately before the decision was made by a council to retreat; and last, the concerns of those crusaders ultimately making the executive decisions. It is the source testimony which sheds light on the deliberations of the princes’ council which illuminates their reasons for retreating. In an effort to agree with a post-Clausewitzian battle-centric hypothesis, Bernard Kugler interpreted the evidence in such a way as to set the council’s assembly immediately after the supposed defeat in battle. Revisiting the source testimonies paints a very different picture.

Crusader Debilitation

A recurrent theme evident throughout all the sources is that many crusaders suffered and died through starvation and dehydration in the hostile terrain beyond Dorylaion. William of Tyre, for example, wrote that ‘in the barren emptiness’ (*in solitudine sterili*), the crusaders were ‘worried by the failure of the provisions, – for any kind of fodder for the pack animals, as well as any kind of food for the people, had entirely failed.’² The Würzburg annalist, upon painting a grim picture of the terrain the crusaders ultimately reached, noted that:

‘when the provisions they had prepared for themselves beforehand began to fail, their spirit, as it has been written, gradually melted away in their misfortunes. Yet they kept going, helped more by hope than by physical strength. First one group, then another was succumbing to starvation, and people as well as pack animals began to die without intermission.’³

Similar independent accounts of crusaders starving to death in a hostile landscape are found in Arnold of Lübeck’s *Chronica Slavorum*, John of Salisbury’s *Historia Pontificalis*, the

¹ *Konrad*, pp.634-5.
³ ‘*tandem deficientibus cibariis que sibi preparaverant, anima eorum, ut scriptum est, paulatim in malis thabescebat. Progregdeiabantur tamen spe potuis adiuti quam virium robore; et modo illis modo istis fame deficientibus, moriebantur tam homines quam iumenta sine intermissione*. ‘*Annales Herbipolenses*, p.5.
Casus Monasterii Petrishusensis, the Pöhlder Annals and the Notae Pisanae. Indeed, the contemporary Annales Rodenses state that the greatest part of the army died through hunger. King Conrad himself advised Louis VII of France not to advance eastwards on the same route he had used because the Germans had been ‘conquered by hunger’ (victus fame). Helmold of Bosau, Gerhoh of Reichersburg, Michael the Syrian and the contemporary Annales Magdeburgenses add that many of the crusaders perished because they were unable to find food or water.

A lack of provisions clearly caused widespread starvation and dehydration throughout the host. We noted earlier that water and grazing would have been available as far as Dorylaion, although Conrad’s army was largely dependent on baggage supplies only. Why did this logistical necessity fail the crusade? Both Odo of Deuil and William of Tyre suggested that the army’s guides purposely instructed the crusaders to carry fewer victuals than they actually needed for the duration of the march on Ikonion. The provisions were therefore naturally consumed before the army reached the Seljuk capital. Odo’s and William’s accusation of Byzantine deceit is not found in Conrad’s letter to Abbot Wibald. As nominal leader of the crusade, Conrad could easily have levelled similar charges against the Byzantine guides to deflect any potential blame for the provisioning failure. Instead, rather than suggesting that the army was instructed to convey fewer supplies than were actually needed to reach Ikonion, he ambiguously declared that the crusaders marched towards the Seljuk capital ‘carrying as many necessities as we could’. Considering the known problems with provisioning the whole force for the duration of the advance to Ikonion, presumably Conrad is implying that the noble retinues carried as many provisions as they could on the available horses and beasts of burden, and/or perhaps, all the supplies they could procure. Given that individuals were responsible for their own and their dependants’ provisioning arrangements, the poorest crusaders, many of whom were probably dependent entirely on others by the time the crusade arrived at Nikaia, would have had to acquire whatever provisions they could by any means possible. Foraging was perhaps a possibility in Bithynia and around Nikaia, and some

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6 Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, p.104.
7 Michael the Syrian, Chronicle, p.276; Michael’s factual detail here is repeated by Bar Hebraeus, Political History, p.274; Gerhoh of Reichersberg, ‘De Investigatione’, p.375; Helmold of Bosau, ‘Chronica Slavorum’, p.117; ‘Annales Magdeburgenses’, p.188.
8 See above p.164.
11 See above chapter 14.
crusaders may have acquired provisions by pillaging. That many crusaders died through starvation proves that all these means of obtaining sustenance were not particularly successful, although many crusaders had succumbed to malnutrition before the army advanced from Nikaia.  

The poorest crusaders suffered first. The Würzburg annalist noted that as provisions were consumed, first one set of crusaders and pack animals began to die through starvation followed by other bands of people and their animals. These groups clearly did not include the surviving originator of the Würzburg account. As the bishops of Würzburg retained close relations with the Staufen during this period, it is reasonable to suggest that the originator of the Würzburg account formed part of a princely retinue, perhaps even part of the king’s contingent. It is unclear when the toil of the march and lack of provisions began to take their toll. Conrad stated that virtually all the provisions had run out after ten days of marching from Nikaia, whereas Odo of Deuil was informed that baggage supplies ran out after eight days. Whilst both time-frames may indicate when some of the army began to suffer because of insufficient provisions, we must recognise that these figures relate to the supplies of the noble retinues; clearly, many of the other crusaders had actually starved to death before this point. Conrad is evidently referring to the length of time his contingent was adequately sustained by baggage supplies. Presumably Odo conferred with other German nobles whose provisions were exhausted after eight days. Notwithstanding the tendency of the sources to focus on the noble elements in the army, the crusade texts still indicate that the dearth of victuals and the attendant crusader debility became manifest as the army advanced through arid and uninhabited terrain. Only the landscape immediately beyond the plain of Dorylaion can be described as barren and deserted, and a projected rate of march suggests it took the army eight days to reach such terrain. It seems, therefore, that after approximately eight days of continual marching from Nikaia, the majority of the crusade survivors recognised that the baggage supplies were insufficient and that many humans and beasts were dying through

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16 Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, p.90.  
18 See above pp.191-7.
starvation. Odo of Deuil’s statement that the baggage supplies lasted eight days is perhaps more than simple coincidence.

It should not be surprising that only now did the provisioning problems become widely apparent. The logistical and topographical impracticalities of attempting to reach Ikonion became manifest at this very juncture. There had been no opportunities to obtain supplies since Nikaia, nor forage, water or green fodder since Dorylaion. Moreover, there was no obvious location where these could be acquired. The horses should have rested for at least one complete day in the previous eight days, but Conrad continued pushing daily towards Dorylaion and, as a consequence of the lack of grain, grazing and rest, the exhausted horses and beasts of burden also suffered and died through their exertions. Those crusaders who had managed to acquire some provisions at Nikaia must still have been hungry. Many more must have been feeling the effects of malnutrition and starvation – never mind exhaustion through the previous toil. All were debilitated and disease was rife.

Gerhoh of Reichersburg brought out the crusaders’ acute sense of despair at this point. He wrote that:

‘While the army was making its way towards Iconium, it was overwhelmed by effort, hunger and thirst in the desert, in addition, almost everyone started to be seriously exhausted by dysentery; and physical labour was, of course, absolutely out of the question when people were so weakened. In consequence, the mob, overwhelmed by weakness, the hardship of their route, and the attendant lack of provisions, started to be devoured by death, with the result that every day large numbers fell to the ground, emaciated through hunger, disease and physical hardship.

Conrad and the noble contingents nevertheless decided to push on towards Ikonion. Gerhoh, for example, confirms that the army continued to advance into the desert and Turkish territory. The Würzburg annalist recorded that the army continued to march with little food and water for a further four days after the debilitated crusaders had entered the desert on the
borders of Seljuk Rûm. Odo of Deuil wrote that the army continued for a further three days once the food had run out. Odo and William of Tyre interpreted the princes’ decision to continue their advance as evidence of Byzantine perfidy. They suggest that once the provisions were consumed (within eight days according to Odo), Conrad was advised by his guides to continue through the desert for a further three days because the army would then arrive at Ikonion where supplies could be seized. Because the army did not reach Ikonion in eleven days, but possibly arrived somewhere near the deserted former Byzantine town of Nakoleia, Odo and William believed the guides purposely advised the princes to continue so that the army would meet its doom through starvation. Odo and William (or their sources of information) presumably arrived at this conclusion by an erroneous assumption. As the army turned back to Nikaia on the eleventh day, Odo and William wrongly assumed the princes were advised they would arrive at Ikonion in eleven days. Conrad, however, believed it took twenty days to reach Ikonion, not eleven, and so the guides did not offer such ‘perfidious advice’.

**The Byzantine Treaty with the Seljuk Turks**

The army encountered and was attacked by its Turkish enemy as it pushed on towards Ikonion. Manuel Komnenos concluded a peace treaty with the Seljuk Turks in the spring of 1147. Odo of Deuil was among the contemporaries who expressed their disgust at this perceived act of Christian treachery. As Odo reminded his readers, the emperor had previously written to Louis VII in response to a letter, now lost, which first alerted the emperor to the impending crusade. He advised the French king that he had recently won a great victory against the Turks and would accompany Louis ‘in order to fight the infidels’ *(ad debellandas gentes)*. Historians have defended Manuel’s treaty in a number of ways. The extent to which their arguments affect the scope of this thesis is twofold. Firstly, crusader indiscipline in the Byzantine European provinces provoked Manuel’s hostility towards Conrad and his army. The emperor, therefore, entered into an alliance with the Turks against the crusaders at some point in the peace negotiations with the Seljuk sultan, Mas‘ûd. Secondly, the treaty with the Seljuks gave Manuel the means to destroy the crusade, thus

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26 Odo of Deuil, *De Profectione*, p.90.
28 See appendix 1.
defending Byzantine interests. Modern crusade scholars have effectively concurred with their medieval counterparts in a convention stemming back to the beginning of the twelfth century, namely, that Turkish attacks on crusaders were to be blamed on the perfidious imperial scapegoat (or, according to a different point of view, the sagacious imperial politician). After all, as Odo asserted, ‘the general opinion of the Byzantines is that anything done on account of the holy empire cannot be considered perjury’.

As we saw in part II, the conventional notion that the German crusaders were unusually indisciplined in Europe and outside Constantinople does not hold up under close scrutiny. Moreover, Manuel’s treaty with Mas’ûd was eventually concluded in the spring of 1147, but the German crusaders did not enter Byzantine territory until around July 20. We may dismiss the notion that German behaviour influenced the treaty.

Is there any tangible, unequivocal evidence proving that Manuel made peace to facilitate the destruction of the crusade? The emperor undertook a punitive expedition against Ikonion in the spring and summer of 1146 in retaliation for Turkish incursions into Byzantine territory and the seizure of Prakana (west of modern Silifke). Manuel set fire to Philomelion, devastated the outskirts of Ikonion and engaged in many skirmishes with Turkish warriors. The Turks opened peace negotiations although their initial overtures were ignored. Manuel apparently informed Mas’ûd that he would return the following spring for satisfaction. In August 1146, Manuel replied to Louis VII’s lost letter, which the emperor presumably received shortly before his reply. Manuel again received peace envoys from Mas’ûd at the spring imperial muster at Lopadion in 1147. All we know of the subsequent negotiations is that Mas’ûd agreed to return a number of Byzantine possessions to the emperor. According to Kinnamos, Manuel then returned to Constantinople satisfied with this proposal.

