ROMANS OVERSEAS
ROMAN AND ITALIAN MIGRANT COMMUNITIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD

Mark William Phillipo

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Romans Overseas

Roman and Italian Migrant Communities in the Mediterranean World

Mark William Phillipo

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of PhD at the University of St Andrews

January 25th, 2013
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Abstract

In this thesis, I characterise the Roman republican diaspora in the western Mediterranean, on the basis of the various activities which prompted the migration of individuals from Italy. The intention of my discussion is to examine the connection between republican imperialism and the generally obscure individuals who were the actual participants in empire. This is partly a response to Brunt’s *Italian Manpower*, in so far as Brunt’s minimalist calculation of the population of the diaspora discouraged subsequent research on the subject. To accomplish this, I have relied principally on the available literary references as the foundation of a thematic analysis of the diaspora, considering migration of those in the military or associated with it, as well as those involved in various categories of commercial activity. The settlement of former soldiers was frequently connected with the re-organisation of overseas communities by Roman generals. Commercial activity was examined with reference to a general model for trade in the late republic, which emphasises the role of agents acting on behalf of wealthier individuals in Italy. I also considered more general characteristics of the diaspora. Firstly, I have proposed a maximum population for the diaspora at the end of the republic of 170,000. Secondly, I have proposed that communities of the diaspora were organising themselves into *conventus* by the 70s BC. Finally, I have suggested that the social and economic networks of the diaspora can be modelled in terms of a network of bilateral connections between communities, though with particularly strong connections to Rome.
Acknowledgements

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**Introduction**

Who were the people involved in Roman republican imperialism? What sort of societies did they help to create? A traditional, simplistic sort of history might focus on the role of magistrates and armies in extending Roman power over ever greater areas. A more realistic picture of this imperialism must incorporate a broader range of individuals. Post-colonial approaches have thus tended to emphasise the active influence of indigenous peoples in the development of Roman imperialism. Another group of individuals remains to be considered, however: those who travelled from Italy into regions of the Mediterranean which were increasingly subordinate to Rome. This diaspora was usually considered only incidentally in ancient sources, and has received relatively little attention in modern scholarship. A notable exception to this was Wilson’s 1966 work, *Emigration from Italy in the Republican age of Rome*, yet the intervening decades demand that the subject be revisited in light of subsequent research. Brunt’s *Italian Manpower*, published five years later, contributed to the neglect of the diaspora through a minimalist estimation of the population of Romans overseas.

In many respects, the objective of this thesis will be to address the lack of a detailed modern account of the communities of the Roman diaspora, in a fashion informed by recent scholarship on pertinent subjects. Accordingly, matters as diverse as Italian demography, the organisation of the Roman economy, and models of cultural contact, all play a role in supporting my discussion. These research questions could be seen as elements of a much larger question of how the republican empire itself worked, not in merely administrative terms, but on a more personal scale. My interest lies in
establishing the connection between republican imperialism, and the relatively obscure individuals whose migration from Italy made them participants in empire.

I have imposed certain chronological and geographical limits on my discussion, in order to facilitate a detailed and thorough examination of the Roman diaspora within the space available. Chronologically, I am concerned with the republican diaspora, specifically between the end of the First Punic War in 241 BC, and the death of Caesar in 44 BC. Although evidence does exist for the presence of individual Italians overseas in the centuries prior to 241, it is relatively sporadic. The absolute number of migrants prior to 241 was probably quite low; as will be discussed in chapter six, the first real watershed in the growth of the diaspora probably occurred at the end of the third century, in association with the end of the Second Punic War. Since 241 marked the beginning of Rome’s control of territory overseas, my choice of start date also means that I will be considering the diaspora in the context of the increasing geographical scope of Roman imperialism. I chose a terminal date of 44 specifically to avoid addressing the altered conditions associated with the establishment of the Principate. The Augustan period saw the foundation of veteran settlements overseas, as well as a reorganisation of existing communities and the establishment of new or altered connections between them and Rome. Despite certain continuities between the diaspora of the republic and that of the Principate, these were fundamental changes. While it is questionable if such different periods could even be considered in adequate detail, a work which attempted to do so would be oddly bifurcated between republic and Principate. Under the circumstances, the end date of 44 is ideal for the republican diaspora to be considered in detail.
Geographically, I have chosen to consider the diaspora in the west, i.e., Gaul, Iberia, North Africa, Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica. This is not to suggest that the diaspora in the west was substantially different from that in the east. A greater abundance of epigraphic evidence is available from the east, which could inform such subjects as the social relations of diaspora communities. Furthermore, the east was more urbanised than many regions of the west, meaning the diaspora there was more likely to be embedded in peregrine towns. I will occasionally use evidence drawn from the east, when it sheds light on specific subjects of interest. Essentially, though, the east will be excluded not because of any presumed differences, but because it is only practicable to undertake a case study on the Roman republican diaspora in a portion of the Mediterranean basin. It should be noted that I have also excluded Cisalpine Gaul from this study. Interesting though this region is, it is dissimilar in several respects from other areas of the west. The establishment of colonies there, the attention given to the region by both Senate and magistrates, and its administrative incorporation into Italy only three years after the death of Caesar, all suggest that it should be treated separately.

Given the chronological and geographical parameters of this thesis, I will be relying primarily on literary evidence. Only a minimal body of epigraphy is available and relevant to the diaspora in the republican west, while the helpfulness of archaeological evidence is limited to certain specific topics. Archaeology is key to a discussion of the wine trade or of mining, precisely because these activities have left archaeological traces. Conversely, it can do little to elucidate the organisation of diaspora communities or their relationship with Rome, and seldom if ever conclusively demonstrates the presence of individual Italians in settlements overseas. Archaeology could, however, be used as a means of tracing the effect of cultural contact between
Italians and indigenous people on material culture. While this is a fascinating subject, and undoubtedly important in describing the development of provincial societies, it is not a question I intend to address. This is not to downplay the importance of the pre-existing societies over which Rome exerted its authority. Rather, my focus is on another group of easily overlooked individuals: those who migrated from Italy, and who must often have been the point of contact between indigenous peoples and Rome.

As will be seen, one of the important conclusions of this thesis is that our estimates of the population of the diaspora should be modestly elevated from the figure proposed by Brunt, though not to the degree proposed by scholars such as Crawford. Following from this, I present a picture of a diaspora which was concentrated in certain coastal centres, as well as in a handful of locations where unique economic opportunities drew migrants further inland. The first five chapters of this thesis are organised on a thematic basis. This mode of organisation allowed me to analyse the diaspora according the particular activities which facilitated the migration of individuals from Italy. One advantage of this arrangement of material is the emphasis it places on the basic unity of the republican diaspora, while allowing for variation between regions and over time. In each instance, interesting conclusions can be drawn about particular segments of the diaspora.

The first two chapters concern overseas settlement by individuals associated with the military, former soldiers in the first, and camp followers in the second. Settlement by such individuals was ubiquitous where Roman armies campaigned. Moreover, there is evidence that their patterns of settlement were often influenced by generals, in a manner more prominently associated with a later period. The next three chapters deal with individuals whose migration was motivated primarily by economic
activities, including trade in grain, wine, fish products, and slaves, as well as mining. All of this is set within the context of a general model for the social organisation of the economy in the late republic, emphasising the role of agents acting on behalf of wealthy individuals in Italy. This model necessarily implies that sections of the diaspora were connected with members of the political elite in Rome, to a greater degree than has been recognised. As I shall discuss, the redirection of large amounts of public grain through Rome, and the elimination of competing markets, was accompanied by an increasing amount of private trade through the city. With respect to wine, the unique scale of the trade between Italy and Gaul means that traders from Italy are likely to have accompanied the product some distance inland. My model for mines, meanwhile, emphasises the role of individuals and small *societates* in their operation, as opposed to larger enterprises. This implies the presence of larger numbers of migrants than alternate models might suggest.

The last two chapters set aside the thematic structure in order to focus on two more general issues. In chapter six, I have set forth my calculation of an approximate figure for the maximum population of the diaspora of 170,000 adult male citizens. Furthermore, I have proposed geographical and chronological distributions for the diaspora. The former emphasises regional variations in the composition of the diaspora, while the latter suggests a gradually increasing rate of migration during the republic, punctuated by episodes of higher rates of migration in response to unique economic conditions. In chapter seven, I discuss the social organisation of the diaspora, with particular attention to the *conventus civium Romanorum*. I contend that the diaspora communities themselves provided the impetus for the establishment of the *conventus*, and that their judicial role reflects the subsequent decision of magistrates to involve
them in the administration of justice. Finally, I propose that the diaspora can be modelled in terms of a system of particularly strong connections with Rome, alongside a network of bilateral connections between diaspora communities.
Chapter One – Military Settlers

1.1 – Introduction

What was the role of military service in driving migration from Italy, and to what extent did former soldiers remain in the provinces in which they had served? In the wake of Rome’s military activities beyond the shores of Italy, literary evidence concerning areas throughout the Western Mediterranean indicates that some fraction of those who had served overseas remained there. Evidence concerning such soldier-settlers is scattered. One frequently finds, however, that generals of the mid- and late republic were involved in establishing new communities, incorporating both Italian and indigenous populations. As will be seen, these foundations took place on a more informal basis than, for example, the veteran colonies of the late 1st century BC. Furthermore, there are occasional references to individual soldiers lingering, as well as to the offspring of soldiers and indigenous women. This population of migrants would have given rise to frontier societies in a number of regions, and the goal of this chapter is to attempt to trace their presence.

Most of this chapter will be organised on a geographical basis, but it will begin by setting the migration of soldiers in the context of Italian demography in the second century. Where migration from Italy has been given scholarly attention, it has been subordinated to debates on demography. These in turn have implications, concerning both the military manpower available to Rome, and the characteristics of the society in Italy which these migrants left behind. Accordingly, section 1.2 will consider the relationship between military recruitment and Italian demography. Section 1.3 will then
concentrate on Spain, for which the most extensive evidence concerning the settlement of ex-soldiers is available. Section 1.4 will address their presence in the larger Mediterranean islands, specifically the Balearics, Sicily, and Sardinia, while sections 1.5 and 1.6 will deal with Africa and Gallia Transalpina respectively. Having completed this geographical survey, the final section (1.7) will offer some general conclusions on the overall pattern of military settlement.

1.2 – Soldiers, Settlers, and Italian Demography

In so far as studies of Italian demography have given consideration to the military, they have tended to concentrate on the relationship between changes in the rural population of Italy during the late Republic, consequent variation in the numbers of assidui available for recruitment, and the associated problems in mobilising manpower.¹ Just as there has been debate over the most suitable model for changes in the Italian population, controversy exists over the picture just described. Thus, Rich argued that the generally held notion of a decline in the number of assidui in the late second century is not supported by the available evidence,² an argument which was subsequently applied in support of the high population count for Italy.³

The traditional picture of the impact of military recruitment during the 2nd century was succinctly described by Smith in 1958,⁴ and this account was subsequently and explicitly supported by Brunt,⁵ as well as by Hopkins.⁶ Their view maintained that

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conscription of small-holders, and service for years overseas, had such a deleterious impact on their farms that these frequently could not be returned to viability once the farmer returned. This was coupled with an influx of wealth that permitted members of the elite both to buy up these farms, and to purchase slaves to work the large estates thus formed. As a consequence, the now displaced farmers and their descendants ceased to be eligible for military service, on the grounds that they no longer met the property qualification required of assidui. This process has been connected with several other phenomena, for example, an attempt to address the shortage of potential conscripts through the diminution of the census property value required to be counted among the assidui. Furthermore, it has been closely associated with the observations on Italian agriculture that are said to have compelled Tiberius Gracchus to pursue his program of land reform. It has also been suggested that a cessation of colonisation after 177 deprived this dispossessed population of opportunities for re-settlement, thus exacerbating poverty in Italy. Finally, it is against this background, in a change of policy often associated with Marius, that the army is supposed to have begun concentrating on the recruitment of individuals who had either lost, or never possessed, property.

Much of this account has been subjected to criticism. Thus, even the central assumption that conscription diminished the viability of small farms may not be valid. Rosenstein has argued that a family of average composition in possession of a relatively

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6 Hopkins (1978), p. 4-8, 29-37.
7 Plut. Tit. Gracch. VIII.7. ... τόν Τιβέριον, καὶ τὴν ἐρήμιαν τῆς χώρας ὑπόστασα καὶ τοὺς γεωργοῦντας ἢ νεῖον τῶν οἰκείων ἐπεισάκτιος καὶ βορβάρους...
8 A variety of dates are given by scholars for the cessation of colonisation. Salmon (1969), p. 112, uses the foundation of the citizen colony in 177, while Rosenstein (2004), p. 59, uses the year 181, corresponding with the foundation of the Latin colony of Aquileia. Brunt (1988), p. 265, meanwhile, argues that the senate ceased to take responsibility for the settlement of veterans after about 150, implying that some settlement did occur, though he does not elaborate further. Given the silence of Livy after 168, some doubts have been expressed regarding the reality of this change.
small amount of land could withstand the absence of a young adult male engaged in military service for several years. The primary reasons given for his potentially counterintuitive conclusion are, firstly, that the diminished capacity of such a family to produce food would have been offset by a reduction in their overall nutritional needs, and secondly, that a typical marriage age of around thirty for males would permit them to complete their military service before starting families. Rosenstein’s quantitative arguments inherently involve a high level of uncertainty. Nonetheless, even when his calculations are based on unfavourable assumptions about demography and nutritional need, they show that military service need not have been incompatible with agriculture. Additionally, the evidence for the replacement of small farms by extensive slave-run estates is not secure, as archaeological field-surveys have found little evidence to support it,\(^\text{10}\) although there is evidence for a range of farm types and sizes.\(^\text{11}\) Furthermore, Rich has advised caution in accepting the hypothesis that the senate reduced the property qualification for the *assidui* twice during the second century, an idea originally invoked to explain the three different figures found in the sources, but one without direct support.\(^\text{12}\)

These alternative positions are well entrenched and, in the absence of new data apart from that provided by field-surveys, are unlikely to be reconciled. There is consequently a persistent disagreement over the relationship between demographic trends in the second century and the number of *assidui*. Rich, for example, did not deny the possibility of a decline in the number of *assidui*, although he doubted the reality of a decline in the overall free population of Italy.\(^\text{13}\) Furthermore, he drew attention to

difficulties encountered in recruitment in the mid-second century, and attributed them specifically to the perceived difficulty of wars in Spain, coupled with the limited opportunities for compensation through booty. This reluctance to serve has been picked up by De Ligt, and connected with contemporaneous decline in census figures between 168-133. He argues that, in this period, individuals sought either to evade inclusion in the census, or to intentionally underestimate the value of their property.

Based on higher census figures after 133, he also suggests that the earlier period actually saw population growth, as well as an increase in the numbers of impoverished Italians, which explains the aforementioned observations of Tiberius Gracchus.

Rosenstein took a similar position to De Ligt, arguing that the numbers of impoverished increased as a result of a birth rate beyond that required for replacement (due to both natural causes and military deaths), and the consequent partitioning of inheritances. Both scholars suggest that Tiberius Gracchus observed this phenomenon, and that he erroneously arrived at the conclusion that this increase signified a decline in the free population of Italy. That is to say, despite a perception of decline, overpopulation lay at the root of the crisis that Gracchus sought to address. Finally, Erdkamp, although concurring that there is unlikely to have been a decline in the number of smallholders, has argued that resistance to military service arose as a consequence of economic growth and a corresponding improvement in conditions among the assidui.

Erdkamp’s position requires that a significant amount of wealth, which is to say enough to act as a disincentive to military service for a broad section of the Italian population, trickled down from the elite. While the general plausibility of this process

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seems questionable, there are more specific potential objections. Firstly, the reluctance to engage in military service was particular to individual campaigns and was not a serious impediment, for example, when preparations for the Third Punic War were underway in 149. Secondly, the proposed mechanism for wealth transfer is the production of cash crops for new markets, most obviously Rome. The viability of such an agricultural shift must, however, have been a function of accessibility to such markets: those growing cash crops either had to be close to Rome or another market town of sufficient size, or had to have access to inexpensive means of transportation. Combined with limitations on demand for these crops, only a subset of the Italian population could have benefitted from them. Finally, it stands in contradiction to Rosenstein’s preferred model of cyclical mobility, in which, as small-holders acquired resources, other factors such as partible inheritance tended to disperse this wealth, thus precluding upward social mobility. The most suitable model, however, may be one which recognises the diversity of experiences among the Italian population. While Erdkamp’s model may be problematic if applied to Italy in general, it is entirely possible that some small-holders succeeded as he describes. Likewise, although Rosenstein argues that an average family could have tolerated the absence of a member on military service, he concedes that other family configurations could have been less favourable.

The traditional demographic model exemplified by Brunt and Hopkins cannot be reconciled completely with the objections that have been raised. Given the present state of the debate, neither alternative is sufficient. While dispossession of small-holders no doubt occurred, it is not clear that it was correlated with a demographic crisis. Similarly,

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although the observations of Erdkamp and Rosenstein show that the outlook for Italian small-holders in the second century was not universally negative, they must still concede that some were forced into poverty. The Brunt/Hopkins model is a worst case scenario of population decline, and the valid objections to it require that decline to have been more limited. Whatever the overall impact of military service on the population of Italy, demographic trends must have affected the prospects of obtaining land, and thus indirectly the decisions of individual soldiers not to return. The changes which Tiberius Gracchus observed in the countryside were experienced by those individuals, and the perception of poor prospects in Italy may explain in part the willingness of some to settle overseas.

What, then, of soldiers who chose to remain where they served? It has been recognised that individuals whose term of military service had expired need not have returned to Italy. The army was thus an institutional mechanism that, incidentally to its role as an agent of imperialism, brought about migration to the provinces in which the military was active. Although Brunt took a minimalist position regarding the population of migrants in general, he nonetheless recognised that some fraction of soldiers remained as settlers in areas where they had carried out their service. In his account, such overseas settlement was associated with inevitable liaisons involving soldiers and locals over lengthy terms of service, and involved marriages with indigenous women, the children of whom would not have held Roman citizenship. Though concerned with the population of Italy itself, Hopkins was able to speak of emigration to the army during the last two centuries of the republic, and he compared it qualitatively with

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21 Ibid, p. 164. From the Roman legal perspective, these relationships between citizen males and peregrine women lacking conubium would not have been recognised as marriages.
migration to Rome in terms of its impact on the rural population. More recent scholars have also considered the effects of military migration, again qualitatively. Rosenstein has described military service as a sink for surplus labour, one which may have relieved the pressure for families without access to land whose productivity was sufficient to support them. Erdkamp, meanwhile, has portrayed enlistment in the army as a form of temporary migration, and again, its impact on the availability of labour in rural areas is emphasised. Nonetheless, he also recognised the potential for temporary migrations to become permanent, a phenomenon which must have applied to soldiers as well as to other migrants. Though Erdkamp was particularly concerned with the movement of individuals within Italy, some fraction of soldiers who served outside Italy would also have been motivated not to return.

Given that the objective of this thesis is to describe informal processes of migration and settlement, it may seem contradictory to commence by examining settlement of those who had served in the army. To be clear, this discussion is not concerned primarily with the establishment of veteran colonies as such, i.e., colonies established primarily for the provision of land for veterans, a phenomenon particularly associated with the last decades of the 1st century BC. That said, some brief discussion of such colonies is appropriate.

Prior to the Second Punic War, Rome had established colonies in Italy of both Latin and citizen type, partly in order to provide land for settlement, and partly to guarantee Roman dominance in their vicinity. Thereafter, for the first three decades of the 2nd century, mostly citizen colonies continued to be established, primarily in

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22 Hopkins (1978), p. 50. Hopkins gives no figures for the number of migrants in this specific category, though they are included among the 150,000 he suggests emigrated from Italy prior to 49 BC (p. 68).
23 Rosenstein (2004), p. 79.
Cisalpine Gaul, and for much the same reasons. These were founded formally, in accordance with a decision of the Senate, with a deductor and commissioners assigned to oversee the process. The foundation of new colonies then ceased, only to be resumed in the Gracchan period with Auximum in 128. Although subjects of fierce debate, these colonies were still founded with the agreement of the Senate, and with officers appointed for the purpose. Novel to this period, and a point of contention, was that colonies overseas were proposed, as at Junonia in 122, and Narbo Martius in 118.

Even if, as seems likely, the numbers of assidui did not decline during the 2nd century, it is generally accepted that a shift in military recruitment, favouring those lacking sufficient property to be counted among the assidui, occurred at some point between 107 and 82. Contemporaneous with this change in recruitment was a shift in favour of establishing formal colonies (primarily) for veterans, one which allowed Velleius Paterculus to claim that it was difficult to identify any colony established after 100 which could not be described as militaris. On Velleius’ model, the final ‘non-veteran’ colonies were founded at Narbo Martius (Narbonne) in 118, and at Eporedia (NW Gallia Cisalpina; modern Ivria) in 100. Though he does not say explicitly, he may have regarded Saturninus’ legislation of 100, enabling the distribution of land to Marius’ veterans, as the first instance of the establishment of colonies exclusively of the militaris type. If, however, these are held not to have been established, he may have perceived Sulla’s establishments throughout Italy, and on Corsica at Aleria, as the first such colonies.

27 Hopkins (1978), p. 75. Hopkins problematizes the connection between Marius and changes in recruitment, but expresses no doubt about the reality of this shift.
28 Vell. Pat., 1.15. ... Mario sextum Valerioque Flacco consulibus. Neque facile memoriae mandaverim quae, nisi militaris, post hoc tempus deducta sit.
29 Levick (1971) notes that this foundation date is disputed, though she concurs with the date given by Velleius.
Velleius is concerned only with colonies that were formally established, whatever their founding populations, but even in the period after 100, informal settlement continued. In this regard, one may point to the settlement of some veterans of the Sertorian war by Pompey at *Lugdunum Convenarum* in 72,\(^{30}\) and of others of these veterans later in Italy.\(^{31}\) By 59, and the forcible passage of Caesar’s bills allowing the settlement of Pompey’s veterans, colonization was effectively the prerogative of individual magnates. The first half of the 1st century thus sees a blurring of two modes of foundation: the formal, senatorially approved colony, and the informal community established on an *ad hoc* basis by an individual commander.

The objective of this chapter is to consider the disposition of soldiers who, upon leaving military service, chose to remain outside Italy. Settlements such as Aleria and Lugdunum Convenarum, by virtue of their foundation through the impetus of individual commanders, might be regarded as early examples of the mode of veteran settlement that would become so prominent under Caesar and Augustus. The foundation of settlements specifically for veterans of the civil wars by individual magnates, with only the incidental approval of the senate, was a novel development. Nonetheless, it has parallels with the independent arrangements made by previous magistrates. The remainder of this chapter will thus be concerned with individual acts of migration, alongside earlier examples of the involvement of a commander in the foundation of a settlement.

As Brunt noted, a great deal of the available evidence for individual settlement by veterans is derived from Spain,\(^{32}\) and it is there that this discussion will commence.

\(^{30}\) Esmonde Cleary (2008), p. 16.
1.3 – Spain

Italica

Established in 206 by P. Cornelius Scipio, Italica was the earliest Roman foundation in Spain, though the event is recorded by Appian alone.\(^{33}\) As a settlement of Romans and/or Italians located on the lower Baetis, and thus in a position to control communication and transportation further inland (an area of significant mineral wealth), it is likely that Italica was intended to assert Roman power over the region.\(^{34}\) Both the precise status and composition of the town at its foundation are unclear, though a predominantly indigenous population and peregrine status have been suggested.\(^{35}\) As Keay has noted, there is a dearth of physical evidence for the presence of large numbers of Italians in Italica, which is attributable in part to subsequent building on the site, but may also be a consequence of limited exploration.\(^{36}\) In any case, limited availability of material evidence is common for the early stages of Roman settlements.\(^{37}\) The only evidence that the town possessed any other status prior to Caesar comes from the *Bellum Alexandrinum*,\(^{38}\) where the term *municeps* was used to describe an inhabitant of the town. It is questionable, however, if this was intended to reflect the juridical status of the townsfolk, rather than their common origin.\(^{39}\) Subsequent Augustan and Tiberian

\(^{33}\) App., *Hisp.* VII.38. ...συνώκισε τοῦς τραυματίας ἐς πόλιν, ἣν ἐπο τῆς Ἰταλίας Ἰταλικὴν ἐκάλεσε...

\(^{34}\) Richardson (1986), p. 53, p. 124. Knapp (1977), p. 116, notes that the town was situated as far up-river as large ships could navigate, though this position was not optimal from a military perspective. At p. 27, however, he suggests that it was established as a military outpost. See also Keay (1997), p. 25.


\(^{39}\) Knapp (1977), p. 112.
coinage, however, indicates that Italica possessed the status of a *municipium* by the time of the former.\(^{40}\)

Potentially relevant to the status of Italica in the decades after its foundation is Appian’s reference to one Gaius Marcius, who was apparently serving with Roman forces in the war against Viriathus in 143.\(^{41}\) Appian describes how the Roman commander Quintus/Quinctius, out of timidity, had retired early to winter quarters near Corduba, but in the meantime sent Gaius Marcius out against Viriathus. Marcius’ names are clearly not Iberian in origin, probably reflecting descent from the original Roman/Italian population of Italica. He held a position of trust and authority among the forces on the Roman side, and must have been successful in the field, given the frequency with which he was sent into battle. Nonetheless, Appian described Marcius as an Iberian. Marcius’ name and position make it unlikely that this adjective would be correct as an ethnic descriptor, and so it is usually assumed that he was non-indigenous. Richardson raises the possibility, however, that he was an Iberian who had simply adopted a Roman name, and this possibility cannot be excluded.\(^{42}\) Nonetheless, Marcius’ military authority suggests otherwise, in which case ‘Iberian’ would indicate either place of birth or status. If the term ‘Iberian’ can be interpreted as a signal of Marcius’ legal status, it becomes unlikely that Italica held any formal legal status in this period, beyond being a peregrine city. While the status of a single individual is limited

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\(^{40}\) Burnett (1992), p. 77-78. Catalogue numbers 60-63 are dated to the Augustan period, and all bear the legend ‘MUNIC ITALIC’, as well as some variation referring to Augustus’ permission (60,61: ‘PERM AUG’; 62: ‘PERM CAES AUG’; 63: ‘PER CAE AUG’.) Burnett suggests that designs on the coins intentionally allude to the Roman origin of the town, as 60-62 include on their respective reverses the genius of the Roman people (labelled), Roma (labelled), and a she-wolf feeding two figures. No pre-Augustan coinage from Italica is known.

\(^{41}\) App., *Hisp.* XI.66. ... Κοίντου ... Γάιον Μάρκιον θαυμινώ ἐπιπέμποντος αὐτῶ, ὅνδρα ἰβηρα ἐκ πόλεως Ἰταλίκης. Broughton, *MRR*, notes some confusion about the identity of this particular Roman commander, who may be Quintus Pompeius Aulus, though Appian (XI.65) earlier renders his praenomen as Κοίντου. See Richardson (2000), p. 158.

\(^{42}\) Richardson (2000), p. 159.
evidence on which to draw any conclusions on the status of Italica, Appian may give an additional hint as to the initial status of Italica.

It is interesting to observe that Appian uses the word *συνώκισε* in order to describe Scipio’s foundation of Italica, given that the usual Greek term referring to a formal colony is *ἀποικὴ* or one of its cognates. Accordingly, elsewhere in the *Iberica*, Appian describes the Saguntines as *ἀποικοὶ Ζακυνθίων*, and later refers to Carthago Nova as *Καρχηδόνιων ἀποικοῦ*.\(^{43}\) One can also examine Appian’s use of these terms in his entire corpus. Thus, some 76% (29/38) of Appian’s uses of various forms of *ἀποικὴ* and *ἀποικιζcharset=039;ω* occur in his *Civil Wars*, whereas only 31% (11/36) of his uses of forms of *σύνοικος* and *συνοικίζcharset=039;ω* occur in that work.\(^{44}\) That is to say, in the same work where formal colonisation is most likely to be prominent, the corresponding Greek term is used more frequently. To return to the case of Italica, Appian’s own terminology indicates that it was not formally established through any process beyond the governor’s prerogative.

If a settlement overseas had received any formal status at this time, such a precedent would almost certainly have drawn the attention of our sources. Their silence is a further demonstration of Italica’s early standing. What, however, may be said of the identity of the original colonists themselves? The name of the city itself suggests that many of the first colonists were Italian in origin, with only a small proportion being Roman,\(^{45}\) though it is only possible to speculate on the latter point. Appian’s only comment on the people who initially populated Italica is to describe them as

\(^{43}\) It must be acknowledged that Appian’s description of the origins of both Saguntum and Carthago Nova is incorrect, though this is inconsequential to my argument, since Appian clearly regards both as formally established colonies.

\(^{44}\) Figures for the incidence of these terms were compiled using word searches on the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae.

How were these soldiers wounded? In Appian’s narrative, the foundation of Italica was preceded by a brief description of the defeat of Indibilis by Scipio. Conceivably, those wounded in this campaign were settled in Italica, and while Appian offers no indication that the Romans suffered an unusual number of casualties, Livy may give a hint that this was the case. In one of only two instances from books 21 to 44 in which the numbers wounded in battle are mentioned, Livy gives a figure of 1200 Romans and allies killed and 3000 wounded, and claims that losses would have been lower if easier routes of escape had been available to the enemy. The significance of this figure is open to interpretation. While the rare appearance of figures for those wounded might suggest this instance was exceptional, this rarity also denies opportunity for comparison. Furthermore, it is unclear how many of these casualties were drawn from indigenous allies, as opposed to Romans and Italian allies. Finally, the casualty figures are given, not primarily to draw attention to the scale of losses, but in order to emphasise the extent of the enemies’ defeat. Accordingly, it is emphasised in the preceding chapter that Scipio chose to fight in a confined valley, that he had dispatched his cavalry to attack the enemy in the rear, and finally that none of the Spanish fighting in the valley survived.

Despite the numbers involved, it seems very strange that a population of wounded soldiers would, in effect, have been abandoned in the interior of southern Spain. Immediately before Appian’s account of the campaign against Indibilis, there

\[\tau\rho\alpha\mu\mu\alpha\tau\iota\varsigma\] – wounded.\(^{46}\) How were these soldiers wounded? In Appian’s narrative, the foundation of Italica was preceded by a brief description of the defeat of Indibilis by Scipio.\(^{47}\) Conceivably, those wounded in this campaign were settled in Italica, and while Appian offers no indication that the Romans suffered an unusual number of casualties, Livy may give a hint that this was the case. In one of only two instances from books 21 to 44 in which the numbers wounded in battle are mentioned,\(^{48}\) Livy gives a figure of 1200 Romans and allies killed and 3000 wounded, and claims that losses would have been lower if easier routes of escape had been available to the enemy.\(^{49}\) The significance of this figure is open to interpretation. While the rare appearance of figures for those wounded might suggest this instance was exceptional, this rarity also denies opportunity for comparison. Furthermore, it is unclear how many of these casualties were drawn from indigenous allies, as opposed to Romans and Italian allies. Finally, the casualty figures are given, not primarily to draw attention to the scale of losses, but in order to emphasise the extent of the enemies’ defeat. Accordingly, it is emphasised in the preceding chapter that Scipio chose to fight in a confined valley, that he had dispatched his cavalry to attack the enemy in the rear, and finally that none of the Spanish fighting in the valley survived.

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\(^{46}\) The Loeb translation of this passage describes them as “sick and wounded soldiers”. There is no suggestion in the Greek text of sickness, nor is this normally implied by the word \[\tau\rho\alpha\mu\mu\alpha\tau\iota\varsigma\], although it is normally used to describe the wounds suffered by soldiers in combat.

\(^{47}\) App., Hisp. VII.37.

\(^{48}\) Rosenstein (2004), p. 128. The other instance, at XLIV.42.8, alludes to the relatively low losses suffered at Pydna.

\(^{49}\) Livy, XXVIII.34.2. Romani sociique ad mille et ducenti eo proelio ceciderunt, vulnerata amplius tria milia hominum, minus cruenta victoria fuisse, si patentiore campo et ad fugam capessendam facili foret pagnatum.
was a description of Scipio’s response to a mutiny among his soldiers, particularly a group of 8000 on garrison duty south of the Ebro. This culminated in the leaders of the mutiny being beaten and beheaded, although the majority of them were pardoned.\(^{50}\) The same episode was recounted by Polybius and Livy, and both give versions of a lengthy speech by Scipio, in which the general upbraids his soldiers for their behaviour, and mocks the origins of the two persons named as the leaders of the mutiny, named as Albius of Cales and Atrius the Umbrian.\(^{51}\) While it is obviously necessary to use caution in drawing evidence from such an invented speech, Livy’s version raises an interesting argument against the mutineers. First, he describes a previous mutiny, by a garrison at Rhegium, who were said to have seized the town and held it for ten years, before all 4000 were executed in Rome.\(^{52}\) Presumably, the fact that Scipio only executed the leaders of this mutiny was intended by Livy to reflect on his clemency,\(^{53}\) but Scipio returned to the idea of a garrison rebelling and taking up residence in the provinces through a rhetorical question in which he asked if the mutineers intended to make Sucro (the river along which they had been encamped) their home.

Could it be that Livy, while composing this speech, has provided a hint as to the intentions of the mutineers? Having potentially served in Spain since 218, an unusually long term of service in comparison with the six years usually expected,\(^{54}\) many of Scipio’s soldiers had no doubt formed relationships with Spanish women, and it is entirely possible that some of them would have preferred to remain. This desire might have become particularly strong now that the Carthaginians had been expelled from

\(^{50}\) App., *Hisp.* VII.36.  
\(^{51}\) Livy, XXVIII.27-29.  
\(^{52}\) Livy, XXVIII.29.  
\(^{53}\) On Scipio’s clemency, however, note that at XXIX.19, upon his return to Rome, Scipio was attacked by Quintus Fabius Maximus both for the number of soldiers lost as a consequence of the mutiny, and for alternately treating his troops with indulgence and brutality.  
\(^{54}\) Keppie, (1984), p. 33-34.
Spain, and Scipio’s departure for Rome was imminent. Furthermore, the leadership of the mutineers was evidently Italian, and one might guess that the Italian allies would have been preferred to citizen troops in the supporting role of forming such garrisons. In this situation, the most likely group to participate in the settlement of a city with a large Italian population, and a large peregrine population, but without any formal civic status, are these individuals. Later, upon his return to Rome, Scipio was attacked by Quintus Fabius Maximus, partly on the grounds that he had lost more soldiers to mutiny than to battle.\textsuperscript{55} Quite apart from the hyperbole likely to have been used in such a claim, the underlying reality might have been that some of these mutineers had simply been left in Spain. Although the leaders of the mutiny were executed, a step which was likely viewed as necessary for the maintenance of military discipline, Scipio may have accommodated the wishes of this group of soldiers (though only after the defeat of Indibilis) through the establishment of Italica.

\textit{Gracchuris}

The city of Gracchuris was established by Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, during his praetorship of Hispania Citerior and campaign against the Celtiberians, in 179 or 178.\textsuperscript{56} It has been argued that the population of the town was comprised of indigenous peoples,\textsuperscript{57} and accordingly Brunt concluded that the available literary evidence does not demonstrate Italian settlement.\textsuperscript{58} He thus described Gracchuris as a “non-Roman” or

\textsuperscript{55} Livy, XXIX.29. \textit{sic et in Hispania plus prope per seditionem militum quam bello amissum}
\textsuperscript{57} Harris (1989), p. 128-9, summarises this argument, though he does not necessarily concur with it.
\textsuperscript{58} Brunt (1971), p. 215, n. 8. See also p. 579.
“native” town, implicitly indicating a sharp distinction between Roman and other categories of settlement. Similarly, Knapp described it as a “purely native town”, and later noted a lack of evidence supporting the presence of a “double Romano-Iberian population”.\(^\text{59}\) By contrast, Harris took a more agnostic approach, suggesting that a mixed population was more likely, on grounds of provincial security,\(^\text{60}\) a claim which will now be elaborated.

The modern location of Gracchuris remains unknown.\(^\text{61}\) It was, however, on the upper Ebro, and the river itself was later described as one of the borders of its territory.\(^\text{62}\) Later Itineraries indicated that the town was located near the confluence of the Ebro and its tributary, the Aragón, in the vicinity of modern Alfaro.\(^\text{63}\) This location would thus have been on the major routes to the northwest, further up the Ebro, and north toward the Pyrenees (a fact reflected in the modern road network). As this location also lies along the route to Numantia,\(^\text{64}\) strategic considerations in its foundation are probable, in which case it seems unlikely that a purely indigenous town would have been established there. Furthermore, a precedent for the settlement of Romans and/or Italians in Spain had already been established by the foundation of Italica in 206, while the town of Carteia, comprised of the descendants of Italians and Spanish women, would be founded a few years after Gracchuris in 171.

The name of the town itself is partly Iberian in origin,\(^\text{65}\) though the names of later Roman foundations in Gaul and Britain frequently employed indigenous elements,

\(^{60}\) Harris (1989), p. 129.
\(^{62}\) Liv. frg. 1.XCI, fines Cascantinorum et Graccuritanerum.
\(^{63}\) The Barrington Atlas locates Gracchuris in the area of Alfaro. See also the discussion in RE, Graccuris.
\(^{65}\) Specifically, the suffix –urris, as noted in RE.
often in combination with Latin.\textsuperscript{66} That said, the use of Gracchus’ name in the town’s represents an innovation.\textsuperscript{67} Richardson suggests that this reflects the “non-involvement” of the senate in the foundation of the town,\textsuperscript{68} and certainly Gracchus appears to have been acting under his own initiative, as was the case when Scipio founded Italica. Given Gracchus’ efforts to establish administrative processes in his province (e.g., regularising taxation, as well as founding towns\textsuperscript{69}), and given the relatively personal relationship that could exist between individual Roman magistrates and the indigenous Iberians (e.g., Scipio being hailed as \textit{rex} in 206\textsuperscript{70}), the impetus for naming the town after Gracchus could have come partly from its Spanish settlers.

Although it was militarily expedient to relocate local populations from remote (and easily defensible) locations in the uplands to valley floors,\textsuperscript{71} the reorganisation of indigenous communities in this manner was relatively novel at this time. There is, for example, no mention in Livy, Polybius, or Plutarch, of Cato the Elder undertaking similar resettlements during his proconsulship in 194. Cato appears to have been concerned almost entirely with fighting, rather than with administrative reorganisation.\textsuperscript{72} In Livy’s version of Cato addressing his troops, a clear emphasis was placed on pillaging, particularly of cities.\textsuperscript{73} Given that Livy explicitly claimed to have used Cato himself as a source, such an emphasis is unlikely to have been a later invention.\textsuperscript{74} With the exception of Livy’s assertion that Cato brought about the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{66} Rivet (1980), p. 9.
\item \textsuperscript{67} Harris (1989), p. 128.
\item \textsuperscript{68} Richardson (1986), p. 118.
\item \textsuperscript{69} Ibid., p. 117-7.
\item \textsuperscript{70} Pliny, \textit{NH} XXVII.19.3. \textit{multitudo Hispanorum ... regem eum ingenti consensus appellavit.}
\item \textsuperscript{71} The relocation of indigenous peoples, sometimes at their own request and associated with settlement on better quality land, is a recurring theme during the mid to late 2\textsuperscript{nd} century. See, for example, App. \textit{Hisp.} X.59, X.61, XII.75, and XVI.99.
\item \textsuperscript{72} Richardson (1986), p. 93.
\item \textsuperscript{73} Livy, XXXIV.13.6. \textit{... non agros inde populari sed urbium opes exhausti licebit.}
\item \textsuperscript{74} Livy, XXXIV.15.9.
\end{itemize}
collection of revenue from iron and silver mines,\textsuperscript{75} the only mention of any administrative arrangements made by Cato appeared in Plutarch,\textsuperscript{76} where it was claimed that the senate resolved to make no alterations to his achievements, leaving his successor with little to do. Regardless of these claims, by 193 fighting was again underway in Hispania Citerior, as a revolt occurred immediately after Cato’s departure, thus raising doubts as to the extent of his success.\textsuperscript{77}

With respect to the indigenous communities, Cato’s only major achievement appears to have been to disarm “all the Spaniards on this side of the Ebro”,\textsuperscript{78} and to destroy their walls in a single day.\textsuperscript{79} Appian alone described how the latter was accomplished, by means of letters delivered simultaneously to each of the towns in question, demanding that they demolish their own walls.\textsuperscript{80} Since these accounts were likely derived from Cato’s own partisan account of his accomplishments, their silence on the matter of resettlement is striking. Even if the relocation of Spanish communities by Cato cannot be entirely disproven, this silence suggests that no significant changes were made by him.

The only evidence for a reorganisation of any Spanish community prior to Tiberius Gracchus comes from an inscription dating to 191-190, in which L. Aemilius Paullus appears to have established the rights of the ‘servei Hastensium’ to both land

\textsuperscript{75} Livy, XXXIV.21.7. See below, n. 74.
\textsuperscript{76} Plut. Cat. Mai. XI.2. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα τῆς συγκλήτου ψηφισμένης μηδὲν ἀλλάττειν μηδὲ κινεῖν τῶν δικαιμένων ὑπὸ Κάτωνος… Cato seems to have been involved in a dispute with Scipio Africanus after his return from Spain, which is the context for this decision of the senate. Cato was succeeded in Spain by P. Scipio Nasica, though Plutarch erroneously claims that this role was filled by Scipio Africanus. See Richardson (1986), p. 90.
\textsuperscript{77} Livy, XXXV.1.1.
\textsuperscript{78} Livy, XXIV.17.5. … arma omnibus cis Hiberum Hispanus adimit.
\textsuperscript{79} Livy, XXIV.17.11. … uno die maris omnium diratus …
\textsuperscript{80} App., Hisp., VIII.41.
and a town in the vicinity of Lascuta (modern Alcalá de los Gazules). Even in this example, however, rather than indicating the establishment of an entirely new settlement, the phrase ‘agrum oppidumqu., quod ea tempestate poseditent’ suggests prior habitation, and thus Roman recognition of occupancy, at least by the commander on the ground rather than the senate. By contrast, Gracchuris appears to have been significantly reorganised, or to have been an entirely new foundation, though again there is no evidence of senatorial approval. Furthermore, Gracchus engaged in the resettlement of people elsewhere, in the vicinity of Complega, all of which indicates a more direct involvement in supervising the population than had previously been the case.

Finally, it should be noted that Gracchuris was, by the time of Pliny, noted as an oppidum Latii veteris, a status it may have achieved under Augustus. Coinage indicates the town to have been described as the municipium Graccurris during the reign of Tiberius. It is, of course, doubtful that the subsequent status of the town would have corresponded to its status in the years immediately after foundation, suggesting its standing was elevated at a later date. To conclude, while the Spanish population of Gracchuris at its foundation may have been predominant, and while the

82 Festus, 86. Gracchuris urbs Iberae regionis, dicta a Graccho Sempronio, quae antea Ilurcis nominabatur. Richardson (1986), p. 113, n. 93 suggests that Festus’ claim that Gracchuris was founded on the site of Ilurcis represents a confusion of Gracchuris with the Gracchan establishment of Iliturgis. This is quite plausible, given the variations on the name Iliturgis that can be found in extant sources, such as Ἰλουργία (Polybius XI.24), Ἰλουργίος (Ptolemy), and Ἰλουργία (Appian, Hisp. VI.32).
83 App., Hisp., VIII.43. τούς δὲ ἀπόροις συνωκίζει, καὶ γῆν αὐτοίς διεμέτρει. The modern location of Complega is unknown. See Richardson (2000), p. 140 for discussion on possible locations.
84 Pliny, NH 3.24. … Latinorum veterum … Graccurritionos… Richardson argues that this status was achieved under Augustus, whereas Brunt, more conservatively, indicates it to have occurred prior to the reign of Vespasian.
size of any Italian element in the town cannot be determined, the presence of some such people is likely, given the importance of the location and the presence in Spain of significant numbers of Italians and their descendents.

**Iliturgis**

The identification of Iliturgis in the sources is somewhat confused by the existence of two separate communities of the same name, one on the Mediterranean coast, the other in the Baetis (modern Guadalquivir) valley in the vicinity of Mengibar. For these purposes, only the latter community is relevant. Like Gracchuris, Iliturgis was founded by Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, as indicated by an inscription found in the area in 1953. While there is a consensus that the inscription dates to a period later than the early 2nd century, both its authenticity and its veracity have been questioned, and there is a suggestion that it may be a Renaissance forgery. Iliturgis was established on the site of an earlier settlement which had been razed, and the population massacred, by forces under P. Cornelius Scipio in 206, ostensibly on the grounds that the inhabitants had betrayed and murdered the survivors of Rome’s defeats in Spain in 212. The town would eventually gain the additional title of *Forum Julium*, leading Knapp to suggest

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87 Harris (1989), p. 129, n. 107; Richardson (1986), p. 113, n. 92; Knapp (1977), p. 110, n. 18. Harris, Richardson, and Knapp treat the inscription as genuine, though not contemporary with Gracchus. The most detailed discussion appears to be Weigels’ (*Madrider Mitteilungen* 23 (1982), 152-221), which Richardson indicates to be inconclusive.
88 Livy, XXVIII.20. trucidant inermes iuxta atque armatos, feminas pariter ac uiros; usque ad infantium caedem irda crudelis peruenit, ignem deinde tectis iniciunt ac diruunt quae incendio absunt nequeunt; adeo uestigia quoque urbis exstinguere ac delere memoriam hostium sedis cordi est. See also App., Hisp. VI.32, where the name of the town is given as Ἰλυρίγια.
89 Livy, XXVIII.19. Iliturgitani prodendis qui ex illa clade ad eos perfugerant interficiendisque scelus etiam defectioni addiderant.
90 Pliny, NH 3.10. *Ilurçi quod Forum Iulium (cognominatur)*
that it received municipal status under Caesar or Augustus,\textsuperscript{91} though the title alone is limited evidence on which to base any conclusions concerning status.\textsuperscript{92}

Presuming that Ilturigis was genuinely a Gracchan foundation, it may be usefully compared with Gracchuris. Ilturigis’ location on the valley floor of the upper Baetis would have been useful for asserting control of that region,\textsuperscript{93} though its strategic value is less obvious than that of Gracchuris. Both towns may have been established on the site of earlier, indigenous settlements, but as previously noted this is not clear in the case of Gracchuris. It is also interesting to note that Ilturigis lies outside the boundaries of Gracchus’ province of Hispania Ulterior,\textsuperscript{94} which would point to the as yet ill-defined nature of Roman administration in this period. Recalling Aemilius Paullus’ reorganisation of the ‘servei Hastensium’, in neither case is there any hint that senatorial approval was required for the foundation of these towns. Ultimately, while there is no proof of the settlement of Romans or Italians in either town, both the military importance of their locations, and the presence in Spain of Romans and Italians no longer attached to the armies, support this possibility.

\textit{Carteia}

An indigenous town had existed at Carteia, on the Mediterranean coast of Spain near modern San Roque, prior to Roman involvement in the area, as indicated when Scipio’s subordinate, Laelius, is said to have sailed there in 206 in order to threaten the

\textsuperscript{91} Knapp (1977), p. 111.
\textsuperscript{92} Fear (1996), p. 111.
\textsuperscript{93} Knapp (1977), p. 19. Knapp is particularly concerned to establish the logic which underlay Roman administrative measures in Spain in this period, and may thus overestimate the strategic importance of given locations.
\textsuperscript{94} Richardson (1986), p. 113.
Carthaginian position at Gades.  

The arrangements made with respect to Carteia in 171, however, represent a novel event in the history of Rome’s involvement in Spain. For the first time, a town was established in Spain with the prior approval of the Senate, a decision made in response to a delegation which had come from Spain, and which was explicitly comprised of the descendants of Roman soldiers and Spanish women. As it was impossible for a legal (Roman) marriage to be constituted between these groups, their offspring technically possessed only peregrine status. In addition to these men, their freed slaves were to be included, as were the existing inhabitants of Carteia, with the stipulation that this last group would have land assigned to them. Finally, Livy noted that this settlement was given the title of a colony of Latins and freedmen, the first time such a status had been conferred on any settlement outside Italy.

In addition to being the first formal Roman establishment outside Italy, the foundation of Carteia was unusual in certain other ways. There was, for example, no commission of tres viri sent to organise the colony, nor is there any evidence that any individual colonists came directly from Italy. Apart from having to provide their names to the praetor then in Spain, L. Canuleius, these individuals appear to have been responsible for organising their own settlement. As Herzig has suggested, it is probable that the founding population of Carteia is the earliest indication of a much broader phenomenon that would have existed wherever armies were sent beyond Italy, at least until Augustus: the formation of a ‘novum genus hominum’ as a result of the

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95 Livy, 28.30...Laelius interim freto in Oceanum euctus ad Carteiam classe accessit.
96 Livy, 43.3. Et alia noui generis hominum ex Hispania legatio uenit. Ex militibus Romanis et ex Hispanis mulieribus, cum quibus conubium non esset, natos se memorantes, supra quattuor milia hominum, orabant, ut sibi oppidum, in quo habitarent, daretur.
97 Ibid. Latinam eam coloniam esse libertinorumque appellari. Incidentally, this raises questions about the claim by Velleius (2.15: Prima autem extra Italiam colonia Carthago condita est.) that the Gracchan foundation at Carthage was the first colony established outside Italy.
cohabitation of soldiers and indigenous women. Accordingly, this is a suitable opportunity to discuss the phenomenon, at least in relation to Spain.

