THE ONTOLOGICAL IN THE THEOLOGY OF PAUL TILlich (VOL. 2)

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A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of St Andrews

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THE ONTOLOGICAL IN THE THEOLOGY

OF PAUL TILLICH

being a Thesis presented by

PAUL WILLIAM NEWMAN B.A., B.D.,

to the University of St. Andrews

in application for the degree of Ph.D.

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Chapter VII

Theological Epistemology.

A. Introduction

The question of knowledge in theological ontology is as important as the question of knowledge in philosophical ontology. The former is, in substance, the question of our knowledge of God, and it entails the subjects of faith, revelation and the problem of symbolic knowledge. Tillich's treatment of the knowledge of God is very profound and involved. Accordingly, it is expedient to introduce the matter by a brief sketch of the main points and scope of Tillich's position. Such a statement, however incomplete in itself, should serve to keep the whole matter in a balanced perspective while the details are being examined at greater or less length.

In Tillich's view, the problem involved in the question of the knowledge of God is his "fundamental
theological problem," namely, the problem of "the relation of the absolute, which is assumed in the idea of God, and of the relative, which belongs to human religion." As we saw earlier, one of Tillich's key distinctions for all knowledge is that it is inevitably involved in the realm of finitude and history. It is, therefore, subject to the categories of finitude and to the fate or destiny which is such a major element of history. The problem of theological knowledge is this: truth consists of the "identity of thinking and being"; but the thinking (i.e. knowledge) about God is fateful and finite whereas God is neither fateful nor finite. The dilemma seems to leave open only three possibilities: either knowledge of God is impossible, or knowledge of God is inevitably distorted by its finitude and fatefulness, or, miraculously, true accurate knowledge of God can occur. Tillich holds to a position endorsing both the second and third possibilities with, perhaps, stronger emphasis on the second than on the third. There remains a degree of unresolved tension between these two possibilities.

1T.H., p. 25.
Having decided that some kind of knowledge of God is possible, Tillich goes to considerable lengths to explain how this is possible. His theology is basically and avowedly apologetic; and nowhere is apologetic more relevant than in connection with this particular question.

The knowledge of God, which comprises theological ontology, is not conceptual knowledge but symbolic knowledge. This is the biggest single factor which separates theological ontology from philosophical ontology. The implications and explanation of symbolic knowledge are obviously of crucial significance and must be aired at some length. One interesting feature of the content of theological ontology is that, in Tillich's view, it does not consist of any information. Revelation does not "add anything directly to the totality of our ordinary knowledge, namely, to our knowledge about the subject-object structure of reality."¹ Knowledge of God is "beyond the subject-object distinction," which accounts for its being necessarily symbolic.

Symbolic knowledge of God is possible because

¹S.T. I, p. 121.
man and all of reality "participates" in God and God "participates" in them in such a way that man's mind can fashion analogical statements and terms that have less than complete literal accuracy with respect to their "object," God, but which very definitely have truth-value. This truth-value is defended partly on the strength of a doctrine of \textit{analogia entis} which is somewhat revised from its Thomistic predecessor, and partly on the strength of a doctrine of Justification by grace which Tillich believes to be revealed supremely or "finally" in the Cross of Jesus Christ but also by the eternally present Risen Christ. The two bases for religious knowledge seem to coincide when specific possibilities arising from the \textit{analogia entis} are justified by grace through faith and thereby attain certain truth-value.

The participation of man's mind in God does not take place outwith particular time and space. Tillich sometimes appears to be tempted by the idea of direct, timeless, mystical union of man's mind with God, but in the final analysis he holds to a "realistic" theory that man's mind participates in God by penetrating into the depth of the present
(place and time) "until the unconditioned ground of everything real, or the unconditioned power in every power of being, is reached."\(^1\) Tillich calls this approach to God "self-transcending realism" or "beliefful realism." The penetration is not initiated by man himself but comes about through "grace" in which "we are grasped...by the unapproachably holy which is the ground of our being."\(^2\) Being so "grasped" is an "ecstatic" experience of "theonomous reason," or, in other words, an experience of revelation through faith.

B. Beliefful Realism. Revelation and Faith.

1. Self-transcending Realism

"Self-transcending realism"\(^3\) or "beliefful realism"\(^4\) consists partly of the principle of contemporaneity, which commands us to look at "concrete existence, its 'here and now,' in order to discover the power of things,"\(^5\) and partly it consists of the "religious depth of historical

\(^1\) P.E., p. 35.  
\(^2\) Ibid., p. 38.  
\(^3\) Ibid., p. 35.  
\(^4\) I.H., p. 13.  
\(^5\) P.E., p. 30.
realism\(^1\) which is the only approach to reality that "makes the participation in the whole of human existence a condition of true knowledge."\(^2\) The combination of these two factors results in the participation of the whole personality in the depth of the historical present.

Since "beliefful realism" involves the religious depth of historical realism one goes a long way towards understanding the former by understanding the latter. Historical realism comprises total union with unique, unrepeatable, fateful events in every historical situation. Such union includes "penetrating into the deeper levels" of one's personality and one's social situation because "knowing the really real of our historical existence presupposes the knowledge of the really real in ourselves."\(^3\) In accordance with Tillich's basic distinction for all knowledge of reality -- that it is the union of detachment and union -- historical realism includes a measure of detachment from, as well as union

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\(^1\)Ibid., p. 36. \(^2\)Ibid., p. 32. \(^3\)Ibid.
with, the events in the historical situation. In fact, Tillich says, "the ideal of knowledge in historical realism is the union of scientific objectivity with a passionate understanding and transformation of the historical situation."

The intense concern about penetrating the present moment does not exclude the relevance of certain principles and criteria which transcend the present. Contemporaneity does not imply a total openness to the flux of time. Ethical principles and formal criteria are included in the process of analysis. "Without universal criteria of justice, no profound analysis of an historical situation is possible. Without principles of the ideal, the real cannot be interpreted in its depth."

The changing circumstances of history and the universal principles are related in historical realism in a "method of correlation" similar to the method of correlation which is the method of theology. The principles of essential reality are known in and through the historical situation and the historical situation is known by the use of

\[1\] Ibid., p. 34.  
\[2\] Ibid., p. 5.
the principles of essential reality. This process is circular, and for this reason there is a question whether it ever takes place in the way in which it is described. Circular processes are always suspect because of the finite necessity of starting a process at a particular point which then, in some degree, precedes the rest of the circle." Nevertheless, in historical realism there is clearly some correlation between events and principles. As Tillich claims, "historical realism prevents the principles from becoming abstract. It expresses them in the light of the present and as answers to the questions implied in an historical situation." The latter quotation shows the close similarity between correlation in historical realism and correlation in theological method. Both deal with questions and answers. Both derive the questions from the "situation" and the answers from beyond the situation.

The intensification of historical realism into self-transcending or beliefful realism is the

1 Ibid.
deepening of the penetration into the present until "the unconditioned ground of everything real, or the unconditioned power in every power of being, is reached."¹ This "deepening of the penetration" suggests that there is a continuous, steady gradation from the finite particularities of history to the infinite, unconditioned power of being itself. Tillich strongly insists that this is not so. "Being-itself infinitely transcends every finite being. There is no proportion or gradation between the finite and the infinite. There is an absolute break, an infinite 'jump'."² The infinite "jump" between finite being and God does not prevent finite being from participating in God. "Everything finite participates in being-itself and in its infinity. Otherwise it would not have the power of being."³ This is a problem for the doctrine of God. The point at issue for the moment is that the transcendence in the process of self-transcending realism locates the cognitive encounter of man with God completely beyond the

¹Ibid.
²S.T. I, p. 283.
³Ibid.
context of ordinary intelligibility. Tillich designates this dimension by saying that it "transcends objectivity as well as subjectivity,"¹ and "transcends both the drives of the non-rational unconscious and the structures of the rational conscious,"² and is "beyond the contrast of essential and existential being."³ The dimension of transcendence is the dimension where God "dwells," and it is the dimension of mystery. It is disclosed only to faith in revelation. In Tillich's thought the terms revelation, faith, ecstatic reason, self-transcending realism, and beliefful realism all designate substantially the same thing, and that is the encounter of men with God considered from different perspectives. All represent in some aspect the epistemology of theological ontology.

2. Revelation.

It is easier and more appropriate to centre the discussions of the epistemology of theological


²D.F., p. 6.

³S.T. I, p. 262.
ontology around the term "revelation" than around any of the other terms because Tillich himself uses it more than any of the others. Revelation is "the manifestation of the mystery of being for the cognitive function of human reason."¹ A more comprehensive definition is given by Tillich elsewhere: "Revelation is the self-manifestation of ultimate reality in ecstatic experiences expressed in symbols."²

Man's activity in revelation is akin in some ways to his activity in the rest of knowledge. He "participates" in the ultimately real and is still separated from it in much the same way as reason is united and detached from all its finite objects. The cognitive side of revelation "is not qualitatively different from knowledge in other realms, in so far as it unites separation and participation, although it does so in a special way."³

¹Ibid., p. 143.


Tillich believes that his concept of cognitive participation is the common factor which unites all kinds of knowledge. He says: "...The concept of cognitive participation removes the barrier between the different forms of cognitive encounter and, above all, it rolls up the iron curtain which now separates religious and controlling knowledge." ¹ In the article from which the latter quotations are taken, Tillich calls the cognitive act in revelation "cognitive commitment" which is identical to "beliefful realism" or one aspect of faith. In cognitive commitment participation is the predominant characteristic. It is a "total, person-centred participation," meaning not "the surrender of oneself as subject to an object, even the highest object" but "rather the participation of the whole personality in that which transcends objectivity as well as subjectivity." ²

It is very difficult to determine clearly what Tillich really means by this transcending of the subject-object structure. Apparently, this

¹Ibid., p. 209. ²Ibid., pp. 208-209.
"participation in that which transcends objectivity as well as subjectivity" is not identical to the "grasping" function of subjective reason. To "reach" the unconditioned ground of everything real is not to "grasp" it because "it is the character of the unconditional that it cannot be grasped; its power includes its unapproachable mystery. If we try to grasp it, it is no longer the unconditional that we have in our hands—even if it has the highest religious or ontological names."¹ It is a real question how the cognitive act in revelation can be participation and not be "grasping" when the two seem to be inseparable in ordinary knowledge.

Tillich deals specifically with this question in his article in Sociologica. It is best to let him speak for himself.

But now the question must be answered; How is knowledge possible if its presupposition, the subject-object structure of reality, is transcended? What is left of the element of separation, objectivity, verification in this kind of encounter? The answer is that knowledge is an ontic relation and that, therefore, it is subject to the categories of being, above all to time. It is the time difference between the moment of uniting participation

¹P.E., p. 85.
and separating objectivation which makes religious, and—in some degree—all knowledge possible. This does not mean that a former participation is remembered and made an object of cognition. But it does mean that the moment is present in the cognitive moment and vice versa. Participation still persists in the moment of cognitive separation; the cognitive encounter includes moments of predominant participation, which I have called the perceptive moments, as well as moments of predominant separation, which I have called the cognitive moments. They alternate and establish in their totality a cognitive encounter. This is the situation in all realms, and it is the structure which makes religious knowledge possible.

Tillich's argument seems based on the assumption that in the moment of participation or union the subject-object distinction is absent and apparently transcended. In participation the knowledge of that which transcends subjectivity and objectivity is gained and then it is preserved in the "cognitive encounter" which is the totality of alternating moments of separation and union. The difficulty with this answer is that, as far as we can tell, participation ordinarily does not mean that the subject-object distinction is absent. Participation is an ontological concept on the second level of ontological distinctions.

1Sociologica, p. 209.
and is derived from the basic subject-object distinction. Neither participation nor any other ontological distinction can avoid being subject to the self-world or subject-object distinction. Hence, the attempt to explain revelatory "transcendent" knowledge in terms of participation is not successful unless the meaning of participation is changed from its normal meaning. Normally, it is in such an interdependent polar relationship with individualisation that the subject-object structure could not logically be transcended in participation.

Tillich's attempt to unite religious knowledge with ordinary knowledge by the concept of cognitive participation fails because participation in its ordinary sense, as it applies to ordinary knowledge, does not allow for the transcending of subjectivity and objectivity which is the chief mark of religious knowledge. If participation is to be used to explain revelatory knowledge than it must mean something different from the kind of participation disclosed by philosophical ontology.

Tillich's description of theological knowledge
as knowledge of that which transcends objectivity and subjectivity makes it illogical even to try and explain this knowledge as a function of an ontological structure, namely, participation. It is illogical because participation cannot, by definition, transcend subjectivity and objectivity. And such an explanation is illogical because something which is a function of God cannot possibly be explained in terms which assume complete literal adequacy of description. Neither God nor God's activities can be described in literal ontological terms which issue from the context of ontological reason because God is beyond this context of semantic rationality. Such an explanation cannot apply literally to him without restricting Him and conditioning Him by the necessities of our understanding of ontological possibilities. That God cannot be so limited is one of Tillich's main tenets of belief, and yet Tillich tried, with this one attempt at least, to describe that "which makes religious...knowledge possible,"¹ as though God in his "self-manifestation" must conform to certain

¹Ibid.
ontological possibilities. This attempt at showing in literal descriptive terms how participation in God is possible is abortive because it attempts the impossible. Its presence in Tillich's work can only be explained as a lapse from the methodological premises of his own theological ontology which holds that all statements about being-itself are metaphorical and cannot be purely literal.

Elsewhere in his work, Tillich "explains" revelatory knowledge in terms which are much more appropriate even though they are not literally explanatory. In these instances Tillich takes into account the truly unconditional character of revelation, or what might be called the gratuitous nature of God's self-manifestation. Here it is recognised that no description of human conditions or possibilities will explain the occurrence of revelation. As Tillich says in *Dynamics of Faith*, "There is no conditional way of reaching the unconditional; there is no finite way of reaching the infinite."¹ God's action in his self-manifestation cannot be designated by literal, finite, human terms

¹p. 14.
that retain the full connotations of semantic logic which is grounded in finite ontological possibilities. God's action must be designated by finite human terms that are not literal and do not retain all the connotations of semantic logic nor all the limitations of finite ontological possibility. This question of symbolic, or metaphorical, theological language will be dealt with presently. Meanwhile, the point we are making is that when Tillich describes the knowledge of faith, or revelatory knowledge, in metaphorical terms—terms which are not bound by all their ontological implications because they apply to God who is beyond ontology—then his description "rings true" and is more illuminating than when he tries to force revelatory knowledge into the literal categories which govern other kinds of knowledge.

3. Faith

The knowledge of faith, which comprises theological ontology, can best be described in terms of "immediate awareness." This description implies the point of central importance, namely, that

1D.F., p. 16.
knowledge of faith is "there" and indisputably real in spite of the impossibility of giving a literal account of its origin. Epistemology of theological ontology starts with the simple recognition of the knowledge of faith, the recognition that "man is able to understand in an immediate personal and central act the meaning of the ultimate, the unconditional, the absolute, the infinite. This alone makes faith a human potentiality."1 The foundation of the knowledge of faith is the stark fact of man's "awareness of the infinite to which he belongs but which he does not own like a possession."2

Tillich tries to account for this fact in several ways. He says: "This is a reality given to the self with its own nature. It is as immediate and as much beyond doubt as the self is to the self. It is the self in its self-transcending quality."3 This would seem to suggest that the knowledge of faith is derived by a kind of self-analysis which would render it completely

1Ibid., p. 9. 2Ibid. 3Ibid., p. 17.
subjective. This is not the case because Tillich believes there is an objective side to the knowledge of faith as well as a subjective side. The objective character of faith resides in the fact that the awareness is awareness of the real infinite which man "does not own like a possession." Tillich speaks of faith as "ultimate concern" and means by this term both the subjective concern in man and its objective counterpart, the Ultimate itself. The two sides are related in terms of their mutual "participation" in each other, "participation" being understood not in a strictly literal sense but in a metaphorical sense so that it can be said that knowledge of the ultimate, the infinite, the unconditional transcends the subject-object distinction.

"There is no faith without participation,"¹ and the participation goes both ways between man and God. However, the participation of God in man is prior in importance because if it were not there man would not be able to participate in it. The objective side of faith and revelation precedes the subjective experience of it. Considered from the

¹D.F., p. 100.
objective side, faith "is an act in which the
infinite participates beyond the limitations of
a finite act."\(^1\) God's participation in man trans-
sends the subject-object split because "God can
never be the object without being at the same time
subject."\(^2\) This is an axiom of Tillich's doctrine
of God, namely, that "in terms like ultimate, un-
conditional, infinite, absolute, the difference
between subjectivity and objectivity is overcome."\(^3\)
This is Tillich's way of speaking about the tradi-
tional doctrine of God as both transcendent and
immanent. "In the act of faith that which is the
source of this act is present beyond the cleavage
of subject and object. It is present as both and
beyond both." (Italics mine)\(^4\)

It is only metaphorically that one can speak
of man participating in God through faith. Since
"the ultimate of the act of faith and the ultimate
that is meant in the act of faith are one and the
same"\(^5\) one can hardly speak literally about man

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\(^1\) Ibid., p. 16.
\(^2\) Ibid., p. 11.
\(^3\) Ibid.
\(^4\) Ibid.
\(^5\) Ibid., p. 11.
participating as though the initiative came from him and the participation were accomplished by him. The initiative is God's and the participation is effected by him. Man participates in the Ultimate in the sense of being the locus where the Ultimate makes itself manifest. "He who is grasped and that by which he is grasped are, so to speak, at the same place."¹ Man participates in God in the sense that his person is coincident with God's presence.

Man participates in God in the sense that he is at one with the Ultimate in his faith, but he is also separated from God at the same time in that God is beyond man and man is less than and different from God. Tillich says: "He who has faith is separated from the object of his faith. Otherwise he would possess it."² Both participation and separation are essential elements in faith which, for Tillich, includes doubt. "Out of the element of participation follows the certainty of faith; out of the element of separation follows the doubt in faith. And each is essential for the nature of

¹D.F., p. 99. ²Ibid., p. 100.
faith. 1

4. ECSTASY

The element of man's participation in revela-
tory knowledge is spoken about by Tillich chiefly
in terms of ecstasy or "ecstatic reason." Ecstasy
is the phenomenon in which reason transcends it-
self in self-transcending realism or faith. It
is in the ecstatic transcending of reason that
the self participates in God, the Unconditional
who transcends subjectivity as well as objectivity.
Ecstasy is correlative to "immediate awareness" of
God in revelation. The term means "standing out-
side of oneself"—without ceasing to be oneself—
with all the elements which are united in the per-
sonal centre." 2 As this definition suggests,
ecstasy is a phenomenon in which union with God
coincides with the preservation of the self's
identity. Such a phenomenon is possible only be-
cause of the nature of God who is in and yet be-
yond all things.

Ecstasy does not mean mere enthusiasm for an
idea. Nor does it mean over-excitement brought on

1 Ibid. 2 Ibid., p. 7.
by frenzied emotion. Rather, it means the genuine experience in which the presence of God grasps a person's whole personality, "shakes" it and "transforms" it. The "shaking" experience of revelation is its negative side which is generally experienced as the "crisis" and "judgment" that occur when a man is made to see his own depths before the presence of God. Tillich believes that the shaking experience of revelation can also take the form of what he calls "ontological shock."\(^1\) This experience occurs when a man looks into the "abyss" of reason to the point where the meaning and rationale of reality are felt to be utterly beyond human comprehension and the final question arises: "why is there something and not nothing?" This is the startling question before which pure reason is completely frustrated. At this point and at every other point where revelation shakes the person the positive side of revelation is also present, "transforming" the person, forgiving, reconciling, revealing that the meaning and rationale of reality reside in God who is the ground of being and meaning.

\(^1\)S.T. I, p. 126.
In revelation and in the ecstatic experience in which it is received, the ontological shock is preserved and overcome at the same time. Ecstasy unites the experience of the abyss to which reason in all its functions is driven with the experience of the ground in which reason is grasped by the mystery of its own depth and of the depth of being generally.  

In ecstasy reason is transcended but not destroyed. "In the ecstasy of faith there is an awareness of truth and of ethical values." The cognitive aspect of ecstasy may be called inspiration provided that this term does not have the connotations of a mechanical act of dictation nor simply mean a creative mood or a burst of intuition.

5. Miracles

Neither ecstasy, nor self-transcendence, nor revelation, nor faith occurs in a vacuum outside the circumstances of time and place. Being transcended beyond the subject-object structure does not mean being transported beyond reality. The subjective experience of ecstasy is always accompanied by an objective phenomenon in reality. These objective phenomena Tillich calls "miracles," and he sums up his doctrine of miracles in three points.

A genuine miracle is first of all an event which

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1 Ibid.
2 D.F., p. 7.
is astonishing, unusual, shaking, without contradicting the rational structure of reality. In the second place, it is an event which points to the mystery of being, expressing its relation to us in a definite way. In the third place, it is an occurrence which is received as a sign-event in an ecstatic experience. Only if these three conditions are fulfilled can one speak of a genuine miracle.¹

Ecstasy and miracle are interdependent—so much so that the words describing each phenomenon are interchangeable. "One can say that ecstasy is the miracle of the mind and that miracle is the ecstasy of reality."² Miracles, understood in this sense, are quite different from miracles as they are traditionally conceived, that is, as supernatural interferences in natural processes. Tillich very strenuously claims that the latter understanding of miracles is unacceptable because it leads to the conclusion that the rational structure of natural reality is shattered every time a miracle occurs—and this would mean that God, the ground of being, would be contradicted by himself when he inspires ecstasy and instigates miracles.

Tillich is right when he observes that this is the traditional problem that accompanies the traditional view of miracles. But there is a question

¹S.T. I, p. 130. ²Ibid.
arising from Tillich's own interpretation of miracles as being completely continuous with the natural order. The question which Tillich fails to answer is "in what sense are miracles truly 'objective,' and, if they are completely continuous with the natural order, in what sense are they initiated by God?".

The difficulty about making ecstasy and miracle so completely correlative is that the "objective" side of the revelatory event can claim only doubtful objectivity. When the so-called "objective" side of the revelatory event is "objective" only in conjunction with the subjective apprehension of it, then the question of its real independent objectivity is left unanswered. Surely it is an admissible question to ask "what is the ontological status of miraculous events in themselves apart from their correlation with the ecstatic experience which they sometimes engender?". When this question is addressed to Tillich's description of miraculous events the answer is far from clear.

A genuine miracle is "first of all an event which is astonishing, unusual, shocking." Does this refer to an event which is astonishing, unusual, and
shaking in itself, in its essential character, or does it refer to an event which is astonishing, etc., only to a person in whom the Holy Spirit has moved to cause an ecstatic experience? I think that the latter alternative is more closely akin to Tillich's position than the former. If this is so, then the objective side which Tillich claims for revelatory events is, in fact, either not really objective or else not really miraculous. An event such as the potter working at his wheel was an objective event which engendered Jeremiah's experience of ecstatic revelation, but the event in itself was not miraculous. It was miraculous only in correlation with Jeremiah's subjective experience. Hence, it could be somewhat misleading to speak of the "miracle" as being the objective side of the revelatory event. Yet this is what Tillich does. The objective events of which Tillich speaks must be somewhat like the case of the potter's wheel. They are completely natural events. He prefers to call them "sign-events," and would admit, I believe, that the distinctively religious meaning indicated by the "sign" can only be apprehended by a religious subject. Without the
religious subject the event is not a sign-event at all but remains an ordinary event. In so far as the ordinary event remains a natural event in itself, apart from any religious subjects, it must be agreed that it has incontestable objectivity. But it does not appear to be as evident that the objective event in itself has anything miraculous about it. Tillich links the category of the miraculous with the objective side of the revelatory event but it appears that, in fact, the miraculous is not ontologically so linked but, rather, could more accurately be described as a prescription of the religious subject who experiences certain natural events as unusual, shaking and astonishing. The concept of the miraculous, according to this understanding, would not be a descriptive one in the strict sense of that word because it is essentially dependent on the subjective condition of the subject being of a particular type. The terms "descriptive" and "objective" in their strict senses are not unrelated to subjects, perhaps, but they can hardly be stretched to include an essential dependence on a very particular type of subject. The truly objective natural events which are experienced as
Revelatory might better be described ontologically as natural coefficients of ecstasy, rather than as miracles.

The question seems to hinge on whether or not God really initiates the "unusual, shaking and astonishing" events which Tillich calls miracles. At times, one is given the impression that God does initiate special events which are somehow continuous with the natural process while at the same time standing within "God's directing creativity." Tillich says that sign-events "consist in special constellations of elements of reality in correlation with special constellations of elements of the mind." More often, however, it seems that Tillich leaves no room for such special events being specially initiated by God. If Tillich ever really asks the question of God's special initiative in nature apart from inspiration by the Holy Spirit, then it would seem clear that he answers it in the negative. He claims, for instance, that in the synoptic records of the miracles of Jesus "miracles are given only to those for whom they are

\[1\text{Ibid., p. 130.}\]
sign-events, to those who receive them in faith. Jesus refuses to perform 'objective' miracles. They are a contradiction in terms."¹ Again, when he is discussing the actual objective events which accompany ecstatic experiences he seems to suggest that these objective elements are universal, part of the ontological structure.

As ecstasy presupposes the shock of non-being in the mind, so sign-events presuppose the stigma of non-being in the reality. In shock and stigma, which are strictly correlated, the negative side of the mystery of being appears...

There is a stigma that appears on everything, the stigma of finitude, or implicit and in-escapable non-being."² (Italics mine.)

The positive side of the mystery of being seems to be potentially revealed in no less universal a distribution. "Revelation is the manifestation of the depth of reason and the ground of being."³ No place and nothing is without the depth of reason and the ground of being. Hence, "There is no reality, thing, or event which cannot become a bearer of the mystery of being."⁴ God's initiative in revealing himself does not appear to consist in

¹Ibid., p. 130. ²Ibid., p. 129.
³Ibid., p. 130. ⁴Ibid., p. 131.
in initiating special events in nature and history so much as in inspiring men's minds to receive signs of him in correlation with natural, non-special events. Miracles are sign-events not so much because of the existence of events which are special in themselves but because God has moved in a man's heart and mind to see a natural event as being specially revelatory of God. Tillich would seem to be in basic agreement with Elizabeth Barrett Browning when she wrote:

Earth's crammed with heaven,
And every common bush as fire with God;
But only he who sees, takes off his shoes.¹

6. Mediums of Revelation and Faith

Revelation, having contemporaneity, "is invariably revelation for someone in a concrete situation of concern."² "Revelations received outside the concrete situation can be apprehended only as reports about revelations which other groups assert that they have received. The knowledge of such reports, and even a keen understanding of them,

¹Aurora Leigh, bk. VII, Lines 321 ff.

²B.T. I, p. 123.
does not make them revelatory for anyone who does not belong to the group which is grasped by the revelation." This does not mean that a particular revelation is bound to only one moment in all history. The same revelation may occur again and again, the first time being the "original" revelation and all subsequent occurrences being "dependent" revelations. Tillich indicates the difference between original and dependent revelations by calling original revelations the "inspiration" of the Holy Spirit while dependent revelations are better called the "illumination" of the Spirit.

Inspiration or illumination can occur in connection with any possible concrete situation. Throughout the history of mankind "almost every type of reality has become a medium of revelation somewhere."  

Tillich deals with the mediums of Revelation under three headings: (a) nature, (b) history, groups and individuals, and (c) the word. He maintains firmly that there is no "natural revelation" if this means nature being used as an argumentative
basis for conclusions about the mystery of being.
"If it is natural knowledge it is not revelation."¹ Natural knowledge only goes as far as to frame questions about the mystery of being. The actual revelation through nature occurs in relation to either the "extraordinarily regular" or the "extraordinarily irregular." In regular things and events God tends to reveal his Logos quality "without ceasing to be the divine mystery." In the irregular God shows his  ἰησοῦς character without ceasing to be divine. Different types of religion result from fastening on one kind of manifestation of God through nature to the exclusion of the other. Tillich cites Kant’s religion as an example of the social and ethical type of religion which hold in high regard the extraordinarily regular as a medium of revelation. Kierkegaard’s religion gives evidence of how "the extraordinarily irregular as a medium of revelation determines the individualistic and paradoxical type of religion."²

Political events or other special events in history may be experienced by groups or individuals

¹Ibid., p. 133. ²Ibid., p. 132.
as manifestations of the mystery of being. Then, in turn, the prophetic interpretation of these revelatory events in history may become mediums of revelation. The individual in himself may be a medium of revelation, notably through personal encounters with others who see him as being "transparent for the ground of being." This means that the individual's "faith and his love can become sign-events for those who are grasped by their power and creativity." The individual's personality, human and imperfect as it is, miraculously reveals something about the mystery of being. It becomes transparent for the ground of being. This optical metaphor is not inappropriate for revelation which is traditionally associated with other optical metaphors such as "illumination," "disclosure," and "vision."

The optical metaphor of transparency is appropriate also in connection with the question of words as a medium of revelation. Words themselves are not revealed. There are no revealed commandments or revealed doctrines. Revelation occurs through.

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1Ibid., p. 135.
words and so it is fitting to speak of seeing through words which have symbolic meaning. Revelation uses ordinary language which has specific literal meaning but it uses it as a medium, which is to say that the revelation does not reside in the literal meaning but "comes through" it. The literal words can thus be said to be "transparent" for God who reveals himself through them. If the revelation resided in the literal words, commandments, and doctrines themselves, then it would mean that to know the words would be to know revelation. But this contradicts the meaning of revelation as a contemporaneous event which is the work of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit would not be necessary simply to know the literal words.

It seems that for Tillich the chief function of words as a medium of revelation is to accompany revelatory events and express their meaning. The events are really the source of the "grasping, shaking, and transforming." The words serve to articulate the mysterious moving occasion. "The word is not a medium of revelation in addition to the other mediums; it is a necessary element in all forms of revelation.... Being proceeds
speaking, and the revelatory reality precedes and determines the revelatory word.\textsuperscript{1}

C. The Problem of Symbols.

1. Introduction: In any contemporary theological epistemology a theory of symbols must have a central place. Perhaps the chief reason for this is an apologetic one, namely, that in view of the recent and widespread interest in linguistics the language of faith cannot escape the questions about literalness and semantic rationality that are being raised on all sides. But there is a constructive reason as well. It is Tillich's belief that symbolic language is more appropriate and more adequate to articulate the matters of faith, especially distinctions about God, than any other kind of language. A theory of symbols, then, becomes a helpful, even necessary, theological implement to serve the highest ends of the theological enterprise. Tillich says about the matter, "The center of my theological doctrine of knowledge is the concept of symbol."\textsuperscript{2}

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid., p. 133.

\textsuperscript{2}"Reply to Interpretation and Criticism," The Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 333.
One might question whether a theory of symbols is in any way relevant to ontology (philosophical or theological) when ontology presumably deals strictly with concepts and not symbols. The answer to this query lies in the understanding of the scope of both philosophical and theological ontology. It is our contention that any treatment of ultimate questions, that is, any articulation of God, the Unconditional, Absolute, and Ultimate Reality, goes beyond the range of purely conceptual thinking.

The implications of this conviction are that when either discipline, philosophy or theology, attempts to articulate God or Ultimate Reality it is forced to adopt the same methodological character because there is only one basic method of making true articulations about God. It follows that a rigid distinction between philosophy and theology in so far as they deal with God is not only superfluous but misleading. It is true that Tillich maintains such a rigid theoretical distinction between philosophy and theology. In practice, however, the distinction really disappears and his philosophical method blends into union with his theological method at the point where the "object" of each coincides, that is, when
each deals with God. At this point it is not of first importance what the common discipline is called. We are calling it "theological ontology" because a large number of the symbols employed have ontological connotations. Other symbols used do not have obviously ontological connotations, and when the discipline uses these symbols it might be more accurately called "theology." In either case the fundamental discipline is the same. The source and connotations of the symbolic material differ, but as we shall see in the theory of symbols, this difference is not significant enough to divorce the two disciplines from each other. The fact that the discipline in question deals with symbols whose referent is God is the main consideration, and the fact that symbols of any kind whose referent is God are verified in the same way guarantees the basic methodological unity of any speaking about God.

In view of the above considerations, the importance of a theory of symbols for any speaking about God, including "theological ontology," can hardly be overestimated. However, because the emphasis on linguistics is a comparatively recent one, it is only very recently that Tillich has developed his
theory of symbols at any great length. One suspects that the theory is still developing and that Tillich's final position has not been definitely settled upon. Evidence for this is especially clear with respect to Tillich's apparent changes of mind about whether or not all statements about God without exception are symbolic in character. We shall examine this question shortly.

Because some of the questions arising in a theory of symbols deal also with central theological issues, (as for example: the one mentioned in the above paragraph) it is difficult to treat the problem of symbols without becoming deeply involved in other theological matters and, in particular, without anticipating questions which will be dealt with in the subsequent treatment of the content of theological ontology. We may find it necessary to "sin bravely" in dealing rather summarily with other theological issues in the course of handling the problem of symbols.