By the spring of 1147, therefore, the emperor was aware of the impending crusade and probably similar information had reached Mas’ûd. Both would want peace at this juncture and undoubtedly the threat of the crusades to the security of Constantinople and Ikonion influenced the peace agreement, but this does not prove that Manuel acted against the

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32 See, for example, Runciman, History, II, pp.274-7; Phillips, Defenders, pp.89-90; Angold, Byzantine Empire, p.199; Harris, Byzantium, pp.99-100.
33 For an example from the beginning of the twelfth century, see Ekkehard of Aura, ‘Hierosolymita’, pp.37-8. For examples of similar accusations after the Second Crusade, see, Michael the Syrian, Chronicle, p.275; Tritton, ‘The First and Second Crusades’, p.298. For examples of similar accusations by modern scholars, see, Lilie, Byzantium, pp.158-62; Phillips, Defenders, pp.89-90; Harris, Byzantium, pp.93-101; Angold, The Byzantine Empire, p.199.
34 ‘Generalis est enim eorum sententia non imputari periurium quod fit propter sacrum imperium’, Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, p.56.
35 Bernhardi, Konrad, pp.606-7.
36 John Kinnamos, Deeds, pp.39-56; Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, pp.31-2; Michael the Syrian, Chronicle, p.275.
37 John Kinnamos, Deeds, p.58.
crusaders. When the emperor received the first Seljuk peace envoy, he could not have known of Louis VII’s decision to take the cross at Vézelay, 31 March 1146. The peace treaty with the Seljuk Turks in 1147 was therefore not engineered with the destruction of the crusade in mind. As Chalandon and Cahen noted, the signing of the treaty in 1147 was the conclusion of negotiations which had commenced before Manuel was even aware of the Second Crusade, and peace between the Byzantines and Seljuks was maintained when the crusaders had left Anatolia.

An alliance against the crusaders might have been formed at some point in the negotiations. Whilst (correctly) tending not overtly to accept prejudiced Latin accounts of Byzantine/Turkish collusion, historians hypothesising that the crusaders’ adversities stemmed from the policies pursued by the Byzantine emperor have pointed to an ostensibly objective Greek source as evidence that Manuel initiated Seljuk attacks. As we have argued earlier, however, Niketas Choniates is actually a very poor source for the events in Anatolia. His necessary dependence on oral evidence, which he himself describes as rumour collected some 55 years after the event, unduly distorts his evidence and no aspect of his relevant testimony is irrefutable. Moreover, we have seen how Choniates’ interpretation of divine providence influences his crusade narrative. This is nowhere more apparent than in the differences between the two drafts of his history. At the time of the composition of his brevior, or shorter first draft, which was completed before the Latin conquest of Constantinople in 1204, Choniates traced evidence of sinful Byzantine deeds which were causing God to withdraw His favour from His chosen Byzantine people. The auctior, or enlarged second draft (the text most accessible to modern historians), was completed in the years after the Latin seizure of Constantinople. In the latter draft, Choniates inserted statements among the original discourse to illuminate perceived Byzantine impiety or imperial tyranny. He aimed to emphasise the Byzantine wickedness which was ultimately responsible for the fall of the Queen of Cities, and thus effectively to demonstrate why God had favoured a barbarian people in 1204. Concerning the rumours that Manuel sabotaged the crusade, Choniates added in the auctior draft that the emperor ‘commanded others to inflict such harm’, and the historian is also keen

38 John Kinnamos’ and Michael the Syrian’s statements that Manuel knew of the crusade whilst on campaign in 1146 are erroneous. Chalandon suggested that Kinnamos confused this with the situation a year later when Manuel retired from Lopadion. John Kinnamos, Deeds, pp.43, 53; Michael the Syrian, Chronicle, p.275; Chalandon, Jean II Comnène, p.254. Conrad III did not take the cross until Christmas 1146.
39 Chalandon, Jean II Comnène, pp.248-57; Cahen, Formation of Turkey, pp.21-2.
40 See, for example, Lilie, Byzantium, pp.158-62; Phillips, Defenders, pp.89-90; Harris, Byzantium, pp.93-101; Angold, The Byzantine Empire, p.199.
41 Niketas Choniates, Historia, p.89; Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, p.39.
42 See above pp.158-9; Also see Roche, ‘Niketas Choniates’, (forthcoming).
43 See above pp.56, 60, 88.
to stress that such ‘sinful’ deeds ‘incensed the All-Seeing Eye’. Choniates’ testimony is therefore not an objective, reliable source. He searched for Byzantine causes behind God’s apparent change of favour, and was willing to insert deleterious evidence into his narrative which at best was based on distorted oral testimony.

It is perhaps worth noting that, although not always accurate, the Arabic sources dismiss the notion of Byzantine/Seljuk collusion. Ibn al-Qalānīsī suggested the Byzantines bowed to the will of the crusaders, and the contemporary Usámah Ibn Munqidh believed that the Byzantines and crusaders attacked Damascus in 1148. The claim Manuel incited the Seljuk Turks to attack the army is clearly problematic: the hypothesis cannot be reasonably substantiated.

Did Seljuk Turks or Autonomous Türkmens Attack the Army?

Masʾūd wished to see the crusade destroyed before it reached his capital; he did not need inciting to halt the advance. The evidence suggesting that Seljuk Turks attacked the crusaders is, however, somewhat questionable. An anonymous Syriac text composed around 1240 suggests Masʾūd attacked the army; the Würzburg Annals record that the sultan of Ikonion called on Muslim allies to stop the crusade; and William of Tyre notes that a certain Paramanus commanded the sultan’s troops. But how would individual crusaders – or, for that matter, William of Tyre writing in the 1180s or an anonymous source who wrote nearly a hundred years after the event – know the actual make-up of Turkish forces on the far flung western marches of the Turkish world in 1147? Turkish or crusader emissaries, scouts, spies and so on could have provided this information, but there is no echo of their doing so in the sources. Considerations on the composition of the force which attacked the crusaders were therefore probably based on presumptions, rather than on what the modern historian would consider dependable testimony.

Perhaps only the Byzantines would actually know who attacked the crusaders on the Byzantine/Turkish borders. The Byzantine guides accompanied the army for ten days from Nikaia, and possibly one of the guides left a first-hand account describing the clashes

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44 Niketas Choniates, *Historia*, pp.88-9; Niketas Choniates, *O City of Byzantium*, p.39. I am indebted to Alicia Simpson for this information. On the two drafts of Choniates’ history, see van Dieten’s editions of *Nicetae Choniatae historia*.
46 Compare with Chalandon, *Jean II Comnène*, p.287.
47 Tritton, ‘The First and Second Crusades’, p.298.
50 See below p.212.
between the crusaders and the Turks which Kinnamos and Choniates utilised. This is a realistic supposition, given the Greek historians’ usual sources of information.\(^{51}\) It is worth noting that Kinnamos’ and William of Tyre’s descriptions of the Turkish feigned retreats employed against the mounted crusaders are very similar.\(^{53}\) Had William’s source conversed with the Byzantine guides? If so, William’s suggestion the Seljuks led a combined force of many armies is valuable. The Greek texts, however, contradict the Latin and Syriac evidence here. Rather than giving the impression the crusaders were attacked by a formidable combined force of many armies, Kinnamos maintained that a small force attacked the crusaders.\(^{54}\) Kinnamos was likely to paint the bleakest picture of Latin martial skill and would perhaps naturally suggest a seemingly negligible force bettered the crusaders. His account, though, is not likely to be less coloured than the Latin or Syriac sources. With the gift of hindsight, the Würzburg annalist criticised the crusade, but both the anonymous Syriac source and William of Tyre largely admired the enterprise. Perhaps when attempting to explain the reason for Conrad’s retreat they were obliged to assume the crusaders encountered a large army under Seljuk command.\(^{55}\)

There is, therefore, no unequivocal evidence proving the Seljuks attacked the crusaders. Yet it is still possible to advance an hypothesis on who attacked the army in the light of other compelling evidence. Possibly an autonomous Türkmen warband was responsible for the assaults on Conrad’s force. Firstly, the heaviest concentration of Türkmens in the northwest was by the Bathys and Tembros rivers in the Dorylaion plain.\(^{56}\) During the autumn month of October, that is, the month Conrad advanced from Nikaia, the Türkmens and their flocks would have been encamped in their Dorylaion summer yayla. The Türkmens’ path of seasonal migration to lowland winter kişla must have taken them along the Karasu valley at least as far as the Armenokastron garrison, even if they were deterred from migrating beyond here. Significantly, therefore, Conrad passed through territory inhabited by the Türkmens. Secondly, whilst the Türkmens often formed the core of Seljuk armies, Türkmen history in Anatolia is characterised by independent actions and a predilection for autonomous martial

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\(^{52}\) See above pp.28-9. If, as Kugler maintained, the guides fled from the army before the combat he described, is it uncertain who else could have furnished a first-hand narrative of the clashes which Kinnamos and Choniates seemingly employed generations later. Kugler, *Studien*, pp.152-3.

\(^{53}\) See below pp.223-4.


\(^{55}\) William of Tyre’s note that a certain Paramanus led a Seljuk force is not helpful. Principal Seljuk emirs and chieftains of large Türkmen tribes living on the Byzantine borders were equally well known to their non-Turkish contemporaries. Vryonis, ‘Nomadization’, pp.43-71.

\(^{56}\) See above p.147.

activity in the form of raids. Lastly, the Seljuks did not necessarily control the Türkmens, and it is important to note here that neither did Manuel Komnenos. Türkmen raids actually increased during Manuel’s reign; he could often do little to control them.\footnote{58}{Vryonis, ‘Nomadization’, pp.45-6; Vryonis, Decline pp.166-7.}

Given the Türkmens’ predilection for performing self-determined actions, their appetite for martial activity, and the fact that the crusade advanced into Türkmen and not Seljuk territory, is it not possible that an autonomous Türkmen warband attacked the crusade? It had plenty of incentives to do so. Perhaps most significantly, an unknown force had invaded its territory with unknown aims. We hear of the Dorylaion Türkmens only when they clashed with imperial forces attempting to remove them from their yayla.\footnote{59}{As Spyros Vryonis suggested.} Niketas Choniates was correct in believing the Türkmens attacked the Byzantines in 1175 because the pastoral-nomads were in danger of losing their summer pastures.\footnote{60}{The crusaders in October 1147 would have met with a similar reception for exactly the same reasons.}

The Attacks on the Crusaders

The Damascene Ibn al-Qalānīsī, writing before 1160, noted that the Turks ‘assiduously launched raids upon their fringes. Death and slaughter counter-mingled with the Franks until a vast number of them perished, and their sufferings from lack of foodstuffs, forage and supplies, or the costliness of them if they were to be had at all, destroyed multitudes of them by hunger and disease.’\footnote{61}{Ibn al-Qalānīsī, The Damascus Chronicle, pp.280-82. Note: Ibn al-Qalānīsī does not differentiate between the German and French armies and his testimony is applicable to both. Abū Shāma appears to have copied his crusade testimony from Ibn al-Qalānīsī. Abū Shāma, ‘Book of the Two Gardens’, R. H. C. Or. 4 & 5 (Paris, 1898, repr. Farnborough, 1967), pp.3-322, 3-206, 4 pp.54-5. For the similar problems encountered by the French, see Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, pp.114-29.}

The Casus Monasterii Petrishusensis reads that while the crusaders ‘were proceeding through the desert and did not come upon food, many perished through hunger. Others were in difficulties from hunger and died either after they had been killed by the pagans or after they had been reduced to the condition of prisoners.’\footnote{62}{’per desertum pergerent et escas non invenirent, multi fame perierunt, alii inedia laborantes a paganis aut perempti, aut in captivitatem redacti disperierunt’. ‘Casus Monasterii Petrishusensis’, p.674}

Importantly, William of Newburgh noted that the crusaders fell to the swords of their Turkish enemy after the army had succumbed to famine.\footnote{63}{John of Salisbury was informed that ‘first they [the crusaders] were so tortured by starvation in the desert that many died, later they were finished

\footnote{58}{Vryonis, ‘Nomadization’, pp.45-6; Vryonis, Decline pp.166-7.}
\footnote{59}{See, for example, Ioannes Cinnamus, Rerum, pp.190-91, 295-96; John Kinnamos, Deeds, pp. 145, 220-22; Niketas Choniates, Historia, pp. 227-228; Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, pp.99-100.}
\footnote{60}{Niketas Choniates, Historia, pp. 227-228; Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, pp.99-100; Vryonis, ‘Nomadization’, pp.52-3.}
\footnote{61}{Ibn al-Qalānīsī, The Damascus Chronicle, pp.280-82. Note: Ibn al-Qalānīsī does not differentiate between the German and French armies and his testimony is applicable to both. Abū Shāma appears to have copied his crusade testimony from Ibn al-Qalānīsī. Abū Shāma, ‘Book of the Two Gardens’, R. H. C. Or. 4 & 5 (Paris, 1898, repr. Farnborough, 1967), pp.3-322, 3-206, 4 pp.54-5. For the similar problems encountered by the French, see Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, pp.114-29.}
\footnote{62}{’per desertum pergerent et escas non invenirent, multi fame perierunt, alii inedia laborantes a paganis aut perempti, aut in captivitatem redacti disperierunt’. ‘Casus Monasterii Petrishusensis’, p.674}
\footnote{63}{William of Newburgh, History, pp.93-5. William does not state specifically that Conrad’s army succumbed in this manner and his narrative echoes conditions which were common to both Conrad’s army and that of Louis VII of France.}
off by the pagans’.  