The 4000 settlers of Carteia are an indication of the extent of the Roman and Italian presence in Spain, but they would have represented only a fraction of the number of such people. As Richardson notes, this number probably included only males, and given the location of Carteia, probably involved only people from Hispania Ulterior. Furthermore, this group was comprised only of individuals who were willing to use and publicise their Roman/Italian background. No doubt many others would have preferred to emphasise their maternal heritage, particularly if they had been raised in a Spanish town rather than a Roman camp or garrison, a difference which would have depended in part on the stability of the relationship between their parents. A range of backgrounds is possible, from outright rape, to liaisons of varying duration, and to marriage, even if not recognised in Roman law. It need not be assumed that longer term relationships were pursued solely by Italians. It is entirely possible that Spanish women themselves would have pursued Italian men in order to promote their own connection, or that of their families, with an increasingly powerful group in the Iberian peninsula.

Under what circumstances would Romans or Italians have formed relationships with Iberian women? The camps and garrisons just mentioned would have been a likely venue, particularly during Rome’s early involvement in the region, and Knapp has provided a convenient list of 24 such places throughout the Spanish provinces. As this list includes only those recorded in later sources, particularly itineraries, there may have been many more such locations. No doubt a certain fraction of time-served soldiers would have preferred to remain in Spain precisely because of relationships formed

100 Richardson (1986), p. 162.
while in service. Another significant possibility also exists and, as one might expect in this relatively early period, it is related to Rome’s military presence in Spain: deserters.\(^{102}\) Knapp noted that deserters are mentioned in a few instances in Spain, and these will be discussed below, but he considers that their numbers were small. While the numbers of deserters cannot be estimated, the fact that they are mentioned at all in the sources attests to their significance. It is instructive that, in Livy’s account of the siege of Syracuse (214-212), deserters played a major role in defending the city, a part which they could have played only if their numbers were significant. In addition, while *en route* to his province in Spain in 193, Gaius Flaminius is said to have recruited soldiers for Spain in Sicily, Africa, and Spain itself.\(^{103}\) His African contingent is said to have been drawn from soldiers of the army of Scipio Africanus, who had been ‘wandering’ in Africa for the last decade. It seems as if the armies of this period were surrounded by a penumbra of those who had absconded and were sometimes left behind.

To return to Spain, however, the existence of deserters is mentioned on at least three occasions. Firstly, in 206, having cornered a Celtiberian and Spanish force under the command of Hanno, the Roman commander Marcius demanded first that Hanno and the deserters be handed over, which was done.\(^{104}\) Much later, in 137 during the Viriathan War, Sextus Junius Brutus demanded the deserters, prisoners and arms present in the town of Talabriga as a condition of its surrender.\(^{105}\) Finally, in 140, when

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\(^{102}\) Knapp (1977), p.146 notes their presence, but considers that their numbers were small. While the numbers of deserters cannot easily be estimated, the fact that they are mentioned in the sources attests to their significance. It is instructive that, in Livy’s account of the siege of Syracuse (214-212), deserters play a major role in defending the city, which hardly suggests their insignificance.

\(^{103}\) Livy, XXXV.2.8-9. *Ualerius Antias et in Sicilium nauigasse dilectus causa C. Flaminium scribit et, ex Sicilia Hispaniam petentem, tempestate in Africam delatum uagos milites de exercitu P. Africani sacramento rogasse; his duarum prouinciarum dilectibus tertium in Hispania adieciisse.*

\(^{104}\) App., *Hisp.* VI.31. ò δ’έκελευν αὐτούς Ἀμβολακαὶ τοὺς αὐτοῦ μόλους ἐκδόντας ὑπὲρ ... καὶ τοὺς αὐτομολους παρέδοσαν.

\(^{105}\) App., *Hisp.* XII.73. πρώτα μὲν τοὺς αὐτομολους Ῥωμαίων ἦτε καὶ τὰ αἰχμαλώτα, καὶ ὅπλα ὁσα εἶχον
the population of Numantia offered its unconditional surrender to Quintus Pompeius Aulus, he first demanded from them hostages, prisoners and deserters, all of which were handed over. While the demand that deserters be produced by a surrendered enemy may have been standard, the variability in the demands that could be made suggests that the demand was not merely *pro forma*. The officers in command regarded seizing deserters as a priority, and this priority would not have existed in the absence of a significant number of deserters. In any case, these deserters represent only those who had gone over to an enemy of Rome, and it may be assumed that others would have sought to avoid fighting their former comrades.

To return to the city of Carteia, which prompted the foregoing digression, the persons who settled there in 171, as the descendants of Roman soldiers and Iberian women, had no legal status in Rome, and no claim other than a moral one to merit the attention of the Senate. Regardless of their formal status, however, the decision of the Senate suggests that a moral obligation was felt to these people. Of course, one could also view the decision as an exercise in improving the Roman position in the region, by establishing a colony whose population recognised that they possessed a strong connection with Italy. No doubt, political considerations did play a role, but these would still have relied on the notion that this *novum genus* had a special relationship, based on descent, with Rome.

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106 [App., *Hisp.* XII.79. ὀμηρὰ τε καὶ σημαλωτα ἔτησε καὶ τῶις αὐτομόλους, καὶ πάντα ἔλαβεν.]
107 One may question what 'significant' means in this context. A very small number would hardly be worth emphasising, even if their punishment would have been as an aid to discipline. Conversely there is no suggestion that deserters were serving in large numbers in the forces fighting against Rome.
The next notable foundation in Spain was at Corduba, where a settlement was established by Marcus Claudius Marcellus, either during his praetorship in 169 or his third consulship in 152. While he does not specify a foundation date, Strabo indicates that Corduba was initially inhabited by a chosen group comprised of both Romans (with Italians presumably subsumed into this category) and individuals who inhabited the area. The only other mention of a connection between Marcellus and Corduba occurs in Polybius, who notes that he overwintered there at the end of 152. Unfortunately, there is no hint of the criteria according to which individuals, whether from Italy or otherwise, were chosen to settle in Corduba. While it is entirely possible that some portion of the founding population was comprised of veterans, there is no direct evidence for their presence.

Prior to considering the identity of the individuals who settled Corduba, some attention must be given to the status of the town at the time of the first settlement by Romans/Italians. After attributing the foundation of the town to Marcellus, and after describing the favourable locations of Corduba and Cadiz, Strabo then identifies Corduba as the first colony in the region. This has been deemed problematic, firstly because it was preceded by both Italica and Carteia, and secondly because Strabo’s usage of the term ἀποικία is open to interpretation. One possible explanation involves the assertion that Italica was not a colony, while Carteia was sufficiently

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109 Strabo, III.2.1. Μαρκέλλου κτίσμα ... ὄχισάν τε ἐξ ἀρχής Ρωμαίων τε καὶ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων ἄνδρες ἐπίλεκτοι... See also Brunt (1971), p. 215.
110 Polyb., XXXV.2.2 ...ἐν Κορδύβα τὴν παραχειμασίαν ἐποίητο.
distant as to be in a separate region. It is then claimed that Strabo’s description of Corduba as a colony corresponds with it being a Latin colony from its foundation.\footnote{Knapp (1983), p. 11. Jiménez (2011) follows a similar line of reasoning. Vell. Pat. 2.15 is, accordingly, interpreted as describing the absence of \textit{colonia civium Romanorum} outside Italy before 122.} Knapp notes that this hypothesis is not without problems, most obviously a lack of direct evidence, but also the fact that Corduba was host to a \textit{conventus civium Romanorum} during the civil wars. It would be an unparalleled situation for a Latin colony to contain a \textit{conventus}. An alternate explanation, however, is that Strabo employed the term \textit{οἶκος} not as a reflection of the town’s status on foundation, but in reference to its later designation as a \textit{colonia civium Romanorum} by Caesar or Augustus.\footnote{Richardson (1986), p. 119. The possibility is noted in Jiménez (2011).} Although Knapp asserts that the “manner of Strabo’s account” excludes this possibility, no justification for this reading is given. Indeed, the initial description of the settlement as \textit{Μαρκέλλου κτίσμα} implies an initially informal settlement, a status which could have been reflected in the lengthy gap until colonial status is mentioned.

As Carteia was established on the instructions of the senate, it can provide no precedent for the establishment of a Latin colony by an individual commander in this period. Even if the possibility that Corduba was a Latin colony from its foundation cannot be entirely excluded, the absence of a formal status is more probable.

While Corduba, and in particular the \textit{conventus} of Roman citizens resident there, would become quite prominent during the civil wars, Strabo emphasises both the agricultural potential of the area around the city, and its commercially advantageous position on the Baetis. In the years after foundation, however, only Corduba’s military role appears noteworthy. So, in 144 during the war against Viriathus, Fabius Maximus Aemilianus is said to have wintered in Corduba after a successful campaign,\footnote{App., \textit{Hisp.} XI.65. καὶ ἔχειμοζεν ἐν Κορδυβή...} while in...
the following year the general Quintius is said to have retired early into winter quarters at Corduba.\textsuperscript{116} The strategic importance of Corduba, combined with its settlement by some combination of Romans, Italians, and individuals already resident in the area, recalls several of the locations in Spain already discussed. It is not unreasonable to envision that it was, like them, established with time-served soldiers, selected according to their willingness to remain in Spain, along with indigenous Iberians who were regarded as trustworthy.\textsuperscript{117} Indeed, given the duration of Roman involvement by the time of Corduba’s foundation, it is likely that some of its first settlers could have possessed a dual, Italian and Iberian, ancestry.

It has been suggested that Corduba’s origins were connected with the presence of \textit{canabae}, associated with the soldiers stationed in the area of Corduba.\textsuperscript{118} The application of the term \textit{canabae} is potentially anachronistic, in so far as these informal settlements were established in proximity to relatively permanent military installations, which were more characteristic of the post-Augustan period.\textsuperscript{119} Corduba was clearly a strategic location, and served on multiple occasions as a suitable site for troops to overwinter, while the Spanish provinces overall contained a permanent garrison throughout this period,\textsuperscript{120} but this falls short of demonstrating the presence of such a garrison at Corduba. The military potential of the site may have been reason enough for Marcellus to establish a settlement, but it would no doubt have suited his purposes if time-served soldiers were willing to remain. One can only speculate how much the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{116} App., \textit{Hisp.} XI.66. \ldots Κοιντίου \ldots εν Κορδύβῃ χειμάζουσιν ἵκ μέσου μετοπώρου \ldots See n. 41 above on the identity of Quintius.
  \item \textsuperscript{117} Trustworthy and/or part of the pre-existing population. An indigenous town was located less than a kilometre SSW of republican Corduba, and remained inhabited until ca. 100 BC. See Jiménez (2011), p. 56.
  \item \textsuperscript{118} Jiménez (2011), p. 56.
  \item \textsuperscript{119} Keppie (1984), p. 191.
  \item \textsuperscript{120} Rich (1993), p. 46.
\end{itemize}
settlement at Corduba owed to the decision of the commander, and how much it owed to the cooperation of the settlers.

Valentia

Valentia was established by Decimus Junius Brutus during his consulship in Spain in 138 and, at least according to the *Periochae* of Livy, the population was initially composed of individuals who had fought *sub Viriatho*.\(^{121}\) The reference therein to an *oppidum* has led to the conclusion that it lacked formal status at the time of its foundation,\(^{122}\) though it has also been suggested that, like Corduba, it was initially a Latin colony.\(^{123}\) The latter claim is based on the non-indigenous name of the town, as well as material evidence of a connection with Italy in the form of imported goods, architectural styles, and funerary rites. While such evidence might point to the presence of a sizeable Italian population, it is merely an assumption that this must correspond with a particular legal status. Although it was devastated during the war against Sertorius,\(^{124}\) Valentia may have been able to describe itself as a colony by 60. Evidence for this is limited, and rests on an inscription from Cupra Maritima, Italy,\(^{125}\) which could refer either to Spanish Valentia, or to an identically named colony in the Rhone valley.\(^{126}\)

In certain respects, Valentia was an unusual foundation. Unlike earlier Roman establishments in Spain, there is no evidence for the prior existence of an indigenous

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\(^{121}\) Livy, *Per. 55*. *Iunius Brutus consul in Hispania iis, qui sub Viriatho militaverant, agros et oppidum dedit, quod vocatum est Valentia.*


\(^{124}\) Sall. *Hist.*, II.98.6. *... dux hostium C. Herennius cum urbe Valentia et exercitu deleti satis clara vobis sunt;*

\(^{125}\) ILLRP 385. *L. Afr(a)ni(o) A. f. | co(n)s(uli) | consc[ri]ptio(nis) et c[ol(oni)ae] Vale[n(orum)]*

community in that location. Furthermore, based on the relative proportions of pottery types, it has been possible to correlate material evidence with the foundation date of the town. As elsewhere in Spain, however, there is no evidence for the erection of permanent structures until the late 2nd century. In part, this may have been a common feature of Roman foundations in Spain during the 2nd century, as Keay has noted a shortage of identifiably Roman buildings throughout Spain during the Republic, and this corresponds in turn with the earlier comments of Ward-Perkins on the lack of such archaeological evidence throughout the republican provinces.

The prominence of the Italian component of Valentia must be reconciled with the statement from Livy that those who initially settled there had campaigned sub Viriatho. The town occupied a strategic position at the mouth of the River Turia, approximately half-way between the important centres of Tarraco and Carthago Nova. Given the improbability of Brutus settling soldiers who had fought for Viriathus in such a location, it has been suggested that Livy’s description is mistaken. Wiegels and Knapp take this line of reasoning further, and speculate that Livy’s epitomator conflated the foundation of Valentia, and that of Brutobriga. Attested to on coinage and by Stephanus, the precise location of Brutobriga is unknown, although it was located somewhere within the conventus Scallabitanus in what is today central Portugal. As Wiegels notes, the name of the town recalls Gracchuris in combining the name of its

128 Ribera (2006), p. 79. Ribera’s conclusion is based on a 75% predominance of Campanian A, over Campanian B Etruscan and Calene types. 
135 Barrington Atlas. Ancient Scallabis corresponds with modern Santarem, approximately 70 km. NE of Lisbon.
founder with an indigenous suffix, and this founder is almost certainly identical with the founder of Valentia since no other Brutus is known to have served in Spain.\textsuperscript{136}

While the most extensive body of evidence relevant to settlement by former soldiers relates to Spain, it is also necessary to examine other regions of the western Mediterranean, commencing with the Mediterranean Islands (the Balearics, Sicily, Corsica and Sardinia), and continuing with Gaul and Africa. As will be seen, the evidence for these areas is limited in comparison with that for Spain, which may be attributable in part to the relatively greater scale and duration of military involvement in Iberia. Despite these regional differences, however, similar patterns of behaviour by both individual soldiers and their commanders can be discerned.

\textbf{1.4 – The Mediterranean Islands}

\textit{Pollentia & Palma}

The Balearic Islands were attacked in 123 by a Roman fleet under the consul Q. Caecilius Metellus, on the grounds that the inhabitants had engaged in piracy.\textsuperscript{137} After his victory, the consul is said to have brought three thousand Roman settlers from Iberia to the islands,\textsuperscript{138} an event which is usually combined with the description of the two towns of Palma and Pollentia as \textit{oppida civium Romanorum} by Pliny\textsuperscript{139} to reach the conclusion that he founded them. Indeed, Strabo notes that Metellus founded towns in

\textsuperscript{137} Strabo, III.5.1. \textit{kakouργων δὲ τῖνων ολίγων κοινωνίας συστηραμένων πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πελάγεσι ληστάς ... καὶ διέβη Μέτελλος ἐπὶ αὐτοὺς ὁ Βαλιάρικος προσαγορευθεῖς ...} See also Livy, \textit{Per.} LX.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid. εἰσήγαγε δὲ ἐποίκους τρισχίλιοι τῶν ἐκ τῆς Ἰβηρίας Ὀλυμπαίων.
\textsuperscript{139} Pliny, \textit{NH} 3.77. \textit{oppida habet civium Romanorum Palmam et Pollentium...}
the Balearics, but this falls short of conclusively demonstrating that he was responsible for the foundation of Palma and Pollentia. As well as this difficulty, there is a lack of archaeological evidence for construction on the sites of Palma and Pollentia prior to 70, leading to the suggestion that there was a complete absence of urban development, and only a military occupation. Conversely, however, a dearth of evidence for the early years of Roman settlements in Spain is not unusual, and there remains the matter of the 3000 individuals whom Metellus brought from Iberia.

Because the migration of these 3000 settlers is one of the few instances in which overseas settlement in this period can be quantified, and because they are an indirect indication of the overall population of Romans, Italians, and their descendants in Spain, it has attracted interest on demographic grounds. Accordingly, Wilson sees this group as an indicator of a much higher population of Italian origin in Spain, whereas Brunt chooses to emphasise that the size of these communities, and others like them, was not substantial. These views can be reconciled. Brunt is surely correct to see a population of 3000 as small (at least relative to the manpower of Italy), but is this figure likely to have reflected a correspondingly small pool of potential migrants in Iberia? As early as 171, there was a group of 4000 descendants of Roman and Italian soldiers willing to petition the senate for land. In subsequent decades Rome maintained a permanent military presence in Spain, as a consequence of which settlements composed at least in part of former soldiers were founded. No doubt there were also soldiers who, for various reasons, chose to remain in Spain, but did not participate in these settlements. In short, the 3000 who migrated to Majorca could have been...

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141 While Strabo refers only to Romans, it is likely that he is not being precise, and that a more diverse founding population was drawn from Iberia.
representative of a much larger population of Italian origin or extraction that had been
growing for nearly a century.

Sicily

On those occasions when Roman forces were active in Sicily, there is evidence
for desertion from the armies, as was the case in Spain. Thus, in Livy’s account of the
Roman siege of Syracuse, there are repeated references to the presence of deserters in
significant numbers. For example, at the outbreak of hostilities between Rome and
Syracuse in 214, a mixed group of 4000 deserters and mercenary auxiliaries were sent
to Leontini, 144 which then participated in raids on Roman-held territory. Furthermore,
upon the fall of Leontini later in the same year, 2000 of these deserters are said to have
been flogged and beheaded by troops under Marcellus. 145 Despite these losses, two
years later during the latter stages of the siege of Syracuse itself when the suburban
Epipolae had been taken, a sufficient number of deserters remained to take
responsibility for the defence of the Achradina district of the city. 146 Where did these
deserters originate? When Livy initially mentions them, he indicates that most of them
were from among the socii navales, 147 which consequently leads to the assumption that
some were Sicilian. 148 As Rome’s other naval allies were based in Italy, those deserters
who were not Sicilian must necessarily have been of Italian origin. Furthermore, it is

144 Livy, XXIV.23.10. Hippocrates praetor ducere eo transfugas iussus; securi multi ex mercennariis
auxiliis quattuor milia armatorum effecerunt.
145 Livy, XXIV.30.6. uerberati ac securi percussi transfugae ad duo milia hominum...
146 Livy, XXV.25.1. teneabant Achradinae portas murosque maxume transfugae...
147 Livy, XXIV.23.10. transfugas, quorum maxima pars ex navalibus sociis Romanorum erat...
possible that Livy or his sources would have emphasised desertion by certain groups and discounted the involvement of ostensibly more reliable troops.

While harsh penalties were meted out to deserters who joined the enemy, it is also clear that other troops who had served in Sicily remained there after the end of the Second Punic War, after their military service ended in less fatal circumstances. Thus in 193, Gaius Flamininus recruited soldiers for service in Spain from both Sicily and Africa. While the origin of those recruited in Sicily is not explicitly stated, those recruited in Africa are specifically said to have been drawn from soldiers of the army of Scipio Africanus. Even if Flamininus was willing to accept Sicilian recruits, it is apparent that he sought experienced soldiers of Italian origin.

Although there is evidence for soldiers remaining in Sicily, it also appears that only limited numbers of Romans and Italians actually served there, and the scale of any garrison on the island is open to debate. In 225, Polybius mentions the presence of at least one στρατόπεδον on the island when he enumerates the manpower available to Rome before the Second Punic War. As this appears to be the term he regularly uses to describe a legion, this force was likely comprised of Romans. Thereafter, in 200, a force of 5,000 Latin and Italian troops was transferred from Cisalpine Gaul to Sicily to act as a garrison there, while two years later, 4,000 infantry and 300 cavalry were sent to relieve those who had completed their service. As Prag notes, however, evidence for the retention of a significant Roman and/or Italian garrison in Sicily after ca. 190 is

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149 Livy, XXXV.2.8-9. Ulterior Antias et in Siciliam naviagasse dilectus causa C. Flaminiun scribit et, ex Sicilia Hispaniam petente, tempestate in Africam delatum uagos milites de exercitu P. Africani sacramento rogasse; his duarum prouinciarum dilectibus tertium in Hispania adiecisse.

150 Polybius, 2.24.13. έτι γε μην τακ Σικελία και Ταραντι στρατόπεδα δώο παρεβίοντεν...

151 Livy, XXXI.8.8-9. Q. Fulvius Gillo ipse... quinque milia socium ac nominis Latini effecisset: id praesidii Siciliea provinciae esset.

152 Livy, XXXII.8.6. Dilectus inde haberi est coeptus... Marcello in Siciliam quattuor milli peditum socium et Latini nominis et trecentos equites...
limited. On the outbreak of the First Slave War, the general L. Hypsaeus was defeated while in command of 8,000 Sicilians, and when P. Rupilius defeated the uprising in 132, he did so with a few “picked troops” of unstated origin. In the early stages of the Second Slave War, 600 men of the garrison of Enna/Henna were sent under the command of M. Titinius to attack the slaves, only to be defeated. This is the only instance cited by Prag for the presence of a Roman garrison in Sicily between the early second century and the Civil Wars, though even in this case, Diodorus does not explicitly indicate that the garrison was comprised of Romans. Thereafter, it is said that the Romans undertook the war with a combination of Italian and Sicilian, or Roman and Italian troops, totalling 14,000 in the latter instance. In the case of the Italian troops at least, it is possible that some portion of them was already resident in Sicily before their recruitment.

As Prag concedes, one of the difficulties involved in assessing the scale and composition of the military forces on Sicily in this period is the loss of the text of Livy, and the alternative possibility of a permanent garrison has been supported. Serrati, for example, discusses the nature of this garrison during the late third century, suggesting that in that period the garrison was billeted in the cities and towns of

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154 Diodorus, XXXIV.2.18. Λευκίων Ψαίων, ἔχοντι στρατιώτας ἐκ Σικελίας ὀκτακισχιλίους...
155 Diodorus, XXXIV.2.23. ἐντεύθεν Ρουπίλος ἐπιτρέχων ὁλην τὴν Σικελίαν ἁμα λογασιν ὀλγοῖς...
156 Diodorus, XXXVI.4.3. ὁ στρατηγὸς ἤγεμόνα προεχείρισατο Μάρκων Τιτίνιον, δοὺς αὐτῶ στρατιώτας τοὺς ἐκ Εὐνῆς φρούρους ἱδακοσίους.
158 Diodorus, XXXVI.4.6. ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς ... ἔχων μεθ᾽ ἐαυτοῦ Ἰταλιώτας τε καὶ ἐκ Σικελίας σχεδὸν στρατιώτας μυρίους...
159 Diodorus, XXXVI.8.1. Λευκίων Λικίνιων Λούκουλλον, ἔχοντα στρατιώτας μυρίους μὲν καὶ τετρακισχιλίους Ῥωμαίοις καὶ Ἰταλοῖς...
Sicily. As he acknowledges, however, there is a dearth of archaeological evidence supporting the presence of such garrisons, even in a period when literary evidence indicates them to have been present. Serrati is keen to interpret the evidence to support the presence of this garrison, to the point that he claims troops transferred from Sicily to Italy in 217 were drawn from it. Polybius 3.75 makes clear, however, that forces had been sent from Italy to Sicily earlier that year, rendering this claim dubious. Nonetheless, it is entirely possible that a relatively limited number of soldiers from Italy could have been in Sicily, while leaving little evidence of their presence.

The limited evidence available for Sicily suggests that, when Roman and Italian soldiers were present, they behaved much like those who served in Spain, however their numbers were relatively limited. The probable lack of a large number of soldiers on a permanent basis would help to explain the absence of settlements associated with former soldiers, but proximity to Italy, and the interest of the Roman elite in the exploitation of Sicilian agriculture are also possible explanations. In short, the model for Roman imperialism in Sicily may not correspond neatly with that for Spain.

Sardinia and Corsica

As large islands proximal to Italy, which were occupied by Rome in the aftermath of the First Punic War, Corsica and Sardinia can be compared profitably with Sicily. Relative to Sicily, these islands were the scene of significantly more military activity during the second century. Perhaps corresponding with this is evidence, though

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163 Serrati (2000), p. 130. The archaeological evidence cited by Serrati for the presence of a Roman garrison consists of a single denarius, found in the destruction layer of a former Carthaginian camp at Monte Adranone.
usually slight, for the establishment of settlements comprised predominantly of Romans and Italians. While there was clearly a population of Italian origin in Sicily, there is no evidence for their organization into independent communities, as opposed to *conventus* in existing towns.

The scale of Rome’s military endeavours in Sardinia and Corsica is indicated well by the number of campaigns undertaken there. From the seizure of Sardinia in 237 to 100, at least 26 annual campaigns are known to have been fought there. These can be divided into six distinct campaigns against indigenous peoples, including an initial one from 236-225 in order to establish Roman control of the island. This is in addition to a somewhat limited degree of activity there during the Second Punic War, accounting for two of the 26 campaigns. A number of these operations were undertaken by consuls, including those related to the initial takeover of the island from 236-231 and in 226/5, as well as the later campaigns of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus (177, 176, 162), L. Aurelius Orestes (126-122), and M. Caecilius Metellus (115-111). The presence of a consul necessarily entailed the deployment of relatively large forces: in 177 Ti. Sempronius Gracchus was authorised to raise 10,400 Roman infantry with 600 cavalry, and 12,000 allied infantry with 600 cavalry. By comparison, when M. Pinarius Rusca was sent to deal with revolts in Sardinia and Corsica four years earlier as praetor, he was allotted only 8,000 allied infantry with 300 cavalry. Furthermore, eight triumphs are known to have been awarded for victories in Sardinia and Corsica during this period.

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166 *Livy, XLI.9.2. in Sardiniam duae legiones scribi iussae, quina milia in singulas et duceni pedites, trecenti equites, et duodecim milia peditum sociorum ac Latini nominis et sescenti equites...*
167 *Livy, XL.19. cum propter defectionem Corsorum bellumque ab Iliaensibus concitatum in Sardinia octo milia peditum ex sociis Latinis nominis placuisset scribe et trecentos equites, quos M. Pinarius praetor secum in Sardiniam traiceret...*
168 These were awarded, *DE SARDEIS*, to T. Manlius Torquatus (234), Sp. Carvilius Maximus (233), and M’ Pomponius Matho (232); *DE CORSEIS*, to C. Papirius Maso (230); *EX SARDINIA* to Ti. Sempronius...
Despite the number of campaigns undertaken in Sardinia and Corsica, outside those periods it is not clear that the islands were garrisoned by anything other than allied troops, or perhaps even by local levies.\textsuperscript{169} A similar shift in the composition of the Sicilian garrison from the 190’s has been commented upon by Prag, and brought into connection with an attempt to employ allied troops alone in Spain in 197, though the latter decision was quickly reversed.\textsuperscript{170} A certain lack of priority accorded to this command under normal circumstances may also be indicated by the tendency for the praetor who would normally be assigned to Sardinia to be given alternate tasks, usually in Italy, that required the attention of one holding \textit{imperium}.\textsuperscript{171} Nonetheless, given the greater number of campaigns fought in Sardinia and Corsica relative to Sicily, one might expect more evidence for the settlement of soldiers there, although the scale of settlement would also have been a function of the duration of campaigns, and the perceived amenability of the island to settlement.

Direct evidence for the settlement of former soldiers is limited, and it has been suggested, based on a comment by Strabo, that despite the fertility of the place, soldiers were dissuaded from settling in Sardinia by the unhealthy quality of the island in the summer.\textsuperscript{172} While Strabo’s comment is indicative of a general attitude toward Sardinia, it need not have reflected the attitude of individual soldiers who had served there. That there was a need for soldiers who had served in Sardinia (as well as Spain and Sicily) to

\textsuperscript{169} Rich (1993) p. 54 n. 4.
\textsuperscript{170} Prag (2007), p. 74.
\textsuperscript{171} Brennan (2000), p. 149, 151. This pattern can be discerned prior to 166, where the text of Livy is extant, as well as from the 120s.
\textsuperscript{172} Brunt (1971), p. 219, based on Strabo, V.2.7: \textit{τὴ δ’ ὀρετῇ τῶν τόπων ἀντιτάττεται τις καὶ μοχθηρία νοσερά γὰρ ἡ νῆσος τοῦ θέρους…}
be allocated land is clear, at least in 199. Furthermore, it is also clear from an
inscription found at Falerii Novi that individuals of Italian origin were present in
Sardinia during the second century, though they need not have been soldiers.

One location that may have involved the settlement of soldiers is at Valentia
(modern Nuragus). This town probably dated to the latter half of the second century, in
which period other settlements bearing the same name were founded in Spain,
Narbonese Gaul, and northern Italy. Located in south-central Sardinia, Valentia lay
on a route from Carales to Olbia, via the interior of the island, and was thus in a
strategic location, particularly given that Roman campaigns were usually directed
against the inhabitants of the more mountainous northern and eastern regions. The
town was sufficiently significant that Pliny later recorded its inhabitants among the best
known on the island. Other settlements, at Aquae Hypsitanæ (later Forum Traiani)
and Uselis, both of which lay in the interior of Sardinia on a route from the west coast to
Olbia, were founded in this period, and may have served a similar purpose to
Valentia. Although there is no evidence for a Sardinian analogue to Gracchuris,
despite the two separate campaigns of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus on the island, the
establishment of settlements in strategic locations is similar to the pattern observed in
Spain.

Two somewhat later settlements in Corsica must also be mentioned, the first of
which was undertaken by C. Marius at Mariana, and the second by Sulla at Aleria. Both

173 Livy, XXXII.1.6. ut militibus, qui in Hispania, Sicilia, Sardinia stipendia per multos annos fecissent, agrum adsignandum curare...
174 CIL I 364. Falesce qui in Sardinia sunt...
176 van Dommelen (1998), p. 174. On campaigns against peoples of the interior of Sardinia, see e.g. Livy XLI.6.5-7
177 Pliny, NH III.82, celeberrimi in ea populorum... Valentini...
178 Ibid; Rowlands (2001), p. 122. van Dommelen notes that the origins of Uselis were Punic, though this hardly precludes the subsequent establishment of settlers there.
of these are described by Pliny as *coloniae*,\(^{179}\) and it is likely that they received veterans of the armies of their respective founders.\(^{180}\) These settlements are of a different type than those previously discussed, partly because they appear to have followed the precedents of Junonia and Narbo Martius as formal colonies established outside Italy. That is to say, they were formal in the sense that they were probably founded with the consent of authorities in Rome, rather than on an *ad hoc* basis by an individual commander. In the case of Mariana, it was likely founded in association with Saturninus’ legislation of 100, whereas the settlement of veterans in the existing town of Aleria had the approval of Sulla as dictator. Of course, under such political circumstances one might argue that these colonies were founded purely at the prerogative of Marius and Sulla. It may be best to understand these as settlements of a transitional type, incorporating a tradition of generals outside Italy looking after the interests of their soldiers, with the earlier tradition of the establishment of colonies by authorisation of the senate.

*Comparing the Islands*

It would be useful at this point to contrast patterns of settlement in the Mediterranean islands. As the Balearics were settled significantly later, and the settlements there are intimately connected with Roman activity in Spain, this discussion will concentrate on Sardinia and Sicily. For both islands, the available evidence provides only sporadic indications of the presence of soldier settlers. When campaigns occurred, it appears that soldiers in those areas behaved much as in Spain, with

\(^{179}\) Pliny, *NH* III.80, *...colonias Marianam a C. Mario deductam, Aleriam a dictator Sulla.*

instances of desertion and of individual soldiers remaining in province. While there is some evidence for generals founding communities containing soldiers in Sardinia, and while Marius and Sulla were involved in foundations in Corsica, there is no evidence for an equivalent pattern in Sicily.

One can speculate on the causes of this difference. As is clear from Cicero’s *Verrines*, there was a significant Roman presence on the island by the 1st century, and this was heavily involved in the economic life of the island as traders, businessmen, and holders of public contracts. While these may have been connected with military settlement in previous generations, this is purely speculative, and it appears that the scale of such settlement was relatively small. While a low level of military activity there might contribute to this situation, the different political and economic circumstances of the island are also relevant. In Sicily, Rome encountered a long standing urban culture, involving both Punic and Greek elements. Most notable among the Greek cities was Syracuse which, under the rule of Hieron II from 270 to 215, had developed an effective means of exploiting the agricultural surplus of its territory. When Syracuse fell in 212, Rome was perfectly content to adopt the same methods of administration, extracting grain tithes under the so-called *lex Hieronica*.

In comparison with Sicily, Sardinia was more akin to a frontier province. 181 Although there were some Punic towns in the coastal plains, particularly in the southwest, much of the island was mountainous, and it was against the inhabitants of those regions that Roman campaigns were repeatedly directed. Regions of agricultural potential appear to have been exploited while leaving the pre-existing social structures

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181 Dyson (1985), for example, does not treat Sicily as a frontier province, but does deal with Gaul, Spain, and Sardinia and Corsica.
intact, in the same manner as in Sicily.\footnote{182} Nonetheless, as was the case for some Spanish foundations, new settlements were founded in the interior, and these seem to have been placed strategically. Partly as a result of greater military activity, and partly as a result of the usefulness of settling key locations, military settlement appears to have played a somewhat more obvious role in Sardinia than in Sicily.

\section*{1.5 \textit{Africa}}

Rome’s direct involvement in Africa (apart from the presence of armies there during the Punic Wars) began later than in the regions thus far discussed. Prior to the defeat of Carthage and the annexation of a portion of its territory in 146,\footnote{183} one might expect a correspondingly more limited body of evidence for military settlement there. Even in the aftermath of the Second Punic War, however, it is clear that some soldiers of Scipio Africanus’ army remained in Africa. In 193, nearly a decade after the war concluded, enough men remained ‘wandering’ there for Gaius Flaminius to recruit soldiers for service in Spain.\footnote{184} While this could refer to African allies of Scipio, the use of the term \textit{milites}, and reference to the administration of a formal oath, suggest they were indeed of Italian origin. One might easily imagine that a similar situation prevailed after the destruction of Carthage,\footnote{185} though there this cannot be verified. The best evidence for the activity of military settlers in Africa pertains to the Jugurthine War and to the subsequent foundation of settlements there in connection with Marius.

\footnote{182}{van Dommelen (1998), p. 174-175.}
\footnote{183}{Lintott (1994), p. 27.}
\footnote{184}{Livy, XXXV.2.8-9. \textit{Ualerius Antias et in Sicilium nauigasse diletus causa C. Flaminium scribit et, ex Sicilia Hispaniam petentem, tempestate in Africam delatum uagos milites de exercitu P. Africani sacramento rogasse; his duarum prouïnciarum diletibus tertium in Hispania adieciisse.}}
\footnote{185}{Lintott (1994), p. 27.}
Desertion from the Roman armies is prominent in Sallust’s description of the Jugurthine War, to the extent that he seems unusually willing to acknowledge the existence of the phenomenon. To some extent, this may reflect an idiosyncrasy of Sallust, given his preoccupation with the general corruption and decline of Rome.\textsuperscript{186} There is a concentration on Jugurtha’s bribery of members of Rome’s political elite, the success of which precluded Roman success in the early years of the war.\textsuperscript{187} Claims of bribery were not, however, limited to that elite, as we are told that Jugurtha sought to suborn centurions and junior officers while Aulus Postumus Albinus was in command in 109.\textsuperscript{188} Deserters are mentioned on a number of later occasions, as when all deserters were demanded, and most handed over, by Jugurtha while negotiating his submission to Metellus.\textsuperscript{189} Both sides in the war used deserters in order to gather intelligence,\textsuperscript{190} which perhaps contributes to the parity Levene notes in Sallust’s portrayal of Jugurtha and his opponents: both sides have been corrupted.\textsuperscript{191} Jugurtha, however, gave these men another significant military role, using them as garrisons of towns\textsuperscript{192} and other strongholds.\textsuperscript{193} In fact, the deserters so feared capture that, when the town of Zama fell, they preferred to commit suicide.\textsuperscript{194} Clearly, it suits Sallust’s purposes to focus on the

\textsuperscript{186} Levene (1992), p. 53.
\textsuperscript{187} Ibid, p. 60.
\textsuperscript{188} Sall., Iug. XXXVIII.3. centuriones ducesque turmarum partim uti transfugerent corrumpere...
\textsuperscript{189} Sall., Iug. LXII.6. iubet omnis perfugas vincitos adduci. Eorum magna pars uti iussum erat adduci, pauci, cum primum deditio coepit, ad regem Bocchum in Mauretaniam abierant. App. Num. III, and Dio XXVI.89.1, add that the deserters were killed, the former emphasising the brutality with which this was done. Orosius, V.15.7, claims that they numbered 3,000, though as Paul (1984), p. 164, notes, the figure is dubious.
\textsuperscript{190} Sall., Iug. LIV.2. [Metellus] tamen interim transfugas et alios opportunos, Jugurtha ubi gentiwm aut quid agitaret, cum paucis esse at exercitum haberet, ut sese victus geret exploratum misit. LVI.2 At ille [Jugurtha] quae parabantur a perfugis edoctus....
\textsuperscript{191} Levene (1992), p. 64. Levene notes that Jugurtha, and the generals opposing him, all appear virtuous initially, but are corrupted over time and through their political activities.
\textsuperscript{192} Sall., Iug. LIV.2. oppidanos horiturum moenia defendant, additis auxilio perfugis...
\textsuperscript{193} Sall., Iug. III.1. turrim regiam, quo Jugurtha perfugas omnis praesidium imposuerat.
\textsuperscript{194} Sall., Iug. LXXVI.6. ibi vino et epulis onerati illaque et domum et semet igni corrumpunt...
role of desertion, but it is equally apparent that desertion was a feature of the Jugurthine War.

In order to act as spies, desertion must have been reasonably common, and to serve as garrisons, a significant number of deserters must have been present. Given the indiscipline which Roman forces seem to have experienced, at least in the early stages of the war, some soldiers would be expected to abscond, to the enemy or otherwise. Admittedly, claims of indiscipline are likely to be somewhat conventional, and Sallust shows a particular interest in it, as well as in bribery and corruption. Although this might lead to some exaggeration of the scale of desertion, it remains apparent that it was a problem, and thus that the Jugurthine War likely left a considerable group of former soldiers in Africa.

Within five years of the conclusion of the Jugurthine War under Marius’ command, he was involved in at least some settlement projects in Africa. The late 4th century source, *de Viris Illustribus*, indicates that Saturninus, as tribune, arranged for grants of 100 *iugera* to be made to veterans of Marius. The date of the source might lead to doubts as to the veracity of such a project, however, additional support for settlement in Africa at this time comes from a damaged inscription, found in the Forum of Augustus, which indicates that Julius Caesar’s father was involved in the settlement of *coloni* on the islands of Cercina (modern Kerkennah, off the east coast of Tunisia).

Only a section of the line pertaining to Cercina survives, which reads OLONOS

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195 Sall., *Jug. XXXIX.5*, postquam eo [Albinus] venit ... cognitis militibus, quos praetor fugam solute imperio licentia atque lascivia corruperat, ex copia rerum statuit sibi nihil agitandum.
197 [Aur. Vict.] *De vir. ill.*, 73.1. Lucius Apuleius Saturninus, tribunus plebis seditiosus, ut gratiam Marianorum militum pararet, legem tulit, ut veteranis centena agris iugera in Africa diuidentur... Brunt (1971), p. 577, prefers 103 to 100 for the date of Saturninus’ measure. This seems plausible since similar proposals pertaining to other regions are dealt with separately, after the death of A. Nunnium in 101.
198 Inscr. Ital. XIII.3, no. 7. See also Broughton (1948), p. 324.
CERCE, and has accordingly been reconstructed as *colonos Cercinam / Cerceinam*.\(^{199}\)

Marius himself took refuge on the island in 87,\(^{200}\) perhaps precisely because of his relationship with the inhabitants, while Pliny would later describe Cercina as a free city.\(^ {201}\)

In addition to Cercina, three other mainland towns used to be regarded as Marian veteran colonies established in accordance with Saturninus’ legislation: Thibaris, Thuburnica, and Uchi Maius.\(^{202}\) In each case, the identification of the town as a Marian foundation was based on assertions to that effect found in inscriptions of a later period.\(^{203}\) Brunt argued that this hypothesis is problematic, given that all three of these towns lay beyond the borders of the province of Africa, as then defined by the *regia fossa*. Accordingly, objections have been raised over the improbability of the establishment of dedicated veteran colonies in Numidian territory, leading Brunt to suggest that their founding populations were indigenous Gaetulians.\(^ {204}\) If so, the inscriptions asserting a connection with Marius would simply represent a claim of antiquity in a later period.\(^ {205}\)

Accepting Brunt’s argument that these were probably not veteran colonies as such, it is interesting to note that he draws parallels between them and the foundation of Gracchuris. While he believed that to be a “native” town, as discussed above, given the stratigraphic nature of its location it is entirely possible that Italians were present among its

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\(^{199}\) The three reconstructions cited by Broughton (1948), p. 325, all append *deduxit*. Though entirely conjectural, neither Frank (1937), nor Broughton, nor Brunt (1971) comment upon it.

\(^{200}\) Plut., *Mar.* XL.7. εὐθὺς οὖν ὁλιγόδος ἐπιβαίνεις εἰς Κέρκιναν διεπέραν...

\(^{201}\) Pliny, *NH* V.41. *Cercina cum urbe eiusdem nominis libera...


Thuburnica: AE, 1951, 81, *C Mario C F / Cos VII Condit/ori coloniae


\(^{205}\) Ibid, p. 579.
founding population.\textsuperscript{206} With Thibaris and Uchi Maius located on the southern heights of the Bagradas valley, and Thuburnica at its western end, they were in a position to control a major east-west route inland, from Africa into Numidian territory. In support of an indigenous population in the towns, Brunt noted that a large number of Gaetulians deserted Scipio Metellus’ army for Caesar’s in 47/46, and are said to have explicitly referred to themselves as clients of Marius.\textsuperscript{207} Conversely, the absence of references to the descendants of Italians as clients of Marius is taken by Brunt as evidence of their absence. This argument from silence is necessarily weak, and in any case, former clients of Marius would have been unlikely to advertise this connection. Furthermore, it is clear that Caesar’s opponents, specifically Labienus, subsequently recruited people of (partly) Italian origin locally.\textsuperscript{208} In any case, a perceived obligation to Marius need not have been the main cause of the Gaetulians’ change of allegiance, even if this was how they justified the act. As Fentress describes, the period between the end of the Jugurthine War and the Civil Wars saw struggle between the Gaetulians and the Numidian kings, and their decision to join Caesar may have had much more to do with local politics.\textsuperscript{209} In short, even if these were not specifically veteran colonies, it is entirely possible that an Italian element was present at the foundation of these three towns.

\textsuperscript{206} See page 20.
\textsuperscript{207} Caes., B. Afr., XXXV. ‘saepenumero,’ inquiunt, ‘imperator, complures Gaetuli, qui sumus clientes C. Mari...’
\textsuperscript{208} Caes., B. Afr. XIX. Labienus ... ibique postea ex hibridis, libertinis servisque conscripserat, arma verat...
In comparison with the regions thus far discussed, the direct involvement of Roman armies in campaigns in Transalpine Gaul began relatively late. Although their forces had passed through the region *en route* to Spain at the start of the Second Punic War, and on several occasions thereafter, the first such engagement was not until 154.\(^{210}\) This, however, was directed against two Ligurian peoples, the Oxybii and Deciates, and marked the completion of Rome’s conquest of the Ligurian territory, as well as supporting Massiliote interests and guaranteeing a land route to that city.\(^{211}\) Rome’s next known military activity in the region was not until 125, against the Salluvii, and it is only from this point that signs of settlement can be discerned.

When the Salluvii were defeated in 123/2, the proconsul C. Sextius Calvinus sacked their central town of Entremont, and established the settlement of Aquae Sextiae (modern Aix) in their territory, approximately three kilometres to the south.\(^{212}\) While Strabo says that a garrison of Romans was placed there, Livy’s epitomator describes the settlement as a colony,\(^{213}\) though this cannot be a true reflection of the town’s status, as Pliny describes Aquae Sextiae as a Latin town.\(^{214}\) Furthermore, Velleius Paterculus, in the same passage in which he claims that Junonia was the first colony established outside Italy, alludes to the roughly contemporaneous foundation of Aquae Sextiae without indicating that they were of comparable status.\(^{215}\) Dyson notes the presence of both native and Roman pottery, dating to the period after the foundation of the

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\(^{211}\) Ibid, p. 148.

\(^{212}\) Strabo, IV.1.5. Σέξτιος γονύν ὁ καταλύσας τοὺς Σάλλυους, οὐ πολὺ ἀπώθεν τῆς Μασσαλίας κτίσας πολίν ὁμοιόμοιον ἐαυτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ιθάντων τῶν ἱππίων, ... ἐνταῦθα τε φρουραν κατέκτησε Ρωμαίων...

\(^{213}\) Livy, *Per. LXI. C. Sextius pro cos. victa Salluviorum gente coloniam Aquas Sextias condidit...*

\(^{214}\) Pliny, *NH III.36. oppida Latina Aquae Sextiae Salluviorum...*

\(^{215}\) Vell. Pat., I.15. *Sextio Calvino, qui Salluues apud aquas, quae ab eo Sextiae appellantur...*
settlement. While this is only tenuous evidence for the ethnic composition of the town’s population, ethnically blended settlements, established on the prerogative of a Roman general, and bearing his name, have certainly been encountered previously in this discussion, for example, at Gracchuris.

Aquae Sextiae may not have been the only town established under these circumstances. Though a very late source, Stephanus, citing Apollodorus of Athens, records the existence of a town called Fabia, named for Quintus Fabius Maximus, who as consul fought against the Allobroges in 121. Further details about this community, including its location, are not known. A third settlement which may have been founded in this period, and in connection with strategic concerns relating to the Allobroges, is Valentia (modern Valence). This town should immediately bring to mind the identically named communities in Spain and Sardina, both of which likely combined Italian and indigenous populations. While the foundation date of this Valentia is unknown, the name itself suggests a late second century date, and its identification as a colony by Pliny might hint that it was then a long established community. A dedication by *coloni et incolae* to the propraetor L. Nonius Asprenas has been found, though this can be dated only approximately to the early 40s BC. Dio may indicate that Valentia was the target of a Roman campaign in 61, which would point to a predominantly indigenous population at that time, but this identification relies on an emendation of the manuscript. Rivet supports this emendation, and further suggests

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219 Pliny, NH III.36. In mediterraneo coloniae ... in agro Cavarum Valentia...
221 Dio, XXXVII.47.2, καὶ Μάλλιος μὲν λευτίνος ἐπὶ Ὀυσαλεύτιναν πόλιν στρατεύσας... The manuscript reads Οὐσεντίαν.
that the name of Valentia represented a Latinisation of an earlier Gallic form,\(^{222}\) though this is hypothetical. Based on these two assertions, Rivet argues for a later date of foundation in 46, and this possibility cannot be discounted. Nonetheless, this only hints at an award of colonial status at that time, and says little about the population of Valentia prior to 61.

Finally, the foundation of Lugdunum Convenarum (modern Saint-Bertrand-de-Comminges) merits examination. The town is mentioned by both Pliny\(^{223}\) and Strabo\(^{224}\) though only the latter makes a parenthetic reference to the inhabitants as a rabble. Details of the actual foundation of the town appear only in late sources. Thus, Isidore of Seville records that the town was established by Pompey in the wake of the Sertorian War, ostensibly while he was hastening to Rome in order to celebrate a triumph.\(^{225}\) Isidore’s description is a direct quotation of Saint Jerome, who described the town in the context of his invective against Vigilantius, who was evidently from there.\(^{226}\) Accordingly, Jerome’s version also includes a number of pejorative details, twice describing the original inhabitants as bandits, and likening their behaviour to his subject’s. Given their context, one could reasonably doubt Jerome’s assertions about the banditry of the founding population of Lugdunum Convenarum, and perhaps Isidore excluded those claims for the same reason. Conversely, Strabo’s description of them as a rabble could have inspired Jerome’s aspersions. Esmonde Cleary suggests that the

\(^{223}\) Pliny, NH IV.108. *mox in oppidum contributi Convenae...*
\(^{224}\) Strabo, IV.2.1. *πρὸς μὲν τῇ Πυρηναίᾳ τῶν Καυκασίων, ὢ ἔστι συγκλύδων, ἐν ἡ πόλις Λούγδουνος...*
\(^{225}\) Isid., *Etym.* IX.2.108. *Quos Gnaeus Pompeius edomita Hispania et ad triumphum venire festinans de Pyrenaei iugis depositit et in unum oppidum congregavit. Unde et Convenarum urbs nomen accepit.*
\(^{226}\) Jer., *Contra Vigilantium 4. Nimirum respondet generi suo, it qui de latronum et Convenarum natus est semine (quos, etc.) hucusque latrocinetur contra Ecclesiam Dei...*
entire concept of the Convenae as bandits may have rested on a false etymology, which
assumed that the word necessarily referred to the gathering together of people.227

Whether Jerome can be relied upon for the identification of Pompey as the
founder of the town is not clear.228 Such a measure on his part did, however, have
general precedents in Gaul, in the shape of the towns discussed earlier, as well as a
precedent specific to Pompey. At the end of the war against Sertorius, Pompey
established a settlement named after himself on the other side of the Pyrenees, opposite
Lugdunum Convenarum, at Pompaelo (modern Pamplona).229 With regard to these
foundations, Pompey was behaving in much the same manner as earlier Roman generals
in Spain and Gaul. Pompey’s actions in the west would later be recalled by his own
foundation of Nicopolis in Armenia, which involved both soldiers and indigenous
elements, as well as his resettlement of pirates in various towns in the eastern
Mediterranean.230 Certainly, Lugdunum had strategic significance for communications
between Spain and Gaul, while the importance of this line of communication and supply
had been demonstrated during the Sertorian War.231 Given this location, Lugdunum
could have had a military role at the time of its foundation, in which case one might
expect an Italian element among the founding population. Furthermore, such an Italian
contingent could have included supporters of Sertorius who had originated in Italy, as
Plutarch records that at least one such individual remained in Spain.232

227 Esmonde Cleary (2008), p. 16.
228 Ibid., p. 17.
229 Strabo, III.4.10. τὸ τῶν Οὐσικών ἔθνος, ἐν ὧ πόλις Πομπέλων, ὡς ἀ Πομπειόπολις.
231 Esmonde Cleary (2008), p. 16.
232 Plut., Sert. XXVII.4. Ἀφίδρως ... οὗτος δὲ ἡ λαθών ἢ παραμεληθείς ἐν τινι βαρβάρῳ κόμην
πενῶμενος καὶ μισοῦμενος κατεγνάσεν.
1.7 – Conclusion

Throughout this foregoing discussion, several themes have been recurrent. Firstly, there is the rarity with which the available sources describe the settlement of soldiers. Then, there is the recurring role of individual generals in arranging and rearranging populations, indigenous and Italian. Related to the latter is a question of the sort of society that would have existed on frontiers populated by indigenous peoples, and those former soldiers who lived among them.