The most distinctive characteristic of symbols as they are conceived by Tillich is their two-sided
nature, consisting of a negative and a positive capacity which reside together in tension as long as a symbol remains a symbol. A symbol necessarily involves a double designation: that which is used as a symbol points beyond itself to that which it symbolizes and, at the same time, retains its own identity and stands for what it is in itself. Hence, a human father is a symbol for God the Father, pointing to Him and indicating something about Him, and, at the same time, a human father manifests his own identity as simply a human father. In this way, "Religious symbols are double-edged. They are directed toward the infinite which they symbolize and toward the finite through which they symbolize it."¹

These two directions give rise to the positive and negative capacities which a symbol has with regard to its function of disclosing something characteristic of God. In so far as the finite material of the symbol is suggestive of God it has a positive capacity as a symbol, but in so much as the finite material is restrictive, indicating only

¹S.T. I, pp. 283-287.
its proper finite meaning, then it has a negative capacity as a symbol. When God speaks through the finite affirming to us something of Himself in the meaning of the finite then the finite has positive symbolic value. But when a finite thing "speaks for itself" in the name of God, that is to say, as a symbol of God and tends to delimit God by imposing on Him all its own particularities, when a symbol purports to identify God with its own proper finite meaning, then the symbol has a negative value. The positive and negative capacities are present in all religious symbols. In fact, Tillich defines symbols primarily in terms of these capacities. He says: "A symbolic expression is one whose proper meaning is negated by that to which it points. And yet it is also affirmed by it, and this affirmation gives the symbolic expression an adequate basis for pointing beyond itself."¹

The affirmation and negation are not static but in dynamic tension. The positive and negative capacities of symbols struggle with each other as the divine and demonic struggle within every finite entity in the historical process. Within symbols

¹S. T. I, pp. 235-236.
this struggle appears as the two-fold tendency "toward religious transcendence" and "toward cultural objectification." Cultural objectification is the tendency of symbols to cease actively to reveal God and to become significant not for their capacity of religious transcendence but for their own objective authority. When this happens the negative capacity of symbols has become predominant, and this means that the symbolic material itself has become the object of knowledge rather than the living reality of God to which the symbol points. In other words, because of this negative tendency toward cultural objectification, religious symbols "are forced inevitably into the status of the demonic," that is to say, they tend to become idolatrous in so far as they assume for themselves the authority which rightly belongs to God alone, or claim divine dignity for their own finite particulars.

To call a characteristic of symbols "negative" is to imply a criticism of that character, and there

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2. Ibid.
is a rightful question about what, in this case, are the grounds for criticism. Another way of describing the criticism of symbols which discloses their negative capacity is to speak about "demythologization." Myths are "symbols of faith combined in stories about divine-human encounters,"¹ and therefore are characterized by the same negative capacity as symbols are. Since this negative capacity of myths and symbols is their tendency to assume the status of literalness, the basic criticism of myths and symbols is the insistence that they are myths and symbols and not literal words or stories. To recognize a myth as a myth is to "break" the myth, and "broken myths" are ones in which the negative capacity is recognised. Now it must be asked: "Why should the tendency toward literalism or cultural objectification of myths and symbols be regarded as negative?" Tillich is most explicit about the answer to this question. The grounds for "breaking" myths or insisting upon negative tendency in symbols is the religious awareness of the infinite transcendence of God, an understanding that God is beyond all finite expression.

¹D.F., p. 49.
so that for any symbol its "proper meaning is neglected by that to which it points." Tillich makes himself quite clear when he says that "Christianity denies by its very nature any unbroken myth, because its presupposition is the first commandment: the affirmation of the ultimate as ultimate and the rejection of any kind of idolatry."¹

The importance and relevance of this presupposition in Tillich's theology cannot be over-estimated as it is perhaps the most central and far-reaching operating factor in his creative work. This conviction of the infinite majesty of God is the religious impulse on the basis of which Tillich sees all articulations of God to be symbolic, which is to say that they contain a measure of inadequacy to denote God accurately. Furthermore, the religious conviction concerning the transcendence of God is operative in formulating the doctrine of God, as we shall see in the next chapter, and it determines Tillich's "Protestant principle" and the criteria for the verification and truth of theological words and statements. It is also a dominant presupposition of the doctrine of Salvation in so far

¹ D.F., pp. 50-51.
as it is an integral element in the doctrine of Justification by God's free grace alone which for Tillich is the main content of the gospel of redemption.

Having dealt up to this point largely with the negative element in symbols and the grounds for the criticism implied, it is necessary to examine the positive capacity of symbols and the basis for the affirmation of symbols as having positive value in the revelation of God. The positive element in symbols is rooted in a religious impulse, although in a different impulse from the one in which the negative side of symbols is founded. Religious symbols can have positive value in revealing God because of the relationship between the human logos and the divine Logos. This relationship is described by Tillich as analogia entis. The structure of being, understood in the broadest possible sense, is the logos. This logos is made conscious in man's mind, or in subjective ontological reason. It is Tillich's belief, however, that the logos in man and in being is made in the image of the Logos of God. In other words, being, the structure of which is microcosmically present in man, is grounded
or rooted in being-itself which God is. The relationship of being grounded or rooted in God is more specifically designated as a relationship of "participation." Hence, the finite symbols of religious language, which are part of the articulations of the human \textit{logos}, have a positive capacity to denote something about God because they participate in God as all distinctions of the human \textit{logos} participate in the divine \textit{logos}, or as all being participates in being-itself.

The \textit{analogia entis}, it will be noted, is not the same kind as that of St. Thomas Aquinas who conceived of it as a condition of reality which allowed truths about God to be inferred by logical extension of truths about the world. The difference in Millich's \textit{analogia entis} is that it specifically denies the validity of any necessary logical relationship between the \textit{logos} of the world and the \textit{logos} of God. The relationship is not logically established but issues strictly from the belief that "in the beginning, God created\textsuperscript{1} and "God created man in his own image.\textsuperscript{2} The belief in God's creativity through

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the *Logos* is the religious impulse beneath the assumption that religious symbols can have positive value in revealing God. The logical inference on which St. Thomas' *analogia entis* depended is seen by Tillich to be impossible because of the fact that symbolic words and statements, with their inherent negative element of inadequacy, cannot enter into deductive syllogisms.

The relationship between the human *logos* and the divine *Logos* can be further clarified. Issuing from the human *logos* are analyses of man's existential situation. From these analyses there arise certain questions which man is strongly constrained to answer but for which no answer can be found within the existential situation itself. Through faith, however, the divine *Logos* is seen to give answers to these questions. If the presupposition is held in faith that the human *logos* is grounded in the divine *Logos*, then, through revelation, answers become evident to the questions arising out of the human situation. Both the questions and the answers are embodied in religious symbols. Tillich says:

> For religious symbols are partly a way of stating the same situation with which existential
analyses are concerned; partly they are answers to the questions implied in the situation. They are the former when they speak of man and his predicament. They are the latter when they speak of God and his reaction to this predicament.

More yet must be said about the relationship of God to the religious symbols which reveal him. Because the relationship is not one of logical necessity then the positive capacity of symbols is not a necessary element either. Symbols can "die" when their positive capacity ceases to be active, or, in other words, when God ceases to reveal himself through them. However, because God is faithful and steadfast in his relationship to man, there is a sense in which the positive capacity of symbols persists so that Tillich can speak about the "inmate power" of symbols which arises from their "participation" in God. After the fact that symbols "point beyond themselves,"¹ and make "perceptible" something which is "intrinsically invisible,"² "the third characteristic of the symbol ³


²Religious Experience and Truth, p. 4.

³Ibid., p. 301.
is its innate power.\textsuperscript{1}

This innate power of symbols distinguishes them from "the mere sign which is impotent in itself."\textsuperscript{2} Signs can be arbitrarily chosen whereas symbols cannot because they must participate in that which they symbolize if they are really to be symbols. Tillich is most emphatic in stressing the necessity of distinguishing between signs and symbols. The two are often confused, he says, and as a result, symbols are degraded in popular opinion as having "the connotation of non-real,"\textsuperscript{3} and are not understood to have the power which they really do have.

The fact of participation of symbols indicates that they "cannot be created at will."\textsuperscript{4} They are not a matter of expediency or convention but they must have "acceptability" in a group in order for them to continue to live. Tillich believes that symbols are "born" out of the "unconscious-conscious

\textsuperscript{1} Ibid., p. 308.  \textsuperscript{2} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{3} S.T., I, p. 237.

\textsuperscript{4} Religious Experience and Truth, p. 4.
reaction of a group, by which he appears to mean out of the "collective unconscious" in a Jungian sense. A symbol coming from this source may come into actual existence through an individual from whom it first "springs forth."

The power of symbols is reflected in another characteristic, namely, their "integrating and disintegrating power" which Tillitch understands as their "elevating, quieting, and stabilizing" propensity and their "tremendous power of...destruction." Symbols "by no means are...harmless, semantic expressions." Since all religious faith "must be expressed symbolically" it is implicit that all the transforming power of religious faith must come through symbols. Hence, Tillitch's characterization of symbols as powerful realities is certainly substantiated for the Christian by his experience of Christian symbols.

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1 Ibid.  
3 Religious Experience and Truth, p. 302.  
4 Ibid., p. 5.  
5 Ibid.  
6 Ibid., p. 6.  
7 D.F., p. 44.
Tillich divides religious symbols into four different kinds which fall into two groups or "levels" with three kinds in the first group and one kind in the second group. The first level or group of religious symbols includes all the symbols which "point directly to the referent of all religious symbols,"¹ in other words, which point directly to God. This group includes first of all the symbols which name God and describe him by applying to him via eminences certain valued qualities like personality, love, justice, etc. As we suggested before, even these eminent qualities are negated in view of the True Eminence of God. As Tillich says: "The via eminences... needs as its balance the via negationes, and the unity of both is the via symbolica."²

The second kind of symbols in the first group consists of those which speak of God's actions "like creation, providence, miracles, incarnation, consummation, etc."³ These statements about God's

¹Religious Experience and Truth, p. 8.
²The Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 334.
³Religious Experience and Truth, p. 9.
actions are always symbolic because they cannot avoid a measure of inadequacy in so far as they subject God to the finite context of time and space and tend to restrict him to the finite meaning of the words used to describe his actions.

Besides symbols describing God Himself and His actions there is a kind of symbol which is comprised of God's "sacramental presence" in finite things. Tillich believes this is the "oldest" kind of symbol since "the basic religious experience is that of the presence of the holy in concrete things, persons, or actions here and now."\(^1\)

The second level of symbols includes only one kind which Tillich calls "supporting"\(^2\) or "pointing" symbols. These do not point directly to God but point to the first level of symbols which point to God. Secondary symbols are ones which have religious meaning but which depend on primary symbols for their meaning rather than depending directly on God as primary symbols do. These additional symbols include such things as cultic gestures and illustrative symbols. As examples Tillich suggests "water, light,

\(^1\)Ibid. \(^2\)Ibid.
oil, or poetic symbols in which a primary religious symbol is artistically resymbolized, or metaphoric expressions as they appear in parables or are used in poetry.\footnote{Ibid.}

Like all other religious symbols, those on the second level can lose their dynamic religious aspect and "degenerate into mere signs."\footnote{Ibid., p. 313.} This religious aspect of symbols is their actual revelatory power to show God to a person through faith. It is the religious aspect which really makes a symbol a symbol. Without the power of revelation a word or an action or idea cannot be a religious symbol. It may continue to be a sign with ecclesiastical or sectarian or cultic associations, but unless it creates an actual revelatory encounter of a person with God it is not a real religious symbol. Tillich takes the word "religious" with utmost seriousness, restricting its meaning to those occasions when God is really involved through faith. When "religious" symbols are mentioned he means symbols in which God is involved with power through ecstasy and miracles.

The symbol of God is the most powerful and most
basic of all religious symbols and warrants special consideration. There has been some confusion among Tillich's readers on the question whether he is making God Himself into a symbol. Certainly, his language on the subject has not always been clear and unequivocal. In *Dynamics of Faith*, however, he has dealt specifically with this question and made his position quite clear. The word "God" and the idea of God behind the word are symbols because they reside in the realm of finitude, the sphere of the human logos. As such, "God," the symbol, has negative and positive elements inherent in it like all other symbols. But the Ultimate Reality in which the symbol of "God" participates is not a symbol. "God is symbol for God."1 The meaning of this cryptic statement is simply that the True God transcends anything we can say about Him and to that extent negates even our highest conception of Him, thereby making even the word and idea of "God" symbolic. At the same time, the True God is the power that comes to us in our symbol God. There is no doubt that for Tillich God

1 D.F., p. 48.
is real although he both transcends reality as we know it and thoroughly penetrates it, too. Tillich uses the terms "ultimate" or "unconditioned transcendent" or, at one point, "the God above God" to convey the meaning of the infinite transcendency of God which threatens any finite conception that claims to circumscribe God within its own literal meaning. God is invisible as well as revealed. These two basic conditions make the symbolic way of knowing God inescapable.

There is one compelling question which arises in connection with the claim that God must be known symbolically. It may appear as though by this method we are left with a vast set of partly adequate terms none of which unequivocally designates God. All the symbols may appear to be "floating in thin air" with no guarantee that any of them really reveals God at all. One is constrained to ask: "Can the referent of religious symbols not be reached in some sure, unequivocal way?" Tillich says the questions arising here can be summed up in one key question, namely: "Is there a non-symbolic statement about the referent of religious symbols?". ¹ A non-symbolic

¹Religious Experience and Truth, p. 8.
statement would literally designate God and provide an "anchor" on which all the other symbols would be grounded. Tillich subscribes to this constraint and recognizes the necessity for at least one non-symbolic statement about God. He says: "An early criticism by Professor Urban of Yale forced me to acknowledge that in order to speak of symbolic knowledge one must delimit the symbolic realm by an unsymbolic statement."1 Again he says: "If this question [of a possible non-symbolic statement] could not be answered affirmatively the necessity of symbolic language for religion could not be proved and the whole argument would lead into a vicious circle."2 This conclusion and the constraint behind it must be carefully examined.

It is my belief that it is precisely at this point in his theory of symbols that Tillich gets into serious difficulties and is even inconsistent. Furthermore, I believe it can be shown that this conclusion of his regarding the necessity of a non-symbolic statement is the opening through which his

1 The Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 334.

2 Religious Experience and Truth, p. 6.
Idealistic philosophy intrudes upon his theology and produces some ground for the charge that he subjects theology to a philosophical system. The conclusion about symbols is at the very heart of the philosophical-theological schizophrenia which is evident in Tillich's work. It is at this point that what we have formerly called Tillich's rationalistic bias is given a systematic sanction to operate legitimately within the theological sphere. It is here that the opposing concepts of philosophy and theology meet head on and philosophy is given recognition over faith. The recognition of a purely philosophical constraint, which is present in the acceptance on logical grounds of a non-symbolic statement about God, is not unequivocally made. Theology and philosophy continue to battle in spite of Tillich's confession of the necessary force of Professor Urban's philosophical argument. The theological constraints keep asserting themselves even though they are not reconciled to the main philosophical premise. The result of the battle is the inconsistency which we are about to document.

Tillich has never really resolved the question
of whether a non-symbolic statement about God is possible or not. As we saw above, he explicitly stated the necessity for one. The non-symbolic statement about God which he believes is the only possible one is that "God is being-itself." On the basis that God is being-itself all other symbolic statements about God are held to be possible. On the basis of this one non-symbolic statement the relationship to God of all ontological analysis is secured, giving a theoretical basis for using ontological terms symbolically to articulate God. Because God is being-itself, the structure of being has God in it and therefore has a positive basis for symbolic assertions about God. This one non-symbolic statement, however, is not incontestably non-symbolic, and Tillich shows signs of being uneasy about awarding it unsymbolic status. At various other places in his writings he comes very close to denying that being-itself can non-symbolically be applied to God.

Over the years Tillich appears to have vacillated away from and back to the claim that being-

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1 S. T. I, p. 264.
itself can be non-symbolically applied to God.
Prior to 1940 Tillich believed that no statement about God could be literally applied to him. Then, in an article in the *Journal of Liberal Religion* (Summer, 1940) he accepted Professor Urban's criticism mentioned above. In 1951 Tillich published *Systematic Theology I* and explicitly held that the statement that "God is being-itself" is the only literal one that can be made about God. In 1952 in his "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism" in *The Theology of Paul Tillich* Tillich seems not quite so sure, still arguing, however, that "being-itself" is not symbolic.¹ In *The Courage to Be*, also published in 1952, Tillich appears to have reverted to his former position when he says: "To speak unsymbolically about being-itself is untrue."² In 1954 in *Love, Power and Justice*, Tillich strengthens this claim by stating that "to say anything about God in the literal sense of the words used means to say something false about him. The symbolic...is the only true way of speaking about God."³ By 1957, however, when *Systematic Theology II*
was published he seems to have shifted his position again, but not precisely back to saying that "God is being-itself" is the only literal statement one can make about God.

The question arises (and has arisen in public discussion) as to whether there is a point at which a non-symbolic assertion about God must be made. There is such a point, namely, the statement that everything we say about God is symbolic. Such a statement is an assertion about God which itself is not symbolic. Otherwise we would fall into a circular argument. ¹

Tillich follows this re-acceptance of Professor Urban's criticism by immediately giving the other side of the question. "On the other hand," he says, "if we make one non-symbolic assertion about God, his ecstatic-transcendent character seems to be endangered."² Here we see the philosopher and theologian in Tillich at the most intense point of conflict. The philosophical element is never completely overcome. In 1961 in *Religious Experience and Truth*, Tillich clearly re-affirms the necessity of one non-symbolic statement about God on the grounds that without it "the whole argument would lead into a vicious circle."³ But even here Tillich is not unequivocal. The tension of the problem

¹S.t II, p. 10.
²Ibid.
³P. 6.
remains. He concludes his major essay in the book with the following:

The situation with regard to religious symbols may give rise to the desire to treat that which is referred to in the symbol without using symbols. [This means]...that reality itself should be looked at immediately and be spoken of in such a way that its position in and before the unconditioned transcendent would receive direct expression. Undoubtedly, it might well be the highest aim of theology to find the point where reality speaks simultaneously of itself and of the Unconditioned in an unsymbolic fashion, to find the point where the unsymbolic reality itself becomes a symbol, where the contrast between reality and symbol is suspended. If this were really possible, the deepest demand of the religious consciousness would be fulfilled; religion would no longer be a separate thing....The idea rests on the presupposition that an unmythical treatment of the unconditioned transcendent provides the religious possibility of fully penetrating reality. This possibility, however, presupposes that reality stands in God, that is, that reality is eschatological and not present. (Italics mine.)

Tillich believes that the tension between symbolic and non-symbolic statements about God can be solved only in the eschaton when eschatological reality would be fully realized. The split between philosophy (with its autonomous reason and literal truth) and theology (with its ecstatic reason and symbolic truth) could be overcome only with the full coming of the Kingdom of God when all things would be

1 pp. 320-321.
revealed and reconciled.

If Tillich believes that "reality is eschatological and not present" and that an unmythical treatment of God is possible only in the eschaton it is difficult to see how he can claim that being-itself is actually a non-symbolic or unmythical designation of God. Both claims cannot be held consistently unless, possibly, being-itself were regarded as the sole precursor of the eschaton.

If this were the case it would be strange that philosophy rather than religion should be the agency for the first full realization of the eschaton. It is unlikely, however, that this is Tillich's contention. I believe that the matter is best understood as an unresolved inconsistency in Tillich's thought. His vacillation on whether or not a non-symbolic statement is possible seems to bear out this interpretation.

Tillich would have avoided the problem if he had retained his original belief that all statements about God are necessarily symbolic. If he had retained this conclusion the immediate effect would be the pre-eminence of his theological, religious impulse over the persistent philosophical constraint
to which he makes his theology conform. In relation to symbols the result would be the unequivocal acknowledgment that all finite language about God is symbolic and that it must, therefore, be justified by grace through faith rather than be dependent upon a doubtful philosophical concept for its validity. As we shall see shortly, justification is a very significant element in Tillich's thought but he does not surrender himself and his theology completely to it. The affirmation and negation inherent in all symbols is their justification by grace through faith and Tillich comes very close to acknowledging it explicitly. He does acknowledge that verification of symbols comes about through justification; and he really fails to separate verification of the knowledge in symbols from the original knowledge in symbols, with the result that he is implicitly acknowledging the act of justification which is present in every symbol which reveals God. If he could have come to acknowledge the necessity of justification as the only legitimate basis for any symbolic statement about God he would have seen the futility and lack of necessity of trying to make symbols legitimate by making
them depend on one non-symbolic statement. They depend on God for their validity or else they have no validity at all and are not really symbols. If God does not "breathe life" into the symbols which reveal Him then no amount of philosophical rationales will make them reveal God and thereby be true religious symbols. It is true that without a non-symbolic "anchor," symbolic language will be seen to be circular. But it need not be a "vicious circle."¹ It is the circle in which faith inescapably finds itself involved. It is the circle where the content of faith and action are justified by God through faith. As St. Paul says in Romans 1:17: "It is a way that starts with faith and ends with faith."² Such a way does not need a philosophical crutch. In fact, a philosophical crutch impedes the walking by faith alone in which we receive full grace and freedom. Having said this it might then be admitted that philosophy can be a tool for faith to use in its works. But faith cannot and does not depend upon it for its theoretical validity.

It is on precisely this point that Tillich is

¹Religious Experience and Truth, p. 6.
²N.B. J.
ambiguous. By making the symbols of faith depend on one non-symbolic statement derived from philosophy he appears to be saying implicitly that faith depends on something outside itself for its validity. On the other hand, when dealing with the question of verification of symbols, Tillich clearly concludes that faith and the knowledge of faith in symbols are self-authenticating, not depending on anything outside themselves for validity. There is, therefore, a measure of inconsistency between Tillich's theory of the basis of religious symbols and what he says about verifying the truth in symbols. The inconsistency is a result of conflict between purely philosophical and purely theological constraints. Tillich's main theological constraint and religious impulse is seen most clearly in his treatment of the verification of the truth of faith which is the truth in religious symbols. This religious impulse is the belief in justification by grace through faith.

3. Verification of Religious Symbols.

Since Tillich's theological ontology, as we conceive it, consists of knowledge through faith embodied in symbols, one of the most relevant questions
in connection with its epistemology is the ques-
tion of verification of religious symbols. The
most significant aspect of Tillich's treatment
of this question is that for him the structure of
verification issues from the structure of the sym-
bols themselves. There is no test for the truth
of symbols outside the dynamics of symbols them-
selves. The truth of symbols resides nowhere else
but in the symbols themselves, with the result that
the testing of this truth is a matter which is
internal to symbols and not a matter of referring
to some external authority. "The truth of revela-
tion is not dependent on criteria which are not
themselves revelatory."¹

Tillich does not believe that there is a
generally-agreed-upon repository of objective know-
ledge of revelation to which the truth of a reli-
gious symbol can be referred in order to test its
truth. Revelation is always dynamic and "alive"
and this fact precludes the possibility of reve-
latory knowledge residing in some objective, static
place of authority. The Bible and the creeds of

¹L.T. I, p. 145.
the Church are sources of revelation, which is to say that they are the primary places through which the Holy Spirit may bring the Word of God "alive" to us. But these sources are not essentially different in kind from any other medium through which God reveals himself to us. They, like all other myths and religious symbols, become revelatory only when God reveals himself through them. They, like any others, may degenerate into "dead" symbols which no longer have any authority for us because they no longer actually reveal God to us. The authority of revelatory knowledge is inseparable from God's active work of inspiring and illuminating our minds and hearts. This is another way of saying that certainty about the truth in religious symbols cannot be assured by "checking" with some other kind of guarantor. All the mediums of revelation are symbolic. We have the truth of revelation always in "earthen vessels." God is never absolutely circumscribed within a certain set of finite propositions. He transcends all finite propositions and situations which reveal Him at all, thereby negating them and making them essentially symbolic. The truth of revelation must
of necessity, therefore, be tested within the context of symbols themselves because there is no way of moving outside that context. To go outside it would be to go beyond the place where revelation is possible. It would be to go to the place of "dead" symbols which, if awarded divine authority, are idols.

The structure of symbols, including as it does elements of affirmation and negation of the truth of God, is symmetrical or parabolic of the relationship of all created, finite entities to God. All of finite reality, in relation to God, is negated and affirmed. With regard to man this situation is expressed in the idea of justification. Justification, as Saint Paul describes it in Romans, includes judgment and acquittal, negation and affirmation in spite of the negation. Tillich believes that the idea of justification is pertinent to all parts of theology and is especially relevant in connection with both the structure of religious symbols and the verification of those symbols. The tests for the validity of religious symbols arise out of the nature of justification and deal with the elements of negation and affirmation within
the structure of symbols themselves. There are, as a result, two main tests for the truth of religious symbols: one which is addressed to the negative capacity of symbols and one which concerns the positive capacity.

The negative capacity in symbols gives rise to the tendency towards idolatry, that is to say, toward claiming divine authority or ultimacy for the finite object or material through which God reveals something of Himself. One test for the truth of religious symbols, therefore, is that which looks for signs of idolatry. If they are shown to be idolatrous then they may be judged not to be true symbols. In other words, the knowledge of God in a religious symbol is truly ultimate, which is to say, truly of God only when the concrete symbol itself admits to a negation of its own ultimacy. If a symbol can express the Ultimate while at the same time negating its own ultimacy then that symbol is adequate for its revelatory function and is therefore a true symbol.

This criterion of the truth of faith or the truth of religious symbols is not derived from mere abstract speculation about the preservation and
identification of the Ultimate. Rather, Tillich believes that this extremely important criterion of the truth of religion is found in Jesus Christ and is symbolized by the Cross on which Jesus died. The Christ, the Logos who is one with God, was manifest in Jesus of Nazareth. Jesus' words, actions and life were the concrete material through which the Ultimate was expressed. It is not improper to say that these were symbols which expressed the Ultimate. As concrete symbols of the Ultimate and Unconditional, Jesus' words, actions, and life escape being idolatrous because they made no claims of ultimacy for themselves as such. On the contrary, Jesus was obedient unto death. His Cross is the epitome of his words, actions, and life. It stands as the manifest negation of the concrete symbol whom Jesus was, and at the same time expresses the Ultimate and Unconditional himself. Here are Tillich's own words about the matter.

The criterion of the truth of faith...is that it implies an element of self-negation. That symbol is most adequate which expresses not only the ultimate but its own lack of ultimacy. Christianity expresses itself in such a symbol in contrast to all other religions, namely, in the Cross of Christ. Jesus could not have been the Christ without sacrificing himself as Jesus to himself as the Christ. Any acceptance of Jesus as the Christ which is not the acceptance
of Jesus the crucified is a form of idolatry. The ultimate concern of the Christian is not Jesus, but the Christ Jesus who is manifest as the crucified. The event which has created this symbol has given the criterion by which the truth of Christianity, as well as of any other religion, must be judged.¹

Tillich believes that the negation and affirmation of Christ Crucified and Risen is the message and actualisation of Justification by God's free grace alone. It becomes operative for us through faith and should apply to every sphere of act or thought. He rightly claims some credit for "the application of the doctrine of justification to the realm of human thought."² It is thus that "the basic principle of Protestantism, the principle of justification through faith is applied to the question of truth—namely, that in the context of existence a visible realisation of the holy is not possible, that all existence remains ambiguous with respect to the Unconditioned."³

This "principle of non-ultimacy," as Tillich elsewhere calls it, provides a negative criterion for the truth of faith in symbols. It serves as a

¹D.F., pp. 97-98. ²I.H., p. 34.
³Ibid., p. 172.
"guardian" against idolatry which is, perhaps, the most dangerous enemy of true revelation.

Since this criterion of revelation issues from Christ it is itself revelatory and is, therefore, subject to the question of verification, too. Tillich holds that this revelation in Christ is the "final revelation" which is "the criterion of all the others."\(^1\) As such it cannot possibly have a criterion of truth outside itself. It must, therefore, verify itself. This is the essence of the theological "circle" of faith. "The criterion of final revelation is derived from what Christianity considers the final revelation, the appearance of Jesus as the Christ."\(^2\) Tillich's admission of the necessity of this theological circle is tantamount to saying that there can be no guarantee of the truth of Christ other than conversion to Him. This, I believe, is sound. Nothing outside of Christ insures that He is the way and the truth. Christ commends Himself to us.

Tillich believes that the abstract principle of

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\(^{1}\) Ibid.  
\(^{2}\) S.T. I, p. 143.  
\(^{3}\) Ibid., p. 150.
non-ultimacy arising from the idea of justification in final revelation is the one and only statement of truth which may possibly be ultimate, absolute, and infallible. He is not completely unequivocal about whether the statement "there are no absolute truths" or its equivalent is absolute or not. At times he has maintained that such an absolutely true statement is possible. At other times he has maintained that the truth in the statement cannot be actually expressed in a statement without contradicting its own meaning. Linguistically speaking, this is indisputable. The statement "no finite statements are absolutely true" contradicts its own meaning which presumably is intended to be absolutely true. Tillich concludes that "the absolute standpoint is therefore a position which can never be taken; rather it is the guard which protects the Unconditioned, averting the encroachment of a conditioned point of view on the sphere of the Unconditioned."1 Nevertheless, the truth which is involved in this paradoxical situation is of a unique kind. "The only infallible truth

1 I. H., p. 171.
of faith, the one in which the ultimate itself is unconditionally manifest, is that any truth of faith stands under a yes-or-no judgment. 1 The "no" judgment is that any truth in man's grasp is judged not to be ultimate or absolute. When this criterion is applied to the truth of religious symbols it excludes from the category of true symbols any which claim absoluteness for themselves.

The "no" judgment preserves the negative side of religious symbols without which the symbols in question would not really be religious symbols at all. Unless a finite symbol is seen to be a less than perfect representation of God it cannot be seen to be related to Him at all and cannot therefore be truly religious. The negative criterion of religious symbols depends for its relevance on the fact that man and all things finite are related to God negatively, which is to say, they are imperfect and less than absolute in the light of His perfection and absoluteness. The negative criterion tests finite symbols for religious truth by checking to see if the negative relation to God

1 D.F., p. 98.
is acknowledged. The negative relation experienced as judgment or doubt is a basic constituent of faith. Hence, without it symbols do not embody faith and, consequently, are not religious. The negative criterion is really a test of faith and, in particular, faith which includes existential experience of judgment and acceptance, the two basic constituents of justification by God's free grace alone.

The positive criterion for the truth of faith in religious symbols also arises out of the faith itself and consists of a test of the symbols in question to see whether they embody real faith and are therefore really religious symbols. Faith and its symbols are comprised of both a negative and a positive element. The positive element is the living Word or Spirit of God actually present in symbols. Hence, a test for religious symbols is one which determines whether they are "alive," whether the positive side of faith is there, whether the Word of God is manifest. As Tillich expresses it, the truth of faith in a religious symbol is verified if the symbol "adequately expresses an ultimate concern...in such a way that it creates
Reply, action, communication. 1 "Symbols which are able to do this are alive." 2 Elsewhere he expresses the same idea thus: "The truth of a symbol depends on its inner necessity for the symbol-creating consciousness." 3 He appears to summarize both kinds of verification when he concludes that "the only criterion that is at all relevant is this: that the Unconditioned is clearly grasped in its unconditionedness." 4

It must be observed that neither of these two kinds of verification in fact provides what is usually called verification. Neither constitutes an independent and authoritative check for the truth or falsity of knowledge in religious symbols. Rather than determine truth or falsity of religious symbols, they both function to guarantee that religious symbols are real religious symbols. The negative test serves to determine whether or not symbols are idolatrous or demonic and therefore not real religious symbols. Tillich appears deliberately

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1 D.F., p. 96.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Religious Experience and Truth, p. 316.  
4 Ibid.
to side-step the question of the truth or falsity of the knowledge in religious symbols. He says:

"Symbols...are not true or false in the sense of cognitive judgments."¹ Again he says: "A symbol... that elevates a conditioned thing to the dignity of the Unconditioned, even if it should not be false, is demonic." (Italics mine.)² The first test for verification of religious symbols in this case could function without raising the question whether or not the symbol was true or false. It is, as we said before, a test for faith rather than a test for truth.

The positive test is no different in this respect. Töllch admits that the criterion of a symbol being "alive" is "not an exact criterion in any scientific sense, but it is a pragmatic one that can be applied rather easily to the past with its stream of obviously dead symbols."³ This criterion functions as a test of whether or not religious symbols are "alive" and, therefore,

¹Contemporary Problems in Religion, p. 54.

²Religious Experience and Truth, p. 316.