The Annals of Magdeburg record that in the uninhabited and pathless places, ‘nearly the whole army perished by famine and by thirst, as well as having been surrounded by pagans whom they call Turks. They were easily killed by arrows, without coming to a fight, because they had already been overwhelmed by toil, hunger and thirst.’ Helmold of Bosau recounted that ‘to such a degree did they waste away from hunger and thirst that they voluntarily proffered their necks to the barbarians who were assaulting them.’ An anonymous Syriac chronicle states that after the crusaders’ provisions had been consumed, the Turks ‘found them in the desert, exhausted with hunger and thirst, attacked and routed them.’ The contemporary annals of Romoaldus II, Archbishop of Salerno, likewise state that: ‘once the Turks had discovered this, they assaulted the Germans who had been weakened by hunger and the toil of the journey, putting many of them to the sword and reducing many to miserable slavery.’ The army was severely debilitated before it encountered the Turks, and if we are to believe the Würzburg annalist, Turkish forces reconnoitred the condition of the crusader army before carrying out their assaults.

Turkish forces took the opportunity to slaughter and capture the weaker crusaders as they became detached from the advancing noble contingents. Conrad himself wrote that after ten days of marching from Nikaia, ‘the Turks did not cease to attack and slaughter the unarmed mob which was unable to follow the army.’ The decision to retreat was made on the eleventh day and the flight back to Nikaia took seven or eight days. The Magdeburg annalist implies that the crusaders were ‘surrounded by pagans’ (a paganis...circumventi) for eighteen days. There is no other evidence suggesting that Turkish forces attacked the crusaders as soon as they left Nikaia. Nevertheless, what we do have indicates that the army was harassed for a prolonged period and that the harassment began before the retreat was announced. Eyewitnesses informed the Pöhlder annalist that for ‘fourteen continual days and nights...they held out against the enemy with scarcely believable effort’. The suggestion

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64 ‘primo in desertis locis inedia macerati sunt et plurimi perirent, deinde confecti a paganis’, John of Salisbury, Historia Pontificalis, p.54.
65 ‘fame ac siti pene omnis multitudo interit, insuper a paganis qui dicuntur Turci circumventi, facile sine congressione, utpote labore fame sitique confecti, sagittis interimebantur’, ‘Annales Magdeburgenses’, p.188.
68 ‘Turchi autem hoc comperto...et debilitatos fame et labore itineris Theotonicos expugnaverunt, multos eorum in more gladii trucidantes, multos in servitutem miseram redigentes.’ ‘Romoaldi Annales’, p.424.
70 ‘cum Turci pedestre vulgus, quod exercitum sequi nequiebat, invadere et caedere non cessabant.’ Conrad III, Die Urkunden, p.354.
71 See above pp.191-2.
72 ‘a paganis qui dicuntur Turci circumventi’, ‘Annales Magdeburgenses’, p.188.
again is that the army was harassed over a prolonged period, in this case, fourteen days. Yet it took Conrad seven or eight days to get back to Nikaia. Similarly, the Pantheon of Gottfried of Viterbo reads that Conrad wore armour for ten days owing to the Turkish attacks.\(^{74}\) Given that the retreat and pursuit lasted around seven days, this again suggests the army endured recurring Turkish assaults before the decision was made to retreat. This is confirmed by Gerhoh of Reichersburg. He wrote that one reason the crusaders turned around was because ‘the [Turkish] archers repeatedly harassed them from every direction day and night at recurrent intervals.’\(^{75}\) The army was clearly under attack for a number of days before it turned around.

Taking the Pöhlder annalist’s figure of fourteen days as the total length of time the army may have endured the Turkish attacks, we might speculate that the crusaders had advanced for three or four days from Nikaia before the first assault. According to our projected rate of march, the initial encounter would therefore have taken place somewhere near the Karasu valley between modern Gülübe and Pazaryeri.\(^{76}\) The Byzantines could often do little to stop the frequent movements of the Türkmen tribes, and a Turkish force could theoretically have penetrated the Karasu Valley to attack the crusade. However, the Türkmens had been dispersed from this region, and their warbands were almost certainly deterred from raiding far up the Karasu Valley by the recent refortification and regarrisoning of Malagina and Pithekas and the Byzantine occupation of Armenokastron.\(^{77}\) Perhaps we should look elsewhere to find where the army first encountered the Turkish forces.

The Gottfried of Viterbo’s Pantheon states that Conrad wore armour for ten days because of the Turkish attacks, yet we know it took him seven or eight days to get back to Nikaia whilst being harassed by Turkish forces. This suggests that the noble retinues continued to advance for two or three days under attack before Conrad turned around on the eleventh day. Put another way, the army had marched for seven or eight continuous days before the leading contingents first encountered the Turkish forces.\(^{78}\) When this time-frame is juxtaposed to our projected rate of march, it indicates that the princes initially encountered their Turkish enemy somewhere within a day’s march of Dorylaion, that is, the Türkmen yayla.

\(^{75}\) ‘sagittariis eos undique per circuitum die noctuque infestantibus.’ Gerhoh of Reichersburg, ‘De Investigatione’, pp.375-6.
\(^{76}\) See below, map no.3.
\(^{78}\) I have purposely avoided using the term ‘vanguard’ to refer to the leading contingents. The term would suggest that the army consisted of a van, middle and rearguard, which at this point does not appear to be the case.
This is confirmed by John Kinnamos and Niketas Choniates. The Greek historians may have merely believed there was inevitably a clash near the fondly remembered city of Dorylaion because the area became synonymous with a Turkish presence.\textsuperscript{79} For all the faults with the Greek sources, however, it is possible that a Byzantine guide left a record of the clashes for the reason mentioned above.\textsuperscript{80} Choniates tells us very little regarding the Turkish attack beside the River Bathys.\textsuperscript{81} John Kinnamos on the other hand describes the encounter at Dorylaion, but taken on its own, his testimony is ambiguous here. He describes the clashes between the Turks and German crusaders,\textsuperscript{82} then discusses Louis VII of France’s stay in Constantinople and the French king’s crossing into Asia Minor, before writing, ‘Meanwhile, as mentioned above, the Germans had frequently been repulsed by the Turks and lost many of their men; now despairing of passage through Philomelion, they withdrew.’\textsuperscript{83} How should we interpret this? It does not convey a sense that the Turks had inflicted serious losses in a set-piece action. Does it suggest that around the time Louis was crossing into Asia Minor, the Turks were frequently attacking Conrad’s army and that he turned back because of the losses incurred? If so, Kinnamos is informing us that the Turks clashed with the crusaders at Dorylaion, and that the army continued to be harassed, presumably as it advanced. This may be stretching the nuances of the language too far, but the army did march beyond Dorylaion, and the advancing, debilitated army was harassed for a number of days before the retreat was called. The action described by Kinnamos is therefore not a set-piece action, as Bernard Kugler interpreted it, but perhaps the first occasion of a Turkish attack on the crusaders at Dorylaion. As the leading contingents advanced through the Türkmen’s yayla, the lightly-armed mounted Türkmen archers took the opportunity to slaughter, capture slaves and plunder the weaker, defenceless crusaders in the twin pursuits of jihād and booty.

Similar incentives impelled the Türkmens to continue attacking the princely retinues. While we must exercise caution when stressing the Türkmens’ commitment to jihād at this juncture, it should be noted that baggage trains often proved irresistible targets for plunder. Second Crusade sources offer plenty of contemporary evidence of the usual contents of baggage trains. For example, Pope Eugenius III wrote to Louis VII of France urging the king to restrict his men to take only arms, horses and other martial equipment on the expedition rather than the usual fine clothing and other things of luxurious pleasure. Not everyone

\textsuperscript{79} See Appendix 2.
\textsuperscript{80} See above p.206.
\textsuperscript{81} Niketas Choniates, Historia, p.89; Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, p.39.
\textsuperscript{82} For the clashes between the Turks and crusaders, see below chapter 18.
\textsuperscript{83} Ioannes Cinnamus, Rerum, pp.81-4; Kinnamos, Deeds, pp.86-90.
complied with these instructions, however.\footnote{84 ‘Epistola Eugenii ad Ludovicum’, \textit{R. H. G. F.}, 15 p.430 (Paris, 1878, repr. Farnborough, 1968); Odo of Deuil, \textit{De Profectione} p.94.} Odo of Deuil suggested the loss of pack animals in Anatolia enriched the local Greek inhabitants with gold, silver, arms and garments, and he even described his fellow noble crusaders as impoverished following the Turkish attack on the French baggage train on Mount Kadmos. He also tells of other soldiers bewailing their lost possessions. It is no surprise that baggage trains carrying such movable forms of wealth attracted hostile attention. This partly explains why Louis VII eventually instructed his army to adopt Templar discipline on the march, procedures that resembled Vegetius’ instructions for protecting baggage trains.\footnote{85 Odo of Deuil, \textit{De Profectione}, pp.99, 104, 122-7; Flavius Vegetius Renatus, \textit{Epitoma Rei Militaris} ed. & trans. L. Stelten (New York, 1990) p.143.} William of Tyre’s description of the plundered contents of the German baggage train, which included treasures and arms, suggests that this too was an obvious target. Michael the Syrian noted that the plunder taken was distributed far and wide, and the anonymous Syriac source believed the Turks grew rich because of the pillaged booty.\footnote{86 William of Tyre, \textit{Willelmi Tyrensis archiepiscopi chronicon}, XVI.22 p.747; Michael the Syrian, \textit{Chronicle}, p.276; Tritton, ‘The First and Second Crusades’, p.298.} The many captives taken were also valuable commodities which could be sold as slaves throughout the East.\footnote{87 Taylor, ‘A New Syriac Fragment’, pp.120-30; ‘Annales Palidenses’, pp.82-3; William of Newburgh, \textit{History}, p.93; ‘Romoaldi Annales’, p.424; ‘Casus Monasterii Petrishusensis’, p.674. In 1159, Nur ad-Din apparently released thousands of captives (presumably slaves) taken from the French and German armies in Anatolia. Kinnamos, \textit{Deeds}, pp.143-4.} The many captives taken were also valuable commodities which could be sold as slaves throughout the East.\footnote{88 Odo of Deuil, \textit{De Profectione}, pp.90-3.} The Byzantine Guides