The paucity of references to settlement by former soldiers in the regions in which they had served could be a function of two phenomena. Either their numbers were very limited or, more likely, the sources available simply chose not to discuss these individuals, a problem compounded by the limited material available for the last half of the second century. This discussion of military settlers began by considering the demography of migration. While quantification of the scale of migration is not possible, it is nonetheless interesting to consider some possible numbers. When examining casualty figures for campaigns in the late republic, Rosenstein concluded that somewhere between 34 to 40% of soldiers who left Italy died overseas.\(^{233}\) Regardless of the accuracy of his assessment, the degree of error he allows is noteworthy: if only a few percent of soldiers chose to remain overseas, it is unlikely that their emigration could be distinguished, as far as the demography of Italy is concerned, from military mortality.

If the rate of this migration was substantially less than the casualty rate, which itself was rarely commented upon, then it comes as little surprise that it received

\(^{233}\) Rosenstein (2004), p. 137.
relatively little attention, unless in combination with some other phenomenon. Desertion and the need to maintain military discipline, for example, were clearly more worthy of comment, as is evident before the foundation of Italica, and during the Jugurthine War. Other unusual circumstances also attracted comment, for example, the foundation of Carteia after the offspring of Roman/Italian soldiers and indigenous women successfully petitioned the senate for a city. Otherwise, the presence of soldier-settlers could be indicated in the context of rearrangements of populations by individual generals, as in the several instances described of generals naming new foundations after themselves (e.g., Gracchuris, Aquae Sextiae).

For most of the second century, individual generals were establishing new communities, and the foundation of settlements containing some proportion of former soldiers existed in continuum with the reorganisation of indigenous peoples. This is closely connected with Richardson’s concept of peripheral imperialism, though his formulation is more concerned with the competence of generals to deal with local diplomacy and military affairs without reference to the senate. The independent authority of praetors and consuls clearly extended to the establishment of new towns. Prior to the foundation of Junonia in 122, the only extra-Italian foundation in which the senate had been involved was Carteia. Even there, the senate’s role was basically passive, reacting to a petition, and ordering the praetor there to administer the foundation of the town.

In this respect, Roman imperialism in the second century operated in *ad hoc* fashion, though perhaps this should not be surprising. One might expect that the actual behaviour of generals in their *provinciae* would be refracted when represented to and by

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individuals in Rome. As Thomas describes, individuals engaged directly in colonial projects can be “half here, half there, sometimes disloyal, sometimes ‘on the side’ of the people they patronize and dominate, and against the interests of some metropolitan office”\textsuperscript{235} The limited attention given in the sources to acts of settlement and resettlement by individual generals, and their freedom to undertake these projects, point to the same lack of concern for them among the elite in Rome.

Certainly by the Augustan period, the establishment of veteran colonies, and the assignment of formal statuses to particular communities, were central to Roman imperialism. If Roman culture of that later period was itself a product of imperialism, in the same way that Gosden describes British culture as a product of its imperial activity,\textsuperscript{236} then the second century should be expected to be a period of development. If generals in the second century were resettling both indigenous peoples, and a diaspora including soldiers who had served under them, it should come as no surprise that Pompey, Caesar, and Augustus did the same, though on a larger and more formalised scale, with their own soldiers.

Returning to the second century, one can ask what sort of a society those generals created on the margins of the republican empire. After the Carthaginians were expelled from Spain, the relationship between Rome and the indigenous Iberians can hardly be described as one of equality. Conversely, it cannot be said that the Romans were yet in a position to dictate to peoples throughout the peninsula, though the disparity in power grew over time. The arrangements made by Roman generals do not suggest a simple case of acculturation, but of mutual adaptation to a new and evolving dynamic. Former soldiers who settled and had children with indigenous women were, in

\textsuperscript{235} Thomas, (1994), p. 60.  
\textsuperscript{236} Gosden (2004), p. 130.
effect, the points of contact for this cultural relationship. At least in second century Spain, what developed was a middle ground, corresponding with White’s formulation of a cultural contact involving adaptation and accommodation, rather than acculturation or reliance entirely on force.²³⁷ White was describing a very different situation, involving the relationship between New France and the indigenous peoples of the upper Great Lakes during the 17\textsuperscript{th} and 18\textsuperscript{th} centuries, but the early years of Roman involvement in Spain are broadly comparable. Of course, there were variations in this system both geographically and chronologically. Roman power grew over time, and was inevitably more concentrated on the Mediterranean coast rather than the interior. Furthermore, there would have been a continuum of responses by the Iberians themselves. Some were willing to intermarry with Romans, and perhaps even sought to do so, while others took arms against them. Nonetheless, the individual solders who settled in Spain contributed to the development of a new society there. No doubt, something similar would have occurred in Sardinia, in Africa, and in Gaul, though with regional variations according to the timing of Roman intervention and the particulars of pre-existing societies.

However minimal the impact of these soldier-settlers was in terms of the demography of Italy, they played in important role in the cultural contact between Rome and the peoples of the western Mediterranean. The ways in which Roman imperialism developed during the late republic were influenced by their behaviour, and the independent undertakings of the generals who had commanded them. In short, they were an important component of the Italian diaspora.

Chapter Two – Non-Combatants & Military Suppliers

2.1 – Introduction

The presence of Roman armies in various regions of the western Mediterranean resulted in a population of former soldiers remaining in those areas. In addition to soldiers, a variety of non-combatants was associated with these armies, and was attached to them with varying degrees of formality. Their presence with the armies suggests that they, like former soldiers, would have been a component of the Italian diaspora in the provinces. Accordingly, the objective of this chapter will be to describe the various groups who accompanied the armies, ranging from the slaves and servants of soldiers and officers, to sutlers (small traders, selling supplementary goods to soldiers), and through to merchants involved directly and officially in the provisioning of the armies. For these purposes, individuals contractually involved in military supply will be considered in a separate section.

Any attempt to describe the groups accompanying the armies necessarily suffers from a shortage of evidence. Even military supply, the smooth operation of which was fundamental to the success of a campaign, is only mentioned incidentally by historiographers, as when it is necessary to explain the actions of an individual commander.¹ A similar situation prevails for those in the category of camp followers, whose status normally rendered them beneath notice, except on rare occasions, such as when they became involved in battle, or when assigned blame for indiscipline among the troops. The principal exception to this shortage of evidence, however, is Caesar,

¹ Erdkamp (1998), p. 4-5.
particularly in his *Gallic Wars*. The supply of grain is particularly prominent (the term *frumentum* appears on nineteen occasions) in this first-hand account, and it can be assumed that maintaining provisions was fundamentally important to any army. Conversely, however, Caesar’s concern for his troops’ food supply is an element of his self-representation as a careful commander, and one who possesses greater foresight than any other individual. Furthermore, it is possible that the supply situation in Gaul was somewhat exceptional, given that those campaigns were frequently distant from the Mediterranean littoral, or from rivers permitting easy communication with it. Consequently, it should not necessarily be assumed that the circumstances of Caesar’s troops were identical to those experienced by others during the period under consideration.

The restricted nature of the evidence imposes a difficulty in determining the numbers of individuals associated with the armies. Erdkamp, for example, suggests as a conservative estimate a 5:1 ratio between soldiers and non-combatants. This figure, however, includes only individuals who were involved with the army in some sort of official capacity, as muleteers or servants, rather than camp followers in the broadest sense. It appears, however, that overall numbers of camp followers could have varied widely. At one extreme, Livy claims that the armies campaigning in Liguria in 187 were entirely unaccompanied. At the other, his epitomator indicates that 40,000 non-

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2 Ibid, p. 6.
4 Similar challenges were probably encountered elsewhere, e.g., in Africa during the Jugurthine War, or during Rome’s various campaigns against the Celtiberians. Nevertheless, the supply situation must have been impacted by geography.
6 Livy, XXXIX.1. Itaque non lixa sequebatur, non iumentorum longus ordo agmen extendebat. Nihil praeter arma et viros omnem spem in armis habentes erat.
combatants were killed, in addition to 80,000 troops, at Arausio in 105. Both of these extremes must be treated as hyperbole, and unreliable in any absolute sense; Livy himself criticises Valerius Antias elsewhere for inflating the numbers he provides. Nonetheless they do give an indication of the range of proportions of camp followers to soldiers that might plausibly exist.

2.2 – Non-Combatants

Thus far, the phrase “camp followers” has been used as a general descriptor for the non-combatants who regularly accompanied Roman armies. This phrase encompasses a number of different terms, the use of which in the available sources suggests that they were applied to overlapping groups of people. Little attention has been given in the scholarship to the categories of individuals found in association with Roman armies, not least because the ancient sources themselves imply contradictory roles for them. The first modern scholar to give significant consideration to these categories of individuals was Jonathan Roth, but while he recognised that the conventional understanding of terms such as calones and lixae was problematic, he reached few conclusions about the distinction between these categories. The tendency of scholarship on the Roman army to give little or no attention to these groups was noted by Vishnia in 2002, and this pattern appears to have continued. The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare makes no mention of these categories of camp followers at all, and while the Blackwell Companion to the Roman Army refers to lixae

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7 Livy, Per. LXVII. ...militum milia octoginta occisa, calonum et lixarum quadrarginta secundum Antiatem apud Arausionem.
twice, in the first instance it describes them as sutlers,\(^{11}\) but in the second equates them with camp followers in general.\(^{12}\) Clearly, some confusion persists. Accordingly, each of these groups will be considered in turn, commencing with military slaves, and proceeding to *calones* and then *lixae*.

**Slaves of Soldiers**

The presence of slaves with the republican armies is occasionally acknowledged explicitly. So, for example, Caesar describes Vercingetorix presenting two Roman slaves, captured while foraging, to his troops, claiming them to be soldiers.\(^{13}\) The loss of slaves while engaged in foraging is also described in the following year, though the significance of such losses is minimised.\(^{14}\) The unintentional involvement of slaves in battle while collecting material for the army had also been seen at Aquae Sextiae in 102, when those collecting water were attacked.\(^{15}\) The normal roles of these slaves are also indicated in 47 when, prior to Zela, Caesar orders them to carry material for the construction of a rampart,\(^{16}\) a detail perhaps included because his opponent, Pharnaces, is subsequently said to have confused these men for soldiers. The normal duties of these slaves thus involved various forms of manual labour: foraging, responsibility for

\(^{11}\) p. 325.

\(^{12}\) p. 410.

\(^{13}\) Caes., *B. Gall.*, VII.20. *Producit servos, quos in pabulatione paucis ante diebus exceperat...*

\(^{14}\) Caes., *B. Gall.*, VIII.10. *...quaes, etsi mediocre detrimentum iumentorum ac servorum nostris adferebat...*

\(^{15}\) Plut., *Mar.*, XIX.1. *τῆς δὲ θεραπείας τὸ πλῆθος ὁυτ᾽ αὐτοὶ ποτὸν ὀυθ᾽ ὑποβυγίωσ᾽ ἔχουτες ἄβροι κατεβινον ἐπὶ τὸν ποταμὸν... τούτοις τὸ πρῶτον ὀλίγοι προεμάχωστο τῶν πολέμων...*

\(^{16}\) Caes., *B. Alex.*, 74. *huc omnem compartatum aggerem ex castris per servitia aggerem iussit...* The use of slaves as bearers is also indicated at Philippi, when *τοῖς παραστιζοσι θεραπουσι*, shield bearers, are included among Cassius’ casualties, though this falls slightly beyond the period in question.
draught animals (*iumentum*), and physically carrying goods. These details, however, appear only incidentally.

Not surprisingly, slaves may also be mentioned when involved in battle, without details of their customary activities. So, Appian describes how one of Pompey’s legions was defeated in Spain immediately after his arrival there in 76, a defeat which explicitly involved the soldiers’ servants also. On several occasions, slaves are mentioned in the narratives when a camp itself comes under attack. During the Third Mithridatic War, Lucullus’ legate, Fabius, is said to have freed the slaves in his camp, and to have managed to hold Mithridates off for a day as a result. Similarly, a foray from Thapsus by Caesar’s opponents is defeated when the slaves in his camp use stones and *pila* against them. Such efforts at defending a camp were not always successful, as when the capture of Pompey’s camp after Pharsalus was accompanied by the slaughter of its defenders and the servants. The involvement of slaves in battle is a sign of desperation, while references to their deaths in large numbers, whatever the actual number of casualties, serves to indicate the magnitude of a defeat. Thus (though slightly later than the period in question), when Velleius describes Antony’s unsuccessful campaign in Parthia in 36–35, the loss of one third of the *calones* and *servitia*, as well as most of the baggage, is explicitly noted and contrasted with the claim of victory. As well as being noteworthy for their presence in battle, their complete absence from an army could be worthy of attention. When Metellus took command of the army

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17 App., *B. Civ.*, I.109. ἀφικομένου δὲ ἦς Ἰβρίαν αὐτίκα ὁ Σερτώριος τέλος ὅλων, ἐπὶ χορτολογίαν ἔξιον, αὐτοῖς ὑποζυγίοις καὶ θεράπουσι συνέκοψε . . .
18 App., *Mith.*, XIII.88. ἐλευθερώσατος δὲ τοῦ Φαβίου θεράποντος ὡς ήσαν ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ, καὶ διὶ ὅλης ἡμέρας αὐθίς ἅγωνιζομένου . . .
19 Caes., *B. Afr.*, 85. qui a servitis puerosque qui in castris errant lapidibus pilisque prohibiti terram attingere . . .
20 Plut., *Pomp.*, LXXII.3. . . . καὶ φόνος ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ πολὺς ἐγένετο σκηνοφιλάκων καὶ θεράποντων . . .
21 Vell. Pat., II.82.3. . . . haud minus pars quarta, ut praediximus, militum, calonum servitiique desiderata tertia est; impedimentorum vis ulla superfluit.
in Numidia in 109, one of the measures he took to restore discipline in the army was to deny common soldiers the privilege of having either slaves or pack animals.\textsuperscript{22} In Metellus’ case, it is unclear if this measure remained in effect once the campaign against Jugurtha was resumed, but Caesar does seem to have campaigned under such conditions. On two occasions Caesar ordered his soldiers to leave their slaves and baggage behind, the first prior to bringing his forces across the Adriatic from Brundisium in 48,\textsuperscript{23} and the second prior to invading Africa from Sicily in 47/46.\textsuperscript{24} In both instances this can be seen as an indication of Caesar’s celerity, but what does it indicate about the role of said slaves? If they could be abandoned, their presence with the army was not, strictly speaking, critical. That said, the soldiers at Brundisium had to be convinced that it was necessary for them to travel without slaves, while in the case of the invasion of Africa it is explicitly noted that they were useful (\textit{usui}) to the soldiers. Indeed, this claim of utility is something of an understatement, occurring in the context of a description of the privations initially experienced by the army in Africa. Lacking adequate provisions and proper accommodation, the soldiers’ lack of slaves is likewise treated as the absence of something approaching a necessity.

\textit{Calones}

Closely related to, and perhaps identical with, the military slaves just discussed are the \textit{calones}. Speidel, for example, though dealing mainly with a later period, regards

\textsuperscript{22} Sall., \textit{Iug.} XLV.2. \textit{...ne miles gregarios in castris neve in agmine servum aut iumentum haberet...}
\textsuperscript{23} Caes., \textit{B. Civ.}, III.6. \textit{...milites ... aequo animo mancipia atque impedimenta in Italia relinquuerent...} See also App., \textit{B. Civ.}, II.8.53.
\textsuperscript{24} Caes., \textit{B. Afr.}, 47. \textit{...ex Sicilia exercitum transportabat ut praeter ipsum militem et arms nec vas nec mancipium neque ullam rem quae usui militia esse consuevit...}
them as entirely equivalent to servants, and implicitly not free.\(^{25}\) Roth demonstrates a similar view, concurring that *calones* were military slaves, though questioning whether they were owned privately, which is the commonly held opinion, or by the state.\(^{26}\) The following discussion will concentrate on the tasks fulfilled by *calones*, and compare these with the duties of slaves not described by that term.

In general, *calones* appear to have assumed roles similar to those of slaves. Caesar describes how, on the Sambre in 58, *calones* left the camp in order to gain booty when they perceived the Nervii to be falling back, only to flee in panic when the enemy exploited a gap in the Roman lines to attack the camp.\(^{27}\) Once the situation was recovered through Labienus’ intervention, however, it is claimed that the *calones* were able to resist the now terrified Nervii.\(^{28}\) Later, in 53, a group of *calones* accompanies five cohorts on a foraging expedition from the camp of Q. Cicero.\(^{29}\) This camp is attacked by Germans shortly thereafter and, when the foragers return, the enemy prepare to attack them. The *calones* then rush to a nearby height,\(^{30}\) only to be pushed back and subsequently saved when they follow a group of veteran troops who successfully break through the enemy lines. In the *Civil Wars*, *calones* are twice mentioned, on one occasion when a number are killed near Ilerda along with 200 Gallic archers,\(^{31}\) and again soon after. When his grain supply grew precarious, Caesar requisitioned food from friendly communities, and sent *calones* to the more distant ones, thus reducing the

\(^{25}\) Speidel (1989), p. 239.
\(^{26}\) Roth (1998), p. 102-3. Roth suggests that a subset of military slaves were owned by the state, based on several instances in which they are said to be armed, coupled with a claim that arms would not have been given to privately owned slaves. This last claim is, however, an assumption, and it cannot be inferred that there existed a class of state-owned slaves, able to bear arms when necessary.
\(^{27}\) Caes., *B. Gall.* II.24. *et calones ... praedandi causa egressi, cum respxissent et hostes in nostris castris versari vidissent, praecepitit fugae sese mandabant.*
\(^{28}\) Caes., *B. Gall.* II.27. *... tum calones perterritos hostes conspirati etiam inermes armatis occurrerunt...*
\(^{29}\) Caes., *B. Gall.* VI. 36. *... magna praeterea multitudo calonum ... facta potestate sequitur.*
\(^{30}\) Caes., *B. Gall.* VI.40. *calones in proximum tumulum procurrant.*
\(^{31}\) Caes., *B. Civ.* I.51. *Desiderati sunt eo die sagittarii circiter CC, equites pauci, calonum atque impedimentorum non magnus numerus.*
amount of food required in the camp.\textsuperscript{32} It seems clear that the \textit{calones} fulfilled similar functions to those individuals described more straightforwardly as slaves. Both groups are routinely involved in manual labour, and are frequently mentioned alongside beasts of burden, yet are only mentioned when they become involved in battle.\textsuperscript{33} Also, as Caesar demonstrates, both \textit{calones} and slaves could be separated from the army as military needs dictated. Conversely, the passage from Velleius cited earlier, describing Antony’s losses in 36-35, refers to \textit{calonumque servitii}.\textsuperscript{34} Rather than implying two separate groups, this might be understood as a hendiadys, employed to emphasise the servile nature of the \textit{calones}. The available evidence indicates no difference in status between \textit{calones} and slaves. In essence, the defining feature of the \textit{calo} was his appearance in military contexts.

The term \textit{calones} may, however, carry pejorative implications beyond implied servility. On the Sambre, their involvement in battle is a direct consequence of their premature departure from the camp in search of booty. The rush of the \textit{calones} to seek higher ground while returning to Q. Cicero’s camp is likewise premature, and exposes them needlessly to the enemy. Livy, too, describes \textit{calones} in a clearly negative way at times. On one occasion near the end of the First Samnite War, he notes that a camp could be established in a confined area specifically because the army had marched without a mob (\textit{turba}) of \textit{calones},\textsuperscript{35} and the same word is later applied in describing

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{32} Caesar eis civitatis, quae ad eius amicitiam accesserant, quod minor erat frumenti copia, pecus imperabat; calones ad longinquiores civitates dimittebat; ipse praeuentem inopiam, quibus poterat subsidii, tutabatur. The Loeb here translates \textit{calones} as sutlers, implying that they were sent out in order to collect or purchase food. This is possible, but the sentence is not explicit on this point, while the verb \textit{dimittebat} suggests that they were simply dismissed.
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\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{33} See also Livy IX.37 and XXIII.16.8, on \textit{calones} and manual labour.
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\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{34} Vell. Pat., II.82.3. See n. 21.
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\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{35} Livy, VII.37. \textit{nec procul ab hoste locum perexiguum, ut quibus praeter equos ceterorum iumentorum calonumque turba abesset, castris cepit.}
\end{quote}
Philopoemen’s arrangement of his forces against Nabis of Sparta in 192. A negative connotation is even clearer in Sallust’s description of those individuals supporting the consul M. Aemilius Lepidus in 78, in which they are set alongside sicarii and said to be willing to sell their lives for a day’s pay. The denigration of camp followers of all descriptions is, as shall be seen, commonplace, yet calones seems to have been a particularly negative term. This reflects a social attitude and a military ideal, which emphasised the superiority of a well-disciplined and austere army, over one corrupted by luxury. An overabundance of servants would certainly have been associated with the latter. The disdainful attitude to calones thus reflects not a concern over actual behaviour, but a general fear of the potential encouragement of disorder in the ranks.

**Lixae**

Another category of camp followers distinguished in our sources are lixae, though again it is difficult to establish precisely what individuals were encompassed by the term. In some instances, they appear to be small-traders engaged in private exchange with soldiers in the armies they accompanied, and the term lixa is thus commonly translated as “sutler”. Accordingly, rather than bearing responsibility for the routine supply of the armies, e.g., with grain, these individuals helped to supplement the provisions officially given to soldiers. At times, they may be described as akin to mercatores, as when the rear of Caesar’s column was harassed by Labienus during the

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36 Livy, XXXV.28... eo impedimenta omnia et calonum turbam collectam armatis circumdedit...
37 Sall., Hist. I.77.7: At tum erat Lepidus latro cum calonibus et paucis sicariis, quorum nemo diurnal mercede vitam mutaverit...
African War, and the baggage of both *lixae* and *mercatores* captured.\(^{40}\) Nonetheless, the two groups were not necessarily coterminous. In describing the indiscipline of the Roman army in Africa prior to Metellus’ arrival in 109, Sallust claims that *lixae*, along with soldiers, ravaged the African countryside and sold their booty to *mercatores*, necessarily implying some disparity between them.\(^{41}\)

Roth has expressed further doubts concerning the equation of *lixae* with sutlers, using instances of the term in Quintilian, Vegetius and Lucan to demonstrate the low status accorded to these individuals. He even suggests that *lixae* were regarded by certain sources as slaves, though in each of the cases cited, the evidence for his claim is weak.\(^{42}\) Furthermore, Livy provides a counter-example when he has the consul of 200, G. Aurelius Cotta, ask rhetorically why no witnesses, not even a *lixa*, was called upon to testify to the senate, and to confirm the praetor L. Furius Purpureo’s eligibility for a triumph.\(^{43}\) As Roth himself notes, such testimony would have been impossible if *lixae* were not free, since the evidence of a slave would have been inadmissible.\(^{44}\)

Admittedly, *lixae* and *calones* could be grouped together at times. Livy describes Marcellus in 216 ordering both, along with injured soldiers, to perform manual labour,\(^{45}\) and shortly thereafter has them shouting together, thus deluding Hannibal into believing

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\(^{40}\) Caes., *R. Afr.*, 75. *...lixarum mercatorumque qui plaustris merces portabant intereceptis sarcinis...*

\(^{41}\) Sall., *Iug.* XLIV.5. *...lixae permixti cum militibus ... pecoris et mancipiorum praedas certantes agere eaque mutare cum mercatoribus vino advocicio et aliis talibus...*

\(^{42}\) Roth (1998), p. 95. In the first instance (Porph., *ad Hor. Sat.* I.22.44), a scholiast on Horace contrasts *calones* and *lixae*, with the former being free and the latter slaves. As Roth himself later notes (p. 102, n. 238), the scholiast likely reversed the meanings. The second instance (Vell. Pat. II.82.3) refers to *calones* and *servitia*, but makes no mention of *lixae* at all. The third (Tac., *Hist.* II.87) involves a description of the army of Vitellius as: *...sexaginta milia armatorum sequabantur; licentia corrupta; calonum numerus amplior, procacissimis etiam inter servos lixarum ingenis...* Roth interprets the last clause to indicate that *lixae* were counted among the slaves, but this reading is not supported in Chilver’s commentary, who reads *etiam ... servos* as “even in comparison with the slaves”.

\(^{43}\) Livy, XXXI.49.11. *ecquem ex eo exercitu qui cum Gallis pugnaverit, si non militem, lixam saltem fuisse quem percuncaturi posset senatus, quid veri praetor vanive adferret?*


\(^{45}\) Livy, XXIII.16.8. *...impedimenta subsequi iussit, calones lixasque et invalidos milites vallum ferre.*
he faced a larger army than was actually present. Nonetheless, the fact that the two categories could be grouped together does not demonstrate that they were identical. In short, while *lixae* might not have been highly regarded, the evidence is not adequate to demonstrate that they were actually slaves.

A repeated theme of Roman military history involves certain generals taking up the command of a disorganised army and re-establishing discipline, with the exclusion of camp followers, sometimes explicitly *lixae*, a key element. When Appian describes Scipio Aemilianus taking command in Africa in 147, the army is said to be in a state of extreme indiscipline, while the soldiers have turned themselves to idleness, greed, and rapacity. Directly involved in these activities is a *πληθος ἄγοραῖον*, following the camp in order to receive booty, and even accompanying the soldiers on illicit raids. The word ἄγοραῖος refers to traders, though of lower status than would be implied by ἐμπορος, and is thus roughly equivalent to *lixa*. This description is followed by a speech to the soldiers, in which Scipio emphasises that victory should have priority over procuring booty. Accordingly, non-soldiers, with the exception of those granted permission or those bringing basic food, are excluded from the camp, though provision will be made for a supervised sale of booty at a later date. Appian records a similar sequence of events when, thirteen years later, Scipio took command of the campaign against Numantia. The army is said to be idle, disorderly, and inclined to luxury.

46 Livy, XXIII.16.14. *addidere clamorem lixae calonesque et alia turba custodiae impedimentorum adposita...* Frontin., Str. II.4.8 describes the same event: *M. Marcellus... simul lixas calonesque et omnis generis sequellas conclamare iussit...*
47 App., *Pun.* 115. *...ἀλλ’ ἐς ἀγρίαν καὶ πλευρείαν καὶ ἀρπαγάς... ἐπιπετραμμένως...*
48 App., *Pun.* 115. *...ἄλλο τοῦ πλήθος αὐτοῖς συνόντας ἄγοραῖον, οἱ τῆς λείας χαρίν ἐπόμενοι τοῖς βρασευτέροις συνεξέτρεχον ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀρπαγάς...*
49 LSJ, definition A.II.
50 App., *Hisp.* 84. *...πυθανομένους αὐτῷ γέμειν ἀγρίας καὶ στάσεων καὶ τρυφῆς...*
Consequently, all traders are excluded from the camp, and in this instance prostitutes and soothsayers are also specified.\textsuperscript{52} Again, no goods that are deemed extravagant or superfluous are to be permitted in the camp.

To some extent, these incidents reflect Scipio’s self-presentation (or Polybius’ version thereof), and not necessarily the particulars of the situations he actually encountered. Subsequently, Scipio’s example would become something of a \textit{locus classicus} for the imposition of traditional discipline on an unruly army, with versions similar to Appian’s appearing in Livy,\textsuperscript{53} Frontinus,\textsuperscript{54} and Plutarch.\textsuperscript{55} Regardless of the original events, the accounts of his actions in Africa and Spain must have been at least plausible. That is to say, Roman armies must often have attracted individuals of the sorts described. Moreover, whatever the actual impact of small-traders, a Roman audience must have believed that their presence in more than minimal numbers would have a negative influence on military discipline.

Sallust gives a similar description of Metellus restoring discipline in Africa in 109, a similarity to which Frontinus draws explicit attention immediately after recounting Scipio’s actions.\textsuperscript{56} Discipline under Metellus’ predecessor, Spurius Postumius Albinus, is said to have been so lax that \textit{lixae} and soldiers together ravaged the countryside to seize booty which they exchanged for wine and other luxuries. So serious was the situation that grain rations were sold in exchange for bread.\textsuperscript{57} Metellus’ remedies involved banning the sale of cooked food to the soldiers, and forbidding

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\item\textsuperscript{52} App., \textit{Hisp.} 85. ἢλθόν δὲ ἐμπόροις τε πάντας ἐξῆλαυν καὶ ἐταίρας καὶ μάντεις καὶ θύταις...
\item\textsuperscript{53} Livy, \textit{Per.} LVII. omnia deliciarum instrumenta recidit; duo milia scortorum a castris eiecit...
\item\textsuperscript{54} Frontin., \textit{Str.} IV.1.1. P. Scipio ad Numantiam corruptum superiorum ducum socordia exercitum corrigit dimisso ingenti lixarum numero, redactis ad munus cotidiana exercitatione militaribus.
\item\textsuperscript{55} Plat., \textit{Mor.} 201B16. ...μεν ἔμπρεπες ἐξῆλαυοι καὶ θύταις καὶ πορνοφοβοκοις...
\item\textsuperscript{56} Frontin., \textit{Str.} IV.1.2. Q. Metellus bello Iugurthino similiter lapsam militum disciplinam pari severitate restituit...
\item\textsuperscript{57} Sall., \textit{Iug.} XLV.5. lixae permixti cum militibus diu noctuque vagabundantur et palantes agros vastare, villas expugnare, pecoris et mancipiorum praedas certantes agere eaque mutare cum mercatoribus vino adventicio et aliis talibus, praeterea frumentum publicum datum vendere, panem in dies mercuri...
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soldiers to be accompanied by slaves or draught animals on the march. The key similarity between Metellus and Scipio, however, is that in each instance the activities of *lixae* are restricted.\(^{58}\) It is entirely possible that Metellus, or Sallust’s version of Metellus, was intentionally appealing to the example of Scipio.

The *lixae* themselves appear to have been a class of comparatively humble merchants, engaged in trade with soldiers. We can speculate that this trade involved the sale of personal goods to soldiers, supplementing provisions provided by the military. It is also likely that such traders purchased a portion of the booty and slaves acquired by soldiers on campaign.\(^{59}\) In both instances, the traders who accompanied the armies must have been connected with larger trade networks, in order to acquire or dispose of goods. Operating at the extremities of these networks, *lixae* were the individuals who actually mediated trade with the armies. Semantically, the difference between *lixae* and *mercatores* might be something akin to the difference in English between “peddler” and “merchant”. Whether *lixae* actually promoted indiscipline among the troops, or their reputation was a matter of convention rather than reality, probably cannot be determined, though some combination of the two seems likely. Nonetheless, Roman armies of the republic were accompanied by a significant number of individuals of modest status, and these men must have provided some useful services. On the rare occasions when traditionalist, moralizing historians choose to mention them, however, a negative attitude is readily apparent.

\(^{58}\) Sall., *Iug.* XLV.2. *...ne lixae exercitum sequentur...*
\(^{59}\) On armies and the slave trade, see section 4.4.
2.3 – Military Suppliers

The groups thus far described had little involvement in the routine supply of the armies. How then were these armies normally supplied, e.g. with grain, and what individuals were involved in this process? With the exception of Caesar who, as noted in the introduction, displays an idiosyncratic concern for the supply of his soldiers, and perhaps faced unusual logistical challenges imposed by the geography of Gaul, there are few earlier references to the process of supply. While some portion of these supplies was acquired locally, through a combination of purchase and requisition, importation also played a role. In regard to the latter, incidents in 215 and in 195, both involving armies in Spain, are key in considering the system of supply, the nature of which must in turn affect discussion of individuals overseas involved in it.

Contracted Supply

Livy describes how, in 215 after the defeat at Cannae in the previous year, the senate was presented with a report from the proconsul P. Cornelius Scipio, and his brother Cn. Cornelius Scpio Calvus, detailing a need for money, clothing, and grain for their soldiers, as well as whatever the naval allies serving with them required. While it is interesting that there is a claimed inability to acquire grain and clothing (though not money) from local Iberian sources, it is the consequent events that are more relevant. Lacking funds as a result of its military commitments elsewhere, the senate

60 Richardson (1986), p. 35-36, notes that it is unclear if Gnaeus was a legatus or held imperium pro praetore.
61 Livy, XXIII.48. ...sed pecuniam in stipendium vestimentaque et frumentum exercitui et sociis navalibus omnia deesse.
directed that those who had in the past benefitted from public contracts should be encouraged to accept contracts for supplying the forces in Spain on condition that payment would be made at a later date. 62 Three societates, comprised of nineteen individuals in total, took up the contracts on condition that the public should assume the risk to their cargoes against enemy action or storms. 63 This arrangement was initially successful, as Livy goes on to state that the army in Spain was furnished with the requisite supplies. It was only three years later, early in 212, that a scandal broke out.

To summarise Livy’s account, 64 the publicani (now explicitly named as such) had been falsely reporting shipwrecks, as well as placing cargoes of minimal value on decrepit ships, sinking them, and reporting losses of far greater value. Though the senate, and specifically the praetor M. Aemilius, had been aware of this fraudulent activity, no action was taken, ostensibly on the grounds that the senate wished to avoid offending the ordinem publicanorum. 65 Consequently, the tribunes Sp. and L. Carvilius sought to impose a fine on the worst offender, one M. Postumius, which he attempted to appeal before the concilium plebis. When it became apparent that this appeal was going to fail, and since a friendly tribune could not be prevailed upon to impose his veto, the publicani resorted to violence and disrupted the assembly. This matter was referred to the senate and, in light of the use of violence against the res publica, the Carvilii brought capital charges against Postumius, who went into exile. A similar procedure followed for the other individuals involved in this disorder.

62 Livy, XXIII.48.10-11. ...cohortandosque, qui redempturis auxissent patrimonia, ut rei publicae, ex qua crevissent, tempus commodarent conducertentque ea lege praebenda quae ad exercitum Hispaniensem opus essent, ut, cum pecunia in aerario esset, iis primis solveretur.
63 Livy, XXIII.49.2. ...ut quae in naves inposissent ab hostium tempestatisque vi publico periculo essent.
64 Livy, XXV.3.8-4.11
65 Livy, XXV.3.12. ...quia patres ordinem publicanorum in tali tempore offensum nolebant.
Objections to Livy’s version of events have been raised. Badian, for example, notes that various elements of the story are anachronistic and reflect political conditions at the end of the republic.\textsuperscript{66} The most obvious of these is the existence of an “organized ordo publicanorum”, of sufficient stature that the senate actively sought to avoid offending it. He thus reinterprets the story, though without expressing doubt as to the existence of fraud. In his version, the senate’s delay in pursuing the matter is attributed to a preference for dealing with the matter at the start of the next consular year, the tribunes acted throughout with the approval of the senate, and it was not a broad group of publicani that disrupted an assembly and were punished, but just the friends and clients of M. Postumius.

Erdkamp, in comparison, attacks Livy’s account in much stronger terms, though on fundamentally the same grounds as Badian, regarding it as wholly “discredited by untruths, inconsistencies and anachronistic elements”.\textsuperscript{67} More seriously, because the notion that the military was supplied by means of private contracts appears in such a story, and because there is a lack of other evidence to corroborate its existence, Erdkamp rejects the idea that the military was supplied in this way at all. In his conception, even when generals and their subordinates could not arrange supply locally, the Roman administrative structure was itself capable of acquiring the necessary goods and supplying them to the army, without resorting to contracting. In this regard, he directly contrasts Rickman’s view that the “machinery of government” was too “rudimentary” to achieve this.\textsuperscript{68} Quite apart from any assessment of the republic’s bureaucratic capacities, there is the matter of adequate shipping, to which Rickman also

\textsuperscript{66} Badian (1972), p. 18-19.
\textsuperscript{67} Erdkamp (1998), p. 116-117.
\textsuperscript{68} Rickman (1980), p. 34.
referred. As Erdkamp acknowledges,⁶⁹ and at least one reviewer points out,⁷⁰ there is little indication for the existence of the large amounts of state-owned shipping that his model requires. Indeed, he suggests that it would have been necessary to employ private ships on contract in order to meet transportation needs.⁷¹ In a sense the debate has come full circle, and all that is at issue is the degree of private involvement in military supply. In this regard, Cato’s treatment of the merchants, *redemptores*, he encountered on his arrival in Spain in 195 is pertinent.

Upon reaching Spain during his consular year, M. Porcius Cato is said to have first assessed the situation and, noting that local supplies of grain were readily available, forbade the contractors to provide it, and sent them back to Rome. The occasion then gave him the opportunity to claim pithily that the war would feed itself.⁷² Given Cato’s reputation for parsimony and self-restraint, particularly in matters of public administration,⁷³ this incident likely reflects his representation of his own behaviour. Nonetheless, in order for this anecdote to carry weight, it must normally have been the case that a commander would have availed himself of such merchants to supply his army.

Based on the few details offered, Erdkamp interprets this incident as concerning only the transportation of grain, rather than its acquisition, and such an interpretation is feasible if not provable.⁷⁴ Furthermore, he is correct in asserting that it offers no evidence for the participation of *publicani* in military supply, if by *publicanu* one understands a representative of a large *societas* in Rome. Still, even a contract to

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⁷² Livy, XXXIV.9.12. *itaque redemptoribus vetitis frumentum parare ac Romam dimissis “bellum” inquit “se ipsum alet.”
⁷³ Plat., *Cat. Mai.* V.1; VI.1-2.
transport grain entailed dealing with public property and, in that broader sense, individuals holding such contracts could be regarded as *publicani*. One should reject an anachronistic model involving the letting of supply contracts in Rome, which relies on a single example when the republic was under enormous strain. This does not, however, require the minimal levels of private involvement preferred by Erdkamp. Under normal circumstances, individuals involved in the grain trade were likely to have followed Roman armies to the provinces. Particularly in Spain, given the near permanent presence of legions there, these traders, and/or individuals employed by them, must likewise have established a permanent presence there. No doubt this was connected with the larger trade in grain destined for the civilian market, though that subject will be addressed in detail in Chapter Three.

*Caesar and Local Supply*

What conclusions can be reached about military supply, based on material from the Caesarian corpus? As mentioned in the introduction, there is some risk that sources are somewhat idiosyncratic, but the concern for supply which they demonstrate renders them indispensable. Rather than isolating specific references to the grain supply (which often involve little more than an assertion that Caesar took care to ensure it was maintained), the following will concentrate on the role of *mercatores* in these texts, and primarily in the *Gallic War*.

The presence of *mercatores* in company with the armies is indicated on several occasions. For example, during the African War, we are told that Labienus attacked the
rear of Caesar’s column, and seized baggage belonging to mercatores, as well as lixae.\textsuperscript{75} Furthermore, the camp of Q. Cicero, which was attacked by Germans in 53, is said to have had mercatores encamped around it.\textsuperscript{76} Certainly in the former example, given the civil war context and the presence of the merchants’ baggage in the army, the mercatores are closely associated with Caesar’s forces. The same may also have been true of those encamped alongside Q. Cicero, however, at other times mercatores are present in the narrative who were clearly not attached on a semi-permanent basis to the army.

That mercatores were present in Gaul independently – or at least somewhat so – of the army is demonstrated by their repeated role as sources of information. Thus, Caesar himself says that he called upon traders over a wide area in order to gather information on Britain.\textsuperscript{77} Less beneficially from Caesar’s perspective, he also relates how traders terrified his troops with stories of German military prowess.\textsuperscript{78} In fact, this is said to have occurred while the army was delayed, waiting for provisions, though it is not clear if the mercatores involved in spreading stories were also involved in the grain supply. It is indicated that traders shared information with Gauls, as they did with Caesar, though one might question the detail that they did so under compulsion.\textsuperscript{79} In fact, merchants trading in grain seem to have been present even at times when Caesar was faced with particularly challenging circumstances. At Ilerda, when rising rivers are said to have cut Caesar’s supply lines, grain was still available for purchase though at a

\textsuperscript{75} Caes., \textit{B. Afr.} 75. ...lixarum mercatorumque qui plaustris merces portabant intereceptis sarcinis...

\textsuperscript{76} Caes., \textit{B. Gall.} VI.37. ...qui sub vallo tenderent mercatores...

\textsuperscript{77} Caes., \textit{B. Gall.} IV.20. itaque vocatis ad se undique mercatoribus... The identity of these traders is not specified, which raises the possibility that some of them were Gauls.

\textsuperscript{78} Caes., \textit{B. Gall.} I.39. ...ex percontatione nostrorum vocibusque Gallorum ac mercatoribus... tantus subito timor omnen exercitum occupavit...

\textsuperscript{79} Caes., \textit{B. Gall.} IV.5. ...mercatores in oppidis vulgus circumsistat quibusque ex regionibus veniant quasque ibi res cognoverint pronuntiari cogant.
heavily inflated price. Similarly, high prices are also indicated for the army shortly after it crossed into Africa, having brought only minimal supplies with it. All of these instances point to the ubiquity of grain traders alongside the armies.

At other times, it is shown that traders were travelling from the army to other areas. When the Aduatuci were sold into slavery, it is clear that traders dealing at least partly in slaves were present with the army, and that these slaves were conveyed elsewhere for sale, with the numbers sold then reported to Caesar. Caesar also asserts that he took care to ensure that merchants could travel without interference or tolls through the Alps, sending a legion to an area south of Lake Geneva for the purpose at the start of 56. While it is not stated that this had a specifically military objective, Caesar must have benefitted from securing a supply line in this way. Conversely, since it seems unlikely that the merchants travelling this route were exclusively involved in military supply, Caesar’s actions must have had the effect of encouraging, or at least easing, trade into this region of Gaul.

On two occasions, both in 52, Caesar draws attention to attacks on Roman citizens involved in trade. So, at the start of Book VII, it is said that the Carnutes massacred traders at Cenabum. Moreover, among the casualties was one Gaius Fufius Cita, described as an honestum equitem Romanum, who was superintending the food supply for the army. When the Romans then besieged Avaricum, the memory of

80 Caes., B. Civ. I.52. iamque ad denarius L in singulos modios annona pervenerat, et militum vires inopia frumenti deminuerat... And later,...quod minor erat frumenti copia...
81 Caes., B. Afr. 47. in Africa autem non modo sibi quicquam non adquisierant aut paraverant sed etiam propter annonae caritatem ante parta consumperant.
82 Caes., B. Gall. II.33. ab eis qui emerant capitum numerus ad eum relatus est millium quinquaginta trium.
83 Caes., B. Gall. III.1. causa mittendi fuit, quod iter per Alpes, quo magno cum periculo magnisque cum portoriis mercatores ire consuerant, patefieri volebat.
84 Caes., B. Gall. ...civesque Romanos, qui negotiandi causa ibi constiterant, in his Gaium Fufium Citam, honestum equitem Romanum, qui rei frumentariae iussu Caesaris praeerat, interficiunt bonaque eorum...
Cenabum is invoked as demanding vengeance, and to have enraged the Roman troops to such a degree that they massacred the besieged. Events at Cenabum thus justify a departure from Caesar’s customary clemency, and perhaps helped to justify Caesar’s continued presence in Gaul. Nonetheless, from a purely military perspective, it seems that Cenabum was attacked precisely because the individuals there were involved in supplying the Roman army. Later, the Aedui under Litaviccus would attack traders at Noviodunum, and one might suppose that the traders there were similarly occupied. If a sizeable number of these traders were involved in the grain supply, and were being coordinated by Fufius Cita or comparable individuals, this implies that military supply was undertaken by relatively small-scale merchants. Recalling the situation with *lixae*, it is likely that these suppliers were part of larger systems of trade: they may have purchased grain from larger importers, or acted on behalf of those individuals. While one should be cautious about generalising from Caesar’s situation, there does seem to be a similarity with the earlier period of Scipio and Cato. Private traders were closely involved in military supply, but there is little evidence for the involvement of large *societates* in Rome.

### 2.4 – Conclusion

A running theme of this chapter has been its concentration on individuals of a somewhat lower social status than have generally been considered. Accompanying the

*diripiunt.* It could be argued, however, that Fufius’ role was semi-official, given that he operated under Caesar’s command.

85 Caes., *B. Gall.* VII.17.
86 Caes., *B. Gall.* VII.28.
87 Caes., *B. Gall.* VII.56. *itaque interfectis Novioduni custodibus quique eo negotiandi causa convenerant...*
armies of the republic throughout our period, though perhaps in varying numbers, was an assortment of non-combatants. Slaves, *calones*, and *lixae* are only occasionally mentioned by our sources, and this disregard hints at their ubiquity in association with the armies. That said, precisely because they are so easily overlooked, it is also difficult to define these groups precisely, and perhaps impossible to get a sense of their numbers. When they are discussed, it is in the context of campaigns, rather than settlement. Nonetheless, given that former soldiers chose to settle in the provinces, it is likely that some of the non-combatants who accompanied them likewise chose to remain. A soldier who settled overseas would presumably have retained his slaves, while small-traders like *lixae* could well have seen former soldiers as a potential market. Indeed, if deserters contributed to that overseas population, then surely the slaves and servants of soldiers would have been even more likely to abscond from the army.

With regard to military supply, this chapter has suggested that it was normally undertaken through merchants of modest means, relative to those involved in the large *societates publicanorum* in Rome itself. Military supply was intertwined with the broader trade in grain, and individual grain traders were probably involved in the civilian trade also. There is evidence that merchants involved in military supply were present in the provinces both at the start of the second century, and 150 years later. It is quite legitimate to question the extent to which they were actually resident in these areas. Nonetheless, Roman military involvement in a given region would have attracted grain traders from elsewhere, as well as providing a new market for those already involved in the civilian trade. The nature of trade would thus have varied between regions. Grain merchants resident in Spain would have been much more likely to be
involved in military supply than those in Sicily. This would reflect the army’s near continuous presence in the former, and generally minimal presence in the latter.
Chapter Three – Grain Trade

3.1 – Introduction

Whereas chapter two dealt with those individuals who participated directly in supplying the armies, this one will consider how the overall grain trade functioned during the republic, and its implications for the Italian diaspora of the period. The categories of military suppliers and civilian traders are not, of course, mutually exclusive. While some traders may have simply followed the armies, campaigns were undertaken against the background of a pre-existing civilian trade.1 Caesar, for example, hints at the presence of such traders in Gaul, in advance of his armies, when he describes their exploitation as sources of military intelligence.2 While Caesar does not explicitly indicate the origins of such merchants, he at least implies that they were a source of information distinct from the Gauls.3 On another occasion, the presence of traders from other regions is mentioned, though this could refer to locations both within and beyond Gaul.4 Finally, prior to his first expedition to Britain, Caesar summoned traders undique, despite which he claims that he was unable to gain a great deal of information.5 While it is unlikely that many Italian merchants had penetrated this far north, Caesar does indicate that a diverse group of merchants in northern Gaul was

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1 On the debate surrounding the degree to which trade was tied to the military, see Tchernia (1983) and, contra, Middleton (1983). Although Middleton recognises the presence of traders in advance of the armies, he minimises their numbers and significance.
2 Caes., B. Gall. I.39; IV.5; IV.20.
3 Caes., B. Gall. I.39. ... ex percontatione nostrorum vocibusque Gallorum ac mercatorum ... subito timor omnem exercitum occupavit ...
4 Caes., B. Gall. IV.5. ... mercatores in oppidis vulgus circumsistat quibus ex regionibus veniant quas ibi res cognoverint pronuntiare cogat.
5 Caes., B. Gall. IV.19. ... vocatis ad se undique mercatoribus ...
questioned. A variety of merchants, both local and from overseas, thus appears to have been operating in Gaul.

Italian merchants already active in a given region prior to a military campaign there may have seen military supply as a potentially lucrative business. Thus, it is claimed that Caesar, in response to a delegation from Thysdra during the African War, provided the town with a garrison specifically in order to preserve the three-hundred thousand modii of wheat that had been brought there by Italian negotiatores and farmers. The reality of the situation remains obscure. Was the collection of grain in Thysdra the normal practice, or was it undertaken in anticipation of military demand? With a garrison in place, to what extent was military need fulfilled by compulsion? Whatever the specifics of this wartime situation, it is clear that Italian negotiatores were active in this part of Africa, and that they had a relationship with the farmers of that region, perhaps of long-standing.

The objective of this chapter will be to examine the trade in grain outside a purely military context, although the trade may sometimes become visible only in that light. Discussion will proceed on a geographical basis, commencing with Sicily by virtue of the abundance of evidence for that province, and continuing with Spain and Gaul. Prior to that regional analysis, however, it will be necessary to contextualise the trade in grain – as well as in other commodities – by setting out a general description of the nature and development of the economy of the study region during the last two centuries of the republic.