³D.F., p. 97.
religious. But again, it only guarantees that the symbols are real religious symbols. It is very difficult to understand Tillich's claim that "the criterion of the truth of faith is whether or not it is alive."¹ One usually thinks of truth as having to do with particular content of knowledge. It does not follow, therefore, that the "living" quality of a religious symbol should guarantee its truth quite apart from the particular content of knowledge involved. If the truth of religious symbols does in fact have to do with different particular contents of knowledge then it can be said with some assurance that neither of Tillich's methods of verification has anything directly to do with the truth of religious symbols because neither deals with the possibility of false contents of knowledge in religious symbols.

It may be, however, that Tillich does not believe the truth of religious symbols has to do with different particular contents of knowledge. This question must be dealt with in detail because it has wide relevance for the question of the

¹Ibid.
content of theological ontology as well as the present question of methods of verification. One cannot dismiss Tillich's methods of verification as being irrelevant to the truth of religious symbols until his position on the question of the cognitive content of faith has been examined. This question, like the methodological question of verification, is of basic relevance to what I have called Tillich's "theological ontology."


Tillich's position regarding the content of revelatory knowledge is by no means clearly expounded by him in his writings. The essential characteristics of revelatory knowledge are, in fact, left considerably in doubt. Some very pressing questions appear to be left unanswered due largely to the fact that Tillich is more thorough in saying what the knowledge of revelation is not than what its actual ontological status is.

Tillich insists emphatically at various places, that revelation includes "cognitive elements" and that "there is no faith without a content toward

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\text{S.T. I, p. 133.}\]
which it is directed.\textsuperscript{1} There can be no doubt that Tillich holds to the necessity of faith having concrete, cognitive content embodied in language. He says specifically, "the ultimate concern of the liberal needs concrete contents, as does every ultimate concern,"\textsuperscript{2} (Italics mine) and moreover, "Faith needs its language, as does every act of the personality; without language it would be blind, not directed towards a content, not conscious of itself."\textsuperscript{3} In the light of this unequivocal evidence it must be concluded that Tillich believes that knowledge of faith has specific content, but beyond this general conclusion it is not an easy matter to discover precisely what kind of content Tillich understands revelatory knowledge to have.

One thing is stressed: revelatory knowledge is knowledge of a "special character"\textsuperscript{4} which is radically different from ordinary knowledge. It does not have content which can be regarded as

\textsuperscript{1} D.F., p. 10. \textsuperscript{2} Ibid., p. 26. \textsuperscript{3} Ibid., p. 24. \textsuperscript{4} S.T. I, p. 143.
"information," and it "does not imply factual assertions," and it "cannot interfere with ordinary knowledge," and it "does not increase our knowledge about the structures of nature, history, and man." Apart from what it is not and does not do, Tillich says little about the specific character of the content of revelation. He describes at length the dynamics of revelation, that is, how it is received (existentially), what accompanies its occurrence (ecstasy and miracle), and what are its sources and mediums but his description of the kind of its content is not nearly so complete.

He does say that "knowledge of revelation is knowledge about the revelation of the mystery of being to us," and that this mystery which revelation manifests "cannot lose its mysteriousness even when it is revealed." He adds that although "revelation does not dissolve the mystery into knowledge," yet, "something more is known of the

1 Ibid., p. 138. 2 Ibid., p. 144.
3 Ibid. 4 Ibid., p. 143.
5 Ibid. 6 Ibid., p. 121.
7 Ibid.
mystery," namely, "its reality has become a matter of experience" and "our relation to it has become a matter of experience."¹ These two areas of knowledge would appear to exhaust all the content of revelatory knowledge. One gathers that all knowledge of God can be shown to be included in one or other of these areas, but even granting this, one is little closer to knowing what kind of knowledge is involved.

Tillich describes the knowledge of revelation as "the manifestation of something within the context of ordinary experience which transcends the ordinary context of experience."² He speaks of revelatory knowledge as reason elevated "beyond its subject-object structure,"³ and describes the mystery which is known in revelation as "a dimension which precedes" the subject-object relationship."⁴ The key difficulty about determining what is the ontological status of revelatory knowledge is the difficulty of understanding precisely what is implied in the word "transcends" and in the idea of reason "beyond its subject-object structure."

¹Ibid.
²Ibid., p. 121.
³Ibid., p. 124.
⁴Ibid., p. 121.
It is the "transcendent" character of the content of revelatory knowledge which separates it so radically from ordinary knowledge and which constitutes its mysterious aspect.

The mysterious character of transcendence is never removed by a clear explanation. Exactly what is meant by "beyond the subject-object structure" is never made known. Some negative assertions about it are made, such as that it "is not a negation of reason"\(^1\) or that "beyond essence and existence" does not mean without it,\(^2\) but to define the exact implications of transcendence and of that which is "beyond subjectivity and objectivity" would appear to involve defining God Himself in such a way as to impose finite conditions upon Him. The region of transcendence is the region of the unconditioned, a term which Tillich often uses to designate God. Our knowledge of transcendence and "beyond subjectivity and objectivity," and of the unconditioned, issues from the revelation of God's infinite majesty articulated through a \textit{via negationis}. In other

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 124.

\(^2\)\textit{The Theology of Paul Tillich}, p. 347.
words, in the light of our experience of God's majesty we know, as a minimum, what God is not: He is not limited to the finite conditions of our world, that is to say, He transcends them; He is not within the subject-object structure of existence and essence because if He were He would be one object among others and therefore not God; and He is not conditioned by finite entities outside of Himself. Apart from this negating technique of making statements about God there is no way of literally designating Him because all literal designations must have finite connotations which would condition Him and violate his transcendence. The mystery of God (which is a result of His transcendence) is ultimately inescrutable in that it is never fully or entirely penetrated by man's cognitive capacities.

As we said before, Tillich believes that the knowledge in revelation has concrete content. There is a way of making positive, meaningful statements about God. Unfortunately, Tillich is not as explicit about this side of revelation as he is about the necessity of the via negationis. He does, however, give some indication of the grounds and
method for making positive statements about God. This information is given in his theory of symbols which we have dealt with already. The via negationis accompanies the via eminentiae and the two together constitute the via symbolica. Positive statements are made about God out of our experience of His self-manifestation in finite situations. We give to God, via eminentiae, the credit for being the Ground and Source of the good, creative, and positive aspects of our experience. Courage and love and justice and truth and beauty are grounded in Him. Tillich believes that the positive factor in reality of widest possible conception and, therefore, of greatest eminence is the power of being. God is, therefore, the Ground of being. There is no way of proving these positive statements about God; they rest ultimately on the conviction that God has made Himself manifest in these ways. Nor are the statements literally true. They are conditioned by the implications of the via negationis. They are negated by the infinite transcendence of God and, as both posited and negated, are, by Tillich's definition, symbolica.

The question remains: what is the ontological
status of symbolic statements about God? What is the status of the content of revelatory knowledge? Part of the answer must be that revelatory knowledge is dialectical in character. This conclusion, in fact, is essential to the understanding of Tillich’s “theological ontology.” The dialectical knowledge of revelation, received always existentially, issues from the dialectical reality of the Trinitarian God. As Tillich says, “the doctrine of the Trinity...describes in dialectical terms the inner movement of the divine life as an eternal separation from itself and return to itself.”¹ This is really a doctrine for discussion later, and for the present it must be asserted without further explanation that the Trinity is the ground out of which dialectical knowledge of revelation comes.

Knowing that revelatory knowledge is dialectical in character does not really advance the question of verification with which we began this section. The question of the verification of dialectical knowledge is still unanswered. The problem is complicated by the fact that dialectical

¹S.T. I, p. 63.
thinking involves a movement of thought "through yes and no" with the result that it "transforms the static ontology behind the logical system of Aristotle and his followers into a dynamic ontology." Dynamic truth is truth involved with time. Tillich has called this kind of truth *kairotic* truth, and by that he means truth which is associated with particular moments (kairoi) in time. Revelatory truth must be dynamic if it is to be existential since existence is dominated by time and, therefore, by movement. This strong constraint for a dynamic truth raises the question, dealt with earlier, about Tillich's two *logoi*, a static one and a dynamic one. As I conclude earlier, it would be better to concede that dynamic truth in existence is to some extent a "defection" from eternal truth than to try to maintain a theory of two *logoi* with its inevitable confusion. This solution would be consistent with the Christian belief that in the *eschaton* the eternal will be perfectly manifest as he never is perfectly manifest in history. This solution,

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3 *Cf.*, supra, pp. 135-143.
however, leaves as difficult as ever the question of verification of kairotic truth.

Because it is both dynamic and existential the content of revelation is not static or "objective" in the sense of being expressible "in definite statements in a series of sharply formulated dogmatic propositions."¹ Hence, "revelation is not definitely definable, although one pole of the revelatory correlation—namely, Jesus as the Christ—is final, definite, and beyond change."² Since revelation is not definitely definable it cannot be assembled into a "core" of truth which tests all other truths.

It may be that no verification of kairotic revelatory truth is possible except by what might more accurately be called justification rather than verification. This would entail the testing of revelatory knowledge expressed in religious symbols by the criterion of the final revelation in Jesus as the Christ. The final revelation, however, is itself dynamic and existential, consisting of the

¹_The Theology of Paul Tillich_, p. 332.

²_Ibid._
experience and actuality of justification by grace alone through faith in Jesus Christ. The abstract formulation of this criterion is the "Protestant principle" or "principle of non-ultimacy." This criterion tests for idolatry or demonic tendencies in revelatory knowledge, thereby guarding the truth against this kind of error at least.

There is a positive content implicit in the final revelation which also serves as a criterion for revelatory truth. The "principle of non-ultimacy" implies not only a negation of ultimacy for finite mediums of revelation; it also involves the self-sacrifice of these mediums. Jesus' obedience unto death and his self-sacrifice on the Cross were, on the negative side, statements of his own dispensability and lack of ultimacy before God. But these same things have a very positive aspect as well. They were acts of love and humility which are supremely defined by Jesus' self-sacrifice. The criterion against idolatrous revelation, that is, the principle of non-ultimacy, is the other side, so to speak, of the Christian "law" of love. The criterion of the truth of revelation can be positively stated in terms of love. Hence, it can be said of
revelation that "the standard of knowledge is the standard of love."¹ Kairotic truth of revelation which is decided upon or received in the spirit of self-sacrificing love is justified, and this it seems, constitutes the only possible kind of verification of revelation.

Tillich's position on the context of revelatory knowledge and its verification seems hardly satisfactory. One must, I believe, accept many of the distinctions which he makes about these matters. Revelation is existential, dynamic, kairotic, and embodied in symbols as Tillich understands their meaning. In order to be real revelation it must, I believe, be justified by grace through faith, which is to say that the positive and negative tests of "verification" as Tillich conceives them do indeed apply. Religious symbols must not claim ultimacy for themselves, and, if they are to pass the test of final revelation in Jesus Christ, they must, as Tillich says, embody the spirit of love in one or more of its various forms. This latter necessity imposes the important demand for

morality upon all instances of revelation. The content of revelation is inextricably involved with morality in that it is comprised of finite thoughts or actions which are subject to the criterion of self-sacrificing love, the first principle and constitutive element of morality. There is no revelation independent of human thought and there is no human thought which is independent of the question of morality. Part of the inadequacy one sees in Tillich's doctrine of revelation is that he has not developed the implications of the moral element at the basis of his concept of revelation. This omission is not unrelated to the inadequate account Tillich gives of the kind of content which revelatory knowledge has. More can be said about the content of morality in revelation than simply to identify it as being essentially the spirit of self-sacrificing love and obedience to God. Similarly, more can be said about the content of revelation than simply to identify it as dialectical, existential, dynamic truth of God which is justified by grace through faith. It is conceivable that Tillich could have developed the analysis of both the moral element in revelation and the concrete
content of revelatory knowledge so that both these aspects of revelation might be seen to play a larger part in the question of verification of revelation. There are surely what might be called "middle principles" of morality as it relates to the formulation of revelatory knowledge. The moral element in revelation surely has principles of action implicit in it which issue from the first principle of love but which have more concrete content and more specific application to the particular circumstances attached to the formulation of revelatory knowledge. In an analogous way, Christian revelation itself surely has some concrete content which, although always subject to the definitive nature of revelation, nevertheless embodies in some degree the actual content of revelatory knowledge, which Tillich agrees revelation must have. In other words, although revelation and morality in revelation are essentially dynamic in character, they still tend to have more or less static content, the importance and implications of which Tillich seems largely to ignore.

Tillich is concerned about the dangers involved in creedal statements and rightly insists that
"Creedal expressions of the ultimate concern of the community must include their own criticism,\(^1\) what he calls the "Protestant principle."\(^2\) This is a legitimate concern about the concrete content of revelatory knowledge. But Tillich asks only about the dangers of idolatrous or heteronomous content of faith. He does not fully explore the constructive and preservative place of the traditional content of Christian faith. This tendency is consistent with the tendency we observed earlier to take a more generous attitude toward the autonomy of the individual than he does toward heteronomy of the community or the institution. It is significant that Tillich asks in connection with the question of concrete content of faith in a community: "How is a community of faith possible without suppression of the autonomy of man's spiritual life?"\(^3\) Tillich sees in the community's expression of their faith largely a danger rather than a creative strength. In a letter to Gustave Weigel, Tillich admits that he deals more with the necessary precautions in handling symbolic religious

\(^1\) D.F., p. 29.  
\(^2\) Ibid.  
\(^3\) Ibid., p. 27.
knowledge than he does with the constructive possibilities therein. He says: "I believe you are right when you say that my understanding of analogy is more negative-protesting than positive-affirming. I am more worried about the idolie character of traditional theology and popular beliefs about God than you are."¹

This concern of Tillich's is valuable but he ought to have said more about the place of traditional theological and creedal propositions in the elaboration and verification of revelatory knowledge. It is slightly ironic that, in spite of this omission in the theory of revelatory knowledge, Tillich, in the actual formulation of the contents of revelatory knowledge as he understands it, very diligently and consistently relates his own theology to the contents of the traditional theology of the Church. In his own writing of theology Tillich apparently unites the autonomy of his own spiritual life with no little degree of heteronomous influence from the traditional message of the Church. It is regrettable that this latter element should occupy such a minor place in his theorising about the method and content of revelatory knowledge.

¹Paul Tillich, Letter in reply to the article by G. Weigel, "The Theological Significance of Paul Tillich," Gregorianum (Rome), Vol. XXXVII, No.1, p. 54.
CHAPTER VIII

The Content of Theological Ontology

A. Introduction

As in dealing with the content of Tillich's philosophical ontology, so in the present section it would be impossible to give every distinction the kind of full discussion and comprehensive treatment which might be given if time and space were not so limited. My aim in dealing with the content of theological ontology is to try to convey adequately the scope of material involved and to put the material into some meaningful perspective. In this introductory section the broadest perspective of the subject will be suggested. Then, after the main body of material has been surveyed some further observations may be relevant.

"God is the answer to the question implied in human finitude."¹ This statement neatly characterizes

¹S.T. I, p. 72.
the primary content of theological ontology as being answer-type material. More specifically, theological ontology could be described as the systematic exposition of Ultimate Reality which answers the questions, resolves the conflicts, and synthesizes the antinomies of ordinary reality as man knows it in his ordinary experience. Because it is God who is the answer to the question implied in finitude, the answer is articulated in a singular fashion, as was seen in considering the theory of religious symbols. The answer is articulated in revelation through symbols which arise out of the analogia entis under the criterion of final revelation in Jesus Christ. These technical aspects of the formation and verification of the content of theological ontology have already been treated in the two previous chapters. They are all aspects of the "method of correlation" which is the methodological device that Tillich uses to conceptualize God, the answer to the questions implied in finite reality.

The questions to which God is the answer arise out of various contexts of reality. Tillich sees reality divided into three major contexts, each of
which provides the question material for one section of his *Systematic Theology*. Two of these contexts are subdivided making five sections altogether. Analysis of each context of reality reveals questions to which God is shown to be the answer. The questions issue from each of the following: *reason*, *being and non-being*, *existence*, *life*, and *history*. History is really an aspect of life and reason is an aspect of being and non-being but Tillich makes them separate sections because the questions involved in each warrant special treatment.

The answers, according to the method of correlation, are dependent on the revelatory events for content and on the structure of the questions for their form. From a delicate combination of these factors the answers are conceived by Tillich in the following terms: Revelation is the answer to the question of reason; God the Father, Ground and Abyss of Being, is the answer with regard to being and non-being; Christ as the New Being is the answer for existence; the Spirit is the answer for life; and the Kingdom of God is the answer for history. Since reason and history are parts of the three main contexts of reality it can be seen that, although
there are five sections of answers, the answers really come from the Triune God. In the broadest perspective, then, the content of theological ontology is the exposition of the Triune God out of which all reality proceeds. Tillich explicitly designates his own theological thought as "trinitarian monotheism"¹ and calls the philosophical equivalent, or "transformation" of it, "dialectical realism."² Accordingly, the most distinctive feature about the content of theological ontology is its dialectical or Trinitarian nature.

Before proceeding with the exposition of trinitarian monotheism it is necessary to review the ways in which philosophical ontology raises the question to which God is the answer. In my earlier exposition of the content and perspective of philosophical ontology in Chapters III to V, I was not solely concerned with raising the question of God but it was seen nevertheless that philosophical ontology in its analysis tends toward the point where the question of God is both possible and, at some points, necessary.³ In connection with each part

¹S.T. I, p. 259. ²Ibid. ³cf. Chapter V in particular.
of the content of philosophical ontology there was a question to which God through faith is the answer. It was further evident that all the questions arise out of the tension between being and non-being, which is to say, from finitude. "It is the finitude of being which drives us to the question of God."¹

The questions arising in philosophical ontology were seen to be of two general types;² the type which starts with the fact of non-being in a situation or, in other words, which issues from the awareness of a deficiency in being and asks about the possibility of God overcoming it to redeem the situation; and the type which asks about the source of a redeeming or reconciling power already seen to be victorious over non-being. It is interesting to note that these two types of question are represented in Tillich's reinterpretation of the traditional arguments for the existence of God. Tillich does not believe that any of the traditional arguments for the existence of God are really arguments at all in the sense that they prove the existence of God. If God could be proved as the conclusion of an argument,

¹S.T., I, p. 134.
²cf., supra, Chapter V.
Tillich reasons, He would then be shown to be "derived from the world" and "this contradicts the idea of God." The so-called arguments "neither are arguments nor are they proof of the existence of God." They nevertheless have a very definite value for the philosophy of religion: "They are expressions of the question of God which is implied in human finitude." Tillich interprets the traditional ontological argument to be an expression of the first type of question which we found arising in philosophical ontology. The traditional cosmological argument, under which Tillich includes also the teleological argument, is an expression of the second type of question.

"The ontological argument in its various forms gives a description of the way in which potential infinity is present in actual finitude." Tillich believes that an unconditional element in the self and the world is present to man's awareness, thereby making it possible for man to ask the question.

1 S.T. I, p. 223.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid.  
5 Ibid., p. 229.
of God. He does not explain adequately why an awareness of the unconditional element should make the question of God possible, but apparently he is claiming that the unconditional element is divine, and that unless men were so confronted by God in awareness he could never ask about God. The ontological argument, by analysing the unconditional element in being, "elaborates the possibility of the question of God."1 Tillich shows how the various forms of the ontological argument in Augustine, Kant, and Anselm acknowledge the unconditional element in the structure of reason and reality but then transgress valid reasoning by trying to use this element "for the establishment of an unconditional being (a contradiction in terms) within reality."2

The unconditional which is described in the ontological argument and which makes the question of God possible is the presupposition beneath the first type of question arising in philosophical ontology. This kind of question asks about the possibility of God redeeming a situation which is seen to be deficient. The deficiency or non-being which constitutes the

problem is defined with reference to the unconditional element in reality. For example, because "the unconditional element appears in the theoretical (receiving) functions of reason as \textit{parum ipsum}, the true-itself as the norm of all approximations to truth,"\(^1\) the deficiency in absoluteness of particular finite truths becomes evident. Similarly, deficiencies in goodness of particular acts are made apparent because "the unconditional element appears in the practical (shaping) functions of reason as \textit{bonum ipsum}, the good-itself as the norm of all approximations to goodness."\(^2\) The manifestations of the unconditional element as \textit{bonum ipsum} and \textit{parum ipsum} are both "manifestations of \textit{asse ipsum}, being-itself as the ground and abyss of everything that is."\(^3\) Being-itself, then, is the unconditional element in view of which the conflicts and deficiencies of reality are recognized, and being-itself is the possible answer to these problems. The question of God who is being-itself is possible because of this

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 229.  \(^2\)Ibid.  \(^3\)Ibid.
awareness of being-itself in man's awareness of his own finitude.

The second type of question arising from philosophical ontology was the kind which asks about the sources of a redeeming or reconciling power already seen to be victorious over non-being. An example of this type of question is the question about the source of courage which overcomes anxiety in finitude. Tillich believes that "the so-called cosmological and teleological arguments for the existence of God are the traditional and inadequate form of this question,"¹ namely, "the question of being conquering non-being and of courage conquering anxiety."²

Tillich interprets the questions of a "first cause" and a "necessary substance," usually associated with the cosmological argument, as "the question of that which transcends finitude and categories, the question of being-itself embracing and conquering non-being, the question of God."³ The question of an "infinite cause of teleology"⁴

¹Ibid., p. 231. ²Ibid. ³Ibid., p. 232. ⁴Ibid., p. 233.
which is raised in the traditional teleological argument is interpreted by Tillich to be "the question of an infinite, unthreatened ground of meaning,... the question of God." In both cases the traditional arguments do not prove the existence of God; they merely raise the question of God. This, however, Tillich believes to be an extremely important function which these questions have, in that they prepare the way for theology to give the answer to the question of God. Moreover, whereas the ontological argument makes the question of God only possible, the cosmological argument (including the teleological argument) makes the question of God necessary. The cosmological question of God "must be asked" because men cannot escape the fact of non-being issuing in anxiety, nor avoid the question of the source of the courage which overcomes it in reality.

It is not entirely clear what kind of necessity Tillich ascribes to the cosmological question of God. It can hardly be a strictly logical necessity since one cannot conceive of a question

\[1\] Ibid. \[2\] Ibid., p. 231.
being logically inferred. The necessity of which Tillich speaks would appear to be a practical or existential necessity in the sense that man is so constituted that the question inevitably occurs to him. This would seem to be borne out by Tillich's discussion of the "ontological question"¹ which is essentially the same question as the cosmological question of God. Tillich says the ontological question, "What is being-itself?", arises "in something like a 'metaphysical shock'...often...expressed in the question, 'Why is there something; why not nothing?'."² Tillich holds that this "is the ultimate question, although fundamentally it is the expression of a state of existence rather than a formulated question."³ (Italics mine.) The question of being-itself, or the question of God, is fundamentally "the expression of a state of existence," and the necessity which Tillich ascribes to this question is not the necessity of logical inference but the existential constraint of having to ask the question "whenever

¹Ibid., p. 182.  
²Ibid., p. 181.  
³Ibid., p. 182.
this state is experienced.  

Even though both the possibility and the necessity of asking the question of God occur in man's experience and are articulated in human terms, it should be noted that it is the presence of God in reality which engenders the question. Tilllich is sometimes accused of being totally anthropocentric in his theology as well as in his philosophy. It is true that his philosophical ontology is highly man-centred and that the method of correlation projects this character on to the formulations of his theological ontology. However, it would be wrong to imply that Tillich does not rely on God to reveal himself. He believes firmly that "every answer concerning ultimate concern is given out of the experience of the self-manifestation of the ultimate." It is the presence of God in existence which enables man to raise the question of God at all. As was seen earlier in connection with the ontological and cosmological

1Ibid.  
2Cf., supra, Chapter IV.  
arguments, God's presence as the unconditional element in reality was presupposed by the question of God arising from these arguments. In the method of correlation the question is framed "under the impact of God's answers." Because God is what He is, namely, "all in all," He is "there" even before men ask about Him and man can ask about Him only because He is there in whatever context of reality the question arises. The God who meets man in all contexts of reality is the Triune God, the God who is being-itself, Logos, and living Spirit. It is this God whom Tillich expounds in his "trinitarian monotheism" that constitutes the content of his theological ontology.

Tillich believes that a trinitarian conception of God is necessary to designate in the best possible way the God who is both beyond and thoroughly present in created reality. Any concept of God has to deal with the fundamental tension between attributing to God such absolute ultimacy that He loses all relationship with concrete reality and attributing to Him such a degree of concreteness that

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1S.T. I, p. 69.
His ultimacy becomes questionable and possibly threatened by other concrete "gods." Tillich's idea of God is fundamentally conditioned by his understanding of this inevitable tension which he believes is inherent in all thinking about God and which he believes is adequately resolved only in trinitarian monotheism. Tillich gives a most penetrating and enlightening analysis of various types of conceptions of God by using their positions with respect to the tensions between concreteness and ultimacy as the chief distinguishing criterion.¹ He shows how the emphasis on the concreteness of God "drives...toward polytheistic structures"² in the idea of God, and "the reaction of the absolute element...drives...toward monotheistic structures."³ The most important conclusion however, at least for Tillich's own doctrine of God, is that "the need for a balance between the concrete and the absolute drives...toward trinitarian structures."⁴ The constraint indicated

²S.T. I, p. 245.
³Ibid.
⁴Ibid.
here is a fundamental part of the basic rationale supporting Tillich's trinitarian monotheism.

The ultimacy and concreteness of God, Tillich believes, are, in fact, "trinitarian principles" which, together with the principle that unites them, are the three distinctive "moments within the process of the divine life." In order to clarify Tillich's position on this point it is necessary to take briefly into account the place of Spirit in his theological ontology.

One of Tillich's most fundamental beliefs about God is that he is a "living" God. The primary purpose of trinitarian monotheism as a theological formulation is that "it is an attempt to speak of the living God, the God in whom the ultimate and the concrete are united." The "living" character of God, however, is His character as Spirit. "God as living is God fulfilled in himself and therefore spirit." "We must say that God is the living God because he is Spirit." Tillich has an

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1 Ibid., p. 277.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid., p. 252.  
4 Ibid., p. 276.  
5 Ibid., p. 277.
understanding of spirit as a legitimate philosophical term, unusual in English philosophy "in contrast to German, French, and Italian, in which the words Geist, esprit, and spirito have preserved their philosophical standing."¹ The term has significance in theological ontology because "Spirit" (with a capital "S") "is the symbolic application of spirit to the divine life."² The significance which "spirit" has for the idea of God can hardly be overestimated. "God is spirit. This is the most embracing, direct, and unrestricted symbol for the divine life."³

The philosophical concept "spirit" designates the unity of all the ontological elements in actual life. The three polarities which constitute the ontological elements can each be seen to represent in one pole the concept of power and in the other pole the concept of meaning. Hence, "spirit is the unity of power and meaning."⁴ or, in a more detailed analysis: "On the side of power it includes centred personality, self-transcending

¹Ibid., p. 276.  
²Ibid.  
³Ibid.  
⁴Ibid.
vitality, and freedom of self-determination. On the side of meaning it includes universal participation, forms and structures of reality, and limiting and directing destiny."1 Spirit, in this sense of "the all-embracing function in which all elements of the structure of being participate,"2 is evident only in man because "only in him is the structure of being completely realised."3

When spirit is applied symbolically to God, power and meaning, the constituents of life as spirit, are seen to reside, respectively, in "the abyss of the divine (the element of power) and the fullness of its content (the element of meaning)," or, in other words, in "the divine depth and the divine logos."4 In terms of concreteness and ultimacy, the divine logos constitutes the concreteness of God, and the abyss or divine depth constitutes the abode of God's absolute ultimacy. It can now be seen that these two factors of concreteness and ultimacy or divine logos and divine

1Ibid., pp. 276-277.  
2Ibid., p. 277.  
3Ibid.  
4Ibid.
depth, together with their union in the actual Life of God as Spirit, comprise the three distinctions in the idea of God which is elaborated in trinitarian monotheism.

It should be pointed out that Tillich does not put forward this philosophical interpretation of trinitarian principles as itself the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. "The consideration of the trinitarian principles is not the Christian doctrine of the Trinity."\(^1\) Tillich justifies his derivation of trinitarian principles from the philosophical concept of life as spirit on the grounds that these principles are "a preparation for" or "presuppositions" of the Christian doctrines of Christ and the Trinity. He says: "If we...ask... the question of the presuppositions of these doctrines...then we must speak about the trinitarian principles, and we must begin with the Spirit rather than with the Logos. God is Spirit, and any trinitarian statement must be derived from this basic assertion."\(^2\) Whereas the philosophical concept of spirit and trinitarian principles implicit

in it are not necessarily exclusive to Christianity, nevertheless, it is Tillich's conviction that only in Christian revelation has God the Trinity made Himself manifest as Trinity. To know the Triune God one must first know Jesus, the Christ. Thus, "Any discussion of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity must begin with the Christological assertion that Jesus is the Christ. The Christian doctrine of the Trinity is a corroboration of the Christological doctrine."¹ The inevitable tension between the concreteness and ultimacy in men's ideas of God is resolved adequately only in Christian revelation which holds that in Jesus, "the absolutely concrete and the absolutely universal are identical."² The "trinitarian problem" of tension between concreteness and ultimacy of universality is "a perennial feature of the history of religion"³ but the solution is exclusive to Christianity. This, solution, in fact, constitutes the uniqueness of Christianity. "Christian theology is the theology in so far as it is based on the tension between the absolutely

¹Ibid., p. 277. ²Ibid., p. 20. ³Ibid., p. 253.
concrete and the absolutely universal."¹ It "has received something which is absolutely concrete and absolutely universal at the same time."²

This paradoxical basis for trinitarian monotheism which is the content of theological ontology makes very difficult the question of where one should start to elaborate the three main aspects of this content. Each "moment" of the divine life, Depth, Logos, or Spirit, appears to have good reason for being dealt with before the other two. In his own statements about the matter Tillich is by no means clear about which aspect or person of the Godhead should logically precede the other two. He says the doctrine of the Trinity follows from the doctrine of the Christ, but also that trinitarian statements are derived from God as Spirit. In his own exposition of his theology he begins with God the Father, Ground and Abyss of being. It is always the difficulty in connection with the dialectical doctrine of the Trinity that one can hardly speak of one person without taking into account the other two and no one person clearly

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¹Ibid., p. 19. ²Ibid.
proceeds the other two. Nevertheless, one must start somewhere. I have chosen to follow the same order that Tillich follows, beginning with the element of power in God and proceeding to the elements of meaning and life.

B. God as Ultimate Power.

1. Ultimacy:—The ultimacy of God would seem to have special claim to first consideration in so far as the initial grounds for speaking of God at all are the experiences of Him as the unconditional element implicit in the ultimate questions which a person asks—such questions as the basic ontological question, "Why is there something; why not nothing?" or "the question of being conquering non-being and of courage conquering anxiety." The initial reason for speaking of God is that "the experience of ultimacy implies an ultimate of being and meaning which concerns man unconditionally because it determines his very being and meaning."

It should be noted that this basis for speaking of God is not, in the strictest sense, a logical basis but rather a basis of faith issuing from

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1Ibid., p. 255.
experience. Tillich, in fact, defines faith in terms of "the experience of ultimacy" as "ultimate concern." He claims to have derived the concept of ultimacy or ultimate concern as the initial term for designating God, and faith in God, from the great commandment: "The Lord, our God, the Lord is one; and you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind, and with all your strength."¹

The concept of ultimate concern, says Tillich, is the "abstract translation"² of this commandment.

Once the initial concept of ultimacy is fashioned other abstract characteristics of God are seen to be implicit in it.

The religious concern is ultimate; it excludes all other concerns from ultimate significance; it makes them preliminary. The ultimate concern is unconditional, independent of any conditions of character, desire, or circumstance. The unconditional concern is total; no part of ourselves or of our world is excluded from it; there is no "place" to flee from it. The total concern is infinite; no moment of relaxation and rest is possible in the face of a religious concern which is ultimate, unconditional, total, and infinite.

God's ultimacy includes his unconditionedness, his

²S.T., I, p. 14. ³Ibid.
universality, and his infinity.