Odo of Deuil tells us that the crusaders’ provisions were exhausted after the army had advanced for eight days from Nikaia. Conrad then continued to advance from ‘morrow to morrow until the third day’ (\textit{de crastino in crastinum usque in tertium}). The army’s guides fled the crusader camp the previous evening, that is, during the tenth night.\footnote{89 Michael the Syrian, \textit{Chronicle}, pp.276; William of Tyre, \textit{Willelmi Tyrensis archiepiscopi chronicon}, XVI.21, p.745; Gerhoh of Reichersberg, ‘De Investigatione’, p.375; ‘Annales Magdeburgenses’, p.188; ‘Annales Rodenses’, p.719; Helmold of Bosau, ‘Chronica Slavorum’, p.117; Gottfried of Viterbo, ‘Pantheon’, pp.263-4; Taylor, ‘A New Syriac Fragment’, pp.120-30; Tritton, ‘The First and Second Crusades’, pp.69-102, 273-306.} The guides’ abandonment of the crusaders in the deserts of Anatolia is testified in a number of texts, and many contemporaries saw the act as further evidence of Byzantine treachery. The sources suggest that the guides purposely led the crusaders away from the correct route to Ikonion and into a pathless, barren wilderness to meet their doom before the guides made good their escape.\footnote{88 Odo of Deuil, \textit{De Profectione}, pp.90-3.}
As previously noted, that the Byzantine guides purposely led the army away from the correct road to Ikonion has long been recognised as dubious. But why did the surviving crusaders judge they were treacherously led on a pathless route into the deserts of Anatolia? Even though the Roman road network was dilapidated, and only two imperial armies had advanced along the crusaders’ route in twelfth century (before the crusade), Manuel Komnenos had dispersed the tribes of Türkmen from the Sangarios and Karasu valleys when refortifying Malagina and Pithekas circa 1145. The route of communication between these forts was therefore presumably well marked, having been utilised by both Byzantines and Turks in the years immediately before the Second Crusade. Indeed, the path as far as Dorylaion was frequently used owing to the seasonal migrations of the Dorylaion/Karasu Türkmen. We can be fairly certain that the road between Malagina and Dorylaion, which follows a natural route of communication, was reasonably defined through regular use if not maintenance in the mid twelfth century. This terrain, then, was not ‘pathless’ (avius).

Immediately beyond the plain of Dorylaion, however, the crusaders’ route – at least as far Kedrea – passed through a largely desolate and uninhabited landscape. There is no evidence of trade between Turkish Kedrea and, say, Byzantine Bithynia, which would have passed through Dorylaion. The plain was approached from the plateau by three ancient, decayed and (after Mantzikert) long abandoned roads, including the path from Kedrea. The migrating Türkmen tribes presumably followed similar routes to the plain. It is unclear when the first migrations to Dorylaion took place and the number of nomads who settled around Dorylaion and the Karasu Valley is unknown. The Türkmen were nevertheless well established around Dorylaion in the mid-twelfth century, although their numbers were never great. It is therefore unlikely that visible traces of the movement from the plateau along the alternative routes to Dorylaion existed at the time of the Second Crusade.

The army marched via a natural route of communication as far as Dorylaion, but thereafter embarked on an unmarked path across the plateau towards Ikonion. Conrad intended to take the shortest route from Nikaia to Ikonion, and he was well aware the army would

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90 See above p.179.
91 See above pp.183-4. The Würzburg annalist, however, has Manuel Komnenos informing Conrad that both he and his father John II Komnenos had often taken the same route as Conrad. ‘Annales Herbipolenses’, p.4.
92 See, for example, ‘Annales Magdeburgenses’, p.188.
93 See above pp.98-9, 136; and below, map no.5.
94 Belke & Mersich, Phrygien, pp.140-6, 150-2.
necessarily advance into the barren, steppe-like terrain after Dorylaion.\textsuperscript{97} Indeed, Manuel Komnenos attempted to dissuade Conrad from embarking on this route but, after consulting his fellow princes, Conrad informed Manuel that:

‘we have decided to endure this toil willingly by sea and land, and through all the dangers of the earth…we shall proceed with our intention…and we shall fight against the barbarian nations. Your task is to show the way to Ikonion and assign someone from your people to lead us even through trackless places which are little known to us’.\textsuperscript{98}

Conrad and those immediately around him knew they would be advancing into uninhabited and trackless enemy terrain and not surprisingly requested guides. The majority of the crusaders whose experiences are recorded in the bulk of the sources, however, were evidently ignorant of this.

The flight of the Byzantine guides from the crusader camp appeared to confirm their treachery. William of Tyre believed the guides returned to Constantinople and informed Louis VII of France that Conrad had not only reached Ikonion, but had razed it to the ground. William suggests the guides lied either to induce Louis to quickly follow Conrad to his death or persuade him not to rush to assist Conrad’s debilitated army, and adds that the guides possibly invented the lie concerning Conrad’s victory as they might otherwise have been seized as traitors if they reported the army had succumbed to starvation and Turkish attacks.\textsuperscript{99}

Historians have rejected William’s accusations, although quite reasonably they have long agreed with him that the guides fled the crusader camp in fear for their personal safety.\textsuperscript{100} We can now also add that the guides might have made good their escape because they recognised that the princes’ determination to continue advancing towards Ikonion was a fatally reckless decision. As we will see, the flight of the guides was the catalyst which led to the decision by a council of princes to retreat.

The Council of Princes

Bernard Kugler maintained that a council of princes was convened because the crusaders had suffered a heavy defeat in a set-piece battle with Turkish forces, and he cites Odo of Deuil

\textsuperscript{97} Both William of Tyre and the Pöhlder annalist, for example, note that Conrad was aware of the hostile nature of this route. William of Tyre, \textit{Willelmi Tyrensii archiepiscopi chronicon}, XVI.20, pp.743-4; ‘Annales Palidenses’, pp.82-3.

\textsuperscript{98} ‘\textit{hunc voluntarium laborem decrevimus subire, per mare per terras per cuncta pericula mundi…proposition nostrum pergermus…contra barbaros nationes pugnabimus. Tuum est, ut que via Iconion ducat ostendas, assignans aliquem tuorum, qui nos precedat et per invia que nobis minus cognita sunt’’. ‘Annales Herbipolenses’, p.5.

\textsuperscript{99} William of Tyre, \textit{Willelmi Tyrensii archiepiscopi chronicon}, XVI.20-1, pp.744-6. These accusations echo Odo of Deuil’s allegation that the Greeks incited the French army to cross the Bosphoros with stories of startling German success at Ikonion. Odo of Deuil, \textit{De Profectione}, p.72.

\textsuperscript{100} See, for example, Bernhardi, Konrad, pp.631-2; Chalandon, \textit{Jean II Comnène}, p.258; Runciman, \textit{History}, 2, pp.274-7.
and Conrad as evidence.\textsuperscript{101} Odo noted that the Turks first appeared on the morning after the guides had fled the crusader camp. ‘These facts were made known to the emperor’ (\textit{fiunt haec nota imperatori}) and,

‘therefore, at that point in time, he consulted the members of council, but he did so tardily, because they had to choose, not good from evil, but the lesser of two evils. They had to advance or retreat, but hunger and the enemy and the unfamiliar maze of mountains made advance impossible, while hunger and fear of scandal made retreat equally impossible.’\textsuperscript{102}

We are then told that the decision was made to retreat and, contrary to all other sources, that the Turks only then began attacking the crusaders as they withdrew. This seemingly contradictory evidence does not cause a problem. In fact, it allows us to place Odo’s testimony regarding the attacks within a chronological sequence. Odo evidently spoke to survivors of the crusade who were not attacked until at least the eleventh day, that is, the day after the guides had fled from the crusader camp and the same day the army turned back to Nikaia. His is therefore valuable evidence for the nature of the Turkish attacks whilst the army retreated. Importantly, according to Odo, the council was held on the eleventh day owing to the Turkish presence and the fear of continuing to advance without guides whilst the army was stricken by starvation. There is no indication that the council was called because the army had suffered a heavy defeat in battle.

We have already seen that Kugler interpreted Conrad’s testimony in a somewhat tendentious fashion. The king informed Abbot Wibald that the army had advanced for a total of ten days from Nikaia before he received the advice of all his princes and barons (\textit{principum omnium et baronum}) and decided to retreat. There is no mention of severe losses in a set-piece encounter. The princes called the retreat because the Turks were slaughtering those crusaders who could not maintain the same pace as the noble retinues, and because the army’s supplies were mostly exhausted. Furthermore, they did not wish to continue advancing into unknown, uninhabited land, but rather they wanted to retreat so that the army might recover.\textsuperscript{103}

There is additional testimony omitted by Kugler which illuminates why the executive decision was made to retreat. We know Gerhoh of Reichersberg relates that as the crusaders advanced through the desert many died ‘emaciated through hunger, disease and physical hardship,’ and that the Turkish archers ‘repeatedly harassed them from every direction day

\begin{footnotes}
\item[102] ‘Consulit itaque in illo articulo sapientes suos, sed tarde, quia non erant de malo bonum sed de malis levius electuri. Procedendum erat vel recedendum, sed processum fames prohibebat et hostis et incognita montium labyrinthus, recessum aequae fames et opprobrii metus.’ Odo of Deuil, \textit{De Profectione}, p.92.
\item[103] See above pp.172-3, 177; Conrad III, \textit{Die Urkunden}, p.354.
\end{footnotes}
and night at recurrent intervals.¹⁰⁴ As will become apparent in the following chapter, the weakened crusaders were unable to combat the harassing tactics of the mounted Turkish archers. ‘Whereupon’, Gerhoh writes, ‘immediately after council, our king, with the army, turned away from them [the Turks] and returned via the route he had taken through the desert’.¹⁰⁵

William of Tyre noted that whilst the crusaders were in the unknown desert terrain and concerned about their lack of provisions, ‘the emperor, seeing that the army was without guides, called a meeting of all the princes to consider what course needed to be taken.’¹⁰⁶ Unlike Gerhoh of Reichersberg, Odo of Deuil and Conrad III, William of Tyre does not mention a Turkish presence initially influencing the council’s deliberations. William gives the impression that the Turks first appeared around the time the council was being held. ‘While thus’ (Dumque sic), he writes, ‘it was reported…that the ranks were taking up their position in the neighbourhood of the enemy, and an innumerable multitude of Turks had arrived.’¹⁰⁷ He notes further that at that time ‘the emperor’s army was suffering thus because of hunger, ignorance of the country, the length of time it had been suffering, the difficulties of the roads, the weakness of the horses and the burden of baggage’. Meanwhile, ‘Turkish satraps and officers of various ranks, first of all summoned their reserve forces, and then made a sudden attack (irruunt repente) on their camp.’¹⁰⁸ William then describes the ensuing conflict. We are presented with an image of Turkish horsemen loosing arrows into the crusader camp, and using their mobility to employ the feigned retreat against weak, pursuing crusaders unsuccessfully attempting to close in on their opponents. Both Gerhoh of Reichersberg and John Kinnamos paint comparable pictures of Turkish attacks on the

¹⁰⁵ ‘Unde ex consilio rex noster cum exercitu divertit ab eis…ierat viam per desertum repedando’. Gerhoh of Reichersberg, ‘De Investigatione’, p.375.
¹⁰⁶ ‘Videns igitur imperator ducibus itineris destitutum exercitum, convocato universorum principum cetu quid facto opus sit deliberat.’ William of Tyre, Willelmi Tyrensis archiepiscopi chronicon, XVI.21, p.745.
¹⁰⁷ nuntiatur,…in vicino hostium consistere acies et Turcorum innumeram adesse multitudinem. William of Tyre, Willelmi Tyrensis archiepiscopi chronicon, XVI.21, p.745.
¹⁰⁸ ‘fame et locorum ignorantia, laboris quoque diuturnitate, difficultate viarum, equorum defectu, sarcinarum pondere domini imperatoris laboraret exercitus. Turcorum satrape et diversi generis magistratus, convocatis prius ad idipsum militarius auxilis, repente super eorum castra hostiliter irruunt’ William of Tyre, Willelmi Tyrensis archiepiscopi chronicon, XVI.22, p.746. Magistratus is a peculiar term to use. Magistratus in Medieval Latin frequently refers to monks in charge of novices. Perhaps William was attempting to show that the Turkish forces had a structured military hierarchy, but did not know any contemporary terms that would designate soldiers who were not in overall command, yet were still in charge of others. ‘Officers of various ranks’ seems to be the best translation. I am indebted to Peter Maxwell-Stuart for this suggestion.
William’s suggestion that there was a sudden attack on the crusader camp is probably the basis of Virgina Berry’s slight alteration to Kugler’s interpretation. Rather than agreeing exactly with Kugler, Berry asserted that the crusaders were defeated in another form of set-piece action, namely, a surprise attack. William’s suggestion that there was a sudden attack does not mean there was an ambush or even a surprise attack. William tends to describe such an assault as ‘insidiae’. For example, see Willelmi Tyrensis archiepiscopi chronicon, XI.19. pp.523-5.
advancing army. Possibly William had heard of similar Turkish tactics employed against the marching column, but he presents the events as occurring on only one particular day.\(^{109}\) Certainly, in contrast to our contemporary sources, no more further clashes are reported by William, and he alone states that Conrad’s camp was attacked around the time the council was held. The modern historian can reject these unsupported elements of William’s evidence. Perhaps William’s testimony reflects his attempt to reconcile disparate verbal forms of information and is the product of the historian’s over-simple connection of cause and effect. He was aware that the Turkish attacks influenced the decision to retreat, but assumed that they took place whilst the council was being held. He interpreted his evidence incorrectly; the Turkish threat was one of the combination of reasons which initially led to the convening of the council.