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6 Caes., B. Afr. 36. legati interim ex oppido Thysdrae, in quod tritici modium milia CCC comportata fuerant a negotiatoribus Italicis aratoribusque, ad Caesarem venire, quantaque copia frumenti apud se sit docent simulque orant ut sibi praesidium mittat quo facilius et frumentum et copiae suae conserventur.
Consideration of the economies of the ancient Mediterranean has, until relatively recently, been dominated by debates over theoretical approaches to this field. Hence, modernists argued that the economy of the late republic was comparable to that of more recent societies, such as those of early modern Europe, and involved high levels of trade. Conversely, primitivists responded by emphasising the agricultural basis of the economy, with trade occurring only for a limited range of high-value goods which excluded the majority of the population. This debate overlapped with a clash between formalism and substantivism, the former asserting that neo-classical economic theory could validly be applied to the ancient world, while the latter held that ancient economies could be understood only within their particular cultural contexts.

These debates of the 1970s and 1980s highlighted aspects of the ancient economy, but a reconciliation leading to a final synthesis was not initially forthcoming. Indeed, it was claimed as early as the mid-1990s that they had culminated in a stalemate. More recent works, however, treat these positions as part of the intellectual background to the subject. Taking the *Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World* as representative of a modern consensus, the authors advocate pursuing research in directions influenced by both formalist and substantivist positions. Reflecting the former, they call for “more systemic analysis” in order to better quantify the performance of the ancient economy. Simultaneously, they call for the continued

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7 See Morley (2007a) and Morris *et al.* (2007). Both summarise the earlier debates in detail, while advocating that future research seek to integrate the findings of all positions.
application of “social-scientific thought” in order to stimulate new developments in ancient economic theory. Ideally, theoretical developments could then be subjected to testing, based on gradually improving quantitative data. The objective of the following is to describe the late republican economy in general terms. The main focus will be on the social organisation of the economy, on transportation, and on general characteristics of the trade.

**Social Organisation of the Economy**

What was the social position of the traders, in all goods, who operated in the western Mediterranean? Prior to Roman domination of the region, trade has been described in terms of “complex micro-scale relations between human agents,” undertaken by “heterogeneous traders” sailing along the coastlines between indigenous and colonial centres, and taking on diverse cargoes based on their perceptions of consumer need. Trade on this scale is dubbed by Morley, among others, as cabotage. While this could be quite sophisticated, it could also have been undertaken without reliance on literacy, currency, or legal institutions. Consequently, there may be comparatively little evidence for its practice, outside the archaeological remains of the goods themselves. Such trade would normally tend to fall beneath the notice of our literary sources, both by virtue of its scale, and the elite attitude towards those engaged in commerce. Consider Cicero’s view of the matter, as expressed in *De Officiis*: trade

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12 Morris *et al.* (2007), p. 7. See also Bang’s 2009 review, which regards the *CEHGRW* as a “new, inspiring beginning”, particularly for its application of institutional economics to the study of the ancient economy.


14 E.g., the Pech-Maho tablet, which describes in Ionian Greek and Etruscan an agreement for the purchase or rent of a small boat. Lejeune *et al.* (1988).

on a small scale is held to be *sordida*, yet if it involves high volumes of goods over
broad areas (and is conducted without deception), it ought not be criticised
excessively.\(^\text{16}\) The stigma of being involved in trade, in this view, can only be
eliminated properly by investing in agriculture. Nonetheless, the real significance of this
statement is that it assumes the existence of a background tier of trade, which is then
specifically maligned. The existence of large numbers of independent traders is assumed
again later in the same work. Cicero suggests that a good trader, finding himself able to
fulfill a need for grain in time of famine, while also aware that other traders are *en route*
to the same location, would not seek to take advantage of the situation by selling at a
high price. Regardless of the morality of the situation, or the probability of a trader
behaving thus, the anecdote assumes the existence of numerous independent traders.\(^\text{17}\)

A social stigma among the elite against direct involvement in trade was reflected
by the *lex Claudia* of 218, which barred senators or their children from owning ships
above a certain capacity.\(^\text{18}\) That said, the *lex Claudia* itself was reputedly passed without
significant support among the senators themselves, and the extent to which it was
subsequently enforced is unclear. Thus, in prosecuting C. Verres, Cicero was able to
claim that his opponent, Hortensius, sought to exculpate Verres for having had a ship
built, on the grounds that the relevant laws were old and dead.\(^\text{19}\) Cicero is, of course,
putting these words in his opponent’s mouth, while making an appeal to what he asserts

\(^{16}\) Cic., *Off.* 1.151. *mercatura autem, si tenuis est, sordida putanda est; sin magna et copiosa, multa
undique apportans multisque sine vanitate impertiens, non est admodum vituperanda...*

\(^{17}\) Cic., *Off.* 3.50. *...si exempli gratia vir bonus Alexandrea Rhodum magnum frumenti numerum advixerit
in Rhodiorum inopia et fame summaque annonae caritate, si idem sciat complures mercatores
Alexandrea solvisse navesque in cursu frumento onustas petentes Rhodum viderit, dicturusne sit id Rhodiis an silentio suum quam plurimo venditurus.*

\(^{18}\) Livy, XXI.63.3. *...novam legem, quam Q. Claudius tribunus plebis aduersus senatum atque uno patrum
adiuuante C. Flaminio tulerat, ne quis senator cuiae senator pater fuisse maritimam nauem, quae plus
quam trecentarum amphorarum esset, haberet.*

\(^{19}\) Cic., *Verr.* 2.5.45. *...noli metuere, Hortensi, ne quaeram qui licuerit aedificare navem senatori;
antiquae sunt istae leges et mortuæ, quem ad modum tu soles dicere, quae vetant.*
was the traditional severity of judges in the past, but his description of the law falling into desuetude would have had no weight if it was being rigorously enforced. In any case, even during the second century, senators were able to participate in commerce, despite the law and prevailing attitudes. As traditional a senator as Cato the Elder is said to have loaned money for shipping, insisting that a partnership be formed among a large group of borrowers, and taking one share in the partnership himself, while being represented by a freedman.\textsuperscript{20} Furthermore, he seems to have promoted commerce in Rome itself while in office, as he was responsible for the construction of two atria, among a variety of other public works.\textsuperscript{21}

While there was a stigma against direct participation in trade, this did not preclude the involvement of senators by indirect means. Thus, D’Arms sought to establish the extent to which shipping and commerce could constitute part of a senator’s negotia. In his view, the familia was an ideal basis around which to organise business, with a single individual at the apex of the structure, and others playing a subordinate role as either dependents or clientes.\textsuperscript{22} This was coupled with an inverse relationship between the visibility of individuals, and the profit which they derived from the enterprise.\textsuperscript{23} Slaves, freedmen, and free persons thus operated businesses nominally and on a day-to-day basis, while the majority of the financial benefits were reaped by their wealthy backers. Senators did not necessarily refrain from commerce, they simply avoided the perception of direct involvement in it, and simultaneously shielded themselves from the relevant risks. Correspondingly, D’Arms places senators on a

\textsuperscript{20} Plut., Cat. Mai. 21.6. ἡχρήσατο δὲ καὶ τῷ διαβεβλημένῳ μάλιστα τῶν δανεισμῶν ἐπὶ ναυτικοῖς τὸν τρόπον τούτου, ἐκέλευε τοὺς δανειζομένους ἐπὶ κοινωνία πολλούς παρακαλέων, γενομένων δὲ πεντίκοντα καὶ πλοίων τοσούτων αὐτὸς ἔιὲ μερίδα διὰ Κοινωνίαν ὁ πελευθέρος τοῖς δανειζομένοις συμπραγματευόμενοι καὶ συμπλέοντος.

\textsuperscript{21} Livy, XXXIX.44.7. Cato atria duo, Maenium et Titium, in lautumiiis et quattor tabernas in publicum emit, basilicamque ibi fecit... See Astin (1978), p. 84.

\textsuperscript{22} D’Arms (1981), p. 42.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid, p. 44.
social continuum with equestrians and the decurial class of the Italian municipalities. Both senators and equestrians could have commercial interests, but those equestrians without an interest in pursuing a political career could engage in certain categories of business more openly.\textsuperscript{24} Furthermore, both groups could be found living alongside the wealthier municipales, e.g., around the Bay of Naples. Describing the period ca. 50 BC, D’Arms hints that the physical proximity of representatives of different classes corresponds with both social proximity and overlapping commercial concerns.\textsuperscript{25} Wallace-Hadrill takes this connection a step further. He argues that, since urban development involved the construction of tabernae and shops adjacent to the homes of the wealthy, it is not feasible to postulate a sharp separation between them and individuals involved directly in trade.\textsuperscript{26} Despite the social pretensions of the senatorial elite, they participated in commerce, though on a relatively silent basis.

If the wealthiest individuals in society could not be seen to be involved in commerce, then more humble persons had to act on their behalf. Correspondingly, the legal framework surrounding agency was developed in precisely the period of this study. Roman law had not previously recognised the capacity of one individual to create a legal obligation on the part of another.\textsuperscript{27} An exception to this predisposition developed, however, in the form of the actio institoria and the related actio exercitoria. Briefly, the actio institoria, created by praetorian edict,\textsuperscript{28} gave a legal action to a third party who had undertaken a contract with the agent of another party. The actio exercitoria, similarly, provided an action against a ship owner for the conduct of a

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid, p. 62.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid, p. 87.
\textsuperscript{26} Wallace-Hadrill (1991), p. 247, 273. Wallace-Hadrill’s argument relies partly on the archaeology of Pompeii, and thus to a later period, but he also draws more generally on literary evidence, including Cicero.
\textsuperscript{27} Johnston (1999), p. 99.
\textsuperscript{28} See below, p. 93, regarding the date of this innovation.
captain. There were, of course, certain restrictions on the use of these legal remedies. Thus, in order for a principal to be liable, it was necessary for his agent (institor) to be acting in strict accordance with the terms under which agency had been established (praeposito). If the agent had been acting outside those limits, a third party could make claims only against the agent’s property. In the event that the agent was a slave or other dependent, liability was limited to the value of the peculium, unless this agent was acting in accordance with the principal’s instructions. This raised the possibility that a wealthy backer could limit his liability by having his business interests operated at arm’s length by his own slaves.29

Who, then, were these agents, and what role might they have played in the Italian diaspora? Though they were most active in the second and third centuries AD, where the jurists present cases involving the actiones described above, they portray most institores as dependents, usually slaves.30 Among the jurists, Gaius explicitly notes that slaves and freedmen were undertaking business transactions overseas.31 Admittedly, he was writing in the late 2nd century AD, and the possibility exists that practices in the late republic were different. Indeed, the term institor does not appear in a contemporary text until 44 BC, though the word was freely used by later authors with reference to earlier events.32 Consider the situation among bankers, some of whom operated outside Italy, acted there as intermediaries representing wealthy individuals in Rome, and could be regarded as a subset of institores.33 Based on funerary inscriptions, Andreau has argued that roughly half of such individuals in the period 50 BC – 150 AD

31 Dig. 40.9.10. quod frequenter accidit his, qui transmarinas negotiationes et aliis regionibus, quam in quibus ipsi morantur, per servos atque libertos exercent...
were freedmen.\textsuperscript{34} He also asserts that free-born bankers were particularly prominent in
the preceding period, a claim based on Cicero’s references to them, as well as on
examples of conspicuous euergetism by wealthy free-born bankers that are without later
parallels.\textsuperscript{35} This implies that the status of the group of individuals involved in banking
gradually diminished. An evolution in practice over the last two centuries of the
republic should also be anticipated from the development of actiones in that period.
While the date at which these were first incorporated in the praetor’s edict is not
precisely known, Aubert considers a date in the late 2\textsuperscript{nd} century BC to be most probable,
though a range from 150 to 50 BC is possible.\textsuperscript{36} Assuming that these laws were
developed in response to the needs of society, it is likely that the use of agents had
grown during the preceding decades. If so, the growth in the use of agents is roughly
correlated with the extension of Roman control over more distant overseas regions.

A spectrum of individuals was involved in commerce, from small-traders to
members of the elite. While members of the propertied classes are prominent in the
political history of the period, by virtue of the role of some as publicani, participation in
trade extended well beyond this group. Among the diaspora in the provinces, one should
probably not expect to see members of the elite, but instead agents and other personnel
acting on their behalf.\textsuperscript{37} These agents might themselves range from slaves to free born
individuals. Furthermore, nothing precluded an agent (even a slave agent, provided he
possessed a peculium), from undertaking other business on his own account.\textsuperscript{38} Thus, one
might expect agents to be operating with varying degrees of independence and,

\textsuperscript{34} Andreau (1999), p. 47.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid, p. 48-49.
\textsuperscript{36} Aubert (1994), p. 76.
\textsuperscript{37} See Brunt (1990), p. 362, on the organisation of societates publicanorum.
independence. In short, the traders in the diaspora were a diverse group in terms of their status, wealth, and connection with Rome.

No doubt this diversity grew as the Roman citizenship was extended throughout Italy. Italian elites thus gained the legal capacity to undertake contracts enforceable in Rome, the right to undertake public contracts, and ultimately the right to participate in the economic benefits of empire on an equal footing. It is possible that the desire among Italians for these advantages was a contributing cause of the Social War, though how significant is not clear. Regardless, the consequent extension of citizenship must have opened opportunities for the numerous Italians who had been involved in trade.

**Transportation and the Grain Trade**

It has generally been held that transportation of goods by land, and particularly the transportation of so bulky a commodity as grain, was prohibitively expensive in comparison with transport by sea or river over any significant distance. While this would seem to be a logical conclusion, and while marine and riverine transportation of goods was doubtlessly cheaper than by land, the disparity was not so great as to inevitably render the latter unaffordable. As Laurence has discussed, the traditional picture is an overstatement, derived in large part from Yeo’s 1946 paper comparing the two modes of transportation. While Laurence acknowledges the cost difference between land and sea transport, he asserts that this does not demonstrate that land transport could not be undertaken at all. Instead, the overall distance, the difficulty of

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40 Rickman (1980) p. 16, for example, makes precisely this claim with respect to grain.
the intervening terrain, the quality of the available roads, and the cost imposed by transferring goods between transportation modes, must all be considered.

The transportation of grain, however, was unusually challenging, by virtue of its bulk. The low value of grain per unit volume rendered it more susceptible than other goods to being prohibitively expensive to transport. Consequently, for inland locations where marine transport was unavailable, grain shortages were most difficult to alleviate.\(^{42}\) Even in circumstances where transport by water was an option, the movement of large quantities of grain demanded significant infrastructure to accommodate ships, and to unload and store their cargo.\(^{43}\) The infrastructure required to support trade is likely to be greater as the distance involved in that trade increases, since greater distances demand larger shipments in order to be profitable. In Hopkins’ model of the grain trade, most grain was transported over short distances, e.g., to the nearest town. Less than a third as much was transported over medium distances (e.g., intra-provincial), while only one-sixth as much was transported over longer distances (e.g., inter-provincial). As Hopkins himself concedes, his figures should be taken only as estimates,\(^{44}\) but it is at least plausible that most of the trade in grain was undertaken over relatively short distances. That said, it is trade over medium to long distances that is of concern here.

Transportation of grain over long distances in the late republic was concerned mainly with the supply of Rome, and of the armies in so far as local sources of supply for them were not sufficient. A portion of this consisted of taxes levied in the provinces, but these alone were not sufficient to feed the city. Consequently, a private grain trade existed in parallel with a system of public contracts for the shipment of grain. In times

\(^{44}\) Hopkins (1983), p. 90.
of shortage, it was necessary for the political elite to take action to address the shortfall, usually on an *ad hoc* basis. A recurring theme of Garnsey’s *Famine and Food Supply in the Ancient World* is that, rather than establishing state institutions to deal with shortage, ancient cities tended to rely on the intervention of wealthy individuals who purchased grain from neighbouring regions. By contrast, in the 2nd century BC and earlier, shortages in Rome were dealt with by the responsible magistrates, who sought emergency supplies overseas and made them available to the populace.\(^{45}\) Increasing attention was given to supply problems in the last century of the republic. For example, when Pompey was given charge of the grain supply in September 57, he sent legates to Sardinia, Sicily and Africa in order to secure additional supplies there.\(^{46}\) Furthermore, Pompey had citizenship granted to individuals from those regions, likely in exchange for services rendered during this time as merchants or shippers.\(^{47}\) What this suggests is a certain latent shipping capacity, capable of addressing shortfalls on a regional level. The individuals who worked with Pompey in the mid-50s may, under normal circumstances, have been involved in a more medium-range trade, or operated between other ports. They would fall into a smaller class of merchants than was normally involved in the grain trade, perhaps participating because the elevated price of grain, and the guaranteed demand in Rome, made them more able to realise a profit.\(^{48}\)

Outside periods of shortage, however, it is likely that the long-distance trade was predominantly in the hands of wealthy individuals, or of agents acting on their behalf. This condition was imposed simply by the capital outlay involved in owning a ship and its cargo. For construction of a ship of 400 tonnes, and a cargo of wheat, Hopkins

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\(^{48}\) Hopkins (1983), p. 90, suggests that the medium range trade tended to be in the hands of smaller-scale merchants.
estimates a total cost of 400,000 to 600,000 HS. Only the wealthiest individuals, or a relatively large group of individuals, would have had the resources to engage in shipping on this level. The high risk and high outlay involved in shipping is also indicated by the way in which maritime loans (pecunia traiecticia) operated. These involved the provision that, if a voyage was undertaken during the normal sailing season, and the ship was lost, the borrower need not be repay. The lender was, however, compensated for this risk by receiving an unusually high rate of interest on the loan.

For long-range shipping, involving large vessels, large cargoes, and a low number of potential voyages in the year, it stands to reason that only a wealthy minority was likely to have participated. Hopkins’ precise figures could be questioned, given that he relies on comparison with a small sample of ship construction costs for the late mediaeval period. Nonetheless, one would expect the largest common vessels to have been relatively expensive, as Hopkins argued. This does not, however, preclude the existence of shippers operating with smaller, cheaper vessels. In the 2nd century AD, special privileges were given to grain shippers operating single vessels over 330 tonnes capacity, or operating multiple vessels over 65 tonnes. Even at that date, shippers with varying degrees of wealth must have existed. Presumably, these would have operated over relatively shorter distances on grounds of efficiency; ships below a certain size would have been too small to profitably carry a bulky cargo such as grain over great distances. For the late republic, a similar range of shippers is likely, though the particular conditions of the grain trade would have rendered the smallest scale ship-owners unable to participate profitably.

Over the last two centuries of the republic, one might expect to see some variation in this pattern. Growth in the population of Rome, coupled with the elimination of commercial competition from Carthage and Corinth after 146, must have led to the trade in grain being increasingly centered on the city itself. Furthermore, the period saw increasing Roman control over the major sources of grain in the western Mediterranean: Sicily and Sardinia after the First Punic War, and Africa from 146 and increasingly thereafter. This can be combined with a gradual diminution of pirate activity before it was largely eliminated by Pompey. Rome thus dominated sources of grain, gradually improved security for its transport, and provided the most consistent demand for it. Each of these reasons would have provided interested parties with an incentive to invest in the construction of larger vessels, as they could more profitably concentrate on the transport of grain to Rome.

**General Characteristics of the Grain Trade**

The production of grain, and demand for it in the ancient Mediterranean, were ubiquitous. While a range of food crops were available to Mediterranean peoples, grains were the most significant among them, providing the bulk of the energy needs of most of the population.\(^{51}\) Ecologically, the Mediterranean features a large number of regional micro-climates, each of which experiences a high level of inter-annual variation.\(^{52}\) As argued by Horden and Purcell, these facts may have rendered the food supply of Mediterranean peoples particularly insecure.\(^{53}\) Highly variable rainfalls meant that food

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\(^{52}\) Ibid., p. 9.

\(^{53}\) Harris (2005), p. 23. Harris expresses reservations on the extent to which ecological conditions, and resulting patterns of trade, created a degree of connectivity or unity across the Mediterranean.
yields in a given location could be unpredictable. Simultaneously, the number of micro-climates meant that yields in neighbouring regions could be quite dissimilar.\textsuperscript{54} Such a pattern of local abundance or shortage could be addressed by a short-range trade in grain, and we might expect this to have been a common feature of the Mediterranean throughout its history.\textsuperscript{55}

It seems reasonable to think that ecological conditions played a role in determining the nature of the Mediterranean grain trade. We should expect to see a short-range trade throughout the period and, as Hopkins discussed, most traded grain may always have been moved only over such short distances.\textsuperscript{56} Inter-regional climatic variability meant there could be shortages over larger areas, which could not be met through local trade. Meeting these needs would have required the exploitation of relatively more secure sources of grain, such as were provided by fertile river valleys and selected other areas. The Nile is most obvious in this regard, as are Sicily, Sardinia, and North Africa. The prominence of these areas as grain suppliers is derived from the greater – though never absolute – reliability of the surpluses produced there. A different variety of trader, willing and able to invest in larger vessels, could have been better suited to exploiting this niche.

Finally, the extraordinary needs of the city of Rome, and perhaps of other large cities, opened opportunities for an even wealthier class of businessman. This long range trade, however, was dependent on a degree of security, and of assured demand, that was increasingly a feature of the last two centuries BC. Obviously, these categories of trade are not intended to be rigid. They are, however, a reflection of prevailing conditions in

\textsuperscript{54} These are, of course, generalisations; certain locations would have been more reliable than others for the production of food.
\textsuperscript{55} An alternate strategy was to acquire food from regions whose food production was not so variable, e.g., the north coast of the Black Sea and Egypt. See Rathbone (1983).
\textsuperscript{56} Hopkins (1983), p. 90.
the Mediterranean, and of likely responses to them. In the various regions considered below, larger traders are the more visible, but it is likely that they operated against a pre-existing background of traders of somewhat lesser means.

3.3 – The Sicilian Grain Trade

The island of Sicily is a useful starting point for considering the grain trade for several reasons. It was the first of Rome’s overseas provinces, an area which was exporting grain to the city and its armies from at least the last decade of the 3rd century, and a location renowned for its agricultural productivity. Sicily would thus have been one possible model for how Rome could extract grain from other regions. Furthermore, we are fortunate to have the evidence of Cicero’s speeches against C. Verres, which, amongst a litany of purported transgressions, concentrate in large part on that governor’s abuses of agricultural tithes in Sicily.

Some grain was privately traded, while some was state owned and consisted of tithe grain. In Sicily, state-owned grain was acquired through taxation in accordance with the arrangements of the former king of Syracuse, Hieron II. After the fall of Syracuse in 212, these were implemented across the island as the *lex Hieronica*, probably between 210 and 205.57 The situation in the Roman province prior to the annexation of Syracuse is not fully known. Tithe-grain was devoted specifically to the supply of the city of Rome itself, ensuring that under normal circumstances there would be a supply there.58 Any surplus remaining in Sicily thereafter would have been available for private trade to Rome, or to other Mediterranean locations.

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Given a tithe of 3,000,000 modii, it has been suggested that a further 5,000,000 modii were available for private export. It is not clear if this trade occurred in the context of a single, connected market, in which price fluctuations in one region quickly impacted the price across the entire market. As Rathbone argued for the Hellenistic East, a regional surplus could have the system-wide effect of reducing price, but local variations could still allow individual merchants to gain significant profits. The more efficiently local demand for grain was fulfilled, the more limited that local variation would have been. The difficulties involved in communication would have contributed to inefficiency, but need not have precluded a connected market. Along the lines described in section 3.2, we might expect wealthy individuals or their agents to react to perceptions of need elsewhere in the Mediterranean. Wealthier individuals, or groups of individuals, invested in the larger vessels, and were correspondingly more able to participate in trade at longer distances. Alongside them were smaller-scale shippers, capable of meeting the demand created by more local variations in agricultural yield.

Among Romans, there was a broad awareness of Sicily’s agricultural potential from an early date. Immediately after the Carthaginians were expelled from the island in 210, the consul M. Valerius Laevinus reported to the senate that the population of Sicily had returned to farming, and that the island could be relied upon to supply grain. By 204, the Sicilians were already being required to provide grain beyond the requirements of the tithe, in order to support the army of Scipio prior to his invasion of Africa. Furthermore, in that same year, it is clear that Italians were present in Syracuse,

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61 See Morley (2007a) p. 95.  
62 Livy, XXVII.5.5. ...desertam recoli tandem terram, frugiferam ipsis cultoribus, populoque Romano pace ac bello fidissimum annonae subsidium.  
63 Livy, XXIX.1.14. ...frumentum Siculorum civitatis imperat, ex Italia advecto parcit...
continuing (in disregard of the instructions of the Roman senate) to hold property seized during the fall of the city six years earlier. Clearly, there was no shortage of willingness to exploit the resources of Sicily quickly.

How, then, did the grain tithe function? Cicero describes how the *lex Hieronica* was maintained throughout Sicily, with the exception of a small amount of land that was *ager publicus* and to which the *lex* did not apply. In each town, the farmers were obliged to declare how much land was under cultivation, and with what crop, in a given year. Based on this information, and their familiarity with prevailing conditions, prospective tithe collectors bid at auction before the governor on the amount of the tithe they believed could be collected from a given community. The successful collector then established *pactiones* with the farmers of that community, stipulating the amount of grain to be provided. In the event that such an agreement was not reached, the amount to be handed over by the farmer was determined after the harvest. The farmers themselves were responsible for conveying the grain to the tithe collector, who was in turn responsible for transporting it least as far as the coast of Sicily. Thereafter, it is unclear who was responsible for conveying the tithe to Rome itself, though Rickman suggests that Cicero’s use of the word *mancipes* to describe the managers of these companies, as opposed to *decumani*, indicates that the two stages of shipment were contracted separately.

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64 Livy, XXIX.1.16. *Graeci res a quibusdam Italici generis eadem vi, qua per bellum ceperant, retinentibus, concessas sibi absenatu repetebant.*
65 Cic., *Verr.* 2.3.12-15.
66 Cic., *Verr.* 2.3.102.
68 Cic., *Verr.* 2.3.102.
70 Rickman (1980), p. 41. See Cic., *Verr.* 2.3.172. The use of *decumis* and *decumanum* shortly before and after *mancipes* could also suggest Cicero employed an alternate word to permit variation.
What, then, was the identity of the individuals involved in this procedure? The collection of the tithe, and its shipment (at least within Sicily), were arranged locally, and it appears that it could have been undertaken by anyone in Sicily. This included Romans in the province, but could also include individual Sicilians, or the towns themselves.\textsuperscript{71} Indeed, Verres himself employed a range of individuals as collectors, including Romans such as C. Sergius,\textsuperscript{72} and non-Romans such as Symmachus\textsuperscript{73} and Apronius.\textsuperscript{74} The one group which was not permitted to bid on these contracts in Sicily, however, were the publicani in Rome. They had sought this privilege just a few years earlier in 75, but their request was denied after the consuls arranged an inquiry into the matter.\textsuperscript{75}

The farmers themselves, also, seem to have had a range of origins, though the relative scale of land-holding by Sicilians, Italians, and Roman citizens in Sicily is not entirely clear.\textsuperscript{76} Diodorus claimed that the blame for the outbreak of the First Servile War in 135 could be attributed to both Sicilian and Italian landowners.\textsuperscript{77} Furthermore, during the Second Servile War, he mentions the death of one P. Clonius at the hands of slaves.\textsuperscript{78} By the period of the Verrines, some sixty years after the first war, Cicero was able to remark in general that Sicily had attracted many Roman citizens, some of whom may only have gained citizenship after the Social War. Some of these citizens profited

\textsuperscript{71} Rickman (1980), p. 40.
\textsuperscript{72} Cic., Verr. 2.3.102.
\textsuperscript{73} Cic., Verr. 2.3.92.
\textsuperscript{74} Cic., Verr. 2.3.59.
\textsuperscript{75} Cic., Verr. 2.3.18. ...publicani postularunt quasdam res ut ad legem adderent neque tamen a ceteris censoris legibus recederent. ... consules causam cognorunt: cum viros primarios atque amplissimos civitatis multos in consilium advocassent, de consili sententia pronuntiarunt se lege Hieronica vendituros.
\textsuperscript{76} Wilson (1990), p. 28. This question of Italian land-holding in Sicily is linked with a debate on the extent to which small-holdings on the island were replaced by latifundia. Wilson suggests that this process of replacement did not occur to any significant extent prior to 50 BC though, as he acknowledges, the archaeological data are limited.
\textsuperscript{77} Diodorus, XXXIV/XXXV.2.27. καὶ γὰρ τῶν Σικελιώτων οἱ πολλοὶ πλούτους κεκτημένοι διημιλλότοι πρὸς τῶν ἵππων ἔπληθος ὑπερήφανος τε καὶ πλεονεξίας καὶ κακουργίας.
\textsuperscript{78} Diodorus, XXXV.4.1. ...τῷ Πολίπου Κλόνιον, γενομένων ἐπειδή Ἡρωικής, ἐπαναστάτως οἱ δούλοι κατέσφαξαν ὁγδοκόροντα ὀντες...
from a distance, while others remained, settled there, and engaged in farming, stock-raising and other business activities.\footnote{Cic., Verr. 2.2.6. ...partim retinet, ut arare, ut pascere, ut negotiari libeat, ut denique sedes ac domicilium conlocare...} Admittedly, Cicero has an interest in emphasising the presence of Roman citizens in Sicily, precisely because Verres’ abuse of Romans, as opposed to Sicilians, would likely have been regarded as more serious by a senatorial court. Nonetheless, Cicero makes repeated references to individual Roman land-holders residing in Sicily. One hears, for example, of Q. Septitius, who sought to resist the excessive claims of the tithe collector Apronius.\footnote{Cic., Verr. 2.3.36. Q. Septicio, honestissimo equite Romano, resistente Apronio et adfirmante se plus decuma non daturum...} Another equestrian, Q. Lollius, similarly attempted to resist Apronius, and was seized and abused by him as a result.\footnote{Cic., Verr. 2.3.61. nam quid ego de Q. Lollio, iudices, dicam, equite Romano spectato atque honesto?} We hear also of senators owning land in Sicily. One, Anneius Brocchus, was compelled to give money, in addition to grain, to Symmachus,\footnote{Cic., Verr. 2.3.93. huic eidem Symmacho C. Annaeus Brocchus senator, homo eo splendore, ea virtute, qua omnes existimalis, nummos praeter frumentum coactus est dare.} while the wife of another, C. Cassius, found the produce of lands inherited from her father confiscated.\footnote{Cic., Verr. 2.3.97. in C. Cassio, clarissimo et fortissimo viro, cum is eo ipso tempore primo istius anno consul esset, tanta improbitate usus est ut, cum eius uxor, femina primaria, paternas haberet arationes in Leontino, frumentum omne decumanos auferre iussit.} While senators are unlikely to have been resident, a range of wealthy Romans clearly held land in Sicily.

Of the 180 individual residents of Sicily mentioned by Cicero, 42 were Roman citizens,\footnote{Verbrugghe (1972), p. 543.} and many of these were negotiator\(s\). Given Sicily’s reputation for agricultural productivity, and given the capacity of negotiator\(s\) to have relatively diverse business interests, one could well imagine that many of these people were involved in aspects of the grain trade. These may have involved shipping tithe grain within and beyond Sicily, or involved the transportation of any additional surplus. There
is no reason to think that the shipment of public grain was an entirely separate affair from that of private; indeed, the two were probably closely connected. Nor need it be assumed that this trade was necessarily in the hands of a very narrow elite. The capital investment involved in shipping restricted the participation of some individuals, particularly with respect to ventures involving large vessels and longer distances. On the other hand, smaller vessels, undertaking shorter voyages, could have been operated by somewhat less wealthy individuals. Furthermore, the ability of individuals to form partnerships allowed a somewhat broader group to participate in shipping. Regardless, we should not expect owners of the smallest, and numerically more common, vessels to have normally participated in the grain trade.

3.4 – The Spanish Grain Trade

The first evidence for grain being sent to Rome from Spain appears only slightly after Sicilian grain began to be systematically exploited by Rome. In the subsequent decades, the trade in Spanish grain receives comparatively little attention in our sources, except on two occasions when the abuses of governors in connection with grain brought about scandal in Rome. In comparison with Sicily, Spain seems to have been less important in terms of the supply of the city of Rome. This is apparent both from the fact that the levy on the Spanish crop was only one-twentieth, half of that applied to Sicily. Furthermore, the continual presence of the legions, often in large numbers, must have diminished the quantity of any surplus that might have been available to the

market. Nonetheless, the early exploitation of Spanish grain means that the situation there can usefully be compared with that in Sicily.

In 203, three years after the expulsion of the Carthaginians from Spain, Livy indicates that food in Rome was particularly cheap as a consequence of the arrival of a large quantity of Spanish grain. This was distributed to the people at a reduced cost, resulting in a depressed price for grain.\(^{86}\) No further details are offered, thus one can only conjecture as to the circumstances under which this grain was collected. The consuls Lentulus and Acidinus together commanded Roman armies in Spain during this period, and it is likely that indigenous peoples, particularly those along the fertile Ebro, were compelled to supply those forces with grain. In that case, the grain provided to Rome represented a surplus beyond military requirements. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the low price at which the grain was sold in Rome points to collection by the consuls, rather than purchase from private shippers.\(^{87}\) Even if this grain was not acquired through a market, shippers must already have been present in order to convey it to Rome.

Apart from Cato’s dismissal of *redemptores* in 191 (see Chapter Two), the next occasion on which Spanish grain comes to our attention is in 171. In this year, delegates from the indigenous people of both Spanish provinces came to Rome, complaining of the greed and arrogance of several recent governors, particularly in connection with the seizure of money.\(^{88}\) The praetor assigned to Spain that year, L. Canuleius Dives, was ordered by the senate to appoint *recuperatores* to judge the matter. Meanwhile, the delegates obtained the counsel of M. Porcius Cato, P. Cornelius Scipio, L. Aemilius

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86 Livy, XXX.26.5-6. *... quod magnam vim frumenti ex Hispania missam M. Valerius Falto et M. Fabius Buteo aediles curales quaternis aeras vicatim populo discripserunt.*

87 Richardson (1986), p. 72.

88 Livy, XLIII.2.2-3. *ii de magistratum Romanorum avaritia superbiaque conquestii... cum et alia indigna quererentur, manifestum autem esset pecunias captas...*
Paulus, and C. Sulpicius Gallus. Initially, M. Titinius Curvus (pr. 178 for Hispania Citerior, prorogued until 175) was tried and acquitted. Accusations were then made against P. Furius Philus (pr. 175 for Hispania Citerior, prorogued until 174), and M. Matienus (pr. 173 for Hispania Ulterior). Both of the latter individuals went into voluntary exile, in Praeneste and Tibur respectively. Livy suggests that the senate subsequently sought to forestall any further trials as L. Canuleius departed for his province shortly thereafter.\(^89\) Nonetheless, the senate did stipulate that, henceforth, a governor would be permitted neither to set the price of grain, nor to compel the Spanish to sell the *vicensuma* (the one-twentieth levy on grain) at the price of his choosing.\(^90\)

It is reasonable to assume that the decisions of the senate were designed to extinguish abuses which had occurred in the provinces. When was this system implemented? Richardson has argued that this was undertaken by Ti. Gracchus, during his governorship from 180-178. This would then be among the taxes and treaties which Gracchus is said to have established.\(^91\) The dispatch of grain to Rome in 203 and Cato’s dismissal of *redemptores* in 191 give no hint that the *vicensuma* existed that early, while the trial of M. Titinius suggests it was in place by the time of his governorship in 178. Indeed, the timing of the trials is used by Richardson to suggest that the system had been implemented shortly before 178.\(^92\) He also argues that, for the preceding period, resources were extracted from Spain on an *ad hoc* basis, according to the prerogatives of the particular governor. The limited interest of the senate in Spanish affairs in this period is also suggested by the inscription in which L. Aemilius Paulus established the

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\(^89\) Livy, XLIII.2.11. *auxitque eam suspicionem Canuleius praetor, quod omissa ea re dilectum habere instituit, dein repente in provinciam abiit, ne plures ab Hispanis vexarentur.*

\(^90\) Livy, XLIII.2.12. *tamen consultum ab senatu Hispanis, quod impetrarunt, ne frumenti aestimationem magistratus Romanus haberet neve cogeret vicensumas vendere Hispanos, quanti ipse vellet...*

\(^91\) App., *Hisp.* VIII.44. *... δὲ συγκλήτως ... φόρους ἦτε τοὺς ὀρίσθενας ἐπὶ Γράκχου ... καὶ γὰρ τούθ’ ἀ΄ Γράκχου συνήθηκαι ἐκέλευον.*

\(^92\) Richardson (1976), p. 151.
rights of the servei Hastensium. In this instance, it is explicitly indicated that his arrangements are valid so long as the senate and people of Rome concur with them.\footnote{CIL II.5041 = ILS 15. \textit{...dum poplus senatusque | Romanus vellet...}}

In contrast to Richardson, however, Harris argues on the basis of probability that Rome would not have waited until the 170s to extract taxes from Spain.\footnote{Harris (1989), p. 130.} Clearly, Rome was extracting resources from Spain as early as 203, and despite the paucity of evidence, it likely continued to do so in the decades thereafter. That said, as long as Rome was benefitting from its occupation of Spain, there is no reason to suppose that a need for a specific system of taxation was recognised. Richardson suggests that Gracchus’ own measures did not reflect the will of the senate, but were undertaken on his own initiative.\footnote{Richardson (1986), p. 120.} Indeed, whatever fiscal arrangements were made by Gracchus, it is clear that the governors who followed him felt no obligation to abide by them. What is significant, however, is that the senate itself chose to enforce a set of arrangements that were in line with Gracchus’. The senators who counselled the Spanish delegates not only had connections with Spain, but were among the most prominent of the period. It is, of course, possible that aristocratic competition, or senatorial self-interest, played a role in these trials. If Livy can be trusted on the point, the senate was believed to have manipulated events to mitigate the damage produced by them. Nonetheless, the senate’s decisions demonstrate an interest in asserting the authority of the senate over governors, and Gracchus’ arrangements could have been the basis for their decisions. Whatever the earlier situation, in 171 the senate selected the example of a recent, successful governor in order to define a new set of fiscal arrangements in Spain, with clearer rules for the extraction of grain. This would explain why Gracchus’ name was invoked by both the
senate and the Spanish in the years to come. Indeed, it may be that Gracchus’ name still carried weight decades later.

In 123, Spanish grain again came to the attention of the senate, when C. Gracchus is said to have persuaded the senate to address the actions of Q. Fabius Maximus Allobrogicus. The latter, as propraetor, sent grain to Rome which had been improperly acquired. Through Gracchus’ influence, the senate responded by selling the grain, remitting the money to the cities of Spain, and censuring Fabius. No lasting damage seems to have been done to Fabius, given that he was elected consul only two years later. Furthermore, as an opponent of Gaius’ legislation, it is entirely likely that the censure vote was connected more with politics in Rome than with concern for Spanish cities. Nonetheless, Fabius’ abuses seem to have been genuine. Gaius, meanwhile, may have presented his actions as an effort to uphold his father’s settlement.

Precisely how the vicensuma operated is unclear. In Richardson’s view, cash could be remitted in lieu of grain, at the discretion of the governors who set the price in a frumenti aestimatio. The reforms described by Livy in the year 171 relate directly to abuses involved in this procedure. Alternately, it may be that the process involved a mandatory sale of five percent of the grain crop to the Roman authorities at a fixed, presumably low, price. It has also been suggested that the funds raised by sale of this

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96 E.g., App., Hisp. VIII.44.
97 Plat., C. Gracch. VI.2. οἴον ἢν καὶ τὸ περὶ τοῦ σίτου δόγμα μετριῶτατον καὶ κάλλιστον, ὃν ἐπεμψε μὲν εὖ Ἱβηρίας Φάβιος ἀντιστράτηγος, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἐπείτε τὴν βουλὴν ἀποδομεῖν τὸν σίτου αναπέρασαι ταῖς πόλεσι τὸ ἀργύριον, καὶ προσεπαιτάσσαθαι τὸν φάβιον...
98 Richardson (1976), p. 150.
99 Ibid., p. 149.
portion of the grain were remitted to the Roman government,\textsuperscript{101} though this appears to be conflation of the \textit{vicensuma} with the fixed \textit{stipendium}.\textsuperscript{102}

What does the nature of the \textit{vicensuma} demonstrate about individuals participating in the grain trade in Spain? If it was possible for the Spanish to remit cash \textit{in lieu} of grain, then a private grain trade must have existed to allow funds to be raised. Moreover, given that coinage was only just coming into use in Spain in the early second century, such a market is likely to have involved traders from Italy. Most of the grain remitted in kind was probably used to supply the armies in the provinces, but any surplus amount would have been shipped to Rome, just as occurred in 203. A spectrum of individuals, analogous to that in Sicily, would have been involved in such trade, though the Spanish trade was likely to be more variable, and less lucrative, than the Sicilian.

Despite the similar dates at which the Spanish and Sicilian grain began to be exploited by Rome, the grain trade of the regions took a different trajectory. The \textit{lex Hieronica} was implemented across Sicily shortly after the fall of Syracuse, yet there is no evidence for the existence of a system for the extraction of grain from Spain until the 170s. In effect, a pre-existing system persisted in both areas. In Sicily, this consisted of an effective, centrally organised tax system, operating in a relatively urbanised society. In Spain, while the matter is open to debate, it appears that governors were free to extract grain almost as they saw fit. The surpluses produced there were more limited, and there was no pre-existing administrative regime to efficiently extract them. These factors must have reduced the amount of grain available for trade, and this situation would have been exacerbated by the demands of the army. The absence of a document

\textsuperscript{101} Rickman (1980), p. 197.
\textsuperscript{102} Richardson (1976), p. 149-150.
such as the *Verrines* makes it difficult to characterise conditions in Spain. Nonetheless, a lower volume of trade might correspond with the involvement of fewer individuals, and with the grain trade tending to be on a more local level. Furthermore, those who had invested in grain shipping might have preferred the more secure returns offered by the Sicilian trade. A spectrum of individuals might still have traded in Spanish grain, but under average conditions, a more limited range of traders is likely.

### 3.5 – The Sardinian Grain Trade

Much like Sicily, Sardinia is known to have been exploited by Rome as a source of grain from as early as the final years of the Second Punic War. Perhaps partly due to its proximity to Rome, Cicero was able to count the island among the three key suppliers of grain for the republic.\(^{103}\) In contrast to Sicily, however, Sardinia had a reputation as a distinctly unhealthy place,\(^{104}\) and experienced a series of military campaigns against the indigenous peoples of the interior. A contrast also exists in the evidence pertaining to these two islands. Nothing comparable to the *Verrines*, with its extensive treatment of the abuses of the Sicilian grain tithe, is available for Sardinia. As a result, only more limited conclusions can be reached about the grain trade in Sardinia.

As early as 215, we hear of allied communities in Sardinia supplying the Roman garrison there,\(^ {105}\) though one may question how voluntary these contributions were.\(^ {106}\) In the same year, Livy describes the Carthaginians being encouraged by the Sardinian

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\(^{103}\) Cic., *Leg. Man.* 12.34. *...inde Sardiniam cum classe venit atque haec tria frumentaria subsidia rei publicae firmissimis praesidiosis classibusque munivit.*

\(^{104}\) Strabo, V.2.7. *τῇ δ’ ἀρετῇ τῶν τόπων ἀντίτάττεται τίς καὶ μοχθηρία νοσερὰ γὰρ ἡ νῆσος τοῦ θέρους...*

\(^{105}\) Livy, XXIII.21. *...Cornelio in Sardinia ciuitates sociae benefique contulereunt.*

Hampsicora to send forces to the island. Part of Hampsicora’s argument for their involvement invokes the excessive demands for grain which Rome had placed on the Sardinians.\textsuperscript{107} The Carthaginians accepted Hampsicora’s invitation, but their attack and the revolt of some of Sardinia’s inhabitants were defeated. As was typical, the defeated communities were compelled to pay money or grain, according to their ability or their degree of involvement as Livy says.\textsuperscript{108} Sufficient grain was exacted from Sardinia, not just to supply the garrison, but to allow some quantity to be sent to Rome.\textsuperscript{109} Several times during the remaining years of the war, notice is given of grain being sent from Sardinia to Rome, and/or to the armies.\textsuperscript{110} In 202, the large quantity of grain shipped from Sicily and Sardinia to Rome depressed the price of grain to such an extent that the sailors who had conveyed it were simply paid in kind.\textsuperscript{111} Whether this referred to public or private grain is unclear, but the merchants involved evidently received the market rate in Rome, rather than a pre-established price.

The end of the Second Punic War does not appear to have substantially altered the way in which Sardinian grain was exploited. Occasionally, the island would be subjected to a second grain tithe. In all the instances cited by Livy, the additional demand for grain was ultimately created by Roman campaigns in Greece. In 191, this grain was sent to Rome, apparently to compensate for the diversion of Sicilian grain to Greece.\textsuperscript{112} A similar redistribution plan was implemented in the following year, though

\begin{footnotes}
\item[107] Livy, XXIII.32. \textit{...ad hoc fessos iam animos Sardorum esse diuturnitate imperii Romani, et proximo iis anno acerbe atque auare imperatum; graui tributo et conlatione iniqua frumenti pressos...}
\item[108] Livy, XXIII.41. \textit{...quibus stipendio frumentosque imperato pro cuiusque aut uiribus aut delicto Carales exercitum reduxit.}
\item[109] Livy, XXIII.41. \textit{...et stipendium quaestoribus, frumentum aedilibus, captuos Q. Faluo praetori tradit.}
\item[110] Livy, XXV.20: Sardinian grain shipped via Ostia to the army in Campania. XXIX.36; XXX.24: Shipments to Scipio’s army in Africa in 204 and 203.
\item[111] Livy, XXX.38. \textit{...per eos dies commeatus ex Sicilia Sardiniaeque tantam uilitatem annonae fecerunt ut pro vectura frumentum nautis mercator relinqueret.}
\item[112] Livy, XXXVI.2. \textit{idem L. Oppio de alteris decumis exigendis in Sardinia imperatum; ceterum non in Graeciam sed Romam id frumentum portari placere.}
\end{footnotes}
Sardinian grain was sent to both the army and to Rome. Later, in 171, the army in Macedonia was supplied with a combination of Sicilian and Sardinian grain. As was discussed with regard to military supply in Chapter Two, this grain was probably conveyed by traders contracted for the purpose. No doubt a similar group of traders would have been involved in shipping grain, public or private, under the normal circumstance of a single tithe.

Repeated and excessive exactions of grain may have contributed to unrest on the island, as had been the case during the Second Punic War. Following a revolt by the indigenous Ilienses in 178, ambassadors from Sardinia travelled to Rome. Part of their appeal to the senate involved a claim that the fields had been abandoned, no doubt because a perceived threat to the agricultural output of the island was likely to motivate the senate. In response, Sardinia was assigned as a consular province to Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, who defeated the Ilienses in campaigns in 177 and 176. As punishment for this revolt, additional taxes and grain were levied from the defeated. This outcome ensured that the peoples of the interior of Sardinia were thereafter compelled to contribute money and/or grain, as was presumably Rome’s objective from the outset.

The available sources do not reveal precisely how the tithe system normally operated in Sardinia. Whatever the system, however, it appears to have been open to abuse by the governor, as was the case in Sicily. Although we lack a source comparable to the Verrines, Cicero’s pro Scauro does comment on the behaviour of a governor of

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113 Livy, XXXVII.2. *Siculum omne frumentum in Aetoliam ad exercitum portari iussum, ex Sardinia pars Romam pars in Aetoliam, eodem quo Siculum.*
114 Livy, XLI.31. *praetoribus, qui eas provincias sortiti essent, mandari placuit, ut alteras decumas Siculis Sardisque imperarent, quod frumentum ad exercitum in Macedoniam portaretur.*
116 Livy, XLI.6.
117 Livy, XLI.17. *omnes Sardorum populi, qui defecerant, in dicionem redacti. stipendiariis veteribus duplex vectigal imperatum exactumque; ceteri frumentum contulerunt.*
Sardinia, though from the perspective of the defence. Unfortunately, the extant portions of this speech concentrate on Scaurus’ character, rather than on the particulars of the case against him. All that can be gleaned from Cicero is that the former governor was accused of making improper demands and requisitions, which were probably related to a supposed crimen frumentarium, the details of which are not elaborated. It is entirely possible that Scaurus was involved in abuses comparable to those of Verres, but their precise details remain a mystery to us.

It is clear, nonetheless, that there were landholders in Sardinia of Italian origin. Epigraphic evidence, in the form of boundary markers, refers to Patulchiae, Euthychiae (possibly from Magna Graecia), and Numisiae, all of whom apparently held land in Sardinia in the 1st or 2nd centuries BC. The presence of Italian family names has been taken as evidence for the development of latifundia in Sardinia during this period. Caution is needed, however, since the simple presence of large estates need not signify that they dominated the agricultural economy. In part, the assumption that Sardinian agriculture was dominated by latifundia is rooted in a comparison with the situation in Sicily, though it is not clear that latifundia were so prevalent even there. Given the unhealthy reputation of the island, Italian landholders may have been less likely to be resident there than holders of land in Sicily. Regardless, the operation of such farms would have relied on the use of agents, who may themselves have been of Italian origin.

It is difficult to reach conclusions about the Sardinian grain trade, and care must be taken in analogising with other regions. The island’s indigenous people were subject

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119 Cic., Scaur. 18, 21 and 22.
122 Ibid., p. 174, 206.
to repeated exactions of grain, much as was the case in Spain. Sardinia was also subject to a combination of monetary taxation and taxation in kind, as in Spain. On the other hand, Italians clearly held land in Sardinia, and the island was subject to a tithe as was Sicily. The ambassadors who came from the island in 178 probably originated from the more urbanised, and more heavily agricultural, SW of the island. This may suggest that a tithe system was implemented more quickly in that region. Perhaps Sardinia should be viewed as a sort of mid-point between Spain and Sicily, with the interior regions comparable to the former, and the coastal regions more akin to the latter. In that case, the collection of grain in the southwest, and it’s shipment to Rome, might be modelled on the Sicilian analog, while recognising that conditions were not uniform across Sardinia.