From the nature of ultimacy comes a most important and most widely relevant characteristic of God, namely, his holiness. Tillich speaks of his own theology as having "a doctrine of God which analyses the meaning of ultimate concern and which derives from it both the meaning of God and the meaning of the holy."1 The holy, in Tillich's view, is "the quality of that which concerns man ultimately."2 Holiness, like ultimacy, is an experienced phenomenon and is therefore "the most adequate basis we have for understanding the divine."3 Holiness and ultimacy must be "correlatively" interpreted, that is to say, "Only that which is holy can give man ultimate concern, only that which gives man ultimate concern has the quality of holiness."4 The two are, in fact, so closely related in meaning that it is slightly misleading even to say that holiness is a quality of ultimacy. Tillich qualifies this basic statement about holiness by saying:

1Ibid., p. 239.
2Ibid.
3Ibid., p. 238.
4Ibid., p. 239.
"God's holiness is not a quality in and of itself; it is that quality which qualifies all other qualities as divine. His power is holy power; his love is holy love." 1

It is in the experience of the holy that we are aware of God's majestic mystery, His fearful and fascinating ultimacy. The idea of holiness originally had the chief connotation of separation "from the ordinary realm of things and experiences." 2 This separation causes a "numinous" experience of awe which includes elements of attraction and something akin to fear. "The human heart seeks the infinite because that is where the finite wants to rest" but, at the same time, "if ultimacy is manifest...one realizes...the infinite distance of the finite from the infinite and, consequently, the negative judgment over any finite attempts to reach the infinite." 3 In the earlier section on symbols this "negative judgment" was mentioned in relation to the definition of symbols themselves and in relation to Justification by grace through faith, a

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1 Ibid., p. 302.  
3 Ibid., p. 13.
factor in the verification of symbols. The experience of judgment is part of the basic experience of God. To acknowledge God's judgment is to recognize His majesty without which He is not God.

The "object" of our experience of awe is not really an object in the usual sense but, rather, is fundamentally mysterious. Mystery is, by definition, impenetrable with the consequence that mystery can only be characterized as "a dimension which 'precedes' the subject-object relationship."¹ Thus Tillich observes of Rudolf Otto that "when he points to the mysterious character of holiness, he indicates that the holy transcends the subject-object structure of reality."² The conclusion that God is mysterious and, therefore, beyond the subject-object structure of reality is extremely important for Tillich's theology in that it affects every statement made about God; and it raises the question of the relation of God to the subject-object structure of reality. This question will be dealt with presently in connection with the

¹ S.T. I, p. 121. ² Ibid., p. 230.
question of God's relatedness.

True holiness "produces an ambiguity in man's ways of experiencing it,"¹ in so far as "the holy can appear as creative and as destructive."² Tillich believes that the divine and demonic both issue from the same source, "the ultimate' in the double sense of that which is the abyss and that which is the ground of man's being."³ Each is an expression of the holy, in one case divine holiness and in the other case demonic holiness. "The divine is characterized by the victory of the creative over the destructive possibility of the holy, and the demonic is characterized by the victory of the destructive over the creative possibility of the holy."⁴ Tillich shows how the development of the idea of holiness reveals a confusion between holiness and moral perfection and between holiness and sacred things, places or persons. In both cases, the holy is limited to the good alone and not to the destructive as well. It is Tillich's belief "that the holy originally lies below the alternative of

the good and the evil; that it is both divine and
demonic; that with the reduction of the demonic
possibility the holy itself becomes transformed
in its meaning.1

It can be seen that the concept of the demonic
has a major place in Tillich's thought. As an ele-
ment of the holy it is one of the primary distinc-
tions in theological ontology. In his earlier
writings Tillich wrote extensively about the demonic
but in his later writings he has largely used the
term "non-being" to mean what was formerly meant
by the demonic. The term "demonic" has not been
abandoned altogether but has been largely replaced
by the negative of the concept of being. More will
be said about the demonic in terms of non-being.

From the concept of God as ultimate and, there-
fore, holy Tillich moves to the conclusion that God
must be conceived as being-itself. It is very im-
portant to the right understanding of Tillich's
theological ontology that the direction of this
movement be rightly distinguished. The precise
question involved here is whether on this basic

1Ibid.
level Tillich builds his doctrine of God, and hence his theology, on a religious or a philosophical impulse. I believe that the religious impulse precedes the philosophical both in systematic exposition and in actual precedence in Tillich's thought. Tillich employs the philosophical concept of being-itself in connection with God on the basis of, and as an implication of, what he calls "the overwhelming impression of the divine majesty as witnessed by classical religion."¹ This can be seen most clearly in the systematic exposition of the formal criteria of theology where Tillich first makes the distinction about God's ultimate and then, in the second criterion, elaborates the implications of ultimacy in terms of the concept of being. There is other evidence, too, of the primacy of the conviction of God's ultimacy. In the theory of symbols it was seen how crucial for all knowledge of God is his holy transcendence. It is God's ultimate transcendence which causes Tillich to vacillate on the question of whether or not the concept of being-itself can be literally applied to God.

Another example of the precedence of ultimacy is evident in Tillich's phenomenological description of the meaning of "God." Here he describes the nature of anthropomorphic conceptions of God and admits that these divine images may, as some theories suggest, be "projections of elements of finitude, natural and human elements."\(^1\) However, he continues:

What these theories disregard is that projection always is projection on something.... Obviously, it is absurd to class that on which the projection is realised with the projection itself.... The realm against which the divine images are projected is not itself a projection. It is the experienced ultimacy of being and meaning. It is the realm of ultimate concern.\(^2\)

Here is clear evidence that beyond all other designations of God is his ultimacy. It is Tillich's primary emphasis on God's ultimate transcendence that accounts for his speaking of the "God above the God of theism."\(^3\)

2. **Being-Itself:** Having established the primacy of God's ultimate holiness, it is necessary to note that the distinction of next importance for Tillich is that of being-itself. He moves directly from the first formal criterion of theology to the second.

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\(^1\)S.T. I, \(p. 235.\) \(^2\)Ibid. \(^3\)The *Courage to Be*, \(p. 180.\)
His logic for the move is shown in the following quotation.  

That which concerns us ultimately must belong to reality as a whole; it must belong to being. Otherwise we could not encounter it, and it could not concern us. Of course, it cannot be one being among others; then it would not concern us infinitely. It must be the ground of our being, that which determines our being or non-being, the ultimate and unconditional power of being, but the power of being, its infinite ground or "being-itself," expresses itself in and through the structure of being. Therefore, we can encounter it, be grasped by it, know it, and act toward it.

Very few single quotations in Tillich's works could have as far-reaching implications as this one. On the strength of the reasoning here the extremely influential concept of being-itself is introduced into Tillich's theology.  

Being-itself is not an easy concept to deal with in Tillich's theology. It is not merely one concept among others but it is the primary concept in terms of which nearly all other concepts are explained, and whether or not it is the one and only literal designation of God it approaches so near to the centre of the meaning of "God" that it assumes no little measure of the mystery of God.

2ef., WORKS, Chapter VII, pp. 315-319.
Himself. It is, however, at least one step removed from the pure, ineffable mystery of God, and it has a number of distinctions which constitute its meaning.

The word that most closely approximates to its central meaning is "power." Being-itself "cannot be defined" but it can be characterized "by concepts which depend on it, but which point to it in a metaphorical way."¹ The concept of power is the most fundamental of these. Tillich says being-itself is not a mere "abstract category" but, rather, "the power of Being in everything that is, in everything that participates in Being."² Since "being" is the most universal concept which it is possible to conceive, and since "everything" that is participates in being, one can say that God is "all in all."³ Tillich's use of the concept being-itself in connection with God appears to be a result of the constraint to attribute to God the greatest conceivable all-sufficiency, "for if God is not being-itself he is subordinate to it."⁴ Tillich's reasoning is that the power and structure of being

would constitute an alien fate imposed upon God from without unless God were Himself the power and structure of being. Only if God is being-itself can God be thought to possess "asentity."\(^1\) He must be the source of all power or else there are powers outside Him which limit Him and destroy His Godhood. For Tillich God is by definition not merely the "highest being," for "when applied to God, superlatives become diminutives," but "qualitatively different from the level of any being—even the highest being."\(^2\) This is part of the fundamental meaning of the term "being-itself" which must include the idea of all possible or actual power and the transcendence of it.

Not all the distinctions of power as it is analysed in philosophical ontology\(^3\) can be extended so as to be metaphorically appropriate to being-itself, but Tillich finds one implication of power very useful when applied metaphorically to God. By it he introduces the concept of non-being into the idea of God. "Power," he says, "presupposes, even

\(^{1}\text{Ibid., p. 262.}\)

\(^{2}\text{Ibid., p. 261.}\)

\(^{3}\text{cf., supra, Chapter III, pp. 155-159.}\)
in the metaphorical use of the word, something over which it proves its power.\textsuperscript{1} In the case of being-itself, "that which is conquered by the power of being is non-being."\textsuperscript{2} And furthermore, Tillich concludes, "non-being belongs to being"\textsuperscript{3} because "the answer to the question how non-being can resist the power of being, can only be that non-being is not foreign to being, but that it is that quality of being by which everything that participates in being is negated."\textsuperscript{4} In order to think of being at all, Tillich holds, we must employ a "double negation" since "being must be thought of as the negation of the negation of being."\textsuperscript{5} Also, he believes, it is evident that "the negative 'lives' by the positive it negates."\textsuperscript{6} Consequently, the conclusion must be that "being embraces itself and that which is opposed to it, non-being."\textsuperscript{7}

Non-being can be conceived in two ways, represented by the Greek terms \textit{me an} and \textit{ouk an}. The

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1}L.P.J., p. 37.
\item \textsuperscript{2}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{3}\textbf{The Courage to Be}, p. 170.
\item \textsuperscript{4}L.P.J., p. 38.
\item \textsuperscript{5}\textbf{The Courage to Be}, p. 170.
\item \textsuperscript{6}L.P.J., p. 39.
\item \textsuperscript{7}\textbf{The Courage to Be}, p. 170.
\end{itemize}
latter, *non-being*, stands for "absolute non-being,"¹ "the 'nothing' which has no relation at all to being."² It is from this kind of nothingness that God created the world. It might be called "sheer nothingness." The former concept of non-being, *non-being*, is "relative non-being,"³ or "dialectical non-being,"⁴ and has a much wider relevance for theological ontology than *non-being*. Everything that is is related to what it is not. "What it is not" is non-being of a relative kind. This relative non-being must always be conceived as having only negative status, "living off" the positive which it negates. It does not have actuality because to think of actual non-being would involve a contradiction in terms and the hypostatization of a negative. Relative non-being is always potential. It can be thought of as what something is "not yet" and what it is "no more."⁵ It is always defined and circumscribed by the difference between what a thing is and what it could be or what it was.

¹*St. T. II*, p. 22.  
Conceived in this way, non-being is seen to be "relative" and also "dialectical" in so far as it is always interacting with being. "Everything which participates in the power of being is 'mixed' with non-being. It is being in process of coming from and going toward non-being."¹

There is another important connotation of relative non-being, namely, that it can be thought to have a kind of resistance to the power of being which the power of being overcomes when it is actualized. This connotation is very important to theology, as will become evident in connection with the Christ in existence, but it is nonetheless a very difficult concept. To think of non-being "resisting" seems to imply some positive ontological status for non-being, as well as suggesting that a negative has been hypostatized. Tillich explains the origin of this notion in the Platonic idea of άνάποιον where "in spite of its 'nothingness' non-being was credited with having the power of resisting a complete union with the ideas."²

Despite the strong suspicion of a positive

¹Ibid., p. 211. ²Ibid., p. 209.
character to non-being, one will seriously misunderstand Tillich's whole theological ontology if one thinks that it includes evil as positive non-being. The truth is that there is simply no place in the dynamics of the system for a positive, independent principle of evil. In many places such as the one just mentioned Tillich speaks of evil and non-being as though it had a positive structure of its own. But this is only a manner of speaking. On closer examination it will be seen that the expressions in question depend for their meaning on the being to which they are related and that they do, in fact, have only negative status. Evil is actual only as deficiency and distortion. The concept of non-being must be taken seriously in terms of its etymological meaning. Non-being must be only potential, not actual. Evil is the result of unactualized potential.

Tillich can "include" non-being in being because he believes that even potential being "participates in being." Relative non-being is identical to potential being. "Potential being...is in the state of relative non-being, it is not-yet-being."\(^1\)

\(^1\)Ibid., II, pp. 22-23.
Even with regard to non-being the mind is driven back to the power of being as that in which everything participates. Even non-being participates in being, although this assertion can be made only dialectically and not with ordinary logic. Non-being must be thought of as a "quality of being by which everything that participates in being is negated."¹ This, Tillich says, is "the answer to the question how non-being can resist the power of being."² As a quality of being it can resist being.

The inclusion of non-being in being and the notion of being as having an internal resistance to itself is not entirely satisfactory. Tillich admits as much in *The Theology of Paul Tillich* when replying to a question by David E. Roberts about "a dualism which is made internal to God."³ Tillich gives this answer:

> The positing of the nonbeing, and therefore of the finite in the process of the divine life, is not as baffling as a doctrine which posits evil as an ontological reality outside God (Roberts). First of all, finitude is not evil, but the potentiality of evil.

Secondly, if the finite is an element in the divine life, the divine freedom, his aseity is preserved, which is not the case in an ontological dualism, for example, between God and a resisting matter. The mystery of life, which precedes every thought, is not removed by any of the solutions, but the one is more compatible with other motives of religious thought than is the other. (Italics mine.)

It remains to be seen whether Tillich's solution is, in fact, a better one. One cannot pretend, however, that there is any alternative solution which would perfectly solve the problem of evil. Always in connection with this basic question there are numerous conflicting constraints which one tries to protect in whatever solution is decided upon. Must one say God is "all in all" and therefore inclusive of even the negative principle or must one posit an irreconcilable dualism in reality? Can one speak, as Tillich apparently does, of a potential dualism in God which results in evil only when man exercises finite freedom in existence? Tillich's solution will be examined in more detail when the concepts of finitude and existence are examined in their relevancy to theological ontology.

The negative element in being-itself, or in

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Reply to Interpretation and Criticism, p. 340.
other words, non-being, is called the "abyssal" element or "the abyss of being" in contrast to the positive element which Tillich calls the "creative ground." Both these terms were formulated with a view to designating the mysterious depth of God while protecting it against designation by "categorical" terms which would force restricting connotations upon it. The mysterious depth of God is "the basis of Godhead, that which makes God God,"¹ and Tillich takes precautions not to trespass upon this "root of his majesty" by circumscribing it within the confines of literal human explanations. Hence, only the fewest possible distinctions are suggested by the terms "ground" and "abyss." They point dimly to the positive and negative elements in "the inexhaustible ground of being in which everything has its origin."²

It is the "abyss," even more than the "ground," which accounts for the mysterious "ineffable" character of God. "It is the abyssal character of the divine life which makes revelation mysterious";³ "Without it the mystery would not be mystery."⁴

¹S.T. I, p. 278.  
²Ibid.  
³Ibid., p. 173.  
⁴Ibid., p. 122.
This is accounted for by the fact that man experiences the depth of God most mysteriously as the negation of everything finite by God's infinite transcendence. The term "abyss" has the implication "that everything participates in the power of being in a finite way, that all beings are infinitely transcended by their creative ground."¹

The infinite, of which man has an awareness, appears to be of such great potential being that man's actual finite being is negated in the light of the infinite and that the infinite appears as the dark, mysterious abyss of being-itself.

The "abyss" is the dynamic "root" of the God-head. "Non-being (that in God which makes his self-affirmation dynamic) opens up the divine self-seclusion and reveals him as power and love."²

The "abyss" appears to be logically prior to the "ground" in that, in Tillich's view, the negative must "resist" the positive in order for the positive to affirm itself. The "abyss" becomes "ground" when its power is united with the form of the Logos

¹Ibid., p. 263.
²The Courage to Be, pp. 170-171.
in expressions of being. It must be remembered that being is only an abstraction unless it is united with the form of being. The three "principles" of the Godhead, Depth, Logos, and Spirit, are always united in fact, and it is only by abstraction that one can speak of them separately. If one were to abstract the "abyss" entirely from the rest of the Godhead one would have the dynamic, formless source of power that could only be characterised as the demonic.

Without the second principle the first principle would be chaos, burning fire, but it would not be the creative ground. Without the second principle God is demonic, is characterised by absolute seclusion, is the "naked absolute" (Luther).

Tillich speaks sometimes as if the demonic holy were a positive power of evil issuing from the depth of God.

Form of being and inexhaustibility of being belong together. Their unity in the depth of essential nature is the divine, their separation in existence, the relatively independent erupting of the "abyss" in things, is the demonic.

Even in this strong suggestion of positive evil one must understand that the evil is negative.

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1 S.T. 1, p. 278.
2 I.H., p. 84.
defined by the loss of the form of being. The actual demonic, if one can speak of it as actual, consists of power with little form. It could not become actual with no form. What becomes actual unites power and form and constitutes being, not non-being. The demonic can be more accurately thought of as the potential being (or relative non-being) associated with a particular expression of being. When a being appears to be much less than what it could be then it appears to be demonic and evil. Everything that actually is is fundamentally positive, participating in the "creative ground" of being.

The term "ground" guarantees the mystery of God as well as the term "abyss." Its meaning is sufficiently uncategorical that "it indicates that the ground of revelation is...the mystery which appears in revelation and which remains a mystery in its appearance."¹ It is, however, "the positive side of the mystery"² and has positive connotations which point to God as "the power of being, conquering non-being."³ The word "ground," in this

¹S.T. I, p. 175. ²Ibid., p. 122. ³Ibid.
respect, is intended to express "the relation of being-itself to finite beings," a relation sometimes interpreted by the categories of causality and substance. These categories which apply literally to the finite situation cannot apply literally to God and, for that reason, are apt to be misleading. Tillich thinks "ground" is a better term because it "oscillates between cause and substance and transcends both of them," thus preserving their strength and avoiding their weakness.

Tillich's use of the term "ground of being" is slightly misleading in itself in so far as it seems to suggest that God is pantheistic. Gustave Weigel has commented on this in an article in Theological Studies. He says: "From a superficial reading of the words one might be led to the idea that Tillich is a pantheist, for he uses words that make perfect pantheistic sense. But it is not his intention to be a pantheist." Tillich explicitly deals with the question of pantheism when discussing the use of

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1 Ibid., p. 263.  
2 Ibid., p. 173.  
the term "substance" to describe God's immanence. He says that Spinoza tried to use this term and established a "naturalistic pantheism" which merged God's being into the being of finite things and thereby deprived finite things of their "substantial independence and freedom." Tillich says that it was because of this inherent danger of pantheism in applying the concept of substance to God that Christianity has traditionally used the concept of causality to express God's relation to finite beings. To Tillich, however, causality is no more satisfactory because the cause and effect series cannot be arbitrarily broken by positing a first cause that is not itself the effect of another prior cause. If causality is used in this sense then it is not being used in its literal sense but symbolically, and Tillich believes that a more directly symbolic term is more appropriate. Such a term is "the creative and abysmal ground of being." 

It is not entirely clear that Tillich has successfully escaped the danger of pantheism in his

1 S.T. I, p. 263.
2 Ibid., p. 264.
own system, even though he is explicitly aware of
the danger and believes himself to have avoided it
successfully. Tillich takes pains to stress what
pantheism really is in contrast to popular miscon-
ceptions of it. It does not mean "that everything
that is is God,"1 or "that God is the totality of
things."2 Rather it means that God is "the crea-
tive power and unity of nature, the absolute sub-
stance which is present in everything"3 or, for
idealistic pantheism, that God is "the essential
structure of being, the essence of all essences."4

Now, in Tillich's own definition of what pan-
theism really is one can see elements that very
much resemble aspects of Tillich's own system.
The "creative power and unity of nature" sounds
not unlike the creative ground of being in which
all finite beings participate, and the "essential
structure of being" sounds virtually identical to
the second principle of the Godhead, the Logos,
"the structure of being." Tillich does not speak
of "absolute substance" except perhaps in a symbolic

1Ibid., p. 259.  
2Ibid.  
3Ibid.  
4Ibid.
sense but apart from this omission his first and second principles of the Godhead sound almost identical to naturalistic and idealistic pantheism, respectively. Nor does the third principle of the Godhead, the Spirit which unites the first and second in Life, provide any safeguard against a pantheistic doctrine. If anything, it increases the participation of God in finite reality. Perhaps the most incriminating aspect of Tillich's system, in this respect, is the insistence that God is "all in all" including even the negative elements of reality. This appears to leave no "room" for things or persons or powers having "substantial independence and freedom" from God.

Tillich, however, is aware of this precise danger and believes that he has successfully avoided it. He firmly maintains that the created order is "substantially independent" from God, the divine ground, while at the same time "it remains in substantial unity with it."¹ The independence of the created resides in its possessing "finite freedom" which is the ability to affirm or negate the

¹S.T. II, p. 30.
essential unity of the created and God. Man has the freedom to relinquish his essential being which is unity with God. This relinquishing of essential being results in a loss of being, not the manifestation of positive evil outside God. The doctrines of the "Fall" and of existence which will be dealt with in the next section are relevant here but it is sufficient to note that finite freedom appears to guarantee some measure of independence from God, even if this independence results only in loss of being and, possibly, eventual annihilation. Tillich maintains that "it is the quality of finite freedom within the created which makes pantheism impossible."¹

There would also appear to be some measure of protection against a pantheistic conception of God in Tillich's insistence on the absolute transcendence of God "beyond subjectivity and objectivity," "beyond essence and existence," and "beyond finitude and infinity." In view of this prominent element in his thought and the element of finite freedom, it is very difficult to call Tillich a pantheist, without reservations. There are definitely pantheistic

¹Ibid.
elements in his system. He says himself that "the
pantheistic element in the classical doctrine that
God is ipsum esse, being-itself, is...necessary
for a Christian doctrine of God." However, in
spite of the pantheistic elements, I believe it is
more adequate to refrain from calling Tillich a
pantheist. His idea of God and of the created order
are too dialectical to be pantheistic. The dialectical
concepts may be liable to criticism of another
sort, but one cannot label them pantheistic without
doing them violence and without overlooking their
dialectical character. I believe that Tillich is
justified, at least in holding his primary presup-
position that the Trinitarian conception of God is
sophisticated enough to include genuine pantheistic
elements while at the same time providing sufficient
guarantees that the pantheism is not totally pre-
dominant.

The question of the relation of God to the
Creation is much broader than the question of pan-
theism. It touches upon nearly everything that it
is possible to say about God. The doctrine of the

Logos and the doctrine of the Spirit are inextricably involved in any discussion of the relation of God and the world. However, as I said earlier, it is necessary to abstract one person or principle of the Trinity from the other two and deal with it even though it presupposes the other two at every point. On this basis something more can be said about the relation of "the creative and abysmal ground of being" to the world. This aspect of God as "power" is especially relevant to the doctrine of Creation and the question of God's omnipotence. It will be seen that the concept of God as being-itself is extremely influential if not determinative in these areas dealing with God's creativity and omnipotent relatedness to the Creation.

3. Creativity: Tillich says that "the divine creativity logically precedes the relation of God to the created," but his descriptions of both are in much the same terminology, the terminology of being-itself, with the result that the distinctions of creativity and the distinctions of relatedness are

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1 S.T. I, p. 304.
identical in substance and different only in minor
connotations. Tillich is aware of this when he
says that "the doctrine of creation...is the basic
description of the relation between God and the
world." Since creativity is not actively pre-
supposed by God's relation to the world it is ex-
pedient to begin with the question of God's omni-
potence because the distinctions implicit here are
useful for dealing with creativity.

Omnipotence is the symbol which expresses the
divine power, "the power of being which resists
non-being in all its expressions and which is
manifest in the creative process in all its forms." Omnipotence does not mean that God "is able to do
whatever he wants." Rather, it means that wherever
or whenever there is power it is the power of God.
To the eyes of faith, the recognition of God's omni-
potence is an affirmation of the "victory over the
threat of non-being." The threat of non-being can
occur in relation to time or space or knowledge, as
well as in other respects, and omnipotence has a

1 Ibid., p. 230.  
2 Ibid., p. 303.  
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid., p. 304.
bearing in each case. "With respect to time, omnipotence is eternity; with respect to space, it is omnipresence; and with respect to the subject-object structure of being, it is omniscience."¹

Eternity is an unusually important concept in Tillich's thought because time is the primary category of finitude out of which man's existential questions arise. Time, more than any other category, shows the nature of relative non-being as the "not yet" of being and the "no more" of being. Accordingly, it gives rise to the threat of non-being more readily than other categories and the question of God is correspondingly more urgent. The eternity of God is the symbol by which the threat of non-being in finite time is overcome. It is a difficult idea to conceive and describe because it does not mean "timelessness" of God which excludes God from a positive relation with time, nor "endlessness" of time which would logically subject God to time. It means "the transcendent unity of the dissected moments of existential time."² In other words, God "includes temporality,

¹ Ibid. ² Ibid.
but...is not subject to it."\(^1\) The only analogy
which is suitable to describe eternity is "the
unity of remembered past and anticipated future
in an experienced present."\(^2\) Hence, Tillich speaks
of the "eternal now."\(^3\) God's inclusion of tem-
porality within Himself is the answer to the threat
of non-being in time because man through faith can
be assured that God has past, present, and future
within the aegis of his creative power. God "re-
creates the past"\(^4\) which, for him, "is not complete."
He can do this "through a new interpretation given
by historical remembrance" or "by developments which
make effective some hidden potentialities"\(^5\) of the
past. For God's omnipotence with respect to time
"both past and future are open."\(^6\) He can work crea-
tively overcoming non-being in all three modes of
time. In fact he must work in relation to the par-
ticular modes of time because being is structured
according to the category of time—past, present,

\(^3\) Paul Tillich, *The Eternal Now* (London: S.C.M.
\(^4\) *S.T. I*, p. 306.
\(^5\) *Ibid*.
\(^6\) *Ibid.*
and future—and wherever being overcomes non-
being it must be in a mode of time. It can be seen
that the meaning of eternity, like omnipotence it-
self, is fundamentally determined by the conception
of God as being-itself, the power of being.

The same holds true with omniscience and omni-
presence. Because space is a category of the struc-
ture of being all space participates in the power of
being, and, from another point of view, the power of
being, or God, participates in all created space.
In this sense, God is omnipresent. As in connection
with time, God is not subject to space but "he trans-
scends it and participates in it." This relation-
ship is symptomatic of all relationship of being-
itsel to finite being. The omnipresence of God
 guarantees imperishable space for all who partici-
pate in God's omnipresence through faith. This
overcomes the anxiety of losing one's space. It
also "breaks down the difference between the sacred
and the profane" because all places can be sacred
if we are aware of God's omnipresence and any place
can be secular if we are not. "Sacred" and "profane"

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1 Ibid., p. 303.  
2 Ibid., p. 309.
are correlated with our faith, not with the presence of God, who is omnipresent.

Omniscience derives meaning from the fact that all being, and therefore all truth, resides in God as being-itself. God's omniscience assures us that "nothing is outside the centred unity of his life, nothing is strange, dark, hidden, isolated, unapproachable." In this confidence man can survive the threat of the unknown, believing that "there is no absolute darkness in one's being." A corollary of divine omniscience is "the belief in the openness of reality to human knowledge" which implies, also, the belief in the unity of all knowledge since "the divine life in which we are rooted embodies all truth." In the light of the unity of truth in God, however, "we experience the fragmentary character of all finite knowledge." The former through faith gives courage to overcome the threat of the latter. Omniscience, like all aspects of God's omnipotence, answers an existential

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1Ibid.  
2Ibid.  
3Ibid., p. 310.  
4Ibid.  
5Ibid.
question arising from the nature of finitude, and the answer is dependent on the conception of God as being-itself.

Now, it is this situation which gives meaning to the concept of God's creativity. Man, in receiving the revealed answers to the questions arising from his finitude, "discovers that the meaning of finitude is creatureliness" and, at the same time, apprehends "its correlate, the divine creativity." The doctrine of Creation "is not the story of an event which took place 'once upon a time'." Rather, it "points to the situation" of God's creative activity as it is correlated with the situation of the finite creature. The fact that Tillich speaks more frequently of "creativity" than of "the Creation" indicates clearly that his doctrine of Creation "does not describe an event" but consists of theological ontology, the description of the situation of "the relation between God and the world." One consequence of this approach is that creation, preservation,
and providence are all included in the treatment of creativity. Since God is eternal and includes all temporality his creative activity must be seen with respect to all three modes of time. "God has created the world, he is creative in the present moment, and he will creatively fulfil his salvos."\(^1\) Creation is the past tense of creativity; preservation is the present tense; and providence is creativity from the point of view of the future.

It might appear that Tillich is saying creativity is eternal and the creature co-eternal with God. He recognizes this danger and answers it by his insistence that the divine eternity transcends time as well as includes it. The transcendence of eternity guarantees its "priority" over time, past present, or future. The literal question of God "before creation" is a question \textit{mal posa} because time is a quality of creation, not a pre-condition of creation. It is more adequate to speak of God's transcendence of time than of his being \textit{before} creation. Tillich thus agrees with Augustine that it is best to speak of God's creation \textit{with time}\(^2\)

\(^1\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 231. \(^2\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 236.
rather than in time.

Other pertinent questions concerning creation deal with creation *ex nihilo*, the split between essential and existential reality or the "Fall," and the place of man in creation. Something has already been said about the first in connection with non-being. Tillich holds that *creatio ex nihilo* is a concept necessary to protect theology from any type of ultimate dualism and, at the same time, to point to the "heritage of non-being"\(^1\) in creatureliness. The second question, about essence and existence and the Fall, will be considered in connection with the doctrine of the Christ. The third question was present implicitly in much of what was said about philosophical ontology where it was seen that "man alone is micro-

\(~\text{cosmos}\)\(^2\) and "in him the structure of all being is defined."\(^3\) Tillich believes that "man is the telos of creation,\(^4\) the only being with "a complete self and a complete world,"\(^5\) or, in other


\(^3\) Of., *Eins*, Chapter IV.

words, the highest conceivable fulfilment of ontological possibilities. In more traditional theological language, "Man is the image of God because his logos is analogous to the divine logos." More will be said about this whole question, too, in connection with the doctrine of the Christ who embodies "essential manhood" which is also "essential God-manhood."  

Tillich calls preservation God's "sustaining creativity" and providence God's "directing creativity." The terms are almost self-explanatory but there are some rather vital questions associated with each of them. Preservation raises the question of God's immemence and transcendence again because it deals with the creature's dependence and independence in relation to God. This is really the question of pantheism which was dealt with at some length earlier. Tillich believes that the transcendence of God's eternity and the quality of freedom in the creature are adequate safeguards against pantheism while the concept of God as the

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1Ibid., p. 298.  
2Ibid., II, p. 102.  
3Ibid., I, p. 391.  
4Ibid., p. 293.
power of being which is "essentially creative"¹ adequately denotes God's actual preservation of things in existence.

The question of providence is much more difficult than the question of preservation because it demands a much more paradoxical answer. Providence raises more urgently the questions of the ambiguity of creation and the relation of God to the individual in his situation which includes destructive and fateful elements. The idea of providence presupposes an end to which God's activity is directed in existence. Tillich holds that this end is the "fulfilling"² of every creature in existence and the fulfilling of history which "contributes to the ultimate fulfilment of creaturely existence."³ Alongside this "helon of creativity," however, one must take into consideration the destructive and fateful elements in existence which appear utterly to frustrate God's aim of fulfilment for creaturely existence. The fact of existential disruption and distortion of

¹Ibid., p. 291. ²Ibid., p. 293. ³Ibid., p. 297.
essential being must, Tillich believes, be given fully serious recognition with the result that providence must be conceived in a paradoxical way rather than as a rational principle. Tillich cites three examples of the latter: the "teleological," "harmonistic," and "dialectical" ways of interpreting providence. The first disregards the fact of evil in arguing that "all things are so constructed and ordered that they serve the purpose of God's action." The second holds that a "law of harmony" regulates all events for good even when they appear conflicting or destructive at the time. The third, the dialectical interpretation, recognizes the "depth of negativity in being and existence" but regards it only as a moment in the dialectical process which "logically as well as actually" will culminate in synthesis. In this interpretation providence applies only to history and cannot offer much consolation to the individual.

In contrast to any of these rationalistic

\[1\text{Ibid., p. 294.}\]
\[2\text{Ibid.}\]
\[3\text{Ibid., p. 295.}\]
theories of providence Tillich proposes a thoroughly paradoxical interpretation in which fulfilment either of the individual or of history "does not lie in an eventual time-and-space future"¹ but is real always "in spite of the darkness of fate and of the meaninglessness of existence."² This interpretation, Tillich believes, is "definitively established"³ with "the victory of Christ over the forces of fate and fear just when they seemed to have overwhelmed him at the cross."⁴ Providence is not always apparent but through faith it is seen to be a "permanent activity of God,"⁵ a "quality of every constellation of conditions, a quality which 'drives' or 'lures' toward fulfilment."⁶ This permanent activity of God is his "directing creativity," the certainty of which is the "ultimate answer"⁷ to the question of theodicy.