It is now possible to review the different issues which influenced the decision to retreat. King Conrad, Odo of Deuil, Gerhoh of Reichersberg and William of Tyre recount the memories and perceptions of different crusade participants. One particular recollection was common to all and deemed to affect the council’s deliberations, namely, that the army lacked supplies for both men and beasts and was therefore severely afflicted with starvation and dehydration. This is a recurrent theme throughout the sources.\(^{110}\) Many survivors believed that the lack of provisions was actually the main reason the army retreated. Arnold of Lübeck, for example, wrote that Conrad ‘was unable to proceed’ (procedere non poterat) and the Pöhlder annalist asserted that the crusaders ‘turned back’ (reflexere) because of the lack of food and water.\(^{111}\) The Sigeberti Continuatio Praemonstratensis, composed before 1155 by an anonymous monk from Rheims or Lyon, noted that the army ‘having consumed the fodder and with provisions running out, [Conrad] returned with his men who were afflicted by starvation.’\(^{112}\) Michael the Syrian wrote that ‘Myriads among them perished by thirst and hunger’ and the crusaders turned back towards Constantinople ‘having realised they had been the victims of deceit’, owing to the flight of the Byzantine guides.\(^{113}\) In theory, the guides could have led the army away from the desert terrain and into a verdant landscape where provisions might once more have been located, and the sources clearly attest that the guides’ escape from the crusader camp affected the council’s discussions. That not all texts mention Turkish harassment shaping the council’s decision is because the originators of the various sources recollected and had recorded different experiences. We must expect that disparate

109 On the Turkish harassing tactics, see below chapter 18.
110 See above pp.199-200.
112 ‘consumptis terrae germinibus et deficientibus victualibus, suis fame afflictis redit’. ‘Sigeberti Continuatio Praemonstratensis’, p.453.
113 Michael the Syrian, Chronicle, p.276.
surviving elements of the crusade would remember and recount varying versions of the advance on Ikonion. What we must not do is follow Kugler’s example and interpret the evidence so as to conform to a rigid hypothesis. Kugler omitted to mention that the army advanced into a desert, that the crusaders were starving through lack of provisions, that they had suffered frequent Turkish attacks for a number of days before the retreat was called, and that the flight of the guides influenced the council’s decision. The sources which illuminate the council’s deliberations demonstrate clearly that it was these different factors, not a defeat is a set-piece encounter, which compelled the princes to retreat.

Scholars have recently tended to agree with their medieval contemporaries when suggesting that the circumstances leading to the retreat can be blamed on Greek duplicity, or put another way, ascribed to Byzantine self-interest. The Byzantines did not, however, purposely cause the destruction of the army through starvation and dehydration. The difficulties each crusader always had in obtaining adequate supplies, owing to the way the army relied on each individual to make provision for himself and his dependants and the amount of surplus foodstuffs available at towns with medieval agrarian economies, were exacerbated in Anatolia. Nikomedia and Nikaia were not centres of thriving populations which consumed the cultivation of an extensive hinterland. Rather, they were sparsely populated fortified towns which ordinarily could not demand or produce enough provisions to feed a large transient force. Moreover, much of fertile lowland eastern Bithynia was effectively a frontier zone at the time of the Second Crusade, following the geopolitical chaos of the latter half of the eleventh century. The political turmoil left eastern Bithynia subject to a Türkmen presence and their associated patterns of land use. The terrain was barren and deserted beyond Dorylaion. Conrad was aware that, owing to the topography of the landscape traversed, the army was largely dependent upon baggage supplies obtained at Nikaia for the advance beyond the town. But Nikaia and Bithynia, which lay largely fallow after 1071, had somehow already managed to provision an army of many thousands for approximately one month before the army advanced towards Dorylaion. Unsurprisingly the baggage supplies failed. The crusaders could not obtain enough beasts to convey the requisite quantity of victuals to Ikonion and/or there were simply not enough provisions procurable at Nikaia to load a baggage train with sufficient supplies.  

Not all the crusaders starved to death during the advance towards Ikonion suggesting that those individuals with enough influence and remaining wealth to obtain and convey

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114 See above p.174.
provisions for themselves and their retinues requisitioned the limited supplies and any available pack animals at Nikaia. King Conrad, pre-eminent in wealth and status amongst the German army, evidently believed that, given his decision to advance, he at least had appropriated a sufficient amount of victuals for himself and his entourage. However, the crusaders’ ability to obtain scarce provisions at famine prices for themselves, immediate dependants, and their surviving horses and pack animals, would have lessened as they advanced towards Nikaia, and diminished further at Nikaia’s market. Among a force without a central authority responsible for its victualing, the problems the poorer crusaders had experienced in procuring supplies at markets en route to Nikaia would certainly have been evident at this last major outpost on their road to Ikonion. It is little wonder that not all the crusaders obtained adequate provisions or that the malnourished and exhausted, that is, those without the means to obtain sustenance at and around Nikaia, died through starvation, dehydration, fatigue and disease. The deficient provisions and attendant starvation therefore had nothing to do with pernicious Byzantines. Sources that say otherwise may have suffered from anti-Greek prejudice; they certainly betray the majority of the crusaders’ ignorance of the impossibility of satisfactorily provisioning the whole of the remaining force on the limited logistical resources at Nikaia.

The crusaders recognised the enormity of the decision to advance from Nikaia when they had marched for approximately eight days and had advanced beyond the plain of Dorylaion. Yet the noble retinues continued to march on to the Anatolian plateau, causing the weak and dying crusaders to lag behind the leading contingents and fall prey to Turkish attacks. Contemporaries believed the crusaders were perfidiously led to their destruction on this pathless, barren route beyond Dorylaion and that the Turks were acting in concert with the Byzantines; the flight of the army’s guides was mere proof of Byzantine duplicity. Manuel Komnenos, however, attempted to dissuade Conrad from advancing on his chosen path, yet the princes willingly elected to march on to the Anatolian plateau. Moreover, the guides did not lead the army on an incorrect path to its destruction, they were merely satisfying their commission by leading the army on the shortest route to Ikonion. The route appeared pathless as the road had fallen out of regular use in the wake of the Battle of Mantzikert. Whilst the flight of the Byzantine guides may have been reprehensible, it must be ascribed to their fears for their personal safety, and there was certainly nothing they could have done to facilitate the advance of a poorly provisioned and debilitated army which insisted on marching on a barren, desert path devoid of sedentary inhabitants and cultivation.

Nor is it likely that the guides, Manuel Komnenos in Constantinople or Masūd in Ikonion could have done anything about the Turkish attacks on Conrad’s army. Manuel did make
peace with the Seljuk Turks in the spring of 1147, but we can dismiss the notion that crusader behaviour influenced the negotiations in any manner, as the crusaders did not enter Byzantine territory until the summer of that year. Nor was the peace treaty engineered with the destruction of the crusade in mind, as Manuel and Mas’ūd commenced their negotiations before either knew of the impending crusade. Traditional notions and preconceptions concerning why the crusade was attacked have tended to ignore the obvious weaknesses in Niketas Choniates’ testimony, the one ostensibly objective source which states that Manuel incited the Turks to attack the crusaders. But the reliability of his evidence must be taken into an analytical consideration of the sum value of the source within the appropriate context before selectively employing elements of his brief testimony to support hypotheses. It is clearly unsound to conclude from his evidence and the negotiated peace between Ikonion and Constantinople that Manuel instigated Seljuk attacks on the crusaders to protect Byzantine interests. Moreover, there is no unequivocal evidence which demonstrates that a Seljuk army did attack Conrad. Importantly, the crusaders advanced into Türkmen and not Seljuk territory. Whilst nominally subject to the Seljuks, and often forming the core of Seljuk armies, the Türkmens were fiercely independent and had a predilection for autonomous martial behaviour in the pursuits of booty and jihād. Can we therefore still reasonably argue that Manuel influenced the Turkish attacks? One might, of course, suggest that Manuel supported Mas’ūd’s instigations of Türkmen attacks on Conrad’s army, but in actual fact neither controlled the Türkmens and there was very little either could do about the Türkmen presence in northwest Anatolia. The modern convention which takes no account of Türkmen existence in northwest Anatolia but still argues that Manuel sabotaged the crusade is not convincing.
18. Turkish Harassing Tactics

It is traditionally held that the disorganisation and indiscipline of the Second Crusade were responsible for the German losses during the clashes with the Turkish forces, although this hypothesis has yet to be proven.\(^1\) To determine if this was indeed the case, we must first consider if the army was unusually disorganised, and secondly, attempt to reconstruct the nature of the clashes and assess if the crusaders did display unusual levels of disorder.

Medieval armies generally consisted of soldiers of largely unknown quality and quantity who mustered at various points for the campaign. The troops of horse and foot were usually loyal to a particular lord and ordinarily could only be coerced into acting for an overall nominal commander. In the case of the Second Crusade, this was Conrad III. The armies were thus loosely organised and indeed individualistic in nature. This was evidently the case with Conrad’s army, as reflected in the way individual crusaders made their own logistical arrangements on campaign. As these arrangements were exactly the same as those followed by Louis VII of France’s forces, it suggests that the French army was also organised loosely and individualistic in nature as is indeed maintained by John France.\(^2\)

While the inherent organisational structure of the two armies was therefore the same, historians argue that the Germans were somehow more disorganised, and for evidence they point to the supposed excessive German acts of disorder committed before the army encountered the Turks.\(^3\) We now know the testimonies supporting such assertions are rather dubious, but it has still been suggested that Odo of Deuil testifies to the disorganisation of the German army when, in the words of John France, it became ‘divided and uncertain even at the moment of crisis’ in Anatolia.\(^4\) Odo actually discusses the council of princes which led to the mutual decision to retreat to Nikaia in this particular example of supposed disorganisation.\(^5\) A council was also convened regarding Manuel Komnenos’ suggestion that the army advance into Anatolia via the ferry crossing at Abydos, at which the princes decided to continue on the road to Constantinople.\(^6\) A similar council was held in which the princes agreed to advance towards Ikonion via Nikaia and Dorylaion.\(^7\) That councils were convened and decisions reached which were apparently acceptable to all parties illustrates there was a sense of unity rather than mutual disagreement among the executive decision makers. The behaviour of the councils therefore does not demonstrate that the army was divided and

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\(^1\) See, for example, Lilie, *Byzantium*, pp.153-4.
\(^3\) See, for example, France, ‘Logistics’, pp.82-3.
\(^5\) Odo of Deuil, *De Profectione*, p.92.
\(^7\) ‘Annales Herbipolenses’, p.5.
indecisive, and there was certainly nothing unusual in its command structure and organisation. Conrad was in nominal command of a fighting force comprised of contingents with varying allegiances. The king convened councils of the heads of the noble retinues to effect executive decisions, and the warriors amongst those retinues were loyal to their particular lords from whom they ultimately took their commands.