3.6 – The African Grain Trade

After the destruction of Carthage in 146, Rome found itself in control of a large area of fertile territory around the coastal cities and in the Bagradas valley.124 Even at the outbreak of the Third Punic War, Italian traders had been present in Carthage itself, when they are said to have suffered abuse at the hands of Carthaginians outraged by Roman demands.125 Over time, Africa would become a major source of grain for Rome, with substantial areas in the Bagradas valley incorporated into imperial estates by the

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125 Appian, Pun. VIII.92. Ἔτεροι δὲ τῶν Ἰταλών, οἱ ἔτι παρ’ αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐν αἰφνιδίῳ καὶ ἀκμακτῳ κακῷ ἠσαν, ἐλυμαίνοντο ποικίλως, ἐπιλέγοντες ὁμήρων πέρι καὶ ὀπλῶν καὶ ἀπάτης ἀμύνεοθαί.
time of Nero. In the late republic, however, one may identify the presence of both individuals involved in farming, and of grain traders.

The earliest instance in which the actual settlement of Italians in Africa can be demonstrated is that of C. Gracchus’ attempt to found a colony on the site of Carthage, as established by the *lex Rubria*. Although the law was swiftly repealed, a group of colonists that may have numbered in the thousands had already been dispatched to Africa, rendering questionable the legal basis of their land tenure. A portion of the *lex agraria* of 111 BC was thus dedicated to addressing this situation, by having the present possessors of land originally assigned under the *lex Rubria* declare their ownership to a *duovir* assigned the task. While the situation was more complex than has been described here, the important question is the extent to which a significant presence of Italian origin is indicated. In Brunt’s view the *lex agraria*, as indicated by its frequent references to the management of land by *magistri* or *procuratores*, indicates that the bulk of the land was held by absentee landlords rather than emigrant peasants. Indeed, the law makes frequent references to both colonists and those who could be regarded as colonists, which indicates the possible presence of owners of various statuses. This is further indicated by the fact that the original land grants seem to have been of varying sizes. While it is difficult to ascertain an exact population figure for these settlers, the

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128 Ibid. Lines 51, 56, 69: [--- eiusu]e rei procurandae causa erit. 56:[--- ut]ei curator eius profiteatur, item utei ---]o edicito utei is, quei ab bonorum emptore magistro curator[ue emerit ---]. 69: quo ita emptum esse comperiet[ur, tutoreue ei]us procuratoreue eius hereidue quoius eorum de eo agro.
129 In Crawford’s version of line 60 of the *lex*, *equites* received 200 *iugera*, while *pedites* received a lesser amount. Even without relying on reconstruction, however, there are clearly two parallel clauses in the law that describe the amount of land to be granted to two different groups. Brunt, p. 217, uses the figure of 200 *iugera* as evidence that the land grants were not to the “proletariat”, but does not seem to have been aware of the existence of smaller grants of land.
presence of a migrant population, whether of free-holders or of agents, is apparent. Perhaps some indication of the eventual impact of this population is provided by the claim that, by the time of Caesar’s campaign in Africa, his opponents were able to raise a force of some 12,000 men. These individuals appear to have been citizens drawn from a resident population in Africa, and could easily be descendants of the earlier colonists around Carthage.

In the wake of the destruction of Carthage, a city with a population of perhaps 200,000-300,000 and thus a major consumer of grain, the hinterland of the city and the Bagradas valley ought to have been producing a substantial surplus. Just as this land attracted settlement from Italy, the availability of a reliable surplus in Africa would have presented a significant opportunity for Italian merchants. Given this situation, and given the presence of large estates under Italian ownership, it comes as no surprise that there is also evidence for the presence of Italian merchants in a number of cities in Africa, possibly trading in grain. During the Jugurthine War, Metellus installed a garrison in the city of Vaga shortly after assuming his command in Numidia in 109. Sallust specifically indicates that a large number of Italian merchants were present in Vaga, and that it was a significant centre of trade in Numidia. Moreover, he claims that Metellus placed a garrison there specifically because he believed that the traffic of merchants and goods through the city would permit his army to be supplied more easily. Admittedly, the presence of grain and of Italian traders doesn’t quite demonstrate that Italians were

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130 Caesar, B. Afr. 19. legiones conscriptas ex cuiusquam medi generis amplius XII milibus. See also 35: cives Romani qui sunt in legion III. et VI, though no origin is explicitly given for these troops.
132 Sall., Iug. XLVII.1. ... Vaga, forum rerum venalium totius regni maxime celebratum, ubi et incolere et mercari consueuerant Italici generis multi mortales.
133 Sall., Iug. XLVII.1. ... ratus, id quod res monebat, frequentiam negotiatorum et commeatu iuvaturam exercitum et iam paratis rebus munimento fore.
trading in grain, but it seems unlikely that they would have refrained from that trade if
they could profit from it.

During the African War in 46, Caesar likewise provided the town of Thysdra
with a garrison, and again military supply was the motivation. In this instance, three-
hundred thousand *modii* of wheat were already present in the town, having been brought
there by Italian *negotiatores* and farmers.\(^{134}\) Clearly in this instance, the *negotiatores*
were involved in the grain trade, and presumably involved in commercial relationships
with farmers in the region. These are not the only locations in which *negotiatores* from
Italy are known to have been present. Cirta, Utica, Thapsus, and Hadrumetum all hosted
such individuals. While no explicit connections are made between merchants in these
towns and the grain trade, it is entirely possible that grain was among the *negotia* of
some of them.

The grain trade in Africa appears to have had some broad similarities with that
in Sicily. Both regions were highly productive, and in both there is evidence of a
substantial number of merchants. In Africa, however, the evidence of the *lex agraria*
suggests the presence of a significant number of individuals involved in agriculture,
either as resident-owners or as agents. Even in Sicily, however, there was some
evidence of land ownership by Italians. Given the similarities between Sicily and Africa
in this context, a comparable range of traders should be expected to be present in both
provinces.

\(^{134}\) *Caes., B. Afr.* 36.
3.7 – The Gallic Grain Trade

Much like the Ebro valley in Spain, areas of Gaul could act as a source of grain for Rome, though the region was normally of only secondary importance during the republic. Evidence for the grain trade in this region only becomes available in the 1st century, principally in the context of two of Cicero’s legal speeches. Nonetheless, traders from Italy may have been active in the region centuries earlier. Etruscan amphorae and other vessels have been found along the coast of southern France, covering the period from the late 7th to 4th centuries. Such material has also been found in the Phocaean Greek settlement of Massilia/Marseille in the first decades after its foundation in 600. The presence of these goods does not definitely confirm the presence of traders from Italy, but they, along with the Etruscan language inscription from Pech Maho, are suggestive.

Rome would subsequently claim a long-standing relationship with Massilia, with an alliance between the two ostensibly initiated ca. 400. This pact was clearly operative during the Second Punic War, when Massilia briefly contributed ships to support the Roman campaign in Spain. The alliance was again invoked in 155/4, when Rome campaigned against Ligurians east of Massilia, at the request of the Massiliots. Conflict between Massilia and the Salluvii in 125 led to direct Roman involvement in Transalpine Gaul, and provided a pretext for the occupation of non-Massiliot territory

138 Ibid., p. 248. Dietler (2010), p. 94, argues that, despite the difficulties inherent in associating the origin of artefacts with that of traders, traders are unlikely to have been “ethnically homogeneous”, therefore the presence of at least some traders from Italy can be assumed.
by the end of the decade.\textsuperscript{140} It is unclear, based on the evidence available, if Rome officially established a province there by means of a \textit{lex provincia} at this time, or some decades later.\textsuperscript{141} Whatever the legal situation elsewhere in the region, Massilia maintained both formal political independence (until 49), and economic importance with respect to trade up the Rhone. After Marius defeated the Teutones in 102, customs revenues from the canal which he had built in support of the war were assigned to Massilia, thus demonstrating the city’s continued economic role. Amphorae from indigenous sites in the region demonstrate that wine and olive oil were imported from Italy during the second century.\textsuperscript{142} As with the earlier period, this is not definite proof that Italian traders were present. Nonetheless, it is likely that a significant portion of this trade passed through Massilia and that such traders were present there.

Shortly after the establishment of Roman military control along the Gallic coast, a \textit{colonia} was established at Narbo/Narbonne in 118, with L. Licinius Crassus and Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus as its commissioners.\textsuperscript{143} As a settlement outside Italy, yet formally established through a \textit{deductio} with legally appointed commissioners, Narbo was highly unusual. There had been a recent precedent, with the Gracchan foundation of Junonia in 122, though the \textit{lex Rubria} which had authorised that colony was repealed amid deadly violence only two years thereafter. Three years later, and despite the still recent bloodshed, Crassus successfully promoted the foundation of Narbo. One can only speculate as to how he gained the approval, tacit or otherwise, of the senate. The outcome, however, was the establishment of a group of Roman citizens in a strategic

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid, p. 24.
\textsuperscript{141} Goudineau (1978), p. 692. Ebel (1976) hypothesised a date in the late 70s, associated with Pompey’s campaign against Sertorius, though this has not been broadly accepted.
\textsuperscript{143} Levick (1971), p. 170.
location, on the Mediterranean terminus of a route to the Atlantic via the area of modern Toulouse and along the Garonne. The importance of trade along this route is clearly demonstrated in the 70s, as M. Fonteius was accused of illegally exacting *portoria* on Italian wine shipped through the area while governor, a charge which Cicero deems the most significant.

Two of Cicero’s speeches provide the earliest direct accounts of Roman economic activities in Gaul. In the first of these, delivered in 81, Cicero sought to defend P. Quinctius against the claims of Sextus Naevius. The two had become business partners after the death of Quinctius’ brother, and an estate in Gaul was held in common. In the second speech, delivered sometime after 70, Cicero defended the former governor M. Fonteius before the *quaestio de repetundis*. According to Cicero, Fonteius stood accused by the Gauls of various financial abuses. While the legal intricacies of the cases are not a concern here, each speech includes a variety of incidental details on conditions in Gaul in the early first century. On this basis, comments can be made on contemporary land holding and trade in the province.

At the centre of the dispute between Quinctius and Naevius was a parcel of land, described by Cicero as *saltu agroque*, from which Quinctius was forcibly driven by the communally owned slaves. The primary use of these lands appears to have been to allow cattle-raising, though Quinctius and Naevius themselves dwelt there for a time. It is an important element of Cicero’s argument that, although Quinctius and Naevius lived in Gaul for nearly a year, Naevius did not take the opportunity to discuss the debts

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146 Ebel (1976), p. 92.
147 Cic., Quinct. VI.28. ... Quinctius interea contra ius, consuetudinem, edicta praetorum de saltu agroque communi a servis communibus vi detruditur.
148 Cic., Quinct. III.12. erat ei pecuaria res ampla et rustica sane bene culta et fructuosa.
he later claimed were owed to him by Quinctius. Moreover, Cicero claims that Quinctius was forcibly separated from his household lares and penates.\footnote{Cic., Quinct. XXVI.83. ... a suis dis penatibus eiectus...: XXVII.84 ... domino a familia sua manus allatas esse ante suos lares familiares...} While this is a deliberate overstatement intended to provoke sympathy, it must have been plausible that there was a residence associated with this estate.

As becomes clear, Quinctius also owned other property in Gaul, solely in his own name.\footnote{Cic., Quinct. XXIX.90. in ipsa Gallia cognostis in praediprivata Quincti Sex. Naevium non venisse...} He was not alone. Quinctius himself had earmarked some property to be auctioned in Narbo, in order to allow him to settle some debts.\footnote{Cic., Quinct. IV.15. ... auctionem in Gallia P. hic Quinctius Narbone se facturum esse proscribit eorum rerum quae ipsius erant privatae.} Though it is unclear what property was involved, this measure suggests that a market for such property existed in Gaul at this time. That is to say, buyers must have been available.\footnote{See Ebel (1976), p. 92.} Better evidence for the extent of the Roman presence in Gaul is provided in the pro Fonteio. Cicero claims that Gaul is full of traders and Roman citizens, to the extent that any business undertaken there involved a citizen.\footnote{Cic., Font. V.11. Referta Gallia negotiatorum est, plena civium Romanorum. Nemo Gallorum sine cive Romano quicquam negotii gerit...} In this speech, however, Cicero attempts throughout to undercut the prosecution by arguing that its case is reliant on the testimony of Gauls, as opposed to Roman citizens. If no reliable witnesses could be produced from this ostensibly large citizen population, the opposing case would be correspondingly weakened. In the context of this hyperbole, Cicero offers a list of the individuals potentially involved in Gaul, specifically referring to farmers and ranchers.\footnote{Cic., Font. V.12 ... unum ex tanto negociatorum, colonorum, publicanorum, aratorum, pecuariorum numero testem producant...} Under the circumstances, it can be assumed that Cicero has in mind the owners of large estates. These estates might at times have played host to owners like Quinctius and Naevius, but would usually have operated under the direction of an agent.
Similarly, land in Gaul that appears to have been under the control of an Italian town must have been supervised by an agent of some description.\textsuperscript{155} Cicero’s list is repeated, in a slightly modified form, later in the speech when Cicero claims that these individuals unanimously defend Fonteius.\textsuperscript{156} The reference to \textit{ceteri negotiatores}, coming after \textit{agricolae} and \textit{pecuarii} in the list, was taken by Clemente as evidence that \textit{negotiatores} included agricultural interests among their affairs.\textsuperscript{157} This agrees well with the expectation that wealthier individuals would have had a diversity of business interests. No doubt, some of these individuals or their agents were involved in the private grain trade. Cicero also provides evidence for the public export of grain from Gaul. We are thus told that Fonteius ensured that grain was collected from the Gauls in order to support the war against Sertorius in Spain.\textsuperscript{158} It has been suggested that Fonteius’ governorship was a watershed moment in the organisation of the province, though his efforts were undertaken primarily to secure the area north of the Pyrenees and supply Pompey while he campaigned to the south.\textsuperscript{159} Even Gauls who were otherwise treated favourably were repeatedly compelled to provide grain, as well as money and cavalry.\textsuperscript{160} While these contributions were made under military compulsion, the repeated nature of the demands suggests something approaching a regular system of taxation.

If Gauls favoured by Rome were nonetheless forced to supply grain, what sort of treatment was given to those who were not so favoured? Cicero twice informs us that

\begin{itemize}
\item Cic., \textit{ad Fam.} 13.7. \textit{locutus sum tecum de agro vectigali municipi Atellani qui esset in Gallia...}
\item Cic., \textit{Font.} XX.46. \textit{... omnes illius provinciae publicani, agricolae, pecuarii, ceteri negotiatores uno animo M. Fonteium atque una voce defendunt.}
\item Cic., \textit{Font.} VI.13. \textit{... maximum frumenti numerum ad Hispaniense bellum tolerandum imperavit.}
\item Goudineau (1978), p. 692.
\item Cic., \textit{Font.} XII.27. \textit{quorum qui optima in causa sunt, equites, frumentum, pecuniam semel atque iterum ac saepius invitissimi dare coacti sunt...}
\end{itemize}

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they have been forced to forfeit their farms and lands.\footnote{Cic., Font. XII.27. ... ceteri partim ex veteribus bellis agro multati...; VI.13 ... qui erant hostes, subegit, qui proxime fuerant, eos ex iis agris, quibus erant multati, decedere coegit...} Although Cicero alleges that the Gaurs would be unreliable witnesses, it is almost certain that forfeiture of grain and land had been common in Gaul. One wonders how Quinctius’ disputed estate originally came into his brother’s possession. If it was part of his patrimony, as Cicero seems to imply, then it may have been held by the family for several decades,\footnote{Cic., Quinct. XXXI.98 ... e fundo ornatissimo ejectus, ignominiis omnibus appetitus, cum illum in suis paternis bonis dominari videtur... Quinctius, by the date of the speech, is said to be sexagesimo anno.} perhaps since shortly after the foundation of Narbo in 118. Precisely how Quinctius’ family gained this property, or any other in Gaul, is obscure, but much land must ultimately have been seized from the indigenous people.

The Ciceronian evidence demonstrates the presence of both traders and farmers from Italy in Transalpine Gaul in the first decades of the 1\textsuperscript{st} century, and it is likely that traders had long been present in the region. It is also clear that grain was shipped from Gaul to the army when its requirements dictated. What is somewhat lacking, however, is evidence of a broader role for Gallic grain in the Mediterranean trade during the republic. Nonetheless, under the empire it is clear that a large number of individuals were involved in shipping grain. An inscription of the 3\textsuperscript{rd} AD century refers to five \textit{corpora} of \textit{navicularii marini} based in Arles, employed by the \textit{annona}, and therefore involved in shipping grain to Rome.\footnote{CIL III.14165. ...naviculariorum marinariorum Arelatensis quinque corporum ... qui annonae deserviunt...} The presence of at least five distinct organisations shipping grain from Arles surely points to the scale of grain exports from Gaul in that period. Moreover, they engaged collectively in a dispute with the \textit{annona} and threatened the withdrawal of their services, a threat which could only have carried weight if they were a relatively important group. While this does not necessarily bear...
upon the situation in the republic, the presence of Italian landholders and traders then
may have initiated the pattern of trade visible in the later period.

3.8 – Conclusion

So far as the available evidence allows, a few patterns can be observed in the
grain trade in the regions that have been considered. In each instance, it appears to have
taken several decades before a system, other than direct military compulsion, was
established for the extraction of surplus grain. In Spain, Sardinia, and Gaul, it appears
that grain was regularly extracted from local populations, in connection with the
military activities of governors. In Sicily, although little can be said of the situation
prior to ca. 210, the implementation of the lex Hieronica across the island placed the
extraction of grain on a relatively regular footing.

Certainly in Sicily, Africa, and Gaul, as well as to some extent in Sardinia, we
have evidence for Roman ownership of large estates, though their overall extent in this
period remains unclear. Nonetheless, wealthy Romans clearly owned land overseas,
which was likely exploited under the supervision of agents/procurators. Meanwhile, at
least for Africa, there is some evidence for smaller landholdings, which would admit the
presence of a somewhat less wealthy class of individual. In each of these regions, one
also finds evidence for the presence of grain traders and shippers, involved in either the
private or the public trade, or some combination thereof. It is unclear to what extent
these individuals operated independently, or on behalf of wealthier individuals, but a
variety of roles seems likely. Unsurprisingly, the best evidence tends to concern the
wealthiest land-holders, and the public grain supply for Rome. By contrast, other land-holders, and the short and medium range grain trade, are much less visible to us.

Interestingly, the basic system of supplying the city of Rome by means of public contracts awarded to private shippers seems to have remained relatively stable. At no time does there appear to have been an effort to impose a uniform system for the collection of grain overseas. Instead, arrangements for the collection of grain were unique to each region, with governors administering the matter, usually as precedent dictated. Furthermore, there is little to indicate that individual entrepreneurs tended to specialise in grain over time. Despite the growth in the city of Rome, and the increasing extent of the empire, private merchants remained able to supply the city throughout the late republic. Correspondingly, the diaspora must have been large enough to handle the growing trade in grain. Other than in scale, however, the details of the grain trade remained constant.
Chapter Four – The Diversity of Traders

4.1 - Introduction

In the previous chapter, I established the general circumstances of trade in the late republic, applied the resulting model to a consideration of the grain trade, and drew some conclusions from it about the nature of the Roman diaspora in the west. A variety of goods other than grain were exchanged in the western Mediterranean during this period, and this chapter will examine the trade in those items, and those involved in it. Generally speaking, the trade in other goods occurred under different conditions from that in grain. Firstly, the restrictions imposed on trade by the low weight/volume ratio of grain are less relevant to the movement of other products. While other goods have their own unique properties, their higher weight/volume ratio means that a cargo of goods other than grain would normally have a relatively greater value, allowing for a greater profit per voyage. Smaller vessels would thus be able to ship these goods, while maintaining a profit. This implies that a relatively less wealthy group of individuals, less focussed on a single item of trade, could be involved. Secondly, while the grain trade was concerned primarily with supplying the city of Rome, the same dynamic need not apply to other goods. So, for example, wine was exported from Italy to the provinces, especially Gaul, as well as to Rome.

It is only possible to examine the trade in a subset of the goods that were exchanged. This is a consequence of the availability of adequate evidence. The pertinent literary sources occasionally provide information on long-distance trade, though these details are usually incidental. Thus, while Cicero’s forensic speeches allude to economic
conditions in Gaul and Sicily, such details are subordinate to his rhetorical purposes. On this sort of basis it is possible to discuss the trade in slaves (section 4.4). Meanwhile, archaeological evidence for trade is necessarily limited to those materials which have been preserved. Plant and animal products, and goods produced from those materials, survive only rarely, though some can be traced by their containers.\textsuperscript{1} So, for example, while textiles could well have been traded in the western Mediterranean, there is little evidence for such a trade, apart from military supply.\textsuperscript{2} Items such as metal ingots, finished metalwork, ceramics (both fine and coarse wares), marble, glass, and even \textit{objets d’art}, are more durable, and are known from shipwrecks.\textsuperscript{3} Of these goods, only some are found in the west in sufficient quantities to justify analysis, though it is worth noting that the rarer items could also have been traded.

Metal ingots are relatively common, but given their association with mining, will be discussed in the following chapter. Finished metal products are less common, but lead pipes and joints are known from the Las Amoladeras wreck (Spain, 125-100 BC), while adzes and parts of mills have been recovered from La Chrétienne J (Gaul, 125-75 BC).\textsuperscript{4} Ceramics, such as fine Campanian ware prior to ca. 50 BC, are commonly found in association with wine amphorae in shipwrecks. The distribution of Campanian ware on land in Gaul more or less mirrors that of the wine amphorae which they accompanied from Italy.\textsuperscript{5} Such evidence of a similar pattern of trade could indicate that a largely similar group of traders was involved in the movement of both commodities. Although most of the stone imported into Italy was eastern in origin, coloured marble quarried from Simitthus in northwestern Tunisia was a notable exception. Examples of

\textsuperscript{1} Wilson (2009), p. 214.
\textsuperscript{2} Harris (2007), p. 533.
\textsuperscript{3} Harris (2007), p. 534 (Table 19.1).
\textsuperscript{4} Parker (1992), p. 54, 144.
\textsuperscript{5} See Woolf (1998), p. 188, and section 4.2 below.
its use in *opus sectile* are known from houses in Ostia of the second century BC. M. Lepidus, cos. 78, was the first person known to Pliny to have used Numidian marble in Rome, for the *limina* of his doors, while columns of the same material were employed in a late 1st century portico. During the republic, Rome alone seems to have imported marble over great distances, and the city’s consumption continued to increase throughout the period, after its first use ca. 146. While the quarries were placed under imperial control by Tiberius, it is unclear how they were managed previously. Ownership by Romans seems likely, by analogy with metal mines in the west. The trade in works of art was principally with the eastern Mediterranean. While some portion of this was simply seized or stolen, it has been suggested that a portion of the money collected as *tributum* in the east was returned there via the purchase of art. Some evidence for this trade has been recovered from shipwrecks, such as bronze and marble statues from the Antikythera wreck. Although the wreck dates to 80 BC, at least some of the bronze statuary is as old as the 4th century. Some works of art were also moved to the west. The La Fourmigue C wreck, found off southern France and dated between 80 and 60, contained bronze couches inlaid with silver and copper. Three of Cicero’s letters to Atticus, sent in 67, include eager requests for specific items to be acquired and sent from Athens. The specific requests are, in each instance, accompanied by a more general one, for Atticus to send whatever other works he judges suitable. Clearly,

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12 Cic., *Att.* 1.9. *signa Megarica et Hermas...*; 1.10. *signa nostra et Hermeroclias...*
13 Cic., *Att.* 1.6. *tu velim, si qua ornamenta γνωρίσασθαι reperire poteris quae loci sint eius quem tu non ignores, ne praetermittas...*; 1.9. *quicquid eiusdem generis habebis dignum Academia tibi quod videbitur*
Athens was host to a significant market in art, destined for Italy. In the west itself, however, Sicily may also have acted as a source for art. Cicero provides an extensive list of the classes of item which he accuses Verres of seeking out and seizing if they suited his taste.\textsuperscript{14} There is certainly in element of hyperbole in Cicero’s claims about the scale of Verres’ rapacity, but no doubt the items described did attract the interest of wealthy Romans, and could be acquired in Sicily.

Given the state of the evidence, a detailed consideration of the social circumstances of trade can only be attempted for a limited range of goods. The trade in some food products, most notably wine, olive oil and garum, can be traced indirectly through finds of the amphorae in which they were commonly transported. Indeed, it is often the case that the locations of shipwrecks are known solely because of the presence of amphorae on the seafloor. While the trade in wine will be traced based on the evidence of amphorae in section 4.2, the situation with oil and garum is somewhat more challenging, and they will be dealt with in the following section. Section 4.4 will then consider the slave trade, while section 4.5 will focus on the social conditions of trade, and on the locations and patterns of movement of traders. Throughout, the objective of the discussion will be to use evidence concerning the conditions of trade to shed light on the traders of the diaspora.

\textsuperscript{14} Cic., Verr. 2.4.1. Nego in Sicilia tota, tam locupleti, tam vetere provincia, tot oppidis, tot familiis tam copiosis, ullum argentium vas, ullum Corinthium aut Deliacum fuisse, ullum gemmam aut margaritam, quicquam ex auro aut ebore factum, signum ullum aeneum, marmoreum, eburneum, nego ullam picturam neque in tabula neque in textili quin conquisierit, inspexerit, quod placitum sit abstulerit.
4.2 – Wine

As has been described, wine is one of the categories of food product whose trade can be traced indirectly through finds of amphorae, both on land and under water. In the western Mediterranean, easily the most numerically significant of these are the Dressel IA and IB, produced almost entirely on the north-west coast of Italy. The massive wine trade with Gaul during the century after ca. 125 was largely comprised of this type, though the earliest definite examples of it have been found at Numantia and thus date to just before 133.\footnote{Tchernia (1986), p. 42.} Also important is the Greco-Italic type, which first appeared in the mid 4th century, and which ultimately developed into the earliest Dressel I amphorae.\footnote{Loughton (2003), p. 179.} By contrast, the Lamboglia 2 type predominates in the Adriatic and Aegean, but represented only a small portion of the western trade.\footnote{Tchernia (1986), 68.} This evidence will first be used to describe the distribution of amphorae in the west, with a particular focus on Gaul. On that basis, comments will be made on the probable organisation of the wine trade and the personnel involved therein.

Wine amphorae have been found throughout the western Mediterranean, in contexts that demonstrate their contents were the object of long distance trade. While it is not possible to describe their distribution comprehensively in this chapter, and while Gaul was undoubtedly the foremost destination for wine in this period, some general comments on other regions of the west are pertinent. In North Africa, we find a shipwreck dominated by Lamboglia 2 amphorae,\footnote{Ibid, p. 68.} while in Carthage itself several
forms of Greco-Italic amphorae have been identified for the period prior to 146.\textsuperscript{19} Perhaps some of the Italians, whose presence in Carthage immediately before the outbreak of the Third Punic War is described by Appian,\textsuperscript{20} were involved in the wine trade. The Dressel 1 type is more common to the west and has been found in Morocco and Hippo.\textsuperscript{21}

In Sicily, Greco-Italic amphorae of various types (perhaps reflecting origins both local and from different regions of Italy) are widespread. In some instances, these bear the names of the owners of the vineyards on which the wines were produced, either in Greek or in Latin. So, for example, the name C. ARISTO / ΓΑΙΟϹΑΡΙϹΤΟΝ appears in both languages.\textsuperscript{22} To these may be added instances of the name TI.Q.IVENTI, an amphora label also found in the eastern Mediterranean, and in the southern mainland of Italy.\textsuperscript{23} This name may be connected with a senatorial family, the Iuventii,\textsuperscript{24} the earliest known member of which was a *tribunus militum* in 197, while another, M’ Iuventius Thalna, held the consulship in 163.\textsuperscript{25} Given a date for these amphorae in the late 3rd or early 2nd century,\textsuperscript{26} members of the Roman elite were clearly involved in the production of wine that was traded to Sicily and beyond shortly after the Second Punic War. It is unclear if this wine was produced in Sicily or mainland Italy,\textsuperscript{27} but the widespread distribution of the amphorae demonstrates the extent over which it was traded.

Additional evidence of a wine trade encompassing Sicily and the eastern Mediterranean

\textsuperscript{19} Will (1982), p. 352.
\textsuperscript{20} App., *Pun.* VIII.
\textsuperscript{21} Tchernia (1986), p. 75.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid, p. 49.
\textsuperscript{24} Tchernia (1986), p. 50.
\textsuperscript{25} Broughton, *MRR*, p. 334, 440.
\textsuperscript{26} Will (1982), p. 348.
\textsuperscript{27} Tchernia (1986), p. 50-51, suggests production in Sicily, and thus viniculture by Roman landowners there. This is based on the concentration of particular examples of certain labels on the island, which he acknowledges is not decisive evidence in favour of local production.
is provided by amphora labels bearing the name TR.LOISIO. These have been linked with one Trebius Loisios, identified in an inscription from Delos as a trader owing a debt to the Temple of Apollo.\textsuperscript{28} In short, from the start of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} century, wine from southern Italy and/or Sicily was being traded in the central and eastern Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{29}

In Spain and the Balearic Islands, all three of the types thus far considered have been found. Lamboglia 2 dominates the amphora finds in a shipwreck off the coast of Catalonia,\textsuperscript{30} while Greco-Italic amphorae are known from a number of coastal sites.\textsuperscript{31} Sherds of Dressel 1 are common on indigenous sites in Spain, but their numbers are significantly outweighed by those found at Emporion and in the mining areas of the Sierra Morena and near Carthago Nova.\textsuperscript{32} This pattern, consisting of finds predominantly in mining areas and an abundance of amphorae along the Iberian coast rather than the interior, has some superficial parallels in Gaul. The quantity sold to indigenous peoples relative to immigrants is unclear and, in any case, the situation probably varied between regions and over time. Nonetheless, the quantities of wine imported into Gaul were of a different order of magnitude, and it is on that region that I shall now concentrate.

No shortage of superlatives has been used to describe the scale of the wine trade from Italy to Gaul during the last century of the republic. To Tchernia, it is a unique phenomenon representing “the only important trade movement exporting food products over large distances where the principle destination was not Rome or the armies”.\textsuperscript{33} More recently, Dietler has described wine as “the overwhelmingly dominant form of

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{28} Tchernia (1986), p. 49.
\item\textsuperscript{29} Nicolet (1994), p. 614-615.
\item\textsuperscript{30} Ibid, p. 68.
\item\textsuperscript{31} Will (1982), p. 344, 354.
\item\textsuperscript{32} Tchernia (1986), p. 84.
\item\textsuperscript{33} Tchernia (1983), p. 91.
\end{itemize}
alien food desired by native peoples of Mediterranean France”. Based on known shipwrecks, and the probable rate at which wrecks occurred, an average annual export of at least 50,000 hL, and perhaps as much as 120,000 to 150,000 hL, has been estimated. This would have entailed the shipment of as many as 650,000 amphorae per year. So much wine was available that, at least in some regions, amphorae are common on almost every indigenous site.

The geographic extent of the trade can be demonstrated, to some extent, by distribution maps of find sites. The Dressel I amphorae which comprised the vast majority of those imported can be found throughout Gaul, and find spots tend to cluster along the coast and rivers. Simple mapping of find sites, however, may obscure the great abundance of amphorae found in certain locations. At Toulouse alone, Tchernia estimates that amphorae may number in the hundreds of thousands, which can be compared with a total of 30 fragments in the three departments of lower Normandy. While the area from Narbonne to Toulouse represents a major concentration of amphorae, six locations north-east of the Massif-Central (in the territory of the Aedui, Arverni, and Segusiavi) can also boast amphorae numbering in the tens of thousands. By contrast, some 26 of France’s 95 departments possess less than five find sites, mostly in eastern and northern areas. Even given the need to account for possible biases introduced by varying degrees of archaeological exploration, and conditions of

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37 Tchernia (1986), p. 80, 82. Loughton (2003) identifies seventeen sites in Lower Normandy, as opposed to Tchernia’s four, but this does not disturb the point that the abundance of amphorae across France is heavily skewed in favour of certain areas.
38 Loughton (2003), p. 192. Loughton’s map identifies Bibracte, Châlon-sur-Saône, Gergovie, Corent, Jouvevre, and Essalois as such “prolific sites”.
40 Tchernia (1986), p. 76. The Dressel 1 type may, however, be less prone to the vagaries of exploration, precisely because the type is well known, and well associated with the wine trade.
deposition, it is clear that certain regions of Gaul imported exceptional quantities of wine in comparison with other regions.

The wine trade from Italy to Gaul was undoubtedly significant, yet it was a particular phenomenon of the period from approximately 125 – 25 BC. Nonetheless, a trade in wine in Gaul had existed for centuries previously, in the hands of a series of foreign peoples who each had the capacity to transport goods overseas. Prior to, and even for some decades after the foundation of Massilia, wine was shipped from Etruria to the coast of southern France. There is even some evidence that traders from Etruria were themselves present in the region, as suggested by the presence of Etruscan language graffiti at Lattes. After 525, however, Massiliote amphorae replaced Etruscan along the Mediterranean coast of France, and began to appear in the interior. The predominance of Massiliote wine would be maintained until the second century, when it was replaced by Italian imports. In 175 BC, 25% of amphorae in France originated in Italy, a figure which rises to 66% by 150, and 99.3% by the end of the century. Even in Marseille, one finds that imports from Italy dominated the market from this time. Initially, these consisted primarily of Greco-Italic amphorae, most of which are found along the Mediterranean coast, but with a scattering in central France. The overall number of these amphorae remained relatively small, however, and it was only after ca. 125 that the overall quantity of wine imported from Italy grew dramatically. This is precisely the period in which Dressel I amphorae came into

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42 Dietler (2010), p. 95.
43 Ibid, p. 97.
44 Ibid, p. 120.
widespread use, and when Rome established a permanent military presence in Transalpine Gaul.

Tchernia has suggested that the Roman conquest of Gallia Narbonensis and the rapid growth of Italian exports to Gaul were not coincidental, and that military control produced safer conditions under which traders could operate inland more securely.\(^48\) Certainly, the abundance of amphorae located in the vicinity of Toulouse, and in the nearby mining area of the Aude, seems likely to be connected with the Roman foundation of Narbo in 118. This foundation could have provided a secure location, facilitating the movement of traders further inland. While it may go too far to suggest that Narbo was founded specifically to facilitate the trade in wine, the Romans are unlikely to have been blind to its economic potential.\(^49\) Furthermore, whether intentionally or otherwise, Narbo clearly contributed to the competitive replacement of Massiliote wine with Italian imports. In this regard, one is reminded of the economic impact of Delos on Rhodes during roughly the same period, though in contrast to the Rhodian case, there is no evidence that Rome intentionally sought this outcome. Regardless of the relative advantages of Italian traders in this period, demand among the Gauls must have been a key factor, without which this wine trade could not have developed.\(^50\) It is against the background of Gallic demand, and Roman military involvement, that the activities of wine traders must be considered.

The distribution of amphorae, both geographically and chronologically, has implications for the operation of the wine trade. Certain regions of Gaul received much

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\(^{49}\) The potential for trade through Narbo is likely to have been only one of several considerations which lead to its creation. The recent foundation of Junonia had already been a *populāritēs* project, which gained support by virtue of its promise of land distribution. No doubt Narbo met a variety of objectives, as would have been necessary to attain relatively broad support in the senate for its establishment, particularly given the fate of Junonia after the death of C. Gracchus.

\(^{50}\) Dietler (2010), p. 194.
larger quantities of wine than others, and to some extent this reflects the ease with which those regions could be accessed from the Mediterranean coast. As Woolf has pointed out, the social contexts under which wine was consumed were impacted by its cost and availability.\textsuperscript{51} In the north and east, consumption of wine would have been restricted to a narrower segment of society, and/or a smaller set of occasions, than in the south. A corresponding pattern of variation may have existed in terms of trade. In the north and east, the very cost and unavailability of wine may have meant that it was an object of reciprocal exchange rather than of trade. Such exchanges would necessarily have been in the hands of the Gallic elite.\textsuperscript{52} At the other extreme, in Narbonne and Toulouse, we should expect the wine trade to be almost exclusively in the hands of Italians, whether acting on their own behalf or as agents of others. These are the individuals from whom, as Cicero describes, Fonteius was accused of exacting *portoria.*\textsuperscript{53} It may have been part of Cicero’s argument that these levies should be viewed as applying only to the Gauls.\textsuperscript{54} Nonetheless, even if these charges were passed on to the end consumer, it was Roman merchants who initially had to pay them.

In central Gaul, given the presence of tens of thousands of amphorae on several indigenous sites, we might expect that Italian traders were physically present, whether permanently or periodically. These may have acted as “cross-cultural brokers” and mediated exchange on both sides in a region beyond nominal Roman control in a relationship reminiscent of White’s middle ground.\textsuperscript{55} If Italian traders were present at

\textsuperscript{51} Woolf (1998), p. 179.
\textsuperscript{52} See, however, Dietler (2010), p. 220, who notes that access to wine could reinforce existing elites, or allow other individuals to make a claim to elite status.
\textsuperscript{53} Cic., Font. IX.19. *crimen a Plaetorio, iudices, ita constitutum est, M. Fonteio non in Gallia primum venisse in mentem ut portorium vini institueret, sed hac inita tamen ad proposita ratione Roma profectum.*
Arles from as early as 180, then this is precisely the sort of role we would expect them to have undertaken. A similar role may have been undertaken by the freedman P. Umbrenus, who became entangled in the Catilinarian affair precisely because of his familiarity with leading individuals among the Allobroges. While Umbrenus’ particular business activities are not specified, his knowledge and influence among the Allobroges suggest that he had adopted a mediating role in Gaul. Between the areas of mass importation, and those where wine was a rare commodity, an intermediate situation may have prevailed, with the movement of wine increasingly in Gallic hands.

One should also consider the changes in the conditions of trade contingent on the dramatic growth in the scale of the wine trade in the last quarter of the 2nd century. Prior to 125, there was a wine trade between Italy and Gaul, but the smaller quantities involved suggest qualitative differences. For example, shipwreck evidence indicates that, although cargoes even in the earlier period were dominated by wine and ceramic tableware, the origins of this wine were heterogeneous. Moreover, wine in Greco-Italic amphorae could simply have travelled to Gaul via cabotage, or perhaps, as Tchernia has suggested, arrived there as a by-product of shipments of wine to Italians in Spain. By contrast, the period after 125 sees a dramatic shift. Ships carrying wine became far larger, with an average capacity twenty times that of the earlier period. From being comparatively minor or even incidental, the wine trade between Italy and Mediterranean Gaul became direct and focussed.

57 Sall., Cat. 40. Umbrenus quod in Gallia negotiatus erat, plerisque principibus civitatum notus erat atque eos novaret. See also Cic., Cat. III.14.
60 Ibid, p. 201.
The distribution of name stamps on amphorae may also indicate how the shipment of wine to Gaul was organised. The best known examples bear the legend SES. These have been linked with the senatorial family of the Sestii, which owned land in the vicinity of Cosa where the greatest abundance of these amphorae has been found.\textsuperscript{61} P. Sestius had a noteworthy political career, attaining the praetorship in 54 or 50, and subsequently serving in Cilicia as a promagistrate in 49 and 48. Partly because of the social stigma against direct involvement in business, and partly because of the chronology of the wine trade with Gaul, it has been suggested that Publius’ father, Lucius, was largely responsible for establishing the family in the wine trade.\textsuperscript{62} Although the presence of these stamps on the amphorae cannot definitely connect the Sestii with the wine therein, it is probable that the family was involved in the production of both items. Likewise, it is probable that the family had a financial interest in at least some of the ships that conveyed their wine to Gaul.\textsuperscript{63} The find spots of these amphorae in Gaul generally reflect the overall distribution of amphorae in the region: there is a concentration in the vicinity of Toulouse, a smaller number in central Gaul, and a scattering elsewhere.\textsuperscript{64} This suggests that, even though estate owners may have helped facilitate the shipment of wine to Gaul, they had little impact on its subsequent distribution. Furthermore, given that the amphorae contained in individual shipwrecks could bear the stamps of multiple producers, it is unlikely that shippers were necessarily limited to carrying the cargoes of single producers.\textsuperscript{65} Cato describes the sale of wine by an estate owner to a wholesaler of some description,\textsuperscript{66} but this example is only one of

\textsuperscript{61} Greene (1986), p. 91; Tchernia (1986), p. 117.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid, p. 58-59.
\textsuperscript{64} Tchernia (1986), p. 401.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid, p. 119.
\textsuperscript{66} Cato, Agr. 148.
several possible models for the wine trade, and in any case it necessarily belongs to the period before 149. The expansion in the Gallic wine trade, and particularly the investment required in the much larger ships used after 125, suggest financial backing from comparatively wealthy individuals like the Sestii. Under these conditions, we should expect that some shipping was undertaken by individuals acting as the agents of others, perhaps the producers themselves. This need not have precluded agents from shipping cargoes from several sources, and on behalf of several parties including themselves. While there is little evidence of vertical integration (in the sense of centralised management of multiple stages in production and movement) in the wine trade, modest steps in that direction could have been a consequence of the unique conditions of the period from 125 – 25 BC.

Italian wine was being traded along all the shores of the Mediterranean from at least 200, but on a small scale in comparison with the trade that developed between the west coast of Italy and Gaul after 125. In the case of Gaul, it appears that the wine trade was in the hands of several different connected groups. Italian estate-owners may have responded to Gallic demand for wine by planting vines, as well as by providing financial backing to those who shipped wine to Gaul. In many instances, these shippers could have acted as agents of the estate-owners, though they were not necessarily limited to conveying solely their employers’ cargoes. In the larger centres of southern Gaul, and in regions where large quantities of wine were consumed, trade was likely undertaken by individuals from Italy, some of whom had cultivated a relationship with indigenous groups. The movement of smaller quantities of wine to less accessible regions is more likely to have been undertaken by the Gauls themselves. The trade elsewhere in the Mediterranean, and in Gaul prior to about 125, perhaps entailed a
simpler version of this model. It would have required less investment in shipping, diminishing the involvement of the wealthy. Furthermore, while Italians in major coastal centres are likely to have been participants, this trade is less likely to have needed an extensive network of traders further inland. In short, the intensity of the Gallic wine trade was associated with a more complex system of exchange, which represented a development of a pre-existing system.

4.3 – Oil and Fish Products

Oil and fish products are the other two major commodities which can be traced through distribution of amphorae. Since consideration of both goods relies on fundamentally the same type of evidence, they can be treated in the same section. During the first two centuries of the Principate, large quantities of olive oil were shipped from Baetica to Rome, and the scale of this trade is demonstrated by the quantity of sherds of discarded Dressel 20 amphorae which make up Monte Testaccio. This best known example of the large-scale trade in oil does not appear even to have begun during the republic. Even the antecedents of the Dressel 20 amphora type date to the Augustan period,\textsuperscript{67} while the greatest expansion of oil production in Baetica belongs to the first-century AD.\textsuperscript{68} Nonetheless, other regions were producing a surplus during the late republic. Oil from North Africa, which would eventually supplant Baetica in supplying Rome, was already being exported in the first-century BC.\textsuperscript{69} A small number of Tripolitanian amphorae were recovered from the Madrague de Giens shipwreck off

\textsuperscript{68} Matingly (1988), p. 38.
\textsuperscript{69} Brun (2004), p. 186.
the French coast, which dates to 70-50 BC. \(^{70}\) In 46 Caesar compelled the population of Leptis to contribute three million pounds of olive oil annually. Even if the precise figure may be doubted, this incident suggests a local surplus that would otherwise have been traded.\(^{71}\) In Sicily, Cicero alludes to the collection of a tithe in oil.\(^{72}\) Given the political volatility of issues affecting the grain supply in this period, it may come as little surprise that Cicero devotes comparatively little attention to the tithe in oil. Nonetheless, when combined with the paucity of archaeological sites demonstrating evidence of oil production,\(^{73}\) it seems likely that Sicily was a relatively minor source.

Though some overseas sources of oil were available, the question remains of how Rome itself was supplied in this period. Samnium, Campania and Apulia all produced oil for consumption in the city,\(^{74}\) while closer regions such as south Etruria and Latium may also have played a role.\(^{75}\) Evidence for the regions proximal to Rome is limited, partly because only a limited number of oil presses are known from these regions, and because the vessels in which oil was transported over such short distances are likely to have been perishable. Furthermore, it has been suggested that production of wine for the city of Rome may have supplanted production of oil in parts of this region after ca. 100 BC.\(^{76}\) Meanwhile, in both Campania and Apulia, it is clear that quantities of oil were exported, although the lack of a sizeable concentration of oil presses in these regions suggests that production was undertaken by a large number of small-scale producers.}

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\(^{71}\) Caes., B. Afr. 97. Leptitanos ... XXX centenis milibus pondo olei in annos singulos multit...
\(^{72}\) Cic., Verr. 2.3.18. L. Octavio et C. Cotta consulis senatus permisit ut vini et olei decumas et frugum minutarum ... Romae venderent...
\(^{74}\) Brun (2003b), p.166.
\(^{76}\) Lafon (1993), p. 279. Lafon asserts that this shift occurred only in a subset of areas close to Rome. Despite the difference in optimal ecological conditions for vines and olive trees, they could be grown on the same plots of land. Thus, Foxhall (2007), p. 114-115, argues that the two were regularly cultivated alongside each other, at least in classical Greece.
producers. In the case of Apulia, Brindisi amphorae demonstrate that oil was traded from Brundisium during the last two centuries of the republic, particularly in the period ca. 125-50. The distribution of these amphorae suggests that most of this trade occurred via Delos, though further amphora studies in the region may refine our knowledge. Corresponding with this pattern is a dedication from that island, made in 91 BC by oil traders there. Nonetheless, examples from the west are known from both Iberia and Gaul. Campanian oil, particularly from Venafrum, had a high reputation in the early empire. No doubt this reputation was somewhat chauvinistic, but it is clear that oil production was widespread in Campania. More importantly, there is evidence for Campanian oil being shipped to Gaul. The Cap Camarat B wreck, dated to 75-25 BC, carried a cargo of spheroidal amphorae which likely contained oil from Venafrum. The Planier C wreck, belonging to a similar period (60-40 BC), carried amphorae similar to the Brindisi type, and which were stamped M.TUCCI.L.F.TRO.GALEONIS. It has been suggested that this individual can be identified with the M. Tuccius mentioned in a letter to Cicero by M. Caelius Rufus. In this instance, we have evidence that members of the Roman elite were involved in producing oil for trade by the end of the republic. Nonetheless, it remains difficult to draw detailed conclusions on how this trade operated, particularly with respect to individuals involved in it outside Italy.

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78 Peacock (1986), p. 82.
80 CIL I.2 705 = ILS 7172 = ILLRP 344.
82 E.g., Pliny, NH 15.8. principatum in hoc quoque bono obtinuit Italia e toto orbe, maxime agro Venafrano...
84 Parker (1992), p. 100.
In comparison with olive oil, the trade in garum and other fish products during the republic is even more obscure. A significant trade certainly existed from southern Spain to Rome during the early empire, and garum amphorae from Iberia (Dressel 7-14) are found in abundance in Rome. This trade seems only to have started getting underway by the mid-1st century BC. Thus, roughly 700 Dressel 12 amphorae containing parts of tuna were recovered from the Titan wreck off southern Gaul, dated to 50-45 BC. The lack of evidence for Spanish exports to Rome prior to this date is noteworthy, given that fish sauce from Spain was known in 5th century Athens. One can speculate that this reflects shifting patterns in both demand and supply. Demand in Rome could have grown as tastes were Hellenised, and fish sauces were consumed by broader sections of the population. Supply, meanwhile, could have been enhanced through investment in the infrastructure required for production of garum. Whatever the relevant factors in the development of this trade, tuna appeared on coins from Gades throughout the last two centuries BC, suggesting that fish were already important in the local economy.

If not from Spain, where did Rome’s supply of garum originate? It is clear that fish sauce was widely consumed from at least the mid 2nd century, since Cato describes its distribution (calling it hallec) to slaves. In approximately the same period, Polybius informs us that preserved fish from Pontus was fetching extreme prices in Rome. By analogy with oil, however, we might look for sources closer to the city, particularly

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91 Cato, Agr. 58. Ubi oleae comesae erunt, hallecem et acetum dato.
92 Polybius, XXXI.25.5. ...ταρίκου Ποντικοῦ κεραμίου τριάκισιων δραχμών.
Sicily and Magna Graecia.\textsuperscript{93} From Sicily, while pre-Roman exports are known, there is no evidence for a republican trade, except in fresh fish.\textsuperscript{94} In Italy, \textit{tituli picti} demonstrate production in Pompeii, and possibly in Antium and Puteoli, while salteries are known or implied to have existed in Magna Graecia.\textsuperscript{95} Evidence of exports from Italy is limited, and in any case pertains to the first century AD.\textsuperscript{96} In short, the available evidence surrounding garum in the republic is only sufficient to demonstrate some trade was taking place.