The question which appears to have been bypassed by Tillich in his doctrine of providence or

¹Ibid., p. 297.
²Ibid., p. 293.
³Ibid., p. 294.
⁴Ibid.
⁵Ibid., p. 296.
⁶Ibid.
⁷Ibid., p. 300.
directing creativity is the question of God's initiative in acts of providence. It has not, perhaps, been by-passed so much as dismissed. Tillich says explicitly that "the man who believes in providence does not believe that a special divine activity will alter the conditions of finitude and estrangement" in which he finds himself. A true belief in providence, Tillich insists, is such as is expressed by St. Paul at the end of Romans, Chapter 8, namely, that "no situation whatsoever can frustrate the fulfilment of his ultimate destiny, that nothing can separate him from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus." One does not doubt that this belief is one side of the belief in providence but the unanswered question appears to be how a person can interpret in terms of providence the individual developments of his life or of history which seem to be distinctive acts of providence. The coming of Christ himself might be regarded as an example of such acts of providence. I do not think that Tillich can really speak of "acts of providence" at all. He does say providence

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1 Ibid., p. 206.  
2 Ibid.
is a "permanent activity" of God but he means by
this "a quality [sig] of every constellation of
conditions...a quality of inner directedness pre-
sent in every situation." To call providence a
quality seems to exclude any possibility of God's
having initiative to act. The same difficulty is
experienced here as was discerned in connection
with Tillich's concept of miracles. If there is
no "special divine activity" it appears misleading
to speak either of miracles or acts of providence.
Tillich deals with "special providence" but under-
stands it not as any special activity of God but
only as giving the individual "the certainty that
under any circumstances, under any set of condi-
tions, the divine 'factor' is active and that
therefore the road to his ultimate fulfilment is
open." Granting that it is extremely difficult
to reconcile all the relevant constraints in the
doctrine of providence, I do not believe that
Tillich's solution is adequate in that it dismisses

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1Ibid.
2cf. supra, Chapter VII, pp. 281-288.
3Ibid., p. 297.
or at least by-passes the possibility that God can act in a special way in special events to achieve his ends. Tillich comes close to affirming special acts of providence in his concept of Kain, which are moments in history manifesting a special measure of God's directing creativity. But even in this concept the element of God's initiative is not explicitly affirmed.

4. Personal and Non-existent: The presuppositions which lead Tillich to his position regarding miracles and special acts of providence are also determinative in connection with the questions of God as personal and God as existing. The presuppositions in question are that "the being of God is being-itself"¹ and the corollaries of this statement, namely, that "God transcends every being and also the totality of being—the world"² and that he "does not possess the logical structure of a thing with qualities."³ On these presuppositions God cannot be thought of either as existing or as a person. Anything which exists

¹Ibid., p. 261.
²Ibid., p. 263.
must be subject to the structure of being and the categories of being, and God is certainly not subject to these. He is the source of them and must transcend them. Tillich believes that the logical implications of the conviction that God transcends everything else must be taken seriously with the result that one must say "God is...not a being"\(^1\) and "He is not a person."\(^2\)

It would not do justice to Tillich's thinking, however, to leave the matter here with the negative assertions that God does not exist and is not a person. The question of God's existence has been anticipated in what was said already about God as being-itself. One must agree, I think, with Tillich's conclusion that it is not strictly adequate to speak of God existing if this means being subject to the categories. In this respect it is no doubt more adequate to speak of God as being-itself, the power which transcends all beings and yet is "inherent in everything."\(^3\) This way of speaking has its problems but in relation to the

\(^1\) S.T. I, p. 263. 
\(^2\) Ibid., p. 271. 
\(^3\) Ibid., p. 261.
question of God's reality its problems are not as obvious or unmanageable as the ones implicit in speaking of God's "existence."

Much more doubtful and difficult to accept is Tillich's solution to the question of a personal God having reciprocity with man. This question is crucial not only to the doctrines of providence and miracles but to the broader question of the whole relation of personalistic concepts of theology to the apparently impersonal concepts of ontology in theology. Tillich recognizes this in *Biblical Religion And The Search For Ultimate Reality*. Here he says that "the most devastating conflict between biblical religion and ontology"1 is between the concept of reciprocity implied in personal relations and the concept of participation which accounts for the divine-human relation in ontology. Tillich tries very hard to reconcile or synthesise the two concepts.

The dialectical nature of Tillich's solution to this question is evident in the fact that he stresses the necessity of thinking of God as

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1 J.R.S.U.R., p. 79.
personal with as much force as he does the impossibility of thinking of God as a person. The reasons for the latter we have already disclosed. The necessity of thinking of God as personal is based on the following reasons: "Concrete concern impels the religious imagination to personify the divine powers,...therefore, the person-to-person relationship between God and man is constitutive for religious experience. Man cannot be ultimately concerned about something which is less than he is, something impersonal."¹ This quotation gives the unfortunate impression that the necessity of God being personal derives from man. Elsewhere, however, this impression is corrected when Tillich says that "in the encounter with God, we first experience what person should mean and how it is distinguished from, and must be protected from, everything a-personal."² This latter statement is closer to Tillich's real position on the matter, which is that God, while not being a person, is "the ground of everything personal."³

¹S.T. I, p. 247.  
²R..S.U.R., p. 27.  
³Ibid., p. 83.
Tillich holds that "being includes personal being"\(^1\) and that, therefore, "the ground of being is the ground of personal being."\(^2\) With this understanding, Tillich says, "The God who is a person is transcended by the God who is the Personal-Itself."\(^3\)

The question of reciprocity, however, remains unanswered. Reciprocity depends on the two related factors being individuals. Tillich admits that "personality (persona, prosopon) includes individuality,"\(^4\) and raises the question "in what sense God can be called an individual."\(^5\) The answer he gives is, again, typically dialectical. He says: "Is it meaningful to call him the 'absolute individual'? The answer must be that it is meaningful only in the sense that he can be called the 'absolute participant'."\(^6\) This answer is founded on the belief that "both individualisation and participation are rooted in the ground of the divine life and that God is equally 'near' to each of them while transcending

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\(^1\) Ibid.
\(^2\) Ibid.
\(^3\) Ibid., pp. 32-33.
\(^4\) S.T. I, p. 271.
\(^5\) Ibid.
\(^6\) Ibid.
them both.\textsuperscript{1} It is this belief in God as both "absolute individual" and "absolute participant" which enables Tillich to say that God is never the object of knowledge without, at the same time, being subject. Hence, "God stands in the divine-human reciprocity, but only as he who transcends it and comprises both sides of the reciprocity."\textsuperscript{2} With regard to the question of prayer the same relationship applies, if it can really be called a relationship. "In every true prayer God is both he to whom we pray and he who prays through us. For it is the divine Spirit who creates the right prayer."\textsuperscript{3}

It can be seen now that Tillich's position on the question of God as personal and individual is not as completely radical as one might think after reading that God does not exist and is not a person. Tillich dialectical inclusion of individuality and personal being within being-itself restores some of what is lost when it is denied that God is a person. Moreover, it can certainly be appreciated that

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[1]{Ibid.}
\footnotetext[2]{J. R. S. J. R., p. 91.}
\footnotetext[3]{Ibid.}
\end{footnotes}
Tillich's fundamental underlying conviction of the transcendence of God must result in God being thought to be beyond the categories of existence of which individuality is an example. God cannot be said to be an individual in the same strictly literal sense in which we are individuals. Granting all this, however, I cannot see why Tillich insists so strongly that God should not be called "a person" or "an individual." Any of the terms with ontological meaning which are applied to God must be applied symbolically; why cannot the terms "person" and "individual" be so applied? Tillich shows no hesitation about applying the term "participates" to God, albeit, symbolically; why not then its polar opposite, "individual"? If God is equally far beyond both why should the one be so preferable to the other? Tillich appears to be concerned to redress what he considers an imbalance in favour of personalistic language in speaking about God. Undoubtedly his new emphasis on God as being-itself who participates in all finite being has made more meaningful the idea of God as Universal Creator and Sustainer. But is it not equally dangerous and unbalanced to swing too far
away from the belief in God as a person? As Tillich well knows all our experiences of God must be existential, coming to us in personal encounters with God. Yet it appears to me that we cannot genuinely participate in such personal encounters knowing all the time that God is not a person in some sense. Is it really feasible, as Tillich claims in *The Courage to Be*, for a person to gain salvation through an experience of justification which consists of "the accepting of the acceptance without somebody or something that accepts"?¹ This "absolute faith," as Tillich calls it, seems to be something other than faith. It occurs only in the situation of despair when one somehow has "the courage to take the anxiety of meaninglessness upon oneself,"² having no grounds of faith, hope, or love to do so. In these cases the power of being simply affirms itself in sheer courage "without the safety of words and concepts,...without a name, a church, a cult, a theology."³ This no doubt happens to people in deep despair but it can hardly be called faith.

If it happens "without a name" etc. then the person to whom it happens cannot know how or why it has happened. If it happens in the unconscious it may be grace but it is not faith. Faith is subjective as well as objective. And in subjective faith the conviction that God is a person seems to be essential.

Without this conviction one cannot genuinely enter into the "person-to-person relationship between God and man" which is at the very heart of our experience of faith. Without it one cannot logically think of a personal relationship at all between man and God. Without it the possibility of "special acts" of God appears to be excluded and one is deprived of the opportunity of seriously giving thanks for events in one's life which seem highly providential. Without it one cannot logically petition God for particular assistance, not even for changes in our mental and spiritual situation. These consequences appear to be the result of protesting the absolute transcendance of God, but I believe the price paid is unnecessarily high. The issue reaches its climax

\[1\text{G.T. I, p. 297.}\]
in Tillich's explicit hypertheism when he speaks about "God above God." Here, I think, the question arises acutely for Tillich whether he has pressed the implications of God's transcendence too far, namely, to the point where it must be denied that God is in some sense a person.

5. Hypertheism: It is in "God above God" that all human distinctions about God are seen to be inadequate, including the belief that God is a person. The term "God above God" is a way of speaking of the transcendence of God which renders all our concepts of God symbolic. In the face of the majestic mystery of God one does not doubt that God is "above the God of theism." But confessing this, I do not believe that we can ever speak about God without being theistic. Tillich says, and I agree, that strictly personalistic theism "must be transcended because it is one-sided." He goes on, however, to speak as though theism could be transcended altogether. Surely a more suitable alternative is to ascribe to God as much glory as possible in a more adequate theistic doctrine which would include the necessary personalistic

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1 The Courage to Be, p. 176. 2 Ibid., pp. 174-175.
elements as well as the necessary universalistic elements. Tillich's own doctrine of God goes a long way toward achieving this objective except when he fails to affirm explicitly the identity or individuality of God which he must continually presuppose in his speaking about God. There seems to be a confusion in speaking about the "God above God." The confusion is that such a way of talking about God purports to have transcended theism when it has in fact not done so at all. It still uses theistic concepts, at least in a negative way, to express its meaning. It still names God even though it claims not to. It still must employ concepts and words and at least imply theology or else it cannot be communicable or even self-conscious. The self-contradiction that constitutes the confusion can be clearly seen when Tillich says, on the one hand, that absolute faith by which one apprehends the God above God "is not... something separated and definite, an event which could be isolated and described,"¹ and then, on the other hand, claims that "one can become aware of it."² He then proceeds to describe it in detail

¹ Ibid., p. 179.  
² Ibid.
with the result that he is describing in detail something which is logically indescribable and which he has acknowledged to be so.

If one is to be consistent, the "God above God" should not even be named or spoken of. It is an impossible concept except as a symbol of the transcendent mystery of the theistic God in which case theism is not absolutely transcended. If theism cannot be actually transcended then it would seem that the personalistic elements in Jewish-Christian theism might well be retained and taken with more seriousness although, admittedly, still in a symbolic sense. Theism cannot be transcended by human powers of conception; therefore, the personalistic substance of theism is discarded unnecessarily if this is done in the name of hyper-theism. In short, the personalistic ways of thinking about God are not necessarily precluded by a rightful emphasis on the transcendence of God.

Another danger in speaking about the "God above God" is that it seems to render unnecessary, unreal, and unworthy of devotion the God in whom we believe. This is a dangerous way to insure a belief in God's transcendence. It is especially dangerous when
Tillich describes the work of the God above God in "absolute faith" which produces saving courage without the recipient knowing Him or naming Him. There is an implication which I am sure Tillich does not intend, namely, that it does not matter whom we name or whom we glorify so long as one can "take the anxiety of meaninglessness upon oneself" even "without seeing anything concrete which could conquer the non-being in fate and death,"¹ and even "although there is no special power that conquers guilt."² Many people are no doubt saved by God in a certain degree without knowing who is the Author of their salvation or, perhaps, even that they have been saved. But we who know in whom we believe simply cannot speak as though His name is unimportant. We may have times of doubt and even despair, and we may be saved by God while we are not fully aware of Him, but when we do become aware of our salvation and when we attempt to speak about it, that is to say, when we theologize, then the name of our Saviour is of utmost importance and to imply otherwise is dangerously misleading.

¹Ibid. ²Ibid., p. 130.
6. God as Meaning.

1. Logos: For power to be actualized it must have form. If this dictum is applied symbolically to God it can be seen to contain analogies of the three principles of the Trinity: power issues from the Depth of God; the logos provides the form; and Spirit is the actualization of the power and form united with each other. The logos, the "second principle" of the Godhead, cannot be understood except in its place in the Trinity. Here it can be seen as interdependent with both Depth and Spirit, inseparable from them in fact but distinguished from them, nevertheless. Only as an abstraction can it be dealt with separately from the other trinitarian principles.

The logos is the "principle of God's self-objectification,"¹ or the "universal principle of divine self-manifestation."² In the logos, or the Son, God "separates Himself from Himself"³ by becoming "distinguishable, definite, finite"⁴ in "meaningful structure."⁵ This objectification or

¹ST. I, p. 278. ²ST. II, p. 129. ³L.C.J., p. 107. ⁴ST. I, p. 278. ⁵Ibid.
manifestation represents a degree of separation from God as God in so far as the distinguishable, definite, and finite are removed from the infinite, inexhaustible, "unapproachable intensity of his being"¹ which is the "basis of Godhead."² Separation is a dangerous symbol to use here because it threatens to split up the Godhead, and Tillich uses it sparingly, usually when talking about "the process of the divine life,"³ the process "in which separation is posited and is overcome by reunion."⁴ Whatever the term used, some notion of distinction or movement or separation and reunion within the Godhead is necessary in order that God should be conceived as "living."

The logos is the articulated structure of the "divine fulness,"⁵ or the structure of being, if God is conceived as being-itself. As such, the logos is the source of all meaning, the content of all truth, and the "outspoken" element in God whereby God becomes accessible in some degree to our minds.

¹Ibid.
²Ibid.
³Ibid.
⁴Ibid., p. 263.
⁵Ibid., p. 273.
The theoretical importance of the concept of the *logos* can hardly be overestimated. By calling the structure of being the *logos* who is God, one re-affirms the link between God and everything that is. Moreover, provision is made for the possibility of God being known through the structure of what is. Tillisch says of God that "He is this structure, and it is impossible to speak about him except in terms of this structure." Because the structural elements of being are the divine *logos*, "They enable us to use symbols which we are certain point to the ground of reality." 

The fact that the structural elements of being render only symbolic knowledge of God rather than literal knowledge points to the very difficult question of the relation of the finite *logos* to God. The relation is not one of simple identity or else knowing the *logos* would imply knowing God in a non-symbolic way. The fact that the finite *logos* can render only symbolic knowledge indicates that God Himself transcends the *logos* in some sense. This is an unacceptable conclusion for Tillich because it destroys the balance of the Trinity by giving

decided priority and pre-eminence to God the Father over the logos. This, of course, would be heresy. One solution to the dilemma might be to call the logos infinite and co-eternal with God the Father. But this solution would involve relinquishing the claim that the logos is finite and changing. As was shown earlier in connection with the logos in philosophical ontology Tillich does not wish to do this either. If the logos structure of being were not finite and fateful, he believes, truth would be impossible for man to achieve because truth is the identity of thinking and being and man's thinking is indisputably finite and fateful.

The solution Tillich has for the dilemma of the logos is a highly dialectical one, consisting of the unique concept of the Trinity in which "the finite is posited as finite within the process of the divine life, but it is reunited with the infinite within the same process."¹ He elaborates by saying that "the divine life is infinite, but in such a way that the finite is posited in it in a manner which transcends potentiality and actuality."² It seems like a clear contradiction in terms to speak of the finite in any

¹Ibid., p. 279. ²Ibid., p. 279.
way transcending potentiality and actuality. Nor
does it seem that the problem of the logon being
subordinate or inferior to the Father has been solved.
If the logon is really identified with the finite it
is difficult to see how it can be identified with the
infinite, etc., although one cannot be quite sure what
is implied by the finite being "posited" in the in-
finite. The term infinite is very difficult to under-
stand on any occasion but some help may be derived
from remembering that infinity is conceived by Tillich
somewhat as a trend of free self-transcendence. "In-
finitude is finitude transcending itself without any
a priori limit."¹ With this understanding of infinity
as "a demand, not a thing"² it may be possible to con-
ceive of the logon being both finite and infinite. It
is finite as formed, "distinguishable, definite"³ and,
at the same time, infinite in so far as it goes be-
yond the finite infinitely by being identified with
the limitless ground of being which "is not infinity"⁴
but "which lies beyond the polarity of finitude and
infinite self-transcendence."⁵ The relationship of

¹Ibid. I, p. 212. ²Ibid.
³Ibid., p. 278. ⁴Ibid., p. 212.
⁵Ibid.
the finite *logos* to being-itself or the divine life of God is obviously a highly dialectical one. Even if it is possible to conceive of the *logos* as both infinite and finite the question still remains how—if the *logos* is finite at all—the conclusion can be avoided that it is "created, not begotten" and, therefore, inferior to the first person of the Trinity.

One thing seems clear and that is Tillich's insistence that the finite be included in God. This position is of central importance in his thought because it insures that all finite reality consisting of essential and existential reality, while in some sense independent of God, is "not cut off" from Him. By positing the finite *logos* in God the link between the creature and Creator is assured which is logically necessary to permit interaction between the two. Of course, Tillich does not wish to have the *logos* conceived as only in the creature since this might deprive it of divinity. Hence, he posits the dialectical treatment of the *logos* which is sufficiently tenacious to justify the question

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1 S.T. II, p. 15.
that I raised in connection with the *logos* in philosophical ontology, namely, whether Tillich does not in fact speak of two *logoi*; the eternal, unchanging one and the fateful, changing one.¹

Undoubtedly, it is the character of the *logos* as finite which is of most systematic importance for theology because theology, as Tillich conceives it, deals almost exclusively with the interaction of creature and Creator which the finite *logos* makes possible. The doctrines of man, salvation, and the Christ deal most directly with the second principle of the Trinity but since all theology is conceived as "correlation" between human questions and divine answers, the *logos* as the "mediating" principle "bridging the infinite gap between the infinite and the finite"² is always at least implicitly involved.

It is, however, the special significance of the *logos* in theological ontology which I am here concerned to examine. The *logos* is of special significance to theological ontology in so far as it

¹ cf. supra, Chapter III, pp. 135-143.
² S.T. II, p. 108.
constitutes the essential being of man (who is 
a microcosm of all creation), the essential 
reality from which man (and all creation) has fal-
len, the "essential manhood" which as the Christ 
"has appeared under the conditions of existence 
without being conquered by them,"\(^1\) and the "New 
Being" which comprises salvation for fallen man. 
In short, the \textit{logos} is of special significance for 
thefology because it is the theological answer in 
light of which the problematic situation of man is 
defined and in the form of which it is rectified. 
Just as the \textit{logos} as ontological reason was seen 
to be of all-pervading relevance to philosophical 
ontology, so the \textit{logos} as essential manhood is of 
all-pervading relevance to theological ontology. 
Tillich says that "the distinction between essence 
and existence,"\(^2\) which is defined by the \textit{logos}, 
"is the backbone of the whole body of theological 
thought."\(^3\) It is with this distinction that the 
exposition of the \textit{logos} as finite meaning must 
begin.

\(^{1}\) \textit{Ibid.} \hspace{1cm} ^{2}\text{S.T. I, p. 226.} 
\(^{3}\) \textit{Ibid.}
2. Essence and Existence: The basic distinction between essence and existence was described earlier in the context of philosophical ontology. There it was seen that essence can be understood either as the true nature of things or as the basis of ethical values. In fact these two connotations are always united with each other and Tillich certainly unites them in his use of the concept of essence in both philosophical and theological ontology. In so far as essence, the true nature of things, is seen to be created by God it is inseparable from essence, "the original goodness of everything created," which is the ontological foundation of ethics. Also, the two connotations of essence are inseparable for Tillich because he conceives essence in either sense to be fully resident only in man who is the microcosmos of all creation and in whom alone the complete ontological structure of being is present.

Essential being is essential manhood and essential manhood is the finite logos in God. This claim that essential manhood "represents God" depends for

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1cf., supra, pp. 77-32.
2S.T. I, p. 223.
3S.T. II, p. 103.
its systematic basis on the problematical claim that the \textit{logos} of God is finite and somehow infinite at the same time. Tillich's tendency to imply two \textit{logos} is apparent in this connection, and this makes it very difficult to perceive in his writings an unequivocal position on the question whether or not essential manhood is really identical to the second principle of the Godhead. I shall try, however, to present the evidence such as it is.

First, it is clear that "essential man...represents the original image of God embodied in man."\textsuperscript{1} The image of God in man means that "his \textit{logos} is analogous to the divine \textit{logos}, so that the divine \textit{logos} can appear as man without destroying the humanity of man."\textsuperscript{2} The key word here is "analogous." It would seem to imply that man's \textit{logos} and God's \textit{logos} are not identical but only similar. If they are only similar, however, it would not necessarily follow that God's \textit{logos} could appear as man without destroying the humanity of man. Further, if the divine \textit{logos} is only analogous to man's \textit{logos}, rather than

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid. \textsuperscript{2}S.T. I, p. 233.
identical with it, then the implications of this analogical relationship would seem to need explicit elaboration because of the central importance of this relationship of human and divine logos to both philosophical and theological ontology.

Tillich, however, to my knowledge does not deal explicitly with the relationship of man's essential logos to the divine logos. On the contrary, he appears to assume the relationship to be one of essential identity rather than analogy. Truth is the identity of human thinking and the divine logos. It is the divine logos which is the structure of being. God "is this structure, and it is impossible to speak about him except in terms of this structure." But the structure of being which is ontological reason constitutes the image of God in man. "Man is the image of God in...his rational structure." Moreover, the second principle of the Godhead is finite, as essential man or essential being is finite. The finite logos, as was shown earlier, is dialectically related to the infinite.

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1 Ibid., p. 264.  
2 Ibid., p. 237.
Godhead, and Tillich says that the fact "that 
esential humanity includes the union of God and 
man...belongs to the dialectics of the infinite and 
the finite." This would seem to mean that the 
union of God and man in man is the finite logon. 
Again Tillich says explicitly that essential man-
hood is identical to "essential God-manhood."2 

The most compelling reason however, for believing 
that Tillich identifies the divine logon and 
esential man is provided by his understanding of 
the incarnation of the logon in Jesus. Here, it 
is clear that the logon is both essential man and 
divine. "The Christ...represents God to man. He 
represents...what man essentially is."3 There may 
remain some doubt whether Tillich intends to iden-
	ify the divine logon and essential manhood but 
there can be no doubt that when it suits his pur-
pose, as it does in connection with the doctrines 
of Christ and salvation, he employs the two con-
cepts as though they were strictly identical. "It 
is essential man who represents...God to man."4

1 ibid., p. 103.  
2 ibid.  
3 ibid., p. 103.  
4 ibid.
Since the substance of essential manhood is the same as the substance of the new being which comprises salvation, its discussion presupposes an examination of the problem to which it is the answer. The problem, of course, is the distortion of essential being under the conditions of existence due to the "Fall."

Existence, like essence, was dealt with earlier in dealing with the content of philosophical ontology. The key to the understanding of existence lies in the concepts of non-being and finitude. Tillich says in the "Introduction" to Systematic Theology II that "the estrangement of existence... can be understood only if one knows the nature of finitude."¹ Finitude is the "mixture of being and non-being,"² the trait everything has of combining possible or actual being with the absolute or relative non-being out of which it has come. This has already been elaborated at length and does not need to be repeated. The important thing to note here is that existence involves finitude in which being actually "stands out" of non-being of both

¹ p. 4. ² S.T. II, p. 22.
kinds. Essential being is finite, too, but it does not have the chief connotation of actuality that characterizes existence. This difference between essence and existence in relation to the actuality of their finitude lies beneath all their other differences. When finitude is actualized it comes into existence with the result that the non-being which only threatened being in essential finitude now in existence unaccountably tends to distort and even destroy essential being. Although it is the actualization of finitude which makes the state of existence it must be noted that actualization results in more than existence alone, actualization of being results in "life" of which existence is only one element.

Existential elements are only one part of the human predicament. They are always combined ambiguously with essential elements; otherwise they would have no being at all. Essential as well as existential elements are always abstractions from the concrete actuality of being, namely, "Life."\(^1\)

The elaboration of the meaning of "Life" is a subject for the next section on God as "Life." Meanwhile, existence can quite safely be treated in abstraction.

\(^1\)S.T. II, p. 32.
Tillich uses the term "estrangement" to describe the condition of being in existence. "Man's estrangement from his essential being is the universal character of existence."¹ because the condition of estrangement is universal in existence it is ontological, and because it is defined by the notion of a "Fall" or "transition"² from what being really is and ought to be it is theological. Hence, the implications of the estrangement of existence, which Tillich treats as almost determinate with sin, are a proper subject of theological ontology. The first question, of course, is about the ontological possibility of the "Fall" or transition from essence to existence. Then questions regarding the consequences of the "Fall" and the ontological status of evil must be dealt with before the question of the New being can be raised or seen to be answered in Jesus as the Christ.

3. The Fall:— Tillich interprets the "Fall" of creation in ontological terms rather than historical terms although he admits that even his own interpretation is only a "half-way demythologisation"³ of

¹ S.T. II, p. 36. ² Ibid., pp. 33 ff. ³ Ibid., p. 33.
the traditional myth. He prefers to use the term "transition from essence to existence"¹ rather than "Fall" but concedes that the word "transition" has temporal connotations that are not strictly applicable to the ontological situation. He tries to circumvent the temporal connotation of the "Fall" or "transition" by insisting that there was "no point in time and space in which created goodness was actualised and had existence"² without the "Fall" being in effect. He believes that neither the Creation nor the "Fall" should be conceived in temporal terms. They are more adequately conceived in ontological terms with the result that it is possible to speak of the "coincidence" of the Creation and the Fall. As was shown earlier, Tillisch deals with the Creation in terms of God's "creativity" which is actually operative in all three modes of time and universally in all space. Similarly, "the transition from essence to existence is a universal quality of finite being"³ which "ontologically precedes everything that happens in time and space."⁴ It is

¹Ibid.  
²Ibid., p. 50.  
³Ibid., p. 42.  
⁴Ibid.
"the original fact" which is coincident with creativity because it is "the trans-historical quality of all events in time and space." The ontological situation is now and always has been that "actualised creation and estranged existence are identical." Everything God has created "participates in the transition from essence to existence."

Tillich has been much criticized in some quarters for saying that the Creation and the Fall coincide. It has been asked whether this manner of speaking does not logically imply that creation is not good in itself as Christian theology has always believed it to be. He has been charged with holding that the actual creation must be essentially evil if it is ontologically coincident with the Fall. Against this allegation Tillich maintains that, although creativity and transition from essence to existence universally coincide, the coincidence is not a logical coincidence. "Creation is good in its essential character" and does not logically

1Ibid., p. 41.  
2Ibid., p. 46.  
3Ibid., p. 50.  
4Ibid.  
5Ibid., p. 50.  
6Ibid.
Imply the transition to existence. Existence is simply "a fact" which cannot be deduced from essential being but which, nevertheless, must be recognized. There is "no logically necessary or deductive step from being to existence," rather, "The way from essence to existence is "irrational". Existence "cannot be derived from essence"; the transition "has the character of a leap and not of structural necessity." Tillich does not believe that the "leap" from essence to existence is totally inexplicable. He analyses "the possibility" of its happening and explains how it happens. As we shall see, however, this explanation does not make the happening rational or necessary; it merely analyses the fact as it happens to be. If Tillich's explanation of the Fall implied its logical necessity then his defence against the allegations of making sin a rational necessity would be destroyed.

As it is, I believe Tillich has not sacrificed any crucial theological truth in his claim that the

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1 Ibid., p. 33.
2 Ibid., p. 3.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., p. 50.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., p. 35.
Creation and the Fall coincide. He is right in insisting that the temporal account of the Creation and the Fall must be considered as myth and not as history and that one cannot speak literally about Creation before the Fall. Time is simply not the relevant category in terms of which this matter can be explicated. There are at least four main theological constraints which must be given recognition in this connection. They are: firstly, that "nothing can happen to God accidentally"; secondly, that God created an essentially good world; thirdly, that "the state of existence is a fallen state"; and fourthly, that man is somehow responsible for the fallen state. To speak of Creation before the Fall is one symbolic way of protecting these theological interests but it is not the only possible way. Tillich tries to describe the situation ontologically in the belief that, while not entirely free of the element of myth or the necessity of speaking symbolically, this way has systematic and conceptual advantages which the other way does not have.

1 S.T. I, p. 234. 2 Ibid.
At the outset it has one notable advantage, namely, it does not rigidly subject the matter of Creation and the Fall to the category of time. It holds that, so far as time is concerned, Creation and Fall always coincide, either in the past, present, or future. Time is certainly involved but no argument is based upon it. With the ontological understanding of Creation and Fall the prime theological constraints can be safeguarded at least as effectively as they are with a dramatic-historical myth. There is nothing in the ontological approach which logically threatens the belief that God created a good world; the distinction between created essence and actual existence protects this belief. The doctrine of existence accounts for the belief in a fallen world; and the questions of man's responsibility and the possibility that the Fall might have been a bad accident which befell God's creation are dealt with as adequately on this hypothesis as by any alternative theory. It is true that the dramatic-historical myth concerning a state of created goodness which existed once upon a time before the Fall seems to satisfy man's strongly emotional need to avoid the conviction that the
tragic state of the fallen world is inevitable. This solution, however, does not systematically exclude the conclusion that evil is inevitable. It merely represents the conviction in a pictorial and symbolic way. The time distinction has no systematic force to guarantee the truth of this conviction because no one can seriously accept it as a fact that there ever was such a state of created goodness in the past. Tillich's solution to the question of the inevitability of the Fall is more adequate, even though it looks superficially as though the Creation is inevitably fallen. The ontological analysis of the Fall in terms of the actualisation of finite freedom provides at least some systematic weight of support for the belief that the Fall is not inevitable.

Tillich holds that the Fall is a possibility, albeit not a necessity, because essential being contains the finite ontological polarity of freedom and destiny. Since essential being is completely present only in man it is the finite freedom and destiny of man which accounts for the Fall. Finitude in man implies the awareness of the infinite and the anxiety of not being infinite which is the
same as the anxiety of being finite. In fact, "finitude and anxiety are the same."1 The anxiety is the "motive" which drives man to actualize his potential. Man can do this because he is free, free even in extreme cases to surrender his freedom and lose his humanity. These factors of finitude and freedom which account for the transition from essence to existence are "manifest in every individual person."2 so that the responsibility for the Fall is very real and direct for each person.

Although responsibility usually implies the possibility of avoiding the action in question there is another factor in the transition from essence to existence which makes the Fall unavoidable for man while not removing the responsibility from him. This is the element of destiny which is in polar tension with freedom. Whereas freedom is largely an individual propensity, a person's destiny is thoroughly mixed with the destinies of other persons, in fact, with the destiny of the whole human race, past and present. Destiny is "universal" in some respects, and the trait of actualizing freedom in

1S.T. II, p. 39. 2Ibid., p. 42.
such a way that it results in estrangement from essential being is one aspect of universal destiny. It is the tragic destiny of existence in which all actual finite beings share. Because of the dialectical relationship of the polarity of freedom and destiny it is possible to say that "every ethical decision is an act both of individual freedom and of universal destiny." Thus, Tillich's ontological analysis of freedom and destiny provides some measure of systematic support for an interpretation of the Fall which preserves the main theological truths that it has traditionally been the concern of the Church to protect. Tillich tries deliberately to steer a middle course between a "Pelagian" concept of freedom and a "Manichaean" concept of tragic destiny. His success depends on the adequacy of his concept of the dialectical polarity of freedom and destiny. With regard to this point one must say that however difficult such a dialectical unity is to conceive it does not suffer from being one-sided, and it at least recognizes all the relevant factors.