It is important, however, to observe at this point that diverse and loosely organised groups of crusaders held no clear tactical or technical advantage over their Turkish foes. As John France suggests, it was inevitable that disparate western forces would employ trusted methods of fighting against unknown enemies. An analysis derived solely from literary sources of the tactics employed by combatants on any given medieval field of warfare is problematic. Firstly, one must consider the various forms of literary bias. Warfare could, for example, excite the natural tendency of the narrator, and especially a chronicler of heroic deeds, to stir his audience by exaggerating and distorting the martial prowess of the combatants. On the other hand, defeat in combat might cause the chronicler to explain actions in terms of alleged cowardly, ignoble or incompetent conduct, even though circumstances beyond the supposed pusillanimous, shameful or inept behaviour of armies or individuals might have accounted for the military proceedings. Secondly, medieval texts were commonly the product of cloistered monks, and this was especially the case in the twelfth century. Often shut off from the world outside the monastery, never mind events on the field of battle, such chroniclers, even those who had conversed with participants, would have little understanding of tactical intricacies. This assumes that the chronicler had not been a soldier before entering religion, but even if he had, any martial experience he might have gained may not have been relevant to the events he was describing. Thirdly, even those soldiers who may have been involved in the thick of the fighting on the Second Crusade were unlikely to have a full understanding of the events beyond their own immediate scope of action. Confusion reigned in pre-modern warfare and what was observed on the flanks of the army, for example, may have borne no resemblance to events which took place elsewhere. A soldier’s subsequent recollection and record of proceedings, whilst providing extremely valuable evidence, should therefore not be considered as an inclusive chronicle of all the action which took place on the field of battle.

We can still ascertain the general tactics employed by the main protagonists in October 1147 by combing through the possible deficiencies in our pertinent sources, namely, those of John Kinnamos, Gerhoh of Reichersberg and William of Tyre, to reveal commonly employed

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tactics which have been identified in modern studies on medieval modes of warfare. The military ideas of the age demanded that commanders of European armies draw up their troops in an orderly array before battle or when encountering the enemy on the march. The resultant battaille ideally consisted of spearmen, archers and/or crossbowmen to protect the cavalry. The ruling offensive idea of the battaille was to maintain cohesion which would enable the cavalry to deliver its traditional charge at the most opportune moment and inflict the utmost damage on an enemy’s solid formation. The principal shock weapon of the west European army was the massed cavalry charge with couched lance. The charge has been described as ‘a projectile in the hands of the commander’, although it commonly struck only once, the mounted warriors then re-grouping with difficulty. The cavalry therefore relied on battaille cohesion, the speed of their horses, and the weight of the initial charge to shatter an enemy’s solid formation so that it could be routed immediately at close range. Whilst historians now recognise the massed charge with couched lance was not as popular or as effective as once thought, contemporaries were clearly convinced of its efficacy.

According to John Kinnamos, the crusader mounted warriors frequently rushed in disorder and confusion at their Turkish enemy, who in turn, pretended flight. ‘Then when their [the crusaders’] horses were exhausted and they were drawn away from the rest of the army, they [the Turks] turned their horses around with speed and slew horses and men’. On this evidence we might hypothesise that pious and zealous western knights, perhaps imbued with chivalric values of honour and glory, charged at the Turks in disorder simply because they were their heathen enemy. This might be seen as a rationale for the actions of the knights and men-at-arms as described by Kinnamos, and enable historians to infer that such disordered and indisciplined martial behaviour ultimately caused Conrad to retreat.

We can, however, interpret Kinnamos’ testimony differently. Against the charge of heavily armoured cavalry the Turkish mounted archers frequently employed the feigned retreat, splitting ranks before they could be hit by the armoured ‘projectile’ and allowing their
opponents to pursue them.\textsuperscript{16} Then, when the well-armed knights and men-at-arms were exhausted and separated from the main force, the Turks turned around on their swift and highly mobile ponies to attack and kill the pursuers with hand weapons.\textsuperscript{17} This is exactly the tactic described by Kinnamos. If we do not allow ourselves to be led astray by Kinnamos’ implied explanation that the crusader losses were the result of their stereotypically arrogant and uncontrolled belligerence,\textsuperscript{18} we can see that the crusaders actually failed to adapt to an enemy who, as far as they were concerned, employed largely unconventional tactics and weaponry. If this interpretation of Kinnamos is correct, the crusader cavalry in 1147 did not display unusual and excessive forms of disorganisation and indiscipline, since such charges against Turkish enemies were not uncommon in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{19}

Amongst the confusion we have already noted in his text, William of Tyre agreed the Turks employed their favoured tactic of the feigned retreat.\textsuperscript{20} He relates how the crusaders on their emaciated and fatigued horses were unable ‘to engage with the enemy at close quarters, in as much as they did not have the ability to lay hold of their foes. For every time our lines strove to charge them, the enemy broke ranks and eluded our men’s attempts [by going] in different directions.’\textsuperscript{21} He writes, moreover, that the Turks galloped towards the crusaders ‘in random groups’ (\textit{catervatim}), and while ‘at long range they launched countless arrows, the equivalent of a hail-storm, wounding the horses and their riders, and bringing agents of death from afar’.\textsuperscript{22} Many sources refer to the oft-recurring attacks of the Turkish horse archers and the death-dealing efficacy of their arrows.\textsuperscript{23}

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{16} On the primary Turkish modes of warfare, see Smail, \textit{Crusading Warfare}, pp.76–85, 156-203; Verbruggen, \textit{The Art of Warfare}, pp.94-6, 185-7; Marshall, \textit{Warfare}, pp.159-62; France, \textit{Victory}, pp.147-9, 157-9; Edbury, P., ‘Warfare in the Latin East’ in M. Keen, ed., \textit{Medieval Warfare: A History} (Oxford, 1999), pp.89-112, especially pp.93, 190; Hillenbrand, C., \textit{The Crusades Islamic Perspectives} (Edinburgh, 1999) pp.512-4. There is no indication the crusaders encountered Turkish footsoldiers although composite Turkish armies included infantry. The bow was the principal weapon of the highly mobile Turkish horseman although a lance and a number of striking weapons were used. At the battle of Mansurah (1250), for example, the crusaders were cut down with ‘Danish axes, with maces and swords.’ Shirley, J., trans. \textit{Crusader Syria in the Thirteenth Century: The Roteulin Continuation of the History of William of Tyre with part of the Eracles or Acre text} (Aldershot, 1999) p.96.
\item\textsuperscript{17} In the words of Hillenbrand, the last thing a Turkish horseman wanted to do was ‘stand and fight’ with a heavily armoured western warrior – at least until he had been rendered vulnerable. Hillenbrand, \textit{Islamic Perspectives}, pp.512-14. Also see Marshall, \textit{Warfare}, pp.159-62.
\item\textsuperscript{18} See above pp.175-6.
\item\textsuperscript{19} Smail, \textit{Crusading Warfare}, pp.128-30; Marshall, \textit{Warfare}, pp.145-82.
\item\textsuperscript{20} See above p.216.
\item\textsuperscript{21} ‘cum hostibus cominus consenerdi copia, quippe quibus comprehendi adversarios nulla erat facultas. Quotiens enim in hostes nostrorum acies impetus faceret nienteantur, illi dissipatis agminibus nostrorum eludentes conatus ad diversa.’ William of Tyre, \textit{Willelmi Tyrensis}, XVI.22 p.746.
\item\textsuperscript{22} ‘eminus sagittarum instar grandinis immissa multitudine infinita, equos eorumque sessores vulnerantes et causas mortis de remoto inferentes.’ William of Tyre, \textit{Willelmi Tyrensis}, XVI.22 p.746.
\end{itemize}

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This detail is absent in John Kinnamos’ *Deeds*, but the use of the famous European cavalry charge, and the Turkish feigned retreat and use of missile power, are all tactics discernible in Gerhoh of Reichersberg’s *De Investigatione*. It is worth quoting Gerhoh at length here, as he graphically depicts the crusaders’ inability to combat Turkish tactics. He writes that the exhausted, starving and dehydrated crusaders entered Turkish territory and were met by their enemy. The crusaders wanted,

‘to fight at close quarters, but they [the Turks] were tiring them out at long range with arrows by day and by night, by charging and running away at one and the same time…Our cavalry wanted to attack them while they were running away, [but] our men did not have the strength to catch up with them, since, of course, our men’s horses were worn out by toil and starvation, whereas, [the Turks’] horses were well fed and rested. The whole host of foes was protected by bows, and this way of fighting was almost the only one in which they put their trust, whereas there were few archers amongst the men of our army.’  

The decision was then made to retreat to Nikaia,

‘not because our men were failures in war and victory, but because war and victory eluded their grasp. For if they wished to fight and drew up their troops into battle-formation, there was no enemy charge from the opposite side; and if they broke camp, they were given no rest, because archers repeatedly harassed them from every direction day and night at recurrent intervals.’

This is very important testimony as it adds substance to the clashes described by John Kinnamos and William of Tyre. The collective evidence illuminates the fundamental tactics employed by the crusaders and Turks. The Turkish horse archers clearly harassed the crusaders with volleys of arrows, whereas Conrad’s army did not include the necessary archers or crossbowmen required to fend off the Turkish attacks. The Turks additionally employed the feigned retreat on their swift, agile and healthy ponies against the charge of the heavily armoured and debilitated crusader cavalry.

Modern historians have ascertained how the Turks combined their superior mobility and missile capability when facing a less mobile, yet well-protected Christian army. The principal aim was to destroy the cohesion of their enemy by the ‘Scythian’ method of shooting arrows,
also known as the ‘Parthian shot’. The method entailed the archers galloping towards the enemy and wheeling their mounts around at the last moment. They then immediately began to loose vast numbers of arrows as they retreated, inflicting wounds on enemy men, horses and beasts of burden. After the first wave of attack, a second and then a third and so on would continue to send arrows into the enemy’s ranks whilst the Turks remained safely away from the dangers of hand to hand combat. European knights and men-at-arms knew that a single charge could put the enemy to flight and bring some respite from this form of harassment. The Turks seemingly counted on the psychological strain this knowledge and tactic caused the medieval knight, and therefore tried to tempt him to break ranks and charge. Historians have cited many examples of the Turks employing this tactic, although none are more famous than Saladin’s attempts to disrupt the unity of Richard I’s forces on the Third Crusade when the continuous volleys of arrows aimed at Richard’s advancing column caused even the highly disciplined and experienced Hospitallers to charge prematurely at their enemy. These, then, were the typical Turkish harassing tactics employed against Byzantine and Latin columns, and we can discern that this was the form of harassment described in our Second Crusade texts. It was a form of warfare largely unknown in the West and impressed greatly those who witnessed it. Veterans of the First Crusade, for example, remarked with astonishment upon similar tactics at ‘Dorylaion’ and the Turkish mounted archers evidently employed the same tactics against the Second Crusade as it advanced towards Ikonion. The Templars instilled in the French crusaders the tactical acumen required to withstand this strange form of warfare during Louis VII’s advance through Anatolia by means of the ‘fighting march’. But even warriors proficient in the fighting march occasionally met with disaster, the most famous example being the lack of cohesion and discipline which led to the breakdown of the fighting march in 1187 and preceded the crusader calamity at the Horns of Hattin. Indeed, the tactics of the eastern horse archers caused Christian armies great difficulties throughout this period, and this was particularly acute for western forces on crusade; the crusades of Theobald of Champagne and Louis IX of France are well known examples.