Perhaps the best way to model the trade in olive oil is by analogy with that in wine. The wine trade with Gaul operated on an exceptional scale, therefore the trade with other regions may be more useful for comparison. As has been seen, at least one wealthy Roman was involved in the olive oil trade, and it is unlikely that he was alone, particularly given the likelihood that the cost of larger ships demanded the involvement of the wealthy.\textsuperscript{97} One might expect that oil produced by such individuals was shipped by their agents to Italian traders operating in larger coastal centres. If the wine trade outside Gaul is an apt analogy, one might also expect that a network of Italian traders is unlikely to have extended much further inland. While garum could have been traded in a similar fashion, the smaller quantities involved may point to it being traded alongside other goods, and indeed this is the pattern observed in shipwrecks containing garum amphorae.\textsuperscript{98}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{93} Laubenheimer (1990), p. 122.
\item \textsuperscript{94} Curtis (1991), p. 100.
\item \textsuperscript{95} Ibid, p. 87.
\item \textsuperscript{96} Curtis (1991), p. 89-90.
\item \textsuperscript{97} Hopkins (1983), p. 101. See also my discussion in Chapter 3, p. 96-97.
\item \textsuperscript{98} Laubenheimer (1990), p. 127.
\end{itemize}
4.4 – Slaves

Slaves were ubiquitous in Italy during the republic, and their purchase there was sufficiently commonplace as to attract little attention in the literary sources of the period. Evidence concerning individuals who engaged in the slave trade is correspondingly limited throughout Roman history, a paucity which is particularly acute for the western Mediterranean during the republic. Thus, Harris identified no slave-traders in the west during the republic, though this should come as little surprise given the lack of republican inscriptions in the region. The more general lack of evidence, however, may be attributed partly to a societal antipathy towards slave-traders. This was perhaps coupled with a tendency for individuals trading in a variety of merchandises to de-emphasise the role of slaves in their interests. Consequently, we are left to deduce the conditions of the slave trade from its scale, the circumstances under which it was undertaken, and by analogy with other areas and periods.

Despite the challenges involved in determining ancient population figures, estimates for the proportion of slaves in the population of Italy under Augustus have ranged from 15-25% up to 35%. From the perspective of the trade in slaves, however, it is the replacement rate that is of concern. For the period from 65 to 30 BC, it has been suggested that 100,000 new slaves were needed annually to maintain a stable population in Italy. Alternately, for the entire empire between 50 BC and AD 150, figures from

100 E.g., Bodel (2005), p. 181.
250,000 to 500,000 have been proposed.\textsuperscript{106} Some of this demand was met internally, mainly through natural reproduction and the fostering of abandoned infants.\textsuperscript{107} Whereas Harris takes the view that natural reproduction could not have come close to maintaining the population of slaves, his perspective can be contrasted with Scheidel’s, who concludes that, in a worst case scenario, at least 80\% of the demand for new slaves in the empire was met in this way.\textsuperscript{108} Even in the disturbed conditions of the late republic, he argues that 50\% of new slaves were born directly into slavery.\textsuperscript{109} It is nonetheless certain that, during the republic and perhaps even thereafter, a large number of slaves were acquired externally, whether enslaved by a victorious Roman army, or simply trafficked into areas under Roman control. The latter may have been a particularly prominent source of slaves in the east. A significant portion of this trade likely passed through Delos prior to its sack in 69, and through Ephesus thereafter, though various other cities may have played a role.\textsuperscript{110} Enslavement through conquest, however, will be considered first. 

Upon defeating an opposing army in the field, or upon capturing a town, it was the standard practice of Roman armies to enslave large numbers of their defeated adversaries.\textsuperscript{111} While some could be killed outright, and a fortunate few might be ransomed, references to the mass enslavement of a population are frequent. This pattern is visible in all regions of the western Mediterranean. In Sicily in 218, 2000 from the surrendered Carthaginian garrison of Malta were sold at Lilybaeum.\textsuperscript{112} During his consulship in Sardinia in 163, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus is said to have killed or

\textsuperscript{107} Harris (2011), p. 63, 70-71.
\textsuperscript{110} Harris (2011), p. 77-78.
\textsuperscript{111} Bradley (1994), p. 26, 32.
\textsuperscript{112} Livy, XXI.51.2. \emph{inde post paucos dies reeditum Lilybaeum, captivique et a consule et a praetore praeter insignes nobilitate viros sub corona venierunt.}
captured 80,000.\textsuperscript{113} Given the almost permanent presence of legions in Spain, it is likely that enslaved Iberians were sold on a regular basis. One might think of the 9,500 supporters of Viriathus sold by Fabius Maximus Servilanus in 140,\textsuperscript{114} or of the sale of the survivors of Numantia by Scipio Aemilianus seven years later.\textsuperscript{115} After the capture of Capsa during the Jugurthine War, Marius killed the young men, and had the rest of the population sold.\textsuperscript{116} Caesar, among a number of other mass enslavements in Gaul, claimed to have sold 53,000 of the Aduatuci at the end of 57.\textsuperscript{117} Many other instances could be described, but it is clear that the enslavement of substantial numbers of the defeated was a regular occurrence throughout the period, wherever Roman armies campaigned. From 297 to 167, our sources report the enslavement of 700,000 people, with the rate of enslavement increasing over the period.\textsuperscript{118} Given the numbers involved, and the likelihood that many instances of the enslavement of smaller groups went unreported, it is probable that enslavement after military defeat was a major, if erratic, source of slaves in the period.\textsuperscript{119}

How did an army undertake the sale of those it had enslaved? Under most circumstances, it appears to have been undertaken relatively quickly.\textsuperscript{120} Cicero describes how, having captured Pindenissus and distributed booty to his soldiers, he arranged for

\textsuperscript{113} Livy, XLI.28.8. Ti. Sempronii Gracchi consulis imperio auspicioque legio exercitusque populi Romani Sardiniam subegit. in ea provincia hostium caesa aut capta supra octoginta milia.

\textsuperscript{114} App., Hisp. 68. αἰχμαλώτων δὲ ἔχων ἀμφὶ τὰ μύρια, πεντακοσίων μὲν ἀπέτεμε τὰς κεφαλὰς, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἀπέδωτο.

\textsuperscript{115} App., Hisp. 98. ἔπλεξάμενος δὲ αὐτῶν πεντήκοντα ὁ Σκιπίων ἐς θρίαμβον, τῶν λοιπῶν ἀπέδωτο, καὶ τὴν πόλιν κατέσκαιρε...

\textsuperscript{116} Sall., Jug. 91. ceterum oppidum incensum, Numidae puberes interfeci, alii omnes venundati, praeda militibus divisa.

\textsuperscript{117} Caes., B. Gall. II.33. Postridie eius diei refractis portis, cum iam defenderet nemo, atque intromissis militibus nostris, sectionem eius oppidi universam Caesar vendidit. Ab ipsis qui emergent captum numeros ad eum relatus est milium LIII.


\textsuperscript{120} Bradley (1987), p. 46.
the sale *in tribunali* of the population. In other words, the sale was carried out in the camp, in mid-December, before the troops were even led back to winter quarters. This should come as little surprise. A commander was unlikely to divert soldiers to guarding captives for a lengthy period, whose presence in large numbers would present a security risk, and whose need for food would place an additional strain on resources. There are exceptions to this pattern, such as Scipio Aemilianus’ decision to retain fifty captives for his triumph after Numantia. This is, however, only a small number of the total captured. Furthermore, Caesar states that he distributed one captive to each of his soldiers following the surrender of Veringetorix. No doubt this was intended as a mark of his generosity, as well as an indication of the numbers of those captured. For practical reasons, it seems likely that Caesar’s soldiers quickly sold their captives, presumably to the same individuals who would otherwise have purchased them.

Roman armies were conventionally accompanied by a range of camp followers, among them *lixae* and *mercatores*. Though *lixae* appear to have been lower in status than *mercatores*, both groups were probably involved in the sale of goods to soldiers. *Mercatores*, meanwhile, are known to have purchased booty from soldiers at times. The traders best positioned to purchase the newly enslaved shortly after capture belong precisely to these two groups. Indeed, it has been suggested that this was the primary function of *lixae*. Given that Rome was by far the largest market for slaves in the west, an informal system must have existed to convey slaves from the armies to Italy.

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121 Cic., *Att. V.*20. *mancipia venibant Saturnalibustertiis. cum haec scribilebam, in tribunali res erat ad HS cxx. hinc exercitum in hiberna agri male pacati deducendum Quinto fratri dabam; ipse me Laodiceam recipiebam.*

122 App., *Hisp.* 98.

123 Caes., *B. Gall.* VII.89. *Reservatis Aeduis atque Arvernis, si per eos civitates recuperare posset, ex reliquis captivis toto exercitui capita singula praedae nomine distribuit.*

124 See Chapter Two, p. 69.

125 E.g., Sall., *Iug.* XLIV.5.


Presumably, *lixae* and *mercatores* would have undertaken part of this process, but it seems likely that slaves would have passed through the hands of several traders *en route.*

Military activity was a major source of slaves, though a large number may also have been acquired independently, beyond the margins of areas under Roman control. One would expect an inverse relationship between successful Roman campaigns against foreign peoples, and the profitability of this independent slave trade. Indeed, one wonders if some of the *lixae* and *mercatores* who accompanied Roman armies would, in the absence of a military campaign, have traded in slaves in the same regions anyway.

Whatever system existed for the transfer of those enslaved by Roman armies, it could have continued to operate under more peaceful conditions. Unfortunately, there is little indication of a permanent infrastructure supporting the slave trade in the west, comparable to that found in the east. Once established in 166, Delos became a notorious entrepôt, where merchants from Italy trafficked in slaves, many of whom were victims of kidnapping by Cilician pirates. On a smaller scale, but also significant, is a republican inscription from Acmoneia, some 250 km inland in Asia Minor, which commemorates the construction of a slave market and altar by one C. Sornatius. No equivalents to these facilities are definitely known in the west, although this may result partly from the lack of epigraphic evidence and the difficulties involved in identifying purpose built structures archaeologically. If permanent slave markets were limited to the east, this is perhaps because the east was able to supply slaves more consistently, which could be the case if enslavement by the army played a greater role in the west. Rome itself could

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128 Bradley (1987), p. 46. It is also possible that multiple stages in the process of transportation and sale were undertaken by members of the same *societas* or *familia."


130 Harris (2011), p. 79.
have served as a centre for the redistribution of slaves in the manner of Delos, given that
Italy was the final destination for the majority of slaves from the west.

Nonetheless, there are hints of an ongoing, independent trade in the west.

Cicero, for example, mentions that one L. Publicius was bringing slaves from Gaul,
intending to pass them on to Quinctius’ adversary Naevius. While it is not explicitly
stated that either Publicius or Naevius themselves are slave traders, they are clearly
participants in that trade. Based on this passage, another from Diodorus, and the
abundance of Gallic slaves in Italy, Tchernia suggested that slaves constituted a major
export from Gaul in exchange for wine during the last century of the republic. Likewise,
though not pertaining to the west, it has been suggested that coin hoards along the lower
Danube, dated to the 60’s, 40’s, and 30’s BC, reflect a contemporary purchase of
slaves. For the imperial period, Harris was able to list four individuals explicitly
named in inscriptions as slave traders, as well as a fifth whose commemoration includes
a depiction of a slave being sold. While much of this evidence is admittedly
circumstantial, it does point to the existence of an independent trade in slaves, at least
for Gaul.

Despite the challenges inherent in identifying individual slave traders, the
number of slaves required in Italy, and the number of those enslaved and sold after
military defeat, indicate that a significant number of individuals were involved in the
slave trade. To the extent that the slave trade depended on the sale of the captured, it

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131 Cic., Quinct. 24. ... vident perfamiliarem Naevi, qui ex Gallia pueros venalis isti adducebat, L. Publicium...
132 Bodel (2005), p. 105. Curiously, Cicero does not abuse Naevius for being a slave-trader: either the
description was not apt, or such a label was not sufficiently pejorative.
133 Diod. Sic., V.26.3, claims that a slave could be purchased in Gaul for an amphora of wine. While
Tchernia (1983), p. 99, considers slaves to have been the major item exchanged for wine, he is more
circumspect about the possibility of such inequitable exchanges.
134 Crawford (1977a), p. 122. This is, however, only one of several possible origins for such coin hoards.
135 Harris (2011), p. 84.
was somewhat sporadic, yet there is also evidence for a persistent trade in slaves independent of the army. This suggests that some individuals in the provinces commonly included slaves among their trading interests. These people would no doubt have profited greatly whenever a victory in the region placed an abundance of human beings in their hands.

4.5 – Social Conditions of Trade

In the previous chapter, I outlined the general organisation of economic activity in the later republic, and applied that outline in considering the grain trade undertaken in the various regions of the western Mediterranean. So far in this chapter, I have extended that discussion to consider the trade in other commodities, particularly those for which relatively abundant evidence is available, such as wine, oil, fish products, and slaves. In these discussions, the locations and patterns of movement of the traders themselves have been considered only in passing, and it is to them that I now turn.

The geographical distribution of the Italian trade diaspora (or, to be precise, the segment of the Italian diaspora which was employed in trade) can be envisioned in terms of a network, comprised of nodes and connecting lines. The nodes are geographical points where traders are present on a permanent or semi-permanent basis, while the lines represent the journeys of those who actually convey goods between nodes, and this system is interconnected with non-Italian trade networks. Within such a model, a great deal of variation both in the relationship between nodes and in the identity of those shipping goods is possible. Rome itself is clearly the most significant

node in the system, for political reasons, for the exchange and transhipment of goods, and as a destination for goods to be consumed. Other nodes frequently occur at transit-markets, where environmental conditions encourage the transfer of goods between different groups of shippers. This is most obviously going to be the case where transport by sea or river gives way to transport by land, e.g. Syracuse, Utica, Gades, Narbo. Such nodes can also exist inland, with locations dictated by a combination of trade routes and political geography, e.g. Toulouse, Cirta, Magdalensberg. Where goods of Italian origin were transported between nodes in the Italian trade network, they are likely to have been transported by Italians. This is indicated by the organisation of trade through agents, as well as by the legal requirement that legally enforceable contracts could be made only between Roman citizens or those possessing *ius commercium*. By contrast, at terminal nodes a different situation may have prevailed. Local inhabitants could have acquired Italian goods at these locations, and local traders may have acquired goods for distribution within their own trade networks. Alternatively, Italian traders may have conveyed goods to indigenous communities, and it is probable that the balance between these alternatives varied among regions.

The geography of trade is, of course, subject to change over time. Thus, while Rome’s importance throughout the period is clear, its dominance could only have increased. The destruction of Carthage and Corinth in 146 eliminated the major commercial centres of two trade networks. While Italian traders were present in Carthage prior to 146, and while the destruction of the city must have been disruptive in the short term, many of those traders may have benefitted in the longer term as the trade formerly centered on the city came into their hands. Less violent, but no less

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effective in bringing more trade under Roman control, was the establishment of Delos as a free port in 166, in deliberate and punitive competition with Rome’s erstwhile ally, Rhodes.\textsuperscript{138} As suggested earlier, the foundation of Narbo in 118 may have had a negative impact on Massiliote wine exports, though Rome’s favourable treatment of Marseille prior to 49 suggests that the effect was unintentional.\textsuperscript{139} The overall pattern involves an increasing amount of trade in the hands of Italian traders. This can be correlated with the growth in Roman military strength, and the ability to apply that strength coercively over ever increasing areas. Italian traders were gradually more able to appeal to governors and generals for assistance, as well having privileged access to new markets created by the presence of soldiers, miners, and other Italians overseas. Cicero, for example, describes how he was asked to supply the creditors of Salamis with cavalry in order that they might threaten the city to obtain payment.\textsuperscript{140} No doubt many governors would have acceded to such a request, but direct coercion need not have been the only way in which Italian traders were supported. The simple proximity of the military could sometimes have secured more favourable conditions for Italian traders, or at the very least have reduced the likelihood that traders would encounter interference. In general, the Italian trade diaspora would thus have operated at an increasing advantage over the course of the late republic.

Among various possible comparisons, one is reminded of the experience of both the Dutch and British East India companies. Both companies were chartered at the beginning of the 17\textsuperscript{th} century, and sought (with at best sporadic success) to monopolise parts of the already extensive Indian Ocean trade. For more than a century, these companies and their traders were simply one economic actor among many in the

\textsuperscript{139} See above, p. 136.
\textsuperscript{140} Cic., \textit{Att.} 5.21.
region. By the mid-18th century, advances in military tactics increasingly allowed the companies to coerce local authorities, and they began to gain a degree of territorial control over Java and Bengal, respectively. The Dutch and British governments responded by gradually assuming political responsibilities from their respective companies. The ultimate result was that the economy of these regions became largely, though not exclusively, “western-style” and “western-run”. The analogy is necessarily imperfect: Roman traders were not organised in a comparable fashion, they did not possess military forces of their own, and it is far from clear that their interests played a role in determining Roman imperial policy. The key similarity, however, is a parallel development from being one group of traders among many, to occupying increasingly advantageous positions as coercive power and then territorial control were extended.

One of the distinctions in the types of communities that comprised the Italian trade diaspora lies in whether they operated in an urbanised or a non-urbanised environment. In Cicero’s *Verrines*, one can observe the presence of these communities in a variety of locations in Sicily. Undoubtedly, it is to Cicero’s advantage to emphasise Verres’ abuses of Roman citizens in Sicily in order to sway the court, but it is nonetheless clear that the major towns of Sicily hosted communities of Roman traders who were resident there for extended periods, but whose business interests could involve them moving around the island. Cicero asserts that, although some traders simply visited the island, others remained there to engage in agriculture or other business, and even claims that the number of Romans on Sicily was great enough to

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constitute a benefit to the republic. Later, he draws particular attention to evidence drawn from a large number of Roman citizens from Sicily, in order to counteract the possible claim that those Romans who do business in Sicily supported Verres. In describing the judicial arrangements of the *lex Rupilia*, Cicero mentions that the regular procedure was for judges to be selected from the *conventus* of Roman citizens in a given region. The *conventus* at Syracuse is frequently mentioned by Cicero, and even described as an ornament to the entire island. Though the prominence of the community at Syracuse is clear, we are also told of Romans doing business in Agrigentum, Lilybaeum, and Panhormus. In the last instance, we are provided with evidence that a businessman from Panhormus was present in Lilybaeum, demonstrating a degree of mobility within the island. Elsewhere, we are informed of the beheading of L. Herennius, described as a banker of Leptis, in Syracuse. After more than a century of Roman control, it is apparent that the major centres of Sicily were host to significant communities of resident Roman traders, whose business interests extended across the island, and perhaps beyond. This pattern was not restricted to Sicily, but clearly extended to Africa as well. Leptis has been mentioned, but Utica was host to a large community of Romans involved in trade, navigation and money-lending. Given

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143 Cic., Verr. II.6. ...partim retinet, ut arare, ut pascere, ut negotiari libeat, ut denique sedes ac domicilium collocare; quod commodum non mediocre rei publicae est, tantum civium numerum tam prope ab domo tam bonis fructuosisque rebus detineri.
144 Cic., Verr. II.16. ...cives Roanos honestissimos ex Sicilia plurimos...
145 Cic., Verr. II.32. ceterarum rerum selecti iudices ex conventu civium Romanorum proponi solent.
146 Cic., Verr. II.70; II.III.136; II.IV.55, 61, 94 (as an ornament), 101; etc.
147 Cic., Verr. II.93. ... quod cives Romani, viri fortes atque honesti, permulti in illo oppido coniunntissimo animo cum ipsis Agrargentinis vivant ac negotiantur...
148 Cic., Verr. II.10. ...testis splendidissima civitas Lilybaetana, testis honestissimus maximusque conventus civium Romanorum...
149 Cic., Verr. II.140. ...in foro Lilybaetanorum maximo conventu C. Serviliun, civem Romanum e conventu Panhormitano, veterem negotiatiorem...
150 Plut., Cat. Min. 59: ...Ρωμαίους μέν ὄντας, ἐν δὲ Λιβύη πραγματευομένους ἀπὸ ἐμπορίας καὶ δανεισμῶν... 61: ...ἀπὶ δὲ πλωτικῶν καὶ δανειτικῶν ἀνθρώπων...
that Caesar specifically describes this population as a *conventus*, by analogy with the situation in Sicily, it is likely that many were present there on a permanent basis.

Similarly, we might guess that some of the traders killed in Cirta at the start of the Jugurthine War were resident there, just as we are informed by Sallust that the Numidian town of Vaga contained Italians who engaged in trade and lived there.\footnote{Sall., *Iug.* 47.1. *...oppidum Numidarum nomine Vaga, forum rerum venalium totius regni maxume celebratum, ubi et incolere et mercari consueverant Italici generis multi mortales.*}

Particularly in coastal cities, the diaspora of businessmen may have been accompanied and supported by resident bankers. Rathbone has suggested that, apart from the financial services these provided, a network of bankers would have propagated Roman commercial practices, and given rise to a more integrated commercial system.\footnote{Rathbone (2007), p. 315.}

Effectively, the existing urban centres of the Western Mediterranean quickly became nodes of an Italian trade diaspora, in some instances even in advance of the military.

What situation prevailed in non-urbanised regions? One model is provided by the Magdalensberg, in modern Carinthia, Austria, where numerous inscriptions provide an indication of how trade between Italy and Noricum was undertaken prior to Rome’s takeover of the formerly independent kingdom in 15 BC. Traders of Italian origin, mainly from the north (i.e., Aquileia, Bononia, Vetulonia) but with representatives from Rome and other locations (Verulae, Anxur, Bantia), established themselves in an enclave of the indigenous Celtic settlement there.\footnote{Collis (1984), p.145-146.} The inscriptions (comprised of notes scratched on walls) even provide evidence of financial dealings between Roman traders and the local population, involving credit, loans, and payments in gold. Located on the main route across the Alps between Italy, Pannonia, and points further north, this was an optimal site for Roman traders to acquire goods produced with Norican iron, a
variety of which are also mentioned in the inscriptions. It has even been suggested that the traders in Magdalensberg remained resident throughout the year. If so, then the distinction between trade in this non-urbanised area, and the urbanised regions previously considered, may be somewhat blurred.

One can compare the image of Gaul presented by Cicero. On the one hand, he presents Transalpine Gaul as an area filled with Roman traders, yet at the same time the area is filled with hostile Gauls. Cicero implies that Narbo and Massilia are the only places that can really be considered civilised, an extreme contrast which serves his rhetorical aims. Narbo was clearly an important centre, and it was populated by enough Romans of sufficient wealth to carry out land auctions there. Furthermore, a significant portion of the wine trade passed through Narbo as it travelled inland to the region of Toulouse. Fonteius, after all, was accused of illegally imposing duties on wine that travelled on this route. In Cicero’s rendering of his adversaries’ claims, one Titurius exacted fourteen denarii per amphora at Tolosa, Portius and Numius three victorati at Crodunum, and Serveus two victoriatu at Vulchalo. Despite textual difficulties in this passage, it appears that Fonteius had given certain individuals responsibility for collecting duties in communities with indigenous names along a specific trade route. Thus, as was the case for the Magdalensburg, we are presented with an established trade

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159 Cic., Font. itaqueTiturium Tolosae quaternos denarios in singulas vini amphorae portori nomine exegisse; Croduni Porcium et munium ternos et victoriatum, Vulchalone Servaeum binos et victoriatum ...
160 Beyond their names, there is no indication of who these individuals were. France (2001), p. 252, notes that their names are not servile in origin, and suggests that they were publicani connected with a societas responsible for collecting vectigalia in the region. This is entirely possible, though France’s argument relies in part (p. 237) on the idea that a lex provinciae existed, constraining the governor, and setting out the terms under which a contract for the vectigalia would have been let. As Hermon (1993), p. 310, and previously, Ebel (1976), p. 99, have pointed out, it is not clear that such law a covered Gallia Transalpina at this time. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to think Fonteius contracted out the collection of duties on wine, and that the collectors can be called publicani.
route, along which a valuable commodity was being moved. We should expect that Tolosa, and probably the indigenous communities along that route where customs fees were collected, also hosted communities of Roman traders. Considering the quantities of wine amphorae concentrated north-east of the Massif Central, we might expect that indigenous communities in that region, and along the route from Massilia, could also have hosted Roman traders.

At what point were goods passed from Italian to indigenous traders? The Magdalensberg may be useful for comparison, but some caution is required in relying on it – our knowledge of the site belongs to a later period, in the years just before 15 BC, and involves a trading enclave established in the administrative centre of a friendly, but still formally independent kingdom. The possibility thus exists that the nature of the trading community in the Magdalensberg was determined, at least in part, by the preferences of indigenous peoples. In effect, it was a transit-market. Its location was determined by political, as opposed to environmental, circumstance, and it was at this point that goods left Italian hands. Tolosa, and those points in central Gaul which were the destination for large quantities of wine, may have operated in a similar way, acting as the terminal nodes of the Italian trade network. While it is conceivable that Italian traders sometimes conveyed goods further inland, the evidence available does not suggest that this was the case. In Gaul and in the Magdalensberg, we are presented with a middle ground, in which Roman military strength lay on the horizon, but was still far enough away that trade required mutual accommodation. Under these circumstances, the need for cross-cultural brokers at the various nodes of the trade network is apparent.
4.6 – Conclusion

In the case of both wine and slaves, a network of individual traders extending some distance inland from the Mediterranean coast has been suggested. In both instances, however, there is a degree of exceptionality. The wine trade between Italy and Gaul was particularly intense, and operated against a background of smaller scale trade elsewhere in the western Mediterranean. Similarly, the slave trade probably operated on a fairly consistent level, except when Roman victories resulted in the enslavement of a noteworthy number of individuals. The regular trade in wine and slaves likely operated in much the same way as the trade in the other commodities described in the introduction. That is to say, it probably involved traders in the provinces, who need not have been highly specialised, while the goods involved would often have been shipped as part of mixed cargoes. This is a commerce more elaborate than cabotage, yet not so focused as the wine trade with Gaul.

At the same time, and in various communities around the Mediterranean, we know that traders from Italy were present. In North Africa, Sallust notes that Vaga was frequented by Italian merchants.\(^{161}\) Moreover, the intervention of the Italian community at Cirta on behalf of Adherbal, and their subsequent massacre, helped to provoke the Jugurthine War.\(^{162}\) In the Verrines, Cicero often refers to negotiatores or cives Romani qui negotiabantur on Sicily,\(^{163}\) while giving little indication of what their negotia actually involved. The presence of these traders is not just a feature of more urbanised regions, as Caesar makes clear on several occasions that he used traders as a source of

\[^{161}\text{Sall., Jug. 47.1. Vaga, forum rerum venalium totius regni maxune celebratum, ubi et incolere et mercari conseuerant Italici generis multi mortales.}\]

\[^{162}\text{Sall., Jug. 21.3. Adherbal cum paucis equitibus Cirtam profugit et ni multitudo togatorum fuisset, quae Numidas insequentis moenibus prohibuit, uno die inter duos reges coeptum atque patratum bellum foret.}\]

\[^{163}\text{Cic., Verr. I.7.20; II.1.5.14; II.I27.69-70; II.II.3.7; II.II.6.15, etc.}\]
military intelligence. While it is difficult to connect these groups of traders with the specific (and probably diverse) objects of their trade, there can be little doubt that they dealt in at least some of the goods discussed here.

164 Caes., B. Gall. 1.39; IV.5; IV.20.
Chapter Five – Mining

5.1 – Introduction

Another major category of economic activity which involved the overseas migration of a substantial number of people from Italy was mining. The previous two chapters have been concerned primarily with the involvement of Italians in commerce in various goods. With respect to mines, however, a large number of migrant Italians appear to have been involved in extractive/productive activity overseas. Thus, Diodorus describes the large number of Italians who were attracted to Iberia after the Second Punic War by the wealth to be gained in the mines there,¹ while Polybius claims that 40,000 people were employed in the mines in the vicinity of New Carthage alone.² The importance of these statements will be considered in further detail later in this chapter, but for now, they serve to indicate the potential scale of migration to these mines. Although Italians were certainly involved in the trade in metals, it is their role in the operation of the mines themselves that will be examined in detail here.

Certainly the most important source of metals (especially gold, silver, lead, and copper) in the western Mediterranean during the last two centuries BC was Iberia.³ The extension of Roman control over the mines of Iberia is correlated with a dramatic

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¹ Diodorus, V.36.3, ὑπεροχὴν δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων κρατησάντων τῆς Ἰβηρίας, πλῆθος Ἰταλῶν ἐπεπόλασε τοῖς μετάλλοις, καὶ μεγάλους ἀπεφέρωτο πλοῦτος διὰ τῆν φιλοκερδίαν.
² Polybius, XXXIV.9.8-9, quoted by Strabo, III.2.10. “... τῶν περὶ Καρχηδῶνα Νέαν ἄργυρεῖν ... ὅπως τέτταρας μυριάδας ἀνθρώπων μένειν τῶν ἐργαζομένων, ἀναφέροντας τότε τῷ δῆμῳ τῶν Ῥωμαίων καθ' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν δισμυρίας καὶ πεντακισχίλιας δραχμάς. Walbank (1979) made no comment on the date of this observation, implying that it pertains to the period of Polybius’ visits to Spain in 151 and 146. On the latter, see Walbank (1957), p. 4-5.
³ Craddock (2008), p. 94.
increase in anthropogenic lead emissions found in Greenland ice cores,\(^4\) which provides indirect testimony to the scale of silver and lead mining there. At the same time, it has been estimated that from the mid-2\(^{nd}\) century onwards the Roman supply of silver, in terms of the number of denarii in circulation, grew steadily.\(^5\) Correspondingly, some of the most important literary evidence relevant to mining during the republic pertains to Iberia. Another important source of evidence is stamped lead ingots, mostly dating from the republic, but with examples from the first century of the principate.\(^6\) Further epigraphic evidence is furnished by the Vipasca tablets which, though they date to the reign of Hadrian, have been used to inform scholarly discussions of mining outside their immediate context.\(^7\) Of necessity, scholarship on Roman mining has tended to invoke evidence from this region, a reliance which is particularly acute for the late republic.\(^8\)

Much of this chapter will thus be concerned with mining in the Iberian peninsula, but it should be emphasised that mining was undertaken in other areas. For example, copper and lead/silver mines are known to have been present in south-western Sardinia, near Iglesiente and Sulcis.\(^9\) Moreover, the Carthaginians exploited Sardinia’s mineral wealth, making it likely that the Romans did the same during the republic, probably beginning soon after their seizure of the island. Unfortunately, few details of Roman mining in Sardinia during this period are known.\(^10\) A similar situation prevails in Gaul. Copper

\(^7\) The date of the tablets is indicated by explicit reference to Hadrian in the second paragraph of the *lex metallis dicta*. On their broader applicability see, e.g., Domergue (1983), p. 175-177; Hirt (2010), p. 269-271.
\(^8\) So, for example, Ørsted (1985), p. 213, applies evidence for the organisation of mining attested by the Vipasca tablets in his study of iron mining in Noricum. A somewhat broader range of sources is available for the empire, e.g., inscriptions referring to *conductores* in Noricum, wooden tablets from Rośia Montană in Dacia (Hirt (2010), p. 270), inscribed lead ingots from Britain (Hirt (2010), p. 101, 279). Furthermore, archaeological evidence can be drawn upon for a variety of mining areas
and silver were mined in Provence and the Cévennes, and gold in the Massif Central, but little can be said about these undertakings during the republic. Peninsular Italy itself lacks gold and silver mines, apart from in the Val d’Aosta; while copper and iron mines had been exploited in earlier periods, with the exception of iron mines on Elba, these were mostly inactive by the late republic. Although this chapter will concentrate on Iberia, evidence from other regions will be drawn upon for comparative purposes. Furthermore, evidence dating from later periods – most notably the Vipasca tablets – will be used where it may illuminate the situation during the republic.

This chapter will seek to examine two questions. Firstly, section 5.2 will be concerned with the administration of the mines. While this is a subject that merits interest in its own right, and one to which scholarly attention has been given, the objective is not to undertake an analysis for its own sake. Instead, the issue will be examined in so far as the way, or ways, in which mines were run has implications for the types of personnel that are likely to have been present. Section 5.3 will proceed from that point, in order to describe the groups of individuals involved in operating the mines, as well as in supporting those undertakings.

5.2 – Administration of Mines

One possible model for the history of Roman mining holds that three distinct administrative models were employed in succession, with societates publicanorum being responsible for the operation of mines during the republic, small scale lessees assuming that role in the Augustan period, and later, direct exploitation of mines by the

This concept of a linear replacement of administrative models can be critiqued in various respects. For example, different models appear to have co-existed, not only between disparate regions, but even within a region such as Iberia. There, varying geological conditions demanded different methods of mining, corresponding with different levels of investment, and different administrative regimes. More important for the purposes of this chapter, however, is the hypothesis that the mines were operated by publicani, in the sense that the right to operate mines was leased to large societates by the censors (censoria locatio) in Rome itself. It certainly appears that some mines were operated in this way. Thus, Pliny alludes to a republican lex censoria, applying to gold mines in the territory of Vercellae, specifying that the publicani who operated those mines could employ no more than 5,000 men, a workforce whose size suggests a large societas. Elsewhere, Strabo notes that mines in the vicinity of Pompeiopolis had been worked by publicani. More famous, however, are Livy’s comments on the decision of the senate not to lease out the mines of Macedonia following Rome’s conquest of that country in 167. Livy’s interpretation of this as an effort to exclude publicani in the interest of either the public good or that of the Macedonians themselves could be an anachronistic reflection of later abuse. Livy clearly has large societates in mind, given the potential abuses he describes, but such organisations may belong to a

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16 Pliny, NH XXX.21.78. estat lex censoria Victumularum aurifodinae in Vercellensi agro, qua cavebatur, ne plus quinque milia hominum in opere publicani haberent.
17 Strabo, XII.3.40. έιργον έστω δε δημοσίων μετάλλων... Strabo’s use of the imperfect suggests publicani operated the mines at an earlier date, while both Hirt (2010), p. 91, and Harris (2007), p. 520, treat this as a description of the situation in the republic.
18 Livy, XLV.18.3-4. metalli quoque Macedonici, quod ingens vectigal erat, locationes praeidiorumque rusticorum tolli placebat; nam neque sine publicano exerceri posse et, ubi publicanus esset, ibi aut ius publicum vanum aut libertatem sociis nullam esse.
period later than 167. \textsuperscript{19} Societates of the size which, after 133, undertook the collection of direct taxes in Asia, correspond well to the enterprises which Livy seems to have in mind. Nonetheless, he presents operation of mines by publicani as the only viable option, apart from simply leaving them closed. Perhaps the best explanation for this apparent contradiction is that the mines were indeed contracted out, and were operated by publicani, but that these individuals were not part of large societates.

How well does a model of operation by large societates apply in Spain? The earliest evidence for any Roman efforts to administer the mines there comes from Livy’s assertion that Cato “arranged for the collection of large revenues from the iron and silver mines” in 195. \textsuperscript{20} Although Livy used Cato as one of his sources, he made no indication of the specific location of these mines. This situation is complicated by a lack of archaeological evidence for the production of iron in Spain. \textsuperscript{21} Gellius, however, preserved a fragment of Cato’s Origines in which he praises the quality of iron and silver mines north of the Ebro. \textsuperscript{22} The details of Cato’s innovation in this area are not indicated, but it is clear that mines – or at least silver mines – were now a source of revenue for the province. Significantly, there is no indication that large societates publicanorum were in any way involved in the mines at this time. \textsuperscript{23}

During the 2\textsuperscript{nd} century BC, a significant number of Italians migrated to the mining areas of Iberia. Diodorus, relying on Posidonius, \textsuperscript{24} states that once the Romans

\textsuperscript{19} Andreau (1989), p. 94-95.
\textsuperscript{20} Livy, XXXIV.21.7. \textit{pacata provincia vectigalia magna instituit ex ferrariis argentariisque quibus tum institutis locupletior in dies provincia fuit}. This is the only specific administrative measure known to have been undertaken by Cato in Spain.
\textsuperscript{21} Domergue (1990), p. 192-193. As Domergue’s table (p. 190-191) makes clear, Spanish mines during the republic almost all produced silver and lead, with a substantial number producing copper.
\textsuperscript{22} Gellius, NA II.22.29. \textit{Nam cum de Hispanis scriberet, qui citra Hiberum colunt, verba haec posuit: "Set in his regionibus ferrareae, argentifodinae pulcherrimae..."} See also Knapp (1977), p. 171-172.
\textsuperscript{23} Richardson (1976), p. 141; Richardson (1986), p. 91.
\textsuperscript{24} Kidd (1988), p. 832-836, in his commentary on Posidonius, describes Diodorus V.35-38 as a “parallel” to Strabo III.2.9, a passage which explicitly recounts Posidonius’ discussion of mines in Iberia. As Kidd
had extended their authority over Iberia, a large number of Italians came to the mines of Iberia, and derived great wealth from them.\textsuperscript{25} It is implied that the Iberians, who had previously worked these mines themselves, were supplanted by these incoming Italians.\textsuperscript{26} The situation in different regions of Iberia need not, however, have been consistent. Mines in the vicinity of Carthago Nova had been operated by the Carthaginians, though the details of their administration, and any possible influences on subsequent Roman practices, are unknown.\textsuperscript{27} Regardless, after the conquest these mines became part of Roman public property, and were exploited relatively quickly.\textsuperscript{28} The other major republican mining area in Iberia, the Sierra Morena, only shows evidence of Roman exploitation after the death of Viriathus in 138.\textsuperscript{29} Here, however, earlier exploitation (usually of superficial copper deposits) had been undertaken by the Iberians themselves, with subsequent Roman works pursuing deeper deposits of silver and lead.\textsuperscript{30} In contrast with the mines near Carthago Nova, production in the Sierra Morena took decades to develop, perhaps because the latter area was less secure, or perhaps because of a need for a greater investment to profitably mine there. A similar pattern can be observed at Rio Tinto, where mining is known to have been undertaken by indigenous peoples,\textsuperscript{31} and where Roman mining began by the end of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} century.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{25} Diodorus, V.36.3. Quoted above, note 1.
\textsuperscript{26} Diodorus, V.38.2.
\textsuperscript{27} Domergue (1990), p. 241, 249.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., p. 225.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., p. 184-185.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., p. 194.
\textsuperscript{31} Jones (1980), p. 152
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., p. 157-158.
In short, mining by Romans and Italians was extended further into Iberia over decades, and against the backdrop of a variety of pre-existing undertakings.\(^{33}\)

As Diodorus subsequently describes, the Italians used slaves, under the supervision of overseers, in order to carry out work in the mines. Despite debate among modern scholars as to the overall scale of migration from Italy to Iberia, Diodorus’ reference to a large influx of Italians involved in mining in Iberia has not been seriously challenged.\(^{34}\) Even Brunt, who took a very minimalist approach to the numbers of migrants from Italy, stated only parenthetically that “one might well doubt the assertion”,\(^{35}\) though without further elaboration. Brunt’s doubts were a consequence of a model for immigration in which he acknowledged the presence of only a minimal number of Italians directly involved in mining activity. Conversely, however, he noted that there is a lack of explicit evidence concerning business activity in Spain, a shortage which is particularly acute for the second century. In fact, the only evidence cited by him to demonstrate the presence of resident Italian businessmen in the 2\(^{nd}\) century does not concern mines at all, but contractors for military supplies.\(^{36}\) Specifically, while describing Cato’s consulship of Hispania Ulterior in 195, Livy stated that the consul forbade *redemptores* from purchasing grain, and dismissed them to Rome.\(^{37}\) With respect to the Spanish mines, it is on the basis of analogy with other regions (e.g., Cisalpine Gaul, Asia Minor, and Macedonia), and the assumption that an operation

\(^{33}\) This could range from the simple replacement of local miners, to the application of new techniques to work new or underutilised deposits. This process extends beyond the republic, as mines were established in the north-west only in the decades after Augustus’ conquest of the region. Excavation of alluvial deposits in some areas, and tunneling in others, required even more significant investment here, and there is little evidence of indigenous mining.

\(^{34}\) See, for example: Knapp (1977), p. 152-3; Richardson (1986), p. 163.


\(^{36}\) Ibid, p. 211.

\(^{37}\) Livy, XXXIV.9.12. *itaque redemptoribus vetitis frumentum parare ac Romam dimissis “bellum” inquit “se ipsum alet.”* The text does not make clear if these individuals were resident. Nonetheless, the involvement of groups of businessmen, *societates*, in military supply contracts for Spain is known from as early as 215 (Livy, XXIII.48.6).
involving 40,000 workers could not have been arranged in any other way, that both
Brunt and Badian concluded that they were operated directly by large societates
publicanorum. 38 Unfortunately, there is little direct evidence for the direct involvement
of large societates in the mines of Iberia.

An alternate model for the administration of mines in Iberia during the republic
is thus called for. Given the situation in other regions, one might hypothesise that
mining was undertaken by publicani outside large societates. One version of this has
been described by Richardson. 39 With the two caveats that the state of the evidence
makes analysis difficult, and that different systems may have co-existed at any given
time, he proposed that the mines (or at least those in the vicinity of Carthago Nova)
were allocated to “small-scale contractors,” and that the relevant contracts were made in
the province by the governor or his representatives. Domergue subsequently suggested
that small-scale lessees could still have been subject to a censorship locatio. 40 Indeed, it
would not have been necessary for small scale contracts, whose value could be
 guaranteed by an individual, to be contracted to large societates. 41 Furthermore, a
parallel for the letting of public contracts by magistrates in the provinces exists in early
1st century Sicily. Cicero informs us that, before his own day, quaestors in Sicily were
accustomed to auction the collection of certain agricultural tithes in the province. 42 If
such local auctions had been customary in one province, it is at least possible that they
were also undertaken elsewhere. Given the early date at which the mines near Carthago
Nova were first exploited, the administration of public contracts for Sicily would have

41 Brunt (1990), p. 373. The relatively small amounts of capital required to exploit these mines profitably
— compared, for example, with those later established in north-western Iberia — are also a relevant.
42 Cic., Verr. II. III. 7.18. L. Octavio et C. Cotta consulibus senatus permisit ut vini et olei decumas et
frugum minutarum, quas ante quaestores in Sicilia vendere consuissent, Romae venderent...
been the major precedent for similar measures in Iberia. However mines were assigned, the suggestion that smaller scale producers were involved finds some support from both literary and archaeological evidence.

Considering the literary evidence first, Richardson interpreted Polybius’ report that the mines provided the Roman people with a return of 25,000 drachmas per day as a figure that was more likely to have been calculated in the provinces, rather than being derived from the value of contracts let through a *censoria locatio* in Rome. Given that daily output would have been variable, however, it is best not to take Polybius too literally by assuming that miners collectively remitted that precise sum every day. The figure of 25,000 was necessarily an aggregate figure for the mines in the area, and must have represented an average over some period of time, whether calculated by a representative of the governor or of a *societas*. The other piece of literary evidence invoked by Richardson is from Posidonius, as quoted by Strabo, where it was claimed that certain private silver-miners could extract a Euboean talent in three days. Clearly, a category of relatively small-scale miners is indicated, which would be incompatible with direct exploitation of mineral resources by the *societates* of Rome.

Archaeologically, Richardson first cited the comparatively small size of individual mines as an indication that they need not have been operated by the extremely wealthy. He then proceeded to consider an alternate source of evidence, specifically the inscriptions found on lead ingots that would have been produced from the same ore as the silver, a useful list of which was compiled by Boulakia. Of the

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43 See above, n. 77.
44 Richardson (1976), p. 142, 145.
45 Strabo, III.2.9. ...τῶν δ’ ἀργυρευόντων τισιν ἱδιωτῶν ἐν τρισὶν ἡμέραις Ἐυβοικῶν τάλαντον ἐξείρουσι. See Richardson (1976), p. 141.
46 Richardson (1976), p. 146.
twenty-four examples cited, twenty involve the names of various individuals, while two bear the name of a *societas*, and another two the abbreviation IMP. At least seventeen different individuals were named, as two people were identified in different ways in the inscriptions. With only one exception, P. Turuilius Arcon, these names were Italian in origin. Domergue’s more recent compilation of these inscriptions includes fifty-four which can be dated to the republic, but the conclusions are generally similar. Thirty-eight of the stamps from Domergue’s list carry the name of a single individual, while another seven bear the name of two individuals, presumably in partnership. A further seven refer to *societes* (SOC or SOCIET), three of which are qualified by the names of individuals, while four indicate the location of the relevant mines. None of the inscriptions referring to *societes* can be connected with Carthago Nova, a fact which is particularly significant given that the majority of the ingots originated there.

Even more recent work has tended to corroborate these findings. Most of the known inscribed ingots originated in the vicinity of Carthago Nova, with individuals and small *societes* being represented. Indeed, the number of different names known from these ingots suggests something about the pattern of mining operations. If these represent the names of those who smelted the metal, then a correspondingly large number of separate smelters is indicated. Given that only a fraction of the overall metal

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47 Boulakia (1972), p. 142. See also Richardson (1976), p. 146, who noted that these ingots were dated to the republic or early empire based on the lettering. 
48 SOCIET. ARGENT FOD. MONT. IULCR GALENA (CIL XV.7916); SOCIET MONT ARGENT IULCRO (Musée du Louvre). 
49 CIL XV.7916; CIL II.6247. 
50 This assumes that L.AETILL.FERM (EphEp. VIII.254) and L.AETILL.FIERM (EphEp. IX.181) are the same individual, and that P.TVRVILI.M.F.MAI (EphEp IX.428), P.TVRVILII ARCON (Museum of Madrid) and P.TVRLLI LABEONI (EphEp VIII.254) are identical. The last name mentioned may belong to an entirely different individual, thus raising the total of those known to eighteen. 
51 Domergue (1990), p. 254-257. 
production is represented by the known ingots, and given that many individual mine 
operators could have relied on others to smelt ore, a substantial number of separate mine 
operators seems likely. While it is possible that these individuals acted on behalf of 
large societates in Rome, the way in which societates were named on the tablets 
mitigates against this conclusion. These societates are mentioned alongside the names of 
the individuals involved, or, where a geographical reference is used as in the case of 
Ilucro, were clearly relatively small undertakings. Of course, by analogy with the 
organisation of trade discussed in previous chapters, it is entirely possible that 
individual miners were acting entirely or in part as the agents of wealthier individuals in 
Rome. By the early principate, moreover, it is clear that some individuals resident in 
Spain had accrued enormous wealth through their involvement in mining. Thus, the P. 
Turuilus named on at least two lead ingots is known from coins to have served as a 
local magistrate (duumvir quinquennalis) during the early empire. Q. Torius Culleo, a 
resident of Castulo in the first century AD, is known to have made donations to his 
home town totalling some 20,000,000 sesterces, and was probably a mining 
contractor. Finally, there is the example of Sextus Marius, the richest man in Spain, 
whom Tacitus claimed was unjustly convicted of incest and executed in AD 33, on the 
grounds that Tiberius wished to place Sextus’ gold and copper mines under state 
control, for his own benefit.

From a somewhat later period, during the reign of Hadrian, one can also cite an 
inscription on bronze tablets, found near Vipasca in the western Sierra Morena. One of

53 Richardson (1976), p. 146. Domergue’s list also describes a SOC. ARGENT. and a SOC. VESC., 
which likely refer to named mines, but their location and details of operation are unknown.
54 Keay (1998), p. 64. See CIL II.3278.
Tarpeio deicitur. Ac ne dubium haberetur magnitudinem pecuniae malo vertisse, aerarias aurariasque 
eius, quamquam publicarentur, sibimet Tiberius seposuit.
these bears a letter from a procurator of mines, and describes the legal procedures under which mining contracts were then let, as well as details of the management of mines.\textsuperscript{56}

The mines in this area were established in the late 1\textsuperscript{st} century BC, and thus at a later date than those in the eastern Sierra Morena and near Carthago Nova.\textsuperscript{57} Given the later foundation date of these mines, and the even later date of the tablets, continuity in administrative arrangements between Vipasca and republican mines is hardly likely. Nonetheless, their evidence is invoked here in order to demonstrate the feasibility of a pattern of leasing to small contractors, and the existence of a legal framework allowing for such leases, at least in the later period. Thus, clause two states that ownership of the 50% share belonging to the imperial treasury can be purchased for 4,000 sesterces.\textsuperscript{58} Of course, this does not rule out the possibility that wealthy individuals or groups could undertake multiple such contracts. Indeed, ownership of multiple pits was specifically accounted for, as clause three requires a mine owner who strikes ore in one-fifth of his pits to continue work in the remainder. Clause six, however, makes it clear that an individual was permitted to occupy a mine in partnership with others, thus the possibility existed for individual citizens with less than 4,000 sesterces on hand to participate in these contracts.\textsuperscript{59}

The legal framework of a somewhat later period clearly allowed for the participation of a relatively broad range of individuals, but is this evidence applicable to Spain during the republic? The applicability of the administrative model at Vipasca to other locations has been questioned on the grounds that its provisions are specific to the

\textsuperscript{57} Keay (1998), p. 64.
\textsuperscript{58} Smallwood, 439.2. \textit{qui primus pretium puteo fecerit et sestertia quattuor milia nummum disco intule}. In addition to this sum, half of the production of the mine was remitted to the imperial treasury.
\textsuperscript{59} Smallwood, 439.6 \textit{Occupatori puteorum socios quos volet habere liceto...}
geology of the site. Thus, Domergue points out that certain regulations presume that silver and copper were being mined, rendering them unsuited even to another region of Iberia such as the Sierra Morena, where silver and lead were produced. Domergue is, however, quite specific that the Vipasca tablets have a more general applicability to other aspects of mining, among them the possible forms of ownership of mines, and the means by which the right to work them could be acquired. A series of tablets from mid-second century AD Dacia has been interpreted as indicating that mines there were operated by a similar range of small and medium scale producers, even though the details of their administration have little in common. The Vipasca model need not have been universally applicable, but it was one available administrative method among several.

One possible solution is to acknowledge the possibility that multiple methods of administration for specific mines could have been in effect in a region such as Iberia at any one time. So, while it seems likely that the mines near Carthago Nova were exploited by a relatively large group of small producers, evidence from lead ingots from the Sierra Morena suggests that societates were more commonly involved there. As has been discussed, this difference may be connected with the later date at which Roman operation of mines in the Sierra Morena began, or it may be a function of differing geological conditions. As the effort required to access, extract and process ore grows, the investment required in order to profitably exploit a mine likewise increases. These higher expenditures could have been undertaken more easily by societates. Indeed, an even greater diversity of regimes is possible. In Noricum, from perhaps the mid-1st

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60 Domergue (1983), 175-176.
61 Ibid., p 77.
century AD, *conductores* received contracts to collect *vectigalia* on iron exported from a region encompassing the mines of that province.