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1 Ibid., p. 43.
Much more difficult to understand is the reasoning by which Tillich arrives at the conclusion that not only man is "fallen" from essence to existence but the universe as well. There seems to be a distinct hiatus between the explanation of the Fall in terms of finite freedom and the conclusion that the universe is also fallen, when the universe does not really possess freedom but only analogies of it. Yet, as Tillich points out, the biblical witness of Isaiah and Paul and others testifies to the conviction that the universe is fallen, and Tillich tries to support this conviction with some kind of rationale. His reasoning is that man and nature participate so thoroughly in each other that no absolute separation can be posited between them. Man is the microcosmos and "what happens in the microcosm happens by mutual participation in the macrocosmos."¹

¹Is. II, p. 290.
²St. I, p. 49.
I find the necessity of Tillich's reasoning here something less than compelling. It appears to me to be another instance of a difficulty which derives from making man the complete source of ontological distinctions and then trying to apply these distinctions universally to non-human spheres where they sometimes are patently inapplicable. One must agree with Tillich, however, that the world as well as man is "fallen," in a way which is at least analogous to man's fallen state. Also, one must admit that there are no alternative explanations of this fact which are any more satisfactory than Tillich's. As Tillich himself would submit, the reasons for the falleness of both man and world are ultimately mysterious. The way from essence to existence is "irrational."

4. Estrangement.- Tillich makes a very penetrating ontological analysis of the state of estrangement in existence, identifying it with "a reinterpretation of sin from a religious point of view." Sin, as estrangement, is the result of both individual freedom and universal destiny. It is both universal

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1 cf., supra, Chapter IV.

2 Ibid., p. 52.
fact and individual act, and "it is impossible to separate sin as fact from sin as act."¹ Sin as estrangement is "a matter of our relation to God,"² and is manifest in the three fundamental characteristics of estrangement, namely, unbelief, hubris, and concupiscence. Each is an aspect of man's separation from his "essential unity" with God. Unbelief is the opposite of faith and, like faith, is an act of total personality. Whereas faith is the turning of the total personality toward God, unbelief or "un-faith"³ is "the act or state in which man in the totality of his being turns away from God."⁴ In turning away from God man's will is separated from God's will and his love is turned from God to himself so that "un-faith is ultimately identical with un-love."⁵

Hubris, the second mark of estrangement, is best described by the term "self-elevation."⁶ It is "the other side of unbelief"⁷ or, in other words, the

¹Ibid., p. 64. ²Ibid., p. 66. ³Ibid., p. 54. ⁴Ibid. ⁵Ibid., p. 55. ⁶Ibid., p. 57. ⁷Ibid., p. 58.
turning toward oneself after one has turned away from God. It involves man's fundamental temptation, namely, that of making himself the centre of himself and his world so that neither the infinity of God nor the finitude of himself in relation to God are acknowledged. Hubris is not identical with pride which may be avoided or be absent in some individuals. It is "universally human," consequent upon the fact that man is the "fully centred being" whose destiny it is and who freely decides to act as though he were the centre of everything. This is the basic meaning of the word "demonic" which designates anything that claims ultimacy for its finitude. Hence, hubris may be regarded as a "demonic structure" which "drives man to confuse natural self-affirmation with destructive self-elevation."3

Concupiscence is closely associated with both unbelief and hubris in that it refers to the desire to have all things for oneself after one has turned from God and towards one's own centre. This desire

1 Ibid., p. 57.
2 Ibid., p. 58.
3 Ibid., p. 59.
is not only sexual desire but refers to "the unlimited desire to draw the whole of reality into one's self." It is "the root of love in all its forms" which Tillich defines as "the drive towards the reunion of the separated." Concupiscence is thus seen to be, like estrangement generally, the perversion of something which is essentially good through the separation of man from his "essential unity" with God.

5. **Evil**— Tillich has separated the doctrine of sin and the doctrine of evil in his system although he admits that the difference between them is "more of focus than of content." Evil is a broader term than sin and may be used to cover both the reality of sin or estrangement and its causes, but Tillich chooses to use the concept of evil in a narrower sense than this, meaning by it only "the consequences of sin and estrangement," rather than both the causes and the consequences. Separation from God in its various forms is the source of evil; the distortion or destruction of the structure of essential being is the consequence.

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1Ibid.
2Ibid.
3L.J., p. 28.
4S.T. II, p. 35.
5Ibid., p. 70.
Since God is conceived as being-itself, and essential being is unity with him, the separation from God, which is sin and the estrangement from essential being, results in a loss of being which, according to the degree of loss, may be regarded either as distortion or destruction. This distortion or destruction can affect any part of the ontological structure of being. Any of the ontological structures denoted by the four levels of ontological concepts or by the analysis of life can be subject to the consequences of sin or estrangement. Hence, it is possible to speak of the "structures of destruction." And since man is responsible for sin and estrangement one can describe evil, the consequences of sin, as "the structure of self-destruction." The term "structure of destruction" is slightly misleading in so far as it suggests that evil may have some positive ontological standing in the whole of reality. This is not the case: "Destruction has no independent standing in the whole of reality but...is dependent on the structure of that in and upon which it acts.

\[1\text{Ibid., p. 71.}\]
destructively.¹ It is imperative for the proper understanding of Tillich's theological ontology to realize that non-being must be conceived as "dependent on being."² Just as death is dependent on life, neither can the structures of destruction be properly understood unless their relationship to God is made quite clear. As we noted above, sin and its consequences of evil are a function of man's relation to God. They are a function of the relation of separation from essential unity. Now in this relationship God does not play merely a passive role. The Fall does not merely "happen" to God. On the contrary, God plays a positive part in the occurrence of estrangement and its consequences. Certainly he does not cause them to happen but he none the less acts positively in relation to their occurrence. How this can be the case can be seen by considering God's omnipotence, his love, and his justice, all of which are implicit in the symbol of God's "wrath."

According to the nature of God's omnipotence, anything which has being at all issues from God as

¹Ibid., p. 69. ²Ibid.
being-itself, the source of all power. Thus, evil, if it can be said to have any being at all, even negative being, does not occur outside the scope of being-itself. It is separated from him but not in an absolute sense. Any power which it has is of God. Consequently, it is possible to say that "the self-destructive consequences of existential estrangement...belong to the structure of being itself."¹ They are not, therefore, "out of God's control." They are possible only because God allows them to happen.² That he allows the consequences of sin to happen can be seen to be a function of his "wrath" which is an aspect of his love and justice. God is love, and love acts positively in relation to the one who sins against love by showing that person the consequences of his rejection of love. God acts positively in relation to

¹Ibid., p. 201.

²With regard to the problem of theodicy and the question of "how a loving and almighty God can permit evil" (S.T. II, p. 70) Tillich maintains that since sin precedes evil the question must first be asked: "How could He permit sin?" (Ibid.) This question, he believes, "is answered the moment it is asked "for" not permitting sin would mean not permitting freedom," and "this would deny the very nature of man, his finite freedom." (Ibid., pp. 70-71.)
the structure of self-destruction by loving it and leaving it to its self-destruction, in order to save those who are destroyed. It will be remembered that justice is the "form" of love and that the highest concept of justice is "creative justice" which works for the realization of "intrinsic justice," that is, the restitution of a thing to the state of being what it essentially is. It is with love in the form of creative justice that God relates himself to estranged men. "In showing any man the self-destructive consequences of his rejection of love, love acts according to its own nature." Man experiences this action of God as his "wrath" because the consequences of sin constitute a threat to man's being. "In preliminary terms," God is a God of wrath, but "in ultimate terms" He is a God of love. It would not be love, however, if God eliminated for man the consequences of man's self-destructive estrangement. God "cannot remove these consequences; they are implied in his justice."  

1Ibid., p. 39.  
2cf., supra. Chapter III, p. 162.  
3Ibid., p. 39.  
Because this is the case, "one must say that even in the state of separation God is creatively working in us—even if his creativity takes the way of destruction." This element of destruction, which is identical to the non-being in God, "seen from inside, is the suffering that God takes upon himself by participating in existential estrangement"; and "the suffering of God, universally and in the Christ, is the power which overcomes creaturely self-destruction by participation and transformation." This aspect of God's relation to estranged man can be fully considered only in relation to the doctrines of the Christ and salvation. Some knowledge of it, however, is necessary to understand the structures of destruction which constitute evil.

Like his analysis of the structure of sin, Tillich's analysis of the "structures of destruction" is extremely penetrating and enlightening. Since the structures of destruction depend on ontological structures for their being, Tillich uses the ontological structures elaborated in his philosophical

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1Ibid., p. 90.  
3Ibid., p. 203.
ontology as the context in which destruction is apparent. Moreover, since these ontological structures reside fully in man they are uniquely appropriate to register the consequences of the transition from essence to existence for which man is responsible.

Just as the self-world polarity is the "basic ontological structure," which includes all the other ontological structures, so its corresponding structure of destruction, the structure of "self-loss" and "world-loss," is "the basic 'structure of destruction,'" and it includes all the others.\(^1\) Self-loss and world-loss are the most extreme consequences of sin. The terms are nearly self-explanatory: self-loss refers to "the disintegration of the unity of the person"\(^2\) which is "manifest in moral conflicts and psychopathological disruptions."\(^3\) World-loss is a correlate to self-loss in that in the condition of self-loss the world "ceases to be a world, in the sense of a meaningful whole."\(^4\)

The consequences of estrangement for the

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 70. \(^2\)Ibid., p. 71.  
\(^3\)Ibid. \(^4\)Ibid.
ontological polarities of freedom and destiny, dynamics and form, and individualization and participation were already touched upon in the analysis of philosophical ontology\(^1\) where it was seen that under the conditions of existence, which are the conditions of estrangement, the polar elements tend to conflict with each other and separate from each other, threatening the being of the separate elements and of the polarities themselves. This threat to the polar elements of man’s essential being is experienced as anxiety and, in extreme cases, as despair. If the separation of the polar elements actually occurs, as it does to some extent in existence, then one suffers a loss of being which corresponds to the degree of separation. The loss of being in these cases is not equivalent to self-loss or world-loss but it is grievous none the less. If, for instance, man grasps his freedom to the exclusion of his destiny he loses his freedom in "overwhelming contingency." Similarly, if the polarity is separated in favour of destiny then freedom may

\(^1\) cf., supra, Chapter V, pp. 227-230.
be lost to necessity. The destruction of the dynamics-form polarity can result, on the one hand, in chaotic, unformed, vitality or, on the other hand, in rigid and stultifying form. Again, excessive individualization results in loneliness and loss of communion while excessive participation results in collectivization and "depersonalisation."^1

Millen continues his analysis of the structures of destruction in connection with the structure of finitude and the categories of finite being. Estrangement affects the structure of finitude by leaving man "to his finite nature of having to die"^2 separated from the eternal which "makes man eternal."^3 Death becomes an evil because in estrangement man has "the painful realisation of a lost eternity,"^4 for which he knows himself to be responsible. Sin, with its guilt, is the "sting"^5 of death that makes death into a "structure of destruction" involving loss of essential being which is unity with God. The results of estrangement

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1*S. T. II, p. 76. 2Ibid., p. 77.
3Ibid. 4Ibid., p. 78.
5Ibid.
and conflict upon the categories have already been
touched upon. In each case the threat of non-being
upon the category in question causes destructive
anxiety and despair, depending on the degree to
which the threat is actualized.

Tillich discusses the ontological situation of
suffering and loneliness, doubt and meaninglessness,
in connection with the consequences of estrangement
on finitude in existence. He does not really explain
in what way suffering is "an element of finitude"¹
and, consequently, the treatment of suffering is not
so much ontological as psychological. He does, how-
ever, make a brilliant ontological analysis of the
relationship of essential solitude and existential
loneliness, and his analysis of doubt, which may
degenerate into the despair of meaninglessness, is
also extremely perceptive.

Despair, itself, is analysed as the "final index
of man's predicament,"² the final stage of the con-
sequences of sin as they are perceived by man him-
self in his awareness. This is "the state of in-
escapable conflict...between what one potentially

¹Ibid., p. 31. ²Ibid., p. 36.
is and therefore ought to be and...what one actually is.\(^1\) It is experienced as "the agony of being responsible for the loss of the meaning of one's existence and of being unable to recover it."\(^2\) Despair often drives people to exhibit "inner suicidal trends"\(^3\) or actually to commit suicide. As the final index of man's predicament, despair is also expressed by the symbol of "condemnation" which has the connotation of "exclusion from eternal life"\(^4\) and subject to "ultimate negativity."\(^5\)

The symbol of condemnation is the most extreme expression of the human experience of the consequences of estrangement. At this point the question of salvation is most intense.

6. Salvation- The question of salvation does not arise solely out of the ontological analysis of sin and evil. According to Tillich's method of correlation the question is asked partly under the influence of the answer and partly out of the problematic situation. In any case the exposition of

\(^1\) Ibid., p. 37. \(^2\) Ibid.

\(^3\) Ibid., p. 88. \(^4\) Ibid., p. 191.

\(^5\) Ibid.
the answer follows the framing of the question which, in Tillich's theological ontology, consists in the ontological analysis of estrangement and its consequences. For the question so framed Tillich believes that the answer must take the form of "a reality in which the self-estrangement of our existence is overcome, a reality of reconciliation and reunion, of creativity, meaning, and hope."¹ Such a reality is the "New Being,"² but, since the substance of the answer in Jesus preceded this particular formulation, it is more adequate to speak of the answer as the "New Being in Jesus as the Christ."³

That there should actually be a New Being which saves the human predicament is not systematically predictable or ontologically necessary. The appearance of the New Being is a paradox. This can be properly understood only if the true nature of paradox is realized, and to this end Tillich carefully distinguishes between the true paradox and the reflective-rational, the dialectical-rational,

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¹ S.T. I, p. 55.  
² Ibid.  
³ Ibid., p. 56.
the irrational, the absurd, and the nonsensical. A paradox is none of these. It is not irrational or nonsensical because it makes sense in its own context, and it is not absurd in the sense of contradicting the meaningful order of reality. Once the paradox of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ is accepted and understood it largely determines one's understanding of the meaningful order of reality, rather than contradicts it. What a paradox does contradict, according to Tillich, is the doxa, that is to say, it "contradicts the opinion derived from man's existential predicament and all expectations imaginable on the basis of this predicament."¹ It is "against man's ordinary interpretation of his predicament"² but it is not impossible. As a meaningful but unexpected occurrence the paradox is not susceptible to being gradually explained away by progressive analysis. It certainly can become better understood in its context but the basic content of the event will always continue to contradict worldly expectations which reason without this knowledge of God. Conceived in

¹ Ist. II, p. 106.  
² Ibid.
this way the paradox can be conceived as an actual occurrence rather than as a desperate expression of intellectual frustration in connection with an ultimately impenetrable situation.

The situation to which the paradox of the appearance of the New Being is related is the total human situation, and for this reason there is in Christianity only one "all-embracing paradox."¹ The appearance of the New Being under the conditions of existence "is the only paradox and the source of all paradoxical statements in Christianity."² In the ontological analysis of the New Being it will be seen how various paradoxical phenomena are all aspects of the central paradoxical reality.

The central paradox of Christianity can be expressed in various ways but the primary one is the confession that Jesus is the Christ. "Historically and systematically, everything else in Christianity is a corroboration of the simple assertion that Jesus is the Christ."³ It is the implications of this confession which comprise the ontology of the

¹Ibid., p. 104. ²Ibid., p. 107. ³Ibid.
New Being as Tillich draws them out, using the method of correlating questions and answers.

To begin with, the term "Christ" has the connotation of meaning both mediator and saviour, and Tillich interprets the mediating and saving work of Christ in the forms of his ontological analysis. Mediating means "bridging the infinite gap between the infinite and the finite, between the unconditional and the conditioned."¹ It has the effect of "making the ultimate concrete."² But this is precisely the substance of salvation which, for Tillich, means reunion of the finite with the infinite, reconciliation of man to God. Because Tillich accepts it as axiomatic that "no act within the context of existential estrangement can overcome existential estrangement"³ he concludes that "salvation and mediation really come from God,"⁴ although appearing in Jesus as the Christ. He stresses that the mediating and saving Christ cannot be conceived as "an ontological reality beside God and man"⁵ or as a

¹ Ibid., p. 103. ² Ibid. ³ Ibid., p. 91. ⁴ Ibid., p. 103. ⁵ Ibid.
"third reality"\textsuperscript{1} which "could only be a half-God who at the same time is half-man."\textsuperscript{2} The Christ must be both God and man or else the infinite and the finite would not really be reunited in him at all, and neither mediation nor salvation would be possible in him.

The Christ as God and man can be understood, Tillich believes, if it is realized that the Logos, the second principle of the Godhead, is essential man, the "original image of God" which is the self-manifestation of God and, therefore, is God. It should be noted that this dialectical relation of God the Father to the Christ, which I discussed earlier, does not constitute the paradox of Christianity. The paradox is that "in one personal life essential manhood has appeared under the conditions of existence without being conquered by them.\textsuperscript{3} The paradox is the unexpected event in which mediation, which is salvation, has occurred and is therefore available to men in existence. This is the immediate meaning implied in the statement that

\begin{itemize}
  \item[\textsuperscript{1}Ibid.]
  \item[\textsuperscript{2}Ibid.]
  \item[\textsuperscript{3}Ibid.]
\end{itemize}
Jesus is the Christ.

The mediation of Christ, which affects the reconciliation of man and God, consists of his representing God to man and, also, his representing "what man essentially is and therefore ought to be."¹ This double representation of both God and man is possible only because of "an eternal unity of God and man within the divine life."² This eternal unity of God and man is "Essential God-Manhood"³ which is identical with the "New Being." It "has an ontological character"⁴ because of its place in the process of the "living" God who is being-itself. It is "an objective structure,"⁵ the structure of essential being in which God manifests himself. This objective structure constitutes salvation for existence when it participates in existence and actualizes the unity of God and man. When this happens, the essential structure of being can be called the "New Being." It is "new" being in two respects: "It is new in contrast to the merely

¹ Ibid., p. 108. ² Ibid., p. 171. ³ Ibid., p. 173. ⁴ Ibid. ⁵ Ibid.
potential character of essential being; and it is new over against the estranged character of existential being.\textsuperscript{1} It can also be thought of as "new" in as much as New Being is no longer being "under the law."\textsuperscript{2}

The fact that the New Being has been actualised is crucial for the question of salvation from sin and evil. Because the New Being has occurred in time and space all of existence has been conquered "in principle"\textsuperscript{3} which means "in beginning and in power."\textsuperscript{4} Sin and evil have been overcome "qualitatively speaking"\textsuperscript{5} if not "quantitatively speaking."\textsuperscript{6} But they would not have been overcome in fact at all had not existence been "conquered in one point--a personal life, representing existence as a whole."\textsuperscript{7} A personal life can represent existence as a whole because "what happens to man happens implicitly to all realms of life, for in man all levels of being are present."\textsuperscript{8}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1}Ibid., p. 137.
\item \textsuperscript{2}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{3}Ibid., p. 114.
\item \textsuperscript{4}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{5}Ibid., p. 139.
\item \textsuperscript{6}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{7}Ibid., p. 114.
\item \textsuperscript{8}Ibid., p. 139.
\end{itemize}
The New Being once actualized in Jesus is available to any man "who participates in the newness of being which is in Christ."¹ A man so saved, however, is not entirely freed of sin and its evil consequences. Because a man's personal destiny is so much interwoven with the destiny of mankind and existence as a whole he participates in the New Being "only fragmentarily and by anticipation,"² remaining "under the condition of man's existential predicament."³ The Christian is always in "the state of relativity with respect to salvation,"⁴ and in contrast to the New Being in Christ which "transcends every relativity in its quality and power."⁵

Salvation, whether fragmentary or not, "has as many connotations as there are negativities from which salvation is needed."⁶ Tillich distinguishes between salvation from "ultimate negativity" and from "that which leads to ultimate negativity."⁷

¹ Ibid., p. 137.
² Ibid., p. 136.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid., p. 194.
⁵ Ibid.
⁶ Ibid., p. 191.
⁷ Ibid.
In both cases the meaning of salvation is "healing"\(^1\) in the sense of "reuniting that which is estranged, giving a centre to what is split, overcoming the split between God and man, man and his world, man and himself."\(^2\) Salvation from ultimate negativity means ultimate union with God in eternal life, and Tillich says that this is the meaning in the "overwhelming majority of occasions in which the word 'salvation'...is used."\(^3\)

The whole question of the actualizing of salvation in life is a matter for the next section and cannot be dealt with fully here. The matter of primary relevance at present is the New Being as the essential answer to the human predicament.

7. New Being in Jesus as the Christ:— The New Being is obviously not restricted to the life of Jesus of Nazareth. As Tillich says, in as much as the New Being is identical in substance to essential being then in some degree all men participate in it. "Otherwise, they would have no being."\(^4\) In any case, Jesus came from a community which was a large factor

\(^1\) Ibid., p. 192.  
\(^2\) Ibid.  
\(^3\) Ibid., p. 191.  
\(^4\) Ibid., p. 193.
in his destiny and, Tillich believes, there were "preparatory manifestations of the New Being within it." Moreover, Jesus created a new community, the Church, which also has manifestations of the New Being within it.

The Christ is not an isolated event which happened "once upon a time"; he is the power of the New Being preparing his decisive manifestation in Jesus as the Christ in all preceding history and actualizing himself as the Christ in all subsequent history. 2

It is the "decisive manifestation," however, with which we are here concerned. It is the New Being in Jesus as the Christ which is the essential answer to the human predicament. The New Being may be apparent elsewhere but it is in Jesus as the Christ that it is completely manifest. Only in Jesus can one see what salvation from sin and evil really means in concrete terms. Jesus as the Christ is the criterion of salvation. "Jesus is the Christ for us." 3

There are a great many interesting questions concerning Jesus as the Christ which are not directly relevant to theological ontology. One of

1 Ibid., p. 155. 2 Ibid., p. 207-208. 3 Ibid., p. 116.
the most interesting of these is the question about "the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith." Another concerns Tillich's conception of the principles of biblical interpretation. Tillich has a well developed position on both of these related matters but it cannot be elaborated fully here. One thing only needs to be said; contrary to some charges brought against Tillich, he does not treat the actual historical Jesus as dispensable. He does say that faith should not be expected or allowed to guarantee facts which are in principle open to historical research. "Faith cannot even guarantee the name 'Jesus' in respect to him who was the Christ."¹ But this does not remove the importance of the manifestation of the Christ in an actual personal life in history. "If the factual element in the Christian event were denied, the foundation of Christianity would be denied."² Furthermore, regardless of historical uncertainties the biblical account of Jesus is indispensable because it provides a sort of "expressionist" portrait of the Christ which is a "real picture"³ of him.

¹Ibid., p. 123.  
²Ibid.  
³Ibid., p. 133.
albeit not a phonographic or photographic historical account. Faith can guarantee the truth of this picture of the Christ because faith participates in the Risen Christ and knows him when it "sees" him. The picture, however, is the test or criterion for the content of faith so that the process of verification is somewhat circular, and greater weight is laid on the picture than on the individual's faith.

Christological dogmas are the theological interpretations of the biblical picture of the Christ. They conceptualize the actual occurrence in Jesus of essential being under the conditions of existence. They can be dangerous in that they may try to force the essential mystery of the appearance of the Christ into too rigid a conceptual mould, and they may misinterpret the picture by emphasizing, excessively or exclusively, either the human or the "divine" element. Nevertheless, christological dogmas are of crucial importance in theology because "all other doctrinal statements--above all, those concerning God and man, the Spirit, and the Trinity--provide the presuppositions, or are the consequences, of the christological dogma."

1 Tillich's own christological dogma attempts

1Ibid., p. 131.
to be "based on the substance of the two great decisions of the early church (Nicæa and Chalcedon)"¹ but expressed in a new form. The form Tillich chooses is one which avoids the concepts of two "natures," the "human" and the "divine," in favour of "relational concepts"² which describe the being of Jesus as the Christ in dynamic terms rather than in terms of his "static essence."³ The main "relational concept" is the dialectical concept of "the eternal unity of God and man,"⁴ which is the basic Trinitarian concept of the living God who goes out from himself and returns to himself again. From this viewpoint it appears that Tillich's Christological dogma really depends on the trinitarian principles for its conceptual equipment.

One consequence of this concept of essential God-man-unity is that the traditional problem of God "coming down" and "becoming a man" is avoided. The unity of God and man already resides in essential being before it is actualized. The actualizing process raises some theoretical problems in so far as

¹Ibid., p. 167. 
²Ibid., p. 170. 
³Ibid. 
⁴Ibid.
it is paradoxical in Tillich's sense of the word, but it is not the thorny question of the transmutation or metamorphosis of the transcendent God into a human being in history. Tillich projects the problem of the unity of God and man out of the sphere of history into the eternal realm where it is subsumed within the mystery of the inner "Life" of God.

It might appear that while not having a problem in "bringing God down" he has a problem in "taking man up" to the essential unity with God. He does have a problem in relating the fateful human logos and the eternal divine logos, which was discussed earlier. But the advantage gained by holding that the image of God is a person in the Life of the Trinity is that God and man are brought so close together that there is little conceptual difficulty in claiming that God can appear in a "decisive manifestation" in Jesus as the Christ, or work continuously in men to judge and heal.

The manifestation of the new being in Jesus must be conceived in dynamic terms as a "process involving tensions, risks, dangers, and determination by freedom as well as by destiny."¹ Tillich

¹Ibid., p. 172.
believes that "abstract definitions" of the nature of the unity of the New Being and Jesus are "as impossible as psychological investigations into its character." The Gospel stories describe the unity in concrete terms, and all one can say as an abstraction from these is that "it is a community between God and the centre of a personal life which determines all utterances of this life and resists the attempts within existential estrangement to disrupt it." Conceived as a "community" it is "dynamic-relational" rather than static.

Because the concept of Jesus as the Christ is a dynamic one it is not wholly compatible with the traditional "incarnational" Christology. Tillich believes the concept of Incarnation is so much encumbered with the "superstitious connotations" of transmutation and metamorphosis that it might better be avoided altogether. On the other hand, he does not favour a purely "adoptionist" Christology. He maintains that a dynamic concept of Christ can unite the defensible connotations of

\[1\text{Ibid., p. 171.}\]
\[2\text{Ibid.}\]
\[3\text{Ibid.}\]
\[4\text{Ibid., p. 110.}\]
both incarnational and adoptionist Christologies and avoid the indefensible ones. The defensible connotation in the idea of incarnation is that "he who transcends the universe appears in it."\(^1\) Tillich's concept of the \textit{Lösch} being manifest fully in Jesus is the incarnation idea but the appearance consists of dynamic manifestation in a particular being, which is "the adoption side."\(^2\) The adoption idea is necessary to preserve the reality of Jesus as a free, destined, tempted, and anxious human being.

Although both the "Jesus" side and the "Christ" side are indispensable in Jesus as the Christ, Tillich lays greater weight upon the Christ side than upon the Jesus side. The Christ who is God is the ultimate concern of the Christian, not the man who is Jesus of Nazareth, although this man is indispensable as the locus of the decisive manifestation of the \textit{Neues} Being in history. From the historical point of view the man Jesus and the eternal Christ are inseparable. But because the Christ transcends time and space it is possible for one to

\(^{1}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 172.\) \(^{2}\textit{Ibid.}\)
abstract the Christ element from Jesus the historical man. Tillich maintains that Jesus himself continually made himself lower than God who was in him. In fact, it is "the continuous self-surrender of Jesus who is Jesus to Jesus who is the Christ"¹ which is "the decisive trait" in the picture of Jesus as the Christ. Tillich condemns "Jesus-centred religion and theology"² as "Jesusology"³ and insists that "Jesus is the religious and theological object as the Christ and only as the Christ."⁴

This emphasis on the primacy of the Christ over Jesus of Nazareth is a result of Tillich's fundamental conviction that any finite expressions of the infinite must negate their own finitude in order to become "transparent"⁵ to the mystery of God which is revealed in them. It must be made clear, however, that this conviction of Tillich's is not of his own fashioning. Tillich arrives at this fundamental conviction through his faith in

¹S.T. I, p. 150. ³Ibid., p. 151. ⁵Ibid., p. 148.
²Ibid. ⁴Ibid., p. 150.
Jesus as the Christ who is the "final" revelation and the criterion of all others. It is in Jesus that the definition of conditions for the manifestation of the infinite in the finite is made. It is in Jesus as the Christ that Tillich finds the fundamental truth about the relation of the infinite and the finite. In Jesus as the Christ is revealed the truth that the finite must negate itself if the infinite is to be manifest in it. In fact, Jesus is the Christ (who is God) only because he continually sacrificed his finite self completely to the infinite, eternal, God-man-unity of the Christ. This complete self-surrender which enabled the New Being to be actualized was not a work of human merit, however, because Jesus could surrender himself completely only because he was "completely... united with the ground of his being and meaning without separation and disruption,"1 or in other words, only because he was the Christ. In Jesus' case, he could become the Christ or the New Being only because he was the Christ. This, of course, is the fundamental paradox of the Christian gospel--

1Ibid., p. 148.
that the eternal God-man-unity of the Christ could be actualized as the New Being in a free and destined human being.

However, because the New Being was actualized in time and space the basic relation of God, the Christ, to estranged existence is revealed and seen to be the paradox of affirmation in spite of negation, forgiveness in spite of judgment, salvation in spite of evil, reconciliation in spite of estranged existence. All these paradoxical forms are basically the same paradox as the one implicit in saying Jesus is the Christ. All represent the human condition in relation to God. The term "justification" in the Pauline-Lutheran sense includes both sides of the paradox, the negation and affirmation, and, except for its spurious legalistic connotations, is a good term to denote the paradoxical relation of God and man outside the ambit of Jesus' life where the Christological paradox is more appropriate. One can safely say that the ontology of the New Being is the ontology of Justification because the New Being is actualized primarily in the form of Justification by grace through faith. Tillich chooses the term "New Being"
rather than Justification by grace to be the norm of his systematic theology because he believes the term "New Being" has positive and constructive connotations which are not present in the term "Justification." This is true to a limited extent but there is little doubt that the basic substance of New Being is largely identical with the substance of Justification. A closer examination of Justification will show this to be the case.

8. Justification:— Tillich calls Justification the "paradox of the divine-human relationship." As this relationship is the central issue in theology the centrality of Justification is apparent. Much has already been said about the divine-human relationship in the contexts of Salvation, the New Being, and Christology itself. By considering it as Justification, however, one can see its basic ontological structure more clearly than in any other way. Tillich does not use the term Justification very often in his theology, preferring the term "New Being" which does not have the false legalistic or purely subjective connotations that

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1 P.E., p. 247.
are sometimes associated with Justification. Neverthe-
less, when Tillich does speak of Justification it
can be seen that the idea of Justification is really
"the heart and centre of salvation"\(^1\) and also of the
New Being. In the final volume of \textit{Systematic
Theology}, Tillich makes explicit the place of Justi-
fication in his theological system. He calls it
"the principle which permeates every single assertion
of the theological system."\(^2\) Only for "unavoidable
reasons of expediency"\(^3\) is it a particular doctrine
among others. In actual fact it is "the universal
principle of Protestant theology."\(^4\)

It is with the picture of Jesus as the Christ,
as Tillich understands it, that one can start to
understand what is involved in Justification. Tillich
believes that the biblical picture of Jesus as the
Christ witnesses in its totality to the two sides of
the paradox of the divine-human relationship. The
two sides of the paradox are epitomized in the two
central symbols of the Cross and the Resurrection
of Jesus which are "interdependent"\(^5\) and together

\(^1\text{S.T. II, p. 205.}\)
\(^2\text{S.T. III, p. 224.}\)
\(^3\text{Ibid., p. 223.}\)
\(^4\text{Ibid., p. 224.}\)
\(^5\text{S.T. II, p. 176.}\)
"correspond to the two basic relations of the Christ to existential estrangement." The divine-human relationship is apparent in the narrative accounts of Jesus' life and is also evident in the other Christological symbols which, Tillich says, "corroborate" the central symbols of the Cross and the Resurrection. In passing it is worth noting that Tillich's predominant and determining distinction in his theological ontology is derived from an analysis of the biblical sources of the Christian faith, notably the biblical picture of Jesus.

The two basic relations of the Christ to existence, both in Jesus and anywhere else that the Christ is made manifest, are "his subjection to it" or "his participation" in it and "his conquest of it." In the account of Jesus' life and in the symbol of the Cross and its corroborating symbols.

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1 Ibid.
2 Ibid., p. 132.
3 Ibid., p. 178.
4 Ibid., p. 151.
5 Ibid., p. 178.
the participation of the Christ in existence is evident. The reality of the temptations of Jesus, the marks of Jesus' finitude and the involvement of Jesus in tragic situations show his participation in the conditions of existence. The Cross is the most powerful indication of the subjection of the Christ to existence in that it shows "the surrender of him who is called the Christ to the ultimate consequence of existence, namely, death under the conditions of estrangement."¹ This is one side of the paradox of the Christ's manifestation in existence.