27 Smail, Crusading Warfare, pp.80-2, 128-30, 162-5.
29 Smail, Crusading Warfare, pp.82-3, 168-70. France, Victory, pp.158, 182.
31 Smail, Crusading Warfare, pp.152-4.
32 Smail, Crusading Warfare, p.76; Marshall, Warfare, p.145.
The crusaders of 1147 did not necessarily display unusual levels of disorder in their exchanges with the Turks. Perhaps religious zeal combined with contemporary notions of chivalry could have caused wildly courageous, rash and disordered feats of individual martial daring among western mounted warriors, which is one reason firm discipline and control were required to maintain the cohesion of the European *battaille* and the ‘fighting march’. The crusaders might also have been under enormous pressure to charge their enemy in order to bring themselves some respite from the typical Turkish harassing tactics.\(^{33}\) That they may have felt some such compulsion to charge, and that they may not have charged *en masse*, but as individuals or small groups, is not in question. But there was nothing unusual in this. There is also no doubt that western noble warriors relied on the cavalry charge as a principal tactic of their offensive warfare, even though charges by individuals or small groups against highly mobile enemies were not usually successful. In spite of this, however, the tactic was still employed in the Latin East throughout the thirteenth century against extremely elusive mounted archers.\(^{34}\) The disparate forces nominally under the command of Conrad III likewise relied on this conventional, inappropriate European manoeuvre. The crusaders in 1147 were not alone in what appears to have been their tactical failure.

Neither were the noble contingents in a position to resist the Turkish tactics for three additional reasons. Firstly, the sources refer to footsoldiers only three times in connection with Conrad’s advance on Ikonion, and all three cases suggest that Conrad marched from Nikaia with very few spearmen, archers and crossbowmen.\(^{35}\) But missile weapons were essential against Turkish forces. Armies rarely enjoyed success without mass ranks of archers and crossbowmen employed to keep Turkish archers at ineffectual ranges.\(^{36}\) Secondly, it is doubtful whether the crusaders could have dispersed their enemies even if they withstood the provocation of Turkish arrows until they charged *en masse*. Hunger and dehydration eventually caused the exhausted men and horses to be too weak to close in on the highly mobile archers who employed the feigned retreat to great effect. Thirdly, the army’s weakness caused the advancing column to become dangerously over-stretched. Had the inherently disparate and loosely organised crusader contingents maintained cohesion and formation at and through Dorylaion, as was largely, and to a great extent, accidentally forced

\(^{33}\) This was achieved at least at one point during the retreat to Nikaia. See ‘Annales Palidenses’, p.83.


upon the armies of the First Crusade, perhaps a level of mutual protection might have been afforded a greater number of the crusaders.\textsuperscript{37}

But Conrad III was no Bohemond of Taranto: the sources certainly do not allow us to talk of Conrad’s military expertise.\textsuperscript{38} Evidently there was not a widespread dispersal of the tactical lessons learnt during the First Crusade and those learnt during the subsequent conflict in the Latin East regarding Turkish modes of warfare. It was, moreover, strategically inept of Conrad to lead an army into the deserts of Anatolia without sufficient provisions for the whole force, and to send the bulk of the footsoldiers on an alternative path to the East. It should be remembered, however, that logistical and topographical considerations compelled Conrad, surely with the agreement of the German nobility, to send most of his and their footsoldiers on the alternative path. It was the actual decision to advance towards the Latin East by way of Nikaia and Dorylaion which was strategical folly.

\textsuperscript{37} France, \textit{Victory}, pp.170-85.

\textsuperscript{38} For a summary of Bohemond’s influence on the military course of the First Crusade, see France, \textit{Victory}, p.369.
Epilogue
The army turned back to Nikaia on 26 October 1147. Perhaps it was a day of significant losses at the hands of Turkish skirmishes; the date certainly figures largely in the sources as it coincided with a solar eclipse which some chroniclers and annalists considered an omen of the crusaders’ misfortunes.\(^1\) It is impossible to offer an accurate reconstruction of the retreat, owing to the great deal of confusing and contradictory evidence, although we can still discern a number of events. On the day the army turned around, or more likely a few days after the princes had called the retreat, the Turks slaughtered and captured the inhabitants of a crusader camp. It was probably that of Count Bernard of Plötzkau, who may have been acting as protector for the surviving pilgrims who he encountered when he was retreating, and whilst the king and the remaining noble retinues made good their escape.\(^2\) The Turks, however, continued to attack the debilitated crusaders who seem now to have survived on the flesh of dead horses. Conrad himself was struck by at least one arrow\(^3\) and many others were slaughtered or captured, especially while they sought to find food and water.\(^4\) The surviving members of the noble retinues eventually made it back to Nikaia where they fortuitously encountered the army of the Louis VII of France.\(^5\)

Those crusaders who elected not to return to Europe travelled west to the Aegean littoral and then south to Ephesos with Conrad and the French army. Conrad was extremely ill at this point owing to his experiences during the doomed advance towards Ikonion, and he elected to return to Constantinople and convalesce through the winter at the court of Manuel Komnenos. The emperor subsequently gave the king money with which to attract a fighting force of pilgrims in the Latin East, and a Greek fleet took the remnants of the German army to various Palestinian ports from where they travelled to Jerusalem in April 1148.\(^6\)

At a court held in Acre on 24 June, King Baldwin III of Jerusalem, Conrad III and Louis VII of France (whose army had suffered from starvation and Turkish attacks in southwest Anatolia before the king embarked at Attaleia to sail to the Latin East), determined to attack Damascus rather than succour Edessa, whose fall had initially prompted Pope Eugenius III’s call for the crusade.\(^7\) The siege of Damascus ended in a humiliating withdrawal of the

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1 See, for example, Odo of Deuil, *De Profectione*, pp.82-4; ‘Annales Magdeburgenses’, p.188.
3 ‘Annales Palidenses’, p.84.
6 Berry, ‘Second Crusade’, pp.496-8, 504-5.
combined forces. Conrad eventually left Palestine following the failure of the allied forces to muster for a march on Fatimid Ascalon, and amidst bitter recriminations as to who was to blame for the collapse of the siege of Damascus. He sailed to Thessalonica and met Manuel Komnenos before travelling with the emperor to Constantinople and spending a second winter in the company of his imperial brother. Conrad left Constantinople in the spring of 1149 and sailed to the town of Pola, now in western Croatia, and finally marched back to Germany, exhausted, and with the continued health problems to which he succumbed within three years.

Many of those who set out with Conrad from Nuremberg in the middle of May 1147 died long before this date. The sources attest to the crusaders’ continual struggle for supplies through the Byzantine Empire and Anatolia owing to the nature of medieval agrarian society and the crusaders’ provisioning arrangements. The need to obtain scarce provisions at famine prices resulted in a number of clashes between the crusaders and the Byzantines at places such as Philippopolis, Adrianople and Constantinople. Lack of critical analysis of the primary source evidence relating to such events would leave us with the impression that the Germans were extraordinarily indisciplined and hostile. But each of the texts which have shaped the current historiography is subject to literary distortions which reflect poorly on the German crusaders, and each chronicler had his own reasons for portraying the crusade, and its interaction with Manuel Komnenos and the Byzantine Empire, in this manner. Whether it was the Byzantine canon of barbarian topoi, burgeoned by encomiastic rhetorical amplification and employed to inflate Manuel’s Davidic-like handling of the crusaders, or Odo of Deuil attributing blame for the French provisioning problems and their need to resort to plunder on the behaviour of perfidious Greeks and disorderly Germans, we must recognise the prejudices and distortions in the sources and, if necessary, offer alternative interpretations of the events they purport to describe.

In not accepting a literal reading of the texts and by considering the army’s logistical arrangements in the Byzantine Empire, we have discovered that there was nothing unusually belligerent or indisciplined about the crusaders who disembarked in Bithynia on the Asiatic coast of the Bosphoros. The crusaders should have been able to obtain adequate provisions in Bithynia for their advance on Ikonion. But they advanced into a country which was in

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10 Constable, ‘Second Crusade’, pp.266-76.
11 It was during this period that the so-called ‘Treaty of Thessalonica’ was concluded, see Vollrath, ‘Konrad III und Byzanz’, pp.321-65; Hiestand, ‘Neptis tua und fasig Graecorum’, pp.502-55.
geopolitical flux, tentatively divided in the west between the lowland Byzantines, highland Seljuks and Türkmen tribes. It was a landscape of sparsely populated fortified towns and castles subject to the martial predilections of its pastoral-nomadic warrior inhabitants. It was thus a vast, wild and forbidding country which the Second Crusade entered in the middle of September 1147.

The crusaders discovered that provisions were not plentiful, and only after the army divided at Nikaia did the princes load their pack animals and elect to advance on the imperial campaign route to Ikonion. After marching for ten days the crusaders were guideless and had largely run out of provisions. Many had already succumbed to malnourishment, dehydration, exhaustion and repeated Turkish attacks, and therefore the decision was made to retreat. Re-examining the source evidence from military, logistical, topographical and geopolitical perspectives has revised the conventional history of this ill-fated adventure. The leading contingents advanced beyond Dorylaion, and did not display unusual levels of disorganisation and indiscipline during their clashes with the Turks. The crusaders did not have the tactical expertise to defeat or at least defend themselves against an enemy who employed tactics with which the crusaders were largely unfamiliar. Their privations had little to do with Byzantine stratagems. The crusaders’ problems, and the subsequent allegations of Greek duplicity, stemmed from the survivors’ lack of topographical and logistical acumen and their ignorance of the realities of the twelfth-century geopolitical situation. It is difficult to envisage what more Manuel Komnenos could have done to facilitate Conrad’s decision to march across the Anatolian plateau once the king had rejected the emperor’s advice to advance along the Aegean littoral. Nikaia was unprepared for the arrival of the Germans, and the Byzantine victuallers were busy contending with the provisioning demands of the French at Constantinople when the decision was made to advance on Ikonion with inadequate supplies. Manuel provided the army with guides, but the provision of a Byzantine force to accompany the crusaders was precluded by the lack of provisions and the needs for Byzantine security, not least against the threat of the French and of Roger II of Sicily.

These conclusions raise a number of points and questions. A recent historiographical trend has sought to demonstrate that Manuel Komnenos pursued a hostile policy against the crusade to further Byzantine interests in the Levant. The evidence to support this premise is based mainly on Niketas Choniates’ history and the sources analysed in part II of this thesis. It would be undesirable to continue to confer too much authority on what has been shown to be questionable medieval accusations of Byzantine intrigue, source testimonies which are distorted by rhetorical conventions and prejudice, and the fragile historiographical tradition in support of this hypothesis, resting as it does on Kugler’s inept interpretation of these self-
same sources.

Perhaps new light would be thrown on the crusade of Louis VII of France and the written histories of the First and Third Crusades in the Byzantine Empire and Anatolia by employing similar approaches to those in this thesis. We may ask, for example, if those crusades actually did pose the significant threat to Byzantine interests as suggested in the Greek texts, or did Alexios I Komnenos, Manuel I Komnenos and Isaac II Angelos strive to weaken the crusades and derive maximum benefit from the expeditions as is commonly supposed? The answers to such questions might have implications for the way the histories of the crusades are currently discussed within the context of Byzantium’s strategical-political relations with the Latin world.