### 5.3 – Mines and Personnel

In a given mining area, who should we expect to have been present? Polybius’ figure of 40,000 people working in the vicinity of Carthago Nova has been mentioned several times already, but not all of these individuals were necessarily employed in mining. Instead, it is entirely possible that the figure includes individuals otherwise occupied in tasks that supported mining operations, and provided necessary services to the miners themselves. The following discussion will thus consider those actively involved in mining first, before proceeding to those attracted to the mining areas but not actively employed in mines.

For the period of the republic, at least, it is likely that slaves undertook most of the physical labour in the mines. Alternatives existed, such as the use of paid labour, or the employment of indigenous people under compulsion. These, however, seem to have been more prominent in a later period, and in any case paid labour could not have been an option prior to the development of a monetized economy in Iberia. Given the regularity of Roman military campaigns in Iberia, it seems likely that this slave population was substantially drawn from the indigenous population of Iberia. In what capacity, then, were the Italian immigrants mentioned by Diodorus likely to have been employed? Some Italians may have been employed in managerial or technical roles, and while there is little direct evidence available concerning the personnel involved in these

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64 Domergue (1990), p. 334.
tasks, a large slave workforce would have required supervision. Archaeological evidence can illuminate the situation to some extent. The housing known from the vicinity of Cartagena was simple, built to similar plans, and organised in small groups proximal to the mines.\(^65\) Housing in the vicinity of mines in the Sierra Morena shows a similar pattern, though there, graffiti demonstrate the presence of Iberians among the miners.\(^66\) The pattern is repeated at Rio Tinto, but at least in this instance the presence of somewhat wealthier individuals can be shown. The tombstone of one Lucius Iulius Rabirius, whose initials appear on locally produced lamps, points to the presence of an Italian population there. Under the circumstances, it is primarily the evidence of lead ingots that will further discussion, even though they are only likely to apply to the wealthiest section of the migrant population.

Based on lead ingots, it has already been established that the mines near Carthago Nova were operated primarily by individuals, with some instances of partnership, while explicit reference to *societates* was restricted to the Sierra Morena. But who were these individuals? Most of the names in question are Italian, and particularly from southern Italy, the only exception being one CN. ATELLI CN. L. BULIO, whose name is Iberian in origin.\(^67\) In a few instances, freedmen are named on these ingots, for example L. AURUNC L. C[.]TA, T IUVENT. T. L. DVSO, and M. LAETILI M. L. Moreover, the last named individual is identified as a partner in a *societas* with the freeman L. GARGILI T. F. In each of these three instances, it is entirely possible that the individuals named were operating as agents on behalf of others who provided the funds necessary to undertake mining operations. Nonetheless, these freedmen are a minority of those named. Several of the other names, however, are

\(^{65}\) Ibid., p. 358.

\(^{66}\) Ibid., p. 359-360.

\(^{67}\) Ibid., p. 322.
shared by members of the Roman nobility, often novi homines of the period.\textsuperscript{68} Again, the likeliest explanation for the presence of these names in Iberia is that they belonged to the freedmen or clients of wealthier Romans, and that they operated mines wholly or partly on behalf of those wealthy individuals. Another group of names, meanwhile, reappears in the epigraphy of the municipal elite of Augustan Carthago Nova.\textsuperscript{69} As the descendants of mine operators, the presence of these people among the municipal elite suggests that their forerunners had accrued personal wealth also. In short, the pecuniary benefits of mining were likely shared between wealthy backers in Italy, and Italian mine operators in Iberia.

Alongside those individuals directly involved in mining must have been another group which was present in a supporting role. The lamp producer, Rabirius, from Rio Tinto falls into this category, but unfortunately this group is not otherwise well attested. Hirt has usefully speculated on the range of tasks that would almost certainly have had to be undertaken, including provision of food, water, and shelter, fabrication and repair of tools, maintenance of draught animals, acquisition of timber for supports, security for the mining area, and so on.\textsuperscript{70} No doubt much of the physical labour involved in these activities was, like mining itself, undertaken by slaves. More technical tasks such as surveying (surely important where multiple mines existed in a limited area) may have fallen to Italian migrants. Moreover, the presence of the mines created demand for a wide range of ancillary activities, and it’s entirely likely that some of them were undertaken by Italians also. The Vipasca tablets, meanwhile, explicitly refer to the auction of concessions for baths, shoemakers, barbers, fullers, schoolmasters, and even individuals to work the waste (scoria) of the mines. Obviously, it cannot be shown that

\textsuperscript{68} Hirt (2010), p. 274-275.
\textsuperscript{69} Domergue (1990), p. 326.
\textsuperscript{70} Hirt (2010), p. 30-31, 44-45.
magistrates in republican Spain were dealing with auctions for such activities. What the tablets point to, however, is the possible range of economic activities to be found in association with mining areas.

5.4 – Conclusion

It has been thought that the large mining areas of the republic were necessarily operated by large societates publicanorum. As I have shown, however, it is entirely feasible that mines were operated on a smaller scale. Strictly speaking, those who operated the mines did so under contracts, and were thus still publicani, and occasionally these operators were organised into societates. The key difference, however, is one of scale. While mining operations certainly required investment, they required neither the degree of financial security that large societates could provide, nor the semi-permanent legal identity of those societates. The general pattern of mining in 2nd century Iberia seems to have involved a large number of smaller operators, but the evidence suggests that at least some of them had the financial backing of wealthier individuals in Rome. That is to say, some of the Italians who migrated to Iberia to exploit the mines there did so as the agents of others. This is a significant result, given that it means that these mines were organised in a way that is compatible with the more general model of the Roman economy that was described and discussed in the preceding two chapters. Over the longer term, there are indications that some of these mine operators acquired a reasonable amount of wealth in their own right, enough to elevate them to the municipal elite, and perhaps further.
Mining in Iberia clearly does show some variation over time. The mines near Carthago Nova were perhaps the first mines overseas which Rome found itself in a position to exploit, and this seems to have been done by means of small contractors. The Sierra Morena began to be exploited from the mid-2nd century, and in that area there is evidence for the existence of small societates. It should be emphasised, however, that all of this activity was ultimately to Rome’s benefit. The growth in Rome’s silver coinage from the mid-2nd century on clearly demonstrates this. It is only starting around 154/153 that silver coins began to be minted in Iberia itself. While this silver may have originated in the mines near Carthago Nova and been sold by mine operators on an open market, its production was probably connected with Roman taxation, and used to pay the military in Iberia. Silver coins actually minted in Italy are unknown in Iberia prior to ca. 125, despite the number of coin hoards found there. This points, unsurprisingly, to the very unidirectional flow of wealth during the first seven decades of Rome’s operation of mines in Iberia. What, then, is the significance of the appearance of coinage from Italy? Crawford suggests that that it reflects migration of Italians to Iberia. Even apart from the mining areas, however, Italian settlement in Iberia had been underway for decades before 125, beginning with the foundation of Italica in 206. While it may be that a critical mass of Italians was present in Iberia after 125, I would suggest that the amount of wealth actually held by those Italians is more important. Not only did the seventy years before 125 see an increasing population of Italians in Iberia, but at least a segment of that immigrant population was becoming increasingly wealthy. The increasing wealth of this resident population is obvious by the principate, when

71 Domergue (1990), p. 376.
73 Ibid., p. 90.
74 Ibid., p. 100.
individuals such as P. Turuilius, Q. Torius Culleo and Sextus Marius who derived their wealth from mining are known to us. In short, the elite of early imperial Iberia owed its position in part to wealth accrued from mines over the preceding two centuries.\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{75} See Orejas (2002), which approaches this evolution from the perspective of landscape archaeology. Orejas emphasises that mining was only one among a variety of economic activities undertaken in the areas of Carthago Nova, and suggests a “consolidation” of a colonial aristocracy contemporaneous with Augustus’ award of colonial status to the city.
Chapter Six – Demography of the Diaspora

6.1 – Introduction

Over the preceding five chapters, I have analysed the Italian diaspora in the western Mediterranean in terms of its constituent groups. These groups are unlikely to have been entirely discrete, since individual migrants could easily have undertaken a variety of roles. Traders could have had a range of economic interests that shifted over time, while former soldiers who remained in the provinces may subsequently have been employed in the various categories of economic activity that have been examined. Nonetheless, organising the available evidence on migrants according to the roles which they undertook in the provinces has provided an analytically expedient foundation for my inquiries to this point. There are, however, characteristics of the diaspora which have not been adequately addressed in the course of examining subdivisions of that population.

The goal of both this chapter and the next is thus to examine the diaspora in a holistic rather than a constitutive manner. In other words, they will seek to establish the group characteristics of the diaspora. Chapter seven will address the social conditions of the diaspora, in terms of interactions within the migrant community, and of relationships between that community and Rome and its magistrates. Chapter six has the more limited objective of describing the demography of the diaspora, including the overall scale of migration, its evolution over time, and its geographical scope. It is thus a necessary preliminary to chapter seven, in so far as the social conditions of migrant communities are affected by the size of their population. Obviously, a migrant group
numbering only a few tens of people, or one whose population is distributed over a large area, is going to have different characteristics from a community of hundreds, concentrated in a single location, and perhaps comprising a substantial fraction of the total population.

Section 6.2 will discuss the quantitative approach to the demography of the diaspora. As will be seen, it is particularly challenging to determine absolute figures for the population of the diaspora. This is simply a consequence of the state of the available evidence, and corresponds with a limited consideration of the subject in modern scholarship. Given this situation, section 6.3 will treat the demographic question in a deliberately more qualitative way, intended to establish probable patterns of migration.

6.2 – Quantifying the Diaspora

The earliest work of modern scholarship to include detailed deliberations on the number of Italian migrants throughout the Mediterranean was Brunt’s *Italian Manpower* of 1971. Brunt was not the first scholar to give attention to these migrants, having long been preceded by Hatzfeld’s *Les trafiquants italiens dans l’Orient hellénique* of 1919, and in fact explicitly responding on certain matters to Wilson’s *Emigration from Italy in the Republican age of Rome* of 1966.¹ The key difference between *Italian Manpower* and the earlier works is that Brunt was specifically interested in quantifying population. Brunt’s work is thus the starting point for all modern studies of late republican demography. Although it should be recognised that Brunt’s interest in the Italian diaspora itself was incidental to his focus on the

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population of mainland Italy, the influence of *Italian Manpower* on later scholarship necessitates some discussion.

The goal of Brunt’s work was to describe demographic changes in the number of Roman citizens during the last two centuries of the republic. He was particularly concerned with resolving a difference of opinion between Beloch and Frank over the possible growth of the citizen population between the census of 70/69 (at which the bulk of the free Italian population was first enrolled), and that of 28. Given that this debate is concerned primarily with the population of Italy, its details need not be discussed here, except to note that Brunt generally took the view that there was no significant growth of the citizen population over this time span, thus following Beloch rather than Frank. With respect to migration, Frank had claimed a demographically significant level of migration from Italy, which helped to inflate his assessment of the overall number of Roman citizens. Brunt, however, took a highly sceptical view of this, and thus tended to proceed from the assumption that the actual number of migrants was not significant. But what constitutes significance in this context? Brunt’s claim was effectively that the number of migrants was small in comparison with the degree of uncertainty in estimates of the population of Italy. For the purposes of Italian demography, he could then treat migration as an interesting but ultimately inconsequential phenomenon. Nonetheless, Brunt conceded that Italians overseas were culturally, socially, economically, and politically important. In terms of their impact overseas too, there is no doubt that migrants were significant.

Brunt’s initial attitude towards the demographic significance of Italian migration translates into scepticism towards what may be inferred on the basis of the limited

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2 Ibid, p. 7.
3 Ibid, p. 159.
quantitative evidence available. This pattern of thought can be illuminated by the way in which he responded to Wilson’s more credulous approach. For purposes of comparison, both scholars were willing to invoke 19th century patterns of migration, particularly from Europe to North America. Wilson used this comparison in order to demonstrate the possibility that conditions in a given region, e.g. Italy, could be so disturbed as to encourage those of modest means to seek refuge elsewhere, or to encourage the wealthy to invest overseas.\footnote{Wilson (1966), p. 2-3.} Brunt, however, emphasised the difficulties involved in such migration, the tendency of migrants from Europe to gravitate to urban areas in North America, and on the need for state involvement and support to assist migrants, a support which was generally lacking in the Roman republic.\footnote{Brunt (1971), p. 160.} The basic validity of this comparison can be called into question. The indigenous peoples of North America were increasingly disregarded through the period, and this corresponded with a settlement pattern involving their wholesale replacement by an immigrant population. As I concluded in Chapter Two, this is not the sort of cultural contact that likely prevailed in the late republic. By focusing on specific conditions relevant to the act of migration, both scholars ignored the social conditions that existed in areas where migrants settled. Brunt sought to dispose of the idea of a mass ‘peasant migration’, which Wilson had argued was at least possible. The rejection of a migration of this type, however, says little about the actual number of migrants, even though it has implications for the economic basis and general characteristics of diaspora communities. A migrant settlement reliant on peasant agriculture is unlikely to resemble one comprised of traders residing within a foreign community.
There are two important pieces of quantitative evidence which both Brunt and Wilson used in order to support their respective positions. The first piece of evidence, and one that is frequently cited, is the claim that 80,000 Italians were killed by Mithridates in 88 in Asia Minor and Delos. If accurate, this number would suggest a much larger migrant population around the Mediterranean. Nonetheless, Wilson conceded that the number was likely subject to exaggeration,\(^6\) while Brunt regarded the number as wholly untrustworthy.\(^7\) Clearly, it is difficult to consider something as politically charged as the numbers killed in a massacre as adequate testimony. The second piece of evidence involves an attempt by Wilson to estimate the population of migrants in Spain based on recruitment levels there during the civil wars of the 40s BC. Both he and Brunt concluded that approximately 10,000 were recruited into the Pompeian forces that were subsequently defeated at Ilerda.\(^8\) This figure necessarily involves some uncertainty. As Brunt himself noted in making his calculation, it is entirely possible that the citizenship of some recruits was doubtful, and that juridical niceties were ignored under difficult circumstances.\(^9\) Regardless, Wilson asserted that this figure was indicative of a significant migrant population, yet Brunt used the same figures to arrive at the opposite conclusion. Brunt went on to argue for the presence of 50,000 provincial recruits from throughout the Mediterranean in the armies of the civil war, and extrapolated from this figure a total population of extra-Italian adult male citizens of 150,000.\(^10\) Even this figure is deemed by Brunt to be demographically insignificant. In the context of Brunt’s interest in the demographic history of Italy, and his attempt to decide between competing hypotheses involving a citizen population of 

\(^{9}\) Brunt (1971), p 231.  
\(^{10}\) Ibid, p. 232-233.
million or 10 million, it is easy to see why 150,000 migrants could be regarded as insignificant. Brunt’s criteria for significance were simply more stringent than Wilson’s. That said, Brunt did not explain how he arrived at a 3:1 ratio between total population and military recruits, and the 33% recruitment rate he postulated seems remarkably high. Under the circumstances, the figure of 150,000 adult male Romans overseas by the end of the republic is clearly a minimal estimate.

What renders Brunt’s work most significant is the tendency for more recent scholarship to follow both his line of reasoning with respect to Italian demography, and his treatment of the population of migrants as a subordinate issue. For example, Harris discusses migrants, concentrating on negotiatores with political connections and influence in Rome but with some consideration of average citizens, while examining the possible economic motivations for Roman imperialism.11 Again in the context of economics, migrants appear in Nicolet’s description of the economy and society of Rome during the last 80 years of the republic.12 In this instance, Brunt’s discussions of population figures are even used explicitly,13 and Brunt’s concession that the diaspora collectively possessed much greater influence than their numbers alone would suggest is echoed. Thus, Delos is said to be inhabited by a “veritable aristocracy of bankers and merchants,” while the migrants as a group are termed a “powerful diaspora, the more so because it was a diaspora of the ruling race.”14 Despite the extent to which Brunt was followed by Nicolet, the latter allows the diaspora a somewhat greater numerical significance, by claiming that in Cisalpina, Narbonensis, and Spain, their numbers were sufficient to constitute an entirely new population. Nicolet is vague about the scale of

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11 Harris (1979), p. 94-101. His conclusion was that, while business interests benefitted from Roman imperialism, they were not a primary concern in motivating the relevant policies.
12 Nicolet (1994).
14 Ibid, p. 638.
migration that would be required to give rise to such a ‘new population,’ but seems to have in mind the formation of communities in which Italians were numerically predominant.

Gabba, meanwhile, was even more willing to contradict Brunt than was Nicolet. Thus, in seeking the causes of a population decline in central and southern Italy after the Second Punic War, he assigned part of the blame to the emigration of individuals and families dispossessed by some combination of war and changes in land use patterns.\(^{15}\) He argued that much of this population settled in Cisalpine Gaul, often in formally established colonies or on other lands granted to them, though he also suggested on several occasions that some portion of this population settled in Spain.\(^{16}\) Such a phenomenon is remarkably close to the sort of peasant migration which Brunt denied to have existed. Essentially, the picture of economic and social conditions in late republican Italy presented by Gabba, and to a lesser degree Nicolet, point toward a higher estimate of the population of Italians overseas than allowed for by Brunt’s low estimate.

Other scholars who have relied upon Brunt’s calculations of the Italian population for their own inquiries pertaining to the demographic history of Italy during the late republic have expressed doubts about his conclusions on migration. Hopkins, in describing this period as one in which peasant agriculture was replaced by large slave-worked farms, relied on Brunt’s population figures. While Hopkins concentrates on the movement of those displaced to Rome, some attention is given to migration overseas, and the assertion made that Brunt’s estimates of the migrant population were notably

\(^{15}\) Gabba (1989).

\(^{16}\) Gabba (1989), p. 214, 216. Gabba does not go into detail here on the nature of this possible migration to Spain, focussing far more on Cisalpine Gaul.
cautious. Similarly, Parkin praises Brunt for his evaluation of the pertinent evidence, but also expresses doubt as to the veracity of a decline in the freeborn population of Italy in this period. Meanwhile, he expresses a further doubt that the available evidence can allow migration to be quantified with sufficient accuracy to be incorporated into demographic models. In effect, Parkin reaches the same conclusion as Brunt concerning the impact of migration on Italian demography, but by denying the possibility of quantifying migration within any reasonable margin of error.

Brunt’s work only temporarily settled the very demographic debate which he originally endeavoured to resolve. Some more recent scholars, most notably Lo Cascio, have revived Frank’s notion of significant population growth in late republican Italy, as well as challenging the overall model of a depopulation of the Italian peasantry. It is likely that a much higher population count in Italy would correspond with emigration on a far greater scale than Brunt’s figures would suggest. While acknowledging his own bias toward the ‘low count’ position, Scheidel has provided a detailed discussion of the terms of this ongoing debate, and gone some way to addressing Morley’s earlier comments that the implications of the ‘high-count’ position require more thorough consideration. It might be challenging to bring a debate on Italian demography to bear on questions of migration, even though participants on both sides acknowledge the role of migration beyond Italy. Conversely, however, the demographic conditions prevailing in Italy necessarily impact on our understanding of the motivations for

17 Hopkins (1978), p. 67, 69. On Hopkins’ view of Brunt, see footnote k, p. 69: “… Brunt may also have overstated his case, in his attempt to fit scattered data to the surviving census figures. At least his figures for overseas migration are cautiously low.”
18 Parkin (1992), p. 68. “… his [Brunt’s] underlying thesis regarding the decline of the freeborn population of republican Italy with a corresponding surge in the numbers of freedmen may be questioned…”
19 Ibid, p. 135.
migration, as the high count implies simple population pressure played a significant role, whereas the low count implies the active involvement of wealthy landowners.

As Erdkamp has noted, there is a shortage of discussion of migration in antiquity,\textsuperscript{23} one which his 2008 contribution seeks to alleviate, at least for intra-Italian migration. A notable exception, however, is Scheidel’s 2004 paper which, although it is concerned with the overall changes in the free population of Italy as the republican empire developed, includes an assessment of the quantitative significance of extra-Italian migration by individuals relative to that of migration involving “state-sponsored re-settlement programs”.\textsuperscript{24} Based on Brunt’s figures, he calculated a rate of individual emigration of 0.1% of the Italian population \textit{per annum} over the period 200-50 BC. This figure was then compared with rates for state-sponsored emigration during the four periods 338-263 BC, 200-177 BC, 81-28 BC within Italy, and 48-14 BC to the western empire, with respective rates of 0.4-0.5%, 0.6-1.0%, 0.4%, and 0.7%. Particular stress is laid on an overall emigration rate of 0.65% for the period 81-14 BC. Scheidel thus concluded that private migration had a more limited demographic impact than publicly sponsored migrations. It should be stressed that Scheidel’s figure for the rate of individual migration must, for several reasons, represent a minimum. Firstly, as previously discussed, Brunt’s estimate of the population of extra-Italian adult male migrants in 49 BC, 150,000, was a cautious one. Secondly, assuming a figure of 150,000 migrants in the provinces by 49 BC, a calculation over the period 200-50 BC also requires the inclusion of those migrants who could not have survived to the end of

\textsuperscript{23}Erdkamp (2008), p. 418. Erdkamp’s paper, along with a number of others in \textit{People, Land and Politics: Demographic Developments and the Transformation of Roman Italy 300 BC-AD14} that I have cited both in this chapter and in Chapter Two, give some attention to migration. Broadhead (2000) and (2001) also address the subject, concentrating on republican migration to Cisalpine Gaul and within Italy respectively. Moatti (2004), meanwhile, examines the effect of human mobility on culture during the empire. None of these directly address demographic issues, though Broadhead (2000), p. 148-9 is critical of Brunt’s cynicism regarding the scale of private migration to Cisalpine Gaul.

\textsuperscript{24}Scheidel (2004), pp. 10-13.
that period. Indeed, Scheidel earlier notes the importance of the time-span of the relevant migration episodes being of a similar order of magnitude. Finally, it should be remembered that only the rate of migration to the western empire from 48-14 BC is, for my purposes, strictly relevant to the rate of individual migration to those areas. The other periods considered by Scheidel deal only with migration within Italy. While the colonisation efforts of the latter half of the 1st century were likely to have been on a larger scale than earlier, private migrations, it seems an exaggeration to claim that they were of completely different orders of magnitude.

Surely more provocative in quantitative terms is Crawford’s suggestion, even if only as a thought-experiment, that half of Roman citizens may have been living “overseas” after 90 BC. Crawford’s argument here has much less to do with precise demography than with pointing out that “alternative states” governed by certain dynasts (e.g., Sertorius in Spain, Pompey in the east, Caesar in Gaul) relied on the presence of significant numbers of Roman citizens in those regions in order to function. Similarly, Purcell has considered the significance of the Italian diaspora during the rule of Augustus, particularly as a point of cultural contact between east and west. As might be expected, his work shows the influence of some of his predecessors. Thus, there is a focus on evidence from the east, and particularly on the inscriptions analysed previously by Hatzfeld and Wilson. Perhaps reflecting Brunt, there is a hesitancy to pursue specific figures for the number of migrants, although an estimate of several hundred thousand is mentioned. Finally, in a manner suggestive of Nicolet, Purcell draws attention to the power dynamic which underlay the importance of the diaspora, and to the privileged

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28 Ibid, p. 86.
position occupied by Roman migrants by virtue of their relationship with the dominant power in the Mediterranean.

In some respects, efforts to quantify the Italian diaspora have made only minimal progress since Brunt. His calculations continue to represent a minimum figure for the total number of adult male Romans overseas by the end of the republic. When the question has been approached from the context of the social, economic, and political conditions existing in the provinces, however, there seems to be greater discomfort with a population estimate as low as Brunt’s. Nonetheless, there has been little discussion of how much greater the migrant population might have been. In principle, migrants might have been several times more numerous. If so, they may still have been insignificant relative to the demography of Italy, and would still not have exceeded the rate of publicly sponsored migration discussed by Scheidel.

One might estimate a migrant population on the order of several hundred thousand by the end of the republic, but the margin of error in this figure remains high. That said, it seems doubtful that achieving greater accuracy in this estimate would be particularly useful in attempting to describe the conditions and experiences of the diaspora. More important in this regard than an aggregate population estimate is establishing when migration occurred and where migrants settled. An examination of these general patterns is the first step in describing the communities that comprised the diaspora and perhaps their evolution over the last two centuries of the republic.
6.3 – Patterns of Population Movement

While it is possible to make a very general estimate of the overall population of the diaspora at the end of the republic, such as the figure of several hundred thousand just discussed, it would be more informative for my purposes to characterise migration in terms of its variation over time and between regions. In this section, I shall endeavour to use the material of the previous chapters in order to hypothesise on the fluctuating patterns of migration throughout the western Mediterranean. An overall picture will be built up by examining the likely contribution to the diaspora of different categories of migrants. As a preliminary to this, however, it would be useful briefly to compare the scale of migration to the west with that to the east.

The earliest major work to focus on migrants from Italy, and the one to which subsequent scholarship almost inevitably refers, is Hatzfeld’s *Les trafiquants italiens dans l’Orient hellénique.* 29 His work was not entirely without precedent, as he cites the earlier efforts of Schulten, Kornemann 30 and Parvan, though Hatzfeld found that their efforts were relatively narrow in scope, and did not adequately address the questions in which he was interested. 31 Specifically, these questions concerned the origins and occupations of Italian migrants, and their relationships both with other Italians and with Greeks. Hatzfeld’s own study was intentionally limited, considering only *les hommes d’affaires,* and almost exclusively dealing with Greece and Asia Minor. In Hatzfeld’s view, the eastward movement of *negotiator* was of an entirely different character to the westward, in part because the east was more attractive and hospitable to those

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29 Hatzfeld, J., (1919).
30 See *RE,* under *conventus.*
engaged in business.\textsuperscript{32} Hatzfeld thus justified the geographical limits of his study, and implied a significant disparity in the scale of migration between east and west. No doubt this perspective was a consequence of Hatzfeld’s concentration on epigraphic evidence.

Hatzfeld’s approach can be compared to that of Wilson. As the latter acknowledged, his geographical scope demanded a different approach in east and west, with scattered literary references providing evidence for the latter, and a relatively greater abundance of inscriptions supporting discussion of the east.\textsuperscript{33} Furthermore, Wilson was willing to use evidence from the east in order to better illuminate the situation in the west, at least with respect to the potential scale of migration.\textsuperscript{34} In fact, rather than regarding the west as relatively inhospitable, Wilson considered the figure of 80,000 killed by Mithridates in 88 in Asia Minor and Delos as indicative of the scale of migration both there and throughout the Mediterranean. It is also worth noting that Brunt subsequently estimated the Italian population in Spain at the end of the republic at 30,000.\textsuperscript{35} This alone represents one-fifth of his total estimate for the population of the diaspora, and should be sufficient to demonstrate that Brunt did not perceive a dramatic disparity in the scale of eastward versus westward migration.

Having established that a substantial number of Italians were migrating to locations in the western Mediterranean, it remains to be discussed when and where they went. The fact that the diaspora has usually been approached from the perspective of Italian demography has corresponded with a tendency for scholars to show little interest in the specific destination of migrants. Instead, scholarly attention generally has concentrated on the causes of emigration and its consequences for Italy. We can start

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid, p. 4-5. Hatzfeld describes the area as possessing “une civilisation qui les avait faits plus attrayants à la fois et plus hospitaliers que les contrées de l’Ouest.”
\textsuperscript{33} Wilson (1966), p. 3.
\textsuperscript{34} Hatzfeld (1919), p. 6; Wilson (1966), p. 9.
from the assumption, however, that the different groups thus far considered are likely to
demonstrate different patterns of migration, and may thus commence with military
migrants.

At the most simplistic level, the number of military migrants (including both
former soldiers and those involved in military supply) should be a function of the
number of troops present in a given region. The implication of this is that a region such
as Iberia, where Roman armies frequently campaigned, should have contained a larger
number of former soldiers than a region where campaigns were relatively rare, such as
Sicily. This effect would be compounded by the duration of Rome’s involvement in
Spain, with an almost permanent presence there from the Second Punic War. By
comparison, migrants of this sort are unlikely to have been present in Africa prior to
146, or in Transalpine Gaul until the 120s. Essentially, military migration should be
dependent on the duration and intensity of Roman military activity in each region.

This relatively simple model, however, conceals several complications. In
particular, a variety of factors may have influenced the probability of military migrants
choosing to remain in the regions where they had served. Firstly, a lengthy term of
service might have encouraged soldiers to remain in a given location. This may have
been a factor in the foundation of Italica in 206, from among soldiers who had been in
Iberia for up to twelve years. Such lengthy service can be compared with the later
tendency for six years of service to become normal in Spain.\(^{36}\) Secondly, one should
consider the perceived hospitality of a given region. Iberia was host to soldier settlers
from an early date, and second century foundations such as Corduba and Valentia may
have been attractive to later migrants. If a community of former soldiers was already in

the province, it seems likely that their presence would have encouraged others to remain. The situation in Iberia can be contrasted with that in Sardinia. Although numerous campaigns were undertaken there, and while there are a few candidate sites for Italian settlement, the evidence of such settlement is comparatively limited.\textsuperscript{37} Furthermore, the island had an unhealthy reputation, which can hardly have enticed potential migrants, even if it did not entirely exclude them.

Even if the presence of Roman armies was not the only factor determining the likelihood of settlement by military migrants in a given region, it was a necessary precondition. The variation in the number of legions in a given province should be correlated with the rate of settlement by ex-soldiers. The average number of legions in service throughout the Mediterranean varied over time, from as few as four to as many as twelve in different periods of the second century.\textsuperscript{38} If one narrows the perspective to specific regions, then the tendency is unsurprisingly for large numbers of troops to be present only for campaigns. In at least some ‘frontier’ areas, it has been argued that such campaigns were broadly periodic, occurring every few decades.\textsuperscript{39} Given the duration of Roman involvement in Spain, such a pattern should be most pronounced there. At least for the second century, the foundation dates of settlements seem to be distributed accordingly, with Italica in 206, Gracchuris in 179 or 178, Corduba in 169 or 152, and Valentia in 138. If these foundations reflect the needs of military migrants, they might point to elevated migration at those times. In essence, military migration should be characterised by bursts of activity reflecting periodic campaigns in particular regions.

\textsuperscript{37} See section 1.4, p. 41–45.
\textsuperscript{38} Rich (1993), p. 46.
\textsuperscript{39} Dyson (1985), p. 102, 206, 257, etc. Dyson frequently returns to the idea that overpopulation was a periodic trigger for frontier wars
Migrants motivated by their involvement in economic activities, such as trading in grain or wine, or mining, might be expected to have exhibited a somewhat different pattern of migration. Some types of trade were closely connected with the army, whether they involved military supply or the sizeable number of those enslaved after defeat. This component of economic activity should be correlated with the scale and success of campaigns. There was likely also a background level of small-scale trade, but beyond that the pattern of migration would be determined by the prevalence of particular economic activities in certain regions. As has been discussed, a grain trade existed throughout the western Mediterranean, and it is likely that some number of individuals participated in it in all regions. That said, the grain trade to Rome was on a far more significant scale, meaning that regions able to supply the city were far more likely to attract grain traders. Given the importance of Sicily to the urban grain supply, it would come as no surprise if migrants there were far more likely to be involved in that trade.

A generally similar pattern might be visible in the wine trade. The evidence of amphorae demonstrates that there was a Mediterranean-wide trade in wine, and there can be little doubt that wine traders would have been present at numerous points along the coast. Nonetheless, as has been discussed, the wine trade from Italy to Gaul between 125 and 25 BC was particularly intense. In that case, we should expect there to have been a correspondingly larger number of individuals in that region participating in the wine trade. Moreover, it is likely that Italian traders were responsible conveying for wine further inland than previously. If so, rather than being concentrated along the coast, an Italian trade diaspora may have been present deeper in Gaul. Part of this trade may have involved seasonal patterns of movement, connected with the transportation of
wine both from Italy to the Gallic coast and inland from the coast, and with the movement of traders to points further inland than locations where they overwintered.

With respect to mining, this activity was almost exclusively present in Iberia, and even then only in certain parts of the peninsula. During the first decades of the second century, Carthago Nova was the only overseas mining district in Roman hands, and it is likely that the diaspora in the vicinity was drawn there for that reason. Gradually, mining began in other areas, for example in the Sierra Morena around the middle of the century. As discussed in chapter five, however, the mines there were organised somewhat differently, with evidence for the presence of small societates, perhaps reflecting the need for greater initial investment. Furthermore, as suggested at the end of chapter six, there may be evidence for an increasing wealth among Italian migrants in Spain during the seventy years preceding 125 BC.

The commercial component of the diaspora is likely to have been determined by the specific business opportunities that were perceived to have been present in each region at any given time. Furthermore, it is likely that the opportunities for traders of various descriptions became more extensive over time, not least as Romans exerted power over greater areas. Presumably, the recognition of these economic opportunities would have been associated with bursts of migration from Italy. Apart from these events, however, it is difficult to perceive an overall trend in migration rate. It could be that the rate of migration was, over the last two centuries of the republic, fairly constant. The increasing extent of Roman power suggests, however, that a gradual increase in the rate of migration is also possible. Turning to their geographic distribution, it seems likely that these traders would have tended to be concentrated in coastal locations, though there were exceptional circumstances. The exploitation of mines would
obviously have driven migration further inland, while the particularly lucrative wine trade with Gaul likely encouraged individuals to trade further inland.

6.4 – Chronology of the Diaspora

Given all the factors that have been mentioned thus far, a chronology of migration can be sketched. That at least some Romans were travelling overseas, perhaps as early as the beginning of the republic, is implied by Polybius’ account of Rome’s treaties with Carthage. The first of these treaties includes clauses stipulating Rome’s commercial privileges in Carthaginian territory, with more stringent rules applying to trade in Africa and Sardinia than in Sicily.40 While it is highly improbable that large numbers of Romans were undertaking overseas trade at such an early date,41 this treaty at least allowed for the possibility that some did so. The second treaty, likely belonging to 348, also restricted Roman trade, barring their involvement in Sardinia and Africa, but allowing them to trade in Sicily and at Carthage.42 The third treaty, of 279, then renewed the clauses of its predecessor.43 The situation prior to 279 thus appears to be one in which Romans were engaged in trade, but under restrictions that make a large-scale, widespread diaspora in the west improbable.

This may be contrasted with the representation in subsequent Roman historiography, that Rome before the Second Punic War was a militaristic state, lacking any significant commercial or maritime interests. Purcell contests this self-description, arguing that the development of historiography in Rome itself demonstrates that the city

40 Polyb. III.22.8-10.
41 Walbank (1957), p. 342-343. Walbank discusses the difficulties surrounding the date of the Polybian treaties, but himself supports dating the first to 509, and the second to 348.
43 Polyb. III.25.2.
had been involved in and influenced by the intellectual discourses of the wider Mediterranean world throughout the fourth and third centuries. In a similar vein, Leigh argues that the First Punic War was subsequently dramatized as the moment of Rome’s entry in the Greek world. While he acknowledges that the war brought about Rome’s first “meaningful” naval presence, he points out several instances of Roman concern with naval affairs in the late fourth and early third centuries. Essentially, Rome was not an isolated entity in this period. Combined with the evidence of the Polybian treaties, it is likely that at least some Romans had commercial interests overseas before the Punic Wars, even if their numbers were as yet limited.

Under the circumstances, the migration of a significant number of Romans is only likely to have occurred once Rome was beginning to exert authority overseas. In that case, the seizure of Sicily in 241, as well as that of Sardinia and Corsica in 238, would be the earliest period in which such migration is likely. Unfortunately, the evidence is inadequate to evaluate the possibility of an immediate surge in migration. There is no indication of military settlement in Sicily, and what exists for Sardinia belongs to a later period. Even with respect to grain, a resource that one might expect the Romans to have exploited quickly, the earliest evidence for it being shipped to Rome is from the last decade of the third century. It is possible that significant migration to these islands took place prior to the Second Punic War. This would have been facilitated by the transition of most of their area to Roman control, and perhaps encouraged by whatever commercial links existed before the outbreak of war in 264. Unfortunately, it is difficult to assess the scale of this migration, as it is not visible in the available sources.

44 Purcell (2003), pp. 33-34.
46 Ibid, p. 266.
A rather different picture emerges toward the end of the Second Punic War. The foundation of Italica in 206 provides the first evidence for the settlement of former soldiers overseas. Furthermore, the mines in the vicinity of Carthago Nova were relatively quickly brought back into production after the ejection of the Carthaginians from Spain. In Sicily, meanwhile, the *lex Hieronica*, regulating the taxation of grain, was extended across the whole island at some time between 210 and 205. The reorganisation of the tax regime in Sicily could have presented Romans with further economic opportunities there. In short, the end of the Hannibalic War was associated with the first visible major movement of Romans overseas.

What pattern of migration then prevailed in the century and a half following the end of that war? Three separate components can be identified. The first is associated with military activity, the second with the exploitation of specific temporarily favourable economic circumstances, and the third with a background level of migration. These components contributed in different ways and to different degrees in each location. While I shall attempt to put numbers to these components, and to each region, it must be remembered that these figures represent best guesses and can only be regarded as accurate within a very broad degree of error. Furthermore, the numbers proposed refer in all cases to the population of adult male citizens.\(^\text{47}\)

In Spain, the more or less permanent presence of at least two legions,\(^\text{48}\) along with allied troops prior to the Social War, meant that ex-soldiers likely comprised a significant portion of the diaspora there. Assuming a garrison of 20,000 men and a term of service of six years,\(^\text{49}\) a minimum of 3,300 reinforcements would have been needed.

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\(^{47}\) To clarify, for the period prior to the Social War, I shall regard ‘citizen’ as inclusive of those individuals who held citizenship in the allied states of Italy.


annually, even ignoring fatalities. If only a few percent of these men chose to remain in province, the result would have been the annual settlement of 100-200 ex-soldiers. This figure does not take into account the involvement of additional legions in the frequent campaigns in Spain, nor does it consider those involved in supplying the armies. In the period from 205-44 BC, the settlement of some 15,000 individuals connected with the military would be a relatively conservative estimate, with double that figure being more probable. Military settlement would in turn have attracted Italian traders, and there would have been a simultaneous migration connected with mining. An initial surge when the mines near Carthago Nova were reopened is likely, followed by another, similar burst in the mid-2nd century when mines in the Sierra Morena were brought into operation. Polybius’ figure of 40,000 employed in the mines near Carthago Nova was discussed in Chapter Five. While slaves no doubt performed a great deal of physical labour in the mines, supervisory, technical, and other, ancillary activities were more likely to fall to Italians. While any estimate of this Italian population is highly speculative, a figure on the order of thousands seems reasonable, perhaps as many as 10,000 across the two mining districts.

Taken together, the military and mining alone might account for 40,000 migrants to Spain. In addition to these, there must also have been a background level of migration, attracted by economic opportunities in the region that were not directly contingent upon military activity or economic booms. This more mundane element is harder to quantify, precisely because it is less likely to have attracted comment in our sources. Nonetheless, the growth of Italian communities in the peninsula, and the extension of Roman control over ever greater areas there, must have been associated with a growth in economic opportunities for Italian migrants. An assessment of the
contribution of this element to the diaspora will necessarily be subjective. For now, however, I would suggest that this component of migration was as significant in Spain as the other two. This would give a figure of 80,000 adult male migrants by the mid-1st century.

Is such a figure reasonable? Crawford, in considering his “alternative states”, would presumably think so. His suggestion, that as many as half of Roman citizens were overseas by the end of the republic, relies in part on the way in which Spain was governed under Sertorius. As he points out, Sertorius established a government with its own senate and magistrates, despite not being accompanied by a large number of individuals from Italy. The only alternative is that the personnel of his parallel government were drawn from the existing Italian population in Iberia. In effect, this probably means that many of the wealthiest Italians in Iberia were co-opted into his government, and indeed it was argued in Chapter Five that a segment of this population had been growing increasingly wealthy during the century before Sertorius. This wealthy tranche of the population was presumably the affluent pinnacle of a broader migrant community in the province. It is debatable whether this supports Crawford’s provocative suggestion that as many as half of Roman citizens were outside Italy by the end of the republic. Even without pushing the figures so far as Crawford, however, they do not contradict the figure of multiple tens of thousands suggested here. Indeed, they rule out any dramatically lower population count.

The situation in other regions of the western Mediterranean can be compared with that in Spain. In Africa after 146, the components of the diaspora made proportionately different contributions to those in Spain, with the result that the diaspora

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there is likely to have been characteristically different. As discussed in Chapter One, the scale of Roman military involvement in Africa was more limited than in Spain. The campaigns of the Punic Wars, and particularly the Jugurthine War, probably resulted in some settlement by former soldiers. Without large standing garrisons, however, the military contribution to the diaspora there is likely to have been much more limited. Rather than the tens of thousands suggested for Spain, a few thousand in Africa seems reasonable. A larger impact was made by those involved in agriculture and in trade. The former was considered in Chapter Three, where it was noted that the Gracchan colony at Junonia probably drew several thousand individuals to Africa. Despite the failure of that colony, it is clear from the *lex agraria* of 111 that Italians held land in Africa, though the proportion of absentee landlords to resident farmers is open to debate. It is also clear that the larger towns of the region played host to an Italian trade diaspora. It is clear that this was present during the Jugurthine War, as Sallust informs us of the massacre of Italian traders in both Cirta\(^{51}\) and Vaga\(^{52}\) in the interior. Furthermore, he comments in a negative and moralising way on Marius’ efforts to gain support among the Italian merchant class in Utica.\(^{53}\) Later, during Caesar’s African War, merchant communities in the cities of Africa again appear, in Thysdra, Hadrumetum, and (again) in Utica. Indeed, in the latter, Caesar’s opponents were able to form a “senate” of 300 wealthy resident Romans,\(^{54}\) which may have been representative of a larger population of Italian origin. It is obviously difficult to use simple evidence for the presence of diaspora communities to quantify the diaspora. Nonetheless, the claim that Caesar’s opponents were able to

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51 Sallust, *Jug.* 21.3. Morstein-Marx (2000) expresses doubt as to the actual scale of this massacre, though a noteworthy number of traders must have been present for the story to have had any weight in prompting a Roman response.  
52 Sallust, *Jug.* 47.1.  
53 Sallust, *Jug.* 64.5.  
54 Plutarch, *Cat. Mi.* LIX.2.
raise 12,000 troops from the Roman population of Africa is clearly suggestive.\textsuperscript{55} Using this figure to estimate the adult male population necessarily involves speculation on the recruitment rate, but a figure of perhaps 35,000 might correspond well. As for the chronology of this diaspora, no doubt there were surges in settlement associated with the Jugurthine War and the settlement at Junonia. Nonetheless, the prominence of traders in Africa suggests that the background component of migration, encouraged by general economic opportunities, played a dominant role.

Transalpine Gaul became a venue for Roman military action at a later date than either Spain or Africa. Despite this, there is at least some evidence for the existence of settlements founded in connection with military activity. Aquae Sextiae was founded after campaigns in the late 120s, while Lugdunum Convenarum was established in the wake of the Sertorian War. In this regard there is a similarity with Spain, and of course the Sertorian War involved a campaign from south-western Gaul into Spain. It has been suggested that this period, specifically Fonteius’ efforts as governor to secure the region and use it to support Pompey’s campaign in Spain, marked a watershed in the organisation of the Gallic province.\textsuperscript{56} Moreover, Ebel suggested the province was administered as part of Hispania Citerior until alternate arrangements were made under the supervision of Pompey.\textsuperscript{57} Despite the similarities with Spain, however, the shorter period of Roman military involvement in Gaul, and the smaller number of campaigns, should both correspond to a smaller level of military settlement. As in Africa, several thousand military settlers seem likely. Also as in Africa, it is clear that traders made a substantial contribution to the diaspora in Gaul. Cicero, in the \textit{pro Fonteio}, represents Gaul as the residence of so great a number of Roman traders that practically all business

\textsuperscript{55} Caesar, \textit{B. Afr.} 19.
\textsuperscript{56} See Chapter Three, p. 123.
\textsuperscript{57} Ebel (1976), p. 97-99.
transactions in the region involved them.\textsuperscript{58} Even allowing for some exaggeration, such a representation would have been ineffective if it lacked at least an element of truth.\textsuperscript{59} As discussed in Chapter Five, the years after 125 saw the shipment of wine from Italy to Gaul on a scale that dwarfed the wine trade with other regions. No doubt this involved a surge in migration in the last quarter of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} century, one that perhaps blazed a trail for a range of other traders, and which may go some way to justifying Cicero’s presentation of the province.\textsuperscript{60} Unfortunately, the available evidence means that only a guess can be made as to the population of this diaspora. A figure comparable to that suggested for Africa (35,000) is perhaps reasonable. This population could have been reached in a relatively shorter time, as a consequence of a population surge after 125.

The larger Mediterranean islands can, to some extent, be understood by comparison with the regions already considered. With regard to Sicily, I described in Chapter One how little evidence exists for military settlement on the island. The evidence for a permanent garrison there is limited, while the only occasion on which Roman troops clearly campaigned there is during the Second Slave War. Conversely, however, Sicily was exploited as a source of grain from an early date, certainly in the immediate aftermath of the Second Punic War, if not before. By the period of the Verrines, Cicero could appeal rhetorically to a number of communities of Roman traders on Sicily as witnesses to Verres’ activities. Cicero mentions no less than 42 individual Roman citizens in the course of the Verrines, and notes that the island had attracted many citizens.\textsuperscript{61} Nonetheless, as was the case for Gaul, it is challenging to

\textsuperscript{58} Cic., \textit{Font.} V.11. See Chapter Three, p. 122.
\textsuperscript{59} Crawford (2008), p. 640, cites this as anecdotal evidence for his high proportion of citizens overseas.\textsuperscript{60} Perhaps also relevant to the situation in Transalpine Gaul is Broadhead’s (2000) discussion of Cisalpine Gaul as a region whose economic opportunities encouraged individual migration from the 3\textsuperscript{rd} century on. Perhaps, by 125, Transalpine Gaul was perceived to be similarly promising.
\textsuperscript{61} Cic., \textit{Verr.} 2.2.6
estimate the migrant population on the basis of this evidence. A figure of 20,000 would be smaller than that proposed for Gaul and Africa, though still of a similar order of magnitude. Sardinia and Corsica seem to have attracted only limited settlement by former soldiers, and to have been comparatively uninviting on economic grounds. Under these circumstances, a migrant population significantly in excess of a few thousand seems unlikely.

6.5 – Conclusion

Taking together the population figures that I have proposed yields a total population for the Italian diaspora in the western Mediterranean of slightly more than 170,000 adult male citizens by the end of the republic. We might suppose an initial overseas population on the order of 5000 at the end of the Punic War. Gradual growth over the subsequent decades, along with migration to the mines near Carthago Nova may have produced a population of 25,000 by the mid-2nd century. The second half of that century saw the extension of Roman control into Africa and Transalpine Gaul, and various circumstances would have contributed to population growth in this period. These would have included the development of mines in the Sierra Morena around 150, the dramatic expansion of the wine trade with Gaul after 125, the foundation of Junonia in 122 and that of Narbo in 118, as well as the settlement of former soldiers following the Jugurthine War. All together, we might expect a population of 80,000 by the end of the 2nd century. A continued growth thereafter would have led to an overseas population of 170,000 by the end of the republic. The overall pattern thus involves a gradually
increasing rate of growth over the period, coupled with a series of watershed events that contributed to the overseas population in the last half of the 2nd century.

The population numbers which contribute to this estimate are themselves educated guesses, ones which exceed those produced by Brunt’s minimalist approach, but fall short of Crawford’s proposal that half the Roman citizen population was overseas by this time. Perhaps more important than an estimate of the absolute population is the pattern of population growth, both in terms of the identity of migrants, and the chronology of their movements. Essentially, the end of the Hannibalic War is associated with the earliest significant growth in the population of Italians overseas, particularly in Spain and Sicily. In several instances, bursts in the overall rate of migration can be identified. Even in a region such as Africa, however, where such bursts are harder to identify, it is clear that a significant migrant population was present by the end of the republic. Here and elsewhere, a background level of migration, independent of periods of unusual growth, was contributing to the population of the diaspora. This background migration rate perhaps grew modestly over the century and a half after the Hannibalic War, but this was punctuated by instances of unusual growth. Geographically, most migration is likely to have been to coastal areas, with traders attracted particularly to existing urban centres. Exceptions would have existed, such as migration to inland mining areas, and in connection with the Gallic wine trade. Having characterised the growth in the population of the diaspora, it remains to examine the communities that were produced by these patterns of migration.
Chapter Seven – Social Conditions of the Diaspora at the end of the Republic

7.1 – Introduction

In chapter six, I undertook a demographic inquiry which sought to characterise migration from Italy in terms of its scale and geographical scope, while also indicating how these evolved. In chapter seven I shall examine the end result of these developments, by describing the state of the diaspora during the thirty years prior to 44 BC. The chapter relies heavily on outside descriptions of diaspora communities by members of the Roman elite who were directly involved with them. This is an inevitable consequence of the elite, urban context in which the available literary evidence was produced. Section 7.2 is concerned with relationships among migrants. Specifically, it deals with the organisation of diaspora communities, at least as far as external sources describe them. Section 7.3 then considers the relationship of the overseas communities with Rome and its magistrates. This is achieved by examining the economic and political networks which connected diaspora communities both with Rome and with each other.