The other side is seen in the victory of the Christ in spite of his participation in the conditions of existential estrangement. In the biblical picture of Jesus' life the victory of the Christ over the conditions and consequences of existence is evident in Jesus' unbroken unity with God which results in an absence of unbelief, dubia, or concupiscence and an absence of the evil consequences of his finitude which was real and included "anxiety about having to die,"² "Homelessness and insecurity

¹Ibid., p. 179. ²Ibid., p. 154.
with respect to a physical, social, and mental place,"\(^1\) as well as "loneliness" and "frustrated attempts to be received"\(^2\) and even "error and doubt."\(^3\) Into his unity with God Jesus "accepts the negativities of existence without removing them... by transcending them in the power of this unity."\(^4\)

It is the Resurrection, however, which is the most powerful symbol of the conquest of Jesus as the Christ over existence. In the Resurrection which is "both reality and symbol"\(^5\) it is shown that even death cannot separate the Christ from him in whom the Christ was manifested. There is no need to examine at length Tillich's "restitution theory"\(^6\) of the Resurrection. In whatever way the Resurrection is understood it remains the clearest symbol and indication of the ultimate victory of the Christ or "the New Being in Jesus as the Christ" over the existential estrangement to which he subjected himself. The symbols of the Virgin Birth, the Transfiguration, the Ascension, the Second Coming, the Sitting at the Right Hand of

\(^1\) Ibid.
\(^2\) Ibid.
\(^3\) Ibid.
\(^4\) Ibid.; p. 155.
\(^5\) Ibid.; p. 177.
\(^6\) Ibid.; p. 132.
God, and some of the miracle stories all corroborate in some special respect the meaning of the Resurrection, which is "the indestructible unity of the New Being and its bearer, Jesus of Nazareth,"¹ a unity which represents a victory over estrangement and its consequences.

Now it may appear that I have wandered far from the concept of Justification with which I began. Such is not the case, however, because it is precisely the two sides of the relationship of "the New Being and its bearer" which constitute the two sides of the "paradox of the divine-human relationship." This can be seen by examining directly the meaning of Justification itself.

Justification is both "an objective event" and "a subjective reception,"² hence, the expression "Justification by grace through faith." In as much as it is an objective event Justification is identical to the manifestation of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ except that in the case of the Justification of sinners the participation and victory of the Christ in existence occur only fragmentarily

¹Ibid., p. 131. ²Ibid., p. 205.
rather than completely as in Jesus. Nevertheless, fragmentarily or not, the actualizing of the New Being or "the re-established unity between God and man" outside the ambit of Jesus life consists mainly of the paradoxical event of Justification. The re-established unity of God and man which constitutes salvation has three "moments" or aspects: Regeneration, Justification, and Sanctification. Tillich has emphasized Justification much more than either Regeneration or Sanctification and, in fact, these latter two moments of salvation appear to be virtually moments in the process of Justification. Regeneration is the first moment of salvation in that it represents the initial work of grace which is presupposed by Justification of the individual. Justification is the content of salvation itself and Sanctification is the "process" of increasingly realizing one's salvation.

The positive side of the paradox of Justification, that is, the victory over existence, is immediately evident in the meaning of the word "Justification" which means a "making just," namely,

1Ibid., p. 170.
making man that which he essentially is and from which he is estranged.\(^1\) The event of Justification is "the eternal act of God by which he accepts as not estranged those who are indeed estranged from him by guilt and the act by which he takes them into the unity with him which is manifest in the New Being in Christ."\(^2\) Justification is "the paradox that man, the sinner, is justified; that man the unrighteous is righteous; that man the unholy is holy, namely, in the judgment of God, which is not based on any human achievements but only on the divine self-surrendering grace."\(^3\) The positive side of the relationship of God to man is clear; it is a relationship of affirmation and acceptance into unity with God in spite of the real estrangement which separates men from Him. This is the basic meaning of atonement which, like Justification, "necessarily has an objective and a subjective element,"\(^4\) and which in the objective side means the "divine act [which] overcomes the estrangement between God and man in so far as it is a matter

\(^1\) Ibid., p. 205. 
\(^2\) Ibid. 
\(^3\) P.E., p. 247. 
\(^4\) S.T. II, p. 197.
of human guilt." The positive side of justification is, therefore, experienced as forgiveness and "acceptance."

The negative side of the paradox of justification is not really negative but only appears to be negative to man who experiences God's judgment of him as being negative. The relationship of God to man, as was shown earlier, includes not only acceptance of man in spite of man's unacceptability but also God's love in the form of justice, which negates what is against love in order to show man the consequences of his unloving estrangement. Man experiences God's justice or righteousness as a judgment on his own righteousness. In the knowledge of God's righteousness man can never suffer the delusion of thinking that he or his actions or ideas can claim divine dignity for themselves. "The doctrine of justification...pens every human claim in the face of God." It constitutes "the prophetic protest, which gives God alone absoluteness and sanctity and denies every claim of human pride." It does more

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1 Ibid.
2 I.H., p. 32.
3 P.k., p. 226.
than insure man’s proper humility, however, although
this is a very important function in itself. The
"negative" side of the paradox of God’s relationship
to man involves man’s suffering the consequences of
his estrangement as the judgment of God. The judg-
ment is "an act of love which surrenders that which
resists love to self-destruction."¹ In the act of
judgment God does not withdraw his love from the
estranged. On the contrary, he participates fully
in the estrangement and its consequences. These
"belong to the structure of being-itself,"² which
is God’s being, and "are implied in his justice."³
As the element of non-being in being-itself, es-
trangement and its consequences are, "seen from the
inside,...the suffering that God takes upon himself
by participating in existential estrangement or the
state of unconquered negativity."⁴ God’s judgment
is really his suffering love, and if a person rea-
lises in faith that God is participating in his own
estrangement then the consequences of estrangement
can be transformed. God "can take them upon himself

by participating in them and transforming them for those who participate in his participation.\footnote{Ibid. p. 201.}

The judgment side of Justification can be seen in the picture of Jesus as the Christ participating in all the conditions of estranged existence and surrendering himself even to the ultimate consequence of existence, namely, death. The Cross is the central symbol of that which is both God's judgment of man and His suffering love for man. It shows the unity of God's love and justice and it shows, in the serenity and patience of Jesus, the way in which God can transform the consequences of evil if a person through faith participates in His power of love. The Resurrection which is "interdependent" with the Cross shows God's affirmation of a person in spite of the most extreme negation. Both this ultimate affirmation and the judgment arising from God's justice are aspects of Justification. Tillich is quite clear on this when he says:

The final expression of the unity of love and justice in God is the symbol of justification. It points to the unconditional validity of the structures of justice but at the same time to the divine act in which love conquers the immanent consequences of the violation of justice.
The ontological unity of love and justice is manifest in final revelation as the justification of the sinner. 1

In the above quotation the relation of justification to Christology is implicit. The final revelation in which justification is manifest is the New Being in Jesus as the Christ. Tillich makes this clearly explicit in the following quotation.

As Protestantism asserts the justification of the sinner, so it demands a Christology of the participation of the Christ in sinful existence, including, at the same time, its conquest. The christological paradox and the paradox of the justification of the sinner are one and the same paradox. It is the paradox of God accepting a world which rejects him.

If this quotation had contained a reference to the New Being as "the new state of things, the new son, which the Christ brought"3 it would have summed up nicely the main emphases of Tillich's doctrine of the Christ who is not only the universal logos structure of reality but the meaning of God for man, which is to say, the meaning of salvation. The meaning of God for man, the meaning of salvation, is that man is crucified but risen, negated but affirmed, judged but forgiven by God alone, as He is known in

1S.T. I, p. 318.  
2S.T. II, p. 172.  
3Ibid., p. 204.
Jesus as the Christ. The "positive" side of this relationship of man and God is of primary importance for it implies that "in relation to God, God alone can act and that no human claim, especially no religious claim, no intellectual or moral or devotional 'work' can reunite us with him."\(^1\) This is the principle of Justification which should condition everything that a Christian does or thinks or says.

D. God as Living Spirit and The Kingdom of God.

1. Introduction: "God is the living God because he is Spirit."\(^2\) In accordance with "the symbolic application of spirit to the divine life,"\(^3\) God's character as "living" is directly related to his character as Spirit. God lives because he is Spirit and God is Spirit because he is living. Just as "spirit" was the term in philosophical ontology which essentially characterised "life," so "Spirit" is the term which primarily characterises God as "living." As the philosophical term "spirit" designates the actualised unity of power and meaning,

\(^1\) S.T. I, I, p. 224. \(^2\) S.T. I, p. 277. \(^3\) Ibid., p. 276.
the theological term "Spirit" means the unity of God as power with God as meaning (or form) in God as acting in actual creation and redemption, that is to say, in God as living. With this understanding of the term "Spirit" it can be seen that "christology is not complete without pneumatology (the doctrine of the Spirit), because 'the Christ is the Spirit' and the actualization of the New Being in history is the work of the Spirit."¹ The living Spirit, then, is the culmination of the content of theological ontology as the spirit was the culmination of philosophical ontology.

Tillich uses three symbols to designate the character of God as living: Spirit of God, Kingdom of God, and Eternal Life. According to the method of correlation each answers the questions arising from a different aspect of life. Spirit of God or "Spiritual Presence," as Tillich usually calls it, denotes "the divine presence in creaturely life"² and is "directly correlated to the ambiguities of life under the dimension of spirit."³ Kingdom of God denotes the divine presence in history and as

¹Ibid., p. 285.
²Ibid., p. 107.
³Ibid.
"the ultimate fulfilment toward which history runs."\(^1\) Eternal Life denotes "the conquest of the ambiguities of life beyond history."\(^2\) All three symbols stand for the ontological reality of "unambiguous life" which is the Divine Life and a matter for theological ontology.

2. **The Spirit of God:** The actualisation of the divine Spirit is "God present,"\(^3\) and to accentuate this connotation Tillich employs the term "Spiritual Presence" as the main way of speaking about God as Living Spirit. Spiritual Presence is God in all His actual relations to man and other dimensions of reality. As this is the case, a great deal has already been said about the substance of Spiritual Presence in connection with earlier parts of our treatment of theological ontology. In a sense, all of what has already been said about God in relation to man in terms of creativity, revelation, and the New Being in Christ is implicit in the Living Spirit or Spiritual Presence in which God actually manifests himself. In the explicit treatment of the Spirit Tillich re-states with fresh

\(^{1}\text{Ibid., p. 108.}\)

\(^{2}\text{Ibid., p. 109.}\)

\(^{3}\text{Ibid., p. 107.}\)
clarity many of the positions and conclusions already developed elsewhere in his system. It will be possible, therefore, for us to touch lightly on these matters and concentrate on the questions which are peculiar to Spiritual Presence.

Tillich's positions on the questions of the relation of God and man, the phenomenon of ecstasy which characterizes actual revelation, and the media of revelation in word and sacrament have already been dealt with. To some extent also, the question has been considered of the content of actual revelation which is identical to the content of Spiritual Presence. It is worth considering this latter explicitly, however, because Spiritual Presence cannot be understood apart from a precise knowledge of its content.

The Spirit of God is the presence of the power and form of God in actual life. It is the various aspects of this Reality which comprise the content of Spiritual Presence, the Kingdom of God, and Eternal Life. The form of God, the Logos, is the essential structure of being which, in actual life, constitutes a New Being in which the essential and existential elements of being are reunited as
"unambiguous life." As New Being or unambiguous life, creaturely existence is "raised above itself to a transcendence that it could not achieve by its own power." It is united with essential being and is the "true expression of potential being." This "transcendent union" of the human spirit with the divine Spirit "appears within the human spirit as the ecstatic movement which from one point of view is called 'faith,' from another, 'love.'" Hence, it is through faith and in love that the Spiritual Presence manifests itself. The nature of faith and love have already been discussed at some length but they can briefly be reviewed in the present context. Faith is the state of "being grasped by the transcendent unity of unambiguous life" whereas love is the state of "being taken into that transcendent unity." The two always coincide in actuality but faith is logically prior because being grasped by the Spirit of God logically precedes the qualitative change effected by love.

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1Ibid., p. 129. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid. 
5Ibid. 
6Ibid.
Faith is "formally" defined as the state of being grasped by an ultimate concern and "materially" defined as the state of being grasped by the New Being as it is manifest in Jesus as the Christ, or, in other words, the "state of being opened by the Spiritual Presence to the transcendent unity of unambiguous life."\(^1\) On its material side, faith has three elements: a receptive, a paradoxical, and an anticipatory character. These three characteristics constitute the "basic structure of the New Being."\(^2\) and are reflected elsewhere in the three moments of salvation, namely, regeneration, justification, and sanctification. In connection with faith itself the three elements appear as the followings: the first is the state of being grasped in the first place by the Spiritual Presence; the second is the paradoxical acceptance of the Spiritual Presence "in spite of the infinite gap between the divine Spirit and the human spirit";\(^3\) and the third element is the hope of final fulfilment by the Spirit of God.

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\(^1\)Ibid., p. 131.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 138.

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 133.
Love in the context of Spiritual Presence is agape love which is unambiguous "and therefore impossible for the human spirit by itself."¹ Agape shares the basic ontological character of all the kinds of love, namely, the "urge towards the reunion of the separated,"² but it is independent of the other qualities of love because it is a creation of the divine Spirit and, unlike them, is unambiguous. Like faith, it shares the basic structure of the New Being and has receptive, paradoxical, and anticipatory elements. In agape, the first is "its acceptance of the object of love without restrictions."³ The second is the paradoxical way it continues to accept its object in spite of the object's "estranged, profanized, and demonized state."⁴ The third is the element of hope in love which looks forward to the salvation of the object of love. Agape, though logically consequent upon faith in the manifestation of Spiritual Presence, is prior to faith in one outstanding way, namely,

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¹ Ibid., p. 136. ² Ibid., p. 137.
³ Ibid., p. 138. ⁴ Ibid.
it "characterizes the divine life itself"¹ which is not characterized by faith. It is "first of all the love God has toward the creature."² Love and faith together, in their special relationship to each other, constitute the essential content of the Spiritual Presence in the human spirit.

3. The Spiritual Community:— The manifestation of the content of Spiritual Presence in the sphere of human affairs, which is to say, in the historical realm, is the basic ontological phenomenon that Tillich calls "essentialization."³ Man's essential being is to have his spirit united with the Divine Spirit. The process in which this actually comes into being is called "essentialization." It occurs in the historical realm always in social groups because all the functions of the human spirit are conditioned in history by social groups, by "the social context of the ego-thou encounter."⁴ In fact, the actualising of Spiritual Presence creates a unique social group in history, consisting of all the individuals in whom the Spiritual Presence is

¹Ibid. ²Ibid. ³Ibid., p. 406. ⁴Ibid., p. 139.
manifest. In this group the Spiritual Presence is not completely or fully manifest but always "fragmentarily" and "anticipatorily."

This concept of the "fragmentary" manifestation of the Spirit of God is extremely important for Tillich's treatment of the actualization of God's grace in history. "Fragmentary" is "quite a different thing from ambiguity" since a fragment, in itself, is unambiguous. A fragment is "pure" and undeniably real but not total. By using the term for God's manifestation of Himself Tillich insures that God's activity cannot be regarded as ambiguous and therefore imperfect, while, at the same time, insuring that it be recognized as real in spite of continuing ambiguities that coexist with it.

This distinction between the ambiguous and the fragmentary makes it possible for us to give full affirmation and full commitment to the manifestations of the Spiritual Presence while remaining aware of the fact that in the very acts of affirmation and commitment the ambiguity of life reappears. Awareness of this situation is the decisive criterion for religious maturity.

The unique social group created by the fragmentary manifestation of Spiritual Presence is called.

1Ibid., p. 140. 2Ibid. 3Ibid.
by Tillich, the Spiritual Community. Tillich believes that this term avoids the equivocal connotations inherent in the term "church," but he acknowledges that it means essentially the same as "the church" (as the body of Christ). 1 The Spiritual Community in itself has two stages or two modes of appearance in history, namely, as "latent" and as "manifest." The "manifest" Spiritual Community contains the actualized Spiritual Presence and has the Spiritual Presence in Jesus as the Christ as the explicit criterion of faith and love. The Spiritual Community "in its latency" 2 includes all social groups in which some of the content of Spiritual Presence (faith and love) is manifest but which do not explicitly acknowledge the Spiritual Presence in Jesus as the Christ as their ultimate criterion. As mankind is never completely without some measure of God's grace it can be said that the latent Spiritual Community is inclusive of all mankind and all social groups, although some groups and individuals undoubtedly have a larger measure of Spiritual Presence than others. The latent stage

1 Ibid., p. 163.  
2 Ibid., p. 152.
of the Spiritual Community is the "period of preparation" for the manifestation of the Spiritual Presence in the body of Christ. It is the correlate of "preparatory" revelation which includes all revelation before or outside of Jesus as the Christ.

The "manifest" stage of the Spiritual Community, on the other hand, is the "period of reception" of Christ, who is the "central manifestation of the divine Spirit." In all, then, there are three manifestations of the Spiritual Presence in the historical realm: "in mankind as a whole in preparation for the central manifestation of the divine Spirit"; in Jesus as the Christ; and in "the body of Christ," the manifest Spiritual Community.

It is worth noting here that Tillich's Christology culminates in a "Spirit-Christology" which understands the essential being of the Christ as the manifestation of the Spiritual Presence of God. The most important implication of this position is the belief that "the Spirit who created the Christ

1 Ibid., p. 152.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid., p. 149.  
4 Ibid., p. 144.
within Jesus is the same Spirit who prepared and continues to prepare mankind for the encounter with the New Being in him.\(^1\) In this view all the manifestations of God in all of history are of the same essential character, namely, Spiritual Presence. Jesus as the Christ is the "ultimate" manifestation of the Spirit of God and, therefore, the concrete criterion of all others. He becomes effective as the criterion only through the work of the Spirit which "grasps" people enabling them to recognize the Spirit in Jesus which makes him the Christ. This recognition of Jesus as the Christ is the "basis"\(^2\) of the manifest Spiritual Community. The Spirit creates the Church and, in a sense, the Church by its recognition of Jesus as the Christ makes him the Christ. Tillich holds that Jesus could not really have been the Christ if he were not accepted as the Christ by men under the impact of the Spirit of God. In a word, the Spirit of God both made Jesus in himself to be the Christ and, by creating the manifest Spiritual Community, continually makes his character as Christ actually

\(^1\) Ibid., p. 147. \(^2\) Ibid., p. 150.
Tillich discerns the basic ontological character of the Spiritual Community in the New Testament account of Pentecost where the Spiritual Presence manifests itself in a social group as "ecstasy united with faith, love, unity, and universality." These are the basic marks of the Spiritual Community. Ecstasy, on Tillich understanding, is the condition of revelation, without which there could be no Spiritual Presence. Faith and self-surrendering love are the content of Spiritual Presence and are essential to the Spiritual Community. The unity follows from the faith which, however fragmentary, is the criterion for the unity of religious groups otherwise diverse in devotional and doctrinal forms. The universality follows from the love and is the character of being open and active to receive all men into the Spiritual Community. Finally, since all four characteristics issue from the Presence of the divine Spirit, the Spiritual Community can be said to be holy, participating in these various ways in "the holiness of the Divine Life."

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1 Ibid., p. 151.  
2 Ibid., p. 156.
It will be remembered that the philosophical analysis of life disclosed the existential separation of the three basic functions of life with their attendant ambiguities and raised the question of the possible reunion of the three functions and the removal of the ambiguities. The Spiritual Community, in so far as it participates in "the transcendent union of unambiguous life" or the Spiritual Presence, recreates the essential unity and unambiguous character of life. The three functions of life are united, albeit fragmentarily, in the Spiritual Community. Religion ceases to be a separate function "for all acts of man's spiritual life are grasped by the Spiritual Presence." Religion becomes the "substance" of culture and culture the "form" of religion. Morals become "theonomous" as expressions of the faith and love which are the content of the Spiritual Presence. When religion unites with culture and morality, these unite with each other with the result that every cultural creation is moral and the ethical content of every moral act is a product of cultural self-creation. This unity of all life—

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1. Ibid., p. 157.
functions in the Spiritual Community occurs only fragmentarily and by anticipation and can be said to be "hidden" except to the eyes of faith.

This situation gives rise to the "paradox of the churches" which consists of the fact that "they participate...in the ambiguities of life in general and of the religious life in particular and...in the unambiguous life of the Spiritual Community." The relation of the churches in history to the ontological Spiritual Community is this: the Spiritual Community is the "essential power," the "inner telos," of every actual church. The churches share the basic marks of the Spiritual Community but always in an ambiguous way so that the characteristics of holiness, unity, and universality "can be ascribed to the churches only with the addition of 'in spite of'." The ambiguities of the religious function of life are never totally removed but they are fragmentarily and anticipatorily overcome by the Spiritual Community. Only to the extent to which the churches

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1 Ibid., p. 165.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid., p. 165.  
4 Ibid.  
5 Ibid., p. 167.
embody the "invisible, essential Spirituality"\textsuperscript{1} of the Spiritual Community are they really churches, for the Spiritual Community is "the source of everything which makes them churches."\textsuperscript{2}

Out of the essential nature of the churches arise three groups of essential functions: the functions of constitution, expansion, and construction. The first group, the constitutive functions, includes receiving and mediating the Spiritual Presence and responding to it in worship and confession of faith. The expanding functions includes missions, education, and evangelism. The constructing functions of the Church include all the ways in which the Church "builds its life by using and transcending the functions of man's life under the dimension of the spirit."\textsuperscript{3} This group of functions includes the use of man's cognitive and aesthetic functions in the realm of \textit{theoria} and the personal and communal functions in the realm of \textit{praxis}. Finally, the churches have "relating functions" by which they relate to other sociological groups, "acting upon them and

\textsuperscript{1} Ibid., p. 164. \textsuperscript{2} Ibid., p. 165. \textsuperscript{3} Ibid., p. 198.
receiving from them."1 All the functions of the churches are, like the churches themselves, involved in the ambiguities of life and "their aim is to conquer these ambiguities through the power of the Spiritual Presence."2

Tillich elaborates at length the particular ways in which the Spiritual Presence overcomes the ambiguities of culture and morality as discovered by his philosophical analysis of life. The central concept used to express the reality of unambiguous life in the realms of culture and morality is the term "theonomy" which means the state of culture and morality "under the impact of the Spiritual Presence."3 Theonomous actions, either of cultural creativity or morality, involve the expression of the "ultimate in being and meaning"4 in such a way that both true autonomy and true heteronomy are united without either the autonomy or heteronomy being "independent"5 and thereby excluding the other. In short, theonomous actions are "Spirit-
determined and Spirit-directed¹ but in such a way that the human spirit is not commandeered or sub-
jected to a domination essentially foreign to it-
self. The human spirit remains free and becomes what it essentially is, that is, at one with the divine Spirit. Essentialization and theonomy are identical.

4. The Kingdom of God— Essentialization, or theonomous action in all three functions of life, comprises the possibility of actualizing, although fragmentarily, the true ontological situation of man as understood by theological ontology through revelation. That is to say, it is the process wherein life in all dimensions is recreated accord-
ing to what God essentially made it to be. Up to this point the analysis of essentialization has dealt almost entirely with the resolution of the ambiguities in the dimension of spirit which is the dominant dimension in the realm of human life. Essentialization in relation to this dimension of life can be called the true meaning of human life. However, the analysis of essentialization, or of

¹Ibid., p. 250.
the meaning of life, or of the content of theological ontology, is not complete without some consideration of the implications of essentialization in the historical realm. The fragmentary and anticipatory character of essentialization in the individual life raises the question of the ultimate fulfilment of the individual and of history which includes all other dimensions of life. The question of the fulfilment of history is the question of the "meaning" of history, and "the answer to the meaning of history implies an answer to the universal meaning of being."¹ This is the final question and answer which Tillisch deals with in his Systematic Theology.

The symbol "Kingdom of God" embraces the answer to the questions of the ultimate fulfilment of the individual, the fulfilment of history, and the universal fulfilment of being. It is the most embracing of the three symbols for unambiguous life and includes the other two in a unique way. Spiritual Presence in the Spiritual Community is a manifestation of the Kingdom of God on its "inner-historical"² side, that is, as the Kingdom of God

¹ S.T. III, p. 350.  ² Ibid., p. 357.
"participates in the dynamics of history."¹ The Kingdom of God is the Spiritual Presence considered in relation to the historical dimension of life. Eternal Life is the Kingdom of God on its "trans-historical"² side, that is, as the ultimate fulfilment toward which history runs or "the eternal fulfilment of life...above history."³ The two sides, the "immanent"⁴ and the "transcendent," are both essential to the meaning of the symbol "Kingdom of God." The chief connotations of the symbol itself point to its immanent and transcendent sides. The symbol has political, social, personalistic, and universalistic connotations, referring to the cosmic power of God bringing fulfilment to the social, individual, and every other realm of life. The Kingdom which is actualised is inner-historical but "by the addition 'of God,'...the impossibility of an earthly fulfilment is implicitly acknowledged."⁵ The ultimate fulfilment in which God's will is perfectly done is transcendent or transhistorical.

¹Ibid.
²Ibid.
³Ibid., p. 109.
⁴Ibid., p. 350.
⁵Ibid., p. 358.
Tillich conceives of the relation between the Kingdom of God and history as being one in which the Kingdom of God is manifest in history first of all as the "centre" of history in Jesus as the Christ and then in church history. The centre of history means the "criterion and source of the saving power in history"¹ and involves "a moment in history for which everything before and after is both preparation and reception."² As such, the centre is not the quantitative centre but the centre of power and meaning to which all parts of history refer for true interpretation and to which they relate for the power of fulfilment.

With this understanding of the centre of history, history must be seen primarily from the point of view of the saving creativity of God and must, therefore, be seen to be "not only a dynamic movement, running ahead, but also a structured whole in which one point is the center."³ Tillich's concept of the latent Spiritual Community—which existed universally even before Jesus—enables him to

¹Ibid., p. 364.  
²Ibid.  
³Ibid., p. 366.
claim that the Kingdom of God is universally manifest in history sometimes in the manifest churches and otherwise in the latent Church. The churches, although "representatives"\(^1\) of the Kingdom of God, are never identical with it because of their distortion due to the ambiguities of life in which they participate.

The Kingdom of God is sometimes manifest in the churches in history in specially significant events that Tillich designates by the term **kairos**. The term **kairos** means an occasion in which a special measure of fulfilment of the meaning of history is actualized. The centre of history, Jesus as the Christ, is the "great **kairos**"\(^2\) to which other **kairos** in history relate for power and meaning. **Kairos** do not occur at regular or predictable times, but rather, history "is a dynamic force moving through cataracts and quiet stretches."\(^3\)

The concept of **kairos** is relevant to the question of historical providence discussed in an earlier section. It provides for an understanding

of God's providential activity in particular events. It does not, however, allow for a human calculation or description of the total work of divine providence such as Hegel tried to achieve. Tillich insists that the way in which God's Kingdom is realized in history as a whole is "identical with the divine mystery"¹ and cannot be plotted by men.

One of the most relevant consequences of the relation of the Kingdom of God and history is the measure in which the ambiguities of historical self-integration, self-creativity, and self-transcendence are overcome by the unambiguous life of the Kingdom of God. Tillich discusses the ways in which this happens with reference to the ambiguities discerned by philosophical ontology in its analysis of history. The general character of the unambiguous life of the Kingdom consists of a balance or unity of the opposite trends which cause the ambiguity in history. For example, in connection with historical self-integration, "in so far as the centering and liberating elements in a structure of political power are balanced, the Kingdom of God in history

¹Ibid., p. 373.
has conquered fragmentarily the ambiguities of control.¹

5. Eternal Life:— The Kingdom of God in history is always fragmentary and raises the question of a non-fragmentary fulfilment of the Kingdom of God "above" history. This transcendent, perfect, Kingdom is the "end" toward which history runs, "end" being understood as "both finish and aim"² but primarily as "aim" or "telos." The "end" of history in either case is not a moment in time any more than the beginning of creation was a moment in time. The sabbaton, like the creation, signifies "the relation of the temporal to the eternal,"³ but whereas creation, spoken of in the mode of time past, indicates the "dependence" of creaturely existence on God, the sabbaton or Eternal Life, spoken of in the mode of future time, indicates the qualitative fulfilment of creaturely existence in the Kingdom of God.

In fact, however, Eternal Life is not future any more than it is past or present. It is an

¹Ibid., p. 386. ²Ibid., p. 394. ³Ibid., p. 395.
attribute of God and as such "is together past, present, and future in a transcendent unity of the three modes of time". In relation to history it is the "end" which is "permanently present" constituting the "transition" of the moments of history into their final fulfilment. This involves, "in a continuous process," the elevation of the positive content of history into an unambiguous eternity while, at the same time, the negative content of history is excluded from eternity. "Eternal Life...includes the positive content of history, liberated from its negative distortions and fulfilled in its potentialities."

Tillich suggests that a "bold" metaphor for Eternal Life might be "eternal memory" in which all the positive content of history resides in "living retention." He appears to be extremely equivocal, however, about whether the negative is remembered in the "eternal memory." On the one hand he states clearly that "the negative is not remembered at all," but then immediately afterwards he says "it is present

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1 Ibid., p. 399.  
2 Ibid., p. 396.  
3 Ibid., p. 399.  
4 Ibid., p. 397.  
5 Ibid., p. 399.  
6 Ibid., p. 400.
in the eternal memory as that which is conquered and thrown out into its naked nothingness. 1

Tillich is trying to satisfy two constraints here. First, the negative cannot be thought to reside in eternity for then the ambiguity of life would not be overcome there; but, on the other hand, some negative element is necessary in order to conceive of eternity as eternal life since "without an element of negativity neither life nor blessedness can be imagined." 2 Blessedness, in fact, consists of the experience of the "negation of the negative," 3 and as the chief characteristic of Eternal Life it strongly requires some place for negativity in eternity. The negative is both indispensable and incongruous in Eternal Life with the result that Tillich's position on the place of the negative in eternity seems extremely equivocal.

Tillich believes that the position in question is a dialectical one which is necessary for a "dynamic idea of eternal blessedness." 4 As with all dialectical logic one must enter fully into the

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urgency of the opposing constraints in order to apprehend the logic of the solution. In this case the main point of the solution is that because the negative is both necessary and impossible in Eternal Life, the Divine Life must be conceived as "the eternal conquest of the negative,"¹ characterized by "blessedness through fight and victory."² This is as close as one can come to satisfying the two constraints involved. There remains some doubt as to whether the two have been satisfactorily related.

Whatever the place of the negative, the positive is the dominant characteristic of Eternal Life. This is evident in the fact that Eternal Life is conceived as the "non-fragmentary, total, and complete conquest of the ambiguities of life—and this under all dimensions of life."³ In Eternal Life the unity of unambiguous self-integration, self-creativity, and self-transcendence is "the life of universal and perfect love."⁴ Life returns to what it essentially is, that is, it undergoes "universal essentialization"⁵ through the elevation of its

¹Ibid.
²Ibid.
³Ibid., p. 401.
⁴Ibid., p. 402.
⁵Ibid., p. 408.
positive content into eternity. The implications of this for the human sphere are that no individual person is absolutely excluded from Eternal Life because "nothing that is can become completely evil." Tillich believes that "the doctrine of the ambiguity of all human goodness and of the dependence of salvation on the divine grace alone either leads us back to the doctrine of double predestination or leads us forward to the doctrine of universal essentialization."  

The "condemning side of the divine judgment" still operates, however, and consists of the exclusion from Eternal Life or the "burning" of the negative and "that which pretends to be positive but is not." The net result, so to speak, of the double process of condemnation and elevation to Eternal Life is the idea of "degrees of essentialization." Both condemnation and elevation of the positive relate to the "whole life process"  

\[1\text{Ibid.}\]
\[2\text{Ibid.}\]
\[3\text{Ibid.}\]
\[4\text{Ibid., p. 399.}\]
\[5\text{Ibid.}\]
\[6\text{Ibid., p. 407.}\]
\[7\text{Ibid., p. 416.}\]
rather than merely to the moment of death and together they work to determine the individual's degree of essentialization. Within the limits of this understanding of Eternal Life Tillich interprets some of the traditional Christian terms such as "immortality" and "resurrection of the body."

The inclusion of all the positive content of creation in Eternal Life raises for the last time the question of the relation of God to the world which has been raised several times before, as in the discussion of Tillich's possible pantheism. The elevation of the positive content of life to Eternal Life which is in God signifies that the world is not only "eternal to God" but also "internal to Him." Tillich suggests that there are three meanings of the proposition "in" when one says Eternal Life is life "in God"; the first is "the 'in' of creative origin"; the second is "the 'in' of ontological dependence"; and the third is "the 'in' of ultimate fulfilment." The last includes the other two as presuppositions since there can be no fulfilment without creation and preservation.