In neglecting the tangible realities of twelfth-century provincial Byzantium, we might find that crusade historians have failed to give logistical, topographical and geopolitical perspectives the attention they deserve. An approach which pays due consideration to these aspects might question current explanations concerning, for example, who attacked the French during the Second Crusade as they advanced through Türkmen territory. Such an approach might also revise the route of the First Crusade, or question the convention that the combined army of the First Crusade numbered in the tens of thousands. The topographical studies of western Anatolia offered in this thesis has thrown new light on the history of Conrad III’s expedition. One hopes that a similar approach, more widely and generally applied, might serve as a vehicle to revise the histories of the other twelfth-century crusades in Anatolia.
Appendices
Appendix 1.

Where did the princely retinues reach before the decision was made to retreat to Nikaia?

King Conrad embarked on the shortest route to Ikonion, and he advanced for a total of ten days before the army turned back to Nikaia. The present author’s examinations of the various potential routes’ topographies and the work of the Tabula Imperii Byzantini scholars indicate that the shortest route between Dorylaion and Ikonion passed through the former Byzantine towns of Nakoleia, Santabaris, Hebraike and Kedrea. How far the leading contingents advanced along this route is difficult to ascertain, as a number of variables which would have affected their rate of march began to be experienced around Day Seven. We have seen, for example, that the crusaders were dependent upon their individual baggage supplies from Nikaia, and that most of the provisions were consumed a number of days before the retreat was called. The army thus suffered from thirst and starvation, as provisions for both men and beasts were unavailable around the very time the leading contingents advanced through the uninhabited and predominantly arid landscape beyond the plain of Dorylaion. These problems only compounded the army’s fatigue which became visibly widespread after at least seven days of marching, and upon reaching Dorylaion on or around Day Seven from Nikaia, the crusaders encountered their Turkish enemy who repeatedly attacked the advancing column.

The sources do not suggest that the princes’ advance was slowed down by these factors, which may indicate that any reduction in the leading contingents’ rate of march was not exceptional. Nevertheless, the distance traversed per hour and the overall distance marched would patently be reduced owing to the combined affect of these variables. If we consider reasonable rates of march over the known topography, whilst allowing for the detrimental factors which would have affected the speed of the advance, we will gain some indication of where the crusaders reached before they turned around and retreated.

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3 For this route see Belke & Mersich, Phrygien, pp.143-4; Belke, Galatien, pp.97-8.

4 See photograph A.1.

5 See photograph A.2.

6 See photograph A.3.

7 See photograph A.4.

8 A consideration of the army’s camp requirements between Dorylaion and Nakoleia is redundant, as one campsite would have been deemed as unattractive as the next. An army could have camped securely anywhere between these two former Byzantine towns, but the route lacked water, and fodder for the animals would have been burnt off after a typically long hot summer. See Admiralty, Asia Minor 3, p.54.
Immediately beyond the Dorylaion plain, the route initially inclines and then traverses low undulating plateau land until it climbs again on the hills beyond Nakoleia. The route thus far is generally wide and the inclines notwithstanding, well suited for the passage of large armies. A combined force marching under normal circumstances could be expected to advance over the even terrain at a rate of 4.8 kilometres per hour, and over the uneven terrain at a rate of four kilometres per hour, that is, 16.7% more slowly.\(^9\) We will speculate that the distance traversed per hour beyond Dorylaion by the leading contingents of the Second Crusade was reduced by a percentage rate in proportion to this figure, let us say, twice as slow, or, on average, 33% slower than their average rate of march in normal circumstances. If we subtract this percentage from the figure for the absolute daily rate of march of the princely retinues between Nikaia and Dorylaion, we are left with some indication of how far, on average, the crusaders may have advanced each day for the remaining three days beyond the plain. Thus, 22 kilometres (approximate absolute average daily rate of march from Nikaia\(^10\)) less 33% equals 15 kilometres marched per day. By this reckoning, the army might have advanced another 45 kilometres over the three days’ march beyond Dorylaion. This is, of course, necessarily pure conjecture, but these simple calculations provide us with at least some indicative figures to work with. If we analyse the source topographical detail of where the advance ceased to continue, and we assume the princes advanced no further than 45 kilometres beyond Dorylaion, can we offer an approximate location of where the crusaders may have turned back to Nikaia? As we have seen, many sources suggest the army advanced into the desert landscape beyond the Dorylaion plain. Such a description matches all the terrain beyond the plain and before Nakoleia, measuring at 38 kilometres from Dorylaion.\(^11\) The majority of the sources therefore provide us with too few clues as to where the crusaders may have ceased to advance on Day Ten. Nakoleia, however, is supplied by a natural water course and situated just before a range of hills. Perhaps it is significant that the Würzburg annalist notes the discovery of a river near the location where the crusaders turned back to Nikaia, and Odo of Deuil refers to a maze of hills nearby.\(^12\) It is thus plausible that the crusaders’ advance was terminated just beyond the approximate site of Nakoleia.

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\(^10\) See above p.197.
\(^12\) *Annales Herbipolenses*, p.6; Odo of Deuil, *De Profectione*, pp.90-2.
Appendix 2.

How did learned Byzantines perceive Dorylaion in the latter half of the twelfth century?

Along the road to Dorylaion from Constantinople, Manuel I Komnenos built and garrisoned the fortress of Malagina on the lower reaches of the Sangarios circa 1145.\(^1\) Around the same time he constructed the fortress of Pithekas somewhere further along the route on the middle or upper reaches of the Karasu valley.\(^2\) It appears that Armenokastron, which has been located further still along the road near modern Pazaryeri, was also occupied in the twelfth century.\(^3\) Just beyond Pazaryeri, though, are Bozüyük and the far northwestern fringe of the Dorylaion plain.\(^4\) This was the effective limit of Byzantine hegemony at the time of the Second Crusade, and indeed the likes of John Kinnamos and Niketas Choniates have shown that the heaviest concentration of Türkmens in the northwest was by the Bathys and Tembros rivers in the plain of Dorylaion.\(^5\)

The city of Dorylaion was once a place of great economic and military importance.\(^6\) The sources relating to the reconstruction of the city in 1175 reveal a great deal about how Dorylaion was perceived by learned Byzantines in the latter half of the twelfth century. John Kinnamos composed his history within seven years of the rebuilding of Dorylaion, and referred to it as ‘once as great a city as any in Asia Minor and worthy of much note.’\(^7\) The 1176 Lenten encomium of Eustathios of Thessaloniki refers to the reconstruction of Dorylaion with delight, and says of the former city that it,

‘long ago lay in name (only) for us, and was a blessed thing, and the memory of it caused weeping, since it had been taken away from us, but it lay as the inheritance of those of another tribe; but now it has returned to us with the emperor recalling its eminence and fulfilling everything for us as a fine thing.’\(^8\)

Dorylaion was apparently remembered with fondness. Euthymios Malakes delivered an encomium at Epiphany in 1176, and wrote of the city,

‘which existed long ago and was razed to the ground by the hands of enemies, is now in turn being renewed and rises to a more illustrious state of far greater beauty and greater usefulness, both because the land is inhabited and the affairs of the inhabited land advance

\(^3\) Anna Komnene, *Alexiad*, p.479.
\(^4\) See below, map no.4.
\(^5\) Vryonis, *Decline*, p.188.
\(^6\) Belke & Mersich, *Phrygien*, pp.238-42.
and become greater, and shameful treatment by the enemy is also dissipated, by whom the city had been made to vanish.'

This suggests that not only was the former eminence of Dorylaion remembered with affection, but also intimates that the city’s reconstruction brought the hope of respite from the Türkmen presence in the northwest. Indeed, Euthymios’ Epiphany oration continues to reveal how Dorylaion, located at the point of ingress to Bithynia and ultimately Constantinople, was perceived as:

‘a partition of a fence, a stumbling block of stone, until a Persian, when he has come, should dash his head against the rock, and he is pricked on the feet by the scorpions here, which these stones will conceal, and no longer will he be able to go forth any further, nor tread on the land of the Romans.’

Similarly, an encomium by Eustathios of Thessaloniki also delivered at Epiphany in 1176 and likewise relating to the reconstruction of Dorylaion, refers to the Turks as a stream which the rebuilding of the city had ‘begun to block off’. The reconstruction had enabled Manuel to ‘keep that confluence in check and force it to return and to silt up so that it is invisible, dividing the enemy off by walls, and keeping the approaches divided with firm fortifications and thus restraining their ingovernability.’ In other words, Dorylaion was perceived as the bulwark against the Turkish threat; contemporary Byzantines evidently considered that a strong point at Dorylaion would effectively rid the empire of Türkmen incursions from this area and the Anatolian plateau. Eustathios’ Epiphany oration declares to Manuel that: ‘there you drove away the thing which oppressed us. Thus you freed us of every fear and you have filled the otherwise beast-nurturing region, beast-nurturing on account of the beasts descended from Ishmael, with men.’

Even allowing for a certain amount of hyperbolic textual distortion owing to the panegyrical nature of the encomia, the former importance of Dorylaion was evidently remembered with affection, and more than that, its reconstruction brought hopes of peace from Türkmen incursions. Manuel did not rebuild Dorylaion just to stop the Türkmen raids, however. Its reconstruction was part of an aggressive military initiative against the Turks which culminated in a campaign against Ikonion in 1176. Kinnamos’ narrative mentions only some of Manuel’s preparations for the campaign. Choniates relates how the expedition

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9 Quoted in Stone, ‘Dorylaion Revisited’, p.188.
12 Quoted in Stone, ‘Dorylaion Revisited’, p.188.
13 On the Dorylaion encomia, also see Magdalino, Empire, pp.463-4.
14 This purpose for the reconstruction of Dorylaion was first put forward by Chalandon, Jean II Comnène, pp.505-6.
came to an inglorious end in the defile at Tzibritze at what is conventionally known as the Battle of Myriokephalon (1176). The known terms of the peace treaty concluded between Manuel and the Seljuk Sultan, Kılıç Arslan II, included the proviso that Manuel tear down Dorylaion and also the recently rebuilt Soublaion. Manuel refused to break up Dorylaion, although the Seljuks soon gained the strong point. The Byzantine plans to re-conquer Asia Minor and the hopes of peace which would have followed came to an end with Myriokephalon. The demoralising affect this surely had in Constantinople would have been exacerbated by the harsh realities which followed the defeat and the attendant loss of Soublaion and Dorylaion. The remaining three years of Manuel’s reign (1177-80) witnessed an intensification of Turkish incursions into Byzantine territory, and indeed over the course of the next two decades, Byzantine authority collapsed in Anatolia with an inverse proliferation of Turkish military activity. The hope of peace from the Turkish threat, which the newly founded and fondly remembered Dorylaion produced, was dashed and Constantinople’s fears were realised around the very time Kinnamos was writing. Similarly, Choniates, who penned his history some two decades after Kinnamos, witnessed the collapse of Byzantine power in Anatolia and a proliferation of Turkish activity which was inextricably linked with the events of 1175/6. Whilst not the sole cause of the increased Turkish presence in western Anatolia after 1177, it is nonetheless plausible that learned Byzantines considered the loss of Dorylaion as greatly contributing to the Turkish threat: Dorylaion was, after all, perceived as the key to peace in northwest Anatolia.

In sum, learned Byzantines such as Kinnamos and Choniates were aware that Byzantine hegemony effectively ended at Dorylaion, and that the Türkmens inhabited the plain. A reconstructed Dorylaion brought hopes of peace in 1175, but its subsequent loss was witness to increased Turkish activity in western Anatolia. Dorylaion was surely synonymous with a Turkish presence.

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Maps

Map no.1 The routes of the Second Crusade (taken from Tyerman, *God’s War*, pp.302-3)

This thesis supercedes the information concerning the Germans’ crusade in Anatolia

Map no.2 Anatolia
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Abbreviations
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