Prior to these considerations, however, it will be useful to summarise some general characteristics of the diaspora which had developed by this time. In chapter six, a peak aggregate population figure of 170,000 was suggested for the diaspora in the west. The rate of migration was not uniform over time, but was characterised by bursts of migration to specific regions. Temporarily high rates of migration could be induced
by particular economic circumstances (e.g., the wine trade with Gaul after 125) or military activity (e.g., in Iberia after the ejection of the Carthaginians in 206). Consequently, the phasing of migration to particular regions varied. Furthermore, the involvement of a significant number of migrants in trade implies that a large segment of the diaspora was concentrated in existing coastal communities. There were, of course, exceptions to this geographical distribution. Communities of former soldiers could be located inland, such as at Italica and Gracchuris in Iberia. Moreover, traders could be found inland, such as those massacred at Cirta in 113, or those involved in mining in the Sierra Morena. Nonetheless, these should be viewed as exceptional cases; as will be seen in section 7.2, most of the organised diaspora communities were located in coastal centres. Apart from these demographic developments, it is also likely that the diaspora collectively disposed of an increasing amount of wealth. As suggested at the end of chapter five, one possible explanation for the appearance of Italian-minted silver coins in Iberia in the last quarter of the second century may be the increasing wealth of the diaspora there. Although some migrant communities may have been unsuccessful, those that persisted and grew might be expected to have followed a similar trajectory, if differently timed, in terms of affluence.

One aspect of the diaspora that has not thus far been considered in detail is the juridical status of its members. Prior to the Social War, and the enfranchisement of the Italians under the terms of the lex Julia, migration from Italy would have involved both those with Roman citizenship and those without it. This is not to suggest that the diaspora necessarily had the same proportion of citizens to non-citizens as existed in Italy. Rather, individuals in the diaspora were citizens either of Rome or of Rome’s Italian allies, and accordingly possessed different rights in Roman law. Under most
circumstances, the distinction between Roman citizens and allies probably had little practical significance to individuals outside Italy. While it is difficult in most instances to distinguish between citizens and non-citizens, the situation in Delos may be illustrative. Onomastic evidence from the island, pertaining to the decades prior to the Social War, suggests that the migrant population there was comprised of both Romans and individuals from southern Italy.\(^1\) When referred to in inscriptions, these people may be named as ‘Ῥωμαῖοι or Ἰταλικοὶ / Italici. As Adams has shown, Romanus never appears in Latin texts from the island, with Italici being used exclusively.\(^2\) Furthermore, Ἰταλικοὶ / Italici is only ever used in the plural, which Adams interprets as an indication that the “clearest collective identity” on the island was an Italian one.\(^3\) On this interpretation, despite the differing citizenship of members of the community, this cleavage was not so important as to be emphasised in its self-description. Even when addressing itself to a Latin-speaking audience, the community chose to describe itself as Italian. A comparable usage, though not contemporary, may be observed in Sallust, who on several occasions applies the term Italici to the negotiatores present in the African cities of Cirta and Vaga.\(^4\) Indeed, Sallust also uses the term in a way that is clearly inclusive of Roman citizens, describing the sole survivor of the garrison of Vaga, the prefect T. Turpilius Silanus, as unus ex omnibus Italici.\(^5\) In other words, he uses Italici in a way that elides distinctions in citizen status. Taken together, these pieces of evidence suggest that migrant communities could use their Italian origin as a unifying characteristic, and that this collective identity could be recognised externally.

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1 Solin (1982), p. 117. Solin explicitly contrasts his emphasis on the Roman population of Delos with Hatzfeld’s (1919) view that the diaspora there originated almost exclusively from southern Italy.
3 Ibid, p. 653.
5 Sall., Jug. 67.3.
Citizenship status must, however, have been divisive in at least one respect, specifically in the relationship of individuals with representatives of the state, and in their ability to access the Roman legal system. It appears, for example, that the first law to provide a legal remedy against extortion by magistrates, the *lex Calpurnia* of 149, was intended for the use of Roman citizens alone. Given that similar protections were only extended to non-citizens in 123, for a generation Italian emigrants were in an inferior legal position when dealing with provincial magistrates. The situation was likewise complicated for Italians engaging in business with Romans overseas. Lacking *ius commercium*, Italians were unable to form contracts with Roman citizens that could be enforced in Roman courts, potentially placing them at another disadvantage. Furthermore, the absence of this right debarred Italians from bidding on Roman public contracts, and thus from direct participation in lucrative activities such as military supply and tax collection. Clearly, Italians were engaging in commerce overseas, suggesting that any legal disadvantages could have had only limited effect on their activities. Indeed, it is clear that Romans and Italians were cooperating in financial matters at least as early as 193. Livy describes how, in that year, the senate addressed the practice of certain Romans, who transferred the accounts of debtors to Italians in order to evade laws against usury that applied only to citizens. It seems unlikely that those engaging in financial transactions designed to evade Roman law would have been particularly concerned whether the relevant contracts were legally enforceable.

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7 Mouritsen (1998), p. 92. See, however, Gabba (1989), p. 224-225, suggesting that Italian economic interests, and their desire for greater influence on Roman decisions affecting trade overseas, were contributory causes of the Social War. Mouritsen takes a contrary view, that the Italians were primarily concerned with escaping Roman domination. In his view, citizenship would have held few commercial advantages for the Italians, hence economic concerns are unlikely to have been relevant to the outbreak of war.
8 Livy, 35.7.2 ... *via fraudis inita erat, ut in socios, qui non tenerentur iis legibus, nomina transcriberent...*
Conversely, however, this example does suggest that less dubious forms of commerce did exist between Romans and Italians, whatever the legal disabilities of the latter. Such distinctions were, of course, eliminated in the wake of the Social War, but must have been operative in diaspora communities. The presence of a large number of Italian traders overseas suggests, however, that formal legal disabilities had relatively little impact on their commercial activities.

7.2 – Community Formation and the Roman conven tus

By the last decades of the republic, communities of Roman citizens existed in various regions of the Mediterranean, and particularly in locations which were advantageous for business purposes.9 By this period, moreover, enough of these communities had organised, or been organised, into *conventus civium Romanorum*, that the latter bodies were common throughout the Roman world.10 Much of the relevant evidence for these communities, however, describes their presence in the eastern provinces, or pertains to the period of the Principate.11 While the *conventus* of the east and the persistence of *conventus* long after the end of the Republic are each interesting subjects in their own right, they lie beyond the scope of my inquiry. Complicating matters further, the term *conventus* is also used in connection with the administration of justice. In this context, it can refer to the provincial cities in which a governor was obliged to hold assizes, as well as to the judicial districts surrounding each of those cities. In this judicial sense, the Latin *conventus* came to be equivalent to the Greek

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9 Purcell (2005), p. 93.
10 *RE: conventus*.
11 This pattern may be a result of the paucity of epigraphic evidence in the west; most of the evidence for *conventus* there is literary.
The first objective of this section will be to consider the evidence pertaining to the citizen *conventus* of the western provinces during the Republic. A second goal will then be to examine the relationship between the *conventus* as a citizen group and the judicial *conventus*.

*Conventus civium Romanorum*

The most extensive evidence for the existence of an organised community of Romans concerns the city of Utica. Initially a Punic city, Utica was on the Roman side during the Third Punic War, was rewarded with territory during the post-war reorganisation of the region, and subsequently became the administrative centre for the province of Africa.\(^\text{12}\) The community of Roman citizens in Utica first comes to prominence in 83/82 BC, at which time they are said to have had the governor of the province, Hadrianus, burned alive in his own house.\(^\text{13}\) Cicero is explicit in stating that this action was not punished by the authorities, and in fact Valerius Maximus employs it as an exemplum for appropriate vengeance. However appropriate these actions may have been, it is remarkable that no punitive action was taken, and may be an indication of the influence of the community. Conversely, it is possible that Hadrianus was an opponent of the then ascendant Sulla, and that his death was at least partly politically motivated.\(^\text{14}\) Whatever the political significance of the Roman community at Utica, and whatever the degree of organisation possessed by that community, our sources clearly treat it as collectively responsible for its actions.


The Roman citizens of Utica would again become prominent in the latter stages of the civil wars of 49-45 BC, at which time it became a centre for the senatorial opposition to Caesar, under the leadership of Cato the Younger. The inhabitants of the town were not, however, united in their opposition to Caesar, as he himself makes clear. He describes the population as “a multitude of people unaccustomed to war,” with the native Uticensis “most friendly to Caesar on account of certain benefits he had conferred upon them,” alongside a Roman convenus which is described as ex variis generibus. This last phrase has been interpreted as indicating that the loyalties of the Roman inhabitants were divided, though the existence of a Caesarian faction among them is not otherwise indicated. As will become clear, however, it is more likely that the phrase is used in a pejorative sense to indicate the fickle or untrustworthy nature of that group.

The events that transpired in Utica subsequent to Caesar’s victory at Thapsus are described in de Bello Africo, where the term convenus is again used to describe the community. A similar version of events is provided by Plutarch in his Life of Cato the Younger. These sources agree that Cato worked in conjunction with a group of 300 Roman inhabitants of Utica, which acted as a “senate”. This group consisted of businessmen, in particular merchants and money-lenders, and was also active in

15 Caes., B.Civ. II.36. Erat in oppido multitudo insolens belli diuturnitate otii, Uticenses pro quibusdam Caesaris in se beneficis illi amicissimi, convenus is, qui ex variis generibus constaret, terror ex superioribus proelis magnus. Carter (1991, p. 235) suggests that the multitude refers to the surrounding rural population, who had presumably taken refuge in the city. The specific benefit that Caesar conferred on the Uticenses is unclear, though a law of 59 BC has been suggested. Perhaps an element of the lex Julia de pecuniis repetundis?
17 OLD, definition 6: “A. changeable in behaviour, mood allegiance, etc., wavering, fickle, or sim.; (also of thoughts or attitudes). B. untrustworthy, insincere, two-faced.”
18 [Caesar], B.Afr., 68.
19 Plutarch, Cat. Mi. LIX.2. οἳς ἐχρήτω ἴστη, Ῥωμαίοις μὲν ὡντας, ἐν δὲ Λιβύη πραγματευομένους ἀπὸ ἐμπορίας καὶ δανεισμῶν.
maritime trade and the slave-trade. More importantly for their subsequent fate, this group is said to have donated money to the “senatorial” cause. Despite Cato’s efforts to rally them, in the aftermath of Caesar’s victory, it was clear that they would not support continued resistance, and they thus sent a delegation to Caesar. Upon his entry into the city, Caesar thanked the native inhabitants for their loyalty, and then upbraided “the Roman citizens who were engaged in trade and those members of the Three Hundred who had contributed sums of money to Varus and Scipio”. Accordingly, Caesar stipulated the fine that he intended to levy against these individuals, a punishment which they are said to have accepted without complaint. The group is then said to have responded as follows: *petieruntque a Caesare ut universis CCC uno nomine pecuniam imperaret.* The phrase *uno nomine* indicates that they sought to pay a single debt, with that debt being assigned to them as a collective. What conclusions can be drawn about the Roman community in Utica based on these events? Firstly, it had an independent decision-making capacity, allowing it to take collective action as it did when it sought to make an arrangement with Caesar. Secondly, it actively sought to be treated as a collective body for the purposes of assigning a fine. Furthermore, the collective identity of the group was recognised by Caesar, even as he was dispensing a punishment to them (though, of course, the passage is designed to demonstrate Caesar’s

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20 Plutarch, *Cat. Mi.* LXI.1, τὸν δὲ τριακοσίων, ἀτέ δὴ πλωτικῶν καὶ δανειστικῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὸ πλείστον ἐν τοῖς οἰκίταις τῆς οὐσίας ἔχοντων.
21 [Caesar], *B.Afr.* 88. *CCC, qui pecuniam Scipioni ad bellum faciendum contulerant.*
22 [Caesar], *B.Afr.* 88. Plutarch’s account gives Cato the opportunity to make a speech which convinces the three-hundred, though only temporarily. Their subsequent defection is attributed partly to a desire not to manumit and arm their slaves for the defence of the city. In any case, this behaviour may explain Caesar’s description of them as *ex variis generibus.*
23 [Caesar], *B.Afr.* 90 *civis autem Romanos negotiatores et eos qui inter CCC pecunias contulerant Varo et Scipioni multis verbis accusat.* This passage creates some difficulty, as it may indicate that some among the 300 did not actually donate funds. The collective nature of the punishment for the three-hundred, however, does not support such a distinction, nor does the description of these funds at *B.Afr.* 88.
24 [Caesar], *B.Afr.* 90.
25 Schneider (1962), p. 126. Schneider describes this debt as “als Gesamtschuld”, a description that corresponds with OLD definition 22.
clemency to his adversaries). Moreover, a similar process can be seen in the brief references to the indemnities which were assigned to two other African communities, Hadrumetum and Thapsus. The actions of the *conventus* at Utica, and the assignment of collective responsibility to it and other *conventus*, indicate that these were organised entities.

The position of the Roman community in Corduba, Spain, merits discussion in this context. Founded either in 169/8 or 152 BC by M. Claudius Marcellus, the town appears to have been comprised of both Romans and Iberians, and received formal colonial status only under Caesar or Augustus. Certainly, the Roman community there is described as a *conventus* by Caesar himself as, for example, when it excluded the Pompeian Varro, and detained two cohorts of troops for the defence of the town. Subsequently, this same group revolted against the corrupt governance of Caesar’s lieutenant, Q. Cassius Longinus, although it is also indicated that they refused “to act contrary to Caesar’s interests”. In this instance then, a community of Romans described as a *conventus* is clearly competent to organise the defence of its town. Furthermore, in a situation reminiscent of Utica, the *conventus* here has sufficient freedom of action to determine whom it will support in the course of the civil war. Rather than being assembled and empowered solely in the presence of a Roman magistrate, the *conventus* of Corduba was an organised and independent decision making body.

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26 [Caesar], *B.Afr.* 97. *ibi bonis venditis eorum qui sub Iuba Petreioque ordines duxerant, Thapsitanis HS XX, conventui eorum HX XXX, itemque Hadrumetinis HS XXX, conventui eorum HS L multae nomine imponit.*


28 Caes., *B.Civ.* II.19.3. *simul ipse Cordubae conventus per se portas Varroni clausit, custodias vigiliasque in turribus muroque dispositi, cohortes duas, quae colonicae apellabantur, cum eo casu venissent, tuendi oppidi causa apud se retinuit.*

29 [Caesar], *B.Alex.* 57. *paucis ei diebus affertur conventum Cordubensem ab eo deficisse.*

30 [Caesar], *B.Alex.* 59. *neque se conventum neque M. Marcellum contra Caesaris causam posse perducere.*
This section has thus far been concerned mainly with the role of *conventus* during time of war. Clearly, the members of these bodies were wealthy enough to attract the interest of the antagonists of the civil war, and bore collective responsibility for their actions. Cicero, however, refers on numerous occasions to the *conventus* of Syracuse in the course of the *Verrines*. So, for example, we are told that members of the *conventus* could be called upon to serve as judges in “other matters”.\(^{31}\) Given that Cicero has just described the permutations of possible disputes involving Sicilians, these other matters presumably concern Romans alone. While the *conventus* mentioned in this particular context does not appear to have any judicial functions per se, its individual members were clearly competent to act as judges. This procedure for the selection of judges can be compared with that indicated in the first Cyrene Edict of 7-6 BC (reproduced in Anderson (1927)). In that instance, jurors are drawn from among those Romans in the province with a census rating of at least 2,500 denarii (ἐξ ὁσιοῦ ἐκίσειν ὁ ἱκτικαί).\(^{32}\) Given Cicero’s subsequent emphasis on the high standing of the members of the *conventus* at Syracuse, it is possible that membership in that body required at least a modest degree of wealth.

Cicero then points out that Verres preferred to appoint judges from among his own associates, rather than from the *conventus*, or even from among the *negotiatoribus*.\(^{33}\) Quite apart from Verres’ impropriety in contradicting pre-existing law and custom, it is interesting to note that Cicero seems to imply a separation between *negotiatoribus* and the *conventus*. This distinction may be connected with the temporary presence of the former, in comparison with the permanent presence of the latter, or it may imply a class

\(^{31}\) Cic., *Verr.* II.2.13.32. ...ceterarum rerum selecti iudices ex conventu civium Romanorum proponi solent.

\(^{32}\) See Anderson (1927) for the original text.

\(^{33}\) Cic., *Verr.* II.2.13.34 Selecti ex conventu aut propositi ex negotiatoribus iudices nulli...
difference. Given the composition of the *conventus* at Utica, i.e., individuals involved in a range of commerce, it hardly seems likely that the *conventus* at Syracuse was devoid of members engaged in commerce. Nonetheless, Cicero may have sought in this way to augment the standing of the *conventus* at Syracuse by emphasising the permanence and stature of its membership. Cicero repeats this pattern later when he argues that judges should have been appointed from the *conventus*, in order to inquire into the relationship between Apronius and Verres. Notably, in this instance, he emphasises the presence of *equites* as members of the *conventus*, thus explicitly heightening its standing.

Elsewhere, Cicero’s reasons for invoking the *conventus* revolve around using them as surrogate, citizen witnesses of Verres’ misdeeds. So, Cicero claims that any of its members could act as witnesses of Verres’ disposal of illegally seized silver. Shortly thereafter, Cicero describes a highly emotive appeal by the Syrian king Antiochus to the assembled Roman citizens of Syracuse, following Verres’ misappropriation of a highly ornate *candelabrum* which the king had intended to dedicate in Rome. While there is an emphasis on the idea of religious impropriety at the theft of the object, it is again the *conventus* which is called upon to act as witness of an act approaching sacrilege. The image which Cicero maintains of the *conventus* in

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34 As discussed in chapter 3.2, it is probable that many senators involved themselves in trade, but only on an indirect basis to avoid the social stigma attached to it. Cicero may have implied a separation between *negotiatores* and *conventus* in order to mirror the social biases of the senatorial jury, thus encouraging sympathy with the *conventus*.

35 Cic., Verr. II.3.59.136, *praeterea conventus honestus Syracusis, multi equites Romani, viri primarii, ex qua copia recuperatores reiici oporteret…*

36 Cicero’s emphasis on the presence of *equites* in Syracuse also reflects the contemporary political contest over the composition of juries for the *quaestio de repetundis*. Cicero claims that, if the senatorial jury fails to convict Verres, then legislation placing the juries is equestrian hands is likely to be passed. See Seager (1994), p. 225-226.

37 Cic., Verr. II.4.25.55. *Quem voles e conventu Syracusano virum bonum nominato; producam; nemo erit quin hoc se audisse aut vidisse dicit.*

38 Cic., Verr. II.4.29.67. *tamen tum se in illo conventu civium Romanorum dare donare dicare consecrare Iovi Optimo Maximo, testemque ipsum Iovem suae voluntatis ac religionis adhibere.*
Syracuse is that of an exceptional body of individuals, which acts as a stand-in in the context of his prosecution for the court itself. Although it suits Cicero’s purposes to exaggerate the standing of the community at Syracuse, there must have been some element of truth in his attitude toward it. The experiences of the *conventus* must have been sufficiently important to warrant consideration by the court, otherwise Cicero would have gained nothing by emphasising it.

**Judicial conventus**

Given the frequency with which Cicero describes the involvement of *conventus* in judicial matters in the provinces, it is necessary to consider what connection existed between the citizen *conventus* and the administration of justice. It is clear in both Caesar and Cicero that the administration of justice in specific provincial locations was among the responsibilities of a governor.\(^{39}\) At the end of several of his campaign seasons in Gaul, Caesar explicitly notes that he returned to Cisalpine Gaul for this purpose, using the phrase *ad conventus agendos* or similar.\(^{40}\) A variant of this same expression is also used by Cicero to describe the customary administration of justice by governors in particular towns in Sicily.\(^{41}\) Given this evidence, there is nothing particularly

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\(^{39}\) To be clear, the governor did not deal personally with all legal matters in his province; matters involving citizens of the same city were dealt with by local courts under local law (Cic., *Verr.* II.2.13.32). As outlined by Cicero, the governor was only called upon to deal with disputes involving more than one community, or those involving Roman citizens.

\(^{40}\) Caes., *B.Gal.* 1.54.3. …*ipse in citeriorem Galliam ad conventus agendos prefectus est.* See also 5.1.5, 5.2.1, 6.44, 7.1.1.

\(^{41}\) Cic., *Verr.* II.5.11.28. …*ex iis oppidis in quibus consistere praetores et conventum agere soleant...*
controversial about the notion that the term *conventus* was used to describe the courts operated by governors during the republic.\(^{42}\)

It is interesting to observe, however, that modern scholarship on *conventus* sometimes concentrates exclusively on the judicial meaning of the term. Consider, for example, the papers by Habicht on the judicial districts of Asia,\(^{43}\) and Burton on the assize tours of proconsular governors, which likewise draws heavily on evidence from Asia.\(^{44}\) The focus of both is on early imperial administration. Although they each draw on evidence from the republic, they are entirely concerned with *conventus* in the judicial sense. Of course, given that these papers are focussed on relatively specific administrative issues pertaining to a later period, this exclusion is hardly surprising. Conversely, van Andringa’s work on the *conventus* of imperial Gaul shows little interest in the judicial dimension of the term. He concentrates instead on the role of these entities in asserting citizen identity, and the relationship between them and their host cities.\(^{45}\) The New Pauly’s entry on *conventus* applies the term only to court districts, their principal cities, and the court assemblies themselves.\(^{46}\) This omission of alternate meanings is remarkable, given that the much more extensive article in the original Pauly-Wissowa provides detailed discussion of both the communal and judicial meanings of *conventus*.\(^{47}\)

Modern scholarship has thus tended to be bifurcated between the two different definitions of *conventus*, treating them in isolation. This is partly a reflection of the

\(^{42}\) These were not, however, permanent standing courts, but were established on an *ad hoc* basis by the governor. They may have been held in certain locations on a semi-regular basis, but this likely reflects precedent and the presence of a citizen population in those places.

\(^{43}\) Habicht (1975).

\(^{44}\) Burton (1975). See p. 92 regarding Burton’s focus on Asia.

\(^{45}\) Van Andringa (1998).

\(^{46}\) Strothmann (1996).

\(^{47}\) Kornemann (1900). Furthermore, both the *Oxford Latin Dictionary* and the *Oxford Classical Dictionary, 3rd ed.* describe the communal and judicial meanings of *conventus*. 

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subjects and periods on which individual scholars have concentrated, but also of the similar meanings of διοικήσεις and *conventus* when the latter refers to assize districts. I would suggest, however, that *conventus* had not yet taken on this particular, technical meaning by the end of the republic. Consequently, the administrative model employed for early imperial Asia (i.e., division into διοικήσεις) would not be applicable to the late republican west. Both literary and epigraphic evidence pertaining to διοικήσεις suggest that the term was distinguished from *conventus* during the Republican period. So, for example, Cicero describes how he travelled from Laodicea to Iconium, in order to meet the magistrates and legates of the dioceses. Elsewhere, he writes to the propraetor of Asia on behalf of L. Genucilius Curvus, asking that if the latter should be involved in a legal dispute with a Hellespontian, his case should be referred to the διοικήσεις of Parium. Cicero also mentions that three διοικήσεις were attached to his province of Cilicia. Whether transliterated or left in Greek, Cicero makes a deliberate decision not to equate διοικήσεις with *conventus*. Relevant to this discussion is an inscription from Priene, which reproduces a letter from a Roman magistrate to the people of Miletus, probably dating to 51-50 BC. While the precise matter which the letter sought to address has been lost, the extant portion orders a copy to be erected in the smaller centres of each of several Asian διοικήσεις. Furthermore, the author later states explicitly that he wrote in Greek, rather than Latin, in order to ensure that the

48 Cic., *ad Fam.* 3.8.4. quid enim erat, quod me perseverentur in castra Taurumve transirent, cum ego Laodicea usque ad Iconium iter ita fecerim, ut me omnium illarum dioecesium, quae eis Taurum sunt, omniumque earum civitatum magistratus legationesque convenirent?
49 Cic., *ad Fam.* 13.53.2. ...si quid habebit cum aliquo Hellespontio controversiae, ut in illam διοικήσειν reicias.
50 Cic., *ad Fam.* 13.67.1. ex provincia mea Ciliciensi, cui scis τρεὶς διοικήσεις Asiaticas adtributas fuisse...
51 Sherk, *RDGE* 52. This date is based on the appearance of Cicero’s name in the document, coupled with his governorship of Cilicia in that year. A date of 29-28 BC is also possible, see Habicht (1975), p. 69.
52 Lines 46-50. ...καὶ τὰ λεικὰ ἐντὸς τῆς τῇ διοικῆσει τῇ ἰδίᾳ πόλεις διαποτείλητο καὶ εἴς τῇ ἐπιφανεστάτῳ τοῖς ἐν στυλοπαραστάδι ἐπὶ λίθου λευκοῦ ἔνθαρσην, οὕτω τὰ γράμματα...
contents of his letter were interpreted correctly. Obviously, this does not prove that he was concerned specifically by a potential for confusion between διοίκησις and conventus. It is, however, clear that this magistrate was aware that linguistic differences had to be accounted for in administrative matters. In addition to these pieces of evidence, it should be noted that the term conventus was not applied to judicial districts until the Augustan period. Under these circumstances, it is not clear that conventus and διοίκησις synonymously referred to judicial districts in the republic.

What bearing does the linguistic history of conventus have on the development of those bodies in the west? I would suggest that the initial origin of the conventus was as a self-organised group of Roman citizens overseas. These entities persisted well into the imperial period, and even beyond the extension of citizenship to virtually all inhabitants of the empire. Cicero in particular makes it clear that, at least in Sicily in the 70s, judges were drawn from the conventus. Likewise, it is also clear that governors there were expected to administer justice in multiple locations. Under this model, the conventus developed locally, and their membership was subsequently drawn upon for judicial purposes. Once the term conventus was being applied to courts, whose judges were members of conventus, it is easy to see how the technical, judicial sense of the word could have evolved and become synonymous with διοίκησις.

This model is, however, only one among several for the evolution of the conventus, a subject which has long been debated. Mommsen, for example, believed that the phrase conventus civium Romanorum was simply a descriptive term for the citizens who inhabited judicial districts. This would suggest that judicial districts existed prior to citizen conventus. Mommsen’s views were, however, thoroughly

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55 Mommsen (1873), p. 319-320.
critiqued by Kornemann and Schulten, who made it clear that citizen *conventus* must have existed before the term was ever applied to judicial districts.\(^{56}\) This leaves open the question of whether the impetus for the formation of *conventus* came from citizen groups themselves, or from magistrates. Recent scholarship has tended to treat *conventus* as basically informal organisations, without formal legal status.\(^{57}\) A more nuanced position is taken by Purcell, who suggests that patronage by Roman magistrates led to the recognition of some of these groups as “formal collectivities under Roman law”.\(^{58}\) Certainly, the attitude of magistrates toward *conventus* suggests recognition of their usefulness for judicial and military purposes, though whether this has any implications for their formal status is unclear.\(^{59}\) Usage of the term *conventus* by Caesar and Cicero does not seem to imply that these bodies were necessarily constituted by any external authority. Indeed, *conventus* appears in the Caesarian *lex Ursonensis* alongside *coetum* and *coniurationem* as a class of banned gatherings.\(^{60}\) *Conventus* was thus being used in legal documents of the late republic in a non-technical sense. While the state of the evidence does not necessarily permit firm conclusions to be drawn about how citizen *conventus* were formed, I believe that the role of the citizens themselves was primary.

A number of other unanswered questions remain about the republican *conventus*. The nature and degree of their organisation, and their range of activities, are both unclear. They may have selected *curatores* in the same manner as later *conventus*.\(^{61}\) While it is likely that these organisations had officers of some description, no evidence

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\(^{56}\) Kornemann (1900), 1180; see also Hardy (1893), p. 277.


\(^{58}\) Purcell (2005), p. 94-95.

\(^{59}\) This could be interpreted as another manifestation of Richardson’s peripheral imperialism. The willingness of magistrates to use the *conventus* in various ways would thus reflect expediency rather than deliberate planning.

\(^{60}\) Crawford (1996), p. 410, 429, 446.

demonstrates that this was the case. Likewise, they may have been loci for cult practices specific to citizens, yet evidence for such differences does not appear until the Augustan period. Given the involvement of some of their members in commerce, it is possible that they functioned as a trade association for citizens, but they need not have been limited to this role. Our knowledge of republican conventus is a function of the interactions between them and Roman magistrates. For the latter, conventus were important in the administration of justice, and as potential sources of support in wartime. The conventus was a means by which diaspora communities could articulate their identity, and the available evidence establishes the reaction of magistrates to them.

7.3 – Social Relations with Rome and Across the Diaspora

By the end of the republic, many individual communities within the diaspora possessed distinct and recognisable identities as conventus civium Romanorum. While it is difficult to ascertain whether the stimulus for this organisation was internal or external, and while the possibility of some formal, legal recognition cannot be excluded, these communities were becoming increasingly prominent in accounts of the actions of magistrates overseas. Details of this rise to prominence are sadly lacking, not least because of the paucity of literary evidence contemporary with the last third of the second century. While the republican empire described in Livy and Polybius did not exclude Romans overseas, the role of these communities in their narratives is limited. This can be compared with the prominent roles ascribed by Caesar to the conventus of

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63 Dio, L.I.20.6-7. Augustus stipulated that Romans resident in Asia should establish temples to Rome and Divus Julius, whereas non-citizens could establish temples to himself. Conventus in 1st century AD Gaul are also known to have organised religious activities for citizens residing in Gallic communities (Woolf (1998), p. 222).
Corduba and Utica during the civil wars, or Cicero’s repeated emphasis on the importance of the Roman citizens in Syracuse. Sallust too hints at the importance of citizen bodies in Africa during the Jugurthine War. No doubt the size of the citizen community at Cirta was exaggerated to heighten the impact of the massacre there, but there can be no doubt about its presence, or that their deaths helped to justify Rome’s military action. Furthermore, the fact that Marius directed complaints about Metellus to citizens in Utica – despite the impropriety involved – implies that the community there had at least some political importance. Despite the difficulties involved in tracing their development, it appears that the communities of the diaspora were playing a significant role in the republican empire, perhaps as early as the Jugurthine War, and certainly by the 70’s. Given the apparent importance of the diaspora communities, it will be useful to characterise the relationships between them and Rome, as well as the relationships among those in the diaspora itself.

The relationship between Rome and the communities of the diaspora can be considered from both an economic and a political perspective. Economically, the diaspora was connected to Rome in several ways. Most obviously, as the largest population centre in the western Mediterranean, Rome must have been the destination for the largest fraction of the goods in which members of the diaspora traded. Consider, for example, the trade in grain. Some in the diaspora would have held public contracts for the transportation of grain from the provinces (especially Sicily) to Rome, as well as to the armies in certain instances. The holders of these contracts, as well as their agents, had a clear connection with the state. Even in the case of privately traded grain,

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64 Interestingly, Sallust never employs the term *conventus* to describe groups of citizens in peregrine cities, though he does apply it in the general sense of a meeting or assembly. While might reflect the absence of *conventus* in North Africa in the last decade of the second century, it could as easily be a peculiarity of Sallust’s own usage.

65 Sall., *Iug.* 64.
however, Rome was the most likely profitable market. Moreover, after the destruction of Carthage in 146, the size of Rome relative to any other centre meant that it could act as a centre for redistribution. The development and increasing elaboration of the harbour and warehouse infrastructure at Rome, Ostia, and Puteoli, are a testament to the centrality of Rome in western economic networks. If goods were already being brought to Rome, they could also be shipped from there, as and when needs for those goods existed elsewhere. Rome’s position in the hierarchy of urban centres with access to the sea was not the only thing that tied the diaspora to the city. The economic model described in Chapter Three itself required close connections between individuals in Italy and in the provinces. Simply put, this model suggests that wealthy Romans avoided the stigma of direct involvement in trade, by using agents in order to undertake commercial activities on their behalf. At least some individuals in the diaspora thus relied, in whole or in part, on the finances of individuals in Rome in order to engage in trade. The size of Rome relative to any other centre, combined with the financial resources available to its wealthiest citizens in the wake of its conquests, meant that traders in the diaspora were likely to be closely connected to it.

Diaspora communities were also connected to Rome politically and militarily. This is not to suggest that the relationship between those communities and Rome had necessarily been given a legal foundation. Granted, there were a few overseas communities whose establishment was sanctioned by the senate, such as Carteia or Narbo Martius. Likewise, there are instances of magistrates founding settlements without prior sanction from Rome, from Italica to Lugdunum Convenarum. There is no evidence to suggest, however, that republican magistrates concerned themselves with

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establishing a legal foundation for most of the various communities of the diaspora. Nonetheless, members of the diaspora could look to magistrates for protection, and for patronage and favours. While Cicero was governor of Cilicia, he was approached by one M. Scaptius who, acting on behalf of Brutus, sought assistance in settling a debt owed by the Cyprian city of Salamis.⁶⁷ Scaptius’ initial request for military assistance was declined by Cicero, though we are told that Cicero’s predecessor, Appius, had acquiesced to a similar petition. Even Cicero, despite his scruples about placing troops under Scaptius’ command, was willing to threaten the Salaminians with compulsion.⁶⁸ Ultimately, Cicero agreed to leave the matter unresolved at Scaptius’ behest, despite explicitly calling the request impudens, and despite the heavier financial burden this would impose on Salamis. While the issue at stake for Cicero was his friendship with Brutus, this example highlights some of the benefits that a magistrate could confer on an individual in the provinces. Little wonder, then, that Roman patrons commended their clients to provincial magistrates. Cicero’s letter on behalf of L. Genucius Curvus, seeking a favourable venue for the latter in the event of a legal dispute, is just one example of the practice.⁶⁹

The dynamics of patronage did not always involve citizens overseas entreating magistrates for favours. By the end of the republic, there are instances of magistrates themselves seeking to gain material support from the diaspora. This was particularly true in the period of the civil wars, as demonstrated by Cato’s formation of a ‘senate’ in Utica and by the recruitment of soldiers from among citizens in Iberia. Even in peacetime, though, the diaspora communities could be politically useful. Thus, Cicero frequently refers to the Roman citizens of Sicily, no doubt in part because the jury was

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⁶⁷ Cic., Att. 5.21.10-13.
⁶⁸ ...dixi denique me coacturum.
⁶⁹ See previously, p. 224.
inclined to treat Verres’ alleged misdeeds against citizens more seriously. Simultaneously, however, Cicero’s prosecution of Verres was an act of patronage on behalf of those citizens. Roman citizens in the provinces were embedded participants in a complex patronage network centered on Rome. In this capacity, they acted in ways that were neither wholly private nor public,\(^70\) playing an integral role in the republican empire.

The recognition of some close political and economic connections between Rome and the diaspora does not imply that this relationship was the only one of importance to communities overseas. The available literary evidence, after all, reflects the concerns of an elite centered in Rome; that evidence refers to citizens overseas primarily when that elite had occasion to deal with them. It is thus potentially misleading to concentrate entirely on the relationship between Rome and the diaspora, as if relationships between diaspora communities were inconsequential. Though the relationship with Rome may have been particularly important, republican imperialism was not characterised by a total concentration of commerce and politics in the city. Though difficult to trace, there must have been relationships between the diaspora communities of individual provinces and regions, as well as between adjacent regions. Thus, while the economic model proposed in Chapter Three acknowledges the commercial centrality of Rome, it also takes into account the persistence of independent coastal trade. Instead of a system defined only by a series of individual relationships with Rome, like so many spokes connecting to a single hub, the communities of the diaspora would also have had a network of bilateral relationships with each other.\(^71\)


\(^{71}\) See Curtin (1984), p. 7-8, on the variety of models for the organisation of trade diasporas.
Doubtless the connections with Rome were the strongest, given the unique economic and political situation of the city, but these were not exclusive.

7.4 – Conclusion

An alternate method for evaluating the role of overseas migrants in the republican empire is to speculate about the properties that empire might have had if the diaspora were absent, or much reduced in population. Under such conditions, a much greater fraction of private trade in the Mediterranean would necessarily have been undertaken by non-Romans, perhaps Greeks. This would diminish the indirect\(^\text{72}\) economic benefits that accrued to individuals as a result of Rome’s increasing political dominance, but is not a wholly implausible scenario. By contrast, the situation with respect to public contracts would have been more complicated. Given that such contracts had to be held by citizens, the absence of citizens overseas would pose an obvious problem. Public contracts might have covered a much more limited range of activities, in which case an alternate administrative model would be required. One option would be to employ a much larger bureaucracy, though it is difficult to see how this would have developed in the republic. Another option would be to give indigenous people a much more prominent role in the administration of public affairs in the provinces. Mines, for instance, could have been operated by indigenous peoples, remitting a portion of their production to the state. Tax collection could have been undertaken by individual indigenous communities, or some such communities could have been given a privileged position and collected taxes from others. The inherent

\(^{72}\) Indirect, in contrast to the direct benefit of appropriating the resources of subordinated peoples.
difficulty in this scenario lies in the even more prominent role it gives to individuals overseas whose connection with Rome was purely one of self-interest. The absence of a diaspora corresponds not only with the loss of agents overseas, but a lack of individuals who were tied into networks of patronage centered on Rome. An informal but vital complement to the minimalist formal administration of the provinces would be lost, weakening Roman political control.\textsuperscript{73} The counter-historical republican empire imagined here is more loosely integrated with Rome, and perhaps less politically stable. Even if the diaspora was not quite a \textit{sine qua non} of the republican empire, its presence was of tremendous importance in defining how that empire functioned.

By the end of the republic communities of Romans overseas, united by their common citizenship and by their role in economic and political networks centered on Rome, were ubiquitous. They often possessed a degree of organisation as \textit{conventus}, even if the precise way in which those bodies emerged is unclear. They co-operated with Roman magistrates in the administration of legal matters pertaining to citizens. By the period of the civil wars, the diaspora and its resources were sufficient to attract the attention of the antagonists. Not only were they prominent and organised, they were an integral factor affecting the evolutionary path which the republican empire followed.

\textsuperscript{73} See Braund (1989), p. 142.
Conclusion

In this work, I have characterised the Roman republican diaspora in the west on a thematic basis, subdividing my discussion of it according to the activities which prompted migration. I was motivated to undertake this discussion on the grounds that the diaspora in the west has received relatively little attention in modern scholarship. Even when the diaspora has been considered, it has been in the context of debates on other subjects, most obviously those on Italian demography. Though there are some exceptions to this pattern (e.g., Purcell (2005)), the fact remains that a monograph length account which focuses on these overseas communities does not yet exist. In my view, the absence of such an account is particularly striking, given that the diaspora was the major point of contact between Romans and indigenous peoples, and thus an important feature of how Roman imperialism operated on an everyday basis.

Traditional perspectives on Roman imperialism have often concentrated on the role of the senate, magistrates, and armies, as the defining features of Roman activity outside Italy. So, for example, Harris examined how the conduct of politics in Rome encouraged military activity overseas, while Richardson discussed in detail the military and administrative actions of Roman magistrates in Spain. Conversely, studies concentrating on trade have exploited archaeological evidence and focussed on the conditions of consumption of goods from Italy by indigenous peoples. No doubt this has been conditioned by the increasing availability of suitable evidence, and by a post-colonial approach which sought to emphasise the agency of local populations. Italian migrants fall into a gap between these approaches, on the one hand being much less visible than magistrates and armies, yet still closely associated with the imperial power.
To be fair, studies of migration from Italy to the east have had a long history in scholarship, going back at least as far as Hatzfeld nearly a century ago. For the most part, however, these studies have tended to rely on the relatively abundant epigraphic evidence available from that region, most obviously at Delos. The situation in the west has not received similar attention. Furthermore, as I have suggested previously, it is only urbanised areas of the west such as Sicily that are likely to have been comparable to those areas of the regions of the east that have been examined.

I have sought to demonstrate that it is possible to characterise the diaspora in the west on the basis of the available evidence. A major step in this process was to assess the size of the migrant population, and its geographical distribution. As discussed at several points, Brunt’s low assessment of the diaspora’s population contributed to a disregard for the subject in subsequent scholarship. In chapter six, I determined, within a broad degree of tolerance, a population figure for the diaspora in the west of 170,000 adult male citizens by the end of the republic. By comparison, Brunt’s figure for the entire Mediterranean basin was 150,000. Assuming the overall scales of eastward and westward migration were comparable, my estimate is roughly double Brunt’s. Nonetheless, this is a much lower migrant population than would be implied by Crawford’s suggestion that half of Roman citizens were overseas by as early as 90 BC. Despite proposing a migrant population twice that calculated by Brunt, my estimate remains closer to his than to Crawford’s. My work has thus sought to correct the consequences of Brunt’s minimal estimate, while not taking the opportunity to radically inflate the figure which he calculated.

What are the implications of this revised estimate of the migrant population? The most obvious impact is going to be on our impression of the migrant communities
themselves. The figures I have proposed suggest that the diaspora was numerically significant in the coastal centres where they were likely concentrated, as well as in certain inland locations such as the mining districts of Spain. It admits the possibility of some Italian migration to rural areas, but implies that the scale of such migration could not have been very great. This is simply the logical outcome of my approach, which looked at the probable population of migrants in a given context, as opposed to Brunt’s, which insisted on direct evidence for their presence. Cleaving closer to Brunt’s figure than Crawford’s, however, has interesting ramifications for discussions of Italian demography. A high migrant population would imply a high rate of reproduction in Italy, and could thus indirectly support the high-population count advocated by Lo Cascio. My more limited estimate removes such support. Indeed, my argument has some parallels with the modified low-count of Italian population supported by, for instance, de Ligt: both involve a moderate upward estimate of conventional population figures, but fall well short of accepting radically higher suggestions. High estimates of the migrant population would necessarily impact our interpretation of events during the civil wars, and into the Principate. If a very high proportion of Roman citizens were overseas during the civil wars, the antagonists would presumably have had access to much larger resources than has been assumed. Furthermore, one would have to consider the subsequent settlement of veterans in the provinces a relatively minor phenomenon in quantitative terms. The impact of Augustus’ reorganisation of provincial administration might also need to be reconsidered, if his efforts affected a much large number of citizens. My comparatively moderate population estimate renders these issues moot, but I raise them in order to emphasise the broader ramifications of alternate counts of the diaspora.
The reappraisal of estimates for the scale of migration from republican Italy is, however, only one component of what I sought to achieve. Beyond the demography of the diaspora, I have established some characteristics of its distribution, activities, and organisation. Involvement with the military, whether as soldiers or among the various categories of individuals who accompanied the armies, was one of the drivers of migration. As I have shown, even if only a small percentage of all the soldiers who served overseas remained there, their numbers would have been a significant contribution to the population of the diaspora. Furthermore, I have highlighted the activities of generals overseas, who founded and reorganised multiple settlements, without apparent reference to Rome. Some of these places definitely contained populations of former soldiers, and the presence of such individuals in other communities can be surmised. The involvement of generals in provincial settlement by former soldiers was, of course, a common feature during the civil wars, and into the Principate. The role of earlier magistrates in founding settlements such as Italica and Gracchuris are examples, though on a more limited scale, of the same behaviour.

The other major driver of migration was economic activity. A significant fraction of the migrant population consisted of a merchant diaspora located in major coastal centres. Not only did this component occupy an advantageous position in relation to the biggest market in the Mediterranean, but many of its individuals are likely to have had financial connections with wealthy and/or politically active individuals in Italy. Indeed, I employed a general model for trade in the late republic which emphasised the role of agents, acting in whole or in part on behalf of wealthy backers. This implies that a section of the diaspora, far from being negligible, was closely bound to the interests of the political class in Rome. My subsequent examination
of specific economic activities allowed conclusions to be drawn about the migrants who
participated in them. Thus, consideration of the grain trade highlighted the intersection
between its private and public components. The redirection of public grain to Rome,
combined with the elimination of major alternate centres of trade, facilitated the private
trade through the city. I traced the trade in wine, giving particular attention to the
intense traffic between Italy and Gaul in the last quarter of the second century. While
the diaspora was likely concentrated in coastal centres, the scale of the wine trade to
inland locations (e.g., along the Aude and Rhone) suggests the presence, at least on a
transitory basis, of migrants in these places. I examined the organisation of provincial
mines, most notably those in Iberia. A diversity of administrative arrangements is likely
to have existed, reflecting both local geological conditions and the period in which
mines were first organised. Rather than being operated by a small number of societates,
I suggested that contracts to operate mines in a given area could have been held by
numerous individuals or small partnerships. Furthermore, based on comparison with the
operation of mines in a later period, the mining districts are likely to have attracted a
large number of individuals who took on a variety of supporting roles in those areas.
The mining districts may thus have attracted a larger number of migrants than would be
suggested by a traditional model, which emphasised the exploitation of vast numbers of
slaves by a limited number of monolithic business interests.

Having examined the diaspora in terms of the activities which its members
undertook, I turned my attention to the social conditions of the diaspora. Firstly, I
investigated the development of conventus civium Romanorum in the last decades of the
republic, both as an indication of organisation in the diaspora, and in connection with
the administration of justice. Although the details of their early development are
obscure, I suggested that the initiative for the development of *conventus* lay with migrants themselves. Given the presence of these organisations, provincial magistrates naturally used them and their members in the administration of justice. Indeed, Cicero’s presentation of events in the *Verrines* shows how a failure to collaborate with the *conventus* on judicial matters was a sign of a bad governor. Conversely, the successful prosecutor presents the *coventus* as a surrogate audience and witness of Verres’ misdeeds. Following from this, I considered the nature of the political and economic networks which bound the diaspora together and to Rome. I proposed that there was a particularly strong relationship between diaspora communities and Rome, but that this was not exclusive, and that there was also a network of bilateral relationships among those communities.

Such scholarly attention as the Italian republican diaspora has received has tended to be in the context of other research questions, with the result that few comprehensive conclusions have been drawn about the characteristics of the diaspora. Frequently, the diaspora is ambiguously portrayed as an ill-defined collection of traders and businessmen who happened to be located overseas. Cicero’s presentation of the diaspora in his forensic speeches has been particularly influential in this regard. Thus, in the *Verrines*, it is the *negotiatores* of the *conventus* of Syracuse who are frequently called upon as the witnesses of Verres’ activities. In this context, however, Cicero has a particular interest in evoking the sympathies of a senatorial jury. Thus, he focuses on the very group of migrants with whom senators in Rome are most likely to have had dealings, and presents those migrants in the most positive possible light. Cicero’s concentration on this class of individuals is reflected in modern scholarship, but as I have shown in my examination of their activities, the diaspora encompassed a much
broader range of individuals. On the military side, former soldiers were among those in the diaspora, while the armies attracted a variety of other individuals ranging from camp followers to military suppliers. Whether they settled in existing indigenous communities, or in centres reorganised by the generals themselves, these individuals usually fall beneath the notice of our sources. Likewise, the categories of economic activity which I examined suggest the involvement of a larger group of individuals than just a handful of comparatively wealthy negotiatores. The Ciceronian portrayal of migrant communities thus represents only the affluent apex of the diaspora.

There is a clear diversity within the diaspora in terms of material prosperity, but there must also have been a corresponding diversity of social circumstances. This ranged from ex-soldiers living in indigenous communities or in mixed settlements established by their generals, to small groups of traders operating in peregrine towns at the limits of Roman trade networks, all the way to the large, organised, and prominent migrant communities which existed in many coastal towns. Obviously, the experience of individuals in rural Spain or Gaul would have been radically different to that of the members of large diaspora communities embedded in pre-existing Greek or Punic cities. Whatever their particular circumstances, the members of the diaspora were united by their common origin, and by the maintenance of their privileged connection with Italy. As agents of wealthy individuals in Rome, some members of the diaspora had direct connections to members of the political elite. These members of the diaspora would in turn have had personal and/or business links with other, less well connected migrants. In short, the diaspora did not consist simply of a handful of individual businessmen in the provinces. It was a diverse and complex network of individuals which was a unifying feature of the various regions of the western Mediterranean. The story of republican
imperialism in the west is not simply one of extending political control through military
action. Alongside the actions of generals and armies, the Italian diaspora created a
network of personal connections which determined how the republican empire itself
operated on an everyday basis.

This work has examined the Roman diaspora in the republican west in detail,
and from this basis multiple avenues for future research are possible. While the diaspora
in the diaspora in the eastern Mediterranean has been given more consideration than that
in the west, much of that attention has concentrated on epigraphically visible
communities such as that on Delos. A broader examination of the activities of the
diaspora in the east could allow for meaningful comparison between it and the migrant
communities of the west. I have suggested that the diaspora had different characteristics
depending on the degree of urbanisation in a given region. In that case, the diaspora in
the east might have shown greater similarity with that in, for instance, North Africa than
that in Iberia or Gaul. One could also examine the role of the diaspora during the
Augustan period and beyond. The settlement of veterans overseas changed the
composition of the diaspora, while developments in provincial administration entailed a
reorganisation of the overseas population and its relationships with Rome. The first
evidence for diaspora communities as loci for collective cult activities is also
contemporary with Augustus. Given the prominence of the diaspora by the late republic,
we might expect that it was not a passive party to these changes, but an active
participant. Relationships between the diaspora and indigenous populations likewise
deserve consideration. These interactions would have been a major determinant of the
living conditions experienced by the diaspora. More important, however, are the
cumulative effects of these relationships, the cultural changes and accommodations
which they occasioned for each party, and the provincial societies that developed as a consequence.

To some extent, this thesis has sought to describe people whose social status normally rendered them below the notice of our sources. Discussions of former soldiers (and even deserters), camp followers, and small-scale traders, fall into this category. Even when discussion has turned to individuals of a somewhat higher status, such as agents acting behalf of individuals in Rome, they remain relatively obscure. Nonetheless, by the end of the republic a large number of Roman citizens were dwelling in the provinces. This was a diaspora that Rome’s magistrates did not disregard, and perhaps could not afford to. Indeed, members of the diaspora were active participants in events during the civil wars. This fact alone suggests an importance which extended beyond mere numbers, something which is only to be expected given that citizens in the diaspora had a unique connection with the dominant power in the Mediterranean. Given the diversity in the diaspora which I have highlighted, there must have been corresponding regional variations. Traders would have been attracted in greater numbers to existing coastal centres. No doubt Iberia had a relatively greater population of former soldiers and their descendants, given the scale of Roman military activity there. Whatever the differences, the diaspora was united not only by a common citizenship, but by a common advantage conferred by that citizenship. The people of the diaspora were, to a significant extent, one face of Roman republican imperialism, and their experiences are a defining feature of that empire.
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