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1Ibid., p. 422.  
2Ibid., p. 421.  
3Ibid.  
4Ibid.
The implication of this last idea of the relation of the temporal to the eternal is that "in ultimate fulfilment God shall be everything in (or for) everything." Tillich claims to find this idea in St Paul and he suggests it might be called "eschatological pan-en-theism."²

In spite of the suspicion that this position may be substantially the same as pure pantheism, I believe that it is not pantheism for the reasons given earlier³ namely, that Tillich's position is too dialectical to be identical with pure pantheism. It is true that in his system everything is thought to reside ultimately in God. But God is a "living" God, which is to say, He unites His identity with "otherness" which separates from Him and ultimately returns to Him. The "rhythm" of this Divine Life "from essence through existential estrangement to essentialisation"⁴ exhibits a love which allows "the other" the freedom to reject or accept the love which reunites and fulfills. Creation, therefore, really creates an "other" which salvation ultimately

¹Ibid. ²Ibid. ³Cf. p. 394-399. ⁴Ibid., p. 421.
reunites with God. This process of separation and reunion in the life of God is the fundamental characteristic of God the Trinity. It is the basic dynamics of trinitarian monotheism and it can only be understood through dialectical thinking. Precisely because it is trinitarian and dialectical, Tillich's position cannot simply be called pantheism.

The dependence of the idea of Eternal Life, the final element of the content of theological ontology, on the concept of trinitarian monotheism corroborates the assertion with which we began this chapter, namely, that the most distinctive feature about the content of Tillich's theological ontology is its dialectical or trinitarian character. In the broadest perspective the content of theological ontology is the exposition of the Triune God out of whom all reality proceeds and to whom it returns. More will be said about this in the concluding chapter to which we now turn.
Chapter IX

Conclusion

We began the treatment of the ontology in Tillich's thought with a brief statement of what we believe to be his basic ontological presuppositions and with the hypothesis that there are two kinds of ontology evident in his theological writings, namely, philosophical and theological ontology. The ways in which the ontological presuppositions are actually reflected in the contents and methods of Tillich's thinking have been examined at some length in the two contexts of philosophical and theological ontology. There remains the necessity of summarizing, in a constructive and partially critical way, the main points of significance in connection with the place of ontological considerations in Tillich's thought.

The most outstanding characteristic of Tillich's ontology is that it is both philosophical and
theological. Ontology is usually thought to belong strictly to philosophy but there can be no doubt that much of the content of Tillich's system of thought can rightly be described as both ontological and theological and can, therefore, be appropriately termed "theological ontology." The nature of Tillich's ontology as both philosophical and theological raises the question of how the two kinds of ontology are related to each other and what is the effect upon Tillich's system of having the two kinds of ontology within it.

I believe that the relationship of philosophical and theological ontology in Tillich's thought is the issue crucial to its systematic and theological adequacy because within the region of this relationship and as corollaries to it are to be found most of the problematical aspects of Tillich's theology. Most of the instances in which, as we have found, his position has proven to be less than satisfactory can be seen to derive from the basic difficulty in his thought, namely, the unsatisfactory way in which theology and philosophy are explicitly related to each other. The essence of this latter problem infects virtually all areas where philosophy and
theology meet, either in matters of method or of content, and it was at these points that some dissatisfaction with Tillich's position was experienced.

The essence of the problem of the relationship of philosophy and theology in Tillich's thought is that the authority of each for ontology is not clearly determined nor consistently followed. Tillich explicitly aspires to stand "on the boundary between theology and philosophy" and as a result he tries to award both disciplines and their different outlooks equal authority in the fashioning of a comprehensive understanding of reality, or, in other words, in the construction of a systematic ontology.

Tillich is trying to reconcile philosophy to theology and _vice versa_ without subjecting one to the authority of the other, and the method of correlation is the specific instrument which he believes capable of achieving this aim. The method of correlation certainly has its advantages, which I shall note presently, but its shortcoming is that it by no means adequately resolves the problem of the

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1 I.H., p. 30.
relationship of philosophy and theology at the many points where they meet. The method is designed to preserve the legitimate influence of philosophy and theology, each in its proper sphere, but the difficulty is that the spheres are not really as clearly separable as Tillich's formulation of the method seems to suggest. There are many instances where an aspect of philosophy is more than a mere question and where the relevant theological element is more than simply an answer. This will become apparent when some of the particular difficulties are reviewed. Hence, in spite of its limited usefulness, the method of correlation does not remove the ambiguities and unresolved tensions arising from the equal priority, if such is conceivable, which Tillich tries to award to philosophy and theology in determining the main conclusions about ontology.

The upshot of this lack of an explicit decision in favour of one discipline over the other is that neither philosophy nor theology achieves the degree of influence which its proponents believe it should have. Thus, from the philosopher's point of view, Tillich's theological ontology may appear to intrude
into the sphere of knowledge and enquiry where philosophy alone should operate. And from the theologian's viewpoint Tillich's use of philosophical ontology in theology may seem to subject theology wrongly to an alien influence. The dissatisfaction on both sides may arise at any of the points at which philosophy and theology meet.

Now, having noted that Tillich aims at giving philosophical and theological constraints equal recognition, it is necessary to state that in spite of this aim Tillich actually gives a very dominant place to theological constraints over philosophy in determining the chief characteristics of his ontology. This, too, will become apparent as attention is paid to some of the points of convergence between philosophy and theology. A preliminary indication of the way in which philosophy is subjected to theology can be found within the method of correlation itself, which is intended by Tillich to preserve the influence of philosophy. As Tillich himself notes, the method of correlation is not new to him but, on the contrary, systematic theology of any kind uses it and "has always done so, sometimes
more, sometimes less, consciously.\(^1\) In the way in which theologians traditionally use the method of correlation philosophy and other non-theological materials are definitely subjected to the authority of theology. In fact, the point of the method of correlation as it is traditionally used is not to provide philosophy with a legitimate entry into theological matters but rather to borrow from philosophy and other sources terminology which becomes explicitly theological when taken into theology. Despite Tillich's intentions, this is the way in which the method of correlation actually works in his own theological system. Theology clearly dominates the system and imposes a theological character on the philosophical material which is used.

Tillich's pretension of the authority of philosophical constraints is what I have previously termed his "slightly rationalistic bias,"\(^2\) which is evident in his acceptance of the legitimacy of the philosopher's epistemological ideal of detached objectivity and, also, in his definition of

\(^1\)S.T. I, pp. 67-68.

\(^2\) cf., supra, pp. 33-39.
autonomous reason which is virtually identical to the autonomous reason. This slightly rationalistic bias, however, does not influence the actual substance of Tillich's theological ontology to a very great extent. Rather, it merely tends to confuse certain issues by superimposing a philosophical conclusion upon a matter which is fundamentally determined by the relevant theological constraint. A good example of this is Tillich's insistence on philosophical grounds that the one statement, "God is being-itself," should be considered a literal, non-symbolic statement even though his doctrine of symbols, which is theologically orientated, makes any non-symbolic statement about God impossible or, at least, idolatrous. Confusions and apparent inconsistencies such as this one occur at various places where theology and philosophy meet in his system, but in most cases the main conclusions in question are essentially determined by the relevant theological constraints. Tillich's thought is dominated by the "Protestant principle" and "Catholic substance"\(^1\) to such an extent that there is little

\(^1\)S.T. III, p. 245.
room left for significant philosophical influence except in the mode of language, which is a legitimate consequence of the method of correlation.

The fact that Tillich is writing a systematic theology and that theological impulses actually predominate in his thought would seem to indicate that the authority of theology ought to be explicitly acknowledged by him to prevail over philosophy. It is, however, precisely because he does not affirm the precedence of theology with sufficient single-mindedness that at various points in his thought his trumpet, so to speak, gives forth an uncertain sound. Confusions arise from his giving philosophical values too much recognition, and this is a consequence of his standing on the border between theology and philosophy. Tillich believes that "the border line is the truly propitious place for acquiring knowledge"¹ and, with regard to several borderlines, there is certainly some justification for this conviction. It is equally certain, however, that the particular borderline between philosophy and theology is not a propitious place to stand to

¹I.H., p. 3.
achieve systematic or theological adequacy. This can be seen by reviewing several of the instances in our exposition of philosophical and theological ontology where some dissatisfaction about Tillich's position was experienced.

Perhaps the most obvious place where the equivocation about the precedence of theology over philosophy is evident is in connection with Tillich's explicit position concerning the definition and relationship of philosophy and theology. These questions were considered by us chiefly in Chapters II and VI. My conclusion on these occasions was that the definitions of both theology and philosophy were too narrow and rigid, each excluding an element from the definition which was indispensable and inevitable for the discipline in question. Thus, philosophy was defined so as to exclude from its essence the theological element without which Tillich admits that "philosophy would be lacking in passion, seriousness, and creativity."¹ That philosophy is really dependent upon theology of one kind or another for its dynamic impulse indicates that the theological

element should be taken into account in the essential definition of philosophy and, further, that theology in fact precedes the philosophical ideals of detached objectivity and complete rational autonomy in terms of which Tillich defines the essence of philosophy. Tillich's analysis of the fundamental a priori necessary to all systems of thought as being essentially theological is a brilliant insight into the universality of religion in human thought, but his failure to draw what appears to be the obvious conclusion, namely, that theology precedes every other cognitive discipline, leaves the way open for consequent lack of clarity about the rightful priority of theological constraints in particular instances where they come in contact with philosophical ones.

Whereas philosophy is defined solely in terms of its theoretical character, to the exclusion of its existential side, theology, on the other hand, is defined solely in terms of the existential side, to the exclusion of its theoretical aspects. One result of this is that the theoretical content of theology, especially of traditional Christian theology, is not taken sufficiently into consideration
in connection with the question of the verification of religious knowledge\(^1\) and, also, in connection with the question whether there can be such a thing as "theological ontology."\(^2\) If Tillich had explicitly acknowledged the essential place of theoretical formulations in theology he might also have explicitly acknowledged the discipline of theological ontology. This would by no means involve the subjection of theology to the authority of philosophy. On the contrary, it would have enabled Tillich unequivocally to affirm the ontological material in his system of thought as being genuinely theological.

As it stands, Tillich does not adequately account for the material in his system which is both theological and ontological. Many critics of Tillich take it for granted that all the ontological material is purely an intrusion of philosophy into the domain of theology. This, of course, is far from the truth. The major part of Tillich's thought is theological ontology in which ontological symbols

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\(^1\) *Ref. supra*, Chapter VII, pp. 342-349.

\(^2\) *Ref. supra*, Chapter VI, p. 234.
are essentially dependent upon the Christian faith for their acceptability rather than upon philosophical premises. Unfortunately, the theoretical status of this kind of material is not explicitly acknowledged and expounded. The chief reason would appear to be that the theoretical side of ontology is too rigidly reserved for the domain of philosophy and thereby is excluded from the proper scope of theology. This is surely an unwarranted restriction in favour of philosophy and an extravagant acknowledgement of the philosopher's capacity for this kind of construction as ever against the theologian's. That this acknowledgement of the philosopher's exclusive claim to ontology should co-exist with an actual preponderance of theological ontology in Tillich's thought is a primary instance of the confusion about the proper scope of each discipline.

Another instance of the clash of philosophical and theological constraints is that mentioned earlier, namely, Tillich's insistence, on philosophical grounds, upon the necessity of one non-symbolic statement to designate God. The reasoning is that one non-symbolic statement will provide a guarantee that all the other symbolic statements in
the system actually refer to God and are not simply "floating in thin air." Such a guarantee would serve the philosophical demand for strict logical deduction of the symbols from the one non-symbolic statement. This demand, however, is irrelevant to theology for several reasons. First of all, theological knowledge in religious symbols is the product of revelation and is not derived by deduction of any kind, least of all deduction from a philosophical concept. Secondly, Tillich is by no means unequivocal when he says that being-itself is a literal designation of God. He does not appear ever to have settled the question finally in his mind. He has always been aware of the danger involved in making literal statements about God. No finite articulation of God could claim to represent him with complete literal adequacy without committing the offence of idolatry in claiming to circumscribe God within finite limits. God's infinite transcendence negates to a greater or less degree all finite designations of him, making them symbolic.

1 cf., supra, Chapter VII, pp. 313-322.

2 cf., supra, Chapter VII, pp. 315-318.
according to Tillich’s understanding of the term. Hence, it is sheer inconsistency with his fundamental theological premise of God’s ultimate transcendence when Tillich subscribes to the philosophical demand for a non-symbolic statement about God.

Tillich has not sufficiently explained what kind of logical relationship symbols have with one another and with non-symbolic statements. They obviously cannot have the strictest possible logical relationship with each other or else they could be derived by deduction and revelation would become the product of a syllogism rather than the gratuitous activity of God. But, on the other hand, they must have some logical relationship with each other or else they would not be susceptible to semantic rationality. The unexplained position of symbols with regard to their logical relatedness is not by any means a problem peculiar to Tillich alone. The matter is still under wide-spread discussion amongst philosophers and theologians. Nevertheless, Tillich’s doctrine of symbols is singularly marked by its failure to say anything specifically and explicitly about this question. One has to surmise what his position would be if he were to make it explicit.
In this way it appears that Tillich's concept of symbols, with regard to the question of their logical relatedness, is somewhat like the idea of "open-ended concepts" which, on the one hand, are susceptible to a measure of semantic rationality but which escape from the demands of strictest logical necessity by virtue of their relationship with God. Beyond this very tentative suggestion one cannot presume to speak on Tillich's behalf. One can say, however, that, in spite of the confusion about one non-symbolic statement and in spite of the omission of a theory of logic, Tillich's position on symbols is largely adequate in representing the main factors which are necessary in a doctrine of religious symbols.

There is at least one place in Tillich's theological ontology where a philosophical stimulus may have been seriously detrimental to the theological issue. This is in connection with the question whether God can in any sense be called a person. This was considered earlier at some length in Chapter VIII. 1 Tillich's position is that God can in no sense be called a person, although He must be

1 cf., supra, pp. 415-424.
conceived as personal. This position, I believe, is inadequate because it does not answer the question of God's initiative in miracles\(^1\) or in special acts of providence,\(^2\) nor does it resolve the question of reciprocity between God and man.\(^3\) Tillich's reasons for taking the position he does are both philosophical and theological with the result that it is difficult to be certain which is decisive. It does appear, however, that the philosophical influence in this case is stronger and is determinative of the position.

The theological reason which Tillich cites against calling God a person is that God's transcendence is such that to call him a person, even the highest person, is to employ a diminutive with respect to him. This point is less than convincing in the light of the fact that everything we say in concrete terms about God has a diminutive character in so far as it is negated by God's infinite transcendence and is thereby necessarily symbolic.

\(^1\) cf., supra, Chapter VII, pp. 281-283.
\(^2\) cf., supra, Chapter VIII, pp. 412-415.
\(^3\) cf., supra, Chapter VIII, pp. 417 ff.
It is the philosophical reason which really decides the issue for Tillich in this case. The philosophical reason against calling God a person is that the being of God is being-itself which is beyond both subjectivity and objectivity and that, therefore, God cannot be conceived as possessing the logical structure of a thing with qualities or a person with individuality. The logic of this argument is admittedly impeccable as a philosophical argument. But the identical philosophical argument could be used against anything which is said about God since all speaking of God must of grammatical necessity imply the individuality of God and treat Him as a subject or an object. It is true that the strict logical implications of calling God a person are negated by God as being-itself, but it is also the case that all statements about God are negated by the nature of God. The philosophical argument against calling God a person is based on the assumption that statements about God should conform to the kind of logical precision expected of ordinary concepts when, in fact, all statements about God are symbolic and by definition do not have the same kind of logical simplicity as
ordinary concepts have. Tillich, in this one instance, has accepted the authority of a purely logical constraint, allowing it to decide the issue.

One wonders whether Tillich is affected in this instance by the fact that personalistic language about God is philosophically embarrassing and perhaps a particularly conspicuous offence to one who is trying to stand on the border of philosophy and theology. Tillich suggests that calling God a being or a person is one of the "apologetic weaknesses" which might be avoided if God were understood as being-itself. Against Tillich at this point one must insist that calling God a person is theologically indispensable for the reasons I cited earlier. Tillich's position on this issue appears to be the most notable instance where philosophical considerations have not only confused his mainly theological emphasis but seriously reduced the theological content.

Another instance where Tillich's position has definite philosophical as well as theological underpinning is in connection with the central place he

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1S.T. I, p. 231.
gives to man as the "entering door" to both philosophical and theological ontology. The philosophical foundation for this position was fully explored earlier in Chapter IV. Then it was suggested that the strictly philosophical reasons for the pre-eminence of man in reality are not adequate in themselves and that theological reasons actually provide a more powerful basis for the position. The detailed examination of the content of Tillich's theological ontology corroborates this latter assertion.

As Tillich's theological system is progressively disclosed it becomes increasingly evident how much everything in the system is systematically dependent upon a few crucial theological tenets of faith, especially the central doctrines of the Trinity, of Christ as the New Being, and of Eternal Life. These three doctrines more than any others establish the central importance of man in Creation. The three are very closely related to each other, each one being a different facet of the same Reality. The New Being in Christ is the substance of Eternal Life which is the life of the living God, the Trinity. This fundamental theological position
contains implications for the assessment of man's place in reality because the New Being in Christ is conceived as the eternal God-man unity and as the telos of Creation in terms of which ontological reality is best understood. Because all realms of reality share the characteristic of the multi-dimensional unity of life which moves ahead quantitatively and qualitatively toward an end, the dynamic ontological reality involved in this process must be understood from the perspective of its end or telos which can be known only by faith and hope through revelation. As the telos is revealed in Christ to be Eternal Life which consists of the essential unity of God and man, and as this is conceived as the fulfillment of the multidimensional unity of life which resides fully only in man, it follows that the nature of man assumes a unique importance for the analysis of ontological reality.

It might indeed be suggested by someone that the centrality of man in philosophical ontology determines the telos of Creation and the definition of the New Being rather than vice versa, and that the place of man in Tillich's theology is a product primarily of philosophical influence.
is no doubt that a case might be made out in support of this claim, but it would not do justice to Tillich's essentially theological orientation. When Tillich starts out with his man-centered philosophical ontology, apparently independent of Christian theological influence, and then proceeds to reinterpret Christian theology in terms of this philosophical ontology, ending up with what he calls "a theocentric vision of the meaning of existence," he is actually determined from the start by the end toward which he proceeds. The theological "Catholic substance" of the Christian faith affects the philosophical starting-place and the man-centred outlook throughout. The circular method of correlation is somewhat vindicated by the fact that it preserves so extensively the "Catholic substance" of Christian theology. This final result in Tillich's theology is not merely an accident of a philosophically oriented method; rather, it must be operative in the method from the outset, determining the theological content while permitting new terminology. In this way the place of man in the method is

1S.T. III, p. 422.
guaranteed rather by the final theological content than by preliminary philosophical considerations.

The most significant point at which philosophical and theological elements meet in Tillich's system is in connection with the all-important question of the relation of God and the world. This question directly or indirectly affects every part of theology, and if a philosophical factor were to determine this issue it would thereby gain an overwhelming influence on many other important issues in the system.

Tillich conceives of the relation of God and the world as being two-folds: dialectical, and paradoxical. God is dialectically related to essence and paradoxically related to existence. Actual life, the unity of essence and existence, is both dialectically and paradoxically related to God. In spite of the philosophical connotations of the terms used, both the conception of the dialectical relationship and that of the paradoxical one are theologically oriented, the dialectical one in the doctrine of the Trinity, and the paradoxical one in the doctrine of Christ which includes the paradox of
Justification by grace through faith. These two kinds of relationship can be viewed briefly to show their genuinely theological nature.

The essence of things cannot be said simply to be God because God is "beyond essence and existence," but because God is the Trinity the essence of things can be "of" God or "in" God, part of the Life of God, without exhausting the fullness of God or without suggesting that God is restricted to the essence of things. Tillich says that "Idealism is the philosophy that makes this mistake. It confuses the world of essences and values and their unity with the unconditionally real. It fails to transcend this sphere of pure reason, a sphere that can be transcended only by accepting that which is 'before reason,' ... the ground and abyss of everything that is." For Tillich, essential being is dialectically related to the Godhead which "transcends it and yet participates in it." The created order is "substantially independent" from God, the divine ground while, at the same time, "it remains in substantial

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1 Of., supra, Chapter VIII, pp. 485-497.

2 P. 25, p. 23.
unity with it."¹ God "includes temporality, but... is not subject to it."² Finite being "is posited as finite within the process of the divine life, but it is reunited with the infinite within the same process."³ The place of the world "in" God is nicely summed up by Tillich as having three meanings: "the 'in' of creative origin";⁴ "the 'in' of ontological dependence";⁵ and "the 'in' of ultimate fulfilment."⁶ It is worth noting that each meaning of "in" preserves a traditional Christian tenet of faith.

The doctrine of the Trinity accounts for essence being "of" God, if not completely exhaustive of God. It provides a way of conceiving of the living God whose life consists of going out from Himself in the Logos and Spirit to give "the universe of essence"⁷ in creation and then of returning to Himself in "essentialisation" or Eternal Life which is the fulfilment of the universe. God's going out from Himself and

returning to himself constitute the dialectical relationship of God and essence wherein essence is "of" God and "in" God but not simply God. One of the greatest theological values of this dynamic idea of God as Trinity is that God is seen to be involved in the world process and dialectically related to the essence of things. The idea of God going out from himself and returning to himself accounts for the idea of "a world which is...external to God and...also internal to Him."\(^1\) Hence, it is the theological conviction about God the Trinity which determines the understanding of the essential relationship of God and man.

A theological conviction dominates the idea of God's relationship with existence also. The "irrational" fact of "fallen" existential being partially interrupts the essential relationship of God and the universe and gives rise to the need for a paradoxical relationship as well as the essential dialectical one. The paradoxical relationship consists of God's accepting man the *microcosmos* into essential (dialectical) union with himself in spite

\(^1\) *Ibid.*
of the judgment which He must make, in loving justice, upon man's self-imposed estrangement. The paradoxical relationship of God with existence is defined and accomplished "in principle" in the Cross and Resurrection of Jesus and is effected in man—and thereby in all dimensions of life—through faith, although only fragmentarily as the destiny of existence cannot be entirely overcome in the individual until it is overcome in the universe. This paradoxical relationship of God and man is the Christological paradox of the unity of God and man and is, at the same time, the paradox of Justification by God's free grace alone through faith.

The universal applicability for all existence of the meaning of the revelation in Jesus as the Christ is an indication of the extent to which Tillich's thought is theologically determined. Christ has universal relevance for every expression of existential being including man's articulations of the truth about God, which, because of their paradoxical relationship to God, are necessarily symbolic. Hence, Tillich conceives of Justification as "the principle that permeates
every single assertion of the theological system\footnote{1} and believes that "historically and systematically, everything else in Christianity is a corroboration of the simple assertion that Jesus is the Christ."\footnote{2}

This latter claim by Tillich might seem to some to be ludicrous, if not hypocrical, in view of the place which he gives in his system to the philosophical idea of being-itsel$. This central concept and its multifarious corollaries undoubtedly exercise a considerable degree of philosophical influence in Tillich's system. They provide the vast bulk of conceptual material from which he constructs his theological ontology. The crucial question which must be asked in the light of this strong philosophical influence is whether the philosophical material is influential in such a way as to be beneficial or detrimental to the theological enterprise. The detrimental effect of the concept of being-itsel$ on the question whether God can be called a person has already been mentioned. I believe, however, that in most other contexts the use of being-itsel$ is beneficial rather than detrimental to theology.

\footnote{1}{S.T. III, p. 224.} \footnote{2}{S.T. II, p. 107.}
The chief reason why the philosophical concept of being-itself does not constitute a harmful foreign element in theology is that it is employed in the theological system in a theological manner. When being-itself and its subsidiary notions are applied to God they become theological symbols rather than remaining literal concepts. It is true that Tillich vacillates on the question whether God can be literally conceived as being-itself\(^1\) and, on at least one occasion, says explicitly that God is literally being-itself. But, in spite of this lapse from theological consistency, being-itself is actually used more as a theological symbol than as a philosophical concept. If the notion of being-itself were used strictly as a literal concept by Tillich it would be virtually impossible to avoid calling him a pantheist, panlogist, or penspiritist because God would be restricted to the scope of being and would not be transcedent but only immanent. In Tillich's thought, however, being-itself is from the outset subjected to a theological constraint which determines that it must be symbolic and

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1 of., supra, Chapter VII, pp. 315-313.
theological rather than merely philosophical. The prior constraint is Tillich’s initial belief in the ultimacy and transcendence of God. Furthermore, the symbols which Tillich uses from the context of being-itself are subject to the theological norm of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ. The symbols derived from philosophical ontology are dominantly and decisively influenced by the main context of Tillich’s thought which is his theological ontology. The Trinitarian, Christological, and teleological character of Tillich’s system affects all parts of the system and imbues any symbolic material borrowed from other disciplines with a distinctly theological character. This is true in spite of Tillich’s occasional utterances which seem to affirm philosophical values in such a way as to compromise theological ones.

Tillich’s conviction that God can be conceived as being-itself was only one of four “ontological presuppositions” in his thought which we outlined briefly in Chapter I. There is a legitimate question as to whether a theologian should bring ontological presuppositions to his theological task.

1 cf., supra, Chapter VI I, pp. 372 ff.
With regard to the presupposition that God is being-itself I have said that it is not on the whole detrimental to theology because it is preceded by a theological element within the circle of faith. That God is being-itself becomes a tenet of theological ontology, part of the comprehensive understanding of reality based upon the Christian faith.

The first ontological presupposition listed in the opening chapter was that reality is united in one inclusive context—the context of being—and that an understanding of this context rightfully precedes any other cognitive approach to reality, presumably including theology which is a kind of cognitive approach to reality. This presupposition would certainly be offensive to the theologian if it meant that he must bring alien philosophical presuppositions to his task. However, because the context of being, seen in its broadest perspective, is described by the discipline of theological ontology which is identical to theology the ontological understanding of reality is not an offense to theology but part of theology itself. Because the context of reality, viewed in its broadest perspective,
is understood primarily in terms of its relation to God and God's participation in it, the ontology which systematically organizes this understanding is theological ontology and is not an alien influence within theology.

The same consideration renders inoffensive the second presupposition listed, namely, that Christian apologetics should be undertaken in terms of the "situation" of man and his world understood by ontological analysis. The final ontological presupposition—that the gospel of grace must be articulated in terms of a New Being—is explicitly a theological presupposition that needs no defence against the possibility of its being offensive to theology. Tillich claims to derive his category of New Being partly from St. Paul's idea of the "new creature."¹

Tillich's interest in using ontology in theology is rooted to a large extent in his apologetic concern, and the value of theological ontology must be seen in the light of this concern. Tillich's explicit description of the apologetic function is

¹II Cor. 5:17.
not a good one because it assumes the possibility of standing on the border of philosophy and theology which is not really possible at all. He says: "To be apologetic means to defend oneself in the face of an aggressor before a mutually acknowledged criterion."¹ This definition makes apologetics impossible for the Christian because there is no mutually acceptable criterion to which all men can subscribe. For the Christian the ultimate criterion of all thought about God is Jesus as the Christ—as Tillich so admirably shows and which he tries in his theology to obey. Technical reason is not a mutually acceptable objective criterion because, as Tillich explains, it cannot determine the ends of thought and must be merely an instrument of ontological reason. The latter, on the other hand, is so shot through with myth and symbol—indicating faith of one kind or another—that it is not mutually acceptable to all men.

Apologetics must consist of something other than the attempt to conform to a mutually acceptable criterion of thought which is different from the

¹I.H., p. 42.
criterion of Jesus as the Christ to which Christians owe and confess total allegiance. Tillich's actual apologetic consists in giving generous and sincere acknowledgement to philosophical values and constraints while actually building his system on the tenets of the Christian faith as resident in the "Protestant principle" and "Catholic substance." His apologetics amounts to a kind of disguised preaching which appears to be very effective.

In spite of this apparent effectiveness, one cannot escape the conviction that apologetics would be better undertaken without a confusion of aims at the outset. Apologetics cannot consist of an intention to compromise (which some see in Tillich, although his theology avoids nearly all compromise), nor can it aim even at integration with other beliefs. Apologetics should aim explicitly at conversion to Christ. There is no other point in it and no justification for clouding this point.

Having said this, however, it is necessary to go on to say that theological ontology may be a successful kind of apologetics in presenting a comprehensive, systematic, world-view based upon the central Christian beliefs. As Tillich himself saw
in his earlier period when he used the concept of theological ontology, it can provide "the foundation not only for interpretation of the idea of salvation, but also for individual and social ethics."¹ Tillich has succeeded to a very high degree in constructing such a theological ontology even if, out of deference to philosophy, his theoretical analysis of the discipline of ontology largely fails to define theological ontology.² His "trinitarian monotheism" represents a systematic world-view with remarkably comprehensive scope and deep profundity. It provides a very broad basis of fresh conceptual material for effectively interpreting the idea of salvation to Christians and non-Christians alike; and the central, fundamental place which it gives to morality and love in the analysis of life provides a valuable foundation for individual and social ethics.

The ontological character of Tillich's theology gives it a universalistic outlook which is valuable in saying something positive and plausible,

¹I. H., p. 272.
²cf., ibid., Chapter VI, pp. 255-256.
which is to say systematically adequate, about the power and relevancy of God beyond the scope of the Christian Church. His idea of the "latent" Church is explicitly ontological and is a valuable idea, theologically and apologetically. The concept of God as Logos and as the power of being acting in Spirit expresses the way in which God is immanent to every part of reality and the way in which all existing things are dependent on him for their creation, preservation, and fulfilment. Tillich's doctrine of Creation, framed in ontological terms, has been a very effective part of his thought from the point of view of apologetics. It has brought alive to many people for the first time the meaning of God's omnipotence and eternitY. At the same time, Tillich's emphasis on Justification by God's free grace alone, especially as it relates to the intellectual sphere, is an important way of showing the meaning of Christ to be of universal relevance to the human situation.

It is the broad scope of Tillich's theological ontology that commends it to many of his readers. The broad scope constitutes perhaps the greatest apologetic attraction in Tillich's thought even if
it appears also to cause many of the systematic difficulties. A broad systematic understanding of reality is attractive and, therefore, of good apologetic value because it answers the human desire to have a well integrated understanding of the world and of one's experience. It is the position which Tillich takes on the "boundary" or "borderline" of many opposite extremes and his use of dialectical thinking which account for the breadth of the system. The position on the boundary between opposites is dangerous in so far as it aims at a balance which cannot be realized unless some substance of the extreme positions is included. The extremes are "courted" dangerously by Tillich with the result that his thought includes elements of such strange "bedfellows" as pantheism, idealism, naturalism, mysticism, existentialism, and transcendentalism. It is not always totally clear how the elements of such opposite extremes can reside together in the system without contradiction and inconsistency.

The relationship between radical opposites is usually explained by Tillich as being dialectical and, therefore, rational. Dialectics is the
"scent," so to speak, which virtually holds Tillich's system together. Without it his thought, which aspires to be so highly systematic, would fracture into a multitude of fragments. Its importance can be seen, for instance, in connection with the polarity of individualization and participation. The concept of participation is central to Tillich's thought in that it makes possible the unity of everything in God while still allowing for some measure of individuality and independence in man and the world. The question is whether the logic of the participation—individualization polarity is comprehensible. There is no doubt that from the point of view of straightforward Aristotelian logic the relationship of this and other polarities is incomprehensible. However, some "feeling," at least, for the unity of a polarity can be achieved by entering into the tension of the opposites (as Tillich says must be done) and by recognizing how each pole needs the other to contribute some relevant and legitimate meaning which it does not itself possess. Dialectical logic must be acknowledged to be legitimate for this reason at least, namely, that it includes within one context relevant factors which appear contradictory and
irreconcilable but which also appear to be distinctly and essentially related to the issue in question. The answers which dialectical thinking renders may not be entirely satisfactory and may require perpetual re-examination, but, in spite of this, they are likely to be nearer adequate solutions than ones which leave out of account the influence of one polar opposite or of one set of conflicting constraints. Dialectical thinking involves a polariscope rather than a polemical outlook. There can be little doubt that the context of reality as such is one in which the truth is larger than any one polar expression of it and that a polariscope outlook is appropriate.

The subject of the breadth of Tillich's outlook is an apt one on which to conclude this treatment of his thought. The breadth is a result as well as a mark of his ontology which attempts to expound a comprehensive understanding of reality in its broadest possible context, a context which is decisively determined by its relation to God as He is revealed in Jesus as the Christ. The enterprise of articulating this "theocentric vision of
the meaning of existence,"¹ constitutes the discipline of theological ontology which Tillich does not establish very well in theory but which he carries out very well in practice.

¹S.T. III, p. 422.
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